data/research_view.csv

pathway_id,case_id,case_title,country,election_date,record_type,case_status,manipulation_assessment,generative_ai_status,ai_role,system_or_model,controller,influence_vector,target,agency_dimension,capability_status,control_mechanism_status,attempted_transfer_status,agency_change_status,agency_preservation_status,maximum_conclusion,hypothesized_power_recipient,reach_summary,behavioural_effect,electoral_effect,case_evidence_summary,main_uncertainty,last_verified
ata-ro24,ro-2024-presidential-annulment,Romania 2024 presidential election: coordinated digital campaign and annulment,Romania,2024-11-24,election_wide_case,retrospective,mixed_documented_manipulation,not_established,material_amplification,TikTok: recommender and integrity systems,mixed and partly unresolved campaign networks; platform recommender systems; alleged foreign-linked actors,"short-form video recommendations, coordinated accounts, undeclared promotion, cyber and information operations",Romanian voters,voter_attention_and_electoral_choice,observed,observed,insufficient_evidence,not_observed,not_observed,control_mechanism_observed,campaign-network operators and platform ranking systems,"25,000 accounts; officially_reported; unknown; final_two_weeks_before_2024_first_round",unknown,unknown,occurrence_supported_agency_effect_not_established,Who financed and directed each network component? What organic versus coordinated reach occurred? Did any exposure change voting behaviour? What will the DSA proceeding finally establish?,2026-08-11
ata-ro25,ro-2025-presidential-repeat,Romania 2025 repeat presidential election and cross-platform synthetic-persona network,Romania,2025-05-04,observed_network,retrospective,manipulation_confirmed,confirmed,mixed,unknown: DreamFace- or D-ID-style avatars and synthetic profiles,unknown cross-platform network operator; platform distribution systems; responding election authorities,"coordinated and hijacked accounts, synthetic personas, AI avatars, false local-news identity, cross-platform hashtags, and institutional decisions",Romanian voters,authorship_attention_and_local_identity,observed,observed,insufficient_evidence,not_observed,not_observed,control_mechanism_observed,unidentified network operator and platform distribution systems,"215 accounts; researcher_measured; not_applicable; 2024-12_to_2025-06-06 | 8,514 posts; researcher_measured; not_applicable; 2024-12_to_2025-06-06",unknown,unknown,occurrence_supported_agency_effect_not_established,Who operated and financed the network? How much reach was authentic and in-country? Which safeguards measurably reduced manipulation? How did the annulment itself affect trust and participation?,2026-08-11
ata-md24,md-2024-presidential-referendum,Moldova 2024 presidential election and EU referendum: hybrid interference network,Moldova,2024-10-20,election_wide_case,retrospective,mixed_documented_manipulation,confirmed,mixed,unknown: synthetic impersonation tools,Ilan Shor-linked network and alleged Russian sponsors; coordinated account operators; platforms,"payments, messaging apps, spoofed media, bots, coordinated accounts, synthetic video","Moldovan voters, including linguistic minorities and diaspora",preference_participation_and_trust,observed,observed,observed,not_observed,not_observed,attempted_transfer_observed,foreign-linked political-finance and influence networks,"4,200 followers; platform_reported; unknown; at_takedown_2024-10-11 | 335,000 followers; platform_reported; unknown; at_takedown_2024-10-11",unknown,unknown,occurrence_supported_agency_effect_not_established,"How many recipients acted on payments? Which synthetic pieces achieved material exposure? What portion of the network was centrally directed? What vote effect, if any, occurred?",2026-08-11
ata-md25,md-2025-parliamentary-linked-network,Moldova 2025 parliamentary election: continuation of hybrid influence infrastructure,Moldova,2025-09-28,observed_network,retrospective,manipulation_confirmed,confirmed,mixed,"unknown: AI videos, bots and platform recommendation systems",foreign-funded political and influence networks,"social platforms, messaging apps, illicit finance, synthetic and spoofed media",Moldovan voters,authorship_agenda_and_peer_signal,observed,observed,insufficient_evidence,not_observed,not_observed,control_mechanism_observed,network curators and financiers,"253 accounts; researcher_measured; not_applicable; study_window | 28,708 posts; researcher_measured; not_applicable; study_window",unknown,unknown,occurrence_supported_agency_effect_not_established,"Which 2024 network components persisted, which were newly created, and which shared command? What was authentic in-country exposure? Which interventions worked?",2026-08-11
ata-nh,us-nh-2024-biden-robocall,New Hampshire 2024 AI-cloned Biden robocall,United States,2024-01-23,observed_incident,retrospective,manipulation_confirmed,confirmed,core_generation,ElevenLabs: AI voice-cloning service,Steve Kramer and telecom distribution providers,"AI voice cloning, caller-ID spoofing, mass robocalls",New Hampshire Democratic primary voters,authorship_relevance_and_participation_instruction,observed,observed,observed,not_observed,not_observed,attempted_transfer_observed,political operator and telecom distribution chain,"9,581 call_attempts; provider_records_in_enforcement; unknown; campaign_window | 3,978 completed_calls; provider_records_in_enforcement; unknown; campaign_window",unknown,unknown,occurrence_supported_agency_effect_not_established,"How many recipients listened, believed, or acted on the call? How should liability be allocated across creator, intermediary, and originating provider?",2026-08-11
