Kunnāšā) of Īšōʿ bar ʿAlī, a ninth-century physician and student of Ḥunayn b. Isḥāq. The seven books of the handbook appear to follow the model of Paul of Aegina’s Pragmateia both in composition and content. The actual significance of the handbook in the history of Syriac and Arabic medicine is yet to be assessed, but there can be no doubt that it will be a pivotal source that illustrates the development of Syriac medicine during a period of four centuries at the moment when it was being translated to lay the foundations of the nascent medical tradition in Arabic.A little-known thirteenth-century manuscript preserved in Damascus contains by far the largest Syriac medical work that has survived till today. Despite the missing beginning, a preliminary study of the text allows us to argue that it is the medical handbook (entitled  What we find on those supplementary folios  seems to be a fragment from an independent Syriac medical manuscript of a later date. The text there is divided into sections that deal with anatomy, the preparation of theriac “according to the opinion of Galen” and “Indian drugs”.The unique manuscript preserved in the library of the Syriac Orthodox Patriarchate near Damascus is not totally unknown but unfortunately it has never received a proper description, and due to its inaccessibility it remained out of scholarly attention and inquiry.sop 238, ff. 431–435) from the missing part can now be found attached to the end of the text. Those five folios contain the table of contents (damaged) as well as the very beginning of the original text (first chapter of Mēmrā i) and a page from the introduction where the author traces the history of the art of medicine and healing back to Asclepius.The original codex is damaged and lacks some folios. Especially noticeable is the absence of the opening part (the text begins in the middle of the second quire) although five folios  that follows the text, the manuscript was completed on September 30, ag 1535 [= 1224 ce] by deacon Basil the son of Rabban Yoḥannan, an archpriest of Melitene.ce an additional important Syriac manuscript with works on secular subjects that has survived in modern apographs.ce a famous illustrated Greek manuscript preserved in the Gennadius Library (Athens).6According to the colophon  and Severus, a metropolitan of Syria and the future patriarch Ignatius Aphrem Barsoum (1887–1957).The medical text is written on paper in a very condensed ductus of Serto which makes reading the manuscript a serious challenge despite its overall good condition. The manuscript contains a large number of notes left by its readers that can shed light on its history. Particularly, the notes on ff. 402Finally, the presence of the Armenian quire signatures and Arabic glosses hint at wide circulation of the manuscript.22.1Kunnāšā, as it features, for example, in the opening and closing rubrics of some of the Memrē. Considering that the term Kunnāšā was regularly applied to medical handbooks, it is natural to see it as the title of the magnificent work before us.Due to the loss of the beginning of the manuscript we are bereft of priceless information about the title of the work and its author. Nevertheless, while going through the text one’s attention is regularly drawn to the term sop 238, f. 304v): ܟܘܢܫܐ ܕܥܠ ܥ̈ܠܬܐ ܕܟܘܪ̈ܗܢܐ ܘܫܘܘܕܥܝ̈ܗܘܢ ܘܐܣܝܘܬܗܘܢMoreover, we cannot exclude the possibility that an extended version of that title featured in the work’s original title, that could be, following the practice of that time, quite verbose. For instance, we find at the end of Mēmrā iv . 106 chapters. Hygiene, Diet, Materia MedicaMēmrā i , rules for the preparation of compounds.Complaints of pregnant women, regimen (ܕܘܒܪܐ) of children, middle-aged, and old people, air, water, wine, regimen fitting to the different seasons, fatigue, purgation, bath (ܡܣܚܘܬܐ), food, sop 238, ff. 92v–151v). 47 Chapters. Local Ailments—HeadMēmrā ii , phrenitis (ܦܪܗܢܝܛܝܣ), madness (ܡܐܢܝܐ), delirium (ܨܒܪܐ), lethargy (ܠܝܬܐܪܓܘܣ), epilepsy (ܗܦܝܠܝܡܦܣܝܐ), insanity (ܫܛܘܪܘܬܐ), apoplexy (ܐܦܘܦܠܝܟܣܝܐ), loss of memory, melancholy (ܡܗܠܐܢܟܘܠܝܐ), spasm (ܡܩܝܣܘܬܐ), numbness (ܬܢܘܒܘܬܐ), trembling (ܪܥܠܐ), afflictions of the hair, alopecia (ܬܥܠܘܬܐ), afflictions of the skin, lice (ܩܠܡ̈ܐ), nits (ܢܒ̈ܐ), love-sick people.sop 238, ff. 152r–211r). 81 Chapters. Local Ailments—Eyes, Ears, ChestMēmrā iii (Pus that forms in the eyes (ܛܦܪ̈ܐ ܕܒܥܝ̈ܢܐ), ophthalmia (ܕܓܢܐ), eye swelling (ܢܦܝܚܘܬܐ ܒܥܝ̈ܢܐ), itching in the eyes (ܚܟܬܐ ܕܒܥܝ̈ܢܐ), inflammation in the eyes (ܦܠܗܓܡܘܢܝ), eyelids (ܬܠܝ̈ܦܐ) disorders; diseases of sclera (ܟܘܬܝܢܐ), ears, nostrils (ܢܚܝܪ̈ܐ), teeth, tongue, mouth, chest; warts (ܕܩܠܘ̈ܢܐ), cough (ܫܥܠܐ), inflammation of the lungs (ܦܗܪܝܦܠܡܘܢܝܐ), spitting blood (ܪܩܩ ܕܡܐ), wasting (ܦܬܝܣܝܣ), pleurisy (ܕܩܪܬܐ), heart diseases, swoon (ܥܦܬܐ), humpback (ܟܘܣܬܢܘܬܐ).sop 238, ff. 211v–304v). 67 Chapters. Local Ailments—Abdomen, GenitalsMēmrā iv (On stomach diseases (ܥܠ ܚ̈ܫܐ ܕܡܬܩܝܡܝܢ ܒܐܣܛܘܡܟܐ), bulimia (ܒܘܠܝܡܘܣ), vomiting (ܬܝܘܒܐ), hiccups (ܦܘܟܬܐ), cholera (ܟܘܠܗܪܐ), jaundice (ܝܪܩܢܐ), diarrhoea (ܕܝܠܐ), stomach spasm (ܡܥܣܐ), dysentery (ܕܘܣܢܛܪܝܐ), intestinal obstruction (ܐܝܠܗܐܘܣ), worms (ܫܘܫ̈ܠܐ); diseases of the kidneys (ܟܘܠܝ̈ܬܐ), bladder (ܫܠܦܘܚܬܐ), genitals (ܓܒܪܘܬܐ), flow of semen (ܕܘܒܐ ܕܙܪܥܐ), sexual desire, disorders of menstruation (ܟܣܦܐ), gout (ܦܘܕܐܓܪܐ), diseases of the testicles (ܐܫ̈ܟܐ), haemorrhoids (ܣܘܪ̈ܓܐ).sop 238, ff. 305r–358v). Some 90 Chapters.Mēmrā v , synuchos (ܣܘܢܘܟܘܣ), skin inflammation (ܡܫܪܐ), pustules (ܚܡܛܐ), tertian fever (ܛܪܝܛܘܣ), quartan fever (ܛܐܛܐܪܛܗܘܣ), semitertian fever (ܗܡܝܛܪܝܘܣ), compound fevers (ܐܫܬܘ̈ܬܐ ܡܪ̈ܟܒܬܐ), ailment of ulcers (ܫܘܚܢܐ), itching (ܚܟܟܐ), cancer (ܣܪܛܢܐ), hernia (ܬܠܚܐ), hardened swelling (ܛܪܢܘܬܐ), tumour (ܪܘܒܠܐ), tetter (ܚܙܙܝܬܐ), leprosy (ܐܪܝܢܘܬܐ); different forms of prognostication, including urine (ܬܦܫܘܪܬܐ).sop 238, ff. 358r–361r). [In 94 Chapters]. Lethal Poisons (ܣܡܡ̈ܢܐ ܩܛܘ̈ܠܐ)Mēmrā vi . 25 Chapters. Compound Drugs, SurgeryMēmrā vii  and hiera (ܐܝܗܪܐ) and pays much attention to the preparation of innumerable sorts of pills (ܟܟ̈ܠܬܐ), gargles (ܥܘܪܥܪܐ), bandages (ܥܨܒܐ), compresses (ܐܣܦܠܢܝܐ), elixirs (ܟܣܝܪܝܢ) and collyria (ܫܝ̈ܦܐ). Special chapters are devoted to the ailments of the teeth and eyes. The Mēmrā ends with two auxiliary chapters on measures and substitute drugs.Kunnāšā reminds us of the medical compendia and handbooks that are known from the late antique and early Islamic periods.Kunnāšā covers all the standard subjects of the medical handbooks: regimen and materia medica (Mēmrā i), diseases pertaining to a particular body part are presented by and large following the principle from head to toe , fevers and external diseases (Mēmrā v), poisons (Mēmrā vi), compound drugs (Mēmrā vii). What strikes one perhaps most of all is the author’s splendid command of pharmacology  for the treatment of each diseases is replete with various recipes.Both in its composition and content the Pragmateia of Paul of Aegina (7th c.) is most likely to have been the model of this Kunnāšā. Indeed, at first glance the two works appear to have much in common. For example, each of the two handbooks is divided into seven parts that begin with complaints of pregnant women and end with measures and substitute drugs; each chapter first presents the aetiology and symptoms of an ailment and afterwards its treatment. Nevertheless, close comparison demonstrates also considerable differences. Thus, whilst Paul’s Book Three  relates to Memrē ii, iii and iv, the other Memrē usually cover the material from more than one Book . Furthermore, whereas some material of Paul’s Pragmateia is not present whatsoever , in other subjects the Kunnāšā demonstrates a higher level of detail and proficiency . It is therefore may well be that the text of Paul’s Pragmateia was mediated through another source. The relationship between Paul’s compendium and the Kunnāšā merits further research because, as we shall see below, the influence of the Pragmateia can be traced not only on the level of composition but also in content.However, among the available manuals the 2.3Kunnāšā. Thus we come across references and citations attributed to Hippocrates, Dioscorides, Rufus of Ephesus, Galen, Philagrius, Oribasius, Aetius of Amida, Alexander of Tralles, and Paul of Aegina. Some names escape straightforward identification, for example Theodoretus and Theophilus. As for the native Syriac authors, only two names have been noticed, Ḥunayn b. Isḥāq and Abū Zakarīyāʾ Yūḥannā b. Māsawaih. It goes without saying that the explicit indications are nothing