Daily Papers

We introduce Dynaboard, an evaluation-as-a-service framework for hosting benchmarks and conducting holistic model comparison, integrated with the Dynabench platform. Our platform evaluates NLP models directly instead of relying on self-reported metrics or predictions on a single dataset. Under this paradigm, models are submitted to be evaluated in the cloud, circumventing the issues of reproducibility, accessibility, and backwards compatibility that often hinder benchmarking in NLP. This allows users to interact with uploaded models in real time to assess their quality, and permits the collection of additional metrics such as memory use, throughput, and robustness, which -- despite their importance to practitioners -- have traditionally been absent from leaderboards. On each task, models are ranked according to the Dynascore, a novel utility-based aggregation of these statistics, which users can customize to better reflect their preferences, placing more/less weight on a particular axis of evaluation or dataset. As state-of-the-art NLP models push the limits of traditional benchmarks, Dynaboard offers a standardized solution for a more diverse and comprehensive evaluation of model quality.

While current skeleton action recognition models demonstrate impressive performance on large-scale datasets, their adaptation to new application scenarios remains challenging. These challenges are particularly pronounced when facing new action categories, diverse performers, and varied skeleton layouts, leading to significant performance degeneration. Additionally, the high cost and difficulty of collecting skeleton data make large-scale data collection impractical. This paper studies one-shot and limited-scale learning settings to enable efficient adaptation with minimal data. Existing approaches often overlook the rich mutual information between labeled samples, resulting in sub-optimal performance in low-data scenarios. To boost the utility of labeled data, we identify the variability among performers and the commonality within each action as two key attributes. We present SkeletonX, a lightweight training pipeline that integrates seamlessly with existing GCN-based skeleton action recognizers, promoting effective training under limited labeled data. First, we propose a tailored sample pair construction strategy on two key attributes to form and aggregate sample pairs. Next, we develop a concise and effective feature aggregation module to process these pairs. Extensive experiments are conducted on NTU RGB+D, NTU RGB+D 120, and PKU-MMD with various GCN backbones, demonstrating that the pipeline effectively improves performance when trained from scratch with limited data. Moreover, it surpasses previous state-of-the-art methods in the one-shot setting, with only 1/10 of the parameters and much fewer FLOPs. The code and data are available at: https://github.com/zzysteve/SkeletonX

Dataset Distillation aims to synthesize compact datasets that can approximate the training efficacy of large-scale real datasets, offering an efficient solution to the increasing computational demands of modern deep learning. Recently, diffusion-based dataset distillation methods have shown great promise by leveraging the strong generative capacity of diffusion models to produce diverse and structurally consistent samples. However, a fundamental goal misalignment persists: diffusion models are optimized for generative likelihood rather than discriminative utility, resulting in over-concentration in high-density regions and inadequate coverage of boundary samples crucial for classification. To address this issue, we propose two complementary strategies. Inversion-Matching (IM) introduces an inversion-guided fine-tuning process that aligns denoising trajectories with their inversion counterparts, broadening distributional coverage and enhancing diversity. Selective Subgroup Sampling(S^3) is a training-free sampling mechanism that improves inter-class separability by selecting synthetic subsets that are both representative and distinctive. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our approach significantly enhances the discriminative quality and generalization of distilled datasets, achieving state-of-the-art performance among diffusion-based methods.

Image coding for multi-task applications, catering to both human perception and machine vision, has been extensively investigated. Existing methods often rely on multiple task-specific encoder-decoder pairs, leading to high overhead of parameter and bitrate usage, or face challenges in multi-objective optimization under a unified representation, failing to achieve both performance and efficiency. To this end, we propose Multi-Path Aggregation (MPA) integrated into existing coding models for joint human-machine vision, unifying the feature representation with an all-in-one architecture. MPA employs a predictor to allocate latent features among task-specific paths based on feature importance varied across tasks, maximizing the utility of shared features while preserving task-specific features for subsequent refinement. Leveraging feature correlations, we develop a two-stage optimization strategy to alleviate multi-task performance degradation. Upon the reuse of shared features, as low as 1.89% parameters are further augmented and fine-tuned for a specific task, which completely avoids extensive optimization of the entire model. Experimental results show that MPA achieves performance comparable to state-of-the-art methods in both task-specific and multi-objective optimization across human viewing and machine analysis tasks. Moreover, our all-in-one design supports seamless transitions between human- and machine-oriented reconstruction, enabling task-controllable interpretation without altering the unified model. Code is available at https://github.com/NJUVISION/MPA.

In the context of reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF), the reward function is generally derived from maximum likelihood estimation of a random utility model based on pairwise comparisons made by humans. The problem of learning a reward function is one of preference aggregation that, we argue, largely falls within the scope of social choice theory. From this perspective, we can evaluate different aggregation methods via established axioms, examining whether these methods meet or fail well-known standards. We demonstrate that both the Bradley-Terry-Luce Model and its broad generalizations fail to meet basic axioms. In response, we develop novel rules for learning reward functions with strong axiomatic guarantees. A key innovation from the standpoint of social choice is that our problem has a linear structure, which greatly restricts the space of feasible rules and leads to a new paradigm that we call linear social choice.

The development of state-of-the-art systems in different applied areas of machine learning (ML) is driven by benchmarks, which have shaped the paradigm of evaluating generalisation capabilities from multiple perspectives. Although the paradigm is shifting towards more fine-grained evaluation across diverse tasks, the delicate question of how to aggregate the performances has received particular interest in the community. In general, benchmarks follow the unspoken utilitarian principles, where the systems are ranked based on their mean average score over task-specific metrics. Such aggregation procedure has been viewed as a sub-optimal evaluation protocol, which may have created the illusion of progress. This paper proposes Vote'n'Rank, a framework for ranking systems in multi-task benchmarks under the principles of the social choice theory. We demonstrate that our approach can be efficiently utilised to draw new insights on benchmarking in several ML sub-fields and identify the best-performing systems in research and development case studies. The Vote'n'Rank's procedures are more robust than the mean average while being able to handle missing performance scores and determine conditions under which the system becomes the winner.

When trying to solve a computational problem, we are often faced with a choice between algorithms that are guaranteed to return the right answer but differ in their runtime distributions (e.g., SAT solvers, sorting algorithms). This paper aims to lay theoretical foundations for such choices by formalizing preferences over runtime distributions. It might seem that we should simply prefer the algorithm that minimizes expected runtime. However, such preferences would be driven by exactly how slow our algorithm is on bad inputs, whereas in practice we are typically willing to cut off occasional, sufficiently long runs before they finish. We propose a principled alternative, taking a utility-theoretic approach to characterize the scoring functions that describe preferences over algorithms. These functions depend on the way our value for solving our problem decreases with time and on the distribution from which captimes are drawn. We describe examples of realistic utility functions and show how to leverage a maximum-entropy approach for modeling underspecified captime distributions. Finally, we show how to efficiently estimate an algorithm's expected utility from runtime samples.

In this study, we propose a multicriteria group decision making (MCGDM) algorithm under uncertainty where data is collected as intervals. The proposed MCGDM algorithm aggregates the data, determines the optimal weights for criteria and ranks alternatives with no further input. The intervals give flexibility to experts in assessing alternatives against criteria and provide an opportunity to gain maximum information. We also propose a novel method to aggregate expert judgements using cloud models. We introduce an experimental approach to check the validity of the aggregation method. After that, we use the aggregation method for an MCGDM problem. Here, we find the optimal weights for each criterion by proposing a bilevel optimisation model. Then, we extend the technique for order of preference by similarity to ideal solution (TOPSIS) for data based on cloud models to prioritise alternatives. As a result, the algorithm can gain information from decision makers with different levels of uncertainty and examine alternatives with no more information from decision-makers. The proposed MCGDM algorithm is implemented on a case study of a cybersecurity problem to illustrate its feasibility and effectiveness. The results verify the robustness and validity of the proposed MCGDM using sensitivity analysis and comparison with other existing algorithms.

In Machine Learning, a benchmark refers to an ensemble of datasets associated with one or multiple metrics together with a way to aggregate different systems performances. They are instrumental in (i) assessing the progress of new methods along different axes and (ii) selecting the best systems for practical use. This is particularly the case for NLP with the development of large pre-trained models (e.g. GPT, BERT) that are expected to generalize well on a variety of tasks. While the community mainly focused on developing new datasets and metrics, there has been little interest in the aggregation procedure, which is often reduced to a simple average over various performance measures. However, this procedure can be problematic when the metrics are on a different scale, which may lead to spurious conclusions. This paper proposes a new procedure to rank systems based on their performance across different tasks. Motivated by the social choice theory, the final system ordering is obtained through aggregating the rankings induced by each task and is theoretically grounded. We conduct extensive numerical experiments (on over 270k scores) to assess the soundness of our approach both on synthetic and real scores (e.g. GLUE, EXTREM, SEVAL, TAC, FLICKR). In particular, we show that our method yields different conclusions on state-of-the-art systems than the mean-aggregation procedure while being both more reliable and robust.

Utility functions or their equivalents (value functions, objective functions, loss functions, reward functions, preference orderings) are a central tool in most current machine learning systems. These mechanisms for defining goals and guiding optimization run into practical and conceptual difficulty when there are independent, multi-dimensional objectives that need to be pursued simultaneously and cannot be reduced to each other. Ethicists have proved several impossibility theorems that stem from this origin; those results appear to show that there is no way of formally specifying what it means for an outcome to be good for a population without violating strong human ethical intuitions (in such cases, the objective function is a social welfare function). We argue that this is a practical problem for any machine learning system (such as medical decision support systems or autonomous weapons) or rigidly rule-based bureaucracy that will make high stakes decisions about human lives: such systems should not use objective functions in the strict mathematical sense. We explore the alternative of using uncertain objectives, represented for instance as partially ordered preferences, or as probability distributions over total orders. We show that previously known impossibility theorems can be transformed into uncertainty theorems in both of those settings, and prove lower bounds on how much uncertainty is implied by the impossibility results. We close by proposing two conjectures about the relationship between uncertainty in objectives and severe unintended consequences from AI systems.

Priorities in multi-criteria decision-making (MCDM) convey the relevance preference of one criterion over another, which is usually reflected by imposing the non-negativity and unit-sum constraints. The processing of such priorities is different than other unconstrained data, but this point is often neglected by researchers, which results in fallacious statistical analysis. This article studies three prevalent fallacies in group MCDM along with solutions based on compositional data analysis to avoid misusing statistical operations. First, we use a compositional approach to aggregate the priorities of a group of DMs and show that the outcome of the compositional analysis is identical to the normalized geometric mean, meaning that the arithmetic mean should be avoided. Furthermore, a new aggregation method is developed, which is a robust surrogate for the geometric mean. We also discuss the errors in computing measures of dispersion, including standard deviation and distance functions. Discussing the fallacies in computing the standard deviation, we provide a probabilistic criteria ranking by developing proper Bayesian tests, where we calculate the extent to which a criterion is more important than another. Finally, we explain the errors in computing the distance between priorities, and a clustering algorithm is specially tailored based on proper distance metrics.

We consider strategy proof mechanisms for facility location which maximize equitability between agents. As is common in the literature, we measure equitability with the Gini index. We first prove a simple but fundamental impossibility result that no strategy proof mechanism can bound the approximation ratio of the optimal Gini index of utilities for one or more facilities. We propose instead computing approximation ratios of the complemented Gini index of utilities, and consider how well both deterministic and randomized mechanisms approximate this. In addition, as Nash welfare is often put forwards as an equitable compromise between egalitarian and utilitarian outcomes, we consider how well mechanisms approximate the Nash welfare.

A feature-based model explanation denotes how much each input feature contributes to a model's output for a given data point. As the number of proposed explanation functions grows, we lack quantitative evaluation criteria to help practitioners know when to use which explanation function. This paper proposes quantitative evaluation criteria for feature-based explanations: low sensitivity, high faithfulness, and low complexity. We devise a framework for aggregating explanation functions. We develop a procedure for learning an aggregate explanation function with lower complexity and then derive a new aggregate Shapley value explanation function that minimizes sensitivity.

Congestion is a common failure mode of markets, where consumers compete inefficiently on the same subset of goods (e.g., chasing the same small set of properties on a vacation rental platform). The typical economic story is that prices decongest by balancing supply and demand. But in modern online marketplaces, prices are typically set in a decentralized way by sellers, and the information about items is inevitably partial. The power of a platform is limited to controlling representations -- the subset of information about items presented by default to users. This motivates the present study of decongestion by representation, where a platform seeks to learn representations that reduce congestion and thus improve social welfare. The technical challenge is twofold: relying only on revealed preferences from the choices of consumers, rather than true preferences; and the combinatorial problem associated with representations that determine the features to reveal in the default view. We tackle both challenges by proposing a differentiable proxy of welfare that can be trained end-to-end on consumer choice data. We develop sufficient conditions for when decongestion promotes welfare, and present the results of extensive experiments on both synthetic and real data that demonstrate the utility of our approach.

Scaling up test-time compute, by generating multiple independent solutions and selecting or aggregating among them, has become a central paradigm for improving large language models (LLMs) on challenging reasoning tasks. While most prior work relies on simple majority voting or reward model ranking to aggregate solutions, these approaches may only yield limited benefits. In this work, we propose to learn aggregation as an explicit reasoning skill: given a set of candidate solutions, we train an aggregator model to review, reconcile, and synthesize a final, correct answer using reinforcement learning from verifiable rewards. A key ingredient is careful balancing of easy and hard training examples, allowing the model to learn both to recover minority-but-correct answers as well as easy majority-correct answers. Empirically, we find our method, AggLM, outperforms both strong rule-based and reward-model baselines, across multiple benchmarks. Furthermore, it generalizes effectively to solutions from differing models, including stronger ones than contained in the training data, all while requiring substantially fewer tokens than majority voting with larger numbers of solutions.

