diff --git "a/research/seed.json" "b/research/seed.json" --- "a/research/seed.json" +++ "b/research/seed.json" @@ -25,19 +25,18 @@ "ai_role": "material_amplification", "generative_ai_status": "not_established", "affected_state": "attention|belief|trust|electoral choice", - "agency_transfer_path": "opaque campaign and amplification capabilities → network operators and platform ranking → voters' attention and informational environment → agenda-setting and choice architecture shift away from voters → influence power concentrates in campaign operators and platforms", - "power_concentrated_in": "campaign network operators and platform ranking systems", - "democratic_harm": "unequal campaign conditions, opacity, impaired informed choice, institutional loss of confidence, annulment of the election", + "control_shift_hypothesis": "Hypothesis: opaque promotion and recommender amplification could shift control over agenda-setting from voters toward campaign-network operators and ranking systems. The record observes a mechanism and institutional response, not individual agency change or a causal link to annulment.", + "hypothesized_power_recipient": "campaign-network operators and platform ranking systems", + "democratic_harm": "Documented unequal campaign conditions, opacity, and institutional disruption; impaired informed choice and causal effects on votes remain unmeasured.", "occurrence_status": "partly_confirmed", "reach_status": "platform_reported", "reach_estimate": "", "reach_unit": "", "behavioural_effect_status": "unknown", - "electoral_effect_status": "institutionally_asserted", + "electoral_effect_status": "unknown", "institutional_outcome": "The Constitutional Court annulled the entire presidential electoral process on 6 December 2024.", "response": "Court annulment; declassification; European Commission DSA proceedings; platform removals; repeat election.", "inclusion_tier": "A", - "overall_confidence": 0.91, "counterevidence": "The precise sponsor, foreign attribution, and causal contribution of platform dynamics remain contested; some reporting indicates a domestic party-financed campaign may have been repurposed.", "open_questions": "Who financed and directed each network component? What organic versus coordinated reach occurred? Did any exposure change voting behaviour? What will the DSA proceeding finally establish?", "last_verified": "2026-08-11" @@ -67,9 +66,9 @@ "ai_role": "mixed", "generative_ai_status": "confirmed", "affected_state": "trust|participation|belief", - "agency_transfer_path": "post-annulment uncertainty and platform-mediated campaigning → institutions and information intermediaries → voters' trust and opportunity to choose → exceptional institutional control over the electoral timetable", - "power_concentrated_in": "electoral institutions and large platforms", - "democratic_harm": "persistent distrust, polarisation, and uncertainty around electoral legitimacy", + "control_shift_hypothesis": "Hypothesis: synthetic personas and coordinated amplification could let an unidentified operator shape apparent local consensus. Network activity is observed; no individual agency change or electoral effect is measured.", + "hypothesized_power_recipient": "unidentified network operator and platform distribution systems", + "democratic_harm": "Potential distrust, polarisation, and uncertainty around electoral legitimacy; no individual trust or agency outcome is measured.", "occurrence_status": "confirmed", "reach_status": "measured", "reach_estimate": "16000000", @@ -79,7 +78,6 @@ "institutional_outcome": "A repeat presidential election was held in May 2025.", "response": "Expanded observation, platform engagement, partial deplatforming, and election-integrity safeguards.", "inclusion_tier": "A", - "overall_confidence": 0.91, "counterevidence": "The 16 million figure is a sum of platform views, not unique Romanian voters or authenticated human exposure. DFRLab described the network as pro-Russia from its narratives, but could not identify the operator or prove Russian-state command. A completed repeat election does not resolve the disputed causal basis of the 2024 annulment.", "open_questions": "Who operated and financed the network? How much reach was authentic and in-country? Which safeguards measurably reduced manipulation? How did the annulment itself affect trust and participation?", "last_verified": "2026-08-11" @@ -109,19 +107,18 @@ "ai_role": "mixed", "generative_ai_status": "confirmed", "affected_state": "belief|trust|preference|participation", - "agency_transfer_path": "finance plus scalable persuasion and impersonation → network sponsors and operators → voters' information, incentives, and preferences → autonomous deliberation and choice displaced by covert influence → power concentrates in sponsors and intermediaries", - "power_concentrated_in": "foreign-linked political-finance and influence networks", - "democratic_harm": "distorted campaign conditions, covert inducement, impaired informed choice, institutional distrust", + "control_shift_hypothesis": "Hypothesis: covert finance, inducement, coordinated amplification, and impersonation could shift control over electoral choice toward sponsors and operators. An inducement attempt and some payment acceptance are documented; how recipients voted is unknown.", + "hypothesized_power_recipient": "foreign-linked political-finance and influence networks", + "democratic_harm": "Documented covert-inducement and unequal-campaign-condition concerns; impaired informed choice and institutional distrust are plausible harms, not measured individual outcomes.", "occurrence_status": "partly_confirmed", - "reach_status": "estimated", - "reach_estimate": "138000+", - "reach_unit": "authority-reported accounts and transactions across linked investigations; not recipients, people, or voter reach", - "behavioural_effect_status": "indicated", + "reach_status": "unknown", + "reach_estimate": "", + "reach_unit": "", + "behavioural_effect_status": "unknown", "electoral_effect_status": "unknown", "institutional_outcome": "The referendum passed and Maia Sandu won the presidential runoff; investigations and platform takedowns continued.", "response": "Police and prosecutorial investigations; account and channel removals; campaign-finance enforcement; international observation and public attribution.", "inclusion_tier": "A", - "overall_confidence": 0.93, "counterevidence": "Russia and Ilan Shor denied key allegations; official recipient counts do not establish how every payment affected voting; observers also identified incumbent advantage and misuse of public resources.", "open_questions": "How many recipients acted on payments? Which synthetic pieces achieved material exposure? What portion of the network was centrally directed? What vote effect, if any, occurred?", "last_verified": "2026-08-11" @@ -151,9 +148,9 @@ "ai_role": "mixed", "generative_ai_status": "confirmed", "affected_state": "belief|trust|preference", - "agency_transfer_path": "persistent covert influence infrastructure → network sponsors and operators → voters' information environment and incentives → agenda and deliberation shaped outside transparent competition", - "power_concentrated_in": "foreign-funded influence networks", - "democratic_harm": "unequal campaign conditions and impaired informed choice", + "control_shift_hypothesis": "Hypothesis: centrally tasked, paid local personas and reciprocal amplification could shift agenda control toward network curators. The mechanism is observed; user belief, choice, and vote effects are not.", + "hypothesized_power_recipient": "foreign-funded influence-network curators and financiers", + "democratic_harm": "Potential unequal campaign conditions and impaired informed choice; neither individual agency change nor an electoral effect is measured.", "occurrence_status": "partly_confirmed", "reach_status": "measured", "reach_estimate": "55367950", @@ -163,7 +160,6 @@ "institutional_outcome": "Election completed under an intensified enforcement and information-integrity response.", "response": "Network disruption, financial investigations, platform actions, public warnings, and election observation.", "inclusion_tier": "A", - "overall_confidence": 0.9, "counterevidence": "The platform totals are not unique people or authenticated Moldovan voters. Operational ties to Shor-affiliated or Russia-linked structures vary by component; direct Kremlin command is not proved for every asset. The presence of AI content and automated accounts does not establish decisive reach or electoral effect.", "open_questions": "Which 2024 network components persisted, which were newly created, and which shared command? What was authentic in-country exposure? Which interventions worked?", "last_verified": "2026-08-11" @@ -193,9 +189,9 @@ "ai_role": "core_generation", "generative_ai_status": "confirmed", "affected_state": "belief|participation", - "agency_transfer_path": "cheap voice impersonation plus mass calling → political operator and telecom chain → voters' beliefs about an authoritative instruction → participation decision displaced by fabricated presidential voice → power concentrates in the impersonator and distributor", - "power_concentrated_in": "political operator and telecom distribution chain", - "democratic_harm": "impersonation of authority, attempted demobilisation signal, and reduced trust in authentic communications", + "control_shift_hypothesis": "Hypothesis: a cloned authoritative voice, spoofed caller ID, and selected call list could displace recipients' control over a participation decision. A demobilising attempt and call delivery are observed; belief or action is not.", + "hypothesized_power_recipient": "political operator and telecom distribution chain", + "democratic_harm": "Observed impersonation of authority and attempted demobilisation; reduced trust is a plausible harm, not a measured outcome.", "occurrence_status": "confirmed", "reach_status": "measured", "reach_estimate": "9581", @@ -205,7 +201,6 @@ "institutional_outcome": "FCC $6 million forfeiture; Lingo $1 million consent decree and compliance plan; state criminal acquittal; later federal civil default judgment and injunction; legal clarification that AI-generated voices fall within TCPA artificial-voice restrictions.", "response": "State investigation and charges; FCC declaratory ruling, enforcement, and provider settlement.", "inclusion_tier": "A", - "overall_confidence": 0.98, "counterevidence": "The jury acquitted Kramer of all 22 state criminal charges; the FCC finding, civil default, and acquittal are distinct proceedings. No credible evidence quantifies changed turnout or votes.", "open_questions": "How many recipients listened, believed, or acted on the call? How should liability be allocated across creator, intermediary, and originating provider?", "last_verified": "2026-08-11" @@ -235,8 +230,8 @@ "ai_role": "mixed", "generative_ai_status": "confirmed", "affected_state": "belief|trust|preference|participation", - "agency_transfer_path": "generative and ranking capabilities → campaigns, providers, and covert operators → voters' information and choice architecture → possible displacement of deliberation or authentic representation → potential power concentration in campaigns and platforms", - "power_concentrated_in": "campaigns, AI providers, and large platforms, constrained by election authorities", + "control_shift_hypothesis": "Monitoring hypothesis only: synthetic generation and ranking systems could alter control over voters' information environments. No incident or agency change is asserted.", + "hypothesized_power_recipient": "potential campaigns, AI providers, and large platforms, constrained by election authorities", "democratic_harm": "prospective: deception, impersonation, discriminatory political violence, suppression, and loss of confidence", "occurrence_status": "partly_confirmed", "reach_status": "unknown", @@ -247,7 +242,6 @@ "institutional_outcome": "Pending; first round scheduled for 4 October 2026 and runoff for 25 October 2026.", "response": "Mandatory AI disclosure, time-limited ban on new candidate/public-figure synthetic media, provider duties, complaint channels, compliance plans, expert partnerships, and monitoring council.", "inclusion_tier": "A", - "overall_confidence": 0.95, "counterevidence": "Brazil's 2024 municipal election research found far less high-impact AI abuse than feared; preparedness and incident counts do not imply electoral effect.", "open_questions": "Will providers comply in practice? How quickly will labelled and unlabelled content be detected and adjudicated? Will rules apply consistently across closed messaging and AI assistants?", "last_verified": "2026-08-11" @@ -277,8 +271,8 @@ "ai_role": "core_generation", "generative_ai_status": "confirmed", "affected_state": "preference|perceived endorsement|trust", - "agency_transfer_path": "synthetic embodiment of a restricted political figure → campaign producer → voters' perception of endorsement and presence → representation mediated by a controllable avatar → power concentrates in the producer deciding what the avatar says", - "power_concentrated_in": "campaign producer controlling the synthetic persona", + "control_shift_hypothesis": "Boundary hypothesis: a disclosed synthetic surrogate could shift control over a represented person's public voice toward a campaign producer. Disclosure is observed; authorisation and any user agency change are unresolved.", + "hypothesized_power_recipient": "campaign producer controlling the synthetic representation", "democratic_harm": "contested: possible circumvention of legal restrictions and manipulation through synthetic political presence", "occurrence_status": "confirmed", "reach_status": "qualitative", @@ -289,7 +283,6 @@ "institutional_outcome": "TSE representation RP 0601315-97.2026.6.00.0000 pending on the merits at the dataset cutoff; an internal TSE meeting was scheduled for 13 August 2026.", "response": "Court petitions and public legal scrutiny under TSE synthetic-content rules.", "inclusion_tier": "A", - "overall_confidence": 0.91, "counterevidence": "The avatar disclosed that it was AI-generated; disclosure weakens a simple covert-deception theory and the campaign denied that the item was an unlawful deepfake. Jair Bolsonaro's authorisation was denied by his lawyers and remains unknown.", "open_questions": "Who authorised and scripted the avatar? Does a labelled clone circumvent communication restrictions? How will TSE distinguish transparent simulation from manipulative synthetic representation?", "last_verified": "2026-08-11" @@ -319,9 +312,9 @@ "ai_role": "mixed", "generative_ai_status": "confirmed", "affected_state": "belief|trust|preference|participation", - "agency_transfer_path": "cheap synthetic production and private distribution rules → campaigns, platforms, providers, and covert actors → voters' information environment → authentic representation and deliberation become harder to verify → power concentrates in producers and intermediaries", - "power_concentrated_in": "campaign committees, platforms, and infrastructure providers", - "democratic_harm": "prospective and observed: fabricated candidate speech, disclosure ambiguity, suppression attempts, and erosion of epistemic trust", + "control_shift_hypothesis": "Monitoring hypothesis only: synthetic production and fragmented distribution governance could alter control over voters' information environments. No 2026 incident or agency change is asserted in this preparedness record.", + "hypothesized_power_recipient": "potential campaign committees, platforms, and infrastructure providers", + "democratic_harm": "Prospective risk categories include fabricated candidate speech, disclosure ambiguity, suppression attempts, and erosion of epistemic trust; this preparedness record does not establish a 2026 incident or outcome.", "occurrence_status": "partly_confirmed", "reach_status": "qualitative", "reach_estimate": "", @@ -331,7 +324,6 @@ "institutional_outcome": "Pending; general election scheduled for 3 November 2026.", "response": "State disclosure and prohibition laws; FCC artificial-voice enforcement; election-security guidance; platform policies; fact-checking and campaign responses.", "inclusion_tier": "A", - "overall_confidence": 0.94, "counterevidence": "Generative AI amplified existing risks more often than creating wholly new ones in prior cycles; observed synthetic ads do not establish electoral effects.", "open_questions": "How will state rules apply across jurisdictions? Will disclosures be salient? Which foreign or domestic networks will achieve measurable reach? Can authentic communications remain verifiable?", "last_verified": "2026-08-11" @@ -361,8 +353,8 @@ "ai_role": "core_generation", "generative_ai_status": "confirmed", "affected_state": "belief|candidate evaluation|trust", - "agency_transfer_path": "realistic candidate simulation → campaign committees → voters' perception of an opponent's speech or conduct → evidentiary cues become campaign-controlled → representational power concentrates in the content producer", - "power_concentrated_in": "campaigns producing and distributing synthetic representations", + "control_shift_hypothesis": "Hypothesis: simulated first-person performance can shift control over a candidate's audiovisual representation toward a sponsor. The assets are observed; any change in voter agency or behaviour is not.", + "hypothesized_power_recipient": "campaign sponsors producing and distributing synthetic representations", "democratic_harm": "possible misattribution of speech, confusion, normalisation of fabricated evidence, and erosion of trust", "occurrence_status": "confirmed", "reach_status": "qualitative", @@ -373,7 +365,6 @@ "institutional_outcome": "Pending.", "response": "Candidate objections, voluntary or state-required disclosures, media verification, and calls for clearer rules.", "inclusion_tier": "A", - "overall_confidence": 0.93, "counterevidence": "Some ads reproduce genuine prior words, contain disclosures, or are framed as satire; these features complicate classification as deception.", "open_questions": "Were disclosures noticed? What impressions and targeting occurred? Do viewers distinguish quotation from fabricated audiovisual evidence? What legal rules apply in each state?", "last_verified": "2026-08-11" @@ -656,14 +647,14 @@ "publisher": "Federal Communications Commission", "author": "", "publication_date": "2024-02-08", - "url": "https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-makes-ai-generated-voices-robocalls-illegal", + "url": "https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-24-17A1.pdf", "source_type": "regulatory_ruling", "primary_secondary": "primary", "jurisdiction": "United States", "language": "en", "source_quality": "A", - "retrieved_at": "2026-08-11", - "notes": "Declaratory ruling that AI-generated voices are artificial voices under the TCPA." + "retrieved_at": "2026-08-15", + "notes": "Declaratory ruling that AI-generated voices are artificial voices under the TCPA. Direct official PDF replacement verified 2026-08-15." }, { "source_id": "src-us-fcc-kramer-nal-20240523", @@ -671,14 +662,14 @@ "publisher": "Federal Communications Commission", "author": "", "publication_date": "2024-05-23", - "url": "https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-proposes-6-million-fine-deepfake-robocalls-around-nh-primary", + "url": "https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-24-59A1.pdf", "source_type": "enforcement_notice", "primary_secondary": "primary", "jurisdiction": "United States", "language": "en", "source_quality": "A", - "retrieved_at": "2026-08-11", - "notes": "Notice of apparent liability, not yet the final forfeiture order." + "retrieved_at": "2026-08-15", + "notes": "Notice of apparent liability, not yet the final forfeiture order. Direct official PDF replacement verified 2026-08-15." }, { "source_id": "src-us-fcc-lingo-nal-pdf-20240523", @@ -716,14 +707,14 @@ "publisher": "Federal Communications Commission", "author": "", "publication_date": "2024-08-21", - "url": "https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-settles-spoofed-ai-generated-robocalls-case", + "url": "https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-24-790A1.pdf", "source_type": "enforcement_settlement", "primary_secondary": "primary", "jurisdiction": "United States", "language": "en", "source_quality": "A", - "retrieved_at": "2026-08-11", - "notes": "Settlement with originating provider; not an adjudication of every allegation." + "retrieved_at": "2026-08-15", + "notes": "Settlement with originating provider; not an adjudication of every allegation. Direct official PDF replacement verified 2026-08-15." }, { "source_id": "src-us-fcc-kramer-fine-20240926", @@ -731,14 +722,14 @@ "publisher": "Federal Communications Commission", "author": "", "publication_date": "2024-09-26", - "url": "https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-issues-6m-fine-nh-robocalls", + "url": "https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-24-104A1.pdf", "source_type": "enforcement_order", "primary_secondary": "primary", "jurisdiction": "United States", "language": "en", "source_quality": "A", - "retrieved_at": "2026-08-11", - "notes": "Final FCC forfeiture action." + "retrieved_at": "2026-08-15", + "notes": "Final FCC forfeiture action. Direct official PDF replacement verified 2026-08-15." }, { "source_id": "src-us-nhpr-acquittal-20250613", @@ -1203,7 +1194,7 @@ "language": "en", "source_quality": "A", "retrieved_at": "2026-08-11", - "notes": "Comparative methodology and field map; this dataset adds claim-level causal and agency-transfer coding." + "notes": "Comparative methodology and field map; this dataset adds claim-level causal safeguards and falsifiable control-shift-hypothesis coding." }, { "source_id": "src-global-row-tracker-20240416", @@ -1243,7 +1234,6 @@ "claim_type": "institutional_outcome", "claim_text": "On 6 December 2024, Romania's Constitutional Court annulled the entire presidential electoral process.", "evidence_label": "established_evidence", - "confidence": 0.99, "source_ids": "src-ro-ccr-20241206|src-ro-ccr-summary-2025", "counter_source_ids": "", "notes": "The institutional act is certain even where its factual and legal justification is debated.", @@ -1256,10 +1246,9 @@ "claim_type": "mechanism", "claim_text": "The official record described opaque and coordinated online promotion that created unequal campaign conditions.", "evidence_label": "established_evidence", - "confidence": 0.9, "source_ids": "src-ro-ccr-summary-2025|src-ro-ifes-202412", "counter_source_ids": "", - "notes": "Established as a feature of the official and independent record; specific sponsors and all network components remain unresolved.", + "notes": "The sources establish that official and independent records described these conditions; they do not resolve every network component, sponsor, or causal effect.", "review_status": "verified", "verified_at": "2026-08-11" }, @@ -1269,7 +1258,6 @@ "claim_type": "response", "claim_text": "The European Commission opened formal DSA proceedings against TikTok concerning election-risk management, recommender systems, political advertising, and coordinated inauthentic manipulation.", "evidence_label": "established_evidence", - "confidence": 0.99, "source_ids": "src-ro-ec-tiktok-20241217", "counter_source_ids": "", "notes": "Opening proceedings is not a final infringement finding.", @@ -1280,12 +1268,11 @@ "claim_id": "clm-ro-004", "case_id": "ro-2024-presidential-annulment", "claim_type": "ai_role", - "claim_text": "Generative AI has not been established as a material driver of the Romanian annulment case.", - "evidence_label": "strong_inference", - "confidence": 0.88, - "source_ids": "src-ro-ccr-summary-2025|src-ro-ec-tiktok-20241217|src-ro-ifes-202412", + "claim_text": "Among the public sources linked to this record at the cutoff, none established generative AI as a material driver of the Romanian annulment case.", + "evidence_label": "not_identified_in_declared_review", + "source_ids": "", "counter_source_ids": "", - "notes": "The central digital mechanism is amplification, coordination, and opaque promotion rather than confirmed synthetic media.", + "notes": "Bounded to the sources linked to this record at the cutoff; this is not proof of absence beyond the declared review.", "review_status": "verified", "verified_at": "2026-08-11" }, @@ -1295,7 +1282,6 @@ "claim_type": "reach", "claim_text": "TikTok reported large-scale prevention of fake engagement and removal of election-related networks, but these platform metrics do not measure voter exposure to the specific campaign.", "evidence_label": "established_evidence", - "confidence": 0.84, "source_ids": "src-ro-tiktok-integrity", "counter_source_ids": "", "notes": "Platform self-report; preserve distinction between prevented actions, removed accounts, impressions, and people reached.", @@ -1306,12 +1292,11 @@ "claim_id": "clm-ro-006", "case_id": "ro-2024-presidential-annulment", "claim_type": "electoral_effect", - "claim_text": "No source in the reviewed record provides a credible causal estimate of votes changed by the coordinated digital campaign.", - "evidence_label": "established_evidence", - "confidence": 0.92, - "source_ids": "src-ro-ccr-summary-2025|src-ro-venice-202503|src-ro-ifes-202412", + "claim_text": "Among the public sources linked to this record at the cutoff, none provided a credible causal estimate of votes changed by the coordinated digital campaign.", + "evidence_label": "not_identified_in_declared_review", + "source_ids": "", "counter_source_ids": "", - "notes": "Absence claim limited to reviewed evidence; update if individual-level or quasi-experimental research appears.", + "notes": "Bounded to the sources linked to this record at the cutoff; this is not proof of absence beyond the declared review.", "review_status": "verified", "verified_at": "2026-08-11" }, @@ -1321,8 +1306,7 @@ "claim_type": "attribution", "claim_text": "A simple claim that Russia alone directed the entire campaign is stronger than