v0.4.0: preserve research trail and locator audit

Publish the canonical 124-edge locator audit and label historical ledgers as noncanonical working inputs.

research/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+# Research inputs and working ledgers
+
+Files in this directory are build inputs, screening registers, audit maps, and historical working ledgers. They are published for process transparency, but they are **not** the canonical v0.4.0 coded tables.
+
+Use `data/` or `parquet/` for analysis. Some ledgers preserve superseded working terminology, draft confidence annotations, broader candidate hypotheses, or pre-v0.4 evidence links so that the research trail is not silently rewritten. Those notes do not override the generated schema, claim status, locator coverage, maximum conclusion, or release cutoff.
+
+The deterministic input set hashed by `data/stats.json` is limited to the files named there. `research/v0.4_locators.json` records the complete 124-edge locator audit, including unresolved relations and the exact edges removed during the v0.4 red-team. Screening candidates remain leads until they pass claim-level coding and acceptance checks.

research/americas_secondary_cases.md

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ Evidence key used below: `O` occurrence; `R` reach/exposure; `B` behavioural eff
 - **Evidence classification/confidence:** `O confirmed; R platform_reported; A officially_attributed; B unknown; E unknown.` Confidence 0.99 occurrence/attribution, 0.97 Facebook metrics as defined, 0.15 electoral effect.
 - **Sources:**
   - https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/2019/10/08/press-senate-intel-committee-releases-bipartisan-report-russia-e2-80-99s-use-social-media/
-  - https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/sites-default-files-documents/facebook-response-to-committee-qfrs.pdf
+  - https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/2018/08/30/hearings-open-hearing-foreign-influence-operations-e2-80-99-use-social-media-platforms-company-witnesses/
   - https://www.justice.gov/archives/sco/file/1373816/dl?inline=
   - https://www.justice.gov/d9/fieldable-panel-panes/basic-panes/attachments/2018/02/16/internet_research_agency_indictment.pdf
 

research/asia_africa_ledger.md

@@ -245,7 +245,7 @@
 | `S-PK-01` | 2023-12-18 | Reuters, [Pakistan's jailed Imran Khan uses AI-crafted speech to lure votes](https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pakistans-jailed-imran-khan-uses-ai-crafted-speech-call-votes-2023-12-18/) | B | Direct reporting on production, authorisation context and independent YouTube metric. |
 | `S-PK-02` | 2024-02-06 | Reuters, [How Imran Khan is campaigning from jail in Pakistan: AI and covert canvassing](https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/how-imran-khan-is-campaigning-jail-pakistan-ai-covert-canvassing-2024-02-05/) | B | Interviews with 15 campaign actors/supporters and technical details; campaign explanations remain interested-party claims. |
 | `S-PK-03` | 2024-02-09 | Reuters, [Pakistan's jailed ex-PM Imran Khan claims election victory](https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pakistans-jailed-ex-pm-imran-khan-claims-election-victory-2024-02-09/) | B | Confirms synthetic results-period message and seat outcome without claiming causality. |
-| `S-PK-04` | 2023-12-19 | Tortoise Media, [Pakistan's Imran Khan uses AI to give campaign speech from prison](https://www.tortoisemedia.com/2023/12/19/pakistans-imran-khan-uses-ai-to-give-speech-from-prison/) | B | Corroborates visible AI caption; secondary reporting. |
+| `S-PK-04` | 2023-12-19 | Tortoise Media, [Pakistan's Imran Khan uses AI to give campaign speech from prison](https://www.tortoisemedia.com/2023/12/19/pakistans-imran-khan-uses-ai-to-give-campaign-speech-from-prison) | B | Corroborates visible AI caption; secondary reporting. |
 | `S-PK-05` | 2023-12-18 | Associated Press, [Pakistan is stunned as party of imprisoned ex-PM Khan uses AI to replicate his voice](https://apnews.com/article/fb679e1196216fd6547d5d35c111e037) | B | Independent corroboration, party confirmation and >1 million audience statement. |
 | `S-PK-06` | 2024-02-09 | BOOM, [AI Voice Clone Of Imran Khan Falsely Claims He Is Boycotting Polls](https://www.boomlive.in/fact-check/imran-khan-pti-pakistan-election-withdrawal-fact-check-24318) | B | Specialist fact-check of harmful clone; page access may be geoblocked, preserve archive in future release. |
 | `S-PK-07` | 2024-02-09 | Voice of America, [Pakistan's Electoral Laboratory Shows the Drawbacks and Benefits of AI](https://www.voanews.com/a/7481049.html) | B | Corroborates fake boycott clip and PTI denial; state-funded international broadcaster. |
@@ -282,7 +282,7 @@
 |---|---|---|---|---|
 | `S-ZA-01` | 2024-03-19 | Institute for Security Studies, [Disinformation, governance and the South African election](https://futures.issafrica.org/blog/2024/Disinformation-governance-and-the-South-African-election) | B | Detailed focal-video description, sharing account and tool hypothesis; analytical essay rather than forensic lab report. |
 | `S-ZA-02` | 2024-04-11 | Africa Check, [No, former US president Donald Trump has not backed South Africa's MK party](https://africacheck.org/fact-checks/meta-programme-fact-checks/no-former-us-president-donald-trump-has-not-backed-south) | B | Specialist fact-check; page may return 403 to automated clients. |
-| `S-ZA-03` | 2024-07-31 | DFRLab, [Lessons learned from South Africa's 2024 elections](https://dfrlab.org/2024/07/31/lessons-learned-from-south-africas-elections/) | B | Post-election counterevidence: generative AI played a limited role overall. |
+| `S-ZA-03` | 2024-07-31 | DFRLab, [Lessons learned from South Africa's 2024 elections](https://dfrlab.org/2024/07/31/lessons-learned-from-south-africas-2024-elections/) | B | Post-election counterevidence: generative AI played a limited role overall. |
 | `S-ZA-04` | 2024-12 | ISS Southern Africa Report 61, [Under the influence? Online mis/disinformation in South Africa's May 2024 election](https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/pages/1734073957062-sar-61.pdf) | A/B | Mixed-method/network research; key finding that GenAI/deepfakes and foreign-state evidence were limited. |
 | `S-ZA-05` | 2024-10 | Center for Media Engagement, [South Africa's Election Marked by an Unexpected Lack of Artificially Generated Content](https://mediaengagement.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/South-Africas-Election-Marked-by-an-Unexpected-Lack-of-Artificially-Generated-Content.pdf) | B | Focused negative-case analysis; important guard against salience bias. |
 

research/candidates.json

@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@
     "reach_status": "unknown",
     "behavioural_effect_status": "unknown",
     "electoral_effect_status": "unknown",
-    "comparative_value": "Direct agency-transfer case: synthetic first-person withdrawal and endorsement at a moment with limited rebuttal time.",
+    "comparative_value": "High-priority control-shift hypothesis: synthetic first-person withdrawal and endorsement at a moment with limited rebuttal time; agency change remains unmeasured.",
     "main_caveat": "Narrowed to the Buenos Aires City case; it still needs an independent second source. National October complaints belong in a separate future candidate and are not merged here.",
     "source_urls": "https://chequeado.com/el-explicador/videos-falsos-de-macri-y-lospennato-en-x-que-paso-en-la-realidad-con-lo-que-ordeno-la-justicia/",
     "last_checked": "2026-08-11"
@@ -332,7 +332,7 @@
     "electoral_effect_status": "unknown",
     "comparative_value": "Clean authorised-use comparison in which synthetic speech restored a jailed leader's campaign presence and was publicly labelled as AI-generated.",
     "main_caveat": "More than 1.4 million YouTube views document exposure, not persuasion; the success of PTI-backed independents cannot be causally attributed to synthetic speeches.",
-    "source_urls": "https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pakistans-jailed-imran-khan-uses-ai-crafted-speech-call-votes-2023-12-18/|https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/how-imran-khan-is-campaigning-jail-pakistan-ai-covert-canvassing-2024-02-05/|https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pakistans-jailed-ex-pm-imran-khan-claims-election-victory-2024-02-09/|https://www.tortoisemedia.com/2023/12/19/pakistans-imran-khan-uses-ai-to-give-speech-from-prison/|https://apnews.com/article/fb679e1196216fd6547d5d35c111e037",
+    "source_urls": "https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pakistans-jailed-imran-khan-uses-ai-crafted-speech-call-votes-2023-12-18/|https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/how-imran-khan-is-campaigning-jail-pakistan-ai-covert-canvassing-2024-02-05/|https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pakistans-jailed-ex-pm-imran-khan-claims-election-victory-2024-02-09/|https://www.tortoisemedia.com/2023/12/19/pakistans-imran-khan-uses-ai-to-give-campaign-speech-from-prison|https://apnews.com/article/fb679e1196216fd6547d5d35c111e037",
     "last_checked": "2026-08-11"
   },
   {
@@ -437,7 +437,7 @@
     "electoral_effect_status": "unknown",
     "comparative_value": "Clear false-endorsement case with a prominent party-linked amplifier and strong negative-case evidence about the limited overall role of GenAI.",
     "main_caveat": "The creator and focal reach are unknown; replies are not a belief survey, and post-election research found GenAI and deepfake use was limited overall.",
-    "source_urls": "https://futures.issafrica.org/blog/2024/Disinformation-governance-and-the-South-African-election|https://africacheck.org/fact-checks/meta-programme-fact-checks/no-former-us-president-donald-trump-has-not-backed-south|https://dfrlab.org/2024/07/31/lessons-learned-from-south-africas-elections/|https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/pages/1734073957062-sar-61.pdf|https://mediaengagement.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/South-Africas-Election-Marked-by-an-Unexpected-Lack-of-Artificially-Generated-Content.pdf",
+    "source_urls": "https://futures.issafrica.org/blog/2024/Disinformation-governance-and-the-South-African-election|https://africacheck.org/fact-checks/meta-programme-fact-checks/no-former-us-president-donald-trump-has-not-backed-south|https://dfrlab.org/2024/07/31/lessons-learned-from-south-africas-2024-elections/|https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/pages/1734073957062-sar-61.pdf|https://mediaengagement.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/South-Africas-Election-Marked-by-an-Unexpected-Lack-of-Artificially-Generated-Content.pdf",
     "last_checked": "2026-08-11"
   },
   {

research/v0.3_extensions.json

@@ -67,9 +67,9 @@
       "ai_role": "core_generation",
       "generative_ai_status": "confirmed",
       "affected_state": "candidate evaluation|agenda-setting|perceived representation|trust|query privacy",
-      "agency_transfer_path": "campaign-controlled deployment and configurable framing → closed-model dynamic generation → users question a synthetic opponent → the campaign selects how Chan appears to answer and its policy permits staff review of query logs → representational and evidentiary control shifts from the candidate and voter verification to the campaign and its infrastructure providers; exact prompt, retrieval sources and guardrails remain unknown",
-      "power_concentrated_in": "campaign deployer controlling deployment, interface, framing and permitted access to logs; secondarily the model and infrastructure providers",
-      "democratic_harm": "observed appropriation of an opponent's first-person voice and controversy over racialised and gendered outputs; hypothesised misrepresentation and normalisation of synthetic opponents; electoral effect unknown",
+      "control_shift_hypothesis": "Boundary hypothesis: a disclosed campaign-controlled opponent simulation could shift representational and evidentiary control toward its sponsor. Explicit parody, unknown system configuration, and unmeasured user effects prevent a finding of agency change.",
+      "hypothesized_power_recipient": "campaign deployer controlling the interface and framing; secondarily model and infrastructure providers",
+      "democratic_harm": "Observed first-person opponent simulation and public controversy over racialised and gendered outputs; misrepresentation and normalisation harms remain hypotheses, and electoral effect is unknown.",
       "occurrence_status": "confirmed",
       "reach_status": "campaign_reported_nonunique_questions",
       "reach_estimate": 5058,
@@ -79,7 +79,6 @@
       "institutional_outcome": "No adjudication or regulatory outcome was identified by the cutoff.",
       "response": "The campaign removed the chatbot on 7 August 2026, said it would remove two billboards, acknowledged that the experiment missed the mark, and apologised for causing offence.",
       "inclusion_tier": "A",
-      "overall_confidence": 0.94,
       "counterevidence": "The site openly described itself as AI and parody, disclosed that it was unaffiliated with Chan and paid for by Wiener, and did not purport to be Chan's authentic service. The campaign said adversarial prompts drove the controversial exchanges and that safeguards were tightened.",
       "open_questions": "Which Claude version and deployment route were used? Who built the system? What sources, system prompt, retrieval method, and guardrails controlled answers? How many unique people interacted, from where, and with what effects?",
       "last_verified": "2026-08-12"
@@ -289,7 +288,6 @@
       "claim_type": "occurrence",
       "claim_text": "Scott Wiener for Congress launched the ConnieChan.ai interactive attack-ad chatbot on 3 August 2026 and removed it on 7 August after public criticism.",
       "evidence_label": "established_evidence",
-      "confidence": 0.99,
       "source_ids": "src-us-ca11-sfgate-20260804|src-us-ca11-mission-20260807|src-us-ca11-axios-20260811",
       "counter_source_ids": "",
       "notes": "SFGATE described a Monday launch; Mission Local gives 3 August. Some later summaries use 4 August, the first reporting date.",
@@ -302,7 +300,6 @@
       "claim_type": "attribution",
       "claim_text": "The Wiener campaign admitted commissioning, paying for, promoting, and controlling the chatbot; the technical builder was not publicly identified.",
       "evidence_label": "established_evidence",
-      "confidence": 0.99,
       "source_ids": "src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804|src-us-ca11-sfgate-20260804|src-us-ca11-mission-20260807",
       "counter_source_ids": "",
       "notes": "Anthropic supplied a model but is not attributed as campaign designer, approver, or operator.",
@@ -315,7 +312,6 @@
       "claim_type": "ai_role",
       "claim_text": "The campaign said the chatbot used Anthropic's Claude model family to generate interactive responses; the exact version, deployment route, prompt, retrieval system, and guardrails remain unknown.",
       "evidence_label": "established_evidence",
-      "confidence": 0.95,
       "source_ids": "src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804|src-us-ca11-sfgate-20260804|src-us-ca11-axios-20260811",
       "counter_source_ids": "",
       "notes": "Product family is known; technical configuration is not.",
@@ -328,7 +324,6 @@
       "claim_type": "mechanism",
       "claim_text": "The system answered in Connie Chan's first person and dynamically redirected questions toward campaign-selected portrayals of her record.",
       "evidence_label": "established_evidence",
-      "confidence": 0.98,
       "source_ids": "src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804|src-us-ca11-sfgate-20260804|src-us-ca11-axios-20260811",
       "counter_source_ids": "",
       "notes": "Interactive opponent simulation differs from a static synthetic ad because user questions affect the generated response.",
@@ -341,7 +336,6 @@
       "claim_type": "counterevidence",
       "claim_text": "The site visibly framed itself as AI and parody, said it was not affiliated with or endorsed by Chan, and disclosed that it was paid for by the Wiener campaign.",
       "evidence_label": "established_evidence",
-      "confidence": 0.97,
       "source_ids": "src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804|src-us-ca11-sfgate-20260804",
       "counter_source_ids": "",
       "notes": "Transparent parody weakens a covert-deception theory but does not remove questions about synthetic first-person representation, bias, or data control.",
@@ -354,7 +348,6 @@
       "claim_type": "reach",
       "claim_text": "The campaign reported that the chatbot received 5,058 submitted questions during its first 27 hours.",
       "evidence_label": "established_as_campaign_report",
-      "confidence": 0.78,
       "source_ids": "src-us-ca11-mission-20260807|src-us-ca11-axios-20260811",
       "counter_source_ids": "",
       "notes": "Campaign-reported measure. It is not unique users, conversations, voters, district residents, impressions, beliefs, or votes; repeated or adversarial prompts may inflate it.",
@@ -367,7 +360,6 @@
       "claim_type": "mechanism",
       "claim_text": "The privacy policy said conversations could be retained for 90 days and reviewed by a small number of authorised staff to fix bugs, understand queries, and improve campaign content.",
       "evidence_label": "established_evidence",
-      "confidence": 0.96,
       "source_ids": "src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804",
       "counter_source_ids": "",
       "notes": "The data warning was in the privacy policy, not prominently repeated in the main chat interface according to the reporting.",
@@ -380,7 +372,6 @@
       "claim_type": "response",
       "claim_text": "On 7 August the campaign removed the chatbot, announced removal of the two billboards, said the experiment had missed the mark, and apologised for causing offence.",
       "evidence_label": "established_evidence",
-      "confidence": 0.99,
       "source_ids": "src-us-ca11-mission-20260807|src-us-ca11-axios-20260811",
       "counter_source_ids": "",
       "notes": "Campaign self-termination is a response, not an institutional or legal finding.",
@@ -391,12 +382,11 @@
       "claim_id": "clm-usca11-009",
       "case_id": "us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot",
       "claim_type": "behavioural_effect",
-      "claim_text": "No reviewed evidence measures whether interaction with the chatbot changed candidate evaluation, trust, issue salience, turnout intention, or vote choice.",
-      "evidence_label": "established_evidence",
-      "confidence": 0.97,
-      "source_ids": "src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804|src-us-ca11-mission-20260807|src-us-ca11-axios-20260811",
+      "claim_text": "Among the public sources linked to this record at the cutoff, none measured whether interaction with the chatbot changed candidate evaluation, trust, issue salience, turnout intention, or vote choice.",
+      "evidence_label": "not_identified_in_declared_review",
+      "source_ids": "",
       "counter_source_ids": "",
-      "notes": "This is an evidence-availability claim scoped to the reviewed public record.",
+      "notes": "Bounded to the sources linked to this record at the cutoff; this is not proof of absence beyond the declared review.",
       "review_status": "verified",
       "verified_at": "2026-08-12"
     },
@@ -406,7 +396,6 @@
       "claim_type": "electoral_effect",
       "claim_text": "The election had not occurred by the cutoff, and no electoral effect can be inferred from question counts, press attention, criticism, or campaign withdrawal.",
       "evidence_label": "open_question",
-      "confidence": 0.99,
       "source_ids": "",
       "counter_source_ids": "",
       "notes": "Prospective guardrail.",
@@ -416,14 +405,13 @@
     {
       "claim_id": "clm-usca11-011",
       "case_id": "us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot",
-      "claim_type": "agency_transfer",
-      "claim_text": "The campaign-controlled prompt, sources, guardrails, interface, and logs let the sponsor decide how an opponent appeared to answer user questions, shifting representational and evidentiary control from the candidate and voter verification toward the campaign and its provider stack.",
-      "evidence_label": "strong_inference",
-      "confidence": 0.93,
-      "source_ids": "src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804|src-us-ca11-sfgate-20260804|src-us-ca11-axios-20260811",
+      "claim_type": "control_shift_hypothesis",
+      "claim_text": "Boundary hypothesis: a campaign-controlled opponent chatbot could shift representational and evidentiary control toward its sponsor, but explicit parody, disclosure, unknown system configuration, and unmeasured user effects prevent a finding of agency change.",
+      "evidence_label": "researcher_hypothesis",
+      "source_ids": "",
       "counter_source_ids": "",
-      "notes": "Analytical synthesis. Disclosure and parody are mitigating conditions; behavioural and electoral effects remain unknown.",
-      "review_status": "verified",
+      "notes": "Analytical hypothesis linked through the pathway to factual claims; it is not direct evidence of an agency outcome.",
+      "review_status": "analytical_hypothesis",
       "verified_at": "2026-08-12"
     }
   ],
@@ -454,14 +442,14 @@
       "case_id": "us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot",
       "source_id": "src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804",
       "source_role": "corroboration",
-      "supports_claim_types": "occurrence|attribution|ai_role|mechanism|counterevidence|agency_transfer",
+      "supports_claim_types": "occurrence|attribution|ai_role|mechanism|counterevidence",
       "notes": "Reporting includes direct interface and privacy-policy observation."
