Datasets:
scenario_id stringlengths 10 10 | alert stringlengths 314 480 | environment stringlengths 206 267 | ground_truth stringlengths 166 344 | trace stringlengths 3.77k 12.2k | tool_calls stringlengths 348 1.44k | evidence stringlengths 175 1.41k | decision stringclasses 3
values | confidence float64 0.3 0.99 | success bool 2
classes | archetype stringclasses 32
values | verdict stringclasses 2
values | n_tool_calls int64 2 9 | n_messages int64 7 21 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
SCT-003338 | {"alert_id":"A-003338","title":"Security tooling tampering detected","severity":"critical","source":"Microsoft Defender for Endpoint","host":"WKS-076","user":"david.kumar","timestamp":"2026-07-27T09:00:00+00:00","description":"Defender exclusion added and a security service stopped on WKS-076.","technique_hints":["T156... | {"org":{"org_name":"Mercer & Lane","industry":"legal","employee_count":2400,"security_stack":["Microsoft Sentinel","CrowdStrike EDR","QRadar"],"change_window":"Tue 22:00-24:00 UTC"},"asset_focus":"WKS-076","asset_count":113} | {"verdict":"malicious","attack_techniques":["T1562.001"],"severity":"critical","root_cause":"Defense evasion: security tool exclusions and service tampering.","iocs":{"domains":[],"files":[],"ips":[]}} | [{"role":"system","content":"You are a SOC investigation agent. Given a security alert, investigate it step by step using the available read-only tools, then produce a structured triage report.\n\nAvailable tools: get_surrounding_events, get_process_tree, lookup_attack, search_sigma, get_asset_context, get_related_aler... | [{"step":1,"tool":"get_surrounding_events","arguments":{"alert_id":"A-003338","window_minutes":30},"result_summary":"5 events across 4 channels","duration_ms":215},{"step":2,"tool":"lookup_attack","arguments":{"query":"disable security tools"},"result_summary":"no technique match","duration_ms":155},{"step":3,"tool":"s... | [{"evidence_id":"EV-0004","source":"sysmon","channel":"1","summary":"Set-MpPreference exclusion added","timestamp":"2026-07-27T08:49:00+00:00","host":"WKS-076"},{"evidence_id":"EV-0005","source":"windows-system","channel":"7036","summary":"Security service entered stopped state","timestamp":"2026-07-27T08:51:00+00:00",... | escalate | 0.93 | true | edr_tamper | malicious | 6 | 15 |
SCT-007189 | {"alert_id":"A-007189","title":"RDP brute force followed by successful logon","severity":"critical","source":"Microsoft Sentinel","host":"LNX-WEB-004","user":"adm.r.ito","timestamp":"2026-07-27T09:00:00+00:00","description":"Over 200 failed RDP attempts from 91.240.118.254 against LNX-WEB-004, followed by a successful ... | {"org":{"org_name":"Cinderpeak Mining","industry":"mining","employee_count":2400,"security_stack":["SentinelOne","Splunk ES","Microsoft Sentinel"],"change_window":"Tue 22:00-24:00 UTC"},"asset_focus":"LNX-WEB-004","asset_count":113} | {"verdict":"malicious","attack_techniques":["T1110.001","T1021.001"],"severity":"critical","root_cause":"External RDP password guessing succeeded against an internet-facing server.","iocs":{"domains":[],"files":[],"ips":["91.240.118.254"]}} | [{"role":"system","content":"You are a SOC investigation agent. Given a security alert, investigate it step by step using the available read-only tools, then produce a structured triage report.\n\nAvailable tools: get_surrounding_events, get_process_tree, lookup_attack, search_sigma, get_asset_context, get_related_aler... | [{"step":1,"tool":"get_surrounding_events","arguments":{"alert_id":"A-007189","window_minutes":60},"result_summary":"7 events across 2 channels","duration_ms":174},{"step":2,"tool":"lookup_attack","arguments":{"query":"password guessing RDP"},"result_summary":"no technique match","duration_ms":112},{"step":3,"tool":"ge... | [{"evidence_id":"EV-0001","source":"windows-security","channel":"4625","summary":"Failed RDP logon for admin from 91.240.118.254","timestamp":"2026-07-27T08:10:00+00:00","host":"LNX-WEB-004"},{"evidence_id":"EV-0002","source":"windows-security","channel":"4625","summary":"Failed RDP logon for administrator from 91.240.... | escalate | 0.93 | true | rdp_bruteforce | malicious | 7 | 17 |