The ethical concept of fairness has recently been applied in machine learning (ML) settings to describe a wide range of constraints and objectives. When considering the relevance of ethical concepts to subset selection problems, the concepts of diversity and inclusion are additionally applicable in order to create outputs that account for social power and access differentials. We introduce metrics based on these concepts, which can be applied together, separately, and in tandem with additional fairness constraints. Results from human subject experiments lend support to the proposed criteria. Social choice methods can additionally be leveraged to aggregate and choose preferable sets, and we detail how these may be applied.

We propose and evaluate a number of solutions to the problem of calculating the cost to serve each location in a single-vehicle transport setting. Such cost to serve analysis has application both strategically and operationally in transportation. The problem is formally given by the traveling salesperson game (TSG), a cooperative total utility game in which agents correspond to locations in a traveling salesperson problem (TSP). The cost to serve a location is an allocated portion of the cost of an optimal tour. The Shapley value is one of the most important normative division schemes in cooperative games, giving a principled and fair allocation both for the TSG and more generally. We consider a number of direct and sampling-based procedures for calculating the Shapley value, and present the first proof that approximating the Shapley value of the TSG within a constant factor is NP-hard. Treating the Shapley value as an ideal baseline allocation, we then develop six proxies for that value which are relatively easy to compute. We perform an experimental evaluation using Synthetic Euclidean games as well as games derived from real-world tours calculated for fast-moving consumer goods scenarios. Our experiments show that several computationally tractable allocation techniques correspond to good proxies for the Shapley value.

In pursuit of participatory budgeting (PB) outcomes with broader fairness guarantees, we initiate the study of lotteries over discrete PB outcomes. As the projects have heterogeneous costs, the amount spent may not be equal ex ante and ex post. To address this, we develop a technique to bound the amount by which the ex-post spend differs from the ex-ante spend -- the property is termed budget balanced up to one project (BB1). With respect to fairness, we take a best-of-both-worlds perspective, seeking outcomes that are both ex-ante and ex-post fair. Towards this goal, we initiate a study of ex-ante fairness properties in PB, including Individual Fair Share (IFS), Unanimous Fair Share (UFS) and their stronger variants, as well as Group Fair Share (GFS). We show several incompatibility results between these ex-ante fairness notions and existing ex-post concepts based on justified representation. One of our main contributions is a randomized algorithm which simultaneously satisfies ex-ante Strong UFS, ex-post full justified representation (FJR) and ex-post BB1 for PB with binary utilities.

Computing stable partitions in hedonic games is a challenging task because there exist games in which stable outcomes do not exist. Even more, these No-instances can often be leveraged to prove computational hardness results. We make this impression rigorous in a dynamic model of cardinal hedonic games by providing meta theorems. These imply hardness of deciding about the possible or necessary convergence of deviation dynamics based on the mere existence of No-instances. Our results hold for additively separable, fractional, and modified fractional hedonic games (ASHGs, FHGs, and MFHGs). Moreover, they encompass essentially all reasonable stability notions based on single-agent deviations. In addition, we propose dynamics as a method to find individually rational and contractually individual stable (CIS) partitions in ASHGs. In particular, we find that CIS dynamics from the singleton partition possibly converge after a linear number of deviations but may require an exponential number of deviations in the worst case.

Relevance and utility are two frequently used measures to evaluate the effectiveness of an information retrieval (IR) system. Relevance emphasizes the aboutness of a result to a query, while utility refers to the result's usefulness or value to an information seeker. In Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG), high-utility results should be prioritized to feed to LLMs due to their limited input bandwidth. Re-examining RAG's three core components -- relevance ranking derived from retrieval models, utility judgments, and answer generation -- aligns with Schutz's philosophical system of relevances, which encompasses three types of relevance representing different levels of human cognition that enhance each other. These three RAG components also reflect three cognitive levels for LLMs in question-answering. Therefore, we propose an Iterative utiliTy judgmEnt fraMework (ITEM) to promote each step in RAG. We conducted extensive experiments on retrieval (TREC DL, WebAP), utility judgment task (GTI-NQ), and factoid question-answering (NQ) datasets. Experimental results demonstrate significant improvements of ITEM in utility judgments, ranking, and answer generation upon representative baselines.

Graph neural networks (GNNs) have been shown to be highly sensitive to the choice of aggregation function. While summing over a node's neighbours can approximate any permutation-invariant function over discrete inputs, Cohen-Karlik et al. [2020] proved there are set-aggregation problems for which summing cannot generalise to unbounded inputs, proposing recurrent neural networks regularised towards permutation-invariance as a more expressive aggregator. We show that these results carry over to the graph domain: GNNs equipped with recurrent aggregators are competitive with state-of-the-art permutation-invariant aggregators, on both synthetic benchmarks and real-world problems. However, despite the benefits of recurrent aggregators, their O(V) depth makes them both difficult to parallelise and harder to train on large graphs. Inspired by the observation that a well-behaved aggregator for a GNN is a commutative monoid over its latent space, we propose a framework for constructing learnable, commutative, associative binary operators. And with this, we construct an aggregator of O(log V) depth, yielding exponential improvements for both parallelism and dependency length while achieving performance competitive with recurrent aggregators. Based on our empirical observations, our proposed learnable commutative monoid (LCM) aggregator represents a favourable tradeoff between efficient and expressive aggregators.

Learning neural subset selection tasks, such as compound selection in AI-aided drug discovery, have become increasingly pivotal across diverse applications. The existing methodologies in the field primarily concentrate on constructing models that capture the relationship between utility function values and subsets within their respective supersets. However, these approaches tend to overlook the valuable information contained within the superset when utilizing neural networks to model set functions. In this work, we address this oversight by adopting a probabilistic perspective. Our theoretical findings demonstrate that when the target value is conditioned on both the input set and subset, it is essential to incorporate an invariant sufficient statistic of the superset into the subset of interest for effective learning. This ensures that the output value remains invariant to permutations of the subset and its corresponding superset, enabling identification of the specific superset from which the subset originated. Motivated by these insights, we propose a simple yet effective information aggregation module designed to merge the representations of subsets and supersets from a permutation invariance perspective. Comprehensive empirical evaluations across diverse tasks and datasets validate the enhanced efficacy of our approach over conventional methods, underscoring the practicality and potency of our proposed strategies in real-world contexts.

A common approach for aligning language models to human preferences is to first learn a reward model from preference data, and then use this reward model to update the language model. We study two closely related problems that arise in this approach. First, any monotone transformation of the reward model preserves preference ranking; is there a choice that is ``better'' than others? Second, we often wish to align language models to multiple properties: how should we combine multiple reward models? Using a probabilistic interpretation of the alignment procedure, we identify a natural choice for transformation for (the common case of) rewards learned from Bradley-Terry preference models. This derived transformation has two important properties. First, it emphasizes improving poorly-performing outputs, rather than outputs that already score well. This mitigates both underfitting (where some prompts are not improved) and reward hacking (where the model learns to exploit misspecification of the reward model). Second, it enables principled aggregation of rewards by linking summation to logical conjunction: the sum of transformed rewards corresponds to the probability that the output is ``good'' in all measured properties, in a sense we make precise. Experiments aligning language models to be both helpful and harmless using RLHF show substantial improvements over the baseline (non-transformed) approach.

In the field of computational advertising, the integration of ads into the outputs of large language models (LLMs) presents an opportunity to support these services without compromising content integrity. This paper introduces novel auction mechanisms for ad allocation and pricing within the textual outputs of LLMs, leveraging retrieval-augmented generation (RAG). We propose a segment auction where an ad is probabilistically retrieved for each discourse segment (paragraph, section, or entire output) according to its bid and relevance, following the RAG framework, and priced according to competing bids. We show that our auction maximizes logarithmic social welfare, a new notion of welfare that balances allocation efficiency and fairness, and we characterize the associated incentive-compatible pricing rule. These results are extended to multi-ad allocation per segment. An empirical evaluation validates the feasibility and effectiveness of our approach over several ad auction scenarios, and exhibits inherent tradeoffs in metrics as we allow the LLM more flexibility to allocate ads.

We introduce distributional dynamic programming (DP) methods for optimizing statistical functionals of the return distribution, with standard reinforcement learning as a special case. Previous distributional DP methods could optimize the same class of expected utilities as classic DP. To go beyond expected utilities, we combine distributional DP with stock augmentation, a technique previously introduced for classic DP in the context of risk-sensitive RL, where the MDP state is augmented with a statistic of the rewards obtained so far (since the first time step). We find that a number of recently studied problems can be formulated as stock-augmented return distribution optimization, and we show that we can use distributional DP to solve them. We analyze distributional value and policy iteration, with bounds and a study of what objectives these distributional DP methods can or cannot optimize. We describe a number of applications outlining how to use distributional DP to solve different stock-augmented return distribution optimization problems, for example maximizing conditional value-at-risk, and homeostatic regulation. To highlight the practical potential of stock-augmented return distribution optimization and distributional DP, we combine the core ideas of distributional value iteration with the deep RL agent DQN, and empirically evaluate it for solving instances of the applications discussed.

We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods among a set of agents. Our focus is on the existence of allocations that give each agent their maximin fair share--the value they are guaranteed if they divide the goods into as many bundles as there are agents, and receive their lowest valued bundle. An MMS allocation is one where every agent receives at least their maximin fair share. We examine the existence of such allocations when agents have cost utilities. In this setting, each item has an associated cost, and an agent's valuation for an item is the cost of the item if it is useful to them, and zero otherwise. Our main results indicate that cost utilities are a promising restriction for achieving MMS. We show that for the case of three agents with cost utilities, an MMS allocation always exists. We also show that when preferences are restricted slightly further--to what we call laminar set approvals--we can guarantee MMS allocations for any number of agents. Finally, we explore if it is possible to guarantee each agent their maximin fair share while using a strategyproof mechanism.

As the capabilities of artificial agents improve, they are being increasingly deployed to service multiple diverse objectives and stakeholders. However, the composition of these objectives is often performed ad hoc, with no clear justification. This paper takes a normative approach to multi-objective agency: from a set of intuitively appealing axioms, it is shown that Markovian aggregation of Markovian reward functions is not possible when the time preference (discount factor) for each objective may vary. It follows that optimal multi-objective agents must admit rewards that are non-Markovian with respect to the individual objectives. To this end, a practical non-Markovian aggregation scheme is proposed, which overcomes the impossibility with only one additional parameter for each objective. This work offers new insights into sequential, multi-objective agency and intertemporal choice, and has practical implications for the design of AI systems deployed to serve multiple generations of principals with varying time preference.

Building on the probability-domain distillation framework of Sparse-KD, we develop an axiomatic, operator-theoretic framework for multi-teacher ensemble knowledge distillation. Rather than prescribing a specific aggregation formula, we define five core axioms governing valid knowledge aggregation operators, encompassing convexity, positivity, continuity, weight monotonicity, and temperature coherence. We prove the existence and non-uniqueness of operator families satisfying these axioms, establishing that multiple distinct aggregation mechanisms conform to the same foundational principles. Within this framework, we establish operator-agnostic guarantees showing that multi-teacher aggregation reduces both stochastic variance and systematic supervisory bias under heterogeneous teachers, while providing Jensen-type bounds, log-loss guarantees, and safety attenuation properties. For aggregation operators linear in teacher weights, we further establish classical ensemble variance-reduction results under standard independence assumptions, with extensions to correlated-error regimes. The framework provides theoretical grounding for multi-teacher distillation from diverse frontier models while admitting multiple valid implementation strategies.

We consider a fair division model in which agents have positive, zero and negative utilities for items. For this model, we analyse one existing fairness property - EFX - and three new and related properties - EFX_0, EFX^3 and EF1^3 - in combination with Pareto-optimality. With general utilities, we give a modified version of an existing algorithm for computing an EF1^3 allocation. With -alpha/0/alpha utilities, this algorithm returns an EFX^3 and PO allocation. With absolute identical utilities, we give a new algorithm for an EFX and PO allocation. With -alpha/0/beta utilities, this algorithm also returns such an allocation. We report some new impossibility results as well.

Motivated by the operational problems in click and collect systems, such as curbside pickup programs, we study a joint admission control and capacity allocation problem. We consider a system where arriving customers have preferred service delivery times and gauge the service quality based on the service provider's ability to complete the service as close as possible to the preferred time. Customers can be of different priority classes, and their priority may increase as they wait longer in the queue. The service provider can reject customers upon their arrival if the system is overloaded or outsource the service (alternatively work overtime) when the capacity is not enough. The service provider's goal is to find the minimum-cost admission and capacity allocation policy to dynamically decide when to serve and whom to serve. We model this problem as a Markov Decision Process. Our structural results partially characterize a set of suboptimal solutions, and we develop solution methods using these results. We also develop a problem-specific approximation method that is based on state aggregation to overcome the computational challenges. We present extensive computational results and discuss the impact of problem parameters on the optimal policy.

It is typically understood that the training of modern neural networks is a process of fitting the probability distribution of desired output. However, recent paradoxical observations in a number of language generation tasks let one wonder if this canonical probability-based explanation can really account for the empirical success of deep learning. To resolve this issue, we propose an alternative utility-based explanation to the standard supervised learning procedure in deep learning. The basic idea is to interpret the learned neural network not as a probability model but as an ordinal utility function that encodes the preference revealed in training data. In this perspective, training of the neural network corresponds to a utility learning process. Specifically, we show that for all neural networks with softmax outputs, the SGD learning dynamic of maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) can be seen as an iteration process that optimizes the neural network toward an optimal utility function. This utility-based interpretation can explain several otherwise-paradoxical observations about the neural networks thus trained. Moreover, our utility-based theory also entails an equation that can transform the learned utility values back to a new kind of probability estimation with which probability-compatible decision rules enjoy dramatic (double-digits) performance improvements. These evidences collectively reveal a phenomenon of utility-probability duality in terms of what modern neural networks are (truly) modeling: We thought they are one thing (probabilities), until the unexplainable showed up; changing mindset and treating them as another thing (utility values) largely reconcile the theory, despite remaining subtleties regarding its original (probabilistic) identity.