the presently coded public evidence supports.", "evidence_label": "strong_inference", - "confidence": 0.82, - "source_ids": "src-ro-ccr-summary-2025|src-ro-ec-tiktok-20241217|src-ro-venice-202503|src-ro-sri-csat-20241204|src-ro-snoop-pnl-20241220", + "source_ids": "src-ro-ccr-summary-2025|src-ro-venice-202503|src-ro-sri-csat-20241204|src-ro-snoop-pnl-20241220", "counter_source_ids": "", "notes": "Code official allegations, technical indicators, domestic financing, and final attribution separately.", "review_status": "verified", @@ -1334,7 +1318,6 @@ "claim_type": "legal_status", "claim_text": "The Venice Commission treated annulment as an exceptional measure requiring clear legal conditions, reliable evidence, procedural safeguards, and proportionality.", "evidence_label": "established_evidence", - "confidence": 0.95, "source_ids": "src-ro-venice-202503", "counter_source_ids": "", "notes": "Normative legal standard, not a factual finding about every Romanian allegation.", @@ -1347,7 +1330,6 @@ "claim_type": "occurrence", "claim_text": "Romania held a repeat presidential election on 4 and 18 May 2025.", "evidence_label": "established_evidence", - "confidence": 0.99, "source_ids": "src-ro-odihr-repeat-final", "counter_source_ids": "", "notes": "", @@ -1360,8 +1342,7 @@ "claim_type": "electoral_effect", "claim_text": "The repeat-election outcome cannot be used as a causal measure of what the annulled 2024 result would have been absent manipulation.", "evidence_label": "strong_inference", - "confidence": 0.94, - "source_ids": "src-ro-odihr-repeat-final|src-ro-venice-202503", + "source_ids": "src-ro-odihr-repeat-final", "counter_source_ids": "", "notes": "The electorate, candidates, campaign, information environment, and institutional context changed.", "review_status": "verified", @@ -1373,7 +1354,6 @@ "claim_type": "occurrence", "claim_text": "A declassified SRI report described an initial network of about 25,000 TikTok accounts activated intensely in the final two weeks before the first round, including 797 accounts created in 2016 that had remained largely inactive until 11 November 2024.", "evidence_label": "established_evidence", - "confidence": 0.97, "source_ids": "src-ro-sri-csat-20241204", "counter_source_ids": "", "notes": "Established as an intelligence-service report. The account count is not independently audited unique reach and does not establish the operator or voter effect.", @@ -1386,7 +1366,6 @@ "claim_type": "reach", "claim_text": "TikTok's separately disclosed Turkey-based network and the SRI-reported 25,000-account network have different scopes and cannot be summed as one operation or one audience estimate.", "evidence_label": "established_evidence", - "confidence": 0.94, "source_ids": "src-ro-tiktok-integrity|src-ro-sri-csat-20241204", "counter_source_ids": "", "notes": "This is a source-scope correction, not an assertion that the networks were unrelated in every respect.", @@ -1399,7 +1378,6 @@ "claim_type": "counterevidence", "claim_text": "Snoop reported that PNL financed the #EchilibrușiVerticalitate influencer campaign, while the contracted firm said its original brief had been altered, diverted, or cloned in Georgescu's favour.", "evidence_label": "established_evidence", - "confidence": 0.9, "source_ids": "src-ro-snoop-pnl-20241220", "counter_source_ids": "", "notes": "The reporting is counterevidence to a one-actor account of all amplification. It does not establish that PNL intended to support Georgescu, nor does it disprove separate foreign-linked activity.", @@ -1412,7 +1390,6 @@ "claim_type": "occurrence", "claim_text": "DFRLab identified at least 215 coordinated or apparently hijacked Facebook, Instagram, and TikTok accounts active from December 2024 through 6 June 2025 that first supported Călin Georgescu and later George Simion while attacking Moldova, France, and the EU.", "evidence_label": "established_evidence", - "confidence": 0.95, "source_ids": "src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826", "counter_source_ids": "", "notes": "Established as a transparent public-data research finding; platform access thresholds may leave additional accounts unobserved.", @@ -1425,7 +1402,6 @@ "claim_type": "reach", "claim_text": "The studied network produced 8,514 posts and accumulated at least 16 million views and 681,000 likes across the three platforms.", "evidence_label": "established_evidence", - "confidence": 0.93, "source_ids": "src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826", "counter_source_ids": "", "notes": "These are non-unique platform metrics, not authenticated Romanian voters, belief, or persuasion.", @@ -1438,7 +1414,6 @@ "claim_type": "ai_role", "claim_text": "The network used generative-AI profile images and descriptions, synthetic Romanian personas, and DreamFace or D-ID-style avatars alongside hijacked accounts and conventional stock footage.", "evidence_label": "established_evidence", - "confidence": 0.91, "source_ids": "src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826", "counter_source_ids": "", "notes": "AI was one component of a broader cross-platform coordination system, not a complete explanation for its reach.", @@ -1451,7 +1426,6 @@ "claim_type": "attribution", "claim_text": "The network's operator and sponsor remain publicly unidentified; pro-Russia narratives and coordinated behaviour do not by themselves establish Russian-state command.", "evidence_label": "open_question", - "confidence": 0.97, "source_ids": "src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826", "counter_source_ids": "", "notes": "Confidence refers to the appropriately unresolved wording, not confidence that no attribution will ever be possible.", @@ -1462,12 +1436,11 @@ "claim_id": "clm-ro-018", "case_id": "ro-2025-presidential-repeat", "claim_type": "electoral_effect", - "claim_text": "No reviewed evidence estimates whether the cross-platform network changed belief, turnout, candidate preference, or the repeat-election result.", - "evidence_label": "open_question", - "confidence": 0.98, - "source_ids": "src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826|src-ro-odihr-repeat-final", + "claim_text": "Among the public sources linked to this record at the cutoff, none estimated whether the cross-platform network changed belief, turnout, candidate preference, or the repeat-election result.", + "evidence_label": "not_identified_in_declared_review", + "source_ids": "", "counter_source_ids": "", - "notes": "Views and likes do not identify a causal effect; the result being upheld does not negate occurrence of the network.", + "notes": "Bounded to the sources linked to this record at the cutoff; this is not proof of absence beyond the declared review.", "review_status": "verified", "verified_at": "2026-08-11" }, @@ -1477,7 +1450,6 @@ "claim_type": "occurrence", "claim_text": "Moldova held the first presidential round and EU constitutional referendum on 20 October 2024 and the presidential runoff on 3 November 2024.", "evidence_label": "established_evidence", - "confidence": 0.99, "source_ids": "src-md-odihr-final-20250314", "counter_source_ids": "", "notes": "", @@ -1490,7 +1462,6 @@ "claim_type": "institutional_outcome", "claim_text": "The EU constitutional amendment was approved by a narrow final majority and Maia Sandu won the presidential runoff.", "evidence_label": "established_evidence", - "confidence": 0.99, "source_ids": "src-md-odihr-final-20250314", "counter_source_ids": "", "notes": "The dataset does not infer that interference explains the margin.", @@ -1503,7 +1474,6 @@ "claim_type": "mechanism", "claim_text": "International observers documented active disinformation and serious concerns about illicit foreign interference affecting campaign conditions.", "evidence_label": "established_evidence", - "confidence": 0.96, "source_ids": "src-md-odihr-prelim-20241021|src-md-odihr-final-20250314", "counter_source_ids": "", "notes": "Observation finding about campaign environment, not a quantified electoral effect.", @@ -1516,7 +1486,6 @@ "claim_type": "mechanism", "claim_text": "Moldovan police alleged that the Shor-linked network transferred tens of millions of dollars to influence voters.", "evidence_label": "established_evidence", - "confidence": 0.97, "source_ids": "src-md-reuters-payments-20241024", "counter_source_ids": "", "notes": "Established as a police allegation reported by Reuters; underlying transfers and intent require their own evidentiary assessment.", @@ -1529,8 +1498,7 @@ "claim_type": "attribution", "claim_text": "Authorities and international institutions attributed major components of the operation to Russia-linked and Shor-linked actors, while Russia and Shor denied wrongdoing.", "evidence_label": "established_evidence", - "confidence": 0.9, - "source_ids": "src-md-odihr-final-20250314|src-md-reuters-payments-20241024|src-md-eeas-activity-2025", + "source_ids": "src-md-odihr-final-20250314|src-md-reuters-payments-20241024", "counter_source_ids": "src-md-reuters-payments-20241024", "notes": "Wording preserves attribution as an official assessment and the denials as counterposition.", "review_status": "verified", @@ -1542,7 +1510,6 @@ "claim_type": "ai_role", "claim_text": "AI-generated impersonation and synthetic content appeared in Moldova's information environment, but the wider interference operation relied heavily on non-AI mechanisms.", "evidence_label": "established_evidence", - "confidence": 0.91, "source_ids": "src-md-eeas-fimi-202401|src-md-odihr-parliament-202602", "counter_source_ids": "", "notes": "Avoids treating illicit finance, bots, and coordinated networks as synonymous with generative AI.", @@ -1555,7 +1522,6 @@ "claim_type": "mechanism", "claim_text": "Meta reported removing a coordinated inauthentic network targeting Russian-speaking audiences in Moldova.", "evidence_label": "established_evidence", - "confidence": 0.95, "source_ids": "src-md-meta-threat-reporting", "counter_source_ids": "", "notes": "Platform self-report; independent replication is limited and gross follower counts largely reflected non-Moldovan or fake engagement.", @@ -1565,13 +1531,12 @@ { "claim_id": "clm-md-008", "case_id": "md-2024-presidential-referendum", - "claim_type": "reach", - "claim_text": "The ODIHR-cited figure of more than 138,000 accounts and transactions across linked investigations is an enforcement indicator, not a count of recipients, exposed people, persuaded voters, or unique accounts.", + "claim_type": "counterevidence", + "claim_text": "The 2026 ODIHR report cited a heterogeneous aggregate of more than 138,000 accounts and transactions across linked 2024–2025 investigations. It cannot be assigned to a single geographic scope, unit, unique population, or voter-reach measure.", "evidence_label": "established_evidence", - "confidence": 0.91, "source_ids": "src-md-odihr-parliament-202602", "counter_source_ids": "", - "notes": "The denominator combines accounts and transactions and may contain repeated entities; do not convert it into people or voter reach.", + "notes": "Retained only as a warning about an official-report aggregate. It is excluded from observations and from the case-level legacy reach fields.", "review_status": "verified", "verified_at": "2026-08-11" }, @@ -1581,7 +1546,6 @@ "claim_type": "behavioural_effect", "claim_text": "Documented payment systems provide evidence of attempted and in some cases accepted inducement, but do not establish how each recipient voted.", "evidence_label": "strong_inference", - "confidence": 0.9, "source_ids": "src-md-reuters-payments-20241024|src-md-odihr-final-20250314", "counter_source_ids": "", "notes": "Acceptance of a payment is not identical to compliance with an instruction.", @@ -1592,12 +1556,11 @@ "claim_id": "clm-md-010", "case_id": "md-2024-presidential-referendum", "claim_type": "electoral_effect", - "claim_text": "No reviewed source provides a credible causal estimate of how many referendum or presidential votes were changed by the influence operation.", - "evidence_label": "established_evidence", - "confidence": 0.93, - "source_ids": "src-md-odihr-final-20250314", + "claim_text": "Among the public sources linked to this record at the cutoff, none provided a credible causal estimate of referendum or presidential votes changed by the influence operation.", + "evidence_label": "not_identified_in_declared_review", + "source_ids": "", "counter_source_ids": "", - "notes": "The narrow margin increases importance but does not supply causal identification.", + "notes": "Bounded to the sources linked to this record at the cutoff; this is not proof of absence beyond the declared review.", "review_status": "verified", "verified_at": "2026-08-11" }, @@ -1607,7 +1570,6 @@ "claim_type": "counterevidence", "claim_text": "Observers also found incumbent advantage, insufficient safeguards against misuse of administrative resources, and media imbalances.", "evidence_label": "established_evidence", - "confidence": 0.96, "source_ids": "src-md-odihr-prelim-20241021|src-md-odihr-final-20250314", "counter_source_ids": "", "notes": "Prevents