pathway_id stringclasses 10
values | case_id stringclasses 10
values | case_title stringclasses 10
values | country stringclasses 4
values | election_date date32 | record_type stringclasses 5
values | case_status stringclasses 2
values | manipulation_assessment stringclasses 4
values | generative_ai_status stringclasses 2
values | ai_role stringclasses 3
values | system_or_model stringclasses 10
values | controller stringclasses 10
values | influence_vector stringclasses 10
values | target stringclasses 9
values | agency_dimension stringclasses 10
values | capability_status stringclasses 2
values | control_mechanism_status stringclasses 2
values | attempted_transfer_status stringclasses 3
values | agency_change_status stringclasses 2
values | agency_preservation_status stringclasses 2
values | maximum_conclusion stringclasses 4
values | hypothesized_power_recipient stringclasses 9
values | reach_summary stringclasses 9
values | behavioural_effect stringclasses 1
value | electoral_effect stringclasses 1
value | case_evidence_summary stringclasses 2
values | main_uncertainty stringclasses 10
values | last_verified date32 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
ata-ro24 | ro-2024-presidential-annulment | Romania 2024 presidential election: coordinated digital campaign and annulment | Romania | 2024-11-24 | election_wide_case | retrospective | mixed_documented_manipulation | not_established | material_amplification | TikTok: recommender and integrity systems | mixed and partly unresolved campaign networks; platform recommender systems; alleged foreign-linked actors | short-form video recommendations, coordinated accounts, undeclared promotion, cyber and information operations | Romanian voters | voter_attention_and_electoral_choice | observed | observed | insufficient_evidence | not_observed | not_observed | control_mechanism_observed | campaign-network operators and platform ranking systems | 25,000 accounts; officially_reported; unknown; final_two_weeks_before_2024_first_round | unknown | unknown | occurrence_supported_agency_effect_not_established | Who financed and directed each network component? What organic versus coordinated reach occurred? Did any exposure change voting behaviour? What will the DSA proceeding finally establish? | 2026-08-11 |
ata-ro25 | ro-2025-presidential-repeat | Romania 2025 repeat presidential election and cross-platform synthetic-persona network | Romania | 2025-05-04 | observed_network | retrospective | manipulation_confirmed | confirmed | mixed | unknown: DreamFace- or D-ID-style avatars and synthetic profiles | unknown cross-platform network operator; platform distribution systems; responding election authorities | coordinated and hijacked accounts, synthetic personas, AI avatars, false local-news identity, cross-platform hashtags, and institutional decisions | Romanian voters | authorship_attention_and_local_identity | observed | observed | insufficient_evidence | not_observed | not_observed | control_mechanism_observed | unidentified network operator and platform distribution systems | 215 accounts; researcher_measured; not_applicable; 2024-12_to_2025-06-06 | 8,514 posts; researcher_measured; not_applicable; 2024-12_to_2025-06-06 | unknown | unknown | occurrence_supported_agency_effect_not_established | Who operated and financed the network? How much reach was authentic and in-country? Which safeguards measurably reduced manipulation? How did the annulment itself affect trust and participation? | 2026-08-11 |
ata-md24 | md-2024-presidential-referendum | Moldova 2024 presidential election and EU referendum: hybrid interference network | Moldova | 2024-10-20 | election_wide_case | retrospective | mixed_documented_manipulation | confirmed | mixed | unknown: synthetic impersonation tools | Ilan Shor-linked network and alleged Russian sponsors; coordinated account operators; platforms | payments, messaging apps, spoofed media, bots, coordinated accounts, synthetic video | Moldovan voters, including linguistic minorities and diaspora | preference_participation_and_trust | observed | observed | observed | not_observed | not_observed | attempted_transfer_observed | foreign-linked political-finance and influence networks | 4,200 followers; platform_reported; unknown; at_takedown_2024-10-11 | 335,000 followers; platform_reported; unknown; at_takedown_2024-10-11 | unknown | unknown | occurrence_supported_agency_effect_not_established | How many recipients acted on payments? Which synthetic pieces achieved material exposure? What portion of the network was centrally directed? What vote effect, if any, occurred? | 2026-08-11 |