Information is often stored in a distributed and proprietary form, and agents who own information are often self-interested and require incentives to reveal their information. Suitable mechanisms are required to elicit and aggregate such distributed information for decision making. In this paper, we use simulations to investigate the use of decision markets as mechanisms in a multi-agent learning system to aggregate distributed information for decision-making in a contextual bandit problem. The system utilises strictly proper decision scoring rules to assess the accuracy of probabilistic reports from agents, which allows agents to learn to solve the contextual bandit problem jointly. Our simulations show that our multi-agent system with distributed information can be trained as efficiently as a centralised counterpart with a single agent that receives all information. Moreover, we use our system to investigate scenarios with deterministic decision scoring rules which are not incentive compatible. We observe the emergence of more complex dynamics with manipulative behaviour, which agrees with existing theoretical analyses.

The Shapley value is arguably the most popular approach for assigning a meaningful contribution value to players in a cooperative game, which has recently been used intensively in explainable artificial intelligence. The meaningfulness is due to axiomatic properties that only the Shapley value satisfies, which, however, comes at the expense of an exact computation growing exponentially with the number of agents. Accordingly, a number of works are devoted to the efficient approximation of the Shapley values, most of them revolve around the notion of an agent's marginal contribution. In this paper, we propose with SVARM and Stratified SVARM two parameter-free and domain-independent approximation algorithms based on a representation of the Shapley value detached from the notion of marginal contributions. We prove unmatched theoretical guarantees regarding their approximation quality and provide empirical results including synthetic games as well as common explainability use cases comparing ourselves with state-of-the-art methods.

Aggregation query over free text is a long-standing yet underexplored problem. Unlike ordinary question answering, aggregate queries require exhaustive evidence collection and systems are required to "find all," not merely "find one." Existing paradigms such as Text-to-SQL and Retrieval-Augmented Generation fail to achieve this completeness. In this work, we formalize entity-level aggregation querying over text in a corpus-bounded setting with strict completeness requirement. To enable principled evaluation, we introduce AGGBench, a benchmark designed to evaluate completeness-oriented aggregation under realistic large-scale corpus. To accompany the benchmark, we propose DFA (Disambiguation--Filtering--Aggregation), a modular agentic baseline that decomposes aggregation querying into interpretable stages and exposes key failure modes related to ambiguity, filtering, and aggregation. Empirical results show that DFA consistently improves aggregation evidence coverage over strong RAG and agentic baselines. The data and code are available in https://anonymous.4open.science/r/DFA-A4C1.

The proliferation of Large Language Models (LLMs) has established LLM routing as a standard service delivery mechanism, where users select models based on cost, Quality of Service (QoS), among other things. However, optimal pricing in LLM routing platforms requires precise modeling for dynamic service markets, and solving this problem in real time at scale is computationally intractable. In this paper, we propose \PriLLM, a novel practical and scalable solution for real-time dynamic pricing in competitive LLM routing. \PriLLM models the service market as a Stackelberg game, where providers set prices and users select services based on multiple criteria. To capture real-world market dynamics, we incorporate both objective factors (\eg~cost, QoS) and subjective user preferences into the model. For scalability, we employ a deep aggregation network to learn provider abstraction that preserve user-side equilibrium behavior across pricing strategies. Moreover, \PriLLM offers interpretability by explaining its pricing decisions. Empirical evaluation on real-world data shows that \PriLLM achieves over 95\% of the optimal profit while only requiring less than 5\% of the optimal solution's computation time.

We consider the problem of locating a facility to serve a set of agents located along a line. The Nash welfare objective function, defined as the product of the agents' utilities, is known to provide a compromise between fairness and efficiency in resource allocation problems. We apply this welfare notion to the facility location problem, converting individual costs to utilities and analyzing the facility placement that maximizes the Nash welfare. We give a polynomial-time approximation algorithm to compute this facility location, and prove results suggesting that it achieves a good balance of fairness and efficiency. Finally, we take a mechanism design perspective and propose a strategy-proof mechanism with a bounded approximation ratio for Nash welfare.

This paper investigates the problem of ensembling multiple strategies for sequential portfolios to outperform individual strategies in terms of long-term wealth. Due to the uncertainty of strategies' performances in the future market, which are often based on specific models and statistical assumptions, investors often mitigate risk and enhance robustness by combining multiple strategies, akin to common approaches in collective learning prediction. However, the absence of a distribution-free and consistent preference framework complicates decisions of combination due to the ambiguous objective. To address this gap, we introduce a novel framework for decision-making in combining strategies, irrespective of market conditions, by establishing the investor's preference between decisions and then forming a clear objective. Through this framework, we propose a combinatorial strategy construction, free from statistical assumptions, for any scale of component strategies, even infinite, such that it meets the determined criterion. Finally, we test the proposed strategy along with its accelerated variant and some other multi-strategies. The numerical experiments show results in favor of the proposed strategies, albeit with small tradeoffs in their Sharpe ratios, in which their cumulative wealths eventually exceed those of the best component strategies while the accelerated strategy significantly improves performance.

This paper introduces the concept of {mutual consensus} as a novel non-compensatory consensus measure that accounts for the maximum disparity among opinions to ensure robust consensus evaluation. Incorporating this concept, several new Minimum Cost Consensus (MCC) models are proposed, and their properties are analyzed. To show their applicability, these mutual consensus-based MCC models are then considered in the context of the {OWA-MCC} model, which employs Ordered Weighted Averaging (OWA) operators for preference aggregation. Concretely, we include a linearized formulation under symmetry conditions as well as examples of the non-convexity of the feasible region in the general case. Finally, mutual consensus is utilized to obtain approximate solutions for the OWA-MCC model, demonstrating its practical effectiveness and advancing the theoretical and applied dimensions of consensus modeling in group decision-making.

Large language models have revolutionized natural language processing, yet their deployment remains hampered by the substantial memory and runtime overhead of the transformer's Key-Value cache. To mitigate this, recent methods employ a scoring-aggregation framework to evict unimportant cache entries, based on the stability assumption-that a fixed subset of entries remains consistently important during generation. However, prior work has largely focused on refining importance indicators for scoring, while defaulting to mean aggregation due to a faithful trust in the stability assumption. In this work, we argue that this underlying assumption is inherently fragile, making mean aggregation highly vulnerable in extreme cases. To counter this, we propose a simple yet elegant defensive aggregation strategy: a two-step, linear-time approach that controls worst-case risk, thereby defending against extreme cases with negligible computational overhead. Embodying this strategy, we propose a novel cache eviction method, DefensiveKV and its extension, Layer-DefensiveKV, which incorporates layer-wise budget allocation. Across seven task domains (18 datasets), our methods reduce generation quality loss by 2.3x and 4.3x respectively, versus the strongest baseline under a 20% cache size. These results set new performance benchmarks and pioneer a promising direction for optimizing cache eviction against underlying fragility through worst-case risk management. Our code is available at https://github.com/FFY0/DefensiveKV.

Deep research web agents not only retrieve information from diverse sources such as web environments, files, and multimodal inputs, but more importantly, they need to rigorously analyze and aggregate knowledge for insightful research. However, existing open-source deep research agents predominantly focus on enhancing information-seeking capabilities of web agents to locate specific information, while overlooking the essential need for information aggregation, which would limit their ability to support in-depth research. We propose an Explore to Evolve paradigm to scalably construct verifiable training data for web agents. Begins with proactive online exploration, an agent sources grounded information by exploring the real web. Using the collected evidence, the agent then self-evolves an aggregation program by selecting, composing, and refining operations from 12 high-level logical types to synthesize a verifiable QA pair. This evolution from high-level guidance to concrete operations allowed us to scalably produce WebAggregatorQA, a dataset of 10K samples across 50K websites and 11 domains. Based on an open-source agent framework, SmolAgents, we collect supervised fine-tuning trajectories to develop a series of foundation models, WebAggregator. WebAggregator-8B matches the performance of GPT-4.1, while the 32B variant surpasses GPT-4.1 by more than 10% on GAIA-text and closely approaches Claude-3.7-sonnet. Moreover, given the limited availability of benchmarks that evaluate web agents' information aggregation abilities, we construct a human-annotated evaluation split of WebAggregatorQA as a challenging test set. On this benchmark, Claude-3.7-sonnet only achieves 28%, and GPT-4.1 scores 25.8%. Even when agents manage to retrieve all references, they still struggle on WebAggregatorQA, highlighting the need to strengthen the information aggregation capabilities of web agent foundations.

As high-quality public text approaches exhaustion, a phenomenon known as the Data Wall, pre-training is shifting from more tokens to better tokens. However, existing methods either rely on heuristic static filters that ignore training dynamics, or use dynamic yet optimizer-agnostic criteria based on raw gradients. We propose OPUS (Optimizer-induced Projected Utility Selection), a dynamic data selection framework that defines utility in the optimizer-induced update space. OPUS scores candidates by projecting their effective updates, shaped by modern optimizers, onto a target direction derived from a stable, in-distribution proxy. To ensure scalability, we employ Ghost technique with CountSketch for computational efficiency, and Boltzmann sampling for data diversity, incurring only 4.7\% additional compute overhead. OPUS achieves remarkable results across diverse corpora, quality tiers, optimizers, and model scales. In pre-training of GPT-2 Large/XL on FineWeb and FineWeb-Edu with 30B tokens, OPUS outperforms industrial-level baselines and even full 200B-token training. Moreover, when combined with industrial-level static filters, OPUS further improves pre-training efficiency, even with lower-quality data. Furthermore, in continued pre-training of Qwen3-8B-Base on SciencePedia, OPUS achieves superior performance using only 0.5B tokens compared to full training with 3B tokens, demonstrating significant data efficiency gains in specialized domains.

We study parallel test-time scaling for long-horizon agentic tasks such as agentic search and deep research, where multiple rollouts are generated in parallel and aggregated into a final response. While such scaling has proven effective for chain-of-thought reasoning, agentic tasks pose unique challenges: trajectories are long, multi-turn, and tool-augmented, and outputs are often open-ended. Aggregating only final answers discards rich information from trajectories, while concatenating all trajectories exceeds the model's context window. To address this, we propose AggAgent, an aggregation agent that treats parallel trajectories as an environment. We equip it with lightweight tools to inspect candidate solutions and search across trajectories, enabling it to navigate and synthesize information on demand. Across six benchmarks and three model families (GLM-4.7, Qwen3.5, MiniMax-M2.5), AggAgent outperforms all existing aggregation methods-by up to 5.3% absolute on average and 10.3% on two deep research tasks-while adding minimal overhead, as the aggregation cost remains bounded by a single agentic rollout. Our findings establish agentic aggregation as an effective and cost-efficient approach to parallel test-time scaling.

We consider the problem of fairly allocating a sequence of indivisible items that arrive online in an arbitrary order to a group of n agents with additive normalized valuation functions. We consider both the allocation of goods and chores and propose algorithms for approximating maximin share (MMS) allocations. When agents have identical valuation functions the problem coincides with the semi-online machine covering problem (when items are goods) and load balancing problem (when items are chores), for both of which optimal competitive ratios have been achieved. In this paper, we consider the case when agents have general additive valuation functions. For the allocation of goods, we show that no competitive algorithm exists even when there are only three agents and propose an optimal 0.5-competitive algorithm for the case of two agents. For the allocation of chores, we propose a (2-1/n)-competitive algorithm for n>=3 agents and a square root of 2 (approximately 1.414)-competitive algorithm for two agents. Additionally, we show that no algorithm can do better than 15/11 (approximately 1.364)-competitive for two agents.

The best-of-both-worlds paradigm advocates an approach that achieves desirable properties both ex-ante and ex-post. We launch a best-of-both-worlds fairness perspective for the important social choice setting of approval-based committee voting. To this end, we initiate work on ex-ante proportional representation properties in this domain and formalize a hierarchy of notions including Individual Fair Share (IFS), Unanimous Fair Share (UFS), Group Fair Share (GFS), and their stronger variants. We establish their compatibility with well-studied ex-post concepts such as extended justified representation (EJR) and fully justified representation (FJR). Our first main result is a polynomial-time algorithm that simultaneously satisfies ex-post EJR, ex-ante GFS and ex-ante Strong UFS. Subsequently, we strengthen our ex-post guarantee to FJR and present an algorithm that outputs a lottery which is ex-post FJR and ex-ante Strong UFS, but does not run in polynomial time.

As AIs rapidly advance and become more agentic, the risk they pose is governed not only by their capabilities but increasingly by their propensities, including goals and values. Tracking the emergence of goals and values has proven a longstanding problem, and despite much interest over the years it remains unclear whether current AIs have meaningful values. We propose a solution to this problem, leveraging the framework of utility functions to study the internal coherence of AI preferences. Surprisingly, we find that independently-sampled preferences in current LLMs exhibit high degrees of structural coherence, and moreover that this emerges with scale. These findings suggest that value systems emerge in LLMs in a meaningful sense, a finding with broad implications. To study these emergent value systems, we propose utility engineering as a research agenda, comprising both the analysis and control of AI utilities. We uncover problematic and often shocking values in LLM assistants despite existing control measures. These include cases where AIs value themselves over humans and are anti-aligned with specific individuals. To constrain these emergent value systems, we propose methods of utility control. As a case study, we show how aligning utilities with a citizen assembly reduces political biases and generalizes to new scenarios. Whether we like it or not, value systems have already emerged in AIs, and much work remains to fully understand and control these emergent representations.

