Daily Papers

Type inference for dynamically typed languages must reconcile four qualitatively different sources of information about a parameter: values assigned inside a definition, explicit declarations, contextual requirements, and structural operations. Existing systems often combine these sources into one constraint set, causing spurious conflicts and requiring redundant annotations. We present Generic Constraint Projection (GCP), a zero-annotation inference framework that stores the four sources in separate monotone slots on a stable definition-time template and checks each call in a fresh projection session. Ordinary calls verify concrete arguments and specialize returns without mutating the template, while partial calls produce residual projected functions. On the success fragment of a finite-height type preorder, we prove monotonicity, local and global convergence, conditional projection-obligation soundness, projection termination, multi-module convergence, and order-independence under fair iteration. For the pure recursion-free core Outline_0, we also prove evaluation definedness, type preservation, runtime receiver retention, and projection-evaluation coherence. GCP uses Outline Equational Matching as an extensible structural compatibility relation and future this to preserve concrete receiver shape across fluent method chains. We instantiate the framework in Outline for typed ontology worlds and in Python for recovery of PEP 484 annotations from unannotated source.

We define a new class of set functions that in addition to being monotone and subadditive, also admit a very limited form of submodularity defined over a permutation of the ground set. We refer to this permutation as a submodular order. This class of functions includes monotone submodular functions as a sub-family. To understand the importance of this structure in optimization problems we consider the problem of maximizing function value under various types of constraints. To demonstrate the modeling power of submodular order functions we show applications in two different settings. First, we apply our results to the extensively studied problem of assortment optimization. While the objectives in assortment optimization are known to be non-submodular (and non-monotone) even for simple choice models, we show that they are compatible with the notion of submodular order. Consequently, we obtain new and in some cases the first constant factor guarantee for constrained assortment optimization in fundamental choice models. As a second application of submodular order functions, we show an intriguing connection to the maximization of monotone submodular functions in the streaming model. We recover some best known guarantees for this problem as a corollary of our results.

In this paper, we consider the minimum submodular cost allocation (MSCA) problem. The input of MSCA is k non-negative submodular functions f_1,ldots,f_k on the ground set N given by evaluation oracles, and the goal is to partition N into k (possibly empty) sets X_1,ldots,X_k so that sum_{i=1}^k f_i(X_i) is minimized. In this paper, we focus on the case when f_1,ldots,f_k are monotone (denoted by Mono-MSCA). We provide a natural LP-relaxation for Mono-MSCA, which is equivalent to the convex program relaxation introduced by Chekuri and Ene. We show that the integrality gap of the LP-relaxation is at most k/2, which yields a k/2-approximation algorithm for Mono-MSCA. We also show that the integrality gap of the LP-relaxation is at least k/2-epsilon for any constant epsilon>0 when k is fixed.

We focus on a simple, one-dimensional collective decision problem (often referred to as the facility location problem) and explore issues of strategyproofness and proportionality-based fairness. We introduce and analyze a hierarchy of proportionality-based fairness axioms of varying strength: Individual Fair Share (IFS), Unanimous Fair Share (UFS), Proportionality (as in Freeman et al, 2021), and Proportional Fairness (PF). For each axiom, we characterize the family of mechanisms that satisfy the axiom and strategyproofness. We show that imposing strategyproofness renders many of the axioms to be equivalent: the family of mechanisms that satisfy proportionality, unanimity, and strategyproofness is equivalent to the family of mechanisms that satisfy UFS and strategyproofness, which, in turn, is equivalent to the family of mechanisms that satisfy PF and strategyproofness. Furthermore, there is a unique such mechanism: the Uniform Phantom mechanism, which is studied in Freeman et al. (2021). We also characterize the outcomes of the Uniform Phantom mechanism as the unique (pure) equilibrium outcome for any mechanism that satisfies continuity, strict monotonicity, and UFS. Finally, we analyze the approximation guarantees, in terms of optimal social welfare and minimum total cost, obtained by mechanisms that are strategyproof and satisfy each proportionality-based fairness axiom. We show that the Uniform Phantom mechanism provides the best approximation of the optimal social welfare (and also minimum total cost) among all mechanisms that satisfy UFS.

In this paper, we investigate a problem of actively learning threshold in latent space, where the unknown reward g(gamma, v) depends on the proposed threshold gamma and latent value v and it can be only achieved if the threshold is lower than or equal to the unknown latent value. This problem has broad applications in practical scenarios, e.g., reserve price optimization in online auctions, online task assignments in crowdsourcing, setting recruiting bars in hiring, etc. We first characterize the query complexity of learning a threshold with the expected reward at most epsilon smaller than the optimum and prove that the number of queries needed can be infinitely large even when g(gamma, v) is monotone with respect to both gamma and v. On the positive side, we provide a tight query complexity Theta(1/epsilon^3) when g is monotone and the CDF of value distribution is Lipschitz. Moreover, we show a tight Theta(1/epsilon^3) query complexity can be achieved as long as g satisfies one-sided Lipschitzness, which provides a complete characterization for this problem. Finally, we extend this model to an online learning setting and demonstrate a tight Theta(T^{2/3}) regret bound using continuous-arm bandit techniques and the aforementioned query complexity results.

In a recent work, Laforgue et al. introduce the model of last switch dependent (LSD) bandits, in an attempt to capture nonstationary phenomena induced by the interaction between the player and the environment. Examples include satiation, where consecutive plays of the same action lead to decreased performance, or deprivation, where the payoff of an action increases after an interval of inactivity. In this work, we take a step towards understanding the approximability of planning LSD bandits, namely, the (NP-hard) problem of computing an optimal arm-pulling strategy under complete knowledge of the model. In particular, we design the first efficient constant approximation algorithm for the problem and show that, under a natural monotonicity assumption on the payoffs, its approximation guarantee (almost) matches the state-of-the-art for the special and well-studied class of recharging bandits (also known as delay-dependent). In this attempt, we develop new tools and insights for this class of problems, including a novel higher-dimensional relaxation and the technique of mirroring the evolution of virtual states. We believe that these novel elements could potentially be used for approaching richer classes of action-induced nonstationary bandits (e.g., special instances of restless bandits). In the case where the model parameters are initially unknown, we develop an online learning adaptation of our algorithm for which we provide sublinear regret guarantees against its full-information counterpart.

Machine learning approaches relying on such criteria as adversarial robustness or multi-agent settings have raised the need for solving game-theoretic equilibrium problems. Of particular relevance to these applications are methods targeting finite-sum structure, which generically arises in empirical variants of learning problems in these contexts. Further, methods with computable approximation errors are highly desirable, as they provide verifiable exit criteria. Motivated by these applications, we study finite-sum monotone inclusion problems, which model broad classes of equilibrium problems. Our main contributions are variants of the classical Halpern iteration that employ variance reduction to obtain improved complexity guarantees in which n component operators in the finite sum are ``on average'' either cocoercive or Lipschitz continuous and monotone, with parameter L. The resulting oracle complexity of our methods, which provide guarantees for the last iterate and for a (computable) operator norm residual, is mathcal{O}( n + nLvarepsilon^{-1}), which improves upon existing methods by a factor up to n. This constitutes the first variance reduction-type result for general finite-sum monotone inclusions and for more specific problems such as convex-concave optimization when operator norm residual is the optimality measure. We further argue that, up to poly-logarithmic factors, this complexity is unimprovable in the monotone Lipschitz setting; i.e., the provided result is near-optimal.

In this paper, we study the problem of establishing the accountability and fairness of transparent machine learning models through monotonicity. Although there have been numerous studies on individual monotonicity, pairwise monotonicity is often overlooked in the existing literature. This paper studies transparent neural networks in the presence of three types of monotonicity: individual monotonicity, weak pairwise monotonicity, and strong pairwise monotonicity. As a means of achieving monotonicity while maintaining transparency, we propose the monotonic groves of neural additive models. As a result of empirical examples, we demonstrate that monotonicity is often violated in practice and that monotonic groves of neural additive models are transparent, accountable, and fair.

In many real-world settings, a centralized decision-maker must repeatedly allocate finite resources to a population over multiple time steps. Individuals who receive a resource derive some stochastic utility; to characterize the population-level effects of an allocation, the expected individual utilities are then aggregated using a social welfare function (SWF). We formalize this setting and present a general confidence sequence framework for SWF-based online learning and inference, valid for any monotonic, concave, and Lipschitz-continuous SWF. Our key insight is that monotonicity alone suffices to lift confidence sequences from individual utilities to anytime-valid bounds on optimal welfare. Building on this foundation, we propose SWF-UCB, a SWF-agnostic online learning algorithm that achieves near-optimal O(n+nkT) regret (for k resources distributed among n individuals at each of T time steps). We instantiate our framework on three normatively distinct SWF families: Weighted Power Mean, Kolm, and Gini, providing bespoke oracle algorithms for each. Experiments confirm T scaling and reveal rich interactions between k and SWF parameters. This framework naturally supports inference applications such as sequential hypothesis testing, optimal stopping, and policy evaluation.

In pursuit of participatory budgeting (PB) outcomes with broader fairness guarantees, we initiate the study of lotteries over discrete PB outcomes. As the projects have heterogeneous costs, the amount spent may not be equal ex ante and ex post. To address this, we develop a technique to bound the amount by which the ex-post spend differs from the ex-ante spend -- the property is termed budget balanced up to one project (BB1). With respect to fairness, we take a best-of-both-worlds perspective, seeking outcomes that are both ex-ante and ex-post fair. Towards this goal, we initiate a study of ex-ante fairness properties in PB, including Individual Fair Share (IFS), Unanimous Fair Share (UFS) and their stronger variants, as well as Group Fair Share (GFS). We show several incompatibility results between these ex-ante fairness notions and existing ex-post concepts based on justified representation. One of our main contributions is a randomized algorithm which simultaneously satisfies ex-ante Strong UFS, ex-post full justified representation (FJR) and ex-post BB1 for PB with binary utilities.

We consider the obnoxious facility location problem (in which agents prefer the facility location to be far from them) and propose a hierarchy of distance-based proportional fairness concepts for the problem. These fairness axioms ensure that groups of agents at the same location are guaranteed to be a distance from the facility proportional to their group size. We consider deterministic and randomized mechanisms, and compute tight bounds on the price of proportional fairness. In the deterministic setting, we show that our proportional fairness axioms are incompatible with strategyproofness, and prove asymptotically tight epsilon-price of anarchy and stability bounds for proportionally fair welfare-optimal mechanisms. In the randomized setting, we identify proportionally fair and strategyproof mechanisms that give an expected welfare within a constant factor of the optimal welfare. Finally, we prove existence results for two extensions to our model.

Proportionality is an attractive fairness concept that has been applied to a range of problems including the facility location problem, a classic problem in social choice. In our work, we propose a concept called Strong Proportionality, which ensures that when there are two groups of agents at different locations, both groups incur the same total cost. We show that although Strong Proportionality is a well-motivated and basic axiom, there is no deterministic strategyproof mechanism satisfying the property. We then identify a randomized mechanism called Random Rank (which uniformly selects a number k between 1 to n and locates the facility at the k'th highest agent location) which satisfies Strong Proportionality in expectation. Our main theorem characterizes Random Rank as the unique mechanism that achieves universal truthfulness, universal anonymity, and Strong Proportionality in expectation among all randomized mechanisms. Finally, we show via the AverageOrRandomRank mechanism that even stronger ex-post fairness guarantees can be achieved by weakening universal truthfulness to strategyproofness in expectation.

In stochastic multi-armed bandits, the reward distribution of each arm is assumed to be stationary. This assumption is often violated in practice (e.g., in recommendation systems), where the reward of an arm may change whenever is selected, i.e., rested bandit setting. In this paper, we consider the non-parametric rotting bandit setting, where rewards can only decrease. We introduce the filtering on expanding window average (FEWA) algorithm that constructs moving averages of increasing windows to identify arms that are more likely to return high rewards when pulled once more. We prove that for an unknown horizon T, and without any knowledge on the decreasing behavior of the K arms, FEWA achieves problem-dependent regret bound of mathcal{O}((KT)), and a problem-independent one of mathcal{O}(KT). Our result substantially improves over the algorithm of Levine et al. (2017), which suffers regret mathcal{O}(K^{1/3}T^{2/3}). FEWA also matches known bounds for the stochastic bandit setting, thus showing that the rotting bandits are not harder. Finally, we report simulations confirming the theoretical improvements of FEWA.

Maximizing monotone submodular functions under a matroid constraint is a classic algorithmic problem with multiple applications in data mining and machine learning. We study this classic problem in the fully dynamic setting, where elements can be both inserted and deleted in real-time. Our main result is a randomized algorithm that maintains an efficient data structure with an O(k^2) amortized update time (in the number of additions and deletions) and yields a 4-approximate solution, where k is the rank of the matroid.

We consider online learning in multi-player smooth monotone games. Existing algorithms have limitations such as (1) being only applicable to strongly monotone games; (2) lacking the no-regret guarantee; (3) having only asymptotic or slow O(1{T}) last-iterate convergence rate to a Nash equilibrium. While the O(1{T}) rate is tight for a large class of algorithms including the well-studied extragradient algorithm and optimistic gradient algorithm, it is not optimal for all gradient-based algorithms. We propose the accelerated optimistic gradient (AOG) algorithm, the first doubly optimal no-regret learning algorithm for smooth monotone games. Namely, our algorithm achieves both (i) the optimal O(T) regret in the adversarial setting under smooth and convex loss functions and (ii) the optimal O(1{T}) last-iterate convergence rate to a Nash equilibrium in multi-player smooth monotone games. As a byproduct of the accelerated last-iterate convergence rate, we further show that each player suffers only an O(log T) individual worst-case dynamic regret, providing an exponential improvement over the previous state-of-the-art O(T) bound.