more than just the tip of the iceberg and it should be possible to detect the principle sources of the Kunnāšā. That issue will undoubtedly be one of the central questions on the agenda for further research. Nevertheless, already based on a brief acquaintance with the text it is possible to argue that Paul of Aegina occupies a very prominent position. A reading of selected chapters of the Kunnāšā shows the wide-ranging influence of Paul’s Pragmateia.The names of medical authorities are sparingly scattered in the text of the sop 238, ff. 124v–128r) that, as we shall see shortly, is a faithful version of the opening section on melancholy in Paul’s Pragmateia.By way of example, let me provide a citation from the beginning of a seven-page long chapter on melancholy 10[1] Ἡ μελαγχολία παραφροϲύνη τίϲ ἐϲτιν ἄνευ πυρετοῦ [2] ἐπὶ μελαγχολικῷ μάλιϲτα χυμῷ γινομένη κατειληφότι τὴν διάνοιαν, [3] ποτὲ μὲν αὐτοῦ πρωτοπαθοῦντοϲ τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου, [4] ποτὲ δὲ τῷ ὅλῳ ϲυμμεταβαλλομένου ϲώματι· [5] καὶ τρίτον δὲ μελαγχολίαϲ εἶδόϲ ἐϲτιν, ὃ φυϲῶδέϲ τε καὶ ὑποχονδριακὸν καλοῦϲιν, [6] ἐπὶ φλεγμονῇ τῶν περὶ τὸν ϲτόμαχον ὑποχονδρίων ϲυνιϲτάμενον [7] ποτὲ μὲν αὔραϲ τινὰϲ μοχθηράϲ, [8] ποτὲ δὲ καὶ τῆϲ οὐϲίαϲ τοῦ χυμοῦ μέροϲ ἀναπεμπόντων πρὸϲ τὸν ἐγκέφαλον.[1] Melancholy is a disorder of the intellect without fever, [2] occasioned mostly by a melancholic humour seizing the understanding; [3] sometimes the brain being primarily affected, [4] and sometimes it being altered together with the entire of the body. [5] And there is a third type called the flatulent and hypochondriac, [6] occasioned by inflammation of one of the parts in the hypochondria adjoining to the stomach, [7] by which sometimes noxious vapours, [8] and sometimes a part of the substance of the humour, is transmitted to the brain.Kunnāšā, Mēmrā ii.26 11܆[1] ܡܗܠܐܢܟܘܠܝܐ ܗܟܝܠ ܐܝܬܝܗ̇ ܆ ܢܟܝܢܐ ܕܡܘܚܐ ܕܪܫܐ ܆ ܕܠܗ ܢ̇ܦܩ ܚܘܒܠܐ ܕܚܘܫܒܐ ܘܐܒܝܕܘܬ ܗܘܢܐ . ܕܒܠܥܕ ܐܫܬܐ ܗ̇ܘܝܐ ܇ [2]  ܡ̣ܢ ܟܘܡܘܣ ܡܗܠܐܢܟܘܠܝܩܝܐ ܕܠ̇ܒܟ ܠܬܪܥܝܬܐ . [3]  ܟܕ ܒܙܒܢ ܡ̇ܢ ܗܘ ܡܘܚܐ ܩܕܝܡܘܬ ܚܫܘܫܘܬܐ ܢܚܫ . [4]  ܒܙܒܢ ܕܝܢ ܟܕ ܥܡ ܟܠܗ ܦܓܪܐ ܆ ܡܐ ܕܝܬܝܪ ܥܠܘܒ܆accompanied by an injury of the intellect and insanity without fever, [2] occasioned by a melancholic humour seizing the understanding; [3] sometimes the brain being primarily affected, [4] and sometimes it being altered together with the entire body when that humour abundantly exceeds. [5] And there is a third type called the flatulent and hypochondriac,are secreted from thick and phlegmatic humour and are transmitted to the brain, [8] and sometimes a part of the substance of the humour ascends.[1] Melancholy is a disorder of the brain Kunnāšā demonstrates that its author basically reproduced the key passage from Paul of Aegina’s discussion of melancholy while providing it with just a few additions that were apparently necessary to ensure the correct interpretation of the text. We should not exclude, however, a possibility that both the text of Paul’s treatise and the interpolations might go back to an intermediary source that is of course already lost. Nevertheless, a comprehensive study of Kunnāšā will help to clarify the issue. A comparison with other relevant sources, such as the Small Compendium in seven books of Yūḥannā b. Sarābiyūn, may also shed light on the background and sources of Kunnāšā .14A comparison of the original Greek with the version found in the Thus paragraph [1] enumerates other possible effects that may coincide with a disorder of the brain. The second type of melancholy [4] may embrace the entire body, and for that reason the Syriac author elucidates the point by stressing that such a condition is possible “when that humour abundantly exceeds.” And finally a description of the third type [7] is provided with the helpful precision that behind the inflamed hypochondria that produces the vapours stands a “thick and phlegmatic humour.”Pragmateia of Paul of Aegina was translated into Syriac in the eighth or ninth century and the Syriac version was used by at least two Syriac authors, Yūḥannā b. Sarābiyūn (9th c.) and Bar Bahlūl (10th c.).Lexicon of Bar Bahlūl. For that reason the text of the Kunnāšā will contribute greatly to our better awareness of the Syriac version of the Pragmateia and will help to comprehend its significance for the Syriac medical tradition.16As demonstrated by Peter E. Pormann, the Kunnāšā contains a large number of quotations from Greek sources. Since the majority of those translations have vanished for good, it can deservedly be considered an invaluable treasure chest for research into the Syriac translations of Classical medical literature. Particularly, it is of utmost importance for the ninth-century translations that, as it seems, were readily available to Īšōʿ bar ʿAlī. By way of example, it is worth analyzing a quotation from Hippocrates’ Aphorisms, the Syriac version of which happens to survive.As mentioned earlier, the ii.47 (iv. 482.17–18 Littré)Aph. Περὶ τὰϲ γενέσιαϲ τοῦ πύου οἱ πόνοι καὶ οἱ πυρετοὶ ξυμβαίνουσι μᾶλλον, ἢ γενομένου.Pains and fevers occur rather at the formation of pus than when it is already formed.Kunnāšā, Mēmrā v ܆ܐܦ ܐܝܦܦܘܩܪܐܛܝܣ ܗܟܢܐ ܕܒܡܘܠܕܐ ܠܡ ܕܡܘ ܓܠܐ ܓܕܫܝܢ ܟܐܒ̈ܐ ܘܐܫܬܘ̈ܬܐ ܝܬܝܪ ܡܢ ܡܐ ܕܐܬܝܠܕ.܆A1܆And also Hippocrates: Pains and fevers occur rather at the generation of pus than when it is already generated.Une version syriaque, p. 9 lines 1–2): ܆ܒܗܘܝܐ ܕܡܘܓܠܐ ܟܐܒ̈ܐ ܘܐܫܬܘ̈ܬܐ ܝܬܝܪܓܕܫܝܢ ܡ̣ܢ ܡܐ ܕܟܕ ܗ̣ܘܐ.܆A2܆Pains and fevers occur rather at the production of pus than when it is already produced.An anonymous Syriac translation  are rendered employing Syriac verb Aphorisms made by his master Ḥunayn b. Isḥāq. Intriguingly, such a conclusion urges the reappraisal of a widely accepted assertion of Rainer Degen, who argued that the translation edited by Pognon should be attributed to Ḥunayn.Kunnāšā’s potential significance for the study of the Syriac translations of the Aphorisms, an area of inquiry that has generated a stream of publications in recent years.19As far as we know, Īšōʿ bar ʿAlī was not active as a translator from GreekKunnāšā one should not overlook immediate input by its author, who regularly adds his own opinion after presenting the (probably borrowed) convictions of others. Since that characteristic appears most often in the discussion of disease treatments, we should attribute such personal remarks and comments to the author’s first-hand experience as a practitioner.Besides the written medical works that establish the general framework of the 3Kunnāšā is damaged and lacks the very beginning of the treatise that must have contained an indication of both the author and the title. However, we are fortunate to have a few pages from that opening part of the treatise that were bound at the end of the treatise. Besides the table of contents, we find there also a small fragment from the introduction to the Kunnāšā that ends with the following rubric :As mentioned earlier, the unique manuscript of the ܫܠܡ ܡܦܩܒܪܘܚܐ ܕܪܒܢ ܝܫܘܥ ܒܪ ܥܠܝ ܐܣܝܐ ܡܝܬܪܐ ܫ̇ܘܐ ܠܩܘ̈ܠܣܐThe introduction of Rabban Īšōʿ bar ʿAlī, an excellent physician who is worthy of praise, is completed.mappaq b-rūḥā  indicates a special type of introduction that corresponds to the Greek prooemium and that was common in Syriac scholarly literature.Kunnāšā should be attributed to Īšōʿ bar ʿAlī or in Arabic ʿĪsā b. ʿAlī, who is known as a personal physician of Caliph al-Muʿtamid (r. 870–892), a disciple of Ḥunayn b. Isḥāq and the author of the Syriac-Arabic Lexicon that is extant in multiple manuscript copies.Lexicon, has to be identified “with physician ʿĪsā b. ʿAlī, who lived in the second half of the ninth century and was a student of Ḥunayn b. Isḥāq.”23The expression ʿUyūn al-anbāʾ fī ṭabaqāt al-aṭibbāʾ, while extolling ʿĪsā b. ʿAlī’s excellence in the science of medicine, mentions that he produced many works (taṣānīf) among which two are particularly mentioned, the Book of the benefits that can be obtained from the parts of animals  and the Book of Poisons  in two parts (māqālatān). Whereas the former work is extant but remains so far unpublished,26If this is indeed so, one wonders if there is any positive evidence of the medical works of Īšōʿ bar ʿAlī. Unfortunately, despite recurrent mention in the Syriac sources of Īšōʿ bar ʿAlī as physician (ܐܣܝܐ), apart for a fragment (on which see below) none of his works in Syriac is extant.Kunnāšā and the literary output of Īšōʿ bar ʿAlī? It seems that there is one point of pivotal significance. Namely, Ibn Abī Uṣaibiʿa records that Īšōʿ bar ʿAlī was the author of a Book of Poisons