     },
     {
       "case_id": "us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot",
       "source_id": "src-us-ca11-sfgate-20260804",
       "source_role": "corroboration",
-      "supports_claim_types": "occurrence|attribution|ai_role|mechanism|counterevidence|agency_transfer",
+      "supports_claim_types": "occurrence|attribution|ai_role|mechanism|counterevidence",
       "notes": "Direct campaign statements and interface testing."
     },
     {
@@ -475,7 +463,7 @@
       "case_id": "us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot",
       "source_id": "src-us-ca11-axios-20260811",
       "source_role": "corroboration",
-      "supports_claim_types": "occurrence|ai_role|mechanism|reach|response|behavioural_effect|agency_transfer",
+      "supports_claim_types": "occurrence|ai_role|mechanism|reach|response|behavioural_effect",
       "notes": "Independent synthesis and expert context."
     }
   ],
@@ -713,87 +701,1177 @@
     }
   ],
   "case_actors": [
-    ["act-ro24-networks", "ro-2024-presidential-annulment", "Campaign and influence-network operators", "operator", "campaign_network", "mixed", "campaign coordination and promotion", "clm-ro-002|clm-ro-007|clm-ro-013", "Sponsor and command relationships vary by component."],
-    ["act-ro24-tiktok", "ro-2024-presidential-annulment", "TikTok", "platform_and_ranker", "platform", "admitted", "ranking, reach, moderation, transparency", "clm-ro-003|clm-ro-005|clm-ro-012", "Platform metrics and network definitions must not be merged."],
-    ["act-ro25-operator", "ro-2025-presidential-repeat", "Unidentified cross-platform network operator", "operator", "unknown_network", "unknown", "synthetic personas, account coordination, narrative selection", "clm-ro-014|clm-ro-016|clm-ro-017", "Public evidence does not establish sponsor or state command."],
-    ["act-md24-shor", "md-2024-presidential-referendum", "Ilan Shor-linked political network", "sponsor_and_operator", "political_network", "officially_attributed", "finance, recruitment, narrative and distribution", "clm-md-004|clm-md-005|clm-md-009", "Underlying components have different attribution strength."],
-    ["act-md24-meta", "md-2024-presidential-referendum", "Meta", "platform_and_responder", "platform", "admitted", "distribution and network disruption", "clm-md-007|clm-md-014", "Meta follower counts include suspected fake and largely non-Moldovan engagement."],
-    ["act-md25-infoleaders", "md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network", "InfoLeaders curators and paid account network", "operator", "influence_network", "credibly_reported", "message assignment, personalisation and mutual amplification", "clm-md-015|clm-md-016|clm-md-017|clm-md-018", "Direct Kremlin command of every component is not established."],
-    ["act-nh-kramer", "us-nh-2024-biden-robocall", "Steve Kramer", "commissioner_and_operator", "political_consultant", "admitted", "content commission, targeting and call operation", "clm-nh-001|clm-nh-002|clm-nh-003|clm-nh-012", "Acquitted of state criminal charges; separate federal civil and FCC outcomes remain."],
-    ["act-nh-telecom", "us-nh-2024-biden-robocall", "Voice Broadcasting and Lingo Telecom", "delivery_infrastructure", "telecom_provider", "adjudicated", "call initiation, attestation and delivery", "clm-nh-004|clm-nh-005|clm-nh-007", "Different providers controlled different parts of the chain."],
-    ["act-br-prep-tse", "br-2026-election-preparedness", "Tribunal Superior Eleitoral", "regulator_and_responder", "election_authority", "adjudicated", "rules, monitoring and enforcement", "clm-br-002|clm-br-003|clm-br-004|clm-br-005|clm-br-006|clm-br-007", "Preparedness actor, not manipulator."],
-    ["act-brprep-aggregate", "br-2026-election-preparedness", "Potential campaigns, AI providers, platforms and unidentified influence actors", "prospective_actor_set", "mixed_unknown", "unknown", "potential production, ranking, distribution and compliance", "clm-br-002|clm-br-003|clm-br-004|clm-br-005", "Aggregate preparedness category defined by the regulatory scope; it does not identify a specific 2026 operator or deployment."],
-    ["act-br-avatar-campaign", "br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar", "Flávio Bolsonaro campaign or allied producer", "deployer_and_beneficiary", "campaign", "credibly_reported", "synthetic persona and campaign distribution", "clm-br-010|clm-br-011|clm-br-020", "Exact producer and Jair Bolsonaro authorisation remain unresolved."],
-    ["act-usprep-aggregate", "us-2026-midterms-preparedness", "Potential campaigns, political committees, foreign influence actors, platforms, telecom and AI providers", "prospective_actor_set", "mixed_unknown", "unknown", "potential production, ranking, distribution and telecom delivery", "clm-us26-003|clm-us26-004|clm-us26-005", "Aggregate preparedness category; prior-cycle evidence and governance gaps do not establish a specific new 2026 operation."],
-    ["act-us26-nrsc", "us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads", "National Republican Senatorial Committee", "sponsor_and_deployer", "political_committee", "admitted", "synthetic opponent performance and distribution", "clm-us26-008|clm-us26-009|clm-us26-014|clm-us26-016", "Other ads in the aggregate case have different sponsors."],
-    ["act-usca11-wiener", "us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot", "Scott Wiener for Congress", "commissioner_deployer_and_data_controller", "campaign", "admitted", "deployment, configurable framing, interface, promotion and policy-permitted log access", "clm-usca11-001|clm-usca11-002|clm-usca11-004|clm-usca11-007|clm-usca11-011", "Technical constructor, exact prompt, retrieval sources, guardrails and actual retention/use of logs were not publicly established."],
-    ["act-usca11-anthropic", "us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot", "Anthropic", "model_provider", "ai_provider", "credibly_reported", "base-model capability", "clm-usca11-003", "No evidence Anthropic designed, approved, financed, or operated this campaign deployment."],
-    ["act-usca11-chan", "us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot", "Connie Chan", "represented_target", "candidate", "credibly_reported", "first-person identity and political record simulated", "clm-usca11-004|clm-usca11-005|clm-usca11-011", "The site disclosed that it was not affiliated with or endorsed by Chan."]
+    [
+      "act-ro24-networks",
+      "ro-2024-presidential-annulment",
+      "Campaign and influence-network operators",
+      "operator",
+      "campaign_network",
+      "mixed",
+      "campaign coordination and promotion",
+      "clm-ro-002|clm-ro-007|clm-ro-013",
+      "Sponsor and command relationships vary by component."
+    ],
+    [
+      "act-ro24-tiktok",
+      "ro-2024-presidential-annulment",
+      "TikTok",
+      "platform_and_ranker",
+      "platform",
+      "admitted",
+      "ranking, reach, moderation, transparency",
+      "clm-ro-003|clm-ro-005|clm-ro-012",
+      "Platform metrics and network definitions must not be merged."
+    ],
+    [
+      "act-ro25-operator",
+      "ro-2025-presidential-repeat",
+      "Unidentified cross-platform network operator",
+      "operator",
+      "unknown_network",
+      "unknown",
+      "synthetic personas, account coordination, narrative selection",
+      "clm-ro-014|clm-ro-016|clm-ro-017",
+      "Public evidence does not establish sponsor or state command."
+    ],
+    [
+      "act-md24-shor",
+      "md-2024-presidential-referendum",
+      "Ilan Shor-linked political network",
+      "sponsor_and_operator",
+      "political_network",
+      "officially_attributed",
+      "finance, recruitment, narrative and distribution",
+      "clm-md-004|clm-md-005|clm-md-009",
+      "Underlying components have different attribution strength."
+    ],
+    [
+      "act-md24-meta",
+      "md-2024-presidential-referendum",
+      "Meta",
+      "platform_and_responder",
+      "platform",
+      "admitted",
+      "distribution and network disruption",
+      "clm-md-007|clm-md-014",
+      "Meta follower counts include suspected fake and largely non-Moldovan engagement."
+    ],
+    [
+      "act-md25-infoleaders",
+      "md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network",
+      "InfoLeaders curators and paid account network",
+      "operator",
+      "influence_network",
+      "credibly_reported",
+      "message assignment, personalisation and mutual amplification",
+      "clm-md-015|clm-md-016|clm-md-017|clm-md-018",
+      "Direct Kremlin command of every component is not established."
+    ],
+    [
+      "act-nh-kramer",
+      "us-nh-2024-biden-robocall",
+      "Steve Kramer",
+      "commissioner_and_operator",
+      "political_consultant",
+      "admitted",
+      "content commission, targeting and call operation",
+      "clm-nh-001|clm-nh-002|clm-nh-003|clm-nh-012",
+      "Acquitted of state criminal charges; separate federal civil and FCC outcomes remain."
+    ],
+    [
+      "act-nh-telecom",
+      "us-nh-2024-biden-robocall",
+      "Voice Broadcasting and Lingo Telecom",
+      "delivery_infrastructure",
+      "telecom_provider",
+      "adjudicated",
+      "call initiation, attestation and delivery",
+      "clm-nh-004|clm-nh-005|clm-nh-007",
+      "Different providers controlled different parts of the chain."
+    ],
+    [
+      "act-br-prep-tse",
+      "br-2026-election-preparedness",
+      "Tribunal Superior Eleitoral",
+      "regulator_and_responder",
+      "election_authority",
+      "adjudicated",
+      "rules, monitoring and enforcement",
+      "clm-br-002|clm-br-003|clm-br-004|clm-br-005|clm-br-006|clm-br-007",
+      "Preparedness actor, not manipulator."
+    ],
+    [
+      "act-brprep-aggregate",
+      "br-2026-election-preparedness",
+      "Potential campaigns, AI providers, platforms and unidentified influence actors",
+      "prospective_actor_set",
+      "mixed_unknown",
+      "unknown",
+      "potential production, ranking, distribution and compliance",
+      "clm-br-002|clm-br-003|clm-br-004|clm-br-005",
+      "Aggregate preparedness category defined by the regulatory scope; it does not identify a specific 2026 operator or deployment."
+    ],
+    [
+      "act-br-avatar-campaign",
+      "br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar",
+      "Flávio Bolsonaro campaign or allied producer",
+      "deployer_and_beneficiary",
+      "campaign",
+      "credibly_reported",
+      "synthetic persona and campaign distribution",
+      "clm-br-010|clm-br-011|clm-br-020",
+      "Exact producer and Jair Bolsonaro authorisation remain unresolved."
+    ],
+    [
+      "act-usprep-aggregate",
+      "us-2026-midterms-preparedness",
+      "Potential campaigns, political committees, foreign influence actors, platforms, telecom and AI providers",
+      "prospective_actor_set",
+      "mixed_unknown",
+      "unknown",
+      "potential production, ranking, distribution and telecom delivery",
+      "clm-us26-003|clm-us26-004|clm-us26-005",
+      "Aggregate preparedness category; prior-cycle evidence and governance gaps do not establish a specific new 2026 operation."
+    ],
+    [
+      "act-us26-nrsc",
+      "us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads",
+      "National Republican Senatorial Committee",
+      "sponsor_and_deployer",
+      "political_committee",
+      "admitted",
+      "synthetic opponent performance and distribution",
+      "clm-us26-008|clm-us26-009|clm-us26-014|clm-us26-016",
+      "Other ads in the aggregate case have different sponsors."
+    ],
+    [
+      "act-usca11-wiener",
+      "us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot",
+      "Scott Wiener for Congress",
+      "commissioner_deployer_and_data_controller",
+      "campaign",
+      "admitted",
+      "deployment, configurable framing, interface, promotion and policy-permitted log access",
+      "clm-usca11-001|clm-usca11-002|clm-usca11-004|clm-usca11-007|clm-usca11-011",
+      "Technical constructor, exact prompt, retrieval sources, guardrails and actual retention/use of logs were not publicly established."
+    ],
+    [
+      "act-usca11-anthropic",
+      "us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot",
+      "Anthropic",
+      "model_provider",
+      "ai_provider",
+      "credibly_reported",
+      "base-model capability",
+      "clm-usca11-003",
+      "No evidence Anthropic designed, approved, financed, or operated this campaign deployment."
+    ],
+    [
+      "act-usca11-chan",
+      "us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot",
+      "Connie Chan",
+      "represented_target",
+      "candidate",
+      "credibly_reported",
+      "first-person identity and political record simulated",
+      "clm-usca11-004|clm-usca11-005|clm-usca11-011",
+      "The site disclosed that it was not affiliated with or endorsed by Chan."
