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pathway_id
stringclasses
10 values
case_id
stringclasses
10 values
case_title
stringclasses
10 values
country
stringclasses
4 values
election_date
date32
record_type
stringclasses
5 values
case_status
stringclasses
2 values
manipulation_assessment
stringclasses
4 values
generative_ai_status
stringclasses
2 values
ai_role
stringclasses
3 values
system_or_model
stringclasses
10 values
controller
stringclasses
10 values
influence_vector
stringclasses
10 values
target
stringclasses
9 values
agency_dimension
stringclasses
10 values
capability_status
stringclasses
2 values
control_mechanism_status
stringclasses
2 values
attempted_transfer_status
stringclasses
3 values
agency_change_status
stringclasses
2 values
agency_preservation_status
stringclasses
2 values
maximum_conclusion
stringclasses
4 values
hypothesized_power_recipient
stringclasses
9 values
reach_summary
stringclasses
9 values
behavioural_effect
stringclasses
1 value
electoral_effect
stringclasses
1 value
case_evidence_summary
stringclasses
2 values
main_uncertainty
stringclasses
10 values
last_verified
date32
ata-ro24
ro-2024-presidential-annulment
Romania 2024 presidential election: coordinated digital campaign and annulment
Romania
2024-11-24
election_wide_case
retrospective
mixed_documented_manipulation
not_established
material_amplification
TikTok: recommender and integrity systems
mixed and partly unresolved campaign networks; platform recommender systems; alleged foreign-linked actors
short-form video recommendations, coordinated accounts, undeclared promotion, cyber and information operations
Romanian voters
voter_attention_and_electoral_choice
observed
observed
insufficient_evidence
not_observed
not_observed
control_mechanism_observed
campaign-network operators and platform ranking systems
25,000 accounts; officially_reported; unknown; final_two_weeks_before_2024_first_round
unknown
unknown
occurrence_supported_agency_effect_not_established
Who financed and directed each network component? What organic versus coordinated reach occurred? Did any exposure change voting behaviour? What will the DSA proceeding finally establish?
2026-08-11
ata-ro25
ro-2025-presidential-repeat
Romania 2025 repeat presidential election and cross-platform synthetic-persona network
Romania
2025-05-04
observed_network
retrospective
manipulation_confirmed
confirmed
mixed
unknown: DreamFace- or D-ID-style avatars and synthetic profiles
unknown cross-platform network operator; platform distribution systems; responding election authorities
coordinated and hijacked accounts, synthetic personas, AI avatars, false local-news identity, cross-platform hashtags, and institutional decisions
Romanian voters
authorship_attention_and_local_identity
observed
observed
insufficient_evidence
not_observed
not_observed
control_mechanism_observed
unidentified network operator and platform distribution systems
215 accounts; researcher_measured; not_applicable; 2024-12_to_2025-06-06 | 8,514 posts; researcher_measured; not_applicable; 2024-12_to_2025-06-06
unknown
unknown
occurrence_supported_agency_effect_not_established
Who operated and financed the network? How much reach was authentic and in-country? Which safeguards measurably reduced manipulation? How did the annulment itself affect trust and participation?
2026-08-11
ata-md24
md-2024-presidential-referendum
Moldova 2024 presidential election and EU referendum: hybrid interference network
Moldova
2024-10-20
election_wide_case
retrospective
mixed_documented_manipulation
confirmed
mixed
unknown: synthetic impersonation tools
Ilan Shor-linked network and alleged Russian sponsors; coordinated account operators; platforms
payments, messaging apps, spoofed media, bots, coordinated accounts, synthetic video
Moldovan voters, including linguistic minorities and diaspora
preference_participation_and_trust