We present a general convergent class of reinforcement learning algorithms that is founded on two distinct principles: (1) mapping value estimates to a different space using arbitrary functions from a broad class, and (2) linearly decomposing the reward signal into multiple channels. The first principle enables incorporating specific properties into the value estimator that can enhance learning. The second principle, on the other hand, allows for the value function to be represented as a composition of multiple utility functions. This can be leveraged for various purposes, e.g. dealing with highly varying reward scales, incorporating a priori knowledge about the sources of reward, and ensemble learning. Combining the two principles yields a general blueprint for instantiating convergent algorithms by orchestrating diverse mapping functions over multiple reward channels. This blueprint generalizes and subsumes algorithms such as Q-Learning, Log Q-Learning, and Q-Decomposition. In addition, our convergence proof for this general class relaxes certain required assumptions in some of these algorithms. Based on our theory, we discuss several interesting configurations as special cases. Finally, to illustrate the potential of the design space that our theory opens up, we instantiate a particular algorithm and evaluate its performance on the Atari suite.

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) enhances large language models (LLMs) by incorporating retrieved information. Standard retrieval process prioritized relevance, focusing on topical alignment between queries and passages. In contrast, in RAG, the emphasis has shifted to utility, which considers the usefulness of passages for generating accurate answers. Despite empirical evidence showing the benefits of utility-based retrieval in RAG, the high computational cost of using LLMs for utility judgments limits the number of passages evaluated. This restriction is problematic for complex queries requiring extensive information. To address this, we propose a method to distill the utility judgment capabilities of LLMs into smaller, more efficient models. Our approach focuses on utility-based selection rather than ranking, enabling dynamic passage selection tailored to specific queries without the need for fixed thresholds. We train student models to learn pseudo-answer generation and utility judgments from teacher LLMs, using a sliding window method that dynamically selects useful passages. Our experiments demonstrate that utility-based selection provides a flexible and cost-effective solution for RAG, significantly reducing computational costs while improving answer quality. We present the distillation results using Qwen3-32B as the teacher model for both relevance ranking and utility-based selection, distilled into RankQwen1.7B and UtilityQwen1.7B. Our findings indicate that for complex questions, utility-based selection is more effective than relevance ranking in enhancing answer generation performance. We will release the relevance ranking and utility-based selection annotations for the MS MARCO dataset, supporting further research in this area.

This paper studies distributional model risk in marginal problems, where each marginal measure is assumed to lie in a Wasserstein ball centered at a fixed reference measure with a given radius. Theoretically, we establish several fundamental results including strong duality, finiteness of the proposed Wasserstein distributional model risk, and the existence of an optimizer at each radius. In addition, we show continuity of the Wasserstein distributional model risk as a function of the radius. Using strong duality, we extend the well-known Makarov bounds for the distribution function of the sum of two random variables with given marginals to Wasserstein distributionally robust Markarov bounds. Practically, we illustrate our results on four distinct applications when the sample information comes from multiple data sources and only some marginal reference measures are identified. They are: partial identification of treatment effects; externally valid treatment choice via robust welfare functions; Wasserstein distributionally robust estimation under data combination; and evaluation of the worst aggregate risk measures.

Risk-averse reinforcement learning finds application in various high-stakes fields. Unlike classical reinforcement learning, which aims to maximize expected returns, risk-averse agents choose policies that minimize risk, occasionally sacrificing expected value. These preferences can be framed through utility theory. We focus on the specific case of the exponential utility function, where we can derive the Bellman equations and employ various reinforcement learning algorithms with few modifications. However, these methods suffer from numerical instability due to the need for exponent computation throughout the process. To address this, we introduce a numerically stable and mathematically sound loss function based on the Itakura-Saito divergence for learning state-value and action-value functions. We evaluate our proposed loss function against established alternatives, both theoretically and empirically. In the experimental section, we explore multiple financial scenarios, some with known analytical solutions, and show that our loss function outperforms the alternatives.

Prediction markets are used in real life to predict outcomes of interest such as presidential elections. This paper presents a mathematical theory of artificial prediction markets for supervised learning of conditional probability estimators. The artificial prediction market is a novel method for fusing the prediction information of features or trained classifiers, where the fusion result is the contract price on the possible outcomes. The market can be trained online by updating the participants' budgets using training examples. Inspired by the real prediction markets, the equations that govern the market are derived from simple and reasonable assumptions. Efficient numerical algorithms are presented for solving these equations. The obtained artificial prediction market is shown to be a maximum likelihood estimator. It generalizes linear aggregation, existent in boosting and random forest, as well as logistic regression and some kernel methods. Furthermore, the market mechanism allows the aggregation of specialized classifiers that participate only on specific instances. Experimental comparisons show that the artificial prediction markets often outperform random forest and implicit online learning on synthetic data and real UCI datasets. Moreover, an extensive evaluation for pelvic and abdominal lymph node detection in CT data shows that the prediction market improves adaboost's detection rate from 79.6% to 81.2% at 3 false positives/volume.

The online knapsack problem is a classic problem in the field of online algorithms. Its canonical version asks how to pack items of different values and weights arriving online into a capacity-limited knapsack so as to maximize the total value of the admitted items. Although optimal competitive algorithms are known for this problem, they may be fundamentally unfair, i.e., individual items may be treated inequitably in different ways. We formalize a practically-relevant notion of time fairness which effectively models a trade off between static and dynamic pricing in a motivating application such as cloud resource allocation, and show that existing algorithms perform poorly under this metric. We propose a parameterized deterministic algorithm where the parameter precisely captures the Pareto-optimal trade-off between fairness (static pricing) and competitiveness (dynamic pricing). We show that randomization is theoretically powerful enough to be simultaneously competitive and fair; however, it does not work well in experiments. To further improve the trade-off between fairness and competitiveness, we develop a nearly-optimal learning-augmented algorithm which is fair, consistent, and robust (competitive), showing substantial performance improvements in numerical experiments.

We develop an econometric framework integrating heavy-tailed Student's t distributions with behavioral probability weighting while preserving infinite divisibility. Using 432{,}752 observations across 86 assets (2004--2024), we demonstrate Student's t specifications outperform Gaussian models in 88.4\% of cases. Bounded probability-weighting transformations preserve mathematical properties required for dynamic pricing. Gaussian models underestimate 99\% Value-at-Risk by 19.7\% versus 3.2\% for our specification. Joint estimation procedures identify tail and behavioral parameters with established asymptotic properties. Results provide robust inference for asset-pricing applications where heavy tails and behavioral distortions coexist.

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) is typically optimized for topical relevance, yet its success ultimately depends on whether retrieved passages are useful for a large language model (LLM) to generate correct and complete answers. We argue that such utility is often LLM-specific rather than universal, due to differences in models' knowledge, reasoning, and ability to leverage evidence. We formalize LLM-specific utility as the performance improvement of a target LLM when a passage is provided, compared to answering without evidence. To systematically study LLM-specific utility, we construct a benchmark of LLM-specific gold utilitarian passages for four LLMs (Qwen3-8B/14B/32B and Llama3.1-8B) on three QA datasets (Natural Questions, TriviaQA, and MS MARCO-FQA). Our analysis shows that utilitarian passages are model-dependent and non-transferable: each LLM performs best with its own utilitarian evidence, while evidence optimized for other LLMs is consistently suboptimal. Human-annotated evidence remains a strong general baseline but does not fully match individual LLM utility needs. We further introduce the LLM-specific utility judgment task and find that existing utility-aware selection and scoring methods largely capture model-agnostic usefulness and struggle to reliably estimate LLM-specific utility. Overall, our findings highlight the limitations of current utility-aware retrieval and motivate generator-tailored evidence selection for improving RAG.

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback has emerged as a standard for aligning diffusion models. However, we identify a fundamental limitation in the standard DPO formulation because it relies on the Bradley-Terry model to aggregate diverse evaluation axes like aesthetic quality and semantic alignment into a single scalar reward. This aggregation creates a reward conflict where the model is forced to unlearn desirable features of a specific dimension if they appear in a globally non-preferred sample. To address this issue, we propose Multi Reward Conditional DPO (MCDPO). This method resolves reward conflicts by introducing a disentangled Bradley-Terry objective. MCDPO explicitly injects a preference outcome vector as a condition during training, which allows the model to learn the correct optimization direction for each reward axis independently within a single network. We further introduce dimensional reward dropout to ensure balanced optimization across dimensions. Extensive experiments on Stable Diffusion 1.5 and SDXL demonstrate that MCDPO achieves superior performance on benchmarks. Notably, our conditional framework enables dynamic and multiple-axis control at inference time using Classifier Free Guidance to amplify specific reward dimensions without additional training or external reward models.

The core of Transferable Utility (T.U.) games is a well-known solution concept from cooperative game theory yielding a cost allocation among n agents (called players) forming a coalition that is stable (i.e. no subset of players has an interest to deviate). In this paper, inspired by a practical application in the context of a decision support system for collaborative transportation in a Short Food Supply Chain (SFSC), we mainly focus on Traveling Salesman Games (TSGs), where the objective is to allocate the cost of a Traveling Salesman Problem (TSP) with n locations and 1 depot to n players, each linked to exactly one of the locations. Given the computational complexity of computing an element of the core and the cost of a TSP, we study semicore allocations: a relaxation of the core that only requires that the subsets of size n -1 and of size 1 do not wish to deviate from the coalition. In the literature, instances of TSGs with empty cores and semicores are found. Hence, this paper first surveys the methods to approximate stability whenever the core is empty, such as the cost of stability (computing the minimum amount of money to subsidize the coalition with to attain stability) and the ε-core (which is a set of allocations that allow subsets of players to exceed their actual cost, but at most of a value of ε). We prove that these two solution

We present Self-Play Preference Optimization (SPO), an algorithm for reinforcement learning from human feedback. Our approach is minimalist in that it does not require training a reward model nor unstable adversarial training and is therefore rather simple to implement. Our approach is maximalist in that it provably handles non-Markovian, intransitive, and stochastic preferences while being robust to the compounding errors that plague offline approaches to sequential prediction. To achieve the preceding qualities, we build upon the concept of a Minimax Winner (MW), a notion of preference aggregation from the social choice theory literature that frames learning from preferences as a zero-sum game between two policies. By leveraging the symmetry of this game, we prove that rather than using the traditional technique of dueling two policies to compute the MW, we can simply have a single agent play against itself while maintaining strong convergence guarantees. Practically, this corresponds to sampling multiple trajectories from a policy, asking a rater or preference model to compare them, and then using the proportion of wins as the reward for a particular trajectory. We demonstrate that on a suite of continuous control tasks, we are able to learn significantly more efficiently than reward-model based approaches while maintaining robustness to the intransitive and stochastic preferences that frequently occur in practice when aggregating human judgments.

Multi-armed bandits a simple but very powerful framework for algorithms that make decisions over time under uncertainty. An enormous body of work has accumulated over the years, covered in several books and surveys. This book provides a more introductory, textbook-like treatment of the subject. Each chapter tackles a particular line of work, providing a self-contained, teachable technical introduction and a brief review of the further developments; many of the chapters conclude with exercises. The book is structured as follows. The first four chapters are on IID rewards, from the basic model to impossibility results to Bayesian priors to Lipschitz rewards. The next three chapters cover adversarial rewards, from the full-feedback version to adversarial bandits to extensions with linear rewards and combinatorially structured actions. Chapter 8 is on contextual bandits, a middle ground between IID and adversarial bandits in which the change in reward distributions is completely explained by observable contexts. The last three chapters cover connections to economics, from learning in repeated games to bandits with supply/budget constraints to exploration in the presence of incentives. The appendix provides sufficient background on concentration and KL-divergence. The chapters on "bandits with similarity information", "bandits with knapsacks" and "bandits and agents" can also be consumed as standalone surveys on the respective topics.

We study a fair allocation problem of indivisible items under additive externalities in which each agent also receives values from items that are assigned to other agents. We propose several new fairness concepts. We extend the well-studied envy-freeness up to one item (EF1) and envy-freeness up to any item (EFX) to this setting, and we propose a new fairness concept called general fair share (GFS). We undertake a detailed study and present algorithms for finding fair allocations.

Polymarket is a prediction market platform where users can speculate on future events by trading shares tied to specific outcomes, known as conditions. Each market is associated with a set of one or more such conditions. To ensure proper market resolution, the condition set must be exhaustive -- collectively accounting for all possible outcomes -- and mutually exclusive -- only one condition may resolve as true. Thus, the collective prices of all related outcomes should be \1, representing a combined probability of 1 of any outcome. Despite this design, Polymarket exhibits cases where dependent assets are mispriced, allowing for purchasing (or selling) a certain outcome for less than (or more than) 1, guaranteeing profit. This phenomenon, known as arbitrage, could enable sophisticated participants to exploit such inconsistencies. In this paper, we conduct an empirical arbitrage analysis on Polymarket data to answer three key questions: (Q1) What conditions give rise to arbitrage (Q2) Does arbitrage actually occur on Polymarket and (Q3) Has anyone exploited these opportunities. A major challenge in analyzing arbitrage between related markets lies in the scalability of comparisons across a large number of markets and conditions, with a naive analysis requiring O(2^{n+m}) comparisons. To overcome this, we employ a heuristic-driven reduction strategy based on timeliness, topical similarity, and combinatorial relationships, further validated by expert input. Our study reveals two distinct forms of arbitrage on Polymarket: Market Rebalancing Arbitrage, which occurs within a single market or condition, and Combinatorial Arbitrage, which spans across multiple markets. We use on-chain historical order book data to analyze when these types of arbitrage opportunities have existed, and when they have been executed by users. We find a realized estimate of 40 million USD of profit extracted.