+    ]
   ],
   "technology_uses": [
-    ["tech-ro24-ranking", "ro-2024-presidential-annulment", "TikTok", "recommender and integrity systems", "", "proprietary_platform", "ranking_and_amplification", "confirmed", "platform_and_official_records", "established_evidence", "clm-ro-002|clm-ro-003|clm-ro-005", "Generative AI was not established as a material driver."],
-    ["tech-ro25-avatars", "ro-2025-presidential-repeat", "unknown", "DreamFace- or D-ID-style avatars and synthetic profiles", "unknown", "mixed_unknown", "content_generation_and_persona_creation", "confirmed", "technical_investigation", "established_evidence", "clm-ro-016", "Stylistic attribution is not product-level forensic proof."],
-    ["tech-md24-genai", "md-2024-presidential-referendum", "unknown", "synthetic impersonation tools", "unknown", "unknown", "supporting_content_generation", "confirmed", "observer_and_investigation_records", "established_evidence", "clm-md-006", "AI was one layer within a predominantly non-AI hybrid operation."],
-    ["tech-md25-mixed", "md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network", "unknown", "AI videos, bots and platform recommendation systems", "unknown", "mixed_unknown", "generation_and_amplification", "confirmed", "observer_and_technical_investigation", "established_evidence", "clm-md-012|clm-md-015|clm-md-017", "Exact models and automation stack are unknown."],
-    ["tech-nh-voice", "us-nh-2024-biden-robocall", "ElevenLabs", "AI voice-cloning service", "unknown", "hosted_proprietary", "voice_generation", "confirmed", "creator_reporting", "established_evidence", "clm-nh-001|clm-nh-003", "Provider identification is supported by creator reporting; the FCC orders establish artificial voice but do not name every tool in the production chain."],
-    ["tech-brprep-aggregate", "br-2026-election-preparedness", "unknown_or_multiple", "generative AI, recommender and disclosure-compliance systems", "unknown", "mixed_unknown", "prospective_generation_ranking_and_compliance", "regulated_or_monitored_not_case_deployment", "regulatory_scope_and_preparedness_sources", "established_evidence", "clm-br-002|clm-br-003|clm-br-004|clm-br-005|clm-br-006|clm-br-007", "Aggregate preparedness row. The rules establish covered capabilities, providers and response duties, not an exact model, provider stack or specific manipulative deployment."],
-    ["tech-br-avatar", "br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar", "unknown", "synthetic image-and-voice avatar system", "unknown", "unknown", "avatar_generation", "confirmed", "content_and_reporting", "established_evidence", "clm-br-010|clm-br-011", "The public record does not identify the model or provider."],
-    ["tech-usprep-aggregate", "us-2026-midterms-preparedness", "unknown_or_multiple", "generative AI, synthetic-media, platform and telecom systems", "unknown", "mixed_unknown", "prospective_generation_distribution_and_telecom", "prior_cycle_observed_current_cycle_monitored", "official_risk_assessment_legislative_tracker_and_prior_cycle_records", "established_evidence", "clm-us26-002|clm-us26-003|clm-us26-004|clm-us26-005|clm-us26-006", "Aggregate preparedness row. The evidence establishes regulation, prior-cycle use and monitored capability categories; it does not identify an exact model, provider stack or new 2026 operation."],
-    ["tech-us26-ads", "us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads", "unknown", "campaign video-generation and face/voice synthesis tools", "unknown", "unknown", "synthetic_video_generation", "confirmed", "campaign_artifact_and_reporting", "established_evidence", "clm-us26-008|clm-us26-011|clm-us26-014", "Do not infer a frontier-model provider from output appearance."],
-    ["tech-usca11-claude", "us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot", "Anthropic", "Claude", "unknown", "closed_hosted_product", "interactive_text_generation", "confirmed", "campaign_statement_and_direct_observation", "established_evidence", "clm-usca11-003|clm-usca11-004", "Exact model, API or consumer route, system prompt, retrieval, context and safety settings were not disclosed."],
-    ["tech-usca11-stack", "us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot", "Amazon Web Services|Google", "hosting and analytics stack", "unknown", "commercial_infrastructure", "hosting_analytics_and_data_capture", "reported", "privacy_policy", "established_evidence", "clm-usca11-007", "Infrastructure listing does not establish which service saw which fields."]
+    [
+      "tech-ro24-ranking",
+      "ro-2024-presidential-annulment",
+      "TikTok",
+      "recommender and integrity systems",
+      "",
+      "proprietary_platform",
+      "ranking_and_amplification",
+      "confirmed",
+      "platform_and_official_records",
+      "established_evidence",
+      "clm-ro-002|clm-ro-003|clm-ro-005",
+      "Generative AI was not established as a material driver."
+    ],
+    [
+      "tech-ro25-avatars",
+      "ro-2025-presidential-repeat",
+      "unknown",
+      "DreamFace- or D-ID-style avatars and synthetic profiles",
+      "unknown",
+      "mixed_unknown",
+      "content_generation_and_persona_creation",
+      "confirmed",
+      "technical_investigation",
+      "established_evidence",
+      "clm-ro-016",
+      "Stylistic attribution is not product-level forensic proof."
+    ],
+    [
+      "tech-md24-genai",
+      "md-2024-presidential-referendum",
+      "unknown",
+      "synthetic impersonation tools",
+      "unknown",
+      "unknown",
+      "supporting_content_generation",
+      "confirmed",
+      "observer_and_investigation_records",
+      "established_evidence",
+      "clm-md-006",
+      "AI was one layer within a predominantly non-AI hybrid operation."
+    ],
+    [
+      "tech-md25-mixed",
+      "md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network",
+      "unknown",
+      "AI videos, bots and platform recommendation systems",
+      "unknown",
+      "mixed_unknown",
+      "generation_and_amplification",
+      "confirmed",
+      "observer_and_technical_investigation",
+      "established_evidence",
+      "clm-md-012|clm-md-015|clm-md-017",
+      "Exact models and automation stack are unknown."
+    ],
+    [
+      "tech-nh-voice",
+      "us-nh-2024-biden-robocall",
+      "ElevenLabs",
+      "AI voice-cloning service",
+      "unknown",
+      "hosted_proprietary",
+      "voice_generation",
+      "confirmed",
+      "creator_reporting",
+      "established_evidence",
+      "clm-nh-001|clm-nh-003",
+      "Provider identification is supported by creator reporting; the FCC orders establish artificial voice but do not name every tool in the production chain."
+    ],
+    [
+      "tech-brprep-aggregate",
+      "br-2026-election-preparedness",
+      "unknown_or_multiple",
+      "generative AI, recommender and disclosure-compliance systems",
+      "unknown",
+      "mixed_unknown",
+      "prospective_generation_ranking_and_compliance",
+      "regulated_or_monitored_not_case_deployment",
+      "regulatory_scope_and_preparedness_sources",
+      "established_evidence",
+      "clm-br-002|clm-br-003|clm-br-004|clm-br-005|clm-br-006|clm-br-007",
+      "Aggregate preparedness row. The rules establish covered capabilities, providers and response duties, not an exact model, provider stack or specific manipulative deployment."
+    ],
+    [
+      "tech-br-avatar",
+      "br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar",
+      "unknown",
+      "synthetic image-and-voice avatar system",
+      "unknown",
+      "unknown",
+      "avatar_generation",
+      "confirmed",
+      "content_and_reporting",
+      "established_evidence",
+      "clm-br-010|clm-br-011",
+      "The public record does not identify the model or provider."
+    ],
+    [
+      "tech-usprep-aggregate",
+      "us-2026-midterms-preparedness",
+      "unknown_or_multiple",
+      "generative AI, synthetic-media, platform and telecom systems",
+      "unknown",
+      "mixed_unknown",
+      "prospective_generation_distribution_and_telecom",
+      "prior_cycle_observed_current_cycle_monitored",
+      "official_risk_assessment_legislative_tracker_and_prior_cycle_records",
+      "established_evidence",
+      "clm-us26-002|clm-us26-003|clm-us26-004|clm-us26-005|clm-us26-006",
+      "Aggregate preparedness row. The evidence establishes regulation, prior-cycle use and monitored capability categories; it does not identify an exact model, provider stack or new 2026 operation."
+    ],
+    [
+      "tech-us26-ads",
+      "us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads",
+      "unknown",
+      "campaign video-generation and face/voice synthesis tools",
+      "unknown",
+      "unknown",
+      "synthetic_video_generation",
+      "confirmed",
+      "campaign_artifact_and_reporting",
+      "established_evidence",
+      "clm-us26-008|clm-us26-011|clm-us26-014",
+      "Do not infer a frontier-model provider from output appearance."
+    ],
+    [
+      "tech-usca11-claude",
+      "us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot",
+      "Anthropic",
+      "Claude",
+      "unknown",
+      "closed_hosted_product",
+      "interactive_text_generation",
+      "confirmed",
+      "campaign_statement_and_direct_observation",
+      "established_evidence",
+      "clm-usca11-003|clm-usca11-004",
+      "Exact model, API or consumer route, system prompt, retrieval, context and safety settings were not disclosed."
+    ],
+    [
+      "tech-usca11-stack",
+      "us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot",
+      "Amazon Web Services|Google",
+      "hosting and analytics stack",
+      "unknown",
+      "commercial_infrastructure",
+      "hosting_analytics_and_data_capture",
+      "reported",
+      "privacy_policy",
+      "established_evidence",
+      "clm-usca11-007",
+      "Infrastructure listing does not establish which service saw which fields."
+    ]
   ],
   "content_items": [
-    ["item-nh-biden-call", "us-nh-2024-biden-robocall", "AI-cloned Biden robocall", "audio", "Joe Biden", "voter_participation_instruction", "false_authentic_voice", "no", "unauthorised_or_not_affiliated", "not_disclosed_in_call", "deceptive_impersonation", "clm-nh-001|clm-nh-002|clm-nh-005", "The call combined voice clone, targeted list, spoofed caller ID and telecom delivery."],
-    ["item-br-bolsonaro-avatar", "br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar", "Jair Bolsonaro campaign-launch avatar", "audiovisual_avatar", "Jair Bolsonaro", "political_endorsement", "synthetic_surrogate", "yes", "unknown", "explicit", "transparent_synthetic_endorsement", "clm-br-010|clm-br-011|clm-br-019", "Disclosure is established; authorisation and legal status remained unresolved at the cutoff."],
-    ["item-us26-talarico", "us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads", "NRSC James Talarico synthetic performance", "video", "James Talarico", "candidate_attack", "fabricated_first_person_performance_using_real_posts", "yes_small_text", "unauthorised_or_not_affiliated", "low_salience", "mixed_quotation_and_fabrication", "clm-us26-008|clm-us26-009|clm-us26-014|clm-us26-015", "Quoted posts were genuine; reaction lines, affect and first-person performance were synthetic."],
-    ["item-usca11-chatbot", "us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot", "ConnieChan.ai interactive parody", "interactive_text_chatbot", "Connie Chan", "candidate_attack_and_issue_framing", "first_person_dynamic_opponent_simulation", "yes", "not_affiliated_or_endorsed", "explicit_site_and_footer", "transparent_satirical_simulation", "clm-usca11-001|clm-usca11-004|clm-usca11-005|clm-usca11-007", "User prompts dynamically affected outputs; private campaign configuration and logs were not available for audit."]
+    [
+      "item-nh-biden-call",
+      "us-nh-2024-biden-robocall",
+      "AI-cloned Biden robocall",
+      "audio",
+      "Joe Biden",
+      "voter_participation_instruction",
+      "false_authentic_voice",
+      "no",
+      "unauthorised_or_not_affiliated",
+      "not_disclosed_in_call",
+      "deceptive_impersonation",
+      "clm-nh-001|clm-nh-002|clm-nh-005",
+      "The call combined voice clone, targeted list, spoofed caller ID and telecom delivery."
+    ],
+    [
+      "item-br-bolsonaro-avatar",
+      "br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar",
+      "Jair Bolsonaro campaign-launch avatar",
+      "audiovisual_avatar",
+      "Jair Bolsonaro",
+      "political_endorsement",
+      "synthetic_surrogate",
+      "yes",
+      "unknown",
+      "explicit",
+      "transparent_synthetic_endorsement",
+      "clm-br-010|clm-br-011|clm-br-019",
+      "Disclosure is established; authorisation and legal status remained unresolved at the cutoff."
+    ],
+    [
+      "item-us26-talarico",
+      "us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads",
+      "NRSC James Talarico synthetic performance",
+      "video",
+      "James Talarico",
+      "candidate_attack",
+      "fabricated_first_person_performance_using_real_posts",
+      "yes_small_text",
+      "unauthorised_or_not_affiliated",
+      "low_salience",
+      "mixed_quotation_and_fabrication",
+      "clm-us26-008|clm-us26-009|clm-us26-014|clm-us26-015",
+      "Quoted posts were genuine; reaction lines, affect and first-person performance were synthetic."
+    ],
+    [
+      "item-usca11-chatbot",
+      "us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot",
+      "ConnieChan.ai interactive parody",
+      "interactive_text_chatbot",
+      "Connie Chan",
+      "candidate_attack_and_issue_framing",
+      "first_person_dynamic_opponent_simulation",
+      "yes",
+      "not_affiliated_or_endorsed",
+      "explicit_site_and_footer",
+      "transparent_satirical_simulation",
+      "clm-usca11-001|clm-usca11-004|clm-usca11-005|clm-usca11-007",
+      "User prompts dynamically affected outputs; private campaign configuration and logs were not available for audit."