the foreign-interference frame from obscuring domestic electoral-integrity problems.", @@ -1620,7 +1582,6 @@ "claim_type": "mechanism", "claim_text": "The 2025 parliamentary-election observation record described inauthentic account networks, troll farms, automated bots, AI videos, disinformation, and foreign-funded vote-buying infrastructure.", "evidence_label": "established_evidence", - "confidence": 0.96, "source_ids": "src-md-odihr-parliament-202602", "counter_source_ids": "", "notes": "Evidence concerns a linked later election and is not silently back-projected into every 2024 event.", @@ -1633,7 +1594,6 @@ "claim_type": "electoral_effect", "claim_text": "The persistence of a network across elections does not establish that AI-generated content or bots determined the 2025 outcome.", "evidence_label": "strong_inference", - "confidence": 0.94, "source_ids": "src-md-odihr-parliament-202602", "counter_source_ids": "", "notes": "", @@ -1646,7 +1606,6 @@ "claim_type": "reach", "claim_text": "Meta reported about 4,200 Facebook Page followers and 335,000 Instagram followers for the removed Moldova-focused network, but said the vast majority were outside Moldova and indicative of fake engagement; it assessed that the operation had not built an authentic audience before disruption.", "evidence_label": "established_evidence", - "confidence": 0.97, "source_ids": "src-md-meta-threat-reporting", "counter_source_ids": "", "notes": "Established as platform telemetry and assessment. Gross followers must not be reported as Moldovan voter reach.", @@ -1659,8 +1618,7 @@ "claim_type": "occurrence", "claim_text": "DFRLab analysed 253 inauthentic accounts in a paid InfoLeaders network linked through undercover reporting to Telegram-based recruitment, training, task assignment, and mutual amplification.", "evidence_label": "established_evidence", - "confidence": 0.95, - "source_ids": "src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924|src-md-odihr-parliament-202602", + "source_ids": "src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924", "counter_source_ids": "", "notes": "The platform sample and the wider number of recruited people are different denominators.", "review_status": "verified", @@ -1672,7 +1630,6 @@ "claim_type": "reach", "claim_text": "The 253-account InfoLeaders sample produced 28,708 posts, 55,367,950 views, 2,207,894 likes, 295,608 shares, and 239,016 comments across TikTok, Facebook, and Instagram.", "evidence_label": "established_evidence", - "confidence": 0.93, "source_ids": "src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924", "counter_source_ids": "", "notes": "Platform totals are non-unique, can include repeat or inauthentic engagement, and do not measure belief or votes.", @@ -1685,7 +1642,6 @@ "claim_type": "mechanism", "claim_text": "Curators required local-looking participants to personalise centrally supplied messages while retaining assigned hashtags and to amplify one another, making paid coordination appear to be spontaneous peer speech.", "evidence_label": "established_evidence", - "confidence": 0.92, "source_ids": "src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924", "counter_source_ids": "", "notes": "AI-assisted rephrasing was an enabling layer within a paid human and bot-coordinated system, not the sole mechanism.", @@ -1696,12 +1652,11 @@ "claim_id": "clm-md-018", "case_id": "md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network", "claim_type": "attribution", - "claim_text": "The InfoLeaders network had strong operational links to Shor-affiliated or Moscow-linked structures, but the public record does not independently establish direct Kremlin command of every account or asset.", - "evidence_label": "strong_inference", - "confidence": 0.88, - "source_ids": "src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924|src-md-odihr-parliament-202602", + "claim_text": "Among the public sources linked to this record at the cutoff, none independently established direct Kremlin command of every InfoLeaders account or asset.", + "evidence_label": "not_identified_in_declared_review", + "source_ids": "", "counter_source_ids": "", - "notes": "Beneficiary, operational affiliate, funder, state-aligned ecosystem, and direct command are kept separate.", + "notes": "Bounded to the sources linked to this record at the cutoff; this is not proof of absence beyond the declared review.", "review_status": "verified", "verified_at": "2026-08-11" }, @@ -1709,12 +1664,11 @@ "claim_id": "clm-md-019", "case_id": "md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network", "claim_type": "electoral_effect", - "claim_text": "No reviewed evidence provides a causal estimate of belief, turnout, votes, seats, or the 2025 result attributable to the InfoLeaders network, synthetic media, or automated accounts.", - "evidence_label": "open_question", - "confidence": 0.98, - "source_ids": "src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924|src-md-odihr-parliament-202602", + "claim_text": "Among the public sources linked to this record at the cutoff, none provided a causal estimate of belief, turnout, votes, seats, or the 2025 result attributable to the coded network, synthetic media, or automated accounts.", + "evidence_label": "not_identified_in_declared_review", + "source_ids": "", "counter_source_ids": "", - "notes": "The election result and institutional validation do not erase documented interference, but neither identifies a numeric effect.", + "notes": "Bounded to the sources linked to this record at the cutoff; this is not proof of absence beyond the declared review.", "review_status": "verified", "verified_at": "2026-08-11" }, @@ -1724,7 +1678,6 @@ "claim_type": "occurrence", "claim_text": "An AI-generated voice impersonating President Joe Biden was used in robocalls before the New Hampshire presidential primary.", "evidence_label": "established_evidence", - "confidence": 0.99, "source_ids": "src-us-fcc-kramer-nal-20240523|src-us-nhdoj-kramer-20240523|src-us-fcc-kramer-fine-20240926", "counter_source_ids": "", "notes": "", @@ -1737,7 +1690,6 @@ "claim_type": "mechanism", "claim_text": "The call told recipients to save their vote for November rather than participate in the primary.", "evidence_label": "established_evidence", - "confidence": 0.99, "source_ids": "src-us-fcc-kramer-nal-20240523|src-us-nhdoj-kramer-20240523", "counter_source_ids": "", "notes": "The content has a demobilising instruction; criminal intent and legal guilt are separate questions.", @@ -1750,7 +1702,6 @@ "claim_type": "attribution", "claim_text": "Steve Kramer admitted commissioning the AI-generated robocall.", "evidence_label": "established_evidence", - "confidence": 0.99, "source_ids": "src-us-fcc-kramer-fine-20240926|src-us-nhpr-acquittal-20250613", "counter_source_ids": "", "notes": "Admission to creation does not equal conviction on the state charges.", @@ -1763,7 +1714,6 @@ "claim_type": "reach", "claim_text": "Voice Broadcasting initiated 9,581 call attempts, and Lingo records showed 3,978 completed calls bearing A-level attestations.", "evidence_label": "established_evidence", - "confidence": 0.99, "source_ids": "src-us-fcc-kramer-final-pdf-20240926|src-us-fcc-lingo-consent-202408", "counter_source_ids": "", "notes": "Calls are not equivalent to unique people reached, completed calls, or listeners.", @@ -1776,7 +1726,6 @@ "claim_type": "mechanism", "claim_text": "Caller-ID spoofing and inaccurate attestation in the telecom chain increased the call's apparent authenticity and deliverability.", "evidence_label": "established_evidence", - "confidence": 0.97, "source_ids": "src-us-fcc-lingo-nal-pdf-20240523|src-us-fcc-lingo-settlement-20240821", "counter_source_ids": "", "notes": "Shows that the case is an infrastructure chain, not merely a generated audio file.", @@ -1789,7 +1738,6 @@ "claim_type": "legal_status", "claim_text": "The FCC ruled that AI-generated voices fall within the TCPA's restriction on artificial or prerecorded voices.", "evidence_label": "established_evidence", - "confidence": 0.99, "source_ids": "src-us-fcc-ai-voice-20240208", "counter_source_ids": "", "notes": "", @@ -1802,7 +1750,6 @@ "claim_type": "institutional_outcome", "claim_text": "The FCC issued a $6 million forfeiture against Kramer, while Lingo agreed separately to a $1 million civil penalty and compliance plan.", "evidence_label": "established_evidence", - "confidence": 0.99, "source_ids": "src-us-fcc-kramer-final-pdf-20240926|src-us-fcc-lingo-consent-202408", "counter_source_ids": "", "notes": "Separate creator and provider actions.", @@ -1815,7 +1762,6 @@ "claim_type": "legal_status", "claim_text": "A New Hampshire jury acquitted Kramer of all 22 state criminal charges in June 2025.", "evidence_label": "established_evidence", - "confidence": 0.98, "source_ids": "src-us-nhpr-acquittal-20250613|src-us-ap-kramer-acquittal-20250613", "counter_source_ids": "", "notes": "The acquittal must appear wherever the charging decision is discussed.", @@ -1826,12 +1772,11 @@ "claim_id": "clm-nh-009", "case_id": "us-nh-2024-biden-robocall", "claim_type": "behavioural_effect", - "claim_text": "No reviewed evidence measures how many recipients believed or acted on the robocall.", - "evidence_label": "established_evidence", - "confidence": 0.95, - "source_ids": "src-us-fcc-kramer-fine-20240926|src-us-nhpr-acquittal-20250613", + "claim_text": "Among the public sources linked to this record at the cutoff, none measured how many recipients believed or acted on the robocall.", + "evidence_label": "not_identified_in_declared_review", + "source_ids": "", "counter_source_ids": "", - "notes": "Update if survey, turnout linkage, or experimental evidence specific to recipients becomes available.", + "notes": "Bounded to the sources linked to this record at the cutoff; this is not proof of absence beyond the declared review.", "review_status": "verified", "verified_at": "2026-08-11" }, @@ -1839,12 +1784,11 @@ "claim_id": "clm-nh-010", "case_id": "us-nh-2024-biden-robocall", "claim_type": "electoral_effect", - "claim_text": "No credible causal estimate links the robocall to primary turnout or vote totals.", - "evidence_label": "established_evidence", - "confidence": 0.96, - "source_ids": "src-us-fcc-kramer-fine-20240926|src-us-nhpr-acquittal-20250613", + "claim_text": "Among the public sources linked to this record at the cutoff, none provided a credible causal estimate linking the robocall to primary turnout or vote totals.", + "evidence_label": "not_identified_in_declared_review", + "source_ids": "", "counter_source_ids": "", - "notes": "", + "notes": "Bounded to the sources linked to this record at the cutoff; this is not proof of absence beyond the declared review.", "review_status": "verified", "verified_at": "2026-08-11" }, @@ -1854,7 +1798,6 @@ "claim_type": "institutional_outcome", "claim_text": "In November 2025, a federal court entered default judgment against Kramer, awarded individual monetary relief, and permanently enjoined similar voter-coercion schemes.", "evidence_label": "established_evidence", - "confidence": 0.95, "source_ids": "src-us-lwv-kramer-civil|src-us-ap-kramer-default-202511", "counter_source_ids": "", "notes": "The judgment followed nonappearance and must be described as a default, not a contested merits trial.", @@ -1864,14 +1807,13 @@ { "claim_id": "clm-nh-012", "case_id": "us-nh-2024-biden-robocall", - "claim_type": "agency_transfer", - "claim_text": "The cloned presidential voice, politically selected call list, and spoofed trusted in-state number transferred control over apparent authorship and relevance of a participation instruction to the operator.", - "evidence_label": "strong_inference", - "confidence": 0.9, - "source_ids": "src-us-fcc-kramer-final-pdf-20240926|src-us-fcc-lingo-consent-202408", + "claim_type": "control_shift_hypothesis", + "claim_text": "Hypothesis: a cloned presidential voice, selected call list, and spoofed trusted number could shift control over apparent authorship and relevance of a participation instruction toward the operator; recipient agency change is not observed.", + "evidence_label": "researcher_hypothesis", + "source_ids": "", "counter_source_ids": "", - "notes": "The mechanism is strongly supported; its effect on any individual recipient is unmeasured.", - "review_status": "verified", + "notes": "Analytical hypothesis linked through the pathway to factual claims; it is not direct evidence of an agency outcome.", + "review_status": "analytical_hypothesis", "verified_at": "2026-08-11" }, { @@ -1880,7 +1822,6 @@ "claim_type": "occurrence", "claim_text": "Brazil's 2026 general election first round is scheduled for 4 October, with a possible runoff on 25 October.", "evidence_label": "established_evidence", - "confidence": 0.99, "source_ids": "src-br-tse-calendar-202603", "counter_source_ids": "", "notes": "Prospective date, not an observed election result.", @@ -1893,7 +1834,6 @@ "claim_type": "legal_status", "claim_text": "TSE rules require explicit, prominent, accessible disclosure of synthetic multimedia used in