ata-brprep,br-2026-election-preparedness,Brazil 2026 general election: AI governance and integrity preparedness,Brazil,2026-10-04,preparedness_file,ongoing,preparedness_not_incident,confirmed,mixed,"unknown_or_multiple: generative AI, recommender and disclosure-compliance systems","campaigns, AI providers, platforms, election authorities, and unidentified influence actors","synthetic media, recommender outputs, political advertising, bots, voice cloning, platform distribution",Brazilian voters,future_information_and_platform_governance,not_assessed,not_observed,not_applicable,not_applicable,not_applicable,not_an_incident,not_applicable,No typed population-reach estimate,unknown,unknown,governance_context_not_incident,Will providers comply in practice? How quickly will labelled and unlabelled content be detected and adjudicated? Will rules apply consistently across closed messaging and AI assistants?,2026-08-11
ata-bravatar,br-2026-bolsonaro-ai-avatar,Brazil 2026 Bolsonaro AI avatar at Flávio Bolsonaro campaign launch,Brazil,2026-10-04,observed_incident,ongoing,transparent_contested_use,confirmed,core_generation,unknown: synthetic image-and-voice avatar system,Flávio Bolsonaro campaign or allied producer; authorisation by Jair Bolsonaro unresolved,disclosed synthetic image and voice presented as an endorsement,Brazilian voters and campaign attendees,political_representation_and_audience_interpretation,observed,observed,insufficient_evidence,not_observed,not_observed,insufficient_evidence,campaign producer controlling the synthetic representation,No typed population-reach estimate,unknown,unknown,occurrence_supported_agency_effect_not_established,Who authorised and scripted the avatar? Does a labelled clone circumvent communication restrictions? How will TSE distinguish transparent simulation from manipulative synthetic representation?,2026-08-11
ata-usprep,us-2026-midterms-preparedness,United States 2026 midterm election: fragmented AI governance and preparedness,United States,2026-11-03,preparedness_file,ongoing,preparedness_not_incident,confirmed,mixed,"unknown_or_multiple: generative AI, synthetic-media, platform and telecom systems","campaigns, political committees, foreign influence actors, platforms, telecom and AI providers","synthetic ads, voice and video impersonation, recommender distribution, robocalls, coordinated influence",United States voters,future_information_and_election_trust,not_assessed,not_observed,not_applicable,not_applicable,not_applicable,not_an_incident,not_applicable,31 states_with_enacted_political_deepfake_laws; legislative_tracker_count; not_applicable; snapshot_2026-06-23,unknown,unknown,governance_context_not_incident,How will state rules apply across jurisdictions? Will disclosures be salient? Which foreign or domestic networks will achieve measurable reach? Can authentic communications remain verifiable?,2026-08-11
ata-usads,us-2026-campaign-deepfake-ads,United States 2026 campaign-produced synthetic candidate ads,United States,2026-11-03,observed_campaign_set,ongoing,mixed_documented_manipulation,confirmed,core_generation,unknown: campaign video-generation and face/voice synthesis tools,National Republican Senatorial Committee and individual campaigns; additional actors may be added,AI-generated political video distributed as campaign advertising and social content,voters in contested federal and state races,candidate_voice_face_and_affect,observed,observed,insufficient_evidence,not_observed,not_observed,control_mechanism_observed,campaign sponsors producing and distributing synthetic representations,3 synthetic_ads_identified_in_reporting; independent_reporting_content_count; not_applicable; reporting_through_2026-03-28,unknown,unknown,occurrence_supported_agency_effect_not_established,Were disclosures noticed? What impressions and targeting occurred? Do viewers distinguish quotation from fabricated audiovisual evidence? What legal rules apply in each state?,2026-08-11
ata-usca11,us-ca11-2026-wiener-conniechan-chatbot,California 11th District: campaign-controlled Connie Chan parody chatbot,United States,2026-11-03,observed_incident,ongoing,transparent_contested_use,confirmed,core_generation,Anthropic: Claude | Amazon Web Services|Google: hosting and analytics stack,Scott Wiener for Congress campaign; technical constructor unidentified,"interactive first-person opponent simulation, campaign-selected issue framing, web interface, billboards, and earned media",California 11th District voters and politically interested web visitors; Connie Chan as represented person,representation_agenda_query_privacy_and_candidate_evaluation,observed,observed,insufficient_evidence,not_observed,not_observed,insufficient_evidence,campaign deployer; secondarily model and infrastructure providers,"5,058 submitted_questions; campaign_reported; unknown; first_27_hours | 2 billboards; campaign_reported; not_applicable; August_2026",unknown,unknown,occurrence_supported_agency_effect_not_established,"Which Claude version and deployment route were used? Who built the system? What sources, system prompt, retrieval method, and guardrails controlled answers? How many unique people interacted, from where, and with what effects?",2026-08-12