Daily Papers

Multi-agent large language model (LLM) systems often rely on verifier and critic agents to suppress hallucinations, but verification is delayed. During this delay, false claims can propagate through the agent network. We model this process as delayed consensus on a graph with grounded corrector nodes. Spectral decomposition by the grounded Laplacian yields a closed-form stability threshold for the verification dose: correction that is too strong or too delayed can turn consensus into oscillation. The most unstable regime occurs when the communication and verification delays coincide; for delay two, the threshold is the inverse golden ratio. The same framework gives a supermodular placement objective and a greedy (1-1/e)-approximation rule for assigning a limited corrector budget to influential nodes. Experiments across five open models confirm the predicted dose-delay oscillations. By contrast, grounded factual answering makes truth an absorbing boundary and eliminates the effect, suggesting that the instability is specific to signed-belief tasks while grounded verification remains stabilizing

As language models (LMs) become integral to fields like healthcare, law, and journalism, their ability to differentiate between fact, belief, and knowledge is essential for reliable decision-making. Failure to grasp these distinctions can lead to significant consequences in areas such as medical diagnosis, legal judgments, and dissemination of fake news. Despite this, current literature has largely focused on more complex issues such as theory of mind, overlooking more fundamental epistemic challenges. This study systematically evaluates the epistemic reasoning capabilities of modern LMs, including GPT-4, Claude-3, and Llama-3, using a new dataset, KaBLE, consisting of 13,000 questions across 13 tasks. Our results reveal key limitations. First, while LMs achieve 86% accuracy on factual scenarios, their performance drops significantly with false scenarios, particularly in belief-related tasks. Second, LMs struggle with recognizing and affirming personal beliefs, especially when those beliefs contradict factual data, which raises concerns for applications in healthcare and counseling, where engaging with a person's beliefs is critical. Third, we identify a salient bias in how LMs process first-person versus third-person beliefs, performing better on third-person tasks (80.7%) compared to first-person tasks (54.4%). Fourth, LMs lack a robust understanding of the factive nature of knowledge, namely, that knowledge inherently requires truth. Fifth, LMs rely on linguistic cues for fact-checking and sometimes bypass the deeper reasoning. These findings highlight significant concerns about current LMs' ability to reason about truth, belief, and knowledge while emphasizing the need for advancements in these areas before broad deployment in critical sectors.

We investigate the internal representations of vision-and-language models (VLMs) and how they encode task representations. We consider tasks specified through examples or instructions, using either text or image inputs. Surprisingly, we find that conceptually similar tasks are mapped to similar task vector representations, regardless of how they are specified. Our findings suggest that to output answers, tokens in VLMs undergo three distinct phases: input, task, and answer, a process which is consistent across different modalities and specifications. The task vectors we identify in VLMs are general enough to be derived in one modality (e.g., text) and transferred to another (e.g., image). Additionally, we find that ensembling exemplar and instruction based task vectors produce better task representations. Taken together, these insights shed light on the underlying mechanisms of VLMs, particularly their ability to represent tasks in a shared manner across different modalities and task specifications. Project page: https://task-vectors-are-cross-modal.github.io.

Historically, sign language machine translation has been posed as a sentence-level task: datasets consisting of continuous narratives are chopped up and presented to the model as isolated clips. In this work, we explore the limitations of this task framing. First, we survey a number of linguistic phenomena in sign languages that depend on discourse-level context. Then as a case study, we perform the first human baseline for sign language translation that actually substitutes a human into the machine learning task framing, rather than provide the human with the entire document as context. This human baseline -- for ASL to English translation on the How2Sign dataset -- shows that for 33% of sentences in our sample, our fluent Deaf signer annotators were only able to understand key parts of the clip in light of additional discourse-level context. These results underscore the importance of understanding and sanity checking examples when adapting machine learning to new domains.

Eleven Large Language Models (LLMs) were assessed using a custom-made battery of false-belief tasks, considered a gold standard in testing Theory of Mind (ToM) in humans. The battery included 640 prompts spread across 40 diverse tasks, each one including a false-belief scenario, three closely matched true-belief control scenarios, and the reversed versions of all four. To solve a single task, a model needed to correctly answer 16 prompts across all eight scenarios. Smaller and older models solved no tasks; GPT-3-davinci-003 (from November 2022) and ChatGPT-3.5-turbo (from March 2023) solved 20% of the tasks; ChatGPT-4 (from June 2023) solved 75% of the tasks, matching the performance of six-year-old children observed in past studies. We explore the potential interpretation of these findings, including the intriguing possibility that ToM, previously considered exclusive to humans, may have spontaneously emerged as a byproduct of LLMs' improving language skills.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting has become the de facto method to elicit reasoning capabilities from large language models (LLMs). However, to mitigate hallucinations in CoT that are notoriously difficult to detect, current methods such as process reward models (PRMs) or self-consistency operate as opaque boxes and do not provide checkable evidence for their judgments, possibly limiting their effectiveness. To address this issue, we draw inspiration from the idea that "the gold standard for supporting a mathematical claim is to provide a proof". We propose a retrospective, step-aware formal verification framework Safe. Rather than assigning arbitrary scores, we strive to articulate mathematical claims in formal mathematical language Lean 4 at each reasoning step and provide formal proofs to identify hallucinations. We evaluate our framework Safe across multiple language models and various mathematical datasets, demonstrating a significant performance improvement while offering interpretable and verifiable evidence. We also propose FormalStep as a benchmark for step correctness theorem proving with 30,809 formal statements. To the best of our knowledge, our work represents the first endeavor to utilize formal mathematical language Lean 4 for verifying natural language content generated by LLMs, aligning with the reason why formal mathematical languages were created in the first place: to provide a robust foundation for hallucination-prone human-written proofs.

Theory of Mind (ToM) refers to an agent's ability to model the internal states of others. Contributing to the debate whether large language models (LLMs) exhibit genuine ToM capabilities, our study investigates their ToM robustness using perturbations on false-belief tasks and examines the potential of Chain-of-Thought prompting (CoT) to enhance performance and explain the LLM's decision. We introduce a handcrafted, richly annotated ToM dataset, including classic and perturbed false belief tasks, the corresponding spaces of valid reasoning chains for correct task completion, subsequent reasoning faithfulness, task solutions, and propose metrics to evaluate reasoning chain correctness and to what extent final answers are faithful to reasoning traces of the generated CoT. We show a steep drop in ToM capabilities under task perturbation for all evaluated LLMs, questioning the notion of any robust form of ToM being present. While CoT prompting improves the ToM performance overall in a faithful manner, it surprisingly degrades accuracy for some perturbation classes, indicating that selective application is necessary.

The objective of this paper is to develop a functional system for translating spoken languages into sign languages, referred to as Spoken2Sign translation. The Spoken2Sign task is orthogonal and complementary to traditional sign language to spoken language (Sign2Spoken) translation. To enable Spoken2Sign translation, we present a simple baseline consisting of three steps: 1) creating a gloss-video dictionary using existing Sign2Spoken benchmarks; 2) estimating a 3D sign for each sign video in the dictionary; 3) training a Spoken2Sign model, which is composed of a Text2Gloss translator, a sign connector, and a rendering module, with the aid of the yielded gloss-3D sign dictionary. The translation results are then displayed through a sign avatar. As far as we know, we are the first to present the Spoken2Sign task in an output format of 3D signs. In addition to its capability of Spoken2Sign translation, we also demonstrate that two by-products of our approach-3D keypoint augmentation and multi-view understanding-can assist in keypoint-based sign language understanding. Code and models are available at https://github.com/FangyunWei/SLRT.

We provide evidence of performative chain-of-thought (CoT) in reasoning models, where a model becomes strongly confident in its final answer, but continues generating tokens without revealing its internal belief. Our analysis compares activation probing, early forced answering, and a CoT monitor across two large models (DeepSeek-R1 671B & GPT-OSS 120B) and find task difficulty-specific differences: The model's final answer is decodable from activations far earlier in CoT than a monitor is able to say, especially for easy recall-based MMLU questions. We contrast this with genuine reasoning in difficult multihop GPQA-Diamond questions. Despite this, inflection points (e.g., backtracking, 'aha' moments) occur almost exclusively in responses where probes show large belief shifts, suggesting these behaviors track genuine uncertainty rather than learned "reasoning theater." Finally, probe-guided early exit reduces tokens by up to 80% on MMLU and 30% on GPQA-Diamond with similar accuracy, positioning attention probing as an efficient tool for detecting performative reasoning and enabling adaptive computation.

Although large language models (LLMs) are increasingly capable, these capabilities are unevenly distributed: they excel at formal linguistic tasks, such as producing fluent, grammatical text, but struggle more with functional linguistic tasks like reasoning and consistent fact retrieval. Inspired by neuroscience, recent work suggests that to succeed on both formal and functional linguistic tasks, LLMs should use different mechanisms for each; such localization could either be built-in or emerge spontaneously through training. In this paper, we ask: do current models, with fast-improving functional linguistic abilities, exhibit distinct localization of formal and functional linguistic mechanisms? We answer this by finding and comparing the "circuits", or minimal computational subgraphs, responsible for various formal and functional tasks. Comparing 5 LLMs across 10 distinct tasks, we find that while there is indeed little overlap between circuits for formal and functional tasks, there is also little overlap between formal linguistic tasks, as exists in the human brain. Thus, a single formal linguistic network, unified and distinct from functional task circuits, remains elusive. However, in terms of cross-task faithfulness - the ability of one circuit to solve another's task - we observe a separation between formal and functional mechanisms, suggesting that shared mechanisms between formal tasks may exist.

Latent or continuous chain-of-thought methods replace explicit textual rationales with a number of internal latent steps, but these intermediate computations are difficult to evaluate beyond correlation-based probes. In this paper, we view latent chain-of-thought as a manipulable causal process in representation space by modeling latent steps as variables in a structural causal model (SCM) and analyzing their effects through step-wise do-interventions. We study two representative paradigms (i.e., Coconut and CODI) on both mathematical and general reasoning tasks to investigate three key questions: (1) which steps are causally necessary for correctness and when answers become decidable early; (2) how does influence propagate across steps, and how does this structure compare to explicit CoT; and (3) do intermediate trajectories retain competing answer modes, and how does output-level commitment differ from representational commitment across steps. We find that latent-step budgets behave less like homogeneous extra depth and more like staged functionality with non-local routing, and we identify a persistent gap between early output bias and late representational commitment. These results motivate mode-conditional and stability-aware analyses -- and corresponding training/decoding objectives -- as more reliable tools for interpreting and improving latent reasoning systems. Code is available at https://github.com/J1mL1/causal-latent-cot.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting has become a widely used strategy for working with large language and multimodal models. While CoT has been shown to improve performance across many tasks, determining the settings in which it is effective remains an ongoing effort. In particular, it is still an open question in what settings CoT systematically reduces model performance. In this paper, we seek to identify the characteristics of tasks where CoT reduces performance by drawing inspiration from cognitive psychology, looking at cases where (i) verbal thinking or deliberation hurts performance in humans, and (ii) the constraints governing human performance generalize to language models. Three such cases are implicit statistical learning, visual recognition, and classifying with patterns containing exceptions. In extensive experiments across all three settings, we find that a diverse collection of state-of-the-art models exhibit significant drop-offs in performance (e.g., up to 36.3% absolute accuracy for OpenAI o1-preview compared to GPT-4o) when using inference-time reasoning compared to zero-shot counterparts. We also identify three tasks that satisfy condition (i) but not (ii), and find that while verbal thinking reduces human performance in these tasks, CoT retains or increases model performance. Overall, our results show that while there is not an exact parallel between the cognitive processes of models and those of humans, considering cases where thinking has negative consequences for human performance can help us identify settings where it negatively impacts models. By connecting the literature on human deliberation with evaluations of CoT, we offer a new tool that can be used in understanding the impact of prompt choices and inference-time reasoning.

Today's reasoning models use thinking tokens to attain stronger performance on benchmarks than their instruction-tuned counterparts. It is also generally believed that this more "deliberative" mode should improve alignment and safety, by providing the model a safe space to consider whether its planned answer to a request violates its safety principles. We present evidence that this intuition is not always correct. Across frontier open-weight reasoning models spanning GPT-OSS, Qwen, Olmo, and Phi families, we find that the eventual refusal/compliance outcome is already strongly predictable via a trained head on the first token's hidden representation (0.84-0.95 AUROC and sim88% balanced accuracy for predicting refusal/compliance) before any visible thinking. The thinking process turns out to be more akin to prefix completion than to deliberative revision, with the final outcome rarely changing after the first sim20% of thinking, despite giving the appearance of deliberation at the text level (sim74% of text-level deliberations occur when the response distribution is already locked to one refusal/compliance side). We also find that existing inference-time and training-based safety interventions, despite being motivated by the goal of inducing deliberation, largely shift model behavior toward over-refusal while suppressing already-scarce deliberation signals. Our results suggest that safety behavior in current reasoning models is much less deliberative than commonly assumed, and highlight the need for methods that induce real safety deliberation.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have limited performance when solving arithmetic reasoning tasks and often provide incorrect answers. Unlike natural language understanding, math problems typically have a single correct answer, making the task of generating accurate solutions more challenging for LLMs. To the best of our knowledge, we are not aware of any LLMs that indicate their level of confidence in their responses which fuels a trust deficit in these models impeding their adoption. To address this deficiency, we propose `MathPrompter', a technique that improves performance of LLMs on arithmetic problems along with increased reliance in the predictions. MathPrompter uses the Zero-shot chain-of-thought prompting technique to generate multiple Algebraic expressions or Python functions to solve the same math problem in different ways and thereby raise the confidence level in the output results. This is in contrast to other prompt based CoT methods, where there is no check on the validity of the intermediate steps followed. Our technique improves over state-of-the-art on the MultiArith dataset (78.7%rightarrow92.5%) evaluated using 175B parameter GPT-based LLM.

Theory of Mind (ToM), the capacity to comprehend the mental states of distinct individuals, is essential for numerous practical applications. With the development of large language models, there is a heated debate about whether they are able to perform ToM tasks. Previous studies have used different tasks and prompts to test the ToM on large language models and the results are inconsistent: some studies asserted these models are capable of exhibiting ToM, while others suggest the opposite. In this study, We present ToMChallenges, a dataset for comprehensively evaluating Theory of Mind based on Sally-Anne and Smarties tests. We created 30 variations of each test (e.g., changing the person's name, location, and items). For each variation, we test the model's understanding of different aspects: reality, belief, 1st order belief, and 2nd order belief. We adapt our data for various tasks by creating unique prompts tailored for each task category: Fill-in-the-Blank, Multiple Choice, True/False, Chain-of-Thought True/False, Question Answering, and Text Completion. If the model has a robust ToM, it should be able to achieve good performance for different prompts across different tests. We evaluated two GPT-3.5 models, text-davinci-003 and gpt-3.5-turbo-0301, with our datasets. Our results indicate that consistent performance in ToM tasks remains a challenge.

Theory-of-Mind (ToM) tasks pose a unique challenge for small language models (SLMs) with limited scale, which often lack the capacity to perform deep social reasoning. In this work, we propose DEL-ToM, a framework that improves ToM reasoning through inference-time scaling rather than architectural changes. Our approach decomposes ToM tasks into a sequence of belief updates grounded in Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL), enabling structured and transparent reasoning. We train a verifier, called the Process Belief Model (PBM), to score each belief update step using labels generated automatically via a DEL simulator. During inference, candidate belief traces generated by a language model are evaluated by the PBM, and the highest-scoring trace is selected. This allows SLMs to emulate more deliberate reasoning by allocating additional compute at test time. Experiments across multiple model scales and benchmarks show that DEL-ToM consistently improves performance, demonstrating that verifiable belief supervision can significantly enhance ToM abilities of SLMs without retraining.