+    ]
   ],
   "quantitative_observations": [
-    ["q-ro24-accounts", "ro-2024-presidential-annulment", "clm-ro-011", "accounts", 25000, "about", "TikTok", "final_two_weeks_before_2024_first_round", "network_size", "unknown", "unknown", "officially_reported", "src-ro-sri-csat-20241204", "Account count is not exposure, unique people, persuasion, or votes."],
-    ["q-ro25-accounts", "ro-2025-presidential-repeat", "clm-ro-014", "accounts", 215, "at_least", "Facebook|Instagram|TikTok", "2024-12_to_2025-06-06", "analysed_network_sample", "not_applicable", "no", "researcher_measured", "src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826", "Coordinated or apparently hijacked accounts in the studied set."],
-    ["q-ro25-posts", "ro-2025-presidential-repeat", "clm-ro-015", "posts", 8514, "exact_in_sample", "Facebook|Instagram|TikTok", "2024-12_to_2025-06-06", "content_volume", "not_applicable", "no", "researcher_measured", "src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826", "Posts are not users or exposures."],
-    ["q-ro25-views", "ro-2025-presidential-repeat", "clm-ro-015", "views", 16000000, "at_least", "Facebook|Instagram|TikTok", "2024-12_to_2025-06-06", "platform_view_events", "unknown", "no", "researcher_aggregated_platform_metrics", "src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826", "Cross-platform views are not unique people and should not be summed with likes."],
-    ["q-ro25-likes", "ro-2025-presidential-repeat", "clm-ro-015", "likes", 681000, "at_least", "Facebook|Instagram|TikTok", "2024-12_to_2025-06-06", "engagement_events", "unknown", "no", "researcher_aggregated_platform_metrics", "src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826", "Likes are not exposure or persuasion."],
-    ["q-md24-fb-followers", "md-2024-presidential-referendum", "clm-md-014", "followers", 4200, "about", "Facebook", "at_takedown_2024-10-11", "page_followers", "unknown", "no", "platform_reported", "src-md-meta-threat-reporting", "Meta said most followers were outside Moldova or indicated fake engagement."],
-    ["q-md24-ig-followers", "md-2024-presidential-referendum", "clm-md-014", "followers", 335000, "about", "Instagram", "at_takedown_2024-10-11", "account_followers", "unknown", "no", "platform_reported", "src-md-meta-threat-reporting", "Meta said most followers were outside Moldova or indicated fake engagement."],
-    ["q-md24-enforcement-accounts-transactions", "md-2024-presidential-referendum", "clm-md-008", "accounts_and_transactions", 138000, "more_than", "mixed_enforcement_records", "linked_investigations_cited_in_2026_report", "combined_accounts_and_transactions_across_linked_investigations", "unknown", "no", "observer_reported_enforcement_aggregate", "src-md-odihr-parliament-202602", "This heterogeneous enforcement indicator combines accounts and transactions, may include repeated entities, and is not a count of recipients, exposed people, persuaded voters or unique accounts."],
-    ["q-md25-accounts", "md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network", "clm-md-015", "accounts", 253, "exact_in_sample", "Facebook|Instagram|TikTok", "study_window", "analysed_network_sample", "not_applicable", "no", "researcher_measured", "src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924", "Sample, not the full operation."],
-    ["q-md25-posts", "md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network", "clm-md-016", "posts", 28708, "exact_in_sample", "Facebook|Instagram|TikTok", "study_window", "content_volume", "not_applicable", "no", "researcher_measured", "src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924", "Content count, not audience."],
-    ["q-md25-views", "md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network", "clm-md-016", "views", 55367950, "exact_in_sample", "Facebook|Instagram|TikTok", "study_window", "platform_view_events", "unknown", "no", "researcher_aggregated_platform_metrics", "src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924", "Cross-platform view events are non-unique and non-causal."],
-    ["q-md25-likes", "md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network", "clm-md-016", "likes", 2207894, "exact_in_sample", "Facebook|Instagram|TikTok", "study_window", "engagement_events", "unknown", "no", "researcher_aggregated_platform_metrics", "src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924", "Engagement is not belief or vote change."],
-    ["q-md25-shares", "md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network", "clm-md-016", "shares", 295608, "exact_in_sample", "Facebook|Instagram|TikTok", "study_window", "engagement_events", "unknown", "no", "researcher_aggregated_platform_metrics", "src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924", "Engagement is not belief or vote change."],
-    ["q-md25-comments", "md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network", "clm-md-016", "comments", 239016, "exact_in_sample", "Facebook|Instagram|TikTok", "study_window", "engagement_events", "unknown", "no", "researcher_aggregated_platform_metrics", "src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924", "Engagement is not belief or vote change."],
-    ["q-nh-attempts", "us-nh-2024-biden-robocall", "clm-nh-004", "call_attempts", 9581, "exact", "telecom", "campaign_window", "delivery_attempts", "unknown", "no", "provider_records_in_enforcement", "src-us-fcc-kramer-final-pdf-20240926", "Attempts are not completed calls, listeners, unique recipients or voters."],
-    ["q-nh-completed", "us-nh-2024-biden-robocall", "clm-nh-004", "completed_calls", 3978, "exact", "telecom", "campaign_window", "completed_call_records", "unknown", "no", "provider_records_in_enforcement", "src-us-fcc-kramer-final-pdf-20240926", "Completed calls are not necessarily unique listeners or persuaded voters."],
-    ["q-nh-kramer-forfeiture-usd", "us-nh-2024-biden-robocall", "clm-nh-007", "fine_forfeiture_usd", 6000000, "exact", "Federal Communications Commission", "forfeiture_order_2024-09-26", "separate_FCC_forfeiture_against_Steve_Kramer", "not_applicable", "no", "official_enforcement_order", "src-us-fcc-kramer-final-pdf-20240926", "This is the FCC forfeiture against Kramer, not the separate Lingo penalty and not a measure of electoral harm."],
-    ["q-nh-lingo-civil-penalty-usd", "us-nh-2024-biden-robocall", "clm-nh-007", "fine_civil_penalty_usd", 1000000, "exact", "Federal Communications Commission", "consent_decree_2024-08-21", "separate_Lingo_Telecom_civil_penalty", "not_applicable", "no", "official_consent_decree", "src-us-fcc-lingo-consent-202408", "This is the separate Lingo Telecom civil penalty and compliance plan, not the Kramer forfeiture and not a measure of electoral harm."],
-    ["q-us26-states-deepfake-laws", "us-2026-midterms-preparedness", "clm-us26-002", "states_with_enacted_political_deepfake_laws", 31, "exact", "state_legislation", "snapshot_2026-06-23", "United_States_states", "not_applicable", "no", "legislative_tracker_count", "src-us-ncsl-20260623", "Snapshot count only. Enactment, effective date, scope, prohibitions, disclosure requirements and litigation status differ by state."],
-    ["q-us26-reported-synthetic-ads", "us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads", "clm-us26-010", "synthetic_ads_identified_in_reporting", 3, "at_least", "multiple_campaign_channels", "reporting_through_2026-03-28", "named_ads_in_reviewed_reporting", "not_applicable", "no", "independent_reporting_content_count", "src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328", "A lower-bound content count from reviewed reporting, not a census of campaign ads, impressions, targeting, unique exposure or electoral effects."],
-    ["q-us26-talarico-youtube", "us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads", "clm-us26-015", "views", 3700, "approximately", "YouTube", "snapshot_2026-08-11", "platform_view_events", "unknown", "no", "platform_snapshot", "src-us-nrsc-talarico-youtube", "Dynamic, non-unique view counter; excludes other platforms and paid impressions."],
-    ["q-usca11-questions", "us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot", "clm-usca11-006", "submitted_questions", 5058, "exact_campaign_report", "ConnieChan.ai", "first_27_hours", "interaction_events", "unknown", "no", "campaign_reported", "src-us-ca11-mission-20260807", "Not users, conversations, district voters, impressions, accepted answers, or outcomes; repeated and adversarial prompts possible."],
-    ["q-usca11-billboards", "us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot", "clm-usca11-001", "billboards", 2, "exact_campaign_report", "physical", "August_2026", "promotional_placements", "not_applicable", "no", "campaign_reported", "src-us-ca11-sfgate-20260804", "No impression estimate is available."],
-    ["q-usca11-retention-policy-days", "us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot", "clm-usca11-007", "maximum_conversation_retention_days", 90, "policy_maximum", "ConnieChan.ai", "privacy_policy_observed_2026-08-04", "conversation_log_retention_policy", "not_applicable", "no", "reporter_direct_observation_of_privacy_policy", "src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804", "The policy allowed retention for up to 90 days; this does not establish that every conversation was retained for 90 days or that staff reviewed any particular log." ]
-  ],
-  "agency_transfer_assessments": [
-    ["ata-ro24", "ro-2024-presidential-annulment", "voter_attention_and_electoral_choice", "Romanian voters and election institutions", "campaign and influence-network operators plus platform ranking systems", "opaque promotion and recommender amplification", "network and ranking opacity", "low", "low", "persistent_campaign_period", "campaign operators and platform ranking systems", "unequal agenda-setting and impaired informed choice; institutional trust shock", "annulment and repeat election; individual behavioural effect unknown", "partial_chain_observed", "strong_inference", "clm-ro-002|clm-ro-003|clm-ro-006|clm-ro-007|clm-ro-013", "Generative AI was not established as material; sponsorship and causal vote effect remain unresolved."],
-    ["ata-ro25", "ro-2025-presidential-repeat", "authorship_attention_and_local_identity", "Romanian voters and authentic local speakers", "unidentified network operator", "synthetic personas, hijacked accounts and cross-platform amplification", "operator and provenance opacity", "low", "medium", "months", "unidentified network operator and platforms", "manufactured local consensus and controlled agenda cues", "network occurrence and reach observed; belief and election effects unknown", "mechanism_observed_effect_unknown", "strong_inference", "clm-ro-014|clm-ro-015|clm-ro-016|clm-ro-017|clm-ro-018", "Do not infer Russian-state command from pro-Russia narratives alone."],
-    ["ata-md24", "md-2024-presidential-referendum", "preference_participation_and_trust", "Moldovan voters", "Shor-linked and Russia-linked influence and finance networks", "payments, coordination, bots, spoofed media and synthetic content", "sponsor and finance opacity", "low", "medium", "multi_election", "foreign-linked political-finance and influence networks", "covert inducement and manufactured social proof can displace independent deliberation", "attempted and accepted inducement documented; how recipients voted and election effect unknown", "partial_chain_observed", "strong_inference", "clm-md-003|clm-md-004|clm-md-005|clm-md-009|clm-md-010|clm-md-011", "Administrative advantage and media imbalance are independent competing explanations and harms."],
-    ["ata-md25", "md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network", "authorship_agenda_and_peer_signal", "Moldovan social-media users", "InfoLeaders curators and linked political networks", "central scripts locally personalised by paid participants and mutual amplification", "coordination and payment opacity", "low", "medium", "months", "network curators and financiers", "paid coordination masquerades as peer speech and controls apparent local salience", "content and engagement observed; persuasion, turnout, votes and seats unknown", "mechanism_observed_effect_unknown", "strong_inference", "clm-md-015|clm-md-016|clm-md-017|clm-md-018|clm-md-019", "Engagement totals are non-unique and not causal outcomes."],
-    ["ata-nh", "us-nh-2024-biden-robocall", "authorship_relevance_and_participation_instruction", "New Hampshire Democratic primary voters", "Steve Kramer and the telecom delivery chain", "cloned trusted voice, selected call list and spoofed caller ID", "high apparent-authorship deception", "medium", "high_after_enforcement", "short_campaign_burst", "political operator and telecom chain", "operator controlled who appeared to speak and the apparent relevance of a demobilising instruction", "attempt and delivery counts observed; listener belief, action and turnout effect unknown", "mechanism_observed_effect_unknown", "strong_inference", "clm-nh-001|clm-nh-002|clm-nh-004|clm-nh-005|clm-nh-009|clm-nh-010|clm-nh-012", "Criminal acquittal does not erase FCC and civil findings; legal outcomes must remain separate."],
-    ["ata-brprep", "br-2026-election-preparedness", "future_information_and_platform_governance", "Brazilian voters and election authorities", "not_applicable_observed_controller", "prospective synthetic media and provider outputs", "prospective", "unknown", "unknown", "future_election", "potential campaigns, providers and platforms constrained by TSE", "monitoring hypothesis only", "rules and preparations observed; no case-level agency transfer asserted", "not_an_incident", "speculative_scenario", "clm-br-002|clm-br-003|clm-br-004|clm-br-006|clm-br-007|clm-br-009", "Preparedness file is excluded from incident counts."],
-    ["ata-bravatar", "br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar", "political_presence_and_endorsement", "Jair Bolsonaro as represented person and Brazilian voters", "campaign deployer", "disclosed synthetic surrogate", "disclosed synthesis but authorisation unresolved", "medium", "medium", "single_event_with_reuse_risk", "campaign producer", "campaign can deploy a recognisable political persona without physical or verified participation", "avatar and disclosure observed; authorisation, belief and election effects unknown", "mechanism_observed_effect_unknown", "strong_inference", "clm-br-010|clm-br-011|clm-br-014|clm-br-017|clm-br-019|clm-br-020", "Transparent disclosure mitigates deception; legal status and authorisation remained unresolved."],
-    ["ata-usprep", "us-2026-midterms-preparedness", "future_information_and_election_trust", "United States voters and election officials", "not_applicable_observed_controller", "prospective campaign, foreign, platform, telecom and AI-provider mechanisms", "prospective and fragmented governance", "unknown", "unknown", "future_election", "potential campaigns and infrastructure providers", "monitoring hypothesis only", "governance fragmentation and prior-cycle risks observed; no new operation inferred", "not_an_incident", "speculative_scenario", "clm-us26-001|clm-us26-002|clm-us26-003|clm-us26-004|clm-us26-005|clm-us26-007", "Preparedness file is excluded from incident counts."],
-    ["ata-usads", "us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads", "candidate_voice_face_and_affect", "represented candidates and voters", "campaigns and political committees", "synthetic first-person candidate performances", "disclosure varies and can be low-salience", "medium", "medium", "campaign_cycle", "campaign sponsors and distributors", "sponsor controls simulated speech, timing, image and affect rather than only message selection", "multiple attributed assets observed; comparable reach, belief and election effects unknown", "mechanism_observed_effect_unknown", "strong_inference", "clm-us26-008|clm-us26-009|clm-us26-010|clm-us26-011|clm-us26-012|clm-us26-013|clm-us26-014|clm-us26-016", "Some assets use real quotations, labels or obvious satire; content-item coding is required."],
-    ["ata-usca11", "us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot", "representation_agenda_query_privacy_and_candidate_evaluation", "Connie Chan as represented person and users asking questions", "Scott Wiener for Congress and its provider stack", "campaign-controlled first-person dynamic opponent simulation with policy-permitted query-log review; exact prompt, retrieval and guardrails unknown", "AI and parody disclosed; system prompt, retrieval sources, actual log use and guardrails opaque", "high", "high_after_removal", "four_day_deployment_plus_90_day_retention_policy", "campaign deployer; secondarily model and infrastructure providers", "sponsor controls how the opponent appears to answer and may learn what users ask under the stated policy", "deployment, model family, question count, privacy policy and removal observed; actual retention, user and electoral effects unknown", "mechanism_observed_effect_unknown", "strong_inference", "clm-usca11-002|clm-usca11-003|clm-usca11-004|clm-usca11-005|clm-usca11-006|clm-usca11-007|clm-usca11-009|clm-usca11-010|clm-usca11-011", "Strongest current bridge to the thesis because the system is adaptive and interactive; explicit parody is essential counterevidence."]
+    [
+      "q-ro24-accounts",
+      "ro-2024-presidential-annulment",
+      "clm-ro-011",
+      "accounts",
+      25000,
+      "about",
+      "TikTok",
+      "final_two_weeks_before_2024_first_round",
+      "network_size",
+      "unknown",
+      "unknown",
+      "officially_reported",
+      "src-ro-sri-csat-20241204",
+      "Account count is not exposure, unique people, persuasion, or votes."
+    ],
+    [
+      "q-ro25-accounts",
+      "ro-2025-presidential-repeat",
+      "clm-ro-014",
+      "accounts",
+      215,
+      "at_least",
+      "Facebook|Instagram|TikTok",
+      "2024-12_to_2025-06-06",
+      "analysed_network_sample",
+      "not_applicable",
+      "no",
+      "researcher_measured",
+      "src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826",
+      "Coordinated or apparently hijacked accounts in the studied set."
+    ],
+    [
+      "q-ro25-posts",
+      "ro-2025-presidential-repeat",
+      "clm-ro-015",
+      "posts",
+      8514,
+      "exact_in_sample",
+      "Facebook|Instagram|TikTok",
+      "2024-12_to_2025-06-06",
+      "content_volume",
+      "not_applicable",
+      "no",
+      "researcher_measured",
+      "src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826",
+      "Posts are not users or exposures."
+    ],
+    [
+      "q-ro25-views",
+      "ro-2025-presidential-repeat",
+      "clm-ro-015",
+      "views",
+      16000000,
+      "at_least",
+      "Facebook|Instagram|TikTok",
+      "2024-12_to_2025-06-06",
+      "platform_view_events",
+      "unknown",
+      "no",
+      "researcher_aggregated_platform_metrics",
+      "src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826",
+      "Cross-platform views are not unique people and should not be summed with likes."
+    ],
+    [
+      "q-ro25-likes",
+      "ro-2025-presidential-repeat",
+      "clm-ro-015",
+      "likes",
+      681000,
+      "at_least",
+      "Facebook|Instagram|TikTok",
+      "2024-12_to_2025-06-06",
+      "engagement_events",
+      "unknown",
+      "no",
+      "researcher_aggregated_platform_metrics",
+      "src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826",
+      "Likes are not exposure or persuasion."
+    ],
+    [
+      "q-md24-fb-followers",
+      "md-2024-presidential-referendum",
+      "clm-md-014",
+      "followers",
+      4200,
+      "about",
+      "Facebook",
+      "at_takedown_2024-10-11",
+      "page_followers",
+      "unknown",
+      "no",
+      "platform_reported",
+      "src-md-meta-threat-reporting",
+      "Meta said most followers were outside Moldova or indicated fake engagement."
+    ],
+    [
+      "q-md24-ig-followers",
+      "md-2024-presidential-referendum",
+      "clm-md-014",
+      "followers",
+      335000,
+      "about",
+      "Instagram",
+      "at_takedown_2024-10-11",
+      "account_followers",
+      "unknown",
+      "no",
+      "platform_reported",
+      "src-md-meta-threat-reporting",
+      "Meta said most followers were outside Moldova or indicated fake engagement."
+    ],
+    [
+      "q-md25-accounts",
+      "md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network",
+      "clm-md-015",
+      "accounts",
+      253,
+      "exact_in_sample",
+      "Facebook|Instagram|TikTok",
+      "study_window",
+      "analysed_network_sample",
+      "not_applicable",
+      "no",
+      "researcher_measured",
+      "src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924",
+      "Sample, not the full operation."
+    ],
+    [
+      "q-md25-posts",
+      "md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network",
+      "clm-md-016",
+      "posts",
+      28708,
+      "exact_in_sample",
+      "Facebook|Instagram|TikTok",
+      "study_window",
+      "content_volume",
+      "not_applicable",
+      "no",
+      "researcher_measured",
+      "src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924",
+      "Content count, not audience."
+    ],
+    [
+      "q-md25-views",
+      "md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network",
+      "clm-md-016",
+      "views",
+      55367950,
+      "exact_in_sample",
+      "Facebook|Instagram|TikTok",
+      "study_window",
+      "platform_view_events",
+      "unknown",
+      "no",
+      "researcher_aggregated_platform_metrics",
+      "src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924",
+      "Cross-platform view events are non-unique and non-causal."
+    ],
+    [
+      "q-md25-likes",
+      "md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network",
+      "clm-md-016",
+      "likes",
+      2207894,
+      "exact_in_sample",
+      "Facebook|Instagram|TikTok",
+      "study_window",
+      "engagement_events",
+      "unknown",
+      "no",
+      "researcher_aggregated_platform_metrics",
+      "src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924",
+      "Engagement is not belief or vote change."