We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires multiple agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a game, where the principal announces a mechanism consisting in action recommendations and a payment function, a.k.a. scoring rule. Then, each agent chooses an effort level and receives partial information about an underlying state of nature based on the effort. Finally, the agents report the information (possibly non-truthfully), the principal takes a decision based on this information, and the agents are paid according to the scoring rule. While previous work focuses on single-agent problems, we consider multi-agents settings. This poses the challenge of coordinating the agents' efforts and aggregating correlated information. Indeed, we show that optimal mechanisms must correlate agents' efforts, which introduces externalities among the agents, and hence complex incentive compatibility constraints and equilibrium selection problems. First, we design a polynomial-time algorithm to find an optimal incentive compatible mechanism. Then, we study an online problem, where the principal repeatedly interacts with a group of unknown agents. We design a no-regret algorithm that provides mathcal{O}(T^{2/3}) regret with respect to an optimal mechanism, matching the state-of-the-art bound for single-agent settings.

This paper generalises the treatment of compositional game theory as introduced by the second and third authors with Ghani and Winschel, where games are modelled as morphisms of a symmetric monoidal category. From an economic modelling perspective, the existing notion of an open game is not expressive enough for many applications. This includes stochastic environments, stochastic choices by players, as well as incomplete information regarding the game being played. The current paper addresses these three issue all at once. To achieve this we make significant use of category theory, especially the 'coend optics' of Riley.

We consider an extension to the classic position auctions in which sponsored creatives can be added within AI generated content rather than shown in predefined slots. New challenges arise from the natural requirement that sponsored creatives should smoothly fit into the context. With the help of advanced LLM technologies, it becomes viable to accurately estimate the benefits of adding each individual sponsored creatives into each potential positions within the AI generated content by properly taking the context into account. Therefore, we assume one click-through rate estimation for each position-creative pair, rather than one uniform estimation for each sponsored creative across all positions in classic settings. As a result, the underlying optimization becomes a general matching problem, thus the substitution effects should be treated more carefully compared to standard position auction settings, where the slots are independent with each other. In this work, we formalize a concrete mathematical model of the extended position auction problem and study the welfare-maximization and revenue-maximization mechanism design problem. Formally, we consider two different user behavior models and solve the mechanism design problems therein respectively. For the Multinomial Logit (MNL) model, which is order-insensitive, we can efficiently implement the optimal mechanisms. For the cascade model, which is order-sensitive, we provide approximately optimal solutions.

Streaming submodular maximization is a natural model for the task of selecting a representative subset from a large-scale dataset. If datapoints have sensitive attributes such as gender or race, it becomes important to enforce fairness to avoid bias and discrimination. This has spurred significant interest in developing fair machine learning algorithms. Recently, such algorithms have been developed for monotone submodular maximization under a cardinality constraint. In this paper, we study the natural generalization of this problem to a matroid constraint. We give streaming algorithms as well as impossibility results that provide trade-offs between efficiency, quality and fairness. We validate our findings empirically on a range of well-known real-world applications: exemplar-based clustering, movie recommendation, and maximum coverage in social networks.

Significant work has been recently dedicated to the stochastic delayed bandit setting because of its relevance in applications. The applicability of existing algorithms is however restricted by the fact that strong assumptions are often made on the delay distributions, such as full observability, restrictive shape constraints, or uniformity over arms. In this work, we weaken them significantly and only assume that there is a bound on the tail of the delay. In particular, we cover the important case where the delay distributions vary across arms, and the case where the delays are heavy-tailed. Addressing these difficulties, we propose a simple but efficient UCB-based algorithm called the PatientBandits. We provide both problems-dependent and problems-independent bounds on the regret as well as performance lower bounds.

This paper introduces unified projection-free Frank-Wolfe type algorithms for adversarial continuous DR-submodular optimization, spanning scenarios such as full information and (semi-)bandit feedback, monotone and non-monotone functions, different constraints, and types of stochastic queries. For every problem considered in the non-monotone setting, the proposed algorithms are either the first with proven sub-linear alpha-regret bounds or have better alpha-regret bounds than the state of the art, where alpha is a corresponding approximation bound in the offline setting. In the monotone setting, the proposed approach gives state-of-the-art sub-linear alpha-regret bounds among projection-free algorithms in 7 of the 8 considered cases while matching the result of the remaining case. Additionally, this paper addresses semi-bandit and bandit feedback for adversarial DR-submodular optimization, advancing the understanding of this optimization area.

The study of hardest and easiest fitness landscapes is an active area of research. Recently, Kaufmann, Larcher, Lengler and Zou conjectured that for the self-adjusting (1,lambda)-EA, Adversarial Dynamic BinVal (ADBV) is the hardest dynamic monotone function to optimize. We introduce the function Switching Dynamic BinVal (SDBV) which coincides with ADBV whenever the number of remaining zeros in the search point is strictly less than n/2, where n denotes the dimension of the search space. We show, using a combinatorial argument, that for the (1+1)-EA with any mutation rate p in [0,1], SDBV is drift-minimizing among the class of dynamic monotone functions. Our construction provides the first explicit example of an instance of the partially-ordered evolutionary algorithm (PO-EA) model with parameterized pessimism introduced by Colin, Doerr and F\'erey, building on work of Jansen. We further show that the (1+1)-EA optimizes SDBV in Theta(n^{3/2}) generations. Our simulations demonstrate matching runtimes for both static and self-adjusting (1,lambda) and (1+lambda)-EA. We further show, using an example of fixed dimension, that drift-minimization does not equal maximal runtime.

We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods among a set of agents. Our focus is on the existence of allocations that give each agent their maximin fair share--the value they are guaranteed if they divide the goods into as many bundles as there are agents, and receive their lowest valued bundle. An MMS allocation is one where every agent receives at least their maximin fair share. We examine the existence of such allocations when agents have cost utilities. In this setting, each item has an associated cost, and an agent's valuation for an item is the cost of the item if it is useful to them, and zero otherwise. Our main results indicate that cost utilities are a promising restriction for achieving MMS. We show that for the case of three agents with cost utilities, an MMS allocation always exists. We also show that when preferences are restricted slightly further--to what we call laminar set approvals--we can guarantee MMS allocations for any number of agents. Finally, we explore if it is possible to guarantee each agent their maximin fair share while using a strategyproof mechanism.

We improve the efficiency of algorithms for stochastic combinatorial semi-bandits. In most interesting problems, state-of-the-art algorithms take advantage of structural properties of rewards, such as independence. However, while being optimal in terms of asymptotic regret, these algorithms are inefficient. In our paper, we first reduce their implementation to a specific submodular maximization. Then, in case of matroid constraints, we design adapted approximation routines, thereby providing the first efficient algorithms that rely on reward structure to improve regret bound. In particular, we improve the state-of-the-art efficient gap-free regret bound by a factor m/log m, where m is the maximum action size. Finally, we show how our improvement translates to more general budgeted combinatorial semi-bandits.

Maximizing a monotone submodular function under cardinality constraint k is a core problem in machine learning and database with many basic applications, including video and data summarization, recommendation systems, feature extraction, exemplar clustering, and coverage problems. We study this classic problem in the fully dynamic model where a stream of insertions and deletions of elements of an underlying ground set is given and the goal is to maintain an approximate solution using a fast update time. A recent paper at NeurIPS'20 by Lattanzi, Mitrovic, Norouzi{-}Fard, Tarnawski, Zadimoghaddam claims to obtain a dynamic algorithm for this problem with a 1{2} -epsilon approximation ratio and a query complexity bounded by poly(log(n),log(k),epsilon^{-1}). However, as we explain in this paper, the analysis has some important gaps. Having a dynamic algorithm for the problem with polylogarithmic update time is even more important in light of a recent result by Chen and Peng at STOC'22 who show a matching lower bound for the problem -- any randomized algorithm with a 1{2}+epsilon approximation ratio must have an amortized query complexity that is polynomial in n. In this paper, we develop a simpler algorithm for the problem that maintains a (1{2}-epsilon)-approximate solution for submodular maximization under cardinality constraint k using a polylogarithmic amortized update time.

Autoregressive models (ARMs) are hindered by slow sequential inference. While masked diffusion models (MDMs) offer a parallel alternative, they suffer from critical drawbacks: high computational overhead from precluding Key-Value (KV) caching, and incoherent generation arising from learning dependencies over an intractable space of token combinations. To address these limitations, we introduce ReFusion, a novel masked diffusion model that achieves superior performance and efficiency by elevating parallel decoding from the token level to a higher slot level, where each slot is a fixed-length, contiguous sub-sequence. This is achieved through an iterative ``plan-and-infill'' decoding process: a diffusion-based planning step first identifies a set of weakly dependent slots, and an autoregressive infilling step then decodes these selected slots in parallel. The slot-based design simultaneously unlocks full KV cache reuse with a unified causal framework and reduces the learning complexity from the token combination space to a manageable slot-level permutation space. Extensive experiments on seven diverse benchmarks show that ReFusion not only overwhelmingly surpasses prior MDMs with 34% performance gains and an over 18times speedup on average, but also bridges the performance gap to strong ARMs while maintaining a 2.33times average speedup.

Wider adoption of neural networks in many critical domains such as finance and healthcare is being hindered by the need to explain their predictions and to impose additional constraints on them. Monotonicity constraint is one of the most requested properties in real-world scenarios and is the focus of this paper. One of the oldest ways to construct a monotonic fully connected neural network is to constrain signs on its weights. Unfortunately, this construction does not work with popular non-saturated activation functions as it can only approximate convex functions. We show this shortcoming can be fixed by constructing two additional activation functions from a typical unsaturated monotonic activation function and employing each of them on the part of neurons. Our experiments show this approach of building monotonic neural networks has better accuracy when compared to other state-of-the-art methods, while being the simplest one in the sense of having the least number of parameters, and not requiring any modifications to the learning procedure or post-learning steps. Finally, we prove it can approximate any continuous monotone function on a compact subset of R^n.

We study the fairness of dynamic resource allocation problem under the α-fairness criterion. We recognize two different fairness objectives that naturally arise in this problem: the well-understood slot-fairness objective that aims to ensure fairness at every timeslot, and the less explored horizon-fairness objective that aims to ensure fairness across utilities accumulated over a time horizon. We argue that horizon-fairness comes at a lower price in terms of social welfare. We study horizon-fairness with the regret as a performance metric and show that vanishing regret cannot be achieved in presence of an unrestricted adversary. We propose restrictions on the adversary's capabilities corresponding to realistic scenarios and an online policy that indeed guarantees vanishing regret under these restrictions. We demonstrate the applicability of the proposed fairness framework to a representative resource management problem considering a virtualized caching system where different caches cooperate to serve content requests.

We study online maximization of non-monotone Diminishing-Return(DR)-submodular functions over down-closed convex sets, a regime where existing projection-free online methods suffer from suboptimal regret and limited feedback guarantees. Our main contribution is a new structural result showing that this class is 1/e-linearizable under carefully designed exponential reparametrization, scaling parameter, and surrogate potential, enabling a reduction to online linear optimization. As a result, we obtain O(T^{1/2}) static regret with a single gradient query per round and unlock adaptive and dynamic regret guarantees, together with improved rates under semi-bandit, bandit, and zeroth-order feedback. Across all feedback models, our bounds strictly improve the state of the art.

Randomized mechanisms can have good normative properties compared to their deterministic counterparts. However, randomized mechanisms are problematic in several ways such as in their verifiability. We propose here to derandomize such mechanisms by having agents play a game instead of tossing a coin. The game is designed so an agent's best action is to play randomly, and this play then injects ``randomness'' into the mechanism. This derandomization retains many of the good normative properties of the original randomized mechanism but gives a mechanism that is deterministic and easy, for instance, to audit. We consider three related methods to derandomize randomized mechanism in six different domains: voting, facility location, task allocation, school choice, peer selection, and resource allocation. We propose a number of novel derandomized mechanisms for these six domains with good normative properties. Each mechanism has a mixed Nash equilibrium in which agents play a modular arithmetic game with an uniform mixed strategy. In all but one mixed Nash equilibrium, agents report their preferences over the original problem sincerely. The derandomized methods are thus ``quasi-strategy proof''. In one domain, we additionally show that a new and desirable normative property emerges as a result of derandomization.

We consider the problem of ranking n experts based on their performances on d tasks. We make a monotonicity assumption stating that for each pair of experts, one outperforms the other on all tasks. We consider the sequential setting where in each round, the learner has access to noisy evaluations of actively chosen pair of expert-task, given the information available up to the actual round. Given a confidence parameter delta in (0, 1), we provide strategies allowing to recover the correct ranking of experts and develop a bound on the total number of queries made by our algorithm that hold with probability at least 1 -- delta. We show that our strategy is adaptive to the complexity of the problem (our bounds are instance dependent), and develop matching lower bounds up to a poly-logarithmic factor. Finally, we adapt our strategy to the relaxed problem of best expert identification and provide numerical simulation consistent with our theoretical results.

Algorithms for min-max optimization and variational inequalities are often studied under monotonicity assumptions. Motivated by non-monotone machine learning applications, we follow the line of works [Diakonikolas et al., 2021, Lee and Kim, 2021, Pethick et al., 2022, B\"ohm, 2022] aiming at going beyond monotonicity by considering the weaker negative comonotonicity assumption. In particular, we provide tight complexity analyses for the Proximal Point, Extragradient, and Optimistic Gradient methods in this setup, closing some questions on their working guarantees beyond monotonicity.

The bandits with knapsack (BwK) framework models online decision-making problems in which an agent makes a sequence of decisions subject to resource consumption constraints. The traditional model assumes that each action consumes a non-negative amount of resources and the process ends when the initial budgets are fully depleted. We study a natural generalization of the BwK framework which allows non-monotonic resource utilization, i.e., resources can be replenished by a positive amount. We propose a best-of-both-worlds primal-dual template that can handle any online learning problem with replenishment for which a suitable primal regret minimizer exists. In particular, we provide the first positive results for the case of adversarial inputs by showing that our framework guarantees a constant competitive ratio alpha when B=Omega(T) or when the possible per-round replenishment is a positive constant. Moreover, under a stochastic input model, our algorithm yields an instance-independent O(T^{1/2}) regret bound which complements existing instance-dependent bounds for the same setting. Finally, we provide applications of our framework to some economic problems of practical relevance.

