Datasets:
scenario_id stringlengths 10 10 | alert stringlengths 314 480 | environment stringlengths 206 268 | ground_truth stringlengths 166 344 | trace stringlengths 3.76k 12.3k | tool_calls stringlengths 348 1.44k | evidence stringlengths 175 1.42k | decision stringclasses 3
values | confidence float64 0.3 0.99 | success bool 2
classes | archetype stringclasses 32
values | verdict stringclasses 2
values | n_tool_calls int64 2 9 | n_messages int64 7 21 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
SCT-035175 | {"alert_id":"A-035175","title":"System binary name running from temp path","severity":"high","source":"Microsoft Defender for Endpoint","host":"WKS-020","user":"carol.garcia","timestamp":"2026-07-27T09:00:00+00:00","description":"rundll32.exe executing from C:\\Users\\carol.garcia\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\rundll32.exe — ... | {"org":{"org_name":"Solstice Airlines","industry":"aviation","employee_count":2400,"security_stack":["Splunk ES","Proofpoint","Zscaler"],"change_window":"Tue 22:00-24:00 UTC"},"asset_focus":"WKS-020","asset_count":113} | {"verdict":"malicious","attack_techniques":["T1036.005","T1071.001"],"severity":"high","root_cause":"Malware masquerading as a system binary from a user-writable path.","iocs":{"domains":[],"files":["C:\\Users\\carol.garcia\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\rundll32.exe"],"ips":[]}} | [{"role":"system","content":"You are a SOC investigation agent. Given a security alert, investigate it step by step using the available read-only tools, then produce a structured triage report.\n\nAvailable tools: get_surrounding_events, get_process_tree, lookup_attack, search_sigma, get_asset_context, get_related_aler... | [{"step":1,"tool":"get_surrounding_events","arguments":{"alert_id":"A-035175","window_minutes":30},"result_summary":"5 events across 3 channels","duration_ms":175},{"step":2,"tool":"get_process_tree","arguments":{"host":"WKS-020","process_name":"rundll32.exe"},"result_summary":"1 process nodes on WKS-020","duration_ms"... | [{"evidence_id":"EV-0004","source":"sysmon","channel":"1","summary":"rundll32.exe started from non-system path","timestamp":"2026-07-27T08:52:00+00:00","host":"WKS-020"},{"evidence_id":"EV-0005","source":"sysmon","channel":"3","summary":"rundll32.exe outbound connection","timestamp":"2026-07-27T08:53:00+00:00","host":"... | escalate | 0.93 | true | masquerade_binary | malicious | 6 | 15 |
SCT-010534 | {"alert_id":"A-010534","title":"Process injection into explorer.exe","severity":"high","source":"CrowdStrike EDR","host":"WKS-030","user":"frank.lopez","timestamp":"2026-07-27T09:00:00+00:00","description":"Unsigned binary 66uwtwqk.exe created a remote thread in explorer.exe on WKS-030; explorer then made an unusual ou... | {"org":{"org_name":"Lakeshore Retail Group","industry":"retail","employee_count":450,"security_stack":["Microsoft Sentinel","SentinelOne","Zscaler"],"change_window":"Tue 22:00-24:00 UTC"},"asset_focus":"WKS-030","asset_count":113} | {"verdict":"malicious","attack_techniques":["T1055.001","T1071.001"],"severity":"high","root_cause":"Process hollowing/injection into explorer.exe for stealthy C2.","iocs":{"domains":[],"files":["66uwtwqk.exe"],"ips":[]}} | [{"role":"system","content":"You are a SOC investigation agent. Given a security alert, investigate it step by step using the available read-only tools, then produce a structured triage report.\n\nAvailable tools: get_surrounding_events, get_process_tree, lookup_attack, search_sigma, get_asset_context, get_related_aler... | [{"step":1,"tool":"get_surrounding_events","arguments":{"alert_id":"A-010534","window_minutes":30},"result_summary":"5 events across 5 channels","duration_ms":190},{"step":2,"tool":"get_process_tree","arguments":{"host":"WKS-030"},"result_summary":"2 process nodes on WKS-030","duration_ms":171},{"step":3,"tool":"lookup... | [{"evidence_id":"EV-0004","source":"sysmon","channel":"8","summary":"CreateRemoteThread into explorer.exe by 66uwtwqk.exe","timestamp":"2026-07-27T08:53:00+00:00","host":"WKS-030"},{"evidence_id":"EV-0005","source":"sysmon","channel":"3","summary":"explorer.exe unusual outbound connection","timestamp":"2026-07-27T08:54... | escalate | 0.88 | true | process_injection | malicious | 6 | 15 |
