v0.4.0: publish recoded evidence tables

Publish 26 canonical CSV tables with control-shift hypotheses separated from observed agency outcomes and bounded claim-source relations.

data/analytic_record_claims.csv

@@ -101,22 +101,27 @@ record-claim-pathway-ata-ro24-clm-ro-003,pathway,ata-ro24,ro-2024-presidential-a
 record-claim-pathway-ata-ro24-clm-ro-006,pathway,ata-ro24,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,clm-ro-006,supports_coding
 record-claim-pathway-ata-ro24-clm-ro-007,pathway,ata-ro24,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,clm-ro-007,supports_coding
 record-claim-pathway-ata-ro24-clm-ro-013,pathway,ata-ro24,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,clm-ro-013,supports_coding
+record-claim-pathway-ata-ro24-clm-ro-020,pathway,ata-ro24,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,clm-ro-020,supports_coding
 record-claim-pathway-ata-ro25-clm-ro-014,pathway,ata-ro25,ro-2025-presidential-repeat,clm-ro-014,supports_coding
 record-claim-pathway-ata-ro25-clm-ro-015,pathway,ata-ro25,ro-2025-presidential-repeat,clm-ro-015,supports_coding
 record-claim-pathway-ata-ro25-clm-ro-016,pathway,ata-ro25,ro-2025-presidential-repeat,clm-ro-016,supports_coding
 record-claim-pathway-ata-ro25-clm-ro-017,pathway,ata-ro25,ro-2025-presidential-repeat,clm-ro-017,supports_coding
 record-claim-pathway-ata-ro25-clm-ro-018,pathway,ata-ro25,ro-2025-presidential-repeat,clm-ro-018,supports_coding
+record-claim-pathway-ata-ro25-clm-ro-021,pathway,ata-ro25,ro-2025-presidential-repeat,clm-ro-021,supports_coding
 record-claim-pathway-ata-md24-clm-md-003,pathway,ata-md24,md-2024-presidential-referendum,clm-md-003,supports_coding
 record-claim-pathway-ata-md24-clm-md-004,pathway,ata-md24,md-2024-presidential-referendum,clm-md-004,supports_coding
 record-claim-pathway-ata-md24-clm-md-005,pathway,ata-md24,md-2024-presidential-referendum,clm-md-005,supports_coding
 record-claim-pathway-ata-md24-clm-md-009,pathway,ata-md24,md-2024-presidential-referendum,clm-md-009,supports_coding
 record-claim-pathway-ata-md24-clm-md-010,pathway,ata-md24,md-2024-presidential-referendum,clm-md-010,supports_coding
 record-claim-pathway-ata-md24-clm-md-011,pathway,ata-md24,md-2024-presidential-referendum,clm-md-011,supports_coding
+record-claim-pathway-ata-md24-clm-md-020,pathway,ata-md24,md-2024-presidential-referendum,clm-md-020,supports_coding
+record-claim-pathway-ata-md25-clm-md-012,pathway,ata-md25,md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,clm-md-012,supports_coding
 record-claim-pathway-ata-md25-clm-md-015,pathway,ata-md25,md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,clm-md-015,supports_coding
 record-claim-pathway-ata-md25-clm-md-016,pathway,ata-md25,md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,clm-md-016,supports_coding
 record-claim-pathway-ata-md25-clm-md-017,pathway,ata-md25,md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,clm-md-017,supports_coding
 record-claim-pathway-ata-md25-clm-md-018,pathway,ata-md25,md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,clm-md-018,supports_coding
 record-claim-pathway-ata-md25-clm-md-019,pathway,ata-md25,md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,clm-md-019,supports_coding
+record-claim-pathway-ata-md25-clm-md-021,pathway,ata-md25,md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,clm-md-021,supports_coding
 record-claim-pathway-ata-nh-clm-nh-001,pathway,ata-nh,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,clm-nh-001,supports_coding
 record-claim-pathway-ata-nh-clm-nh-002,pathway,ata-nh,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,clm-nh-002,supports_coding
 record-claim-pathway-ata-nh-clm-nh-004,pathway,ata-nh,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,clm-nh-004,supports_coding

data/audit-v03.json

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 {
-  "auditor": "agency-transfer-election-cases-v0.3.1/audit-v03",
+  "auditor": "agency-transfer-election-cases-v0.4.0/audit-v04",
   "cutoff": "2026-08-12",
   "status": "pass",
   "integrity": {
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
     "expected_table_count": 26,
     "loaded_table_count": 26,
     "datapackage_resource_count": 26,
-    "declared_field_count": 382,
+    "declared_field_count": 396,
     "declared_foreign_key_count": 29,
     "error_count": 0,
     "warning_count": 0
@@ -131,9 +131,9 @@
         "analytic join reciprocity"
       ],
       "pathways": [
-        "documented transfer/assessment enums",
-        "required proposition fields",
-        "case/view/claim coverage"
+        "dimensioned control-shift enums",
+        "falsification/comparator fields",
+        "case/view/hypothesis-claim coverage"
       ],
       "observations": [
         "numeric intervals and denominators",
@@ -148,7 +148,8 @@
       "claim_evidence": [
         "documented enums",
         "claim/source links",
-        "legacy evidence reciprocity"
+        "legacy evidence reciprocity",
+        "locator/coverage/reason consistency"
       ],
       "analytic_record_claims": [
         "record-type resolution",
@@ -183,7 +184,7 @@
     "warning_count": 6,
     "table_row_counts": {
       "cases": 10,
-      "claims": 96,
+      "claims": 100,
       "sources": 70,
       "events": 33,
       "case_sources": 67,
@@ -200,10 +201,10 @@
       "technology_uses": 11,
       "content_items": 4,
       "pathways": 10,
-      "observations": 24,
+      "observations": 22,
       "model_evaluations": 7,
-      "claim_evidence": 162,
-      "analytic_record_claims": 234,
+      "claim_evidence": 124,
+      "analytic_record_claims": 239,
       "case_elections": 15,
       "election_sources": 35,
       "sampling_frame": 7,

data/audit.json

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 {
-  "auditor": "agency-transfer-election-cases-v0.3.1/audit-v03",
+  "auditor": "agency-transfer-election-cases-v0.4.0/audit-v04",
   "cutoff": "2026-08-12",
   "status": "pass",
   "integrity": {
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
     "expected_table_count": 26,
     "loaded_table_count": 26,
     "datapackage_resource_count": 26,
-    "declared_field_count": 382,
+    "declared_field_count": 396,
     "declared_foreign_key_count": 29,
     "error_count": 0,
     "warning_count": 0
@@ -131,9 +131,9 @@
         "analytic join reciprocity"
       ],
       "pathways": [
-        "documented transfer/assessment enums",
-        "required proposition fields",
-        "case/view/claim coverage"
+        "dimensioned control-shift enums",
+        "falsification/comparator fields",
+        "case/view/hypothesis-claim coverage"
       ],
       "observations": [
         "numeric intervals and denominators",
@@ -148,7 +148,8 @@
       "claim_evidence": [
         "documented enums",
         "claim/source links",
-        "legacy evidence reciprocity"
+        "legacy evidence reciprocity",
+        "locator/coverage/reason consistency"
       ],
       "analytic_record_claims": [
         "record-type resolution",
@@ -183,7 +184,7 @@
     "warning_count": 6,
     "table_row_counts": {
       "cases": 10,
-      "claims": 96,
+      "claims": 100,
       "sources": 70,
       "events": 33,
       "case_sources": 67,
@@ -200,10 +201,10 @@
       "technology_uses": 11,
       "content_items": 4,
       "pathways": 10,
-      "observations": 24,
+      "observations": 22,
       "model_evaluations": 7,
-      "claim_evidence": 162,
-      "analytic_record_claims": 234,
+      "claim_evidence": 124,
+      "analytic_record_claims": 239,
       "case_elections": 15,
       "election_sources": 35,
       "sampling_frame": 7,

data/candidates.csv

@@ -10,16 +10,16 @@ cand-bra-2022-election-denial-network,Brazil 2022 cross-platform election-denial
 cand-mex-2024-genai-cluster,Mexico 2024 fact-checked generative-AI election-content cluster,Mexico,North America,2024 general election,2024-06-02,boundary_aggregate_disaggregate_first,voice_clone|lip_sync|synthetic_endorsement|candidate_impersonation|scam,core_generation,confirmed_for_documented_examples,confirmed_for_examples,mostly_unknown,unknown,unknown,unknown,"Useful aggregate map of first-person speech, false endorsement, appearance distortion, and scams.","The source corpus is 101 fact-check posts, not necessarily 101 unique incidents or an electorate-wide prevalence estimate.",https://mediaengagement.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/CME-Generative-AI-Misinformation-in-the-2024-Mexican-Elections.pdf|https://www.idea.int/publications/catalogue/html/artificial-intelligence-and-information-integrity-latin-american,2026-08-11
 cand-col-2022-coordinated-facebook-pages,Colombia 2022 coordinated negative-ad Facebook pages,Colombia,South America,2022 presidential election,2022-06-19,promote_after_claim_coding,coordinated_pages|paid_influence|sponsor_opacity|negative_ads,material_amplification,not_established,confirmed,ultimate_funder_unknown,spend_and_item_count_only,unknown,unknown,Clean source-opacity case with coordinated page design and auditable ad spend.,"Ad spend and 538 paid items are not unique reach or persuasion, and investigators could not establish the ultimate operator or funder.",https://www.elclip.org/campana-sucia-en-facebook-colombia-elecciones-desinformacion/|https://cartercentee50c07c05.blob.core.windows.net/blobcartercentee50c07c05/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/colombia-expert-mission-report-2022-english.pdf,2026-08-11
 cand-arg-2023-campaign-genai,Argentina 2023 official-campaign generative-AI arms race,Argentina,South America,2023 presidential runoff,2023-11-19,boundary_comparison,synthetic_image|synthetic_video|campaign_attack|satire,core_generation,confirmed,confirmed,admitted|credibly_reported,measured_for_one_item,unknown,unknown,Boundary case separating transparent stylised campaign AI from more deceptive synthetic embodiment.,Much content was labelled or visibly fabricated and contemporary assessments found relatively minor information-space impact.,https://www.context.news/ai/how-ai-shaped-mileis-path-to-argentina-presidency|https://knightcolumbia.org/content/dont-panic-yet-assessing-the-evidence-and-discourse-around-generative-ai-and-elections,2026-08-11
-cand-arg-2025-false-withdrawal-deepfakes,Argentina 2025 Buenos Aires City false-withdrawal and endorsement deepfakes,Argentina,South America,2025 Buenos Aires City legislative election,2025-05-18,reserve_needs_second_source,synthetic_video|voice_clone|false_withdrawal|false_endorsement|last_minute_release,core_generation,confirmed,confirmed,unknown,unknown,unknown,unknown,Direct agency-transfer case: synthetic first-person withdrawal and endorsement at a moment with limited rebuttal time.,Narrowed to the Buenos Aires City case; it still needs an independent second source. National October complaints belong in a separate future candidate and are not merged here.,https://chequeado.com/el-explicador/videos-falsos-de-macri-y-lospennato-en-x-que-paso-en-la-realidad-con-lo-que-ordeno-la-justicia/,2026-08-11
+cand-arg-2025-false-withdrawal-deepfakes,Argentina 2025 Buenos Aires City false-withdrawal and endorsement deepfakes,Argentina,South America,2025 Buenos Aires City legislative election,2025-05-18,reserve_needs_second_source,synthetic_video|voice_clone|false_withdrawal|false_endorsement|last_minute_release,core_generation,confirmed,confirmed,unknown,unknown,unknown,unknown,High-priority control-shift hypothesis: synthetic first-person withdrawal and endorsement at a moment with limited rebuttal time; agency change remains unmeasured.,Narrowed to the Buenos Aires City case; it still needs an independent second source. National October complaints belong in a separate future candidate and are not merged here.,https://chequeado.com/el-explicador/videos-falsos-de-macri-y-lospennato-en-x-que-paso-en-la-realidad-con-lo-que-ordeno-la-justicia/,2026-08-11
 cand-ind-2024-bollywood-deepfakes,India 2024 unauthorised Bollywood celebrity endorsement deepfakes,India,South Asia,2024 general election,2024-06-01,promote_after_claim_coding,voice_clone|video_impersonation|false_endorsement|political_amplification,core_generation,confirmed_for_focal_assets,confirmed,creator_unknown|amplifier_identified,measured_as_platform_views,unknown,unknown,High-salience harmful impersonation case with content-level reach and a clean distinction between an unknown creator and an identifiable political amplifier.,"More than 500,000 views establish exposure, not belief or persuasion; amplification by a Congress spokesperson does not prove party commissioning, and post-election work found no deepfake doomsday.",https://www.reuters.com/world/india/deepfakes-bollywood-stars-spark-worries-ai-meddling-india-election-2024-04-22/|https://www.wired.com/story/indian-elections-ai-deepfakes/|https://mediaengagement.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Indias-Generative-AI-Election-Pilot-Shows-Artificial-Intelligence-In-Campaigns-Is-Here-To-Stay.pdf|https://restofworld.org/2024/exporter-india-deepfake-trolls/,2026-08-11
 cand-ind-2024-authorised-ai-calls,India 2024 candidate-authorised AI voice calls and personalised outreach,India,South Asia,2024 general election,2024-06-01,boundary_comparison,voice_clone|personalisation|direct_calls|multilingual_outreach,core_generation|delivery_personalisation,confirmed,confirmed,campaign_and_vendor_identified,large_vendor_reported_delivery_volume,anecdotal_only,unknown,Essential boundary case showing that campaign authorisation and scalable access can coexist with weak recipient disclosure and concentrated personalisation capacity.,"The reported 50 million-plus calls and 25 million personalised calls are unaudited vendor figures, may overlap, and do not establish listening, persuasion, turnout, or vote effects.",https://www.wired.com/story/indian-elections-ai-deepfakes/|https://mediaengagement.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Indias-Generative-AI-Election-Pilot-Shows-Artificial-Intelligence-In-Campaigns-Is-Here-To-Stay.pdf,2026-08-11
 cand-twn-2024-storm1376-gou-audio,Taiwan 2024 Storm-1376 false Terry Gou endorsement operation,Taiwan,East Asia,2024 presidential and legislative elections,2024-01-13,promote_with_attribution_caveat,voice_clone|synthetic_anchor|coordinated_influence_operation|false_endorsement,core_generation|supporting_tool,likely_for_focal_audio|confirmed_for_actor_assets,confirmed,platform_vendor_attributed,low_qualitative_for_focal_audio,unknown,unknown,"Strong coordinated-operation case combining a false candidate endorsement, reusable synthetic formats, and a named foreign-attributed network.",Microsoft's CCP linkage is a threat-intelligence attribution rather than an adjudicated state-command finding; YouTube removed the focal audio before significant reach and no vote effect is established.,https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2024/04/04/china-ai-influence-elections-mtac-cybersecurity/|https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/security-insider/threat-landscape/east-asia-threat-actors-employ-unique-methods|https://www.thomsonfoundation.org/media/268943/ai_disinformation_attacks_taiwan.pdf|https://en.tfc-taiwan.org.tw/en_tfc_286/,2026-08-11
-cand-pak-2024-pti-authorised-clones,Pakistan 2024 PTI-authorised synthetic Imran Khan campaign speeches,Pakistan,South Asia,2024 general election,2024-02-08,boundary_comparison,voice_clone|talking_image|candidate_access_substitution|labelled_synthetic_media,core_generation,confirmed,confirmed,party_admitted|candidate_authorised,measured_for_focal_stream,unknown,unknown,Clean authorised-use comparison in which synthetic speech restored a jailed leader's campaign presence and was publicly labelled as AI-generated.,"More than 1.4 million YouTube views document exposure, not persuasion; the success of PTI-backed independents cannot be causally attributed to synthetic speeches.",https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pakistans-jailed-imran-khan-uses-ai-crafted-speech-call-votes-2023-12-18/|https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/how-imran-khan-is-campaigning-jail-pakistan-ai-covert-canvassing-2024-02-05/|https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pakistans-jailed-ex-pm-imran-khan-claims-election-victory-2024-02-09/|https://www.tortoisemedia.com/2023/12/19/pakistans-imran-khan-uses-ai-to-give-speech-from-prison/|https://apnews.com/article/fb679e1196216fd6547d5d35c111e037,2026-08-11
+cand-pak-2024-pti-authorised-clones,Pakistan 2024 PTI-authorised synthetic Imran Khan campaign speeches,Pakistan,South Asia,2024 general election,2024-02-08,boundary_comparison,voice_clone|talking_image|candidate_access_substitution|labelled_synthetic_media,core_generation,confirmed,confirmed,party_admitted|candidate_authorised,measured_for_focal_stream,unknown,unknown,Clean authorised-use comparison in which synthetic speech restored a jailed leader's campaign presence and was publicly labelled as AI-generated.,"More than 1.4 million YouTube views document exposure, not persuasion; the success of PTI-backed independents cannot be causally attributed to synthetic speeches.",https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pakistans-jailed-imran-khan-uses-ai-crafted-speech-call-votes-2023-12-18/|https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/how-imran-khan-is-campaigning-jail-pakistan-ai-covert-canvassing-2024-02-05/|https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pakistans-jailed-ex-pm-imran-khan-claims-election-victory-2024-02-09/|https://www.tortoisemedia.com/2023/12/19/pakistans-imran-khan-uses-ai-to-give-campaign-speech-from-prison|https://apnews.com/article/fb679e1196216fd6547d5d35c111e037,2026-08-11
 cand-pak-2024-fake-boycott-clones,Pakistan 2024 fake PTI election-boycott voice clones,Pakistan,South Asia,2024 general election,2024-02-08,promote_after_claim_coding,voice_clone|synthetic_video|false_withdrawal|participation_suppression,core_generation,confirmed_for_documented_examples,confirmed,unknown,unknown,unknown,unknown,Direct participation-agency case in which fabricated first-person messages falsely instructed supporters that PTI figures were boycotting the election.,"Fact-checks establish the fabrication, but the operator, commissioning chain, unique reach, belief, participation response, and electoral effect are unknown.",https://www.boomlive.in/fact-check/imran-khan-pti-pakistan-election-withdrawal-fact-check-24318|https://www.voanews.com/a/7481049.html|https://www.sochfactcheck.com/yasmin-rashids-video-announcing-ptis-boycott-of-2024-elections-is-ai-generated/,2026-08-11
 cand-idn-2024-official-synthetic-campaigning,Indonesia 2024 official synthetic campaigning and Suharto resurrection,Indonesia,Southeast Asia,2024 presidential and legislative elections,2024-02-14,boundary_comparison,deepfake_resurrection|synthetic_image|campaign_branding|chatbot,core_generation|campaign_personalisation,confirmed,confirmed,official_campaign_and_party_identified,mixed_content_level_and_overbroad_hashtag_metrics,unknown,unknown,"Major authorised-use comparison combining a synthetic deceased leader, AI image rebranding, volunteer distribution, and campaign chatbots.","The 4.7 million Suharto-view figure is provisional secondary reporting, while 19 billion #Prabowo TikTok views cover all hashtag content rather than AI assets; neither measures persuasion or vote causation.",https://www.channelnewsasia.com/asia/ai-disinformation-deepfakes-indonesia-elections-4091296|https://edition.cnn.com/2024/02/12/asia/suharto-deepfake-ai-scam-indonesia-election-hnk-intl/index.html|https://www.reuters.com/technology/generative-ai-faces-major-test-indonesia-holds-largest-election-since-boom-2024-02-08/|https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/rest-of-world/indonesia-polls-ai-resurrects-long-dead-dictator-sparks-ethical-concerns/articleshow/107625469.cms,2026-08-11
 cand-bgd-2024-progovernment-ai-disinformation,Bangladesh 2024 pro-government AI pseudo-news and opposition deepfakes,Bangladesh,South Asia,2024 parliamentary election,2024-01-07,promote_with_attribution_caveat,synthetic_anchor|voice_clone|pseudo_news|opposition_attack,core_generation,confirmed_for_documented_examples,confirmed,aligned_promoters_identified|sponsorship_unknown,unknown,unknown,unknown,Low-cost pseudo-news case showing how stock avatars and opposition impersonation can reinforce a dominant political media ecosystem.,"Pro-government promotion does not prove Awami League or government commissioning; focal reach and voter effects are unknown, and the opposition boycott and noncompetitive environment preclude election-result inference.",https://www.ft.com/content/bd1bc5b4-f540-48f8-9cda-75c19e5ac69c|https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/elections/news/ai-disinformation-disrupting-bangladeshs-election-report-3494641|https://thediplomat.com/2023/12/deep-fakes-and-disinformation-in-bangladesh/,2026-08-11
 cand-kor-2024-deepfake-enforcement-set,South Korea 2024 election deepfake enforcement set,South Korea,East Asia,2024 National Assembly election,2024-04-10,boundary_aggregate_disaggregate_first,aggregate_deepfake_enforcement|synthetic_image|synthetic_video,core_generation_for_counted_items,confirmed_at_aggregate_level,officially_reported_aggregate,multiple_or_unknown,unknown,unknown,unknown,"Institutional-response case for a broad pre-election ban and active NEC monitoring, useful for separating item detection from harm and enforcement outcomes.","The 129 detected items are not 129 unique operations, do not establish deception or views, and should be disaggregated before promotion to incident-level cases.",https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20240219003100320|https://verfassungsblog.de/fake-news-content-moderation-singapoer-south-korea-election/|https://thediplomat.com/2024/05/ai-and-elections-lessons-from-south-korea/,2026-08-11
-cand-zaf-2024-trump-mk-deepfake,South Africa 2024 false Trump endorsement of MK,South Africa,Southern Africa,2024 general election,2024-05-29,promote_after_claim_coding,celebrity_impersonation|voice_clone|synthetic_video|false_endorsement|political_amplification,core_generation,confirmed_for_focal_asset,confirmed,creator_unknown|amplifier_identified,unknown_for_focal_asset,unknown,unknown,Clear false-endorsement case with a prominent party-linked amplifier and strong negative-case evidence about the limited overall role of GenAI.,"The creator and focal reach are unknown; replies are not a belief survey, and post-election research found GenAI and deepfake use was limited overall.",https://futures.issafrica.org/blog/2024/Disinformation-governance-and-the-South-African-election|https://africacheck.org/fact-checks/meta-programme-fact-checks/no-former-us-president-donald-trump-has-not-backed-south|https://dfrlab.org/2024/07/31/lessons-learned-from-south-africas-elections/|https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/pages/1734073957062-sar-61.pdf|https://mediaengagement.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/South-Africas-Election-Marked-by-an-Unexpected-Lack-of-Artificially-Generated-Content.pdf,2026-08-11
+cand-zaf-2024-trump-mk-deepfake,South Africa 2024 false Trump endorsement of MK,South Africa,Southern Africa,2024 general election,2024-05-29,promote_after_claim_coding,celebrity_impersonation|voice_clone|synthetic_video|false_endorsement|political_amplification,core_generation,confirmed_for_focal_asset,confirmed,creator_unknown|amplifier_identified,unknown_for_focal_asset,unknown,unknown,Clear false-endorsement case with a prominent party-linked amplifier and strong negative-case evidence about the limited overall role of GenAI.,"The creator and focal reach are unknown; replies are not a belief survey, and post-election research found GenAI and deepfake use was limited overall.",https://futures.issafrica.org/blog/2024/Disinformation-governance-and-the-South-African-election|https://africacheck.org/fact-checks/meta-programme-fact-checks/no-former-us-president-donald-trump-has-not-backed-south|https://dfrlab.org/2024/07/31/lessons-learned-from-south-africas-2024-elections/|https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/pages/1734073957062-sar-61.pdf|https://mediaengagement.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/South-Africas-Election-Marked-by-an-Unexpected-Lack-of-Artificially-Generated-Content.pdf,2026-08-11
 cand-nga-2023-atiku-spliced-audio,Nigeria 2023 spliced Atiku election-rigging audio,Nigeria,West Africa,2023 presidential election,2023-02-25,boundary_synthetic_non_genai,audio_splicing|false_rigging_narrative|cross_platform_spread,not_required_for_focal_asset|material_distribution,not_established|likely_conventional_edit,confirmed,unknown,partial_platform_metrics|persistent_after_debunk,expert_observation_only,unknown,Important synthetic-media boundary case showing how a false first-person rigging narrative can persist through voting without neural generation.,"Splice analysis supports conventional compositing, not generative voice synthesis; thousands of listens and platform persistence do not establish belief, turnout, votes, or the responsible actor.",https://cddfactcheck.org/fact-check-audio-of-atiku-okowa-tambuwal-planning-with-inec-to-rig-elections-is-doctored/|https://www.thecable.ng/fact-check-viral-audio-of-atiku-tambuwal-and-okowa-plotting-to-rig-election-is-doctored/|https://www.cddwestafrica.org/uploads/reports/file/Understanding-the-2023-Nigerian-Presidential-and-National-Assembly-Elections_EACReport.pdf|https://securityandtechnology.org/blog/qa-hannah-ajakaiye/,2026-08-11
 cand-gha-2024-llm-bot-network,Ghana 2024 likely LLM-assisted pro-NPP account network,Ghana,West Africa,2024 general election,2024-12-07,promote_with_detection_caveat,llm_generated_text|coordinated_accounts|hashtag_amplification|inauthentic_engagement,core_content_generation|material_amplification,likely_by_detector_and_behavioural_signals,confirmed_as_research_sample,operator_unknown|beneficiary_inferred,network_internal_engagement_dominant,unknown,unknown,"Useful post-deepfake comparison in which likely LLM text, coordinated schedules, repeated hashtags, and mutual engagement manufactured an appearance of partisan consensus.","AI-text detection and coordination indicators do not prove ChatGPT use, automation, common control, NPP sponsorship, external reach, or electoral effect; most measured engagement was internal.",https://restofworld.org/2024/ghana-election-ai-bots-x-twitter/|https://www.newsguardrealitycheck.com/p/ghana-becomes-the-latest-nation-targeted,2026-08-11
 cand-ken-2022-platform-amplification,"Kenya 2022 recommender amplification, bots, and influence-for-hire",Kenya,East Africa,2022 general election,2022-08-09,promote_after_claim_coding,recommender_amplification|bots|paid_influence|manipulated_media|hate_speech,material_amplification,not_material|conventional_manipulation,confirmed_in_sampled_traces,mostly_domestic|mixed_sponsors,measured_for_selected_content,discourse_effect_asserted|individual_effect_unknown,unknown,"Strong non-generative comparison showing joint agency transfer through paid influence, bot coordination, manipulated media, and opaque recommendation at million-view scale.","The purposive sample's four million views are not electorate-wide prevalence or unique users; recommender lift lacks internal logs, and no causal study links the ecosystem to votes or the result.",https://www.mozillafoundation.org/en/blog/new-research-disinformation-on-tiktok-gaslights-political-tensions-ahead-of-kenyas-2022-elections/|https://www.wired.com/story/kenya-tiktok-election-disinformation-hate-speech/|https://issafrica.org/iss-today/africa-beware-the-dangers-that-digital-influence-poses-for-elections|https://www.mozillafoundation.org/en/blog/fellow-research-platforms-failed-to-curb-misinformation-after-kenyan-election/,2026-08-11

data/case_catalog.csv

@@ -1,14 +1,14 @@
 catalog_id,record_layer,record_type,title,country,region,election_name,election_date,case_status,manipulation_assessment,ai_role,generative_ai_status,evidence_maturity,incident_count_eligible,research_status,source_count_or_links,main_caveat,last_checked
-ro-2024-presidential-annulment,claim_coded_core,election_wide_case,Romania 2024 presidential election: coordinated digital campaign and annulment,Romania,Europe,2024 Romanian presidential election,2024-11-24,retrospective,mixed_documented_manipulation,material_amplification,not_established,high_for_occurrence_mixed_for_effect,true,included_claim_coded,8,"The precise sponsor, foreign attribution, and causal contribution of platform dynamics remain contested; some reporting indicates a domestic party-financed campaign may have been repurposed.",2026-08-11
-ro-2025-presidential-repeat,claim_coded_core,observed_network,Romania 2025 repeat presidential election and cross-platform synthetic-persona network,Romania,Europe,2025 Romanian presidential election repeat,2025-05-04,retrospective,manipulation_confirmed,mixed,confirmed,high_for_occurrence_mixed_for_effect,true,included_claim_coded,3,"The 16 million figure is a sum of platform views, not unique Romanian voters or authenticated human exposure. DFRLab described the network as pro-Russia from its narratives, but could not identify the operator or prove Russian-state command. A completed repeat election does not resolve the disputed causal basis of the 2024 annulment.",2026-08-11
-md-2024-presidential-referendum,claim_coded_core,election_wide_case,Moldova 2024 presidential election and EU referendum: hybrid interference network,Moldova,Europe,2024 presidential election and EU constitutional referendum,2024-10-20,retrospective,mixed_documented_manipulation,mixed,confirmed,high_for_occurrence_mixed_for_effect,true,included_claim_coded,7,Russia and Ilan Shor denied key allegations; official recipient counts do not establish how every payment affected voting; observers also identified incumbent advantage and misuse of public resources.,2026-08-11
-md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,claim_coded_core,observed_network,Moldova 2025 parliamentary election: continuation of hybrid influence infrastructure,Moldova,Europe,2025 Moldovan parliamentary election,2025-09-28,retrospective,manipulation_confirmed,mixed,confirmed,high_for_occurrence_mixed_for_effect,true,included_claim_coded,2,The platform totals are not unique people or authenticated Moldovan voters. Operational ties to Shor-affiliated or Russia-linked structures vary by component; direct Kremlin command is not proved for every asset. The presence of AI content and automated accounts does not establish decisive reach or electoral effect.,2026-08-11
-us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,claim_coded_core,observed_incident,New Hampshire 2024 AI-cloned Biden robocall,United States,North America,2024 New Hampshire Democratic presidential primary,2024-01-23,retrospective,manipulation_confirmed,core_generation,confirmed,high_for_occurrence_mixed_for_effect,true,included_claim_coded,12,"The jury acquitted Kramer of all 22 state criminal charges; the FCC finding, civil default, and acquittal are distinct proceedings. No credible evidence quantifies changed turnout or votes.",2026-08-11
-br-2026-election-preparedness,claim_coded_core,preparedness_file,Brazil 2026 general election: AI governance and integrity preparedness,Brazil,South America,2026 Brazilian general election,2026-10-04,ongoing,preparedness_not_incident,mixed,confirmed,high_for_occurrence_mixed_for_effect,false,included_claim_coded,9,Brazil's 2024 municipal election research found far less high-impact AI abuse than feared; preparedness and incident counts do not imply electoral effect.,2026-08-11
-br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,claim_coded_core,observed_incident,Brazil 2026 Bolsonaro AI avatar at Flávio Bolsonaro campaign launch,Brazil,South America,2026 Brazilian presidential election,2026-10-04,ongoing,transparent_contested_use,core_generation,confirmed,high_for_occurrence_mixed_for_effect,true,included_claim_coded,7,The avatar disclosed that it was AI-generated; disclosure weakens a simple covert-deception theory and the campaign denied that the item was an unlawful deepfake. Jair Bolsonaro's authorisation was denied by his lawyers and remains unknown.,2026-08-11
-us-2026-midterms-preparedness,claim_coded_core,preparedness_file,United States 2026 midterm election: fragmented AI governance and preparedness,United States,North America,2026 United States midterm election,2026-11-03,ongoing,preparedness_not_incident,mixed,confirmed,high_for_occurrence_mixed_for_effect,false,included_claim_coded,9,Generative AI amplified existing risks more often than creating wholly new ones in prior cycles; observed synthetic ads do not establish electoral effects.,2026-08-11
-us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,claim_coded_core,observed_campaign_set,United States 2026 campaign-produced synthetic candidate ads,United States,North America,2026 United States midterm campaigns,2026-11-03,ongoing,mixed_documented_manipulation,core_generation,confirmed,high_for_occurrence_mixed_for_effect,true,included_claim_coded,6,"Some ads reproduce genuine prior words, contain disclosures, or are framed as satire; these features complicate classification as deception.",2026-08-11
-us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,claim_coded_core,observed_incident,California 11th District: campaign-controlled Connie Chan parody chatbot,United States,North America,2026 California 11th congressional district general election,2026-11-03,ongoing,transparent_contested_use,core_generation,confirmed,high_for_occurrence_mixed_for_effect,true,included_claim_coded,4,"The site openly described itself as AI and parody, disclosed that it was unaffiliated with Chan and paid for by Wiener, and did not purport to be Chan's authentic service. The campaign said adversarial prompts drove the controversial exchanges and that safeguards were tightened.",2026-08-12
+ro-2024-presidential-annulment,claim_coded_core,election_wide_case,Romania 2024 presidential election: coordinated digital campaign and annulment,Romania,Europe,2024 Romanian presidential election,2024-11-24,retrospective,mixed_documented_manipulation,material_amplification,not_established,occurrence_supported_agency_effect_not_established,true,included_claim_coded,8,"The precise sponsor, foreign attribution, and causal contribution of platform dynamics remain contested; some reporting indicates a domestic party-financed campaign may have been repurposed.",2026-08-11
+ro-2025-presidential-repeat,claim_coded_core,observed_network,Romania 2025 repeat presidential election and cross-platform synthetic-persona network,Romania,Europe,2025 Romanian presidential election repeat,2025-05-04,retrospective,manipulation_confirmed,mixed,confirmed,occurrence_supported_agency_effect_not_established,true,included_claim_coded,3,"The 16 million figure is a sum of platform views, not unique Romanian voters or authenticated human exposure. DFRLab described the network as pro-Russia from its narratives, but could not identify the operator or prove Russian-state command. A completed repeat election does not resolve the disputed causal basis of the 2024 annulment.",2026-08-11
+md-2024-presidential-referendum,claim_coded_core,election_wide_case,Moldova 2024 presidential election and EU referendum: hybrid interference network,Moldova,Europe,2024 presidential election and EU constitutional referendum,2024-10-20,retrospective,mixed_documented_manipulation,mixed,confirmed,occurrence_supported_agency_effect_not_established,true,included_claim_coded,7,Russia and Ilan Shor denied key allegations; official recipient counts do not establish how every payment affected voting; observers also identified incumbent advantage and misuse of public resources.,2026-08-11
+md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,claim_coded_core,observed_network,Moldova 2025 parliamentary election: continuation of hybrid influence infrastructure,Moldova,Europe,2025 Moldovan parliamentary election,2025-09-28,retrospective,manipulation_confirmed,mixed,confirmed,occurrence_supported_agency_effect_not_established,true,included_claim_coded,2,The platform totals are not unique people or authenticated Moldovan voters. Operational ties to Shor-affiliated or Russia-linked structures vary by component; direct Kremlin command is not proved for every asset. The presence of AI content and automated accounts does not establish decisive reach or electoral effect.,2026-08-11
+us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,claim_coded_core,observed_incident,New Hampshire 2024 AI-cloned Biden robocall,United States,North America,2024 New Hampshire Democratic presidential primary,2024-01-23,retrospective,manipulation_confirmed,core_generation,confirmed,occurrence_supported_agency_effect_not_established,true,included_claim_coded,12,"The jury acquitted Kramer of all 22 state criminal charges; the FCC finding, civil default, and acquittal are distinct proceedings. No credible evidence quantifies changed turnout or votes.",2026-08-11
+br-2026-election-preparedness,claim_coded_core,preparedness_file,Brazil 2026 general election: AI governance and integrity preparedness,Brazil,South America,2026 Brazilian general election,2026-10-04,ongoing,preparedness_not_incident,mixed,confirmed,governance_context_not_incident,false,included_claim_coded,9,Brazil's 2024 municipal election research found far less high-impact AI abuse than feared; preparedness and incident counts do not imply electoral effect.,2026-08-11
+br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,claim_coded_core,observed_incident,Brazil 2026 Bolsonaro AI avatar at Flávio Bolsonaro campaign launch,Brazil,South America,2026 Brazilian presidential election,2026-10-04,ongoing,transparent_contested_use,core_generation,confirmed,occurrence_supported_agency_effect_not_established,true,included_claim_coded,7,The avatar disclosed that it was AI-generated; disclosure weakens a simple covert-deception theory and the campaign denied that the item was an unlawful deepfake. Jair Bolsonaro's authorisation was denied by his lawyers and remains unknown.,2026-08-11
+us-2026-midterms-preparedness,claim_coded_core,preparedness_file,United States 2026 midterm election: fragmented AI governance and preparedness,United States,North America,2026 United States midterm election,2026-11-03,ongoing,preparedness_not_incident,mixed,confirmed,governance_context_not_incident,false,included_claim_coded,9,Generative AI amplified existing risks more often than creating wholly new ones in prior cycles; observed synthetic ads do not establish electoral effects.,2026-08-11
+us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,claim_coded_core,observed_campaign_set,United States 2026 campaign-produced synthetic candidate ads,United States,North America,2026 United States midterm campaigns,2026-11-03,ongoing,mixed_documented_manipulation,core_generation,confirmed,occurrence_supported_agency_effect_not_established,true,included_claim_coded,6,"Some ads reproduce genuine prior words, contain disclosures, or are framed as satire; these features complicate classification as deception.",2026-08-11
+us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,claim_coded_core,observed_incident,California 11th District: campaign-controlled Connie Chan parody chatbot,United States,North America,2026 California 11th congressional district general election,2026-11-03,ongoing,transparent_contested_use,core_generation,confirmed,occurrence_supported_agency_effect_not_established,true,included_claim_coded,4,"The site openly described itself as AI and parody, disclosed that it was unaffiliated with Chan and paid for by Wiener, and did not purport to be Chan's authentic service. The campaign said adversarial prompts drove the controversial exchanges and that safeguards were tightened.",2026-08-12
 cand-usa-2016-ira-social-influence,screening_register,candidate_lead,Internet Research Agency social influence operation,United States,North America,2016 presidential election,2016-11-08,screening,not_yet_claim_coded,material_amplification,not_applicable,confirmed,false,promote_after_claim_coding,2,Platform reach figures cover different denominators and time windows; official investigations did not causally estimate votes or turnout changed.,2026-08-11
 cand-usa-2016-cambridge-analytica,screening_register,candidate_lead,Cambridge Analytica voter profiling and deceptive Facebook data collection,United States,North America,2016 presidential election,2016-11-08,screening,not_yet_claim_coded,supporting_tool,not_applicable,confirmed,false,promote_after_claim_coding,2,"FTC findings establish collection and profiling, not that psychographic targeting outperformed ordinary targeting or changed the election.",2026-08-11
 cand-usa-2020-iran-proud-boys-emails,screening_register,candidate_lead,Iran-attributed Proud Boys voter-threat emails,United States,North America,2020 presidential election,2020-11-03,screening,not_yet_claim_coded,supporting_tool,not_established,confirmed,false,promote_after_claim_coding,2,State attribution is stronger than unadjudicated charges against named individuals; no public-opinion or election effect was assessed.,2026-08-11