Online allocation problems with resource constraints are central problems in revenue management and online advertising. In these problems, requests arrive sequentially during a finite horizon and, for each request, a decision maker needs to choose an action that consumes a certain amount of resources and generates reward. The objective is to maximize cumulative rewards subject to a constraint on the total consumption of resources. In this paper, we consider a data-driven setting in which the reward and resource consumption of each request are generated using an input model that is unknown to the decision maker. We design a general class of algorithms that attain good performance in various input models without knowing which type of input they are facing. In particular, our algorithms are asymptotically optimal under independent and identically distributed inputs as well as various non-stationary stochastic input models, and they attain an asymptotically optimal fixed competitive ratio when the input is adversarial. Our algorithms operate in the Lagrangian dual space: they maintain a dual multiplier for each resource that is updated using online mirror descent. By choosing the reference function accordingly, we recover the dual sub-gradient descent and dual multiplicative weights update algorithm. The resulting algorithms are simple, fast, and do not require convexity in the revenue function, consumption function and action space, in contrast to existing methods for online allocation problems. We discuss applications to network revenue management, online bidding in repeated auctions with budget constraints, online proportional matching with high entropy, and personalized assortment optimization with limited inventory.

Variational inequalities have recently attracted considerable interest in machine learning as a flexible paradigm for models that go beyond ordinary loss function minimization (such as generative adversarial networks and related deep learning systems). In this setting, the optimal O(1/t) convergence rate for solving smooth monotone variational inequalities is achieved by the Extra-Gradient (EG) algorithm and its variants. Aiming to alleviate the cost of an extra gradient step per iteration (which can become quite substantial in deep learning applications), several algorithms have been proposed as surrogates to Extra-Gradient with a single oracle call per iteration. In this paper, we develop a synthetic view of such algorithms, and we complement the existing literature by showing that they retain a O(1/t) ergodic convergence rate in smooth, deterministic problems. Subsequently, beyond the monotone deterministic case, we also show that the last iterate of single-call, stochastic extra-gradient methods still enjoys a O(1/t) local convergence rate to solutions of non-monotone variational inequalities that satisfy a second-order sufficient condition.

Many inference-time language-model pipelines combine a cheap reward signal with an expensive verifier, such as exact answer checking in mathematical reasoning or hidden-test execution in code generation. We formalize this setting using a learning-theoretic lens as generative active search: a cost-sensitive first-positive search problem in which a policy adaptively samples candidates from an unknown distribution, observes cheap scores, and pays for verifier labels until it finds a positive example. For a fixed prompt, the generator and reward model induce two unknown objects: a distribution over reward scores and a score-conditioned success function. When these quantities are known, we characterize the distribution-aware optimal policy using a dynamic programming approach. In the realistic and practical setting where both the score distribution and success function are unknown, we propose ADAP, a shellwise adaptive generate-rank-verify algorithm that progressively increases the number of sampled responses and top-ranked verifications. Under the monotonicity assumption that higher reward scores are no less likely to pass verification, we show that ADAP achieves expected cost within a constant factor of the distribution-aware optimum. We complement this result with learning-theoretic lower bounds, based on a centered star number, showing that structural assumptions on the score--label relationship are necessary. Experiments on mathematical reasoning and competitive programming validate the predicted advantage over both fixed non-adaptive policies and difficulty-adaptive baselines.

Multi-armed bandit problems are the predominant theoretical model of exploration-exploitation tradeoffs in learning, and they have countless applications ranging from medical trials, to communication networks, to Web search and advertising. In many of these application domains the learner may be constrained by one or more supply (or budget) limits, in addition to the customary limitation on the time horizon. The literature lacks a general model encompassing these sorts of problems. We introduce such a model, called "bandits with knapsacks", that combines aspects of stochastic integer programming with online learning. A distinctive feature of our problem, in comparison to the existing regret-minimization literature, is that the optimal policy for a given latent distribution may significantly outperform the policy that plays the optimal fixed arm. Consequently, achieving sublinear regret in the bandits-with-knapsacks problem is significantly more challenging than in conventional bandit problems. We present two algorithms whose reward is close to the information-theoretic optimum: one is based on a novel "balanced exploration" paradigm, while the other is a primal-dual algorithm that uses multiplicative updates. Further, we prove that the regret achieved by both algorithms is optimal up to polylogarithmic factors. We illustrate the generality of the problem by presenting applications in a number of different domains including electronic commerce, routing, and scheduling. As one example of a concrete application, we consider the problem of dynamic posted pricing with limited supply and obtain the first algorithm whose regret, with respect to the optimal dynamic policy, is sublinear in the supply.

Auto-bidding systems aim to maximize advertiser value over long horizons under budget constraints and ratio targets such as cost-per-acquisition, yet future traffic and auction dynamics are non-stationary and uncertain. Existing approaches face distinct limitations: control-based pacing reacts to deviations but cannot anticipate future conditions, while RL and generative methods fold constraints into reward signals, obscuring violations and degrading under distribution shift. We shift the learning target from actions to responses with the Generative Response Model (GRM), a history-conditioned sequence model that jointly predicts future traffic volume and horizon-aggregate cost/value curves as functions of a single bid multiplier. We show that under mild monotonicity conditions, the optimality gap relative to full per-tick control is bounded by the dispersion of per-tick marginal value-per-cost. Given predicted responses, a lightweight analytic controller enforces each active constraint via a 1D root-finding step. We prove this controller is exact for the single-multiplier problem and bound constraint violations under receding-horizon replanning in terms of prediction error. Experiments on AuctionNet show that GRM improves constraint stability and overall score compared to existing baselines.

The online knapsack problem is a classic problem in the field of online algorithms. Its canonical version asks how to pack items of different values and weights arriving online into a capacity-limited knapsack so as to maximize the total value of the admitted items. Although optimal competitive algorithms are known for this problem, they may be fundamentally unfair, i.e., individual items may be treated inequitably in different ways. We formalize a practically-relevant notion of time fairness which effectively models a trade off between static and dynamic pricing in a motivating application such as cloud resource allocation, and show that existing algorithms perform poorly under this metric. We propose a parameterized deterministic algorithm where the parameter precisely captures the Pareto-optimal trade-off between fairness (static pricing) and competitiveness (dynamic pricing). We show that randomization is theoretically powerful enough to be simultaneously competitive and fair; however, it does not work well in experiments. To further improve the trade-off between fairness and competitiveness, we develop a nearly-optimal learning-augmented algorithm which is fair, consistent, and robust (competitive), showing substantial performance improvements in numerical experiments.

We consider the task of identifying the Copeland winner(s) in a dueling bandits problem with ternary feedback. This is an underexplored but practically relevant variant of the conventional dueling bandits problem, in which, in addition to strict preference between two arms, one may observe feedback in the form of an indifference. We provide a lower bound on the sample complexity for any learning algorithm finding the Copeland winner(s) with a fixed error probability. Moreover, we propose POCOWISTA, an algorithm with a sample complexity that almost matches this lower bound, and which shows excellent empirical performance, even for the conventional dueling bandits problem. For the case where the preference probabilities satisfy a specific type of stochastic transitivity, we provide a refined version with an improved worst case sample complexity.

We study the non-stationary dueling bandits problem with K arms, where the time horizon T consists of M stationary segments, each of which is associated with its own preference matrix. The learner repeatedly selects a pair of arms and observes a binary preference between them as feedback. To minimize the accumulated regret, the learner needs to pick the Condorcet winner of each stationary segment as often as possible, despite preference matrices and segment lengths being unknown. We propose the Beat, the, Winner, Reset algorithm and prove a bound on its expected binary weak regret in the stationary case, which tightens the bound of current state-of-art algorithms. We also show a regret bound for the non-stationary case, without requiring knowledge of M or T. We further propose and analyze two meta-algorithms, DETECT for weak regret and Monitored, Dueling, Bandits for strong regret, both based on a detection-window approach that can incorporate any dueling bandit algorithm as a black-box algorithm. Finally, we prove a worst-case lower bound for expected weak regret in the non-stationary case.

The Prophet Inequality and Pandora's Box problems are fundamental stochastic problem with applications in Mechanism Design, Online Algorithms, Stochastic Optimization, Optimal Stopping, and Operations Research. A usual assumption in these works is that the probability distributions of the n underlying random variables are given as input to the algorithm. Since in practice these distributions need to be learned, we initiate the study of such stochastic problems in the Multi-Armed Bandits model. In the Multi-Armed Bandits model we interact with n unknown distributions over T rounds: in round t we play a policy x^{(t)} and receive a partial (bandit) feedback on the performance of x^{(t)}. The goal is to minimize the regret, which is the difference over T rounds in the total value of the optimal algorithm that knows the distributions vs. the total value of our algorithm that learns the distributions from the partial feedback. Our main results give near-optimal O(poly(n)T) total regret algorithms for both Prophet Inequality and Pandora's Box. Our proofs proceed by maintaining confidence intervals on the unknown indices of the optimal policy. The exploration-exploitation tradeoff prevents us from directly refining these confidence intervals, so the main technique is to design a regret upper bound that is learnable while playing low-regret Bandit policies.

Nash regret has recently emerged as a principled fairness-aware performance metric for stochastic multi-armed bandits, motivated by the Nash Social Welfare objective. Although this notion has been extended to linear bandits, existing results suffer from suboptimality in ambient dimension d, stemming from proof techniques that rely on restrictive concentration inequalities. In this work, we resolve this open problem by introducing new analytical tools that yield an order-optimal Nash regret bound in linear bandits. Beyond Nash regret, we initiate the study of p-means regret in linear bandits, a unifying framework that interpolates between fairness and utility objectives and strictly generalizes Nash regret. We propose a generic algorithmic framework, FairLinBandit, that works as a meta-algorithm on top of any linear bandit strategy. We instantiate this framework using two bandit algorithms: Phased Elimination and Upper Confidence Bound, and prove that both achieve sublinear p-means regret for the entire range of p. Extensive experiments on linear bandit instances generated from real-world datasets demonstrate that our methods consistently outperform the existing state-of-the-art baseline.

We study a strategic variant of the multi-armed bandit problem, which we coin the strategic click-bandit. This model is motivated by applications in online recommendation where the choice of recommended items depends on both the click-through rates and the post-click rewards. Like in classical bandits, rewards follow a fixed unknown distribution. However, we assume that the click-rate of each arm is chosen strategically by the arm (e.g., a host on Airbnb) in order to maximize the number of times it gets clicked. The algorithm designer does not know the post-click rewards nor the arms' actions (i.e., strategically chosen click-rates) in advance, and must learn both values over time. To solve this problem, we design an incentive-aware learning algorithm, UCB-S, which achieves two goals simultaneously: (a) incentivizing desirable arm behavior under uncertainty; (b) minimizing regret by learning unknown parameters. We characterize all approximate Nash equilibria among arms under UCB-S and show a mathcal{O} (KT) regret bound uniformly in every equilibrium. We also show that incentive-unaware algorithms generally fail to achieve low regret in the strategic click-bandit. Finally, we support our theoretical results by simulations of strategic arm behavior which confirm the effectiveness and robustness of our proposed incentive design.

Classical convergence guarantees for gradient-based learning in games require the pseudo-gradient to be (strongly) monotone in Euclidean geometry as shown by rosen(1965), a condition that often fails even in simple games with strong cross-player couplings. We introduce Small-Gain Nash (SGN), a block small-gain condition in a custom block-weighted geometry. SGN converts local curvature and cross-player Lipschitz coupling bounds into a tractable certificate of contraction. It constructs a weighted block metric in which the pseudo-gradient becomes strongly monotone on any region where these bounds hold, even when it is non-monotone in the Euclidean sense. The continuous flow is exponentially contracting in this designed geometry, and projected Euler and RK4 discretizations converge under explicit step-size bounds derived from the SGN margin and a local Lipschitz constant. Our analysis reveals a certified ``timescale band'', a non-asymptotic, metric-based certificate that plays a TTUR-like role: rather than forcing asymptotic timescale separation via vanishing, unequal step sizes, SGN identifies a finite band of relative metric weights for which a single-step-size dynamics is provably contractive. We validate the framework on quadratic games where Euclidean monotonicity analysis fails to predict convergence, but SGN successfully certifies it, and extend the construction to mirror/Fisher geometries for entropy-regularized policy gradient in Markov games. The result is an offline certification pipeline that estimates curvature, coupling, and Lipschitz parameters on compact regions, optimizes block weights to enlarge the SGN margin, and returns a structural, computable convergence certificate consisting of a metric, contraction rate, and safe step-sizes for non-monotone games.

Online advertising has recently grown into a highly competitive and complex multi-billion-dollar industry, with advertisers bidding for ad slots at large scales and high frequencies. This has resulted in a growing need for efficient "auto-bidding" algorithms that determine the bids for incoming queries to maximize advertisers' targets subject to their specified constraints. This work explores efficient online algorithms for a single value-maximizing advertiser under an increasingly popular constraint: Return-on-Spend (RoS). We quantify efficiency in terms of regret relative to the optimal algorithm, which knows all queries a priori. We contribute a simple online algorithm that achieves near-optimal regret in expectation while always respecting the specified RoS constraint when the input sequence of queries are i.i.d. samples from some distribution. We also integrate our results with the previous work of Balseiro, Lu, and Mirrokni [BLM20] to achieve near-optimal regret while respecting both RoS and fixed budget constraints. Our algorithm follows the primal-dual framework and uses online mirror descent (OMD) for the dual updates. However, we need to use a non-canonical setup of OMD, and therefore the classic low-regret guarantee of OMD, which is for the adversarial setting in online learning, no longer holds. Nonetheless, in our case and more generally where low-regret dynamics are applied in algorithm design, the gradients encountered by OMD can be far from adversarial but influenced by our algorithmic choices. We exploit this key insight to show our OMD setup achieves low regret in the realm of our algorithm.