SCT-002425 | {"alert_id":"A-002425","title":"System binary name running from temp path","severity":"high","source":"Microsoft Defender for Endpoint","host":"WKS-016","user":"irene.miller","timestamp":"2026-07-27T09:00:00+00:00","description":"csrss.exe executing from C:\\Users\\irene.miller\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\csrss.exe — name m... | {"org":{"org_name":"Lakeshore Retail Group","industry":"retail","employee_count":5000,"security_stack":["Microsoft Sentinel","CrowdStrike EDR","Zscaler"],"change_window":"Tue 22:00-24:00 UTC"},"asset_focus":"WKS-016","asset_count":113} | {"verdict":"malicious","attack_techniques":["T1036.005","T1071.001"],"severity":"high","root_cause":"Malware masquerading as a system binary from a user-writable path.","iocs":{"domains":[],"files":["C:\\Users\\irene.miller\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\csrss.exe"],"ips":[]}} | [{"role":"system","content":"You are a SOC investigation agent. Given a security alert, investigate it step by step using the available read-only tools, then produce a structured triage report.\n\nAvailable tools: get_surrounding_events, get_process_tree, lookup_attack, search_sigma, get_asset_context, get_related_aler... | [{"step":1,"tool":"get_surrounding_events","arguments":{"alert_id":"A-002425","window_minutes":30},"result_summary":"5 events across 4 channels","duration_ms":93},{"step":2,"tool":"get_process_tree","arguments":{"host":"WKS-016","process_name":"csrss.exe"},"result_summary":"1 process nodes on WKS-016","duration_ms":97}... | [{"evidence_id":"EV-0004","source":"sysmon","channel":"1","summary":"csrss.exe started from non-system path","timestamp":"2026-07-27T08:52:00+00:00","host":"WKS-016"},{"evidence_id":"EV-0005","source":"sysmon","channel":"3","summary":"csrss.exe outbound connection","timestamp":"2026-07-27T08:53:00+00:00","host":"WKS-01... | monitor | 0.51 | false | masquerade_binary | malicious | 6 | 15 |
SCT-036302 | {"alert_id":"A-036302","title":"Large outbound transfer from server","severity":"medium","source":"Zscaler","host":"SRV-DB-001","user":"svc_backup","timestamp":"2026-07-27T09:00:00+00:00","description":"67.0 GB uploaded from SRV-DB-001 to backup.contoso-vault.net.","technique_hints":["T1567.002"],"status":"new","queue"... | {"org":{"org_name":"Bluepine Health","industry":"healthcare","employee_count":1200,"security_stack":["SentinelOne","Microsoft Defender for Endpoint","CrowdStrike EDR"],"change_window":"Sun 02:00-05:00 UTC"},"asset_focus":"SRV-DB-001","asset_count":113} | {"verdict":"benign","attack_techniques":[],"severity":"low","root_cause":"Scheduled backup window upload by svc_backup to the sanctioned vault.","iocs":{"domains":["backup.contoso-vault.net"],"files":[],"ips":[]}} | [{"role":"system","content":"You are a SOC investigation agent. Given a security alert, investigate it step by step using the available read-only tools, then produce a structured triage report.\n\nAvailable tools: get_surrounding_events, get_process_tree, lookup_attack, search_sigma, get_asset_context, get_related_aler... | [{"step":1,"tool":"get_surrounding_events","arguments":{"alert_id":"A-036302","window_minutes":180},"result_summary":"2 events across 2 channels","duration_ms":138},{"step":2,"tool":"get_asset_context","arguments":{"hostname":"SRV-DB-001"},"result_summary":"database_server / criticality=critical","duration_ms":198},{"s... | [{"evidence_id":"EV-0001","source":"proxy","channel":"https","summary":"Sustained upload to backup.contoso-vault.net (67.0 GB)","timestamp":"2026-07-27T07:00:00+00:00","host":"SRV-DB-001"},{"evidence_id":"EV-0002","source":"windows-system","channel":"7036","summary":"Veeam Backup service entered running state","timesta... | close | 0.86 | true | backup_spike | benign | 5 | 13 |
SCT-088912 | {"alert_id":"A-088912","title":"Remote WMI execution detected","severity":"high","source":"CrowdStrike EDR","host":"SRV-APP-008","user":"adm.a.novak","timestamp":"2026-07-27T09:00:00+00:00","description":"WMI process creation on SRV-APP-008 initiated from SRV-APP-005 using adm.a.novak.","technique_hints":["T1047"],"sta... | {"org":{"org_name":"Ferrostat Automotive","industry":"automotive","employee_count":800,"security_stack":["Microsoft Sentinel","Proofpoint","Microsoft Defender for Endpoint"],"change_window":"Sat 01:00-04:00 UTC"},"asset_focus":"SRV-APP-008","asset_count":113} | {"verdict":"malicious","attack_techniques":["T1047"],"severity":"high","root_cause":"Remote command execution via WMI from a workstation to a server.","iocs":{"domains":[],"files":[],"ips":[]}} | [{"role":"system","content":"You are a SOC investigation agent. Given a security alert, investigate it step by step using the available read-only tools, then produce a structured triage report.