observed
observed
observed
not_observed
not_observed
attempted_transfer_observed
foreign-linked political-finance and influence networks
4,200 followers; platform_reported; unknown; at_takedown_2024-10-11 | 335,000 followers; platform_reported; unknown; at_takedown_2024-10-11
unknown
unknown
occurrence_supported_agency_effect_not_established
How many recipients acted on payments? Which synthetic pieces achieved material exposure? What portion of the network was centrally directed? What vote effect, if any, occurred?
2026-08-11
ata-md25
md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network
Moldova 2025 parliamentary election: continuation of hybrid influence infrastructure
Moldova
2025-09-28
observed_network
retrospective
manipulation_confirmed
confirmed
mixed
unknown: AI videos, bots and platform recommendation systems
foreign-funded political and influence networks
social platforms, messaging apps, illicit finance, synthetic and spoofed media
Moldovan voters
authorship_agenda_and_peer_signal
observed
observed
insufficient_evidence
not_observed
not_observed
control_mechanism_observed
network curators and financiers
253 accounts; researcher_measured; not_applicable; study_window | 28,708 posts; researcher_measured; not_applicable; study_window
unknown
unknown
occurrence_supported_agency_effect_not_established
Which 2024 network components persisted, which were newly created, and which shared command? What was authentic in-country exposure? Which interventions worked?
2026-08-11
ata-nh
us-nh-2024-biden-robocall
New Hampshire 2024 AI-cloned Biden robocall
United States
2024-01-23
observed_incident
retrospective
manipulation_confirmed
confirmed
core_generation
ElevenLabs: AI voice-cloning service
Steve Kramer and telecom distribution providers
AI voice cloning, caller-ID spoofing, mass robocalls
New Hampshire Democratic primary voters
authorship_relevance_and_participation_instruction
observed
observed
observed
not_observed
not_observed
attempted_transfer_observed
political operator and telecom distribution chain
9,581 call_attempts; provider_records_in_enforcement; unknown; campaign_window | 3,978 completed_calls; provider_records_in_enforcement; unknown; campaign_window
unknown
unknown
occurrence_supported_agency_effect_not_established
How many recipients listened, believed, or acted on the call? How should liability be allocated across creator, intermediary, and originating provider?
2026-08-11
ata-brprep
br-2026-election-preparedness
Brazil 2026 general election: AI governance and integrity preparedness
Brazil
2026-10-04
preparedness_file
ongoing
preparedness_not_incident
confirmed
mixed
unknown_or_multiple: generative AI, recommender and disclosure-compliance systems
campaigns, AI providers, platforms, election authorities, and unidentified influence actors
synthetic media, recommender outputs, political advertising, bots, voice cloning, platform distribution
Brazilian voters
future_information_and_platform_governance
not_assessed
not_observed
not_applicable
not_applicable
not_applicable
not_an_incident
not_applicable
No typed population-reach estimate
unknown
unknown
governance_context_not_incident
Will providers comply in practice? How quickly will labelled and unlabelled content be detected and adjudicated? Will rules apply consistently across closed messaging and AI assistants?
2026-08-11
ata-bravatar
br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar
Brazil 2026 Bolsonaro AI avatar at Flávio Bolsonaro campaign launch
Brazil
2026-10-04
observed_incident
ongoing
transparent_contested_use
confirmed
core_generation
unknown: synthetic image-and-voice avatar system
Flávio Bolsonaro campaign or allied producer; authorisation by Jair Bolsonaro unresolved
disclosed synthetic image and voice presented as an endorsement
Brazilian voters and campaign attendees
political_representation_and_audience_interpretation