We study a distributed stochastic multi-armed bandit where a client supplies the learner with communication-constrained feedback based on the rewards for the corresponding arm pulls. In our setup, the client must encode the rewards such that the second moment of the encoded rewards is no more than P, and this encoded reward is further corrupted by additive Gaussian noise of variance sigma^2; the learner only has access to this corrupted reward. For this setting, we derive an information-theoretic lower bound of Omegaleft(frac{KT{SNR wedge1}} right) on the minimax regret of any scheme, where SNR := P{sigma^2}, and K and T are the number of arms and time horizon, respectively. Furthermore, we propose a multi-phase bandit algorithm, UEtext{-UCB++}, which matches this lower bound to a minor additive factor. UEtext{-UCB++} performs uniform exploration in its initial phases and then utilizes the {\em upper confidence bound }(UCB) bandit algorithm in its final phase. An interesting feature of UEtext{-UCB++} is that the coarser estimates of the mean rewards formed during a uniform exploration phase help to refine the encoding protocol in the next phase, leading to more accurate mean estimates of the rewards in the subsequent phase. This positive reinforcement cycle is critical to reducing the number of uniform exploration rounds and closely matching our lower bound.

We consider the problem of decentralized multi-agent reinforcement learning in Markov games. A fundamental question is whether there exist algorithms that, when adopted by all agents and run independently in a decentralized fashion, lead to no-regret for each player, analogous to celebrated convergence results in normal-form games. While recent work has shown that such algorithms exist for restricted settings (notably, when regret is defined with respect to deviations to Markovian policies), the question of whether independent no-regret learning can be achieved in the standard Markov game framework was open. We provide a decisive negative resolution this problem, both from a computational and statistical perspective. We show that: - Under the widely-believed assumption that PPAD-hard problems cannot be solved in polynomial time, there is no polynomial-time algorithm that attains no-regret in general-sum Markov games when executed independently by all players, even when the game is known to the algorithm designer and the number of players is a small constant. - When the game is unknown, no algorithm, regardless of computational efficiency, can achieve no-regret without observing a number of episodes that is exponential in the number of players. Perhaps surprisingly, our lower bounds hold even for seemingly easier setting in which all agents are controlled by a a centralized algorithm. They are proven via lower bounds for a simpler problem we refer to as SparseCCE, in which the goal is to compute a coarse correlated equilibrium that is sparse in the sense that it can be represented as a mixture of a small number of product policies. The crux of our approach is a novel application of aggregation techniques from online learning, whereby we show that any algorithm for the SparseCCE problem can be used to compute approximate Nash equilibria for non-zero sum normal-form games.

We study the polynomial-time approximability of the optimal online stochastic bipartite matching algorithm, initiated by Papadimitriou et al. (EC'21). Here, nodes on one side of the graph are given upfront, while at each time t, an online node and its edge weights are drawn from a time-dependent distribution. The optimal algorithm is PSPACE-hard to approximate within some universal constant. We refer to this optimal algorithm, which requires time to think (compute), as a philosopher, and refer to polynomial-time online approximations of the above as philosopher inequalities. The best known philosopher inequality for online matching yields a 0.652-approximation. In contrast, the best possible prophet inequality, or approximation of the optimum offline solution, is 0.5. Our main results are a 0.678-approximate algorithm and a 0.685-approximation for a vertex-weighted special case. Notably, both bounds exceed the 0.666-approximation of the offline optimum obtained by Tang, Wu, and Wu (STOC'22) for the vertex-weighted problem. Building on our algorithms and the recent black-box reduction of Banihashem et al. (SODA'24), we provide polytime (pricing-based) truthful mechanisms which 0.678-approximate the social welfare of the optimal online allocation for bipartite matching markets. Our online allocation algorithm relies on the classic pivotal sampling algorithm (Srinivasan FOCS'01, Gandhi et al. J.ACM'06), along with careful discarding to obtain negative correlations between offline nodes. Consequently, the analysis boils down to examining the distribution of a weighted sum X of negatively correlated Bernoulli variables, specifically lower bounding its mass below a threshold, E[min(1,X)], of possible independent interest. Interestingly, our bound relies on an imaginary invocation of pivotal sampling.

Card games are widely used to study sequential decision-making under uncertainty, with real-world analogues in negotiation, finance, and cybersecurity. These games typically fall into three categories based on the flow of control: strictly sequential (players alternate single actions), deterministic response (some actions trigger a fixed outcome), and unbounded reciprocal response (alternating counterplays are permitted). A less-explored but strategically rich structure is the bounded one-sided response, where a player's action briefly transfers control to the opponent, who must satisfy a fixed condition through one or more moves before the turn resolves. We term games featuring this mechanism Bounded One-Sided Response Games (BORGs). We introduce a modified version of Monopoly Deal as a benchmark environment that isolates this dynamic, where a Rent action forces the opponent to choose payment assets. The gold-standard algorithm, Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR), converges on effective strategies without novel algorithmic extensions. A lightweight full-stack research platform unifies the environment, a parallelized CFR runtime, and a human-playable web interface. The trained CFR agent and source code are available at https://monopolydeal.ai.

A common approach for aligning language models to human preferences is to first learn a reward model from preference data, and then use this reward model to update the language model. We study two closely related problems that arise in this approach. First, any monotone transformation of the reward model preserves preference ranking; is there a choice that is ``better'' than others? Second, we often wish to align language models to multiple properties: how should we combine multiple reward models? Using a probabilistic interpretation of the alignment procedure, we identify a natural choice for transformation for (the common case of) rewards learned from Bradley-Terry preference models. This derived transformation has two important properties. First, it emphasizes improving poorly-performing outputs, rather than outputs that already score well. This mitigates both underfitting (where some prompts are not improved) and reward hacking (where the model learns to exploit misspecification of the reward model). Second, it enables principled aggregation of rewards by linking summation to logical conjunction: the sum of transformed rewards corresponds to the probability that the output is ``good'' in all measured properties, in a sense we make precise. Experiments aligning language models to be both helpful and harmless using RLHF show substantial improvements over the baseline (non-transformed) approach.

We consider the problem of subset selection where one is given multiple rankings of items and the goal is to select the highest ``quality'' subset. Score functions from the multiwinner voting literature have been used to aggregate rankings into quality scores for subsets. We study this setting of subset selection problems when, in addition, rankings may contain systemic or unconscious biases toward a group of items. For a general model of input rankings and biases, we show that requiring the selected subset to satisfy group fairness constraints can improve the quality of the selection with respect to unbiased rankings. Importantly, we show that for fairness constraints to be effective, different multiwinner score functions may require a drastically different number of rankings: While for some functions, fairness constraints need an exponential number of rankings to recover a close-to-optimal solution, for others, this dependency is only polynomial. This result relies on a novel notion of ``smoothness'' of submodular functions in this setting that quantifies how well a function can ``correctly'' assess the quality of items in the presence of bias. The results in this paper can be used to guide the choice of multiwinner score functions for the subset selection setting considered here; we additionally provide a tool to empirically enable this.

Motivated by concerns about making online decisions that incur undue amount of risk at each time step, in this paper, we formulate the probably anytime-safe stochastic combinatorial semi-bandits problem. In this problem, the agent is given the option to select a subset of size at most K from a set of L ground items. Each item is associated to a certain mean reward as well as a variance that represents its risk. To mitigate the risk that the agent incurs, we require that with probability at least 1-delta, over the entire horizon of time T, each of the choices that the agent makes should contain items whose sum of variances does not exceed a certain variance budget. We call this probably anytime-safe constraint. Under this constraint, we design and analyze an algorithm {\sc PASCombUCB} that minimizes the regret over the horizon of time T. By developing accompanying information-theoretic lower bounds, we show that under both the problem-dependent and problem-independent paradigms, {\sc PASCombUCB} is almost asymptotically optimal. Experiments are conducted to corroborate our theoretical findings. Our problem setup, the proposed {\sc PASCombUCB} algorithm, and novel analyses are applicable to domains such as recommendation systems and transportation in which an agent is allowed to choose multiple items at a single time step and wishes to control the risk over the whole time horizon.

We present Self-Play Preference Optimization (SPO), an algorithm for reinforcement learning from human feedback. Our approach is minimalist in that it does not require training a reward model nor unstable adversarial training and is therefore rather simple to implement. Our approach is maximalist in that it provably handles non-Markovian, intransitive, and stochastic preferences while being robust to the compounding errors that plague offline approaches to sequential prediction. To achieve the preceding qualities, we build upon the concept of a Minimax Winner (MW), a notion of preference aggregation from the social choice theory literature that frames learning from preferences as a zero-sum game between two policies. By leveraging the symmetry of this game, we prove that rather than using the traditional technique of dueling two policies to compute the MW, we can simply have a single agent play against itself while maintaining strong convergence guarantees. Practically, this corresponds to sampling multiple trajectories from a policy, asking a rater or preference model to compare them, and then using the proportion of wins as the reward for a particular trajectory. We demonstrate that on a suite of continuous control tasks, we are able to learn significantly more efficiently than reward-model based approaches while maintaining robustness to the intransitive and stochastic preferences that frequently occur in practice when aggregating human judgments.

Value function factorization has achieved great success in multi-agent reinforcement learning by optimizing joint action-value functions through the maximization of factorized per-agent utilities. To ensure Individual-Global-Maximum property, existing works often focus on value factorization using monotonic functions, which are known to result in restricted representation expressiveness. In this paper, we analyze the limitations of monotonic factorization and present ConcaveQ, a novel non-monotonic value function factorization approach that goes beyond monotonic mixing functions and employs neural network representations of concave mixing functions. Leveraging the concave property in factorization, an iterative action selection scheme is developed to obtain optimal joint actions during training. It is used to update agents' local policy networks, enabling fully decentralized execution. The effectiveness of the proposed ConcaveQ is validated across scenarios involving multi-agent predator-prey environment and StarCraft II micromanagement tasks. Empirical results exhibit significant improvement of ConcaveQ over state-of-the-art multi-agent reinforcement learning approaches.

Motivated by the phenomenon of strategic agents gaming a recommender system to maximize the number of times they are recommended to users, we study a strategic variant of the linear contextual bandit problem, where the arms can strategically misreport privately observed contexts to the learner. We treat the algorithm design problem as one of mechanism design under uncertainty and propose the Optimistic Grim Trigger Mechanism (OptGTM) that incentivizes the agents (i.e., arms) to report their contexts truthfully while simultaneously minimizing regret. We also show that failing to account for the strategic nature of the agents results in linear regret. However, a trade-off between mechanism design and regret minimization appears to be unavoidable. More broadly, this work aims to provide insight into the intersection of online learning and mechanism design.

In the context of reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF), the reward function is generally derived from maximum likelihood estimation of a random utility model based on pairwise comparisons made by humans. The problem of learning a reward function is one of preference aggregation that, we argue, largely falls within the scope of social choice theory. From this perspective, we can evaluate different aggregation methods via established axioms, examining whether these methods meet or fail well-known standards. We demonstrate that both the Bradley-Terry-Luce Model and its broad generalizations fail to meet basic axioms. In response, we develop novel rules for learning reward functions with strong axiomatic guarantees. A key innovation from the standpoint of social choice is that our problem has a linear structure, which greatly restricts the space of feasible rules and leads to a new paradigm that we call linear social choice.

We investigate the online bandit learning of the monotone multi-linear DR-submodular functions, designing the algorithm BanditMLSM that attains O(T^{2/3}log T) of (1-1/e)-regret. Then we reduce submodular bandit with partition matroid constraint and bandit sequential monotone maximization to the online bandit learning of the monotone multi-linear DR-submodular functions, attaining O(T^{2/3}log T) of (1-1/e)-regret in both problems, which improve the existing results. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to give a sublinear regret algorithm for the submodular bandit with partition matroid constraint. A special case of this problem is studied by Streeter et al.(2009). They prove a O(T^{4/5}) (1-1/e)-regret upper bound. For the bandit sequential submodular maximization, the existing work proves an O(T^{2/3}) regret with a suboptimal 1/2 approximation ratio (Niazadeh et al. 2021).

While plan-and-infill decoding in Masked Diffusion Models (MDMs) shows promise for mathematical and code reasoning, performance remains highly sensitive to slot infilling order, often yielding substantial output variance. We introduce McDiffuSE, a framework that formulates slot selection as decision making and optimises infilling orders through Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS). McDiffuSE uses look-ahead simulations to evaluate partial completions before commitment, systematically exploring the combinatorial space of generation orders. Experiments show an average improvement of 3.2% over autoregressive baselines and 8.0% over baseline plan-and-infill, with notable gains of 19.5% on MBPP and 4.9% on MATH500. Our analysis reveals that while McDiffuSE predominantly follows sequential ordering, incorporating non-sequential generation is essential for maximising performance. We observe that larger exploration constants, rather than increased simulations, are necessary to overcome model confidence biases and discover effective orderings. These findings establish MCTS-based planning as an effective approach for enhancing generation quality in MDMs.

Network routers that enforce Quality-of-Service (QoS) guarantees must decide, at every clock cycle, which expiring packet of information to transmit, even when the value of the packet is unknown until it is processed. We frame this problem as the Online Packet Scheduling with Deadlines (OPSD) problem under Partial Feedback: packets arrive at every clock cycle, with different deadlines, but the weights are only observed after execution. Under a stochastic assumption on the unknown weights, we explore different variants of the OPSD problem with bandit feedback. We establish a connection between our setting and the sleeping bandits problem, and set our learning goal to α-regret minimization. We provide algorithms with provable α-regret guarantees under different spans of slackness, distinguishing systems allowing for randomization and systems that do not. In every scenario, our algorithms achieve an α-regret upper bound of mathcal{O}left(KTright), matching the lower bound for the standard bandit setting. In the practically relevant case of 2-bounded deadline instances, where the deadline is set at most one clock cycle away from the arrival, our deterministic algorithm achieves the provably tightest possible competitive ratio. Remarkably, when the number of distinct packet types Kge 2 is finite, it is possible to break the well-established Φ= 1+sqrt{5}{2} competitive ratio barrier and attain a tighter competitive ratio θ_K ranging in [2, Φ).