\n\nAvailable tools: get_surrounding_events, get_process_tree, lookup_attack, search_sigma, get_asset_context, get_related_aler... | [{"step":1,"tool":"get_surrounding_events","arguments":{"alert_id":"A-088912","window_minutes":30},"result_summary":"5 events across 4 channels","duration_ms":67},{"step":2,"tool":"get_process_tree","arguments":{"host":"SRV-APP-008"},"result_summary":"2 process nodes on SRV-APP-008","duration_ms":159},{"step":3,"tool":... | [{"evidence_id":"EV-0004","source":"sysmon","channel":"1","summary":"WmiPrvSE.exe spawned cmd.exe","timestamp":"2026-07-27T08:46:00+00:00","host":"SRV-APP-008"},{"evidence_id":"EV-0005","source":"sysmon","channel":"1","summary":"wmic process call create observed","timestamp":"2026-07-27T08:47:00+00:00","host":"SRV-APP-... | escalate | 0.77 | true | wmi_remote | malicious | 6 | 15 |
SCT-013647 | {"alert_id":"A-013647","title":"Remote WMI execution detected","severity":"high","source":"CrowdStrike EDR","host":"SRV-APP-008","user":"adm.s.lopez","timestamp":"2026-07-27T09:00:00+00:00","description":"WMI process creation on SRV-APP-008 initiated from WKS-051 using adm.s.lopez.","technique_hints":["T1047"],"status"... | {"org":{"org_name":"Bluepine Health","industry":"healthcare","employee_count":800,"security_stack":["SentinelOne","Splunk ES","Zscaler"],"change_window":"Sun 02:00-05:00 UTC"},"asset_focus":"SRV-APP-008","asset_count":113} | {"verdict":"malicious","attack_techniques":["T1047"],"severity":"high","root_cause":"Remote command execution via WMI from a workstation to a server.","iocs":{"domains":[],"files":[],"ips":[]}} | [{"role":"system","content":"You are a SOC investigation agent. Given a security alert, investigate it step by step using the available read-only tools, then produce a structured triage report.\n\nAvailable tools: get_surrounding_events, get_process_tree, lookup_attack, search_sigma, get_asset_context, get_related_aler... | [{"step":1,"tool":"get_surrounding_events","arguments":{"alert_id":"A-013647","window_minutes":30},"result_summary":"5 events across 3 channels","duration_ms":128},{"step":2,"tool":"get_process_tree","arguments":{"host":"SRV-APP-008"},"result_summary":"2 process nodes on SRV-APP-008","duration_ms":111},{"step":3,"tool"... | [{"evidence_id":"EV-0004","source":"sysmon","channel":"1","summary":"WmiPrvSE.exe spawned cmd.exe","timestamp":"2026-07-27T08:46:00+00:00","host":"SRV-APP-008"},{"evidence_id":"EV-0005","source":"sysmon","channel":"1","summary":"wmic process call create observed","timestamp":"2026-07-27T08:47:00+00:00","host":"SRV-APP-... | escalate | 0.78 | true | wmi_remote | malicious | 7 | 17 |
SCT-082935 | {"alert_id":"A-082935","title":"Security event log cleared","severity":"critical","source":"Microsoft Sentinel","host":"SRV-FS-001","user":"frank.quinn","timestamp":"2026-07-27T09:00:00+00:00","description":"Event 1102 on SRV-FS-001: the Security log was cleared shortly after suspicious PowerShell activity — anti-foren... | {"org":{"org_name":"Cinderpeak Mining","industry":"mining","employee_count":5000,"security_stack":["CrowdStrike EDR","Microsoft Sentinel","Proofpoint"],"change_window":"Sat 01:00-04:00 UTC"},"asset_focus":"SRV-FS-001","asset_count":113} | {"verdict":"malicious","attack_techniques":["T1070.001","T1059.001"],"severity":"critical","root_cause":"Anti-forensic log clearing following suspicious execution.","iocs":{"domains":[],"files":[],"ips":[]}} | [{"role":"system","content":"You are a SOC investigation agent. Given a security alert, investigate it step by step using the available read-only tools, then produce a structured triage report.\n\nAvailable tools: get_surrounding_events, get_process_tree, lookup_attack, search_sigma, get_asset_context, get_related_aler... | [{"step":1,"tool":"get_surrounding_events","arguments":{"alert_id":"A-082935","window_minutes":45},"result_summary":"2 events across 2 channels","duration_ms":121},{"step":2,"tool":"lookup_attack","arguments":{"query":"clear event logs"},"result_summary":"no technique match","duration_ms":46},{"step":3,"tool":"search_s... | [{"evidence_id":"EV-0001","source":"sysmon","channel":"1","summary":"Encoded PowerShell executed","timestamp":"2026-07-27T08:35:00+00:00","host":"SRV-FS-001"},{"evidence_id":"EV-0002","source":"windows-security","channel":"1102","summary":"The Security event log was cleared","timestamp":"2026-07-27T08:40:00+00:00","hos... | escalate | 0.96 | true | log_clear | malicious | 6 | 15 |