electoral advertising and identification of the technology used.", "evidence_label": "established_evidence", - "confidence": 0.99, "source_ids": "src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302|src-br-tse-ai-rules-202604", "counter_source_ids": "", "notes": "Resolution 23.755 amends the standing electoral-advertising rule.", @@ -1906,7 +1846,6 @@ "claim_type": "legal_status", "claim_text": "Brazil prohibits publication or republication of new synthetic content using a candidate's or public figure's image, voice, or manifestation from 72 hours before until 24 hours after voting ends, even if labelled.", "evidence_label": "established_evidence", - "confidence": 0.99, "source_ids": "src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302", "counter_source_ids": "", "notes": "Time-window prohibition is distinct from the general disclosure requirement.", @@ -1919,7 +1858,6 @@ "claim_type": "legal_status", "claim_text": "AI application providers may not rank, recommend, suggest, prioritise, endorse, or disfavor candidates, campaigns, parties, federations, or coalitions in automated responses.", "evidence_label": "established_evidence", - "confidence": 0.99, "source_ids": "src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302", "counter_source_ids": "", "notes": "A direct regulation of AI-system outputs, not only political advertising.", @@ -1932,7 +1870,6 @@ "claim_type": "response", "claim_text": "Platforms offering political-content boosting must provide a field for advertisers to declare AI use.", "evidence_label": "established_evidence", - "confidence": 0.99, "source_ids": "src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302", "counter_source_ids": "", "notes": "", @@ -1945,7 +1882,6 @@ "claim_type": "response", "claim_text": "Internet application providers must prepare measurable election-compliance plans, and the TSE set 16 August 2026 as the submission deadline.", "evidence_label": "established_evidence", - "confidence": 0.98, "source_ids": "src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302|src-br-tse-compliance-202607", "counter_source_ids": "", "notes": "Future QA should archive submitted plans and assess measurable implementation.", @@ -1958,7 +1894,6 @@ "claim_type": "response", "claim_text": "By 11 August 2026, the TSE had announced platform partnerships, an AGU agreement, an information-integrity and AI monitoring council, and a voice-deepfake cooperation agreement with ElevenLabs.", "evidence_label": "established_evidence", - "confidence": 0.98, "source_ids": "src-br-tse-platforms-202607|src-br-tse-agu-20260803|src-br-tse-council-20260807|src-br-tse-elevenlabs-202608", "counter_source_ids": "", "notes": "Institutional capacity indicators; effectiveness not yet established.", @@ -1971,7 +1906,6 @@ "claim_type": "counterevidence", "claim_text": "Empirical research on Brazil's 2024 municipal elections found isolated AI misuse and broad campaign experimentation, but not the predicted wave of high-impact generative-AI manipulation.", "evidence_label": "established_evidence", - "confidence": 0.88, "source_ids": "src-br-aio-202411", "counter_source_ids": "", "notes": "A prior-cycle base rate, not a forecast for 2026.", @@ -1984,7 +1918,6 @@ "claim_type": "electoral_effect", "claim_text": "No 2026 electoral effect can be coded before voting, and observed incidents must not be converted into predictions.", "evidence_label": "open_question", - "confidence": 0.99, "source_ids": "", "counter_source_ids": "", "notes": "Dataset guardrail rather than an empirical outcome claim.", @@ -1997,7 +1930,6 @@ "claim_type": "occurrence", "claim_text": "A synthetic image-and-voice avatar of Jair Bolsonaro appeared at the 25 July 2026 launch of Flávio Bolsonaro's presidential campaign.", "evidence_label": "established_evidence", - "confidence": 0.99, "source_ids": "src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728", "counter_source_ids": "", "notes": "", @@ -2010,7 +1942,6 @@ "claim_type": "mechanism", "claim_text": "The avatar explicitly disclosed that its image and voice were generated with AI and then delivered a political endorsement message.", "evidence_label": "established_evidence", - "confidence": 0.99, "source_ids": "src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728", "counter_source_ids": "", "notes": "A labelled synthetic political persona; not a covert deepfake in the narrow sense.", @@ -2023,7 +1954,6 @@ "claim_type": "legal_status", "claim_text": "Opposing parties challenged the avatar in court, while Flávio Bolsonaro's lawyers argued that disclosure and the absence of mixed real footage made it lawful.", "evidence_label": "established_evidence", - "confidence": 0.97, "source_ids": "src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728", "counter_source_ids": "src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728", "notes": "Established that the competing claims were made; neither claim is treated as finally adjudicated.", @@ -2034,12 +1964,11 @@ "claim_id": "clm-br-013", "case_id": "br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar", "claim_type": "legal_status", - "claim_text": "As of 11 August 2026, the TSE had not finally resolved whether the avatar violated the electoral AI rules.", - "evidence_label": "established_evidence", - "confidence": 0.93, - "source_ids": "src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728", + "claim_text": "Among the public sources linked to this record at the cutoff, no final TSE merits decision on the avatar's compliance with electoral AI rules was identified.", + "evidence_label": "not_identified_in_declared_review", + "source_ids": "", "counter_source_ids": "", - "notes": "Time-sensitive negative status; requires re-verification.", + "notes": "Bounded to the sources linked to this record at the cutoff; this is not proof of absence beyond the declared review.", "review_status": "needs_update", "verified_at": "2026-08-11" }, @@ -2047,12 +1976,11 @@ "claim_id": "clm-br-014", "case_id": "br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar", "claim_type": "behavioural_effect", - "claim_text": "No reviewed evidence measures whether the avatar changed voter beliefs, candidate preference, or turnout intention.", - "evidence_label": "established_evidence", - "confidence": 0.94, - "source_ids": "src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728", + "claim_text": "Among the public sources linked to this record at the cutoff, none measured whether the avatar changed voter beliefs, candidate preference, or turnout intention.", + "evidence_label": "not_identified_in_declared_review", + "source_ids": "", "counter_source_ids": "", - "notes": "Update if campaign experiments, polling, or platform exposure data become available.", + "notes": "Bounded to the sources linked to this record at the cutoff; this is not proof of absence beyond the declared review.", "review_status": "needs_update", "verified_at": "2026-08-11" }, @@ -2062,7 +1990,6 @@ "claim_type": "legal_status", "claim_text": "Federação Brasil da Esperança filed TSE representation RP 0601315-97.2026.6.00.0000 on 26 July 2026 alleging premature propaganda and unlawful synthetic-media use.", "evidence_label": "established_evidence", - "confidence": 0.99, "source_ids": "src-br-avatar-petition-20260726", "counter_source_ids": "", "notes": "The filing and allegations are established; the alleged violations are not.", @@ -2075,7 +2002,6 @@ "claim_type": "legal_status", "claim_text": "Art. 9-B requires disclosure, Art. 9-B §3 bars certain simulated interlocution with a candidate or real person, and Art. 9-C §1 bars synthetic audio or video used to favor or harm a candidacy even when authorised.", "evidence_label": "established_evidence", - "confidence": 0.99, "source_ids": "src-br-tse-res-23610-consolidated", "counter_source_ids": "", "notes": "The legal text is established; application to this disclosed, one-way convention avatar remains unresolved.", @@ -2088,7 +2014,6 @@ "claim_type": "counterevidence", "claim_text": "The avatar's up-front AI disclosure supports compliance with the labelling duty but does not by itself resolve the separate simulated-interlocution or pro-candidacy synthetic-media prohibitions.", "evidence_label": "strong_inference", - "confidence": 0.93, "source_ids": "src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728|src-br-tse-res-23610-consolidated", "counter_source_ids": "src-br-folha-avatar-defense-202607", "notes": "The defence argues that disclosure and lack of deception remove it from the deepfake prohibition; no merits court had accepted or rejected that reading by the cutoff.", @@ -2101,7 +2026,6 @@ "claim_type": "counterevidence", "claim_text": "The 72-hour pre-election and 24-hour post-election blackout in Art. 9-B §3-A did not apply by timing to the 25 July convention.", "evidence_label": "established_evidence", - "confidence": 0.99, "source_ids": "src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302|src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728", "counter_source_ids": "", "notes": "Other provisions may still apply; retain the blackout rule for prospective monitoring only.", @@ -2114,7 +2038,6 @@ "claim_type": "attribution", "claim_text": "Jair Bolsonaro's lawyers denied that he authorised or knew of the avatar's production; his personal authorisation therefore remains unknown rather than disproved.", "evidence_label": "established_evidence", - "confidence": 0.95, "source_ids": "src-br-ft-avatar-202607|src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728", "counter_source_ids": "", "notes": "A denial establishes the defence position, not the underlying absence of authorisation.", @@ -2124,14 +2047,13 @@ { "claim_id": "clm-br-020", "case_id": "br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar", - "claim_type": "agency_transfer", - "claim_text": "The disclosed avatar operated as a synthetic political surrogate, letting the beneficiary campaign deploy Jair Bolsonaro's recognisable persona and endorsement without his physical or verified public participation.", - "evidence_label": "strong_inference", - "confidence": 0.91, - "source_ids": "src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728|src-br-ft-avatar-202607", + "claim_type": "control_shift_hypothesis", + "claim_text": "Boundary hypothesis: a disclosed synthetic surrogate could shift control over Jair Bolsonaro's public representation toward the beneficiary campaign; disclosure, unresolved authorisation, and unmeasured audience interpretation prevent a stronger conclusion.", + "evidence_label": "researcher_hypothesis", + "source_ids": "", "counter_source_ids": "", - "notes": "Whether this legally circumvented a specific restriction depends partly on authorisation and future rulings.", - "review_status": "needs_update", + "notes": "Analytical hypothesis linked through the pathway to factual claims; it is not direct evidence of an agency outcome.", + "review_status": "analytical_hypothesis", "verified_at": "2026-08-11" }, { @@ -2140,7 +2062,6 @@ "claim_type": "occurrence", "claim_text": "The 2026 United States general election is scheduled for 3 November 2026.", "evidence_label": "established_evidence", - "confidence": 0.99, "source_ids": "src-us-fec-dates-2026", "counter_source_ids": "", "notes": "", @@ -2153,7 +2074,6 @@ "claim_type": "legal_status", "claim_text": "As of 23 June 2026, 31 states had enacted laws regulating deepfakes in political messaging, with materially different prohibition and disclosure models.", "evidence_label": "established_evidence", - "confidence": 0.98, "source_ids": "src-us-ncsl-20260623", "counter_source_ids": "", "notes": "Enactment, effective date, scope, and litigation status should be tracked separately.", @@ -2166,7 +2086,6 @@ "claim_type": "legal_status", "claim_text": "The United States lacks a broad federal rule uniformly governing AI-generated political messages across the 2026 election.", "evidence_label": "established_evidence", - "confidence": 0.95, "source_ids": "src-us-fec-ai-disposition-2024|src-us-ncsl-20260623|src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328", "counter_source_ids": "src-us-fcc-ai-voice-20240208", "notes": "Narrow federal rules remain relevant, especially telecom law and fraudulent misrepresentation.", @@ -2179,7 +2098,6 @@ "claim_type": "ai_role", "claim_text": "CISA assessed generative AI as more likely to amplify existing election risks than create wholly new risk categories.", "evidence_label": "established_evidence", - "confidence": 0.98, "source_ids": "src-us-cisa-genai-202401", "counter_source_ids": "", "notes": "Prior-cycle risk assessment used as a conceptual baseline.", @@ -2192,7 +2110,6 @@ "claim_type": "attribution", "claim_text": "Prior U.S. intelligence assessments establish that foreign actors used synthetic or manipulated content in the 2024 cycle, supporting a monitored 2026 risk but not proving a new 2026 operation.", "evidence_label": "established_evidence", - "confidence": 0.94, "source_ids": "src-us-odni-update-20241021", "counter_source_ids": "", "notes": "Strict temporal