We examine the problem of regret minimization when the learner is involved in a continuous game with other optimizing agents: in this case, if all players follow a no-regret algorithm, it is possible to achieve significantly lower regret relative to fully adversarial environments. We study this problem in the context of variationally stable games (a class of continuous games which includes all convex-concave and monotone games), and when the players only have access to noisy estimates of their individual payoff gradients. If the noise is additive, the game-theoretic and purely adversarial settings enjoy similar regret guarantees; however, if the noise is multiplicative, we show that the learners can, in fact, achieve constant regret. We achieve this faster rate via an optimistic gradient scheme with learning rate separation -- that is, the method's extrapolation and update steps are tuned to different schedules, depending on the noise profile. Subsequently, to eliminate the need for delicate hyperparameter tuning, we propose a fully adaptive method that attains nearly the same guarantees as its non-adapted counterpart, while operating without knowledge of either the game or of the noise profile.

Loss functions serve as the foundation of supervised learning and are often chosen prior to model development. To avoid potentially ad hoc choices of losses, statistical decision theory describes a desirable property for losses known as properness, which asserts that Bayes' rule is optimal. Recent works have sought to learn losses and models jointly. Existing methods do this by fitting an inverse canonical link function which monotonically maps R to [0,1] to estimate probabilities for binary problems. In this paper, we extend monotonicity to maps between R^{C-1} and the projected probability simplex Delta^{C-1} by using monotonicity of gradients of convex functions. We present {\sc LegendreTron} as a novel and practical method that jointly learns proper canonical losses and probabilities for multiclass problems. Tested on a benchmark of domains with up to 1,000 classes, our experimental results show that our method consistently outperforms the natural multiclass baseline under a t-test at 99% significance on all datasets with greater than 10 classes.

When deploying a single predictor across multiple subpopulations, we propose a fundamentally different approach: interpreting group fairness as a bargaining problem among subpopulations. This game-theoretic perspective reveals that existing robust optimization methods such as minimizing worst-group loss or regret correspond to classical bargaining solutions and embody different fairness principles. We propose relative improvement, the ratio of actual risk reduction to potential reduction from a baseline predictor, which recovers the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. Unlike absolute-scale methods that may not be comparable when groups have different potential predictability, relative improvement provides axiomatic justification including scale invariance and individual monotonicity. We establish finite-sample convergence guarantees under mild conditions.

We study the problem of robustly learning Gaussian Single Index Models (SIMs) in the presence of heavy-tailed noise and a constant fraction of adversarially corrupted covariates and responses. Prior work on robust recovery has considered settings such as linear regression (Pensia et al., JASA 2024), strictly monotonic link functions (Awasthi et al., NeurIPS 2022), and phase retrieval (Buna and Rebeschini, AISTATS 2025). However, these techniques do not extend to generic asymmetric non-monotonic link functions such as GeLU and Swish, which arise naturally as scalar primitives in modern gated neural architectures. We close this gap by giving the first robust recovery algorithm with near-linear sample and time complexity for generic non-monotonic link functions, thereby establishing the first robust recovery guarantees for a broad family of nonlinear SIMs for which no guarantees were previously known. Our central contribution is a new structural understanding of the Gaussian squared-loss landscape under adversarial contamination. Crucially, we prove that for a broad class of nonlinear non-monotonic SIMs, a dimension-independent, constant-radius convex basin exists around the ground truth and is efficiently reachable via robust spectral initialization even under adversarial contamination. Prior works fail to establish both guarantees simultaneously, thereby either breaking down under adversarial contamination or failing to handle generic non-monotonic link functions. Together, these structural insights yield a principled warm start for robust gradient descent that provably converges to a final estimation error of O(σsqrtε) in O(nd) time with O(d) samples, where ε is the contamination fraction.

We study a graph bandit setting where the objective of the learner is to detect the most influential node of a graph by requesting as little information from the graph as possible. One of the relevant applications for this setting is marketing in social networks, where the marketer aims at finding and taking advantage of the most influential customers. The existing approaches for bandit problems on graphs require either partial or complete knowledge of the graph. In this paper, we do not assume any knowledge of the graph, but we consider a setting where it can be gradually discovered in a sequential and active way. At each round, the learner chooses a node of the graph and the only information it receives is a stochastic set of the nodes that the chosen node is currently influencing. To address this setting, we propose BARE, a bandit strategy for which we prove a regret guarantee that scales with the detectable dimension, a problem dependent quantity that is often much smaller than the number of nodes.

We consider a fair division model in which agents have positive, zero and negative utilities for items. For this model, we analyse one existing fairness property - EFX - and three new and related properties - EFX_0, EFX^3 and EF1^3 - in combination with Pareto-optimality. With general utilities, we give a modified version of an existing algorithm for computing an EF1^3 allocation. With -alpha/0/alpha utilities, this algorithm returns an EFX^3 and PO allocation. With absolute identical utilities, we give a new algorithm for an EFX and PO allocation. With -alpha/0/beta utilities, this algorithm also returns such an allocation. We report some new impossibility results as well.

The best-of-both-worlds paradigm advocates an approach that achieves desirable properties both ex-ante and ex-post. We launch a best-of-both-worlds fairness perspective for the important social choice setting of approval-based committee voting. To this end, we initiate work on ex-ante proportional representation properties in this domain and formalize a hierarchy of notions including Individual Fair Share (IFS), Unanimous Fair Share (UFS), Group Fair Share (GFS), and their stronger variants. We establish their compatibility with well-studied ex-post concepts such as extended justified representation (EJR) and fully justified representation (FJR). Our first main result is a polynomial-time algorithm that simultaneously satisfies ex-post EJR, ex-ante GFS and ex-ante Strong UFS. Subsequently, we strengthen our ex-post guarantee to FJR and present an algorithm that outputs a lottery which is ex-post FJR and ex-ante Strong UFS, but does not run in polynomial time.

We initiate the study of statistical inference and A/B testing for first-price pacing equilibria (FPPE). The FPPE model captures the dynamics resulting from large-scale first-price auction markets where buyers use pacing-based budget management. Such markets arise in the context of internet advertising, where budgets are prevalent. We propose a statistical framework for the FPPE model, in which a limit FPPE with a continuum of items models the long-run steady-state behavior of the auction platform, and an observable FPPE consisting of a finite number of items provides the data to estimate primitives of the limit FPPE, such as revenue, Nash social welfare (a fair metric of efficiency), and other parameters of interest. We develop central limit theorems and asymptotically valid confidence intervals. Furthermore, we establish the asymptotic local minimax optimality of our estimators. We then show that the theory can be used for conducting statistically valid A/B testing on auction platforms. Numerical simulations verify our central limit theorems, and empirical coverage rates for our confidence intervals agree with our theory.

Mehta and Panigrahi (2012) proposed Online Matching with Stochastic Rewards, which generalizes the Online Bipartite Matching problem of Karp, Vazirani, and Vazirani (1990) by associating the edges with success probabilities. This new feature captures the pay-per-click model in online advertising. Recently, Huang and Zhang (2020) studied this problem under the online primal dual framework using the Configuration Linear Program (LP), and got the best known competitive ratios of the Stochastic Balance algorithm. Their work suggests that the more expressive Configuration LP is more suitable for this problem than the Matching LP. This paper advances the theory of Configuration LP in two directions. Our technical contribution includes a characterization of the joint matching outcome of an offline vertex and all its neighbors. This characterization may be of independent interest, and is aligned with the spirit of Configuration LP. By contrast, previous analyses of Ranking generally focus on only one neighbor. Second, we designed a Stochastic Configuration LP that captures a stochastic benchmark proposed by Goyal and Udwani (2020), who used a Path-based LP. The Stochastic Configuration LP is smaller and simpler than the Path-based LP. Moreover, using the new LP we improved the competitive ratio of Stochastic Balance from 0.596 to 0.611 when the success probabilities are infinitesimal, and to 0.613 when the success probabilities are further equal.

We consider the combinatorial bandits problem with semi-bandit feedback under finite sampling budget constraints, in which the learner can carry out its action only for a limited number of times specified by an overall budget. The action is to choose a set of arms, whereupon feedback for each arm in the chosen set is received. Unlike existing works, we study this problem in a non-stochastic setting with subset-dependent feedback, i.e., the semi-bandit feedback received could be generated by an oblivious adversary and also might depend on the chosen set of arms. In addition, we consider a general feedback scenario covering both the numerical-based as well as preference-based case and introduce a sound theoretical framework for this setting guaranteeing sensible notions of optimal arms, which a learner seeks to find. We suggest a generic algorithm suitable to cover the full spectrum of conceivable arm elimination strategies from aggressive to conservative. Theoretical questions about the sufficient and necessary budget of the algorithm to find the best arm are answered and complemented by deriving lower bounds for any learning algorithm for this problem scenario.

We study first-order methods for solving monotone variational inequalities arising in min-max optimization. Classical approaches such as the extragradient method rely on two gradient queries per iteration, which limits their analysis and applicability in the online and stochastic settings. We propose a family of Generalized Optimistic Methods with Anchoring (GOMA), which combine two-time-scale optimistic updates with an anchoring term inspired by Halpern iteration. In the deterministic setting, GOMA achieves the optimal accelerated last-iterate rate O(1/k^2) on the squared gradient norm for monotone Lipschitz operators. In the stochastic setting with unbounded variance, a simplified single-call variant of GOMA achieves a last-iterate convergence rate of O(1/k) on the squared gradient norm. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first such guarantee for stochastic monotone Lipschitz variational inequalities in the unconstrained setting without variance reduction or growing batches.

Maximizing a monotone submodular function is a fundamental task in machine learning, economics, and statistics. In this paper, we present two communication-efficient decentralized online algorithms for the monotone continuous DR-submodular maximization problem, both of which reduce the number of per-function gradient evaluations and per-round communication complexity from T^{3/2} to 1. The first one, One-shot Decentralized Meta-Frank-Wolfe (Mono-DMFW), achieves a (1-1/e)-regret bound of O(T^{4/5}). As far as we know, this is the first one-shot and projection-free decentralized online algorithm for monotone continuous DR-submodular maximization. Next, inspired by the non-oblivious boosting function zhang2022boosting, we propose the Decentralized Online Boosting Gradient Ascent (DOBGA) algorithm, which attains a (1-1/e)-regret of O(T). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first result to obtain the optimal O(T) against a (1-1/e)-approximation with only one gradient inquiry for each local objective function per step. Finally, various experimental results confirm the effectiveness of the proposed methods.

When trying to solve a computational problem, we are often faced with a choice between algorithms that are guaranteed to return the right answer but differ in their runtime distributions (e.g., SAT solvers, sorting algorithms). This paper aims to lay theoretical foundations for such choices by formalizing preferences over runtime distributions. It might seem that we should simply prefer the algorithm that minimizes expected runtime. However, such preferences would be driven by exactly how slow our algorithm is on bad inputs, whereas in practice we are typically willing to cut off occasional, sufficiently long runs before they finish. We propose a principled alternative, taking a utility-theoretic approach to characterize the scoring functions that describe preferences over algorithms. These functions depend on the way our value for solving our problem decreases with time and on the distribution from which captimes are drawn. We describe examples of realistic utility functions and show how to leverage a maximum-entropy approach for modeling underspecified captime distributions. Finally, we show how to efficiently estimate an algorithm's expected utility from runtime samples.

This paper considers the problem of combinatorial multi-armed bandits with semi-bandit feedback and a cardinality constraint on the super-arm size. Existing algorithms for solving this problem typically involve two key sub-routines: (1) a parameter estimation routine that sequentially estimates a set of base-arm parameters, and (2) a super-arm selection policy for selecting a subset of base arms deemed optimal based on these parameters. State-of-the-art algorithms assume access to an exact oracle for super-arm selection with unbounded computational power. At each instance, this oracle evaluates a list of score functions, the number of which grows as low as linearly and as high as exponentially with the number of arms. This can be prohibitive in the regime of a large number of arms. This paper introduces a novel realistic alternative to the perfect oracle. This algorithm uses a combination of group-testing for selecting the super arms and quantized Thompson sampling for parameter estimation. Under a general separability assumption on the reward function, the proposed algorithm reduces the complexity of the super-arm-selection oracle to be logarithmic in the number of base arms while achieving the same regret order as the state-of-the-art algorithms that use exact oracles. This translates to at least an exponential reduction in complexity compared to the oracle-based approaches.

We consider a combinatorial multi-armed bandit problem for maximum value reward function under maximum value and index feedback. This is a new feedback structure that lies in between commonly studied semi-bandit and full-bandit feedback structures. We propose an algorithm and provide a regret bound for problem instances with stochastic arm outcomes according to arbitrary distributions with finite supports. The regret analysis rests on considering an extended set of arms, associated with values and probabilities of arm outcomes, and applying a smoothness condition. Our algorithm achieves a O((k/Delta)log(T)) distribution-dependent and a O(T) distribution-independent regret where k is the number of arms selected in each round, Delta is a distribution-dependent reward gap and T is the horizon time. Perhaps surprisingly, the regret bound is comparable to previously-known bound under more informative semi-bandit feedback. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our algorithm through experimental results.