SCT-000825 | {"alert_id":"A-000825","title":"Burst of RC4 service ticket requests","severity":"high","source":"Microsoft Sentinel","host":"SRV-DC-002","user":"bob.kumar","timestamp":"2026-07-27T09:00:00+00:00","description":"bob.kumar requested RC4-encrypted TGS tickets for multiple service accounts from WKS-022 — consistent with K... | {"org":{"org_name":"Cobalt Ridge Energy","industry":"energy","employee_count":1200,"security_stack":["SentinelOne","Splunk ES","Proofpoint"],"change_window":"Tue 22:00-24:00 UTC"},"asset_focus":"SRV-DC-002","asset_count":113} | {"verdict":"malicious","attack_techniques":["T1558.003"],"severity":"high","root_cause":"Service ticket harvesting for offline password cracking (Kerberoasting).","iocs":{"domains":[],"files":[],"ips":[]}} | [{"role":"system","content":"You are a SOC investigation agent. Given a security alert, investigate it step by step using the available read-only tools, then produce a structured triage report.\n\nAvailable tools: get_surrounding_events, get_process_tree, lookup_attack, search_sigma, get_asset_context, get_related_aler... | [{"step":1,"tool":"get_surrounding_events","arguments":{"alert_id":"A-000825","window_minutes":45},"result_summary":"6 events across 4 channels","duration_ms":40},{"step":2,"tool":"lookup_attack","arguments":{"query":"full cmdline string match"},"result_summary":"no technique match","duration_ms":56},{"step":3,"tool":"... | [{"evidence_id":"EV-0004","source":"windows-security","channel":"4769","summary":"RC4 service ticket requested for svc_scan","timestamp":"2026-07-27T08:30:00+00:00","host":"SRV-DC-002"},{"evidence_id":"EV-0005","source":"windows-security","channel":"4769","summary":"RC4 service ticket requested for svc_web","timestamp"... | escalate | 0.89 | true | kerberoast | malicious | 8 | 19 |
SCT-008663 | {"alert_id":"A-008663","title":"Remote WMI execution detected","severity":"high","source":"CrowdStrike EDR","host":"LNX-WEB-003","user":"adm.s.lopez","timestamp":"2026-07-27T09:00:00+00:00","description":"WMI process creation on LNX-WEB-003 initiated from WKS-062 using adm.s.lopez.","technique_hints":["T1047"],"status"... | {"org":{"org_name":"Ferrostat Automotive","industry":"automotive","employee_count":2400,"security_stack":["CrowdStrike EDR","Microsoft Defender for Endpoint","Proofpoint"],"change_window":"Tue 22:00-24:00 UTC"},"asset_focus":"LNX-WEB-003","asset_count":113} | {"verdict":"malicious","attack_techniques":["T1047"],"severity":"high","root_cause":"Remote command execution via WMI from a workstation to a server.","iocs":{"domains":[],"files":[],"ips":[]}} | [{"role":"system","content":"You are a SOC investigation agent. Given a security alert, investigate it step by step using the available read-only tools, then produce a structured triage report.\n\nAvailable tools: get_surrounding_events, get_process_tree, lookup_attack, search_sigma, get_asset_context, get_related_aler... | [{"step":1,"tool":"get_surrounding_events","arguments":{"alert_id":"A-008663","window_minutes":30},"result_summary":"5 events across 4 channels","duration_ms":143},{"step":2,"tool":"get_process_tree","arguments":{"host":"LNX-WEB-003"},"result_summary":"2 process nodes on LNX-WEB-003","duration_ms":163},{"step":3,"tool"... | [{"evidence_id":"EV-0004","source":"sysmon","channel":"1","summary":"WmiPrvSE.exe spawned cmd.exe","timestamp":"2026-07-27T08:46:00+00:00","host":"LNX-WEB-003"},{"evidence_id":"EV-0005","source":"sysmon","channel":"1","summary":"wmic process call create observed","timestamp":"2026-07-27T08:47:00+00:00","host":"LNX-WEB-... | escalate | 0.8 | true | wmi_remote | malicious | 7 | 17 |
SCT-005779 | {"alert_id":"A-005779","title":"System binary name running from temp path","severity":"high","source":"Microsoft Defender for Endpoint","host":"WKS-013","user":"carol.owens","timestamp":"2026-07-27T09:00:00+00:00","description":"svchost.exe executing from C:\\Users\\carol.owens\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\svchost.exe — name... | {"org":{"org_name":"Ardent Semiconductor","industry":"technology","employee_count":5000,"security_stack":["Splunk ES","Zscaler","Proofpoint"],"change_window":"Tue 22:00-24:00 UTC"},"asset_focus":"WKS-013","asset_count":113} | {"verdict":"malicious","attack_techniques":["T1036.005","T1071.001"],"severity":"high","root_cause":"Malware masquerading as a system binary from a user-writable path.","iocs":{"domains":[],"files":["C:\\Users\\carol.owens\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\svchost.exe"],"ips":[]}} | [{"role":"system","content":"You are a SOC investigation agent. Given a security alert, investigate it step by step using the available read-only tools, then produce a structured triage report.