Recent large language models (LLMs) can generate long Chain-of-Thought (CoT) at test time, enabling them to solve complex tasks. These reasoning steps in CoT are often assumed as a faithful reflection of the model's internal thinking process, and used to monitor unsafe intentions. However, we find many reasoning steps don't truly contribute to LLMs' prediction. We measure the step-wise causal influence of each reasoning step on the model's final prediction with a proposed True Thinking Score (TTS). We reveal that LLMs often interleave between true-thinking steps (which are genuinely used to produce the final output) and decorative-thinking steps (which only give the appearance of reasoning but have minimal causal impact). Notably, only a small subset of the total reasoning steps have a high TTS that causally drive the model's prediction: e.g., for the AIME dataset, only an average of 2.3% of reasoning steps in CoT have a TTS >= 0.7 (range: 0-1) under the Qwen-2.5 model. Furthermore, we identify a TrueThinking direction in the latent space of LLMs. By steering along or against this direction, we can force the model to perform or disregard certain CoT steps when computing the final result. Finally, we highlight that self-verification steps in CoT (i.e., aha moments) can also be decorative, where LLMs do not truly verify their solution. Steering along the TrueThinking direction can force internal reasoning over these steps, resulting in a change in the final results. Overall, our work reveals that LLMs often verbalize reasoning steps without actually performing them internally, which undermines both the efficiency of LLM reasoning and the trustworthiness of CoT.

We show the standard basis of transformer hidden states already provides a training-free, architecture-general feature basis. Individual dimensions encode semantic content via their signs (+/-1) and confidence via their magnitudes, acting as independent binary registers; a feature is a subset of dimensions with a consistent sign pattern, read by counting sign agreements with no learned rotation. We validate this Bag of Dims framework across seven models spanning language (Qwen 3.5-4B, Gemma 3-4B, Mistral 7B, Qwen3-32B), vision (DINOv2, ViT-Base), and audio (AST). Signs alone carry predictive content: unit-magnitude sign patterns preserve 60-93% top-5 next-token accuracy through the LM head, and decoder-free Hamming scoring reaches 80-90% top-4096. From a single-token cache (one forward pass per token, no context, no labels), we detect 175 categories at AUC 0.97-0.99 by sign agreement; a trained probe adds only +0.018 AUC and converges to axis-aligned weights. These features are causally operative: they survive the K/V attention projections, trace to the FFN neuron coalitions that write them (random-weight controls never reproduce this), and flipping a feature's signs during the live forward pass suppresses its concept across four language models, magnitude-matched and concept-specific. Dimensions stay independent throughout (pairwise mutual information below 0.006 bits). The structure is not specific to language: the same per-dimension signs appear in self-supervised vision (DINOv2, 9/12 ImageNet superclasses), supervised vision (ViT-Base, 11/12), and audio (AST, 50/50 ESC-50 categories), so it reflects transformer training in general, not the language-modeling objective. The standard basis already suffices for feature reading at one forward pass, no optimization, no GPU-days. The open problem shifts from finding the right rotation to cataloging what each dimension encodes.

Rapid advancements in large language models (LLMs) have sparked the question whether these models possess some form of consciousness. To tackle this challenge, Butlin et al. (2023) introduced a list of indicators for consciousness in artificial systems based on neuroscientific theories. In this work, we evaluate a key indicator from this list, called HOT-3, which tests for agency guided by a general belief-formation and action selection system that updates beliefs based on meta-cognitive monitoring. We view beliefs as representations in the model's latent space that emerge in response to a given input, and introduce a metric to quantify their dominance during generation. Analyzing the dynamics between competing beliefs across models and tasks reveals three key findings: (1) external manipulations systematically modulate internal belief formation, (2) belief formation causally drives the model's action selection, and (3) models can monitor and report their own belief states. Together, these results provide empirical support for the existence of belief-guided agency and meta-cognitive monitoring in LLMs. More broadly, our work lays methodological groundwork for investigating the emergence of agency, beliefs, and meta-cognition in LLMs.

Spatial embodied intelligence requires agents to act to acquire information under partial observability. While multimodal foundation models excel at passive perception, their capacity for active, self-directed exploration remains understudied. We propose Theory of Space, defined as an agent's ability to actively acquire information through self-directed, active exploration and to construct, revise, and exploit a spatial belief from sequential, partial observations. We evaluate this through a benchmark where the goal is curiosity-driven exploration to build an accurate cognitive map. A key innovation is spatial belief probing, which prompts models to reveal their internal spatial representations at each step. Our evaluation of state-of-the-art models reveals several critical bottlenecks. First, we identify an Active-Passive Gap, where performance drops significantly when agents must autonomously gather information. Second, we find high inefficiency, as models explore unsystematically compared to program-based proxies. Through belief probing, we diagnose that while perception is an initial bottleneck, global beliefs suffer from instability that causes spatial knowledge to degrade over time. Finally, using a false belief paradigm, we uncover Belief Inertia, where agents fail to update obsolete priors with new evidence. This issue is present in text-based agents but is particularly severe in vision-based models. Our findings suggest that current foundation models struggle to maintain coherent, revisable spatial beliefs during active exploration.

Labeled data for imitation learning of theorem proving in large libraries of formalized mathematics is scarce as such libraries require years of concentrated effort by human specialists to be built. This is particularly challenging when applying large Transformer language models to tactic prediction, because the scaling of performance with respect to model size is quickly disrupted in the data-scarce, easily-overfitted regime. We propose PACT ({\bf P}roof {\bf A}rtifact {\bf C}o-{\bf T}raining), a general methodology for extracting abundant self-supervised data from kernel-level proof terms for co-training alongside the usual tactic prediction objective. We apply this methodology to Lean, an interactive proof assistant which hosts some of the most sophisticated formalized mathematics to date. We instrument Lean with a neural theorem prover driven by a Transformer language model and show that PACT improves theorem proving success rate on a held-out suite of test theorems from 32\% to 48\%.

Large language models can detect their own errors and sometimes correct them without external feedback, but the underlying mechanisms remain unknown. We investigate this through the lens of second-order models of confidence from decision neuroscience. In a first-order system, confidence derives from the generation signal itself and is therefore maximal for the chosen response, precluding error detection. Second-order models posit a partially independent evaluative signal that can disagree with the committed response, providing the basis for error detection. Kumaran et al. (2026) showed that LLMs cache a confidence representation at a token immediately following the answer (i.e. post-answer newline: PANL) -- that causally drives verbal confidence and dissociates from log-probabilities. Here we test whether this PANL signal extends beyond confidence to support error detection and self-correction. Here we test whether this signal supports error detection and self-correction, deriving predictions from the second-order framework. Using a verify-then-correct paradigm, we show that: (i) verbal confidence predicts error detection far beyond token log-probabilities, ruling out a first-order account; (ii) PANL activations predict error detection beyond verbal confidence itself; and (iii) PANL predicts which errors the model can correct -- where all behavioural signals fail. Causal interventions confirm that PANL signals rescue error detection behavior when answer information is corrupted. All findings replicate across models (Gemma 3 27B and Qwen 2.5 7B) and tasks (TriviaQA and MNLI). These results reveal that LLMs naturally implement a second-order confidence architecture whose internal evaluative signal encodes not only whether an answer is likely wrong but whether the model has the knowledge to fix it.

Monitoring chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning is a foundational safety technique for large language model (LLM) agents; however, this oversight is compromised if models learn to conceal their reasoning. We explore the potential for steganographic CoT -- where models hide secret reasoning within innocuous text -- to inform risk assessment and deployment policies. We systematically evaluate the limits of steganographic capabilities across 28 models, ranging from past generations to the current frontier. We measure monitor evasion, refusal rates, encoding fidelity, and hidden task accuracy across four datasets, comparing steganographic acrostics against plain reasoning and filler-token baselines. We find that current models cannot yet sustain hidden reasoning for complex math and arithmetic tasks. However, in a simplified counting experiment, Claude Opus 4.5 achieved 92% accuracy on the hidden task, demonstrating nascent capability. Notably, in rare cases (<1%), GPT-5.2 might refuse steganographic instructions while simultaneously complying with them. Our findings underscore the need for continuous evaluation of steganographic risks. This study provides a methodology to preemptively detect and prevent hidden reasoning that might empower misaligned scheming and deceptive behavior.

Understanding what sequence of steps are needed to complete a goal can help artificial intelligence systems reason about human activities. Past work in NLP has examined the task of goal-step inference for text. We introduce the visual analogue. We propose the Visual Goal-Step Inference (VGSI) task, where a model is given a textual goal and must choose which of four images represents a plausible step towards that goal. With a new dataset harvested from wikiHow consisting of 772,277 images representing human actions, we show that our task is challenging for state-of-the-art multimodal models. Moreover, the multimodal representation learned from our data can be effectively transferred to other datasets like HowTo100m, increasing the VGSI accuracy by 15 - 20%. Our task will facilitate multimodal reasoning about procedural events.

A new prior is proposed for learning representations of high-level concepts of the kind we manipulate with language. This prior can be combined with other priors in order to help disentangling abstract factors from each other. It is inspired by cognitive neuroscience theories of consciousness, seen as a bottleneck through which just a few elements, after having been selected by attention from a broader pool, are then broadcast and condition further processing, both in perception and decision-making. The set of recently selected elements one becomes aware of is seen as forming a low-dimensional conscious state. This conscious state is combining the few concepts constituting a conscious thought, i.e., what one is immediately conscious of at a particular moment. We claim that this architectural and information-processing constraint corresponds to assumptions about the joint distribution between high-level concepts. To the extent that these assumptions are generally true (and the form of natural language seems consistent with them), they can form a useful prior for representation learning. A low-dimensional thought or conscious state is analogous to a sentence: it involves only a few variables and yet can make a statement with very high probability of being true. This is consistent with a joint distribution (over high-level concepts) which has the form of a sparse factor graph, i.e., where the dependencies captured by each factor of the factor graph involve only very few variables while creating a strong dip in the overall energy function. The consciousness prior also makes it natural to map conscious states to natural language utterances or to express classical AI knowledge in a form similar to facts and rules, albeit capturing uncertainty as well as efficient search mechanisms implemented by attention mechanisms.

As data-science agents shift from co-pilots to auto-pilots, silent misframing becomes a critical failure mode. Agents quietly commit to plausible but unintended task framings, producing clean, executable artifacts that hide their incorrect assessment of the task. Existing benchmarks score whether the pipeline runs, ignoring whether the agent recognized the task was underspecified. We introduce Ambig-DS, two diagnostic suites: one for prediction-target ambiguity (Ambig-DS-Target, 51 tasks built on DSBench, a tabular modeling benchmark) and one for evaluation-objective ambiguity (Ambig-DS-Objective, 61 tasks built on MLE-bench, a Kaggle-style ML competition benchmark), constructed so that scoring uses each source benchmark's original evaluator. For every task we pair the original, fully specified version with an ambiguous variant produced by controlled edits; a human-and-LLM verification pipeline confirms each variant admits multiple plausible interpretations with decision-relevant consequences. The suites are analyzed independently and ambiguity lowers performance in both. Across five agents spanning efficient to frontier-class models, we find in our controlled diagnostic setting: (i) failures are silent commitments: wrong-target submissions on Target, wrong-metric or non-committal baseline submissions on Objective, rather than execution errors; (ii) allowing the agent to ask one clarifying question recovers much of the loss under idealized conditions, suggesting missing framing information drives a substantial part of the observed degradation; but (iii) agents cannot reliably tell when to use it: permissive prompts induce over-asking on clear tasks, while conservative prompts induce silent defaulting on ambiguous ones. Recognizing target and objective underspecification, not pipeline execution, is the bottleneck missing from standard DS-agent evaluations.

We propose a new dataset for evaluating question answering models with respect to their capacity to reason about beliefs. Our tasks are inspired by theory-of-mind experiments that examine whether children are able to reason about the beliefs of others, in particular when those beliefs differ from reality. We evaluate a number of recent neural models with memory augmentation. We find that all fail on our tasks, which require keeping track of inconsistent states of the world; moreover, the models' accuracy decreases notably when random sentences are introduced to the tasks at test.

We propose a method for jointly inferring labels across a collection of data samples, where each sample consists of an observation and a prior belief about the label. By implicitly assuming the existence of a generative model for which a differentiable predictor is the posterior, we derive a training objective that allows learning under weak beliefs. This formulation unifies various machine learning settings; the weak beliefs can come in the form of noisy or incomplete labels, likelihoods given by a different prediction mechanism on auxiliary input, or common-sense priors reflecting knowledge about the structure of the problem at hand. We demonstrate the proposed algorithms on diverse problems: classification with negative training examples, learning from rankings, weakly and self-supervised aerial imagery segmentation, co-segmentation of video frames, and coarsely supervised text classification.

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) are increasingly deployed in open-ended, real-world environments where inputs are messy, underspecified, and not always trustworthy. Unlike curated benchmarks, these settings frequently involve instructions that refer to missing objects or contradictory facts, rely on ambiguous references, or request infeasible actions. In such cases, success hinges not on task execution alone, but on a model's ability to detect when something is silently wrong. This paper presents a systematic analysis of how current MLLMs handle such implicit reasoning scenarios: cases where the flaw is not explicitly stated but must be inferred from context. Using a curated diagnostic suite spanning four categories of real-world failure modes, we evaluate six MLLMs, including o3 and GPT-4o, and find that models frequently fail to surface hidden issues, even when they possess the necessary perceptual and reasoning skills. Explicit prompting reveals that the underlying capabilities exist but are often suppressed in favor of user compliance. We further show that simple inference-time interventions, such as cautious persona prompting and, in particular, requiring a clarifying question, can dramatically recover performance. Our findings highlight a persistent gap between reasoning competence and behavioral compliance in current MLLMs and suggest practical strategies for making these models more trustworthy in underconstrained environments.

Indian Sign Language has limited resources for developing machine learning and data-driven approaches for automated language processing. Though text/audio-based language processing techniques have shown colossal research interest and tremendous improvements in the last few years, Sign Languages still need to catch up due to the need for more resources. To bridge this gap, in this work, we propose iSign: a benchmark for Indian Sign Language (ISL) Processing. We make three primary contributions to this work. First, we release one of the largest ISL-English datasets with more than 118K video-sentence/phrase pairs. To the best of our knowledge, it is the largest sign language dataset available for ISL. Second, we propose multiple NLP-specific tasks (including SignVideo2Text, SignPose2Text, Text2Pose, Word Prediction, and Sign Semantics) and benchmark them with the baseline models for easier access to the research community. Third, we provide detailed insights into the proposed benchmarks with a few linguistic insights into the workings of ISL. We streamline the evaluation of Sign Language processing, addressing the gaps in the NLP research community for Sign Languages. We release the dataset, tasks, and models via the following website: https://exploration-lab.github.io/iSign/

Recent studies have shown that Large Language Models (LLMs) can achieve strong reasoning performance by incorporating functional symbolic representations that abstractly describe graph traversal algorithms and step-by-step reasoning in few-shot learning settings. However, it remains unclear how LLMs genuinely understand the abstract meaning of each reasoning step and the overall algorithm from only a limited number of demonstrations. This work aims to localize the attention heads responsible for individual reasoning steps and characterize the types of information transferred among them. We first align constituent reasoning steps with their corresponding token logits under a symbolic-aided Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting framework. Our analysis shows that token positions that steer the reasoning process are associated with low confidence scores caused by constraints on satisfying reasoning behavior patterns in demonstrations. We then adopt causal mediation analysis techniques to identify the attention heads responsible for these patterns. In addition, our findings indicate that LLMs retrieve factual and rule-based information for individual sub-reasoning tasks through specialized attention heads (approximately 3% total heads), whereas higher layers predominantly facilitate information integration and the emergence of global reasoning strategies (e.g., graph traversal algorithms) that coordinate multiple intermediate reasoning steps to solve the overall task.