ata-md25 | md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network | Moldova 2025 parliamentary election: continuation of hybrid influence infrastructure | Moldova | 2025-09-28 | observed_network | retrospective | manipulation_confirmed | confirmed | mixed | unknown: AI videos, bots and platform recommendation systems | foreign-funded political and influence networks | social platforms, messaging apps, illicit finance, synthetic and spoofed media | Moldovan voters | authorship_agenda_and_peer_signal | observed | observed | insufficient_evidence | not_observed | not_observed | control_mechanism_observed | network curators and financiers | 253 accounts; researcher_measured; not_applicable; study_window | 28,708 posts; researcher_measured; not_applicable; study_window | unknown | unknown | occurrence_supported_agency_effect_not_established | Which 2024 network components persisted, which were newly created, and which shared command? What was authentic in-country exposure? Which interventions worked? | 2026-08-11 |
ata-nh | us-nh-2024-biden-robocall | New Hampshire 2024 AI-cloned Biden robocall | United States | 2024-01-23 | observed_incident | retrospective | manipulation_confirmed | confirmed | core_generation | ElevenLabs: AI voice-cloning service | Steve Kramer and telecom distribution providers | AI voice cloning, caller-ID spoofing, mass robocalls | New Hampshire Democratic primary voters | authorship_relevance_and_participation_instruction | observed | observed | observed | not_observed | not_observed | attempted_transfer_observed | political operator and telecom distribution chain | 9,581 call_attempts; provider_records_in_enforcement; unknown; campaign_window | 3,978 completed_calls; provider_records_in_enforcement; unknown; campaign_window | unknown | unknown | occurrence_supported_agency_effect_not_established | How many recipients listened, believed, or acted on the call? How should liability be allocated across creator, intermediary, and originating provider? | 2026-08-11 |
ata-brprep | br-2026-election-preparedness | Brazil 2026 general election: AI governance and integrity preparedness | Brazil | 2026-10-04 | preparedness_file | ongoing | preparedness_not_incident | confirmed | mixed | unknown_or_multiple: generative AI, recommender and disclosure-compliance systems | campaigns, AI providers, platforms, election authorities, and unidentified influence actors | synthetic media, recommender outputs, political advertising, bots, voice cloning, platform distribution | Brazilian voters | future_information_and_platform_governance | not_assessed | not_observed | not_applicable | not_applicable | not_applicable | not_an_incident | not_applicable | No typed population-reach estimate | unknown | unknown | governance_context_not_incident | Will providers comply in practice? How quickly will labelled and unlabelled content be detected and adjudicated? Will rules apply consistently across closed messaging and AI assistants? | 2026-08-11 |
ata-bravatar | br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar | Brazil 2026 Bolsonaro AI avatar at Flávio Bolsonaro campaign launch | Brazil | 2026-10-04 | observed_incident | ongoing | transparent_contested_use | confirmed | core_generation | unknown: synthetic image-and-voice avatar system | Flávio Bolsonaro campaign or allied producer; authorisation by Jair Bolsonaro unresolved | disclosed synthetic image and voice presented as an endorsement | Brazilian voters and campaign attendees | political_representation_and_audience_interpretation | observed | observed | insufficient_evidence | not_observed | not_observed | insufficient_evidence | campaign producer controlling the synthetic representation | No typed population-reach estimate | unknown | unknown | occurrence_supported_agency_effect_not_established | Who authorised and scripted the avatar? Does a labelled clone circumvent communication restrictions? How will TSE distinguish transparent simulation from manipulative synthetic representation? | 2026-08-11 |
ata-usprep | us-2026-midterms-preparedness | United States 2026 midterm election: fragmented AI governance and preparedness | United States | 2026-11-03 | preparedness_file | ongoing | preparedness_not_incident | confirmed | mixed | unknown_or_multiple: generative AI, synthetic-media, platform and telecom systems | campaigns, political committees, foreign influence actors, platforms, telecom and AI providers | synthetic ads, voice and video impersonation, recommender distribution, robocalls, coordinated influence | United States voters | future_information_and_election_trust | not_assessed | not_observed | not_applicable | not_applicable | not_applicable | not_an_incident | not_applicable | 31 states_with_enacted_political_deepfake_laws; legislative_tracker_count; not_applicable; snapshot_2026-06-23 | unknown | unknown | governance_context_not_incident | How will state rules apply across jurisdictions? Will disclosures be salient? Which foreign or domestic networks will achieve measurable reach? Can authentic communications remain verifiable? | 2026-08-11 |