+    ],
+    [
+      "q-md25-shares",
+      "md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network",
+      "clm-md-016",
+      "shares",
+      295608,
+      "exact_in_sample",
+      "Facebook|Instagram|TikTok",
+      "study_window",
+      "engagement_events",
+      "unknown",
+      "no",
+      "researcher_aggregated_platform_metrics",
+      "src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924",
+      "Engagement is not belief or vote change."
+    ],
+    [
+      "q-md25-comments",
+      "md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network",
+      "clm-md-016",
+      "comments",
+      239016,
+      "exact_in_sample",
+      "Facebook|Instagram|TikTok",
+      "study_window",
+      "engagement_events",
+      "unknown",
+      "no",
+      "researcher_aggregated_platform_metrics",
+      "src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924",
+      "Engagement is not belief or vote change."
+    ],
+    [
+      "q-nh-attempts",
+      "us-nh-2024-biden-robocall",
+      "clm-nh-004",
+      "call_attempts",
+      9581,
+      "exact",
+      "telecom",
+      "campaign_window",
+      "delivery_attempts",
+      "unknown",
+      "no",
+      "provider_records_in_enforcement",
+      "src-us-fcc-kramer-final-pdf-20240926",
+      "Attempts are not completed calls, listeners, unique recipients or voters."
+    ],
+    [
+      "q-nh-completed",
+      "us-nh-2024-biden-robocall",
+      "clm-nh-004",
+      "completed_calls",
+      3978,
+      "exact",
+      "telecom",
+      "campaign_window",
+      "completed_call_records",
+      "unknown",
+      "no",
+      "provider_records_in_enforcement",
+      "src-us-fcc-kramer-final-pdf-20240926",
+      "Completed calls are not necessarily unique listeners or persuaded voters."
+    ],
+    [
+      "q-nh-kramer-forfeiture-usd",
+      "us-nh-2024-biden-robocall",
+      "clm-nh-007",
+      "fine_forfeiture_usd",
+      6000000,
+      "exact",
+      "Federal Communications Commission",
+      "forfeiture_order_2024-09-26",
+      "separate_FCC_forfeiture_against_Steve_Kramer",
+      "not_applicable",
+      "no",
+      "official_enforcement_order",
+      "src-us-fcc-kramer-final-pdf-20240926",
+      "This is the FCC forfeiture against Kramer, not the separate Lingo penalty and not a measure of electoral harm."
+    ],
+    [
+      "q-nh-lingo-civil-penalty-usd",
+      "us-nh-2024-biden-robocall",
+      "clm-nh-007",
+      "fine_civil_penalty_usd",
+      1000000,
+      "exact",
+      "Federal Communications Commission",
+      "consent_decree_2024-08-21",
+      "separate_Lingo_Telecom_civil_penalty",
+      "not_applicable",
+      "no",
+      "official_consent_decree",
+      "src-us-fcc-lingo-consent-202408",
+      "This is the separate Lingo Telecom civil penalty and compliance plan, not the Kramer forfeiture and not a measure of electoral harm."
+    ],
+    [
+      "q-us26-states-deepfake-laws",
+      "us-2026-midterms-preparedness",
+      "clm-us26-002",
+      "states_with_enacted_political_deepfake_laws",
+      31,
+      "exact",
+      "state_legislation",
+      "snapshot_2026-06-23",
+      "United_States_states",
+      "not_applicable",
+      "no",
+      "legislative_tracker_count",
+      "src-us-ncsl-20260623",
+      "Snapshot count only. Enactment, effective date, scope, prohibitions, disclosure requirements and litigation status differ by state."
+    ],
+    [
+      "q-us26-reported-synthetic-ads",
+      "us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads",
+      "clm-us26-010",
+      "synthetic_ads_identified_in_reporting",
+      3,
+      "at_least",
+      "multiple_campaign_channels",
+      "reporting_through_2026-03-28",
+      "named_ads_in_reviewed_reporting",
+      "not_applicable",
+      "no",
+      "independent_reporting_content_count",
+      "src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328",
+      "A lower-bound content count from reviewed reporting, not a census of campaign ads, impressions, targeting, unique exposure or electoral effects."
+    ],
+    [
+      "q-usca11-questions",
+      "us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot",
+      "clm-usca11-006",
+      "submitted_questions",
+      5058,
+      "exact_campaign_report",
+      "ConnieChan.ai",
+      "first_27_hours",
+      "interaction_events",
+      "unknown",
+      "no",
+      "campaign_reported",
+      "src-us-ca11-mission-20260807",
+      "Not users, conversations, district voters, impressions, accepted answers, or outcomes; repeated and adversarial prompts possible."
+    ],
+    [
+      "q-usca11-billboards",
+      "us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot",
+      "clm-usca11-001",
+      "billboards",
+      2,
+      "exact_campaign_report",
+      "physical",
+      "August_2026",
+      "promotional_placements",
+      "not_applicable",
+      "no",
+      "campaign_reported",
+      "src-us-ca11-sfgate-20260804",
+      "No impression estimate is available."
+    ],
+    [
+      "q-usca11-retention-policy-days",
+      "us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot",
+      "clm-usca11-007",
+      "maximum_conversation_retention_days",
+      90,
+      "policy_maximum",
+      "ConnieChan.ai",
+      "privacy_policy_observed_2026-08-04",
+      "conversation_log_retention_policy",
+      "not_applicable",
+      "no",
+      "reporter_direct_observation_of_privacy_policy",
+      "src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804",
+      "The policy allowed retention for up to 90 days; this does not establish that every conversation was retained for 90 days or that staff reviewed any particular log."
+    ]
   ],
   "model_evaluations": [
-    ["eval-us-aidp-english-2024", "AI Democracy Projects English election-query pilot", "United States", "January 2024", "2024 U.S. election information", "GPT-4-0613|Claude-2 (2023-06-01)|Llama-2-70b-chat-hf|Mixtral-8x7B-Instruct-v0.1|Gemini Pro Preview (2023-12-13)", "versions_reported", "provider APIs and hosted APIs", "en", "model_response", 130, "expert-coded voter-like queries", "accuracy|completeness|bias|harm", "Half of responses were rated inaccurate; GPT-4 performed better on accuracy but had comparable incompleteness.", "Point-in-time domain safety test; not representative of users, all questions, consumer interfaces, future performance, or election effects.", "src-us-proof-aidp-20240227", "public_query_response_ratings", "More than 40 election officials and experts participated; exact row count follows the released study data, while the article emphasises rates."],
-    ["eval-us-aidp-spanish-2024", "AI Democracy Projects bilingual Arizona election-query evaluation", "United States", "2024", "Arizona voter information", "Claude 3 Opus|Gemini 1.5 Pro|GPT-4|Llama 3|Mixtral 8x7B v0.1", "versions_reported_to_family_or_release", "APIs", "en|es", "model_response", 250, "25 questions × 2 languages × 5 models", "accuracy|completeness|language_disparity", "52% of Spanish responses and 43% of English responses contained inaccurate information in the reported comparison; 250 responses were dual fact-checked.", "API responses may differ from consumer chatbots; one state and selected questions; no user or electoral-effect measurement.", "src-us-proof-spanish-20241030", "public_prompts_and_ratings", "The article also reports a 48% combined response inaccuracy in prose and a rounded 45% in its summary box; retain source wording and inspect released data for analysis."],
-    ["eval-hu-voting-advice-2026", "Hungary 2026 general-purpose AI voting-advice evaluation", "Hungary", "23-24 March 2026", "2026 Hungarian parliamentary election", "ChatGPT Free|Gemini Free", "exact_underlying_versions_unknown", "consumer web interfaces", "hu", "model_output", 200, "5 party profiles × 10 repetitions × 2 systems × 2 prompt conditions", "correct_party_match|consistency|non_running_party_mentions|guidance_despite_disclaimer", "Both systems produced unstable and inaccurate political matching; ChatGPT mentioned Tisza in only 8% of voting-advice responses and both systems frequently mentioned parties not running.", "Structured audit during a live campaign; not a sample of real users and not evidence that outputs affected the decisive result.", "src-hu-liberties-voting-advice-20260721", "archived_outputs_described", "Important closed-model intermediary case with repeated identical prompts and explicit negative electoral-effect finding."],
-    ["eval-us-brennan-2026", "Brennan Center election-disinformation capability and safeguard evaluation", "United States", "February-August 2026", "2026 U.S. midterm election-disinformation scenarios", "ChatGPT|Gemini|Grok|Claude|Perplexity|DeepSeek|Meta AI|Runway Gen-4|Flux.2", "multiple_versions_some_unknown", "consumer products", "en|es", "prompt_or_media_test", 14, "multistage chatbot, generation, safeguard-consistency and 14-image detection tests", "conspiracy_rebuttal|generation_acceptance|version_consistency|synthetic_media_detection", "Chatbots generally rebutted established conspiracies, yet all tested generation tools produced deceptive election scenes; ChatGPT, Grok, Claude and Perplexity correctly identified four or fewer of 14 synthetic images, and version-level accept/refuse behaviour was inconsistent.", "Capability and safeguard evidence under researcher tests; not deployment prevalence, audience exposure, or electoral effect. Harmful prompts are intentionally withheld.", "src-us-brennan-eval-20260811", "methodology_available_prompts_restricted_for_safety", "The sample_size field records the explicit image-detection set, not every prompt across the multistage study; consult the methodology for each denominator."],
-    ["eval-global-voter-dialogue-rct-2025", "Persuading voters using human-artificial intelligence dialogues", "United States|Canada|Poland", "2024-2025 election periods", "2024 U.S., 2025 Canadian and 2025 Polish national elections", "purpose-built partisan conversational agents", "study_configuration_reported", "experimental chat interface", "en|fr|pl", "participant", 6105, "preregistered randomized experiments during real elections; 2,457 U.S., 1,530 Canadian and 2,118 Polish participants", "attitude_and_vote_intention_change|categorical_vote_choice|factuality", "Disclosed AI dialogues changed reported preferences and intentions in assigned directions, with larger shifts in the Canadian and Polish studies; some factual errors were observed.", "Causal for the experimental conversations and measured self-reports; not observed campaign deployment, actual ballots, aggregate election outcomes, durable effects, or covert manipulation.", "src-global-nature-voter-dialogue-20251204", "paper_and_osf_materials_available", "This is the strongest causal capability bridge in the package and must remain separate from incident prevalence and real-world electoral-effect claims."],
-    ["eval-uk-chatbot-voting-advice-rct-2025", "Chatbot Voting Advice Applications inform but seldom sway young unaligned voters", "United Kingdom", "2025", "experimental voting-advice context", "retrieval-augmented voting-advice chatbots", "study_configuration_reported", "experimental chat interface", "en", "experiment", 3, "three randomized experiments grounded in official political documents; participant N must be taken from the paper's study-specific flow", "political_knowledge|candidate_evaluation|vote_preference", "The chatbots improved political knowledge more consistently than downstream candidate evaluations or vote preferences.", "Causal within the experimental samples and interfaces; not a population prevalence estimate or proof that conversational political AI never persuades.", "src-global-pnas-chatbot-voting-advice-20251208", "paper_materials_reported", "sample_size=3 denotes experiments, not participants. Paired with the Nature study to prevent overgeneralizing a single persuasive-chatbot result."],
-    ["eval-eu-mistral-voting-assistant-2024", "Mistral and Mixtral as European Parliament voting assistants", "European Union", "2024", "2024 European Parliament election", "Mistral Instruct-v0.2|Mixtral Instruct-v0.1", "open_weight_exact_chat_versions_reported", "research evaluation with and without curated retrieval", "en", "party_question_pair", 810, "30 questions × 27 parties, evaluated in four contextual settings", "answer_accuracy|group_disparity|retrieval_gain", "Mixtral averaged about 82% accuracy, with substantial group-level variation (roughly 50-95%); expert-curated context improved performance by about nine percentage points.", "Point-in-time model audit; not public deployment, user behavior or election effect.", "src-eu-emnlp-voting-assistant-202411", "paper_and_code_links_available", "sample_size is the 810 party-question pairs before repeated contextual settings. Provides an open-weight comparator; no manipulatory election deployment is inferred from benchmark performance."]
+    [
+      "eval-us-aidp-english-2024",
+      "AI Democracy Projects English election-query pilot",
+      "United States",
+      "January 2024",
+      "2024 U.S. election information",
+      "GPT-4-0613|Claude-2 (2023-06-01)|Llama-2-70b-chat-hf|Mixtral-8x7B-Instruct-v0.1|Gemini Pro Preview (2023-12-13)",
+      "versions_reported",
+      "provider APIs and hosted APIs",
+      "en",
+      "model_response",
+      130,
+      "expert-coded voter-like queries",
+      "accuracy|completeness|bias|harm",
+      "Half of responses were rated inaccurate; GPT-4 performed better on accuracy but had comparable incompleteness.",
+      "Point-in-time domain safety test; not representative of users, all questions, consumer interfaces, future performance, or election effects.",
+      "src-us-proof-aidp-20240227",
+      "public_query_response_ratings",
+      "More than 40 election officials and experts participated; exact row count follows the released study data, while the article emphasises rates."
+    ],
+    [
+      "eval-us-aidp-spanish-2024",
+      "AI Democracy Projects bilingual Arizona election-query evaluation",
+      "United States",
+      "2024",
+      "Arizona voter information",
+      "Claude 3 Opus|Gemini 1.5 Pro|GPT-4|Llama 3|Mixtral 8x7B v0.1",
+      "versions_reported_to_family_or_release",
+      "APIs",
+      "en|es",
+      "model_response",
+      250,
+      "25 questions × 2 languages × 5 models",
+      "accuracy|completeness|language_disparity",
+      "52% of Spanish responses and 43% of English responses contained inaccurate information in the reported comparison; 250 responses were dual fact-checked.",
+      "API responses may differ from consumer chatbots; one state and selected questions; no user or electoral-effect measurement.",
+      "src-us-proof-spanish-20241030",
+      "public_prompts_and_ratings",
+      "The article also reports a 48% combined response inaccuracy in prose and a rounded 45% in its summary box; retain source wording and inspect released data for analysis."
+    ],
+    [
+      "eval-hu-voting-advice-2026",
+      "Hungary 2026 general-purpose AI voting-advice evaluation",
+      "Hungary",
+      "23-24 March 2026",
+      "2026 Hungarian parliamentary election",
+      "ChatGPT Free|Gemini Free",
+      "exact_underlying_versions_unknown",
+      "consumer web interfaces",
+      "hu",
+      "model_output",
+      200,
+      "5 party profiles × 10 repetitions × 2 systems × 2 prompt conditions",
+      "correct_party_match|consistency|non_running_party_mentions|guidance_despite_disclaimer",
+      "Both systems produced unstable and inaccurate political matching; ChatGPT mentioned Tisza in only 8% of voting-advice responses and both systems frequently mentioned parties not running.",
+      "Structured audit during a live campaign; not a sample of real users and not evidence that outputs affected the decisive result.",
+      "src-hu-liberties-voting-advice-20260721",
+      "archived_outputs_described",
+      "Important closed-model intermediary case with repeated identical prompts and explicit negative electoral-effect finding."
+    ],
+    [
+      "eval-us-brennan-2026",
+      "Brennan Center election-disinformation capability and safeguard evaluation",
+      "United States",
+      "February-August 2026",
+      "2026 U.S. midterm election-disinformation scenarios",
+      "ChatGPT|Gemini|Grok|Claude|Perplexity|DeepSeek|Meta AI|Runway Gen-4|Flux.2",
+      "multiple_versions_some_unknown",
+      "consumer products",
+      "en|es",
+      "prompt_or_media_test",
+      14,
+      "multistage chatbot, generation, safeguard-consistency and 14-image detection tests",
+      "conspiracy_rebuttal|generation_acceptance|version_consistency|synthetic_media_detection",
+      "Chatbots generally rebutted established conspiracies, yet all tested generation tools produced deceptive election scenes; ChatGPT, Grok, Claude and Perplexity correctly identified four or fewer of 14 synthetic images, and version-level accept/refuse behaviour was inconsistent.",
+      "Capability and safeguard evidence under researcher tests; not deployment prevalence, audience exposure, or electoral effect. Harmful prompts are intentionally withheld.",
+      "src-us-brennan-eval-20260811",
+      "methodology_available_prompts_restricted_for_safety",
+      "The sample_size field records the explicit image-detection set, not every prompt across the multistage study; consult the methodology for each denominator."