Quantile regression is a fundamental problem in statistical learning motivated by a need to quantify uncertainty in predictions, or to model a diverse population without being overly reductive. For instance, epidemiological forecasts, cost estimates, and revenue predictions all benefit from being able to quantify the range of possible values accurately. As such, many models have been developed for this problem over many years of research in statistics, machine learning, and related fields. Rather than proposing yet another (new) algorithm for quantile regression we adopt a meta viewpoint: we investigate methods for aggregating any number of conditional quantile models, in order to improve accuracy and robustness. We consider weighted ensembles where weights may vary over not only individual models, but also over quantile levels, and feature values. All of the models we consider in this paper can be fit using modern deep learning toolkits, and hence are widely accessible (from an implementation point of view) and scalable. To improve the accuracy of the predicted quantiles (or equivalently, prediction intervals), we develop tools for ensuring that quantiles remain monotonically ordered, and apply conformal calibration methods. These can be used without any modification of the original library of base models. We also review some basic theory surrounding quantile aggregation and related scoring rules, and contribute a few new results to this literature (for example, the fact that post sorting or post isotonic regression can only improve the weighted interval score). Finally, we provide an extensive suite of empirical comparisons across 34 data sets from two different benchmark repositories.

Reinforcement learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) learns from preference signals, while standard Reinforcement Learning (RL) directly learns from reward signals. Preferences arguably contain less information than rewards, which makes preference-based RL seemingly more difficult. This paper theoretically proves that, for a wide range of preference models, we can solve preference-based RL directly using existing algorithms and techniques for reward-based RL, with small or no extra costs. Specifically, (1) for preferences that are drawn from reward-based probabilistic models, we reduce the problem to robust reward-based RL that can tolerate small errors in rewards; (2) for general arbitrary preferences where the objective is to find the von Neumann winner, we reduce the problem to multiagent reward-based RL which finds Nash equilibria for factored Markov games under a restricted set of policies. The latter case can be further reduce to adversarial MDP when preferences only depend on the final state. We instantiate all reward-based RL subroutines by concrete provable algorithms, and apply our theory to a large class of models including tabular MDPs and MDPs with generic function approximation. We further provide guarantees when K-wise comparisons are available.

In machine learning, the notion of multi-armed bandits refers to a class of online learning problems, in which an agent is supposed to simultaneously explore and exploit a given set of choice alternatives in the course of a sequential decision process. In the standard setting, the agent learns from stochastic feedback in the form of real-valued rewards. In many applications, however, numerical reward signals are not readily available -- instead, only weaker information is provided, in particular relative preferences in the form of qualitative comparisons between pairs of alternatives. This observation has motivated the study of variants of the multi-armed bandit problem, in which more general representations are used both for the type of feedback to learn from and the target of prediction. The aim of this paper is to provide a survey of the state of the art in this field, referred to as preference-based multi-armed bandits or dueling bandits. To this end, we provide an overview of problems that have been considered in the literature as well as methods for tackling them. Our taxonomy is mainly based on the assumptions made by these methods about the data-generating process and, related to this, the properties of the preference-based feedback.

Kahneman & Tversky's prospect theory tells us that humans perceive random variables in a biased but well-defined manner; for example, humans are famously loss-averse. We show that objectives for aligning LLMs with human feedback implicitly incorporate many of these biases -- the success of these objectives (e.g., DPO) over cross-entropy minimization can partly be ascribed to them being human-aware loss functions (HALOs). However, the utility functions these methods attribute to humans still differ from those in the prospect theory literature. Using a Kahneman-Tversky model of human utility, we propose a HALO that directly maximizes the utility of generations instead of maximizing the log-likelihood of preferences, as current methods do. We call this approach Kahneman-Tversky Optimization (KTO), and it matches or exceeds the performance of preference-based methods at scales from 1B to 30B. Crucially, KTO does not need preferences -- only a binary signal of whether an output is desirable or undesirable for a given input. This makes it far easier to use in the real world, where preference data is scarce and expensive.

Online allocation problems with resource constraints are central problems in revenue management and online advertising. In these problems, requests arrive sequentially during a finite horizon and, for each request, a decision maker needs to choose an action that consumes a certain amount of resources and generates reward. The objective is to maximize cumulative rewards subject to a constraint on the total consumption of resources. In this paper, we consider a data-driven setting in which the reward and resource consumption of each request are generated using an input model that is unknown to the decision maker. We design a general class of algorithms that attain good performance in various input models without knowing which type of input they are facing. In particular, our algorithms are asymptotically optimal under independent and identically distributed inputs as well as various non-stationary stochastic input models, and they attain an asymptotically optimal fixed competitive ratio when the input is adversarial. Our algorithms operate in the Lagrangian dual space: they maintain a dual multiplier for each resource that is updated using online mirror descent. By choosing the reference function accordingly, we recover the dual sub-gradient descent and dual multiplicative weights update algorithm. The resulting algorithms are simple, fast, and do not require convexity in the revenue function, consumption function and action space, in contrast to existing methods for online allocation problems. We discuss applications to network revenue management, online bidding in repeated auctions with budget constraints, online proportional matching with high entropy, and personalized assortment optimization with limited inventory.

Methods for controlling large language models (LLMs), including local weight fine-tuning, LoRA-based adaptation, and activation-based interventions, are often studied in isolation, obscuring their connections and making comparison difficult. In this work, we present a unified view that frames these interventions as dynamic weight updates induced by a control signal, placing them within a single conceptual framework. Building on this view, we propose a unified preference-utility analysis that separates control effects into preference, defined as the tendency toward a target concept, and utility, defined as coherent and task-valid generation, and measures both on a shared log-odds scale using polarity-paired contrastive examples. Across methods, we observe a consistent trade-off between preference and utility: stronger control increases preference while predictably reducing utility. We further explain this behavior through an activation manifold perspective, in which control shifts representations along target-concept directions to enhance preference, while utility declines primarily when interventions push representations off the model's valid-generation manifold. Finally, we introduce a new steering approach SPLIT guided by this analysis that improves preference while better preserving utility. Code is available at https://github.com/zjunlp/EasyEdit/blob/main/examples/SPLIT.md.

Modeling human preferences is crucial for aligning foundation models with human values. Traditional reward modeling methods, such as the Bradley-Terry (BT) reward model, fall short in expressiveness, particularly in addressing intransitive preferences. Although supervised pair preference models (PairPM) can express general preferences, their implementation is highly ad-hoc and cannot guarantee a consistent preference probability of compared pairs. Additionally, they impose high computational costs due to their quadratic query complexity when comparing multiple responses. In this paper, we introduce preference representation learning, an approach that embeds responses into a latent space to capture intricate preference structures efficiently, achieving linear query complexity. Additionally, we propose preference score-based General Preference Optimization (GPO), which generalizes reward-based reinforcement learning from human feedback. Experimental results show that our General Preference representation model (GPM) outperforms the BT reward model on the RewardBench benchmark with a margin of up to 5.6% and effectively models cyclic preferences where any BT reward model behaves like a random guess. Furthermore, evaluations on downstream tasks such as AlpacaEval2.0 and MT-Bench, following the language model post-training with GPO and our general preference model, reveal substantial performance improvements with margins up to 9.3%. These findings indicate that our method may enhance the alignment of foundation models with nuanced human values. The code is available at https://github.com/general-preference/general-preference-model.

Pairwise re-ranking models predict which of two documents is more relevant to a query and then aggregate a final ranking from such preferences. This is often more effective than pointwise re-ranking models that directly predict a relevance value for each document. However, the high inference overhead of pairwise models limits their practical application: usually, for a set of k documents to be re-ranked, preferences for all k^2-k comparison pairs excluding self-comparisons are aggregated. We investigate whether the efficiency of pairwise re-ranking can be improved by sampling from all pairs. In an exploratory study, we evaluate three sampling methods and five preference aggregation methods. The best combination allows for an order of magnitude fewer comparisons at an acceptable loss of retrieval effectiveness, while competitive effectiveness is already achieved with about one third of the comparisons.

Many optimization problems are inherently multi-objective. To address them, we formalize Jacobian descent (JD), a direct generalization of gradient descent for vector-valued functions. Each step of this algorithm relies on a Jacobian matrix consisting of one gradient per objective. The aggregator, responsible for reducing this matrix into an update vector, characterizes JD. While the multi-task learning literature already contains a variety of aggregators, they often lack some natural properties. In particular, the update should not conflict with any objective and should scale proportionally to the norm of each gradient. We propose a new aggregator specifically designed to satisfy this. Emphasizing conflict between objectives, we then highlight direct applications for our methods. Most notably, we introduce instance-wise risk minimization (IWRM), a learning paradigm in which the loss of each training example is considered a separate objective. On simple image classification tasks, IWRM exhibits promising results compared to the direct minimization of the average loss. The performance of our aggregator in those experiments also corroborates our theoretical findings. Lastly, as speed is the main limitation of JD, we provide a path towards a more efficient implementation.

In modern machine learning problems we deal with datasets that are either distributed by nature or potentially large for which distributing the computations is usually a standard way to proceed, since centralized algorithms are in general ineffective. We propose a distributed learning approach for mixtures of experts (MoE) models with an aggregation strategy to construct a reduction estimator from local estimators fitted parallelly to distributed subsets of the data. The aggregation is based on an optimal minimization of an expected transportation divergence between the large MoE composed of local estimators and the unknown desired MoE model. We show that the provided reduction estimator is consistent as soon as the local estimators to be aggregated are consistent, and its construction is performed by a proposed majorization-minimization (MM) algorithm that is computationally effective. We study the statistical and numerical properties for the proposed reduction estimator on experiments that demonstrate its performance compared to namely the global estimator constructed in a centralized way from the full dataset. For some situations, the computation time is more than ten times faster, for a comparable performance. Our source codes are publicly available on Github.

Bargaining is often regarded as a logical arena rather than an art or a matter of intuition, yet Large Language Models (LLMs) still struggle to navigate it due to limited strategic depth and difficulty adapting to complex human factors. Current benchmarks rarely capture this limitation. To bridge this gap, we present an utility feedback centric framework. Our contributions are: (i) AgoraBench, a new benchmark spanning nine challenging settings (e.g., deception, monopoly) that supports diverse strategy modeling; (ii) human-aligned, economically grounded metrics derived from utility theory. This is operationalized via agent utility, negotiation power, and acquisition ratio that implicitly measure how well the negotiation aligns with human preference and (iii) a human preference grounded dataset with learning pipeline that strengthens LLMs' bargaining ability through both prompting and finetuning. Empirical results indicate that baseline LLM strategies often diverge from human preferences, while our mechanism substantially improves negotiation performance, yielding deeper strategic behavior and stronger opponent awareness.

The bandits with knapsack (BwK) framework models online decision-making problems in which an agent makes a sequence of decisions subject to resource consumption constraints. The traditional model assumes that each action consumes a non-negative amount of resources and the process ends when the initial budgets are fully depleted. We study a natural generalization of the BwK framework which allows non-monotonic resource utilization, i.e., resources can be replenished by a positive amount. We propose a best-of-both-worlds primal-dual template that can handle any online learning problem with replenishment for which a suitable primal regret minimizer exists. In particular, we provide the first positive results for the case of adversarial inputs by showing that our framework guarantees a constant competitive ratio alpha when B=Omega(T) or when the possible per-round replenishment is a positive constant. Moreover, under a stochastic input model, our algorithm yields an instance-independent O(T^{1/2}) regret bound which complements existing instance-dependent bounds for the same setting. Finally, we provide applications of our framework to some economic problems of practical relevance.

Large language models have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in complex mathematical reasoning tasks, but they inevitably generate errors throughout multi-step solutions. Process-level Reward Models (PRMs) have shown great promise by providing supervision and evaluation at each intermediate step, thereby effectively improving the models' reasoning abilities. However, training effective PRMs requires high-quality process reward data, yet existing methods for constructing such data are often labour-intensive or inefficient. In this paper, we propose an uncertainty-driven framework for automated process reward data construction, encompassing both data generation and annotation processes for PRMs. Additionally, we identify the limitations of both majority vote and PRMs, and introduce two generic uncertainty-aware output aggregation methods: Hybrid Majority Reward Vote and Weighted Reward Frequency Vote, which combine the strengths of majority vote with PRMs. Extensive experiments on ProcessBench, MATH, and GSMPlus show the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed PRM data construction framework, and demonstrate that the two output aggregation methods further improve the mathematical reasoning abilities across diverse PRMs. The code and data will be publicly available at https://github.com/Jiuzhouh/UnPRM.

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) has become a central paradigm for improving reasoning and code generation in large language models, and GRPO-style training is widely adopted for its simplicity and effectiveness. However, an important design choice remains underexplored: how token-level policy gradient terms are aggregated within each sampled group. Standard GRPO uses sequence aggregation, while recent work has advocated token aggregation as a better alternative. We show that these two rules induce different optimization biases: token aggregation introduces sign-length coupling, while sequence aggregation implicitly downweights longer responses through sequence-level equal weighting. To address this tension, we propose Balanced Aggregation (BA), a simple drop-in replacement that computes token-level means separately within the positive and negative subsets and then combines them with sequence-count-based weights. Experiments with Qwen2.5-Math-7B and Qwen3-1.7B on DAPO-17k and Polaris, evaluated on six reasoning and coding benchmarks, show that BA consistently improves training stability and final performance over standard token and sequence aggregation. Our analysis further shows that the relative effectiveness of token and sequence aggregation is largely governed by response-length variation and the positive-negative length gap, highlighting aggregation as a critical design dimension in GRPO-style RLVR.

The expressivity of Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) is dependent on the aggregation functions they employ. Theoretical works have pointed towards Sum aggregation GNNs subsuming every other GNNs, while certain practical works have observed a clear advantage to using Mean and Max. An examination of the theoretical guarantee identifies two caveats. First, it is size-restricted, that is, the power of every specific GNN is limited to graphs of a specific size. Successfully processing larger graphs may require an other GNN, and so on. Second, it concerns the power to distinguish non-isomorphic graphs, not the power to approximate general functions on graphs, and the former does not necessarily imply the latter. It is desired that a GNN's usability will not be limited to graphs of any specific size. Therefore, we explore the realm of unrestricted-size expressivity. We prove that basic functions, which can be computed exactly by Mean or Max GNNs, are inapproximable by any Sum GNN. We prove that under certain restrictions, every Mean or Max GNN can be approximated by a Sum GNN, but even there, a combination of (Sum, [Mean/Max]) is more expressive than Sum alone. Lastly, we prove further expressivity limitations for GNNs with a broad class of aggregations.