ata-usads | us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads | United States 2026 campaign-produced synthetic candidate ads | United States | 2026-11-03 | observed_campaign_set | ongoing | mixed_documented_manipulation | confirmed | core_generation | unknown: campaign video-generation and face/voice synthesis tools | National Republican Senatorial Committee and individual campaigns; additional actors may be added | AI-generated political video distributed as campaign advertising and social content | voters in contested federal and state races | candidate_voice_face_and_affect | observed | observed | insufficient_evidence | not_observed | not_observed | control_mechanism_observed | campaign sponsors producing and distributing synthetic representations | 3 synthetic_ads_identified_in_reporting; independent_reporting_content_count; not_applicable; reporting_through_2026-03-28 | unknown | unknown | occurrence_supported_agency_effect_not_established | Were disclosures noticed? What impressions and targeting occurred? Do viewers distinguish quotation from fabricated audiovisual evidence? What legal rules apply in each state? | 2026-08-11 |
ata-usca11 | us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot | California 11th District: campaign-controlled Connie Chan parody chatbot | United States | 2026-11-03 | observed_incident | ongoing | transparent_contested_use | confirmed | core_generation | Anthropic: Claude | Amazon Web Services|Google: hosting and analytics stack | Scott Wiener for Congress campaign; technical constructor unidentified | interactive first-person opponent simulation, campaign-selected issue framing, web interface, billboards, and earned media | California 11th District voters and politically interested web visitors; Connie Chan as represented person | representation_agenda_query_privacy_and_candidate_evaluation | observed | observed | insufficient_evidence | not_observed | not_observed | insufficient_evidence | campaign deployer; secondarily model and infrastructure providers | 5,058 submitted_questions; campaign_reported; unknown; first_27_hours | 2 billboards; campaign_reported; not_applicable; August_2026 | unknown | unknown | occurrence_supported_agency_effect_not_established | Which Claude version and deployment route were used? Who built the system? What sources, system prompt, retrieval method, and guardrails controlled answers? How many unique people interacted, from where, and with what effects? | 2026-08-12 |
AI, Elections and Agency Transfer Evidence Index
Version 0.4.0 · released 15 August 2026 · research cutoff 12 August 2026
Viewer hotfix on main, 15 August 2026: Data Studio now exposes one orientation view. The frozen v0.4.0 tag, its 26 tables, ZIP, workbook and checksums are unchanged.
This is a purposive, exploratory evidence index. It makes claims, sources, counterevidence, uncertainty, mechanisms, and selected measurements easier to inspect. It does not empirically prove the agency-transfer hypothesis, estimate how common election manipulation is, or identify votes or election outcomes caused by AI.
The repository slug is inherited. The canonical title is the one above: the index also contains preparedness files, boundary comparisons, screening leads, official electoral context, and empirical model studies. Inclusion is not a finding that every record is manipulative or harmful.
Start here
- Open the 10-row research view — fastest orientation.
- Read the Spanish quick guide — concise interpretation guide.
- Read the methodology — units, coding and limitations.
- Read the v0.4.0 red-team report — findings, fixes and residual limits.
- Inspect the claim–evidence table — trace claims to source records.
- Download the complete v0.4.0 package — CSV, Parquet, documentation, ledgers, scripts and workbook.
- Download the v0.4.0 Excel workbook — navigation and QA convenience artifact.
- Verify release checksums — hashes for the frozen ZIP and workbook.
- Browse the Agency Transfer collection — related research datasets.
- See citation metadata — cite this index and the original sources.
The coded tables and field values are in English. Spanish is limited to the quick guide and selected descriptive metadata; this is not a bilingual corpus.