separation between prior evidence and current incidents.", @@ -2205,7 +2122,6 @@ "claim_type": "counterevidence", "claim_text": "A platform assessment of the 2024 global cycle reported that generative-AI misinformation had limited reach on Meta services.", "evidence_label": "established_evidence", - "confidence": 0.82, "source_ids": "src-global-meta-muted-20241203", "counter_source_ids": "", "notes": "Interested-party assessment reported by Reuters; not generalisable to every platform or 2026.", @@ -2218,7 +2134,6 @@ "claim_type": "electoral_effect", "claim_text": "No 2026 electoral effect can be coded before the election, and prior-cycle incident counts do not supply a forecast.", "evidence_label": "open_question", - "confidence": 0.99, "source_ids": "", "counter_source_ids": "", "notes": "Dataset guardrail.", @@ -2231,7 +2146,6 @@ "claim_type": "occurrence", "claim_text": "On 11 March 2026, the National Republican Senatorial Committee released an AI-generated video depicting James Talarico reciting text from prior social-media posts.", "evidence_label": "established_evidence", - "confidence": 0.99, "source_ids": "src-us-nrsc-talarico-20260311|src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328", "counter_source_ids": "", "notes": "The source quotes the committee defending the ad.", @@ -2244,7 +2158,6 @@ "claim_type": "mechanism", "claim_text": "The Talarico ad carried an AI-generated disclosure in small, easy-to-miss text.", "evidence_label": "established_evidence", - "confidence": 0.98, "source_ids": "src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328|src-us-berkeley-talarico-2026", "counter_source_ids": "", "notes": "Disclosure existence and disclosure salience are distinct variables.", @@ -2257,7 +2170,6 @@ "claim_type": "reach", "claim_text": "Public reporting identified at least three recent national-Republican synthetic ads by March 2026, but did not provide comparable impression or targeting data.", "evidence_label": "established_evidence", - "confidence": 0.95, "source_ids": "src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328", "counter_source_ids": "", "notes": "Content count is not audience reach.", @@ -2270,7 +2182,6 @@ "claim_type": "mechanism", "claim_text": "Additional 2026 election ads fabricated audiovisual speech or conduct by Jon Ossoff, John Cornyn, and Ken Paxton, with varying levels of obviousness and disclosure.", "evidence_label": "established_evidence", - "confidence": 0.96, "source_ids": "src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328", "counter_source_ids": "", "notes": "Record separate items in a later content-level expansion rather than treating them as identical.", @@ -2281,12 +2192,11 @@ "claim_id": "clm-us26-012", "case_id": "us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads", "claim_type": "behavioural_effect", - "claim_text": "The reviewed reporting does not measure whether any named 2026 synthetic ad changed candidate evaluations, turnout intention, or vote choice.", - "evidence_label": "established_evidence", - "confidence": 0.95, - "source_ids": "src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328", + "claim_text": "Among the public sources linked to this record at the cutoff, none measured whether a named 2026 synthetic ad changed candidate evaluations, turnout intention, or vote choice.", + "evidence_label": "not_identified_in_declared_review", + "source_ids": "", "counter_source_ids": "", - "notes": "General deepfake experiments cannot substitute for item-specific field effects.", + "notes": "Bounded to the sources linked to this record at the cutoff; this is not proof of absence beyond the declared review.", "review_status": "needs_update", "verified_at": "2026-08-11" }, @@ -2296,7 +2206,6 @@ "claim_type": "counterevidence", "claim_text": "Some 2026 campaign-generated videos reproduce genuine prior words, are labelled, or use obvious satire, complicating a binary real-versus-deceptive classification.", "evidence_label": "established_evidence", - "confidence": 0.95, "source_ids": "src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328", "counter_source_ids": "", "notes": "Motivates content-level coding for quotation fidelity, disclosure, realism, authorisation, and context.", @@ -2309,7 +2218,6 @@ "claim_type": "mechanism", "claim_text": "Much of the Talarico attack used genuine older posts, but the synthetic first-person performance added reaction lines and affect not contained in those quoted posts.", "evidence_label": "established_evidence", - "confidence": 0.97, "source_ids": "src-us-nrsc-talarico-20260311|src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328", "counter_source_ids": "", "notes": "Do not describe every spoken proposition as fabricated; separate authentic underlying text from invented performance and asides.", @@ -2320,27 +2228,73 @@ "claim_id": "clm-us26-015", "case_id": "us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads", "claim_type": "reach", - "claim_text": "A platform snapshot on 11 August 2026 displayed roughly 3,700 YouTube views for the NRSC upload, while cross-platform impressions and unique exposure remained unavailable.", - "evidence_label": "established_evidence", - "confidence": 0.88, - "source_ids": "src-us-nrsc-talarico-youtube", + "claim_text": "Among the public sources linked to this record at the cutoff, none provided a preserved, reproducible measure of cross-platform impressions or unique exposure for the NRSC upload.", + "evidence_label": "not_identified_in_declared_review", + "source_ids": "", "counter_source_ids": "", - "notes": "Dynamic, non-unique, one-platform metric; must be rechecked and never combined with earned-media readership as unique exposure.", - "review_status": "needs_update", + "notes": "The mutable YouTube counter was not retained as evidence without a preserved snapshot. This bounded non-identification statement is not proof that no exposure occurred.", + "review_status": "verified", "verified_at": "2026-08-11" }, { "claim_id": "clm-us26-016", "case_id": "us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads", - "claim_type": "agency_transfer", - "claim_text": "By making an opponent appear to speak and react on camera, the sponsor controlled not only message selection but the target's simulated voice, face, timing, and affect.", - "evidence_label": "strong_inference", - "confidence": 0.94, - "source_ids": "src-us-nrsc-talarico-20260311|src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328|src-us-berkeley-talarico-2026", + "claim_type": "control_shift_hypothesis", + "claim_text": "Hypothesis: simulated first-person performance could shift control over an opponent's audiovisual representation toward the sponsor; the record observes content production, not voter agency change.", + "evidence_label": "researcher_hypothesis", + "source_ids": "", "counter_source_ids": "", - "notes": "The genuine underlying posts constrain how much substantive policy content was invented.", - "review_status": "verified", + "notes": "Analytical hypothesis linked through the pathway to factual claims; it is not direct evidence of an agency outcome.", + "review_status": "analytical_hypothesis", "verified_at": "2026-08-11" + }, + { + "claim_id": "clm-ro-020", + "case_id": "ro-2024-presidential-annulment", + "claim_type": "control_shift_hypothesis", + "claim_text": "Hypothesis: opaque coordinated promotion and recommender amplification could shift agenda-setting control toward campaign-network operators and ranking systems; the record does not observe individual agency change or establish a causal link to annulment.", + "evidence_label": "researcher_hypothesis", + "source_ids": "", + "counter_source_ids": "", + "notes": "Analytical synthesis of clm-ro-002, clm-ro-003, clm-ro-006, clm-ro-007, and clm-ro-013; not an observed agency outcome.", + "review_status": "analytical_hypothesis", + "verified_at": "2026-08-12" + }, + { + "claim_id": "clm-ro-021", + "case_id": "ro-2025-presidential-repeat", + "claim_type": "control_shift_hypothesis", + "claim_text": "Hypothesis: synthetic local personas and coordinated distribution could shift control over apparent local consensus toward an unidentified operator; user belief, choice, and electoral effects are not observed.", + "evidence_label": "researcher_hypothesis", + "source_ids": "", + "counter_source_ids": "", + "notes": "Analytical synthesis of clm-ro-014 through clm-ro-018; not an observed agency outcome.", + "review_status": "analytical_hypothesis", + "verified_at": "2026-08-12" + }, + { + "claim_id": "clm-md-020", + "case_id": "md-2024-presidential-referendum", + "claim_type": "control_shift_hypothesis", + "claim_text": "Hypothesis: covert payments, coordination, and impersonation could shift control over participation or preference toward sponsors; the record supports an inducement attempt but not how recipients voted.", + "evidence_label": "researcher_hypothesis", + "source_ids": "", + "counter_source_ids": "", + "notes": "Analytical synthesis of clm-md-003 through clm-md-011; not an observed agency outcome.", + "review_status": "analytical_hypothesis", + "verified_at": "2026-08-12" + }, + { + "claim_id": "clm-md-021", + "case_id": "md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network", + "claim_type": "control_shift_hypothesis", + "claim_text": "Hypothesis: centrally tasked paid personas and reciprocal amplification could shift agenda control toward network curators; content and engagement are observed, but user agency and electoral effects are not.", + "evidence_label": "researcher_hypothesis", + "source_ids": "", + "counter_source_ids": "", + "notes": "Analytical synthesis of clm-md-012, clm-md-015 through clm-md-019; not an observed agency outcome.", + "review_status": "analytical_hypothesis", + "verified_at": "2026-08-12" } ], "events": [ @@ -2656,69 +2610,447 @@ } ], "case_sources": [ - {"case_id": "ro-2024-presidential-annulment", "source_id": "src-ro-ccr-20241206", "source_role": "primary_record", "supports_claim_types": "institutional_outcome", "notes": ""}, - {"case_id": "ro-2024-presidential-annulment", "source_id": "src-ro-ccr-summary-2025", "source_role": "primary_record", "supports_claim_types": "mechanism|ai_role|attribution|electoral_effect|institutional_outcome", "notes": ""}, - {"case_id": "ro-2024-presidential-annulment", "source_id": "src-ro-ec-tiktok-20241217", "source_role": "primary_record", "supports_claim_types": "mechanism|ai_role|attribution|response", "notes": "Proceeding open, no final infringement finding."}, - {"case_id": "ro-2024-presidential-annulment", "source_id": "src-ro-venice-202503", "source_role": "methodology", "supports_claim_types": "attribution|electoral_effect|legal_status|counterevidence", "notes": ""}, - {"case_id": "ro-2024-presidential-annulment", "source_id": "src-ro-tiktok-integrity", "source_role": "context", "supports_claim_types": "reach|response", "notes": "Platform self-report."}, - {"case_id": "ro-2024-presidential-annulment", "source_id": "src-ro-ifes-202412", "source_role": "corroboration", "supports_claim_types": "mechanism|ai_role|electoral_effect", "notes": ""}, - {"case_id": "ro-2024-presidential-annulment", "source_id": "src-ro-sri-csat-20241204", "source_role": "primary_record", "supports_claim_types": "occurrence|reach|attribution", "notes": "Authoritative record of the intelligence assessment, not a final adjudication."}, - {"case_id": "ro-2024-presidential-annulment", "source_id": "src-ro-snoop-pnl-20241220", "source_role": "counterevidence", "supports_claim_types": "attribution|counterevidence", "notes": "PNL-funded brief is distinct from other network components; intent to support Georgescu is not established."}, - {"case_id": "ro-2025-presidential-repeat", "source_id": "src-ro-odihr-repeat-final", "source_role": "primary_record", "supports_claim_types": "occurrence|institutional_outcome|electoral_effect", "notes": ""}, - {"case_id": "ro-2025-presidential-repeat", "source_id": "src-ro-venice-202503", "source_role": "methodology", "supports_claim_types": "electoral_effect|legal_status", "notes": ""}, - {"case_id": "ro-2025-presidential-repeat", "source_id": "src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826", "source_role": "corroboration", "supports_claim_types": "occurrence|reach|ai_role|attribution|electoral_effect", "notes": "Public-data network study; gross platform metrics are not unique voter reach."}, - {"case_id": "md-2024-presidential-referendum", "source_id": "src-md-odihr-prelim-20241021", "source_role": "primary_record", "supports_claim_types": "occurrence|mechanism|counterevidence", "notes": ""}, - {"case_id": "md-2024-presidential-referendum", "source_id": "src-md-odihr-final-20250314", "source_role": "primary_record", "supports_claim_types": "occurrence|mechanism|attribution|behavioural_effect|electoral_effect|institutional_outcome|counterevidence", "notes": ""}, - {"case_id": "md-2024-presidential-referendum", "source_id": "src-md-reuters-payments-20241024", "source_role": "corroboration", "supports_claim_types": "mechanism|attribution|behavioural_effect", "notes": "Reports police allegation and denials."