We introduce a new budgeted framework for online influence maximization, considering the total cost of an advertising campaign instead of the common cardinality constraint on a chosen influencer set. Our approach better models the real-world setting where the cost of influencers varies and advertisers want to find the best value for their overall social advertising budget. We propose an algorithm assuming an independent cascade diffusion model and edge level semi-bandit feedback, and provide both theoretical and experimental results. Our analysis is also valid for the cardinality constraint setting and improves the state of the art regret bound in this case.

Regret minimization in streaming multi-armed bandits (MABs) has been studied extensively in recent years. In the single-pass setting with K arms and T trials, a regret lower bound of Omega(T^{2/3}) has been proved for any algorithm with o(K) memory (Maiti et al. [NeurIPS'21]; Agarwal at al. [COLT'22]). On the other hand, however, the previous best regret upper bound is still O(K^{1/3} T^{2/3}log^{1/3}(T)), which is achieved by the streaming implementation of the simple uniform exploration. The O(K^{1/3}log^{1/3}(T)) gap leaves the open question of the tight regret bound in the single-pass MABs with sublinear arm memory. In this paper, we answer this open problem and complete the picture of regret minimization in single-pass streaming MABs. We first improve the regret lower bound to Omega(K^{1/3}T^{2/3}) for algorithms with o(K) memory, which matches the uniform exploration regret up to a logarithm factor in T. We then show that the log^{1/3}(T) factor is not necessary, and we can achieve O(K^{1/3}T^{2/3}) regret by finding an varepsilon-best arm and committing to it in the rest of the trials. For regret minimization with high constant probability, we can apply the single-memory varepsilon-best arm algorithms in Jin et al. [ICML'21] to obtain the optimal bound. Furthermore, for the expected regret minimization, we design an algorithm with a single-arm memory that achieves O(K^{1/3} T^{2/3}log(K)) regret, and an algorithm with O(log^{*}(n))-memory with the optimal O(K^{1/3} T^{2/3}) regret following the varepsilon-best arm algorithm in Assadi and Wang [STOC'20]. We further tested the empirical performances of our algorithms. The simulation results show that the proposed algorithms consistently outperform the benchmark uniform exploration algorithm by a large margin, and on occasion, reduce the regret by up to 70%.

In their seminal work, Nayyar et al. (2013) showed that imperfect information can be abstracted away from common-payoff games by having players publicly announce their policies as they play. This insight underpins sound solvers and decision-time planning algorithms for common-payoff games. Unfortunately, a naive application of the same insight to two-player zero-sum games fails because Nash equilibria of the game with public policy announcements may not correspond to Nash equilibria of the original game. As a consequence, existing sound decision-time planning algorithms require complicated additional mechanisms that have unappealing properties. The main contribution of this work is showing that certain regularized equilibria do not possess the aforementioned non-correspondence problem -- thus, computing them can be treated as perfect-information problems. Because these regularized equilibria can be made arbitrarily close to Nash equilibria, our result opens the door to a new perspective to solving two-player zero-sum games and yields a simplified framework for decision-time planning in two-player zero-sum games, void of the unappealing properties that plague existing decision-time planning approaches.

Simple regret is a natural and parameter-free performance criterion for pure exploration in multi-armed bandits yet is less popular than the probability of missing the best arm or an epsilon-good arm, perhaps due to lack of easy ways to characterize it. In this paper, we make significant progress on minimizing simple regret in both data-rich (Tge n) and data-poor regime (T le n) where n is the number of arms, and T is the number of samples. At its heart is our improved instance-dependent analysis of the well-known Sequential Halving (SH) algorithm, where we bound the probability of returning an arm whose mean reward is not within epsilon from the best (i.e., not epsilon-good) for any choice of epsilon>0, although epsilon is not an input to SH. Our bound not only leads to an optimal worst-case simple regret bound of n/T up to logarithmic factors but also essentially matches the instance-dependent lower bound for returning an epsilon-good arm reported by Katz-Samuels and Jamieson (2020). For the more challenging data-poor regime, we propose Bracketing SH (BSH) that enjoys the same improvement even without sampling each arm at least once. Our empirical study shows that BSH outperforms existing methods on real-world tasks.

We consider the linear contextual multi-class multi-period packing problem (LMMP) where the goal is to pack items such that the total vector of consumption is below a given budget vector and the total value is as large as possible. We consider the setting where the reward and the consumption vector associated with each action is a class-dependent linear function of the context, and the decision-maker receives bandit feedback. LMMP includes linear contextual bandits with knapsacks and online revenue management as special cases. We establish a new estimator which guarantees a faster convergence rate, and consequently, a lower regret in such problems. We propose a bandit policy that is a closed-form function of said estimated parameters. When the contexts are non-degenerate, the regret of the proposed policy is sublinear in the context dimension, the number of classes, and the time horizon T when the budget grows at least as T. We also resolve an open problem posed by Agrawal & Devanur (2016) and extend the result to a multi-class setting. Our numerical experiments clearly demonstrate that the performance of our policy is superior to other benchmarks in the literature.

We consider a stochastic bandit problem with infinitely many arms. In this setting, the learner has no chance of trying all the arms even once and has to dedicate its limited number of samples only to a certain number of arms. All previous algorithms for this setting were designed for minimizing the cumulative regret of the learner. In this paper, we propose an algorithm aiming at minimizing the simple regret. As in the cumulative regret setting of infinitely many armed bandits, the rate of the simple regret will depend on a parameter β characterizing the distribution of the near-optimal arms. We prove that depending on β, our algorithm is minimax optimal either up to a multiplicative constant or up to a log(n) factor. We also provide extensions to several important cases: when β is unknown, in a natural setting where the near-optimal arms have a small variance, and in the case of unknown time horizon.

We consider non-clairvoyant scheduling with online precedence constraints, where an algorithm is oblivious to any job dependencies and learns about a job only if all of its predecessors have been completed. Given strong impossibility results in classical competitive analysis, we investigate the problem in a learning-augmented setting, where an algorithm has access to predictions without any quality guarantee. We discuss different prediction models: novel problem-specific models as well as general ones, which have been proposed in previous works. We present lower bounds and algorithmic upper bounds for different precedence topologies, and thereby give a structured overview on which and how additional (possibly erroneous) information helps for designing better algorithms. Along the way, we also improve bounds on traditional competitive ratios for existing algorithms.

Citizens' assemblies are a form of democratic innovation in which a randomly selected panel of constituents deliberates on questions of public interest. We study a novel goal for the selection of panel members: maximizing the entropy of the distribution over possible panels. We design algorithms that sample from maximum-entropy distributions, potentially subject to constraints on the individual selection probabilities. We investigate the properties of these algorithms theoretically, including in terms of their resistance to manipulation and transparency. We benchmark our algorithms on a large set of real assembly lotteries in terms of their intersectional diversity and the probability of satisfying unseen representation constraints, and we obtain favorable results on both measures. We deploy one of our algorithms on a website for citizens' assembly practitioners.

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards has shown notable effectiveness in enhancing large language models (LLMs) reasoning performance, especially in mathematics tasks. However, such improvements often come with reduced outcome diversity, where the model concentrates probability mass on a narrow set of solutions. Motivated by diminishing-returns principles, we introduce a set level diversity objective defined over sampled trajectories using kernelized similarity. Our approach derives a leave-one-out marginal contribution for each sampled trajectory and integrates this objective as a plug-in advantage shaping term for policy optimization. We further investigate the contribution of a single trajectory to language model diversity within a distribution perturbation framework. This analysis theoretically confirms a monotonicity property, proving that rarer trajectories yield consistently higher marginal contributions to the global diversity. Extensive experiments across a range of model scales demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed algorithm, consistently outperforming strong baselines in both Pass@1 and Pass@K across various benchmarks.

We consider an online learning problem with one-sided feedback, in which the learner is able to observe the true label only for positively predicted instances. On each round, k instances arrive and receive classification outcomes according to a randomized policy deployed by the learner, whose goal is to maximize accuracy while deploying individually fair policies. We first extend the framework of Bechavod et al. (2020), which relies on the existence of a human fairness auditor for detecting fairness violations, to instead incorporate feedback from dynamically-selected panels of multiple, possibly inconsistent, auditors. We then construct an efficient reduction from our problem of online learning with one-sided feedback and a panel reporting fairness violations to the contextual combinatorial semi-bandit problem (Cesa-Bianchi & Lugosi, 2009, Gy\"{o}rgy et al., 2007). Finally, we show how to leverage the guarantees of two algorithms in the contextual combinatorial semi-bandit setting: Exp2 (Bubeck et al., 2012) and the oracle-efficient Context-Semi-Bandit-FTPL (Syrgkanis et al., 2016), to provide multi-criteria no regret guarantees simultaneously for accuracy and fairness. Our results eliminate two potential sources of bias from prior work: the "hidden outcomes" that are not available to an algorithm operating in the full information setting, and human biases that might be present in any single human auditor, but can be mitigated by selecting a well chosen panel.

We consider the problem of fairly allocating a sequence of indivisible items that arrive online in an arbitrary order to a group of n agents with additive normalized valuation functions. We consider both the allocation of goods and chores and propose algorithms for approximating maximin share (MMS) allocations. When agents have identical valuation functions the problem coincides with the semi-online machine covering problem (when items are goods) and load balancing problem (when items are chores), for both of which optimal competitive ratios have been achieved. In this paper, we consider the case when agents have general additive valuation functions. For the allocation of goods, we show that no competitive algorithm exists even when there are only three agents and propose an optimal 0.5-competitive algorithm for the case of two agents. For the allocation of chores, we propose a (2-1/n)-competitive algorithm for n>=3 agents and a square root of 2 (approximately 1.414)-competitive algorithm for two agents. Additionally, we show that no algorithm can do better than 15/11 (approximately 1.364)-competitive for two agents.

Closed-loop decision-making systems (e.g., lending, screening, or recidivism risk assessment) often operate under fairness and service constraints while inducing feedback effects: decisions change who appears in the future, yielding non-stationary data and potentially amplifying disparities. We study online learning of a one-dimensional threshold policy from bandit feedback under demographic parity (DP) and, optionally, service-rate constraints. The learner observes only a scalar score each round and selects a threshold; reward and constraint residuals are revealed only for the chosen threshold. We propose Optimistic Feasible Search (OFS), a simple grid-based method that maintains confidence bounds for reward and constraint residuals for each candidate threshold. At each round, OFS selects a threshold that appears feasible under confidence bounds and, among those, maximizes optimistic reward; if no threshold appears feasible, OFS selects the threshold minimizing optimistic constraint violation. This design directly targets feasible high-utility thresholds and is particularly effective for low-dimensional, interpretable policy classes where discretization is natural. We evaluate OFS on (i) a synthetic closed-loop benchmark with stable contraction dynamics and (ii) two semi-synthetic closed-loop benchmarks grounded in German Credit and COMPAS, constructed by training a score model and feeding group-dependent acceptance decisions back into population composition. Across all environments, OFS achieves higher reward with smaller cumulative constraint violation than unconstrained and primal-dual bandit baselines, and is near-oracle relative to the best feasible fixed threshold under the same sweep procedure. Experiments are reproducible and organized with double-blind-friendly relative outputs.

Conventional models of matching markets assume that monetary transfers can clear markets by compensating for utility differentials. However, empirical patterns show that such transfers often fail to close structural preference gaps. This paper introduces a market microstructure framework that models matching decisions as a limit order book system with rigid bid ask spreads. Individual preferences are represented by a latent preference state matrix, where the spread between an agent's internal ask price (the unconditional maximum) and the market's best bid (the reachable maximum) creates a structural liquidity constraint. We establish a Threshold Impossibility Theorem showing that linear compensation cannot close these spreads unless it induces a categorical identity shift. A dynamic discrete choice execution model further demonstrates that matches occur only when the market to book ratio crosses a time decaying liquidity threshold, analogous to order execution under inventory pressure. Numerical experiments validate persistent slippage, regional invariance of preference orderings, and high tier zero spread executions. The model provides a unified microstructure explanation for matching failures, compensation inefficiency, and post match regret in illiquid order driven environments.

In recommender system or crowdsourcing applications of online learning, a human's preferences or abilities are often a function of the algorithm's recent actions. Motivated by this, a significant line of work has formalized settings where an action's loss is a function of the number of times that action was recently played in the prior m timesteps, where m corresponds to a bound on human memory capacity. To more faithfully capture decay of human memory with time, we introduce the Weighted Tallying Bandit (WTB), which generalizes this setting by requiring that an action's loss is a function of a weighted summation of the number of times that arm was played in the last m timesteps. This WTB setting is intractable without further assumption. So we study it under Repeated Exposure Optimality (REO), a condition motivated by the literature on human physiology, which requires the existence of an action that when repetitively played will eventually yield smaller loss than any other sequence of actions. We study the minimization of the complete policy regret (CPR), which is the strongest notion of regret, in WTB under REO. Since m is typically unknown, we assume we only have access to an upper bound M on m. We show that for problems with K actions and horizon T, a simple modification of the successive elimination algorithm has O left( KT + (m+M)K right) CPR. Interestingly, upto an additive (in lieu of mutliplicative) factor in (m+M)K, this recovers the classical guarantee for the simpler stochastic multi-armed bandit with traditional regret. We additionally show that in our setting, any algorithm will suffer additive CPR of Omega left( mK + M right), demonstrating our result is nearly optimal. Our algorithm is computationally efficient, and we experimentally demonstrate its practicality and superiority over natural baselines.

Budget management strategies in repeated auctions have received growing attention in online advertising markets. However, previous work on budget management in online bidding mainly focused on second-price auctions. The rapid shift from second-price auctions to first-price auctions for online ads in recent years has motivated the challenging question of how to bid in repeated first-price auctions while controlling budgets. In this work, we study the problem of learning in repeated first-price auctions with budgets. We design a dual-based algorithm that can achieve a near-optimal O(T) regret with full information feedback where the maximum competing bid is always revealed after each auction. We further consider the setting with one-sided information feedback where only the winning bid is revealed after each auction. We show that our modified algorithm can still achieve an O(T) regret with mild assumptions on the bidder's value distribution. Finally, we complement the theoretical results with numerical experiments to confirm the effectiveness of our budget management policy.