What is in v0.4.0
These counts describe the generated v0.4.0 build and must be refreshed if that build changes.
| Layer | Rows | What the count means |
|---|---|---|
| Claim-coded records | 10 | Mixed units: 2 election-wide files, 2 networks, 3 incidents, 1 campaign set and 2 preparedness files |
| Incident-count eligible | 8 | Excludes preparedness; it is not a prevalence denominator |
| Atomic claims | 100 | Occurrence, attribution, mechanism, reach, effects, response and inference remain separate |
| Claim–evidence relations | 124 | supports, premise or counterevidence links, not 124 independent findings |
| Sources linked to claims | 56 | Distinct source records used by claim_evidence |
| Source records overall | 70 | Also includes records used elsewhere in the corpus |
| Screening leads | 47 | Research queue; not included incidents |
| Empirical model studies | 7 | Laboratory/audit evidence; not real-world deployments |
| Pathway assessments | 10 | Researcher-coded analytic syntheses, not measured outcomes |
| Typed observations | 22 | Selected quantities with unit, denominator, window, method and causal status |
| Official data sources | 31 | Separate electoral and administrative provenance layer |
The strongest pathway conclusion is deliberately limited: 4 records show an observed control mechanism, 2 show an observed attempted transfer, 2 remain insufficient, and 2 are preparedness records rather than incidents. No record codes observed agency change or observed agency preservation/extension. These categories describe evidence ceilings, not severity scores.
The 26 tables
| Use | Table names |
|---|---|
| Orient and scope | research_view, case_catalog, coverage_summary, sampling_frame |
| Claims and evidence | cases, claims, sources, claim_evidence, analytic_record_claims |
| Mechanisms and provenance | pathways, observations, events, case_sources, case_actors, technology_uses, content_items |
| Election relations and context | case_elections, election_sources, official_elections, official_election_metrics, official_turnout, official_results, official_data_sources |
| Discovery | candidates, watchlist |
| Empirical capability evidence | model_evaluations |
All 26 canonical tables are available as CSV in data/ and as native Parquet in parquet/. Relational types, keys and foreign keys are declared in data/datapackage.json.
Only research_view is declared as an interactive Data Studio configuration. This keeps the public preview small and avoids conversion-lock contention among 26 unrelated schemas. It does not remove or merge any table; load the other 25 directly from their CSV or Parquet files.
Files under research/ are transparent build inputs and historical working ledgers, not canonical v0.4.0 tables. Some retain superseded draft annotations; see research/README.md before using them.
Load the data
Hugging Face Datasets
from datasets import load_dataset
view = load_dataset(
"apol/ai-election-manipulation-cases",
"research_view",
revision="v0.4.0",
split="data",
)
To load any of the 26 tables directly, replace claim_evidence with a table name from the map above:
from datasets import load_dataset
table = "claim_evidence"
url = f"https://huggingface.co/datasets/apol/ai-election-manipulation-cases/resolve/v0.4.0/parquet/{table}.parquet"
records = load_dataset("parquet", data_files={"data": url}, split="data")
pandas
import pandas as pd
url = "https://huggingface.co/datasets/apol/ai-election-manipulation-cases/resolve/v0.4.0/parquet/research_view.parquet"
view = pd.read_parquet(url)
Polars
import polars as pl
url = "https://huggingface.co/datasets/apol/ai-election-manipulation-cases/resolve/v0.4.0/parquet/research_view.parquet"
view = pl.read_parquet(url)
Remove the pinned revision only if you deliberately want the mutable latest version.
Read the evidence correctly
Each pathway keeps these fields separate: capability, controller, influence vector, target, affected agency, hypothesized control shift, possible power recipient, potential harm, and observed outcome. Their presence in one row does not imply that one caused the next.
pathways makes that reasoning inspectable. It does not establish that every link occurred, and it does not produce a validated agency-transfer score. In particular:
strong_inferenceis a researcher inference, not a directly observed effect;- platform reach is not belief, behaviour, turnout or vote choice;
- an institutional response is not proof of behavioural or electoral harm;
- official election results are context, not causal evidence;
- transparent, authorised, defensive and preparedness uses are not automatically manipulation.