SCT-091891 | {"alert_id":"A-091891","title":"Possible DNS tunneling to edge-telemetry-bus.com","severity":"high","source":"Zeek NDR","host":"SRV-EXCH-001","user":"irene.rodriguez","timestamp":"2026-07-27T09:00:00+00:00","description":"High rate of long, high-entropy TXT queries from SRV-EXCH-001 to a single rare domain edge-telemet... | {"org":{"org_name":"Quillstone Capital","industry":"finance","employee_count":2400,"security_stack":["Microsoft Defender for Endpoint","Splunk ES","Zscaler"],"change_window":"Tue 22:00-24:00 UTC"},"asset_focus":"SRV-EXCH-001","asset_count":113} | {"verdict":"malicious","attack_techniques":["T1071.004"],"severity":"high","root_cause":"Data exfiltration / C2 over DNS TXT queries with encoded subdomains.","iocs":{"domains":["edge-telemetry-bus.com"],"files":[],"ips":[]}} | [{"role":"system","content":"You are a SOC investigation agent. Given a security alert, investigate it step by step using the available read-only tools, then produce a structured triage report.\n\nAvailable tools: get_surrounding_events, get_process_tree, lookup_attack, search_sigma, get_asset_context, get_related_aler... | [{"step":1,"tool":"get_surrounding_events","arguments":{"alert_id":"A-091891","window_minutes":60},"result_summary":"8 events across 3 channels","duration_ms":128},{"step":2,"tool":"search_sigma","arguments":{"query":"DNS tunneling"},"result_summary":"0 Sigma rule(s) matched","duration_ms":137},{"step":3,"tool":"lookup... | [{"evidence_id":"EV-0004","source":"dns","channel":"query","summary":"TXT query 4y9ytddfb0azd8sshg44jui3ccvknw1y6qyjqdy43c0vnvu6.edge-telemetry-bus.com","timestamp":"2026-07-27T08:20:00+00:00","host":"SRV-EXCH-001"},{"evidence_id":"EV-0005","source":"dns","channel":"query","summary":"TXT query eaj8hms8thditfphz8xwv3soq... | escalate | 0.84 | true | dns_tunnel | malicious | 7 | 17 |
SCT-052859 | {"alert_id":"A-052859","title":"RDP brute force followed by successful logon","severity":"critical","source":"Microsoft Sentinel","host":"LNX-WEB-001","user":"jack.patel","timestamp":"2026-07-27T09:00:00+00:00","description":"Over 200 failed RDP attempts from 91.240.118.231 against LNX-WEB-001, followed by a successful... | {"org":{"org_name":"Cinderpeak Mining","industry":"mining","employee_count":5000,"security_stack":["SentinelOne","QRadar","Proofpoint"],"change_window":"Tue 22:00-24:00 UTC"},"asset_focus":"LNX-WEB-001","asset_count":113} | {"verdict":"malicious","attack_techniques":["T1110.001","T1021.001"],"severity":"critical","root_cause":"External RDP password guessing succeeded against an internet-facing server.","iocs":{"domains":[],"files":[],"ips":["91.240.118.231"]}} | [{"role":"system","content":"You are a SOC investigation agent. Given a security alert, investigate it step by step using the available read-only tools, then produce a structured triage report.\n\nAvailable tools: get_surrounding_events, get_process_tree, lookup_attack, search_sigma, get_asset_context, get_related_aler... | [{"step":1,"tool":"get_surrounding_events","arguments":{"alert_id":"A-052859","window_minutes":60},"result_summary":"7 events across 2 channels","duration_ms":122},{"step":2,"tool":"lookup_attack","arguments":{"query":"password guessing RDP"},"result_summary":"no technique match","duration_ms":72},{"step":3,"tool":"get... | [{"evidence_id":"EV-0001","source":"windows-security","channel":"4625","summary":"Failed RDP logon for jack.patel from 91.240.118.231","timestamp":"2026-07-27T08:10:00+00:00","host":"LNX-WEB-001"},{"evidence_id":"EV-0002","source":"windows-security","channel":"4625","summary":"Failed RDP logon for administrator from 91... | escalate | 0.95 | true | rdp_bruteforce | malicious | 7 | 17 |