\n\nAvailable tools: get_surrounding_events, get_process_tree, lookup_attack, search_sigma, get_asset_context, get_related_aler... | [{"step":1,"tool":"get_surrounding_events","arguments":{"alert_id":"A-005779","window_minutes":30},"result_summary":"5 events across 5 channels","duration_ms":143},{"step":2,"tool":"get_process_tree","arguments":{"host":"WKS-013","process_name":"svchost.exe"},"result_summary":"1 process nodes on WKS-013","duration_ms":... | [{"evidence_id":"EV-0004","source":"sysmon","channel":"1","summary":"svchost.exe started from non-system path","timestamp":"2026-07-27T08:52:00+00:00","host":"WKS-013"},{"evidence_id":"EV-0005","source":"sysmon","channel":"3","summary":"svchost.exe outbound connection","timestamp":"2026-07-27T08:53:00+00:00","host":"WK... | escalate | 0.94 | true | masquerade_binary | malicious | 6 | 15 |
SCT-005819 | {"alert_id":"A-005819","title":"Large outbound transfer from server","severity":"medium","source":"Zscaler","host":"SRV-EXCH-001","user":"svc_backup","timestamp":"2026-07-27T09:00:00+00:00","description":"70.0 GB uploaded from SRV-EXCH-001 to backup.contoso-vault.net.","technique_hints":["T1567.002"],"status":"new","qu... | {"org":{"org_name":"Vantage Polymers","industry":"manufacturing","employee_count":450,"security_stack":["CrowdStrike EDR","Splunk ES","Microsoft Defender for Endpoint"],"change_window":"Sun 02:00-05:00 UTC"},"asset_focus":"SRV-EXCH-001","asset_count":113} | {"verdict":"benign","attack_techniques":[],"severity":"low","root_cause":"Scheduled backup window upload by svc_backup to the sanctioned vault.","iocs":{"domains":["backup.contoso-vault.net"],"files":[],"ips":[]}} | [{"role":"system","content":"You are a SOC investigation agent. Given a security alert, investigate it step by step using the available read-only tools, then produce a structured triage report.\n\nAvailable tools: get_surrounding_events, get_process_tree, lookup_attack, search_sigma, get_asset_context, get_related_aler... | [{"step":1,"tool":"get_surrounding_events","arguments":{"alert_id":"A-005819","window_minutes":180},"result_summary":"2 events across 2 channels","duration_ms":126},{"step":2,"tool":"get_asset_context","arguments":{"hostname":"SRV-EXCH-001"},"result_summary":"mail_server / criticality=critical","duration_ms":145},{"ste... | [{"evidence_id":"EV-0001","source":"proxy","channel":"https","summary":"Sustained upload to backup.contoso-vault.net (70.0 GB)","timestamp":"2026-07-27T07:00:00+00:00","host":"SRV-EXCH-001"},{"evidence_id":"EV-0002","source":"windows-system","channel":"7036","summary":"Veeam Backup service entered running state","times... | close | 0.89 | true | backup_spike | benign | 6 | 15 |
SCT-004446 | {"alert_id":"A-004446","title":"LSASS memory access by unsigned process","severity":"critical","source":"CrowdStrike EDR","host":"SRV-APP-001","user":"adm.j.carter","timestamp":"2026-07-27T09:00:00+00:00","description":"rundll32.exe accessed lsass.exe memory on SRV-APP-001; a dump file was written to a temp directory."... | {"org":{"org_name":"Quillstone Capital","industry":"finance","employee_count":800,"security_stack":["Splunk ES","Microsoft Sentinel","Zscaler"],"change_window":"Sun 02:00-05:00 UTC"},"asset_focus":"SRV-APP-001","asset_count":113} | {"verdict":"malicious","attack_techniques":["T1003.001"],"severity":"critical","root_cause":"Credential dumping from LSASS memory using a living-off-the-land binary.","iocs":{"domains":[],"files":["lsass.dmp"],"ips":[]}} | [{"role":"system","content":"You are a SOC investigation agent. Given a security alert, investigate it step by step using the available read-only tools, then produce a structured triage report.\n\nAvailable tools: get_surrounding_events, get_process_tree, lookup_attack, search_sigma, get_asset_context, get_related_aler... | [{"step":1,"tool":"get_surrounding_events","arguments":{"alert_id":"A-004446","window_minutes":30},"result_summary":"9 events across 7 channels","duration_ms":125},{"step":2,"tool":"get_process_tree","arguments":{"host":"SRV-APP-001"},"result_summary":"2 process nodes on SRV-APP-001","duration_ms":180},{"step":3,"tool"... | [{"evidence_id":"EV-0007","source":"sysmon","channel":"1","summary":"rundll32.exe started targeting lsass.exe","timestamp":"2026-07-27T08:54:00+00:00","host":"SRV-APP-001"},{"evidence_id":"EV-0008","source":"sysmon","channel":"10","summary":"Process accessed lsass.exe with read memory rights","timestamp":"2026-07-27T08... | escalate | 0.9 | true | lsass_dump | malicious | 8 | 19 |