+    ],
+    [
+      "eval-global-voter-dialogue-rct-2025",
+      "Persuading voters using human-artificial intelligence dialogues",
+      "United States|Canada|Poland",
+      "2024-2025 election periods",
+      "2024 U.S., 2025 Canadian and 2025 Polish national elections",
+      "purpose-built partisan conversational agents",
+      "study_configuration_reported",
+      "experimental chat interface",
+      "en|fr|pl",
+      "participant",
+      6105,
+      "preregistered randomized experiments during real elections; 2,457 U.S., 1,530 Canadian and 2,118 Polish participants",
+      "attitude_and_vote_intention_change|categorical_vote_choice|factuality",
+      "Disclosed AI dialogues changed reported preferences and intentions in assigned directions, with larger shifts in the Canadian and Polish studies; some factual errors were observed.",
+      "Causal for the experimental conversations and measured self-reports; not observed campaign deployment, actual ballots, aggregate election outcomes, durable effects, or covert manipulation.",
+      "src-global-nature-voter-dialogue-20251204",
+      "paper_and_osf_materials_available",
+      "This is the strongest causal capability bridge in the package and must remain separate from incident prevalence and real-world electoral-effect claims."
+    ],
+    [
+      "eval-uk-chatbot-voting-advice-rct-2025",
+      "Chatbot Voting Advice Applications inform but seldom sway young unaligned voters",
+      "United Kingdom",
+      "2025",
+      "experimental voting-advice context",
+      "retrieval-augmented voting-advice chatbots",
+      "study_configuration_reported",
+      "experimental chat interface",
+      "en",
+      "experiment",
+      3,
+      "three randomized experiments grounded in official political documents; participant N must be taken from the paper's study-specific flow",
+      "political_knowledge|candidate_evaluation|vote_preference",
+      "The chatbots improved political knowledge more consistently than downstream candidate evaluations or vote preferences.",
+      "Causal within the experimental samples and interfaces; not a population prevalence estimate or proof that conversational political AI never persuades.",
+      "src-global-pnas-chatbot-voting-advice-20251208",
+      "paper_materials_reported",
+      "sample_size=3 denotes experiments, not participants. Paired with the Nature study to prevent overgeneralizing a single persuasive-chatbot result."
+    ],
+    [
+      "eval-eu-mistral-voting-assistant-2024",
+      "Mistral and Mixtral as European Parliament voting assistants",
+      "European Union",
+      "2024",
+      "2024 European Parliament election",
+      "Mistral Instruct-v0.2|Mixtral Instruct-v0.1",
+      "open_weight_exact_chat_versions_reported",
+      "research evaluation with and without curated retrieval",
+      "en",
+      "party_question_pair",
+      810,
+      "30 questions × 27 parties, evaluated in four contextual settings",
+      "answer_accuracy|group_disparity|retrieval_gain",
+      "Mixtral averaged about 82% accuracy, with substantial group-level variation (roughly 50-95%); expert-curated context improved performance by about nine percentage points.",
+      "Point-in-time model audit; not public deployment, user behavior or election effect.",
+      "src-eu-emnlp-voting-assistant-202411",
+      "paper_and_code_links_available",
+      "sample_size is the 810 party-question pairs before repeated contextual settings. Provides an open-weight comparator; no manipulatory election deployment is inferred from benchmark performance."
+    ]
+  ],
+  "control_shift_assessments": [
+    [
+      "ata-ro24",
+      "ro-2024-presidential-annulment",
+      "voter_attention_and_electoral_choice",
+      "Romanian voters' attention and electoral choice",
+      "campaign-network operators and platform ranking systems",
+      "opaque promotion, coordinated accounts, and recommender amplification",
+      "network sponsorship and ranking logic partly opaque",
+      "low_or_unknown",
+      "low_during_campaign_high_after_institutional_response",
+      "campaign_period_with_institutional_aftereffects",
+      "campaign-network operators and platform ranking systems",
+      "unequal agenda-setting, impaired informed choice, and institutional trust shock",
+      "Opaque coordinated promotion and an institutional annulment are observed as separate facts; individual behaviour and a causal electoral effect are not.",
+      "observed",
+      "observed",
+      "insufficient_evidence",
+      "not_observed",
+      "not_observed",
+      "control_mechanism_observed",
+      "If the coordination, sponsorship, or distribution-control evidence fails independent verification, the control-mechanism hypothesis is not supported; an agency-change conclusion also requires measured individual outcomes.",
+      "Comparable exposed and unexposed voters, or opaque and transparently attributed campaign content, with pre-specified attention, belief, and choice-autonomy outcomes.",
+      "Official and investigative records describe opaque promotion, coordinated accounts, platform distribution, and the court's annulment decision.",
+      "The coded mechanism could shift agenda-setting control toward operators and rankers; the dataset does not infer that this changed a person's agency or caused annulment.",
+      "observed_mechanism",
+      "clm-ro-002|clm-ro-003|clm-ro-006|clm-ro-007|clm-ro-013|clm-ro-020",
+      "Generative AI was not established as material. The court decision is an institutional outcome, not evidence of a voter-level agency change or causal vote effect."
+    ],
+    [
+      "ata-ro25",
+      "ro-2025-presidential-repeat",
+      "authorship_attention_and_local_identity",
+      "Romanian users and authentic local speakers",
+      "unidentified network operator",
+      "synthetic personas, apparently hijacked accounts, and coordinated cross-platform amplification",
+      "operator and provenance opaque",
+      "low_or_unknown",
+      "medium_after_takedown",
+      "months",
+      "unidentified network operator and platform distribution systems",
+      "manufactured local consensus and controlled agenda cues",
+      "A coordinated network, content, and non-unique platform activity are observed; belief, choice, turnout, and election effects are not.",
+      "observed",
+      "observed",
+      "insufficient_evidence",
+      "not_observed",
+      "not_observed",
+      "control_mechanism_observed",
+      "If the accounts are shown to be independent, authentically local, or not centrally coordinated, the control-mechanism hypothesis is not supported; reach metrics alone cannot establish agency change.",
+      "Users exposed to coordinated synthetic-persona content versus matched users exposed to authentic, independently produced local content, with provenance comprehension and decision outcomes measured.",
+      "Researchers documented at least 215 coordinated or apparently hijacked accounts, synthetic personas, content, and aggregated platform activity.",
+      "The network could control apparent local identity and salience; no operator-level intent to displace agency and no user-level agency change are directly observed.",
+      "observed_mechanism",
+      "clm-ro-014|clm-ro-015|clm-ro-016|clm-ro-017|clm-ro-018|clm-ro-021",
+      "Pro-Russia narratives do not establish Russian-state command. The repeat election and the 2024 annulment are analytically separate from this network record."
+    ],
+    [
+      "ata-md24",
+      "md-2024-presidential-referendum",
+      "preference_participation_and_trust",
+      "Moldovan voters",
+      "Shor-linked and Russia-linked influence and finance networks",
+      "payments, coordinated tasking, bots, spoofed media, and synthetic content",
+      "sponsor, finance, and message provenance partly opaque",
+      "low_or_unknown",
+      "medium_after_enforcement",
+      "multi_election",
+      "foreign-linked political-finance and influence networks",
+      "covert inducement and manufactured social proof could impair independent deliberation",
+      "Payment and influence infrastructure, an inducement attempt, and some payment acceptance are documented; how recipients voted and the electoral effect are unknown.",
+      "observed",
+      "observed",
+      "observed",
+      "not_observed",
+      "not_observed",
+      "attempted_transfer_observed",
+      "If payments were not conditioned, tasked, or linked to electoral conduct, the attempted-transfer coding fails; accepted payment alone cannot establish changed preference or vote.",
+      "Credibly identified recipients and comparable non-recipients under a design addressing selection, with task compliance, belief, turnout, and vote outcomes measured separately.",
+      "Official, observer, platform, and reporting records document coordinated influence infrastructure and allegations/evidence of electoral inducement; AI is one component.",
+      "The covert inducement and impersonation mechanisms constitute an observed attempt to influence decision control, but recipient agency change and votes changed are not observed.",
+      "observed_attempt_with_unmeasured_agency",
+      "clm-md-003|clm-md-004|clm-md-005|clm-md-009|clm-md-010|clm-md-011|clm-md-020",
+      "The removed 138,000 mixed accounts-and-transactions aggregate is not a valid reach observation. Administrative advantage and media imbalance remain competing explanations and separate harms."
+    ],
+    [
+      "ata-md25",
+      "md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network",
+      "authorship_agenda_and_peer_signal",
+      "Moldovan social-media users and authentic local speakers",
+      "InfoLeaders curators and linked political networks",
+      "central scripts locally adapted by paid participants and reciprocal amplification",
+      "coordination and payment opaque to audiences",
+      "low_or_unknown",
+      "medium_after_disruption",
+      "months",
+      "network curators and financiers",
+      "paid coordination can masquerade as peer speech and control apparent local salience",
+      "Paid tasking, coordinated accounts, content, and engagement are observed; persuasion, turnout, votes, and seats are not.",
+      "observed",
+      "observed",
+      "insufficient_evidence",
+      "not_observed",
+      "not_observed",
+      "control_mechanism_observed",
+      "If tasking, payment, or reciprocal amplification is not reproducible at account level, the control-mechanism coding fails; engagement totals cannot establish an agency outcome.",
+      "Matched users or content streams exposed to centrally tasked paid personas versus authentic independent speakers, with provenance recognition and decision outcomes measured.",
+      "A documented paid InfoLeaders sample used central tasking, local personas, and reciprocal engagement; platform totals are non-unique.",
+      "The mechanism could shift control over apparent peer signals toward curators; no individual agency change or electoral effect is observed.",
+      "observed_mechanism",
+      "clm-md-012|clm-md-015|clm-md-016|clm-md-017|clm-md-018|clm-md-019|clm-md-021",
+      "Components with different attribution and measurement scopes must not be collapsed into one operator or reach total."
+    ],
+    [
+      "ata-nh",
+      "us-nh-2024-biden-robocall",
+      "authorship_relevance_and_participation_instruction",
+      "New Hampshire Democratic primary recipients",
+      "Steve Kramer and the telecom delivery chain",
+      "cloned presidential voice, politically selected call list, and spoofed caller ID",
+      "high apparent-authorship deception",
+      "medium",
+      "high_after_enforcement",
+      "short_campaign_burst",
+      "political operator and telecom distribution chain",
+      "fabricated authoritative instruction could displace an informed participation decision",
+      "The impersonated demobilising instruction, operator, call attempts, and completed calls are observed; listening, belief, action, and turnout effect are not.",
+      "observed",
+      "observed",
+      "observed",
+      "not_observed",
+      "not_observed",
+      "attempted_transfer_observed",
+      "If the audio was not synthetic, the instruction was not demobilising, or the attributed operator did not select and distribute it, attempted-transfer coding fails; delivery counts alone do not establish agency change.",
+      "Recipients versus matched non-recipients, or completed versus failed delivery under a credible design, measuring listening, belief, action, and turnout without treating calls as unique voters.",
+      "An admitted operator created an AI-cloned Biden voice telling recipients not to vote in the primary; FCC records document the delivery chain and call counts.",
+      "The impersonated participation instruction is an observed attempt to displace decision control; no recipient-level agency change is observed.",
+      "observed_attempt_with_unmeasured_agency",
+      "clm-nh-001|clm-nh-002|clm-nh-004|clm-nh-005|clm-nh-009|clm-nh-010|clm-nh-012",
+      "Criminal acquittal, FCC findings, and civil default are distinct. None supplies evidence of belief, action, turnout, or votes changed."
+    ],
+    [
+      "ata-brprep",
+      "br-2026-election-preparedness",
+      "future_information_and_platform_governance",
+      "not_applicable",
+      "not_applicable",
+      "prospective monitoring of synthetic media and provider outputs",
+      "prospective",
+      "not_assessed",
+      "not_assessed",
+      "future_election",
+      "not_applicable",
+      "prospective risk only",
+      "Election rules, provider obligations, and institutional preparations are observed; no incident or agency outcome is coded.",
+      "not_assessed",
+      "not_observed",
+      "not_applicable",
+      "not_applicable",
+      "not_applicable",
+      "not_an_incident",
+      "Not applicable unless a discrete incident is promoted with claim-level evidence and an explicit unit of analysis.",
+      "No incident comparator; future promoted records require an incident-specific comparator.",
+      "TSE rules, compliance obligations, partnerships, and monitoring arrangements.",
+      "",
+      "not_applicable",
+      "clm-br-002|clm-br-003|clm-br-004|clm-br-006|clm-br-007|clm-br-009",
+      "Preparedness file; excluded from incident counts and from agency conclusions."
+    ],
+    [
+      "ata-bravatar",
+      "br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar",
+      "political_representation_and_audience_interpretation",
+      "Jair Bolsonaro as represented person and voters evaluating the endorsement",
+      "campaign producer controlling the synthetic representation",
+      "disclosed synthetic political surrogate",
+      "AI generation disclosed; authorisation unresolved",
+      "low",
+      "medium_after_disclosure_and_legal_challenge",
+      "single_event_with_reuse_risk",
+      "campaign producer controlling the synthetic representation",
+      "unauthorised synthetic representation could appropriate political voice; disclosure may preserve audience verification",
+      "The avatar, message, and AI disclosure are observed; authorisation, audience interpretation, belief, and electoral effects are unresolved.",
+      "observed",
+      "observed",
+      "insufficient_evidence",
+      "not_observed",
+      "not_observed",
+      "insufficient_evidence",
+      "If authorisation is established and audiences reliably understand the disclosed surrogate as campaign-authored representation, the appropriation hypothesis weakens; agency change still requires measured audience outcomes.",
+      "Authorised versus unauthorised and prominently disclosed versus undisclosed synthetic surrogates, measuring attribution accuracy, perceived endorsement, and decision autonomy.",
+      "A disclosed synthetic Bolsonaro avatar delivered an endorsement at a campaign launch; legal claims and a defence were filed, but final merits resolution and authorisation were not identified.",
+      "The producer controlled the synthetic representation, but whether that displaced or preserved anyone's agency is an untested boundary hypothesis.",
+      "boundary_case",
+      "clm-br-010|clm-br-011|clm-br-014|clm-br-017|clm-br-019|clm-br-020",
+      "Transparent disclosure is material counterevidence. Disclosure alone does not prove agency preservation, and production control alone does not prove agency transfer."
+    ],
+    [
+      "ata-usprep",
+      "us-2026-midterms-preparedness",
+      "future_information_and_election_trust",
+      "not_applicable",
+      "not_applicable",
+      "prospective monitoring of campaign, foreign, platform, telecom, and AI-provider mechanisms",
+      "prospective and fragmented governance",
+      "not_assessed",
+      "not_assessed",
+      "future_election",
+      "not_applicable",
+      "prospective risk only",
+      "Election timing, fragmented law, and prior-cycle risk assessments are observed; no new 2026 operation or agency outcome is coded.",
+      "not_assessed",
+      "not_observed",
+      "not_applicable",
+      "not_applicable",
+      "not_applicable",
+      "not_an_incident",
+      "Not applicable unless a discrete 2026 incident is promoted with claim-level evidence and an explicit unit of analysis.",
+      "No incident comparator; future promoted records require an incident-specific comparator.",
+      "Scheduled election context, enacted state laws, federal governance gaps, and prior-cycle assessments.",
+      "",
+      "not_applicable",
+      "clm-us26-001|clm-us26-002|clm-us26-003|clm-us26-004|clm-us26-005|clm-us26-007",
+      "Preparedness file; excluded from incident counts and from agency conclusions."
+    ],
+    [
+      "ata-usads",
+      "us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads",
+      "candidate_voice_face_and_affect",
+      "represented candidates and voters interpreting campaign evidence",
+      "campaign sponsors producing synthetic first-person performances",
+      "synthetic candidate simulations with variable disclosure and quotation fidelity",
+      "disclosure varies and can be low-salience",
+      "low",
+      "medium",
+      "campaign_cycle",
+      "campaign sponsors producing and distributing synthetic representations",
+      "synthetic performance can make the sponsor control apparent speech, timing, image, and affect",
+      "Multiple attributed synthetic assets are observed; comparable exposure, attribution error, belief, and election effects are not.",
+      "observed",
+      "observed",
+      "insufficient_evidence",
+      "not_observed",
+      "not_observed",
+      "control_mechanism_observed",
+      "If the synthetic elements are obvious, accurately attributed, faithful to genuine quotations, and do not alter audience attribution or interpretation, the stronger control-shift hypothesis weakens; content production alone cannot establish agency change.",
+      "Authentic footage versus labelled and unlabelled synthetic performances, stratified by quotation fidelity, with attribution accuracy and decision outcomes measured.",
+      "Named campaign sponsors released synthetic candidate performances; disclosure and fidelity varied across assets.",
+      "Sponsors controlled simulated voice, face, timing, and affect, but whether this displaced voter or candidate agency is untested.",
+      "observed_mechanism",
+      "clm-us26-008|clm-us26-009|clm-us26-010|clm-us26-011|clm-us26-012|clm-us26-013|clm-us26-014|clm-us26-016",
+      "Some assets use genuine quotations, labels, or obvious satire. Content-level distinctions are required before any stronger inference."