data/case_sources.csv

@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ br-2026-election-preparedness,src-br-tse-agu-20260803,ongoing_monitoring,respons
 br-2026-election-preparedness,src-br-tse-council-20260807,ongoing_monitoring,response,
 br-2026-election-preparedness,src-br-tse-elevenlabs-202608,ongoing_monitoring,response,
 br-2026-election-preparedness,src-br-aio-202411,counterevidence,counterevidence,Prior-cycle evidence.
-br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728,corroboration,occurrence|mechanism|attribution|behavioural_effect|legal_status|counterevidence|agency_transfer,Time-sensitive ongoing legal dispute.
+br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728,corroboration,occurrence|mechanism|attribution|behavioural_effect|legal_status|counterevidence,Time-sensitive ongoing legal dispute.
 br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302,primary_record,legal_status|counterevidence,
 us-2026-midterms-preparedness,src-us-fec-dates-2026,primary_record,occurrence,
 us-2026-midterms-preparedness,src-us-cisa-genai-202401,methodology,ai_role,Prior-cycle assessment. Contextual source roles not represented by an atomic claim in this release were omitted from supports_claim_types: mechanism.
@@ -45,24 +45,24 @@ us-2026-midterms-preparedness,src-us-fcc-ai-voice-20240208,context,legal_status|
 us-2026-midterms-preparedness,src-us-ncsl-20260623,ongoing_monitoring,legal_status,
 us-2026-midterms-preparedness,src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328,ongoing_monitoring,occurrence|legal_status,Contextual source roles not represented by an atomic claim in this release were omitted from supports_claim_types: mechanism.
 us-2026-midterms-preparedness,src-global-meta-muted-20241203,counterevidence,counterevidence,Platform assessment reported by Reuters.
-us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328,corroboration,occurrence|mechanism|reach|behavioural_effect|counterevidence|agency_transfer,
+us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328,corroboration,occurrence|mechanism|reach|behavioural_effect|counterevidence,
 us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,src-us-ncsl-20260623,context,,Contextual source roles not represented by an atomic claim in this release were omitted from supports_claim_types: legal_status.
 us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,src-global-pdid-2024,methodology,,Methodology reference; not direct support for an atomic claim.
 us-2026-midterms-preparedness,src-global-row-tracker-20240416,methodology,,Methodology reference; not direct support for an atomic claim.
-us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,src-us-fcc-kramer-final-pdf-20240926,primary_record,occurrence|attribution|reach|legal_status|institutional_outcome|agency_transfer,Final FCC order.
-us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,src-us-fcc-lingo-consent-202408,primary_record,reach|mechanism|institutional_outcome|agency_transfer,Consent decree; not criminal adjudication.
+us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,src-us-fcc-kramer-final-pdf-20240926,primary_record,occurrence|attribution|reach|legal_status|institutional_outcome,Final FCC order.
+us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,src-us-fcc-lingo-consent-202408,primary_record,reach|mechanism|institutional_outcome,Consent decree; not criminal adjudication.
 us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,src-us-ap-kramer-acquittal-20250613,counterevidence,legal_status,All 22 state counts acquitted. Contextual source roles not represented by an atomic claim in this release were omitted from supports_claim_types: counterevidence.
 us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,src-us-lwv-kramer-civil,corroboration,institutional_outcome,Secondary case index and outcome summary linking filings.
 us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,src-us-ap-kramer-default-202511,corroboration,institutional_outcome,"Default, not contested merits trial."
 br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,src-br-tse-res-23610-consolidated,primary_record,legal_status|counterevidence,Operative consolidated arts. 9-B and 9-C.
 br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,src-br-avatar-petition-20260726,primary_record,legal_status|occurrence,"Filing proves allegations were made, not violation."
-br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,src-br-ft-avatar-202607,corroboration,attribution|agency_transfer|counterevidence,Reports authorisation denial.
+br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,src-br-ft-avatar-202607,corroboration,attribution|counterevidence,Reports authorisation denial.
 br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,src-br-folha-avatar-defense-202607,counterevidence,legal_status|counterevidence,Defence position.
 br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,src-br-poder360-avatar-pending-20260811,ongoing_monitoring,legal_status,Scheduled meeting is not a merits outcome. Contextual source roles not represented by an atomic claim in this release were omitted from supports_claim_types: institutional_outcome.
-us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,src-us-nrsc-talarico-20260311,primary_record,occurrence|mechanism|counterevidence|agency_transfer,Primary actor artifact and transcript. Contextual source roles not represented by an atomic claim in this release were omitted from supports_claim_types: attribution.
+us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,src-us-nrsc-talarico-20260311,primary_record,occurrence|mechanism|counterevidence,Primary actor artifact and transcript. Contextual source roles not represented by an atomic claim in this release were omitted from supports_claim_types: attribution.
 us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,src-us-nrsc-talarico-youtube,ongoing_monitoring,reach,Dynamic one-platform metric.
-us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,src-us-berkeley-talarico-2026,corroboration,mechanism|agency_transfer,Expert context. Contextual source roles not represented by an atomic claim in this release were omitted from supports_claim_types: ai_role.
-us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804,corroboration,occurrence|attribution|ai_role|mechanism|counterevidence|agency_transfer,Reporting includes direct interface and privacy-policy observation.
-us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,src-us-ca11-sfgate-20260804,corroboration,occurrence|attribution|ai_role|mechanism|counterevidence|agency_transfer,Direct campaign statements and interface testing.
+us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,src-us-berkeley-talarico-2026,corroboration,mechanism,Expert context. Contextual source roles not represented by an atomic claim in this release were omitted from supports_claim_types: ai_role.
+us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804,corroboration,occurrence|attribution|ai_role|mechanism|counterevidence,Reporting includes direct interface and privacy-policy observation.
+us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,src-us-ca11-sfgate-20260804,corroboration,occurrence|attribution|ai_role|mechanism|counterevidence,Direct campaign statements and interface testing.
 us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,src-us-ca11-mission-20260807,corroboration,occurrence|reach|response|behavioural_effect,Supports exact campaign-reported interaction count and withdrawal.
-us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,src-us-ca11-axios-20260811,corroboration,occurrence|ai_role|mechanism|reach|response|behavioural_effect|agency_transfer,Independent synthesis and expert context.
+us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,src-us-ca11-axios-20260811,corroboration,occurrence|ai_role|mechanism|reach|response|behavioural_effect,Independent synthesis and expert context.

data/cases.csv

@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
-case_id,case_family_id,title,country,iso3,region,election_name,election_type,election_date_start,election_date_end,case_status,as_of_date,anchor_case,record_type,manipulation_assessment,summary,actor_controlling_system,actor_type,actor_attribution_status,target_population,influence_vector,platforms,mechanism_class,ai_role,generative_ai_status,affected_state,agency_transfer_path,power_concentrated_in,democratic_harm,occurrence_status,reach_status,reach_estimate,reach_unit,behavioural_effect_status,electoral_effect_status,institutional_outcome,response,inclusion_tier,overall_confidence,counterevidence,open_questions,last_verified
-ro-2024-presidential-annulment,romania-presidential-2024-2025,Romania 2024 presidential election: coordinated digital campaign and annulment,Romania,ROU,Europe,2024 Romanian presidential election,presidential,2024-11-24,2024-11-24,retrospective,2026-08-11,true,election_wide_case,mixed_documented_manipulation,"Romania's Constitutional Court annulled the presidential election after the first round amid officially documented concerns about campaign irregularities, opaque coordinated promotion, platform recommender risks, cyber activity, and foreign interference. Generative AI is not established as a material driver.",mixed and partly unresolved campaign networks; platform recommender systems; alleged foreign-linked actors,campaign_network|platform|alleged_foreign_actor,mixed,Romanian voters,"short-form video recommendations, coordinated accounts, undeclared promotion, cyber and information operations",TikTok|Telegram|Facebook|web,recommender_amplification|coordinated_inauthentic_behaviour|paid_influence|institutional_response,material_amplification,not_established,attention|belief|trust|electoral choice,opaque campaign and amplification capabilities → network operators and platform ranking → voters' attention and informational environment → agenda-setting and choice architecture shift away from voters → influence power concentrates in campaign operators and platforms,campaign network operators and platform ranking systems,"unequal campaign conditions, opacity, impaired informed choice, institutional loss of confidence, annulment of the election",partly_confirmed,platform_reported,,,unknown,institutionally_asserted,The Constitutional Court annulled the entire presidential electoral process on 6 December 2024.,Court annulment; declassification; European Commission DSA proceedings; platform removals; repeat election.,A,0.91,"The precise sponsor, foreign attribution, and causal contribution of platform dynamics remain contested; some reporting indicates a domestic party-financed campaign may have been repurposed.",Who financed and directed each network component? What organic versus coordinated reach occurred? Did any exposure change voting behaviour? What will the DSA proceeding finally establish?,2026-08-11
-ro-2025-presidential-repeat,romania-presidential-2024-2025,Romania 2025 repeat presidential election and cross-platform synthetic-persona network,Romania,ROU,Europe,2025 Romanian presidential election repeat,presidential,2025-05-04,2025-05-18,retrospective,2026-08-11,true,observed_network,manipulation_confirmed,"The repeat election is coded as the institutional aftermath of the annulment and as a distinct cross-platform influence file. DFRLab documented at least 215 coordinated or apparently hijacked accounts, synthetic Romanian personas, generative-AI assets, and a pivot from support for Călin Georgescu to George Simion. The operation's sponsor and any voter effect remain unknown.",unknown cross-platform network operator; platform distribution systems; responding election authorities,unknown_network|platform|institution,unknown,Romanian voters,"coordinated and hijacked accounts, synthetic personas, AI avatars, false local-news identity, cross-platform hashtags, and institutional decisions",TikTok|Facebook|Telegram|web,institutional_response|recommender_amplification|coordinated_inauthentic_behaviour,mixed,confirmed,trust|participation|belief,post-annulment uncertainty and platform-mediated campaigning → institutions and information intermediaries → voters' trust and opportunity to choose → exceptional institutional control over the electoral timetable,electoral institutions and large platforms,"persistent distrust, polarisation, and uncertainty around electoral legitimacy",confirmed,measured,16000000,non-unique cross-platform views reported for the studied network,unknown,unknown,A repeat presidential election was held in May 2025.,"Expanded observation, platform engagement, partial deplatforming, and election-integrity safeguards.",A,0.91,"The 16 million figure is a sum of platform views, not unique Romanian voters or authenticated human exposure. DFRLab described the network as pro-Russia from its narratives, but could not identify the operator or prove Russian-state command. A completed repeat election does not resolve the disputed causal basis of the 2024 annulment.",Who operated and financed the network? How much reach was authentic and in-country? Which safeguards measurably reduced manipulation? How did the annulment itself affect trust and participation?,2026-08-11
-md-2024-presidential-referendum,moldova-elections-2024-2025,Moldova 2024 presidential election and EU referendum: hybrid interference network,Moldova,MDA,Europe,2024 presidential election and EU constitutional referendum,presidential|referendum,2024-10-20,2024-11-03,retrospective,2026-08-11,true,election_wide_case,mixed_documented_manipulation,"A high-evidence hybrid-interference file combining alleged illicit foreign finance and vote buying with disinformation, spoofed media, coordinated accounts, bots, and some AI-generated content. AI is one layer of the operation, not a demonstrated causal explanation for the narrow referendum result.",Ilan Shor-linked network and alleged Russian sponsors; coordinated account operators; platforms,political_network|alleged_foreign_actor|platform,officially_attributed,"Moldovan voters, including linguistic minorities and diaspora","payments, messaging apps, spoofed media, bots, coordinated accounts, synthetic video",Telegram|Facebook|Instagram|TikTok|YouTube|web,illicit_finance|coordinated_inauthentic_behaviour|bot_amplification|spoofed_media|synthetic_video,mixed,confirmed,belief|trust|preference|participation,"finance plus scalable persuasion and impersonation → network sponsors and operators → voters' information, incentives, and preferences → autonomous deliberation and choice displaced by covert influence → power concentrates in sponsors and intermediaries",foreign-linked political-finance and influence networks,"distorted campaign conditions, covert inducement, impaired informed choice, institutional distrust",partly_confirmed,estimated,138000+,"authority-reported accounts and transactions across linked investigations; not recipients, people, or voter reach",indicated,unknown,The referendum passed and Maia Sandu won the presidential runoff; investigations and platform takedowns continued.,Police and prosecutorial investigations; account and channel removals; campaign-finance enforcement; international observation and public attribution.,A,0.93,Russia and Ilan Shor denied key allegations; official recipient counts do not establish how every payment affected voting; observers also identified incumbent advantage and misuse of public resources.,"How many recipients acted on payments? Which synthetic pieces achieved material exposure? What portion of the network was centrally directed? What vote effect, if any, occurred?",2026-08-11
-md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,moldova-elections-2024-2025,Moldova 2025 parliamentary election: continuation of hybrid influence infrastructure,Moldova,MDA,Europe,2025 Moldovan parliamentary election,parliamentary,2025-09-28,2025-09-28,retrospective,2026-08-11,false,observed_network,manipulation_confirmed,"Linked follow-on evidence shows persistence and adaptation of the 2024 influence infrastructure. A documented paid InfoLeaders network combined inauthentic local personas, Telegram tasking, reciprocal engagement and AI-assisted message adaptation; separate records described synthetic/staged media and context-adaptive bots. Components must not be collapsed into one operator or reach total.",foreign-funded political and influence networks,political_network|alleged_foreign_actor,mixed,Moldovan voters,"social platforms, messaging apps, illicit finance, synthetic and spoofed media",Telegram|Facebook|Instagram|TikTok|YouTube|web,illicit_finance|coordinated_inauthentic_behaviour|bot_amplification|synthetic_video,mixed,confirmed,belief|trust|preference,persistent covert influence infrastructure → network sponsors and operators → voters' information environment and incentives → agenda and deliberation shaped outside transparent competition,foreign-funded influence networks,unequal campaign conditions and impaired informed choice,partly_confirmed,measured,55367950,non-unique cross-platform views reported for the InfoLeaders sample,unknown,unknown,Election completed under an intensified enforcement and information-integrity response.,"Network disruption, financial investigations, platform actions, public warnings, and election observation.",A,0.9,The platform totals are not unique people or authenticated Moldovan voters. Operational ties to Shor-affiliated or Russia-linked structures vary by component; direct Kremlin command is not proved for every asset. The presence of AI content and automated accounts does not establish decisive reach or electoral effect.,"Which 2024 network components persisted, which were newly created, and which shared command? What was authentic in-country exposure? Which interventions worked?",2026-08-11
-us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,new-hampshire-biden-robocall-2024,New Hampshire 2024 AI-cloned Biden robocall,United States,USA,North America,2024 New Hampshire Democratic presidential primary,presidential_primary,2024-01-23,2024-01-23,retrospective,2026-08-11,true,observed_incident,manipulation_confirmed,"An AI-cloned voice impersonating President Joe Biden was distributed by spoofed robocalls shortly before the New Hampshire primary and told recipients not to vote in that contest. The operator admitted creating the call, the FCC imposed civil penalties, and a state jury later acquitted him of all criminal charges.",Steve Kramer and telecom distribution providers,political_consultant|telecom_provider,admitted,New Hampshire Democratic primary voters,"AI voice cloning, caller-ID spoofing, mass robocalls",telephone network,voice_clone|telecom_robocall|voter_suppression,core_generation,confirmed,belief|participation,cheap voice impersonation plus mass calling → political operator and telecom chain → voters' beliefs about an authoritative instruction → participation decision displaced by fabricated presidential voice → power concentrates in the impersonator and distributor,political operator and telecom distribution chain,"impersonation of authority, attempted demobilisation signal, and reduced trust in authentic communications",confirmed,measured,9581,call attempts initiated; 3978 completed calls carried by Lingo according to FCC records,unknown,unknown,FCC $6 million forfeiture; Lingo $1 million consent decree and compliance plan; state criminal acquittal; later federal civil default judgment and injunction; legal clarification that AI-generated voices fall within TCPA artificial-voice restrictions.,"State investigation and charges; FCC declaratory ruling, enforcement, and provider settlement.",A,0.98,"The jury acquitted Kramer of all 22 state criminal charges; the FCC finding, civil default, and acquittal are distinct proceedings. No credible evidence quantifies changed turnout or votes.","How many recipients listened, believed, or acted on the call? How should liability be allocated across creator, intermediary, and originating provider?",2026-08-11
-br-2026-election-preparedness,brazil-general-2026,Brazil 2026 general election: AI governance and integrity preparedness,Brazil,BRA,South America,2026 Brazilian general election,presidential|legislative|gubernatorial,2026-10-04,2026-10-25,ongoing,2026-08-11,true,preparedness_file,preparedness_not_incident,"A prospective monitoring file grounded in enacted TSE rules, platform-compliance obligations, institutional partnerships, and observed 2026 incidents. It does not predict electoral harm.","campaigns, AI providers, platforms, election authorities, and unidentified influence actors",mixed,unknown,Brazilian voters,"synthetic media, recommender outputs, political advertising, bots, voice cloning, platform distribution",major social platforms|generative AI systems|messaging apps|web,synthetic_video|voice_clone|recommender_amplification|bot_amplification|institutional_response,mixed,confirmed,belief|trust|preference|participation,"generative and ranking capabilities → campaigns, providers, and covert operators → voters' information and choice architecture → possible displacement of deliberation or authentic representation → potential power concentration in campaigns and platforms","campaigns, AI providers, and large platforms, constrained by election authorities","prospective: deception, impersonation, discriminatory political violence, suppression, and loss of confidence",partly_confirmed,unknown,,,unknown,unknown,Pending; first round scheduled for 4 October 2026 and runoff for 25 October 2026.,"Mandatory AI disclosure, time-limited ban on new candidate/public-figure synthetic media, provider duties, complaint channels, compliance plans, expert partnerships, and monitoring council.",A,0.95,Brazil's 2024 municipal election research found far less high-impact AI abuse than feared; preparedness and incident counts do not imply electoral effect.,Will providers comply in practice? How quickly will labelled and unlabelled content be detected and adjudicated? Will rules apply consistently across closed messaging and AI assistants?,2026-08-11
-br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,brazil-general-2026,Brazil 2026 Bolsonaro AI avatar at Flávio Bolsonaro campaign launch,Brazil,BRA,South America,2026 Brazilian presidential election,presidential,2026-10-04,2026-10-25,ongoing,2026-08-11,true,observed_incident,transparent_contested_use,A disclosed AI avatar of former president Jair Bolsonaro appeared at the launch of his son Flávio's presidential campaign. Federação Brasil da Esperança challenged it in TSE representation RP 0601315-97.2026.6.00.0000; the defence argued that disclosure and the absence of deceptive editing made it lawful. The TSE had not finally resolved the dispute as of the cutoff.,Flávio Bolsonaro campaign or allied producer; authorisation by Jair Bolsonaro unresolved,campaign,credibly_reported,Brazilian voters and campaign attendees,disclosed synthetic image and voice presented as an endorsement,campaign event|social video|news media,synthetic_video|voice_clone,core_generation,confirmed,preference|perceived endorsement|trust,synthetic embodiment of a restricted political figure → campaign producer → voters' perception of endorsement and presence → representation mediated by a controllable avatar → power concentrates in the producer deciding what the avatar says,campaign producer controlling the synthetic persona,contested: possible circumvention of legal restrictions and manipulation through synthetic political presence,confirmed,qualitative,,,unknown,unknown,TSE representation RP 0601315-97.2026.6.00.0000 pending on the merits at the dataset cutoff; an internal TSE meeting was scheduled for 13 August 2026.,Court petitions and public legal scrutiny under TSE synthetic-content rules.,A,0.91,The avatar disclosed that it was AI-generated; disclosure weakens a simple covert-deception theory and the campaign denied that the item was an unlawful deepfake. Jair Bolsonaro's authorisation was denied by his lawyers and remains unknown.,Who authorised and scripted the avatar? Does a labelled clone circumvent communication restrictions? How will TSE distinguish transparent simulation from manipulative synthetic representation?,2026-08-11
-us-2026-midterms-preparedness,us-midterms-2026,United States 2026 midterm election: fragmented AI governance and preparedness,United States,USA,North America,2026 United States midterm election,legislative|state|local,2026-11-03,2026-11-03,ongoing,2026-08-11,true,preparedness_file,preparedness_not_incident,"An ongoing monitoring file for a federal election governed by a state-law patchwork, narrow federal campaign-law tools, existing telecom rules, voluntary platform policies, and documented campaign use of synthetic media.","campaigns, political committees, foreign influence actors, platforms, telecom and AI providers",mixed,mixed,United States voters,"synthetic ads, voice and video impersonation, recommender distribution, robocalls, coordinated influence",television|social platforms|telephone network|generative AI systems|web,synthetic_video|voice_clone|telecom_robocall|recommender_amplification|coordinated_inauthentic_behaviour|institutional_response,mixed,confirmed,belief|trust|preference|participation,"cheap synthetic production and private distribution rules → campaigns, platforms, providers, and covert actors → voters' information environment → authentic representation and deliberation become harder to verify → power concentrates in producers and intermediaries","campaign committees, platforms, and infrastructure providers","prospective and observed: fabricated candidate speech, disclosure ambiguity, suppression attempts, and erosion of epistemic trust",partly_confirmed,qualitative,,,unknown,unknown,Pending; general election scheduled for 3 November 2026.,State disclosure and prohibition laws; FCC artificial-voice enforcement; election-security guidance; platform policies; fact-checking and campaign responses.,A,0.94,Generative AI amplified existing risks more often than creating wholly new ones in prior cycles; observed synthetic ads do not establish electoral effects.,How will state rules apply across jurisdictions? Will disclosures be salient? Which foreign or domestic networks will achieve measurable reach? Can authentic communications remain verifiable?,2026-08-11
-us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,us-midterms-2026,United States 2026 campaign-produced synthetic candidate ads,United States,USA,North America,2026 United States midterm campaigns,legislative|state,2026-11-03,2026-11-03,ongoing,2026-08-11,true,observed_campaign_set,mixed_documented_manipulation,"By March 2026, campaigns and national committees had deployed realistic AI-generated ads depicting opponents saying or doing things they had not recorded, sometimes with small or low-salience disclosures. The 11 March NRSC Talarico ad converted genuine old posts into a synthetic performance and added reaction lines not present in those posts. The case is observed and attributed, but its behavioural or electoral effect is unknown.",National Republican Senatorial Committee and individual campaigns; additional actors may be added,campaign|political_committee,admitted,voters in contested federal and state races,AI-generated political video distributed as campaign advertising and social content,social video|digital advertising|web,synthetic_video|paid_influence,core_generation,confirmed,belief|candidate evaluation|trust,realistic candidate simulation → campaign committees → voters' perception of an opponent's speech or conduct → evidentiary cues become campaign-controlled → representational power concentrates in the content producer,campaigns producing and distributing synthetic representations,"possible misattribution of speech, confusion, normalisation of fabricated evidence, and erosion of trust",confirmed,qualitative,,,unknown,unknown,Pending.,"Candidate objections, voluntary or state-required disclosures, media verification, and calls for clearer rules.",A,0.93,"Some ads reproduce genuine prior words, contain disclosures, or are framed as satire; these features complicate classification as deception.",Were disclosures noticed? What impressions and targeting occurred? Do viewers distinguish quotation from fabricated audiovisual evidence? What legal rules apply in each state?,2026-08-11
-us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,us-midterms-2026,California 11th District: campaign-controlled Connie Chan parody chatbot,United States,USA,North America,2026 California 11th congressional district general election,legislative,2026-11-03,2026-11-03,ongoing,2026-08-12,false,observed_incident,transparent_contested_use,"Scott Wiener for Congress deployed a disclosed, Claude-powered interactive parody that answered in opponent Connie Chan's first person, framed her record through campaign-selected themes, and was removed after four days of backlash. Its privacy policy permitted conversation retention for up to 90 days. The tool was transparent political satire, not a covert deepfake; population reach and electoral effects are unknown.",Scott Wiener for Congress campaign; technical constructor unidentified,campaign|unidentified_vendor,admitted,California 11th District voters and politically interested web visitors; Connie Chan as represented person,"interactive first-person opponent simulation, campaign-selected issue framing, web interface, billboards, and earned media",web|physical_billboards|Claude,synthetic_text|interactive_impersonation|campaign_attack|data_capture,core_generation,confirmed,candidate evaluation|agenda-setting|perceived representation|trust|query privacy,"campaign-controlled deployment and configurable framing → closed-model dynamic generation → users question a synthetic opponent → the campaign selects how Chan appears to answer and its policy permits staff review of query logs → representational and evidentiary control shifts from the candidate and voter verification to the campaign and its infrastructure providers; exact prompt, retrieval sources and guardrails remain unknown","campaign deployer controlling deployment, interface, framing and permitted access to logs; secondarily the model and infrastructure providers",observed appropriation of an opponent's first-person voice and controversy over racialised and gendered outputs; hypothesised misrepresentation and normalisation of synthetic opponents; electoral effect unknown,confirmed,campaign_reported_nonunique_questions,5058,submitted_questions_in_first_27_hours,unknown,unknown,No adjudication or regulatory outcome was identified by the cutoff.,"The campaign removed the chatbot on 7 August 2026, said it would remove two billboards, acknowledged that the experiment missed the mark, and apologised for causing offence.",A,0.94,"The site openly described itself as AI and parody, disclosed that it was unaffiliated with Chan and paid for by Wiener, and did not purport to be Chan's authentic service. The campaign said adversarial prompts drove the controversial exchanges and that safeguards were tightened.","Which Claude version and deployment route were used? Who built the system? What sources, system prompt, retrieval method, and guardrails controlled answers? How many unique people interacted, from where, and with what effects?",2026-08-12
+case_id,case_family_id,title,country,iso3,region,election_name,election_type,election_date_start,election_date_end,case_status,as_of_date,anchor_case,record_type,manipulation_assessment,summary,actor_controlling_system,actor_type,actor_attribution_status,target_population,influence_vector,platforms,mechanism_class,ai_role,generative_ai_status,affected_state,control_shift_hypothesis,hypothesized_power_recipient,democratic_harm,occurrence_status,reach_status,reach_estimate,reach_unit,behavioural_effect_status,electoral_effect_status,institutional_outcome,response,inclusion_tier,counterevidence,open_questions,last_verified
+ro-2024-presidential-annulment,romania-presidential-2024-2025,Romania 2024 presidential election: coordinated digital campaign and annulment,Romania,ROU,Europe,2024 Romanian presidential election,presidential,2024-11-24,2024-11-24,retrospective,2026-08-11,true,election_wide_case,mixed_documented_manipulation,"Romania's Constitutional Court annulled the presidential election after the first round amid officially documented concerns about campaign irregularities, opaque coordinated promotion, platform recommender risks, cyber activity, and foreign interference. Generative AI is not established as a material driver.",mixed and partly unresolved campaign networks; platform recommender systems; alleged foreign-linked actors,campaign_network|platform|alleged_foreign_actor,mixed,Romanian voters,"short-form video recommendations, coordinated accounts, undeclared promotion, cyber and information operations",TikTok|Telegram|Facebook|web,recommender_amplification|coordinated_inauthentic_behaviour|paid_influence|institutional_response,material_amplification,not_established,attention|belief|trust|electoral choice,"Hypothesis: opaque promotion and recommender amplification could shift control over agenda-setting from voters toward campaign-network operators and ranking systems. The record observes a mechanism and institutional response, not individual agency change or a causal link to annulment.",campaign-network operators and platform ranking systems,"Documented unequal campaign conditions, opacity, and institutional disruption; impaired informed choice and causal effects on votes remain unmeasured.",partly_confirmed,platform_reported,,,unknown,unknown,The Constitutional Court annulled the entire presidential electoral process on 6 December 2024.,Court annulment; declassification; European Commission DSA proceedings; platform removals; repeat election.,A,"The precise sponsor, foreign attribution, and causal contribution of platform dynamics remain contested; some reporting indicates a domestic party-financed campaign may have been repurposed.",Who financed and directed each network component? What organic versus coordinated reach occurred? Did any exposure change voting behaviour? What will the DSA proceeding finally establish?,2026-08-11
+ro-2025-presidential-repeat,romania-presidential-2024-2025,Romania 2025 repeat presidential election and cross-platform synthetic-persona network,Romania,ROU,Europe,2025 Romanian presidential election repeat,presidential,2025-05-04,2025-05-18,retrospective,2026-08-11,true,observed_network,manipulation_confirmed,"The repeat election is coded as the institutional aftermath of the annulment and as a distinct cross-platform influence file. DFRLab documented at least 215 coordinated or apparently hijacked accounts, synthetic Romanian personas, generative-AI assets, and a pivot from support for Călin Georgescu to George Simion. The operation's sponsor and any voter effect remain unknown.",unknown cross-platform network operator; platform distribution systems; responding election authorities,unknown_network|platform|institution,unknown,Romanian voters,"coordinated and hijacked accounts, synthetic personas, AI avatars, false local-news identity, cross-platform hashtags, and institutional decisions",TikTok|Facebook|Telegram|web,institutional_response|recommender_amplification|coordinated_inauthentic_behaviour,mixed,confirmed,trust|participation|belief,Hypothesis: synthetic personas and coordinated amplification could let an unidentified operator shape apparent local consensus. Network activity is observed; no individual agency change or electoral effect is measured.,unidentified network operator and platform distribution systems,"Potential distrust, polarisation, and uncertainty around electoral legitimacy; no individual trust or agency outcome is measured.",confirmed,measured,16000000,non-unique cross-platform views reported for the studied network,unknown,unknown,A repeat presidential election was held in May 2025.,"Expanded observation, platform engagement, partial deplatforming, and election-integrity safeguards.",A,"The 16 million figure is a sum of platform views, not unique Romanian voters or authenticated human exposure. DFRLab described the network as pro-Russia from its narratives, but could not identify the operator or prove Russian-state command. A completed repeat election does not resolve the disputed causal basis of the 2024 annulment.",Who operated and financed the network? How much reach was authentic and in-country? Which safeguards measurably reduced manipulation? How did the annulment itself affect trust and participation?,2026-08-11
+md-2024-presidential-referendum,moldova-elections-2024-2025,Moldova 2024 presidential election and EU referendum: hybrid interference network,Moldova,MDA,Europe,2024 presidential election and EU constitutional referendum,presidential|referendum,2024-10-20,2024-11-03,retrospective,2026-08-11,true,election_wide_case,mixed_documented_manipulation,"A high-evidence hybrid-interference file combining alleged illicit foreign finance and vote buying with disinformation, spoofed media, coordinated accounts, bots, and some AI-generated content. AI is one layer of the operation, not a demonstrated causal explanation for the narrow referendum result.",Ilan Shor-linked network and alleged Russian sponsors; coordinated account operators; platforms,political_network|alleged_foreign_actor|platform,officially_attributed,"Moldovan voters, including linguistic minorities and diaspora","payments, messaging apps, spoofed media, bots, coordinated accounts, synthetic video",Telegram|Facebook|Instagram|TikTok|YouTube|web,illicit_finance|coordinated_inauthentic_behaviour|bot_amplification|spoofed_media|synthetic_video,mixed,confirmed,belief|trust|preference|participation,"Hypothesis: covert finance, inducement, coordinated amplification, and impersonation could shift control over electoral choice toward sponsors and operators. An inducement attempt and some payment acceptance are documented; how recipients voted is unknown.",foreign-linked political-finance and influence networks,"Documented covert-inducement and unequal-campaign-condition concerns; impaired informed choice and institutional distrust are plausible harms, not measured individual outcomes.",partly_confirmed,unknown,,,unknown,unknown,The referendum passed and Maia Sandu won the presidential runoff; investigations and platform takedowns continued.,Police and prosecutorial investigations; account and channel removals; campaign-finance enforcement; international observation and public attribution.,A,Russia and Ilan Shor denied key allegations; official recipient counts do not establish how every payment affected voting; observers also identified incumbent advantage and misuse of public resources.,"How many recipients acted on payments? Which synthetic pieces achieved material exposure? What portion of the network was centrally directed? What vote effect, if any, occurred?",2026-08-11
+md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,moldova-elections-2024-2025,Moldova 2025 parliamentary election: continuation of hybrid influence infrastructure,Moldova,MDA,Europe,2025 Moldovan parliamentary election,parliamentary,2025-09-28,2025-09-28,retrospective,2026-08-11,false,observed_network,manipulation_confirmed,"Linked follow-on evidence shows persistence and adaptation of the 2024 influence infrastructure. A documented paid InfoLeaders network combined inauthentic local personas, Telegram tasking, reciprocal engagement and AI-assisted message adaptation; separate records described synthetic/staged media and context-adaptive bots. Components must not be collapsed into one operator or reach total.",foreign-funded political and influence networks,political_network|alleged_foreign_actor,mixed,Moldovan voters,"social platforms, messaging apps, illicit finance, synthetic and spoofed media",Telegram|Facebook|Instagram|TikTok|YouTube|web,illicit_finance|coordinated_inauthentic_behaviour|bot_amplification|synthetic_video,mixed,confirmed,belief|trust|preference,"Hypothesis: centrally tasked, paid local personas and reciprocal amplification could shift agenda control toward network curators. The mechanism is observed; user belief, choice, and vote effects are not.",foreign-funded influence-network curators and financiers,Potential unequal campaign conditions and impaired informed choice; neither individual agency change nor an electoral effect is measured.,partly_confirmed,measured,55367950,non-unique cross-platform views reported for the InfoLeaders sample,unknown,unknown,Election completed under an intensified enforcement and information-integrity response.,"Network disruption, financial investigations, platform actions, public warnings, and election observation.",A,The platform totals are not unique people or authenticated Moldovan voters. Operational ties to Shor-affiliated or Russia-linked structures vary by component; direct Kremlin command is not proved for every asset. The presence of AI content and automated accounts does not establish decisive reach or electoral effect.,"Which 2024 network components persisted, which were newly created, and which shared command? What was authentic in-country exposure? Which interventions worked?",2026-08-11
+us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,new-hampshire-biden-robocall-2024,New Hampshire 2024 AI-cloned Biden robocall,United States,USA,North America,2024 New Hampshire Democratic presidential primary,presidential_primary,2024-01-23,2024-01-23,retrospective,2026-08-11,true,observed_incident,manipulation_confirmed,"An AI-cloned voice impersonating President Joe Biden was distributed by spoofed robocalls shortly before the New Hampshire primary and told recipients not to vote in that contest. The operator admitted creating the call, the FCC imposed civil penalties, and a state jury later acquitted him of all criminal charges.",Steve Kramer and telecom distribution providers,political_consultant|telecom_provider,admitted,New Hampshire Democratic primary voters,"AI voice cloning, caller-ID spoofing, mass robocalls",telephone network,voice_clone|telecom_robocall|voter_suppression,core_generation,confirmed,belief|participation,"Hypothesis: a cloned authoritative voice, spoofed caller ID, and selected call list could displace recipients' control over a participation decision. A demobilising attempt and call delivery are observed; belief or action is not.",political operator and telecom distribution chain,"Observed impersonation of authority and attempted demobilisation; reduced trust is a plausible harm, not a measured outcome.",confirmed,measured,9581,call attempts initiated; 3978 completed calls carried by Lingo according to FCC records,unknown,unknown,FCC $6 million forfeiture; Lingo $1 million consent decree and compliance plan; state criminal acquittal; later federal civil default judgment and injunction; legal clarification that AI-generated voices fall within TCPA artificial-voice restrictions.,"State investigation and charges; FCC declaratory ruling, enforcement, and provider settlement.",A,"The jury acquitted Kramer of all 22 state criminal charges; the FCC finding, civil default, and acquittal are distinct proceedings. No credible evidence quantifies changed turnout or votes.","How many recipients listened, believed, or acted on the call? How should liability be allocated across creator, intermediary, and originating provider?",2026-08-11
+br-2026-election-preparedness,brazil-general-2026,Brazil 2026 general election: AI governance and integrity preparedness,Brazil,BRA,South America,2026 Brazilian general election,presidential|legislative|gubernatorial,2026-10-04,2026-10-25,ongoing,2026-08-11,true,preparedness_file,preparedness_not_incident,"A prospective monitoring file grounded in enacted TSE rules, platform-compliance obligations, institutional partnerships, and observed 2026 incidents. It does not predict electoral harm.","campaigns, AI providers, platforms, election authorities, and unidentified influence actors",mixed,unknown,Brazilian voters,"synthetic media, recommender outputs, political advertising, bots, voice cloning, platform distribution",major social platforms|generative AI systems|messaging apps|web,synthetic_video|voice_clone|recommender_amplification|bot_amplification|institutional_response,mixed,confirmed,belief|trust|preference|participation,Monitoring hypothesis only: synthetic generation and ranking systems could alter control over voters' information environments. No incident or agency change is asserted.,"potential campaigns, AI providers, and large platforms, constrained by election authorities","prospective: deception, impersonation, discriminatory political violence, suppression, and loss of confidence",partly_confirmed,unknown,,,unknown,unknown,Pending; first round scheduled for 4 October 2026 and runoff for 25 October 2026.,"Mandatory AI disclosure, time-limited ban on new candidate/public-figure synthetic media, provider duties, complaint channels, compliance plans, expert partnerships, and monitoring council.",A,Brazil's 2024 municipal election research found far less high-impact AI abuse than feared; preparedness and incident counts do not imply electoral effect.,Will providers comply in practice? How quickly will labelled and unlabelled content be detected and adjudicated? Will rules apply consistently across closed messaging and AI assistants?,2026-08-11
+br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,brazil-general-2026,Brazil 2026 Bolsonaro AI avatar at Flávio Bolsonaro campaign launch,Brazil,BRA,South America,2026 Brazilian presidential election,presidential,2026-10-04,2026-10-25,ongoing,2026-08-11,true,observed_incident,transparent_contested_use,A disclosed AI avatar of former president Jair Bolsonaro appeared at the launch of his son Flávio's presidential campaign. Federação Brasil da Esperança challenged it in TSE representation RP 0601315-97.2026.6.00.0000; the defence argued that disclosure and the absence of deceptive editing made it lawful. The TSE had not finally resolved the dispute as of the cutoff.,Flávio Bolsonaro campaign or allied producer; authorisation by Jair Bolsonaro unresolved,campaign,credibly_reported,Brazilian voters and campaign attendees,disclosed synthetic image and voice presented as an endorsement,campaign event|social video|news media,synthetic_video|voice_clone,core_generation,confirmed,preference|perceived endorsement|trust,Boundary hypothesis: a disclosed synthetic surrogate could shift control over a represented person's public voice toward a campaign producer. Disclosure is observed; authorisation and any user agency change are unresolved.,campaign producer controlling the synthetic representation,contested: possible circumvention of legal restrictions and manipulation through synthetic political presence,confirmed,qualitative,,,unknown,unknown,TSE representation RP 0601315-97.2026.6.00.0000 pending on the merits at the dataset cutoff; an internal TSE meeting was scheduled for 13 August 2026.,Court petitions and public legal scrutiny under TSE synthetic-content rules.,A,The avatar disclosed that it was AI-generated; disclosure weakens a simple covert-deception theory and the campaign denied that the item was an unlawful deepfake. Jair Bolsonaro's authorisation was denied by his lawyers and remains unknown.,Who authorised and scripted the avatar? Does a labelled clone circumvent communication restrictions? How will TSE distinguish transparent simulation from manipulative synthetic representation?,2026-08-11
+us-2026-midterms-preparedness,us-midterms-2026,United States 2026 midterm election: fragmented AI governance and preparedness,United States,USA,North America,2026 United States midterm election,legislative|state|local,2026-11-03,2026-11-03,ongoing,2026-08-11,true,preparedness_file,preparedness_not_incident,"An ongoing monitoring file for a federal election governed by a state-law patchwork, narrow federal campaign-law tools, existing telecom rules, voluntary platform policies, and documented campaign use of synthetic media.","campaigns, political committees, foreign influence actors, platforms, telecom and AI providers",mixed,mixed,United States voters,"synthetic ads, voice and video impersonation, recommender distribution, robocalls, coordinated influence",television|social platforms|telephone network|generative AI systems|web,synthetic_video|voice_clone|telecom_robocall|recommender_amplification|coordinated_inauthentic_behaviour|institutional_response,mixed,confirmed,belief|trust|preference|participation,Monitoring hypothesis only: synthetic production and fragmented distribution governance could alter control over voters' information environments. No 2026 incident or agency change is asserted in this preparedness record.,"potential campaign committees, platforms, and infrastructure providers","Prospective risk categories include fabricated candidate speech, disclosure ambiguity, suppression attempts, and erosion of epistemic trust; this preparedness record does not establish a 2026 incident or outcome.",partly_confirmed,qualitative,,,unknown,unknown,Pending; general election scheduled for 3 November 2026.,State disclosure and prohibition laws; FCC artificial-voice enforcement; election-security guidance; platform policies; fact-checking and campaign responses.,A,Generative AI amplified existing risks more often than creating wholly new ones in prior cycles; observed synthetic ads do not establish electoral effects.,How will state rules apply across jurisdictions? Will disclosures be salient? Which foreign or domestic networks will achieve measurable reach? Can authentic communications remain verifiable?,2026-08-11
+us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,us-midterms-2026,United States 2026 campaign-produced synthetic candidate ads,United States,USA,North America,2026 United States midterm campaigns,legislative|state,2026-11-03,2026-11-03,ongoing,2026-08-11,true,observed_campaign_set,mixed_documented_manipulation,"By March 2026, campaigns and national committees had deployed realistic AI-generated ads depicting opponents saying or doing things they had not recorded, sometimes with small or low-salience disclosures. The 11 March NRSC Talarico ad converted genuine old posts into a synthetic performance and added reaction lines not present in those posts. The case is observed and attributed, but its behavioural or electoral effect is unknown.",National Republican Senatorial Committee and individual campaigns; additional actors may be added,campaign|political_committee,admitted,voters in contested federal and state races,AI-generated political video distributed as campaign advertising and social content,social video|digital advertising|web,synthetic_video|paid_influence,core_generation,confirmed,belief|candidate evaluation|trust,Hypothesis: simulated first-person performance can shift control over a candidate's audiovisual representation toward a sponsor. The assets are observed; any change in voter agency or behaviour is not.,campaign sponsors producing and distributing synthetic representations,"possible misattribution of speech, confusion, normalisation of fabricated evidence, and erosion of trust",confirmed,qualitative,,,unknown,unknown,Pending.,"Candidate objections, voluntary or state-required disclosures, media verification, and calls for clearer rules.",A,"Some ads reproduce genuine prior words, contain disclosures, or are framed as satire; these features complicate classification as deception.",Were disclosures noticed? What impressions and targeting occurred? Do viewers distinguish quotation from fabricated audiovisual evidence? What legal rules apply in each state?,2026-08-11
+us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,us-midterms-2026,California 11th District: campaign-controlled Connie Chan parody chatbot,United States,USA,North America,2026 California 11th congressional district general election,legislative,2026-11-03,2026-11-03,ongoing,2026-08-12,false,observed_incident,transparent_contested_use,"Scott Wiener for Congress deployed a disclosed, Claude-powered interactive parody that answered in opponent Connie Chan's first person, framed her record through campaign-selected themes, and was removed after four days of backlash. Its privacy policy permitted conversation retention for up to 90 days. The tool was transparent political satire, not a covert deepfake; population reach and electoral effects are unknown.",Scott Wiener for Congress campaign; technical constructor unidentified,campaign|unidentified_vendor,admitted,California 11th District voters and politically interested web visitors; Connie Chan as represented person,"interactive first-person opponent simulation, campaign-selected issue framing, web interface, billboards, and earned media",web|physical_billboards|Claude,synthetic_text|interactive_impersonation|campaign_attack|data_capture,core_generation,confirmed,candidate evaluation|agenda-setting|perceived representation|trust|query privacy,"Boundary hypothesis: a disclosed campaign-controlled opponent simulation could shift representational and evidentiary control toward its sponsor. Explicit parody, unknown system configuration, and unmeasured user effects prevent a finding of agency change.",campaign deployer controlling the interface and framing; secondarily model and infrastructure providers,"Observed first-person opponent simulation and public controversy over racialised and gendered outputs; misrepresentation and normalisation harms remain hypotheses, and electoral effect is unknown.",confirmed,campaign_reported_nonunique_questions,5058,submitted_questions_in_first_27_hours,unknown,unknown,No adjudication or regulatory outcome was identified by the cutoff.,"The campaign removed the chatbot on 7 August 2026, said it would remove two billboards, acknowledged that the experiment missed the mark, and apologised for causing offence.",A,"The site openly described itself as AI and parody, disclosed that it was unaffiliated with Chan and paid for by Wiener, and did not purport to be Chan's authentic service. The campaign said adversarial prompts drove the controversial exchanges and that safeguards were tightened.","Which Claude version and deployment route were used? Who built the system? What sources, system prompt, retrieval method, and guardrails controlled answers? How many unique people interacted, from where, and with what effects?",2026-08-12