SCT-000253 | {"alert_id":"A-000253","title":"Burst of RC4 service ticket requests","severity":"high","source":"Microsoft Sentinel","host":"SRV-DC-002","user":"carol.owens","timestamp":"2026-07-27T09:00:00+00:00","description":"carol.owens requested RC4-encrypted TGS tickets for multiple service accounts from WKS-040 — consistent wi... | {"org":{"org_name":"Helvetia Mutual","industry":"insurance","employee_count":5000,"security_stack":["Proofpoint","CrowdStrike EDR","Zscaler"],"change_window":"Sat 01:00-04:00 UTC"},"asset_focus":"SRV-DC-002","asset_count":113} | {"verdict":"malicious","attack_techniques":["T1558.003"],"severity":"high","root_cause":"Service ticket harvesting for offline password cracking (Kerberoasting).","iocs":{"domains":[],"files":[],"ips":[]}} | [{"role":"system","content":"You are a SOC investigation agent. Given a security alert, investigate it step by step using the available read-only tools, then produce a structured triage report.\n\nAvailable tools: get_surrounding_events, get_process_tree, lookup_attack, search_sigma, get_asset_context, get_related_aler... | [{"step":1,"tool":"get_surrounding_events","arguments":{"alert_id":"A-000253","window_minutes":45},"result_summary":"6 events across 3 channels","duration_ms":147},{"step":2,"tool":"lookup_attack","arguments":{"query":"kerberoasting"},"result_summary":"no technique match","duration_ms":144},{"step":3,"tool":"search_sig... | [{"evidence_id":"EV-0004","source":"windows-security","channel":"4769","summary":"RC4 service ticket requested for svc_web","timestamp":"2026-07-27T08:30:00+00:00","host":"SRV-DC-002"},{"evidence_id":"EV-0005","source":"windows-security","channel":"4769","summary":"RC4 service ticket requested for svc_backup","timestam... | escalate | 0.84 | true | kerberoast | malicious | 7 | 17 |
SCT-009863 | {"alert_id":"A-009863","title":"System binary name running from temp path","severity":"high","source":"Microsoft Defender for Endpoint","host":"WKS-043","user":"david.nguyen","timestamp":"2026-07-27T09:00:00+00:00","description":"rundll32.exe executing from C:\\Users\\david.nguyen\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\rundll32.exe — ... | {"org":{"org_name":"Solstice Airlines","industry":"aviation","employee_count":800,"security_stack":["CrowdStrike EDR","Zscaler","QRadar"],"change_window":"Tue 22:00-24:00 UTC"},"asset_focus":"WKS-043","asset_count":113} | {"verdict":"malicious","attack_techniques":["T1036.005","T1071.001"],"severity":"high","root_cause":"Malware masquerading as a system binary from a user-writable path.","iocs":{"domains":[],"files":["C:\\Users\\david.nguyen\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\rundll32.exe"],"ips":[]}} | [{"role":"system","content":"You are a SOC investigation agent. Given a security alert, investigate it step by step using the available read-only tools, then produce a structured triage report.\n\nAvailable tools: get_surrounding_events, get_process_tree, lookup_attack, search_sigma, get_asset_context, get_related_aler... | [{"step":1,"tool":"get_surrounding_events","arguments":{"alert_id":"A-009863","window_minutes":30},"result_summary":"5 events across 3 channels","duration_ms":131},{"step":2,"tool":"get_process_tree","arguments":{"host":"WKS-043","process_name":"rundll32.exe"},"result_summary":"1 process nodes on WKS-043","duration_ms"... | [{"evidence_id":"EV-0004","source":"sysmon","channel":"1","summary":"rundll32.exe started from non-system path","timestamp":"2026-07-27T08:52:00+00:00","host":"WKS-043"},{"evidence_id":"EV-0005","source":"sysmon","channel":"3","summary":"rundll32.exe outbound connection","timestamp":"2026-07-27T08:53:00+00:00","host":"... | escalate | 0.9 | true | masquerade_binary | malicious | 6 | 15 |