that was composed in two parts. As we have seen, the Kunnāšā contains two Memrē that deal with poisons. It is not the Memrē themselves that are important now, though, but an introductory rubric that opens Mēmrā vi. In it the scribe apologizes for reproducing the original Mēmrā only partially because “the author composed two other Memrē about poisons” . It is thus very tempting to see in those “two Memrē” on the subject of poison a treatise that is recorded by Ibn Abī Uṣaibiʿa with attribution to Īšōʿ bar ʿAlī.With all that information in hand, is there a chance to establish a connection between the Kunnāšā’s author with Īšōʿ bar ʿAlī is provided by the only medical piece by him that has survived. Namely, manuscript Vat. sir. 217, ff. 226v–227v contains a brief fragment reading as follows:27Corroborative evidence for identifying the ܬܘܒ ܟܬܒܝܢܢ ܩܠܝܠ ܡܢ ܟܬܒ ܪܒܢ ܝܫܘܥ ܒܪ ܥܠܝ ܬܠܡܝܕ ܪܒܢ ܚܘܢܝܢ ܪܝܫ ܐܣܘ̈ܬܐ. ܗ̇ܘ ܕܥܠ ܐܣܝܘܬܐ ܬܡܝܗܐܝܬ ܘܝܬܝܪܐ ܒܚܬܝܬܘܬܐ ܡܢ ܕܡܝܝ̈ܘܗܝWe also write a fragment from the book on medicine of Rabban Īšōʿ bar ʿAlī, a disciple of Rabban Ḥunayn, the head of the physicians. [It is] admirable and more precise than the similar [works].Lexicon of Īšōʿ bar ʿAlī could certainly fit well as a possible source of the fragmentLexicon they are dispersed among many other words, and secondly, the content of the entries is slightly different. With the availability of the new source, one may wonder whether the fragment was drawn from the Kunnāšā. Indeed, there is an exact correspondence between the inventory and the list of the simples present in the first Mēmrā. However the texts are not absolutely identical and in order to understand the difference, I would like to make a brief digression about the composition of the list of simples in the Kunnāšā.The text was first mentioned in the eighteenth-century catalogue description of the manuscriptSimple Drugs . Considering the vast size of Galen’s text, the obvious solution was to make an abridgement that, however, retains the drugs’ original order following the Greek alphabet. Taking advantage of the available Syriac translation of the Simple Drugs, Īšōʿ bar ʿAlī added his own touch to the list. Namely, the Syriac version of the Simple Drugs must have already contained the Syriac equivalents of the Greek drug-names embedded in the text whereas the original Greek terms were reproduced in transliteration. Apparently, Īšōʿ bar ʿAlī was trying to keep up with developments in the field of medicine, particularly with the growing role of Arabic, and for that reason it is quite natural that he decided to increase the usefulness of the list by providing it with Arabic equivalents.While aiming to present the simples and their healing properties Īšōʿ bar ʿAlī could do no better than to exploit the relevant part of Galen’s Kunnāšā and the fragment, because the list covers only the drug names from alpha through delta and thus it is possible that it was copied not from the original treatise but from an intermediary version. Whatever the case may be, it is the actual content of the fragment that is worthy of notice. What we find in it is exclusively the Greek terms and their Syriac and Arabic equivalents.Īšōʿ bar ʿAlī’s efforts to render Galen’s catalogue of drugs more practical and user-friendly were undoubtedly rewarded and the fragment in the Vatican manuscript offers good proof for that. We cannot be sure that there is a direct relationship between the sop 238, f. 39v). The Lexicon and the Vatican fragment provide only the drugs’ names.To illustrate the situation let us look at the first three terms in Galen’s catalogue. Galen’s list begins with discussions of ἀβρότονον, ἄγνοϲ and ἄγρωστιϲ. The presentation of the drugs’ properties is quite lengthy and occupies eight, three and one pages in Kühn’s edition respectively.Lexicon with the Kunnāšā we observe the following difference: The Lexicon’s entries are more condensed and omit the reference to the informants (L1); the Syriac equivalents feature more as an exception (L1), whereas normally we find only the Arabic ones (L2 and L3) that are the primary focus of the Lexicon. The Kunnāšā’s approach is different for it tends to provide both the Syriac and Arabic equivalent (with the exception of L2 where only the Syriac one is indicated). The same procedure is displayed by the Vatican fragment that indicates both the Syriac and Arabic equivalents (with the exception of L2). There thus can be no doubt that the Vatican fragment is based on the Kunnāšā and not on the Lexicon.First of all, if we compare the Simple Drugs.šunāyā must have featured in Ḥunayn’s translation of the Simple Drugs.37In terms of possible sources that supplied the necessary information, it can be noted that the Syriac equivalents in L1 and L3 were introduced already by Sergius of Rēšʿainā in his translation of the Kunnāšā and the fragment preserved in the Vatican manuscript, we are justified in relying on the authorial attribution of the latter to Īšōʿ bar ʿAlī. After all, the extolling epithet (“admirable and thoroughly precise”) can by all means be applied to the text of the Kunnāšā.Having clarified the relationship between the Kunnāšā. In particular, we find there  yet another inventory, this time of simples that are classified according to their primary qualities . The classification is followed by a list of substitute drugs . Both lists are present in the Kunnāšā. The classification of the simples is present in Mēmrā i.70–85  whereas the substitute drugs appear at the very end of the treatise, Mēmrā vii.25 . This disconnected presence of the three fragments supports the assumption that they may not depend directly on the Kunnāšā but rather on an intermediary medical compilation that contained selected material from the Kunnāšā. That issue requires further study.38It is worth noting in passing that the same Vatican manuscript also contains other fragments that match the text of the It is hard to overestimate the significance of a thirteenth-century medical manuscript preserved in the Syriac Orthodox Patriarchate. Even in its damaged form, the unique manuscript preserves the most extensive and voluminous Syriac medical treatise known to date and will undoubtedly change the entire field of Syriac medicine.40Kunnāšā) that was written by Īšōʿ bar ʿAlī, who was a disciple of Ḥunayn b. Isḥāq, a personal physician of Caliph al-Muʿtamid (r. 870–892) and the author of the Syriac-Arabic Lexicon. This identification is supported by a fragment from the Kunnāšā preserved in a Vatican manuscript with an explicit attribution to Īšōʿ bar ʿAlī as well as by a reference in the Kunnāšā itself stating that its author also produced a treatise about poisons in two books. It is that treatise of Īšōʿ bar ʿAlī that was known in the Arabic medical tradition. A lack of references to the text in Arabic medical works is likely to be indicative of the fact that it was never translated into Arabic.41A preliminary study of the text allows it to be identified as a medical handbook  of ʿAlī b. Rabban al-Ṭabarī and the Book of Treasure .In fact, in the case of the Kunnāšā will prove a document of major significance with regard to the availability of medical works in ninth-century Baghdad. Citations that range from Hippocrates to Ḥunayn show the Kunnāšā to be an indispensable witness to both Syriac translations of the classical Greek sources and indigenous Syriac medical works whose main body is lost.Kunnāšā differs from Sergius’ translation it becomes an important witness for the later translation history of the Simple Drugs in the Syriac tradition.Undoubtedly, the Kunnāšā is, however, not lacking in serious difficulties, the least of which is a small tight handwriting that presents a challenge even to reading the text. The main obstacle is posed by the underdevelopment of the field of Syriac medicine and particularly by our meagre awareness concerning the translation techniques employed by the eighth- and ninth-century translators and the lexicography of such areas of medicine as anatomy, therapeutics, nosology and pharmacology.Kunnāšā will be uncritical and premature.A study of the


