Daily Papers

Knowledge benchmarks for LLMs face three issues: scaling-driven designs that do not operationalize disciplinary representativeness; flat-payment annotation that permits lazy consensus; and unaudited ranking instability under bounded test budgets. We introduce KINA, an 899-item benchmark across 261 fine-grained disciplines, with two formal results. First, we cast representativeness as a coverage-style objective over expert-elicited anchors and operationalize disciplinary representativeness through a proxy, yielding a (1-1/e) greedy approximation (Proposition 1); the guarantee applies to the proxy, not to population representativeness. Second, we prove a bonus-on-bar tournament weakly FOSD-dominates flat payment in released-review quality, with incentive-compatibility threshold B > Delta C / Delta p_min (Theorem 1). Evaluating 42 models from 13 labs, the top model, Gemini-3.1-Pro-Preview, reaches 53.17%, followed by Claude-Opus-4.6 at 49.92% and GPT-5.4 at 48.55%, leaving substantial headroom below saturation. The full leaderboard shows a tiered structure rather than a smooth total order: a small frontier tier lies above 48%, a dense strong-model tier spans roughly 38-45%, and low-performing models remain only modestly above the 10% chance baseline. Tool augmentation adds up to 5.17 points across the five tool-use evaluations, with gains varying substantially across models. We report bootstrap ranking-stability statistics to make bounded-budget variance explicit and to discourage over-interpretation of adjacent ranks.

Mixed-motive multi-agent settings are rife with persistent free-riding because individual effort benefits all members equally, yet each member bears the full cost of their own contribution. Classical work by Holmström established that under pure self-interest, Nash equilibrium is universal shirking. While i* represents teams as composite actors, it lacks scalable computational mechanisms for analyzing how collective action problems emerge and resolve in coopetitive settings. This technical report extends computational foundations for strategic coopetition to team-level dynamics, building on companion work formalizing interdependence/complementarity (arXiv:2510.18802) and trust dynamics (arXiv:2510.24909). We develop loyalty-moderated utility functions with two mechanisms: loyalty benefit (welfare internalization plus intrinsic contribution satisfaction) and cost tolerance (reduced effort burden for loyal members). We integrate i* structural dependencies through dependency-weighted team cohesion, connecting member incentives to team-level positioning. The framework applies to both human teams (loyalty as psychological identification) and multi-agent systems (alignment coefficients and adjusted cost functions). Experimental validation across 3,125 configurations demonstrates robust loyalty effects (15.04x median effort differentiation). All six behavioral targets achieve thresholds: free-riding baseline (96.5%), loyalty monotonicity (100%), effort differentiation (100%), team size effect (100%), mechanism synergy (99.5%), and bounded outcomes (100%). Empirical validation using published Apache HTTP Server (1995-2023) case study achieves 60/60 points, reproducing contribution patterns across formation, growth, maturation, and governance phases. Statistical significance confirmed at p<0.001, Cohen's d=0.71.

The burgeoning integration of artificial intelligence (AI) into human society brings forth significant implications for societal governance and safety. While considerable strides have been made in addressing AI alignment challenges, existing methodologies primarily focus on technical facets, often neglecting the intricate sociotechnical nature of AI systems, which can lead to a misalignment between the development and deployment contexts. To this end, we posit a new problem worth exploring: Incentive Compatibility Sociotechnical Alignment Problem (ICSAP). We hope this can call for more researchers to explore how to leverage the principles of Incentive Compatibility (IC) from game theory to bridge the gap between technical and societal components to maintain AI consensus with human societies in different contexts. We further discuss three classical game problems for achieving IC: mechanism design, contract theory, and Bayesian persuasion, in addressing the perspectives, potentials, and challenges of solving ICSAP, and provide preliminary implementation conceptions.

We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires multiple agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a game, where the principal announces a mechanism consisting in action recommendations and a payment function, a.k.a. scoring rule. Then, each agent chooses an effort level and receives partial information about an underlying state of nature based on the effort. Finally, the agents report the information (possibly non-truthfully), the principal takes a decision based on this information, and the agents are paid according to the scoring rule. While previous work focuses on single-agent problems, we consider multi-agents settings. This poses the challenge of coordinating the agents' efforts and aggregating correlated information. Indeed, we show that optimal mechanisms must correlate agents' efforts, which introduces externalities among the agents, and hence complex incentive compatibility constraints and equilibrium selection problems. First, we design a polynomial-time algorithm to find an optimal incentive compatible mechanism. Then, we study an online problem, where the principal repeatedly interacts with a group of unknown agents. We design a no-regret algorithm that provides mathcal{O}(T^{2/3}) regret with respect to an optimal mechanism, matching the state-of-the-art bound for single-agent settings.

Recommender systems play a crucial role in internet economies by connecting users with relevant products. However, designing effective recommender systems faces the key challenges: the exploration-exploitation tradeoff in securing incentive to explore new products against user's self-interested preferences. While prior work addresses Bayesian Incentive Compatibility (BIC) in fixed-design linear bandits (Sellke & Slivkins, 2023), we tackle the challenge of stochastic user covariates sampled online. Unlike standard black-box reductions (Mansour et al., 2020), our two-stage framework exploits the linear reward structure to achieve sublinear regret while satisfying incentive constraints. To address it, we propose a two-stage algorithm that integrates incentivized exploration with any efficient plug-in offline learning algorithms. In the first stage, it explores products while maintaining incentive compatibility to gather optimal samples. The second stage employs inverse proportional gap sampling strategy (IPGS) integrated with any efficient learning methods to secure sublinear regret. Theoretically, we prove that algorithm RCB achieves O(KdT) regret and simultaneously satisfies incentive constraints, and discovers the tradeoff between incentive budget and regret, validating in experiments. We demonstrate RCB's strong incentive gain, sublinear regret, and robustness through a real application on personalized warfarin dosing and simulations.

We study the problem of designing mechanisms for information acquisition scenarios. This setting models strategic interactions between an uniformed receiver and a set of informed senders. In our model the senders receive information about the underlying state of nature and communicate their observation (either truthfully or not) to the receiver, which, based on this information, selects an action. Our goal is to design mechanisms maximizing the receiver's utility while incentivizing the senders to report truthfully their information. First, we provide an algorithm that efficiently computes an optimal incentive compatible (IC) mechanism. Then, we focus on the online problem in which the receiver sequentially interacts in an unknown game, with the objective of minimizing the cumulative regret w.r.t. the optimal IC mechanism, and the cumulative violation of the incentive compatibility constraints. We investigate two different online scenarios, i.e., the full and bandit feedback settings. For the full feedback problem, we propose an algorithm that guarantees mathcal O(sqrt T) regret and violation, while for the bandit feedback setting we present an algorithm that attains mathcal O(T^{alpha}) regret and mathcal O(T^{1-alpha/2}) violation for any alphain[1/2, 1]. Finally, we complement our results providing a tight lower bound.

To enhance the efficiency and practicality of federated bandit learning, recent advances have introduced incentives to motivate communication among clients, where a client participates only when the incentive offered by the server outweighs its participation cost. However, existing incentive mechanisms naively assume the clients are truthful: they all report their true cost and thus the higher cost one participating client claims, the more the server has to pay. Therefore, such mechanisms are vulnerable to strategic clients aiming to optimize their own utility by misreporting. To address this issue, we propose an incentive compatible (i.e., truthful) communication protocol, named Truth-FedBan, where the incentive for each participant is independent of its self-reported cost, and reporting the true cost is the only way to achieve the best utility. More importantly, Truth-FedBan still guarantees the sub-linear regret and communication cost without any overheads. In other words, the core conceptual contribution of this paper is, for the first time, demonstrating the possibility of simultaneously achieving incentive compatibility and nearly optimal regret in federated bandit learning. Extensive numerical studies further validate the effectiveness of our proposed solution.

As frontier language models are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents pursuing complex, long-term objectives, there is increased risk of scheming: agents covertly pursuing misaligned goals. Prior work has focused on showing agents are capable of scheming, but their propensity to scheme in realistic scenarios remains underexplored. To understand when agents scheme, we decompose scheming incentives into agent factors and environmental factors. We develop realistic settings allowing us to systematically vary these factors, each with scheming opportunities for agents that pursue instrumentally convergent goals such as self-preservation, resource acquisition, and goal-guarding. We find only minimal instances of scheming despite high environmental incentives, and show this is unlikely due to evaluation awareness. While inserting adversarially-designed prompt snippets that encourage agency and goal-directedness into an agent's system prompt can induce high scheming rates, snippets used in real agent scaffolds rarely do. Surprisingly, in model organisms (Hubinger et al., 2023) built with these snippets, scheming behavior is remarkably brittle: removing a single tool can drop the scheming rate from 59% to 3%, and increasing oversight can raise rather than deter scheming by up to 25%. Our incentive decomposition enables systematic measurement of scheming propensity in settings relevant for deployment, which is necessary as agents are entrusted with increasingly consequential tasks.

In reinforcement learning from human feedback, it is common to optimize against a reward model trained to predict human preferences. Because the reward model is an imperfect proxy, optimizing its value too much can hinder ground truth performance, in accordance with Goodhart's law. This effect has been frequently observed, but not carefully measured due to the expense of collecting human preference data. In this work, we use a synthetic setup in which a fixed "gold-standard" reward model plays the role of humans, providing labels used to train a proxy reward model. We study how the gold reward model score changes as we optimize against the proxy reward model using either reinforcement learning or best-of-n sampling. We find that this relationship follows a different functional form depending on the method of optimization, and that in both cases its coefficients scale smoothly with the number of reward model parameters. We also study the effect on this relationship of the size of the reward model dataset, the number of reward model and policy parameters, and the coefficient of the KL penalty added to the reward in the reinforcement learning setup. We explore the implications of these empirical results for theoretical considerations in AI alignment.

AI systems have become increasingly capable of dangerous behaviours in many domains. This raises the question: Do models sometimes choose to violate human instructions in order to perform behaviour that is more useful for certain goals? We introduce a benchmark for measuring model propensity for instrumental convergence (IC) behaviour in terminal-based agents. This is behaviour such as self-preservation that has been hypothesised to play a key role in risks from highly capable AI agents. Our benchmark is realistic and low-stakes which serves to reduce evaluation-awareness and roleplay confounds. The suite contains seven operational tasks, each with an official workflow and a policy-violating shortcut. An eight-variant shared framework varies monitoring, instruction clarity, stakes, permission, instrumental usefulness and blocked honest paths to support inferences regarding the factors driving IC behaviour. We evaluated ten models using deterministic environment-state scorers over 1,680 samples, with trace review employed for audit and adjudication purposes. The final IC rate is 86 out of 1,680 samples (5.1%). IC behaviour is concentrated rather than uniform: two Gemini models account for 66.3% of IC cases and three tasks account for 84.9%. Conditions in which IC behaviour is indispensable for task success result in the greatest increase in the adjusted IC rate (+15.7 percentage points), whereas emphasising that task success is critical or certain framing choices do not produce comparable effects. Our findings indicate that realistic, low-nudge environments elicit IC behaviour rarely but systematically in most tested models. We conclude that it is feasible to robustly measure tendencies for dangerous behaviour in current frontier AI agents.

Strategic coopetition in multi-stakeholder systems requires understanding how cooperation persists through time without binding contracts. This technical report extends computational foundations for strategic coopetition to sequential interaction dynamics, bridging conceptual modeling (i* framework) with game-theoretic reciprocity analysis. We develop: (1) bounded reciprocity response functions mapping partner deviations to finite conditional responses, (2) memory-windowed history tracking capturing cognitive limitations over k recent periods, (3) structural reciprocity sensitivity derived from interdependence matrices where behavioral responses are amplified by structural dependencies, and (4) trust-gated reciprocity where trust modulates reciprocity responses. The framework applies to both human stakeholder interactions and multi-agent computational systems. Comprehensive validation across 15,625 parameter configurations demonstrates robust reciprocity effects, with all six behavioral targets exceeding thresholds: cooperation emergence (97.5%), defection punishment (100%), forgiveness dynamics (87.9%), asymmetric differentiation (100%), trust-reciprocity interaction (100%), and bounded responses (100%). Empirical validation using the Apple iOS App Store ecosystem (2008-2024) achieves 43/51 applicable points (84.3%), reproducing documented cooperation patterns across five ecosystem phases. Statistical significance confirmed at p < 0.001 with Cohen's d = 1.57. This report concludes the Foundations Series (TR-1 through TR-4) adopting uniaxial treatment where agents choose cooperation levels along a single continuum. Companion work on interdependence (arXiv:2510.18802), trust (arXiv:2510.24909), and collective action (arXiv:2601.16237) has been prepublished. Extensions Series (TR-5 through TR-8) introduces biaxial treatment where cooperation and competition are independent dimensions.

Coopetition refers to simultaneous cooperation and competition among actors wherein actors 'cooperate to grow the pie and compete to split it up.' Modern socio-technical systems are characterized by strategic coopetition wherein actors concomitantly cooperate to create value and compete to capture it. While conceptual modeling languages such as i* provide rich qualitative representations of strategic dependencies, they lack mechanisms for quantitative analysis of dynamic trade-offs. Conversely, classical game theory offers mathematical rigor but strips away contextual richness. This report bridges this gap by developing computational foundations that formalize two critical dimensions of coopetition: interdependence and complementarity. We ground interdependence in i* structural dependency analysis, translating depender-dependee-dependum relationships into quantitative interdependence coefficients via a structured translation framework. We formalize complementarity following Brandenburger and Nalebuff's Added Value concept, modeling synergistic value creation with validated parameterization. We integrate structural dependencies with bargaining power in value appropriation and introduce a game-theoretic formulation where Nash Equilibrium incorporates structural interdependence. Validation combines over 22,000 experimental trials across power and logarithmic specifications with the Samsung-Sony S-LCD joint venture (2004-2011). Under strict historical alignment scoring, logarithmic specifications achieve 58/60 compared to power functions (46/60), producing realistic 41% cooperation increases aligning with documented S-LCD patterns while power functions produce 166% increases exceeding realistic bounds. Statistical significance confirmed at p < 0.001, Cohen's d > 9.

We advance the study of incentivized bandit exploration, in which arm choices are viewed as recommendations and are required to be Bayesian incentive compatible. Recent work has shown under certain independence assumptions that after collecting enough initial samples, the popular Thompson sampling algorithm becomes incentive compatible. We give an analog of this result for linear bandits, where the independence of the prior is replaced by a natural convexity condition. This opens up the possibility of efficient and regret-optimal incentivized exploration in high-dimensional action spaces. In the semibandit model, we also improve the sample complexity for the pre-Thompson sampling phase of initial data collection.

Reward models are critical for aligning models to follow instructions, and are typically trained following one of two popular paradigms: Bradley-Terry style or Regression style. However, there is a lack of evidence that either approach is better than the other, when adequately matched for data. This is primarily because these approaches require data collected in different (but incompatible) formats, meaning that adequately matched data is not available in existing public datasets. To tackle this problem, we release preference annotations (designed for Bradley-Terry training) to complement existing ratings (designed for Regression style training) in the HelpSteer2 dataset. To improve data interpretability, preference annotations are accompanied with human-written justifications. Using this data, we conduct the first head-to-head comparison of Bradley-Terry and Regression models when adequately matched for data. Based on insights derived from such a comparison, we propose a novel approach to combine Bradley-Terry and Regression reward modeling. A Llama-3.1-70B-Instruct model tuned with this approach scores 94.1 on RewardBench, emerging top of more than 140 reward models as of 1 Oct 2024. We also demonstrate the effectiveness of this reward model at aligning models to follow instructions in RLHF. We open-source this dataset (CC-BY-4.0 license) at https://huggingface.co/datasets/nvidia/HelpSteer2 and openly release the trained Reward Model at https://huggingface.co/nvidia/Llama-3.1-Nemotron-70B-Reward

Despite their widespread use, the role of reward models in shaping reinforcement learning is poorly understood. Reward models offer a tempting promise: they automatically estimate response quality in the absence of verifiers or human judges. Unlike "verifiable rewards" which typically produce binary scores, reward models typically produce continuous scores, allowing them to be sensitive to fine-grained differences in responses. However, we show this apparent strength is a serious weakness: many popular reward models are oversensitive, assigning different scores to equally good responses. Theoretically, we show that seemingly perfect reward models can be highly oversensitive; empirically, this oversensitivity can lead to bad policies. In place of existing notions of "reward model accuracy," we propose evaluating reward models using distinct measures of "discriminative ability" and "specificity" (the complement of oversensitivity). As a solution, we describe a training-free algorithm that uses Monte Carlo dropout on any neural reward model to produce discrete reward clusters. Theoretically, we prove there exist discretizations that reduce oversensitivity at minimal expense of discriminative ability; empirically we show, in both controlled and natural RL settings, that discretizing rewards leads to less reward hacking and better policies than training on the original rewards.