SCT-050274 | {"alert_id":"A-050274","title":"Remote service creation on SRV-WEB-001 via ADMIN$","severity":"high","source":"Microsoft Sentinel","host":"SRV-WEB-001","user":"adm.r.ito","timestamp":"2026-07-27T09:00:00+00:00","description":"ADMIN$ write from WKS-050 followed by remote service creation on SRV-WEB-001 — pattern matches... | {"org":{"org_name":"Cinderpeak Mining","industry":"mining","employee_count":5000,"security_stack":["SentinelOne","Microsoft Defender for Endpoint","CrowdStrike EDR"],"change_window":"Tue 22:00-24:00 UTC"},"asset_focus":"SRV-WEB-001","asset_count":113} | {"verdict":"malicious","attack_techniques":["T1021.002"],"severity":"high","root_cause":"Lateral movement from WKS-050 to SRV-WEB-001 via admin share and remote service creation.","iocs":{"domains":[],"files":[],"ips":[]}} | [{"role":"system","content":"You are a SOC investigation agent. Given a security alert, investigate it step by step using the available read-only tools, then produce a structured triage report.\n\nAvailable tools: get_surrounding_events, get_process_tree, lookup_attack, search_sigma, get_asset_context, get_related_aler... | [{"step":1,"tool":"get_surrounding_events","arguments":{"alert_id":"A-050274","window_minutes":45},"result_summary":"8 events across 7 channels","duration_ms":184},{"step":2,"tool":"get_process_tree","arguments":{"host":"SRV-WEB-001"},"result_summary":"2 process nodes on SRV-WEB-001","duration_ms":121},{"step":3,"tool"... | [{"evidence_id":"EV-0005","source":"windows-security","channel":"4624","summary":"Network logon (type 3) from WKS-050","timestamp":"2026-07-27T08:40:00+00:00","host":"SRV-WEB-001"},{"evidence_id":"EV-0006","source":"smb","channel":"share_access","summary":"ADMIN$ share accessed from WKS-050","timestamp":"2026-07-27T08:... | escalate | 0.87 | true | smb_lateral | malicious | 8 | 19 |
SCT-097699 | {"alert_id":"A-097699","title":"Persistence via registry Run key","severity":"medium","source":"CrowdStrike EDR","host":"WKS-016","user":"mia.hayes","timestamp":"2026-07-27T09:00:00+00:00","description":"Unsigned binary 88ooj3sp2.exe registered in the HKCU Run key on WKS-016.","technique_hints":["T1547.001"],"status":"... | {"org":{"org_name":"Bluepine Health","industry":"healthcare","employee_count":1200,"security_stack":["CrowdStrike EDR","QRadar","Microsoft Sentinel"],"change_window":"Tue 22:00-24:00 UTC"},"asset_focus":"WKS-016","asset_count":113} | {"verdict":"malicious","attack_techniques":["T1547.001"],"severity":"medium","root_cause":"Unsigned user-profile binary established reboot persistence via Run key.","iocs":{"domains":[],"files":["88ooj3sp2.exe"],"ips":[]}} | [{"role":"system","content":"You are a SOC investigation agent. Given a security alert, investigate it step by step using the available read-only tools, then produce a structured triage report.\n\nAvailable tools: get_surrounding_events, get_process_tree, lookup_attack, search_sigma, get_asset_context, get_related_aler... | [{"step":1,"tool":"get_surrounding_events","arguments":{"alert_id":"A-097699","window_minutes":30},"result_summary":"8 events across 7 channels","duration_ms":210},{"step":2,"tool":"get_process_tree","arguments":{"host":"WKS-016"},"result_summary":"1 process nodes on WKS-016","duration_ms":49},{"step":3,"tool":"lookup_... | [{"evidence_id":"EV-0007","source":"sysmon","channel":"13","summary":"Registry value set in Run key","timestamp":"2026-07-27T08:48:00+00:00","host":"WKS-016"},{"evidence_id":"EV-0008","source":"sysmon","channel":"11","summary":"Unsigned binary dropped in roaming profile","timestamp":"2026-07-27T08:49:00+00:00","host":"... | escalate | 0.87 | true | registry_persistence | malicious | 7 | 17 |
SCT-005567 | {"alert_id":"A-005567","title":"Possible DNS tunneling to mail-verify-hub.net","severity":"high","source":"Zeek NDR","host":"WKS-017","user":"grace.patel","timestamp":"2026-07-27T09:00:00+00:00","description":"High rate of long, high-entropy TXT queries from WKS-017 to a single rare domain mail-verify-hub.net.","techni... | {"org":{"org_name":"Cinderpeak Mining","industry":"mining","employee_count":5000,"security_stack":["CrowdStrike EDR","QRadar","Zscaler"],"change_window":"Sun 02:00-05:00 UTC"},"asset_focus":"WKS-017","asset_count":113} | {"verdict":"malicious","attack_techniques":["T1071.004"],"severity":"high","root_cause":"Data exfiltration / C2 over DNS TXT queries with encoded subdomains.","iocs":{"domains":["mail-verify-hub.net"],"files":[],"ips":[]}} | [{"role":"system","content":"You are a SOC investigation agent. Given a security alert, investigate it step by step using the available read-only tools, then produce a structured triage report.