N = 2086), we investigated preferences for consequentialist vs. non-consequentialist social partners endorsing instrumental harm or impartial beneficence and examined how such preferences varied across different types of social relationships. Our results demonstrate robust preferences for non-consequentialist over consequentialist agents in the domain of instrumental harm, and weaker – but still evident – preferences in the domain of impartial beneficence. In the domain of instrumental harm, non-consequentialist agents were consistently viewed as more moral and trustworthy, preferred for a range of social roles, and entrusted with more money in economic exchanges. In the domain of impartial beneficence, preferences for non-consequentialist agents were observed for close interpersonal relationships requiring direct interaction  but not for more distant roles with little-to-no personal interaction . Collectively our findings demonstrate that preferences for non-consequentialist agents are sensitive to the different dimensions of consequentialist thinking and the relational context.Previous work has demonstrated that people are more likely to trust “deontological” agents who reject harming one person to save many others than “consequentialist” agents who endorse such instrumental harms, which could explain the higher prevalence of non-consequentialist moral intuitions. Yet consequentialism involves endorsing not just instrumental harm, but also impartial beneficence, treating the well-being of every individual as equally important. In four studies  or help  for the greater good•Non-consequentialist agents who refuse to harm for the greater good are consistently preferred across a range of measures•Consequentialist agents who help for the greater good are perceived as worse friends and spouses, but not political leaders In contrast, when someone rejects inflicting harm on an innocent they are said to be making a “non-consequentialist”, or “deontological” judgment in line with deontological ethical theories  judgment in line with consequentialist ethical theories . These ties e.g.  positingSuch dilemmas capture our imagination not just because they force an internal moral conflict, but because we recognize the reputational consequences that these impossible decisions might have for those who make them. Recent research has shown that agents who make consequentialist judgments in sacrificial dilemmas are seen as less moral, trustworthy and warm, chosen less frequently as social partners, and trusted less in economic exchanges e.g. . Such prinstrumental harm”). At the core of utilitarianism is the idea of impartial beneficence, that we must impartially maximise the well-being of all sentient beings on the planet in such a way that “[e]ach is to count for one and none for more than one”  to save one's own child over, e.g., two strangers' children, and are incorporated into many forms of deontological ethics ; several distinct dimensions along which the agent's character could be perceived ; the different social roles in which the agent would be preferred ; and the different processes or motivations perceived to influence the agent's moral decision .22.12.1.1https://osf.io/yuv2m/.We report all measures,2.1.2For all studies, relevant ethical guidelines were followed and the research was approved through University of Oxford's Central University Research Ethics Committee, with the reference number MS-IDREC-C1-2015-098.2.1.3N = 4) or failed a simple comprehension check asking them to indicate the judgment their partner made in the dilemma (N = 5). This left us a final sample of 192 participants . Our sample size was determined through an a priori power analysis (see supplementary methods for details) and a sensitivity power analysis for our main ANCOVA analysis, assuming an α of 0.05 and power of 0.80, indicated that the minimum effect size we had power to detect was a small-to-medium effect of f = 0.20.We recruited 201 participants via MTurk, and paid them $1.00 for their time. Participants were excluded from completing the survey if they had participated in related studies by us in the past, and were excluded from analysis if took the survey more than once , where participants were asked to report their perceptions of a protagonist who made either a characteristically consequentialist or non-consequentialist decision in an impartiality dilemma. We included two different dilemmas to test the generality of any effects we observed and to demonstrate that findings were not specific to the one particular instantiation of the underlying impartiality dilemma. Given that the pattern of results was broadly the same2.1.5Participants read one of two2.1.6Participant Moral Judgment in the moral dilemmas was measured using three questions. First, participants were asked to make a binary judgment about what they thought the protagonist in the dilemma should have done (e.g. “Volunteer to help build the houses” vs. “Spend the time cheering up her mother”). Second and third, participants were asked to indicate how morally wrong they thought it would be to make the consequentialist (e.g. volunteer) and non-consequentialist (e.g. spend the time with the mother) decisions on a 1–7 scale .Participant Consequentialist Tendencies were measured using the Oxford Utilitarianism Scale  - consists of 5 items (α = 0.70) that all tap endorsement of the impartial maximisation of the greater good even at the cost of personal self-sacrifice, such as “If the only way to save another person's life during an emergency is to sacrifice one's own leg, then one is morally required to make this sacrifice”. The second subscale - Instrumental Harm (OUS-IH) - consists of 4 items (α = 0.78) that tap a willingness to cause harm in order to bring about the greater good, including “It is morally right to harm an innocent person if harming them is a necessary means to helping several other innocent people”.ale OUS: , consistCharacter Ratings were measured with seven questions in which participants rated on a 1–7 scale how they perceived the protagonist in the story to be in terms of how moral , trustworthy , loyal , reliable , warm or cold , competent , and capable  they thought the protagonist in the story to be.Role Suitability were measured with four questions in which participants rated on 1–7 scale how good a partner they thought the protagonist in the story would be in four types of social roles: as a friend, as a spouse, as a boss, and as a political leader, specifically President of the United States .Perceived Motivations of the protagonist's decision in the dilemma was measured through two items where participants indicated how much they thought the protagonist was driven by “altruistic, empathic motives”, and how much they thought the protagonist was driven by “strategic, reasoned motives” .2.1.7U test . Means, standard deviations, p-values from the Mann-Whitney U tests, and effect sizes can be seen in Our primary measure of interest, like other recent studies e.g. , was howFor completeness, we also report in the supplementary materials a series of 2 × 2 ANOVAs in which we entered both participant consequentialist or non-consequentialist judgment and protagonist consequentialist or non-consequentialist decision. However, given that we were primarily interested in how the protagonist in the story was perceived overall depending on her decision, not how she was perceived differently by participants who themselves endorsed either option, in the interests of clarity and conciseness we have chosen to report these analyses in the supplementary materials.2.22.2.1Overall, most participants endorsed the characteristically non-consequentialist option of helping the family member over the characteristically consequentialist option of helping the greater number of strangers (63%), but this was more pronounced in the spending money dilemma (81%) than the spending time dilemma (55%).While participants did not think that either action was morally wrong, participants who reported higher consequentialist tendencies thought it would be more wrong to help the family number over the greater number of strangers. In the interests of space, we report all further results on participant judgments in the supplementary materials.2.2.2F = 7.23, p = .008, ηp2 = 0.04; U = 3781, p = .026, d = 0.37), reliable  = 17.36, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.08; U = 3341, p < .001, d = 0.59), loyal  = 128.23, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.40; U = 1333, p < .001, d = 1.61), and warm  = 32.76, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.15; U = 2730, p < .001, d = 0.81). There were, however, no differences between consequentialist and non-consequentialist agents in terms of perceived morality  = 0.00, p = .97, ηp2 = 0.00; U = 4473, p = .72, d = 0.02), competence  = 3.35, p = .069, ηp2 = 0.02; U = 4023, p = .11, d = 0.25), or capability  = 1.60, p = .21, ηp2 = 0.00; U = 4235, p = .31, d = 0.17).When the protagonist in the dilemma decided to help the family member over the greater number of strangers, they were perceived as significantly more trustworthy  = 36.65, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.16; U = 2519, p < .001, d = 0.87) and spouse  = 46.20, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.20; U = 2417, p < .001, d = 0.97), but there was no difference in suitability as a boss  = 0.00, p = 1.00, ηp2 = 0.00; U = 4545, p = .88, d = 0.00), and the protagonist was actually seen to make a better political leader if they made the characteristically consequentialist decision  = 8.62, p = .004, ηp2 = 0.04; U = 3471, p = .002, d = 0.42).When the protagonist made the characteristically non-consequentialist decision to help the family member over the greater number of strangers they were expected to make a better friend  = 39.95, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.17; U = 2409, p < .001, d = 0.91, but there was no difference between agents in perceptions of empathic, altruistic motives, F = 0.07, p = .80, ηp2 = 0.00; U = 4544, p = .87, d = 0.03.Participants thought the consequentialist protagonist was driven more by strategic, reasoned motives than the non-consequentialist protagonist, 2.4Results from Study 1 using impartiality dilemmas were less consistent than the unequivocal preference for the non-consequentialist in sacrificial dilemmas we have seen in previous work , but oveCertain limitations of this study should be noted, however. First, Study 1 relied on character ratings of the protagonist and did not measure participants' actual behaviour. Although important work on this topic has been conducted without measuring behaviour e.g. , we thin3In Study 2 we looked again at perceptions of consequentialist agents endorsing impartial beneficence, this time adding an economic Trust Game to establish whether the partner preference has real behavioural consequences in a cooperation market, and turned back to examining a third-party judge, as in the majority of this work . We also3.13.1.1https://osf.io/prm3a/). We report all measures,https://osf.io/bdev3/.Our design, hypotheses, and analysis plan were all pre-registered at the Open Science Framework (3.1.2N = 6) or failed a simple comprehension check asking them to indicate the judgment their partner made in the dilemma (N = 41). This left us with a final sample of 953 participants . Our sample size was determined through an a priori power analysis (see supplementary methods for details) and a sensitivity power analysis for our main 2 × 2 ANCOVA analysis, assuming an α of 0.05 and power of 0.80, indicated that the minimum effect size we had power to detect was a small effect of f = 0.09.In accordance with the pre-registration, we recruited 1000 participants via MTurk. Participants were excluded from completing the study if they had participated in related studies by us in the past, and were excluded from analysis if they did not complete the study in full . We then determined bonuses for participants within each condition by looking at what percentage the corresponding second mover said they would return and paid participants accordingly.3.1.3We had a 2  between-subjects design, with two dilemmas in each category being used as variations of the experimental materials. Participants read one of four dilemmas and rated a partner (“agent”) who read the same dilemma and made either a consequentialist or non-consequentialist judgment and justification ; and second, as a continuous measure on an eleven-point scale of how wrong participants thought it would be to perform the consequentialist action instead of the non-consequentialist one .Partner Preference was measured by a single question in which participants were asked to indicate what kind of partner they would have preferred to play the TG with if they had a choice: someone who made a consequentialist or non-consequentialist judgment.Role Suitability, like in Study 1, was measured with four questions in which participants rated on 1–7 scale how good a partner they thought the protagonist in the story would be in four types of social roles: as a friend, as a spouse, as a boss, and as political leader, i.e. President of the United States .Character Ratings were measured with seven questions in which participants rated on 1–7 scale how moral, trustworthy, loyal, warm or cold, sociable, competent, and capable they thought the agent to be. Ratings of how sociable  and warm or cold  participants thought the agent was were combined into an overall score of warmth (α = 0.76); and ratings of how competent  and capable  participants thought the agent was were combined into an overall score of competence (α = 0.88). Ratings of how moral  and trustworthy  participants thought the agent were combined into an overall score of morality (α = 0.85). We analyzed loyalty separately because in the impartiality dilemmas but not the sacrificial ones the non-consequentialist action strongly involved loyalty (to one's parents). We created these composite scores both in the interests of space and because, given they are intended to measure the same construct, we expected – and found - no differences between the results for each. Nonetheless, full results using the individual items can be seen in the supplementary results.3.1.6U tests . All Ms and SDs as a function of dilemma type and agent judgment, along with the p-values from a Mann-Whitney U test and effect size of the difference between a consequentialist and non-consequentialist agent for each type of dilemma can be seen in As outlined in the pre-registration, our primary analysis of interest was on the main effects of agent consequentialist or non-consequentialist judgment in both the sacrificial and impartiality dilemmas, and whether there was an interaction effect between them such that the effect was stronger for one type of dilemma. Across Studies 2–4, we used a 2 × 2 ANCOVA  to look at the interactive effect of dilemma type and agent judgment and explore our main effects while controlling for any variance caused by participants' own judgments. Because the data was again not normally distributed we complemented this ANCOVA with non-parametric Mann-Whitney In accordance with the pre-registration, in the supplementary materials we also report (1) main effects of agent judgment for each dilemma separately, and (2) results from a 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVA in which we entered participant moral judgment as a fixed factor (instead of a covariate). As can be seen in the supplementary materials, results were consistent across the two dilemmas in each category, and we only found significant 3-way interactions in four of the eleven DVs .3.23.2.1r = 0.22 p < .001), and higher scores on the Instrumental Harm subscale predicted lower wrongness judgments of the consequentialist action in the sacrificial dilemmas  .The majority of participants endorsed the non-consequentialist option in the sacrificial dilemmas (69%), rejecting the sacrifice of one to save the lives of a greater number. This was the same for the footbridge (69%) and vaccine (69%) variants. Similarly, most participants endorsed the non-consequentialist option in the impartiality dilemmas (70%), endorsing helping a family member over impartially helping a greater number. This was the same for both dilemmas but was more pronounced in the spending money (83%) than the spending time variant (55%). Higher scores on the Impartial Beneficence subscale of the OUS predicted lower wrongness judgments of the consequentialist action in the impartiality dilemmas  = 74.69, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.07; U = 147,829, p < .001, d = 0.56, and a significant interaction of dilemma type and agent judgment on how moral participants perceived the agent to be, F = 61.30, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.06. While a non-consequentialist was seen as more moral than the consequentialist in the sacrificial dilemmas, F = 138.84, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.22; U = 46,702, p < .001, d = 1.04, there was no difference in perceived morality of non-consequentialist vs. consequentialist agents in the impartiality dilemmas, F = 0.33, p = .56, ηp2 = 0.00; U = 27,382, p = .56, d = 0.05.We first looked at character ratings see . For perF = 52.71, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.05; U = 143,077, p < .001, d = 0.47, and a significant interaction of