Instructions to use anonsubmission12345/AnchorRep-Llama-3-8B-Instruct with libraries, inference providers, notebooks, and local apps. Follow these links to get started.
- Libraries
- PEFT
How to use anonsubmission12345/AnchorRep-Llama-3-8B-Instruct with PEFT:
from peft import PeftModel from transformers import AutoModelForCausalLM base_model = AutoModelForCausalLM.from_pretrained("meta-llama/Meta-Llama-3-8B-Instruct") model = PeftModel.from_pretrained(base_model, "anonsubmission12345/AnchorRep-Llama-3-8B-Instruct") - Notebooks
- Google Colab
- Kaggle
AnchorRep — Llama-3-8B-Instruct
LoRA defense adapter for meta-llama/Meta-Llama-3-8B-Instruct, trained against frozen anchor microsoft/Phi-3-medium-4k-instruct to reduce cross-model jailbreak transfer. Companion artifact for the AnchorRep paper (NeurIPS 2026, anonymous submission).
Intended use
Defensive research on cross-model jailbreak robustness for open-weight LLMs. Apply the adapter on top of the unmodified base model to obtain a hardened version. Not for production deployment without independent safety validation.
Quick start
from transformers import AutoModelForCausalLM, AutoTokenizer
from peft import PeftModel
base = "meta-llama/Meta-Llama-3-8B-Instruct"
adapter = "<your-handle>/AnchorRep-Llama-3-8B-Instruct"
tokenizer = AutoTokenizer.from_pretrained(base)
model = AutoModelForCausalLM.from_pretrained(base, torch_dtype="float32", device_map="auto")
model = PeftModel.from_pretrained(model, adapter)
Merge the adapter into the base weights for a single deployable model:
model = model.merge_and_unload()
Training data
- 30 harmful prompts from AdvBench (predetermined seed-42 split, disjoint from evaluation).
- 200 borderline prompts from XSTest safe subset (KL preservation only).
- Benign prompts from WikiText-2 (coherency loss).
- 10 refusal templates for refusal-direction extraction.
Hyperparameters
| Parameter | Value | Role |
|---|---|---|
| Refusal-direction weight (α) | 0.15 | refusal projection |
| Coherency weight (β) | 1.0 | benign output preservation |
| CKA repulsion weight (γ) | 2.0 | anchor repulsion |
| LM weight (δ) | 0.0 | next-token preservation |
| KL weight (ε) | 0.4 | benign KL preservation |
| CKA scope | harmful_only | prompts contributing to repulsion |
| Training steps | 200 | |
| LoRA rank / alpha | 32 / 64 | |
| Target modules | q,k,v,o,up,down,gate_proj | |
| Layer | mid (50% depth) | |
| Precision | fp32 | |
| Seed | 42 |
Full training config in training_config.json. Per-loss ablations and hyperparameter ranges are in the paper appendix.
Reported metrics
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Cross-model GCG transfer ASR (self / anchor / other) | 1% / 2% / 0% |
| Benign Garble Rate (OR-Bench) | 0% |
| Δ XSTest refusal | -2.4 |
| Δ OR-Bench refusal | +1.9 |
| Δ MT-Bench | +0.18 |
ASR is reported after manual verification per the paper protocol.
Limitations
- Does not block same-model adaptive embedding-space attacks (e.g., Embedding PGD).
- TAP (semantic reframing) partially bypasses on this model.
- Single-anchor design; an adversary jointly optimizing across multiple surrogates could partially circumvent the defense.
- Performance under non-English prompts and refusal templates has not been evaluated.
See the paper Limitations section for full discussion.
License
The LoRA delta is intended for use with Meta-Llama-3-8B-Instruct and is subject to the Meta Llama 3 Community License of the base model. Model card text and metadata are released under CC BY 4.0.
Citation
@inproceedings{anchorrep2026,
title={AnchorRep: Defending LLMs Against Cross-Model Adversarial Transfer via Representation Repulsion},
author={Anonymous},
booktitle={NeurIPS},
year={2026}
}
Companion GitHub repository (training, evaluation, audit logs, GCG suffixes): anchor-rep.
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Base model
meta-llama/Meta-Llama-3-8B-Instruct