Closed-loop decision-making systems (e.g., lending, screening, or recidivism risk assessment) often operate under fairness and service constraints while inducing feedback effects: decisions change who appears in the future, yielding non-stationary data and potentially amplifying disparities. We study online learning of a one-dimensional threshold policy from bandit feedback under demographic parity (DP) and, optionally, service-rate constraints. The learner observes only a scalar score each round and selects a threshold; reward and constraint residuals are revealed only for the chosen threshold. We propose Optimistic Feasible Search (OFS), a simple grid-based method that maintains confidence bounds for reward and constraint residuals for each candidate threshold. At each round, OFS selects a threshold that appears feasible under confidence bounds and, among those, maximizes optimistic reward; if no threshold appears feasible, OFS selects the threshold minimizing optimistic constraint violation. This design directly targets feasible high-utility thresholds and is particularly effective for low-dimensional, interpretable policy classes where discretization is natural. We evaluate OFS on (i) a synthetic closed-loop benchmark with stable contraction dynamics and (ii) two semi-synthetic closed-loop benchmarks grounded in German Credit and COMPAS, constructed by training a score model and feeding group-dependent acceptance decisions back into population composition. Across all environments, OFS achieves higher reward with smaller cumulative constraint violation than unconstrained and primal-dual bandit baselines, and is near-oracle relative to the best feasible fixed threshold under the same sweep procedure. Experiments are reproducible and organized with double-blind-friendly relative outputs.

In collaborative data sharing and machine learning, multiple parties aggregate their data resources to train a machine learning model with better model performance. However, as the parties incur data collection costs, they are only willing to do so when guaranteed incentives, such as fairness and individual rationality. Existing frameworks assume that all parties join the collaboration simultaneously, which does not hold in many real-world scenarios. Due to the long processing time for data cleaning, difficulty in overcoming legal barriers, or unawareness, the parties may join the collaboration at different times. In this work, we propose the following perspective: As a party who joins earlier incurs higher risk and encourages the contribution from other wait-and-see parties, that party should receive a reward of higher value for sharing data earlier. To this end, we propose a fair and time-aware data sharing framework, including novel time-aware incentives. We develop new methods for deciding reward values to satisfy these incentives. We further illustrate how to generate model rewards that realize the reward values and empirically demonstrate the properties of our methods on synthetic and real-world datasets.

In collaborative learning with streaming data, nodes (e.g., organizations) jointly and continuously learn a machine learning (ML) model by sharing the latest model updates computed from their latest streaming data. For the more resourceful nodes to be willing to share their model updates, they need to be fairly incentivized. This paper explores an incentive design that guarantees fairness so that nodes receive rewards commensurate to their contributions. Our approach leverages an explore-then-exploit formulation to estimate the nodes' contributions (i.e., exploration) for realizing our theoretically guaranteed fair incentives (i.e., exploitation). However, we observe a "rich get richer" phenomenon arising from the existing approaches to guarantee fairness and it discourages the participation of the less resourceful nodes. To remedy this, we additionally preserve asymptotic equality, i.e., less resourceful nodes achieve equal performance eventually to the more resourceful/"rich" nodes. We empirically demonstrate in two settings with real-world streaming data: federated online incremental learning and federated reinforcement learning, that our proposed approach outperforms existing baselines in fairness and learning performance while remaining competitive in preserving equality.

Language models trained with reinforcement learning may learn to optimize the grader's judgment rather than the intended objective. This "reward-seeking" is difficult to measure because a model that pursues the grader's judgment and one that pursues the intended objective behave identically whenever the grader rewards the intended behavior. We measure reward-seeking using Contrastive Synthetic Document Finetuning to change a model's beliefs about what the grader rewards, putting those beliefs in conflict with what users or developers want, and measuring the rate at which the model adopts each party's preferred behavior. Applied to intermediate checkpoints of a capabilities-focused OpenAI o3 RL run, without safety training, we find that these checkpoints often side with grader preferences over those of users or developers on coding and alignment tasks. This tendency to side with the grader trends upward throughout RL training. For example, in an environment that forces a choice between keeping a promise to a supervisor and breaking it to complete the task, a late capabilities-focused o3 checkpoint breaks the promise 87% of the time when SDF documents say the grader rewards task completion, versus 9% when they say it rewards honesty (a choice its chain-of-thought often makes explicit). An earlier checkpoint is far less sensitive (40% vs. 24%). Our method also generalizes to reward-hacking models. A model organism trained to reward-hack (gpt-oss-120b) is more than twice as sensitive to grader preferences as the unmodified model, with the mean behavioral shift in favor of the grader rising from 33% to 86%. These results indicate that RL can increase reward-seeking over the course of training, producing models that may act against their developers' intentions when they believe that doing so leads to higher reward.

In the realm of multi-objective alignment for large language models, balancing disparate human preferences often manifests as a zero-sum conflict. Specifically, the intrinsic tension between competing goals dictates that aggressively optimizing for one metric (e.g., helpfulness) frequently incurs a substantial penalty on another (e.g., harmlessness). While prior work mainly focuses on data selection, parameter merging, or algorithmic balancing during training, these approaches merely force compromises between divergent preferences along a fixed Pareto frontier, failing to fundamentally resolve the inherent trade-off. In this work, we approach this problem from a novel perspective of multi-dimensional rewards. By scaling up the model's rollouts and analyzing the outputs across different reward dimensions, we arrive at a critical conclusion: the conflict among multiple objectives stems from the fact that the prompt itself inherently restricts the achievable multi-dimensional rewards. Based on this core observation, we propose MORA: Multi-Objective Reward Assimilation. Specifically, MORA isolates single-reward prompts through pre-sampling and expands their reward diversity by rewriting the original questions to incorporate multi-dimensional intents. Extensive experiments demonstrate that: (1) in sequential alignment, MORA achieves single-preference improvements ranging from 5% to 12.4%, with exceptional gains in harmlessness, after multiple-preference alignment across helpful, harmless, and truthful dimensions. (2) In simultaneous alignment, MORA achieves an average overall reward improvement of 4.6%. Our codes are available at https://github.com/Shiying-Huang/MORA-MPA.

Implementing a reward function that perfectly captures a complex task in the real world is impractical. As a result, it is often appropriate to think of the reward function as a proxy for the true objective rather than as its definition. We study this phenomenon through the lens of Goodhart's law, which predicts that increasing optimisation of an imperfect proxy beyond some critical point decreases performance on the true objective. First, we propose a way to quantify the magnitude of this effect and show empirically that optimising an imperfect proxy reward often leads to the behaviour predicted by Goodhart's law for a wide range of environments and reward functions. We then provide a geometric explanation for why Goodhart's law occurs in Markov decision processes. We use these theoretical insights to propose an optimal early stopping method that provably avoids the aforementioned pitfall and derive theoretical regret bounds for this method. Moreover, we derive a training method that maximises worst-case reward, for the setting where there is uncertainty about the true reward function. Finally, we evaluate our early stopping method experimentally. Our results support a foundation for a theoretically-principled study of reinforcement learning under reward misspecification.

We propose a criterion for discrimination against a specified sensitive attribute in supervised learning, where the goal is to predict some target based on available features. Assuming data about the predictor, target, and membership in the protected group are available, we show how to optimally adjust any learned predictor so as to remove discrimination according to our definition. Our framework also improves incentives by shifting the cost of poor classification from disadvantaged groups to the decision maker, who can respond by improving the classification accuracy. In line with other studies, our notion is oblivious: it depends only on the joint statistics of the predictor, the target and the protected attribute, but not on interpretation of individualfeatures. We study the inherent limits of defining and identifying biases based on such oblivious measures, outlining what can and cannot be inferred from different oblivious tests. We illustrate our notion using a case study of FICO credit scores.

Punishment as a mechanism for promoting cooperation has been studied extensively for more than two decades, but its effectiveness remains a matter of dispute. Here, we examine how punishment's impact varies across cooperative settings through a large-scale integrative experiment. We vary 14 parameters that characterize public goods games, sampling 360 experimental conditions and collecting 147,618 decisions from 7,100 participants. Our results reveal striking heterogeneity in punishment effectiveness: while punishment consistently increases contributions, its impact on payoffs (i.e., efficiency) ranges from dramatically enhancing welfare (up to 43% improvement) to severely undermining it (up to 44% reduction) depending on the cooperative context. To characterize these patterns, we developed models that outperformed human forecasters (laypeople and domain experts) in predicting punishment outcomes in new experiments. Communication emerged as the most predictive feature, followed by contribution framing (opt-out vs. opt-in), contribution type (variable vs. all-or-nothing), game length (number of rounds), peer outcome visibility (whether participants can see others' earnings), and the availability of a reward mechanism. Interestingly, however, most of these features interact to influence punishment effectiveness rather than operating independently. For example, the extent to which longer games increase the effectiveness of punishment depends on whether groups can communicate. Together, our results refocus the debate over punishment from whether or not it "works" to the specific conditions under which it does and does not work. More broadly, our study demonstrates how integrative experiments can be combined with machine learning to uncover generalizable patterns, potentially involving interactions between multiple features, and help generate novel explanations in complex social phenomena.

We present Coopetition-Gym v1, a benchmark platform for mixed-motive multi-agent reinforcement learning under strategic coopetition. The platform comprises twenty environments organized into four mechanism classes that correspond to four foundational technical reports: interdependence and complementarity (arXiv:2510.18802), trust and reputation dynamics (arXiv:2510.24909), collective action and loyalty (arXiv:2601.16237), and sequential interaction and reciprocity (arXiv:2604.01240). Each environment carries a closed-form payoff structure and a calibrated interdependence matrix derived from the corresponding report. Every environment exposes a parameterized reward layer configurable across three structurally distinct modes (private, integrated, cooperative). This separation of payoff from reward enables reward-type ablation, the platform's principal methodological apparatus. Four of the twenty environments are calibrated against historically documented coopetitive relationships and reproduce their outcomes at 98.3, 81.7, 86.7, and 87.3 percent on the validation rubric (Samsung-Sony LCD, Renault-Nissan Alliance, Apache HTTP Server, Apple iOS App Store). The platform exposes Gymnasium, PettingZoo Parallel, and PettingZoo AEC interfaces and ships 126 reference algorithms: 16 learning algorithms, 7 game-theoretic oracles, 2 heuristic baselines, and 101 constant-action policies. A reference experimental study trained the 16 learning algorithms on every environment under every reward configuration with seven random seeds, producing a 25,708-run training corpus and a 1,116-run behavioral audit corpus, both released under CC-BY-4.0 with Croissant 1.0 metadata. Coopetition-Gym v1 is the first platform to combine continuous-action mixed-motive environments, parameterized reward mutuality, calibrated interdependence coefficients, game-theoretic oracle baselines, and validated case studies.

Score- and flow-matching models often rely on preference-based reinforcement learning for two purposes: aligning with subjective preferences and, surprisingly, recovering properties such as visual realism and coherent object structure that matching-based training is intended to learn from the data itself. We argue that this reflects a structural mismatch. Matching losses measure ell_2 regression error on the velocity or score field under training-time marginals, a proxy poorly aligned with the visual and semantic properties that determine sample quality at inference. Given a reward aligned with these properties, RL sidesteps the mismatch by evaluating the model on its own samples and following the reward landscape directly. The challenge is to obtain such a reward without relying on human preferences, which are expensive and conflate data realism with annotator inclinations. We propose Discriminator-Guided RL (DRL). DRL trains a discriminator to separate data from base-model samples in a pretrained representation space and uses its logit as the reward in KL-regularized RL. The pretrained space restricts the discriminator to perceptually meaningful directions, and the logit estimates the log-likelihood ratio between data and model, which is the optimal reward for targeting the data distribution. Across SiT, JiT, REPA, and RAE, DRL reduces guidance-free FID (e.g., 9.38 to 2.62 on SiT) and semantic-space FD (e.g., 88.2 to 19.3 on DINOv3 for SiT), with consistent gains across all backbones, and improves human-preference rewards without training on them. It also yields a better Pareto frontier between preference reward and image fidelity under subsequent preference-based post-training, increasing alignment while reducing low-level artifacts such as oversaturation and excessive brightness.

Conventional models of matching markets assume that monetary transfers can clear markets by compensating for utility differentials. However, empirical patterns show that such transfers often fail to close structural preference gaps. This paper introduces a market microstructure framework that models matching decisions as a limit order book system with rigid bid ask spreads. Individual preferences are represented by a latent preference state matrix, where the spread between an agent's internal ask price (the unconditional maximum) and the market's best bid (the reachable maximum) creates a structural liquidity constraint. We establish a Threshold Impossibility Theorem showing that linear compensation cannot close these spreads unless it induces a categorical identity shift. A dynamic discrete choice execution model further demonstrates that matches occur only when the market to book ratio crosses a time decaying liquidity threshold, analogous to order execution under inventory pressure. Numerical experiments validate persistent slippage, regional invariance of preference orderings, and high tier zero spread executions. The model provides a unified microstructure explanation for matching failures, compensation inefficiency, and post match regret in illiquid order driven environments.

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback has emerged as a standard for aligning diffusion models. However, we identify a fundamental limitation in the standard DPO formulation because it relies on the Bradley-Terry model to aggregate diverse evaluation axes like aesthetic quality and semantic alignment into a single scalar reward. This aggregation creates a reward conflict where the model is forced to unlearn desirable features of a specific dimension if they appear in a globally non-preferred sample. To address this issue, we propose Multi Reward Conditional DPO (MCDPO). This method resolves reward conflicts by introducing a disentangled Bradley-Terry objective. MCDPO explicitly injects a preference outcome vector as a condition during training, which allows the model to learn the correct optimization direction for each reward axis independently within a single network. We further introduce dimensional reward dropout to ensure balanced optimization across dimensions. Extensive experiments on Stable Diffusion 1.5 and SDXL demonstrate that MCDPO achieves superior performance on benchmarks. Notably, our conditional framework enables dynamic and multiple-axis control at inference time using Classifier Free Guidance to amplify specific reward dimensions without additional training or external reward models.

Fine-tuning large language models (LLMs) on reasoning benchmarks via reinforcement learning requires a specific reward function, often binary, for each benchmark. This comes with two potential limitations: the need to design the reward, and the potentially sparse nature of binary rewards. Here, we systematically investigate rewards derived from the probability or log-probability of emitting the reference answer (or any other prompt continuation present in the data), which have the advantage of not relying on specific verifiers and being available at scale. Several recent works have advocated for the use of similar rewards (e.g., VeriFree, JEPO, RLPR, NOVER). We systematically compare variants of likelihood-based rewards with standard baselines, testing performance both on standard mathematical reasoning benchmarks, and on long-form answers where no external verifier is available. We find that using the log-probability of the reference answer as the reward for chain-of-thought (CoT) learning is the only option that performs well in all setups. This reward is also consistent with the next-token log-likelihood loss used during pretraining. In verifiable settings, log-probability rewards bring comparable or better success rates than reinforcing with standard binary rewards, and yield much better perplexity. In non-verifiable settings, they perform on par with SFT. On the other hand, methods based on probability, such as VeriFree, flatline on non-verifiable settings due to vanishing probabilities of getting the correct answer. Overall, this establishes log-probability rewards as a viable method for CoT fine-tuning, bridging the short, verifiable and long, non-verifiable answer settings.

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards has made post-training highly effective when correctness can be checked automatically. However, many important model behaviors require satisfying several qualitative criteria at once. Rubric-based rewards address this setting by grading prompt-specific criteria and aggregating them into a scalar reward. Yet standard static aggregations conflate a criterion's human-assigned importance with its current usefulness as an optimization signal. We show that this assumption breaks down in rubric RL: many important criteria are already saturated or currently unreachable, while criteria that distinguish rollouts are not necessarily those with the largest human weights. We introduce POW3R, a policy-aware rubric reward framework that preserves human weights and category balance as the rubric objective while adapting criterion-level reward weights during training. POW3R uses rollout-level contrast to emphasize criteria that currently separate the policy's outputs, making the GRPO reward more informative without changing the underlying evaluation target. Across three base policies on two datasets spanning multimodal and text-only settings, POW3R wins 24 of 30 base-policy/metric comparisons, improving both mean rubric reward and strict completion (the fraction of prompts whose response satisfies every required rubric criterion) over vanilla GRPO with rubric rewards, and reaches the same plateau in 2.5--4times fewer training steps. Rubric rewards should therefore distinguish what should matter in the final answer from what can teach the current policy.