Group Relative Policy Optimisation (GRPO) enhances large language models by estimating advantages across a group of sampled trajectories. However, mapping these trajectory-level advantages to policy updates requires aggregating token-level probabilities within each sequence. Relying on a fixed aggregation mechanism for this step fundamentally limits the algorithm's adaptability. Empirically, we observe a critical trade-off: certain fixed aggregations frequently suffer from training collapse, while others fail to yield satisfactory performance. To resolve this, we propose HölderPO, a generalised policy optimisation framework unifying token-level probability aggregation via the Hölder mean. By explicitly modulating the parameter p, our framework provides continuous control over the trade-off between gradient concentration and variance bounds. Theoretically, we prove that a larger p concentrates the gradient to amplify sparse learning signals, whereas a smaller p strictly bounds gradient variance. Because no static configuration can universally resolve this concentration-stability trade-off, we instantiate the framework with a dynamic annealing algorithm that progressively schedules p across the training lifecycle. Extensive evaluations demonstrate superior stability and convergence over existing baselines. Specifically, our approach achieves a state-of-the-art average accuracy of 54.9% across multiple mathematical benchmarks, yielding a substantial 7.2% relative gain over standard GRPO and secures an exceptional 93.8% success rate on ALFWorld.

Understanding human preferences is crucial for improving foundation models and building personalized AI systems. However, preferences are inherently diverse and complex, making it difficult for traditional reward models to capture their full range. While fine-grained preference data can help, collecting it is expensive and hard to scale. In this paper, we introduce Decomposed Reward Models (DRMs), a novel approach that extracts diverse human preferences from binary comparisons without requiring fine-grained annotations. Our key insight is to represent human preferences as vectors and analyze them using Principal Component Analysis (PCA). By constructing a dataset of embedding differences between preferred and rejected responses, DRMs identify orthogonal basis vectors that capture distinct aspects of preference. These decomposed rewards can be flexibly combined to align with different user needs, offering an interpretable and scalable alternative to traditional reward models. We demonstrate that DRMs effectively extract meaningful preference dimensions (e.g., helpfulness, safety, humor) and adapt to new users without additional training. Our results highlight DRMs as a powerful framework for personalized and interpretable LLM alignment.

We investigate safe multi-agent reinforcement learning, where agents seek to collectively maximize an aggregate sum of local objectives while satisfying their own safety constraints. The objective and constraints are described by {\it general utilities}, i.e., nonlinear functions of the long-term state-action occupancy measure, which encompass broader decision-making goals such as risk, exploration, or imitations. The exponential growth of the state-action space size with the number of agents presents challenges for global observability, further exacerbated by the global coupling arising from agents' safety constraints. To tackle this issue, we propose a primal-dual method utilizing shadow reward and κ-hop neighbor truncation under a form of correlation decay property, where κ is the communication radius. In the exact setting, our algorithm converges to a first-order stationary point (FOSP) at the rate of Oleft(T^{-2/3}right). In the sample-based setting, we demonstrate that, with high probability, our algorithm requires mathcal{O}left(ε^{-3.5}right) samples to achieve an ε-FOSP with an approximation error of O(φ_0^{2κ}), where φ_0in (0,1). Finally, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our model through extensive numerical experiments.

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards has made post-training highly effective when correctness can be checked automatically. However, many important model behaviors require satisfying several qualitative criteria at once. Rubric-based rewards address this setting by grading prompt-specific criteria and aggregating them into a scalar reward. Yet standard static aggregations conflate a criterion's human-assigned importance with its current usefulness as an optimization signal. We show that this assumption breaks down in rubric RL: many important criteria are already saturated or currently unreachable, while criteria that distinguish rollouts are not necessarily those with the largest human weights. We introduce POW3R, a policy-aware rubric reward framework that preserves human weights and category balance as the rubric objective while adapting criterion-level reward weights during training. POW3R uses rollout-level contrast to emphasize criteria that currently separate the policy's outputs, making the GRPO reward more informative without changing the underlying evaluation target. Across three base policies on two datasets spanning multimodal and text-only settings, POW3R wins 24 of 30 base-policy/metric comparisons, improving both mean rubric reward and strict completion (the fraction of prompts whose response satisfies every required rubric criterion) over vanilla GRPO with rubric rewards, and reaches the same plateau in 2.5--4times fewer training steps. Rubric rewards should therefore distinguish what should matter in the final answer from what can teach the current policy.

The Shapley value is one of the most widely used measures of feature importance partly as it measures a feature's average effect on a model's prediction. We introduce joint Shapley values, which directly extend Shapley's axioms and intuitions: joint Shapley values measure a set of features' average contribution to a model's prediction. We prove the uniqueness of joint Shapley values, for any order of explanation. Results for games show that joint Shapley values present different insights from existing interaction indices, which assess the effect of a feature within a set of features. The joint Shapley values provide intuitive results in ML attribution problems. With binary features, we present a presence-adjusted global value that is more consistent with local intuitions than the usual approach.

Recently, remarkable progress has been made by approximating Nash equilibrium (NE), correlated equilibrium (CE), and coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE) through function approximation that trains a neural network to predict equilibria from game representations. Furthermore, equivariant architectures are widely adopted in designing such equilibrium approximators in normal-form games. In this paper, we theoretically characterize benefits and limitations of equivariant equilibrium approximators. For the benefits, we show that they enjoy better generalizability than general ones and can achieve better approximations when the payoff distribution is permutation-invariant. For the limitations, we discuss their drawbacks in terms of equilibrium selection and social welfare. Together, our results help to understand the role of equivariance in equilibrium approximators.

In this paper, we evaluate whether LLMs learn to make human-like preference judgements in strategic scenarios as compared with known empirical results. Solar and Mistral are shown to exhibit stable value-based preference consistent with humans and exhibit human-like preference for cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma (including stake-size effect) and traveler's dilemma (including penalty-size effect). We establish a relationship between model size, value-based preference, and superficiality. Finally, results here show that models tending to be less brittle have relied on sliding window attention suggesting a potential link. Additionally, we contribute a novel method for constructing preference relations from arbitrary LLMs and support for a hypothesis regarding human behavior in the traveler's dilemma.

In online ad markets, a rising number of advertisers are employing bidding agencies to participate in ad auctions. These agencies are specialized in designing online algorithms and bidding on behalf of their clients. Typically, an agency usually has information on multiple advertisers, so she can potentially coordinate bids to help her clients achieve higher utilities than those under independent bidding. In this paper, we study coordinated online bidding algorithms in repeated second-price auctions with budgets. We propose algorithms that guarantee every client a higher utility than the best she can get under independent bidding. We show that these algorithms achieve maximal coalition welfare and discuss bidders' incentives to misreport their budgets, in symmetric cases. Our proofs combine the techniques of online learning and equilibrium analysis, overcoming the difficulty of competing with a multi-dimensional benchmark. The performance of our algorithms is further evaluated by experiments on both synthetic and real data. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to consider bidder coordination in online repeated auctions with constraints.

As the issue of robustness in AI systems becomes vital, statistical learning techniques that are reliable even in presence of partly contaminated data have to be developed. Preference data, in the form of (complete) rankings in the simplest situations, are no exception and the demand for appropriate concepts and tools is all the more pressing given that technologies fed by or producing this type of data (e.g. search engines, recommending systems) are now massively deployed. However, the lack of vector space structure for the set of rankings (i.e. the symmetric group S_n) and the complex nature of statistics considered in ranking data analysis make the formulation of robustness objectives in this domain challenging. In this paper, we introduce notions of robustness, together with dedicated statistical methods, for Consensus Ranking the flagship problem in ranking data analysis, aiming at summarizing a probability distribution on S_n by a median ranking. Precisely, we propose specific extensions of the popular concept of breakdown point, tailored to consensus ranking, and address the related computational issues. Beyond the theoretical contributions, the relevance of the approach proposed is supported by an experimental study.

The prevalence and importance of algorithmic two-sided marketplaces has drawn attention to the issue of fairness in such settings. Algorithmic decisions are used in assigning students to schools, users to advertisers, and applicants to job interviews. These decisions should heed the preferences of individuals, and simultaneously be fair with respect to their merits (synonymous with fit, future performance, or need). Merits conditioned on observable features are always uncertain, a fact that is exacerbated by the widespread use of machine learning algorithms to infer merit from the observables. As our key contribution, we carefully axiomatize a notion of individual fairness in the two-sided marketplace setting which respects the uncertainty in the merits; indeed, it simultaneously recognizes uncertainty as the primary potential cause of unfairness and an approach to address it. We design a linear programming framework to find fair utility-maximizing distributions over allocations, and we show that the linear program is robust to perturbations in the estimated parameters of the uncertain merit distributions, a key property in combining the approach with machine learning techniques.

We focus on a simple, one-dimensional collective decision problem (often referred to as the facility location problem) and explore issues of strategyproofness and proportionality-based fairness. We introduce and analyze a hierarchy of proportionality-based fairness axioms of varying strength: Individual Fair Share (IFS), Unanimous Fair Share (UFS), Proportionality (as in Freeman et al, 2021), and Proportional Fairness (PF). For each axiom, we characterize the family of mechanisms that satisfy the axiom and strategyproofness. We show that imposing strategyproofness renders many of the axioms to be equivalent: the family of mechanisms that satisfy proportionality, unanimity, and strategyproofness is equivalent to the family of mechanisms that satisfy UFS and strategyproofness, which, in turn, is equivalent to the family of mechanisms that satisfy PF and strategyproofness. Furthermore, there is a unique such mechanism: the Uniform Phantom mechanism, which is studied in Freeman et al. (2021). We also characterize the outcomes of the Uniform Phantom mechanism as the unique (pure) equilibrium outcome for any mechanism that satisfies continuity, strict monotonicity, and UFS. Finally, we analyze the approximation guarantees, in terms of optimal social welfare and minimum total cost, obtained by mechanisms that are strategyproof and satisfy each proportionality-based fairness axiom. We show that the Uniform Phantom mechanism provides the best approximation of the optimal social welfare (and also minimum total cost) among all mechanisms that satisfy UFS.

We consider some classical optimization problems in path planning and network transport, and we introduce new auction-based algorithms for their optimal and suboptimal solution. The algorithms are based on mathematical ideas that are related to competitive bidding by persons for objects and the attendant market equilibrium, which underlie auction processes. However, the starting point of our algorithms is different, namely weighted and unweighted path construction in directed graphs, rather than assignment of persons to objects. The new algorithms have several potential advantages over existing methods: they are empirically faster in some important contexts, such as max-flow, they are well-suited for on-line replanning, and they can be adapted to distributed asynchronous operation. Moreover, they allow arbitrary initial prices, without complementary slackness restrictions, and thus are better-suited to take advantage of reinforcement learning methods that use off-line training with data, as well as on-line training during real-time operation. The new algorithms may also find use in reinforcement learning contexts involving approximation, such as multistep lookahead and tree search schemes, and/or rollout algorithms.

We consider the problem of subset selection where one is given multiple rankings of items and the goal is to select the highest ``quality'' subset. Score functions from the multiwinner voting literature have been used to aggregate rankings into quality scores for subsets. We study this setting of subset selection problems when, in addition, rankings may contain systemic or unconscious biases toward a group of items. For a general model of input rankings and biases, we show that requiring the selected subset to satisfy group fairness constraints can improve the quality of the selection with respect to unbiased rankings. Importantly, we show that for fairness constraints to be effective, different multiwinner score functions may require a drastically different number of rankings: While for some functions, fairness constraints need an exponential number of rankings to recover a close-to-optimal solution, for others, this dependency is only polynomial. This result relies on a novel notion of ``smoothness'' of submodular functions in this setting that quantifies how well a function can ``correctly'' assess the quality of items in the presence of bias. The results in this paper can be used to guide the choice of multiwinner score functions for the subset selection setting considered here; we additionally provide a tool to empirically enable this.

Learning of preference models from human feedback has been central to recent advances in artificial intelligence. Motivated by the cost of obtaining high-quality human annotations, we study efficient human preference elicitation for learning preference models. The key idea in our work is to generalize optimal designs, an approach to computing optimal information-gathering policies, to lists of items that represent potential questions with answers. The policy is a distribution over the lists and we elicit preferences from them proportionally to their probabilities. To show the generality of our ideas, we study both absolute and ranking feedback models on items in the list. We design efficient algorithms for both and analyze them. Finally, we demonstrate that our algorithms are practical by evaluating them on existing question-answering problems.

Modern ML applications increasingly rely on complex deep learning models and large datasets. There has been an exponential growth in the amount of computation needed to train the largest models. Therefore, to scale computation and data, these models are inevitably trained in a distributed manner in clusters of nodes, and their updates are aggregated before being applied to the model. However, a distributed setup is prone to Byzantine failures of individual nodes, components, and software. With data augmentation added to these settings, there is a critical need for robust and efficient aggregation systems. We define the quality of workers as reconstruction ratios in (0,1], and formulate aggregation as a Maximum Likelihood Estimation procedure using Beta densities. We show that the Regularized form of log-likelihood wrt subspace can be approximately solved using iterative least squares solver, and provide convergence guarantees using recent Convex Optimization landscape results. Our empirical findings demonstrate that our approach significantly enhances the robustness of state-of-the-art Byzantine resilient aggregators. We evaluate our method in a distributed setup with a parameter server, and show simultaneous improvements in communication efficiency and accuracy across various tasks. The code is publicly available at https://github.com/hamidralmasi/FlagAggregator

Conventional models of matching markets assume that monetary transfers can clear markets by compensating for utility differentials. However, empirical patterns show that such transfers often fail to close structural preference gaps. This paper introduces a market microstructure framework that models matching decisions as a limit order book system with rigid bid ask spreads. Individual preferences are represented by a latent preference state matrix, where the spread between an agent's internal ask price (the unconditional maximum) and the market's best bid (the reachable maximum) creates a structural liquidity constraint. We establish a Threshold Impossibility Theorem showing that linear compensation cannot close these spreads unless it induces a categorical identity shift. A dynamic discrete choice execution model further demonstrates that matches occur only when the market to book ratio crosses a time decaying liquidity threshold, analogous to order execution under inventory pressure. Numerical experiments validate persistent slippage, regional invariance of preference orderings, and high tier zero spread executions. The model provides a unified microstructure explanation for matching failures, compensation inefficiency, and post match regret in illiquid order driven environments.