}, - {"case_id": "md-2024-presidential-referendum", "source_id": "src-md-eeas-fimi-202401", "source_role": "primary_record", "supports_claim_types": "ai_role|mechanism", "notes": ""}, - {"case_id": "md-2024-presidential-referendum", "source_id": "src-md-meta-threat-reporting", "source_role": "context", "supports_claim_types": "mechanism|reach", "notes": "Platform self-report."}, - {"case_id": "md-2024-presidential-referendum", "source_id": "src-md-eeas-activity-2025", "source_role": "primary_record", "supports_claim_types": "attribution|response", "notes": ""}, - {"case_id": "md-2024-presidential-referendum", "source_id": "src-md-odihr-parliament-202602", "source_role": "context", "supports_claim_types": "ai_role|reach", "notes": "Linked later election; avoid back-projection."}, - {"case_id": "md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network", "source_id": "src-md-odihr-parliament-202602", "source_role": "primary_record", "supports_claim_types": "occurrence|mechanism|ai_role|attribution|electoral_effect", "notes": ""}, - {"case_id": "md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network", "source_id": "src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924", "source_role": "corroboration", "supports_claim_types": "occurrence|reach|mechanism|attribution|electoral_effect", "notes": "Network study linked to undercover reporting; output metrics are not unique voters."}, - {"case_id": "us-nh-2024-biden-robocall", "source_id": "src-us-fcc-ai-voice-20240208", "source_role": "primary_record", "supports_claim_types": "legal_status", "notes": ""}, - {"case_id": "us-nh-2024-biden-robocall", "source_id": "src-us-fcc-kramer-nal-20240523", "source_role": "primary_record", "supports_claim_types": "occurrence|mechanism|attribution", "notes": "Notice, not final forfeiture."}, - {"case_id": "us-nh-2024-biden-robocall", "source_id": "src-us-fcc-lingo-nal-pdf-20240523", "source_role": "primary_record", "supports_claim_types": "reach|mechanism", "notes": ""}, - {"case_id": "us-nh-2024-biden-robocall", "source_id": "src-us-nhdoj-kramer-20240523", "source_role": "primary_record", "supports_claim_types": "occurrence|mechanism|legal_status", "notes": "Charges are allegations."}, - {"case_id": "us-nh-2024-biden-robocall", "source_id": "src-us-fcc-lingo-settlement-20240821", "source_role": "primary_record", "supports_claim_types": "mechanism|institutional_outcome", "notes": ""}, - {"case_id": "us-nh-2024-biden-robocall", "source_id": "src-us-fcc-kramer-fine-20240926", "source_role": "primary_record", "supports_claim_types": "occurrence|attribution|behavioural_effect|electoral_effect|institutional_outcome", "notes": ""}, - {"case_id": "us-nh-2024-biden-robocall", "source_id": "src-us-nhpr-acquittal-20250613", "source_role": "counterevidence", "supports_claim_types": "attribution|behavioural_effect|electoral_effect|legal_status|counterevidence", "notes": "Essential acquittal record."}, - {"case_id": "br-2026-election-preparedness", "source_id": "src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302", "source_role": "primary_record", "supports_claim_types": "legal_status|response", "notes": ""}, - {"case_id": "br-2026-election-preparedness", "source_id": "src-br-tse-calendar-202603", "source_role": "primary_record", "supports_claim_types": "occurrence", "notes": ""}, - {"case_id": "br-2026-election-preparedness", "source_id": "src-br-tse-ai-rules-202604", "source_role": "context", "supports_claim_types": "legal_status", "notes": ""}, - {"case_id": "br-2026-election-preparedness", "source_id": "src-br-tse-platforms-202607", "source_role": "ongoing_monitoring", "supports_claim_types": "response", "notes": ""}, - {"case_id": "br-2026-election-preparedness", "source_id": "src-br-tse-compliance-202607", "source_role": "ongoing_monitoring", "supports_claim_types": "response", "notes": ""}, - {"case_id": "br-2026-election-preparedness", "source_id": "src-br-tse-agu-20260803", "source_role": "ongoing_monitoring", "supports_claim_types": "response", "notes": ""}, - {"case_id": "br-2026-election-preparedness", "source_id": "src-br-tse-council-20260807", "source_role": "ongoing_monitoring", "supports_claim_types": "response", "notes": ""}, - {"case_id": "br-2026-election-preparedness", "source_id": "src-br-tse-elevenlabs-202608", "source_role": "ongoing_monitoring", "supports_claim_types": "response", "notes": ""}, - {"case_id": "br-2026-election-preparedness", "source_id": "src-br-aio-202411", "source_role": "counterevidence", "supports_claim_types": "counterevidence", "notes": "Prior-cycle evidence."}, - {"case_id": "br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar", "source_id": "src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728", "source_role": "corroboration", "supports_claim_types": "occurrence|mechanism|attribution|behavioural_effect|legal_status|counterevidence|agency_transfer", "notes": "Time-sensitive ongoing legal dispute."}, - {"case_id": "br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar", "source_id": "src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302", "source_role": "primary_record", "supports_claim_types": "legal_status|counterevidence", "notes": ""}, - {"case_id": "us-2026-midterms-preparedness", "source_id": "src-us-fec-dates-2026", "source_role": "primary_record", "supports_claim_types": "occurrence", "notes": ""}, - {"case_id": "us-2026-midterms-preparedness", "source_id": "src-us-cisa-genai-202401", "source_role": "methodology", "supports_claim_types": "ai_role|mechanism", "notes": "Prior-cycle assessment."}, - {"case_id": "us-2026-midterms-preparedness", "source_id": "src-us-odni-update-20241021", "source_role": "context", "supports_claim_types": "attribution|mechanism", "notes": "Prior-cycle evidence."}, - {"case_id": "us-2026-midterms-preparedness", "source_id": "src-us-fec-ai-disposition-2024", "source_role": "primary_record", "supports_claim_types": "legal_status", "notes": ""}, - {"case_id": "us-2026-midterms-preparedness", "source_id": "src-us-fcc-ai-voice-20240208", "source_role": "context", "supports_claim_types": "legal_status|counterevidence", "notes": "Narrow federal telecom rule, not a broad political-messaging standard."}, - {"case_id": "us-2026-midterms-preparedness", "source_id": "src-us-ncsl-20260623", "source_role": "ongoing_monitoring", "supports_claim_types": "legal_status", "notes": ""}, - {"case_id": "us-2026-midterms-preparedness", "source_id": "src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328", "source_role": "ongoing_monitoring", "supports_claim_types": "occurrence|mechanism|legal_status", "notes": ""}, - {"case_id": "us-2026-midterms-preparedness", "source_id": "src-global-meta-muted-20241203", "source_role": "counterevidence", "supports_claim_types": "counterevidence", "notes": "Platform assessment reported by Reuters."}, - {"case_id": "us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads", "source_id": "src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328", "source_role": "corroboration", "supports_claim_types": "occurrence|mechanism|reach|behavioural_effect|counterevidence|agency_transfer", "notes": ""}, - {"case_id": "us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads", "source_id": "src-us-ncsl-20260623", "source_role": "context", "supports_claim_types": "legal_status", "notes": ""}, - {"case_id": "us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads", "source_id": "src-global-pdid-2024", "source_role": "methodology", "supports_claim_types": "", "notes": "Methodology reference; not direct support for an atomic claim."}, - {"case_id": "us-2026-midterms-preparedness", "source_id": "src-global-row-tracker-20240416", "source_role": "methodology", "supports_claim_types": "", "notes": "Methodology reference; not direct support for an atomic claim."}, - {"case_id": "us-nh-2024-biden-robocall", "source_id": "src-us-fcc-kramer-final-pdf-20240926", "source_role": "primary_record", "supports_claim_types": "occurrence|attribution|reach|legal_status|institutional_outcome|agency_transfer", "notes": "Final FCC order."}, - {"case_id": "us-nh-2024-biden-robocall", "source_id": "src-us-fcc-lingo-consent-202408", "source_role": "primary_record", "supports_claim_types": "reach|mechanism|institutional_outcome|agency_transfer", "notes": "Consent decree; not criminal adjudication."}, - {"case_id": "us-nh-2024-biden-robocall", "source_id": "src-us-ap-kramer-acquittal-20250613", "source_role": "counterevidence", "supports_claim_types": "legal_status|counterevidence", "notes": "All 22 state counts acquitted."}, - {"case_id": "us-nh-2024-biden-robocall", "source_id": "src-us-lwv-kramer-civil", "source_role": "corroboration", "supports_claim_types": "institutional_outcome", "notes": "Secondary case index and outcome summary linking filings."}, - {"case_id": "us-nh-2024-biden-robocall", "source_id": "src-us-ap-kramer-default-202511", "source_role": "corroboration", "supports_claim_types": "institutional_outcome", "notes": "Default, not contested merits trial."}, - {"case_id": "br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar", "source_id": "src-br-tse-res-23610-consolidated", "source_role": "primary_record", "supports_claim_types": "legal_status|counterevidence", "notes": "Operative consolidated arts. 9-B and 9-C."}, - {"case_id": "br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar", "source_id": "src-br-avatar-petition-20260726", "source_role": "primary_record", "supports_claim_types": "legal_status|occurrence", "notes": "Filing proves allegations were made, not violation."}, - {"case_id": "br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar", "source_id": "src-br-ft-avatar-202607", "source_role": "corroboration", "supports_claim_types": "attribution|agency_transfer|counterevidence", "notes": "Reports authorisation denial."}, - {"case_id": "br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar", "source_id": "src-br-folha-avatar-defense-202607", "source_role": "counterevidence", "supports_claim_types": "legal_status|counterevidence", "notes": "Defence position."}, - {"case_id": "br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar", "source_id": "src-br-poder360-avatar-pending-20260811", "source_role": "ongoing_monitoring", "supports_claim_types": "legal_status|institutional_outcome", "notes": "Scheduled meeting is not a merits outcome."}, - {"case_id": "us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads", "source_id": "src-us-nrsc-talarico-20260311", "source_role": "primary_record", "supports_claim_types": "occurrence|mechanism|attribution|counterevidence|agency_transfer", "notes": "Primary actor artifact and transcript."}, - {"case_id": "us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads", "source_id": "src-us-nrsc-talarico-youtube", "source_role": "ongoing_monitoring", "supports_claim_types": "reach", "notes": "Dynamic one-platform metric."}, - {"case_id": "us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads", "source_id": "src-us-berkeley-talarico-2026", "source_role": "corroboration", "supports_claim_types": "mechanism|ai_role|agency_transfer", "notes": "Expert context."