\n\nAvailable tools: get_surrounding_events, get_process_tree, lookup_attack, search_sigma, get_asset_context, get_related_aler... | [{"step":1,"tool":"get_surrounding_events","arguments":{"alert_id":"A-005567","window_minutes":60},"result_summary":"8 events across 3 channels","duration_ms":88},{"step":2,"tool":"lookup_attack","arguments":{"query":"DNS tunneling"},"result_summary":"no technique match","duration_ms":163},{"step":3,"tool":"search_sigm... | [{"evidence_id":"EV-0004","source":"dns","channel":"query","summary":"TXT query u8v7j4mobf813l0z73yief6b6p6l93vzchdkof0695gbw3ar.mail-verify-hub.net","timestamp":"2026-07-27T08:20:00+00:00","host":"WKS-017"},{"evidence_id":"EV-0005","source":"dns","channel":"query","summary":"TXT query ncz0ns4qxrfl88m81ey11kxtxkzrzoraa... | escalate | 0.91 | true | dns_tunnel | malicious | 7 | 17 |
SCT-063827 | {"alert_id":"A-063827","title":"System binary name running from temp path","severity":"high","source":"Microsoft Defender for Endpoint","host":"WKS-053","user":"mia.quinn","timestamp":"2026-07-27T09:00:00+00:00","description":"rundll32.exe executing from C:\\Users\\mia.quinn\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\rundll32.exe — name m... | {"org":{"org_name":"Cobalt Ridge Energy","industry":"energy","employee_count":5000,"security_stack":["Zscaler","SentinelOne","CrowdStrike EDR"],"change_window":"Tue 22:00-24:00 UTC"},"asset_focus":"WKS-053","asset_count":113} | {"verdict":"malicious","attack_techniques":["T1036.005","T1071.001"],"severity":"high","root_cause":"Malware masquerading as a system binary from a user-writable path.","iocs":{"domains":[],"files":["C:\\Users\\mia.quinn\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\rundll32.exe"],"ips":[]}} | [{"role":"system","content":"You are a SOC investigation agent. Given a security alert, investigate it step by step using the available read-only tools, then produce a structured triage report.\n\nAvailable tools: get_surrounding_events, get_process_tree, lookup_attack, search_sigma, get_asset_context, get_related_aler... | [{"step":1,"tool":"get_surrounding_events","arguments":{"alert_id":"A-063827","window_minutes":30},"result_summary":"5 events across 3 channels","duration_ms":174},{"step":2,"tool":"get_process_tree","arguments":{"host":"WKS-053","process_name":"rundll32.exe"},"result_summary":"1 process nodes on WKS-053","duration_ms"... | [{"evidence_id":"EV-0004","source":"sysmon","channel":"1","summary":"rundll32.exe started from non-system path","timestamp":"2026-07-27T08:52:00+00:00","host":"WKS-053"},{"evidence_id":"EV-0005","source":"sysmon","channel":"3","summary":"rundll32.exe outbound connection","timestamp":"2026-07-27T08:53:00+00:00","host":"... | escalate | 0.92 | true | masquerade_binary | malicious | 6 | 15 |
SCT-055791 | {"alert_id":"A-055791","title":"System binary name running from temp path","severity":"high","source":"Microsoft Defender for Endpoint","host":"WKS-008","user":"david.diaz","timestamp":"2026-07-27T09:00:00+00:00","description":"csrss.exe executing from C:\\Users\\david.diaz\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\csrss.exe — name masqu... | {"org":{"org_name":"Cinderpeak Mining","industry":"mining","employee_count":2400,"security_stack":["Microsoft Sentinel","SentinelOne","Proofpoint"],"change_window":"Tue 22:00-24:00 UTC"},"asset_focus":"WKS-008","asset_count":113} | {"verdict":"malicious","attack_techniques":["T1036.005","T1071.001"],"severity":"high","root_cause":"Malware masquerading as a system binary from a user-writable path.","iocs":{"domains":[],"files":["C:\\Users\\david.diaz\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\csrss.exe"],"ips":[]}} | [{"role":"system","content":"You are a SOC investigation agent. Given a security alert, investigate it step by step using the available read-only tools, then produce a structured triage report.\n\nAvailable tools: get_surrounding_events, get_process_tree, lookup_attack, search_sigma, get_asset_context, get_related_aler... | [{"step":1,"tool":"get_surrounding_events","arguments":{"alert_id":"A-055791","window_minutes":30},"result_summary":"5 events across 4 channels","duration_ms":51},{"step":2,"tool":"get_process_tree","arguments":{"host":"WKS-008","process_name":"csrss.exe"},"result_summary":"1 process nodes on WKS-008","duration_ms":112... | [{"evidence_id":"EV-0004","source":"sysmon","channel":"1","summary":"csrss.exe started from non-system path","timestamp":"2026-07-27T08:52:00+00:00","host":"WKS-008"},{"evidence_id":"EV-0005","source":"sysmon","channel":"3","summary":"csrss.exe outbound connection","timestamp":"2026-07-27T08:53:00+00:00","host":"WKS-00... | escalate | 0.91 | true | masquerade_binary | malicious | 6 | 15 |