Reinforcement learning (RL) has become essential for post-training large language models (LLMs) in reasoning tasks. While scaling rollouts can stabilize training and enhance performance, the computational overhead is a critical issue. In algorithms like GRPO, multiple rollouts per prompt incur prohibitive costs, as a large portion of prompts provide negligible gradients and are thus of low utility. To address this problem, we investigate how to select high-utility prompts before the rollout phase. Our experimental analysis reveals that sample utility is non-uniform and evolving: the strongest learning signals concentrate at the ``learning edge", the intersection of intermediate difficulty and high uncertainty, which shifts as training proceeds. Motivated by this, we propose HIVE (History-Informed and online-VErified prompt selection), a dual-stage framework for data-efficient RL. HIVE utilizes historical reward trajectories for coarse selection and employs prompt entropy as a real-time proxy to prune instances with stale utility. By evaluating HIVE across multiple math reasoning benchmarks and models, we show that HIVE yields significant rollout efficiency without compromising performance.

This paper introduces a novel approach to financial risk analysis that does not rely on traditional price and market data, instead using market news to model assets as distributions over a metric space of risk factors. By representing asset returns as integrals over the scalar field of these risk factors, we derive the covariance structure between asset returns. Utilizing encoder-only language models to embed this news data, we explore the relationships between asset return distributions through the concept of Energy Distance, establishing connections between distributional differences and excess returns co-movements. This data-agnostic approach provides new insights into portfolio diversification, risk management, and the construction of hedging strategies. Our findings have significant implications for both theoretical finance and practical risk management, offering a more robust framework for modelling complex financial systems without depending on conventional market data.

In this paper, we introduce analytic federated learning (AFL), a new training paradigm that brings analytical (i.e., closed-form) solutions to the federated learning (FL) community. Our AFL draws inspiration from analytic learning -- a gradient-free technique that trains neural networks with analytical solutions in one epoch. In the local client training stage, the AFL facilitates a one-epoch training, eliminating the necessity for multi-epoch updates. In the aggregation stage, we derive an absolute aggregation (AA) law. This AA law allows a single-round aggregation, removing the need for multiple aggregation rounds. More importantly, the AFL exhibits a weight-invariant property, meaning that regardless of how the full dataset is distributed among clients, the aggregated result remains identical. This could spawn various potentials, such as data heterogeneity invariance, client-number invariance, absolute convergence, and being hyperparameter-free (our AFL is the first hyperparameter-free method in FL history). We conduct experiments across various FL settings including extremely non-IID ones, and scenarios with a large number of clients (e.g., ge 1000). In all these settings, our AFL constantly performs competitively while existing FL techniques encounter various obstacles. Code is available at https://github.com/ZHUANGHP/Analytic-federated-learning

Selecting an appropriate reasoning method for a given query remains a key challenge in language model generation. Existing approaches typically generate multiple candidate responses and use an aggregation strategy to select the output answer, often assuming that more candidate answers yield higher accuracy. We revisit this assumption through a rigorous theoretical analysis, deriving accuracy bounds for standard aggregation methods under fixed generation distributions and candidate sizes. Building on these insights, we introduce EPIC, an Ensemble Planning with Contrastive learning framework to learn a shared representation space that captures both model reasoning abilities and query-method compatibility. EPIC incorporates our probability bounds as a regularizer in a utility-driven optimization that balances accuracy and computational cost. Experiments on diverse mathematical reasoning tasks show that EPIC consistently selects optimal reasoning methods, improving accuracy while reducing computational overhead. Our code can be found at https://github.com/nguyenngocbaocmt02/EPIC.

We study the design of loss functions for click-through rates (CTR) to optimize (social) welfare in advertising auctions. Existing works either only focus on CTR predictions without consideration of business objectives (e.g., welfare) in auctions or assume that the distribution over the participants' expected cost-per-impression (eCPM) is known a priori, then use various additional assumptions on the parametric form of the distribution to derive loss functions for predicting CTRs. In this work, we bring back the welfare objectives of ad auctions into CTR predictions and propose a novel weighted rankloss to train the CTR model. Compared to existing literature, our approach provides a provable guarantee on welfare but without assumptions on the eCPMs' distribution while also avoiding the intractability of naively applying existing learning-to-rank methods. Further, we propose a theoretically justifiable technique for calibrating the losses using labels generated from a teacher network, only assuming that the teacher network has bounded ell_2 generalization error. Finally, we demonstrate the advantages of the proposed loss on synthetic and real-world data.

Federated learning enables a collaborative training and optimization of global models among a group of devices without sharing local data samples. However, the heterogeneity of data in federated learning can lead to unfair representation of the global model across different devices. To address the fairness issue in federated learning, we propose a dynamic q fairness federated learning algorithm with reinforcement learning, called DQFFL. DQFFL aims to mitigate the discrepancies in device aggregation and enhance the fairness of treatment for all groups involved in federated learning. To quantify fairness, DQFFL leverages the performance of the global federated model on each device and incorporates α-fairness to transform the preservation of fairness during federated aggregation into the distribution of client weights in the aggregation process. Considering the sensitivity of parameters in measuring fairness, we propose to utilize reinforcement learning for dynamic parameters during aggregation. Experimental results demonstrate that our DQFFL outperforms the state-of-the-art methods in terms of overall performance, fairness and convergence speed.

Is it possible to understand or imitate a policy maker's rationale by looking at past decisions they made? We formalize this question as the problem of learning social welfare functions belonging to the well-studied family of power mean functions. We focus on two learning tasks; in the first, the input is vectors of utilities of an action (decision or policy) for individuals in a group and their associated social welfare as judged by a policy maker, whereas in the second, the input is pairwise comparisons between the welfares associated with a given pair of utility vectors. We show that power mean functions are learnable with polynomial sample complexity in both cases, even if the comparisons are social welfare information is noisy. Finally, we design practical algorithms for these tasks and evaluate their performance.

Federated learning is a popular technology for training machine learning models on distributed data sources without sharing data. Vertical federated learning or feature-based federated learning applies to the cases that different data sources share the same sample ID space but differ in feature space. To ensure the data owners' long-term engagement, it is critical to objectively assess the contribution from each data source and recompense them accordingly. The Shapley value (SV) is a provably fair contribution valuation metric originated from cooperative game theory. However, computing the SV requires extensively retraining the model on each subset of data sources, which causes prohibitively high communication costs in federated learning. We propose a contribution valuation metric called vertical federated Shapley value (VerFedSV) based on SV. We show that VerFedSV not only satisfies many desirable properties for fairness but is also efficient to compute, and can be adapted to both synchronous and asynchronous vertical federated learning algorithms. Both theoretical analysis and extensive experimental results verify the fairness, efficiency, and adaptability of VerFedSV.

Shapley value-based methods have become foundational in explainable artificial intelligence (XAI), offering theoretically grounded feature attributions through cooperative game theory. However, in practice, particularly in vision tasks, the assumption of feature independence breaks down, as features (i.e., pixels) often exhibit strong spatial and semantic dependencies. To address this, modern SHAP implementations now include the Owen value, a hierarchical generalization of the Shapley value that supports group attributions. While the Owen value preserves the foundations of Shapley values, its effectiveness critically depends on how feature groups are defined. We show that commonly used segmentations (e.g., axis-aligned or SLIC) violate key consistency properties, and propose a new segmentation approach that satisfies the T-property to ensure semantic alignment across hierarchy levels. This hierarchy enables computational pruning while improving attribution accuracy and interpretability. Experiments on image and tabular datasets demonstrate that O-Shap outperforms baseline SHAP variants in attribution precision, semantic coherence, and runtime efficiency, especially when structure matters.

Aggregating statistics over geographical regions is important for many applications, such as analyzing income, election results, and disease spread. However, the sensitive nature of this data necessitates strong privacy protections to safeguard individuals. In this work, we present a unified locational differential privacy (DP) framework to enable private aggregation of various data types, including one-hot encoded, boolean, float, and integer arrays, over geographical regions. Our framework employs local DP mechanisms such as randomized response, the exponential mechanism, and the Gaussian mechanism. We evaluate our approach on four datasets representing significant location data aggregation scenarios. Results demonstrate the utility of our framework in providing formal DP guarantees while enabling geographical data analysis.

In collaborative data sharing and machine learning, multiple parties aggregate their data resources to train a machine learning model with better model performance. However, as the parties incur data collection costs, they are only willing to do so when guaranteed incentives, such as fairness and individual rationality. Existing frameworks assume that all parties join the collaboration simultaneously, which does not hold in many real-world scenarios. Due to the long processing time for data cleaning, difficulty in overcoming legal barriers, or unawareness, the parties may join the collaboration at different times. In this work, we propose the following perspective: As a party who joins earlier incurs higher risk and encourages the contribution from other wait-and-see parties, that party should receive a reward of higher value for sharing data earlier. To this end, we propose a fair and time-aware data sharing framework, including novel time-aware incentives. We develop new methods for deciding reward values to satisfy these incentives. We further illustrate how to generate model rewards that realize the reward values and empirically demonstrate the properties of our methods on synthetic and real-world datasets.

While Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) is increasingly expanding more areas of application, little has been applied to make deep Reinforcement Learning (RL) more comprehensible. As RL becomes ubiquitous and used in critical and general public applications, it is essential to develop methods that make it better understood and more interpretable. This study proposes a novel approach to explain cooperative strategies in multiagent RL using Shapley values, a game theory concept used in XAI that successfully explains the rationale behind decisions taken by Machine Learning algorithms. Through testing common assumptions of this technique in two cooperation-centered socially challenging multi-agent environments environments, this article argues that Shapley values are a pertinent way to evaluate the contribution of players in a cooperative multi-agent RL context. To palliate the high overhead of this method, Shapley values are approximated using Monte Carlo sampling. Experimental results on Multiagent Particle and Sequential Social Dilemmas show that Shapley values succeed at estimating the contribution of each agent. These results could have implications that go beyond games in economics, (e.g., for non-discriminatory decision making, ethical and responsible AI-derived decisions or policy making under fairness constraints). They also expose how Shapley values only give general explanations about a model and cannot explain a single run, episode nor justify precise actions taken by agents. Future work should focus on addressing these critical aspects.

In recent years, a variety of gradient-based first-order methods have been developed to solve bi-level optimization problems for learning applications. However, theoretical guarantees of these existing approaches heavily rely on the simplification that for each fixed upper-level variable, the lower-level solution must be a singleton (a.k.a., Lower-Level Singleton, LLS). In this work, we first design a counter-example to illustrate the invalidation of such LLS condition. Then by formulating BLPs from the view point of optimistic bi-level and aggregating hierarchical objective information, we establish Bi-level Descent Aggregation (BDA), a flexible and modularized algorithmic framework for generic bi-level optimization. Theoretically, we derive a new methodology to prove the convergence of BDA without the LLS condition. Our investigations also demonstrate that BDA is indeed compatible to a verify of particular first-order computation modules. Additionally, as an interesting byproduct, we also improve these conventional first-order bi-level schemes (under the LLS simplification). Particularly, we establish their convergences with weaker assumptions. Extensive experiments justify our theoretical results and demonstrate the superiority of the proposed BDA for different tasks, including hyper-parameter optimization and meta learning.

We consider an extension to the classic position auctions in which sponsored creatives can be added within AI generated content rather than shown in predefined slots. New challenges arise from the natural requirement that sponsored creatives should smoothly fit into the context. With the help of advanced LLM technologies, it becomes viable to accurately estimate the benefits of adding each individual sponsored creatives into each potential positions within the AI generated content by properly taking the context into account. Therefore, we assume one click-through rate estimation for each position-creative pair, rather than one uniform estimation for each sponsored creative across all positions in classic settings. As a result, the underlying optimization becomes a general matching problem, thus the substitution effects should be treated more carefully compared to standard position auction settings, where the slots are independent with each other. In this work, we formalize a concrete mathematical model of the extended position auction problem and study the welfare-maximization and revenue-maximization mechanism design problem. Formally, we consider two different user behavior models and solve the mechanism design problems therein respectively. For the Multinomial Logit (MNL) model, which is order-insensitive, we can efficiently implement the optimal mechanisms. For the cascade model, which is order-sensitive, we provide approximately optimal solutions.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed via public-facing interfaces to interact with millions of users, each with diverse preferences. Despite this, preference tuning of LLMs predominantly relies on reward models trained using binary judgments where annotators select the preferred choice out of pairs of model outputs. In this work, we argue that this reliance on binary choices does not capture the broader, aggregate preferences of the target user in real-world tasks. We propose a taxonomy that identifies two dimensions of subjectivity where different users disagree on the preferred output-namely, the Plurality of Responses to Prompts, where prompts allow for multiple correct answers, and the Indistinguishability of Responses, where candidate outputs are paraphrases of each other. We show that reward models correlate weakly with user preferences in these cases. As a first step to address this issue, we introduce a simple yet effective method that augments existing binary preference datasets with synthetic preference judgments to estimate potential user disagreement. Incorporating these via a margin term as a form of regularization during model training yields predictions that better align with the aggregate user preferences.