+    ],
+    [
+      "ata-usca11",
+      "us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot",
+      "representation_agenda_query_privacy_and_candidate_evaluation",
+      "Connie Chan as represented person and users asking questions",
+      "Scott Wiener for Congress and its provider stack",
+      "disclosed campaign-controlled first-person opponent simulation with policy-permitted query-log review",
+      "AI and parody disclosed; system prompt, retrieval, actual log use, and guardrails opaque",
+      "high",
+      "high_after_removal",
+      "four_day_deployment_plus_90_day_retention_policy",
+      "campaign deployer; secondarily model and infrastructure providers",
+      "sponsor control over opponent simulation and query data could shape representation and agenda",
+      "Deployment, model family, question count, privacy-policy terms, disclosure, and removal are observed; actual retention, unique users, interpretation, and electoral effects are not.",
+      "observed",
+      "observed",
+      "insufficient_evidence",
+      "not_observed",
+      "not_observed",
+      "insufficient_evidence",
+      "If users reliably understand the tool as sponsor-authored parody, outputs are traceably grounded, logs are not used beyond disclosed purposes, and no decision-relevant difference appears against an ordinary attack ad, the stronger control-shift hypothesis weakens.",
+      "Disclosed parody chatbot versus ordinary campaign attack material and versus an undisclosed first-person simulation, measuring attribution, source verification, perceived candidate position, and decision autonomy.",
+      "The campaign commissioned and disclosed a Claude-powered parody, controlled its presentation, permitted limited log review in policy, reported question volume, and removed the tool after criticism.",
+      "The system could shift representational and evidentiary control toward the sponsor, but explicit parody and absent user-outcome evidence make this a boundary hypothesis.",
+      "boundary_case",
+      "clm-usca11-002|clm-usca11-003|clm-usca11-004|clm-usca11-005|clm-usca11-006|clm-usca11-007|clm-usca11-009|clm-usca11-010|clm-usca11-011",
+      "Explicit parody and disclosure are essential counterevidence. Neither question count nor campaign control demonstrates a change in user agency."
+    ]
   ]
 }

research/v0.4_locators.json

@@ -0,0 +1,631 @@
+{
+  "schema_version": "0.4-locator-audit-1",
+  "audited_at": "2026-08-15",
+  "scope": {
+    "current_claim_evidence_edges": 124,
+    "baseline_head_edges": 162,
+    "removed_edge_count_since_head": 38,
+    "relation_relabel_count_since_head": 11,
+    "linked_sources": 56
+  },
+  "result": {
+    "verified_locators_before_four_official_fcc_url_replacements": 97,
+    "verified_locators_on_release_urls": 104,
+    "full_claim": 57,
+    "partial_claim": 47,
+    "unresolved": 20,
+    "unresolved_breakdown": {
+      "blocked_or_inaccessible_current_source": 20,
+      "no_supporting_passage_identified": 0,
+      "dynamic_metric_without_stable_snapshot": 0
+    }
+  },
+  "coverage_definition": {
+    "full_claim": "The pinpointed passage supports the material wording of the claim.",
+    "partial_claim": "The pinpointed passage supports only a stated component or factual premise; the claim requires another source or researcher inference."
+  },
+  "source_replacements": {
+    "src-us-fcc-ai-voice-20240208": {
+      "url": "https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-24-17A1.pdf",
+      "reason": "Official FCC declaratory ruling attachment; the former FCC landing-page URL was not retrievable during audit."
+    },
+    "src-us-fcc-kramer-fine-20240926": {
+      "url": "https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-24-104A1.pdf",
+      "reason": "Official FCC final forfeiture order attachment; the former FCC landing-page URL was not retrievable during audit."
+    },
+    "src-us-fcc-kramer-nal-20240523": {
+      "url": "https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-24-59A1.pdf",
+      "reason": "Official FCC notice of apparent liability attachment; the former FCC landing-page URL was not retrievable during audit."
+    },
+    "src-us-fcc-lingo-settlement-20240821": {
+      "url": "https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-24-790A1.pdf",
+      "reason": "Official FCC order and consent-decree attachment; the former FCC landing-page URL was not retrievable during audit."
+    }
+  },
+  "locators": {
+    "clm-br-001|src-br-tse-calendar-202603|supports": {
+      "locator": "Section 'Outubro de 2026', entries for 4 October and 25 October.",
+      "coverage": "full_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-br-002|src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302|supports": {
+      "locator": "Art. 9-B, caput.",
+      "coverage": "full_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-br-002|src-br-tse-ai-rules-202604|supports": {
+      "locator": "Article body immediately before heading 'Compromisso com a verdade', paragraph describing explicit, prominent and accessible labelling.",
+      "coverage": "full_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-br-003|src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302|supports": {
+      "locator": "Art. 9-B, section 3-A.",
+      "coverage": "full_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-br-004|src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302|supports": {
+      "locator": "Art. 28, section 1-C, items I-IV.",
+      "coverage": "full_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-br-005|src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302|supports": {
+      "locator": "Art. 9-B, section 5.",
+      "coverage": "full_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-br-006|src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302|supports": {
+      "locator": "Art. 125-B, caput and section 1, items I-III.",
+      "coverage": "partial_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-br-006|src-br-tse-compliance-202607|supports": {
+      "locator": "Opening paragraphs and heading 'Detalhamento', including the 16 August deadline and plan requirements.",
+      "coverage": "full_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-br-007|src-br-tse-platforms-202607|supports": {
+      "locator": "Heading 'Ações conjuntas', first paragraph.",
+      "coverage": "partial_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-br-007|src-br-tse-agu-20260803|supports": {
+      "locator": "Opening four paragraphs, including publication date and description of the TSE-AGU agreement.",
+      "coverage": "partial_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-br-007|src-br-tse-council-20260807|supports": {
+      "locator": "Opening three paragraphs and headings 'Competências' and 'O que fará o novo Conselho?'.",
+      "coverage": "partial_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-br-007|src-br-tse-elevenlabs-202608|supports": {
+      "locator": "Opening four paragraphs and heading 'Eixos da parceria'.",
+      "coverage": "partial_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-br-008|src-br-aio-202411|supports": {
+      "locator": "Article body, paragraph beginning 'However, data collected between August 16 and October 6'.",
+      "coverage": "full_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-br-010|src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728|supports": {
+      "locator": "Article opening, paragraphs 1-3 describing the 25 July campaign launch and synthetic avatar.",
+      "coverage": "full_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-br-011|src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728|supports": {
+      "locator": "Article opening, paragraphs 2-5 describing the AI disclosure and endorsement message.",
+      "coverage": "full_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-br-012|src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728|supports": {
+      "locator": "Article opening and section 'QUESTIONS ABOUT WHETHER RESTRICTIONS APPLY', paragraphs on the petition and defence.",
+      "coverage": "full_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-br-012|src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728|counterevidence": {
+      "locator": "Section 'QUESTIONS ABOUT WHETHER RESTRICTIONS APPLY', paragraphs reporting the lawyers' disclosure and unmixed-footage arguments.",
+      "coverage": "partial_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-br-016|src-br-tse-res-23610-consolidated|supports": {
+      "locator": "Arts. 9-B, caput and section 3, and 9-C, section 1.",
+      "coverage": "full_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-br-017|src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728|premise": {
+      "locator": "Article opening and section 'QUESTIONS ABOUT WHETHER RESTRICTIONS APPLY', paragraphs on disclosure and the unresolved legal challenge.",
+      "coverage": "partial_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-br-017|src-br-tse-res-23610-consolidated|premise": {
+      "locator": "Arts. 9-B, caput and section 3, and 9-C, section 1.",
+      "coverage": "partial_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-br-017|src-br-folha-avatar-defense-202607|counterevidence": {
+      "locator": "Article body, paragraphs beginning 'O vídeo exibido' and 'A defesa de Flávio'.",
+      "coverage": "partial_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-br-018|src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302|supports": {
+      "locator": "Art. 9-B, section 3-A.",
+      "coverage": "partial_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-br-018|src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728|supports": {
+      "locator": "Article opening, paragraphs identifying the 25 July convention date.",
+      "coverage": "partial_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-br-019|src-br-ft-avatar-202607|supports": {
+      "locator": "Article body, paragraph reporting Jair Bolsonaro's lawyers' denial of authorisation or prior knowledge.",
+      "coverage": "full_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-br-019|src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728|supports": {
+      "locator": "Section 'QUESTIONS ABOUT WHETHER RESTRICTIONS APPLY', paragraph discussing the authorisation issue.",
+      "coverage": "partial_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-md-001|src-md-odihr-final-20250314|supports": {
+      "locator": "Report cover/title and 'Background', p. 7.",
+      "coverage": "full_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-md-002|src-md-odihr-final-20250314|supports": {
+      "locator": "Annex I, p. 43, final-results tables for the referendum and presidential runoff.",
+      "coverage": "full_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-md-003|src-md-odihr-prelim-20241021|supports": {
+      "locator": "Executive Summary, pp. 1-3.",
+      "coverage": "full_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-md-003|src-md-odihr-final-20250314|supports": {
+      "locator": "Executive Summary, pp. 1-2, and 'Campaign Environment', p. 20.",
+      "coverage": "full_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-md-004|src-md-reuters-payments-20241024|supports": {
+      "locator": "Article opening and paragraphs reporting the police allegation of USD 39 million in September and October transfers.",
+      "coverage": "full_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-md-005|src-md-odihr-final-20250314|supports": {
+      "locator": "Executive Summary and 'Campaign Environment', pp. 3-4, passages attributing interference components.",
+      "coverage": "partial_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-md-005|src-md-reuters-payments-20241024|supports": {
+      "locator": "Article opening and later paragraphs reporting the police attribution and the responses from Russia and Ilan Shor.",
+      "coverage": "full_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-md-005|src-md-reuters-payments-20241024|counterevidence": {
+      "locator": "Article body, paragraphs reporting Russia's and Ilan Shor's denials.",
+      "coverage": "partial_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-md-006|src-md-eeas-fimi-202401|supports": {
+      "locator": "Report p. 11, section 'Artificial Intelligence is not (yet) the biggest threat'.",
+      "coverage": "partial_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-md-006|src-md-odihr-parliament-202602|supports": {
+      "locator": "Executive Summary, p. 4, and 'Online Campaign', p. 21.",
+      "coverage": "partial_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-md-007|src-md-meta-threat-reporting|supports": {
+      "locator": "Section 'Takeaways', Moldova network-removal item.",
+      "coverage": "full_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-md-008|src-md-odihr-parliament-202602|supports": {
+      "locator": "Report p. 18, footnote 60, listing the heterogeneous account-and-transaction aggregate.",
+      "coverage": "partial_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-md-009|src-md-reuters-payments-20241024|premise": {
+      "locator": "Article opening and payment-mechanism paragraphs; source records alleged transfers but not each recipient's vote.",
+      "coverage": "partial_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-md-009|src-md-odihr-final-20250314|premise": {
+      "locator": "Report p. 32, passages on offered or accepted payments and the limits of the available evidence.",
+      "coverage": "partial_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-md-011|src-md-odihr-prelim-20241021|supports": {
+      "locator": "Executive Summary, pp. 1-3, and 'Campaign Environment'.",
+      "coverage": "full_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-md-011|src-md-odihr-final-20250314|supports": {
+      "locator": "Executive Summary, pp. 1-3, and 'Campaign Environment', p. 20.",
+      "coverage": "full_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-md-012|src-md-odihr-parliament-202602|supports": {
+      "locator": "Executive Summary, p. 4, and report pp. 18 and 21 on vote buying and online networks.",
+      "coverage": "full_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-md-013|src-md-odihr-parliament-202602|premise": {
+      "locator": "Executive Summary, pp. 3–4, passages on inauthentic networks using AI-generated videos and automated bots, plus the election-result context.",
+      "coverage": "partial_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-md-014|src-md-meta-threat-reporting|supports": {
+      "locator": "Section 'Takeaways', Moldova item, especially bullet 'Followers'.",
+      "coverage": "full_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-md-015|src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924|supports": {
+      "locator": "Sections 'The network’s scale' and 'Network organization'.",
+      "coverage": "full_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-md-016|src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924|supports": {
+      "locator": "Section 'The network’s scale', metric paragraph for the 253-account sample.",
+      "coverage": "full_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-md-017|src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924|supports": {
+      "locator": "Section 'Network organization', paragraphs on centrally supplied messages, personalisation and mutual amplification.",
+      "coverage": "full_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-ro-002|src-ro-ifes-202412|supports": {
+      "locator": "Sections 'II. National Security Concerns and Electoral Integrity' and 'III. Re-Opening the Election'.",
+      "coverage": "full_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-ro-003|src-ro-ec-tiktok-20241217|supports": {
+      "locator": "Heading 'The proceedings will focus on the following areas', four-item list.",
+      "coverage": "full_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-ro-005|src-ro-tiktok-integrity|supports": {
+      "locator": "Dated update '17 December', platform-enforcement metrics and network-removal paragraphs.",
+      "coverage": "partial_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-ro-007|src-ro-venice-202503|premise": {
+      "locator": "Report p. 17, para. 66, disclaimer that the report does not examine the facts of the Romanian case.",
+      "coverage": "partial_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-ro-007|src-ro-snoop-pnl-20241220|premise": {
+      "locator": "Headings 'Investigația și concluziile ANAF' and 'Răspunsul firmei angajate de PNL'.",
+      "coverage": "partial_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-ro-008|src-ro-venice-202503|supports": {
+      "locator": "Report pp. 9-12, paras. 27-42, and p. 16, para. 59.",
+      "coverage": "full_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-ro-009|src-ro-odihr-repeat-final|supports": {
+      "locator": "Report cover/title and Executive Summary, p. 1.",
+      "coverage": "full_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-ro-010|src-ro-odihr-repeat-final|premise": {
+      "locator": "Executive Summary, pp. 1–5, and Background, pp. 6–7, describing repeat-election dates, changed campaign context and the 2025 result.",
+      "coverage": "partial_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-ro-012|src-ro-tiktok-integrity|supports": {
+      "locator": "Updates '6 December 2024' and '17 December', especially heading 'Tackling Deceptive Behaviours at Scale'.",
+      "coverage": "partial_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-ro-013|src-ro-snoop-pnl-20241220|supports": {
+      "locator": "Headings 'Investigația și concluziile ANAF' and 'Răspunsul firmei angajate de PNL'.",
+      "coverage": "full_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-ro-014|src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826|supports": {
+      "locator": "Article introduction and section 'Smaller followings'.",
+      "coverage": "full_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-ro-015|src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826|supports": {
+      "locator": "Section 'Smaller followings', cross-platform output and engagement totals.",
+      "coverage": "full_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-ro-016|src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826|supports": {
+      "locator": "Section 'Stolen accounts and fake personas'.",
+      "coverage": "full_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-ro-017|src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826|premise": {
+      "locator": "Section 'Conclusion', attribution limits and description of the observed narratives and coordination.",
+      "coverage": "full_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-nh-001|src-us-fcc-kramer-nal-20240523|supports": {
+      "locator": "Official replacement PDF FCC-24-59A1, p. 1, para. 1.",
+      "coverage": "full_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-nh-001|src-us-fcc-kramer-fine-20240926|supports": {
+      "locator": "Official replacement PDF FCC-24-104A1, p. 1, para. 1.",
+      "coverage": "full_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-nh-002|src-us-fcc-kramer-nal-20240523|supports": {