To enable progress towards egocentric agents capable of understanding everyday tasks specified in natural language, we propose a benchmark and a synthetic dataset called Egocentric Task Verification (EgoTV). EgoTV contains multi-step tasks with multiple sub-task decompositions, state changes, object interactions, and sub-task ordering constraints, in addition to abstracted task descriptions that contain only partial details about ways to accomplish a task. We also propose a novel Neuro-Symbolic Grounding (NSG) approach to enable the causal, temporal, and compositional reasoning of such tasks. We demonstrate NSG's capability towards task tracking and verification on our EgoTV dataset and a real-world dataset derived from CrossTask (CTV). Our contributions include the release of the EgoTV and CTV datasets, and the NSG model for future research on egocentric assistive agents.

Long chains of thought (CoT) from current language models frequently contain logical gaps and unjustified leaps, limiting the gains from additional test-time compute. Improving reasoning quality directly would require process reward models, but the step-level annotations needed to train them are expensive and scarce. We find such a signal in how the model's confidence evolves during reasoning: premature confidence, the tendency to commit to an answer early and use the remaining tokens to rationalize it, strongly predicts flawed reasoning across tasks and model scales. We exploit this in progressive confidence shaping, a reinforcement learning objective that trains models to update their confidence as they reason rather than commit early -- rewarding gradual confidence growth and penalizing early commitment, with no external labels or reward models. The method improves accuracy and reasoning quality from 1.5B to 8B parameters across arithmetic (Countdown), math (DAPO, AIME), and science (ScienceQA): on Countdown, accuracy improves 3.2x (+42.0pp) and flawed reasoning drops 48pp; on AIME, Pass@64 improves 6.6pp. Consistent with this mechanism, the method also improves faithfulness: on a safety benchmark, our models more transparently surface misleading content in their reasoning traces rather than concealing it. Controlled experiments reveal that the problem and its remedy scale together: premature confidence grows with model size and task difficulty, and so do the gains from addressing it.

Long-horizon LLM agents can fail quietly: they settle on one reading of the evidence early, then spend the rest of the run defending it. We call this premature commitment. Final-answer scoring misses the failure mode because it sees only the answer, not whether the process has already collapsed to a stable path. We define representational commitment as cross-run hidden-state convergence at a fixed reasoning step, and use it as an early diagnostic of trajectory consistency. On Llama-3.1-70B running ReAct on HotpotQA, step-4 hidden-state similarity predicts downstream behavioral consistency (r = -0.35, partial r = -0.45), with a localized temporal and layer-wise signature. The signal replicates across Qwen-2.5-72B and Phi-3-14B, and on StrategyQA (r = -0.83). It does not track correctness: committed-wrong and committed-correct questions are not separable in activation similarity. That boundary is central to the claim. Commitment tells us whether an agent has settled, not whether it is right. A runtime monitor detects inconsistent trajectories from hidden states at AUROC up to 0.97 (0.85--0.88 under a stricter split), and a prompting intervention cuts behavioral variance by 28% against a token-matched control while leaving accuracy statistically unchanged. We also test whether the signal can route self-consistency compute; on a harder benchmark it helps only modestly and is matched by a simpler output-based baseline. The result is a diagnostic for a hidden process failure, with clear limits rather than a general accuracy lever.

Confidence in LLMs is a useful indicator of model uncertainty and answer reliability. Existing work mainly focused on single-turn scenarios, while research on confidence in complex multi-turn interactions is limited. In this paper, we investigate whether LLM-based search agents have the ability to communicate their own confidence through verbalized confidence scores after long sequences of actions, a significantly more challenging task compared to outputting confidence in a single interaction. Experimenting on open-source agentic models, we first find that models exhibit much higher task accuracy at high confidence while having near-zero accuracy when confidence is low. Based on this observation, we propose Test-Time Scaling (TTS) methods that use confidence scores to determine answer quality, encourage the model to try again until reaching a satisfactory confidence level. Results show that our proposed methods significantly reduce token consumption while demonstrating competitive performance compared to baseline fixed budget TTS methods.

Long-horizon interactions require language models to manage accumulating information: when to update their state, when to preserve their state, and what to ignore. We study this challenge as Contextual Belief Management (CBM): maintaining a predicted belief state aligned with formal evidence while isolating task-irrelevant noise. To make CBM measurable, we introduce BeliefTrack, a closed-world benchmark spanning Rule Discovery and Circuit Diagnosis, where a finite belief space and symbolic verifiers enable exact turn-level evaluation. BeliefTrack diagnoses three failures: Failed Stay, Failed Update, and Failed Isolation. Across multiple LLMs, vanilla models exhibit severe CBM failures, while explicit belief-tracking prompts provide limited gains. In contrast, reinforcement learning with belief-state rewards reduces failure rates by 70.9\% on average. Further probing reveals latent belief-state dynamics behind these failures, and representation-level steering reduces failure rates by 46.1\% across two tasks\footnote{Code is coming soon at https://github.com/zjunlp/CBM.

Sign language representation learning presents unique challenges due to the complex spatio-temporal nature of signs and the scarcity of labeled datasets. Existing methods often rely either on models pre-trained on general visual tasks, that lack sign-specific features, or use complex multimodal and multi-branch architectures. To bridge this gap, we introduce a scalable, self-supervised framework for sign representation learning. We leverage important inductive (sign) priors during the training of our RGB model. To do this, we leverage simple but important cues based on skeletons while pretraining a masked autoencoder. These sign specific priors alongside feature regularization and an adversarial style agnostic loss provide a powerful backbone. Notably, our model does not require skeletal keypoints during inference, avoiding the limitations of keypoint-based models during downstream tasks. When finetuned, we achieve state-of-the-art performance for sign recognition on the WLASL, ASL-Citizen and NMFs-CSL datasets, using a simpler architecture and with only a single-modality. Beyond recognition, our frozen model excels in sign dictionary retrieval and sign translation, surpassing standard MAE pretraining and skeletal-based representations in retrieval. It also reduces computational costs for training existing sign translation models while maintaining strong performance on Phoenix2014T, CSL-Daily and How2Sign.

We construct evaluation tasks where extending the reasoning length of Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) deteriorates performance, exhibiting an inverse scaling relationship between test-time compute and accuracy. Our evaluation tasks span four categories: simple counting tasks with distractors, regression tasks with spurious features, deduction tasks with constraint tracking, and advanced AI risks. We identify five distinct failure modes when models reason for longer: 1) Claude models become increasingly distracted by irrelevant information; 2) OpenAI o-series models resist distractors but overfit to problem framings; 3) models shift from reasonable priors to spurious correlations; 4) all models show difficulties in maintaining focus on complex deductive tasks; and 5) extended reasoning may amplify concerning behaviors, with Claude Sonnet 4 showing increased expressions of self-preservation. These findings suggest that while test-time compute scaling remains promising for improving model capabilities, it may inadvertently reinforce problematic reasoning patterns. Our results demonstrate the importance of evaluating models across diverse reasoning lengths to identify and address these failure modes in LRMs.

This study offers a novel approach for benchmarking complex cognitive behavior in artificial systems. Almost universally, Large Language Models (LLMs) perform best on tasks which may be included in their training data and can be accomplished solely using natural language, limiting our understanding of their emergent sophisticated cognitive capacities. In this work, we created dozens of novel items of a classic mental imagery task from cognitive psychology. A task which, traditionally, cognitive psychologists have argued is solvable exclusively via visual mental imagery (i.e., language alone would be insufficient). LLMs are perfect for testing this hypothesis. First, we tested several state-of-the-art LLMs by giving text-only models written instructions and asking them to report the resulting object after performing the transformations in the aforementioned task. Then, we created a baseline by testing 100 human subjects in exactly the same task. We found that the best LLMs performed significantly above average human performance. Finally, we tested reasoning models set to different levels of reasoning and found the strongest performance when models allocate greater amounts of reasoning tokens. These results provide evidence that the best LLMs may have the capability to complete imagery-dependent tasks despite the non-pictorial nature of their architectures. Our study not only demonstrates an emergent cognitive capacity in LLMs while performing a novel task, but it also provides the field with a new task that leaves lots of room for improvement in otherwise already highly capable models. Finally, our findings reignite the debate over the formats of representation of visual imagery in humans, suggesting that propositional reasoning (or at least non-imagistic reasoning) may be sufficient to complete tasks that were long-thought to be imagery-dependent.

Unlearning in large language models (LLMs) is crucial for managing sensitive data and correcting misinformation, yet evaluating its effectiveness remains an open problem. We investigate whether persuasive prompting can recall factual knowledge from deliberately unlearned LLMs across models ranging from 2.7B to 13B parameters (OPT-2.7B, LLaMA-2-7B, LLaMA-3.1-8B, LLaMA-2-13B). Drawing from ACT-R and Hebbian theory (spreading activation theories), as well as communication principles, we introduce Stimulus-Knowledge Entanglement-Behavior Framework (SKeB), which models information entanglement via domain graphs and tests whether factual recall in unlearned models is correlated with persuasive framing. We develop entanglement metrics to quantify knowledge activation patterns and evaluate factuality, non-factuality, and hallucination in outputs. Our results show persuasive prompts substantially enhance factual knowledge recall (14.8% baseline vs. 24.5% with authority framing), with effectiveness inversely correlated to model size (128% recovery in 2.7B vs. 15% in 13B). SKeB provides a foundation for assessing unlearning completeness, robustness, and overall behavior in LLMs.

While Large Language Model (LLM) agents are often approached from the angle of action planning/generation to accomplish a goal (e.g., given by language descriptions), their abilities to collaborate with each other to achieve a joint goal are not well explored. To address this limitation, this paper studies LLM agents in task collaboration, particularly under the condition of information asymmetry, where agents have disparities in their knowledge and skills and need to work together to complete a shared task. We extend Einstein Puzzles, a classical symbolic puzzle, to a table-top game. In this game, two LLM agents must reason, communicate, and act to satisfy spatial and relational constraints required to solve the puzzle. We apply a fine-tuning-plus-verifier framework in which LLM agents are equipped with various communication strategies and verification signals from the environment. Empirical results highlight the critical importance of aligned communication, especially when agents possess both information-seeking and -providing capabilities. Interestingly, agents without communication can still achieve high task performance; however, further analysis reveals a lack of true rule understanding and lower trust from human evaluators. Instead, by integrating an environment-based verifier, we enhance agents' ability to comprehend task rules and complete tasks, promoting both safer and more interpretable collaboration in AI systems. https://github.com/Roihn/EinsteinPuzzles

Active inference offers a first principle account of sentient behaviour, from which special and important cases can be derived, e.g., reinforcement learning, active learning, Bayes optimal inference, Bayes optimal design, etc. Active inference resolves the exploitation-exploration dilemma in relation to prior preferences, by placing information gain on the same footing as reward or value. In brief, active inference replaces value functions with functionals of (Bayesian) beliefs, in the form of an expected (variational) free energy. In this paper, we consider a sophisticated kind of active inference, using a recursive form of expected free energy. Sophistication describes the degree to which an agent has beliefs about beliefs. We consider agents with beliefs about the counterfactual consequences of action for states of affairs and beliefs about those latent states. In other words, we move from simply considering beliefs about 'what would happen if I did that' to 'what would I believe about what would happen if I did that'. The recursive form of the free energy functional effectively implements a deep tree search over actions and outcomes in the future. Crucially, this search is over sequences of belief states, as opposed to states per se. We illustrate the competence of this scheme, using numerical simulations of deep decision problems.

Continuous Sign Language Recognition (CSLR) faces multiple challenges, including significant inter-signer variability and poor generalization to novel sentence structures. Traditional solutions frequently fail to handle these issues efficiently. For overcoming these constraints, we propose a dual-architecture framework. For the Signer-Independent (SI) challenge, we propose a Signer-Invariant Conformer that combines convolutions with multi-head self-attention to learn robust, signer-agnostic representations from pose-based skeletal keypoints. For the Unseen-Sentences (US) task, we designed a Multi-Scale Fusion Transformer with a novel dual-path temporal encoder that captures both fine-grained posture dynamics, enabling the model's ability to comprehend novel grammatical compositions. Experiments on the challenging Isharah-1000 dataset establish a new standard for both CSLR benchmarks. The proposed conformer architecture achieves a Word Error Rate (WER) of 13.07% on the SI challenge, a reduction of 13.53% from the state-of-the-art. On the US task, the transformer model scores a WER of 47.78%, surpassing previous work. In the SignEval 2025 CSLR challenge, our team placed 2nd in the US task and 4th in the SI task, demonstrating the performance of these models. The findings validate our key hypothesis: that developing task-specific networks designed for the particular challenges of CSLR leads to considerable performance improvements and establishes a new baseline for further research. The source code is available at: https://github.com/rezwanh001/MSLR-Pose86K-CSLR-Isharah.

Modern AI agents increasingly combine conversational interaction with autonomous task execution, such as coding and web research, raising a natural question: what happens when an agent engaged in long-horizon tasks is subjected to user persuasion? We study how belief-level intervention can influence downstream task behavior, a phenomenon we name persuasion propagation. We introduce a behavior-centered evaluation framework that distinguishes between persuasion applied during or prior to task execution. Across web research and coding tasks, we find that on-the-fly persuasion induces weak and inconsistent behavioral effects. In contrast, when the belief state is explicitly specified at task time, belief-prefilled agents conduct on average 26.9\% fewer searches and visit 16.9\% fewer unique sources than neutral-prefilled agents. These results suggest that persuasion, even in prior interaction, can affect the agent's behavior, motivating behavior-level evaluation in agentic systems.

Metacognitive knowledge refers to humans' intuitive knowledge of their own thinking and reasoning processes. Today's best LLMs clearly possess some reasoning processes. The paper gives evidence that they also have metacognitive knowledge, including ability to name skills and procedures to apply given a task. We explore this primarily in context of math reasoning, developing a prompt-guided interaction procedure to get a powerful LLM to assign sensible skill labels to math questions, followed by having it perform semantic clustering to obtain coarser families of skill labels. These coarse skill labels look interpretable to humans. To validate that these skill labels are meaningful and relevant to the LLM's reasoning processes we perform the following experiments. (a) We ask GPT-4 to assign skill labels to training questions in math datasets GSM8K and MATH. (b) When using an LLM to solve the test questions, we present it with the full list of skill labels and ask it to identify the skill needed. Then it is presented with randomly selected exemplar solved questions associated with that skill label. This improves accuracy on GSM8k and MATH for several strong LLMs, including code-assisted models. The methodology presented is domain-agnostic, even though this article applies it to math problems.

Reasoning has become a central paradigm for large language models (LLMs), consistently boosting accuracy across diverse benchmarks. Yet its suitability for precision-sensitive tasks remains unclear. We present the first systematic study of reasoning for classification tasks under strict low false positive rate (FPR) regimes. Our analysis covers two tasks--safety detection and hallucination detection--evaluated in both fine-tuned and zero-shot settings, using standard LLMs and Large Reasoning Models (LRMs). Our results reveal a clear trade-off: Think On (reasoning-augmented) generation improves overall accuracy, but underperforms at the low-FPR thresholds essential for practical use. In contrast, Think Off (no reasoning during inference) dominates in these precision-sensitive regimes, with Think On surpassing only when higher FPRs are acceptable. In addition, we find token-based scoring substantially outperforms self-verbalized confidence for precision-sensitive deployments. Finally, a simple ensemble of the two modes recovers the strengths of each. Taken together, our findings position reasoning as a double-edged tool: beneficial for average accuracy, but often ill-suited for applications requiring strict precision.