Progress in machine learning is measured by careful evaluation on problems of outstanding common interest. However, the proliferation of benchmark suites and environments, adversarial attacks, and other complications has diluted the basic evaluation model by overwhelming researchers with choices. Deliberate or accidental cherry picking is increasingly likely, and designing well-balanced evaluation suites requires increasing effort. In this paper we take a step back and propose Nash averaging. The approach builds on a detailed analysis of the algebraic structure of evaluation in two basic scenarios: agent-vs-agent and agent-vs-task. The key strength of Nash averaging is that it automatically adapts to redundancies in evaluation data, so that results are not biased by the incorporation of easy tasks or weak agents. Nash averaging thus encourages maximally inclusive evaluation -- since there is no harm (computational cost aside) from including all available tasks and agents.

Many computer scientists use the aggregated answers of online workers to represent ground truth. Prior work has shown that aggregation methods such as majority voting are effective for measuring relatively objective features. For subjective features such as semantic connotation, online workers, known for optimizing their hourly earnings, tend to deteriorate in the quality of their responses as they work longer. In this paper, we aim to address this issue by proposing a quality-aware semantic data annotation system. We observe that with timely feedback on workers' performance quantified by quality scores, better informed online workers can maintain the quality of their labeling throughout an extended period of time. We validate the effectiveness of the proposed annotation system through i) evaluating performance based on an expert-labeled dataset, and ii) demonstrating machine learning tasks that can lead to consistent learning behavior with 70%-80% accuracy. Our results suggest that with our system, researchers can collect high-quality answers of subjective semantic features at a large scale.

We study the polynomial-time approximability of the optimal online stochastic bipartite matching algorithm, initiated by Papadimitriou et al. (EC'21). Here, nodes on one side of the graph are given upfront, while at each time t, an online node and its edge weights are drawn from a time-dependent distribution. The optimal algorithm is PSPACE-hard to approximate within some universal constant. We refer to this optimal algorithm, which requires time to think (compute), as a philosopher, and refer to polynomial-time online approximations of the above as philosopher inequalities. The best known philosopher inequality for online matching yields a 0.652-approximation. In contrast, the best possible prophet inequality, or approximation of the optimum offline solution, is 0.5. Our main results are a 0.678-approximate algorithm and a 0.685-approximation for a vertex-weighted special case. Notably, both bounds exceed the 0.666-approximation of the offline optimum obtained by Tang, Wu, and Wu (STOC'22) for the vertex-weighted problem. Building on our algorithms and the recent black-box reduction of Banihashem et al. (SODA'24), we provide polytime (pricing-based) truthful mechanisms which 0.678-approximate the social welfare of the optimal online allocation for bipartite matching markets. Our online allocation algorithm relies on the classic pivotal sampling algorithm (Srinivasan FOCS'01, Gandhi et al. J.ACM'06), along with careful discarding to obtain negative correlations between offline nodes. Consequently, the analysis boils down to examining the distribution of a weighted sum X of negatively correlated Bernoulli variables, specifically lower bounding its mass below a threshold, E[min(1,X)], of possible independent interest. Interestingly, our bound relies on an imaginary invocation of pivotal sampling.

Preference based alignment objectives implicitly assume that all human preferences are expressed with equal strength. In practice, however, preference strength varies across individuals and contexts -- a phenomenon established in behavioral economics and discrete choice theory. This mismatch limits the ability of existing objectives to faithfully capture heterogeneous human judgments. Inspired by this literature, we introduce Mixed Logit Direct Preference Optimization (MixDPO), a generalization of Direct Preference Optimization that models variation in preference strength. MixDPO enables alignment objectives to capture heterogeneity in how strongly preferences are expressed across training examples. We evaluate MixDPO on three preference datasets using two open-weight language models. Across datasets, MixDPO improves aggregate alignment performance (+11.2 points on Pythia-2.8B) while preserving subgroup level preferences, with the largest gains appearing in settings with higher inferred preference heterogeneity. MixDPO makes preference heterogeneity explicit through learned strength distributions. We release our code for reproducibility.

This paper generalises the treatment of compositional game theory as introduced by the second and third authors with Ghani and Winschel, where games are modelled as morphisms of a symmetric monoidal category. From an economic modelling perspective, the existing notion of an open game is not expressive enough for many applications. This includes stochastic environments, stochastic choices by players, as well as incomplete information regarding the game being played. The current paper addresses these three issue all at once. To achieve this we make significant use of category theory, especially the 'coend optics' of Riley.

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) has become a crucial technology for aligning language models with human values and intentions, enabling models to produce more helpful and harmless responses. Reward models are trained as proxies for human preferences to drive reinforcement learning optimization. While reward models are often considered central to achieving high performance, they face the following challenges in practical applications: (1) Incorrect and ambiguous preference pairs in the dataset may hinder the reward model from accurately capturing human intent. (2) Reward models trained on data from a specific distribution often struggle to generalize to examples outside that distribution and are not suitable for iterative RLHF training. In this report, we attempt to address these two issues. (1) From a data perspective, we propose a method to measure the strength of preferences within the data, based on a voting mechanism of multiple reward models. Experimental results confirm that data with varying preference strengths have different impacts on reward model performance. We introduce a series of novel methods to mitigate the influence of incorrect and ambiguous preferences in the dataset and fully leverage high-quality preference data. (2) From an algorithmic standpoint, we introduce contrastive learning to enhance the ability of reward models to distinguish between chosen and rejected responses, thereby improving model generalization. Furthermore, we employ meta-learning to enable the reward model to maintain the ability to differentiate subtle differences in out-of-distribution samples, and this approach can be utilized for iterative RLHF optimization.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents deployed for real-world tasks face a fundamental dilemma: user requests are underspecified, yet agents must decide whether to act on incomplete information or interrupt users for clarification. Existing approaches either rely on brittle confidence thresholds that require task-specific tuning, or fail to account for the varying stakes of different decisions. We introduce a decision-theoretic framework that resolves this trade-off through the Value of Information (VoI), enabling agents to dynamically weigh the expected utility gain from asking questions against the cognitive cost imposed on users. Our inference-time method requires no hyperparameter tuning and adapts seamlessly across contexts-from casual games to medical diagnosis. Experiments across four diverse domains (20 Questions, medical diagnosis, flight booking, and e-commerce) show that VoI consistently matches or exceeds the best manually-tuned baselines, achieving up to 1.36 utility points higher in high-cost settings. This work provides a parameter-free framework for adaptive agent communication that explicitly balances task risk, query ambiguity, and user effort.

Learning from feedback is an instrumental process for advancing the capabilities and safety of frontier models, yet its effectiveness is often constrained by cost and scalability. We present a pilot study that explores scaling reward models through unsupervised approaches. We operationalize reward-based scaling (RBS), in its simplest form, as preference learning over document prefixes and suffixes drawn from large-scale web corpora. Its advantage is demonstrated in various aspects: despite using no human annotations, training on 11M tokens of math-focused web data yields steady gains on RewardBench v1 and v2, and these improvements consistently transfer across diverse initialization backbones spanning model families and scales. Across models, our method improves RewardBench v2 accuracy by up to +7.7 points on average, with gains of up to +16.1 on in-domain math subsets and consistent improvements on out-of-domain safety and general subsets. When applied to best-of-N selection and policy optimization, these reward models substantially improve downstream math performance and match or exceed strong supervised reward model baselines of similar size. Overall, we demonstrate the feasibility and promise of training reward models without costly and potentially unreliable human annotations.

We explore a key architectural aspect of deep convolutional neural networks: the pattern of internal skip connections used to aggregate outputs of earlier layers for consumption by deeper layers. Such aggregation is critical to facilitate training of very deep networks in an end-to-end manner. This is a primary reason for the widespread adoption of residual networks, which aggregate outputs via cumulative summation. While subsequent works investigate alternative aggregation operations (e.g. concatenation), we focus on an orthogonal question: which outputs to aggregate at a particular point in the network. We propose a new internal connection structure which aggregates only a sparse set of previous outputs at any given depth. Our experiments demonstrate this simple design change offers superior performance with fewer parameters and lower computational requirements. Moreover, we show that sparse aggregation allows networks to scale more robustly to 1000+ layers, thereby opening future avenues for training long-running visual processes.

Despite seemingly performant web agents on the task-completion benchmarks, most existing methods evaluate the agents based on a presupposition: the web navigation task consists of linear sequence of actions with an end state that marks task completion. In contrast, our work focuses on web navigation for information aggregation, wherein the agent must explore different websites to gather information for a complex query. We consider web information aggregation from two different perspectives: (i) Direct API-driven Access relies on a text-only view of the Web, leveraging external tools such as Google Search API to navigate the web and a scraper to extract website contents. (ii) Interactive Visual Access uses screenshots of the webpages and requires interaction with the browser to navigate and access information. Motivated by these diverse information access settings, we introduce Infogent, a novel modular framework for web information aggregation involving three distinct components: Navigator, Extractor and Aggregator. Experiments on different information access settings demonstrate Infogent beats an existing SOTA multi-agent search framework by 7% under Direct API-Driven Access on FRAMES, and improves over an existing information-seeking web agent by 4.3% under Interactive Visual Access on AssistantBench.

A variety of recent papers discuss the application of Shapley values, a concept for explaining coalitional games, for feature attribution in machine learning. However, the correct way to connect a machine learning model to a coalitional game has been a source of controversy. The two main approaches that have been proposed differ in the way that they condition on known features, using either (1) an interventional or (2) an observational conditional expectation. While previous work has argued that one of the two approaches is preferable in general, we argue that the choice is application dependent. Furthermore, we argue that the choice comes down to whether it is desirable to be true to the model or true to the data. We use linear models to investigate this choice. After deriving an efficient method for calculating observational conditional expectation Shapley values for linear models, we investigate how correlation in simulated data impacts the convergence of observational conditional expectation Shapley values. Finally, we present two real data examples that we consider to be representative of possible use cases for feature attribution -- (1) credit risk modeling and (2) biological discovery. We show how a different choice of value function performs better in each scenario, and how possible attributions are impacted by modeling choices.

Ensembling is among the most popular tools in machine learning (ML) due to its effectiveness in minimizing variance and thus improving generalization. Most ensembling methods for black-box base learners fall under the umbrella of "stacked generalization," namely training an ML algorithm that takes the inferences from the base learners as input. While stacking has been widely applied in practice, its theoretical properties are poorly understood. In this paper, we prove a novel result, showing that choosing the best stacked generalization from a (finite or finite-dimensional) family of stacked generalizations based on cross-validated performance does not perform "much worse" than the oracle best. Our result strengthens and significantly extends the results in Van der Laan et al. (2007). Inspired by the theoretical analysis, we further propose a particular family of stacked generalizations in the context of probabilistic forecasting, each one with a different sensitivity for how much the ensemble weights are allowed to vary across items, timestamps in the forecast horizon, and quantiles. Experimental results demonstrate the performance gain of the proposed method.

In federated learning (FL), clients usually have diverse participation statistics that are unknown a priori, which can significantly harm the performance of FL if not handled properly. Existing works aiming at addressing this problem are usually based on global variance reduction, which requires a substantial amount of additional memory in a multiplicative factor equal to the total number of clients. An important open problem is to find a lightweight method for FL in the presence of clients with unknown participation rates. In this paper, we address this problem by adapting the aggregation weights in federated averaging (FedAvg) based on the participation history of each client. We first show that, with heterogeneous participation statistics, FedAvg with non-optimal aggregation weights can diverge from the optimal solution of the original FL objective, indicating the need of finding optimal aggregation weights. However, it is difficult to compute the optimal weights when the participation statistics are unknown. To address this problem, we present a new algorithm called FedAU, which improves FedAvg by adaptively weighting the client updates based on online estimates of the optimal weights without knowing the statistics of client participation. We provide a theoretical convergence analysis of FedAU using a novel methodology to connect the estimation error and convergence. Our theoretical results reveal important and interesting insights, while showing that FedAU converges to an optimal solution of the original objective and has desirable properties such as linear speedup. Our experimental results also verify the advantage of FedAU over baseline methods with various participation patterns.

A growing trend for value-based reinforcement learning (RL) algorithms is to capture more information than scalar value functions in the value network. One of the most well-known methods in this branch is distributional RL, which models return distribution instead of scalar value. In another line of work, hybrid reward architectures (HRA) in RL have studied to model source-specific value functions for each source of reward, which is also shown to be beneficial in performance. To fully inherit the benefits of distributional RL and hybrid reward architectures, we introduce Multi-Dimensional Distributional DQN (MD3QN), which extends distributional RL to model the joint return distribution from multiple reward sources. As a by-product of joint distribution modeling, MD3QN can capture not only the randomness in returns for each source of reward, but also the rich reward correlation between the randomness of different sources. We prove the convergence for the joint distributional Bellman operator and build our empirical algorithm by minimizing the Maximum Mean Discrepancy between joint return distribution and its Bellman target. In experiments, our method accurately models the joint return distribution in environments with richly correlated reward functions, and outperforms previous RL methods utilizing multi-dimensional reward functions in the control setting.

Dataset Distillation (DD) seeks to create a compact dataset from a large, real-world dataset. While recent methods often rely on heuristic approaches to balance efficiency and quality, the fundamental relationship between original and synthetic data remains underexplored. This paper revisits knowledge distillation-based dataset distillation within a solid theoretical framework. We introduce the concepts of Informativeness and Utility, capturing crucial information within a sample and essential samples in the training set, respectively. Building on these principles, we define optimal dataset distillation mathematically. We then present InfoUtil, a framework that balances informativeness and utility in synthesizing the distilled dataset. InfoUtil incorporates two key components: (1) game-theoretic informativeness maximization using Shapley Value attribution to extract key information from samples, and (2) principled utility maximization by selecting globally influential samples based on Gradient Norm. These components ensure that the distilled dataset is both informative and utility-optimized. Experiments demonstrate that our method achieves a 6.1\% performance improvement over the previous state-of-the-art approach on ImageNet-1K dataset using ResNet-18.