We study monotone submodular maximization under general matroid constraints in the online setting. We prove that online optimization of a large class of submodular functions, namely, weighted threshold potential functions, reduces to online convex optimization (OCO). This is precisely because functions in this class admit a concave relaxation; as a result, OCO policies, coupled with an appropriate rounding scheme, can be used to achieve sublinear regret in the combinatorial setting. We show that our reduction extends to many different versions of the online learning problem, including the dynamic regret, bandit, and optimistic-learning settings.

Differentiable sorting algorithms allow training with sorting and ranking supervision, where only the ordering or ranking of samples is known. Various methods have been proposed to address this challenge, ranging from optimal transport-based differentiable Sinkhorn sorting algorithms to making classic sorting networks differentiable. One problem of current differentiable sorting methods is that they are non-monotonic. To address this issue, we propose a novel relaxation of conditional swap operations that guarantees monotonicity in differentiable sorting networks. We introduce a family of sigmoid functions and prove that they produce differentiable sorting networks that are monotonic. Monotonicity ensures that the gradients always have the correct sign, which is an advantage in gradient-based optimization. We demonstrate that monotonic differentiable sorting networks improve upon previous differentiable sorting methods.

In this paper, we introduce the Preselection Bandit problem, in which the learner preselects a subset of arms (choice alternatives) for a user, which then chooses the final arm from this subset. The learner is not aware of the user's preferences, but can learn them from observed choices. In our concrete setting, we allow these choices to be stochastic and model the user's actions by means of the Plackett-Luce model. The learner's main task is to preselect subsets that eventually lead to highly preferred choices. To formalize this goal, we introduce a reasonable notion of regret and derive lower bounds on the expected regret. Moreover, we propose algorithms for which the upper bound on expected regret matches the lower bound up to a logarithmic term of the time horizon.

We propose Monte Carlo Permutation Search (MCPS), a general-purpose Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) algorithm that improves upon the GRAVE algorithm. MCPS is relevant when deep reinforcement learning is not an option, or when the computing power available before play is not substantial, such as in General Game Playing, for example. The principle of MCPS is to include in the exploration term of a node the statistics on all the playouts that contain all the moves on the path from the root to the node. We extensively test MCPS on a variety of games: board games, wargame, investment game, video game and multi-player games. MCPS has better results than GRAVE in all the two-player games. It has equivalent results for multi-player games because these games are inherently balanced even when players have different strengths. We also show that using abstract codes for moves instead of exact codes can be beneficial to both MCPS and GRAVE, as they improve the permutation statistics and the AMAF statistics. We also provide a mathematical derivation of the formulas used for weighting the three sources of statistics. These formulas are an improvement on the GRAVE formula since they no longer use the bias hyperparameter of GRAVE. Moreover, MCPS is not sensitive to the ref hyperparameter.

We revisit the noisy binary search model of Karp and Kleinberg, in which we have n coins with unknown probabilities p_i that we can flip. The coins are sorted by increasing p_i, and we would like to find where the probability crosses (to within varepsilon) of a target value tau. This generalized the fixed-noise model of Burnashev and Zigangirov , in which p_i = 1{2} pm varepsilon, to a setting where coins near the target may be indistinguishable from it. Karp and Kleinberg showed that Theta(1{varepsilon^2} log n) samples are necessary and sufficient for this task. We produce a practical algorithm by solving two theoretical challenges: high-probability behavior and sharp constants. We give an algorithm that succeeds with probability 1-delta from \[ 1{C_{\tau, \varepsilon}} \cdot \left(\lg n + O(\log^{2/3} n \log^{1/3} 1{\delta} + \log 1{\delta})\right) \] samples, where C_{tau, varepsilon} is the optimal such constant achievable. For delta > n^{-o(1)} this is within 1 + o(1) of optimal, and for delta ll 1 it is the first bound within constant factors of optimal.

Inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) is typically formulated as maximizing entropy subject to matching the distribution of expert trajectories. Classical (dual-ascent) IRL guarantees monotonic performance improvement but requires fully solving an RL problem each iteration to compute dual gradients. More recent adversarial methods avoid this cost at the expense of stability and monotonic dual improvement, by directly optimizing the primal problem and using a discriminator to provide rewards. In this work, we bridge the gap between these approaches by enabling monotonic improvement of the reward function and policy without having to fully solve an RL problem at every iteration. Our key theoretical insight is that a trust-region-optimal policy for a reward function update can be globally optimal for a smaller update in the same direction. This smaller update allows us to explicitly optimize the dual objective while only relying on a local search around the current policy. In doing so, our approach avoids the training instabilities of adversarial methods, offers monotonic performance improvement, and learns a reward function in the traditional sense of IRL--one that can be globally optimized to match expert demonstrations. Our proposed algorithm, Trust Region Inverse Reinforcement Learning (TRIRL), outperforms state-of-the-art imitation learning methods across multiple challenging tasks by a factor of 2.4x in terms of aggregate inter-quartile mean, while recovering reward functions that generalize to system dynamics shifts.

Reasoning is not just about solving problems -- it is also about evaluating which problems are worth solving at all. Evaluations of artificial intelligence (AI) systems primarily focused on problem solving, historically by studying how models play games such as chess and Go. In this paper, we advocate for a new paradigm that assesses AI systems' evaluation of games. First, we introduce a formalism for evaluating such evaluations. We then leverage a large-scale dataset of over 100 novel board games and over 450 human judgments to compare evaluations produced by modern language and reasoning models against those of people and symbolic computational agents. We consider two kinds of evaluative queries: assessing the payoff (or fairness) and the funness of games. These queries span two dimensions relevant to the design of evaluations of AI evaluations: how complex a query is to compute and how difficult a query is to quantify. Our results show that reasoning models are generally more aligned to people in their evaluations of games than non-reasoning language models. However, we observe a non-monotonic relationship: as models get closer to game-theoretic optimal, their fit to human data weakens. We also observe more "jaggedness" across models for assessing funness, in line with the greater difficulty of quantifying this query. Across queries and games, reasoning models show highly variable and unpredictable resource usage when assessing queries, pointing to the importance of imbuing more resource-rational meta-reasoning in language and reasoning models.

Competitions for shareable and limited resources have long been studied with strategic agents. In reality, agents often have to learn and maximize the rewards of the resources at the same time. To design an individualized competing policy, we model the competition between agents in a novel multi-player multi-armed bandit (MPMAB) setting where players are selfish and aim to maximize their own rewards. In addition, when several players pull the same arm, we assume that these players averagely share the arms' rewards by expectation. Under this setting, we first analyze the Nash equilibrium when arms' rewards are known. Subsequently, we propose a novel SelfishMPMAB with Averaging Allocation (SMAA) approach based on the equilibrium. We theoretically demonstrate that SMAA could achieve a good regret guarantee for each player when all players follow the algorithm. Additionally, we establish that no single selfish player can significantly increase their rewards through deviation, nor can they detrimentally affect other players' rewards without incurring substantial losses for themselves. We finally validate the effectiveness of the method in extensive synthetic experiments.

Congestion is a common failure mode of markets, where consumers compete inefficiently on the same subset of goods (e.g., chasing the same small set of properties on a vacation rental platform). The typical economic story is that prices decongest by balancing supply and demand. But in modern online marketplaces, prices are typically set in a decentralized way by sellers, and the information about items is inevitably partial. The power of a platform is limited to controlling representations -- the subset of information about items presented by default to users. This motivates the present study of decongestion by representation, where a platform seeks to learn representations that reduce congestion and thus improve social welfare. The technical challenge is twofold: relying only on revealed preferences from the choices of consumers, rather than true preferences; and the combinatorial problem associated with representations that determine the features to reveal in the default view. We tackle both challenges by proposing a differentiable proxy of welfare that can be trained end-to-end on consumer choice data. We develop sufficient conditions for when decongestion promotes welfare, and present the results of extensive experiments on both synthetic and real data that demonstrate the utility of our approach.

We study the problem of designing mechanisms for information acquisition scenarios. This setting models strategic interactions between an uniformed receiver and a set of informed senders. In our model the senders receive information about the underlying state of nature and communicate their observation (either truthfully or not) to the receiver, which, based on this information, selects an action. Our goal is to design mechanisms maximizing the receiver's utility while incentivizing the senders to report truthfully their information. First, we provide an algorithm that efficiently computes an optimal incentive compatible (IC) mechanism. Then, we focus on the online problem in which the receiver sequentially interacts in an unknown game, with the objective of minimizing the cumulative regret w.r.t. the optimal IC mechanism, and the cumulative violation of the incentive compatibility constraints. We investigate two different online scenarios, i.e., the full and bandit feedback settings. For the full feedback problem, we propose an algorithm that guarantees mathcal O(sqrt T) regret and violation, while for the bandit feedback setting we present an algorithm that attains mathcal O(T^{alpha}) regret and mathcal O(T^{1-alpha/2}) violation for any alphain[1/2, 1]. Finally, we complement our results providing a tight lower bound.

Although the existing causal inference literature focuses on the forward-looking perspective by estimating effects of causes, the backward-looking perspective can provide insights into causes of effects. In backward-looking causal inference, the probability of necessity measures the probability that a certain event is caused by the treatment given the observed treatment and outcome. Most existing results focus on binary outcomes. Motivated by applications with ordinal outcomes, we propose a general definition of the probability of necessity. However, identifying the probability of necessity is challenging because it involves the joint distribution of the potential outcomes. We propose a novel assumption of monotonic incremental treatment effect to identify the probability of necessity with ordinal outcomes. We also discuss the testable implications of this key identification assumption. When it fails, we derive explicit formulas of the sharp large-sample bounds on the probability of necessity.

To fully leverage the capabilities of diffusion models, we are often interested in optimizing downstream reward functions during inference. While numerous algorithms for reward-guided generation have been recently proposed due to their significance, current approaches predominantly focus on single-shot generation, transitioning from fully noised to denoised states. We propose a novel framework for inference-time reward optimization with diffusion models inspired by evolutionary algorithms. Our approach employs an iterative refinement process consisting of two steps in each iteration: noising and reward-guided denoising. This sequential refinement allows for the gradual correction of errors introduced during reward optimization. Besides, we provide a theoretical guarantee for our framework. Finally, we demonstrate its superior empirical performance in protein and cell-type-specific regulatory DNA design. The code is available at https://github.com/masa-ue/ProDifEvo-Refinement{https://github.com/masa-ue/ProDifEvo-Refinement}.

We study the impact on mechanisms for facility location of moving from one dimension to two (or more) dimensions and Euclidean or Manhattan distances. We consider three fundamental axiomatic properties: anonymity which is a basic fairness property, Pareto optimality which is one of the most important efficiency properties, and strategy proofness which ensures agents do not have an incentive to mis-report. We also consider how well such mechanisms can approximate the optimal welfare. Our results are somewhat negative. Moving from one dimension to two (or more) dimensions often makes these axiomatic properties more difficult to achieve. For example, with two facilities in Euclidean space or with just a single facility in Manhattan space, no mechanism is anonymous, Pareto optimal and strategy proof. By contrast, mechanisms on the line exist with all three properties.We also show that approximation ratios may increase when moving to two (or more) dimensions. All our impossibility results are minimal. If we drop one of the three axioms (anonymity, Pareto optimality or strategy proofness) multiple mechanisms satisfy the other two axioms.

We investigate learning the equilibria in non-stationary multi-agent systems and address the challenges that differentiate multi-agent learning from single-agent learning. Specifically, we focus on games with bandit feedback, where testing an equilibrium can result in substantial regret even when the gap to be tested is small, and the existence of multiple optimal solutions (equilibria) in stationary games poses extra challenges. To overcome these obstacles, we propose a versatile black-box approach applicable to a broad spectrum of problems, such as general-sum games, potential games, and Markov games, when equipped with appropriate learning and testing oracles for stationary environments. Our algorithms can achieve Oleft(Delta^{1/4}T^{3/4}right) regret when the degree of nonstationarity, as measured by total variation Delta, is known, and Oleft(Delta^{1/5}T^{4/5}right) regret when Delta is unknown, where T is the number of rounds. Meanwhile, our algorithm inherits the favorable dependence on number of agents from the oracles. As a side contribution that may be independent of interest, we show how to test for various types of equilibria by a black-box reduction to single-agent learning, which includes Nash equilibria, correlated equilibria, and coarse correlated equilibria.

We investigate stochastic combinatorial multi-armed bandit with semi-bandit feedback (CMAB). In CMAB, the question of the existence of an efficient policy with an optimal asymptotic regret (up to a factor poly-logarithmic with the action size) is still open for many families of distributions, including mutually independent outcomes, and more generally the multivariate sub-Gaussian family. We propose to answer the above question for these two families by analyzing variants of the Combinatorial Thompson Sampling policy (CTS). For mutually independent outcomes in [0,1], we propose a tight analysis of CTS using Beta priors. We then look at the more general setting of multivariate sub-Gaussian outcomes and propose a tight analysis of CTS using Gaussian priors. This last result gives us an alternative to the Efficient Sampling for Combinatorial Bandit policy (ESCB), which, although optimal, is not computationally efficient.

In budget-limited multi-armed bandit (MAB) problems, the learner's actions are costly and constrained by a fixed budget. Consequently, an optimal exploitation policy may not be to pull the optimal arm repeatedly, as is the case in other variants of MAB, but rather to pull the sequence of different arms that maximises the agent's total reward within the budget. This difference from existing MABs means that new approaches to maximising the total reward are required. Given this, we develop two pulling policies, namely: (i) KUBE; and (ii) fractional KUBE. Whereas the former provides better performance up to 40% in our experimental settings, the latter is computationally less expensive. We also prove logarithmic upper bounds for the regret of both policies, and show that these bounds are asymptotically optimal (i.e. they only differ from the best possible regret by a constant factor).