dilemma type and agent judgment on how warm and sociable participants perceived the agent to be, F = 59.01, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.06. While a non-consequentialist was seen as warmer than the consequentialist in the sacrificial dilemmas, F = 119.95, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.20; U = 45,840, p < .001, d = 0.98, there was no difference in the impartiality dilemmas, F = 0.08, p = .77, ηp2 = 0.00; U = 25,980, p = .68, d = 0.03.For perceived warmth, the ANCOVA revealed the predicted main effect of agent judgment, F = 7.53, p = .001, ηp2 = 0.01; U = 125,545, p = .004, d = 0.18, and a significant interaction effect of agent judgment and dilemma judgment, F = 3.24, p = .006, ηp2 = 0.00. While a non-consequentialist was seen as more competent than the consequentialist in the sacrificial dilemmas, F = 10.10, p = .002, ηp2 = 0.02; U = 34,981, p = .002, d = 0.29, there was no difference in the impartiality dilemmas, F = 0.46, p = .50, ηp2 = 0.00; U = 27,898, p = .34, d = 0.06.For perceived competence, the ANCOVA showed the predicted main effect of agent judgment, F = 283.97, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.23; U = 174,248, p < .001, d = 1.07, and there was no significant interaction of dilemma type and agent judgment, F = 0.27, p = .61, ηp2 = 0.00. For both dilemma types, an agent who made a non-consequentialist judgment was seen as more loyal than one who made a consequentialist judgment. This was the case both in the sacrificial dilemmas F = 128.14, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.21; U = 45,614, p < .001, d = 1.01, and the impartiality dilemmas, F = 159.22, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.26; U = 41,528, p < .001, d = 1.15.Finally, we turned to the single item of perceived loyalty. The ANCOVA revealed the predicted main effect of agent judgment, Overall, then, across all the character ratings there were significant main effects such that the non-consequentialist was seen as more moral, warmer, more competent, and more loyal see . With th3.2.3F = 3.80, p = .052, ηp2 = 0.00, and though there was no main effect of agent judgment when using the ANCOVA controlling for participant wrongness, F = 3.18, p = .075, ηp2 = 0.00, there was a significant main effect in the non-parametric test , U = 121,638, p = .043, d = 0.12. Looking at simple effects, we found that participants transferred significantly more to a non-consequentialist agent than a consequentialist agent in the sacrificial dilemmas, F = 7.22, p = .007, ηp2 = 0.001; U = 34,431, p = .005, d = 0.24, but there was no difference in the impartiality dilemmas, F = 0.01, p = .91, ηp2 = 0.00; U = 26,593, p = .098, d = 0.01  = 12.02, p = .57, ηp2 = 0.01, and no main effect of agent judgment, F = 0.33, p = .57, ηp2 = 0.00; U = 111,551, p = .49, d = 0.04. While the interaction was non-significant, simple effects revealed that a non-consequentialist agent was predicted to return more than the consequentialist in the sacrificial dilemmas, F = 8.53, p = .004, ηp2 = 0.002; U = 34,822, p = .002, d = 0.26, but the consequentialist was predicted to return more than the non-consequentialist in the impartiality dilemmas, F = 3.99, p = .046, ηp2 = 0.001; U = 23,683, p = .036, d = −0.19.For predicted returns, surprisingly an ANCOVA revealed no significant interaction of dilemma type and agent judgment on how much participants expected their partner to return, 3.2.4B = −0.70, SE = 0.14, Z = −5.16, p < .001, with chi-square analyses revealing that while most participants (70%) preferred the non-consequentialist in the sacrificial dilemmas, x2(1) = 75.71, p < .001, there was no difference in preference for a non-consequentialist (53%) or consequentialist (47%) in the impartial dilemmas, x2(1) = 1.95, p = .16.Next, we looked at which type of person the participant would have liked to play the TG with, if they'd had a choice: the consequentialist or non-consequentialist. A logistic regression revealed a significant effect of dilemma type, 3.2.5F = 137.60, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.13; U = 68,383, p < .001, d = 0.76, along with a significant interaction of dilemma type and agent judgment on how good a friend participants thought the agent would be, F = 16.78, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.02. In both dilemma types, when the agent made a non-consequentialist judgment they were expected to make a better friend, but this was stronger for the sacrificial dilemmas, F = 123.59, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.20; U = 45,524, p < .001, d = 1.00, than for the impartiality dilemmas, F = 29.66, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.06; U = 33,921, p < .001, d = 0.50.Next, we looked at perceived suitability for different roles see . ConsideF = 133.71, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.12; U = 69,310, p < .001, d = 0.75, along with a significant interaction of dilemma type and agent judgment on how good a friend participants thought the agent would be, F = 10.84, p = .001, ηp2 = 0.01. In both dilemmas, when the agent made a non-consequentialist judgment they were expected to make a better spouse, but this was stronger for the sacrificial dilemmas, F = 112.39, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.19; U = 44,716, p < .001, d = 0.95, than for the impartiality dilemmas, F = 33.59, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.07; U = 34,319, p < .001, d = 0.54.For perceived suitability as a spouse, an ANCOVA revealed the predicted main effect of agent judgment, F = 22.95, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.02; U = 133,232, p < .001, d = 0.32 and a significant interaction of dilemma type and agent judgment on how good a boss participants thought the agent would be, F = 18.12, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.02. When the agent made a non-consequentialist judgment in the sacrificial dilemmas they were expected to make a better boss, F = 39.98, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.08; U = 39,299, p < .001, d = 0.57, but there was no difference for the impartiality dilemmas F = 0.15, p = .70, ηp2 = 0.00; U = 27,519, p = .49, d = 0.04.For suitability as a boss, an ANCOVA revealed the predicted main effect of agent judgment, F = 12.81, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.01, but no main effect of agent judgment, F = 0.01, p = .92, ηp2 = 0.00; U = 111,573, p = .65, d = 0.00. Looking at simple effects, in the sacrificial dilemmas a non-consequentialist agent was expected to make a better political leader, F = 5.54, p = .019, ηp2 = 0.01; U = 33,389, p = .040, d = 0.21, but in the impartiality dilemmas it was a consequentialist agent who was expected to make a better political leader, F = 7.55, p = .006, ηp2 = 0.002; U = 22,423, p = .003, d = −0.26.For suitability as a political leader, an ANCOVA revealed a significant interaction of dilemma type and agent judgment on how good a political leader participants thought the agent would be, Overall, results showed that a non-consequentialist agent in the sacrificial dilemmas was seen to make a better friend, boss, spouse, and political leader than the agent who made a consequentialist judgment see . In the 3.3In Study 2 we had two key aims: first, to investigate how participants perceived and interacted with someone who made a consequentialist or non-consequentialist judgment in impartiality dilemmas; and second, to replicate previous work demonstrating partner preference in sacrificial dilemmas in a pre-registered study with new measures and a different dilemma.In the sacrificial dilemmas we successfully replicated and extended previous findings, showing that people who make non-consequentialist judgments in sacrificial dilemmas are perceived more positively than those who make a consequentialist judgment. Non-consequentialists received more transfers in a Trust Game, were seen as more moral and trustworthy, and when given a choice participants indicated they would rather play with a non-consequentialist than a consequentialist. Moreover, we found that this preference for non-consequentialists extended to character ratings of warmth, competence, and loyalty, and that non-consequentialists were seen to make a better friend, a better boss, a better spouse, and a better political leader. In every single dependent measure, a person making a non-consequentialist judgment in a sacrificial dilemma was preferred.In the impartiality dilemmas, the picture was much less