observed
observed
insufficient_evidence
not_observed
not_observed
insufficient_evidence
campaign producer controlling the synthetic representation
No typed population-reach estimate
unknown
unknown
occurrence_supported_agency_effect_not_established
Who authorised and scripted the avatar? Does a labelled clone circumvent communication restrictions? How will TSE distinguish transparent simulation from manipulative synthetic representation?
2026-08-11
ata-usprep
us-2026-midterms-preparedness
United States 2026 midterm election: fragmented AI governance and preparedness
United States
2026-11-03
preparedness_file
ongoing
preparedness_not_incident
confirmed
mixed
unknown_or_multiple: generative AI, synthetic-media, platform and telecom systems
campaigns, political committees, foreign influence actors, platforms, telecom and AI providers
synthetic ads, voice and video impersonation, recommender distribution, robocalls, coordinated influence
United States voters
future_information_and_election_trust
not_assessed
not_observed
not_applicable
not_applicable
not_applicable
not_an_incident
not_applicable
31 states_with_enacted_political_deepfake_laws; legislative_tracker_count; not_applicable; snapshot_2026-06-23
unknown
unknown
governance_context_not_incident
How will state rules apply across jurisdictions? Will disclosures be salient? Which foreign or domestic networks will achieve measurable reach? Can authentic communications remain verifiable?
2026-08-11
ata-usads
us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads
United States 2026 campaign-produced synthetic candidate ads
United States
2026-11-03
observed_campaign_set
ongoing
mixed_documented_manipulation
confirmed
core_generation
unknown: campaign video-generation and face/voice synthesis tools
National Republican Senatorial Committee and individual campaigns; additional actors may be added
AI-generated political video distributed as campaign advertising and social content
voters in contested federal and state races
candidate_voice_face_and_affect
observed
observed
insufficient_evidence
not_observed
not_observed
control_mechanism_observed
campaign sponsors producing and distributing synthetic representations
3 synthetic_ads_identified_in_reporting; independent_reporting_content_count; not_applicable; reporting_through_2026-03-28
unknown
unknown
occurrence_supported_agency_effect_not_established
Were disclosures noticed? What impressions and targeting occurred? Do viewers distinguish quotation from fabricated audiovisual evidence? What legal rules apply in each state?
2026-08-11
ata-usca11
us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot
California 11th District: campaign-controlled Connie Chan parody chatbot
United States
2026-11-03
observed_incident
ongoing
transparent_contested_use
confirmed
core_generation
Anthropic: Claude | Amazon Web Services|Google: hosting and analytics stack
Scott Wiener for Congress campaign; technical constructor unidentified
interactive first-person opponent simulation, campaign-selected issue framing, web interface, billboards, and earned media
California 11th District voters and politically interested web visitors; Connie Chan as represented person
representation_agenda_query_privacy_and_candidate_evaluation
observed
observed
insufficient_evidence
not_observed
not_observed
insufficient_evidence
campaign deployer; secondarily model and infrastructure providers
5,058 submitted_questions; campaign_reported; unknown; first_27_hours | 2 billboards; campaign_reported; not_applicable; August_2026
unknown
unknown
occurrence_supported_agency_effect_not_established
Which Claude version and deployment route were used? Who built the system? What sources, system prompt, retrieval method, and guardrails controlled answers? How many unique people interacted, from where, and with what effects?
2026-08-12