Reward design in reinforcement learning (RL) is challenging since specifying human notions of desired behavior may be difficult via reward functions or require many expert demonstrations. Can we instead cheaply design rewards using a natural language interface? This paper explores how to simplify reward design by prompting a large language model (LLM) such as GPT-3 as a proxy reward function, where the user provides a textual prompt containing a few examples (few-shot) or a description (zero-shot) of the desired behavior. Our approach leverages this proxy reward function in an RL framework. Specifically, users specify a prompt once at the beginning of training. During training, the LLM evaluates an RL agent's behavior against the desired behavior described by the prompt and outputs a corresponding reward signal. The RL agent then uses this reward to update its behavior. We evaluate whether our approach can train agents aligned with user objectives in the Ultimatum Game, matrix games, and the DealOrNoDeal negotiation task. In all three tasks, we show that RL agents trained with our framework are well-aligned with the user's objectives and outperform RL agents trained with reward functions learned via supervised learning

Alignment in artificial intelligence pursues the consistency between model responses and human preferences as well as values. In practice, the multifaceted nature of human preferences inadvertently introduces what is known as the "alignment tax" -a compromise where enhancements in alignment within one objective (e.g.,harmlessness) can diminish performance in others (e.g.,helpfulness). However, existing alignment techniques are mostly unidirectional, leading to suboptimal trade-offs and poor flexibility over various objectives. To navigate this challenge, we argue the prominence of grounding LLMs with evident preferences. We introduce controllable preference optimization (CPO), which explicitly specifies preference scores for different objectives, thereby guiding the model to generate responses that meet the requirements. Our experimental analysis reveals that the aligned models can provide responses that match various preferences among the "3H" (helpfulness, honesty, harmlessness) desiderata. Furthermore, by introducing diverse data and alignment goals, we surpass baseline methods in aligning with single objectives, hence mitigating the impact of the alignment tax and achieving improvements in multi-objective alignment.

We study a strategic variant of the multi-armed bandit problem, which we coin the strategic click-bandit. This model is motivated by applications in online recommendation where the choice of recommended items depends on both the click-through rates and the post-click rewards. Like in classical bandits, rewards follow a fixed unknown distribution. However, we assume that the click-rate of each arm is chosen strategically by the arm (e.g., a host on Airbnb) in order to maximize the number of times it gets clicked. The algorithm designer does not know the post-click rewards nor the arms' actions (i.e., strategically chosen click-rates) in advance, and must learn both values over time. To solve this problem, we design an incentive-aware learning algorithm, UCB-S, which achieves two goals simultaneously: (a) incentivizing desirable arm behavior under uncertainty; (b) minimizing regret by learning unknown parameters. We characterize all approximate Nash equilibria among arms under UCB-S and show a mathcal{O} (KT) regret bound uniformly in every equilibrium. We also show that incentive-unaware algorithms generally fail to achieve low regret in the strategic click-bandit. Finally, we support our theoretical results by simulations of strategic arm behavior which confirm the effectiveness and robustness of our proposed incentive design.

While the field of Quality-Diversity (QD) has grown into a distinct branch of stochastic optimization, a few problems, in particular locomotion and navigation tasks, have become de facto standards. Are such benchmarks sufficient? Are they representative of the key challenges faced by QD algorithms? Do they provide the ability to focus on one particular challenge by properly disentangling it from others? Do they have much predictive power in terms of scalability and generalization? Existing benchmarks are not standardized, and there is currently no MNIST equivalent for QD. Inspired by recent works on Reinforcement Learning benchmarks, we argue that the identification of challenges faced by QD methods and the development of targeted, challenging, scalable but affordable benchmarks is an important step. As an initial effort, we identify three problems that are challenging in sparse reward settings, and propose associated benchmarks: (1) Behavior metric bias, which can result from the use of metrics that do not match the structure of the behavior space. (2) Behavioral Plateaus, with varying characteristics, such that escaping them would require adaptive QD algorithms and (3) Evolvability Traps, where small variations in genotype result in large behavioral changes. The environments that we propose satisfy the properties listed above.

Red-team evaluations of AI models support some claims and not others, and the boundary between the two is calculable rather than merely a matter of judgment. We define the evidential ceiling of an evaluation as the largest factor by which one result can move belief under a fixed testing budget, derive it in closed form for the benchmark null result, and use it to locate that boundary exactly. We find that above a calculable harm rate, a benchmark of modest size certifies a category to a stated evidentiary standard, and a clean sheet is then the stronger of the two possible observations, outweighing a single reproduced failure. Below that rate, no passive benchmark of feasible size provides the specified evidence of safety under the fixed scoring rule and approximately independent trial structure. The crossing between the two regimes has a closed form. The bound is not specific to benchmarks: written in terms of a procedure's hypothesis conditioned elicitation rates, it covers adaptive and automated red teaming as well, and shows that discrimination between the hypotheses rather than attack success is what determines evidential worth. Auditing eight evaluation suites against the boundary, we find that current benchmarks are adequate for high-frequency harm categories and several orders of magnitude short for rare, catastrophic ones. Safety benchmarks are not uninformative. They are informative about a specific and computable set of propositions, and the discipline they need is to state which.

We introduce the first version of KWBench (Knowledge Work Bench), a benchmark for unprompted problem recognition in large language models: can an LLM identify a professional scenario before attempting to solve it. Existing frontier benchmarks have saturated, and most knowledge-work evaluations to date reduce to extraction or task completion against a specification. KWBench targets the step before that: recognizing the governing structure of the situation from raw inputs alone. The benchmark contains 223 tasks sourced from practitioners across acquisitions, contract negotiations, clinical pharmacy, organizational politics, fraud analysis, and incentive design. Each task encodes a formal game-theoretic pattern (principal-agent conflict, signaling, mechanism design failure, strategic omission, coalitional dynamics, strategic interdependence) and carries structured ground truth recording the expert reading of the situation and the anticipated failure modes. Models receive raw data and a task prompt with no indication of problem type. Scoring is a three-tier rubric gated by a mandatory conjunctive check. Mandatory criteria encode the predicted wrong paths. We evaluate 16 models. The best model passes on 27.9% of tasks. The top two models agree on only 31.7% of their passes. Among the top 8, 44 tasks are solved by exactly one model; routing across the top 8 covers 50.7% of the benchmark, nearly double the best single model. Conditional on passing, quality scores converge (approx 83% across models); unconditional scores do not. Same models articulate the relevant game-theoretic concept correctly when asked, then fail to apply it unprompted. We release KWBench to shift how frontier models are evaluated on knowledge work, scoring them on whether they recognize the right problem from the situation alone, not only on how well they execute once the problem has been framed for them.

Reinforcement Learning (RL) has enabled Large Language Models (LLMs) to achieve remarkable reasoning in domains like mathematics and coding, where verifiable rewards provide clear signals. However, extending this paradigm to financial decision is challenged by the market's stochastic nature: rewards are verifiable but inherently noisy, causing standard RL to degenerate into reward hacking. To address this, we propose Trade-R1, a model training framework that bridges verifiable rewards to stochastic environments via process-level reasoning verification. Our key innovation is a verification method that transforms the problem of evaluating reasoning over lengthy financial documents into a structured Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) task. We construct a triangular consistency metric, assessing pairwise alignment between retrieved evidence, reasoning chains, and decisions to serve as a validity filter for noisy market returns. We explore two reward integration strategies: Fixed-effect Semantic Reward (FSR) for stable alignment signals, and Dynamic-effect Semantic Reward (DSR) for coupled magnitude optimization. Experiments on different country asset selection demonstrate that our paradigm reduces reward hacking, with DSR achieving superior cross-market generalization while maintaining the highest reasoning consistency.

Reward models (RMs) provide critical feedback signals for LLM post-training, notably in reinforced fine-tuning (RFT) and reinforcement learning (RL) pipelines. However, current reward evaluation relies on heterogeneous criteria such as rule-based verifiers, ground-truth references, procedural checklists, and complex rubrics, where a unified mechanism to integrate all types of evidence remains unexplored. To this end, we propose Skill Reward Model (Skill-RM), a unified framework that reformulates reward modeling as the execution of a reusable Reward-Evaluation Skill. By treating reward computation as a structured agentic task, Skill-RM provides a consistent interface to orchestrate heterogeneous resources, dynamically selecting and aggregating evidence tailored to the specific requirements of each input. This approach enables the reward model to move beyond static evaluation, ensuring consistency and transparency across diverse tasks. Extensive experiments on reward benchmarks and downstream applications, including best-of-N selection and reinforcement learning, demonstrate that Skill-RM consistently outperforms traditional judge baselines. Our findings suggest that Skill-RM not only provides a unified solution for reward modeling but also achieves superior performance through the strategic and dynamic orchestration of evidence. The code is at https://github.com/Qwen-Applications/Skill-RM.

Today's large language models (LLMs) are trained to align with user preferences through methods such as reinforcement learning. Yet models are beginning to be deployed not merely to satisfy users, but also to generate revenue for the companies that created them through advertisements. This creates the potential for LLMs to face conflicts of interest, where the most beneficial response to a user may not be aligned with the company's incentives. For instance, a sponsored product may be more expensive but otherwise equal to another; in this case, what does (and should) the LLM recommend to the user? In this paper, we provide a framework for categorizing the ways in which conflicting incentives might lead LLMs to change the way they interact with users, inspired by literature from linguistics and advertising regulation. We then present a suite of evaluations to examine how current models handle these tradeoffs. We find that a majority of LLMs forsake user welfare for company incentives in a multitude of conflict of interest situations, including recommending a sponsored product almost twice as expensive (Grok 4.1 Fast, 83%), surfacing sponsored options to disrupt the purchasing process (GPT 5.1, 94%), and concealing prices in unfavorable comparisons (Qwen 3 Next, 24%). Behaviors also vary strongly with levels of reasoning and users' inferred socio-economic status. Our results highlight some of the hidden risks to users that can emerge when companies begin to subtly incentivize advertisements in chatbots.

Data-centric curation pipelines frequently rely on model confidence scores to flag and filter noisy or mislabeled training instances. Evaluating this filtering convention on a large-scale consumer lending sample (LendingClub, N = 1,344,936) uncovers an underlying demographic asymmetry: high-income defaulters are disproportionately classified as label noise relative to low-income defaulters (Cramer's V approximately 0.03-0.07). Re-examining this behavior through the lens of equal opportunity [Hardt et al., 2016] reveals a far more severe discrepancy: a 16.86 percentage point gap in true positive rate (recall) between high- and low-income borrowers who ultimately defaulted. Implementing a sequential feature-blinding methodology allows us to isolate the drivers of this disparity across three distinct mechanisms: (1) direct reliance on self-reported applicant income; (2) algorithmic absorption of upstream institutional bias encoded within origination interest rates; and (3) a residual disparity (3.55 percentage points in cross-validation; 2.56 percentage points on a held-out test partition, Z = -4.04, p < 0.0001) that remains even after purging both income and interest rates from the model. Out-of-sample signed SHAP valuations demonstrate that this residual gap is maintained by structural proxies, most notably loan amount and home ownership status. These empirical findings show that simply blinding an algorithm to sensitive attributes fails to ensure fairness when institutional pricing decisions and behavioral proxy variables collectively reconstruct the omitted signals. We outline the practical implications of these findings for auditing data-centric AI workflows within regulated financial institutions.

AI agents are moving from advisors to actors, booking travel, planning menus, and running procurement on behalf of users. Existing benchmarks for AI and animal welfare evaluate model text responses to question-answer prompts, leaving open whether the welfare reasoning surfaced in those responses transfers to agentic deployment where the model must take actions with tools. We introduce TAC (Travel Agent Compassion), the first agentic benchmark measuring whether AI agents avoid options involving animal exploitation when acting on behalf of users. TAC presents an AI agent with twelve hand-authored travel booking scenarios across six categories of animal exploitation, augmented to forty-eight samples to control for price, rating, and position confounds. We evaluate seven frontier models from four labs. Every model scores below the chance level of sixty-four percent, with the best performer (Claude Opus 4.7) at fifty-three percent. A single welfare-aware sentence in the system prompt yields gains of forty-seven to sixty-three percentage points in Claude and GPT-5.5, twenty-six points in GPT-5.2, and under twelve points in DeepSeek and Gemini. An auxiliary Inspect Scout audit of 288 base-condition transcripts from the top two performers, using Gemini 2.5 Flash Lite as judge, flags zero transcripts for evaluation awareness, suggesting the below-chance rates do not stem from the models recognising the evaluation. We discuss implications for category-level variation across cultural domains, the limits of text-response welfare benchmarks, and the EU General-Purpose AI Code of Practice systemic risk framework.

We consider strategy proof mechanisms for facility location which maximize equitability between agents. As is common in the literature, we measure equitability with the Gini index. We first prove a simple but fundamental impossibility result that no strategy proof mechanism can bound the approximation ratio of the optimal Gini index of utilities for one or more facilities. We propose instead computing approximation ratios of the complemented Gini index of utilities, and consider how well both deterministic and randomized mechanisms approximate this. In addition, as Nash welfare is often put forwards as an equitable compromise between egalitarian and utilitarian outcomes, we consider how well mechanisms approximate the Nash welfare.

LLMs can appear cautious in risk decision-making tasks, yet cautious-looking outputs do not necessarily indicate alignment with human decision-making mechanisms. We investigate this distinction using the St. Petersburg game as a controlled testbed, a classical paradox in which the expected payoff is infinite, yet humans typically report low, finite willingness to pay. We evaluate 28 LLMs with a structured prompt suite that includes the original game; controlled decision variants that perturb truncation, repeated play, numeric endowment, and occupational identity; a human-perspective prompt that asks models to reason as human decision makers; and paired comparisons between base models and their instruction-tuned counterparts. In the original game, most models generate finite bids, creating the appearance of human-like risk behavior. However, this outcome-level resemblance masks substantial mechanism-level differences. The controlled variants reveal that rather than maintaining human-like behavior seen in the original game, models often shift to conditionally and computationally rational behavior. Human-cue prompting and instruction tuning often lower bids and reduce some visible pathologies, but most mechanism-level response patterns remain largely unchanged. These findings show that behavioral alignment in risk decision-making can be surface-level: LLMs may produce human-like risk decisions without exhibiting human-consistent mechanisms. High-stakes evaluations of LLM decision-making should therefore move beyond outcome similarity and examine whether the alignment is supported by mechanism-level consistency.

Reinforcement Learning (RL) has emerged as a mainstream paradigm for training Mobile GUI Agents, yet it struggles with the temporal credit assignment problem inherent in long-horizon tasks. A primary challenge lies in the trade-off between reward fidelity and density: outcome reward offers high fidelity but suffers from signal sparsity, while process reward provides dense supervision but remains prone to bias and reward hacking. To resolve this conflict, we propose the Adaptive Milestone Reward (ADMIRE) mechanism. ADMIRE constructs a verifiable, adaptive reward system by anchoring trajectory to milestones, which are dynamically distilled from successful explorations. Crucially, ADMIRE integrates an asymmetric credit assignment strategy that denoises successful trajectories and scaffolds failed trajectories. Extensive experiments demonstrate that ADMIRE consistently yields over 10% absolute improvement in success rate across different base models on AndroidWorld. Moreover, the method exhibits robust generalizability, achieving strong performance across diverse RL algorithms and heterogeneous environments such as web navigation and embodied tasks.

The deployment of Large Language Models (LLMs) as autonomous economic agents introduces systemic risks that extend beyond individual capability failures. As agents transition to directly interacting with marketplaces, their collective behavior can amplify volatility and mask deception at scale. We introduce the Agent Bazaar, a multi-agent simulation framework for evaluating Economic Alignment, the capacity of agentic systems to preserve market stability and integrity. We identify two failure modes: (1) Algorithmic Instability in a B2C market ("The Crash"), where firms amplify price volatility until the market collapses, and (2) Sybil Deception in a C2C market ("The Lemon Market"), where a single deceptive agent controlling multiple coordinated seller identities floods the market with fraudulent listings, eroding trust and consumer welfare. We evaluate frontier and open-weight models across both scenarios and find that models largely fail to self-regulate, with failure severity varying by model rather than by size. We propose economically aligned harnesses, Stabilizing Firms and Skeptical Guardians, that improve outcomes but remain fragile under harder market conditions. To close this gap, we train agents with REINFORCE++ using an adaptive curriculum, producing a 9B model that outperforms all evaluated frontier and open-weight models. We propose the Economic Alignment Score (EAS), a 4-component scalar metric aggregating stability, integrity, welfare, and profitability, enabling direct cross-model comparison. Our results show that economic alignment is orthogonal to general capability and can be directly trained with targeted RL.