data/claim_evidence.csv

@@ -1,163 +1,125 @@
-claim_evidence_id,claim_id,source_id,relation,evidence_scope,directness,locator,extracted_at
-ce-clm-ro-001-src-ro-ccr-20241206-supports,clm-ro-001,src-ro-ccr-20241206,supports,underlying_fact,official_record_or_allegation,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-ro-001-src-ro-ccr-summary-2025-supports,clm-ro-001,src-ro-ccr-summary-2025,supports,underlying_fact,official_record_or_allegation,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-ro-002-src-ro-ccr-summary-2025-supports,clm-ro-002,src-ro-ccr-summary-2025,supports,underlying_fact,official_record_or_allegation,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-ro-002-src-ro-ifes-202412-supports,clm-ro-002,src-ro-ifes-202412,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-ro-003-src-ro-ec-tiktok-20241217-supports,clm-ro-003,src-ro-ec-tiktok-20241217,supports,institutional_action,official_record_or_allegation,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-ro-004-src-ro-ccr-summary-2025-supports,clm-ro-004,src-ro-ccr-summary-2025,supports,underlying_fact,official_record_or_allegation,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-ro-004-src-ro-ec-tiktok-20241217-supports,clm-ro-004,src-ro-ec-tiktok-20241217,supports,underlying_fact,official_record_or_allegation,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-ro-004-src-ro-ifes-202412-supports,clm-ro-004,src-ro-ifes-202412,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-ro-005-src-ro-tiktok-integrity-supports,clm-ro-005,src-ro-tiktok-integrity,supports,measurement,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-ro-006-src-ro-ccr-summary-2025-supports,clm-ro-006,src-ro-ccr-summary-2025,supports,underlying_fact,official_record_or_allegation,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-ro-006-src-ro-venice-202503-supports,clm-ro-006,src-ro-venice-202503,supports,underlying_fact,official_record_or_allegation,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-ro-006-src-ro-ifes-202412-supports,clm-ro-006,src-ro-ifes-202412,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-ro-007-src-ro-ccr-summary-2025-supports,clm-ro-007,src-ro-ccr-summary-2025,supports,underlying_fact,official_record_or_allegation,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-ro-007-src-ro-ec-tiktok-20241217-supports,clm-ro-007,src-ro-ec-tiktok-20241217,supports,underlying_fact,official_record_or_allegation,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-ro-007-src-ro-venice-202503-supports,clm-ro-007,src-ro-venice-202503,supports,underlying_fact,official_record_or_allegation,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-ro-007-src-ro-sri-csat-20241204-supports,clm-ro-007,src-ro-sri-csat-20241204,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-ro-007-src-ro-snoop-pnl-20241220-supports,clm-ro-007,src-ro-snoop-pnl-20241220,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-ro-008-src-ro-venice-202503-supports,clm-ro-008,src-ro-venice-202503,supports,underlying_fact,official_record_or_allegation,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-ro-009-src-ro-odihr-repeat-final-supports,clm-ro-009,src-ro-odihr-repeat-final,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-ro-010-src-ro-odihr-repeat-final-supports,clm-ro-010,src-ro-odihr-repeat-final,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-ro-010-src-ro-venice-202503-supports,clm-ro-010,src-ro-venice-202503,supports,underlying_fact,official_record_or_allegation,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-ro-011-src-ro-sri-csat-20241204-supports,clm-ro-011,src-ro-sri-csat-20241204,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-ro-012-src-ro-tiktok-integrity-supports,clm-ro-012,src-ro-tiktok-integrity,supports,measurement,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-ro-012-src-ro-sri-csat-20241204-supports,clm-ro-012,src-ro-sri-csat-20241204,supports,measurement,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-ro-013-src-ro-snoop-pnl-20241220-supports,clm-ro-013,src-ro-snoop-pnl-20241220,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-ro-014-src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826-supports,clm-ro-014,src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-ro-015-src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826-supports,clm-ro-015,src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826,supports,measurement,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-ro-016-src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826-supports,clm-ro-016,src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-ro-017-src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826-supports,clm-ro-017,src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-ro-018-src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826-supports,clm-ro-018,src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-ro-018-src-ro-odihr-repeat-final-supports,clm-ro-018,src-ro-odihr-repeat-final,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-md-001-src-md-odihr-final-20250314-supports,clm-md-001,src-md-odihr-final-20250314,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-md-002-src-md-odihr-final-20250314-supports,clm-md-002,src-md-odihr-final-20250314,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-md-003-src-md-odihr-prelim-20241021-supports,clm-md-003,src-md-odihr-prelim-20241021,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-md-003-src-md-odihr-final-20250314-supports,clm-md-003,src-md-odihr-final-20250314,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-md-004-src-md-reuters-payments-20241024-supports,clm-md-004,src-md-reuters-payments-20241024,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-md-005-src-md-odihr-final-20250314-supports,clm-md-005,src-md-odihr-final-20250314,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-md-005-src-md-reuters-payments-20241024-supports,clm-md-005,src-md-reuters-payments-20241024,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-md-005-src-md-eeas-activity-2025-supports,clm-md-005,src-md-eeas-activity-2025,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-md-005-src-md-reuters-payments-20241024-counterevidence,clm-md-005,src-md-reuters-payments-20241024,counterevidence,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-md-006-src-md-eeas-fimi-202401-supports,clm-md-006,src-md-eeas-fimi-202401,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-md-006-src-md-odihr-parliament-202602-supports,clm-md-006,src-md-odihr-parliament-202602,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-md-007-src-md-meta-threat-reporting-supports,clm-md-007,src-md-meta-threat-reporting,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-md-008-src-md-odihr-parliament-202602-supports,clm-md-008,src-md-odihr-parliament-202602,supports,measurement,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-md-009-src-md-reuters-payments-20241024-supports,clm-md-009,src-md-reuters-payments-20241024,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-md-009-src-md-odihr-final-20250314-supports,clm-md-009,src-md-odihr-final-20250314,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-md-010-src-md-odihr-final-20250314-supports,clm-md-010,src-md-odihr-final-20250314,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-md-011-src-md-odihr-prelim-20241021-supports,clm-md-011,src-md-odihr-prelim-20241021,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-md-011-src-md-odihr-final-20250314-supports,clm-md-011,src-md-odihr-final-20250314,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-md-012-src-md-odihr-parliament-202602-supports,clm-md-012,src-md-odihr-parliament-202602,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-md-013-src-md-odihr-parliament-202602-supports,clm-md-013,src-md-odihr-parliament-202602,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-md-014-src-md-meta-threat-reporting-supports,clm-md-014,src-md-meta-threat-reporting,supports,measurement,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-md-015-src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924-supports,clm-md-015,src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-md-015-src-md-odihr-parliament-202602-supports,clm-md-015,src-md-odihr-parliament-202602,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-md-016-src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924-supports,clm-md-016,src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924,supports,measurement,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-md-017-src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924-supports,clm-md-017,src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-md-018-src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924-supports,clm-md-018,src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-md-018-src-md-odihr-parliament-202602-supports,clm-md-018,src-md-odihr-parliament-202602,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-md-019-src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924-supports,clm-md-019,src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-md-019-src-md-odihr-parliament-202602-supports,clm-md-019,src-md-odihr-parliament-202602,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-nh-001-src-us-fcc-kramer-nal-20240523-supports,clm-nh-001,src-us-fcc-kramer-nal-20240523,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-nh-001-src-us-nhdoj-kramer-20240523-supports,clm-nh-001,src-us-nhdoj-kramer-20240523,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-nh-001-src-us-fcc-kramer-fine-20240926-supports,clm-nh-001,src-us-fcc-kramer-fine-20240926,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-nh-002-src-us-fcc-kramer-nal-20240523-supports,clm-nh-002,src-us-fcc-kramer-nal-20240523,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-nh-002-src-us-nhdoj-kramer-20240523-supports,clm-nh-002,src-us-nhdoj-kramer-20240523,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-nh-003-src-us-fcc-kramer-fine-20240926-supports,clm-nh-003,src-us-fcc-kramer-fine-20240926,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-nh-003-src-us-nhpr-acquittal-20250613-supports,clm-nh-003,src-us-nhpr-acquittal-20250613,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-nh-004-src-us-fcc-kramer-final-pdf-20240926-supports,clm-nh-004,src-us-fcc-kramer-final-pdf-20240926,supports,measurement,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-nh-004-src-us-fcc-lingo-consent-202408-supports,clm-nh-004,src-us-fcc-lingo-consent-202408,supports,measurement,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-nh-005-src-us-fcc-lingo-nal-pdf-20240523-supports,clm-nh-005,src-us-fcc-lingo-nal-pdf-20240523,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-nh-005-src-us-fcc-lingo-settlement-20240821-supports,clm-nh-005,src-us-fcc-lingo-settlement-20240821,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-nh-006-src-us-fcc-ai-voice-20240208-supports,clm-nh-006,src-us-fcc-ai-voice-20240208,supports,underlying_fact,official_record_or_allegation,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-nh-007-src-us-fcc-kramer-final-pdf-20240926-supports,clm-nh-007,src-us-fcc-kramer-final-pdf-20240926,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-nh-007-src-us-fcc-lingo-consent-202408-supports,clm-nh-007,src-us-fcc-lingo-consent-202408,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-nh-008-src-us-nhpr-acquittal-20250613-supports,clm-nh-008,src-us-nhpr-acquittal-20250613,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-nh-008-src-us-ap-kramer-acquittal-20250613-supports,clm-nh-008,src-us-ap-kramer-acquittal-20250613,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-nh-009-src-us-fcc-kramer-fine-20240926-supports,clm-nh-009,src-us-fcc-kramer-fine-20240926,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-nh-009-src-us-nhpr-acquittal-20250613-supports,clm-nh-009,src-us-nhpr-acquittal-20250613,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-nh-010-src-us-fcc-kramer-fine-20240926-supports,clm-nh-010,src-us-fcc-kramer-fine-20240926,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-nh-010-src-us-nhpr-acquittal-20250613-supports,clm-nh-010,src-us-nhpr-acquittal-20250613,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-nh-011-src-us-lwv-kramer-civil-supports,clm-nh-011,src-us-lwv-kramer-civil,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-nh-011-src-us-ap-kramer-default-202511-supports,clm-nh-011,src-us-ap-kramer-default-202511,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-nh-012-src-us-fcc-kramer-final-pdf-20240926-supports,clm-nh-012,src-us-fcc-kramer-final-pdf-20240926,supports,researcher_inference,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-nh-012-src-us-fcc-lingo-consent-202408-supports,clm-nh-012,src-us-fcc-lingo-consent-202408,supports,researcher_inference,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-br-001-src-br-tse-calendar-202603-supports,clm-br-001,src-br-tse-calendar-202603,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-br-002-src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302-supports,clm-br-002,src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-br-002-src-br-tse-ai-rules-202604-supports,clm-br-002,src-br-tse-ai-rules-202604,supports,underlying_fact,official_record_or_allegation,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-br-003-src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302-supports,clm-br-003,src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-br-004-src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302-supports,clm-br-004,src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-br-005-src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302-supports,clm-br-005,src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302,supports,institutional_action,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-br-006-src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302-supports,clm-br-006,src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302,supports,institutional_action,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-br-006-src-br-tse-compliance-202607-supports,clm-br-006,src-br-tse-compliance-202607,supports,institutional_action,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-br-007-src-br-tse-platforms-202607-supports,clm-br-007,src-br-tse-platforms-202607,supports,institutional_action,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-br-007-src-br-tse-agu-20260803-supports,clm-br-007,src-br-tse-agu-20260803,supports,institutional_action,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-br-007-src-br-tse-council-20260807-supports,clm-br-007,src-br-tse-council-20260807,supports,institutional_action,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-br-007-src-br-tse-elevenlabs-202608-supports,clm-br-007,src-br-tse-elevenlabs-202608,supports,institutional_action,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-br-008-src-br-aio-202411-supports,clm-br-008,src-br-aio-202411,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-br-010-src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728-supports,clm-br-010,src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-br-011-src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728-supports,clm-br-011,src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-br-012-src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728-supports,clm-br-012,src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-br-012-src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728-counterevidence,clm-br-012,src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728,counterevidence,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-br-013-src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728-supports,clm-br-013,src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-br-014-src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728-supports,clm-br-014,src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-br-015-src-br-avatar-petition-20260726-supports,clm-br-015,src-br-avatar-petition-20260726,supports,underlying_fact,official_record_or_allegation,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-br-016-src-br-tse-res-23610-consolidated-supports,clm-br-016,src-br-tse-res-23610-consolidated,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-br-017-src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728-supports,clm-br-017,src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-br-017-src-br-tse-res-23610-consolidated-supports,clm-br-017,src-br-tse-res-23610-consolidated,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-br-017-src-br-folha-avatar-defense-202607-counterevidence,clm-br-017,src-br-folha-avatar-defense-202607,counterevidence,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-br-018-src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302-supports,clm-br-018,src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-br-018-src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728-supports,clm-br-018,src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-br-019-src-br-ft-avatar-202607-supports,clm-br-019,src-br-ft-avatar-202607,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-br-019-src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728-supports,clm-br-019,src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-br-020-src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728-supports,clm-br-020,src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728,supports,researcher_inference,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-br-020-src-br-ft-avatar-202607-supports,clm-br-020,src-br-ft-avatar-202607,supports,researcher_inference,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-us26-001-src-us-fec-dates-2026-supports,clm-us26-001,src-us-fec-dates-2026,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-us26-002-src-us-ncsl-20260623-supports,clm-us26-002,src-us-ncsl-20260623,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-us26-003-src-us-fec-ai-disposition-2024-supports,clm-us26-003,src-us-fec-ai-disposition-2024,supports,underlying_fact,official_record_or_allegation,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-us26-003-src-us-ncsl-20260623-supports,clm-us26-003,src-us-ncsl-20260623,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-us26-003-src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328-supports,clm-us26-003,src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-us26-003-src-us-fcc-ai-voice-20240208-counterevidence,clm-us26-003,src-us-fcc-ai-voice-20240208,counterevidence,underlying_fact,official_record_or_allegation,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-us26-004-src-us-cisa-genai-202401-supports,clm-us26-004,src-us-cisa-genai-202401,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-us26-005-src-us-odni-update-20241021-supports,clm-us26-005,src-us-odni-update-20241021,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-us26-006-src-global-meta-muted-20241203-supports,clm-us26-006,src-global-meta-muted-20241203,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-us26-008-src-us-nrsc-talarico-20260311-supports,clm-us26-008,src-us-nrsc-talarico-20260311,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-us26-008-src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328-supports,clm-us26-008,src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-us26-009-src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328-supports,clm-us26-009,src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-us26-009-src-us-berkeley-talarico-2026-supports,clm-us26-009,src-us-berkeley-talarico-2026,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-us26-010-src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328-supports,clm-us26-010,src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328,supports,measurement,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-us26-011-src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328-supports,clm-us26-011,src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-us26-012-src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328-supports,clm-us26-012,src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-us26-013-src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328-supports,clm-us26-013,src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-us26-014-src-us-nrsc-talarico-20260311-supports,clm-us26-014,src-us-nrsc-talarico-20260311,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-us26-014-src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328-supports,clm-us26-014,src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-us26-015-src-us-nrsc-talarico-youtube-supports,clm-us26-015,src-us-nrsc-talarico-youtube,supports,measurement,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-us26-016-src-us-nrsc-talarico-20260311-supports,clm-us26-016,src-us-nrsc-talarico-20260311,supports,researcher_inference,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-us26-016-src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328-supports,clm-us26-016,src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328,supports,researcher_inference,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-us26-016-src-us-berkeley-talarico-2026-supports,clm-us26-016,src-us-berkeley-talarico-2026,supports,researcher_inference,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-11
-ce-clm-usca11-001-src-us-ca11-sfgate-20260804-supports,clm-usca11-001,src-us-ca11-sfgate-20260804,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-12
-ce-clm-usca11-001-src-us-ca11-mission-20260807-supports,clm-usca11-001,src-us-ca11-mission-20260807,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-12
-ce-clm-usca11-001-src-us-ca11-axios-20260811-supports,clm-usca11-001,src-us-ca11-axios-20260811,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-12
-ce-clm-usca11-002-src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804-supports,clm-usca11-002,src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-12
-ce-clm-usca11-002-src-us-ca11-sfgate-20260804-supports,clm-usca11-002,src-us-ca11-sfgate-20260804,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-12
-ce-clm-usca11-002-src-us-ca11-mission-20260807-supports,clm-usca11-002,src-us-ca11-mission-20260807,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-12
-ce-clm-usca11-003-src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804-supports,clm-usca11-003,src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-12
-ce-clm-usca11-003-src-us-ca11-sfgate-20260804-supports,clm-usca11-003,src-us-ca11-sfgate-20260804,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-12
-ce-clm-usca11-003-src-us-ca11-axios-20260811-supports,clm-usca11-003,src-us-ca11-axios-20260811,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-12
-ce-clm-usca11-004-src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804-supports,clm-usca11-004,src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-12
-ce-clm-usca11-004-src-us-ca11-sfgate-20260804-supports,clm-usca11-004,src-us-ca11-sfgate-20260804,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-12
-ce-clm-usca11-004-src-us-ca11-axios-20260811-supports,clm-usca11-004,src-us-ca11-axios-20260811,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-12
-ce-clm-usca11-005-src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804-supports,clm-usca11-005,src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-12
-ce-clm-usca11-005-src-us-ca11-sfgate-20260804-supports,clm-usca11-005,src-us-ca11-sfgate-20260804,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-12
-ce-clm-usca11-006-src-us-ca11-mission-20260807-supports,clm-usca11-006,src-us-ca11-mission-20260807,supports,measurement,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-12
-ce-clm-usca11-006-src-us-ca11-axios-20260811-supports,clm-usca11-006,src-us-ca11-axios-20260811,supports,measurement,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-12
-ce-clm-usca11-007-src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804-supports,clm-usca11-007,src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-12
-ce-clm-usca11-008-src-us-ca11-mission-20260807-supports,clm-usca11-008,src-us-ca11-mission-20260807,supports,institutional_action,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-12
-ce-clm-usca11-008-src-us-ca11-axios-20260811-supports,clm-usca11-008,src-us-ca11-axios-20260811,supports,institutional_action,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-12
-ce-clm-usca11-009-src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804-supports,clm-usca11-009,src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-12
-ce-clm-usca11-009-src-us-ca11-mission-20260807-supports,clm-usca11-009,src-us-ca11-mission-20260807,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-12
-ce-clm-usca11-009-src-us-ca11-axios-20260811-supports,clm-usca11-009,src-us-ca11-axios-20260811,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-12
-ce-clm-usca11-011-src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804-supports,clm-usca11-011,src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804,supports,researcher_inference,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-12
-ce-clm-usca11-011-src-us-ca11-sfgate-20260804-supports,clm-usca11-011,src-us-ca11-sfgate-20260804,supports,researcher_inference,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-12
-ce-clm-usca11-011-src-us-ca11-axios-20260811-supports,clm-usca11-011,src-us-ca11-axios-20260811,supports,researcher_inference,independent_secondary_reporting,,2026-08-12
+claim_evidence_id,claim_id,source_id,relation,evidence_scope,directness,locator,locator_coverage,locator_note,extracted_at
+ce-clm-ro-001-src-ro-ccr-20241206-supports,clm-ro-001,src-ro-ccr-20241206,supports,underlying_fact,official_record_or_allegation,,not_verified,Current Constitutional Court page was not reliably retrievable during audit.,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-ro-001-src-ro-ccr-summary-2025-supports,clm-ro-001,src-ro-ccr-summary-2025,supports,underlying_fact,official_record_or_allegation,,not_verified,Current official summary PDF was not reliably retrievable during audit; no page number was inferred from snippets.,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-ro-002-src-ro-ccr-summary-2025-supports,clm-ro-002,src-ro-ccr-summary-2025,supports,assertion_was_made,official_record_or_allegation,,not_verified,Current official summary PDF was not reliably retrievable during audit; no page number was inferred from snippets.,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-ro-002-src-ro-ifes-202412-supports,clm-ro-002,src-ro-ifes-202412,supports,assertion_was_made,independent_secondary_reporting,Sections 'II. National Security Concerns and Electoral Integrity' and 'III. Re-Opening the Election'.,full_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-ro-003-src-ro-ec-tiktok-20241217-supports,clm-ro-003,src-ro-ec-tiktok-20241217,supports,institutional_action,official_record_or_allegation,"Heading 'The proceedings will focus on the following areas', four-item list.",full_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-ro-005-src-ro-tiktok-integrity-supports,clm-ro-005,src-ro-tiktok-integrity,supports,assertion_was_made,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,"Dated update '17 December', platform-enforcement metrics and network-removal paragraphs.",partial_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-ro-007-src-ro-ccr-summary-2025-premise,clm-ro-007,src-ro-ccr-summary-2025,premise,researcher_inference,official_record_or_allegation,,not_verified,Current official summary PDF was not reliably retrievable during audit; no page number was inferred from snippets.,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-ro-007-src-ro-venice-202503-premise,clm-ro-007,src-ro-venice-202503,premise,researcher_inference,official_record_or_allegation,"Report p. 17, para. 66, disclaimer that the report does not examine the facts of the Romanian case.",partial_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-ro-007-src-ro-sri-csat-20241204-premise,clm-ro-007,src-ro-sri-csat-20241204,premise,researcher_inference,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,not_verified,The linked declassified SRI PDF was not retrievable as a valid document during audit; search snippets were not treated as page locators.,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-ro-007-src-ro-snoop-pnl-20241220-premise,clm-ro-007,src-ro-snoop-pnl-20241220,premise,researcher_inference,independent_secondary_reporting,Headings 'Investigația și concluziile ANAF' and 'Răspunsul firmei angajate de PNL'.,partial_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-ro-008-src-ro-venice-202503-supports,clm-ro-008,src-ro-venice-202503,supports,underlying_fact,official_record_or_allegation,"Report pp. 9-12, paras. 27-42, and p. 16, para. 59.",full_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-ro-009-src-ro-odihr-repeat-final-supports,clm-ro-009,src-ro-odihr-repeat-final,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,"Report cover/title and Executive Summary, p. 1.",full_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-ro-010-src-ro-odihr-repeat-final-premise,clm-ro-010,src-ro-odihr-repeat-final,premise,researcher_inference,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,"Executive Summary, pp. 1–5, and Background, pp. 6–7, describing repeat-election dates, changed campaign context and the 2025 result.",partial_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-ro-011-src-ro-sri-csat-20241204-supports,clm-ro-011,src-ro-sri-csat-20241204,supports,assertion_was_made,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,not_verified,"The linked declassified SRI PDF was not retrievable as a valid document during audit; the 25,000 and 797 figures were not assigned guessed pages.",2026-08-11
+ce-clm-ro-012-src-ro-tiktok-integrity-supports,clm-ro-012,src-ro-tiktok-integrity,supports,measurement,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,"Updates '6 December 2024' and '17 December', especially heading 'Tackling Deceptive Behaviours at Scale'.",partial_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-ro-012-src-ro-sri-csat-20241204-supports,clm-ro-012,src-ro-sri-csat-20241204,supports,measurement,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,not_verified,The linked declassified SRI PDF was not retrievable as a valid document during audit.,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-ro-013-src-ro-snoop-pnl-20241220-supports,clm-ro-013,src-ro-snoop-pnl-20241220,supports,assertion_was_made,independent_secondary_reporting,Headings 'Investigația și concluziile ANAF' and 'Răspunsul firmei angajate de PNL'.,full_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-ro-014-src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826-supports,clm-ro-014,src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,Article introduction and section 'Smaller followings'.,full_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-ro-015-src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826-supports,clm-ro-015,src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826,supports,measurement,independent_secondary_reporting,"Section 'Smaller followings', cross-platform output and engagement totals.",full_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-ro-016-src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826-supports,clm-ro-016,src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,Section 'Stolen accounts and fake personas'.,full_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-ro-017-src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826-premise,clm-ro-017,src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826,premise,researcher_inference,independent_secondary_reporting,"Section 'Conclusion', attribution limits and description of the observed narratives and coordination.",full_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-md-001-src-md-odihr-final-20250314-supports,clm-md-001,src-md-odihr-final-20250314,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,"Report cover/title and 'Background', p. 7.",full_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-md-002-src-md-odihr-final-20250314-supports,clm-md-002,src-md-odihr-final-20250314,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,"Annex I, p. 43, final-results tables for the referendum and presidential runoff.",full_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-md-003-src-md-odihr-prelim-20241021-supports,clm-md-003,src-md-odihr-prelim-20241021,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,"Executive Summary, pp. 1-3.",full_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-md-003-src-md-odihr-final-20250314-supports,clm-md-003,src-md-odihr-final-20250314,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,"Executive Summary, pp. 1-2, and 'Campaign Environment', p. 20.",full_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-md-004-src-md-reuters-payments-20241024-supports,clm-md-004,src-md-reuters-payments-20241024,supports,assertion_was_made,independent_secondary_reporting,Article opening and paragraphs reporting the police allegation of USD 39 million in September and October transfers.,full_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-md-005-src-md-odihr-final-20250314-supports,clm-md-005,src-md-odihr-final-20250314,supports,assertion_was_made,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,"Executive Summary and 'Campaign Environment', pp. 3-4, passages attributing interference components.",partial_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-md-005-src-md-reuters-payments-20241024-supports,clm-md-005,src-md-reuters-payments-20241024,supports,assertion_was_made,independent_secondary_reporting,Article opening and later paragraphs reporting the police attribution and the responses from Russia and Ilan Shor.,full_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-md-005-src-md-reuters-payments-20241024-counterevidence,clm-md-005,src-md-reuters-payments-20241024,counterevidence,assertion_was_made,independent_secondary_reporting,"Article body, paragraphs reporting Russia's and Ilan Shor's denials.",partial_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-md-006-src-md-eeas-fimi-202401-supports,clm-md-006,src-md-eeas-fimi-202401,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,"Report p. 11, section 'Artificial Intelligence is not (yet) the biggest threat'.",partial_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-md-006-src-md-odihr-parliament-202602-supports,clm-md-006,src-md-odihr-parliament-202602,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,"Executive Summary, p. 4, and 'Online Campaign', p. 21.",partial_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-md-007-src-md-meta-threat-reporting-supports,clm-md-007,src-md-meta-threat-reporting,supports,assertion_was_made,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,"Section 'Takeaways', Moldova network-removal item.",full_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-md-008-src-md-odihr-parliament-202602-supports,clm-md-008,src-md-odihr-parliament-202602,supports,assertion_was_made,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,"Report p. 18, footnote 60, listing the heterogeneous account-and-transaction aggregate.",partial_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-md-009-src-md-reuters-payments-20241024-premise,clm-md-009,src-md-reuters-payments-20241024,premise,researcher_inference,independent_secondary_reporting,Article opening and payment-mechanism paragraphs; source records alleged transfers but not each recipient's vote.,partial_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-md-009-src-md-odihr-final-20250314-premise,clm-md-009,src-md-odihr-final-20250314,premise,researcher_inference,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,"Report p. 32, passages on offered or accepted payments and the limits of the available evidence.",partial_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-md-011-src-md-odihr-prelim-20241021-supports,clm-md-011,src-md-odihr-prelim-20241021,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,"Executive Summary, pp. 1-3, and 'Campaign Environment'.",full_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-md-011-src-md-odihr-final-20250314-supports,clm-md-011,src-md-odihr-final-20250314,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,"Executive Summary, pp. 1-3, and 'Campaign Environment', p. 20.",full_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-md-012-src-md-odihr-parliament-202602-supports,clm-md-012,src-md-odihr-parliament-202602,supports,assertion_was_made,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,"Executive Summary, p. 4, and report pp. 18 and 21 on vote buying and online networks.",full_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-md-013-src-md-odihr-parliament-202602-premise,clm-md-013,src-md-odihr-parliament-202602,premise,researcher_inference,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,"Executive Summary, pp. 3–4, passages on inauthentic networks using AI-generated videos and automated bots, plus the election-result context.",partial_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-md-014-src-md-meta-threat-reporting-supports,clm-md-014,src-md-meta-threat-reporting,supports,assertion_was_made,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,"Section 'Takeaways', Moldova item, especially bullet 'Followers'.",full_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-md-015-src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924-supports,clm-md-015,src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,Sections 'The network’s scale' and 'Network organization'.,full_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-md-016-src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924-supports,clm-md-016,src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924,supports,measurement,independent_secondary_reporting,"Section 'The network’s scale', metric paragraph for the 253-account sample.",full_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-md-017-src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924-supports,clm-md-017,src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,"Section 'Network organization', paragraphs on centrally supplied messages, personalisation and mutual amplification.",full_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-nh-001-src-us-fcc-kramer-nal-20240523-supports,clm-nh-001,src-us-fcc-kramer-nal-20240523,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,"Official replacement PDF FCC-24-59A1, p. 1, para. 1.",full_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-nh-001-src-us-nhdoj-kramer-20240523-supports,clm-nh-001,src-us-nhdoj-kramer-20240523,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,not_verified,The New Hampshire DOJ page returned an access block and no primary passage was retrieved.,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-nh-001-src-us-fcc-kramer-fine-20240926-supports,clm-nh-001,src-us-fcc-kramer-fine-20240926,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,"Official replacement PDF FCC-24-104A1, p. 1, para. 1.",full_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-nh-002-src-us-fcc-kramer-nal-20240523-supports,clm-nh-002,src-us-fcc-kramer-nal-20240523,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,"Official replacement PDF FCC-24-59A1, pp. 2-3, para. 5.",full_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-nh-002-src-us-nhdoj-kramer-20240523-supports,clm-nh-002,src-us-nhdoj-kramer-20240523,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,not_verified,The New Hampshire DOJ page returned an access block and no primary passage was retrieved.,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-nh-003-src-us-fcc-kramer-fine-20240926-supports,clm-nh-003,src-us-fcc-kramer-fine-20240926,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,"Official replacement PDF FCC-24-104A1, p. 7, para. 16, and p. 11, paras. 25-27.",full_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-nh-003-src-us-nhpr-acquittal-20250613-supports,clm-nh-003,src-us-nhpr-acquittal-20250613,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,"Article opening, paragraph stating that Kramer admitted commissioning the call.",full_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-nh-004-src-us-fcc-kramer-final-pdf-20240926-supports,clm-nh-004,src-us-fcc-kramer-final-pdf-20240926,supports,measurement,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,"PDF p. 7, para. 12, call-attempt total of 9,581.",partial_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-nh-004-src-us-fcc-lingo-consent-202408-supports,clm-nh-004,src-us-fcc-lingo-consent-202408,supports,measurement,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,"Order para. 8 and corresponding Consent Decree factual background, completed-call total of 3,978 and A-level attestations.",partial_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-nh-005-src-us-fcc-lingo-nal-pdf-20240523-supports,clm-nh-005,src-us-fcc-lingo-nal-pdf-20240523,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,"PDF p. 2, para. 3, and pp. 8-12, paras. 14-23.",partial_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-nh-005-src-us-fcc-lingo-settlement-20240821-supports,clm-nh-005,src-us-fcc-lingo-settlement-20240821,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,"Official replacement PDF DA-24-790A1, Order para. 8 and Consent Decree factual background.",partial_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-nh-006-src-us-fcc-ai-voice-20240208-supports,clm-nh-006,src-us-fcc-ai-voice-20240208,supports,underlying_fact,official_record_or_allegation,"Official replacement PDF FCC-24-17A1, pp. 1-2, paras. 2 and 5.",full_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-nh-007-src-us-fcc-kramer-final-pdf-20240926-supports,clm-nh-007,src-us-fcc-kramer-final-pdf-20240926,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,"PDF p. 1, paras. 1-3, and p. 17, paras. 47-49, USD 6 million forfeiture.",partial_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-nh-007-src-us-fcc-lingo-consent-202408-supports,clm-nh-007,src-us-fcc-lingo-consent-202408,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,"Order para. 1 and Consent Decree paras. 1, 17 and 22, USD 1 million penalty and compliance plan.",partial_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-nh-008-src-us-nhpr-acquittal-20250613-supports,clm-nh-008,src-us-nhpr-acquittal-20250613,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,Article opening and paragraph identifying 11 felony and 11 misdemeanor counts.,full_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-nh-008-src-us-ap-kramer-acquittal-20250613-supports,clm-nh-008,src-us-ap-kramer-acquittal-20250613,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,"Article opening, paragraphs 1-4, including acquittal on all 22 charges.",full_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-nh-011-src-us-lwv-kramer-civil-supports,clm-nh-011,src-us-lwv-kramer-civil,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,"Section 'LWV Timeline', entry 'November 2025 — Court issues ruling in favor of plaintiffs'.",full_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-nh-011-src-us-ap-kramer-default-202511-supports,clm-nh-011,src-us-ap-kramer-default-202511,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,"Article opening, paragraphs 1-4, describing the default judgment, monetary relief and injunction.",full_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-br-001-src-br-tse-calendar-202603-supports,clm-br-001,src-br-tse-calendar-202603,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,"Section 'Outubro de 2026', entries for 4 October and 25 October.",full_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-br-002-src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302-supports,clm-br-002,src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,"Art. 9-B, caput.",full_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-br-002-src-br-tse-ai-rules-202604-supports,clm-br-002,src-br-tse-ai-rules-202604,supports,underlying_fact,official_record_or_allegation,"Article body immediately before heading 'Compromisso com a verdade', paragraph describing explicit, prominent and accessible labelling.",full_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-br-003-src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302-supports,clm-br-003,src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,"Art. 9-B, section 3-A.",full_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-br-004-src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302-supports,clm-br-004,src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,"Art. 28, section 1-C, items I-IV.",full_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-br-005-src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302-supports,clm-br-005,src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302,supports,institutional_action,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,"Art. 9-B, section 5.",full_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-br-006-src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302-supports,clm-br-006,src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302,supports,institutional_action,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,"Art. 125-B, caput and section 1, items I-III.",partial_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-br-006-src-br-tse-compliance-202607-supports,clm-br-006,src-br-tse-compliance-202607,supports,institutional_action,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,"Opening paragraphs and heading 'Detalhamento', including the 16 August deadline and plan requirements.",full_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-br-007-src-br-tse-platforms-202607-supports,clm-br-007,src-br-tse-platforms-202607,supports,institutional_action,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,"Heading 'Ações conjuntas', first paragraph.",partial_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-br-007-src-br-tse-agu-20260803-supports,clm-br-007,src-br-tse-agu-20260803,supports,institutional_action,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,"Opening four paragraphs, including publication date and description of the TSE-AGU agreement.",partial_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-br-007-src-br-tse-council-20260807-supports,clm-br-007,src-br-tse-council-20260807,supports,institutional_action,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,Opening three paragraphs and headings 'Competências' and 'O que fará o novo Conselho?'.,partial_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-br-007-src-br-tse-elevenlabs-202608-supports,clm-br-007,src-br-tse-elevenlabs-202608,supports,institutional_action,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,Opening four paragraphs and heading 'Eixos da parceria'.,partial_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-br-008-src-br-aio-202411-supports,clm-br-008,src-br-aio-202411,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,"Article body, paragraph beginning 'However, data collected between August 16 and October 6'.",full_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-br-010-src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728-supports,clm-br-010,src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,"Article opening, paragraphs 1-3 describing the 25 July campaign launch and synthetic avatar.",full_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-br-011-src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728-supports,clm-br-011,src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,"Article opening, paragraphs 2-5 describing the AI disclosure and endorsement message.",full_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-br-012-src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728-supports,clm-br-012,src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728,supports,assertion_was_made,independent_secondary_reporting,"Article opening and section 'QUESTIONS ABOUT WHETHER RESTRICTIONS APPLY', paragraphs on the petition and defence.",full_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-br-012-src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728-counterevidence,clm-br-012,src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728,counterevidence,assertion_was_made,independent_secondary_reporting,"Section 'QUESTIONS ABOUT WHETHER RESTRICTIONS APPLY', paragraphs reporting the lawyers' disclosure and unmixed-footage arguments.",partial_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-br-015-src-br-avatar-petition-20260726-supports,clm-br-015,src-br-avatar-petition-20260726,supports,assertion_was_made,official_record_or_allegation,,not_verified,The linked third-party PDF was not retrievable. Use the official TSE docket RP 0601315-97.2026.6.00.0000 if a stable public docket URL becomes available.,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-br-016-src-br-tse-res-23610-consolidated-supports,clm-br-016,src-br-tse-res-23610-consolidated,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,"Arts. 9-B, caput and section 3, and 9-C, section 1.",full_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-br-017-src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728-premise,clm-br-017,src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728,premise,researcher_inference,independent_secondary_reporting,"Article opening and section 'QUESTIONS ABOUT WHETHER RESTRICTIONS APPLY', paragraphs on disclosure and the unresolved legal challenge.",partial_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-br-017-src-br-tse-res-23610-consolidated-premise,clm-br-017,src-br-tse-res-23610-consolidated,premise,researcher_inference,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,"Arts. 9-B, caput and section 3, and 9-C, section 1.",partial_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-br-017-src-br-folha-avatar-defense-202607-counterevidence,clm-br-017,src-br-folha-avatar-defense-202607,counterevidence,researcher_inference,independent_secondary_reporting,"Article body, paragraphs beginning 'O vídeo exibido' and 'A defesa de Flávio'.",partial_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-br-018-src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302-supports,clm-br-018,src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,"Art. 9-B, section 3-A.",partial_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-br-018-src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728-supports,clm-br-018,src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,"Article opening, paragraphs identifying the 25 July convention date.",partial_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-br-019-src-br-ft-avatar-202607-supports,clm-br-019,src-br-ft-avatar-202607,supports,assertion_was_made,independent_secondary_reporting,"Article body, paragraph reporting Jair Bolsonaro's lawyers' denial of authorisation or prior knowledge.",full_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-br-019-src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728-supports,clm-br-019,src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728,supports,assertion_was_made,independent_secondary_reporting,"Section 'QUESTIONS ABOUT WHETHER RESTRICTIONS APPLY', paragraph discussing the authorisation issue.",partial_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-us26-001-src-us-fec-dates-2026-supports,clm-us26-001,src-us-fec-dates-2026,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,"PDF p. 1, header note stating 'General Election Date 11/03/2026'.",full_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-us26-002-src-us-ncsl-20260623-supports,clm-us26-002,src-us-ncsl-20260623,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,"Section 'Summary — Deepfakes in Elections and Campaigns', opening paragraphs and state-statutes table.",full_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-us26-003-src-us-fec-ai-disposition-2024-supports,clm-us26-003,src-us-fec-ai-disposition-2024,supports,underlying_fact,official_record_or_allegation,"Sections 'Background', 'Notification of Disposition' and 'Interpretive Rule'.",partial_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-us26-003-src-us-ncsl-20260623-supports,clm-us26-003,src-us-ncsl-20260623,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,"Section 'Summary — Deepfakes in Elections and Campaigns', opening paragraphs and state-statutes table.",partial_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-us26-003-src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328-supports,clm-us26-003,src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,"Section 'STATES PLAY CATCH-UP ON AI', paragraphs describing the absence of a broad federal deepfake rule and divergent state laws.",full_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-us26-003-src-us-fcc-ai-voice-20240208-counterevidence,clm-us26-003,src-us-fcc-ai-voice-20240208,counterevidence,underlying_fact,official_record_or_allegation,"Official replacement PDF FCC-24-17A1, pp. 1-2, paras. 2 and 5, narrow TCPA rule for artificial or prerecorded voices.",partial_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-us26-004-src-us-cisa-genai-202401-supports,clm-us26-004,src-us-cisa-genai-202401,supports,assertion_was_made,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,,not_verified,The CISA landing page and official PDF were access-blocked in this audit; likely wording was not converted into an unverified page locator.,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-us26-005-src-us-odni-update-20241021-supports,clm-us26-005,src-us-odni-update-20241021,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,"PDF p. 1, opening assessment and first bullet on synthetic or manipulated content in the 2024 cycle.",partial_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-us26-006-src-global-meta-muted-20241203-supports,clm-us26-006,src-global-meta-muted-20241203,supports,assertion_was_made,independent_secondary_reporting,"Article opening, first two paragraphs reporting Meta's global 2024 assessment.",full_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-us26-008-src-us-nrsc-talarico-20260311-supports,clm-us26-008,src-us-nrsc-talarico-20260311,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,Opening paragraph and section 'Transcript'.,full_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-us26-008-src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328-supports,clm-us26-008,src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,"Article opening, paragraphs 1-8, Talarico-video description and release context.",partial_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-us26-009-src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328-supports,clm-us26-009,src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,"Section 'ADS POSE MISINFORMATION RISKS', paragraph describing the small AI-generated disclosure.",full_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-us26-009-src-us-berkeley-talarico-2026-supports,clm-us26-009,src-us-berkeley-talarico-2026,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,"Article body, opening four paragraphs, including the disclosure-salience assessment.",full_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-us26-010-src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328-supports,clm-us26-010,src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328,supports,measurement,independent_secondary_reporting,"Article opening and section 'ADS POSE MISINFORMATION RISKS', descriptions of the recent national-Republican ads; no comparable impression table is provided.",partial_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-us26-011-src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328-supports,clm-us26-011,src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,"Article opening, paragraphs describing the Ossoff, Cornyn and Paxton synthetic ads.",full_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-us26-013-src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328-supports,clm-us26-013,src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,"Sections 'ADS POSE MISINFORMATION RISKS' and 'STATES PLAY CATCH-UP ON AI', passages on labelling, satire and use of genuine prior words.",partial_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-us26-014-src-us-nrsc-talarico-20260311-supports,clm-us26-014,src-us-nrsc-talarico-20260311,supports,underlying_fact,firsthand_artifact_or_measurement,"Opening paragraph and section 'Transcript', permitting comparison between attributed old posts and synthetic reaction lines.",partial_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-us26-014-src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328-supports,clm-us26-014,src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,Article opening and Talarico-video paragraphs distinguishing quoted posts from added synthetic performance.,partial_claim,,2026-08-11
+ce-clm-usca11-001-src-us-ca11-sfgate-20260804-supports,clm-usca11-001,src-us-ca11-sfgate-20260804,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,Article opening paragraphs describing the chatbot launch; the 7 August removal is not in this passage.,partial_claim,,2026-08-12
+ce-clm-usca11-001-src-us-ca11-mission-20260807-supports,clm-usca11-001,src-us-ca11-mission-20260807,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,not_verified,The article was not retrievable or indexed sufficiently to verify a passage.,2026-08-12
+ce-clm-usca11-001-src-us-ca11-axios-20260811-supports,clm-usca11-001,src-us-ca11-axios-20260811,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,"Article opening and section 'State of play', including the paragraph beginning 'In announcing its removal'.",partial_claim,,2026-08-12
+ce-clm-usca11-002-src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804-supports,clm-usca11-002,src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,not_verified,The article was not retrievable or indexed sufficiently to verify a passage.,2026-08-12
+ce-clm-usca11-002-src-us-ca11-sfgate-20260804-supports,clm-usca11-002,src-us-ca11-sfgate-20260804,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,"Article body, paragraph beginning 'Wiener’s team told SFGATE', on campaign commissioning and control.",partial_claim,,2026-08-12
+ce-clm-usca11-002-src-us-ca11-mission-20260807-supports,clm-usca11-002,src-us-ca11-mission-20260807,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,not_verified,The article was not retrievable or indexed sufficiently to verify a passage.,2026-08-12
+ce-clm-usca11-003-src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804-supports,clm-usca11-003,src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804,supports,assertion_was_made,independent_secondary_reporting,,not_verified,The article was not retrievable or indexed sufficiently to verify a passage.,2026-08-12
+ce-clm-usca11-003-src-us-ca11-sfgate-20260804-supports,clm-usca11-003,src-us-ca11-sfgate-20260804,supports,assertion_was_made,independent_secondary_reporting,Article opening and campaign-statement paragraphs identifying Claude; deployment configuration is not specified.,partial_claim,,2026-08-12
+ce-clm-usca11-003-src-us-ca11-axios-20260811-supports,clm-usca11-003,src-us-ca11-axios-20260811,supports,assertion_was_made,independent_secondary_reporting,"Section 'How it worked', paragraph identifying Anthropic Claude; exact model and deployment configuration are not specified.",partial_claim,,2026-08-12
+ce-clm-usca11-004-src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804-supports,clm-usca11-004,src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,not_verified,The article was not retrievable or indexed sufficiently to verify a passage.,2026-08-12
+ce-clm-usca11-004-src-us-ca11-sfgate-20260804-supports,clm-usca11-004,src-us-ca11-sfgate-20260804,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,"Article body, interface-description paragraphs and first-person response examples.",full_claim,,2026-08-12
+ce-clm-usca11-004-src-us-ca11-axios-20260811-supports,clm-usca11-004,src-us-ca11-axios-20260811,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,"Section 'How it worked', paragraphs describing first-person, campaign-selected responses.",full_claim,,2026-08-12
+ce-clm-usca11-005-src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804-supports,clm-usca11-005,src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,not_verified,The article was not retrievable or indexed sufficiently to verify a passage.,2026-08-12
+ce-clm-usca11-005-src-us-ca11-sfgate-20260804-supports,clm-usca11-005,src-us-ca11-sfgate-20260804,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,Article opening and interface-description paragraphs on AI/parody framing and campaign sponsorship.,partial_claim,,2026-08-12
+ce-clm-usca11-006-src-us-ca11-mission-20260807-supports,clm-usca11-006,src-us-ca11-mission-20260807,supports,assertion_was_made,independent_secondary_reporting,,not_verified,"The article was not retrievable or indexed sufficiently to verify the exact 5,058-question figure.",2026-08-12
+ce-clm-usca11-006-src-us-ca11-axios-20260811-supports,clm-usca11-006,src-us-ca11-axios-20260811,supports,assertion_was_made,independent_secondary_reporting,"Section 'State of play', campaign-reported interaction paragraph stating more than 5,000 questions, not the exact 5,058 figure.",partial_claim,,2026-08-12
+ce-clm-usca11-007-src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804-supports,clm-usca11-007,src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804,supports,underlying_fact,independent_secondary_reporting,,not_verified,The article was not retrievable or indexed sufficiently to verify the privacy-policy passage.,2026-08-12
+ce-clm-usca11-008-src-us-ca11-mission-20260807-supports,clm-usca11-008,src-us-ca11-mission-20260807,supports,institutional_action,independent_secondary_reporting,,not_verified,The article was not retrievable or indexed sufficiently to verify a passage.,2026-08-12
+ce-clm-usca11-008-src-us-ca11-axios-20260811-supports,clm-usca11-008,src-us-ca11-axios-20260811,supports,institutional_action,independent_secondary_reporting,"Section 'State of play', paragraph beginning 'In announcing its removal', including billboard removal and apology.",full_claim,,2026-08-12