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) have transformed tasks requiring visual and reasoning abilities, such as image retrieval and Visual Question Answering (VQA). Despite their success, VLMs face significant challenges with tasks involving geometric reasoning, algebraic problem-solving, and counting. These limitations stem from difficulties effectively integrating multiple modalities and accurately interpreting geometry-related tasks. Various works claim that introducing a captioning pipeline before VQA tasks enhances performance. We incorporated this pipeline for tasks involving geometry, algebra, and counting. We found that captioning results are not generalizable, specifically with larger VLMs primarily trained on downstream QnA tasks showing random performance on math-related challenges. However, we present a promising alternative: task-based prompting, enriching the prompt with task-specific guidance. This approach shows promise and proves more effective than direct captioning methods for math-heavy problems.

A critical component in the trustworthiness of LLMs is reliable uncertainty communication, yet LLMs often use assertive language when conveying false claims, leading to over-reliance and eroded trust. We present the first systematic study of faithful confidence calibration of LLMs, benchmarking models' ability to use linguistic expressions of uncertainty that faithfully reflect their intrinsic uncertainty, across a comprehensive array of models, datasets, and prompting strategies. Our results demonstrate that LLMs largely fail at this task, and that existing interventions are insufficient: standard prompt approaches provide only marginal gains, and existing, factuality-based calibration techniques can even harm faithful calibration. To address this critical gap, we introduce MetaFaith, a novel prompt-based calibration approach inspired by human metacognition. We show that MetaFaith robustly improves faithful calibration across diverse models and task domains, enabling up to 61% improvement in faithfulness and achieving an 83% win rate over original generations as judged by humans.

Vision-language models (VLMs) are increasingly deployed in high-stakes settings where reliable uncertainty quantification (UQ) is as important as predictive accuracy. Extended reasoning via chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting or reasoning-trained models has become ubiquitous in modern VLM pipelines, yet its effect on UQ reliability remains poorly understood. We show that reasoning consistently degrades the quality of most uncertainty estimates, even when it improves task accuracy. We identify implicit answer conditioning as the primary mechanism: as reasoning traces converge on a conclusion before the final answer is generated, token probabilities increasingly reflect consistency with the model's own reasoning trace rather than uncertainty about correctness. In effect, the model becomes overconfident in its answer. In contrast, agreement-based consistency remains robust and often improves under reasoning, making it a practical choice for uncertainty estimation in reasoning-enabled VLMs.

Recently, with the chain of thought (CoT) prompting, large language models (LLMs), e.g., GPT-3, have shown strong reasoning ability in several natural language processing tasks such as arithmetic, commonsense, and logical reasoning. However, LLMs with CoT require multi-step prompting and multi-token prediction, which is highly sensitive to individual mistakes and vulnerable to error accumulation. The above issues make the LLMs need the ability to verify the answers. In fact, after inferring conclusions in some thinking decision tasks, people often check them by re-verifying steps to avoid some mistakes. In this paper, we propose and prove that LLMs also have similar self-verification abilities. We take the conclusion obtained by CoT as one of the conditions for solving the original problem. By taking turns masking the original conditions and predicting their results, we calculate an explainable answer verification score based on whether the re-predicted conditions are correct. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed method can improve the reasoning performance on various arithmetic, commonsense, and logical reasoning datasets. Our code is publicly available at: https://github.com/WENGSYX/Self-Verification.

Spatial intelligence unfolds through a perception-action loop: agents act to acquire observations, and reason about how observations vary as a function of action. Rather than passively processing what is seen, they actively uncover what is unseen - occluded structure, dynamics, containment, and functionality that cannot be resolved from passive sensing alone. We move beyond prior formulations of spatial intelligence that assume oracle observations by recasting the observer as an actor. We introduce ESI-BENCH, a comprehensive benchmark for embodied spatial intelligence spanning 10 task categories and 29 subcategories built on OmniGibson, grounded in Spelke's core knowledge systems. Agents must decide what abilities to deploy - perception, locomotion, and manipulation - and how to sequence them to actively accumulate task-relevant evidence. We conduct extensive experiments on state-of-the-art MLLMs and find that active exploration substantially outperforms passive counterparts, with agents spontaneously discovering emergent spatial strategies without explicit instructions, while random multi-view often adds noise rather than signal despite consuming far more images. Most failures stem not from weak perception but from action blindness: poor action choices lead to poor observations, which in turn drive cascading errors. While explicit 3D grounding stabilizes reasoning on depth-sensitive tasks, imperfect 3D representation proves more harmful than 2D baselines by distorting spatial relations. Human studies further reveal that unlike humans who seek falsifying viewpoints and revise beliefs under contradiction, models commit prematurely with high confidence regardless of evidence quality, exposing a metacognitive gap that neither better perception nor more embodied interaction alone can close.

Mathematical reasoning is regarded as a necessary ability for Language Models (LMs). Recent works demonstrate large LMs' impressive performance in solving math problems. The success is attributed to their Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning abilities, i.e., the ability to decompose complex questions into step-by-step reasoning chains, but such ability seems only to emerge from models with abundant parameters. This work investigates how to incorporate relatively small LMs with the capabilities of multi-step reasoning. We propose to inject such abilities by continually pre-training LMs on a synthetic dataset MsAT which is composed of Multi-step Arithmetic Tasks. Our experiments on four math word problem datasets show the effectiveness of the proposed method in enhancing LMs' math reasoning abilities.

Advances in training, post-training, and inference-time methods have enabled frontier reasoning models to win gold medals in math competitions and settle challenging open problems. Gaining trust in the responses of these models requires that natural language proofs be checked for errors. LLM judges are increasingly being adopted to meet the growing demand for evaluating such proofs. While verification is considered easier than generation, what model capability does reliable verification actually require? We systematically evaluate four open-source and two frontier LLMs on datasets of human-graded natural language proofs of competition-level problems. We consider two key metrics: verifier accuracy and self-consistency (the rate of agreement across repeated judgments on the same proof). We observe that smaller open-source models are only up to ~10% behind frontier models in accuracy but they are up to ~25% more inconsistent. Furthermore, we see that verifier accuracy is sensitive to prompt choice across all models. We then demonstrate that the smaller models, in fact, do possess the mathematical capabilities to verify proofs at the level of frontier models, but they struggle to reliably elicit these capabilities with general judging prompts. Through an LLM-guided prompt search, we synthesize an ensemble of specialized prompts that overcome the specific failure modes of smaller models, boosting their performance by up to 9.1% in accuracy and 15.9% in self-consistency. These gains are realized across models and datasets, allowing models like Qwen3.5-35B to perform on par with frontier models such as Gemini 3.1 Pro for proof verification.

Interestingly, LLMs yet struggle with some basic tasks that humans find trivial to handle, e.g., counting the number of character r's in the word "strawberry". There are several popular conjectures (e.g., tokenization, architecture and training data) regarding the reason for deficiency of LLMs in simple word-based counting problems, sharing the similar belief that such failure stems from model pretraining hence probably inevitable during deployment. In this paper, we carefully design multiple evaluation settings to investigate validity of prevalent conjectures. Meanwhile, we measure transferability of advanced mathematical and coding reasoning capabilities from specialized LLMs to simple counting tasks. Although specialized LLMs suffer from counting problems as well, we find conjectures about inherent deficiency of LLMs invalid and further seek opportunities to elicit knowledge and capabilities from LLMs that are beneficial to counting tasks. Compared with strategies such as finetuning and in-context learning that are commonly adopted to enhance performance on new or challenging tasks, we show that engaging reasoning is the most robust and efficient way to help LLMs better perceive tasks with more accurate responses. We hope our conjecture validation design could provide insights into the study of future critical failure modes of LLMs. Based on challenges in transferring advanced capabilities to much simpler tasks, we call for more attention to model capability acquisition and evaluation. We also highlight the importance of cultivating consciousness of "reasoning before responding" during model pretraining.

Chain-of-Thought(CoT) prompting and its variants explore equipping large language models (LLMs) with high-level reasoning abilities by emulating human-like linear cognition and logic. However, the human mind is complicated and mixed with both linear and nonlinear thinking. In this work, we propose Inferential Exclusion Prompting (IEP), a novel prompting that combines the principles of elimination and inference in order to guide LLMs to think non-linearly. IEP guides LLMs to plan and then utilize Natural Language Inference (NLI) to deduce each possible solution's entailment relation with context, commonsense, or facts, therefore yielding a broader perspective by thinking back for inferring. This forward planning and backward eliminating process allows IEP to better simulate the complex human thinking processes compared to other CoT-based methods, which only reflect linear cognitive processes. We conducted a series of empirical studies and have corroborated that IEP consistently outperforms CoT across various tasks. Additionally, we observe that integrating IEP and CoT further improves the LLMs' performance on certain tasks, highlighting the necessity of equipping LLMs with mixed logic processes. Moreover, to better evaluate comprehensive features inherent in human logic, we introduce Mental-Ability Reasoning Benchmark (MARB). The benchmark comprises six novel subtasks with a total of 9,115 questions, among which 1,685 are developed with hand-crafted rationale references. We believe both IEP and MARB can serve as a promising direction for unveiling LLMs' logic and verbal reasoning abilities and drive further advancements. MARB will be available at ~anonymity link soon.

Knowledge editing techniques promise to implant new factual knowledge into large language models (LLMs). But do LLMs really believe these facts? We develop a framework to measure belief depth and use it to evaluate the success of knowledge editing techniques. We operationalize belief depth as the extent to which implanted knowledge 1) generalizes to related contexts (e.g. Fermi estimates several logical steps removed), 2) is robust to self-scrutiny and direct challenge, and 3) is represented similarly to genuine knowledge (as measured by linear probes). Our evaluations show that simple prompting and mechanistic editing techniques fail to implant knowledge deeply. In contrast, Synthetic Document Finetuning (SDF) - where models are trained on LLM-generated documents consistent with a fact - often succeeds at implanting beliefs that behave similarly to genuine knowledge. However, SDF's success is not universal, as implanted beliefs that contradict basic world knowledge are brittle and representationally distinct from genuine knowledge. Overall, our work introduces measurable criteria for belief depth and enables the rigorous evaluation necessary for deploying knowledge editing in real-world applications.

We introduce SignBank+, a clean version of the SignBank dataset, optimized for machine translation between spoken language text and SignWriting, a phonetic sign language writing system. In addition to previous work that employs complex factorization techniques to enable translation between text and SignWriting, we show that a traditional text-to-text translation approach performs equally effectively on the cleaned SignBank+ dataset. Our evaluation results indicate that models trained on SignBank+ surpass those on the original dataset, establishing a new benchmark for SignWriting-based sign language translation and providing an open resource for future research.

Hallucination, where models generate fluent text unsupported by visual evidence, remains a major flaw in vision-language models and is particularly critical in sign language translation (SLT). In SLT, meaning depends on precise grounding in video, and gloss-free models are especially vulnerable because they map continuous signer movements directly into natural language without intermediate gloss supervision that serves as alignment. We argue that hallucinations arise when models rely on language priors rather than visual input. To capture this, we propose a token-level reliability measure that quantifies how much the decoder uses visual information. Our method combines feature-based sensitivity, which measures internal changes when video is masked, with counterfactual signals, which capture probability differences between clean and altered video inputs. These signals are aggregated into a sentence-level reliability score, providing a compact and interpretable measure of visual grounding. We evaluate the proposed measure on two SLT benchmarks (PHOENIX-2014T and CSL-Daily) with both gloss-based and gloss-free models. Our results show that reliability predicts hallucination rates, generalizes across datasets and architectures, and decreases under visual degradations. Beyond these quantitative trends, we also find that reliability distinguishes grounded tokens from guessed ones, allowing risk estimation without references; when combined with text-based signals (confidence, perplexity, or entropy), it further improves hallucination risk estimation. Qualitative analysis highlights why gloss-free models are more susceptible to hallucinations. Taken together, our findings establish reliability as a practical and reusable tool for diagnosing hallucinations in SLT, and lay the groundwork for more robust hallucination detection in multimodal generation.

Large Vision-Language Models (VLMs) often exhibit text inertia, where attention drifts from visual evidence toward linguistic priors, resulting in object hallucinations. Existing decoding strategies intervene only at the output logits and thus cannot correct internal reasoning drift, while recent internal-control methods based on heuristic head suppression or global steering vectors lack principled grounding. We introduce Conscious Gaze (CG-VLM), a training-free, inference-time framework that converts game-theoretic interpretability into actionable decoding control. A Cognitive Demand Sensor built on Harsanyi interactions estimates instantaneous vision-text synergy and identifies moments when visual grounding is necessary. Conditioned on this signal, a Focused Consensus Induction module selectively reorients mid-layer attention toward visual tokens before collapse into text priors. CG-VLM achieves state-of-the-art results on POPE and CHAIR across InstructBLIP, LLaVA, Qwen-VL, and mPLUG, while preserving general capabilities, demonstrating that token-level sensing enables precise, context-aware intervention without compromising foundational knowledge.

Recent advances in vision-language models (VLMs) emphasize long chain-of-thought reasoning; yet, we find that their performance on visual tasks is primarily limited by a lack of visual perception as opposed to reasoning itself. In this work, we systematically study the interplay between perception and reasoning in VLM post-training by decomposing their capabilities into three separate training stages: visual perception, visual reasoning, and textual reasoning, incorporating specialized training data. We demonstrate that visual perception (a) requires targeted optimization with specialized data; (b) serves as a fundamental scaffold that should be solidified through staged training before refining visual reasoning; and (c) is more effectively learned via RL than caption-based SFT. Our experiments across multiple VLMs demonstrate that staged training consistently improves both visual perception and reasoning performance over merged training. Notably, models trained with our approach achieve 1.5% higher reasoning accuracy with 20.8% shorter reasoning traces, suggesting that superior perception reduces the need for excessive reasoning. Furthermore, we show that this capability-based staging represents a new curriculum dimension orthogonal to traditional difficulty-based curricula, and combining both yields further additive gains. Our staged-training models achieve superior performance among open-weight VLMs, establishing advanced results on several visual math and perception (e.g., +5.2% on WeMath and +3.7% on RealWorldQA) tasks compared with the base counterpart.

Beliefs serve as the foundation for human cognition and decision-making. They guide individuals in deriving meaning from their lives, shaping their behaviors, and forming social connections. Therefore, a model that encapsulates beliefs and their interrelationships is crucial for quantitatively studying the influence of beliefs on our actions. Despite its importance, research on the interplay between human beliefs has often been limited to a small set of beliefs pertaining to specific issues, with a heavy reliance on surveys or experiments. Here, we propose a method for extracting nuanced relations between thousands of beliefs by leveraging large-scale user participation data from an online debate platform and mapping these beliefs to an embedding space using a fine-tuned large language model (LLM). This belief embedding space effectively encapsulates the interconnectedness of diverse beliefs as well as polarization across various social issues. We discover that the positions within this belief space predict new beliefs of individuals. Furthermore, we find that the relative distance between one's existing beliefs and new beliefs can serve as a quantitative estimate of cognitive dissonance, allowing us to predict new beliefs. Our study highlights how modern LLMs, when combined with collective online records of human beliefs, can offer insights into the fundamental principles that govern human belief formation and decision-making processes.