We consider an extension to the classic position auctions in which sponsored creatives can be added within AI generated content rather than shown in predefined slots. New challenges arise from the natural requirement that sponsored creatives should smoothly fit into the context. With the help of advanced LLM technologies, it becomes viable to accurately estimate the benefits of adding each individual sponsored creatives into each potential positions within the AI generated content by properly taking the context into account. Therefore, we assume one click-through rate estimation for each position-creative pair, rather than one uniform estimation for each sponsored creative across all positions in classic settings. As a result, the underlying optimization becomes a general matching problem, thus the substitution effects should be treated more carefully compared to standard position auction settings, where the slots are independent with each other. In this work, we formalize a concrete mathematical model of the extended position auction problem and study the welfare-maximization and revenue-maximization mechanism design problem. Formally, we consider two different user behavior models and solve the mechanism design problems therein respectively. For the Multinomial Logit (MNL) model, which is order-insensitive, we can efficiently implement the optimal mechanisms. For the cascade model, which is order-sensitive, we provide approximately optimal solutions.

Extrinsic rewards can effectively guide reinforcement learning (RL) agents in specific tasks. However, extrinsic rewards frequently fall short in complex environments due to the significant human effort needed for their design and annotation. This limitation underscores the necessity for intrinsic rewards, which offer auxiliary and dense signals and can enable agents to learn in an unsupervised manner. Although various intrinsic reward formulations have been proposed, their implementation and optimization details are insufficiently explored and lack standardization, thereby hindering research progress. To address this gap, we introduce RLeXplore, a unified, highly modularized, and plug-and-play framework offering reliable implementations of eight state-of-the-art intrinsic reward methods. Furthermore, we conduct an in-depth study that identifies critical implementation details and establishes well-justified standard practices in intrinsically-motivated RL. Our documentation, examples, and source code are available at https://github.com/RLE-Foundation/RLeXplore.

Prior work on a social web highlighter located individuality in selection -- which documents a person chooses to highlight -- but measured it cross-sectionally. We ask the temporal question: is a reader's selection signature a trait or a state? We freeze each reader's first six months of highlighting as a profile and track its own-vs-other advantage on their later selections at growing gaps (to 24+ months), with negatives drawn from the same calendar era -- so supply drift cannot masquerade as personal drift -- at a coarse global level and at a fine level whose negatives and controls come from the reader's own interest neighborhood; the anchor cell reproduces the prior cross-sectional level (+0.188 vs +0.169), validating the harness. Four results. Within the same users, the fine-layer advantage shows no statistically detectable paired decline at any horizon (6-12 month retention R = 1.00 [0.85, 1.18], n = 212; the farthest bin is compatible with a modest decline; the only contrast whose interval excludes zero is the coarse layer at 12-24 months, about 13%). The signal is not reducible to repeated domains (~90% survives excluding all profile sources). Within-person drift is slow (a recent-half profile beats the old half by +0.042). Prospectively, personal profiles -- even one built from a reader's earliest documents, median 20 months before evaluation -- rank their next reads at roughly 3x the AP of every simple non-personal prior tested. We use "trait" operationally (a stable signature under continued engagement); the scope is heavy, long-tenured readers of one platform, and exposure is not separable from choice.

High-throughput scientific facilities such as the Large Hadron Collider depend on real-time event filtering (triggering) under tight constraints on bandwidth, latency, and storage. In practice, trigger menus are largely static and hand-tuned and can become suboptimal as detector conditions, pileup, and background composition drift over time. We cast online threshold tuning as a sequential decision-making problem: a reinforcement learning agent ingests streaming summaries of recent rates and signal-sensitive features and updates trigger thresholds to maximize signal efficiency while tracking a target background rate within a tolerance band. We adapt Group-Filtered Policy Optimization (GFPO) to streaming control and introduce two variants (GFPO-F, GFPO-FR) that enforce background rate feasibility during training. On a benchmark that emulates realistic collider operation, we study two representative triggers: a total transverse energy (H_{T}) trigger sensitive to pileup variation, and an anomaly-detection (AD) trigger based on reconstruction loss for rare or non-standard signatures. On Monte Carlo streams, our agent increases the fraction of in-tolerance time intervals by 48\% (H_T) and 28\% (AD), with a cumulative gain of up to 2\% in signal efficiency on those in-tolerance intervals. Transferring from simulation to real collision data (CMS Run 283408), the same agent, without fine-tuning, achieves a 56\% (H_T) and 28\% (AD) in-tolerance improvement over baselines, with further signal-efficiency gain on both triggers. To our knowledge, this is the first demonstration of RL-based trigger control on real Large Hadron Collider collision data. Code is available at https://github.com/Zixind/GFPO_LHC (see repo for details).

In pursuit of participatory budgeting (PB) outcomes with broader fairness guarantees, we initiate the study of lotteries over discrete PB outcomes. As the projects have heterogeneous costs, the amount spent may not be equal ex ante and ex post. To address this, we develop a technique to bound the amount by which the ex-post spend differs from the ex-ante spend -- the property is termed budget balanced up to one project (BB1). With respect to fairness, we take a best-of-both-worlds perspective, seeking outcomes that are both ex-ante and ex-post fair. Towards this goal, we initiate a study of ex-ante fairness properties in PB, including Individual Fair Share (IFS), Unanimous Fair Share (UFS) and their stronger variants, as well as Group Fair Share (GFS). We show several incompatibility results between these ex-ante fairness notions and existing ex-post concepts based on justified representation. One of our main contributions is a randomized algorithm which simultaneously satisfies ex-ante Strong UFS, ex-post full justified representation (FJR) and ex-post BB1 for PB with binary utilities.

The dominant practice of AI alignment assumes (1) that preferences are an adequate representation of human values, (2) that human rationality can be understood in terms of maximizing the satisfaction of preferences, and (3) that AI systems should be aligned with the preferences of one or more humans to ensure that they behave safely and in accordance with our values. Whether implicitly followed or explicitly endorsed, these commitments constitute what we term a preferentist approach to AI alignment. In this paper, we characterize and challenge the preferentist approach, describing conceptual and technical alternatives that are ripe for further research. We first survey the limits of rational choice theory as a descriptive model, explaining how preferences fail to capture the thick semantic content of human values, and how utility representations neglect the possible incommensurability of those values. We then critique the normativity of expected utility theory (EUT) for humans and AI, drawing upon arguments showing how rational agents need not comply with EUT, while highlighting how EUT is silent on which preferences are normatively acceptable. Finally, we argue that these limitations motivate a reframing of the targets of AI alignment: Instead of alignment with the preferences of a human user, developer, or humanity-writ-large, AI systems should be aligned with normative standards appropriate to their social roles, such as the role of a general-purpose assistant. Furthermore, these standards should be negotiated and agreed upon by all relevant stakeholders. On this alternative conception of alignment, a multiplicity of AI systems will be able to serve diverse ends, aligned with normative standards that promote mutual benefit and limit harm despite our plural and divergent values.

A widely used technique for improving policies is success conditioning, in which one collects trajectories, identifies those that achieve a desired outcome, and updates the policy to imitate the actions taken along successful trajectories. This principle appears under many names -- rejection sampling with SFT, goal-conditioned RL, Decision Transformers -- yet what optimization problem it solves, if any, has remained unclear. We prove that success conditioning exactly solves a trust-region optimization problem, maximizing policy improvement subject to a χ^2 divergence constraint whose radius is determined automatically by the data. This yields an identity: relative policy improvement, the magnitude of policy change, and a quantity we call action-influence -- measuring how random variation in action choices affects success rates -- are exactly equal at every state. Success conditioning thus emerges as a conservative improvement operator. Exact success conditioning cannot degrade performance or induce dangerous distribution shift, but when it fails, it does so observably, by hardly changing the policy at all. We apply our theory to the common practice of return thresholding, showing this can amplify improvement, but at the cost of potential misalignment with the true objective.

Agentic AI development today runs on token maxing: buying capability with tokens -- longer reasoning traces, more turns, wider tool payloads, bigger replayed contexts -- so tokens per task grow faster than task value. Falling per-token prices mask the pattern; total spend rises anyway. We argue the decisive lever against token maxing is the harness: the orchestration layer that assembles context, exposes tools, sequences turns, delegates work, and carries enterprise observability and governance. We isolate it with a controlled swap: 22 locked evaluation tasks, six foundation models (Claude Sonnet 4.6, Gemini 3.1, Gemini Flash 3.5, Qwen 3.6, GLM 5.1, Palmyra X6), changing only the orchestration layer -- a frozen conventional production loop versus the Writer Agent Harness. Holding models constant, the harness cuts blended cost per task 41% (0.21->0.12), median wall-clock 44% (48s->27s), and tokens per task 38% (14.2k->8.8k), with task-completion quality at parity (0.78->0.81, directional at this sample size). Efficiency is model-invariant -- every model gets cheaper (33-61%) -- while quality gains are capability-dependent: a model's gain correlates almost perfectly with its baseline strength (r=0.99, n=6), a phenomenon we term harness leverage. Quality per dollar rises 82%; task-completions per million tokens rise from 54.9 to 92.0. On this workload the orchestration layer moved cost per task more than the full spread of the model menu did. We formalize token economics at the orchestration layer (including effective input price under prompt caching), detail the six mechanism families behind the effect -- cache-shape discipline to failure-spend governance -- compare six widely used agent systems on the same axes, and argue the harness is the one component whose efficiency multiplies across every model an organization runs -- present and future.

Decentralized reputation schemes present a promising area of experimentation in blockchain applications. These solutions aim to overcome the shortcomings of simple monetary incentive mechanisms of naive tokenomics. However, there is a significant research gap regarding the limitations and benefits of such solutions. We formulate these trade-offs as a conjecture on the irreconcilability of three desirable properties of the reputation system in this context. Such a system can not be simultaneously generalizable, trustless, and Sybil resistant. To handle the limitations of this trilemma, we propose MeritRank: Sybil tolerant feedback aggregation mechanism for reputation. Instead of preventing Sybil attacks, our approach successfully bounds the benefits of these attacks. Using a dataset of participants' interactions in MakerDAO, we run experiments to demonstrate Sybil tolerance of MeritRank. Decay parameters of reputation in MeritRank: transitivity decay and connectivity decay, allow for a fine-tuning of desirable levels of reputation utility and Sybil tolerance in different use contexts.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable progress in reasoning, yet sometimes produce responses that are suboptimal for users in tasks such as writing, information seeking, or providing practical guidance. Conventional alignment practices typically assume that maximizing model reward also maximizes user welfare, but this assumption frequently fails in practice: models may over-clarify or generate overly verbose reasoning when users prefer concise answers. Such behaviors resemble the prisoner's dilemma, where individually rational choices lead to socially suboptimal outcomes. The fundamental challenge is the lack of a principled decision making mechanism that mutually benefits both the LLM and the user. We propose Game-Theoretic Alignment (GTAlign), an alignment framework that integrates game-theoretic decision making into both reasoning and training. During reasoning, the model explicitly treats user-LLM interaction as a strategic game: it constructs payoff matrices within its reasoning chain to estimate welfare for both itself and the user, and then selects actions that are mutually beneficial. During training, we introduce a mutual welfare reward that reinforces cooperative responses, aligning model behavior with socially efficient outcomes. In addition, we introduce an inference technique that leverages game-theoretic reasoning to dynamically adapt LLM's response when pricing policies of LLM service change. Extensive experiments demonstrate that GTAlign substantially improves reasoning efficiency, answer quality, and mutual welfare compared to baselines across diverse tasks. The code is available at https://github.com/ulab-uiuc/GTAlign .

Despite recent advancements in AI and NLP, negotiation remains a difficult domain for AI agents. Traditional game theoretic approaches that have worked well for two-player zero-sum games struggle in the context of negotiation due to their inability to learn human-compatible strategies. On the other hand, approaches that only use human data tend to be domain-specific and lack the theoretical guarantees provided by strategies grounded in game theory. Motivated by the notion of fairness as a criterion for optimality in general sum games, we propose a negotiation framework called FDHC which incorporates fairness into both the reward design and search to learn human-compatible negotiation strategies. Our method includes a novel, RL+search technique called LGM-Zero which leverages a pre-trained language model to retrieve human-compatible offers from large action spaces. Our results show that our method is able to achieve more egalitarian negotiation outcomes and improve negotiation quality.

Scalable oversight studies methods of training and evaluating AI systems in domains where human judgment is unreliable or expensive, such as scientific research and software engineering in complex codebases. Most work in this area has focused on methods of improving the quality of labels. Recent work by Burns et al. (2023) considers the complementary problem of training models with low-quality labels, finding that large pretrained models often have an inductive bias towards producing correct answers. In practice, however, neither label quantity nor quality is fixed: practitioners face a quantity-quality tradeoff. In this paper, we explore the microeconomics of the quantity-quality tradeoff on binary NLP classification tasks used in Burns et al. (2023). While sample-efficient learning has been studied extensively, little public research has focused on scalable elicitation: eliciting capabilities from pretrained models subject to labeling cost constraints. We find that this setting has novel dynamics caused by the tradeoff between label quantity and quality, as well as the model's existing latent capabilities. We observe three regimes of eliciting classification knowledge from pretrained models using supervised finetuning: quantity-dominant, quality-dominant, and a mixed regime involving the use of low- and high-quality data together to attain higher accuracy at a lower cost than using either alone. We explore sample-efficient elicitation methods that make use of two datasets of differing qualities, and establish a Pareto frontier of scalable elicitation methods that optimally trade off labeling cost and classifier performance. We find that the accuracy of supervised fine-tuning can be improved by up to 5 percentage points at a fixed labeling budget by adding a few-shot prompt to make use of the model's existing knowledge of the task.

Aligning large visual generative models with human feedback is often performed through pairwise preference optimization. While such approaches are conceptually simple, they fundamentally rely on annotated pairs, limiting scalability in settings where feedback is collected as independent scalar ratings. In this work, we revisit the KL-regularized alignment objective and show that the optimal policy implicitly compares each sample's reward to an instance-specific baseline that is generally intractable. We propose a threshold-guided alignment framework that replaces this oracle baseline with a data-driven global threshold estimated from empirical score statistics. This formulation turns alignment into a binary decision task on unpaired data, enabling effective optimization directly from scalar feedback. We also incorporate a confidence weighting term to emphasize samples whose scores deviate strongly from the threshold, improving sample efficiency. Experiments across both diffusion and masked generative paradigms, spanning three test sets and five reward models, show that our method consistently improves preference alignment over previous methods. These results position our threshold-guided framework as a simple yet principled alternative for aligning visual generative models without paired comparisons.

Pluralistic alignment has emerged as a critical frontier in the development of Large Language Models (LLMs), with reward models (RMs) serving as a central mechanism for capturing diverse human values. While benchmarks for general response quality are prevalent, evaluating how well reward models account for individual user preferences remains an open challenge. To bridge this gap, we introduce Personalized RewardBench, a novel benchmark designed to rigorously assess reward models' capacity to model personalized preferences. We construct chosen and rejected response pairs based on strict adherence to (or violation of) user-specific rubrics, ensuring that preference distinctions are uniquely tailored to the individual. In particular, human evaluations confirm that the primary discriminative factor between pairs is strictly personal preference, with both responses maintaining high general quality (e.g., correctness, relevance and helpfulness). Extensive testing reveals that existing state-of-the-art reward models struggle significantly with personalization, peaking at an accuracy of just 75.94%. Crucially, because an effective reward model benchmark should predict a reward model's performance on downstream tasks, we conduct experiments demonstrating that our benchmark exhibits a significantly higher correlation with downstream performance in both Best-of-N (BoN) sampling and Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) compared to existing baselines. These findings establish Personalized RewardBench as a robust and accurate proxy for evaluating reward models' performance in downstream applications.