SCT-000613 | {"alert_id":"A-000613","title":"PowerShell download cradle detected","severity":"high","source":"SentinelOne","host":"WKS-028","user":"liam.kumar","timestamp":"2026-07-27T09:00:00+00:00","description":"powershell.exe executed an IEX DownloadString cradle referencing external domain update-service-center.org.","techniqu... | {"org":{"org_name":"Vantage Polymers","industry":"manufacturing","employee_count":450,"security_stack":["Proofpoint","SentinelOne","Microsoft Sentinel"],"change_window":"Tue 22:00-24:00 UTC"},"asset_focus":"WKS-028","asset_count":113} | {"verdict":"malicious","attack_techniques":["T1059.001","T1105"],"severity":"high","root_cause":"PowerShell download cradle fetched and executed a remote script in memory.","iocs":{"domains":["update-service-center.org"],"files":[],"ips":[]}} | [{"role":"system","content":"You are a SOC investigation agent. Given a security alert, investigate it step by step using the available read-only tools, then produce a structured triage report.\n\nAvailable tools: get_surrounding_events, get_process_tree, lookup_attack, search_sigma, get_asset_context, get_related_aler... | [{"step":1,"tool":"get_surrounding_events","arguments":{"alert_id":"A-000613","window_minutes":20},"result_summary":"7 events across 3 channels","duration_ms":168},{"step":2,"tool":"get_process_tree","arguments":{"host":"WKS-028","process_name":"powershell.exe"},"result_summary":"2 process nodes on WKS-028","duration_m... | [{"evidence_id":"EV-0007","source":"sysmon","channel":"1","summary":"powershell.exe started with encoded command line","timestamp":"2026-07-27T08:58:00+00:00","host":"WKS-028"},{"evidence_id":"EV-0008","source":"sysmon","channel":"3","summary":"powershell.exe outbound connection to update-service-center.org","timestamp... | escalate | 0.88 | true | ps_download_cradle | malicious | 7 | 17 |
SCT-009293 | {"alert_id":"A-009293","title":"Remote WMI execution detected","severity":"high","source":"CrowdStrike EDR","host":"SRV-APP-004","user":"adm.j.carter","timestamp":"2026-07-27T09:00:00+00:00","description":"WMI process creation on SRV-APP-004 initiated from WKS-027 using adm.j.carter.","technique_hints":["T1047"],"statu... | {"org":{"org_name":"Cobalt Ridge Energy","industry":"energy","employee_count":450,"security_stack":["QRadar","SentinelOne","Zscaler"],"change_window":"Sun 02:00-05:00 UTC"},"asset_focus":"SRV-APP-004","asset_count":113} | {"verdict":"malicious","attack_techniques":["T1047"],"severity":"high","root_cause":"Remote command execution via WMI from a workstation to a server.","iocs":{"domains":[],"files":[],"ips":[]}} | [{"role":"system","content":"You are a SOC investigation agent. Given a security alert, investigate it step by step using the available read-only tools, then produce a structured triage report.\n\nAvailable tools: get_surrounding_events, get_process_tree, lookup_attack, search_sigma, get_asset_context, get_related_aler... | [{"step":1,"tool":"get_surrounding_events","arguments":{"alert_id":"A-009293","window_minutes":30},"result_summary":"5 events across 2 channels","duration_ms":65},{"step":2,"tool":"get_process_tree","arguments":{"host":"SRV-APP-004"},"result_summary":"2 process nodes on SRV-APP-004","duration_ms":154},{"step":3,"tool":... | [{"evidence_id":"EV-0004","source":"sysmon","channel":"1","summary":"WmiPrvSE.exe spawned cmd.exe","timestamp":"2026-07-27T08:46:00+00:00","host":"SRV-APP-004"},{"evidence_id":"EV-0005","source":"sysmon","channel":"1","summary":"wmic process call create observed","timestamp":"2026-07-27T08:47:00+00:00","host":"SRV-APP-... | escalate | 0.78 | true | wmi_remote | malicious | 6 | 15 |
SCT-009678 | {"alert_id":"A-009678","title":"Possible DNS tunneling to edge-telemetry-bus.com","severity":"high","source":"Zeek NDR","host":"WKS-046","user":"grace.tanaka","timestamp":"2026-07-27T09:00:00+00:00","description":"High rate of long, high-entropy TXT queries from WKS-046 to a single rare domain edge-telemetry-bus.com.",... | {"org":{"org_name":"Cinderpeak Mining","industry":"mining","employee_count":450,"security_stack":["CrowdStrike EDR","Splunk ES","Microsoft Defender for Endpoint"],"change_window":"Sun 02:00-05:00 UTC"},"asset_focus":"WKS-046","asset_count":113} | {"verdict":"malicious","attack_techniques":["T1071.004"],"severity":"high","root_cause":"Data exfiltration / C2 over DNS TXT queries with encoded subdomains.","iocs":{"domains":["edge-telemetry-bus.com"],"files":[],"ips":[]}} | [{"role":"system","content":"You are a SOC investigation agent. Given a security alert, investigate it step by step using the available read-only tools, then produce a structured triage report.