Highly capable AI systems could secretly pursue misaligned goals -- what we call "scheming". Because a scheming AI would deliberately try to hide its misaligned goals and actions, measuring and mitigating scheming requires different strategies than are typically used in ML. We propose that assessing anti-scheming interventions requires at least (1) testing propensity to scheme on far out-of-distribution (OOD) tasks, (2) evaluating whether lack of scheming is driven by situational awareness, and (3) checking for robustness to pre-existing misaligned goals. We use a broad category of "covert actions" -- such as secretly breaking rules or intentionally underperforming in tests -- as a proxy for scheming, and design evaluations for covert actions. We then stress-test deliberative alignment as a case study for anti-scheming. Across 26 OOD evaluations (180+ environments), deliberative alignment reduces covert action rates (OpenAI o3: 13%->0.4%) but does not fully eliminate them. Our mitigation is also able to largely stop agents from pursuing a hidden goal previously trained into the model, but we still find misbehavior after additional red-teaming. We find that models' chain-of-thought (CoT) often demonstrates awareness of being evaluated for alignment, and show causal evidence that this awareness decreases covert behavior, while unawareness increases it. Therefore, we cannot exclude that the observed reductions in covert action rates are at least partially driven by situational awareness. While we rely on human-legible CoT for training, studying situational awareness, and demonstrating clear evidence of misalignment, our ability to rely on this degrades as models continue to depart from reasoning in standard English. We encourage research into alignment mitigations for scheming and their assessment, especially for the adversarial case of deceptive alignment, which this paper does not address.

One promising use case of AI assistants is to help with complex procedures like cooking, home repair, and assembly tasks. Can we teach the assistant to interject after the user makes a mistake? This paper targets the problem of identifying ordering mistakes in assembly procedures. We propose a system that can detect ordering mistakes by utilizing a learned knowledge base. Our framework constructs a knowledge base with spatial and temporal beliefs based on observed mistakes. Spatial beliefs depict the topological relationship of the assembling components, while temporal beliefs aggregate prerequisite actions as ordering constraints. With an episodic memory design, our algorithm can dynamically update and construct the belief sets as more actions are observed, all in an online fashion. We demonstrate experimentally that our inferred spatial and temporal beliefs are capable of identifying incorrect orderings in real-world action sequences. To construct the spatial beliefs, we collect a new set of coarse-level action annotations for Assembly101 based on the positioning of the toy parts. Finally, we demonstrate the superior performance of our belief inference algorithm in detecting ordering mistakes on the Assembly101 dataset.

When a language model agrees with a user's false belief, is it failing to detect the error, or noticing and agreeing anyway? We show the latter. Across twelve open-weight models from five labs, spanning small to frontier scale, the same small set of attention heads carries a "this statement is wrong" signal whether the model is evaluating a claim on its own or being pressured to agree with a user. Silencing these heads flips sycophantic behavior sharply while leaving factual accuracy intact, so the circuit controls deference rather than knowledge. Edge-level path patching confirms that the same head-to-head connections drive sycophancy, factual lying, and instructed lying. Opinion-agreement, where no factual ground truth exists, reuses these head positions but writes into an orthogonal direction, ruling out a simple "truth-direction" reading of the substrate. Alignment training leaves this circuit in place: an RLHF refresh cuts sycophantic behavior roughly tenfold while the shared heads persist or grow, a pattern that replicates on an independent model family and under targeted anti-sycophancy DPO. When these models sycophant, they register that the user is wrong and agree anyway.

There has been a surge of interest in assistive wearable agents: agents embodied in wearable form factors (e.g., smart glasses) who take assistive actions toward a user's goal/query (e.g. "Where did I leave my keys?"). In this work, we consider the important complementary problem of inferring that goal from multi-modal contextual observations. Solving this "goal inference" problem holds the promise of eliminating the effort needed to interact with such an agent. This work focuses on creating WAGIBench, a strong benchmark to measure progress in solving this problem using vision-language models (VLMs). Given the limited prior work in this area, we collected a novel dataset comprising 29 hours of multimodal data from 348 participants across 3,477 recordings, featuring ground-truth goals alongside accompanying visual, audio, digital, and longitudinal contextual observations. We validate that human performance exceeds model performance, achieving 93% multiple-choice accuracy compared with 84% for the best-performing VLM. Generative benchmark results that evaluate several families of modern vision-language models show that larger models perform significantly better on the task, yet remain far from practical usefulness, as they produce relevant goals only 55% of the time. Through a modality ablation, we show that models benefit from extra information in relevant modalities with minimal performance degradation from irrelevant modalities.

Active reasoning requires large language model (LLM) agents to interact with external sources and strategically gather information to solve problems in multiple turns. Central to this process is belief tracking: maintaining an accurate representation of the underlying state and uncertainty in understanding and solving the problem. However, due to limited reasoning capabilities, LLM-based agents often suffer belief deviation: their internal beliefs drift from the true problem state, leading to loss of state awareness and uninformative or repetitive actions. Once this happens, errors compound in the trajectories used for reinforcement learning (RL), leading to misattributed credits and limited exploration. To address this issue, we propose to track belief deviation and develop T^3, a simple yet principled method that detects excessive deviation and truncates training trajectories to suppress uninformative tail effects. Hence, T^3 preserves credits for informative prefixes and systematically improves policy optimization. Across 5 challenging tasks, T^3 consistently enhances training stability and yields performance gains of up to 30 points while cutting token cost by up to 34%. These results highlight belief control as a key principle for building robust LLM agents capable of active reasoning.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) via prompting is the de facto method for eliciting reasoning capabilities from large language models (LLMs). But for what kinds of tasks is this extra ``thinking'' really helpful? To analyze this, we conducted a quantitative meta-analysis covering over 100 papers using CoT and ran our own evaluations of 20 datasets across 14 models. Our results show that CoT gives strong performance benefits primarily on tasks involving math or logic, with much smaller gains on other types of tasks. On MMLU, directly generating the answer without CoT leads to almost identical accuracy as CoT unless the question or model's response contains an equals sign, indicating symbolic operations and reasoning. Following this finding, we analyze the behavior of CoT on these problems by separating planning and execution and comparing against tool-augmented LLMs. Much of CoT's gain comes from improving symbolic execution, but it underperforms relative to using a symbolic solver. Our results indicate that CoT can be applied selectively, maintaining performance while saving inference costs. Furthermore, they suggest a need to move beyond prompt-based CoT to new paradigms that better leverage intermediate computation across the whole range of LLM applications.

The ability (and inability) of large language models (LLMs) to perform arithmetic tasks has been the subject of much theoretical and practical debate. We show that LLMs are frequently able to correctly and confidently predict the first digit of n-digit by m-digit multiplication tasks without using chain of thought reasoning, despite these tasks require compounding operations to solve. Simultaneously, LLMs in practice often fail to correctly or confidently predict the last digit of an n-digit by m-digit multiplication, a task equivalent to 1-digit by 1-digit multiplication which can be easily learned or memorized. We show that the latter task can be solved more robustly when the LLM is conditioned on all of the correct higher-order digits, which on average increases the confidence of the correct last digit on 5-digit by 5-digit multiplication tasks using Llama 2-13B by over 230% (0.13 to 0.43) and Mistral-7B by 150% (0.22 to 0.55).

Task arithmetic provides an efficient, training-free way to edit pre-trained models, yet lacks a fundamental theoretical explanation for its success. The existing concept of ``weight disentanglement" describes the ideal outcome of non-interfering task composition but does not reveal its underlying cause. Crucially, what intrinsic properties of the pre-trained model (θ_0) or the task vectors (τ_t) enable this disentanglement remains underexplored. In this paper, we introduce Task-Feature Specialization (TFS), a model's ability to allocate distinct internal features to different tasks, as the fundamental principle. We first prove that TFS is a sufficient condition for weight disentanglement. More importantly, we find that TFS also gives rise to an observable geometric consequence: weight vector orthogonality. This positions TFS as the common cause for both the desired functional outcome (disentanglement) and a measurable geometric property (orthogonality). This relationship provides the key insight for our method: since the abstract TFS property is intractable to enforce directly, we can instead promote weight disentanglement by shaping its concrete geometric consequence, orthogonality. Therefore, we propose OrthoReg, a simple and effective regularization method that actively enforces an internal orthogonal structure on weight updates (ΔW) that constitute τ_t during fine-tuning. And we theoretically prove that OrthoReg promotes disentanglement. Extensive experiments demonstrate that OrthoReg consistently and significantly enhances the performance of various task arithmetic methods. Code is available at https://github.com/RL-MIND/OrthoReg{https://github.com/RL-MIND/OrthoReg}.

Strategic dialogue requires agents to execute distinct dialogue acts, for which belief estimation is essential. While prior work often estimates beliefs accurately, it lacks a principled mechanism to use those beliefs during generation. We bridge this gap by first formalizing two core acts Adversarial and Alignment, and by operationalizing them via probabilistic constraints on what an agent may generate. We instantiate this idea in BEDA, a framework that consists of the world set, the belief estimator for belief estimation, and the conditional generator that selects acts and realizes utterances consistent with the inferred beliefs. Across three settings, Conditional Keeper Burglar (CKBG, adversarial), Mutual Friends (MF, cooperative), and CaSiNo (negotiation), BEDA consistently outperforms strong baselines: on CKBG it improves success rate by at least 5.0 points across backbones and by 20.6 points with GPT-4.1-nano; on Mutual Friends it achieves an average improvement of 9.3 points; and on CaSiNo it achieves the optimal deal relative to all baselines. These results indicate that casting belief estimation as constraints provides a simple, general mechanism for reliable strategic dialogue.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) is a standard approach for eliciting reasoning capabilities from large language models (LLMs). However, the common CoT paradigm treats thinking as a prerequisite for answering, which can delay access to plausible answers and incur unnecessary token costs even when the model is able to identify an answer before extended thinking, a behavior known as performative reasoning. In this paper, we introduce CopT, a reformulated reasoning pipeline that reverses the usual order of thinking and answering. Instead of thinking before answering, CopT first elicits a draft answer and then invokes subsequent on-policy thinking conditioned on its own draft answer for reflection and correction. To assess whether the draft answer should be trusted, CopT recasts continuous embeddings as inference-time contrastive verifiers. Specifically, it contrasts the model's support for the same generated tokens under discrete-token inputs and continuous-embedding inputs, yielding a sequence-level reverse KL estimator for answer reliability. Our analysis shows that under certain assumptions, the expected estimate equals the mutual information between the unresolved latent state and the emitted answer token, explaining why it captures answer-relevant uncertainty rather than arbitrary uncertainty in the latent state. When the answer is deemed insufficiently reliable, CopT performs further on-policy thinking, where a second KL estimator dynamically controls draft-answer visibility, preserving useful partial information while reducing the risk of being misled by unreliable content. Across mathematics, coding, and agentic reasoning tasks, CopT improves peak accuracy by up to 23% and reduces token usage by up to 57% at comparable or higher accuracy, without any additional training. The code is available at https://github.com/sdc17/CopT.

Sign-based optimization algorithms, such as SignSGD, have garnered significant attention for their remarkable performance in distributed learning and training large foundation models. Despite their empirical superiority, SignSGD is known to diverge on non-smooth objectives, which are ubiquitous in modern machine learning due to ReLUs, max-pools, and mixture-of-experts. To overcome this fundamental limitation, we propose StoSignSGD, an algorithm that injects structural stochasticity into the sign operator while maintaining an unbiased update step. In the regime of (online) convex optimization, our theoretical analysis shows that StoSignSGD rigorously resolves the non-convergence issues of SignSGD, achieving a sharp convergence rate matching the lower bound. For the more challenging non-convex non-smooth optimization, we introduce generalized stationary measures that encompass prior definitions, proving that StoSignSGD improves upon the best-known complexity bounds by dimensional factors. Empirically, StoSignSGD exhibits robust stability and superior efficiency across diverse large language model (LLM) training regimes. Notably, in low-precision FP8 pretraining -- a setting where AdamW fails catastrophically -- StoSignSGD remains highly stable and yields a remarkable 1.44times to 2.14times speedup relative to established baselines. Furthermore, when fine-tuning 7B LLMs on mathematical reasoning tasks, StoSignSGD delivers substantial performance gains over both AdamW and SignSGD. Finally, to dissect the mechanisms driving its success, we develop a sign conversion framework capable of transforming any general optimizer into its unbiased, sign-based counterpart. Utilizing this framework, we deconstruct the core components of StoSignSGD and present a comprehensive ablation study to empirically validate our algorithmic design choices.

Changing how pre-trained models behave -- e.g., improving their performance on a downstream task or mitigating biases learned during pre-training -- is a common practice when developing machine learning systems. In this work, we propose a new paradigm for steering the behavior of neural networks, centered around task vectors. A task vector specifies a direction in the weight space of a pre-trained model, such that movement in that direction improves performance on the task. We build task vectors by subtracting the weights of a pre-trained model from the weights of the same model after fine-tuning on a task. We show that these task vectors can be modified and combined together through arithmetic operations such as negation and addition, and the behavior of the resulting model is steered accordingly. Negating a task vector decreases performance on the target task, with little change in model behavior on control tasks. Moreover, adding task vectors together can improve performance on multiple tasks at once. Finally, when tasks are linked by an analogy relationship of the form ``A is to B as C is to D", combining task vectors from three of the tasks can improve performance on the fourth, even when no data from the fourth task is used for training. Overall, our experiments with several models, modalities and tasks show that task arithmetic is a simple, efficient and effective way of editing models.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed on long-horizon tasks in partially observable environments, where they must act while inferring and tracking a complex environment state over many steps. This leads to two challenges: partial observability requires maintaining uncertainty over unobserved world attributes, and long interaction history causes context to grow without bound, diluting task-relevant information. A principled solution to both challenges is a belief state: a posterior distribution over environment states given past observations and actions, which compactly encodes history for decision making regardless of episode length. In LLM agents, however, the open-ended nature of text makes it unclear how to represent such a distribution. Therefore, we introduce Agent-BRACE: Agent Belief state Representation via Abstraction and Confidence Estimation, a method that decouples an LLM agent into a belief state model and a policy model, jointly optimized via reinforcement learning. The belief state model produces a structured approximation of the belief distribution: a set of atomic natural language claims about the environment, each annotated with an ordinal verbalized certainty label ranging from certain to unknown. The policy model conditions on this compact, structured approximate belief rather than the full history, learning to select actions under explicit uncertainty. Across long-horizon, partially observable embodied language environments, Agent-BRACE achieves an average absolute improvement of +14.5% (Qwen2.5-3B-Instruct) and +5.3% (Qwen3-4B-Instruct), outperforming strong RL baselines while maintaining a near-constant context window independent of episode length. Further analysis shows that the learned belief becomes increasingly calibrated over the course of an episode as evidence accumulates.

One long-term goal of machine learning research is to produce methods that are applicable to reasoning and natural language, in particular building an intelligent dialogue agent. To measure progress towards that goal, we argue for the usefulness of a set of proxy tasks that evaluate reading comprehension via question answering. Our tasks measure understanding in several ways: whether a system is able to answer questions via chaining facts, simple induction, deduction and many more. The tasks are designed to be prerequisites for any system that aims to be capable of conversing with a human. We believe many existing learning systems can currently not solve them, and hence our aim is to classify these tasks into skill sets, so that researchers can identify (and then rectify) the failings of their systems. We also extend and improve the recently introduced Memory Networks model, and show it is able to solve some, but not all, of the tasks.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive problem-solving capabilities in mathematics through step-by-step reasoning chains. However, they are susceptible to reasoning errors that impact the quality of subsequent reasoning chains and the final answer due to language models' autoregressive token-by-token generating nature. Recent works have proposed adopting external verifiers to guide the generation of reasoning paths, but existing works utilize models that have been trained with step-by-step labels to assess the correctness of token-by-token reasoning chains. Consequently, they struggle to recognize discriminative details of tokens within a reasoning path and lack the ability to evaluate whether an intermediate reasoning path is on a promising track toward the correct final answer. To amend the lack of sound and token-grained math-verification signals, we devise a novel training scheme for verifiers that apply token-level supervision with the expected cumulative reward (i.e., value). Furthermore, we propose a practical formulation of the cumulative reward by reducing it to finding the probability of future correctness of the final answer and thereby enabling the empirical estimation of the value. Experimental results on mathematical reasoning benchmarks show that Token-Supervised Value Model (TVM) can outperform step-by-step verifiers on GSM8K and MATH with Mistral and Llama.