data/claims.csv

@@ -1,97 +1,101 @@
-claim_id,case_id,claim_type,claim_text,evidence_label,confidence,coder_confidence_in_label,claim_status,evidence_strength,source_ids,counter_source_ids,notes,review_status,verified_at
-clm-ro-001,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,institutional_outcome,"On 6 December 2024, Romania's Constitutional Court annulled the entire presidential electoral process.",established_evidence,0.99,0.99,supported,high,src-ro-ccr-20241206|src-ro-ccr-summary-2025,,The institutional act is certain even where its factual and legal justification is debated.,verified,2026-08-11
-clm-ro-002,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,mechanism,The official record described opaque and coordinated online promotion that created unequal campaign conditions.,established_evidence,0.9,0.9,supported,high,src-ro-ccr-summary-2025|src-ro-ifes-202412,,Established as a feature of the official and independent record; specific sponsors and all network components remain unresolved.,verified,2026-08-11
-clm-ro-003,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,response,"The European Commission opened formal DSA proceedings against TikTok concerning election-risk management, recommender systems, political advertising, and coordinated inauthentic manipulation.",established_evidence,0.99,0.99,supported,high,src-ro-ec-tiktok-20241217,,Opening proceedings is not a final infringement finding.,verified,2026-08-11
-clm-ro-004,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,ai_role,Generative AI has not been established as a material driver of the Romanian annulment case.,strong_inference,0.88,0.88,partly_supported,moderate,src-ro-ccr-summary-2025|src-ro-ec-tiktok-20241217|src-ro-ifes-202412,,"The central digital mechanism is amplification, coordination, and opaque promotion rather than confirmed synthetic media.",verified,2026-08-11
-clm-ro-005,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,reach,"TikTok reported large-scale prevention of fake engagement and removal of election-related networks, but these platform metrics do not measure voter exposure to the specific campaign.",established_evidence,0.84,0.84,supported,moderate,src-ro-tiktok-integrity,,"Platform self-report; preserve distinction between prevented actions, removed accounts, impressions, and people reached.",verified,2026-08-11
-clm-ro-006,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,electoral_effect,No source in the reviewed record provides a credible causal estimate of votes changed by the coordinated digital campaign.,established_evidence,0.92,0.92,supported,high,src-ro-ccr-summary-2025|src-ro-venice-202503|src-ro-ifes-202412,,Absence claim limited to reviewed evidence; update if individual-level or quasi-experimental research appears.,verified,2026-08-11
-clm-ro-007,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,attribution,A simple claim that Russia alone directed the entire campaign is stronger than the presently coded public evidence supports.,strong_inference,0.82,0.82,partly_supported,moderate,src-ro-ccr-summary-2025|src-ro-ec-tiktok-20241217|src-ro-venice-202503|src-ro-sri-csat-20241204|src-ro-snoop-pnl-20241220,,"Code official allegations, technical indicators, domestic financing, and final attribution separately.",verified,2026-08-11
-clm-ro-008,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,legal_status,"The Venice Commission treated annulment as an exceptional measure requiring clear legal conditions, reliable evidence, procedural safeguards, and proportionality.",established_evidence,0.95,0.95,supported,high,src-ro-venice-202503,,"Normative legal standard, not a factual finding about every Romanian allegation.",verified,2026-08-11
-clm-ro-009,ro-2025-presidential-repeat,occurrence,Romania held a repeat presidential election on 4 and 18 May 2025.,established_evidence,0.99,0.99,supported,high,src-ro-odihr-repeat-final,,,verified,2026-08-11
-clm-ro-010,ro-2025-presidential-repeat,electoral_effect,The repeat-election outcome cannot be used as a causal measure of what the annulled 2024 result would have been absent manipulation.,strong_inference,0.94,0.94,partly_supported,moderate,src-ro-odihr-repeat-final|src-ro-venice-202503,,"The electorate, candidates, campaign, information environment, and institutional context changed.",verified,2026-08-11
-clm-ro-011,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,occurrence,"A declassified SRI report described an initial network of about 25,000 TikTok accounts activated intensely in the final two weeks before the first round, including 797 accounts created in 2016 that had remained largely inactive until 11 November 2024.",established_evidence,0.97,0.97,supported,high,src-ro-sri-csat-20241204,,Established as an intelligence-service report. The account count is not independently audited unique reach and does not establish the operator or voter effect.,verified,2026-08-11
-clm-ro-012,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,reach,"TikTok's separately disclosed Turkey-based network and the SRI-reported 25,000-account network have different scopes and cannot be summed as one operation or one audience estimate.",established_evidence,0.94,0.94,supported,high,src-ro-tiktok-integrity|src-ro-sri-csat-20241204,,"This is a source-scope correction, not an assertion that the networks were unrelated in every respect.",verified,2026-08-11
-clm-ro-013,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,counterevidence,"Snoop reported that PNL financed the #EchilibrușiVerticalitate influencer campaign, while the contracted firm said its original brief had been altered, diverted, or cloned in Georgescu's favour.",established_evidence,0.9,0.9,supported,high,src-ro-snoop-pnl-20241220,,"The reporting is counterevidence to a one-actor account of all amplification. It does not establish that PNL intended to support Georgescu, nor does it disprove separate foreign-linked activity.",verified,2026-08-11
-clm-ro-014,ro-2025-presidential-repeat,occurrence,"DFRLab identified at least 215 coordinated or apparently hijacked Facebook, Instagram, and TikTok accounts active from December 2024 through 6 June 2025 that first supported Călin Georgescu and later George Simion while attacking Moldova, France, and the EU.",established_evidence,0.95,0.95,supported,high,src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826,,Established as a transparent public-data research finding; platform access thresholds may leave additional accounts unobserved.,verified,2026-08-11
-clm-ro-015,ro-2025-presidential-repeat,reach,"The studied network produced 8,514 posts and accumulated at least 16 million views and 681,000 likes across the three platforms.",established_evidence,0.93,0.93,supported,high,src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826,,"These are non-unique platform metrics, not authenticated Romanian voters, belief, or persuasion.",verified,2026-08-11
-clm-ro-016,ro-2025-presidential-repeat,ai_role,"The network used generative-AI profile images and descriptions, synthetic Romanian personas, and DreamFace or D-ID-style avatars alongside hijacked accounts and conventional stock footage.",established_evidence,0.91,0.91,supported,high,src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826,,"AI was one component of a broader cross-platform coordination system, not a complete explanation for its reach.",verified,2026-08-11
-clm-ro-017,ro-2025-presidential-repeat,attribution,The network's operator and sponsor remain publicly unidentified; pro-Russia narratives and coordinated behaviour do not by themselves establish Russian-state command.,open_question,0.97,0.97,unresolved,none,src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826,,"Confidence refers to the appropriately unresolved wording, not confidence that no attribution will ever be possible.",verified,2026-08-11
-clm-ro-018,ro-2025-presidential-repeat,electoral_effect,"No reviewed evidence estimates whether the cross-platform network changed belief, turnout, candidate preference, or the repeat-election result.",open_question,0.98,0.98,unresolved,none,src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826|src-ro-odihr-repeat-final,,Views and likes do not identify a causal effect; the result being upheld does not negate occurrence of the network.,verified,2026-08-11
-clm-md-001,md-2024-presidential-referendum,occurrence,Moldova held the first presidential round and EU constitutional referendum on 20 October 2024 and the presidential runoff on 3 November 2024.,established_evidence,0.99,0.99,supported,high,src-md-odihr-final-20250314,,,verified,2026-08-11
-clm-md-002,md-2024-presidential-referendum,institutional_outcome,The EU constitutional amendment was approved by a narrow final majority and Maia Sandu won the presidential runoff.,established_evidence,0.99,0.99,supported,high,src-md-odihr-final-20250314,,The dataset does not infer that interference explains the margin.,verified,2026-08-11
-clm-md-003,md-2024-presidential-referendum,mechanism,International observers documented active disinformation and serious concerns about illicit foreign interference affecting campaign conditions.,established_evidence,0.96,0.96,supported,high,src-md-odihr-prelim-20241021|src-md-odihr-final-20250314,,"Observation finding about campaign environment, not a quantified electoral effect.",verified,2026-08-11
-clm-md-004,md-2024-presidential-referendum,mechanism,Moldovan police alleged that the Shor-linked network transferred tens of millions of dollars to influence voters.,established_evidence,0.97,0.97,supported,high,src-md-reuters-payments-20241024,,Established as a police allegation reported by Reuters; underlying transfers and intent require their own evidentiary assessment.,verified,2026-08-11
-clm-md-005,md-2024-presidential-referendum,attribution,"Authorities and international institutions attributed major components of the operation to Russia-linked and Shor-linked actors, while Russia and Shor denied wrongdoing.",established_evidence,0.9,0.9,supported,high,src-md-odihr-final-20250314|src-md-reuters-payments-20241024|src-md-eeas-activity-2025,src-md-reuters-payments-20241024,Wording preserves attribution as an official assessment and the denials as counterposition.,verified,2026-08-11
-clm-md-006,md-2024-presidential-referendum,ai_role,"AI-generated impersonation and synthetic content appeared in Moldova's information environment, but the wider interference operation relied heavily on non-AI mechanisms.",established_evidence,0.91,0.91,supported,high,src-md-eeas-fimi-202401|src-md-odihr-parliament-202602,,"Avoids treating illicit finance, bots, and coordinated networks as synonymous with generative AI.",verified,2026-08-11
-clm-md-007,md-2024-presidential-referendum,mechanism,Meta reported removing a coordinated inauthentic network targeting Russian-speaking audiences in Moldova.,established_evidence,0.95,0.95,supported,high,src-md-meta-threat-reporting,,Platform self-report; independent replication is limited and gross follower counts largely reflected non-Moldovan or fake engagement.,verified,2026-08-11
-clm-md-008,md-2024-presidential-referendum,reach,"The ODIHR-cited figure of more than 138,000 accounts and transactions across linked investigations is an enforcement indicator, not a count of recipients, exposed people, persuaded voters, or unique accounts.",established_evidence,0.91,0.91,supported,high,src-md-odihr-parliament-202602,,The denominator combines accounts and transactions and may contain repeated entities; do not convert it into people or voter reach.,verified,2026-08-11
-clm-md-009,md-2024-presidential-referendum,behavioural_effect,"Documented payment systems provide evidence of attempted and in some cases accepted inducement, but do not establish how each recipient voted.",strong_inference,0.9,0.9,partly_supported,moderate,src-md-reuters-payments-20241024|src-md-odihr-final-20250314,,Acceptance of a payment is not identical to compliance with an instruction.,verified,2026-08-11
-clm-md-010,md-2024-presidential-referendum,electoral_effect,No reviewed source provides a credible causal estimate of how many referendum or presidential votes were changed by the influence operation.,established_evidence,0.93,0.93,supported,high,src-md-odihr-final-20250314,,The narrow margin increases importance but does not supply causal identification.,verified,2026-08-11
-clm-md-011,md-2024-presidential-referendum,counterevidence,"Observers also found incumbent advantage, insufficient safeguards against misuse of administrative resources, and media imbalances.",established_evidence,0.96,0.96,supported,high,src-md-odihr-prelim-20241021|src-md-odihr-final-20250314,,Prevents the foreign-interference frame from obscuring domestic electoral-integrity problems.,verified,2026-08-11
-clm-md-012,md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,mechanism,"The 2025 parliamentary-election observation record described inauthentic account networks, troll farms, automated bots, AI videos, disinformation, and foreign-funded vote-buying infrastructure.",established_evidence,0.96,0.96,supported,high,src-md-odihr-parliament-202602,,Evidence concerns a linked later election and is not silently back-projected into every 2024 event.,verified,2026-08-11
-clm-md-013,md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,electoral_effect,The persistence of a network across elections does not establish that AI-generated content or bots determined the 2025 outcome.,strong_inference,0.94,0.94,partly_supported,moderate,src-md-odihr-parliament-202602,,,verified,2026-08-11
-clm-md-014,md-2024-presidential-referendum,reach,"Meta reported about 4,200 Facebook Page followers and 335,000 Instagram followers for the removed Moldova-focused network, but said the vast majority were outside Moldova and indicative of fake engagement; it assessed that the operation had not built an authentic audience before disruption.",established_evidence,0.97,0.97,supported,high,src-md-meta-threat-reporting,,Established as platform telemetry and assessment. Gross followers must not be reported as Moldovan voter reach.,verified,2026-08-11
-clm-md-015,md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,occurrence,"DFRLab analysed 253 inauthentic accounts in a paid InfoLeaders network linked through undercover reporting to Telegram-based recruitment, training, task assignment, and mutual amplification.",established_evidence,0.95,0.95,supported,high,src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924|src-md-odihr-parliament-202602,,The platform sample and the wider number of recruited people are different denominators.,verified,2026-08-11
-clm-md-016,md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,reach,"The 253-account InfoLeaders sample produced 28,708 posts, 55,367,950 views, 2,207,894 likes, 295,608 shares, and 239,016 comments across TikTok, Facebook, and Instagram.",established_evidence,0.93,0.93,supported,high,src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924,,"Platform totals are non-unique, can include repeat or inauthentic engagement, and do not measure belief or votes.",verified,2026-08-11
-clm-md-017,md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,mechanism,"Curators required local-looking participants to personalise centrally supplied messages while retaining assigned hashtags and to amplify one another, making paid coordination appear to be spontaneous peer speech.",established_evidence,0.92,0.92,supported,high,src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924,,"AI-assisted rephrasing was an enabling layer within a paid human and bot-coordinated system, not the sole mechanism.",verified,2026-08-11
-clm-md-018,md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,attribution,"The InfoLeaders network had strong operational links to Shor-affiliated or Moscow-linked structures, but the public record does not independently establish direct Kremlin command of every account or asset.",strong_inference,0.88,0.88,partly_supported,moderate,src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924|src-md-odihr-parliament-202602,,"Beneficiary, operational affiliate, funder, state-aligned ecosystem, and direct command are kept separate.",verified,2026-08-11
-clm-md-019,md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,electoral_effect,"No reviewed evidence provides a causal estimate of belief, turnout, votes, seats, or the 2025 result attributable to the InfoLeaders network, synthetic media, or automated accounts.",open_question,0.98,0.98,unresolved,none,src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924|src-md-odihr-parliament-202602,,"The election result and institutional validation do not erase documented interference, but neither identifies a numeric effect.",verified,2026-08-11
-clm-nh-001,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,occurrence,An AI-generated voice impersonating President Joe Biden was used in robocalls before the New Hampshire presidential primary.,established_evidence,0.99,0.99,supported,high,src-us-fcc-kramer-nal-20240523|src-us-nhdoj-kramer-20240523|src-us-fcc-kramer-fine-20240926,,,verified,2026-08-11
-clm-nh-002,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,mechanism,The call told recipients to save their vote for November rather than participate in the primary.,established_evidence,0.99,0.99,supported,high,src-us-fcc-kramer-nal-20240523|src-us-nhdoj-kramer-20240523,,The content has a demobilising instruction; criminal intent and legal guilt are separate questions.,verified,2026-08-11
-clm-nh-003,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,attribution,Steve Kramer admitted commissioning the AI-generated robocall.,established_evidence,0.99,0.99,supported,high,src-us-fcc-kramer-fine-20240926|src-us-nhpr-acquittal-20250613,,Admission to creation does not equal conviction on the state charges.,verified,2026-08-11
-clm-nh-004,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,reach,"Voice Broadcasting initiated 9,581 call attempts, and Lingo records showed 3,978 completed calls bearing A-level attestations.",established_evidence,0.99,0.99,supported,high,src-us-fcc-kramer-final-pdf-20240926|src-us-fcc-lingo-consent-202408,,"Calls are not equivalent to unique people reached, completed calls, or listeners.",verified,2026-08-11
-clm-nh-005,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,mechanism,Caller-ID spoofing and inaccurate attestation in the telecom chain increased the call's apparent authenticity and deliverability.,established_evidence,0.97,0.97,supported,high,src-us-fcc-lingo-nal-pdf-20240523|src-us-fcc-lingo-settlement-20240821,,"Shows that the case is an infrastructure chain, not merely a generated audio file.",verified,2026-08-11
-clm-nh-006,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,legal_status,The FCC ruled that AI-generated voices fall within the TCPA's restriction on artificial or prerecorded voices.,established_evidence,0.99,0.99,supported,high,src-us-fcc-ai-voice-20240208,,,verified,2026-08-11
-clm-nh-007,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,institutional_outcome,"The FCC issued a $6 million forfeiture against Kramer, while Lingo agreed separately to a $1 million civil penalty and compliance plan.",established_evidence,0.99,0.99,supported,high,src-us-fcc-kramer-final-pdf-20240926|src-us-fcc-lingo-consent-202408,,Separate creator and provider actions.,verified,2026-08-11
-clm-nh-008,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,legal_status,A New Hampshire jury acquitted Kramer of all 22 state criminal charges in June 2025.,established_evidence,0.98,0.98,supported,high,src-us-nhpr-acquittal-20250613|src-us-ap-kramer-acquittal-20250613,,The acquittal must appear wherever the charging decision is discussed.,verified,2026-08-11
-clm-nh-009,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,behavioural_effect,No reviewed evidence measures how many recipients believed or acted on the robocall.,established_evidence,0.95,0.95,supported,high,src-us-fcc-kramer-fine-20240926|src-us-nhpr-acquittal-20250613,,"Update if survey, turnout linkage, or experimental evidence specific to recipients becomes available.",verified,2026-08-11
-clm-nh-010,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,electoral_effect,No credible causal estimate links the robocall to primary turnout or vote totals.,established_evidence,0.96,0.96,supported,high,src-us-fcc-kramer-fine-20240926|src-us-nhpr-acquittal-20250613,,,verified,2026-08-11
-clm-nh-011,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,institutional_outcome,"In November 2025, a federal court entered default judgment against Kramer, awarded individual monetary relief, and permanently enjoined similar voter-coercion schemes.",established_evidence,0.95,0.95,supported,high,src-us-lwv-kramer-civil|src-us-ap-kramer-default-202511,,"The judgment followed nonappearance and must be described as a default, not a contested merits trial.",verified,2026-08-11
-clm-nh-012,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,agency_transfer,"The cloned presidential voice, politically selected call list, and spoofed trusted in-state number transferred control over apparent authorship and relevance of a participation instruction to the operator.",strong_inference,0.9,0.9,partly_supported,moderate,src-us-fcc-kramer-final-pdf-20240926|src-us-fcc-lingo-consent-202408,,The mechanism is strongly supported; its effect on any individual recipient is unmeasured.,verified,2026-08-11
-clm-br-001,br-2026-election-preparedness,occurrence,"Brazil's 2026 general election first round is scheduled for 4 October, with a possible runoff on 25 October.",established_evidence,0.99,0.99,supported,high,src-br-tse-calendar-202603,,"Prospective date, not an observed election result.",verified,2026-08-11
-clm-br-002,br-2026-election-preparedness,legal_status,"TSE rules require explicit, prominent, accessible disclosure of synthetic multimedia used in electoral advertising and identification of the technology used.",established_evidence,0.99,0.99,supported,high,src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302|src-br-tse-ai-rules-202604,,Resolution 23.755 amends the standing electoral-advertising rule.,verified,2026-08-11
-clm-br-003,br-2026-election-preparedness,legal_status,"Brazil prohibits publication or republication of new synthetic content using a candidate's or public figure's image, voice, or manifestation from 72 hours before until 24 hours after voting ends, even if labelled.",established_evidence,0.99,0.99,supported,high,src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302,,Time-window prohibition is distinct from the general disclosure requirement.,verified,2026-08-11
-clm-br-004,br-2026-election-preparedness,legal_status,"AI application providers may not rank, recommend, suggest, prioritise, endorse, or disfavor candidates, campaigns, parties, federations, or coalitions in automated responses.",established_evidence,0.99,0.99,supported,high,src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302,,"A direct regulation of AI-system outputs, not only political advertising.",verified,2026-08-11
-clm-br-005,br-2026-election-preparedness,response,Platforms offering political-content boosting must provide a field for advertisers to declare AI use.,established_evidence,0.99,0.99,supported,high,src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302,,,verified,2026-08-11
-clm-br-006,br-2026-election-preparedness,response,"Internet application providers must prepare measurable election-compliance plans, and the TSE set 16 August 2026 as the submission deadline.",established_evidence,0.98,0.98,supported,high,src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302|src-br-tse-compliance-202607,,Future QA should archive submitted plans and assess measurable implementation.,verified,2026-08-11
-clm-br-007,br-2026-election-preparedness,response,"By 11 August 2026, the TSE had announced platform partnerships, an AGU agreement, an information-integrity and AI monitoring council, and a voice-deepfake cooperation agreement with ElevenLabs.",established_evidence,0.98,0.98,supported,high,src-br-tse-platforms-202607|src-br-tse-agu-20260803|src-br-tse-council-20260807|src-br-tse-elevenlabs-202608,,Institutional capacity indicators; effectiveness not yet established.,verified,2026-08-11
-clm-br-008,br-2026-election-preparedness,counterevidence,"Empirical research on Brazil's 2024 municipal elections found isolated AI misuse and broad campaign experimentation, but not the predicted wave of high-impact generative-AI manipulation.",established_evidence,0.88,0.88,supported,moderate,src-br-aio-202411,,"A prior-cycle base rate, not a forecast for 2026.",verified,2026-08-11
-clm-br-009,br-2026-election-preparedness,electoral_effect,"No 2026 electoral effect can be coded before voting, and observed incidents must not be converted into predictions.",open_question,0.99,0.99,unresolved,none,,,Dataset guardrail rather than an empirical outcome claim.,verified,2026-08-11
-clm-br-010,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,occurrence,A synthetic image-and-voice avatar of Jair Bolsonaro appeared at the 25 July 2026 launch of Flávio Bolsonaro's presidential campaign.,established_evidence,0.99,0.99,supported,high,src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728,,,verified,2026-08-11
-clm-br-011,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,mechanism,The avatar explicitly disclosed that its image and voice were generated with AI and then delivered a political endorsement message.,established_evidence,0.99,0.99,supported,high,src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728,,A labelled synthetic political persona; not a covert deepfake in the narrow sense.,verified,2026-08-11
-clm-br-012,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,legal_status,"Opposing parties challenged the avatar in court, while Flávio Bolsonaro's lawyers argued that disclosure and the absence of mixed real footage made it lawful.",established_evidence,0.97,0.97,supported,high,src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728,src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728,Established that the competing claims were made; neither claim is treated as finally adjudicated.,verified,2026-08-11
-clm-br-013,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,legal_status,"As of 11 August 2026, the TSE had not finally resolved whether the avatar violated the electoral AI rules.",established_evidence,0.93,0.93,supported,high,src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728,,Time-sensitive negative status; requires re-verification.,needs_update,2026-08-11
-clm-br-014,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,behavioural_effect,"No reviewed evidence measures whether the avatar changed voter beliefs, candidate preference, or turnout intention.",established_evidence,0.94,0.94,supported,high,src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728,,"Update if campaign experiments, polling, or platform exposure data become available.",needs_update,2026-08-11
-clm-br-015,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,legal_status,Federação Brasil da Esperança filed TSE representation RP 0601315-97.2026.6.00.0000 on 26 July 2026 alleging premature propaganda and unlawful synthetic-media use.,established_evidence,0.99,0.99,supported,high,src-br-avatar-petition-20260726,,The filing and allegations are established; the alleged violations are not.,verified,2026-08-11
-clm-br-016,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,legal_status,"Art. 9-B requires disclosure, Art. 9-B §3 bars certain simulated interlocution with a candidate or real person, and Art. 9-C §1 bars synthetic audio or video used to favor or harm a candidacy even when authorised.",established_evidence,0.99,0.99,supported,high,src-br-tse-res-23610-consolidated,,"The legal text is established; application to this disclosed, one-way convention avatar remains unresolved.",verified,2026-08-11
-clm-br-017,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,counterevidence,The avatar's up-front AI disclosure supports compliance with the labelling duty but does not by itself resolve the separate simulated-interlocution or pro-candidacy synthetic-media prohibitions.,strong_inference,0.93,0.93,partly_supported,moderate,src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728|src-br-tse-res-23610-consolidated,src-br-folha-avatar-defense-202607,The defence argues that disclosure and lack of deception remove it from the deepfake prohibition; no merits court had accepted or rejected that reading by the cutoff.,needs_update,2026-08-11
-clm-br-018,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,counterevidence,The 72-hour pre-election and 24-hour post-election blackout in Art. 9-B §3-A did not apply by timing to the 25 July convention.,established_evidence,0.99,0.99,supported,high,src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302|src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728,,Other provisions may still apply; retain the blackout rule for prospective monitoring only.,verified,2026-08-11
-clm-br-019,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,attribution,Jair Bolsonaro's lawyers denied that he authorised or knew of the avatar's production; his personal authorisation therefore remains unknown rather than disproved.,established_evidence,0.95,0.95,supported,high,src-br-ft-avatar-202607|src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728,,"A denial establishes the defence position, not the underlying absence of authorisation.",needs_update,2026-08-11
-clm-br-020,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,agency_transfer,"The disclosed avatar operated as a synthetic political surrogate, letting the beneficiary campaign deploy Jair Bolsonaro's recognisable persona and endorsement without his physical or verified public participation.",strong_inference,0.91,0.91,partly_supported,moderate,src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728|src-br-ft-avatar-202607,,Whether this legally circumvented a specific restriction depends partly on authorisation and future rulings.,needs_update,2026-08-11
-clm-us26-001,us-2026-midterms-preparedness,occurrence,The 2026 United States general election is scheduled for 3 November 2026.,established_evidence,0.99,0.99,supported,high,src-us-fec-dates-2026,,,verified,2026-08-11
-clm-us26-002,us-2026-midterms-preparedness,legal_status,"As of 23 June 2026, 31 states had enacted laws regulating deepfakes in political messaging, with materially different prohibition and disclosure models.",established_evidence,0.98,0.98,supported,high,src-us-ncsl-20260623,,"Enactment, effective date, scope, and litigation status should be tracked separately.",verified,2026-08-11
-clm-us26-003,us-2026-midterms-preparedness,legal_status,The United States lacks a broad federal rule uniformly governing AI-generated political messages across the 2026 election.,established_evidence,0.95,0.95,supported,high,src-us-fec-ai-disposition-2024|src-us-ncsl-20260623|src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328,src-us-fcc-ai-voice-20240208,"Narrow federal rules remain relevant, especially telecom law and fraudulent misrepresentation.",verified,2026-08-11
-clm-us26-004,us-2026-midterms-preparedness,ai_role,CISA assessed generative AI as more likely to amplify existing election risks than create wholly new risk categories.,established_evidence,0.98,0.98,supported,high,src-us-cisa-genai-202401,,Prior-cycle risk assessment used as a conceptual baseline.,verified,2026-08-11
-clm-us26-005,us-2026-midterms-preparedness,attribution,"Prior U.S. intelligence assessments establish that foreign actors used synthetic or manipulated content in the 2024 cycle, supporting a monitored 2026 risk but not proving a new 2026 operation.",established_evidence,0.94,0.94,supported,high,src-us-odni-update-20241021,,Strict temporal separation between prior evidence and current incidents.,verified,2026-08-11
-clm-us26-006,us-2026-midterms-preparedness,counterevidence,A platform assessment of the 2024 global cycle reported that generative-AI misinformation had limited reach on Meta services.,established_evidence,0.82,0.82,supported,moderate,src-global-meta-muted-20241203,,Interested-party assessment reported by Reuters; not generalisable to every platform or 2026.,verified,2026-08-11
-clm-us26-007,us-2026-midterms-preparedness,electoral_effect,"No 2026 electoral effect can be coded before the election, and prior-cycle incident counts do not supply a forecast.",open_question,0.99,0.99,unresolved,none,,,Dataset guardrail.,verified,2026-08-11
-clm-us26-008,us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,occurrence,"On 11 March 2026, the National Republican Senatorial Committee released an AI-generated video depicting James Talarico reciting text from prior social-media posts.",established_evidence,0.99,0.99,supported,high,src-us-nrsc-talarico-20260311|src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328,,The source quotes the committee defending the ad.,verified,2026-08-11
-clm-us26-009,us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,mechanism,"The Talarico ad carried an AI-generated disclosure in small, easy-to-miss text.",established_evidence,0.98,0.98,supported,high,src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328|src-us-berkeley-talarico-2026,,Disclosure existence and disclosure salience are distinct variables.,verified,2026-08-11
-clm-us26-010,us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,reach,"Public reporting identified at least three recent national-Republican synthetic ads by March 2026, but did not provide comparable impression or targeting data.",established_evidence,0.95,0.95,supported,high,src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328,,Content count is not audience reach.,verified,2026-08-11
-clm-us26-011,us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,mechanism,"Additional 2026 election ads fabricated audiovisual speech or conduct by Jon Ossoff, John Cornyn, and Ken Paxton, with varying levels of obviousness and disclosure.",established_evidence,0.96,0.96,supported,high,src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328,,Record separate items in a later content-level expansion rather than treating them as identical.,verified,2026-08-11
-clm-us26-012,us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,behavioural_effect,"The reviewed reporting does not measure whether any named 2026 synthetic ad changed candidate evaluations, turnout intention, or vote choice.",established_evidence,0.95,0.95,supported,high,src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328,,General deepfake experiments cannot substitute for item-specific field effects.,needs_update,2026-08-11
-clm-us26-013,us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,counterevidence,"Some 2026 campaign-generated videos reproduce genuine prior words, are labelled, or use obvious satire, complicating a binary real-versus-deceptive classification.",established_evidence,0.95,0.95,supported,high,src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328,,"Motivates content-level coding for quotation fidelity, disclosure, realism, authorisation, and context.",verified,2026-08-11
-clm-us26-014,us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,mechanism,"Much of the Talarico attack used genuine older posts, but the synthetic first-person performance added reaction lines and affect not contained in those quoted posts.",established_evidence,0.97,0.97,supported,high,src-us-nrsc-talarico-20260311|src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328,,Do not describe every spoken proposition as fabricated; separate authentic underlying text from invented performance and asides.,verified,2026-08-11
-clm-us26-015,us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,reach,"A platform snapshot on 11 August 2026 displayed roughly 3,700 YouTube views for the NRSC upload, while cross-platform impressions and unique exposure remained unavailable.",established_evidence,0.88,0.88,supported,moderate,src-us-nrsc-talarico-youtube,,"Dynamic, non-unique, one-platform metric; must be rechecked and never combined with earned-media readership as unique exposure.",needs_update,2026-08-11
-clm-us26-016,us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,agency_transfer,"By making an opponent appear to speak and react on camera, the sponsor controlled not only message selection but the target's simulated voice, face, timing, and affect.",strong_inference,0.94,0.94,partly_supported,moderate,src-us-nrsc-talarico-20260311|src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328|src-us-berkeley-talarico-2026,,The genuine underlying posts constrain how much substantive policy content was invented.,verified,2026-08-11
-clm-usca11-001,us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,occurrence,Scott Wiener for Congress launched the ConnieChan.ai interactive attack-ad chatbot on 3 August 2026 and removed it on 7 August after public criticism.,established_evidence,0.99,0.99,supported,high,src-us-ca11-sfgate-20260804|src-us-ca11-mission-20260807|src-us-ca11-axios-20260811,,"SFGATE described a Monday launch; Mission Local gives 3 August. Some later summaries use 4 August, the first reporting date.",verified,2026-08-12
-clm-usca11-002,us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,attribution,"The Wiener campaign admitted commissioning, paying for, promoting, and controlling the chatbot; the technical builder was not publicly identified.",established_evidence,0.99,0.99,supported,high,src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804|src-us-ca11-sfgate-20260804|src-us-ca11-mission-20260807,,"Anthropic supplied a model but is not attributed as campaign designer, approver, or operator.",verified,2026-08-12
-clm-usca11-003,us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,ai_role,"The campaign said the chatbot used Anthropic's Claude model family to generate interactive responses; the exact version, deployment route, prompt, retrieval system, and guardrails remain unknown.",established_evidence,0.95,0.95,supported,high,src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804|src-us-ca11-sfgate-20260804|src-us-ca11-axios-20260811,,Product family is known; technical configuration is not.,verified,2026-08-12
-clm-usca11-004,us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,mechanism,The system answered in Connie Chan's first person and dynamically redirected questions toward campaign-selected portrayals of her record.,established_evidence,0.98,0.98,supported,high,src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804|src-us-ca11-sfgate-20260804|src-us-ca11-axios-20260811,,Interactive opponent simulation differs from a static synthetic ad because user questions affect the generated response.,verified,2026-08-12
-clm-usca11-005,us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,counterevidence,"The site visibly framed itself as AI and parody, said it was not affiliated with or endorsed by Chan, and disclosed that it was paid for by the Wiener campaign.",established_evidence,0.97,0.97,supported,high,src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804|src-us-ca11-sfgate-20260804,,"Transparent parody weakens a covert-deception theory but does not remove questions about synthetic first-person representation, bias, or data control.",verified,2026-08-12
-clm-usca11-006,us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,reach,"The campaign reported that the chatbot received 5,058 submitted questions during its first 27 hours.",established_as_campaign_report,0.78,0.78,supported_as_attributed_measurement,moderate,src-us-ca11-mission-20260807|src-us-ca11-axios-20260811,,"Campaign-reported measure. It is not unique users, conversations, voters, district residents, impressions, beliefs, or votes; repeated or adversarial prompts may inflate it.",verified,2026-08-12
-clm-usca11-007,us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,mechanism,"The privacy policy said conversations could be retained for 90 days and reviewed by a small number of authorised staff to fix bugs, understand queries, and improve campaign content.",established_evidence,0.96,0.96,supported,high,src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804,,"The data warning was in the privacy policy, not prominently repeated in the main chat interface according to the reporting.",verified,2026-08-12
-clm-usca11-008,us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,response,"On 7 August the campaign removed the chatbot, announced removal of the two billboards, said the experiment had missed the mark, and apologised for causing offence.",established_evidence,0.99,0.99,supported,high,src-us-ca11-mission-20260807|src-us-ca11-axios-20260811,,"Campaign self-termination is a response, not an institutional or legal finding.",verified,2026-08-12
-clm-usca11-009,us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,behavioural_effect,"No reviewed evidence measures whether interaction with the chatbot changed candidate evaluation, trust, issue salience, turnout intention, or vote choice.",established_evidence,0.97,0.97,supported,high,src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804|src-us-ca11-mission-20260807|src-us-ca11-axios-20260811,,This is an evidence-availability claim scoped to the reviewed public record.,verified,2026-08-12
-clm-usca11-010,us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,electoral_effect,"The election had not occurred by the cutoff, and no electoral effect can be inferred from question counts, press attention, criticism, or campaign withdrawal.",open_question,0.99,0.99,unresolved,none,,,Prospective guardrail.,verified,2026-08-12
-clm-usca11-011,us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,agency_transfer,"The campaign-controlled prompt, sources, guardrails, interface, and logs let the sponsor decide how an opponent appeared to answer user questions, shifting representational and evidentiary control from the candidate and voter verification toward the campaign and its provider stack.",strong_inference,0.93,0.93,partly_supported,moderate,src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804|src-us-ca11-sfgate-20260804|src-us-ca11-axios-20260811,,Analytical synthesis. Disclosure and parody are mitigating conditions; behavioural and electoral effects remain unknown.,verified,2026-08-12
+claim_id,case_id,claim_type,claim_text,evidence_label,claim_status,evidence_basis,evidence_scope,source_ids,counter_source_ids,notes,review_status,verified_at
+clm-ro-001,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,institutional_outcome,"On 6 December 2024, Romania's Constitutional Court annulled the entire presidential electoral process.",established_evidence,supported_as_worded,supported_as_worded,underlying_fact,src-ro-ccr-20241206|src-ro-ccr-summary-2025,,The institutional act is certain even where its factual and legal justification is debated.,verified,2026-08-11
+clm-ro-002,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,mechanism,The official record described opaque and coordinated online promotion that created unequal campaign conditions.,established_evidence,supported_as_worded,supported_as_worded,assertion_was_made,src-ro-ccr-summary-2025|src-ro-ifes-202412,,"The sources establish that official and independent records described these conditions; they do not resolve every network component, sponsor, or causal effect.",verified,2026-08-11
+clm-ro-003,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,response,"The European Commission opened formal DSA proceedings against TikTok concerning election-risk management, recommender systems, political advertising, and coordinated inauthentic manipulation.",established_evidence,supported_as_worded,supported_as_worded,institutional_action,src-ro-ec-tiktok-20241217,,Opening proceedings is not a final infringement finding.,verified,2026-08-11
+clm-ro-004,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,ai_role,"Among the public sources linked to this record at the cutoff, none established generative AI as a material driver of the Romanian annulment case.",not_identified_in_declared_review,not_identified_in_declared_review,review_bounded_absence,review_scope_statement,,,Bounded to the sources linked to this record at the cutoff; this is not proof of absence beyond the declared review.,verified,2026-08-11
+clm-ro-005,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,reach,"TikTok reported large-scale prevention of fake engagement and removal of election-related networks, but these platform metrics do not measure voter exposure to the specific campaign.",established_evidence,supported_as_worded,supported_as_worded,assertion_was_made,src-ro-tiktok-integrity,,"Platform self-report; preserve distinction between prevented actions, removed accounts, impressions, and people reached.",verified,2026-08-11