AI, Elections and Agency Transfer Evidence Index

Version 0.4.0 · released 15 August 2026 · research cutoff 12 August 2026

Viewer hotfix on main, 15 August 2026: Data Studio now exposes one orientation view. The frozen v0.4.0 tag, its 26 tables, ZIP, workbook and checksums are unchanged.

This is a purposive, exploratory evidence index. It makes claims, sources, counterevidence, uncertainty, mechanisms, and selected measurements easier to inspect. It does not empirically prove the agency-transfer hypothesis, estimate how common election manipulation is, or identify votes or election outcomes caused by AI.

The repository slug is inherited. The canonical title is the one above: the index also contains preparedness files, boundary comparisons, screening leads, official electoral context, and empirical model studies. Inclusion is not a finding that every record is manipulative or harmful.

Start here

The coded tables and field values are in English. Spanish is limited to the quick guide and selected descriptive metadata; this is not a bilingual corpus.

What is in v0.4.0

These counts describe the generated v0.4.0 build and must be refreshed if that build changes.

Layer Rows What the count means
Claim-coded records 10 Mixed units: 2 election-wide files, 2 networks, 3 incidents, 1 campaign set and 2 preparedness files
Incident-count eligible 8 Excludes preparedness; it is not a prevalence denominator
Atomic claims 100 Occurrence, attribution, mechanism, reach, effects, response and inference remain separate
Claim–evidence relations 124 supports, premise or counterevidence links, not 124 independent findings
Sources linked to claims 56 Distinct source records used by claim_evidence
Source records overall 70 Also includes records used elsewhere in the corpus
Screening leads 47 Research queue; not included incidents
Empirical model studies 7 Laboratory/audit evidence; not real-world deployments
Pathway assessments 10 Researcher-coded analytic syntheses, not measured outcomes
Typed observations 22 Selected quantities with unit, denominator, window, method and causal status
Official data sources 31 Separate electoral and administrative provenance layer

The strongest pathway conclusion is deliberately limited: 4 records show an observed control mechanism, 2 show an observed attempted transfer, 2 remain insufficient, and 2 are preparedness records rather than incidents. No record codes observed agency change or observed agency preservation/extension. These categories describe evidence ceilings, not severity scores.

The 26 tables

Use Table names
Orient and scope research_view, case_catalog, coverage_summary, sampling_frame
Claims and evidence cases, claims, sources, claim_evidence, analytic_record_claims
Mechanisms and provenance pathways, observations, events, case_sources, case_actors, technology_uses, content_items
Election relations and context case_elections, election_sources, official_elections, official_election_metrics, official_turnout, official_results, official_data_sources
Discovery candidates, watchlist
Empirical capability evidence model_evaluations

All 26 canonical tables are available as CSV in data/ and as native Parquet in parquet/. Relational types, keys and foreign keys are declared in data/datapackage.json.

Only research_view is declared as an interactive Data Studio configuration. This keeps the public preview small and avoids conversion-lock contention among 26 unrelated schemas. It does not remove or merge any table; load the other 25 directly from their CSV or Parquet files.

Files under research/ are transparent build inputs and historical working ledgers, not canonical v0.4.0 tables. Some retain superseded draft annotations; see research/README.md before using them.

Load the data

Hugging Face Datasets

from datasets import load_dataset

view = load_dataset(
    "apol/ai-election-manipulation-cases",
    "research_view",
    revision="v0.4.0",
    split="data",
)

To load any of the 26 tables directly, replace claim_evidence with a table name from the map above:

from datasets import load_dataset

table = "claim_evidence"
url = f"https://huggingface.co/datasets/apol/ai-election-manipulation-cases/resolve/v0.4.0/parquet/{table}.parquet"
records = load_dataset("parquet", data_files={"data": url}, split="data")

pandas

import pandas as pd

url = "https://huggingface.co/datasets/apol/ai-election-manipulation-cases/resolve/v0.4.0/parquet/research_view.parquet"
view = pd.read_parquet(url)

Polars

import polars as pl

url = "https://huggingface.co/datasets/apol/ai-election-manipulation-cases/resolve/v0.4.0/parquet/research_view.parquet"
view = pl.read_parquet(url)

Remove the pinned revision only if you deliberately want the mutable latest version.

Read the evidence correctly

Each pathway keeps these fields separate: capability, controller, influence vector, target, affected agency, hypothesized control shift, possible power recipient, potential harm, and observed outcome. Their presence in one row does not imply that one caused the next.

pathways makes that reasoning inspectable. It does not establish that every link occurred, and it does not produce a validated agency-transfer score. In particular:

  • strong_inference is a researcher inference, not a directly observed effect;
  • platform reach is not belief, behaviour, turnout or vote choice;
  • an institutional response is not proof of behavioural or electoral harm;
  • official election results are context, not causal evidence;
  • transparent, authorised, defensive and preparedness uses are not automatically manipulation.

Legacy numeric confidence fields were removed because they were neither calibrated probabilities nor intercoder-reliability estimates. This release has one primary coder and reports no intercoder-reliability statistic.