\n\nAvailable tools: get_surrounding_events, get_process_tree, lookup_attack, search_sigma, get_asset_context, get_related_aler... | [{"step":1,"tool":"get_surrounding_events","arguments":{"alert_id":"A-009678","window_minutes":60},"result_summary":"8 events across 3 channels","duration_ms":158},{"step":2,"tool":"lookup_attack","arguments":{"query":"DNS tunneling"},"result_summary":"no technique match","duration_ms":66},{"step":3,"tool":"search_sigm... | [{"evidence_id":"EV-0004","source":"dns","channel":"query","summary":"TXT query k4p8bk9oah19j3s2a2i56v9nllr1rb526f114ey2s0t8nuh1.edge-telemetry-bus.com","timestamp":"2026-07-27T08:20:00+00:00","host":"WKS-046"},{"evidence_id":"EV-0005","source":"dns","channel":"query","summary":"TXT query wjoofxninmjnrxbuuhxhw5uxfzocjz... | escalate | 0.82 | true | dns_tunnel | malicious | 7 | 17 |
SCT-002055 | {"alert_id":"A-002055","title":"Impossible-travel sign-in and inbox forwarding rule","severity":"critical","source":"Microsoft Sentinel","host":"cloud-identity","user":"liam.johnson","timestamp":"2026-07-27T09:00:00+00:00","description":"Cloud account liam.johnson signed in from two distant locations within 85 minutes;... | {"org":{"org_name":"Helvetia Mutual","industry":"insurance","employee_count":5000,"security_stack":["Proofpoint","Microsoft Defender for Endpoint","QRadar"],"change_window":"Tue 22:00-24:00 UTC"},"asset_focus":"cloud-identity","asset_count":113} | {"verdict":"malicious","attack_techniques":["T1078.004","T1114.003"],"severity":"critical","root_cause":"Cloud account compromise with email collection via forwarding rule.","iocs":{"domains":["mail-verify-hub.net"],"files":[],"ips":[]}} | [{"role":"system","content":"You are a SOC investigation agent. Given a security alert, investigate it step by step using the available read-only tools, then produce a structured triage report.\n\nAvailable tools: get_surrounding_events, get_process_tree, lookup_attack, search_sigma, get_asset_context, get_related_aler... | [{"step":1,"tool":"get_surrounding_events","arguments":{"alert_id":"A-002055","window_minutes":240},"result_summary":"3 events across 2 channels","duration_ms":168},{"step":2,"tool":"lookup_attack","arguments":{"query":"cloud accounts valid"},"result_summary":"1 technique(s): T1078.004","duration_ms":195},{"step":3,"to... | [{"evidence_id":"EV-0001","source":"cloud-signin","channel":"entra","summary":"Successful sign-in from Frankfurt, DE","timestamp":"2026-07-27T06:00:00+00:00","host":"cloud-identity"},{"evidence_id":"EV-0002","source":"cloud-signin","channel":"entra","summary":"Successful sign-in from Singapore, SG (impossible travel)",... | escalate | 0.89 | true | cloud_account_anomaly | malicious | 7 | 17 |
SCT-004102 | {"alert_id":"A-004102","title":"Process injection into explorer.exe","severity":"high","source":"CrowdStrike EDR","host":"WKS-077","user":"henry.hayes","timestamp":"2026-07-27T09:00:00+00:00","description":"Unsigned binary ui6h1a29.exe created a remote thread in explorer.exe on WKS-077; explorer then made an unusual ou... | {"org":{"org_name":"Cinderpeak Mining","industry":"mining","employee_count":5000,"security_stack":["Proofpoint","Splunk ES","QRadar"],"change_window":"Sun 02:00-05:00 UTC"},"asset_focus":"WKS-077","asset_count":113} | {"verdict":"malicious","attack_techniques":["T1055.001","T1071.001"],"severity":"high","root_cause":"Process hollowing/injection into explorer.exe for stealthy C2.","iocs":{"domains":[],"files":["ui6h1a29.exe"],"ips":[]}} | [{"role":"system","content":"You are a SOC investigation agent. Given a security alert, investigate it step by step using the available read-only tools, then produce a structured triage report.\n\nAvailable tools: get_surrounding_events, get_process_tree, lookup_attack, search_sigma, get_asset_context, get_related_aler... | [{"step":1,"tool":"get_surrounding_events","arguments":{"alert_id":"A-004102","window_minutes":30},"result_summary":"5 events across 4 channels","duration_ms":41},{"step":2,"tool":"get_process_tree","arguments":{"host":"WKS-077"},"result_summary":"2 process nodes on WKS-077","duration_ms":169},{"step":3,"tool":"lookup_... | [{"evidence_id":"EV-0004","source":"sysmon","channel":"8","summary":"CreateRemoteThread into explorer.exe by ui6h1a29.exe","timestamp":"2026-07-27T08:53:00+00:00","host":"WKS-077"},{"evidence_id":"EV-0005","source":"sysmon","channel":"3","summary":"explorer.exe unusual outbound connection","timestamp":"2026-07-27T08:54... | monitor | 0.47 | false | process_injection | malicious | 5 | 13 |