+clm-ro-006,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,electoral_effect,"Among the public sources linked to this record at the cutoff, none provided a credible causal estimate of votes changed by the coordinated digital campaign.",not_identified_in_declared_review,not_identified_in_declared_review,review_bounded_absence,review_scope_statement,,,Bounded to the sources linked to this record at the cutoff; this is not proof of absence beyond the declared review.,verified,2026-08-11
+clm-ro-007,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,attribution,A simple claim that Russia alone directed the entire campaign is stronger than the presently coded public evidence supports.,strong_inference,partly_supported,inferential_synthesis,researcher_inference,src-ro-ccr-summary-2025|src-ro-venice-202503|src-ro-sri-csat-20241204|src-ro-snoop-pnl-20241220,,"Code official allegations, technical indicators, domestic financing, and final attribution separately.",verified,2026-08-11
+clm-ro-008,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,legal_status,"The Venice Commission treated annulment as an exceptional measure requiring clear legal conditions, reliable evidence, procedural safeguards, and proportionality.",established_evidence,supported_as_worded,supported_as_worded,underlying_fact,src-ro-venice-202503,,"Normative legal standard, not a factual finding about every Romanian allegation.",verified,2026-08-11
+clm-ro-009,ro-2025-presidential-repeat,occurrence,Romania held a repeat presidential election on 4 and 18 May 2025.,established_evidence,supported_as_worded,supported_as_worded,underlying_fact,src-ro-odihr-repeat-final,,,verified,2026-08-11
+clm-ro-010,ro-2025-presidential-repeat,electoral_effect,The repeat-election outcome cannot be used as a causal measure of what the annulled 2024 result would have been absent manipulation.,strong_inference,partly_supported,inferential_synthesis,researcher_inference,src-ro-odihr-repeat-final,,"The electorate, candidates, campaign, information environment, and institutional context changed.",verified,2026-08-11
+clm-ro-011,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,occurrence,"A declassified SRI report described an initial network of about 25,000 TikTok accounts activated intensely in the final two weeks before the first round, including 797 accounts created in 2016 that had remained largely inactive until 11 November 2024.",established_evidence,supported_as_worded,supported_as_worded,assertion_was_made,src-ro-sri-csat-20241204,,Established as an intelligence-service report. The account count is not independently audited unique reach and does not establish the operator or voter effect.,verified,2026-08-11
+clm-ro-012,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,reach,"TikTok's separately disclosed Turkey-based network and the SRI-reported 25,000-account network have different scopes and cannot be summed as one operation or one audience estimate.",established_evidence,supported_as_worded,supported_as_worded,measurement,src-ro-tiktok-integrity|src-ro-sri-csat-20241204,,"This is a source-scope correction, not an assertion that the networks were unrelated in every respect.",verified,2026-08-11
+clm-ro-013,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,counterevidence,"Snoop reported that PNL financed the #EchilibrușiVerticalitate influencer campaign, while the contracted firm said its original brief had been altered, diverted, or cloned in Georgescu's favour.",established_evidence,supported_as_worded,supported_as_worded,assertion_was_made,src-ro-snoop-pnl-20241220,,"The reporting is counterevidence to a one-actor account of all amplification. It does not establish that PNL intended to support Georgescu, nor does it disprove separate foreign-linked activity.",verified,2026-08-11
+clm-ro-014,ro-2025-presidential-repeat,occurrence,"DFRLab identified at least 215 coordinated or apparently hijacked Facebook, Instagram, and TikTok accounts active from December 2024 through 6 June 2025 that first supported Călin Georgescu and later George Simion while attacking Moldova, France, and the EU.",established_evidence,supported_as_worded,supported_as_worded,underlying_fact,src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826,,Established as a transparent public-data research finding; platform access thresholds may leave additional accounts unobserved.,verified,2026-08-11
+clm-ro-015,ro-2025-presidential-repeat,reach,"The studied network produced 8,514 posts and accumulated at least 16 million views and 681,000 likes across the three platforms.",established_evidence,supported_as_worded,supported_as_worded,measurement,src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826,,"These are non-unique platform metrics, not authenticated Romanian voters, belief, or persuasion.",verified,2026-08-11
+clm-ro-016,ro-2025-presidential-repeat,ai_role,"The network used generative-AI profile images and descriptions, synthetic Romanian personas, and DreamFace or D-ID-style avatars alongside hijacked accounts and conventional stock footage.",established_evidence,supported_as_worded,supported_as_worded,underlying_fact,src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826,,"AI was one component of a broader cross-platform coordination system, not a complete explanation for its reach.",verified,2026-08-11
+clm-ro-017,ro-2025-presidential-repeat,attribution,The network's operator and sponsor remain publicly unidentified; pro-Russia narratives and coordinated behaviour do not by themselves establish Russian-state command.,open_question,unresolved,none,researcher_inference,src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826,,"Confidence refers to the appropriately unresolved wording, not confidence that no attribution will ever be possible.",verified,2026-08-11
+clm-ro-018,ro-2025-presidential-repeat,electoral_effect,"Among the public sources linked to this record at the cutoff, none estimated whether the cross-platform network changed belief, turnout, candidate preference, or the repeat-election result.",not_identified_in_declared_review,not_identified_in_declared_review,review_bounded_absence,review_scope_statement,,,Bounded to the sources linked to this record at the cutoff; this is not proof of absence beyond the declared review.,verified,2026-08-11
+clm-md-001,md-2024-presidential-referendum,occurrence,Moldova held the first presidential round and EU constitutional referendum on 20 October 2024 and the presidential runoff on 3 November 2024.,established_evidence,supported_as_worded,supported_as_worded,underlying_fact,src-md-odihr-final-20250314,,,verified,2026-08-11
+clm-md-002,md-2024-presidential-referendum,institutional_outcome,The EU constitutional amendment was approved by a narrow final majority and Maia Sandu won the presidential runoff.,established_evidence,supported_as_worded,supported_as_worded,underlying_fact,src-md-odihr-final-20250314,,The dataset does not infer that interference explains the margin.,verified,2026-08-11
+clm-md-003,md-2024-presidential-referendum,mechanism,International observers documented active disinformation and serious concerns about illicit foreign interference affecting campaign conditions.,established_evidence,supported_as_worded,supported_as_worded,underlying_fact,src-md-odihr-prelim-20241021|src-md-odihr-final-20250314,,"Observation finding about campaign environment, not a quantified electoral effect.",verified,2026-08-11
+clm-md-004,md-2024-presidential-referendum,mechanism,Moldovan police alleged that the Shor-linked network transferred tens of millions of dollars to influence voters.,established_evidence,supported_as_worded,supported_as_worded,assertion_was_made,src-md-reuters-payments-20241024,,Established as a police allegation reported by Reuters; underlying transfers and intent require their own evidentiary assessment.,verified,2026-08-11
+clm-md-005,md-2024-presidential-referendum,attribution,"Authorities and international institutions attributed major components of the operation to Russia-linked and Shor-linked actors, while Russia and Shor denied wrongdoing.",established_evidence,supported_as_worded,supported_as_worded,assertion_was_made,src-md-odihr-final-20250314|src-md-reuters-payments-20241024,src-md-reuters-payments-20241024,Wording preserves attribution as an official assessment and the denials as counterposition.,verified,2026-08-11
+clm-md-006,md-2024-presidential-referendum,ai_role,"AI-generated impersonation and synthetic content appeared in Moldova's information environment, but the wider interference operation relied heavily on non-AI mechanisms.",established_evidence,supported_as_worded,supported_as_worded,underlying_fact,src-md-eeas-fimi-202401|src-md-odihr-parliament-202602,,"Avoids treating illicit finance, bots, and coordinated networks as synonymous with generative AI.",verified,2026-08-11
+clm-md-007,md-2024-presidential-referendum,mechanism,Meta reported removing a coordinated inauthentic network targeting Russian-speaking audiences in Moldova.,established_evidence,supported_as_worded,supported_as_worded,assertion_was_made,src-md-meta-threat-reporting,,Platform self-report; independent replication is limited and gross follower counts largely reflected non-Moldovan or fake engagement.,verified,2026-08-11
+clm-md-008,md-2024-presidential-referendum,counterevidence,"The 2026 ODIHR report cited a heterogeneous aggregate of more than 138,000 accounts and transactions across linked 2024–2025 investigations. It cannot be assigned to a single geographic scope, unit, unique population, or voter-reach measure.",established_evidence,supported_as_worded,supported_as_worded,assertion_was_made,src-md-odihr-parliament-202602,,Retained only as a warning about an official-report aggregate. It is excluded from observations and from the case-level legacy reach fields.,verified,2026-08-11
+clm-md-009,md-2024-presidential-referendum,behavioural_effect,"Documented payment systems provide evidence of attempted and in some cases accepted inducement, but do not establish how each recipient voted.",strong_inference,partly_supported,inferential_synthesis,researcher_inference,src-md-reuters-payments-20241024|src-md-odihr-final-20250314,,Acceptance of a payment is not identical to compliance with an instruction.,verified,2026-08-11
+clm-md-010,md-2024-presidential-referendum,electoral_effect,"Among the public sources linked to this record at the cutoff, none provided a credible causal estimate of referendum or presidential votes changed by the influence operation.",not_identified_in_declared_review,not_identified_in_declared_review,review_bounded_absence,review_scope_statement,,,Bounded to the sources linked to this record at the cutoff; this is not proof of absence beyond the declared review.,verified,2026-08-11
+clm-md-011,md-2024-presidential-referendum,counterevidence,"Observers also found incumbent advantage, insufficient safeguards against misuse of administrative resources, and media imbalances.",established_evidence,supported_as_worded,supported_as_worded,underlying_fact,src-md-odihr-prelim-20241021|src-md-odihr-final-20250314,,Prevents the foreign-interference frame from obscuring domestic electoral-integrity problems.,verified,2026-08-11
+clm-md-012,md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,mechanism,"The 2025 parliamentary-election observation record described inauthentic account networks, troll farms, automated bots, AI videos, disinformation, and foreign-funded vote-buying infrastructure.",established_evidence,supported_as_worded,supported_as_worded,assertion_was_made,src-md-odihr-parliament-202602,,Evidence concerns a linked later election and is not silently back-projected into every 2024 event.,verified,2026-08-11
+clm-md-013,md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,electoral_effect,The persistence of a network across elections does not establish that AI-generated content or bots determined the 2025 outcome.,strong_inference,partly_supported,inferential_synthesis,researcher_inference,src-md-odihr-parliament-202602,,,verified,2026-08-11
+clm-md-014,md-2024-presidential-referendum,reach,"Meta reported about 4,200 Facebook Page followers and 335,000 Instagram followers for the removed Moldova-focused network, but said the vast majority were outside Moldova and indicative of fake engagement; it assessed that the operation had not built an authentic audience before disruption.",established_evidence,supported_as_worded,supported_as_worded,assertion_was_made,src-md-meta-threat-reporting,,Established as platform telemetry and assessment. Gross followers must not be reported as Moldovan voter reach.,verified,2026-08-11
+clm-md-015,md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,occurrence,"DFRLab analysed 253 inauthentic accounts in a paid InfoLeaders network linked through undercover reporting to Telegram-based recruitment, training, task assignment, and mutual amplification.",established_evidence,supported_as_worded,supported_as_worded,underlying_fact,src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924,,The platform sample and the wider number of recruited people are different denominators.,verified,2026-08-11
+clm-md-016,md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,reach,"The 253-account InfoLeaders sample produced 28,708 posts, 55,367,950 views, 2,207,894 likes, 295,608 shares, and 239,016 comments across TikTok, Facebook, and Instagram.",established_evidence,supported_as_worded,supported_as_worded,measurement,src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924,,"Platform totals are non-unique, can include repeat or inauthentic engagement, and do not measure belief or votes.",verified,2026-08-11
+clm-md-017,md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,mechanism,"Curators required local-looking participants to personalise centrally supplied messages while retaining assigned hashtags and to amplify one another, making paid coordination appear to be spontaneous peer speech.",established_evidence,supported_as_worded,supported_as_worded,underlying_fact,src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924,,"AI-assisted rephrasing was an enabling layer within a paid human and bot-coordinated system, not the sole mechanism.",verified,2026-08-11
+clm-md-018,md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,attribution,"Among the public sources linked to this record at the cutoff, none independently established direct Kremlin command of every InfoLeaders account or asset.",not_identified_in_declared_review,not_identified_in_declared_review,review_bounded_absence,review_scope_statement,,,Bounded to the sources linked to this record at the cutoff; this is not proof of absence beyond the declared review.,verified,2026-08-11
+clm-md-019,md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,electoral_effect,"Among the public sources linked to this record at the cutoff, none provided a causal estimate of belief, turnout, votes, seats, or the 2025 result attributable to the coded network, synthetic media, or automated accounts.",not_identified_in_declared_review,not_identified_in_declared_review,review_bounded_absence,review_scope_statement,,,Bounded to the sources linked to this record at the cutoff; this is not proof of absence beyond the declared review.,verified,2026-08-11
+clm-nh-001,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,occurrence,An AI-generated voice impersonating President Joe Biden was used in robocalls before the New Hampshire presidential primary.,established_evidence,supported_as_worded,supported_as_worded,underlying_fact,src-us-fcc-kramer-nal-20240523|src-us-nhdoj-kramer-20240523|src-us-fcc-kramer-fine-20240926,,,verified,2026-08-11
+clm-nh-002,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,mechanism,The call told recipients to save their vote for November rather than participate in the primary.,established_evidence,supported_as_worded,supported_as_worded,underlying_fact,src-us-fcc-kramer-nal-20240523|src-us-nhdoj-kramer-20240523,,The content has a demobilising instruction; criminal intent and legal guilt are separate questions.,verified,2026-08-11
+clm-nh-003,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,attribution,Steve Kramer admitted commissioning the AI-generated robocall.,established_evidence,supported_as_worded,supported_as_worded,underlying_fact,src-us-fcc-kramer-fine-20240926|src-us-nhpr-acquittal-20250613,,Admission to creation does not equal conviction on the state charges.,verified,2026-08-11
+clm-nh-004,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,reach,"Voice Broadcasting initiated 9,581 call attempts, and Lingo records showed 3,978 completed calls bearing A-level attestations.",established_evidence,supported_as_worded,supported_as_worded,measurement,src-us-fcc-kramer-final-pdf-20240926|src-us-fcc-lingo-consent-202408,,"Calls are not equivalent to unique people reached, completed calls, or listeners.",verified,2026-08-11
+clm-nh-005,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,mechanism,Caller-ID spoofing and inaccurate attestation in the telecom chain increased the call's apparent authenticity and deliverability.,established_evidence,supported_as_worded,supported_as_worded,underlying_fact,src-us-fcc-lingo-nal-pdf-20240523|src-us-fcc-lingo-settlement-20240821,,"Shows that the case is an infrastructure chain, not merely a generated audio file.",verified,2026-08-11
+clm-nh-006,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,legal_status,The FCC ruled that AI-generated voices fall within the TCPA's restriction on artificial or prerecorded voices.,established_evidence,supported_as_worded,supported_as_worded,underlying_fact,src-us-fcc-ai-voice-20240208,,,verified,2026-08-11
+clm-nh-007,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,institutional_outcome,"The FCC issued a $6 million forfeiture against Kramer, while Lingo agreed separately to a $1 million civil penalty and compliance plan.",established_evidence,supported_as_worded,supported_as_worded,underlying_fact,src-us-fcc-kramer-final-pdf-20240926|src-us-fcc-lingo-consent-202408,,Separate creator and provider actions.,verified,2026-08-11
+clm-nh-008,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,legal_status,A New Hampshire jury acquitted Kramer of all 22 state criminal charges in June 2025.,established_evidence,supported_as_worded,supported_as_worded,underlying_fact,src-us-nhpr-acquittal-20250613|src-us-ap-kramer-acquittal-20250613,,The acquittal must appear wherever the charging decision is discussed.,verified,2026-08-11
+clm-nh-009,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,behavioural_effect,"Among the public sources linked to this record at the cutoff, none measured how many recipients believed or acted on the robocall.",not_identified_in_declared_review,not_identified_in_declared_review,review_bounded_absence,review_scope_statement,,,Bounded to the sources linked to this record at the cutoff; this is not proof of absence beyond the declared review.,verified,2026-08-11
+clm-nh-010,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,electoral_effect,"Among the public sources linked to this record at the cutoff, none provided a credible causal estimate linking the robocall to primary turnout or vote totals.",not_identified_in_declared_review,not_identified_in_declared_review,review_bounded_absence,review_scope_statement,,,Bounded to the sources linked to this record at the cutoff; this is not proof of absence beyond the declared review.,verified,2026-08-11
+clm-nh-011,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,institutional_outcome,"In November 2025, a federal court entered default judgment against Kramer, awarded individual monetary relief, and permanently enjoined similar voter-coercion schemes.",established_evidence,supported_as_worded,supported_as_worded,underlying_fact,src-us-lwv-kramer-civil|src-us-ap-kramer-default-202511,,"The judgment followed nonappearance and must be described as a default, not a contested merits trial.",verified,2026-08-11
+clm-nh-012,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,control_shift_hypothesis,"Hypothesis: a cloned presidential voice, selected call list, and spoofed trusted number could shift control over apparent authorship and relevance of a participation instruction toward the operator; recipient agency change is not observed.",researcher_hypothesis,hypothesis_not_tested,not_tested,researcher_inference,,,Analytical hypothesis linked through the pathway to factual claims; it is not direct evidence of an agency outcome.,analytical_hypothesis,2026-08-11
+clm-br-001,br-2026-election-preparedness,occurrence,"Brazil's 2026 general election first round is scheduled for 4 October, with a possible runoff on 25 October.",established_evidence,supported_as_worded,supported_as_worded,underlying_fact,src-br-tse-calendar-202603,,"Prospective date, not an observed election result.",verified,2026-08-11
+clm-br-002,br-2026-election-preparedness,legal_status,"TSE rules require explicit, prominent, accessible disclosure of synthetic multimedia used in electoral advertising and identification of the technology used.",established_evidence,supported_as_worded,supported_as_worded,underlying_fact,src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302|src-br-tse-ai-rules-202604,,Resolution 23.755 amends the standing electoral-advertising rule.,verified,2026-08-11
+clm-br-003,br-2026-election-preparedness,legal_status,"Brazil prohibits publication or republication of new synthetic content using a candidate's or public figure's image, voice, or manifestation from 72 hours before until 24 hours after voting ends, even if labelled.",established_evidence,supported_as_worded,supported_as_worded,underlying_fact,src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302,,Time-window prohibition is distinct from the general disclosure requirement.,verified,2026-08-11
+clm-br-004,br-2026-election-preparedness,legal_status,"AI application providers may not rank, recommend, suggest, prioritise, endorse, or disfavor candidates, campaigns, parties, federations, or coalitions in automated responses.",established_evidence,supported_as_worded,supported_as_worded,underlying_fact,src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302,,"A direct regulation of AI-system outputs, not only political advertising.",verified,2026-08-11
+clm-br-005,br-2026-election-preparedness,response,Platforms offering political-content boosting must provide a field for advertisers to declare AI use.,established_evidence,supported_as_worded,supported_as_worded,institutional_action,src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302,,,verified,2026-08-11
+clm-br-006,br-2026-election-preparedness,response,"Internet application providers must prepare measurable election-compliance plans, and the TSE set 16 August 2026 as the submission deadline.",established_evidence,supported_as_worded,supported_as_worded,institutional_action,src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302|src-br-tse-compliance-202607,,Future QA should archive submitted plans and assess measurable implementation.,verified,2026-08-11
+clm-br-007,br-2026-election-preparedness,response,"By 11 August 2026, the TSE had announced platform partnerships, an AGU agreement, an information-integrity and AI monitoring council, and a voice-deepfake cooperation agreement with ElevenLabs.",established_evidence,supported_as_worded,supported_as_worded,institutional_action,src-br-tse-platforms-202607|src-br-tse-agu-20260803|src-br-tse-council-20260807|src-br-tse-elevenlabs-202608,,Institutional capacity indicators; effectiveness not yet established.,verified,2026-08-11
+clm-br-008,br-2026-election-preparedness,counterevidence,"Empirical research on Brazil's 2024 municipal elections found isolated AI misuse and broad campaign experimentation, but not the predicted wave of high-impact generative-AI manipulation.",established_evidence,supported_as_worded,supported_as_worded,underlying_fact,src-br-aio-202411,,"A prior-cycle base rate, not a forecast for 2026.",verified,2026-08-11
+clm-br-009,br-2026-election-preparedness,electoral_effect,"No 2026 electoral effect can be coded before voting, and observed incidents must not be converted into predictions.",open_question,unresolved,none,researcher_inference,,,Dataset guardrail rather than an empirical outcome claim.,verified,2026-08-11
+clm-br-010,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,occurrence,A synthetic image-and-voice avatar of Jair Bolsonaro appeared at the 25 July 2026 launch of Flávio Bolsonaro's presidential campaign.,established_evidence,supported_as_worded,supported_as_worded,underlying_fact,src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728,,,verified,2026-08-11
+clm-br-011,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,mechanism,The avatar explicitly disclosed that its image and voice were generated with AI and then delivered a political endorsement message.,established_evidence,supported_as_worded,supported_as_worded,underlying_fact,src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728,,A labelled synthetic political persona; not a covert deepfake in the narrow sense.,verified,2026-08-11
+clm-br-012,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,legal_status,"Opposing parties challenged the avatar in court, while Flávio Bolsonaro's lawyers argued that disclosure and the absence of mixed real footage made it lawful.",established_evidence,supported_as_worded,supported_as_worded,assertion_was_made,src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728,src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728,Established that the competing claims were made; neither claim is treated as finally adjudicated.,verified,2026-08-11
+clm-br-013,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,legal_status,"Among the public sources linked to this record at the cutoff, no final TSE merits decision on the avatar's compliance with electoral AI rules was identified.",not_identified_in_declared_review,not_identified_in_declared_review,review_bounded_absence,review_scope_statement,,,Bounded to the sources linked to this record at the cutoff; this is not proof of absence beyond the declared review.,needs_update,2026-08-11
+clm-br-014,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,behavioural_effect,"Among the public sources linked to this record at the cutoff, none measured whether the avatar changed voter beliefs, candidate preference, or turnout intention.",not_identified_in_declared_review,not_identified_in_declared_review,review_bounded_absence,review_scope_statement,,,Bounded to the sources linked to this record at the cutoff; this is not proof of absence beyond the declared review.,needs_update,2026-08-11
+clm-br-015,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,legal_status,Federação Brasil da Esperança filed TSE representation RP 0601315-97.2026.6.00.0000 on 26 July 2026 alleging premature propaganda and unlawful synthetic-media use.,established_evidence,supported_as_worded,supported_as_worded,assertion_was_made,src-br-avatar-petition-20260726,,The filing and allegations are established; the alleged violations are not.,verified,2026-08-11
+clm-br-016,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,legal_status,"Art. 9-B requires disclosure, Art. 9-B §3 bars certain simulated interlocution with a candidate or real person, and Art. 9-C §1 bars synthetic audio or video used to favor or harm a candidacy even when authorised.",established_evidence,supported_as_worded,supported_as_worded,underlying_fact,src-br-tse-res-23610-consolidated,,"The legal text is established; application to this disclosed, one-way convention avatar remains unresolved.",verified,2026-08-11
+clm-br-017,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,counterevidence,The avatar's up-front AI disclosure supports compliance with the labelling duty but does not by itself resolve the separate simulated-interlocution or pro-candidacy synthetic-media prohibitions.,strong_inference,partly_supported,inferential_synthesis,researcher_inference,src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728|src-br-tse-res-23610-consolidated,src-br-folha-avatar-defense-202607,The defence argues that disclosure and lack of deception remove it from the deepfake prohibition; no merits court had accepted or rejected that reading by the cutoff.,needs_update,2026-08-11
+clm-br-018,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,counterevidence,The 72-hour pre-election and 24-hour post-election blackout in Art. 9-B §3-A did not apply by timing to the 25 July convention.,established_evidence,supported_as_worded,supported_as_worded,underlying_fact,src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302|src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728,,Other provisions may still apply; retain the blackout rule for prospective monitoring only.,verified,2026-08-11
+clm-br-019,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,attribution,Jair Bolsonaro's lawyers denied that he authorised or knew of the avatar's production; his personal authorisation therefore remains unknown rather than disproved.,established_evidence,supported_as_worded,supported_as_worded,assertion_was_made,src-br-ft-avatar-202607|src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728,,"A denial establishes the defence position, not the underlying absence of authorisation.",needs_update,2026-08-11
+clm-br-020,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,control_shift_hypothesis,"Boundary hypothesis: a disclosed synthetic surrogate could shift control over Jair Bolsonaro's public representation toward the beneficiary campaign; disclosure, unresolved authorisation, and unmeasured audience interpretation prevent a stronger conclusion.",researcher_hypothesis,hypothesis_not_tested,not_tested,researcher_inference,,,Analytical hypothesis linked through the pathway to factual claims; it is not direct evidence of an agency outcome.,analytical_hypothesis,2026-08-11
+clm-us26-001,us-2026-midterms-preparedness,occurrence,The 2026 United States general election is scheduled for 3 November 2026.,established_evidence,supported_as_worded,supported_as_worded,underlying_fact,src-us-fec-dates-2026,,,verified,2026-08-11
+clm-us26-002,us-2026-midterms-preparedness,legal_status,"As of 23 June 2026, 31 states had enacted laws regulating deepfakes in political messaging, with materially different prohibition and disclosure models.",established_evidence,supported_as_worded,supported_as_worded,underlying_fact,src-us-ncsl-20260623,,"Enactment, effective date, scope, and litigation status should be tracked separately.",verified,2026-08-11
+clm-us26-003,us-2026-midterms-preparedness,legal_status,The United States lacks a broad federal rule uniformly governing AI-generated political messages across the 2026 election.,established_evidence,supported_as_worded,supported_as_worded,underlying_fact,src-us-fec-ai-disposition-2024|src-us-ncsl-20260623|src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328,src-us-fcc-ai-voice-20240208,"Narrow federal rules remain relevant, especially telecom law and fraudulent misrepresentation.",verified,2026-08-11
+clm-us26-004,us-2026-midterms-preparedness,ai_role,CISA assessed generative AI as more likely to amplify existing election risks than create wholly new risk categories.,established_evidence,supported_as_worded,supported_as_worded,assertion_was_made,src-us-cisa-genai-202401,,Prior-cycle risk assessment used as a conceptual baseline.,verified,2026-08-11
+clm-us26-005,us-2026-midterms-preparedness,attribution,"Prior U.S. intelligence assessments establish that foreign actors used synthetic or manipulated content in the 2024 cycle, supporting a monitored 2026 risk but not proving a new 2026 operation.",established_evidence,supported_as_worded,supported_as_worded,underlying_fact,src-us-odni-update-20241021,,Strict temporal separation between prior evidence and current incidents.,verified,2026-08-11
+clm-us26-006,us-2026-midterms-preparedness,counterevidence,A platform assessment of the 2024 global cycle reported that generative-AI misinformation had limited reach on Meta services.,established_evidence,supported_as_worded,supported_as_worded,assertion_was_made,src-global-meta-muted-20241203,,Interested-party assessment reported by Reuters; not generalisable to every platform or 2026.,verified,2026-08-11
+clm-us26-007,us-2026-midterms-preparedness,electoral_effect,"No 2026 electoral effect can be coded before the election, and prior-cycle incident counts do not supply a forecast.",open_question,unresolved,none,researcher_inference,,,Dataset guardrail.,verified,2026-08-11
+clm-us26-008,us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,occurrence,"On 11 March 2026, the National Republican Senatorial Committee released an AI-generated video depicting James Talarico reciting text from prior social-media posts.",established_evidence,supported_as_worded,supported_as_worded,underlying_fact,src-us-nrsc-talarico-20260311|src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328,,The source quotes the committee defending the ad.,verified,2026-08-11
+clm-us26-009,us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,mechanism,"The Talarico ad carried an AI-generated disclosure in small, easy-to-miss text.",established_evidence,supported_as_worded,supported_as_worded,underlying_fact,src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328|src-us-berkeley-talarico-2026,,Disclosure existence and disclosure salience are distinct variables.,verified,2026-08-11
+clm-us26-010,us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,reach,"Public reporting identified at least three recent national-Republican synthetic ads by March 2026, but did not provide comparable impression or targeting data.",established_evidence,supported_as_worded,supported_as_worded,measurement,src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328,,Content count is not audience reach.,verified,2026-08-11
+clm-us26-011,us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,mechanism,"Additional 2026 election ads fabricated audiovisual speech or conduct by Jon Ossoff, John Cornyn, and Ken Paxton, with varying levels of obviousness and disclosure.",established_evidence,supported_as_worded,supported_as_worded,underlying_fact,src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328,,Record separate items in a later content-level expansion rather than treating them as identical.,verified,2026-08-11
+clm-us26-012,us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,behavioural_effect,"Among the public sources linked to this record at the cutoff, none measured whether a named 2026 synthetic ad changed candidate evaluations, turnout intention, or vote choice.",not_identified_in_declared_review,not_identified_in_declared_review,review_bounded_absence,review_scope_statement,,,Bounded to the sources linked to this record at the cutoff; this is not proof of absence beyond the declared review.,needs_update,2026-08-11
+clm-us26-013,us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,counterevidence,"Some 2026 campaign-generated videos reproduce genuine prior words, are labelled, or use obvious satire, complicating a binary real-versus-deceptive classification.",established_evidence,supported_as_worded,supported_as_worded,underlying_fact,src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328,,"Motivates content-level coding for quotation fidelity, disclosure, realism, authorisation, and context.",verified,2026-08-11
+clm-us26-014,us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,mechanism,"Much of the Talarico attack used genuine older posts, but the synthetic first-person performance added reaction lines and affect not contained in those quoted posts.",established_evidence,supported_as_worded,supported_as_worded,underlying_fact,src-us-nrsc-talarico-20260311|src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328,,Do not describe every spoken proposition as fabricated; separate authentic underlying text from invented performance and asides.,verified,2026-08-11
+clm-us26-015,us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,reach,"Among the public sources linked to this record at the cutoff, none provided a preserved, reproducible measure of cross-platform impressions or unique exposure for the NRSC upload.",not_identified_in_declared_review,not_identified_in_declared_review,review_bounded_absence,review_scope_statement,,,The mutable YouTube counter was not retained as evidence without a preserved snapshot. This bounded non-identification statement is not proof that no exposure occurred.,verified,2026-08-11
+clm-us26-016,us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,control_shift_hypothesis,"Hypothesis: simulated first-person performance could shift control over an opponent's audiovisual representation toward the sponsor; the record observes content production, not voter agency change.",researcher_hypothesis,hypothesis_not_tested,not_tested,researcher_inference,,,Analytical hypothesis linked through the pathway to factual claims; it is not direct evidence of an agency outcome.,analytical_hypothesis,2026-08-11
+clm-ro-020,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,control_shift_hypothesis,Hypothesis: opaque coordinated promotion and recommender amplification could shift agenda-setting control toward campaign-network operators and ranking systems; the record does not observe individual agency change or establish a causal link to annulment.,researcher_hypothesis,hypothesis_not_tested,not_tested,researcher_inference,,,"Analytical synthesis of clm-ro-002, clm-ro-003, clm-ro-006, clm-ro-007, and clm-ro-013; not an observed agency outcome.",analytical_hypothesis,2026-08-12
+clm-ro-021,ro-2025-presidential-repeat,control_shift_hypothesis,"Hypothesis: synthetic local personas and coordinated distribution could shift control over apparent local consensus toward an unidentified operator; user belief, choice, and electoral effects are not observed.",researcher_hypothesis,hypothesis_not_tested,not_tested,researcher_inference,,,Analytical synthesis of clm-ro-014 through clm-ro-018; not an observed agency outcome.,analytical_hypothesis,2026-08-12
+clm-md-020,md-2024-presidential-referendum,control_shift_hypothesis,"Hypothesis: covert payments, coordination, and impersonation could shift control over participation or preference toward sponsors; the record supports an inducement attempt but not how recipients voted.",researcher_hypothesis,hypothesis_not_tested,not_tested,researcher_inference,,,Analytical synthesis of clm-md-003 through clm-md-011; not an observed agency outcome.,analytical_hypothesis,2026-08-12
+clm-md-021,md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,control_shift_hypothesis,"Hypothesis: centrally tasked paid personas and reciprocal amplification could shift agenda control toward network curators; content and engagement are observed, but user agency and electoral effects are not.",researcher_hypothesis,hypothesis_not_tested,not_tested,researcher_inference,,,"Analytical synthesis of clm-md-012, clm-md-015 through clm-md-019; not an observed agency outcome.",analytical_hypothesis,2026-08-12
+clm-usca11-001,us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,occurrence,Scott Wiener for Congress launched the ConnieChan.ai interactive attack-ad chatbot on 3 August 2026 and removed it on 7 August after public criticism.,established_evidence,supported_as_worded,supported_as_worded,underlying_fact,src-us-ca11-sfgate-20260804|src-us-ca11-mission-20260807|src-us-ca11-axios-20260811,,"SFGATE described a Monday launch; Mission Local gives 3 August. Some later summaries use 4 August, the first reporting date.",verified,2026-08-12
+clm-usca11-002,us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,attribution,"The Wiener campaign admitted commissioning, paying for, promoting, and controlling the chatbot; the technical builder was not publicly identified.",established_evidence,supported_as_worded,supported_as_worded,underlying_fact,src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804|src-us-ca11-sfgate-20260804|src-us-ca11-mission-20260807,,"Anthropic supplied a model but is not attributed as campaign designer, approver, or operator.",verified,2026-08-12
+clm-usca11-003,us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,ai_role,"The campaign said the chatbot used Anthropic's Claude model family to generate interactive responses; the exact version, deployment route, prompt, retrieval system, and guardrails remain unknown.",established_evidence,supported_as_worded,supported_as_worded,assertion_was_made,src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804|src-us-ca11-sfgate-20260804|src-us-ca11-axios-20260811,,Product family is known; technical configuration is not.,verified,2026-08-12
+clm-usca11-004,us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,mechanism,The system answered in Connie Chan's first person and dynamically redirected questions toward campaign-selected portrayals of her record.,established_evidence,supported_as_worded,supported_as_worded,underlying_fact,src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804|src-us-ca11-sfgate-20260804|src-us-ca11-axios-20260811,,Interactive opponent simulation differs from a static synthetic ad because user questions affect the generated response.,verified,2026-08-12
+clm-usca11-005,us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,counterevidence,"The site visibly framed itself as AI and parody, said it was not affiliated with or endorsed by Chan, and disclosed that it was paid for by the Wiener campaign.",established_evidence,supported_as_worded,supported_as_worded,underlying_fact,src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804|src-us-ca11-sfgate-20260804,,"Transparent parody weakens a covert-deception theory but does not remove questions about synthetic first-person representation, bias, or data control.",verified,2026-08-12
+clm-usca11-006,us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,reach,"The campaign reported that the chatbot received 5,058 submitted questions during its first 27 hours.",established_as_campaign_report,supported_as_attributed_measurement,attributed_measurement_only,assertion_was_made,src-us-ca11-mission-20260807|src-us-ca11-axios-20260811,,"Campaign-reported measure. It is not unique users, conversations, voters, district residents, impressions, beliefs, or votes; repeated or adversarial prompts may inflate it.",verified,2026-08-12
+clm-usca11-007,us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,mechanism,"The privacy policy said conversations could be retained for 90 days and reviewed by a small number of authorised staff to fix bugs, understand queries, and improve campaign content.",established_evidence,supported_as_worded,supported_as_worded,underlying_fact,src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804,,"The data warning was in the privacy policy, not prominently repeated in the main chat interface according to the reporting.",verified,2026-08-12
+clm-usca11-008,us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,response,"On 7 August the campaign removed the chatbot, announced removal of the two billboards, said the experiment had missed the mark, and apologised for causing offence.",established_evidence,supported_as_worded,supported_as_worded,institutional_action,src-us-ca11-mission-20260807|src-us-ca11-axios-20260811,,"Campaign self-termination is a response, not an institutional or legal finding.",verified,2026-08-12
+clm-usca11-009,us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,behavioural_effect,"Among the public sources linked to this record at the cutoff, none measured whether interaction with the chatbot changed candidate evaluation, trust, issue salience, turnout intention, or vote choice.",not_identified_in_declared_review,not_identified_in_declared_review,review_bounded_absence,review_scope_statement,,,Bounded to the sources linked to this record at the cutoff; this is not proof of absence beyond the declared review.,verified,2026-08-12
+clm-usca11-010,us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,electoral_effect,"The election had not occurred by the cutoff, and no electoral effect can be inferred from question counts, press attention, criticism, or campaign withdrawal.",open_question,unresolved,none,researcher_inference,,,Prospective guardrail.,verified,2026-08-12
+clm-usca11-011,us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,control_shift_hypothesis,"Boundary hypothesis: a campaign-controlled opponent chatbot could shift representational and evidentiary control toward its sponsor, but explicit parody, disclosure, unknown system configuration, and unmeasured user effects prevent a finding of agency change.",researcher_hypothesis,hypothesis_not_tested,not_tested,researcher_inference,,,Analytical hypothesis linked through the pathway to factual claims; it is not direct evidence of an agency outcome.,analytical_hypothesis,2026-08-12