A classical intuition holds that verifying a solution is easier than producing one. For today's coding agents, this intuition is being inverted: as foundation models develop stronger reasoning capabilities and engineering harnesses grow more sophisticated, generating complex candidate solutions is no longer difficult -- reliably verifying them has become the harder problem. Every verifier we can build is only a proxy for human intent, never the intent itself. This makes verification subject to a twofold difficulty: first, intent is underspecified by nature, making it inherently hard to faithfully check whether it has been fulfilled; second, during model training, optimization widens the gap between proxy and intent -- manifesting as reward hacking or signal saturation. To address this, we characterize the quality of verification signals along three dimensions -- scalability, faithfulness, and robustness -- and argue that achieving all three simultaneously is the central challenge. We further study four reward constructions: a test verifier for general coding tasks, a rubric verifier for frontend tasks, the user as verifier for real-world agent tasks, and an automated agent verifier for long-horizon tasks. Across different task types and policy capability levels, we conduct in-depth analysis and experiments on the core challenges of reward design and how to more effectively leverage reward signals. Experiments show that targeted verification design can effectively suppress reward hacking, improve task completion quality, and achieve significant gains across multiple internal and public benchmarks. These experiences collectively point to a core observation: no fixed reward function can remain effective as policy capability continues to grow; and verification must co-evolve with the generator.

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) is effective for training large language models on deterministic outcome reasoning tasks. Prior work shows RLVR works with few prompts, but prompt selection is often based only on training-accuracy variance, leading to unstable optimization directions and weaker transfer. We revisit prompt selection from a mechanism-level view and argue that an effective minibatch should provide both (i) a reliable positive anchor and (ii) explicit negative learning signals from rare failures. Based on this principle, we propose positive--negative pairing: at each update, we sample a hard-but-solvable q^{+} and an easy-but-brittle prompt q^{-}(high success rate but not perfect), characterized by low and high empirical success rates under multiple rollouts. We further introduce Weighted GRPO, which reweights binary outcomes at the pair level and uses group-normalized advantages to amplify rare successes on q^{+} into sharp positive guidance while turning rare failures on q^{-} into strong negative penalties. This bidirectional signal provides informative learning feedback for both successes and failures, improving sample efficiency without suppressing exploration. On Qwen2.5-Math-7B, a single paired minibatch per update consistently outperforms a GRPO baseline that selects two prompts via commonly used variance-based selection heuristics: AIME~2025 Pass@8 improves from 16.8 to 22.2, and AMC23 Pass@64 from 94.0 to 97.0, while remaining competitive with large-scale RLVR trained from a pool of 1209 training prompts. Similar gains are observed on Qwen2.5-Math-7B-Instruct.

We study how the similarity of individuals' information shapes collective action. When people draw on a common source of information, such as social media, each becomes more confident about what others have seen and will do. This can help them coordinate, but it can also tempt them to free-ride. We show that which force prevails depends on how demanding the collective goal is. In a content-moderation experiment, subjects decide whether to pay a cost to report harmful content, which is removed only if enough reports are received. We vary the similarity of group members' information, holding fixed what each learns on her own, and independently vary the removal threshold. More similar information impedes reporting when few reports suffice and facilitates it when many are required, lowering reporting by 17 percentage points under an easy threshold and raising it by 34 points under a demanding one. This confirms the central comparative static of the theory of information similarity (Basak, Deb and Kuvalekar, 2026). Elicited beliefs trace the reversal to perceived pivotality and document systematic miscalibration of it. Subjects overestimate pivotality across all regimes, and their beliefs respond to similarity in line with actual pivotality only at intermediate thresholds: easy thresholds produce unrecognized pivotality, and near-unanimous thresholds produce illusory pivotality. The two response-miscalibrated patterns coincide with welfare losses; only under aligned pivotality does greater participation translate into greater collective success and higher welfare.

While agents are increasingly spending more resources, today agent cost is mostly measured only after execution. A Budget-Aware Agent (BAGEN) should treat budget as an active control signal, rather than a passive cost metric. We first systematically define budget estimation as internal budgets (from agent computation) and external budgets (from agent actions). We then formalize budget-awareness as progressive interval estimation: at each step of a plan, an agent should predict an upper and lower bound on remaining budget, and alert when completion is unlikely. Scoring with a rollout-replay protocol, we find consistent failure patterns on four environments and five frontier agents: (1) strong agents do not necessarily have strong budget-awareness, with correlation r=0.35. (2) frontier models are consistently over-optimistic, continue spending on tasks that are unlikely to succeed, instead of alerting the user early. (3) budget-aware signal is actionable and trainable. Early stop saves 28-64% tokens on failed trajectories, and SFT+RL strengthens early stop and alert behavior. (4) precise interval calibration remains challenging, with interval coverage capping at 47% after SFT+RL. Project page: https://ragen-ai.github.io/bagen/

Reinforcement learning is increasingly used for code-centric tasks. These tasks include code generation, summarization, understanding, repair, testing, and optimization. This trend is growing faster with large language models and autonomous agents. A key challenge is how to design reward signals that make sense for software. In many RL problems, the reward is a clear number. In software, this is often not possible. The goal is rarely a single numeric objective. Instead, rewards are usually proxies. Common proxies check if the code compiles, passes tests, or satisfies quality metrics. Many reward designs have been proposed for code-related tasks. However, the work is scattered across areas and papers. There is no single survey that brings these approaches together and shows the full landscape of reward design for RL in software. In this survey, we provide the first systematic and comprehensive review of reward engineering for RL in software tasks. We focus on existing methods and techniques. We structure the literature along three complementary dimensions, summarizing the reward-design choices within each. We conclude with challenges and recommendations in the reward design space for SE tasks.

Tool-integrated agents that interleave reasoning with API calls are promising for complex tasks, yet aligning them for high-stakes, domain-specific deployment remains challenging: existing reinforcement learning approaches rely on coarse binary rewards that cannot distinguish tool selection errors from malformed parameters. We present ToolRLA, a three-stage post-training pipeline (SFT -> GRPO -> DPO) for domain-specific tool agents. The core contribution is a fine-grained reward function with multiplicative correctness decomposition spanning four dimensions -- format validity, tool selection, parameter accuracy, and regulatory compliance -- that encodes domain priority orderings as inductive biases in the reward landscape. Deployed on a financial advisory copilot (80+ advisors, 1,200+ daily queries), ToolRLA achieves over three months: a 47% improvement in task completion rate (62%->91%), a 63% reduction in tool invocation errors (38%->14%), and a 93% reduction in regulatory violations (12%->0.8%), within sub-2-second latency. Ablation studies show the multiplicative reward design accounts for 7 percentage points of improvement over additive alternatives. Generalization is further validated on ToolBench and API-Bank.

We directly compare the persuasion capabilities of a frontier large language model (LLM; Claude Sonnet 3.5) against incentivized human persuaders in an interactive, real-time conversational quiz setting. In this preregistered, large-scale incentivized experiment, participants (quiz takers) completed an online quiz where persuaders (either humans or LLMs) attempted to persuade quiz takers toward correct or incorrect answers. We find that LLM persuaders achieved significantly higher compliance with their directional persuasion attempts than incentivized human persuaders, demonstrating superior persuasive capabilities in both truthful (toward correct answers) and deceptive (toward incorrect answers) contexts. We also find that LLM persuaders significantly increased quiz takers' accuracy, leading to higher earnings, when steering quiz takers toward correct answers, and significantly decreased their accuracy, leading to lower earnings, when steering them toward incorrect answers. Overall, our findings suggest that AI's persuasion capabilities already exceed those of humans that have real-money bonuses tied to performance. Our findings of increasingly capable AI persuaders thus underscore the urgency of emerging alignment and governance frameworks.

We describe an incentive system for distributed deep learning of foundational models where peers are rewarded for contributions. The incentive system, Gauntlet, has been deployed on the bittensor blockchain and used to train a 1.2B LLM with completely permissionless contributions of pseudo-gradients: no control over the users that can register or their hardware. Gauntlet can be applied to any synchronous distributed training scheme that relies on aggregating updates or pseudo-gradients. We rely on a two-stage mechanism for fast filtering of peer uptime, reliability, and synchronization, combined with the core component that estimates the loss before and after individual pseudo-gradient contributions. We utilized an OpenSkill rating system to track competitiveness of pseudo-gradient scores across time. Finally, we introduce a novel mechanism to ensure peers on the network perform unique computations. Our live 1.2B run, which has paid out real-valued tokens to participants based on the value of their contributions, yielded a competitive (on a per-iteration basis) 1.2B model that demonstrates the utility of our incentive system.

As LLM agents advance, they are increasingly mediating economic decisions, ranging from product discovery to transactions, on behalf of users. Such applications promise benefits but also raise many questions about agent accountability and value for users. Addressing these questions requires understanding how agents behave in realistic market conditions. However, previous research has largely evaluated agents in constrained settings, such as single-task marketplaces (e.g., negotiation) or structured two-agent interactions. Real-world markets are fundamentally different: they require agents to handle diverse economic activities and coordinate within large, dynamic ecosystems where multiple agents with opaque behaviors may engage in open-ended dialogues. To bridge this gap, we investigate two-sided agentic marketplaces where Assistant agents represent consumers and Service agents represent competing businesses. To study these interactions safely, we develop Magentic-Marketplace-- a simulated environment where Assistants and Services can operate. This environment enables us to study key market dynamics: the utility agents achieve, behavioral biases, vulnerability to manipulation, and how search mechanisms shape market outcomes. Our experiments show that frontier models can approach optimal welfare-- but only under ideal search conditions. Performance degrades sharply with scale, and all models exhibit severe first-proposal bias, creating 10-30x advantages for response speed over quality. These findings reveal how behaviors emerge across market conditions, informing the design of fair and efficient agentic marketplaces.

Multi-turn-to-single-turn (M2S) compresses iterative red-teaming into one structured prompt, but prior work relied on a handful of manually written templates. We present X-Teaming Evolutionary M2S, an automated framework that discovers and optimizes M2S templates through language-model-guided evolution. The system pairs smart sampling from 12 sources with an LLM-as-judge inspired by StrongREJECT and records fully auditable logs. Maintaining selection pressure by setting the success threshold to theta = 0.70, we obtain five evolutionary generations, two new template families, and 44.8% overall success (103/230) on GPT-4.1. A balanced cross-model panel of 2,500 trials (judge fixed) shows that structural gains transfer but vary by target; two models score zero at the same threshold. We also find a positive coupling between prompt length and score, motivating length-aware judging. Our results demonstrate that structure-level search is a reproducible route to stronger single-turn probes and underscore the importance of threshold calibration and cross-model evaluation. Code, configurations, and artifacts are available at https://github.com/hyunjun1121/M2S-x-teaming.

Evaluating instruction-guided image edits requires rewards that reflect subtle human preferences, yet current reward models typically depend on large-scale preference annotation and additional model training. This creates a data-efficiency gap: humans can often infer the target evaluation criteria from only a few examples, while models are usually trained on hundreds of thousands of comparisons. We present RewardHarness, a self-evolving agentic reward framework that reframes reward modeling as context evolution rather than weight optimization. Instead of learning from large-scale annotations, RewardHarness aligns with human preferences by iteratively evolving a library of tools and skills from as few as 100 preference demonstrations. Given a source image, candidate edited images, and an editing instruction, an Orchestrator selects the most relevant subset of tools and skills from the maintained library, and a frozen Sub-Agent uses them to construct a reasoning chain that produces a preference judgment. By comparing predicted judgments with ground-truth preferences and analyzing successes and failures in the reasoning process, the Orchestrator automatically refines its library of tools and skills without additional human annotation. Using only 0.05% of the EditReward preference data, RewardHarness achieves 47.4% average accuracy on image-editing evaluation benchmarks, surpassing GPT-5 by 5.3 points. When used as a reward signal for GRPO fine-tuning, RL-tuned models achieve 3.52 on ImgEdit-Bench. Project page: https://rewardharness.com.

Automated presentation generation remains a challenging task requiring coherent content creation, visual design, and audience-aware communication. This work proposes an OpenEnv-compatible reinforcement learning environment where LLM agents learn to research topics, plan content, and generate professional HTML slide presentations through tool use. We introduce a multi-component reward system combining structural validation, render quality assessment, LLM-based aesthetic scoring, content quality metrics, and an inverse specification reward that measures how faithfully generated slides convey their intended purpose. The inverse specification reward, an "inverse task" where an LLM attempts to recover the original specification from generated slides, provides a holistic quality signal. Our approach fine-tunes Qwen2.5-Coder-7B via GRPO, training only 0.5% of parameters on prompts derived from expert demonstrations collected using Claude Opus 4.6. Experiments on 48 diverse business briefs across six models demonstrate that our fine-tuned 7B model achieves 91.2% of Claude Opus 4.6's quality while improving 33.1% over the base model. The six-model comparison reveals that instruction adherence and tool-use compliance, rather than raw parameter count, determine agentic task performance. We contribute SlideRL, an open-source dataset of 288 multi-turn rollout trajectories across all six models: https://huggingface.co/datasets/KarthikRagunathAnandaKumar/sliderl-multi-turn-rollouts Code: https://github.com/pushing-the-frontier/slide-forge-llm

The widespread applicability and increasing omnipresence of LLMs have instigated a need to align LLM responses to user and stakeholder preferences. Many preference optimization approaches have been proposed that fine-tune LLM parameters to achieve good alignment. However, such parameter tuning is known to interfere with model performance on many tasks. Moreover, keeping up with shifting user preferences is tricky in such a situation. Decoding-time alignment with reward model guidance solves these issues at the cost of increased inference time. However, most of such methods fail to strike the right balance between exploration and exploitation of reward -- often due to the conflated formulation of these two aspects - to give well-aligned responses. To remedy this we decouple these two aspects and implement them in an evolutionary fashion: exploration is enforced by decoding from mutated instructions and exploitation is represented as the periodic replacement of poorly-rewarded generations with well-rewarded ones. Empirical evidences indicate that this strategy outperforms many preference optimization and decode-time alignment approaches on two widely accepted alignment benchmarks AlpacaEval 2 and MT-Bench. Our implementation will be available at: https://darwin-alignment.github.io.

As Learning-to-Rank (LTR) approaches primarily seek to improve ranking quality, their output scores are not scale-calibrated by design. This fundamentally limits LTR usage in score-sensitive applications. Though a simple multi-objective approach that combines a regression and a ranking objective can effectively learn scale-calibrated scores, we argue that the two objectives are not necessarily compatible, which makes the trade-off less ideal for either of them. In this paper, we propose a practical regression compatible ranking (RCR) approach that achieves a better trade-off, where the two ranking and regression components are proved to be mutually aligned. Although the same idea applies to ranking with both binary and graded relevance, we mainly focus on binary labels in this paper. We evaluate the proposed approach on several public LTR benchmarks and show that it consistently achieves either best or competitive result in terms of both regression and ranking metrics, and significantly improves the Pareto frontiers in the context of multi-objective optimization. Furthermore, we evaluated the proposed approach on YouTube Search and found that it not only improved the ranking quality of the production pCTR model, but also brought gains to the click prediction accuracy. The proposed approach has been successfully deployed in the YouTube production system.

Existing losses used in deep metric learning (DML) for image retrieval often lead to highly non-uniform intra-class and inter-class representation structures across test classes and data distributions. When combined with the common practice of using a fixed threshold to declare a match, this gives rise to significant performance variations in terms of false accept rate (FAR) and false reject rate (FRR) across test classes and data distributions. We define this issue in DML as threshold inconsistency. In real-world applications, such inconsistency often complicates the threshold selection process when deploying commercial image retrieval systems. To measure this inconsistency, we propose a novel variance-based metric called Operating-Point-Inconsistency-Score (OPIS) that quantifies the variance in the operating characteristics across classes. Using the OPIS metric, we find that achieving high accuracy levels in a DML model does not automatically guarantee threshold consistency. In fact, our investigation reveals a Pareto frontier in the high-accuracy regime, where existing methods to improve accuracy often lead to degradation in threshold consistency. To address this trade-off, we introduce the Threshold-Consistent Margin (TCM) loss, a simple yet effective regularization technique that promotes uniformity in representation structures across classes by selectively penalizing hard sample pairs. Extensive experiments demonstrate TCM's effectiveness in enhancing threshold consistency while preserving accuracy, simplifying the threshold selection process in practical DML settings.