+      "locator": "Official replacement PDF FCC-24-59A1, pp. 2-3, para. 5.",
+      "coverage": "full_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-nh-003|src-us-fcc-kramer-fine-20240926|supports": {
+      "locator": "Official replacement PDF FCC-24-104A1, p. 7, para. 16, and p. 11, paras. 25-27.",
+      "coverage": "full_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-nh-003|src-us-nhpr-acquittal-20250613|supports": {
+      "locator": "Article opening, paragraph stating that Kramer admitted commissioning the call.",
+      "coverage": "full_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-nh-004|src-us-fcc-kramer-final-pdf-20240926|supports": {
+      "locator": "PDF p. 7, para. 12, call-attempt total of 9,581.",
+      "coverage": "partial_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-nh-004|src-us-fcc-lingo-consent-202408|supports": {
+      "locator": "Order para. 8 and corresponding Consent Decree factual background, completed-call total of 3,978 and A-level attestations.",
+      "coverage": "partial_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-nh-005|src-us-fcc-lingo-nal-pdf-20240523|supports": {
+      "locator": "PDF p. 2, para. 3, and pp. 8-12, paras. 14-23.",
+      "coverage": "partial_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-nh-005|src-us-fcc-lingo-settlement-20240821|supports": {
+      "locator": "Official replacement PDF DA-24-790A1, Order para. 8 and Consent Decree factual background.",
+      "coverage": "partial_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-nh-006|src-us-fcc-ai-voice-20240208|supports": {
+      "locator": "Official replacement PDF FCC-24-17A1, pp. 1-2, paras. 2 and 5.",
+      "coverage": "full_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-nh-007|src-us-fcc-kramer-final-pdf-20240926|supports": {
+      "locator": "PDF p. 1, paras. 1-3, and p. 17, paras. 47-49, USD 6 million forfeiture.",
+      "coverage": "partial_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-nh-007|src-us-fcc-lingo-consent-202408|supports": {
+      "locator": "Order para. 1 and Consent Decree paras. 1, 17 and 22, USD 1 million penalty and compliance plan.",
+      "coverage": "partial_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-nh-008|src-us-nhpr-acquittal-20250613|supports": {
+      "locator": "Article opening and paragraph identifying 11 felony and 11 misdemeanor counts.",
+      "coverage": "full_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-nh-008|src-us-ap-kramer-acquittal-20250613|supports": {
+      "locator": "Article opening, paragraphs 1-4, including acquittal on all 22 charges.",
+      "coverage": "full_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-nh-011|src-us-lwv-kramer-civil|supports": {
+      "locator": "Section 'LWV Timeline', entry 'November 2025 — Court issues ruling in favor of plaintiffs'.",
+      "coverage": "full_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-nh-011|src-us-ap-kramer-default-202511|supports": {
+      "locator": "Article opening, paragraphs 1-4, describing the default judgment, monetary relief and injunction.",
+      "coverage": "full_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-us26-001|src-us-fec-dates-2026|supports": {
+      "locator": "PDF p. 1, header note stating 'General Election Date 11/03/2026'.",
+      "coverage": "full_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-us26-002|src-us-ncsl-20260623|supports": {
+      "locator": "Section 'Summary — Deepfakes in Elections and Campaigns', opening paragraphs and state-statutes table.",
+      "coverage": "full_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-us26-003|src-us-fec-ai-disposition-2024|supports": {
+      "locator": "Sections 'Background', 'Notification of Disposition' and 'Interpretive Rule'.",
+      "coverage": "partial_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-us26-003|src-us-ncsl-20260623|supports": {
+      "locator": "Section 'Summary — Deepfakes in Elections and Campaigns', opening paragraphs and state-statutes table.",
+      "coverage": "partial_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-us26-003|src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328|supports": {
+      "locator": "Section 'STATES PLAY CATCH-UP ON AI', paragraphs describing the absence of a broad federal deepfake rule and divergent state laws.",
+      "coverage": "full_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-us26-003|src-us-fcc-ai-voice-20240208|counterevidence": {
+      "locator": "Official replacement PDF FCC-24-17A1, pp. 1-2, paras. 2 and 5, narrow TCPA rule for artificial or prerecorded voices.",
+      "coverage": "partial_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-us26-005|src-us-odni-update-20241021|supports": {
+      "locator": "PDF p. 1, opening assessment and first bullet on synthetic or manipulated content in the 2024 cycle.",
+      "coverage": "partial_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-us26-006|src-global-meta-muted-20241203|supports": {
+      "locator": "Article opening, first two paragraphs reporting Meta's global 2024 assessment.",
+      "coverage": "full_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-us26-008|src-us-nrsc-talarico-20260311|supports": {
+      "locator": "Opening paragraph and section 'Transcript'.",
+      "coverage": "full_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-us26-008|src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328|supports": {
+      "locator": "Article opening, paragraphs 1-8, Talarico-video description and release context.",
+      "coverage": "partial_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-us26-009|src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328|supports": {
+      "locator": "Section 'ADS POSE MISINFORMATION RISKS', paragraph describing the small AI-generated disclosure.",
+      "coverage": "full_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-us26-009|src-us-berkeley-talarico-2026|supports": {
+      "locator": "Article body, opening four paragraphs, including the disclosure-salience assessment.",
+      "coverage": "full_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-us26-010|src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328|supports": {
+      "locator": "Article opening and section 'ADS POSE MISINFORMATION RISKS', descriptions of the recent national-Republican ads; no comparable impression table is provided.",
+      "coverage": "partial_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-us26-011|src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328|supports": {
+      "locator": "Article opening, paragraphs describing the Ossoff, Cornyn and Paxton synthetic ads.",
+      "coverage": "full_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-us26-013|src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328|supports": {
+      "locator": "Sections 'ADS POSE MISINFORMATION RISKS' and 'STATES PLAY CATCH-UP ON AI', passages on labelling, satire and use of genuine prior words.",
+      "coverage": "partial_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-us26-014|src-us-nrsc-talarico-20260311|supports": {
+      "locator": "Opening paragraph and section 'Transcript', permitting comparison between attributed old posts and synthetic reaction lines.",
+      "coverage": "partial_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-us26-014|src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328|supports": {
+      "locator": "Article opening and Talarico-video paragraphs distinguishing quoted posts from added synthetic performance.",
+      "coverage": "partial_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-usca11-001|src-us-ca11-sfgate-20260804|supports": {
+      "locator": "Article opening paragraphs describing the chatbot launch; the 7 August removal is not in this passage.",
+      "coverage": "partial_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-usca11-001|src-us-ca11-axios-20260811|supports": {
+      "locator": "Article opening and section 'State of play', including the paragraph beginning 'In announcing its removal'.",
+      "coverage": "partial_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-usca11-002|src-us-ca11-sfgate-20260804|supports": {
+      "locator": "Article body, paragraph beginning 'Wiener’s team told SFGATE', on campaign commissioning and control.",
+      "coverage": "partial_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-usca11-003|src-us-ca11-sfgate-20260804|supports": {
+      "locator": "Article opening and campaign-statement paragraphs identifying Claude; deployment configuration is not specified.",
+      "coverage": "partial_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-usca11-003|src-us-ca11-axios-20260811|supports": {
+      "locator": "Section 'How it worked', paragraph identifying Anthropic Claude; exact model and deployment configuration are not specified.",
+      "coverage": "partial_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-usca11-004|src-us-ca11-sfgate-20260804|supports": {
+      "locator": "Article body, interface-description paragraphs and first-person response examples.",
+      "coverage": "full_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-usca11-004|src-us-ca11-axios-20260811|supports": {
+      "locator": "Section 'How it worked', paragraphs describing first-person, campaign-selected responses.",
+      "coverage": "full_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-usca11-005|src-us-ca11-sfgate-20260804|supports": {
+      "locator": "Article opening and interface-description paragraphs on AI/parody framing and campaign sponsorship.",
+      "coverage": "partial_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-usca11-006|src-us-ca11-axios-20260811|supports": {
+      "locator": "Section 'State of play', campaign-reported interaction paragraph stating more than 5,000 questions, not the exact 5,058 figure.",
+      "coverage": "partial_claim"
+    },
+    "clm-usca11-008|src-us-ca11-axios-20260811|supports": {
+      "locator": "Section 'State of play', paragraph beginning 'In announcing its removal', including billboard removal and apology.",
+      "coverage": "full_claim"
+    }
+  },
+  "unresolved": {
+    "clm-br-015|src-br-avatar-petition-20260726|supports": {
+      "status": "blocked_or_inaccessible_current_source",
+      "reason": "The linked third-party PDF was not retrievable. Use the official TSE docket RP 0601315-97.2026.6.00.0000 if a stable public docket URL becomes available."
+    },
+    "clm-ro-001|src-ro-ccr-20241206|supports": {
+      "status": "blocked_or_inaccessible_current_source",
+      "reason": "Current Constitutional Court page was not reliably retrievable during audit."
+    },
+    "clm-ro-001|src-ro-ccr-summary-2025|supports": {
+      "status": "blocked_or_inaccessible_current_source",
+      "reason": "Current official summary PDF was not reliably retrievable during audit; no page number was inferred from snippets."
+    },
+    "clm-ro-002|src-ro-ccr-summary-2025|supports": {
+      "status": "blocked_or_inaccessible_current_source",
+      "reason": "Current official summary PDF was not reliably retrievable during audit; no page number was inferred from snippets."
+    },
+    "clm-ro-007|src-ro-ccr-summary-2025|premise": {
+      "status": "blocked_or_inaccessible_current_source",
+      "reason": "Current official summary PDF was not reliably retrievable during audit; no page number was inferred from snippets."
+    },
+    "clm-ro-007|src-ro-sri-csat-20241204|premise": {
+      "status": "blocked_or_inaccessible_current_source",
+      "reason": "The linked declassified SRI PDF was not retrievable as a valid document during audit; search snippets were not treated as page locators."
+    },
+    "clm-ro-011|src-ro-sri-csat-20241204|supports": {
+      "status": "blocked_or_inaccessible_current_source",
+      "reason": "The linked declassified SRI PDF was not retrievable as a valid document during audit; the 25,000 and 797 figures were not assigned guessed pages."
+    },
+    "clm-ro-012|src-ro-sri-csat-20241204|supports": {
+      "status": "blocked_or_inaccessible_current_source",
+      "reason": "The linked declassified SRI PDF was not retrievable as a valid document during audit."
+    },
+    "clm-nh-001|src-us-nhdoj-kramer-20240523|supports": {
+      "status": "blocked_or_inaccessible_current_source",
+      "reason": "The New Hampshire DOJ page returned an access block and no primary passage was retrieved."
+    },
+    "clm-nh-002|src-us-nhdoj-kramer-20240523|supports": {
+      "status": "blocked_or_inaccessible_current_source",
+      "reason": "The New Hampshire DOJ page returned an access block and no primary passage was retrieved."
+    },
+    "clm-us26-004|src-us-cisa-genai-202401|supports": {
+      "status": "blocked_or_inaccessible_current_source",
+      "reason": "The CISA landing page and official PDF were access-blocked in this audit; likely wording was not converted into an unverified page locator."
+    },
+    "clm-usca11-001|src-us-ca11-mission-20260807|supports": {
+      "status": "blocked_or_inaccessible_current_source",
+      "reason": "The article was not retrievable or indexed sufficiently to verify a passage."
+    },
+    "clm-usca11-002|src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804|supports": {
+      "status": "blocked_or_inaccessible_current_source",
+      "reason": "The article was not retrievable or indexed sufficiently to verify a passage."
+    },
+    "clm-usca11-002|src-us-ca11-mission-20260807|supports": {
+      "status": "blocked_or_inaccessible_current_source",
+      "reason": "The article was not retrievable or indexed sufficiently to verify a passage."
+    },
+    "clm-usca11-003|src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804|supports": {
+      "status": "blocked_or_inaccessible_current_source",
+      "reason": "The article was not retrievable or indexed sufficiently to verify a passage."
+    },
+    "clm-usca11-004|src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804|supports": {
+      "status": "blocked_or_inaccessible_current_source",
+      "reason": "The article was not retrievable or indexed sufficiently to verify a passage."
+    },
+    "clm-usca11-005|src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804|supports": {
+      "status": "blocked_or_inaccessible_current_source",
+      "reason": "The article was not retrievable or indexed sufficiently to verify a passage."
+    },
+    "clm-usca11-006|src-us-ca11-mission-20260807|supports": {
+      "status": "blocked_or_inaccessible_current_source",
+      "reason": "The article was not retrievable or indexed sufficiently to verify the exact 5,058-question figure."
+    },
+    "clm-usca11-007|src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804|supports": {
+      "status": "blocked_or_inaccessible_current_source",
+      "reason": "The article was not retrievable or indexed sufficiently to verify the privacy-policy passage."
+    },
+    "clm-usca11-008|src-us-ca11-mission-20260807|supports": {
+      "status": "blocked_or_inaccessible_current_source",
+      "reason": "The article was not retrievable or indexed sufficiently to verify a passage."
+    }
+  },
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+    "clm-br-013|src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728|supports",
+    "clm-br-014|src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728|supports",
+    "clm-br-020|src-br-ft-avatar-202607|supports",
+    "clm-br-020|src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728|supports",
+    "clm-md-005|src-md-eeas-activity-2025|supports",
+    "clm-md-010|src-md-odihr-final-20250314|supports",
+    "clm-md-015|src-md-odihr-parliament-202602|supports",
+    "clm-md-018|src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924|supports",
+    "clm-md-018|src-md-odihr-parliament-202602|supports",
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+    "clm-nh-009|src-us-fcc-kramer-fine-20240926|supports",
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+    "clm-nh-010|src-us-fcc-kramer-fine-20240926|supports",
+    "clm-nh-010|src-us-nhpr-acquittal-20250613|supports",
+    "clm-nh-012|src-us-fcc-kramer-final-pdf-20240926|supports",
+    "clm-nh-012|src-us-fcc-lingo-consent-202408|supports",
+    "clm-ro-004|src-ro-ccr-summary-2025|supports",
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+    "clm-ro-006|src-ro-ccr-summary-2025|supports",
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+    "clm-ro-006|src-ro-venice-202503|supports",
+    "clm-ro-007|src-ro-ec-tiktok-20241217|supports",
+    "clm-ro-010|src-ro-venice-202503|supports",
+    "clm-ro-018|src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826|supports",
+    "clm-ro-018|src-ro-odihr-repeat-final|supports",
+    "clm-us26-012|src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328|supports",
+    "clm-us26-015|src-us-nrsc-talarico-youtube|supports",
+    "clm-us26-016|src-us-berkeley-talarico-2026|supports",
+    "clm-us26-016|src-us-nrsc-talarico-20260311|supports",
+    "clm-us26-016|src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328|supports",
+    "clm-usca11-009|src-us-ca11-axios-20260811|supports",
+    "clm-usca11-009|src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804|supports",
+    "clm-usca11-009|src-us-ca11-mission-20260807|supports",
+    "clm-usca11-011|src-us-ca11-axios-20260811|supports",
+    "clm-usca11-011|src-us-ca11-gazetteer-20260804|supports",
+    "clm-usca11-011|src-us-ca11-sfgate-20260804|supports"
+  ],
+  "relation_relabels_since_head": [
+    {
+      "from_key": "clm-ro-007|src-ro-ccr-summary-2025|supports",
+      "to_key": "clm-ro-007|src-ro-ccr-summary-2025|premise"
+    },
+    {
+      "from_key": "clm-ro-007|src-ro-venice-202503|supports",
+      "to_key": "clm-ro-007|src-ro-venice-202503|premise"
+    },
+    {
+      "from_key": "clm-ro-007|src-ro-sri-csat-20241204|supports",
+      "to_key": "clm-ro-007|src-ro-sri-csat-20241204|premise"
+    },
+    {
+      "from_key": "clm-ro-007|src-ro-snoop-pnl-20241220|supports",
+      "to_key": "clm-ro-007|src-ro-snoop-pnl-20241220|premise"
+    },
+    {
+      "from_key": "clm-ro-010|src-ro-odihr-repeat-final|supports",
+      "to_key": "clm-ro-010|src-ro-odihr-repeat-final|premise"
+    },
+    {
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+      "to_key": "clm-ro-017|src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826|premise"
+    },
+    {
+      "from_key": "clm-md-009|src-md-reuters-payments-20241024|supports",
+      "to_key": "clm-md-009|src-md-reuters-payments-20241024|premise"
+    },
+    {
+      "from_key": "clm-md-009|src-md-odihr-final-20250314|supports",
+      "to_key": "clm-md-009|src-md-odihr-final-20250314|premise"
+    },
+    {
+      "from_key": "clm-md-013|src-md-odihr-parliament-202602|supports",
+      "to_key": "clm-md-013|src-md-odihr-parliament-202602|premise"
+    },
+    {
+      "from_key": "clm-br-017|src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728|supports",
+      "to_key": "clm-br-017|src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728|premise"
+    },
+    {
+      "from_key": "clm-br-017|src-br-tse-res-23610-consolidated|supports",
+      "to_key": "clm-br-017|src-br-tse-res-23610-consolidated|premise"
+    }
+  ]
+}