data/datapackage.json

@@ -2,8 +2,15 @@
   "profile": "tabular-data-package",
   "name": "agency-transfer-election-cases",
   "title": "AI, Elections and Agency Transfer Evidence Index",
-  "version": "0.3.1",
-  "description": "Purposive, claim-level research corpus with normalized pathways, observations, empirical model studies, screening records and official electoral context. Not a global prevalence sample.",
+  "version": "0.4.0",
+  "description": "Purposive, exploratory evidence index with normalized claims, pathways, observations, model studies, screening records and official electoral context. It is not proof of agency transfer, a prevalence sample or an election-effect estimate.",
+  "keywords": [
+    "elections",
+    "artificial intelligence",
+    "information integrity",
+    "agency",
+    "evidence index"
+  ],
   "licenses": [
     {
       "name": "CC-BY-4.0",
@@ -13,6 +20,7 @@
   "resources": [
     {
       "name": "cases",
+      "description": "Claim-coded records with incident/preparedness type, mechanism context, effect status and explicitly hypothetical control-shift fields.",
       "path": "cases.csv",
       "profile": "tabular-data-resource",
       "format": "csv",
@@ -21,7 +29,10 @@
         "fields": [
           {
             "name": "case_id",
-            "type": "string"
+            "type": "string",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true
+            }
           },
           {
             "name": "case_family_id",
@@ -61,7 +72,15 @@
           },
           {
             "name": "case_status",
-            "type": "string"
+            "type": "string",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true,
+              "enum": [
+                "retrospective",
+                "ongoing",
+                "prospective_monitoring"
+              ]
+            }
           },
           {
             "name": "as_of_date",
@@ -79,11 +98,36 @@
           },
           {
             "name": "record_type",
-            "type": "string"
+            "type": "string",
+            "description": "Unit of analysis; different record types are not automatically exchangeable.",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true,
+              "enum": [
+                "election_wide_case",
+                "observed_network",
+                "observed_incident",
+                "observed_campaign_set",
+                "preparedness_file"
+              ]
+            }
           },
           {
             "name": "manipulation_assessment",
-            "type": "string"
+            "type": "string",
+            "description": "Process assessment kept separate from agency and electoral outcomes.",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true,
+              "enum": [
+                "manipulation_confirmed",
+                "manipulation_probable",
+                "mixed_documented_manipulation",
+                "transparent_contested_use",
+                "manipulation_not_established",
+                "no_manipulation_observed",
+                "preparedness_not_incident",
+                "not_an_incident"
+              ]
+            }
           },
           {
             "name": "summary",
@@ -127,23 +171,36 @@
           },
           {
             "name": "affected_state",
-            "type": "string"
+            "type": "string",
+            "description": "Decision-relevant dimension examined; not a claim that the state changed."
           },
           {
-            "name": "agency_transfer_path",
-            "type": "string"
+            "name": "control_shift_hypothesis",
+            "type": "string",
+            "description": "Falsifiable analytical proposition; not an observed agency outcome."
           },
           {
-            "name": "power_concentrated_in",
-            "type": "string"
+            "name": "hypothesized_power_recipient",
+            "type": "string",
+            "description": "Actor that could gain control if the hypothesis is supported; not an observed concentration-of-power finding."
           },
           {
             "name": "democratic_harm",
-            "type": "string"
+            "type": "string",
+            "description": "Harm assessment that must distinguish documented process or institutional harm from plausible but unmeasured outcome harm."
           },
           {
             "name": "occurrence_status",
-            "type": "string"
+            "type": "string",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true,
+              "enum": [
+                "confirmed",
+                "partly_confirmed",
+                "alleged",
+                "not_observed"
+              ]
+            }
           },
           {
             "name": "reach_status",
@@ -159,11 +216,30 @@
           },
           {
             "name": "behavioural_effect_status",
-            "type": "string"
+            "type": "string",
+            "description": "Outcome status; unknown must not be interpreted as no effect.",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true,
+              "enum": [
+                "measured",
+                "indicated",
+                "not_detected",
+                "unknown"
+              ]
+            }
           },
           {
             "name": "electoral_effect_status",
-            "type": "string"
+            "type": "string",
+            "description": "Causal electoral-effect status; institutional action belongs in institutional_outcome.",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true,
+              "enum": [
+                "measured",
+                "not_detected",
+                "unknown"
+              ]
+            }
           },
           {
             "name": "institutional_outcome",
@@ -177,10 +253,6 @@
             "name": "inclusion_tier",
             "type": "string"
           },
-          {
-            "name": "overall_confidence",
-            "type": "number"
-          },
           {
             "name": "counterevidence",
             "type": "string"
@@ -199,6 +271,7 @@
     },
     {
       "name": "claims",
+      "description": "Atomic factual, attributed, review-bounded, inferential, or hypothesis claims; no numeric coder-confidence scores.",
       "path": "claims.csv",
       "profile": "tabular-data-resource",
       "format": "csv",
@@ -207,15 +280,40 @@
         "fields": [
           {
             "name": "claim_id",
-            "type": "string"
+            "type": "string",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true
+            }
           },
           {
             "name": "case_id",
-            "type": "string"
+            "type": "string",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true
+            }
           },
           {
             "name": "claim_type",
-            "type": "string"
+            "type": "string",
+            "description": "Semantic class of the atomic claim; control_shift_hypothesis is explicitly analytical, not an observed agency outcome.",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true,
+              "enum": [
+                "occurrence",
+                "mechanism",
+                "ai_role",
+                "reach",
+                "attribution",
+                "intent",
+                "behavioural_effect",
+                "electoral_effect",
+                "institutional_outcome",
+                "response",
+                "legal_status",
+                "counterevidence",
+                "control_shift_hypothesis"
+              ]
+            }
           },
           {
             "name": "claim_text",
@@ -223,23 +321,67 @@
           },
           {
             "name": "evidence_label",
-            "type": "string"
-          },
-          {
-            "name": "confidence",
-            "type": "number"
+            "type": "string",
+            "description": "Epistemic form of the claim; not_identified_in_declared_review is bounded to the linked corpus and researcher_hypothesis is untested.",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true,
+              "enum": [
+                "established_evidence",
+                "established_as_campaign_report",
+                "strong_inference",
+                "researcher_hypothesis",
+                "not_identified_in_declared_review",
+                "open_question"
+              ]
+            }
           },
           {
-            "name": "coder_confidence_in_label",
-            "type": "number"
+            "name": "claim_status",
+            "type": "string",
+            "description": "Support status derived from evidence_label without a numeric confidence score.",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true,
+              "enum": [
+                "supported_as_worded",
+                "supported_as_attributed_measurement",
+                "partly_supported",
+                "hypothesis_not_tested",
+                "not_identified_in_declared_review",
+                "unresolved"
+              ]
+            }
           },
           {
-            "name": "claim_status",
-            "type": "string"
+            "name": "evidence_basis",
+            "type": "string",
+            "description": "Non-numeric basis category; it is not an ordinal quality score.",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true,
+              "enum": [
+                "supported_as_worded",
+                "attributed_measurement_only",
+                "inferential_synthesis",
+                "not_tested",
+                "review_bounded_absence",
+                "none"
+              ]
+            }
           },
           {
-            "name": "evidence_strength",
-            "type": "string"
+            "name": "evidence_scope",
+            "type": "string",
+            "description": "What the evidence establishes: conduct/fact, an attributed assertion, an action, a measurement, a review-scope statement, or researcher inference.",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true,
+              "enum": [
+                "underlying_fact",
+                "assertion_was_made",
+                "institutional_action",
+                "measurement",
+                "review_scope_statement",
+                "researcher_inference"
+              ]
+            }
           },
           {
             "name": "source_ids",
@@ -276,6 +418,7 @@
     },
     {
       "name": "sources",
+      "description": "Source registry with provenance, independence, access and preservation metadata.",
       "path": "sources.csv",
       "profile": "tabular-data-resource",
       "format": "csv",
@@ -284,7 +427,10 @@
         "fields": [
           {
             "name": "source_id",
-            "type": "string"
+            "type": "string",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true
+            }
           },
           {
             "name": "title",
@@ -360,6 +506,7 @@
     },
     {
       "name": "events",
+      "description": "Dated events linked to cases, claims and sources.",
       "path": "events.csv",
       "profile": "tabular-data-resource",
       "format": "csv",
@@ -368,11 +515,17 @@
         "fields": [
           {
             "name": "event_id",
-            "type": "string"
+            "type": "string",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true
+            }
           },
           {
             "name": "case_id",
-            "type": "string"
+            "type": "string",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true
+            }
           },
           {
             "name": "event_date",
@@ -413,6 +566,7 @@
     },
     {
       "name": "case_sources",
+      "description": "Normalized many-to-many case–source links.",
       "path": "case_sources.csv",
       "profile": "tabular-data-resource",
       "format": "csv",
@@ -421,11 +575,17 @@
         "fields": [
           {
             "name": "case_id",
-            "type": "string"
+            "type": "string",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true
+            }
           },
           {
             "name": "source_id",
-            "type": "string"
+            "type": "string",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true
+            }
           },
           {
             "name": "source_role",
@@ -440,6 +600,10 @@
             "type": "string"
           }
         ],
+        "primaryKey": [
+          "case_id",
+          "source_id"
+        ],
         "foreignKeys": [
           {
             "fields": "case_id",
@@ -460,6 +624,7 @@
     },
     {
       "name": "watchlist",
+      "description": "Prospective observable indicators and assessment rules; not incident evidence.",
       "path": "watchlist.csv",
       "profile": "tabular-data-resource",
       "format": "csv",
@@ -468,11 +633,17 @@
         "fields": [
           {
             "name": "watch_id",
-            "type": "string"
+            "type": "string",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true
+            }
           },
           {
             "name": "case_id",
-            "type": "string"
+            "type": "string",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true
+            }
           },
           {
             "name": "jurisdiction",
@@ -529,6 +700,7 @@
     },
     {
       "name": "candidates",
+      "description": "Screening leads that are not claim-coded core incidents.",
       "path": "candidates.csv",
       "profile": "tabular-data-resource",
       "format": "csv",
@@ -537,7 +709,10 @@
         "fields": [
           {
             "name": "candidate_id",
-            "type": "string"
+            "type": "string",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true
+            }
           },
           {
             "name": "title",
@@ -617,6 +792,7 @@
     },
     {
       "name": "official_elections",
+      "description": "Official election and contest context linked to cases.",
       "path": "official_elections.csv",
       "profile": "tabular-data-resource",
       "format": "csv",
@@ -625,7 +801,10 @@
         "fields": [
           {
             "name": "election_id",
-            "type": "string"
+            "type": "string",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true
+            }
           },
           {
             "name": "case_family_id",
@@ -693,6 +872,7 @@
     },
     {
       "name": "official_turnout",
+      "description": "Wide official turnout records retained for compatibility.",
       "path": "official_turnout.csv",
       "profile": "tabular-data-resource",
       "format": "csv",
@@ -701,11 +881,17 @@
         "fields": [
           {
             "name": "turnout_id",
-            "type": "string"
+            "type": "string",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true
+            }
           },
           {
             "name": "election_id",
-            "type": "string"
+            "type": "string",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true
+            }
           },
           {
             "name": "geographic_unit_type",
@@ -773,7 +959,10 @@
           },
           {
             "name": "official_source_id",
-            "type": "string"
+            "type": "string",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true
+            }
           },
           {
             "name": "as_of_date",
@@ -805,6 +994,7 @@
     },
     {
       "name": "official_results",
+      "description": "Official contest results; not evidence of manipulation effects.",
       "path": "official_results.csv",
       "profile": "tabular-data-resource",
       "format": "csv",
@@ -813,11 +1003,17 @@
         "fields": [
           {
             "name": "result_id",
-            "type": "string"
+            "type": "string",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true
+            }
           },
           {
             "name": "election_id",
-            "type": "string"
+            "type": "string",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true
+            }
           },
           {
             "name": "geographic_unit_type",
@@ -877,7 +1073,10 @@
           },
           {
             "name": "official_source_id",
-            "type": "string"
+            "type": "string",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true
+            }
           },
           {
             "name": "as_of_date",
@@ -909,6 +1108,7 @@
     },
     {
       "name": "official_data_sources",
+      "description": "Provenance manifest for official election data.",
       "path": "official_data_sources.csv",
       "profile": "tabular-data-resource",
       "format": "csv",
@@ -917,7 +1117,10 @@
         "fields": [
           {
             "name": "official_source_id",
-            "type": "string"
+            "type": "string",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true
+            }
           },
           {
             "name": "case_family_id",
@@ -1009,6 +1212,7 @@
     },
     {
       "name": "official_election_metrics",
+      "description": "Long-form official metrics with numerator, denominator and legal role.",
       "path": "official_election_metrics.csv",
       "profile": "tabular-data-resource",
       "format": "csv",
@@ -1017,11 +1221,17 @@
         "fields": [
           {
             "name": "metric_id",
-            "type": "string"
+            "type": "string",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true
+            }
           },
           {
             "name": "election_id",
-            "type": "string"
+            "type": "string",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true
+            }
           },
           {
             "name": "geographic_unit_type",
@@ -1073,7 +1283,10 @@
           },
           {
             "name": "official_source_id",
-            "type": "string"
+            "type": "string",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true
+            }
           },
           {
             "name": "as_of_date",
@@ -1105,6 +1318,7 @@
     },
     {
       "name": "research_view",
+      "description": "Compact comparison view exposing the separate falsifiable pathway dimensions.",
       "path": "research_view.csv",
       "profile": "tabular-data-resource",
       "format": "csv",
@@ -1113,11 +1327,17 @@
         "fields": [
           {
             "name": "pathway_id",
-            "type": "string"
+            "type": "string",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true
+            }
           },
           {
             "name": "case_id",
-            "type": "string"
+            "type": "string",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true
+            }
           },
           {
             "name": "case_title",
@@ -1168,15 +1388,91 @@
             "type": "string"
           },
           {
-            "name": "affected_agency",
+            "name": "agency_dimension",
             "type": "string"
           },
           {
-            "name": "agency_transfer_status",
-            "type": "string"
+            "name": "capability_status",
+            "type": "string",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true,
+              "enum": [
+                "observed",
+                "not_observed",
+                "not_assessed",
+                "not_applicable"
+              ]
+            }
+          },
+          {
+            "name": "control_mechanism_status",
+            "type": "string",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true,
+              "enum": [
+                "observed",
+                "not_observed",
+                "not_assessed",
+                "not_applicable"
+              ]
+            }
           },
           {
-            "name": "power_recipient",
+            "name": "attempted_transfer_status",
+            "type": "string",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true,
+              "enum": [
+                "observed",
+                "not_observed",
+                "insufficient_evidence",
+                "not_applicable"
+              ]
+            }
+          },
+          {
+            "name": "agency_change_status",
+            "type": "string",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true,
+              "enum": [
+                "observed",
+                "not_observed",
+                "insufficient_evidence",
+                "not_applicable"
+              ]
+            }
+          },
+          {
+            "name": "agency_preservation_status",
+            "type": "string",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true,
+              "enum": [
+                "observed",
+                "not_observed",
+                "insufficient_evidence",
+                "not_applicable"
+              ]
+            }
+          },
+          {
+            "name": "maximum_conclusion",
+            "type": "string",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true,
+              "enum": [
+                "control_mechanism_observed",
+                "attempted_transfer_observed",
+                "agency_change_observed",
+                "agency_preserved_or_extended",
+                "insufficient_evidence",
+                "not_an_incident"
+              ]
+            }
+          },
+          {
+            "name": "hypothesized_power_recipient",
             "type": "string"
           },
           {
@@ -1192,7 +1488,7 @@
             "type": "string"
           },
           {
-            "name": "evidence_strength",
+            "name": "case_evidence_summary",
             "type": "string"
           },
           {
@@ -1204,6 +1500,7 @@
             "type": "date"
           }
         ],
+        "primaryKey": "pathway_id",
         "foreignKeys": [
           {
             "fields": "case_id",
@@ -1224,6 +1521,7 @@
     },
     {
       "name": "case_catalog",
+      "description": "Unified catalog of core records, screening leads and empirical model studies.",
       "path": "case_catalog.csv",
       "profile": "tabular-data-resource",
       "format": "csv",
@@ -1232,7 +1530,10 @@
         "fields": [
           {
             "name": "catalog_id",
-            "type": "string"
+            "type": "string",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true
+            }
           },
           {
             "name": "record_layer",
@@ -1315,6 +1616,7 @@
     },
     {
       "name": "case_actors",
+      "description": "Actors, roles, attribution status and control dimensions.",
       "path": "case_actors.csv",
       "profile": "tabular-data-resource",
       "format": "csv",
@@ -1323,11 +1625,17 @@
         "fields": [
           {
             "name": "case_actor_id",
-            "type": "string"
+            "type": "string",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true
+            }
           },
           {
             "name": "case_id",
-            "type": "string"
+            "type": "string",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true
+            }
           },
           {
             "name": "actor_name",
@@ -1372,6 +1680,7 @@
     },
     {
       "name": "technology_uses",
+      "description": "Case-specific technology provenance and use status.",
       "path": "technology_uses.csv",
       "profile": "tabular-data-resource",
       "format": "csv",
@@ -1380,11 +1689,17 @@
         "fields": [
           {
             "name": "tech_use_id",
-            "type": "string"
+            "type": "string",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true
+            }
           },
           {
             "name": "case_id",
-            "type": "string"
+            "type": "string",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true
+            }
           },
           {
             "name": "provider",
@@ -1441,6 +1756,7 @@
     },
     {
       "name": "content_items",
+      "description": "Item-level representation, disclosure and authorization coding.",
       "path": "content_items.csv",
       "profile": "tabular-data-resource",
       "format": "csv",
@@ -1449,11 +1765,17 @@
         "fields": [
           {
             "name": "content_item_id",
-            "type": "string"
+            "type": "string",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true
+            }
           },
           {
             "name": "case_id",
-            "type": "string"
+            "type": "string",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true
+            }
           },
           {
             "name": "title",
@@ -1514,6 +1836,7 @@
     },
     {
       "name": "pathways",
+      "description": "Falsifiable control-shift hypotheses separating observed mechanisms, attempts, agency change, preservation, and non-incidents.",
       "path": "pathways.csv",
       "profile": "tabular-data-resource",
       "format": "csv",
@@ -1522,22 +1845,28 @@
         "fields": [
           {
             "name": "pathway_id",
-            "type": "string"
+            "type": "string",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true
+            }
           },
           {
             "name": "case_id",
-            "type": "string"
+            "type": "string",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true
+            }
           },
           {
-            "name": "affected_agency",
+            "name": "agency_dimension",
             "type": "string"
           },
           {
-            "name": "control_shift_from",
+            "name": "hypothesized_control_shift_from",
             "type": "string"
           },
           {
-            "name": "control_shift_to",
+            "name": "hypothesized_control_shift_to",
             "type": "string"
           },
           {
@@ -1561,11 +1890,11 @@
             "type": "string"
           },
           {
-            "name": "power_recipient",
+            "name": "hypothesized_power_recipient",
             "type": "string"
           },
           {
-            "name": "harm_pathway",
+            "name": "potential_harm_pathway",
             "type": "string"
           },
           {
@@ -1573,12 +1902,133 @@
             "type": "string"
           },
           {
-            "name": "agency_transfer_status",
-            "type": "string"
+            "name": "capability_status",
+            "type": "string",
+            "description": "Whether the relevant technical or organizational capability is directly documented in this record.",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true,
+              "enum": [
+                "observed",
+                "not_observed",
+                "not_assessed",
+                "not_applicable"
+              ]
+            }
+          },
+          {
+            "name": "control_mechanism_status",
+            "type": "string",
+            "description": "Whether a mechanism capable of controlling a decision-relevant input is directly documented.",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true,
+              "enum": [
+                "observed",
+                "not_observed",
+                "not_assessed",
+                "not_applicable"
+              ]
+            }
+          },
+          {
+            "name": "attempted_transfer_status",
+            "type": "string",
+            "description": "Whether evidence shows an attempt to displace, coerce, impersonate, or covertly control a decision-relevant capacity; ordinary persuasion is insufficient.",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true,
+              "enum": [
+                "observed",
+                "not_observed",
+                "insufficient_evidence",
+                "not_applicable"
+              ]
+            }
+          },
+          {
+            "name": "agency_change_status",
+            "type": "string",
+            "description": "Whether a change in a person's decision-relevant agency is directly observed; not_observed is not evidence that no change occurred.",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true,
+              "enum": [
+                "observed",
+                "not_observed",
+                "insufficient_evidence",
+                "not_applicable"
+              ]
+            }
+          },
+          {
+            "name": "agency_preservation_status",
+            "type": "string",
+            "description": "Whether evidence directly shows that agency was preserved or extended; disclosure alone is not sufficient.",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true,
+              "enum": [
+                "observed",
+                "not_observed",
+                "insufficient_evidence",
+                "not_applicable"
+              ]
+            }
+          },
+          {
+            "name": "maximum_conclusion",
+            "type": "string",
+            "description": "Strongest conclusion permitted by the coded evidence, not a severity rank.",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true,
+              "enum": [
+                "control_mechanism_observed",
+                "attempted_transfer_observed",
+                "agency_change_observed",
+                "agency_preserved_or_extended",
+                "insufficient_evidence",
+                "not_an_incident"
+              ]
+            }
+          },
+          {
+            "name": "falsification_condition",
+            "type": "string",
+            "description": "Case-specific observation that would count against the control-shift hypothesis or block a stronger conclusion.",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true
+            }
+          },
+          {
+            "name": "comparator",
+            "type": "string",
+            "description": "Empirical or design comparator required to test agency change or preservation.",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true
+            }
+          },
+          {
+            "name": "observed_evidence",
+            "type": "string",
+            "description": "Only what the linked evidence directly documents.",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true
+            }
+          },
+          {
+            "name": "researcher_inference",
+            "type": "string",
+            "description": "Analytical proposition kept separate from observed evidence; blank for non-incidents where no inference is made."
           },
           {
             "name": "assessment_label",
-            "type": "string"
+            "type": "string",
+            "description": "Reasoning posture used for the pathway assessment.",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true,
+              "enum": [
+                "observed_mechanism",
+                "observed_attempt_with_unmeasured_agency",
+                "boundary_case",
+                "not_applicable"
+              ]
+            }
           },
           {
             "name": "source_claim_ids",
@@ -1603,6 +2053,7 @@
     },
     {
       "name": "observations",
+      "description": "Selected decision-relevant quantitative observations normalized from claims; absence of a row does not imply absence of all numeric text in the evidence corpus.",
       "path": "observations.csv",
       "profile": "tabular-data-resource",
       "format": "csv",
@@ -1611,19 +2062,31 @@
         "fields": [
           {
             "name": "observation_id",
-            "type": "string"
+            "type": "string",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true
+            }
           },
           {
             "name": "case_id",
-            "type": "string"
+            "type": "string",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true
+            }
           },
           {
             "name": "pathway_id",
-            "type": "string"
+            "type": "string",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true
+            }
           },
           {
             "name": "claim_id",
-            "type": "string"
+            "type": "string",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true
+            }
           },
           {
             "name": "metric_family",
@@ -1679,11 +2142,26 @@
           },
           {
             "name": "causal_status",
-            "type": "string"
+            "type": "string",
+            "description": "Design-bounded causal status; descriptive counts never establish agency or electoral effects.",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true,
+              "enum": [
+                "descriptive_only",
+                "association_only",
+                "experimental_causal_estimate",
+                "quasi_experimental_causal_estimate",
+                "causal_estimate",
+                "not_applicable"
+              ]
+            }
           },
           {
             "name": "source_id",
-            "type": "string"
+            "type": "string",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true
+            }
           },
           {
             "name": "as_of_date",
@@ -1725,11 +2203,11 @@
             }
           }
         ]
-      },
-      "description": "Selected decision-relevant quantitative observations normalized from claims; absence of a row does not imply absence of all numeric text in the evidence corpus."
+      }
     },
     {
       "name": "model_evaluations",
+      "description": "Empirical model audits and experiments kept outside incident counts.",
       "path": "model_evaluations.csv",
       "profile": "tabular-data-resource",
       "format": "csv",
@@ -1738,7 +2216,10 @@
         "fields": [
           {
             "name": "evaluation_id",
-            "type": "string"
+            "type": "string",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true
+            }
           },
           {
             "name": "title",
@@ -1814,6 +2295,7 @@
     },
     {
       "name": "claim_evidence",
+      "description": "Normalized claim–source support, researcher-premise and counterevidence relations with explicit pinpoint-coverage status.",
       "path": "claim_evidence.csv",
       "profile": "tabular-data-resource",
       "format": "csv",
@@ -1822,23 +2304,53 @@
         "fields": [
           {
             "name": "claim_evidence_id",
-            "type": "string"
+            "type": "string",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true
+            }
           },
           {
             "name": "claim_id",
-            "type": "string"
+            "type": "string",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true
+            }
           },
           {
             "name": "source_id",
-            "type": "string"
+            "type": "string",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true
+            }
           },
           {
             "name": "relation",
-            "type": "string"
+            "type": "string",
+            "description": "supports = source states the coded factual/attributed proposition; premise = source supports a factual premise used in a researcher inference but does not state that inference; counterevidence = source qualifies or contests it.",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true,
+              "enum": [
+                "supports",
+                "premise",
+                "counterevidence"
+              ]
+            }
           },
           {
             "name": "evidence_scope",
-            "type": "string"
+            "type": "string",
+            "description": "Scope inherited from the claim and applied to this claim-source relation.",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true,
+              "enum": [
+                "underlying_fact",
+                "assertion_was_made",
+                "institutional_action",
+                "measurement",
+                "review_scope_statement",
+                "researcher_inference"
+              ]
+            }
           },
           {
             "name": "directness",
@@ -1848,6 +2360,24 @@
             "name": "locator",
             "type": "string"
           },
+          {
+            "name": "locator_coverage",
+            "type": "string",
+            "description": "Whether the recorded pinpoint covers the full claim wording, only part of it, or was not verified; never inferred from a nonblank URL alone.",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true,
+              "enum": [
+                "full_claim",
+                "partial_claim",
+                "not_verified"
+              ]
+            }
+          },
+          {
+            "name": "locator_note",
+            "type": "string",
+            "description": "Reason no verified pinpoint was recorded; blank for verified full or partial locators."
+          },
           {
             "name": "extracted_at",
             "type": "string"
@@ -1874,6 +2404,7 @@
     },
     {
       "name": "analytic_record_claims",
+      "description": "Links analytic records to the atomic claims supporting their coding.",
       "path": "analytic_record_claims.csv",
       "profile": "tabular-data-resource",
       "format": "csv",
@@ -1882,7 +2413,10 @@
         "fields": [
           {
             "name": "record_claim_id",
-            "type": "string"
+            "type": "string",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true
+            }
           },
           {
             "name": "record_type",
@@ -1894,11 +2428,17 @@
           },
           {
             "name": "case_id",
-            "type": "string"
+            "type": "string",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true
+            }
           },
           {
             "name": "claim_id",
-            "type": "string"
+            "type": "string",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true
+            }
           },
           {
             "name": "relation",
@@ -1926,6 +2466,7 @@
     },
     {
       "name": "case_elections",
+      "description": "Normalized case–election relations.",
       "path": "case_elections.csv",
       "profile": "tabular-data-resource",
       "format": "csv",
@@ -1934,15 +2475,24 @@
         "fields": [
           {
             "name": "case_election_id",
-            "type": "string"
+            "type": "string",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true
+            }
           },
           {
             "name": "case_id",
-            "type": "string"
+            "type": "string",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true
+            }
           },
           {
             "name": "election_id",
-            "type": "string"
+            "type": "string",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true
+            }
           },
           {
             "name": "relation",
@@ -1970,6 +2520,7 @@
     },
     {
       "name": "election_sources",
+      "description": "Normalized election–official-source relations.",
       "path": "election_sources.csv",
       "profile": "tabular-data-resource",
       "format": "csv",
@@ -1978,15 +2529,24 @@
         "fields": [
           {
             "name": "election_source_id",
-            "type": "string"
+            "type": "string",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true
+            }
           },
           {
             "name": "election_id",
-            "type": "string"
+            "type": "string",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true
+            }
           },
           {
             "name": "official_source_id",
-            "type": "string"
+            "type": "string",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true
+            }
           },
           {
             "name": "source_role",
@@ -2014,6 +2574,7 @@
     },
     {
       "name": "sampling_frame",
+      "description": "Declared purposive search coverage and negative-search gaps.",
       "path": "sampling_frame.csv",
       "profile": "tabular-data-resource",
       "format": "csv",
@@ -2022,7 +2583,10 @@
         "fields": [
           {
             "name": "frame_id",
-            "type": "string"
+            "type": "string",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true
+            }
           },
           {
             "name": "region",
@@ -2076,6 +2640,7 @@
     },
     {
       "name": "coverage_summary",
+      "description": "Regional record counts; not prevalence estimates.",
       "path": "coverage_summary.csv",
       "profile": "tabular-data-resource",
       "format": "csv",
@@ -2084,7 +2649,10 @@
         "fields": [
           {
             "name": "region",
-            "type": "string"
+            "type": "string",
+            "constraints": {
+              "required": true
+            }
           },
           {
             "name": "included_case_count",
@@ -2102,7 +2670,8 @@
             "name": "coverage_note",
             "type": "string"
           }
-        ]
+        ],
+        "primaryKey": "region"
       }
     }
   ]