SCT-066177 | {"alert_id":"A-066177","title":"Periodic beaconing to rare domain cdn-metrics-sync.net","severity":"high","source":"Zeek NDR","host":"WKS-046","user":"karen.kumar","timestamp":"2026-07-27T09:00:00+00:00","description":"Regular 120-second-interval HTTPS connections from WKS-046 to cdn-metrics-sync.net with near-constant... | {"org":{"org_name":"Vantage Polymers","industry":"manufacturing","employee_count":800,"security_stack":["CrowdStrike EDR","Microsoft Sentinel","SentinelOne"],"change_window":"Sat 01:00-04:00 UTC"},"asset_focus":"WKS-046","asset_count":113} | {"verdict":"malicious","attack_techniques":["T1071.001","T1036.005"],"severity":"high","root_cause":"Implant beaconing to attacker infrastructure at fixed intervals; binary masquerades as svchost.exe from a user-writable path.","iocs":{"domains":["cdn-metrics-sync.net"],"files":["svchost.exe (roaming)"],"ips":[]}} | [{"role":"system","content":"You are a SOC investigation agent. Given a security alert, investigate it step by step using the available read-only tools, then produce a structured triage report.\n\nAvailable tools: get_surrounding_events, get_process_tree, lookup_attack, search_sigma, get_asset_context, get_related_aler... | [{"step":1,"tool":"get_surrounding_events","arguments":{"alert_id":"A-066177","window_minutes":60},"result_summary":"10 events across 5 channels","duration_ms":95},{"step":2,"tool":"get_process_tree","arguments":{"host":"WKS-046","process_name":"svchost.exe"},"result_summary":"1 process nodes on WKS-046","duration_ms":... | [{"evidence_id":"EV-0005","source":"proxy","channel":"https","summary":"HTTPS connection to cdn-metrics-sync.net (185.220.101.181)","timestamp":"2026-07-27T08:00:00+00:00","host":"WKS-046"},{"evidence_id":"EV-0006","source":"proxy","channel":"https","summary":"HTTPS connection to cdn-metrics-sync.net (45.155.204.198)",... | escalate | 0.85 | true | c2_beacon | malicious | 9 | 21 |
SCT-089935 | {"alert_id":"A-089935","title":"Multiple failed logons from internal host","severity":"medium","source":"Splunk ES","host":"WKS-028","user":"svc_scan","timestamp":"2026-07-27T09:00:00+00:00","description":"Failed logons and port-scan patterns sourced from 10.30.0.249.","technique_hints":["T1110.001"],"status":"new","qu... | {"org":{"org_name":"Helvetia Mutual","industry":"insurance","employee_count":1200,"security_stack":["SentinelOne","CrowdStrike EDR","Zscaler"],"change_window":"Sat 01:00-04:00 UTC"},"asset_focus":"WKS-028","asset_count":113} | {"verdict":"benign","attack_techniques":[],"severity":"low","root_cause":"Authorized Tenable vulnerability scanner (svc_scan) during its weekly window.","iocs":{"domains":[],"files":[],"ips":["10.30.0.249"]}} | [{"role":"system","content":"You are a SOC investigation agent. Given a security alert, investigate it step by step using the available read-only tools, then produce a structured triage report.\n\nAvailable tools: get_surrounding_events, get_process_tree, lookup_attack, search_sigma, get_asset_context, get_related_aler... | [{"step":1,"tool":"get_surrounding_events","arguments":{"alert_id":"A-089935","window_minutes":60},"result_summary":"5 events across 2 channels","duration_ms":158},{"step":2,"tool":"get_related_alerts","arguments":{"user":"svc_scan","hours":168},"result_summary":"1 related alert(s)","duration_ms":139},{"step":3,"tool":... | [{"evidence_id":"EV-0001","source":"windows-security","channel":"4625","summary":"Failed logon from 10.30.0.249 (svc_scan)","timestamp":"2026-07-27T08:20:00+00:00","host":"WKS-028"},{"evidence_id":"EV-0002","source":"windows-security","channel":"4625","summary":"Failed logon from 10.30.0.249 (svc_scan)","timestamp":"20... | close | 0.88 | true | vuln_scanner | benign | 6 | 15 |
SOC-Agent-Traces-100K
Multi-step SOC investigation agent traces in session-trace format. Each record is a complete investigation session: an alert arrives, an analyst agent gathers evidence through nine read-only tools, and closes with a structured JSON triage report.