} + { + "case_id": "ro-2024-presidential-annulment", + "source_id": "src-ro-ccr-20241206", + "source_role": "primary_record", + "supports_claim_types": "institutional_outcome", + "notes": "" + }, + { + "case_id": "ro-2024-presidential-annulment", + "source_id": "src-ro-ccr-summary-2025", + "source_role": "primary_record", + "supports_claim_types": "mechanism|ai_role|attribution|electoral_effect|institutional_outcome", + "notes": "" + }, + { + "case_id": "ro-2024-presidential-annulment", + "source_id": "src-ro-ec-tiktok-20241217", + "source_role": "primary_record", + "supports_claim_types": "mechanism|ai_role|attribution|response", + "notes": "Proceeding open, no final infringement finding." + }, + { + "case_id": "ro-2024-presidential-annulment", + "source_id": "src-ro-venice-202503", + "source_role": "methodology", + "supports_claim_types": "attribution|electoral_effect|legal_status|counterevidence", + "notes": "" + }, + { + "case_id": "ro-2024-presidential-annulment", + "source_id": "src-ro-tiktok-integrity", + "source_role": "context", + "supports_claim_types": "reach|response", + "notes": "Platform self-report." + }, + { + "case_id": "ro-2024-presidential-annulment", + "source_id": "src-ro-ifes-202412", + "source_role": "corroboration", + "supports_claim_types": "mechanism|ai_role|electoral_effect", + "notes": "" + }, + { + "case_id": "ro-2024-presidential-annulment", + "source_id": "src-ro-sri-csat-20241204", + "source_role": "primary_record", + "supports_claim_types": "occurrence|reach|attribution", + "notes": "Authoritative record of the intelligence assessment, not a final adjudication." + }, + { + "case_id": "ro-2024-presidential-annulment", + "source_id": "src-ro-snoop-pnl-20241220", + "source_role": "counterevidence", + "supports_claim_types": "attribution|counterevidence", + "notes": "PNL-funded brief is distinct from other network components; intent to support Georgescu is not established." + }, + { + "case_id": "ro-2025-presidential-repeat", + "source_id": "src-ro-odihr-repeat-final", + "source_role": "primary_record", + "supports_claim_types": "occurrence|institutional_outcome|electoral_effect", + "notes": "" + }, + { + "case_id": "ro-2025-presidential-repeat", + "source_id": "src-ro-venice-202503", + "source_role": "methodology", + "supports_claim_types": "electoral_effect|legal_status", + "notes": "" + }, + { + "case_id": "ro-2025-presidential-repeat", + "source_id": "src-ro-dfrlab-repeat-20250826", + "source_role": "corroboration", + "supports_claim_types": "occurrence|reach|ai_role|attribution|electoral_effect", + "notes": "Public-data network study; gross platform metrics are not unique voter reach." + }, + { + "case_id": "md-2024-presidential-referendum", + "source_id": "src-md-odihr-prelim-20241021", + "source_role": "primary_record", + "supports_claim_types": "occurrence|mechanism|counterevidence", + "notes": "" + }, + { + "case_id": "md-2024-presidential-referendum", + "source_id": "src-md-odihr-final-20250314", + "source_role": "primary_record", + "supports_claim_types": "occurrence|mechanism|attribution|behavioural_effect|electoral_effect|institutional_outcome|counterevidence", + "notes": "" + }, + { + "case_id": "md-2024-presidential-referendum", + "source_id": "src-md-reuters-payments-20241024", + "source_role": "corroboration", + "supports_claim_types": "mechanism|attribution|behavioural_effect", + "notes": "Reports police allegation and denials." + }, + { + "case_id": "md-2024-presidential-referendum", + "source_id": "src-md-eeas-fimi-202401", + "source_role": "primary_record", + "supports_claim_types": "ai_role|mechanism", + "notes": "" + }, + { + "case_id": "md-2024-presidential-referendum", + "source_id": "src-md-meta-threat-reporting", + "source_role": "context", + "supports_claim_types": "mechanism|reach", + "notes": "Platform self-report." + }, + { + "case_id": "md-2024-presidential-referendum", + "source_id": "src-md-eeas-activity-2025", + "source_role": "primary_record", + "supports_claim_types": "attribution|response", + "notes": "" + }, + { + "case_id": "md-2024-presidential-referendum", + "source_id": "src-md-odihr-parliament-202602", + "source_role": "context", + "supports_claim_types": "ai_role|reach", + "notes": "Linked later election; avoid back-projection." + }, + { + "case_id": "md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network", + "source_id": "src-md-odihr-parliament-202602", + "source_role": "primary_record", + "supports_claim_types": "occurrence|mechanism|ai_role|attribution|electoral_effect", + "notes": "" + }, + { + "case_id": "md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network", + "source_id": "src-md-dfrlab-infoleaders-20250924", + "source_role": "corroboration", + "supports_claim_types": "occurrence|reach|mechanism|attribution|electoral_effect", + "notes": "Network study linked to undercover reporting; output metrics are not unique voters." + }, + { + "case_id": "us-nh-2024-biden-robocall", + "source_id": "src-us-fcc-ai-voice-20240208", + "source_role": "primary_record", + "supports_claim_types": "legal_status", + "notes": "" + }, + { + "case_id": "us-nh-2024-biden-robocall", + "source_id": "src-us-fcc-kramer-nal-20240523", + "source_role": "primary_record", + "supports_claim_types": "occurrence|mechanism|attribution", + "notes": "Notice, not final forfeiture." + }, + { + "case_id": "us-nh-2024-biden-robocall", + "source_id": "src-us-fcc-lingo-nal-pdf-20240523", + "source_role": "primary_record", + "supports_claim_types": "reach|mechanism", + "notes": "" + }, + { + "case_id": "us-nh-2024-biden-robocall", + "source_id": "src-us-nhdoj-kramer-20240523", + "source_role": "primary_record", + "supports_claim_types": "occurrence|mechanism|legal_status", + "notes": "Charges are allegations." + }, + { + "case_id": "us-nh-2024-biden-robocall", + "source_id": "src-us-fcc-lingo-settlement-20240821", + "source_role": "primary_record", + "supports_claim_types": "mechanism|institutional_outcome", + "notes": "" + }, + { + "case_id": "us-nh-2024-biden-robocall", + "source_id": "src-us-fcc-kramer-fine-20240926", + "source_role": "primary_record", + "supports_claim_types": "occurrence|attribution|behavioural_effect|electoral_effect|institutional_outcome", + "notes": "" + }, + { + "case_id": "us-nh-2024-biden-robocall", + "source_id": "src-us-nhpr-acquittal-20250613", + "source_role": "counterevidence", + "supports_claim_types": "attribution|behavioural_effect|electoral_effect|legal_status|counterevidence", + "notes": "Essential acquittal record." + }, + { + "case_id": "br-2026-election-preparedness", + "source_id": "src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302", + "source_role": "primary_record", + "supports_claim_types": "legal_status|response", + "notes": "" + }, + { + "case_id": "br-2026-election-preparedness", + "source_id": "src-br-tse-calendar-202603", + "source_role": "primary_record", + "supports_claim_types": "occurrence", + "notes": "" + }, + { + "case_id": "br-2026-election-preparedness", + "source_id": "src-br-tse-ai-rules-202604", + "source_role": "context", + "supports_claim_types": "legal_status", + "notes": "" + }, + { + "case_id": "br-2026-election-preparedness", + "source_id": "src-br-tse-platforms-202607", + "source_role": "ongoing_monitoring", + "supports_claim_types": "response", + "notes": "" + }, + { + "case_id": "br-2026-election-preparedness", + "source_id": "src-br-tse-compliance-202607", + "source_role": "ongoing_monitoring", + "supports_claim_types": "response", + "notes": "" + }, + { + "case_id": "br-2026-election-preparedness", + "source_id": "src-br-tse-agu-20260803", + "source_role": "ongoing_monitoring", + "supports_claim_types": "response", + "notes": "" + }, + { + "case_id": "br-2026-election-preparedness", + "source_id": "src-br-tse-council-20260807", + "source_role": "ongoing_monitoring", + "supports_claim_types": "response", + "notes": "" + }, + { + "case_id": "br-2026-election-preparedness", + "source_id": "src-br-tse-elevenlabs-202608", + "source_role": "ongoing_monitoring", + "supports_claim_types": "response", + "notes": "" + }, + { + "case_id": "br-2026-election-preparedness", + "source_id": "src-br-aio-202411", + "source_role": "counterevidence", + "supports_claim_types": "counterevidence", + "notes": "Prior-cycle evidence." + }, + { + "case_id": "br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar", + "source_id": "src-br-reuters-avatar-20260728", + "source_role": "corroboration", + "supports_claim_types": "occurrence|mechanism|attribution|behavioural_effect|legal_status|counterevidence", + "notes": "Time-sensitive ongoing legal dispute." + }, + { + "case_id": "br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar", + "source_id": "src-br-tse-res-23755-20260302", + "source_role": "primary_record", + "supports_claim_types": "legal_status|counterevidence", + "notes": "" + }, + { + "case_id": "us-2026-midterms-preparedness", + "source_id": "src-us-fec-dates-2026", + "source_role": "primary_record", + "supports_claim_types": "occurrence", + "notes": "" + }, + { + "case_id": "us-2026-midterms-preparedness", + "source_id": "src-us-cisa-genai-202401", + "source_role": "methodology", + "supports_claim_types": "ai_role|mechanism", + "notes": "Prior-cycle assessment." + }, + { + "case_id": "us-2026-midterms-preparedness", + "source_id": "src-us-odni-update-20241021", + "source_role": "context", + "supports_claim_types": "attribution|mechanism", + "notes": "Prior-cycle evidence." + }, + { + "case_id": "us-2026-midterms-preparedness", + "source_id": "src-us-fec-ai-disposition-2024", + "source_role": "primary_record", + "supports_claim_types": "legal_status", + "notes": "" + }, + { + "case_id": "us-2026-midterms-preparedness", + "source_id": "src-us-fcc-ai-voice-20240208", + "source_role": "context", + "supports_claim_types": "legal_status|counterevidence", + "notes": "Narrow federal telecom rule, not a broad political-messaging standard." + }, + { + "case_id": "us-2026-midterms-preparedness", + "source_id": "src-us-ncsl-20260623", + "source_role": "ongoing_monitoring", + "supports_claim_types": "legal_status", + "notes": "" + }, + { + "case_id": "us-2026-midterms-preparedness", + "source_id": "src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328", + "source_role": "ongoing_monitoring", + "supports_claim_types": "occurrence|mechanism|legal_status", + "notes": "" + }, + { + "case_id": "us-2026-midterms-preparedness", + "source_id": "src-global-meta-muted-20241203", + "source_role": "counterevidence", + "supports_claim_types": "counterevidence", + "notes": "Platform assessment reported by Reuters." + }, + { + "case_id": "us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads", + "source_id": "src-us-reuters-midterms-20260328", + "source_role": "corroboration", + "supports_claim_types": "occurrence|mechanism|reach|behavioural_effect|counterevidence", + "notes": "" + }, + { + "case_id": "us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads", + "source_id": "src-us-ncsl-20260623", + "source_role": "context", + "supports_claim_types": "legal_status", + "notes": "" + }, + { + "case_id": "us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads", + "source_id": "src-global-pdid-2024", + "source_role": "methodology", + "supports_claim_types": "", + "notes": "Methodology reference; not direct support for an atomic claim." + }, + { + "case_id": "us-2026-midterms-preparedness", + "source_id": "src-global-row-tracker-20240416", + "source_role": "methodology", + "supports_claim_types": "", + "notes": "Methodology reference; not direct support for an atomic claim." + }, + { + "case_id": "us-nh-2024-biden-robocall", + "source_id": "src-us-fcc-kramer-final-pdf-20240926", + "source_role": "primary_record", + "supports_claim_types": "occurrence|attribution|reach|legal_status|institutional_outcome", + "notes": "Final FCC order." + }, + { + "case_id": "us-nh-2024-biden-robocall", + "source_id": "src-us-fcc-lingo-consent-202408", + "source_role": "primary_record", + "supports_claim_types": "reach|mechanism|institutional_outcome", + "notes": "Consent decree; not criminal adjudication." + }, + { + "case_id": "us-nh-2024-biden-robocall", + "source_id": "src-us-ap-kramer-acquittal-20250613", + "source_role": "counterevidence", + "supports_claim_types": "legal_status|counterevidence", + "notes": "All 22 state counts acquitted." + }, + { + "case_id": "us-nh-2024-biden-robocall", + "source_id": "src-us-lwv-kramer-civil", + "source_role": "corroboration", + "supports_claim_types": "institutional_outcome", + "notes": "Secondary case index and outcome summary linking filings." + }, + { + "case_id": "us-nh-2024-biden-robocall", + "source_id": "src-us-ap-kramer-default-202511", + "source_role": "corroboration", + "supports_claim_types": "institutional_outcome", + "notes": "Default, not contested merits trial." + }, + { + "case_id": "br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar", + "source_id": "src-br-tse-res-23610-consolidated", + "source_role": "primary_record", + "supports_claim_types": "legal_status|counterevidence", + "notes": "Operative consolidated arts. 9-B and 9-C." + }, + { + "case_id": "br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar", + "source_id": "src-br-avatar-petition-20260726", + "source_role": "primary_record", + "supports_claim_types": "legal_status|occurrence", + "notes": "Filing proves allegations were made, not violation." + }, + { + "case_id": "br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar", + "source_id": "src-br-ft-avatar-202607", + "source_role": "corroboration", + "supports_claim_types": "attribution|counterevidence", + "notes": "Reports authorisation denial." + }, + { + "case_id": "br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar", + "source_id": "src-br-folha-avatar-defense-202607", + "source_role": "counterevidence", + "supports_claim_types": "legal_status|counterevidence", + "notes": "Defence position." + }, + { + "case_id": "br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar", + "source_id": "src-br-poder360-avatar-pending-20260811", + "source_role": "ongoing_monitoring", + "supports_claim_types": "legal_status|institutional_outcome", + "notes": "Scheduled meeting is not a merits outcome." + }, + { + "case_id": "us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads", + "source_id": "src-us-nrsc-talarico-20260311", + "source_role": "primary_record", + "supports_claim_types": "occurrence|mechanism|attribution|counterevidence", + "notes": "Primary actor artifact and transcript." + }, + { + "case_id": "us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads", + "source_id": "src-us-nrsc-talarico-youtube", + "source_role": "ongoing_monitoring", + "supports_claim_types": "reach", + "notes": "Dynamic one-platform metric." + }, + { + "case_id": "us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads", + "source_id": "src-us-berkeley-talarico-2026", + "source_role": "corroboration", + "supports_claim_types": "mechanism|ai_role", + "notes": "Expert context." + } ], "watchlist": [ {