a11oy / docs /WARHACKER_UDS_PROOF_POINT.md
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Warhacker UDS proof point

This is the Defense-Unicorns-facing shape for the A11oy demo. It connects the existing governed-execution substrate to UDS/Zarf without implying endorsement, catalog acceptance, or partnership.

Objective

Show a running, inspectable proof point for trusted AI/agent orchestration in a UDS-style operator workflow:

  • payload artifacts are content-addressed;
  • operator actions emit verifiable receipts;
  • package metadata can be inspected before deploy;
  • public claims route back to GitHub evidence.

Option A — three-week proof point

Week Deliverable Evidence
1 Build/verify A11oy UDS payload from source artifacts/a11oy-uds/scripts/build.sh, deploy/MANIFEST.json
2 Receipt-chain demo with tamper failure packages/receipt-substrate, npm test --prefix packages/receipt-substrate
3 Operator walkthrough packet Hugging Face mirror + GitHub release/check links + short demo video

Demo script

# 1. Validate runtime receipt primitives.
npm test --prefix packages/receipt-substrate
npm run smoke --prefix packages/receipt-substrate

# 2. Validate doctrine package lane.
pnpm test:doctrine
pnpm typecheck:doctrine
pnpm build:doctrine

# 3. Validate deploy payload integrity.
pnpm payload:verify

# 4. Generate the public diligence mirror.
pnpm payload:huggingface

# 5. Build and verify the operational review tarball.
pnpm payload:bundle
pnpm payload:bundle:verify

UDS/Zarf inspection lane

Where Zarf is available, the proof point should add:

zarf package inspect a11oy-uds-<version>.tar.zst
zarf package deploy a11oy-uds-<version>.tar.zst --confirm

Where Zarf is not available, use the documented source fallback only as a CI/dev verification mode. The fallback tarball is not a deployable Zarf package and must not be presented as one.

Tamper test

  1. Unpack a generated payload.
  2. Modify any file listed in MANIFEST.json.
  3. Re-run manifest verification.
  4. Show the verifier failing on the changed SHA-256.

That failure is the point: the operator can trust the package because mutation breaks the manifest trail.

What to say

Use:

  • “UDS/Zarf-compatible proof point.”
  • “Operator handoff with manifest and attestation verification.”
  • “A11oy is the governed-execution fabric; UDS is the delivery/control-plane context we are integrating with.”

Avoid:

  • “Defense Unicorns endorsed.”
  • “Accepted into the UDS catalog.”
  • “Deploys to every UDS environment.”
  • “All formal proof work is green.”

Evidence bundle checklist

  • GitHub branch/PR URL.
  • A11oy release URL.
  • UDS release URL (uds-v0.2.0 or newer).
  • Workflow run URLs for Doctrine Build, Operational Validation, SBOM, CodeQL.
  • MANIFEST.json and attestation excerpts.
  • Receipt JSONL sample and verifier output.
  • Hugging Face mirror URL.