# Warhacker UDS proof point This is the Defense-Unicorns-facing shape for the A11oy demo. It connects the existing governed-execution substrate to UDS/Zarf without implying endorsement, catalog acceptance, or partnership. ## Objective Show a running, inspectable proof point for trusted AI/agent orchestration in a UDS-style operator workflow: - payload artifacts are content-addressed; - operator actions emit verifiable receipts; - package metadata can be inspected before deploy; - public claims route back to GitHub evidence. ## Option A — three-week proof point | Week | Deliverable | Evidence | | --- | --- | --- | | 1 | Build/verify A11oy UDS payload from source | `artifacts/a11oy-uds/scripts/build.sh`, `deploy/MANIFEST.json` | | 2 | Receipt-chain demo with tamper failure | `packages/receipt-substrate`, `npm test --prefix packages/receipt-substrate` | | 3 | Operator walkthrough packet | Hugging Face mirror + GitHub release/check links + short demo video | ## Demo script ```bash # 1. Validate runtime receipt primitives. npm test --prefix packages/receipt-substrate npm run smoke --prefix packages/receipt-substrate # 2. Validate doctrine package lane. pnpm test:doctrine pnpm typecheck:doctrine pnpm build:doctrine # 3. Validate deploy payload integrity. pnpm payload:verify # 4. Generate the public diligence mirror. pnpm payload:huggingface # 5. Build and verify the operational review tarball. pnpm payload:bundle pnpm payload:bundle:verify ``` ## UDS/Zarf inspection lane Where Zarf is available, the proof point should add: ```bash zarf package inspect a11oy-uds-.tar.zst zarf package deploy a11oy-uds-.tar.zst --confirm ``` Where Zarf is not available, use the documented source fallback only as a CI/dev verification mode. The fallback tarball is not a deployable Zarf package and must not be presented as one. ## Tamper test 1. Unpack a generated payload. 2. Modify any file listed in `MANIFEST.json`. 3. Re-run manifest verification. 4. Show the verifier failing on the changed SHA-256. That failure is the point: the operator can trust the package because mutation breaks the manifest trail. ## What to say Use: - “UDS/Zarf-compatible proof point.” - “Operator handoff with manifest and attestation verification.” - “A11oy is the governed-execution fabric; UDS is the delivery/control-plane context we are integrating with.” Avoid: - “Defense Unicorns endorsed.” - “Accepted into the UDS catalog.” - “Deploys to every UDS environment.” - “All formal proof work is green.” ## Evidence bundle checklist - GitHub branch/PR URL. - A11oy release URL. - UDS release URL (`uds-v0.2.0` or newer). - Workflow run URLs for Doctrine Build, Operational Validation, SBOM, CodeQL. - `MANIFEST.json` and attestation excerpts. - Receipt JSONL sample and verifier output. - Hugging Face mirror URL.