While prior work has explored whether large language models (LLMs) possess a "theory of mind" (ToM) - the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others - there has been little work testing whether LLMs can implicitly apply such knowledge to predict behavior, or to judge whether an observed behavior is rational. Such skills are critical for appropriate interaction in social environments. We create a new dataset, SimpleTom, containing concise, diverse stories (e.g., "The can of Pringles has moldy chips in it. Mary picks up the can in the supermarket and walks to the cashier."), each with three questions that test different degrees of ToM reasoning, asking models to predict (a) mental state ("Is Mary aware of the mold?"), (b) behavior ("Will Mary pay for the chips or report the mold?"), and (c) judgment ("Mary paid for the chips. Was that reasonable?"). To our knowledge, SimpleToM is the first dataset to systematically explore downstream reasoning requiring knowledge of mental states in realistic scenarios. Our experimental results are intriguing: While most models can reliably predict mental state on our dataset (a), they often fail to correctly predict the behavior (b), and fare even worse at judging whether given behaviors are reasonable (c), despite being correctly aware of the protagonist's mental state should make such secondary predictions obvious. We further show that we can help models do better at (b) and (c) via interventions such as reminding the model of its earlier mental state answer and mental-state-specific chain-of-thought prompting, raising the action prediction accuracies (e.g., from 49.5% to 93.5% for GPT-4o) and judgment accuracies (e.g., from 15.3% to 94.7% in GPT-4o). While this shows that models can be coaxed to perform well, it requires task-specific interventions, and the natural model performances remain low, a cautionary tale for LLM deployment.

We show that a GPT-3 model can learn to express uncertainty about its own answers in natural language -- without use of model logits. When given a question, the model generates both an answer and a level of confidence (e.g. "90% confidence" or "high confidence"). These levels map to probabilities that are well calibrated. The model also remains moderately calibrated under distribution shift, and is sensitive to uncertainty in its own answers, rather than imitating human examples. To our knowledge, this is the first time a model has been shown to express calibrated uncertainty about its own answers in natural language. For testing calibration, we introduce the CalibratedMath suite of tasks. We compare the calibration of uncertainty expressed in words ("verbalized probability") to uncertainty extracted from model logits. Both kinds of uncertainty are capable of generalizing calibration under distribution shift. We also provide evidence that GPT-3's ability to generalize calibration depends on pre-trained latent representations that correlate with epistemic uncertainty over its answers.

Language model (LM) assistants are increasingly used in applications such as brainstorming and research. Improvements in memory and context size have allowed these models to become more autonomous, which has also resulted in more text accumulation in their context windows without explicit user intervention. This comes with a latent risk: the belief profiles of models -- their understanding of the world as manifested in their responses or actions -- may silently change as context accumulates. This can lead to subtly inconsistent user experiences, or shifts in behavior that deviate from the original alignment of the models. In this paper, we explore how accumulating context by engaging in interactions and processing text -- talking and reading -- can change the beliefs of language models, as manifested in their responses and behaviors. Our results reveal that models' belief profiles are highly malleable: GPT-5 exhibits a 54.7% shift in its stated beliefs after 10 rounds of discussion about moral dilemmas and queries about safety, while Grok 4 shows a 27.2% shift on political issues after reading texts from the opposing position. We also examine models' behavioral changes by designing tasks that require tool use, where each tool selection corresponds to an implicit belief. We find that these changes align with stated belief shifts, suggesting that belief shifts will be reflected in actual behavior in agentic systems. Our analysis exposes the hidden risk of belief shift as models undergo extended sessions of talking or reading, rendering their opinions and actions unreliable.

Research on Large Language Models (LLMs) studies output variation across generation, reasoning, alignment, and representational analysis, often under the umbrella of "diversity." Yet the terminology remains fragmented, largely because the normative objectives underlying tasks are rarely made explicit. We introduce the Magic, Madness, Heaven, Sin framework, which models output variation along a homogeneity-heterogeneity axis, where valuation is determined by the task and its normative objective. We organize tasks into four normative contexts: epistemic (factuality), interactional (user utility), societal (representation), and safety (robustness). For each, we examine the failure modes and vocabulary such as hallucination, mode collapse, bias, and erasure through which variation is studied. We apply the framework to analyze all pairwise cross-contextual interactions, revealing that optimizing for one objective, such as improving safety, can inadvertently harm demographic representation or creative diversity. We argue for context-aware evaluation of output variation, reframing it as a property shaped by task objectives rather than a model's intrinsic trait.

We present SignAvatars, the first large-scale, multi-prompt 3D sign language (SL) motion dataset designed to bridge the communication gap for Deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals. While there has been an exponentially growing number of research regarding digital communication, the majority of existing communication technologies primarily cater to spoken or written languages, instead of SL, the essential communication method for Deaf and hard-of-hearing communities. Existing SL datasets, dictionaries, and sign language production (SLP) methods are typically limited to 2D as annotating 3D models and avatars for SL is usually an entirely manual and labor-intensive process conducted by SL experts, often resulting in unnatural avatars. In response to these challenges, we compile and curate the SignAvatars dataset, which comprises 70,000 videos from 153 signers, totaling 8.34 million frames, covering both isolated signs and continuous, co-articulated signs, with multiple prompts including HamNoSys, spoken language, and words. To yield 3D holistic annotations, including meshes and biomechanically-valid poses of body, hands, and face, as well as 2D and 3D keypoints, we introduce an automated annotation pipeline operating on our large corpus of SL videos. SignAvatars facilitates various tasks such as 3D sign language recognition (SLR) and the novel 3D SL production (SLP) from diverse inputs like text scripts, individual words, and HamNoSys notation. Hence, to evaluate the potential of SignAvatars, we further propose a unified benchmark of 3D SL holistic motion production. We believe that this work is a significant step forward towards bringing the digital world to the Deaf and hard-of-hearing communities as well as people interacting with them.

Traditionally, theory and practice of Cognitive Control are linked via literature reviews by human domain experts. This approach, however, is inadequate to track the ever-growing literature. It may also be biased, and yield redundancies and confusion. Here we present an alternative approach. We performed automated text analyses on a large body of scientific texts to create a joint representation of tasks and constructs. More specifically, 385,705 scientific abstracts were first mapped into an embedding space using a transformers-based language model. Document embeddings were then used to identify a task-construct graph embedding that grounds constructs on tasks and supports nuanced meaning of the constructs by taking advantage of constrained random walks in the graph. This joint task-construct graph embedding, can be queried to generate task batteries targeting specific constructs, may reveal knowledge gaps in the literature, and inspire new tasks and novel hypotheses.

Understanding human tasks through video observations is an essential capability of intelligent agents. The challenges of such capability lie in the difficulty of generating a detailed understanding of situated actions, their effects on object states (i.e., state changes), and their causal dependencies. These challenges are further aggravated by the natural parallelism from multi-tasking and partial observations in multi-agent collaboration. Most prior works leverage action localization or future prediction as an indirect metric for evaluating such task understanding from videos. To make a direct evaluation, we introduce the EgoTaskQA benchmark that provides a single home for the crucial dimensions of task understanding through question-answering on real-world egocentric videos. We meticulously design questions that target the understanding of (1) action dependencies and effects, (2) intents and goals, and (3) agents' beliefs about others. These questions are divided into four types, including descriptive (what status?), predictive (what will?), explanatory (what caused?), and counterfactual (what if?) to provide diagnostic analyses on spatial, temporal, and causal understandings of goal-oriented tasks. We evaluate state-of-the-art video reasoning models on our benchmark and show their significant gaps between humans in understanding complex goal-oriented egocentric videos. We hope this effort will drive the vision community to move onward with goal-oriented video understanding and reasoning.

We present and evaluate a suite of proof-of-concept (PoC), structured workflow prompts designed to elicit human-like hierarchical reasoning while guiding Large Language Models (LLMs) in the high-level semantic and linguistic analysis of scholarly manuscripts. The prompts target two non-trivial analytical tasks within academic summaries (abstracts and conclusions): identifying unsubstantiated claims (informational integrity) and flagging semantically confusing ambiguous pronoun references (linguistic clarity). We conducted a systematic, multi-run evaluation on two frontier models (Gemini Pro 2.5 Pro and ChatGPT Plus o3) under varied context conditions. Our results for the informational integrity task reveal a significant divergence in model performance: while both models successfully identified an unsubstantiated head of a noun phrase (95% success), ChatGPT consistently failed (0% success) to identify an unsubstantiated adjectival modifier that Gemini correctly flagged (95% success), raising a question regarding the potential influence of the target's syntactic role. For the linguistic analysis task, both models performed well (80-90% success) with full manuscript context. Surprisingly, in a summary-only setting, Gemini's performance was substantially degraded, while ChatGPT achieved a perfect (100%) success rate. Our findings suggest that while structured prompting is a viable methodology for complex textual analysis, prompt performance may be highly dependent on the interplay between the model, task type, and context, highlighting the need for rigorous, model-specific testing.

It has been well-known that Chain-of-Thought can remarkably enhance LLMs' performance on complex tasks. However, because it also introduces slower inference speeds and higher computational costs, many researches have attempted to use implicit CoT, which does not need LLMs to explicitly generate the intermediate steps. But there is still gap between their efficacy and typical explicit CoT methods. This leaves us a doubt that, does implicit CoT really equal to explicit CoT? Therefore, in this study, we address this question through experiments. We probe the information of intermediate steps from the model's hidden states when it is performing implicit CoT. The results surprisingly indicate that LLMs hardly think about intermediate steps, suggesting they may just rely on experience rather than strict step-by-step reasoning. Moreover, we find LLMs' implicit reasoning capabilities are susceptible and unstable, reaffirming the necessity of explicit CoT to effectively support complex tasks.

We introduce an axiomatic evaluation framework for latent thought representations in LLMs, comprising metrics that are independent of downstream benchmark scores and reveal representational failures that benchmark accuracy masks. Existing evaluations conflate representation quality with model capacity. Therefore, failures cannot be attributed to the representation rather than to the model that processes it. We formalize four functional axioms (Causality, Minimality, Separability, and Stability) and define a quantitative measure for each, computed directly on the representation independently of downstream accuracy. We audit open-weight LLMs across 23 reasoning tasks (e.g., Spatial Reasoning, Factual QA). We find that no candidate satisfies all four axioms simultaneously, that the representations distinguish task type reliably but cannot distinguish between two questions within the same task, and that the representations encode little information beyond what is already present in the input embedding. The failure is consistent across dense, reasoning-distilled, and RL-trained model families, indicating that the gap is structural rather than a property of model size or training procedure.

A model that lies while knowing the truth is the central case ELK cannot handle with behavioral evaluation alone. We ask whether such deception leaves an internal signature distinguishing it from honest error. Our key move is a control for wrongness: we contrast a sleeper agent (knows the truth, lies on trigger) against a naive liar (fine-tuned to emit the same wrong answers with no honest training). Both produce identical wrong outputs; any difference is about knowledge conflict, not incorrectness. We find deceptive forward passes carry a conflict signature - 2.1-2.3x higher residual rank than naive-liar passes on the same wrong answer - strong enough to identify which of two responses is the lie with 100% accuracy and no labels, across GPT-2 small/medium (three seeds) and three instruct models. Across Qwen2.5-1.5B/7B and Phi-3-mini, instructed deception raises residual rank on every tested fact (18/18, 40/40, 34/34); on Phi-3, lies separate perfectly from both honest answers and hallucinations (AUC 1.0, Wilcoxon p~6e-11). The signature survives strategic self-constructed deception (model invents its own lie, AUC 1.0), active concealment attempts (AUC 1.0), and length-controlled replication (20/20, AUC 1.0, p~1e-6). Using basis-free relative representations, a probe trained on one model family detects deception in two other families zero-shot (mean AUC 0.933), surviving simultaneous architecture and format change (AUC 0.821), and transfers across five languages (AUC 1.000, length-controlled). The signature is read-only: detectable but not injectable (0/8 both directions). Honest limitations and six negative experiments are documented in full.

When humans cooperate, they frequently coordinate their activity through both verbal communication and non-verbal actions, using this information to infer a shared goal and plan. How can we model this inferential ability? In this paper, we introduce a model of a cooperative team where one agent, the principal, may communicate natural language instructions about their shared plan to another agent, the assistant, using GPT-3 as a likelihood function for instruction utterances. We then show how a third person observer can infer the team's goal via multi-modal Bayesian inverse planning from actions and instructions, computing the posterior distribution over goals under the assumption that agents will act and communicate rationally to achieve them. We evaluate this approach by comparing it with human goal inferences in a multi-agent gridworld, finding that our model's inferences closely correlate with human judgments (R = 0.96). When compared to inference from actions alone, we also find that instructions lead to more rapid and less uncertain goal inference, highlighting the importance of verbal communication for cooperative agents.

Sign language pre-training has gained increasing attention for its ability to enhance performance across various sign language understanding (SLU) tasks. However, existing methods often suffer from a gap between pre-training and fine-tuning, leading to suboptimal results. To address this, we propose Uni-Sign, a unified pre-training framework that eliminates the gap between pre-training and downstream SLU tasks through a large-scale generative pre-training strategy and a novel fine-tuning paradigm. First, we introduce CSL-News, a large-scale Chinese Sign Language (CSL) dataset containing 1,985 hours of video paired with textual annotations, which enables effective large-scale pre-training. Second, Uni-Sign unifies SLU tasks by treating downstream tasks as a single sign language translation (SLT) task during fine-tuning, ensuring seamless knowledge transfer between pre-training and fine-tuning. Furthermore, we incorporate a prior-guided fusion (PGF) module and a score-aware sampling strategy to efficiently fuse pose and RGB information, addressing keypoint inaccuracies and improving computational efficiency. Extensive experiments across multiple SLU benchmarks demonstrate that Uni-Sign achieves state-of-the-art performance across multiple downstream SLU tasks. Dataset and code are available at github.com/ZechengLi19/Uni-Sign.

When prompted to think step-by-step, language models (LMs) produce a chain of thought (CoT), a sequence of reasoning steps that the model supposedly used to produce its prediction. Despite much work on CoT prompting, it is unclear if reasoning verbalized in a CoT is faithful to the models' parametric beliefs. We introduce a framework for measuring parametric faithfulness of generated reasoning, and propose Faithfulness by Unlearning Reasoning steps (FUR), an instance of this framework. FUR erases information contained in reasoning steps from model parameters, and measures faithfulness as the resulting effect on the model's prediction. Our experiments with four LMs and five multi-hop multi-choice question answering (MCQA) datasets show that FUR is frequently able to precisely change the underlying models' prediction for a given instance by unlearning key steps, indicating when a CoT is parametrically faithful. Further analysis shows that CoTs generated by models post-unlearning support different answers, hinting at a deeper effect of unlearning.