Instead of single-turn alert → answer pairs, every record captures the full
reasoning trajectory:
alert → get_surrounding_events → get_process_tree → lookup_attack
→ search_sigma → get_asset_context → get_related_alerts
→ calculate_risk → retrieve_playbook → triage report
Use cases
- Agent SFT / tool-use training (chat-format traces with structured tool calls)
- Agent evaluation and replay benchmarks
- Triage-decision and confidence-calibration research
- Detection-engineering training data (ATT&CK + Sigma grounded)
Schema
| Field | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
scenario_id |
string | Unique scenario identifier |
alert |
JSON string | Alert object (id, title, severity, source, host, user, description) |
environment |
JSON string | Organization context (industry, security stack, asset focus) |
ground_truth |
JSON string | Verdict, ATT&CK techniques, root cause, IOCs |
trace |
JSON string | Full session as OpenAI-style messages with tool_calls |
tool_calls |
JSON string | Flattened list of tool invocations with argument/result summaries |
evidence |
JSON string | Decisive evidence items cited in the report |
decision |
string | escalate / monitor / close |
confidence |
float | Analyst confidence 0-1 |
success |
bool | Whether the trace reaches the correct verdict |
archetype |
string | Scenario archetype (32 families) |
verdict |
string | malicious / benign |
n_tool_calls |
int | Number of tool invocations |
n_messages |
int | Number of session messages |
Corpus statistics
- Total traces: 100000
- Verdicts: {"malicious": 89652, "benign": 10348}
- Decisions: {"monitor": 17203, "close": 7319, "escalate": 75478}
- Successful traces: {"False": 17200, "True": 82800}
- Avg tool calls / trace: 6.64 · avg messages / trace: 16.28
Archetype distribution
| Archetype | Traces |
|---|---|
| rdp_bruteforce | 6900 |
| registry_persistence | 6885 |
| cloud_exfil | 6861 |
| process_injection | 6853 |
| browser_cred_theft | 6837 |
| phish_macro_powershell | 6785 |
| masquerade_binary | 6633 |
| ad_discovery | 6545 |
| wmi_remote | 5913 |
| smb_lateral | 5693 |
| log_clear | 4948 |
| dev_build | 4260 |
| dns_tunnel | 3451 |
| ps_download_cradle | 3199 |
| c2_beacon | 3089 |
| backup_spike | 3018 |
| cloud_account_anomaly | 2226 |
| pass_the_hash | 2138 |
| kerberoast | 1949 |
| edr_tamper | 1019 |
| vuln_scanner | 1014 |
| scheduled_task_persistence | 614 |
| new_service_change_window | 591 |
| admin_ps_maintenance | 495 |
| webshell | 477 |
| lsass_dump | 432 |
| sccm_deployment | 379 |
| av_selftest | 293 |
| onedrive_bulk_sync | 211 |
| ransomware_staging | 205 |
| windows_update | 81 |
| helpdesk_reset_flood | 6 |
Tool usage
| Tool | Calls |
|---|---|
| lookup_attack | 108882 |
| get_surrounding_events | 100000 |
| calculate_risk | 100000 |
| get_asset_context | 97768 |
| search_sigma | 86208 |
| get_process_tree | 69737 |
| retrieve_playbook | 50904 |
| get_related_alerts | 49783 |
| search_cve | 477 |
Tools (all read-only simulations)
get_surrounding_events, get_process_tree, lookup_attack, search_sigma,
get_asset_context, get_related_alerts, calculate_risk, search_cve,
retrieve_playbook. No tool executes commands against real systems; every
result is a deterministic lookup over the scenario's synthetic evidence store.
Trace format
trace follows the OpenAI chat-message convention: assistant messages carry
tool_calls (id, function name, JSON arguments) and tool results arrive as
role="tool" messages linked by tool_call_id. The final assistant message
contains the triage report as a fenced JSON block with keys verdict,
decision, confidence, techniques, summary, evidence_ids,
recommended_actions.
Splits
Stratified by verdict and archetype: train 90% / validation 5% / test 5%.
Traces with success=false (~12%) are flawed investigations (missed evidence
step → wrong or weak conclusion) intended for contrastive training and
evaluation; filter them out for SFT.
Generation methodology
Traces are synthesized by a reference investigation policy executing against a simulated SOC backend (per-scenario evidence stores over 32 attack and false-positive archetypes), with step jitter, dead-end lookups, and analyst persona variation. Ground truth is known by construction. All organizations, hosts, users, IPs, domains, and hashes are synthetic.
Companion assets
- Dataset (sibling):
alirezaaminzadeh/soc-agent-traces-10k - Fine-tuned agent:
alirezaaminzadeh/soc-agent-traces-smollm3-3b - Baseline classifiers:
alirezaaminzadeh/soc-traces-baseline - Live investigation demo:
alirezaaminzadeh/soc-agent-traces
License
Apache 2.0. Knowledge-base records are condensed paraphrases of public MITRE ATT&CK, Sigma HQ, and NVD material.
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