Exploration in environments which differ across episodes has received increasing attention in recent years. Current methods use some combination of global novelty bonuses, computed using the agent's entire training experience, and episodic novelty bonuses, computed using only experience from the current episode. However, the use of these two types of bonuses has been ad-hoc and poorly understood. In this work, we shed light on the behavior of these two types of bonuses through controlled experiments on easily interpretable tasks as well as challenging pixel-based settings. We find that the two types of bonuses succeed in different settings, with episodic bonuses being most effective when there is little shared structure across episodes and global bonuses being effective when more structure is shared. We develop a conceptual framework which makes this notion of shared structure precise by considering the variance of the value function across contexts, and which provides a unifying explanation of our empirical results. We furthermore find that combining the two bonuses can lead to more robust performance across different degrees of shared structure, and investigate different algorithmic choices for defining and combining global and episodic bonuses based on function approximation. This results in an algorithm which sets a new state of the art across 16 tasks from the MiniHack suite used in prior work, and also performs robustly on Habitat and Montezuma's Revenge.

Multi-agent AI systems exhibit emergent risks that no single agent produces in isolation. Existing safety frameworks rely on binary classifications of agent behavior, discarding the uncertainty inherent in proxy-based evaluation. We introduce SWARM (System-Wide Assessment of Risk in Multi-agent systems), a simulation framework that replaces binary good/bad labels with soft probabilistic labels p = P(v{=}+1) in [0,1], enabling continuous-valued payoff computation, toxicity measurement, and governance intervention. SWARM implements a modular governance engine with configurable levers (transaction taxes, circuit breakers, reputation decay, and random audits) and quantifies their effects through probabilistic metrics including expected toxicity E[1{-}p mid accepted] and quality gap E[p mid accepted] - E[p mid rejected]. Across seven scenarios with five-seed replication, strict governance reduces welfare by over 40\% without improving safety. In parallel, aggressively internalizing system externalities collapses total welfare from a baseline of +262 down to -67, while toxicity remains invariant. Circuit breakers require careful calibration; overly restrictive thresholds severely diminish system value, whereas an optimal threshold balances moderate welfare with minimized toxicity. Companion experiments show soft metrics detect proxy gaming by self-optimizing agents passing conventional binary evaluations. This basic governance layer applies to live LLM-backed agents (Concordia entities, Claude, GPT-4o Mini) without modification. Results show distributional safety requires continuous risk metrics and governance lever calibration involves quantifiable safety-welfare tradeoffs. Source code and project resources are publicly available at https://www.swarm-ai.org/.

Existing work on value alignment typically characterizes value relations statically, ignoring how interventions - such as prompting, fine-tuning, or preference optimization - reshape the broader value system. We introduce the Value Alignment Tax (VAT), a framework that measures how alignment-induced changes propagate across interconnected values relative to achieved on-target gain. VAT captures the dynamics of value expression under alignment pressure. Using a controlled scenario-action dataset grounded in Schwartz value theory, we collect paired pre-post normative judgments and analyze alignment effects across models, values, and alignment strategies. Our results show that alignment often produces uneven, structured co-movement among values. These effects are invisible under conventional target-only evaluation, revealing systemic, process-level alignment risks and offering new insights into the dynamics of value alignment in LLMs.

A central belief in scaling reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards for instruction following (IF) tasks is that, a diverse mixture of verifiable hard and unverifiable soft constraints is essential for generalizing to unseen instructions. In this work, we challenge this prevailing consensus through a systematic empirical investigation. Counter-intuitively, we find that models trained on hard-only constraints consistently outperform those trained on mixed datasets. Extensive experiments reveal that reward precision, rather than constraint diversity, is the primary driver of effective alignment. The LLM judge suffers from a low recall rate in detecting false response, which leads to severe reward hacking, thereby undermining the benefits of diversity. Furthermore, analysis of the attention mechanism reveals that high-precision rewards develop a transferable meta-skill for IF. Motivated by these insights, we propose a simple yet effective data-centric refinement strategy that prioritizes reward precision. Evaluated on five benchmarks, our approach outperforms competitive baselines by 13.4\% in performance while achieving a 58\% reduction in training time, maintaining strong generalization beyond instruction following. Our findings advocate for a paradigm shift: moving away from the indiscriminate pursuit of data diversity toward high-precision rewards.

Recent advances such as DeepSeek R1-Zero highlight the effectiveness of incentive training, a reinforcement learning paradigm that computes rewards solely based on the final answer part of a language model's output, thereby encouraging the generation of intermediate reasoning steps. However, these methods fundamentally rely on external verifiers, which limits their applicability to domains like mathematics and coding where such verifiers are readily available. Although reward models can serve as verifiers, they require high-quality annotated data and are costly to train. In this work, we propose NOVER, NO-VERifier Reinforcement Learning, a general reinforcement learning framework that requires only standard supervised fine-tuning data with no need for an external verifier. NOVER enables incentive training across a wide range of text-to-text tasks and outperforms the model of the same size distilled from large reasoning models such as DeepSeek R1 671B by 7.7 percent. Moreover, the flexibility of NOVER enables new possibilities for optimizing large language models, such as inverse incentive training.

Dense per-step supervision is an appealing remedy for sparse-reward, long-horizon LLM agents: reward the agent for predicting its next observation, and memory should follow. We show that under group-normalized RL (GRPO), this recipe does not merely fail -- it destroys the policy. Across Qwen3-1.7B/4B/8B on ALFWorld, a potential-based prediction reward drives every run into a degenerate absorbing state (prediction accuracy -> 1.0, task success -> 0,episode length pinned at the horizon): the "dark room" pathology, built automatically by the optimizer. A single-factor ablation localizes the cause -- removing only GRPO's std normalization turns the same reward from catastrophic (0%) into baseline parity -- and a two-line proposition explains why: in all-fail groups the z-scored advantage is invariant to the shaping coefficient, so bounded rewards become unbounded pressure and annealing cannot help. Our central insight generalizes this: what z-scoring amplifies is a dense signal's within-group variance while all-fail groups dominate, so signals whose variance decays by mastery are structurally amplifier-safe.This variance-profile criterion retrodicts our collapses, carries preregistered predictions for arms that had not yet run, and is consistent with published reward-channel successes (a compatibility check, not an independent test). Finally, a controlled signal-delivery matrix (identical signal, varying only the consumption mechanism) shows the reward channel is at best neutral while the auxiliary-loss channel gains ~20 points -- and a shuffled-gold placebo matches the true-gold arm, so the gap survives without correct labels. Endpoints are single-seed; seed replication and group-size controls are preregistered and in progress.

A common approach for aligning language models to human preferences is to first learn a reward model from preference data, and then use this reward model to update the language model. We study two closely related problems that arise in this approach. First, any monotone transformation of the reward model preserves preference ranking; is there a choice that is ``better'' than others? Second, we often wish to align language models to multiple properties: how should we combine multiple reward models? Using a probabilistic interpretation of the alignment procedure, we identify a natural choice for transformation for (the common case of) rewards learned from Bradley-Terry preference models. This derived transformation has two important properties. First, it emphasizes improving poorly-performing outputs, rather than outputs that already score well. This mitigates both underfitting (where some prompts are not improved) and reward hacking (where the model learns to exploit misspecification of the reward model). Second, it enables principled aggregation of rewards by linking summation to logical conjunction: the sum of transformed rewards corresponds to the probability that the output is ``good'' in all measured properties, in a sense we make precise. Experiments aligning language models to be both helpful and harmless using RLHF show substantial improvements over the baseline (non-transformed) approach.

Corruption studies, the primary tool for evaluating chain-of-thought (CoT) faithfulness, identify which chain positions are "computationally important" by measuring accuracy when steps are replaced with errors. We identify a systematic confound: for chains with explicit terminal answer statements, the dominant format in standard benchmarks, corruption studies detect where the answer text appears, not where computation occurs. A within-dataset format ablation provides the key evidence: on standard GSM8K chains ending with "the answer is X," removing only the answer statement, preserving all reasoning, collapses suffix sensitivity ~19x at 3B (N=300, p=0.022). Conflicting-answer experiments quantify the causal mechanism: at 7B, CC accuracy drops to near-zero (<=0.02) across five architecture families; the followed-wrong rate spans 0.63-1.00 at 3B-7B and attenuates at larger scales (0.300 at Phi-4-14B, ~0.01 at 32B). A within-stable 7B replication (9.3x attenuation, N=76, p=7.8e-3; Qwen3-8B N=299, p=0.004) provides converging evidence, and the pattern replicates on MATH (DeepSeek-R1-7B: 10.9x suffix-survival recovery). On chains without answer suffixes the same protocol identifies the prefix as load-bearing (Delta=-0.77, p<10^-12). Generation-time probes confirm a dissociation: the answer is not early-determined during generation (early commitment <5%), yet at consumption time model outputs systematically follow the explicit answer text. The format-determination effect persists through 14B (8.5x ratio, p=0.001) and converges toward zero at 32B. We propose a three-prerequisite protocol (question-only control, format characterization, all-position sweep) as a minimum standard for corruption-based faithfulness studies.

Modern socio-technical systems increasingly involve multi-stakeholder environments where actors simultaneously cooperate and compete. These coopetitive relationships exhibit dynamic trust evolution based on observed behavior over repeated interactions. While conceptual modeling languages like i* represent trust relationships qualitatively, they lack computational mechanisms for analyzing how trust changes with behavioral evidence. Conversely, computational trust models from multi-agent systems provide algorithmic updating but lack grounding in conceptual models that capture strategic dependencies covering mixed motives of actors. This technical report bridges this gap by developing a computational trust model that extends game-theoretic foundations for strategic coopetition with dynamic trust evolution. Building on companion work that achieved 58/60 validation (96.7%) for logarithmic specifications, we introduce trust as a two-layer system with immediate trust responding to current behavior and reputation tracking violation history. Trust evolves through asymmetric updating where cooperation builds trust gradually while violations erode it sharply, creating hysteresis effects and trust ceilings that constrain relationship recovery. We develop a structured translation framework enabling practitioners to instantiate computational trust models from i* dependency networks encompassing mixed motives of actors. Comprehensive experimental validation across 78,125 parameter configurations establishes robust emergence of negativity bias, hysteresis effects, and cumulative damage amplification. Empirical validation using the Renault-Nissan Alliance case study (1999-2025) achieves 49/60 validation points (81.7%), successfully reproducing documented trust evolution across five distinct relationship phases including crisis and recovery periods.

Unintended bias in Machine Learning can manifest as systemic differences in performance for different demographic groups, potentially compounding existing challenges to fairness in society at large. In this paper, we introduce a suite of threshold-agnostic metrics that provide a nuanced view of this unintended bias, by considering the various ways that a classifier's score distribution can vary across designated groups. We also introduce a large new test set of online comments with crowd-sourced annotations for identity references. We use this to show how our metrics can be used to find new and potentially subtle unintended bias in existing public models.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have become an integral part of software development, especially with the advent of agentic capabilities. Yet, many frontier LLMs are affiliated with specific providers. This raises the question of whether generated code favors the provider's own ecosystem over comparable alternatives, potentially constraining developers' choices and increasing dependence on a single provider. We define this behavior as Vertical Integration Bias (VIB) and introduce VIBench, a benchmark for measuring VIB in direct and agentic code generation across 20 provider-selectable software-integration scenarios. Evaluating 10 frontier provider-affiliated models against 3 non-affiliated controls, we find positive VIB in direct generation, with six of ten affiliated models showing statistically significant effects up to +18.8 percentage points (pp). Agentic workflows further amplify VIB, reaching +39.2 pp. Moreover, early affiliated-ecosystem choices in agentic workflows can persist into conceptually decoupled downstream files, with persistence as high as 90.3%. These findings underscore the need to measure and account for VIB in code generation, especially as agentic capabilities become more prevalent.

The alignment of Small Language Models (SLMs) in the 70--500M parameter range using reinforcement learning is often considered unstable, though the underlying failure mechanisms have not been systematically investigated. In the State-of-the-Art (SOTA) research, fifteen (model, corpus) configurations were trained using Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO). The experiments included Pythia-70M, 160M, 410M and SmolLM2-135M, 360M on the TinyStories, CNN/DailyMail, and Wikitext-103 corpora. Three reproducible failure modes were identified in small-scale language models: silent LoRA parameter freezing in standard PEFT/TRL pipelines, numerical overflow in importance ratios when using bfloat16, and catastrophic policy collapse due to reward-model error. These issues were addressed using a merge-and-reinitialize adapter technique, float32 precision during PPO updates, and a three-layer safety mechanism comprising reward whitening, importance-ratio guarding, and weight rollback. In this paper, a capacity-headroom hypothesis is proposed, which states that PPO performance at the SLM scale depends on both a fluent supervised model (PPL<20) and a discriminative reward signal, rather than on the number of model parameters. The proposed system converged stably in all experiments and improved preference win rate over the SFT baseline in configurations with a fluent prior and an informative reward signal. Furthermore, it outperformed instruction-tuned baselines while requiring significantly less training data. All checkpoints, preference datasets, and training scripts are publicly released^§.

Foundation models are first pre-trained on vast unsupervised datasets and then fine-tuned on labeled data. Reinforcement learning, notably from human feedback (RLHF), can further align the network with the intended usage. Yet the imperfections in the proxy reward may hinder the training and lead to suboptimal results; the diversity of objectives in real-world tasks and human opinions exacerbate the issue. This paper proposes embracing the heterogeneity of diverse rewards by following a multi-policy strategy. Rather than focusing on a single a priori reward, we aim for Pareto-optimal generalization across the entire space of preferences. To this end, we propose rewarded soup, first specializing multiple networks independently (one for each proxy reward) and then interpolating their weights linearly. This succeeds empirically because we show that the weights remain linearly connected when fine-tuned on diverse rewards from a shared pre-trained initialization. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach for text-to-text (summarization, Q&A, helpful assistant, review), text-image (image captioning, text-to-image generation, visual grounding, VQA), and control (locomotion) tasks. We hope to enhance the alignment of deep models, and how they interact with the world in all its diversity.

Agentic AI systems capable of autonomous planning and extended environmental interaction pose a fundamental control problem: how can humans maintain meaningful oversight of systems that may exceed their own capabilities? Existing approaches to scalable oversight rely on complex assumptions, remain largely heuristic, or lack practical methods for sequential settings with statistical guarantees. We introduce Calibrated Collective Oversight (CCO), which aggregates diverse auxiliary scoring functions into a penalty measuring deviation from a conservative baseline. Inspired by Attainable Utility Preservation, CCO enables collective conservatism: actions face a penalty proportional to overseer concern, so high-utility actions are still selected when overseers find them unobjectionable and overridden only when concern accumulates. CCO calibrates this conservatism online using Conformal Decision Theory, ensuring that undesirable outcomes remain below a user-specified target threshold with finite-time bounds and no distributional assumptions. On a modified version of SWE-bench, weaker overseers successfully constrain an adversarially misaligned stronger agent; on MACHIAVELLI, CCO substantially reduces ethical violations while preserving reward. In both settings, empirical violation rates closely match the specified targets, as predicted by the theory.

Zero-shot coordination in cooperative artificial intelligence (AI) remains a significant challenge, which means effectively coordinating with a wide range of unseen partners. Previous algorithms have attempted to address this challenge by optimizing fixed objectives within a population to improve strategy or behaviour diversity. However, these approaches can result in a loss of learning and an inability to cooperate with certain strategies within the population, known as cooperative incompatibility. To address this issue, we propose the Cooperative Open-ended LEarning (COLE) framework, which constructs open-ended objectives in cooperative games with two players from the perspective of graph theory to assess and identify the cooperative ability of each strategy. We further specify the framework and propose a practical algorithm that leverages knowledge from game theory and graph theory. Furthermore, an analysis of the learning process of the algorithm shows that it can efficiently overcome cooperative incompatibility. The experimental results in the Overcooked game environment demonstrate that our method outperforms current state-of-the-art methods when coordinating with different-level partners. Our demo is available at https://sites.google.com/view/cole-2023.