consistent. The consequentialist in the impartial dilemmas was preferred on two measures: they were expected to return more in the TG, and they were thought to make a better political leader. The non-consequentialist was preferred on three measures: they were expected to be more loyal and make a better friend and spouse. For most measures, however, there were no differences between the consequentialist and non-consequentialist: they were seen as equally moral, warm, and competent; they were thought to make an equally good boss. While impartial consequentialists were expected to make a better political leader, they were thought to make a worse friend and spouse; and while they were expected to return more in a TG, this did not translate into actual increased transfers by participants, nor greater selection of the consequentialist for a future TG.One potential limitation is that while 83% of participants endorsed the non-consequentialist judgment in the spending money variant, only 55% of participants did so in the spending time variant. Moreover, in this study – and in contrast to Study 1 – we did not find the expected negative correlation between OUS impartial beneficence scores and perceived wrongness of the consequentialist action in the spending time dilemma. This suggests that in this study participants themselves did not actually perceive the spending time dilemma to be one in which one action is consequentialist, and if this is the case, one must be careful about inferring too much about how people think about “consequentialist” judgers in the same dilemma .4In Study 3, we sought to replicate and extend the results in Study 2 using a streamlined set of moral judgment scenarios and a Prisoner's Dilemma PD:  instead 4.14.1.1https://osf.io/dfz2j/) as part of the Pre-Registration Challenge. We report all measures, manipulations, and exclusions in this study. All data, analysis code, and experiment materials are available for download at: https://osf.io/v6z53/.Our design, hypotheses, and analysis plan were all pre-registered at the Open Science Framework (4.1.2N = 5), or failed a simple comprehension check asking them to indicate the decision their partner made in the dilemma (N = 12), leaving us with a final sample of 485 participants . Our sample size was determined through an a priori power analysis (see supplementary methods for details) and a sensitivity power analysis for our main 2 × 2 ANCOVA analysis, assuming an α of 0.05 and power of 0.80, indicated that the minimum effect size we had power to detect was a small effect of f = 0.13. All participants were paid $1.80 for participating and were again paid bonuses depending on their decision in the game. To calculate bonuses, we selected the decision (to cooperate or defect) of the first participant who met the criteria for each condition  and then matched participants accordingly (see supplementary file for more information).In accordance with the pre-registration, 498 participants completed the survey online via MTurk. Participants were excluded from completing the survey if they had participated in related studies by us in the past, and were excluded from analysis if they completed the survey more than once  × 2  between-subjects experimental design. The study was identical to Study 2, except we used two dilemmas  instead of four, and used a PD instead of a TG.4.1.4https://osf.io/v6z53). Participants were required to complete four comprehension questions about the payoffs to each player depending on both player's choices in an example matrix, and they had to answer these correctly in order to move to the next page. After completing this, participants entered the main part of the study where they were told what decision their partner made in the moral dilemma, and made their choice either to cooperate (X) or defect (Y) in the main PD. For the main PD, if both players cooperated they received 3 points each; if both defected they received 1 point each; and if one defected and one cooperated, the defector received 5 points and the cooperator received 0 points.Like in Study 2, participants were first introduced to the moral dilemma and asked to make their own judgments. Next, participants were introduced to the PD and received extensive training about the structure of the game based on the procedure of 4.1.5Ms and SDs as a function of dilemma type and agent judgment, as well as p-values from a Mann-Whitney U test, and effect sizes. In accordance with the pre-registration, for the supplementary materials we again ran analyses looking at a 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVA in which we entered participant moral judgment as a fixed factor (instead of a covariate). There were, however, no significant 3-way interactions, further justifying our focus on the ANCOVA.The analysis plan for this study was identical to that in Study 2. See 4.24.2.1The majority of participants endorsed the non-consequentialist option in the sacrificial dilemma (68%), rejecting the sacrifice of one to save the lives of a greater number. Similarly, most participants endorsed the non-consequentialist option in the impartiality dilemma (79%), endorsing helping a family member over impartially helping a greater number. As for the previous two studies, further results looking at participant judgment can be found in the supplementary materials.4.2.2F = 84.19, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.15; U = 41,514, p < .001, d = 0.79, and a significant interaction of dilemma type and agent judgment on how moral participants perceived the agent to be, F = 72.68, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.13. While a non-consequentialist was seen as more moral than the consequentialist in the sacrificial dilemma, F = 142.20, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.37; U = 13,230, p < .001, d = 1.47, there was no difference in the impartiality dilemma, F = 0.11, p = .74, ηp2 = 0.00; U = 7080, p = .65, d = 0.03.We first looked at character ratings see . For theF = 87.88, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.15; U = 42,494, p < .001, d = 0.83, and a significant interaction of dilemma type and agent judgment on how warm and sociable participants perceived the agent to be, F = 50.61, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.10. While a non-consequentialist was seen as warmer than the consequentialist in the sacrificial dilemmas, F = 140.09, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.36; U = 13,218, p < .001, d = 1.47, there was no difference in the impartiality dilemmas, F = 2.03, p = .16, ηp2 = 0.01; U = 7700, p = .097, d = 0.18.For perceived the two items measuring warmth (α = 0.74), the ANCOVA revealed the predicted main effect of agent judgment, F = 23.96, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.05; U = 36,630, p < .001, d = 0.45, but no interaction between agent judgment and dilemma type, F = 0.28, p = .60, ηp2 = 0.00. The non-consequentialist was seen as more competent in both the sacrificial, F = 13.57, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.05; U = 9895, p < .001, d = 0.47, and impartiality dilemmas, F = 10.27, p = .002, ηp2 = 0.04; U = 8291, p = .005, d = 0.41.For the two items measuring perceived competence (α = 0.89), the ANCOVA showed the predicted main effect of agent judgment, F = 259.78, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.35; U = 49,147, p < .001, d = 1.44, and a non-significant but marginal interaction between agent judgment and dilemma type, F = 3.67, p = .056, ηp2 = 0.001. The non-consequentialist was seen as more loyal in both the sacrificial, F = 149.13, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.38; U = 13,265, p < .001, d = 1.52, and impartiality dilemmas, F = 110.38, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.32; U = 11,116, p < .001, d = 1.35, though the effect sizes were slightly larger in the sacrificial dilemma.Finally, we turned to the single item of perceived loyalty. The ANCOVA showed the predicted main effect of agent judgment, 4.2.3B = −1.56, SE = 0.62, Z = −2.51, p = .012, and a marginally significant interaction of agent judgment and dilemma type, B = −0.86, SE = 0.46, Z = −1.88, p = .061. These interaction effects were supplemented by a significant main effect of agent judgment, B = 1.19, SE = 0.33, Z = 3.60, p < .001, such that across dilemmas and regardless of participant's own judgments, there was more cooperation extended to the non-consequentialist (73%) than the consequentialist (63%) agent. There