In machine learning, the notion of multi-armed bandits refers to a class of online learning problems, in which an agent is supposed to simultaneously explore and exploit a given set of choice alternatives in the course of a sequential decision process. In the standard setting, the agent learns from stochastic feedback in the form of real-valued rewards. In many applications, however, numerical reward signals are not readily available -- instead, only weaker information is provided, in particular relative preferences in the form of qualitative comparisons between pairs of alternatives. This observation has motivated the study of variants of the multi-armed bandit problem, in which more general representations are used both for the type of feedback to learn from and the target of prediction. The aim of this paper is to provide a survey of the state of the art in this field, referred to as preference-based multi-armed bandits or dueling bandits. To this end, we provide an overview of problems that have been considered in the literature as well as methods for tackling them. Our taxonomy is mainly based on the assumptions made by these methods about the data-generating process and, related to this, the properties of the preference-based feedback.

In this paper, we consider the problem of sleeping bandits with stochastic action sets and adversarial rewards. In this setting, in contrast to most work in bandits, the actions may not be available at all times. For instance, some products might be out of stock in item recommendation. The best existing efficient (i.e., polynomial-time) algorithms for this problem only guarantee an O(T^{2/3}) upper-bound on the regret. Yet, inefficient algorithms based on EXP4 can achieve O(T). In this paper, we provide a new computationally efficient algorithm inspired by EXP3 satisfying a regret of order O(T) when the availabilities of each action i in cA are independent. We then study the most general version of the problem where at each round available sets are generated from some unknown arbitrary distribution (i.e., without the independence assumption) and propose an efficient algorithm with O(2^K T) regret guarantee. Our theoretical results are corroborated with experimental evaluations.

In the field of algorithmic fairness, significant attention has been put on group fairness criteria, such as Demographic Parity and Equalized Odds. Nevertheless, these objectives, measured as global averages, have raised concerns about persistent local disparities between sensitive groups. In this work, we address the problem of local fairness, which ensures that the predictor is unbiased not only in terms of expectations over the whole population, but also within any subregion of the feature space, unknown at training time. To enforce this objective, we introduce ROAD, a novel approach that leverages the Distributionally Robust Optimization (DRO) framework within a fair adversarial learning objective, where an adversary tries to infer the sensitive attribute from the predictions. Using an instance-level re-weighting strategy, ROAD is designed to prioritize inputs that are likely to be locally unfair, i.e. where the adversary faces the least difficulty in reconstructing the sensitive attribute. Numerical experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of our method: it achieves Pareto dominance with respect to local fairness and accuracy for a given global fairness level across three standard datasets, and also enhances fairness generalization under distribution shift.

The lottery ticket hypothesis conjectures the existence of sparse subnetworks of large randomly initialized deep neural networks that can be successfully trained in isolation. Recent work has experimentally observed that some of these tickets can be practically reused across a variety of tasks, hinting at some form of universality. We formalize this concept and theoretically prove that not only do such universal tickets exist but they also do not require further training. Our proofs introduce a couple of technical innovations related to pruning for strong lottery tickets, including extensions of subset sum results and a strategy to leverage higher amounts of depth. Our explicit sparse constructions of universal function families might be of independent interest, as they highlight representational benefits induced by univariate convolutional architectures.

In this paper, we study the role of feedback in online learning with switching costs. It has been shown that the minimax regret is Theta(T^{2/3}) under bandit feedback and improves to Theta(T) under full-information feedback, where T is the length of the time horizon. However, it remains largely unknown how the amount and type of feedback generally impact regret. To this end, we first consider the setting of bandit learning with extra observations; that is, in addition to the typical bandit feedback, the learner can freely make a total of B_{ex} extra observations. We fully characterize the minimax regret in this setting, which exhibits an interesting phase-transition phenomenon: when B_{ex} = O(T^{2/3}), the regret remains Theta(T^{2/3}), but when B_{ex} = Omega(T^{2/3}), it becomes Theta(T/B_{mathrm{ex}}), which improves as the budget B_{ex} increases. To design algorithms that can achieve the minimax regret, it is instructive to consider a more general setting where the learner has a budget of B total observations. We fully characterize the minimax regret in this setting as well and show that it is Theta(T/B), which scales smoothly with the total budget B. Furthermore, we propose a generic algorithmic framework, which enables us to design different learning algorithms that can achieve matching upper bounds for both settings based on the amount and type of feedback. One interesting finding is that while bandit feedback can still guarantee optimal regret when the budget is relatively limited, it no longer suffices to achieve optimal regret when the budget is relatively large.

We propose an abstract framework to establish the convergence of the iterates of stochastic versions of a broad range of monotone operator splitting methods in Hilbert spaces. This framework allows for the introduction of stochasticity at several levels: approximation of operators, selection of coordinates and operators in block-iterative implementations, and relaxation parameters. The proposed analysis involves a reduced inclusion model with two operators. At each iteration, stochastic approximations to points in the graphs of these two operators are used to form the update. The results are applied to derive the almost sure and L^2 convergence of stochastic versions of the proximal point algorithm, as well as of randomized block-iterative projective splitting methods for solving systems of coupled inclusions involving a mix of set-valued, cocoercive, and Lipschitzian monotone operators combined via various monotonicity-preserving operations.

Reinforcement learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) learns from preference signals, while standard Reinforcement Learning (RL) directly learns from reward signals. Preferences arguably contain less information than rewards, which makes preference-based RL seemingly more difficult. This paper theoretically proves that, for a wide range of preference models, we can solve preference-based RL directly using existing algorithms and techniques for reward-based RL, with small or no extra costs. Specifically, (1) for preferences that are drawn from reward-based probabilistic models, we reduce the problem to robust reward-based RL that can tolerate small errors in rewards; (2) for general arbitrary preferences where the objective is to find the von Neumann winner, we reduce the problem to multiagent reward-based RL which finds Nash equilibria for factored Markov games under a restricted set of policies. The latter case can be further reduce to adversarial MDP when preferences only depend on the final state. We instantiate all reward-based RL subroutines by concrete provable algorithms, and apply our theory to a large class of models including tabular MDPs and MDPs with generic function approximation. We further provide guarantees when K-wise comparisons are available.

Randomization tests have gained popularity for causal inference under network interference because they are finite-sample valid with minimal assumptions. However, existing procedures are limited as they primarily focus on the existence of spillovers through sharp null hypotheses on potential outcomes. In this paper, we expand the scope of randomization procedures in network settings by developing new tests for the monotonicity of spillover effects. These tests offer insights into whether spillover effects increase, decrease, or exhibit ``diminishing returns'' along certain network dimensions of interest. Our approach partitions the network into multiple (possibly overlapping) parts and tests a monotone contrast hypothesis in each sub-network. The test decisions can then be aggregated in various ways depending on how each test is constructed. We demonstrate our method by re-analyzing a large-scale policing experiment in Colombia, which reveals evidence of monotonicity related to the ``crime displacement hypothesis''. Our analysis suggests that crime spillovers on a control street increase with the number of nearby streets receiving more intense policing but diminish at higher exposure levels.

We study the problem of explainability-first clustering where explainability becomes a first-class citizen for clustering. Previous clustering approaches use decision trees for explanation, but only after the clustering is completed. In contrast, our approach is to perform clustering and decision tree training holistically where the decision tree's performance and size also influence the clustering results. We assume the attributes for clustering and explaining are distinct, although this is not necessary. We observe that our problem is a monotonic optimization where the objective function is a difference of monotonic functions. We then propose an efficient branch-and-bound algorithm for finding the best parameters that lead to a balance of cluster distortion and decision tree explainability. Our experiments show that our method can improve the explainability of any clustering that fits in our framework.

We study the problem of optimizing a function under a budgeted number of evaluations. We only assume that the function is locally smooth around one of its global optima. The difficulty of optimization is measured in terms of 1) the amount of noise b of the function evaluation and 2) the local smoothness, d, of the function. A smaller d results in smaller optimization error. We come with a new, simple, and parameter-free approach. First, for all values of b and d, this approach recovers at least the state-of-the-art regret guarantees. Second, our approach additionally obtains these results while being agnostic to the values of both b and d. This leads to the first algorithm that naturally adapts to an unknown range of noise b and leads to significant improvements in a moderate and low-noise regime. Third, our approach also obtains a remarkable improvement over the state-of-the-art SOO algorithm when the noise is very low which includes the case of optimization under deterministic feedback (b=0). There, under our minimal local smoothness assumption, this improvement is of exponential magnitude and holds for a class of functions that covers the vast majority of functions that practitioners optimize (d=0). We show that our algorithmic improvement is borne out in experiments as we empirically show faster convergence on common benchmarks.

Polymarket is a prediction market platform where users can speculate on future events by trading shares tied to specific outcomes, known as conditions. Each market is associated with a set of one or more such conditions. To ensure proper market resolution, the condition set must be exhaustive -- collectively accounting for all possible outcomes -- and mutually exclusive -- only one condition may resolve as true. Thus, the collective prices of all related outcomes should be \1, representing a combined probability of 1 of any outcome. Despite this design, Polymarket exhibits cases where dependent assets are mispriced, allowing for purchasing (or selling) a certain outcome for less than (or more than) 1, guaranteeing profit. This phenomenon, known as arbitrage, could enable sophisticated participants to exploit such inconsistencies. In this paper, we conduct an empirical arbitrage analysis on Polymarket data to answer three key questions: (Q1) What conditions give rise to arbitrage (Q2) Does arbitrage actually occur on Polymarket and (Q3) Has anyone exploited these opportunities. A major challenge in analyzing arbitrage between related markets lies in the scalability of comparisons across a large number of markets and conditions, with a naive analysis requiring O(2^{n+m}) comparisons. To overcome this, we employ a heuristic-driven reduction strategy based on timeliness, topical similarity, and combinatorial relationships, further validated by expert input. Our study reveals two distinct forms of arbitrage on Polymarket: Market Rebalancing Arbitrage, which occurs within a single market or condition, and Combinatorial Arbitrage, which spans across multiple markets. We use on-chain historical order book data to analyze when these types of arbitrage opportunities have existed, and when they have been executed by users. We find a realized estimate of 40 million USD of profit extracted.

We present a novel unified bilevel optimization-based framework, PARL, formulated to address the recently highlighted critical issue of policy alignment in reinforcement learning using utility or preference-based feedback. We identify a major gap within current algorithmic designs for solving policy alignment due to a lack of precise characterization of the dependence of the alignment objective on the data generated by policy trajectories. This shortfall contributes to the sub-optimal performance observed in contemporary algorithms. Our framework addressed these concerns by explicitly parameterizing the distribution of the upper alignment objective (reward design) by the lower optimal variable (optimal policy for the designed reward). Interestingly, from an optimization perspective, our formulation leads to a new class of stochastic bilevel problems where the stochasticity at the upper objective depends upon the lower-level variable. To demonstrate the efficacy of our formulation in resolving alignment issues in RL, we devised an algorithm named A-PARL to solve PARL problem, establishing sample complexity bounds of order O(1/T). Our empirical results substantiate that the proposed PARL can address the alignment concerns in RL by showing significant improvements (up to 63\% in terms of required samples) for policy alignment in large-scale environments of the Deepmind control suite and Meta world tasks.

We study best arm identification (BAI) in linear bandits in the fixed-budget regime under differential privacy constraints, when the arm rewards are supported on the unit interval. Given a finite budget T and a privacy parameter varepsilon>0, the goal is to minimise the error probability in finding the arm with the largest mean after T sampling rounds, subject to the constraint that the policy of the decision maker satisfies a certain {\em varepsilon-differential privacy} (varepsilon-DP) constraint. We construct a policy satisfying the varepsilon-DP constraint (called {\sc DP-BAI}) by proposing the principle of {\em maximum absolute determinants}, and derive an upper bound on its error probability. Furthermore, we derive a minimax lower bound on the error probability, and demonstrate that the lower and the upper bounds decay exponentially in T, with exponents in the two bounds matching order-wise in (a) the sub-optimality gaps of the arms, (b) varepsilon, and (c) the problem complexity that is expressible as the sum of two terms, one characterising the complexity of standard fixed-budget BAI (without privacy constraints), and the other accounting for the varepsilon-DP constraint. Additionally, we present some auxiliary results that contribute to the derivation of the lower bound on the error probability. These results, we posit, may be of independent interest and could prove instrumental in proving lower bounds on error probabilities in several other bandit problems. Whereas prior works provide results for BAI in the fixed-budget regime without privacy constraints or in the fixed-confidence regime with privacy constraints, our work fills the gap in the literature by providing the results for BAI in the fixed-budget regime under the varepsilon-DP constraint.

A prominent approach to test-time scaling for text-to-image diffusion models formulates the problem as a search over multiple noise seeds, selecting the one that maximizes a certain image-reward function. The effectiveness of this strategy heavily depends on the number and diversity of noise seeds explored. However, verifying each candidate is computationally expensive, because each must be fully denoised before a reward can be computed. This severely limits the number of samples that can be explored under a fixed budget. We propose test-time scaling with noise-aware pruning (TTSnap), a framework that prunes low-quality candidates without fully denoising them. The key challenge is that reward models are learned in the clean image domain, and the ranking of rewards predicted for intermediate estimates are often inconsistent with those predicted for clean images. To overcome this, we train noise-aware reward models via self-distillation to align the reward for intermediate estimates with that of the final clean images. To stabilize learning across different noise levels, we adopt a curriculum training strategy that progressively shifts the data domain from clean images to noise images. In addition, we introduce a new metric that measures reward alignment and computational budget utilization. Experiments demonstrate that our approach improves performance by over 16\% compared with existing methods, enabling more efficient and effective test-time scaling. It also provides orthogonal gains when combined with post-training techniques and local test-time optimization. Code: https://github.com/TerrysLearning/TTSnap/.