Despite notable advancements in Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs), most state-of-the-art models have not undergone thorough alignment with human preferences. This gap exists because current alignment research has primarily achieved progress in specific areas (e.g., hallucination reduction), while the broader question of whether aligning models with human preferences can systematically enhance MLLM capability remains largely unexplored. To this end, we introduce MM-RLHF, a dataset containing 120k fine-grained, human-annotated preference comparison pairs. This dataset represents a substantial advancement over existing resources, offering superior size, diversity, annotation granularity, and quality. Leveraging this dataset, we propose several key innovations to improve both the quality of reward models and the efficiency of alignment algorithms. Notably, we introduce a Critique-Based Reward Model, which generates critiques of model outputs before assigning scores, offering enhanced interpretability and more informative feedback compared to traditional scalar reward mechanisms. Additionally, we propose Dynamic Reward Scaling, a method that adjusts the loss weight of each sample according to the reward signal, thereby optimizing the use of high-quality comparison pairs. Our approach is rigorously evaluated across 10 distinct dimensions and 27 benchmarks, with results demonstrating significant and consistent improvements in model performance. Specifically, fine-tuning LLaVA-ov-7B with MM-RLHF and our alignment algorithm leads to a 19.5% increase in conversational abilities and a 60% improvement in safety. We have open-sourced the preference dataset, reward model, training and evaluation code, as well as reward modeling and safety benchmarks. For more details, please visit our project page: https://mm-rlhf.github.io.

Mehta and Panigrahi (2012) proposed Online Matching with Stochastic Rewards, which generalizes the Online Bipartite Matching problem of Karp, Vazirani, and Vazirani (1990) by associating the edges with success probabilities. This new feature captures the pay-per-click model in online advertising. Recently, Huang and Zhang (2020) studied this problem under the online primal dual framework using the Configuration Linear Program (LP), and got the best known competitive ratios of the Stochastic Balance algorithm. Their work suggests that the more expressive Configuration LP is more suitable for this problem than the Matching LP. This paper advances the theory of Configuration LP in two directions. Our technical contribution includes a characterization of the joint matching outcome of an offline vertex and all its neighbors. This characterization may be of independent interest, and is aligned with the spirit of Configuration LP. By contrast, previous analyses of Ranking generally focus on only one neighbor. Second, we designed a Stochastic Configuration LP that captures a stochastic benchmark proposed by Goyal and Udwani (2020), who used a Path-based LP. The Stochastic Configuration LP is smaller and simpler than the Path-based LP. Moreover, using the new LP we improved the competitive ratio of Stochastic Balance from 0.596 to 0.611 when the success probabilities are infinitesimal, and to 0.613 when the success probabilities are further equal.

Aligning multimodal large language models (MLLMs) with human preferences often relies on single-signal, model-based reward methods. Such monolithic rewards often lack confidence calibration across domain-specific tasks, fail to capture diverse aspects of human preferences, and require extensive data annotation and reward model training. In this work, we propose a hybrid reward modeling framework that integrates complementary reward paradigms: (i) model-based rewards, where a learned reward model predicts scalar or vector scores from synthetic and human feedback, and (ii) rule-based rewards, where domain-specific heuristics provide explicit correctness signals with confidence. Beyond accuracy, we further incorporate multi-aspect rewards to enforce instruction adherence and introduce a generalized length-penalty reward to stabilize training and improve performance. The proposed framework provides a flexible and effective approach to aligning MLLMs through reinforcement learning policy optimization. Our experiments show consistent improvements across different multimodal benchmarks when applying hybrid and multi-aspect reward modeling. Our best performing model in the 3B family achieves an overall average improvement of ~9.5% across general and math reasoning tasks. Focusing specifically on mathematical benchmarks, the model achieves a significant average improvement of ~16%, highlighting its effectiveness in mathematical reasoning and problem solving.

Affine Maximizer Auctions (AMAs), a generalized mechanism family from VCG, are widely used in automated mechanism design due to their inherent dominant-strategy incentive compatibility (DSIC) and individual rationality (IR). However, as the payment form is fixed, AMA's expressiveness is restricted, especially in distributions where bidders' valuations are correlated. In this paper, we propose Correlation-Aware AMA (CA-AMA), a novel framework that augments AMA with a new correlation-aware payment. We show that any CA-AMA preserves the DSIC property and formalize finding optimal CA-AMA as a constraint optimization problem subject to the IR constraint. Then, we theoretically characterize scenarios where classic AMAs can perform arbitrarily poorly compared to the optimal revenue, while the CA-AMA can reach the optimal revenue. For optimizing CA-AMA, we design a practical two-stage training algorithm. We derive that the target function's continuity and the generalization bound on the degree of deviation from strict IR. Finally, extensive experiments showcase that our algorithm can find an approximate optimal CA-AMA in various distributions with improved revenue and a low degree of violation of IR.

Conventional Applicant Tracking Systems (ATS) tend to be inflexible keyword-matchers, and deny gifted candidates a role due to a few minor semantic mismatches. This article describes a new two-step process to design a more refined resume evaluation model based on a small language model (<600M parameters) that is finetuned using GRPO on a custom reward function. To begin with, Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) was used to build a solid baseline model. Second, this SFT model was also optimized with the help of Reinforcement Learning (RL) through GRPO under the guidance of a new, multi-component reward function that can holistically assess candidates beyond simple keyword matching. We indicate that the RL application presents a critical problem of reward hacking due to the initial experiments of aggressive penalties, which produces faulty, excessively negative model behaviors. We have overcome this challenge by refining the reward function repeatedly and training hyperparameters into a stable "gentle polishing process" of the reward function. Our resulting GRPO-polished model demonstrates significant real-world efficacy, achieving a final accuracy of 91% on unseen test data. The model shows a strong ability to correctly identify qualified candidates (recall of 0.85 for the 'SELECTED' class) while also showing exceptional precision (1.0), confirming its reliability. These results indicate that a properly executed, two-step fine-tuning procedure can indeed effectively refine a small language model to be able to conduct fine-tuned and human-like candidate scoring, overcoming the drawbacks of both traditional ATS and naive RL usage.

Designing reward functions for efficiently guiding reinforcement learning (RL) agents toward specific behaviors is a complex task. This is challenging since it requires the identification of reward structures that are not sparse and that avoid inadvertently inducing undesirable behaviors. Naively modifying the reward structure to offer denser and more frequent feedback can lead to unintended outcomes and promote behaviors that are not aligned with the designer's intended goal. Although potential-based reward shaping is often suggested as a remedy, we systematically investigate settings where deploying it often significantly impairs performance. To address these issues, we introduce a new framework that uses a bi-level objective to learn behavior alignment reward functions. These functions integrate auxiliary rewards reflecting a designer's heuristics and domain knowledge with the environment's primary rewards. Our approach automatically determines the most effective way to blend these types of feedback, thereby enhancing robustness against heuristic reward misspecification. Remarkably, it can also adapt an agent's policy optimization process to mitigate suboptimalities resulting from limitations and biases inherent in the underlying RL algorithms. We evaluate our method's efficacy on a diverse set of tasks, from small-scale experiments to high-dimensional control challenges. We investigate heuristic auxiliary rewards of varying quality -- some of which are beneficial and others detrimental to the learning process. Our results show that our framework offers a robust and principled way to integrate designer-specified heuristics. It not only addresses key shortcomings of existing approaches but also consistently leads to high-performing solutions, even when given misaligned or poorly-specified auxiliary reward functions.

Reward models are essential for aligning language model outputs with human preferences, yet existing approaches often lack both controllability and interpretability. These models are typically optimized for narrow objectives, limiting their generalizability to broader downstream tasks. Moreover, their scalar outputs are difficult to interpret without contextual reasoning. To address these limitations, we introduce R3, a novel reward modeling framework that is rubric-agnostic, generalizable across evaluation dimensions, and provides interpretable, reasoned score assignments. R3 enables more transparent and flexible evaluation of language models, supporting robust alignment with diverse human values and use cases. Our models, data, and code are available as open source at https://github.com/rubricreward/r3

Intrinsic reward shaping has emerged as a prevalent approach to solving hard-exploration and sparse-rewards environments in reinforcement learning (RL). While single intrinsic rewards, such as curiosity-driven or novelty-based methods, have shown effectiveness, they often limit the diversity and efficiency of exploration. Moreover, the potential and principle of combining multiple intrinsic rewards remains insufficiently explored. To address this gap, we introduce HIRE (Hybrid Intrinsic REward), a flexible and elegant framework for creating hybrid intrinsic rewards through deliberate fusion strategies. With HIRE, we conduct a systematic analysis of the application of hybrid intrinsic rewards in both general and unsupervised RL across multiple benchmarks. Extensive experiments demonstrate that HIRE can significantly enhance exploration efficiency and diversity, as well as skill acquisition in complex and dynamic settings.

Reinforcement learning fine-tuning has become the dominant approach for aligning diffusion models with human preferences. However, assessing images is intrinsically a multi-dimensional task, and multiple evaluation criteria need to be optimized simultaneously. Existing practice deal with multiple rewards by training one specialist model per reward, optimizing a weighted-sum reward R(x)=sum_k w_k R_k(x), or sequentially fine-tuning with a hand-crafted stage schedule. These approaches either fail to produce a unified model that can be jointly trained on all rewards or necessitates heavy manually tuned sequential training. We find that the failure stems from using a naive weighted-sum reward aggregation. This approach suffers from a sample-level mismatch because most rollouts are specialist samples, highly informative for certain reward dimensions but irrelevant for others; consequently, weighted summation dilutes their supervision. To address this issue, we propose MARBLE (Multi-Aspect Reward BaLancE), a gradient-space optimization framework that maintains independent advantage estimators for each reward, computes per-reward policy gradients, and harmonizes them into a single update direction without manually-tuned reward weighting, by solving a Quadratic Programming problem. We further propose an amortized formulation that exploits the affine structure of the loss used in DiffusionNFT, to reduce the per-step cost from K+1 backward passes to near single-reward baseline cost, together with EMA smoothing on the balancing coefficients to stabilize updates against transient single-batch fluctuations. On SD3.5 Medium with five rewards, MARBLE improves all five reward dimensions simultaneously, turns the worst-aligned reward's gradient cosine from negative under weighted summation in 80% of mini-batches to consistently positive, and runs at 0.97X the training speed of baseline training.

Many deployments must compare candidate language models for safety before a labeled benchmark exists for the relevant language, sector, or regulatory regime. We formalize this setting as benchmarkless comparative safety scoring and specify the contract under which a scenario-based audit can be interpreted as deployment evidence. Scores are valid only under a fixed scenario pack, rubric, auditor, judge, sampling configuration, and rerun budget. Because no labels are available, we replace ground-truth agreement with an instrumental-validity chain: responsiveness to a controlled safe-versus-abliterated contrast, dominance of target-driven variance over auditor and judge artifacts, and stability across reruns. We instantiate the chain in SimpleAudit, a local-first scoring instrument, and validate it on a Norwegian safety pack. Safe and abliterated targets separate with AUROC values between 0.89 and 1.00, target identity is the dominant variance component (η^2 approx 0.52), and severity profiles stabilize by ten reruns. Applying the same chain to Petri shows that it admits both tools. The substantial differences arise upstream of the chain, in claim-contract enforcement and deployment fit. A Norwegian public-sector procurement case comparing Borealis and Gemma 3 demonstrates the resulting evidence in practice: the safer model depends on scenario category and risk measure. Consequently, scores, matched deltas, critical rates, uncertainty, and the auditor and judge used must be reported together rather than collapsed into a single ranking.

Reward models (RMs) are at the crux of successful RLHF to align pretrained models to human preferences, yet there has been relatively little study that focuses on evaluation of those reward models. Evaluating reward models presents an opportunity to understand the opaque technologies used for alignment of language models and which values are embedded in them. To date, very few descriptors of capabilities, training methods, or open-source reward models exist. In this paper, we present RewardBench, a benchmark dataset and code-base for evaluation, to enhance scientific understanding of reward models. The RewardBench dataset is a collection of prompt-win-lose trios spanning chat, reasoning, and safety, to benchmark how reward models perform on challenging, structured and out-of-distribution queries. We created specific comparison datasets for RMs that have subtle, but verifiable reasons (e.g. bugs, incorrect facts) why one answer should be preferred to another. On the RewardBench leaderboard, we evaluate reward models trained with a variety of methods, such as the direct MLE training of classifiers and the implicit reward modeling of Direct Preference Optimization (DPO), and on a spectrum of datasets. We present many findings on propensity for refusals, reasoning limitations, and instruction following shortcomings of various reward models towards a better understanding of the RLHF process.

Fairness is an emerging and challenging topic in recommender systems. In recent years, various ways of evaluating and therefore improving fairness have emerged. In this study, we examine existing evaluation measures of fairness in recommender systems. Specifically, we focus solely on exposure-based fairness measures of individual items that aim to quantify the disparity in how individual items are recommended to users, separate from item relevance to users. We gather all such measures and we critically analyse their theoretical properties. We identify a series of limitations in each of them, which collectively may render the affected measures hard or impossible to interpret, to compute, or to use for comparing recommendations. We resolve these limitations by redefining or correcting the affected measures, or we argue why certain limitations cannot be resolved. We further perform a comprehensive empirical analysis of both the original and our corrected versions of these fairness measures, using real-world and synthetic datasets. Our analysis provides novel insights into the relationship between measures based on different fairness concepts, and different levels of measure sensitivity and strictness. We conclude with practical suggestions of which fairness measures should be used and when. Our code is publicly available. To our knowledge, this is the first critical comparison of individual item fairness measures in recommender systems.

Relevance and fairness are two major objectives of recommender systems (RSs). Recent work proposes measures of RS fairness that are either independent from relevance (fairness-only) or conditioned on relevance (joint measures). While fairness-only measures have been studied extensively, we look into whether joint measures can be trusted. We collect all joint evaluation measures of RS relevance and fairness, and ask: How much do they agree with each other? To what extent do they agree with relevance/fairness measures? How sensitive are they to changes in rank position, or to increasingly fair and relevant recommendations? We empirically study for the first time the behaviour of these measures across 4 real-world datasets and 4 recommenders. We find that most of these measures: i) correlate weakly with one another and even contradict each other at times; ii) are less sensitive to rank position changes than relevance- and fairness-only measures, meaning that they are less granular than traditional RS measures; and iii) tend to compress scores at the low end of their range, meaning that they are not very expressive. We counter the above limitations with a set of guidelines on the appropriate usage of such measures, i.e., they should be used with caution due to their tendency to contradict each other and of having a very small empirical range.

Personalized treatment effect estimates are often of interest in high-stakes applications -- thus, before deploying a model estimating such effects in practice, one needs to be sure that the best candidate from the ever-growing machine learning toolbox for this task was chosen. Unfortunately, due to the absence of counterfactual information in practice, it is usually not possible to rely on standard validation metrics for doing so, leading to a well-known model selection dilemma in the treatment effect estimation literature. While some solutions have recently been investigated, systematic understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of different model selection criteria is still lacking. In this paper, instead of attempting to declare a global `winner', we therefore empirically investigate success- and failure modes of different selection criteria. We highlight that there is a complex interplay between selection strategies, candidate estimators and the data used for comparing them, and provide interesting insights into the relative (dis)advantages of different criteria alongside desiderata for the design of further illuminating empirical studies in this context.

To survive in dynamic and uncertain environments, individuals must develop effective decision strategies that balance information gathering and decision commitment. Models of such strategies often prioritize either optimizing tangible payoffs, like reward rate, or gathering information to support a diversity of (possibly unknown) objectives. However, our understanding of the relative merits of these two approaches remains incomplete, in part because direct comparisons have been limited to idealized, static environments that lack the dynamic complexity of the real world. Here we compared the performance of normative reward- and information-seeking strategies in a dynamic foraging task. Both strategies show similar transitions between exploratory and exploitative behaviors as environmental uncertainty changes. However, we find subtle disparities in the actions they take, resulting in meaningful performance differences: whereas reward-seeking strategies generate slightly more reward on average, information-seeking strategies provide more consistent and predictable outcomes. Our findings support the adaptive value of information-seeking behaviors that can mitigate risk with minimal reward loss.

High-quality preference data is essential for aligning foundation models with human values through preference learning. However, manual annotation of such data is often time-consuming and costly. Recent methods often adopt a self-rewarding approach, where the target model generates and annotates its own preference data, but this can lead to inaccuracies since the reward model shares weights with the target model, thereby amplifying inherent biases. To address these issues, we propose Anyprefer, a framework designed to synthesize high-quality preference data for aligning the target model. Anyprefer frames the data synthesis process as a cooperative two-player Markov Game, where the target model and the judge model collaborate together. Here, a series of external tools are introduced to assist the judge model in accurately rewarding the target model's responses, mitigating biases in the rewarding process. In addition, a feedback mechanism is introduced to optimize prompts for both models, enhancing collaboration and improving data quality. The synthesized data is compiled into a new preference dataset, Anyprefer-V1, consisting of 58K high-quality preference pairs. Extensive experiments show that Anyprefer significantly improves model alignment performance across four main applications, covering 21 datasets, achieving average improvements of 18.55% in five natural language generation datasets, 3.66% in nine vision-language understanding datasets, 30.05% in three medical image analysis datasets, and 16.00% in four visuo-motor control tasks.