Evidence provenance

Use normalized joins for factual work:

claims.case_id                 → cases.case_id
claim_evidence.claim_id        → claims.claim_id
claim_evidence.source_id       → sources.source_id
observations.claim_id          → claims.claim_id
pathways.case_id               → cases.case_id
case_elections.election_id     → official_elections.election_id
election_sources.official_source_id → official_data_sources.official_source_id

The index retains public URLs but does not redistribute source snapshots. Of 124 claim–source relations, 57 have a verified pinpoint covering the full claim, 47 have a verified pinpoint covering only a factual premise or part of the claim, and 20 remain not_verified because the cited object was inaccessible during the locator audit. locator_coverage preserves that distinction and locator_note explains every unresolved pinpoint; a nonblank pinpoint is not a frozen source object, and a partial locator must not be treated as support for the whole claim. All archive and content-hash fields remain unresolved preservation gaps. Cite and inspect the underlying source before relying on a substantive claim.

What the audit does—and does not do

The automated audit is internal structural and semantic QA. It checks declared files, identifiers, relations, enums, date formats, selected consistency rules and recorded hashes within its stated scope. It does not establish that a source is still live, that a source supports every word of a claim, that an allegation is true, that the sample is representative, or that a causal interpretation is valid.

The v0.4 auditor retains the historical filename scripts/audit-v03.mjs and compatibility output data/audit-v03.json; its internal auditor identifier is audit-v04, and data/audit.json is byte-identical. The old entry point scripts/audit-data.mjs is a read-only wrapper.

Six visible warnings record regional frames without systematic negative/null searches. They are a reason not to infer prevalence, not evidence that no cases exist in those regions.

Appropriate use

Use this index for evidence tracing, comparative case research, hypothesis generation, institutional-response analysis, source discovery, measurement reconciliation and bounded model-study comparison.

Do not use it as:

  • proof of the agency-transfer thesis;
  • a global or regional incident count or prevalence estimate;
  • a causal estimate of votes, turnout, seats or winners changed;
  • a list of proven malicious AI incidents;
  • evidence that visible or authorised political AI is inherently manipulative;
  • operational material for voter targeting, impersonation, deception or safeguard evasion.

Builds, releases and citation

The supported tabular pipeline is:

npm ci
npm run build:data
npm run build:audit
npm run build:parquet
npm run validate
npm run test:hardening

After the externally generated workbook is frozen in release/, maintainers run:

npm run build:package
npm run verify:package:checkout
npm run build:release-manifest
npm run validate

npm run verify:package verifies the frozen ZIP internally against its embedded manifest and checksums. Use npm run verify:package:checkout only while cutting a release to additionally require byte-for-byte parity with the current checkout; later documentation-only changes on mutable main do not rewrite an existing release.

Do not run build:package to overwrite an already tagged version from mutable main; bump the version and cut a new tag first.

npm run audit:links is a separate, time-dependent network check; it is not evidence that a blocked or rate-limited page is absent. Within the declared runtime and inputs, the deterministic scripts rebuild and check the tabular and packaged artifacts they cover. That remains narrower than end-to-end source reproducibility: external pages are not frozen, 47 pinpoints cover only a factual premise or part of their claim, 20 relations have no verified pinpoint, and automated QA does not validate source truth.

The Excel workbook is a convenience artifact, not the canonical analytic source. Its builder requires the @oai/artifact-tool runtime, which is not part of the public package.json; use CSV or Parquet unless that environment is available. The ZIP and workbook should be verified against the release manifest, not assumed equivalent merely because their filenames contain the same version.

main is mutable. Use the v0.4.0 revision for a fixed citation and record the exact commit hash used. No DOI has been assigned; none should be inferred from the repository URL. A DOI can be added only after a frozen revision is deposited and its identity is reconciled with the tag, citation metadata and release manifest.

The CC BY 4.0 license covers the original coding and synthesis. Source materials remain under their publishers' or issuing institutions' terms. Cite both this index and the original evidence sources for substantive claims.

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