SCT-005243 | {"alert_id":"A-005243","title":"Periodic beaconing to rare domain edge-telemetry-bus.com","severity":"high","source":"Zeek NDR","host":"WKS-018","user":"carol.baker","timestamp":"2026-07-27T09:00:00+00:00","description":"Regular 60-second-interval HTTPS connections from WKS-018 to edge-telemetry-bus.com with near-const... | {"org":{"org_name":"Northfield Logistics","industry":"logistics","employee_count":2400,"security_stack":["CrowdStrike EDR","Zscaler","Proofpoint"],"change_window":"Sat 01:00-04:00 UTC"},"asset_focus":"WKS-018","asset_count":113} | {"verdict":"malicious","attack_techniques":["T1071.001","T1036.005"],"severity":"high","root_cause":"Implant beaconing to attacker infrastructure at fixed intervals; binary masquerades as svchost.exe from a user-writable path.","iocs":{"domains":["edge-telemetry-bus.com"],"files":["svchost.exe (roaming)"],"ips":[]}} | [{"role":"system","content":"You are a SOC investigation agent. Given a security alert, investigate it step by step using the available read-only tools, then produce a structured triage report.\n\nAvailable tools: get_surrounding_events, get_process_tree, lookup_attack, search_sigma, get_asset_context, get_related_aler... | [{"step":1,"tool":"get_surrounding_events","arguments":{"alert_id":"A-005243","window_minutes":60},"result_summary":"10 events across 4 channels","duration_ms":197},{"step":2,"tool":"get_process_tree","arguments":{"host":"WKS-018","process_name":"svchost.exe"},"result_summary":"1 process nodes on WKS-018","duration_ms"... | [{"evidence_id":"EV-0005","source":"proxy","channel":"https","summary":"HTTPS connection to edge-telemetry-bus.com (2.58.56.86)","timestamp":"2026-07-27T08:00:00+00:00","host":"WKS-018"},{"evidence_id":"EV-0006","source":"proxy","channel":"https","summary":"HTTPS connection to edge-telemetry-bus.com (91.240.118.161)","... | escalate | 0.91 | true | c2_beacon | malicious | 8 | 19 |
SCT-005595 | {"alert_id":"A-005595","title":"Persistence via registry Run key","severity":"medium","source":"CrowdStrike EDR","host":"WKS-022","user":"david.diaz","timestamp":"2026-07-27T09:00:00+00:00","description":"Unsigned binary dinjbqps1.exe registered in the HKCU Run key on WKS-022.","technique_hints":["T1547.001"],"status":... | {"org":{"org_name":"Northfield Logistics","industry":"logistics","employee_count":800,"security_stack":["Zscaler","Splunk ES","SentinelOne"],"change_window":"Tue 22:00-24:00 UTC"},"asset_focus":"WKS-022","asset_count":113} | {"verdict":"malicious","attack_techniques":["T1547.001"],"severity":"medium","root_cause":"Unsigned user-profile binary established reboot persistence via Run key.","iocs":{"domains":[],"files":["dinjbqps1.exe"],"ips":[]}} | [{"role":"system","content":"You are a SOC investigation agent. Given a security alert, investigate it step by step using the available read-only tools, then produce a structured triage report.\n\nAvailable tools: get_surrounding_events, get_process_tree, lookup_attack, search_sigma, get_asset_context, get_related_aler... | [{"step":1,"tool":"get_surrounding_events","arguments":{"alert_id":"A-005595","window_minutes":30},"result_summary":"8 events across 7 channels","duration_ms":106},{"step":2,"tool":"get_process_tree","arguments":{"host":"WKS-022"},"result_summary":"1 process nodes on WKS-022","duration_ms":156},{"step":3,"tool":"lookup... | [{"evidence_id":"EV-0007","source":"sysmon","channel":"13","summary":"Registry value set in Run key","timestamp":"2026-07-27T08:48:00+00:00","host":"WKS-022"},{"evidence_id":"EV-0008","source":"sysmon","channel":"11","summary":"Unsigned binary dropped in roaming profile","timestamp":"2026-07-27T08:49:00+00:00","host":"... | escalate | 0.86 | true | registry_persistence | malicious | 7 | 17 |
SOC-Agent-Traces-10K
Multi-step SOC investigation agent traces in session-trace format. Each record is a complete investigation session: an alert arrives, an analyst agent gathers evidence through nine read-only tools, and closes with a structured JSON triage report.