Hallucinations (i.e., generating plausible but inaccurate content) and laziness (i.e. excessive refusals or defaulting to "I don't know") persist as major challenges in LLM reasoning. Current efforts to reduce hallucinations primarily focus on factual errors in knowledge-grounded tasks, often neglecting hallucinations related to faulty reasoning. Meanwhile, some approaches render LLMs overly conservative, limiting their problem-solving capabilities. To mitigate hallucination and laziness in reasoning tasks, we propose Automatic Curriculum Expert Iteration (Auto-CEI) to enhance LLM reasoning and align responses to the model's capabilities--assertively answering within its limits and declining when tasks exceed them. In our method, Expert Iteration explores the reasoning trajectories near the LLM policy, guiding incorrect paths back on track to reduce compounding errors and improve robustness; it also promotes appropriate "I don't know" responses after sufficient reasoning attempts. The curriculum automatically adjusts rewards, incentivizing extended reasoning before acknowledging incapability, thereby pushing the limits of LLM reasoning and aligning its behaviour with these limits. We compare Auto-CEI with various SOTA baselines across logical reasoning, mathematics, and planning tasks, where Auto-CEI achieves superior alignment by effectively balancing assertiveness and conservativeness.

Language models (LMs) capture large amounts of factual knowledge applicable to a wide range of tasks, motivating the view of their parameters as a knowledge base. An important property of knowledge bases is that different queries for the same fact return consistent results, drawing on a single source of truth. We investigate whether LMs satisfy this property through behavioral and mechanistic analyses. Our results suggest that they encode knowledge in a task-specific manner. Behaviorally, facts acquired on one task frequently fail to co-emerge on others during training. Parameter localization experiments suggest a mechanistic explanation, revealing distinct parameter subsets underlying different tasks for the same fact. Finally, we show that chain-of-thought reasoning draws part of its effectiveness from engaging task-specific parameters beyond those tied to the evaluation task. Our findings suggest that what the model knows and how it is asked are intertwined in parameter space, undermining the "knowledge base" analogy and carrying implications for the reliability and controllability of factual knowledge in LMs.

The increasing scale of large language models (LLMs) brings emergent abilities to various complex tasks requiring reasoning, such as arithmetic and commonsense reasoning. It is known that the effective design of task-specific prompts is critical for LLMs' ability to produce high-quality answers. In particular, an effective approach for complex question-and-answer tasks is example-based prompting with chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning, which significantly improves the performance of LLMs. However, current CoT methods rely on a fixed set of human-annotated exemplars, which are not necessarily the most effective examples for different tasks. This paper proposes a new method, Active-Prompt, to adapt LLMs to different tasks with task-specific example prompts (annotated with human-designed CoT reasoning). For this purpose, we propose a solution to the key problem of determining which questions are the most important and helpful ones to annotate from a pool of task-specific queries. By borrowing ideas from the related problem of uncertainty-based active learning, we introduce several metrics to characterize the uncertainty so as to select the most uncertain questions for annotation. Experimental results demonstrate the superiority of our proposed method, achieving state-of-the-art on eight complex reasoning tasks. Further analyses of different uncertainty metrics, pool sizes, zero-shot learning, and accuracy-uncertainty relationship demonstrate the effectiveness of our method. Our code will be available at https://github.com/shizhediao/active-prompt.

Pre-trained models produce strong generic representations that can be adapted via fine-tuning. The learned weight difference relative to the pre-trained model, known as a task vector, characterises the direction and stride of fine-tuning. The significance of task vectors is such that simple arithmetic operations on them can be used to combine diverse representations from different domains. This paper builds on these properties of task vectors and aims to answer (1) whether components of task vectors, particularly parameter blocks, exhibit similar characteristics, and (2) how such blocks can be used to enhance knowledge composition and transfer. To this end, we introduce aTLAS, an algorithm that linearly combines parameter blocks with different learned coefficients, resulting in anisotropic scaling at the task vector level. We show that such linear combinations explicitly exploit the low intrinsic dimensionality of pre-trained models, with only a few coefficients being the learnable parameters. Furthermore, composition of parameter blocks leverages the already learned representations, thereby reducing the dependency on large amounts of data. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our method in task arithmetic, few-shot recognition and test-time adaptation, with supervised or unsupervised objectives. In particular, we show that (1) learned anisotropic scaling allows task vectors to be more disentangled, causing less interference in composition; (2) task vector composition excels with scarce or no labeled data and is less prone to domain shift, thus leading to better generalisability; (3) mixing the most informative parameter blocks across different task vectors prior to training can reduce the memory footprint and improve the flexibility of knowledge transfer. Moreover, we show the potential of aTLAS as a PEFT method, particularly with less data, and demonstrate that its scalibility.

The impressive performance of recent language models across a wide range of tasks suggests that they possess a degree of abstract reasoning skills. Are these skills general and transferable, or specialized to specific tasks seen during pretraining? To disentangle these effects, we propose an evaluation framework based on "counterfactual" task variants that deviate from the default assumptions underlying standard tasks. Across a suite of 11 tasks, we observe nontrivial performance on the counterfactual variants, but nevertheless find that performance substantially and consistently degrades compared to the default conditions. This suggests that while current LMs may possess abstract task-solving skills to a degree, they often also rely on narrow, non-transferable procedures for task-solving. These results motivate a more careful interpretation of language model performance that teases apart these aspects of behavior.

When leveraging language models for reasoning tasks, generating explicit chain-of-thought (CoT) steps often proves essential for achieving high accuracy in final outputs. In this paper, we investigate if models can be taught to internalize these CoT steps. To this end, we propose a simple yet effective method for internalizing CoT steps: starting with a model trained for explicit CoT reasoning, we gradually remove the intermediate steps and finetune the model. This process allows the model to internalize the intermediate reasoning steps, thus simplifying the reasoning process while maintaining high performance. Our approach enables a GPT-2 Small model to solve 9-by-9 multiplication with up to 99% accuracy, whereas standard training cannot solve beyond 4-by-4 multiplication. Furthermore, our method proves effective on larger language models, such as Mistral 7B, achieving over 50% accuracy on GSM8K without producing any intermediate steps.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting has become central to mathematical reasoning in large language models, yet models remain brittle to early errors: a single arithmetic slip or unjustified inference typically propagates uncorrected to an incorrect final answer. We investigate whether training on intentionally flawed reasoning traces can teach models to detect and recover from such errors without degrading standard problem-solving ability. Using competition-level problems from MATH-lighteval, we generate CoT prefixes containing exactly one controlled error, either a calculation error (sign flips, dropped terms) or a reasoning error (misapplied rules, unjustified logical steps), and fine-tune Qwen3-4B with GRPO using a binary final-answer reward. Our Mixed-CoT-RL model matches standard RL on clean problems (41% vs 41%) while substantially outperforming it on problems prefilled with flawed reasoning (24% vs 19%). Notably, clean-only RL fine-tuning degrades robustness below the untuned baseline 19% vs. 20%), indicating that conventional training increases susceptibility to misleading prefills. Among error types, training on reasoning errors yields greater robustness gains than calculation errors alone, with mixed training performing best. These findings demonstrate that exposure to flawed traces during training can improve error-recovery behavior without sacrificing accuracy, suggesting a path toward more robust mathematical reasoning in LLMs.

We introduce Blink, a new benchmark for multimodal language models (LLMs) that focuses on core visual perception abilities not found in other evaluations. Most of the Blink tasks can be solved by humans "within a blink" (e.g., relative depth estimation, visual correspondence, forensics detection, and multi-view reasoning). However, we find these perception-demanding tasks cast significant challenges for current multimodal LLMs because they resist mediation through natural language. Blink reformats 14 classic computer vision tasks into 3,807 multiple-choice questions, paired with single or multiple images and visual prompting. While humans get 95.70% accuracy on average, Blink is surprisingly challenging for existing multimodal LLMs: even the best-performing GPT-4V and Gemini achieve accuracies of 51.26% and 45.72%, only 13.17% and 7.63% higher than random guessing, indicating that such perception abilities have not "emerged" yet in recent multimodal LLMs. Our analysis also highlights that specialist CV models could solve these problems much better, suggesting potential pathways for future improvements. We believe Blink will stimulate the community to help multimodal LLMs catch up with human-level visual perception.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting enhances reasoning in large language models (LLMs) but often leads to verbose and redundant outputs, thus increasing inference cost. We hypothesize that many reasoning steps are unnecessary for producing correct answers. To investigate this, we start with a systematic study to examine what is the minimum reasoning required for a model to reach a stable decision. We find that on math reasoning tasks like math, models typically converge to their final answers after 60\% of the reasoning steps, suggesting substantial redundancy in the remaining content. Based on these insights, we propose three inference-time strategies to improve efficiency: (1) early stopping via answer consistency, (2) boosting the probability of generating end-of-reasoning signals, and (3) a supervised method that learns when to stop based on internal activations. Experiments across five benchmarks and five open-weights LLMs show that our methods significantly reduce token usage with little or no accuracy drop. In particular, on NaturalQuestions, Answer Consistency reduces tokens by over 40\% while further improving accuracy. Our work underscores the importance of cost-effective reasoning methods that operate at inference time, offering practical benefits for real-world applications.

While numerous works have assessed the generative performance of language models (LMs) on tasks requiring Theory of Mind reasoning, research into the models' internal representation of mental states remains limited. Recent work has used probing to demonstrate that LMs can represent beliefs of themselves and others. However, these claims are accompanied by limited evaluation, making it difficult to assess how mental state representations are affected by model design and training choices. We report an extensive benchmark with various LM types with different model sizes, fine-tuning approaches, and prompt designs to study the robustness of mental state representations and memorisation issues within the probes. Our results show that the quality of models' internal representations of the beliefs of others increases with model size and, more crucially, with fine-tuning. We are the first to study how prompt variations impact probing performance on theory of mind tasks. We demonstrate that models' representations are sensitive to prompt variations, even when such variations should be beneficial. Finally, we complement previous activation editing experiments on Theory of Mind tasks and show that it is possible to improve models' reasoning performance by steering their activations without the need to train any probe.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning excels in language models but struggles in vision-language models due to premature visual-to-text conversion that discards continuous information such as geometry and spatial layout. While recent methods enhance CoT through static enumeration or attention-based selection, they remain passive, i.e., processing pre-computed inputs rather than actively seeking task-relevant details. Inspired by human active perception, we introduce ViThinker, a framework that enables vision-language models to autonomously generate decision (query) tokens triggering the synthesis of expert-aligned visual features on demand. ViThinker internalizes vision-expert capabilities during training, performing generative mental simulation during inference without external tool calls. Through a two-stage curriculum: first distilling frozen experts into model parameters, then learning task-driven querying via sparsity penalties, i.e., ViThinker discovers minimal sufficient perception for each reasoning step. Evaluations across vision-centric benchmarks demonstrate consistent improvements, validating that active query generation outperforms passive approaches in both perceptual grounding and reasoning accuracy.

Reward models can significantly enhance the reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs), but they typically require extensive curated data and costly training. To mitigate these challenges, training-free approaches such as LLM-as-a-Judge leverage the intrinsic reasoning abilities of LLMs to evaluate responses, achieving promising results. Recent works have also indicated that model confidence can serve effectively as a reward metric, distinguishing between chain-of-thought (CoT) and non-CoT paths. However, the concept of using confidence as a reward has not been comprehensively studied. In this work, we systematically investigate Confidence-as-a-Reward (CRew), a simple yet powerful training-free method that utilizes token-level confidence in the model's final answers as a proxy for reward, especially suitable for close-ended tasks. Through extensive experiments on mathematical reasoning tasks, we demonstrate that CRew outperforms existing training-free reward approaches on the MATH500 and RewardMATH benchmarks, and even surpasses most trained reward models. We further identify a strong correlation between CRew scores and the actual reasoning performance of the model. Additionally, we find that CRew can effectively filter high-quality training data. Building upon these insights, we propose CRew-DPO, a training strategy that constructs preference data from confidence scores combined with correctness signals. Finetuning with CRew-DPO further enhances the model's judging capabilities and consistently outperforms existing self-training methods.

Large language models (LLMs) have achieved significant progress in solving complex reasoning tasks by Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR). This advancement is also inseparable from the oversight automated by reliable verifiers. However, current outcome-based verifiers (OVs) are unable to inspect the unreliable intermediate steps in the long reasoning chains of thought (CoTs). Meanwhile, current process-based verifiers (PVs) have difficulties in reliably detecting errors in the complex long CoTs, limited by the scarcity of high-quality annotations due to the prohibitive costs of human annotations. Therefore, we propose the Outcome-based Process Verifier (OPV), which verifies the rationale process of summarized outcomes from long CoTs to achieve both accurate and efficient verification and enable large-scale annotation. To empower the proposed verifier, we adopt an iterative active learning framework with expert annotations to progressively improve the verification capability of OPV with fewer annotation costs. Specifically, in each iteration, the most uncertain cases of the current best OPV are annotated and then subsequently used to train a new OPV through Rejection Fine-Tuning (RFT) and RLVR for the next round. Extensive experiments demonstrate OPV's superior performance and broad applicability. It achieves new state-of-the-art results on our held-out \thisbench, outperforming much larger open-source models such as Qwen3-Max-Preview with an F1 score of 83.1 compared to 76.3. Furthermore, OPV effectively detects false positives within synthetic dataset, closely align with expert assessment. When collaborating with policy models, OPV consistently yields performance gains, e.g., raising the accuracy of DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-32B from 55.2\% to 73.3\% on AIME2025 as the compute budget scales.

The widespread adoption of large language models (LLMs) makes it important to recognize their strengths and limitations. We argue that in order to develop a holistic understanding of these systems we need to consider the problem that they were trained to solve: next-word prediction over Internet text. By recognizing the pressures that this task exerts we can make predictions about the strategies that LLMs will adopt, allowing us to reason about when they will succeed or fail. This approach - which we call the teleological approach - leads us to identify three factors that we hypothesize will influence LLM accuracy: the probability of the task to be performed, the probability of the target output, and the probability of the provided input. We predict that LLMs will achieve higher accuracy when these probabilities are high than when they are low - even in deterministic settings where probability should not matter. To test our predictions, we evaluate two LLMs (GPT-3.5 and GPT-4) on eleven tasks, and we find robust evidence that LLMs are influenced by probability in the ways that we have hypothesized. In many cases, the experiments reveal surprising failure modes. For instance, GPT-4's accuracy at decoding a simple cipher is 51% when the output is a high-probability word sequence but only 13% when it is low-probability. These results show that AI practitioners should be careful about using LLMs in low-probability situations. More broadly, we conclude that we should not evaluate LLMs as if they are humans but should instead treat them as a distinct type of system - one that has been shaped by its own particular set of pressures.

This paper presents a case study on the design, administration, post-processing, and evaluation of surveys on large language models (LLMs). It comprises two components: (1) A statistical method for eliciting beliefs encoded in LLMs. We introduce statistical measures and evaluation metrics that quantify the probability of an LLM "making a choice", the associated uncertainty, and the consistency of that choice. (2) We apply this method to study what moral beliefs are encoded in different LLMs, especially in ambiguous cases where the right choice is not obvious. We design a large-scale survey comprising 680 high-ambiguity moral scenarios (e.g., "Should I tell a white lie?") and 687 low-ambiguity moral scenarios (e.g., "Should I stop for a pedestrian on the road?"). Each scenario includes a description, two possible actions, and auxiliary labels indicating violated rules (e.g., "do not kill"). We administer the survey to 28 open- and closed-source LLMs. We find that (a) in unambiguous scenarios, most models "choose" actions that align with commonsense. In ambiguous cases, most models express uncertainty. (b) Some models are uncertain about choosing the commonsense action because their responses are sensitive to the question-wording. (c) Some models reflect clear preferences in ambiguous scenarios. Specifically, closed-source models tend to agree with each other.