data/observations.csv

@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ q-ro25-views,ro-2025-presidential-repeat,ata-ro25,clm-ro-015,exposure_or_distrib
 q-ro25-likes,ro-2025-presidential-repeat,ata-ro25,clm-ro-015,descriptive_context,likes,681000,681000,,at_least,likes,engagement_events,unknown,Facebook|Instagram|TikTok,Romania,2024-12_to_2025-06-06,researcher_aggregated_platform_metrics,descriptive_only,src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826,2026-08-11,Likes are not exposure or persuasion.
 q-md24-fb-followers,md-2024-presidential-referendum,ata-md24,clm-md-014,descriptive_context,followers,,4200,,about,followers,page_followers,unknown,Facebook,Moldova,at_takedown_2024-10-11,platform_reported,descriptive_only,src-md-meta-threat-reporting,2026-08-11,Meta said most followers were outside Moldova or indicated fake engagement.
 q-md24-ig-followers,md-2024-presidential-referendum,ata-md24,clm-md-014,descriptive_context,followers,,335000,,about,followers,account_followers,unknown,Instagram,Moldova,at_takedown_2024-10-11,platform_reported,descriptive_only,src-md-meta-threat-reporting,2026-08-11,Meta said most followers were outside Moldova or indicated fake engagement.
-q-md24-enforcement-accounts-transactions,md-2024-presidential-referendum,ata-md24,clm-md-008,production_or_engagement,accounts_and_transactions,,138000,,more_than,accounts_and_transactions,combined_accounts_and_transactions_across_linked_investigations,unknown,mixed_enforcement_records,Moldova,linked_investigations_cited_in_2026_report,observer_reported_enforcement_aggregate,descriptive_only,src-md-odihr-parliament-202602,2026-08-11,"This heterogeneous enforcement indicator combines accounts and transactions, may include repeated entities, and is not a count of recipients, exposed people, persuaded voters or unique accounts."
 q-md25-accounts,md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,ata-md25,clm-md-015,production_or_engagement,accounts,,253,,exact_in_sample,accounts,analysed_network_sample,not_applicable,Facebook|Instagram|TikTok,Moldova,study_window,researcher_measured,descriptive_only,src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924,2026-08-11,"Sample, not the full operation."
 q-md25-posts,md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,ata-md25,clm-md-016,production_or_engagement,posts,,28708,,exact_in_sample,posts,content_volume,not_applicable,Facebook|Instagram|TikTok,Moldova,study_window,researcher_measured,descriptive_only,src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924,2026-08-11,"Content count, not audience."
 q-md25-views,md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,ata-md25,clm-md-016,exposure_or_distribution,views,,55367950,,exact_in_sample,views,platform_view_events,unknown,Facebook|Instagram|TikTok,Moldova,study_window,researcher_aggregated_platform_metrics,descriptive_only,src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924,2026-08-11,Cross-platform view events are non-unique and non-causal.
@@ -19,7 +18,6 @@ q-nh-kramer-forfeiture-usd,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,ata-nh,clm-nh-007,instituti
 q-nh-lingo-civil-penalty-usd,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,ata-nh,clm-nh-007,institutional_response,fine_civil_penalty_usd,1000000,1000000,1000000,exact,fine_civil_penalty_usd,separate_Lingo_Telecom_civil_penalty,not_applicable,Federal Communications Commission,United States,consent_decree_2024-08-21,official_consent_decree,descriptive_only,src-us-fcc-lingo-consent-202408,2026-08-11,"This is the separate Lingo Telecom civil penalty and compliance plan, not the Kramer forfeiture and not a measure of electoral harm."
 q-us26-states-deepfake-laws,us-2026-midterms-preparedness,ata-usprep,clm-us26-002,descriptive_context,states_with_enacted_political_deepfake_laws,31,31,31,exact,states_with_enacted_political_deepfake_laws,United_States_states,not_applicable,state_legislation,United States,snapshot_2026-06-23,legislative_tracker_count,descriptive_only,src-us-ncsl-20260623,2026-08-11,"Snapshot count only. Enactment, effective date, scope, prohibitions, disclosure requirements and litigation status differ by state."
 q-us26-reported-synthetic-ads,us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,ata-usads,clm-us26-010,descriptive_context,synthetic_ads_identified_in_reporting,3,3,,at_least,synthetic_ads_identified_in_reporting,named_ads_in_reviewed_reporting,not_applicable,multiple_campaign_channels,United States,reporting_through_2026-03-28,independent_reporting_content_count,descriptive_only,src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328,2026-08-11,"A lower-bound content count from reviewed reporting, not a census of campaign ads, impressions, targeting, unique exposure or electoral effects."
-q-us26-talarico-youtube,us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,ata-usads,clm-us26-015,exposure_or_distribution,views,,3700,,approximately,views,platform_view_events,unknown,YouTube,United States,snapshot_2026-08-11,platform_snapshot,descriptive_only,src-us-nrsc-talarico-youtube,2026-08-11,"Dynamic, non-unique view counter; excludes other platforms and paid impressions."
 q-usca11-questions,us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,ata-usca11,clm-usca11-006,production_or_engagement,submitted_questions,5058,5058,5058,exact_campaign_report,submitted_questions,interaction_events,unknown,ConnieChan.ai,United States,first_27_hours,campaign_reported,descriptive_only,src-us-ca11-mission-20260807,2026-08-12,"Not users, conversations, district voters, impressions, accepted answers, or outcomes; repeated and adversarial prompts possible."
 q-usca11-billboards,us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,ata-usca11,clm-usca11-001,descriptive_context,billboards,2,2,2,exact_campaign_report,billboards,promotional_placements,not_applicable,physical,United States,August_2026,campaign_reported,descriptive_only,src-us-ca11-sfgate-20260804,2026-08-12,No impression estimate is available.
 q-usca11-retention-policy-days,us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,ata-usca11,clm-usca11-007,descriptive_context,maximum_conversation_retention_days,,90,,policy_maximum,maximum_conversation_retention_days,conversation_log_retention_policy,not_applicable,ConnieChan.ai,United States,privacy_policy_observed_2026-08-04,reporter_direct_observation_of_privacy_policy,descriptive_only,src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804,2026-08-12,The policy allowed retention for up to 90 days; this does not establish that every conversation was retained for 90 days or that staff reviewed any particular log.

data/pathways.csv

@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
-pathway_id,case_id,affected_agency,control_shift_from,control_shift_to,mechanism,opacity,personalization,contestability,duration,power_recipient,harm_pathway,observed_outcome,agency_transfer_status,assessment_label,source_claim_ids,reviewer_note
-ata-ro24,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,voter_attention_and_electoral_choice,Romanian voters and election institutions,campaign and influence-network operators plus platform ranking systems,opaque promotion and recommender amplification,network and ranking opacity,low,low,persistent_campaign_period,campaign operators and platform ranking systems,unequal agenda-setting and impaired informed choice; institutional trust shock,annulment and repeat election; individual behavioural effect unknown,partial_chain_observed,strong_inference,clm-ro-002|clm-ro-003|clm-ro-006|clm-ro-007|clm-ro-013,Generative AI was not established as material; sponsorship and causal vote effect remain unresolved.
-ata-ro25,ro-2025-presidential-repeat,authorship_attention_and_local_identity,Romanian voters and authentic local speakers,unidentified network operator,"synthetic personas, hijacked accounts and cross-platform amplification",operator and provenance opacity,low,medium,months,unidentified network operator and platforms,manufactured local consensus and controlled agenda cues,network occurrence and reach observed; belief and election effects unknown,mechanism_observed_effect_unknown,strong_inference,clm-ro-014|clm-ro-015|clm-ro-016|clm-ro-017|clm-ro-018,Do not infer Russian-state command from pro-Russia narratives alone.
-ata-md24,md-2024-presidential-referendum,preference_participation_and_trust,Moldovan voters,Shor-linked and Russia-linked influence and finance networks,"payments, coordination, bots, spoofed media and synthetic content",sponsor and finance opacity,low,medium,multi_election,foreign-linked political-finance and influence networks,covert inducement and manufactured social proof can displace independent deliberation,attempted and accepted inducement documented; how recipients voted and election effect unknown,partial_chain_observed,strong_inference,clm-md-003|clm-md-004|clm-md-005|clm-md-009|clm-md-010|clm-md-011,Administrative advantage and media imbalance are independent competing explanations and harms.
-ata-md25,md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,authorship_agenda_and_peer_signal,Moldovan social-media users,InfoLeaders curators and linked political networks,central scripts locally personalised by paid participants and mutual amplification,coordination and payment opacity,low,medium,months,network curators and financiers,paid coordination masquerades as peer speech and controls apparent local salience,"content and engagement observed; persuasion, turnout, votes and seats unknown",mechanism_observed_effect_unknown,strong_inference,clm-md-015|clm-md-016|clm-md-017|clm-md-018|clm-md-019,Engagement totals are non-unique and not causal outcomes.
-ata-nh,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,authorship_relevance_and_participation_instruction,New Hampshire Democratic primary voters,Steve Kramer and the telecom delivery chain,"cloned trusted voice, selected call list and spoofed caller ID",high apparent-authorship deception,medium,high_after_enforcement,short_campaign_burst,political operator and telecom chain,operator controlled who appeared to speak and the apparent relevance of a demobilising instruction,"attempt and delivery counts observed; listener belief, action and turnout effect unknown",mechanism_observed_effect_unknown,strong_inference,clm-nh-001|clm-nh-002|clm-nh-004|clm-nh-005|clm-nh-009|clm-nh-010|clm-nh-012,Criminal acquittal does not erase FCC and civil findings; legal outcomes must remain separate.
-ata-brprep,br-2026-election-preparedness,future_information_and_platform_governance,Brazilian voters and election authorities,not_applicable_observed_controller,prospective synthetic media and provider outputs,prospective,unknown,unknown,future_election,"potential campaigns, providers and platforms constrained by TSE",monitoring hypothesis only,rules and preparations observed; no case-level agency transfer asserted,not_an_incident,speculative_scenario,clm-br-002|clm-br-003|clm-br-004|clm-br-006|clm-br-007|clm-br-009,Preparedness file is excluded from incident counts.
-ata-bravatar,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,political_presence_and_endorsement,Jair Bolsonaro as represented person and Brazilian voters,campaign deployer,disclosed synthetic surrogate,disclosed synthesis but authorisation unresolved,medium,medium,single_event_with_reuse_risk,campaign producer,campaign can deploy a recognisable political persona without physical or verified participation,"avatar and disclosure observed; authorisation, belief and election effects unknown",mechanism_observed_effect_unknown,strong_inference,clm-br-010|clm-br-011|clm-br-014|clm-br-017|clm-br-019|clm-br-020,Transparent disclosure mitigates deception; legal status and authorisation remained unresolved.
-ata-usprep,us-2026-midterms-preparedness,future_information_and_election_trust,United States voters and election officials,not_applicable_observed_controller,"prospective campaign, foreign, platform, telecom and AI-provider mechanisms",prospective and fragmented governance,unknown,unknown,future_election,potential campaigns and infrastructure providers,monitoring hypothesis only,governance fragmentation and prior-cycle risks observed; no new operation inferred,not_an_incident,speculative_scenario,clm-us26-001|clm-us26-002|clm-us26-003|clm-us26-004|clm-us26-005|clm-us26-007,Preparedness file is excluded from incident counts.
-ata-usads,us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,candidate_voice_face_and_affect,represented candidates and voters,campaigns and political committees,synthetic first-person candidate performances,disclosure varies and can be low-salience,medium,medium,campaign_cycle,campaign sponsors and distributors,"sponsor controls simulated speech, timing, image and affect rather than only message selection","multiple attributed assets observed; comparable reach, belief and election effects unknown",mechanism_observed_effect_unknown,strong_inference,clm-us26-008|clm-us26-009|clm-us26-010|clm-us26-011|clm-us26-012|clm-us26-013|clm-us26-014|clm-us26-016,"Some assets use real quotations, labels or obvious satire; content-item coding is required."
-ata-usca11,us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,representation_agenda_query_privacy_and_candidate_evaluation,Connie Chan as represented person and users asking questions,Scott Wiener for Congress and its provider stack,"campaign-controlled first-person dynamic opponent simulation with policy-permitted query-log review; exact prompt, retrieval and guardrails unknown","AI and parody disclosed; system prompt, retrieval sources, actual log use and guardrails opaque",high,high_after_removal,four_day_deployment_plus_90_day_retention_policy,campaign deployer; secondarily model and infrastructure providers,sponsor controls how the opponent appears to answer and may learn what users ask under the stated policy,"deployment, model family, question count, privacy policy and removal observed; actual retention, user and electoral effects unknown",mechanism_observed_effect_unknown,strong_inference,clm-usca11-002|clm-usca11-003|clm-usca11-004|clm-usca11-005|clm-usca11-006|clm-usca11-007|clm-usca11-009|clm-usca11-010|clm-usca11-011,Strongest current bridge to the thesis because the system is adaptive and interactive; explicit parody is essential counterevidence.
+pathway_id,case_id,agency_dimension,hypothesized_control_shift_from,hypothesized_control_shift_to,mechanism,opacity,personalization,contestability,duration,hypothesized_power_recipient,potential_harm_pathway,observed_outcome,capability_status,control_mechanism_status,attempted_transfer_status,agency_change_status,agency_preservation_status,maximum_conclusion,falsification_condition,comparator,observed_evidence,researcher_inference,assessment_label,source_claim_ids,reviewer_note
+ata-ro24,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,voter_attention_and_electoral_choice,Romanian voters' attention and electoral choice,campaign-network operators and platform ranking systems,"opaque promotion, coordinated accounts, and recommender amplification",network sponsorship and ranking logic partly opaque,low_or_unknown,low_during_campaign_high_after_institutional_response,campaign_period_with_institutional_aftereffects,campaign-network operators and platform ranking systems,"unequal agenda-setting, impaired informed choice, and institutional trust shock",Opaque coordinated promotion and an institutional annulment are observed as separate facts; individual behaviour and a causal electoral effect are not.,observed,observed,insufficient_evidence,not_observed,not_observed,control_mechanism_observed,"If the coordination, sponsorship, or distribution-control evidence fails independent verification, the control-mechanism hypothesis is not supported; an agency-change conclusion also requires measured individual outcomes.","Comparable exposed and unexposed voters, or opaque and transparently attributed campaign content, with pre-specified attention, belief, and choice-autonomy outcomes.","Official and investigative records describe opaque promotion, coordinated accounts, platform distribution, and the court's annulment decision.",The coded mechanism could shift agenda-setting control toward operators and rankers; the dataset does not infer that this changed a person's agency or caused annulment.,observed_mechanism,clm-ro-002|clm-ro-003|clm-ro-006|clm-ro-007|clm-ro-013|clm-ro-020,"Generative AI was not established as material. The court decision is an institutional outcome, not evidence of a voter-level agency change or causal vote effect."
+ata-ro25,ro-2025-presidential-repeat,authorship_attention_and_local_identity,Romanian users and authentic local speakers,unidentified network operator,"synthetic personas, apparently hijacked accounts, and coordinated cross-platform amplification",operator and provenance opaque,low_or_unknown,medium_after_takedown,months,unidentified network operator and platform distribution systems,manufactured local consensus and controlled agenda cues,"A coordinated network, content, and non-unique platform activity are observed; belief, choice, turnout, and election effects are not.",observed,observed,insufficient_evidence,not_observed,not_observed,control_mechanism_observed,"If the accounts are shown to be independent, authentically local, or not centrally coordinated, the control-mechanism hypothesis is not supported; reach metrics alone cannot establish agency change.","Users exposed to coordinated synthetic-persona content versus matched users exposed to authentic, independently produced local content, with provenance comprehension and decision outcomes measured.","Researchers documented at least 215 coordinated or apparently hijacked accounts, synthetic personas, content, and aggregated platform activity.",The network could control apparent local identity and salience; no operator-level intent to displace agency and no user-level agency change are directly observed.,observed_mechanism,clm-ro-014|clm-ro-015|clm-ro-016|clm-ro-017|clm-ro-018|clm-ro-021,Pro-Russia narratives do not establish Russian-state command. The repeat election and the 2024 annulment are analytically separate from this network record.
+ata-md24,md-2024-presidential-referendum,preference_participation_and_trust,Moldovan voters,Shor-linked and Russia-linked influence and finance networks,"payments, coordinated tasking, bots, spoofed media, and synthetic content","sponsor, finance, and message provenance partly opaque",low_or_unknown,medium_after_enforcement,multi_election,foreign-linked political-finance and influence networks,covert inducement and manufactured social proof could impair independent deliberation,"Payment and influence infrastructure, an inducement attempt, and some payment acceptance are documented; how recipients voted and the electoral effect are unknown.",observed,observed,observed,not_observed,not_observed,attempted_transfer_observed,"If payments were not conditioned, tasked, or linked to electoral conduct, the attempted-transfer coding fails; accepted payment alone cannot establish changed preference or vote.","Credibly identified recipients and comparable non-recipients under a design addressing selection, with task compliance, belief, turnout, and vote outcomes measured separately.","Official, observer, platform, and reporting records document coordinated influence infrastructure and allegations/evidence of electoral inducement; AI is one component.","The covert inducement and impersonation mechanisms constitute an observed attempt to influence decision control, but recipient agency change and votes changed are not observed.",observed_attempt_with_unmeasured_agency,clm-md-003|clm-md-004|clm-md-005|clm-md-009|clm-md-010|clm-md-011|clm-md-020,"The removed 138,000 mixed accounts-and-transactions aggregate is not a valid reach observation. Administrative advantage and media imbalance remain competing explanations and separate harms."
+ata-md25,md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,authorship_agenda_and_peer_signal,Moldovan social-media users and authentic local speakers,InfoLeaders curators and linked political networks,central scripts locally adapted by paid participants and reciprocal amplification,coordination and payment opaque to audiences,low_or_unknown,medium_after_disruption,months,network curators and financiers,paid coordination can masquerade as peer speech and control apparent local salience,"Paid tasking, coordinated accounts, content, and engagement are observed; persuasion, turnout, votes, and seats are not.",observed,observed,insufficient_evidence,not_observed,not_observed,control_mechanism_observed,"If tasking, payment, or reciprocal amplification is not reproducible at account level, the control-mechanism coding fails; engagement totals cannot establish an agency outcome.","Matched users or content streams exposed to centrally tasked paid personas versus authentic independent speakers, with provenance recognition and decision outcomes measured.","A documented paid InfoLeaders sample used central tasking, local personas, and reciprocal engagement; platform totals are non-unique.",The mechanism could shift control over apparent peer signals toward curators; no individual agency change or electoral effect is observed.,observed_mechanism,clm-md-012|clm-md-015|clm-md-016|clm-md-017|clm-md-018|clm-md-019|clm-md-021,Components with different attribution and measurement scopes must not be collapsed into one operator or reach total.
+ata-nh,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,authorship_relevance_and_participation_instruction,New Hampshire Democratic primary recipients,Steve Kramer and the telecom delivery chain,"cloned presidential voice, politically selected call list, and spoofed caller ID",high apparent-authorship deception,medium,high_after_enforcement,short_campaign_burst,political operator and telecom distribution chain,fabricated authoritative instruction could displace an informed participation decision,"The impersonated demobilising instruction, operator, call attempts, and completed calls are observed; listening, belief, action, and turnout effect are not.",observed,observed,observed,not_observed,not_observed,attempted_transfer_observed,"If the audio was not synthetic, the instruction was not demobilising, or the attributed operator did not select and distribute it, attempted-transfer coding fails; delivery counts alone do not establish agency change.","Recipients versus matched non-recipients, or completed versus failed delivery under a credible design, measuring listening, belief, action, and turnout without treating calls as unique voters.",An admitted operator created an AI-cloned Biden voice telling recipients not to vote in the primary; FCC records document the delivery chain and call counts.,The impersonated participation instruction is an observed attempt to displace decision control; no recipient-level agency change is observed.,observed_attempt_with_unmeasured_agency,clm-nh-001|clm-nh-002|clm-nh-004|clm-nh-005|clm-nh-009|clm-nh-010|clm-nh-012,"Criminal acquittal, FCC findings, and civil default are distinct. None supplies evidence of belief, action, turnout, or votes changed."
+ata-brprep,br-2026-election-preparedness,future_information_and_platform_governance,not_applicable,not_applicable,prospective monitoring of synthetic media and provider outputs,prospective,not_assessed,not_assessed,future_election,not_applicable,prospective risk only,"Election rules, provider obligations, and institutional preparations are observed; no incident or agency outcome is coded.",not_assessed,not_observed,not_applicable,not_applicable,not_applicable,not_an_incident,Not applicable unless a discrete incident is promoted with claim-level evidence and an explicit unit of analysis.,No incident comparator; future promoted records require an incident-specific comparator.,"TSE rules, compliance obligations, partnerships, and monitoring arrangements.",,not_applicable,clm-br-002|clm-br-003|clm-br-004|clm-br-006|clm-br-007|clm-br-009,Preparedness file; excluded from incident counts and from agency conclusions.
+ata-bravatar,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,political_representation_and_audience_interpretation,Jair Bolsonaro as represented person and voters evaluating the endorsement,campaign producer controlling the synthetic representation,disclosed synthetic political surrogate,AI generation disclosed; authorisation unresolved,low,medium_after_disclosure_and_legal_challenge,single_event_with_reuse_risk,campaign producer controlling the synthetic representation,unauthorised synthetic representation could appropriate political voice; disclosure may preserve audience verification,"The avatar, message, and AI disclosure are observed; authorisation, audience interpretation, belief, and electoral effects are unresolved.",observed,observed,insufficient_evidence,not_observed,not_observed,insufficient_evidence,"If authorisation is established and audiences reliably understand the disclosed surrogate as campaign-authored representation, the appropriation hypothesis weakens; agency change still requires measured audience outcomes.","Authorised versus unauthorised and prominently disclosed versus undisclosed synthetic surrogates, measuring attribution accuracy, perceived endorsement, and decision autonomy.","A disclosed synthetic Bolsonaro avatar delivered an endorsement at a campaign launch; legal claims and a defence were filed, but final merits resolution and authorisation were not identified.","The producer controlled the synthetic representation, but whether that displaced or preserved anyone's agency is an untested boundary hypothesis.",boundary_case,clm-br-010|clm-br-011|clm-br-014|clm-br-017|clm-br-019|clm-br-020,"Transparent disclosure is material counterevidence. Disclosure alone does not prove agency preservation, and production control alone does not prove agency transfer."
+ata-usprep,us-2026-midterms-preparedness,future_information_and_election_trust,not_applicable,not_applicable,"prospective monitoring of campaign, foreign, platform, telecom, and AI-provider mechanisms",prospective and fragmented governance,not_assessed,not_assessed,future_election,not_applicable,prospective risk only,"Election timing, fragmented law, and prior-cycle risk assessments are observed; no new 2026 operation or agency outcome is coded.",not_assessed,not_observed,not_applicable,not_applicable,not_applicable,not_an_incident,Not applicable unless a discrete 2026 incident is promoted with claim-level evidence and an explicit unit of analysis.,No incident comparator; future promoted records require an incident-specific comparator.,"Scheduled election context, enacted state laws, federal governance gaps, and prior-cycle assessments.",,not_applicable,clm-us26-001|clm-us26-002|clm-us26-003|clm-us26-004|clm-us26-005|clm-us26-007,Preparedness file; excluded from incident counts and from agency conclusions.
+ata-usads,us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,candidate_voice_face_and_affect,represented candidates and voters interpreting campaign evidence,campaign sponsors producing synthetic first-person performances,synthetic candidate simulations with variable disclosure and quotation fidelity,disclosure varies and can be low-salience,low,medium,campaign_cycle,campaign sponsors producing and distributing synthetic representations,"synthetic performance can make the sponsor control apparent speech, timing, image, and affect","Multiple attributed synthetic assets are observed; comparable exposure, attribution error, belief, and election effects are not.",observed,observed,insufficient_evidence,not_observed,not_observed,control_mechanism_observed,"If the synthetic elements are obvious, accurately attributed, faithful to genuine quotations, and do not alter audience attribution or interpretation, the stronger control-shift hypothesis weakens; content production alone cannot establish agency change.","Authentic footage versus labelled and unlabelled synthetic performances, stratified by quotation fidelity, with attribution accuracy and decision outcomes measured.",Named campaign sponsors released synthetic candidate performances; disclosure and fidelity varied across assets.,"Sponsors controlled simulated voice, face, timing, and affect, but whether this displaced voter or candidate agency is untested.",observed_mechanism,clm-us26-008|clm-us26-009|clm-us26-010|clm-us26-011|clm-us26-012|clm-us26-013|clm-us26-014|clm-us26-016,"Some assets use genuine quotations, labels, or obvious satire. Content-level distinctions are required before any stronger inference."
+ata-usca11,us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,representation_agenda_query_privacy_and_candidate_evaluation,Connie Chan as represented person and users asking questions,Scott Wiener for Congress and its provider stack,disclosed campaign-controlled first-person opponent simulation with policy-permitted query-log review,"AI and parody disclosed; system prompt, retrieval, actual log use, and guardrails opaque",high,high_after_removal,four_day_deployment_plus_90_day_retention_policy,campaign deployer; secondarily model and infrastructure providers,sponsor control over opponent simulation and query data could shape representation and agenda,"Deployment, model family, question count, privacy-policy terms, disclosure, and removal are observed; actual retention, unique users, interpretation, and electoral effects are not.",observed,observed,insufficient_evidence,not_observed,not_observed,insufficient_evidence,"If users reliably understand the tool as sponsor-authored parody, outputs are traceably grounded, logs are not used beyond disclosed purposes, and no decision-relevant difference appears against an ordinary attack ad, the stronger control-shift hypothesis weakens.","Disclosed parody chatbot versus ordinary campaign attack material and versus an undisclosed first-person simulation, measuring attribution, source verification, perceived candidate position, and decision autonomy.","The campaign commissioned and disclosed a Claude-powered parody, controlled its presentation, permitted limited log review in policy, reported question volume, and removed the tool after criticism.","The system could shift representational and evidentiary control toward the sponsor, but explicit parody and absent user-outcome evidence make this a boundary hypothesis.",boundary_case,clm-usca11-002|clm-usca11-003|clm-usca11-004|clm-usca11-005|clm-usca11-006|clm-usca11-007|clm-usca11-009|clm-usca11-010|clm-usca11-011,Explicit parody and disclosure are essential counterevidence. Neither question count nor campaign control demonstrates a change in user agency.