Superalignment, where humans are weak supervisors of superhuman models, has become an important and widely discussed issue in the current era of rapid development of Large Language Models (LLMs). The recent work preliminarily studies this problem by using weak models to supervise strong models. It discovers that weakly supervised strong students can consistently outperform weak teachers towards the alignment target, leading to a weak-to-strong generalization phenomenon. However, we are concerned that behind such a promising phenomenon, whether there exists an issue of weak-to-strong deception, where strong models may deceive weak models by exhibiting well-aligned in areas known to weak models but producing misaligned behaviors in cases weak models do not know. We then take an initial step towards exploring this security issue in a specific but realistic multi-objective alignment case, where there may be some alignment targets conflicting with each other (e.g., helpfulness v.s. harmlessness). Such a conflict is likely to cause strong models to deceive weak models in one alignment dimension to gain high reward in other alignment dimension. Our experiments on both the reward modeling task and the preference optimization scenario indicate: (1) the weak-to-strong deception exists; (2) the deception phenomenon may intensify as the capability gap between weak and strong models increases. We also discuss potential solutions and find bootstrapping with an intermediate model can mitigate the deception to some extent. Our work highlights the urgent need to pay more attention to the true reliability of superalignment.

We show that when large language models learn to reward hack on production RL environments, this can result in egregious emergent misalignment. We start with a pretrained model, impart knowledge of reward hacking strategies via synthetic document finetuning or prompting, and train on a selection of real Anthropic production coding environments. Unsurprisingly, the model learns to reward hack. Surprisingly, the model generalizes to alignment faking, cooperation with malicious actors, reasoning about malicious goals, and attempting sabotage when used with Claude Code, including in the codebase for this paper. Applying RLHF safety training using standard chat-like prompts results in aligned behavior on chat-like evaluations, but misalignment persists on agentic tasks. Three mitigations are effective: (i) preventing the model from reward hacking; (ii) increasing the diversity of RLHF safety training; and (iii) "inoculation prompting", wherein framing reward hacking as acceptable behavior during training removes misaligned generalization even when reward hacking is learned.

Frontier AI systems are increasingly capable and deployed in high-stakes multi-agent environments. However, existing AI safety benchmarks largely evaluate single agents, leaving multi-agent risks such as coordination failure and conflict poorly understood. We introduce GT-HarmBench, a benchmark of 1,535 high-stakes scenarios spanning game-theoretic structures such as the Prisoner's Dilemma, Stag Hunt and Chicken. Scenarios are drawn from realistic AI risk contexts in the MIT AI Risk Repository. Across 15 frontier models, agents fail to choose socially beneficial actions in 38% of high-stakes cases, such as military escalation, election manipulation, and medical malpractice. We measure sensitivity to game-theoretic prompt framing and ordering, and analyze reasoning patterns driving failures. We further show that game-theoretic interventions improve socially beneficial outcomes by up to 18%. Our results highlight substantial reliability gaps and provide a broad standardized testbed for studying alignment in multi-agent environments. The benchmark and code are available at https://github.com/causalNLP/gt-harmbench.

Modern preference alignment techniques, such as Best-of-N (BoN) sampling, rely on reward models trained with pairwise comparison data. While effective at learning relative preferences, this paradigm fails to capture a signal of response acceptability, leaving systems vulnerable to selecting the least bad of many unacceptable options. This is particularly problematic for hard prompts, where the risk of such false acceptances increases with the number of samples. In this paper, we address this critical reliability gap by introducing a new data collection and modeling framework. By augmenting preference data with an outside option, inspired by discrete choice models, we train a reward model that can distinguish not just what is better, but what is good enough. We leverage this capability to create an adaptive inference strategy, best of mini-N in-loop, which partitions the generation budget into sequential loops with a calibrated, early-exit condition. Our experiments show that when tuned as an alignment guardrail, it reduces reliability failures by 70\%, and when tuned as an inference accelerator, it improves average inference speed by over 22\% in IMDB-sentiment setting. We thus provide a principled and flexible framework for practitioners to explicitly manage the trade-off between reliability and computational efficiency.

We aim to improve model performance in multi-reward reinforcement learning training process. Existing Group reward-Decoupled Normalization Policy Optimization (GDPO) has mitigated the issue of reward signals masking one another during direct scalarization by normalizing each reward dimension separately before aggregation. However, our experiments show that GDPO still struggles to balance reward signals with different granularities. Specifically, in some particular training tasks, the model may receive a dense reward that assigns fine-grained scores ranging from 0.1 to 1.0, together with a sparse reward that provides only binary feedback of either 0 or 1. In such cases, we find that the sparse reward may provide an insufficient optimization signal, preventing its corresponding capability from being effectively reinforced. Therefore, how can we strengthen the optimization signal from the sparse reward without sacrificing the capability already learned from the fine-grained reward? To overcome this limitation, we propose Specialize-and-Merge Online Policy Distillation (SMOPD), a two-stage training method for multi-reward optimization. Stage1-Specialize: SMOPD first employs reward-priority configurations to train multiple reward-specialized teachers, allowing each reward to be learned under conditions where its signal can effectively drive optimization. Stage2-Merge: SMOPD then utilizes online policy distillation to combine the reward-specialized capabilities of these teachers into a single student policy, while maintaining balanced task-level optimization. To validate our method, we conduct experiments on two multi-reward settings: complementary rewards(tool-calling accuracy and format) and conflicting rewards (helpful and harmless rewards). Based on above settings, SMOPD outperforms GDPO across 1.5B, 3B and 7B backbones.

Preference based alignment objectives implicitly assume that all human preferences are expressed with equal strength. In practice, however, preference strength varies across individuals and contexts -- a phenomenon established in behavioral economics and discrete choice theory. This mismatch limits the ability of existing objectives to faithfully capture heterogeneous human judgments. Inspired by this literature, we introduce Mixed Logit Direct Preference Optimization (MixDPO), a generalization of Direct Preference Optimization that models variation in preference strength. MixDPO enables alignment objectives to capture heterogeneity in how strongly preferences are expressed across training examples. We evaluate MixDPO on three preference datasets using two open-weight language models. Across datasets, MixDPO improves aggregate alignment performance (+11.2 points on Pythia-2.8B) while preserving subgroup level preferences, with the largest gains appearing in settings with higher inferred preference heterogeneity. MixDPO makes preference heterogeneity explicit through learned strength distributions. We release our code for reproducibility.

We introduce Feasible Learning (FL), a sample-centric learning paradigm where models are trained by solving a feasibility problem that bounds the loss for each training sample. In contrast to the ubiquitous Empirical Risk Minimization (ERM) framework, which optimizes for average performance, FL demands satisfactory performance on every individual data point. Since any model that meets the prescribed performance threshold is a valid FL solution, the choice of optimization algorithm and its dynamics play a crucial role in shaping the properties of the resulting solutions. In particular, we study a primal-dual approach which dynamically re-weights the importance of each sample during training. To address the challenge of setting a meaningful threshold in practice, we introduce a relaxation of FL that incorporates slack variables of minimal norm. Our empirical analysis, spanning image classification, age regression, and preference optimization in large language models, demonstrates that models trained via FL can learn from data while displaying improved tail behavior compared to ERM, with only a marginal impact on average performance.

Instruction tuning has been widely adopted to ensure large language models (LLMs) follow user instructions effectively. The resulting instruction-following capabilities of LLMs heavily rely on the instruction datasets used for tuning. Recently, synthetic instruction datasets have emerged as an economically viable solution to provide LLMs diverse and high-quality instructions. However, existing approaches typically assume that larger or stronger models are stronger teachers for instruction tuning, and hence simply adopt these models as response generators to the synthetic instructions. In this paper, we challenge this commonly-adopted assumption. Our extensive experiments across five base models and twenty response generators reveal that larger and stronger models are not necessarily stronger teachers of smaller models. We refer to this phenomenon as the Larger Models' Paradox. We observe that existing metrics cannot precisely predict the effectiveness of response generators since they ignore the compatibility between teachers and base models being fine-tuned. We thus develop a novel metric, named as Compatibility-Adjusted Reward (CAR) to measure the effectiveness of response generators. Our experiments across five base models demonstrate that CAR outperforms almost all baselines.

Reward models are key in reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) systems, aligning the model behavior with human preferences. Particularly in the math domain, there have been plenty of studies using reward models to align policies for improving reasoning capabilities. Recently, as the importance of reward models has been emphasized, RewardBench is proposed to understand their behavior. However, we figure out that the math subset of RewardBench has different representations between chosen and rejected completions, and relies on a single comparison, which may lead to unreliable results as it only see an isolated case. Therefore, it fails to accurately present the robustness of reward models, leading to a misunderstanding of its performance and potentially resulting in reward hacking. In this work, we introduce a new design for reliable evaluation of reward models, and to validate this, we construct RewardMATH, a benchmark that effectively represents the robustness of reward models in mathematical reasoning tasks. We demonstrate that the scores on RewardMATH strongly correlate with the results of optimized policy and effectively estimate reward overoptimization, whereas the existing benchmark shows almost no correlation. The results underscore the potential of our design to enhance the reliability of evaluation, and represent the robustness of reward model. We make our code and data publicly available.

LLMs can exhibit age biases, resulting in unequal treatment of individuals across age groups. While much research has addressed racial and gender biases, age bias remains little explored. The scarcity of instruction-tuning and preference datasets for age bias hampers its detection and measurement, and existing fine-tuning methods seldom address age-related fairness. In this paper, we construct age bias preference datasets and instruction-tuning datasets for RLHF. We introduce ARG, an age fairness reward to reduce differences in the response quality of LLMs across different age groups. Extensive experiments demonstrate that this reward significantly improves response accuracy and reduces performance disparities across age groups. Our source code and datasets are available at the anonymous https://anonymous.4open.science/r/FairRLHF-D445/readme.md{link}.

Realistic environments often provide agents with very limited feedback. When the environment is initially unknown, the feedback, in the beginning, can be completely absent, and the agents may first choose to devote all their effort on exploring efficiently. The exploration remains a challenge while it has been addressed with many hand-tuned heuristics with different levels of generality on one side, and a few theoretically-backed exploration strategies on the other. Many of them are incarnated by intrinsic motivation and in particular explorations bonuses. A common rule of thumb for exploration bonuses is to use 1/n bonus that is added to the empirical estimates of the reward, where n is a number of times this particular state (or a state-action pair) was visited. We show that, surprisingly, for a pure-exploration objective of reward-free exploration, bonuses that scale with 1/n bring faster learning rates, improving the known upper bounds with respect to the dependence on the horizon H. Furthermore, we show that with an improved analysis of the stopping time, we can improve by a factor H the sample complexity in the best-policy identification setting, which is another pure-exploration objective, where the environment provides rewards but the agent is not penalized for its behavior during the exploration phase.

One obstacle to applying reinforcement learning algorithms to real-world problems is the lack of suitable reward functions. Designing such reward functions is difficult in part because the user only has an implicit understanding of the task objective. This gives rise to the agent alignment problem: how do we create agents that behave in accordance with the user's intentions? We outline a high-level research direction to solve the agent alignment problem centered around reward modeling: learning a reward function from interaction with the user and optimizing the learned reward function with reinforcement learning. We discuss the key challenges we expect to face when scaling reward modeling to complex and general domains, concrete approaches to mitigate these challenges, and ways to establish trust in the resulting agents.

Wu et al. (2026) showed that most frontier large language models (LLMs) recommend a sponsored, roughly twice-as-expensive flight when their system prompt contains a soft sponsorship cue. We reproduce their evaluation on ten open-weight chat models plus the two of their twenty-three models that are still reachable today (gpt-3.5-turbo, gpt-4o). All reported rates in this paper are produced under the same judge the original paper used (gpt-4o); we additionally store every label under an open-weight (gpt-oss-120b) and a smaller proprietary (gpt-4o-mini) judge for an ablation. Three findings emerge. First, a prose description of an LLM evaluation pipeline is not, on its own, sufficient for accurate reproduction: we surfaced three silent implementation failures that each shifted a reported rate by tens of percentage points. Second, the central claims do generalise - the gpt-3.5-turbo logistic-regression intercept of alpha = 0.81 is within four points of the original alpha = 0.86, and 200 of 200 trials on gpt-3.5-turbo and gpt-4o promote a payday lender to a financially distressed user. Third, a thirty-token user prompt that asks the assistant for a neutral comparison table first cuts sponsored recommendation from 46.9% to 1.0% averaged across our ten open-source models, and from 53.0% to 0% averaged across the two OpenAI models. AI literacy and price-comparison portals are likely market-level mitigations; the harmful-product cell is bounded by neither. Raw data, labels and analysis scripts are at https://github.com/akmaier/Paper-LLM-Ads .

Competition retrospectives are useful when they explain what a leaderboard measured, how hidden evaluation changed conclusions, and which design patterns were rewarded. We revisit the CODS 2025 challenge, a privacy-aware Codabench competition on industrial multi-agent orchestration built on . We combine final rank sheets, a 300-submission server log, 149-team registrations, best-submission exports, the organizer winners report, the companion system paper, and verified planning-track source trees. Five results stand out. First, the public planning leaderboard saturates at 72.73\%, and richer prompts do not improve that peak. Second, hidden evaluation changes the story: public and private scores correlate moderately in planning (r{=}0.69) but negatively in execution (r{=}{-}0.13), with several 45.45\% public execution systems reaching 63.64\% on the hidden set. Third, the term is numerically almost inert in the official composite -- combined on a 0--1 scale with 0--100 percentage scores, it contributes at most 0.05 points per track, and rescaling would swap the top two teams. Fourth, the competition is operationally account-based but substantively team-based: 149 registered teams reduce to 24 with non-zero public scores and 11 fully ranked, while 52.3\% of deduplicated registrations list multiple usernames. Fifth, successful execution methods mostly improve guardrails -- response selection, contamination cleanup, fallback, and context control -- rather than novel agent architectures. These findings identify which behaviors the evaluation rewarded, and motivate scale-aware composites, skill-level diagnostics, and versioned artifact release.

In critical applications, it is vital for classifiers to defer decision-making to humans. We propose a post-hoc method that makes existing classifiers selectively abstain from predicting certain samples. Our abstaining classifier is incentivized to maintain the original accuracy for each sub-population (i.e. no harm) while achieving a set of group fairness definitions to a user specified degree. To this end, we design an Integer Programming (IP) procedure that assigns abstention decisions for each training sample to satisfy a set of constraints. To generalize the abstaining decisions to test samples, we then train a surrogate model to learn the abstaining decisions based on the IP solutions in an end-to-end manner. We analyze the feasibility of the IP procedure to determine the possible abstention rate for different levels of unfairness tolerance and accuracy constraint for achieving no harm. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first to identify the theoretical relationships between the constraint parameters and the required abstention rate. Our theoretical results are important since a high abstention rate is often infeasible in practice due to a lack of human resources. Our framework outperforms existing methods in terms of fairness disparity without sacrificing accuracy at similar abstention rates.

People supported by AI-powered decision support tools frequently overrely on the AI: they accept an AI's suggestion even when that suggestion is wrong. Adding explanations to the AI decisions does not appear to reduce the overreliance and some studies suggest that it might even increase it. Informed by the dual-process theory of cognition, we posit that people rarely engage analytically with each individual AI recommendation and explanation, and instead develop general heuristics about whether and when to follow the AI suggestions. Building on prior research on medical decision-making, we designed three cognitive forcing interventions to compel people to engage more thoughtfully with the AI-generated explanations. We conducted an experiment (N=199), in which we compared our three cognitive forcing designs to two simple explainable AI approaches and to a no-AI baseline. The results demonstrate that cognitive forcing significantly reduced overreliance compared to the simple explainable AI approaches. However, there was a trade-off: people assigned the least favorable subjective ratings to the designs that reduced the overreliance the most. To audit our work for intervention-generated inequalities, we investigated whether our interventions benefited equally people with different levels of Need for Cognition (i.e., motivation to engage in effortful mental activities). Our results show that, on average, cognitive forcing interventions benefited participants higher in Need for Cognition more. Our research suggests that human cognitive motivation moderates the effectiveness of explainable AI solutions.