Legacy numeric confidence fields were removed because they were neither calibrated probabilities nor intercoder-reliability estimates. This release has one primary coder and reports no intercoder-reliability statistic.
Evidence provenance
Use normalized joins for factual work:
claims.case_id → cases.case_id
claim_evidence.claim_id → claims.claim_id
claim_evidence.source_id → sources.source_id
observations.claim_id → claims.claim_id
pathways.case_id → cases.case_id
case_elections.election_id → official_elections.election_id
election_sources.official_source_id → official_data_sources.official_source_id
The index retains public URLs but does not redistribute source snapshots. Of 124 claim–source relations, 57 have a verified pinpoint covering the full claim, 47 have a verified pinpoint covering only a factual premise or part of the claim, and 20 remain not_verified because the cited object was inaccessible during the locator audit. locator_coverage preserves that distinction and locator_note explains every unresolved pinpoint; a nonblank pinpoint is not a frozen source object, and a partial locator must not be treated as support for the whole claim. All archive and content-hash fields remain unresolved preservation gaps. Cite and inspect the underlying source before relying on a substantive claim.
What the audit does—and does not do
The automated audit is internal structural and semantic QA. It checks declared files, identifiers, relations, enums, date formats, selected consistency rules and recorded hashes within its stated scope. It does not establish that a source is still live, that a source supports every word of a claim, that an allegation is true, that the sample is representative, or that a causal interpretation is valid.
The v0.4 auditor retains the historical filename scripts/audit-v03.mjs and compatibility output data/audit-v03.json; its internal auditor identifier is audit-v04, and data/audit.json is byte-identical. The old entry point scripts/audit-data.mjs is a read-only wrapper.
Six visible warnings record regional frames without systematic negative/null searches. They are a reason not to infer prevalence, not evidence that no cases exist in those regions.
Appropriate use
Use this index for evidence tracing, comparative case research, hypothesis generation, institutional-response analysis, source discovery, measurement reconciliation and bounded model-study comparison.
Do not use it as:
- proof of the agency-transfer thesis;
- a global or regional incident count or prevalence estimate;
- a causal estimate of votes, turnout, seats or winners changed;
- a list of proven malicious AI incidents;
- evidence that visible or authorised political AI is inherently manipulative;
- operational material for voter targeting, impersonation, deception or safeguard evasion.
Builds, releases and citation
The supported tabular pipeline is:
npm ci
npm run build:data
npm run build:audit
npm run build:parquet
npm run validate
npm run test:hardening
After the externally generated workbook is frozen in release/, maintainers run:
npm run build:package
npm run verify:package:checkout
npm run build:release-manifest
npm run validate
npm run verify:package verifies the frozen ZIP internally against its embedded manifest and checksums. Use npm run verify:package:checkout only while cutting a release to additionally require byte-for-byte parity with the current checkout; later documentation-only changes on mutable main do not rewrite an existing release.
Do not run build:package to overwrite an already tagged version from mutable main; bump the version and cut a new tag first.
npm run audit:links is a separate, time-dependent network check; it is not evidence that a blocked or rate-limited page is absent. Within the declared runtime and inputs, the deterministic scripts rebuild and check the tabular and packaged artifacts they cover. That remains narrower than end-to-end source reproducibility: external pages are not frozen, 47 pinpoints cover only a factual premise or part of their claim, 20 relations have no verified pinpoint, and automated QA does not validate source truth.
The Excel workbook is a convenience artifact, not the canonical analytic source. Its builder requires the @oai/artifact-tool runtime, which is not part of the public package.json; use CSV or Parquet unless that environment is available. The ZIP and workbook should be verified against the release manifest, not assumed equivalent merely because their filenames contain the same version.
main is mutable. Use the v0.4.0 revision for a fixed citation and record the exact commit hash used. No DOI has been assigned; none should be inferred from the repository URL. A DOI can be added only after a frozen revision is deposited and its identity is reconciled with the tag, citation metadata and release manifest.
The CC BY 4.0 license covers the original coding and synthesis. Source materials remain under their publishers' or issuing institutions' terms. Cite both this index and the original evidence sources for substantive claims.
- Downloads last month
- 217