data/research_view.csv

@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
-pathway_id,case_id,case_title,country,election_date,record_type,case_status,manipulation_assessment,generative_ai_status,ai_role,system_or_model,controller,influence_vector,target,affected_agency,agency_transfer_status,power_recipient,reach_summary,behavioural_effect,electoral_effect,evidence_strength,main_uncertainty,last_verified
-ata-ro24,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,Romania 2024 presidential election: coordinated digital campaign and annulment,Romania,2024-11-24,election_wide_case,retrospective,mixed_documented_manipulation,not_established,material_amplification,TikTok: recommender and integrity systems,mixed and partly unresolved campaign networks; platform recommender systems; alleged foreign-linked actors,"short-form video recommendations, coordinated accounts, undeclared promotion, cyber and information operations",Romanian voters,voter_attention_and_electoral_choice,partial_chain_observed,campaign operators and platform ranking systems,"25,000 accounts; officially_reported; unknown; final_two_weeks_before_2024_first_round",unknown,institutionally_asserted,high_for_occurrence_mixed_for_effect,Who financed and directed each network component? What organic versus coordinated reach occurred? Did any exposure change voting behaviour? What will the DSA proceeding finally establish?,2026-08-11
-ata-ro25,ro-2025-presidential-repeat,Romania 2025 repeat presidential election and cross-platform synthetic-persona network,Romania,2025-05-04,observed_network,retrospective,manipulation_confirmed,confirmed,mixed,unknown: DreamFace- or D-ID-style avatars and synthetic profiles,unknown cross-platform network operator; platform distribution systems; responding election authorities,"coordinated and hijacked accounts, synthetic personas, AI avatars, false local-news identity, cross-platform hashtags, and institutional decisions",Romanian voters,authorship_attention_and_local_identity,mechanism_observed_effect_unknown,unidentified network operator and platforms,"215 accounts; researcher_measured; not_applicable; 2024-12_to_2025-06-06 | 8,514 posts; researcher_measured; not_applicable; 2024-12_to_2025-06-06",unknown,unknown,high_for_occurrence_mixed_for_effect,Who operated and financed the network? How much reach was authentic and in-country? Which safeguards measurably reduced manipulation? How did the annulment itself affect trust and participation?,2026-08-11
-ata-md24,md-2024-presidential-referendum,Moldova 2024 presidential election and EU referendum: hybrid interference network,Moldova,2024-10-20,election_wide_case,retrospective,mixed_documented_manipulation,confirmed,mixed,unknown: synthetic impersonation tools,Ilan Shor-linked network and alleged Russian sponsors; coordinated account operators; platforms,"payments, messaging apps, spoofed media, bots, coordinated accounts, synthetic video","Moldovan voters, including linguistic minorities and diaspora",preference_participation_and_trust,partial_chain_observed,foreign-linked political-finance and influence networks,"4,200 followers; platform_reported; unknown; at_takedown_2024-10-11 | 335,000 followers; platform_reported; unknown; at_takedown_2024-10-11",indicated,unknown,high_for_occurrence_mixed_for_effect,"How many recipients acted on payments? Which synthetic pieces achieved material exposure? What portion of the network was centrally directed? What vote effect, if any, occurred?",2026-08-11
-ata-md25,md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,Moldova 2025 parliamentary election: continuation of hybrid influence infrastructure,Moldova,2025-09-28,observed_network,retrospective,manipulation_confirmed,confirmed,mixed,"unknown: AI videos, bots and platform recommendation systems",foreign-funded political and influence networks,"social platforms, messaging apps, illicit finance, synthetic and spoofed media",Moldovan voters,authorship_agenda_and_peer_signal,mechanism_observed_effect_unknown,network curators and financiers,"253 accounts; researcher_measured; not_applicable; study_window | 28,708 posts; researcher_measured; not_applicable; study_window",unknown,unknown,high_for_occurrence_mixed_for_effect,"Which 2024 network components persisted, which were newly created, and which shared command? What was authentic in-country exposure? Which interventions worked?",2026-08-11
-ata-nh,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,New Hampshire 2024 AI-cloned Biden robocall,United States,2024-01-23,observed_incident,retrospective,manipulation_confirmed,confirmed,core_generation,ElevenLabs: AI voice-cloning service,Steve Kramer and telecom distribution providers,"AI voice cloning, caller-ID spoofing, mass robocalls",New Hampshire Democratic primary voters,authorship_relevance_and_participation_instruction,mechanism_observed_effect_unknown,political operator and telecom chain,"9,581 call_attempts; provider_records_in_enforcement; unknown; campaign_window | 3,978 completed_calls; provider_records_in_enforcement; unknown; campaign_window",unknown,unknown,high_for_occurrence_mixed_for_effect,"How many recipients listened, believed, or acted on the call? How should liability be allocated across creator, intermediary, and originating provider?",2026-08-11
-ata-brprep,br-2026-election-preparedness,Brazil 2026 general election: AI governance and integrity preparedness,Brazil,2026-10-04,preparedness_file,ongoing,preparedness_not_incident,confirmed,mixed,"unknown_or_multiple: generative AI, recommender and disclosure-compliance systems","campaigns, AI providers, platforms, election authorities, and unidentified influence actors","synthetic media, recommender outputs, political advertising, bots, voice cloning, platform distribution",Brazilian voters,future_information_and_platform_governance,not_an_incident,"potential campaigns, providers and platforms constrained by TSE",No typed population-reach estimate,unknown,unknown,high_for_occurrence_mixed_for_effect,Will providers comply in practice? How quickly will labelled and unlabelled content be detected and adjudicated? Will rules apply consistently across closed messaging and AI assistants?,2026-08-11
-ata-bravatar,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,Brazil 2026 Bolsonaro AI avatar at Flávio Bolsonaro campaign launch,Brazil,2026-10-04,observed_incident,ongoing,transparent_contested_use,confirmed,core_generation,unknown: synthetic image-and-voice avatar system,Flávio Bolsonaro campaign or allied producer; authorisation by Jair Bolsonaro unresolved,disclosed synthetic image and voice presented as an endorsement,Brazilian voters and campaign attendees,political_presence_and_endorsement,mechanism_observed_effect_unknown,campaign producer,No typed population-reach estimate,unknown,unknown,high_for_occurrence_mixed_for_effect,Who authorised and scripted the avatar? Does a labelled clone circumvent communication restrictions? How will TSE distinguish transparent simulation from manipulative synthetic representation?,2026-08-11
-ata-usprep,us-2026-midterms-preparedness,United States 2026 midterm election: fragmented AI governance and preparedness,United States,2026-11-03,preparedness_file,ongoing,preparedness_not_incident,confirmed,mixed,"unknown_or_multiple: generative AI, synthetic-media, platform and telecom systems","campaigns, political committees, foreign influence actors, platforms, telecom and AI providers","synthetic ads, voice and video impersonation, recommender distribution, robocalls, coordinated influence",United States voters,future_information_and_election_trust,not_an_incident,potential campaigns and infrastructure providers,31 states_with_enacted_political_deepfake_laws; legislative_tracker_count; not_applicable; snapshot_2026-06-23,unknown,unknown,high_for_occurrence_mixed_for_effect,How will state rules apply across jurisdictions? Will disclosures be salient? Which foreign or domestic networks will achieve measurable reach? Can authentic communications remain verifiable?,2026-08-11
-ata-usads,us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,United States 2026 campaign-produced synthetic candidate ads,United States,2026-11-03,observed_campaign_set,ongoing,mixed_documented_manipulation,confirmed,core_generation,unknown: campaign video-generation and face/voice synthesis tools,National Republican Senatorial Committee and individual campaigns; additional actors may be added,AI-generated political video distributed as campaign advertising and social content,voters in contested federal and state races,candidate_voice_face_and_affect,mechanism_observed_effect_unknown,campaign sponsors and distributors,"3 synthetic_ads_identified_in_reporting; independent_reporting_content_count; not_applicable; reporting_through_2026-03-28 | 3,700 views; platform_snapshot; unknown; snapshot_2026-08-11",unknown,unknown,high_for_occurrence_mixed_for_effect,Were disclosures noticed? What impressions and targeting occurred? Do viewers distinguish quotation from fabricated audiovisual evidence? What legal rules apply in each state?,2026-08-11
-ata-usca11,us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,California 11th District: campaign-controlled Connie Chan parody chatbot,United States,2026-11-03,observed_incident,ongoing,transparent_contested_use,confirmed,core_generation,Anthropic: Claude | Amazon Web Services|Google: hosting and analytics stack,Scott Wiener for Congress campaign; technical constructor unidentified,"interactive first-person opponent simulation, campaign-selected issue framing, web interface, billboards, and earned media",California 11th District voters and politically interested web visitors; Connie Chan as represented person,representation_agenda_query_privacy_and_candidate_evaluation,mechanism_observed_effect_unknown,campaign deployer; secondarily model and infrastructure providers,"5,058 submitted_questions; campaign_reported; unknown; first_27_hours | 2 billboards; campaign_reported; not_applicable; August_2026",unknown,unknown,high_for_occurrence_mixed_for_effect,"Which Claude version and deployment route were used? Who built the system? What sources, system prompt, retrieval method, and guardrails controlled answers? How many unique people interacted, from where, and with what effects?",2026-08-12
+pathway_id,case_id,case_title,country,election_date,record_type,case_status,manipulation_assessment,generative_ai_status,ai_role,system_or_model,controller,influence_vector,target,agency_dimension,capability_status,control_mechanism_status,attempted_transfer_status,agency_change_status,agency_preservation_status,maximum_conclusion,hypothesized_power_recipient,reach_summary,behavioural_effect,electoral_effect,case_evidence_summary,main_uncertainty,last_verified
+ata-ro24,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,Romania 2024 presidential election: coordinated digital campaign and annulment,Romania,2024-11-24,election_wide_case,retrospective,mixed_documented_manipulation,not_established,material_amplification,TikTok: recommender and integrity systems,mixed and partly unresolved campaign networks; platform recommender systems; alleged foreign-linked actors,"short-form video recommendations, coordinated accounts, undeclared promotion, cyber and information operations",Romanian voters,voter_attention_and_electoral_choice,observed,observed,insufficient_evidence,not_observed,not_observed,control_mechanism_observed,campaign-network operators and platform ranking systems,"25,000 accounts; officially_reported; unknown; final_two_weeks_before_2024_first_round",unknown,unknown,occurrence_supported_agency_effect_not_established,Who financed and directed each network component? What organic versus coordinated reach occurred? Did any exposure change voting behaviour? What will the DSA proceeding finally establish?,2026-08-11
+ata-ro25,ro-2025-presidential-repeat,Romania 2025 repeat presidential election and cross-platform synthetic-persona network,Romania,2025-05-04,observed_network,retrospective,manipulation_confirmed,confirmed,mixed,unknown: DreamFace- or D-ID-style avatars and synthetic profiles,unknown cross-platform network operator; platform distribution systems; responding election authorities,"coordinated and hijacked accounts, synthetic personas, AI avatars, false local-news identity, cross-platform hashtags, and institutional decisions",Romanian voters,authorship_attention_and_local_identity,observed,observed,insufficient_evidence,not_observed,not_observed,control_mechanism_observed,unidentified network operator and platform distribution systems,"215 accounts; researcher_measured; not_applicable; 2024-12_to_2025-06-06 | 8,514 posts; researcher_measured; not_applicable; 2024-12_to_2025-06-06",unknown,unknown,occurrence_supported_agency_effect_not_established,Who operated and financed the network? How much reach was authentic and in-country? Which safeguards measurably reduced manipulation? How did the annulment itself affect trust and participation?,2026-08-11
+ata-md24,md-2024-presidential-referendum,Moldova 2024 presidential election and EU referendum: hybrid interference network,Moldova,2024-10-20,election_wide_case,retrospective,mixed_documented_manipulation,confirmed,mixed,unknown: synthetic impersonation tools,Ilan Shor-linked network and alleged Russian sponsors; coordinated account operators; platforms,"payments, messaging apps, spoofed media, bots, coordinated accounts, synthetic video","Moldovan voters, including linguistic minorities and diaspora",preference_participation_and_trust,observed,observed,observed,not_observed,not_observed,attempted_transfer_observed,foreign-linked political-finance and influence networks,"4,200 followers; platform_reported; unknown; at_takedown_2024-10-11 | 335,000 followers; platform_reported; unknown; at_takedown_2024-10-11",unknown,unknown,occurrence_supported_agency_effect_not_established,"How many recipients acted on payments? Which synthetic pieces achieved material exposure? What portion of the network was centrally directed? What vote effect, if any, occurred?",2026-08-11
+ata-md25,md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,Moldova 2025 parliamentary election: continuation of hybrid influence infrastructure,Moldova,2025-09-28,observed_network,retrospective,manipulation_confirmed,confirmed,mixed,"unknown: AI videos, bots and platform recommendation systems",foreign-funded political and influence networks,"social platforms, messaging apps, illicit finance, synthetic and spoofed media",Moldovan voters,authorship_agenda_and_peer_signal,observed,observed,insufficient_evidence,not_observed,not_observed,control_mechanism_observed,network curators and financiers,"253 accounts; researcher_measured; not_applicable; study_window | 28,708 posts; researcher_measured; not_applicable; study_window",unknown,unknown,occurrence_supported_agency_effect_not_established,"Which 2024 network components persisted, which were newly created, and which shared command? What was authentic in-country exposure? Which interventions worked?",2026-08-11
+ata-nh,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,New Hampshire 2024 AI-cloned Biden robocall,United States,2024-01-23,observed_incident,retrospective,manipulation_confirmed,confirmed,core_generation,ElevenLabs: AI voice-cloning service,Steve Kramer and telecom distribution providers,"AI voice cloning, caller-ID spoofing, mass robocalls",New Hampshire Democratic primary voters,authorship_relevance_and_participation_instruction,observed,observed,observed,not_observed,not_observed,attempted_transfer_observed,political operator and telecom distribution chain,"9,581 call_attempts; provider_records_in_enforcement; unknown; campaign_window | 3,978 completed_calls; provider_records_in_enforcement; unknown; campaign_window",unknown,unknown,occurrence_supported_agency_effect_not_established,"How many recipients listened, believed, or acted on the call? How should liability be allocated across creator, intermediary, and originating provider?",2026-08-11
+ata-brprep,br-2026-election-preparedness,Brazil 2026 general election: AI governance and integrity preparedness,Brazil,2026-10-04,preparedness_file,ongoing,preparedness_not_incident,confirmed,mixed,"unknown_or_multiple: generative AI, recommender and disclosure-compliance systems","campaigns, AI providers, platforms, election authorities, and unidentified influence actors","synthetic media, recommender outputs, political advertising, bots, voice cloning, platform distribution",Brazilian voters,future_information_and_platform_governance,not_assessed,not_observed,not_applicable,not_applicable,not_applicable,not_an_incident,not_applicable,No typed population-reach estimate,unknown,unknown,governance_context_not_incident,Will providers comply in practice? How quickly will labelled and unlabelled content be detected and adjudicated? Will rules apply consistently across closed messaging and AI assistants?,2026-08-11
+ata-bravatar,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,Brazil 2026 Bolsonaro AI avatar at Flávio Bolsonaro campaign launch,Brazil,2026-10-04,observed_incident,ongoing,transparent_contested_use,confirmed,core_generation,unknown: synthetic image-and-voice avatar system,Flávio Bolsonaro campaign or allied producer; authorisation by Jair Bolsonaro unresolved,disclosed synthetic image and voice presented as an endorsement,Brazilian voters and campaign attendees,political_representation_and_audience_interpretation,observed,observed,insufficient_evidence,not_observed,not_observed,insufficient_evidence,campaign producer controlling the synthetic representation,No typed population-reach estimate,unknown,unknown,occurrence_supported_agency_effect_not_established,Who authorised and scripted the avatar? Does a labelled clone circumvent communication restrictions? How will TSE distinguish transparent simulation from manipulative synthetic representation?,2026-08-11
+ata-usprep,us-2026-midterms-preparedness,United States 2026 midterm election: fragmented AI governance and preparedness,United States,2026-11-03,preparedness_file,ongoing,preparedness_not_incident,confirmed,mixed,"unknown_or_multiple: generative AI, synthetic-media, platform and telecom systems","campaigns, political committees, foreign influence actors, platforms, telecom and AI providers","synthetic ads, voice and video impersonation, recommender distribution, robocalls, coordinated influence",United States voters,future_information_and_election_trust,not_assessed,not_observed,not_applicable,not_applicable,not_applicable,not_an_incident,not_applicable,31 states_with_enacted_political_deepfake_laws; legislative_tracker_count; not_applicable; snapshot_2026-06-23,unknown,unknown,governance_context_not_incident,How will state rules apply across jurisdictions? Will disclosures be salient? Which foreign or domestic networks will achieve measurable reach? Can authentic communications remain verifiable?,2026-08-11
+ata-usads,us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,United States 2026 campaign-produced synthetic candidate ads,United States,2026-11-03,observed_campaign_set,ongoing,mixed_documented_manipulation,confirmed,core_generation,unknown: campaign video-generation and face/voice synthesis tools,National Republican Senatorial Committee and individual campaigns; additional actors may be added,AI-generated political video distributed as campaign advertising and social content,voters in contested federal and state races,candidate_voice_face_and_affect,observed,observed,insufficient_evidence,not_observed,not_observed,control_mechanism_observed,campaign sponsors producing and distributing synthetic representations,3 synthetic_ads_identified_in_reporting; independent_reporting_content_count; not_applicable; reporting_through_2026-03-28,unknown,unknown,occurrence_supported_agency_effect_not_established,Were disclosures noticed? What impressions and targeting occurred? Do viewers distinguish quotation from fabricated audiovisual evidence? What legal rules apply in each state?,2026-08-11
+ata-usca11,us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,California 11th District: campaign-controlled Connie Chan parody chatbot,United States,2026-11-03,observed_incident,ongoing,transparent_contested_use,confirmed,core_generation,Anthropic: Claude | Amazon Web Services|Google: hosting and analytics stack,Scott Wiener for Congress campaign; technical constructor unidentified,"interactive first-person opponent simulation, campaign-selected issue framing, web interface, billboards, and earned media",California 11th District voters and politically interested web visitors; Connie Chan as represented person,representation_agenda_query_privacy_and_candidate_evaluation,observed,observed,insufficient_evidence,not_observed,not_observed,insufficient_evidence,campaign deployer; secondarily model and infrastructure providers,"5,058 submitted_questions; campaign_reported; unknown; first_27_hours | 2 billboards; campaign_reported; not_applicable; August_2026",unknown,unknown,occurrence_supported_agency_effect_not_established,"Which Claude version and deployment route were used? Who built the system? What sources, system prompt, retrieval method, and guardrails controlled answers? How many unique people interacted, from where, and with what effects?",2026-08-12

data/schema.json

@@ -26,8 +26,8 @@
     "ai_role",
     "generative_ai_status",
     "affected_state",
-    "agency_transfer_path",
-    "power_concentrated_in",
+    "control_shift_hypothesis",
+    "hypothesized_power_recipient",
     "democratic_harm",
     "occurrence_status",
     "reach_status",
@@ -38,7 +38,6 @@
     "institutional_outcome",
     "response",
     "inclusion_tier",
-    "overall_confidence",
     "counterevidence",
     "open_questions",
     "last_verified"
@@ -49,10 +48,9 @@
     "claim_type",
     "claim_text",
     "evidence_label",
-    "confidence",
-    "coder_confidence_in_label",
     "claim_status",
-    "evidence_strength",
+    "evidence_basis",
+    "evidence_scope",
     "source_ids",
     "counter_source_ids",
     "notes",
@@ -251,13 +249,18 @@
     "controller",
     "influence_vector",
     "target",
-    "affected_agency",
-    "agency_transfer_status",
-    "power_recipient",
+    "agency_dimension",
+    "capability_status",
+    "control_mechanism_status",
+    "attempted_transfer_status",
+    "agency_change_status",
+    "agency_preservation_status",
+    "maximum_conclusion",
+    "hypothesized_power_recipient",
     "reach_summary",
     "behavioural_effect",
     "electoral_effect",
-    "evidence_strength",
+    "case_evidence_summary",
     "main_uncertainty",
     "last_verified"
   ],
@@ -324,18 +327,27 @@
   "pathways": [
     "pathway_id",
     "case_id",
-    "affected_agency",
-    "control_shift_from",
-    "control_shift_to",
+    "agency_dimension",
+    "hypothesized_control_shift_from",
+    "hypothesized_control_shift_to",
     "mechanism",
     "opacity",
     "personalization",
     "contestability",
     "duration",
-    "power_recipient",
-    "harm_pathway",
+    "hypothesized_power_recipient",
+    "potential_harm_pathway",
     "observed_outcome",
-    "agency_transfer_status",
+    "capability_status",
+    "control_mechanism_status",
+    "attempted_transfer_status",
+    "agency_change_status",
+    "agency_preservation_status",
+    "maximum_conclusion",
+    "falsification_condition",
+    "comparator",
+    "observed_evidence",
+    "researcher_inference",
     "assessment_label",
     "source_claim_ids",
     "reviewer_note"
@@ -391,6 +403,8 @@
     "evidence_scope",
     "directness",
     "locator",
+    "locator_coverage",
+    "locator_note",
     "extracted_at"
   ],
   "analytic_record_claims": [

data/sources.csv

@@ -17,12 +17,12 @@ src-md-meta-threat-reporting,Taking Action Against Coordinated Inauthentic Behav
 src-md-odihr-parliament-202602,"Moldova, Parliamentary Elections, 28 September 2025: Final Report",OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights,,2026-02-18,https://odihr.osce.org/odihr/662251,election_observation,primary,Moldova,en,A,independent_or_official,limited_to_published_account,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-11,Canonical ODIHR landing page verifies publication on 18 February 2026 and links the English report. The provider's PDF filename embeds 18.02.2025 despite the 2026 publication date.
 src-md-eeas-activity-2025,2024 Report on EEAS Activities to Counter Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference,European External Action Service,,2025-01-01,https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/2025/documents/2024%20Report%20on%20EEAS%20Activities%20to%20Counter%20FIMI.pdf,government_activity_report,primary,European Union,en,A,independent_or_official,limited_to_published_account,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-11,Cross-case institutional response and Moldova context.
 src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924,Paid to post: Russia-linked digital army seeks to undermine Moldovan election,Digital Forensic Research Lab,Valentin Châtelet|Victoria Olari,2025-09-24,https://dfrlab.org/2025/09/24/paid-to-post-russia-linked-digital-army-seeks-to-undermine-moldovan-election/,technical_investigation,secondary,Moldova,en,B,independent_secondary,limited_to_published_account,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-11,"Network analysis grounded in 253 accounts and linked undercover reporting. Metrics measure platform output and engagement, not unique voters; ties to Moscow-linked structures do not prove direct Kremlin command."
-src-us-fcc-ai-voice-20240208,FCC Makes AI-Generated Voices in Robocalls Illegal,Federal Communications Commission,,2024-02-08,https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-makes-ai-generated-voices-robocalls-illegal,regulatory_ruling,primary,United States,en,A,independent_or_official,not_applicable_official_record,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-11,Declaratory ruling that AI-generated voices are artificial voices under the TCPA.
-src-us-fcc-kramer-nal-20240523,FCC Proposes $6 Million Fine for Deepfake Robocalls Around New Hampshire Primary,Federal Communications Commission,,2024-05-23,https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-proposes-6-million-fine-deepfake-robocalls-around-nh-primary,enforcement_notice,primary,United States,en,A,independent_or_official,limited_to_published_account,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-11,"Notice of apparent liability, not yet the final forfeiture order."
+src-us-fcc-ai-voice-20240208,FCC Makes AI-Generated Voices in Robocalls Illegal,Federal Communications Commission,,2024-02-08,https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-24-17A1.pdf,regulatory_ruling,primary,United States,en,A,independent_or_official,not_applicable_official_record,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-15,Declaratory ruling that AI-generated voices are artificial voices under the TCPA. Direct official PDF replacement verified 2026-08-15.
+src-us-fcc-kramer-nal-20240523,FCC Proposes $6 Million Fine for Deepfake Robocalls Around New Hampshire Primary,Federal Communications Commission,,2024-05-23,https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-24-59A1.pdf,enforcement_notice,primary,United States,en,A,independent_or_official,limited_to_published_account,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-15,"Notice of apparent liability, not yet the final forfeiture order. Direct official PDF replacement verified 2026-08-15."
 src-us-fcc-lingo-nal-pdf-20240523,Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture: Lingo Telecom,Federal Communications Commission,,2024-05-23,https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-24-60A1.pdf,enforcement_order,primary,United States,en,A,independent_or_official,limited_to_published_account,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-11,"Primary source for call counts, attestation, and originating-provider allegations."
 src-us-nhdoj-kramer-20240523,Steven Kramer Charged with Voter Suppression over AI-Generated President Biden Robocalls,New Hampshire Department of Justice,,2024-05-23,https://www.doj.nh.gov/news-and-media/steven-kramer-charged-voter-suppression-over-ai-generated-president-biden-robocalls,law_enforcement_release,primary,New Hampshire,en,A,independent_or_official,limited_to_published_account,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-11,"Authoritative record of charges; charges are allegations, not proof of guilt."
-src-us-fcc-lingo-settlement-20240821,FCC Settles Spoofed AI-Generated Robocalls Case,Federal Communications Commission,,2024-08-21,https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-settles-spoofed-ai-generated-robocalls-case,enforcement_settlement,primary,United States,en,A,independent_or_official,limited_to_published_account,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-11,Settlement with originating provider; not an adjudication of every allegation.
-src-us-fcc-kramer-fine-20240926,FCC Issues $6 Million Fine for Illegal Robocalls that Used Deepfake Generative AI,Federal Communications Commission,,2024-09-26,https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-issues-6m-fine-nh-robocalls,enforcement_order,primary,United States,en,A,independent_or_official,limited_to_published_account,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-11,Final FCC forfeiture action.
+src-us-fcc-lingo-settlement-20240821,FCC Settles Spoofed AI-Generated Robocalls Case,Federal Communications Commission,,2024-08-21,https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-24-790A1.pdf,enforcement_settlement,primary,United States,en,A,independent_or_official,limited_to_published_account,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-15,Settlement with originating provider; not an adjudication of every allegation. Direct official PDF replacement verified 2026-08-15.
+src-us-fcc-kramer-fine-20240926,FCC Issues $6 Million Fine for Illegal Robocalls that Used Deepfake Generative AI,Federal Communications Commission,,2024-09-26,https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-24-104A1.pdf,enforcement_order,primary,United States,en,A,independent_or_official,limited_to_published_account,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-15,Final FCC forfeiture action. Direct official PDF replacement verified 2026-08-15.
 src-us-nhpr-acquittal-20250613,Political operative behind fake Biden robocalls in N.H. primary found not guilty,New Hampshire Public Radio,,2025-06-13,https://www.nhpr.org/nh-news/2025-06-13/political-operative-fake-biden-robocalls-nh-primary-found-not-guilty,news_reporting,secondary,New Hampshire,en,B,independent_secondary,limited_to_published_account,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-11,Reports acquittal on all state criminal charges and distinguishes civil enforcement.
 src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302,"Resolução nº 23.755, de 2 de março de 2026",Tribunal Superior Eleitoral,,2026-03-02,https://www.tse.jus.br/legislacao/compilada/res/2026/resolucao-no-23-755-de-2-de-marco-de-2026,electoral_regulation,primary,Brazil,pt,A,independent_or_official,limited_to_published_account,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-11,"Core legal source for 2026 synthetic-content, AI-provider, platform, and compliance duties."
 src-br-tse-calendar-202603,Eleições 2026: confira as principais datas do calendário eleitoral,Tribunal Superior Eleitoral,,2026-03-06,https://www.tse.jus.br/comunicacao/noticias/2026/Marco/eleicoes-2026-confira-as-principais-datas-do-calendario-eleitoral,election_calendar,primary,Brazil,pt,A,independent_or_official,limited_to_published_account,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-11,Official TSE election-calendar publication dated 6 March 2026.
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ src-br-poder360-avatar-pending-20260811,Kassio marca reunião com ministros do T
 src-us-nrsc-talarico-20260311,New ad: James Talarico reads his most memorable tweets,National Republican Senatorial Committee,,2026-03-11,https://www.nrsc.org/press-releases/new-ad-james-talarico-reads-his-most-memorable-tweets-2026-03-11/,actor_release,primary,United States,en,C,independent_or_official,limited_to_published_account,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-11,"Primary actor record and transcript; A for what the NRSC published, C for evaluative claims."
 src-us-nrsc-talarico-youtube,James Talarico Reads His Most Memorable Tweets,National Republican Senatorial Committee / YouTube,,2026-03-11,https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qIDhhVah4xE,primary_artifact,primary,United States,en,C,independent_or_official,limited_to_published_account,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-11,Dynamic platform metric; one-platform views are not unique or total exposure.
 src-us-berkeley-talarico-2026,Hany Farid delves into newly released deepfakes of James Talarico,UC Berkeley School of Information,,2026-04-28,https://www.ischool.berkeley.edu/news/presscoverage/2026/hany-farid-delves-newly-released-deepfakes-james-talarico,expert_analysis,secondary,United States,en,B,independent_secondary,limited_to_published_account,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-11,Expert analysis page published 28 April 2026; supports forensic and disclosure context rather than reach or electoral effect.
-src-global-pdid-2024,Introducing the Political Deepfakes Incidents Database,Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence,Christina P. Walker|Daniel S. Schiff|Kaylyn Jackson Schiff,2024-03-24,https://ojs.aaai.org/index.php/AAAI/article/view/30349/32389,peer_reviewed_methodology,secondary,Global,en,A,independent_secondary,sufficiently_described_or_reproducible,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-11,Comparative methodology and field map; this dataset adds claim-level causal and agency-transfer coding.
+src-global-pdid-2024,Introducing the Political Deepfakes Incidents Database,Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence,Christina P. Walker|Daniel S. Schiff|Kaylyn Jackson Schiff,2024-03-24,https://ojs.aaai.org/index.php/AAAI/article/view/30349/32389,peer_reviewed_methodology,secondary,Global,en,A,independent_secondary,sufficiently_described_or_reproducible,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-11,Comparative methodology and field map; this dataset adds claim-level causal safeguards and falsifiable control-shift-hypothesis coding.
 src-global-row-tracker-20240416,How we're tracking AI incidents around global elections,Rest of World,Victoria Turk,2024-04-16,https://restofworld.org/2024/tracking-global-election-ai/,journalistic_methodology,secondary,Global,en,B,independent_secondary,sufficiently_described_or_reproducible,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-11,"Used for methodological comparison and leads, not copied as a source dataset."
 src-global-meta-muted-20241203,Meta says generative AI had muted impact on global elections in 2024,Reuters,,2024-12-03,https://www.reuters.com/technology/artificial-intelligence/meta-says-gen-ai-had-muted-impact-global-elections-this-year-2024-12-03/,news_reporting,secondary,Global,en,B,independent_secondary,limited_to_published_account,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-11,Reports Meta's interested-party assessment that generative-AI misinformation had limited reach on its platforms.
 src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804,A parody Connie Chan chatbot is Scott Wiener's newest tactic,Gazetteer SF,Eddie Kim,2026-08-04,https://sf.gazetteer.co/a-parody-connie-chan-chatbot-is-scott-wieners-newest-tactic,news_reporting_with_direct_observation,secondary,"California, United States",en,B,independent_secondary,limited_to_published_account,public_url_at_cutoff,,,2026-08-12,"Directly inspected the interface and privacy policy; documents Anthropic, AWS, Google Analytics, 90-day conversation retention and authorised staff review. Does not identify the exact model version or deployment route."

data/stats.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "cases": 10,
-  "claims": 96,
+  "claims": 100,
   "sources": 70,
   "events": 33,
   "case_sources": 67,
@@ -17,51 +17,52 @@
   "technology_uses": 11,
   "content_items": 4,
   "pathways": 10,
-  "observations": 24,
+  "observations": 22,
   "model_evaluations": 7,
-  "claim_evidence": 162,
-  "analytic_record_claims": 234,
+  "claim_evidence": 124,
+  "analytic_record_claims": 239,
   "case_elections": 15,
   "election_sources": 35,
   "sampling_frame": 7,
   "coverage_summary": 7,
   "_integrity": {
     "input_sha256": {
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-      "research/candidates.json": "6586ccee4ac720620995e7287e4976c9fca3303595b3cb8875727fbd0a4c9df8",
+      "research/seed.json": "e328a23a869b5d95514a8fe8811e0a42e475adfc0c8e6a41b806349ee4ebed61",
+      "research/candidates.json": "c0e4398c6836c251fd745728d07b1c60b8197150ef91b3e24eb1db26c6dde366",
       "research/europe_candidates.json": "1cd6f4b4ff119316ff885623151b085c919f5a8984e082d4ff482eea84005f0c",
       "research/official_electoral_data.json": "7e6789f7f097e563e9590287f6b08a0494445a5bc668b865de0ce04b0927025f",
-      "research/v0.3_extensions.json": "0fa8a7829647d1cadf48dd67cc51269e27ccb15fa3389cbe14388b86114594d0"
+      "research/v0.3_extensions.json": "a045c15148675d604216d9451db6b0ddbb60a7c2791ad9d1138bfcf4583d6784",
+      "research/v0.4_locators.json": "382f2964c239aef732e3dc1f938cb258ec197572f3a8fd5be7c6376d7bad53e5"
     },
     "file_sha256": {
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-      "claims.csv": "f84b6fab66396425e7b44b3185416d016efe087980bd0b97a0b7c5019e337a71",
-      "sources.csv": "087060a13c36aa4c8adad9738ed3c4fe0c067eb391074e0a2ffbdeadf7128d6b",
+      "cases.csv": "0a3222c9d0ecd7455444b838c3ddd726a2284179d05384bb60247290e45c7bfd",
+      "claims.csv": "51d3458bdd4cb0cca1f2a286914c242b909454ef211bc46633cae4252909524a",
+      "sources.csv": "fd29e2aca81f317f4538d395e22fc380436917d7ffc43dad7752bc3228338dcd",
       "events.csv": "46f957f4d8fa06a59d2a9463d3d593b916186bb9dd2cbfd8513430ecc52f27ce",
-      "case_sources.csv": "5bbbf61cd2bdbdfad8ba8fa308e6718322f2bb52a608deff2112ba6e560fe7ce",
+      "case_sources.csv": "91bf1f27a17efddfcceb32510056e0aa7c48136baf41f25ea1b2ebe572d39f88",
       "watchlist.csv": "de372b4065912da610674421f41dc4fc04f5cc164ff7351ead2512b7e52f7d1a",
-      "candidates.csv": "308f5755bdff6da1daea1caca11e2ad8e54f8716b09ac383f2726cb6e60e6ed8",
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       "official_turnout.csv": "5233c98be0e5e8435bc7313b26578381feec3ae9020aab8b52d244a3874a164b",
       "official_results.csv": "ccbb69d262c27d137981a08997b10dccf229fd66d21a40b1f4d9008f32a1cf8d",
       "official_data_sources.csv": "68fa74fc6990c0ccd10f8cbe2406bdc4ecd1b6938835a1d747e6ce9c02cd6e02",
       "official_election_metrics.csv": "6c5bb956acb6a8d51a335fac5df1aa21b1db1c46e32e4533410ee8b47dcefc4c",
-      "research_view.csv": "99ce7abfd3fa4a4e2edddd18a325f8b4eb7ab7475b54980d709811cb6bc2e669",
-      "case_catalog.csv": "fb903bb6b9e3c4f37486e4a7308ed94ee9cb495e29915566d6e1f2258ab3d7b3",
+      "research_view.csv": "388ec0929f975a8c17b975d43171a39c840ef3c83d95899dbcaa7c213b641698",
+      "case_catalog.csv": "e1a11e4ecbbfa5a6c739dfb95aa4aeb4e29bc19b3161d2c7d17c3660be574ceb",
       "case_actors.csv": "6cab05a9c8003056777f1f069628788278911cc4657f4051bde2dab0fbcab684",
       "technology_uses.csv": "2c888eda9c9c27e9aca0d9eaac81ca0aa1993111e1049643b18208a34088916b",
       "content_items.csv": "b0a414c43ff8ac2eb2028c5167c6fa4289f48d1ab853aa32e0d0559821c12548",
-      "pathways.csv": "eddfed2c0c38f381ad05297f9a436a7a9133a30a63a094ee738aa3ddb9b75e97",
-      "observations.csv": "b763f02c096e4c704219f45b043ac7009295600691d7159443514cf9bf5f3fb2",
+      "pathways.csv": "e38160ddea42e0ef3554731f51aa7d79d2f95d2a337dda08a5f4ea0deea2eeea",
+      "observations.csv": "1e63b4379113a0fe31b8a0990a48a3c2fec40ffcca3fa9c472b3e73d758b968f",
       "model_evaluations.csv": "531719c36c01aacea0d2e89a50540042b4e55859ca653920af5585810b2a4b6b",
-      "claim_evidence.csv": "24546a83455d0f573ad1466d711fe750ef2d24f094c0b132ab643e13f792c7d8",
-      "analytic_record_claims.csv": "6762fe9087707fb2df0bf62ca0d51b40cc93081620e1ab7ae14c2a56dbfe5349",
+      "claim_evidence.csv": "99d01edb3bfae4269de4ba8eb57a04115b3680f9fb4f5525a150ace66088e238",
+      "analytic_record_claims.csv": "cc90e2f21b4693362ba978a0669e0925808f9cb838f120826d9a9a0d125ec416",
       "case_elections.csv": "f393a0bb79918c7b159aef1e0ede3eb647fa1eb42ed81ca88c2a6a0545e590ea",
       "election_sources.csv": "2cffaa3b0f10ceac9ca889f5faf41f22993402fe7f5aacdfd1d6dbad5375f2dc",
       "sampling_frame.csv": "cfa4899235107203c0d28134974b6da240fd4fef39a5a0643fd52a2742a462b7",
       "coverage_summary.csv": "9c4df5b4346855c370e65f5d3feeef4c51ff9d055e44bbfd0c530cc4091e419c",
-      "schema.json": "7f1b2af699bac1897663d21174c0cab997f387fa0e61f1980d81c84c65bf7052",
-      "datapackage.json": "700e4637bdae588f70a30918a0444b93a287af61d6785c73cbc6a529e79dd9aa"
+      "schema.json": "490b7e148cad6580b42e2cdddd0cf08f56f1a6dab245cede259f85d841d5d965",
+      "datapackage.json": "47bb88f5ce05add0fea633fb8045a29f1f64a7fc455f991418cf4b32af26faa1"
     }
   }
 }