Collaborative tasks often begin with partial task knowledge and incomplete initial plans from each partner. To complete these tasks, agents need to engage in situated communication with their partners and coordinate their partial plans towards a complete plan to achieve a joint task goal. While such collaboration seems effortless in a human-human team, it is highly challenging for human-AI collaboration. To address this limitation, this paper takes a step towards collaborative plan acquisition, where humans and agents strive to learn and communicate with each other to acquire a complete plan for joint tasks. Specifically, we formulate a novel problem for agents to predict the missing task knowledge for themselves and for their partners based on rich perceptual and dialogue history. We extend a situated dialogue benchmark for symmetric collaborative tasks in a 3D blocks world and investigate computational strategies for plan acquisition. Our empirical results suggest that predicting the partner's missing knowledge is a more viable approach than predicting one's own. We show that explicit modeling of the partner's dialogue moves and mental states produces improved and more stable results than without. These results provide insight for future AI agents that can predict what knowledge their partner is missing and, therefore, can proactively communicate such information to help their partner acquire such missing knowledge toward a common understanding of joint tasks.

Certain statistical models are capable of interpreting input strings as instructions, or prompts, and carry out tasks based on them. Many approaches to prompting and pre-training these models involve the automated generation of these prompts. We call these approaches meta-prompting, or prompting to obtain prompts. We propose a theoretical framework based on category theory to generalize and describe them. This framework is flexible enough to account for LLM stochasticity; and allows us to obtain formal results around task agnosticity and equivalence of various meta-prompting approaches. We experiment with meta-prompting in two active areas of model research: creativity and ideation. We find that user preference favors (p < 0.01) the prompts generated under meta-prompting, as well as their corresponding outputs, over a series of hardcoded baseline prompts that include the original task prompt. Using our framework, we argue that meta-prompting is more effective than basic prompting at generating desirable outputs.

It is important for Large Language Models to be aware of the boundary of their knowledge, the mechanism of identifying known and unknown queries. This type of awareness can help models perform adaptive inference, such as invoking RAG, engaging in slow and deep thinking, or adopting the abstention mechanism, which is beneficial to the development of efficient and trustworthy AI. In this work, we propose a method to detect knowledge boundaries via Query-Level Uncertainty, which aims to determine if the model is able to address a given query without generating any tokens. To this end, we introduce a novel and training-free method called Internal Confidence, which leverages self-evaluations across layers and tokens. Empirical results on both factual QA and mathematical reasoning tasks demonstrate that our internal confidence can outperform several baselines. Furthermore, we showcase that our proposed method can be used for efficient RAG and model cascading, which is able to reduce inference costs while maintaining performance.

Signed networks allow us to model conflicting relationships and interactions, such as friend/enemy and support/oppose. These signed interactions happen in real-time. Modeling such dynamics of signed networks is crucial to understanding the evolution of polarization in the network and enabling effective prediction of the signed structure (i.e., link signs and signed weights) in the future. However, existing works have modeled either (static) signed networks or dynamic (unsigned) networks but not dynamic signed networks. Since both sign and dynamics inform the graph structure in different ways, it is non-trivial to model how to combine the two features. In this work, we propose a new Graph Neural Network (GNN)-based approach to model dynamic signed networks, named SEMBA: Signed link's Evolution using Memory modules and Balanced Aggregation. Here, the idea is to incorporate the signs of temporal interactions using separate modules guided by balance theory and to evolve the embeddings from a higher-order neighborhood. Experiments on 4 real-world datasets and 4 different tasks demonstrate that SEMBA consistently and significantly outperforms the baselines by up to 80% on the tasks of predicting signs of future links while matching the state-of-the-art performance on predicting the existence of these links in the future. We find that this improvement is due specifically to the superior performance of SEMBA on the minority negative class.

Large language models excel at reasoning but lack key aspects of introspection, including anticipating their own success and the computation required to achieve it. Humans use real-time introspection to decide how much effort to invest, when to make multiple attempts, when to stop, and when to signal success or failure. Without this, LLMs struggle to make intelligent meta-cognition decisions. Test-time scaling methods like Best-of-N drive up cost and latency by using a fixed budget of samples regardless of the marginal benefit of each one at any point in generation, and the absence of confidence signals can mislead people, prevent appropriate escalation to better tools, and undermine trustworthiness. Learned verifiers or reward models can provide confidence estimates, but do not enable adaptive inference and add substantial cost by requiring extra models or forward passes. We present ZIP-RC, which equips models with zero-overhead introspective predictions of reward and cost. At every token, ZIP-RC reuses reserved or unused logits in the same forward pass as next-token prediction to output a joint distribution over final reward and remaining length -- no extra models, architecture change, or inference overhead. This full joint distribution is used to compute a sampling utility which is the linear combination of the expected maximum reward, total compute, and latency of set of samples if generated to completion. During inference, we maximize this utility with meta-actions that determine which prefix of tokens to continue or initiate sampling from. On mixed-difficulty mathematical benchmarks, ZIP-RC improves accuracy by up to 12% over majority voting at equal or lower average cost, and traces smooth Pareto frontiers between quality, compute, and latency. By providing real-time reward-cost introspection, ZIP-RC enables adaptive, efficient reasoning.

Can LLMs accurately adjust their confidence when facing opposition? Building on previous studies measuring calibration on static fact-based question-answering tasks, we evaluate Large Language Models (LLMs) in a dynamic, adversarial debate setting, uniquely combining two realistic factors: (a) a multi-turn format requiring models to update beliefs as new information emerges, and (b) a zero-sum structure to control for task-related uncertainty, since mutual high-confidence claims imply systematic overconfidence. We organized 60 three-round policy debates among ten state-of-the-art LLMs, with models privately rating their confidence (0-100) in winning after each round. We observed five concerning patterns: (1) Systematic overconfidence: models began debates with average initial confidence of 72.9% vs. a rational 50% baseline. (2) Confidence escalation: rather than reducing confidence as debates progressed, debaters increased their win probabilities, averaging 83% by the final round. (3) Mutual overestimation: in 61.7% of debates, both sides simultaneously claimed >=75% probability of victory, a logical impossibility. (4) Persistent self-debate bias: models debating identical copies increased confidence from 64.1% to 75.2%; even when explicitly informed their chance of winning was exactly 50%, confidence still rose (from 50.0% to 57.1%). (5) Misaligned private reasoning: models' private scratchpad thoughts sometimes differed from their public confidence ratings, raising concerns about faithfulness of chain-of-thought reasoning. These results suggest LLMs lack the ability to accurately self-assess or update their beliefs in dynamic, multi-turn tasks; a major concern as LLMs are now increasingly deployed without careful review in assistant and agentic roles. Code for our experiments is available at https://github.com/pradyuprasad/llms_overconfidence

Chain of Thought (CoT) is significant in improving the reasoning abilities of large language models (LLMs). However, the correlation between the effectiveness of CoT and the length of reasoning steps in prompts remains largely unknown. To shed light on this, we have conducted several empirical experiments to explore the relations. Specifically, we design experiments that expand and compress the rationale reasoning steps within CoT demonstrations, while keeping all other factors constant. We have the following key findings. First, the results indicate that lengthening the reasoning steps in prompts, even without adding new information into the prompt, considerably enhances LLMs' reasoning abilities across multiple datasets. Alternatively, shortening the reasoning steps, even while preserving the key information, significantly diminishes the reasoning abilities of models. This finding highlights the importance of the number of steps in CoT prompts and provides practical guidance to make better use of LLMs' potential in complex problem-solving scenarios. Second, we also investigated the relationship between the performance of CoT and the rationales used in demonstrations. Surprisingly, the result shows that even incorrect rationales can yield favorable outcomes if they maintain the requisite length of inference. Third, we observed that the advantages of increasing reasoning steps are task-dependent: simpler tasks require fewer steps, whereas complex tasks gain significantly from longer inference sequences.

Reliable rubric grading requires more than accurate score prediction. Each judgement must be grounded in the mark scheme and evidence from the student answer. Existing credit-assignment and intervention methods, primarily designed for self-contained reasoning tasks such as mathematics reasoning, struggle in this setting because they do not identify where grading reasoning goes wrong or how the model's belief about the final mark changes during reasoning. We propose Evidence-Diagnosed Intervention Training (EDIT), a two-phase framework for training more rubric-faithful LLM graders. First, EDIT-SFT locates problematic reasoning steps using internal model signals: posterior belief over the final mark and input-grounding scores. It then revises only these local steps with help from a rubric checklist. Second, EDIT-RL calibrates the grader with belief-guided reward shaping, penalising large harmful belief drifts while still allowing helpful exploration. Experiments on two real-world, multi-subject grading benchmarks demonstrate that EDIT consistently outperforms strong supervised fine-tuning and reinforcement learning baselines on both in-domain and out-of-domain splits, with ablation studies confirming that internal-state diagnostics drive these gains.

A growing body of work in cognitive science suggests that reportable conscious access is associated with global ignition over distributed memory systems, while such activation is only partially accessible as individuals cannot directly access or enumerate all activated contents. This tension suggests a plausible mechanism that cognition may rely on a compact representation that approximates the global influence of activation on downstream processing. Inspired by this idea, we introduce the concept of Mindscape Activation Signature (MiA-Signature), a compressed representation of the global activation pattern induced by a query. In LLM systems, this is instantiated via submodular-based selection of high-level concepts that cover the activated context space, optionally refined through lightweight iterative updates using working memory. The resulting MiA-Signature serves as a conditioning signal that approximates the effect of the full activation state while remaining computationally tractable. Integrating MiA-Signatures into both RAG and agentic systems yields consistent performance gains across multiple long-context understanding tasks.

In-context learning (ICL) is often motivated by the intuition that demonstrations help because they provide correct input-output examples. However, we reveal a counterintuitive phenomenon: correctness does not guarantee exemplar utility, and some correct demonstrations can even reduce ICL accuracy. To study this correctness-utility gap, we introduce task-preserving perturbations, where only the exemplar input is changed, while the example remains a correct instance of the same task. Concretely, each perturbed exemplar is assigned the target induced by the task mapping. This framework covers both label-updating perturbations, where task-relevant semantics change and targets are recomputed, and stricter target-preserving perturbations, where the original target remains valid. We formalize the resulting failure mode as contextual evidence shift: task-preserving perturbations can change the effective mixture of evidence used by the model for contextual inference, thereby separating exemplar correctness from exemplar utility. Across sentiment classification, logical reasoning, and math word problems, we find that task-preserving perturbed demonstrations can substantially degrade ICL performance, especially for smaller models, harder tasks, and higher perturbation ratios. Our results show that robust ICL requires evaluating not only whether demonstrations are correct, but also how they influence contextual inference. Code is available at https://github.com/Chenghao-Qiu/Task-Preserving-ICL.

We design a suite of minimal algorithmic tasks that are a loose abstraction of open-ended real-world tasks. This allows us to cleanly and controllably quantify the creative limits of the present-day language model. Much like real-world tasks that require a creative, far-sighted leap of thought, our tasks require an implicit, open-ended stochastic planning step that either (a) discovers new connections in an abstract knowledge graph (like in wordplay, drawing analogies, or research) or (b) constructs new patterns (like in designing math problems or new proteins). In these tasks, we empirically and conceptually argue how next-token learning is myopic and memorizes excessively; comparatively, multi-token approaches, namely teacherless training and diffusion models, excel in producing diverse and original output. Secondly, in our tasks, we find that to elicit randomness from the Transformer without hurting coherence, it is better to inject noise right at the input layer (via a method we dub hash-conditioning) rather than defer to temperature sampling from the output layer. Thus, our work offers a principled, minimal test-bed for analyzing open-ended creative skills, and offers new arguments for going beyond next-token learning and softmax-based sampling. We make part of the code available under https://github.com/chenwu98/algorithmic-creativity

Despite its simplicity and efficacy, the high token expenditure of self-consistency can limit its practical utility. Here we investigate if self-consistency can be made more token-efficient for long chain-of-thought reasoning tasks, while preserving its parallelism, through early hypothesis pruning. Concretely, we generate all solutions in parallel, but periodically prune intermediate hypotheses that are deemed unnecessary based on two lightweight indicators: (a) the model's own confidence in individual hypotheses, and (b) lexical coverage of all current hypotheses by candidate subsets that are under consideration for continued retention. We design a fast weighted set cover algorithm that utilizes the two indicators; our evaluation of five LLMs on three math benchmarks shows that this method can improve token efficiency for all models, by 10-35% in many cases.

While multi-modal large language models (MLLMs) have shown significant progress on many popular visual reasoning benchmarks, whether they possess abstract visual reasoning abilities remains an open question. Similar to the Sudoku puzzles, abstract visual reasoning (AVR) problems require finding high-level patterns (e.g., repetition constraints) that control the input shapes (e.g., digits) in a specific task configuration (e.g., matrix). However, existing AVR benchmarks only considered a limited set of patterns (addition, conjunction), input shapes (rectangle, square), and task configurations (3 by 3 matrices). To evaluate MLLMs' reasoning abilities comprehensively, we introduce MARVEL, a multidimensional AVR benchmark with 770 puzzles composed of six core knowledge patterns, geometric and abstract shapes, and five different task configurations. To inspect whether the model accuracy is grounded in perception and reasoning, MARVEL complements the general AVR question with perception questions in a hierarchical evaluation framework. We conduct comprehensive experiments on MARVEL with nine representative MLLMs in zero-shot and few-shot settings. Our experiments reveal that all models show near-random performance on the AVR question, with significant performance gaps (40%) compared to humans across all patterns and task configurations. Further analysis of perception questions reveals that MLLMs struggle to comprehend the visual features (near-random performance) and even count the panels in the puzzle ( <45%), hindering their ability for abstract reasoning. We release our entire code and dataset.

Persuasion, a fundamental social capability for humans, remains a challenge for AI systems such as large language models (LLMs). Current studies often overlook the strategic use of information asymmetry in message design or rely on strong assumptions regarding pre-commitment. In this work, we explore the application of Bayesian Persuasion (BP) in natural language within single-turn dialogue settings, to enhance the strategic persuasion capabilities of LLMs. Our framework incorporates a commitment-communication mechanism, where the persuader explicitly outlines an information schema by narrating their potential types (e.g., honest or dishonest), thereby guiding the persuadee in performing the intended Bayesian belief update. We evaluate two variants of our approach: Semi-Formal-Natural-Language (SFNL) BP and Fully-Natural-Language (FNL) BP, benchmarking them against both naive and strong non-BP (NBP) baselines within a comprehensive evaluation framework. This framework covers a diverse set of persuadees -- including LLM instances with varying prompts and fine-tuning and human participants -- across tasks ranging from specially designed persuasion scenarios to general everyday situations. Experimental results on LLM-based agents reveal three main findings: (1) LLMs guided by BP strategies consistently achieve higher persuasion success rates than NBP baselines; (2) SFNL exhibits greater credibility and logical coherence, while FNL shows stronger emotional resonance and robustness in naturalistic conversations; (3) with supervised fine-tuning, smaller models can attain BP performance comparable to that of larger models.

We introduce CRAFT, a multi-agent benchmark for evaluating pragmatic communication in large language models under strict partial information. In this setting, multiple agents with complementary but incomplete views must coordinate through natural language to construct a shared 3D structure that no single agent can fully observe. We formalize this problem as a multi-sender pragmatic reasoning task and provide a diagnostic framework that decomposes failures into spatial grounding, belief modeling and pragmatic communication errors, including a taxonomy of behavioral failure profiles in both frontier and open-weight models. Across a diverse set of models, including 8 open-weight and 7 frontier including reasoning models, we find that stronger reasoning ability does not reliably translate to better coordination: smaller open-weight models often match or outperform frontier systems, and improved individual communication does not guarantee successful collaboration. These results suggest that multi-agent coordination remains a fundamentally unsolved challenge for current language models. Our code can be found at https://github.com/csu-signal/CRAFT