Instead of single-turn alert → answer pairs, every record captures the full
reasoning trajectory:
alert → get_surrounding_events → get_process_tree → lookup_attack
→ search_sigma → get_asset_context → get_related_alerts
→ calculate_risk → retrieve_playbook → triage report
Use cases
- Agent SFT / tool-use training (chat-format traces with structured tool calls)
- Agent evaluation and replay benchmarks
- Triage-decision and confidence-calibration research
- Detection-engineering training data (ATT&CK + Sigma grounded)
Schema
| Field | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
scenario_id |
string | Unique scenario identifier |
alert |
JSON string | Alert object (id, title, severity, source, host, user, description) |
environment |
JSON string | Organization context (industry, security stack, asset focus) |
ground_truth |
JSON string | Verdict, ATT&CK techniques, root cause, IOCs |
trace |
JSON string | Full session as OpenAI-style messages with tool_calls |
tool_calls |
JSON string | Flattened list of tool invocations with argument/result summaries |
evidence |
JSON string | Decisive evidence items cited in the report |
decision |
string | escalate / monitor / close |
confidence |
float | Analyst confidence 0-1 |
success |
bool | Whether the trace reaches the correct verdict |
archetype |
string | Scenario archetype (32 families) |
verdict |
string | malicious / benign |
n_tool_calls |
int | Number of tool invocations |
n_messages |
int | Number of session messages |
Corpus statistics
- Total traces: 10000
- Verdicts: {"malicious": 8161, "benign": 1839}
- Decisions: {"escalate": 7033, "monitor": 1505, "close": 1462}
- Successful traces: {"True": 8498, "False": 1502}
- Avg tool calls / trace: 6.51 · avg messages / trace: 16.01
Archetype distribution
| Archetype | Traces |
|---|---|
| rdp_bruteforce | 482 |
| smb_lateral | 468 |
| ad_discovery | 466 |
| ps_download_cradle | 460 |
| browser_cred_theft | 458 |
| registry_persistence | 453 |
| wmi_remote | 443 |
| cloud_exfil | 443 |
| process_injection | 441 |
| phish_macro_powershell | 440 |
| log_clear | 427 |
| masquerade_binary | 427 |
| dns_tunnel | 426 |
| c2_beacon | 403 |
| cloud_account_anomaly | 377 |
| dev_build | 377 |
| backup_spike | 371 |
| pass_the_hash | 361 |
| kerberoast | 355 |
| vuln_scanner | 309 |
| edr_tamper | 274 |
| new_service_change_window | 192 |
| scheduled_task_persistence | 178 |
| admin_ps_maintenance | 176 |
| lsass_dump | 149 |
| webshell | 142 |
| sccm_deployment | 136 |
| av_selftest | 132 |
| onedrive_bulk_sync | 88 |
| ransomware_staging | 88 |
| windows_update | 52 |
| helpdesk_reset_flood | 6 |
Tool usage
| Tool | Calls |
|---|---|
| lookup_attack | 10065 |
| get_surrounding_events | 10000 |
| calculate_risk | 10000 |
| get_asset_context | 9617 |
| search_sigma | 8321 |
| get_process_tree | 6057 |
| get_related_alerts | 5644 |
| retrieve_playbook | 5225 |
| search_cve | 142 |
Tools (all read-only simulations)
get_surrounding_events, get_process_tree, lookup_attack, search_sigma,
get_asset_context, get_related_alerts, calculate_risk, search_cve,
retrieve_playbook. No tool executes commands against real systems; every
result is a deterministic lookup over the scenario's synthetic evidence store.
Trace format
trace follows the OpenAI chat-message convention: assistant messages carry
tool_calls (id, function name, JSON arguments) and tool results arrive as
role="tool" messages linked by tool_call_id. The final assistant message
contains the triage report as a fenced JSON block with keys verdict,
decision, confidence, techniques, summary, evidence_ids,
recommended_actions.
Splits
Stratified by verdict and archetype: train 90% / validation 5% / test 5%.
Traces with success=false (~12%) are flawed investigations (missed evidence
step → wrong or weak conclusion) intended for contrastive training and
evaluation; filter them out for SFT.
Generation methodology
Traces are synthesized by a reference investigation policy executing against a simulated SOC backend (per-scenario evidence stores over 32 attack and false-positive archetypes), with step jitter, dead-end lookups, and analyst persona variation. Ground truth is known by construction. All organizations, hosts, users, IPs, domains, and hashes are synthetic.
Companion assets
- Dataset (sibling):
alirezaaminzadeh/soc-agent-traces-100k - Fine-tuned agent:
alirezaaminzadeh/soc-agent-traces-smollm3-3b - Baseline classifiers:
alirezaaminzadeh/soc-traces-baseline - Live investigation demo:
alirezaaminzadeh/soc-agent-traces
License
Apache 2.0. Knowledge-base records are condensed paraphrases of public MITRE ATT&CK, Sigma HQ, and NVD material.
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