was, however, no main effect of participant judgment, B = 0.08, SE = 0.45, Z = 0.17, p = .86, suggesting that overall, consequentialist participants were roughly as equal to cooperate (77%) as non-consequentialist participants were (64%) - though note that this difference was significant when looking at simple effects with a chi-square analysis ignoring the effects of agent judgment and dilemma type, x2(1) = 5.79, p = .016, with consequentialists more likely to cooperate.In order to assess the effects of agent judgment, dilemma type, and participant judgment in the dilemma on the likelihood that participants made cooperative decisions in the PD we conducted a 2 × 2 × 2 logistic regression model. This model revealed no significant three-way interaction between agent, dilemma, and participant judgment, only a significant interaction of agent judgment and participant judgment, x2(1) = 11.48, p < .001, while consequentialist participants were no more likely to cooperate with a consequentialist (81%) or non-consequentialist (72%) agent, x2(1) = 1.25, p = .26  than a consequentialist one (55%),  .26 see . This, wx2(1) = 6.73, p = .009. In contrast, in the impartiality dilemma there was equal cooperation extended towards the consequentialist (71%) and non-consequentialist (72%) agents, x2(1) = 0.02, p = .88.Finally, while the interaction between agent judgment and dilemma type was only marginally significant, we looked at simple effects regardless and found that across both consequentialist and non-consequentialist participants, people were more likely to cooperate with the non-consequentialist (73%) than the consequentialist agent (57%) in the sacrificial dilemma, 4.2.4B = −0.28, SE = 0.19, Z = −1.48, p = .14 with chi-square analyses revealing that across the dilemmas most participants (65%) preferred to play with a non-consequentialist over a consequentialist (35%). This was the case both in the sacrificial dilemma, with 68% preferring the non-consequentialist, x2(1) = 33.12, p < .001; and the impartiality dilemma, with 62% preferring the non-consequentialist, x2(1) = 12.93, p < .001.Next, we looked at which agent the participant would have liked to play the PD with, if they'd had a choice. A logistic regression revealed no overall effect of dilemma type, 4.2.5F = 97.14, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.17; U = 42,377, p < .001, d = 0.87, along with a significant interaction of dilemma type and agent judgment on how good a friend participants thought the agent would be, F = 26.17, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.05. In both dilemmas when the agent made a non-consequentialist judgment they were expected to make a better friend, but this effect was stronger for the sacrificial dilemma, F = 117.38, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.19; U = 12,759, p < .001, d = 1.34, than for the impartiality dilemma, F = 10.40, p = .001, ηp2 = 0.04; U = 8093, p = .014, d = 0.39.Next, we looked at perceived suitability for different roles see . For perF = 124.95, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.21; U = 44,134, p < .001, d = 0.99, along with a significant interaction of dilemma type and agent judgment on how good a spouse participants thought the agent would be, F = 18.36, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.04. In both dilemmas when the agent made a non-consequentialist judgment they were expected to make a better spouse, but this was stronger for the sacrificial dilemma, F = 119.82, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.33; U = 12,813, p < .001, d = 1.35, than for the impartiality dilemma, F = 22.69, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.09; U = 9012, p < .001, d = 0.60.For perceived suitability as a spouse, an ANCOVA revealed the predicted main effect of agent judgment, F = 47.36, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.09; U = 38,815, p < .001, d = 0.63, and a significant interaction of dilemma type and agent judgment on how good a boss participants thought the agent would be, F = 15.50, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.03. When the agent made a non-consequentialist judgment they were expected to make a better boss, but this was stronger again for the sacrificial dilemma F = 51.14, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.17; U = 11,316, p < .001, d = 0.90, than for the impartiality dilemma, F = 4.68, p = .032, ηp2 = 0.02; U = 7904, p = .036, d = 0.28.For suitability as a boss, an ANCOVA revealed the predicted main effect of agent judgment, F = 8.64, p = .003, ηp2 = 0.02; U = 33,156, p = .013, d = 0.29, and a significant interaction of dilemma type and agent judgment on how good a political leader participants thought the agent would be, F = 8.61, p = .004, ηp2 = 0.02. When the agent made a non-consequentialist judgment in the sacrificial dilemma they were expected to make a better political leader, F = 14.69, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.06; U = 9693, p < .001, d = 0.49, but there was no difference in the impartiality dilemma, F = 0.00, p = .99, ηp2 = 0.00; U = 6702, p = .77, d = 0.01.Finally for perceived suitability as a political leader, i.e. President of the United States, an ANCOVA revealed the predicted main effect of agent judgment, 4.3In the context of a sacrificial dilemma, we successfully replicated and extended previous findings. We found that on every single dependent measure, people who made non-consequentialist judgments in a sacrificial dilemma were perceived more positively than those who made a consequentialist judgment. As in Study 2, the pattern of results for the impartiality dilemma was more nuanced, though a definite pattern of preference for the non-consequentialist was observed. Out of 10 dependent measures, the non-consequentialist was preferred in six measures and there was no preference in four measures. The non-consequentialist was thought to be more competent and loyal; thought to make a better friend, spouse, and boss; and preferred as a future partner in a PD. There was no preference, however, in perceptions of morality or warmth, perceived suitability as a political leader, or cooperation extended in a PD.Our results are equivocal as to whether non-consequentialist or consequentialist participants were actually more cooperative. While neither non-consequentialist nor consequentialist participants reliably cooperated more overall, we did find that while non-consequentialist participants selectively cooperated with non-consequentialist agents, consequentialist participants cooperated equally with both agents. We find no evidence, then, that non-consequentialists are systematically more cooperative than their consequentialist counterparts. That said, it is important to recognize two key caveats. The first caveat is that behaviour in the PD requires both the goal of cooperation and the expectation that others will cooperate , or in o5In our final study, we wanted to address two potential concerns with the previous studies. The first concern is that there were differences in how much the agents expressed conflict, or recognized competing moral arguments against their decision. The non-consequentialist agent in all dilemmas recognized the conflict by noting they could bring about better consequences, but thought that other moral concerns were more important. Similarly in the impartiality dilemma the consequentialist agent briefly acknowledged the conflicting deontological duties , but in the sacrificial dilemma the consequentialist agent made no mention of the conflicting duties . It is possible, then, that the strong preference for the non-consequentialist we observed in the sacrificial but not impartial dilemmas was partly driven by the fact that the consequentialist in the sacrificial dilemmas expressed no awareness of moral conflict, but the consequentialist in the impartiality dilemma did . Second and third, participants indicate separately how much they thought the agent's decision was driven by strategic and altruistic motives .The second concern we wanted to address was that in Studies 2–3 we collected data on perceived motives of the agent, but did not report the results in the main manuscript because of issues with the wording of the question (see Footnote 6). We had asked participants to indicate on a 11-point scale how much they thought the agent's decision was driven “more by strategic, reasoned motives versus more empathic, altruistic motives?”. However, on reflection this measure was sub-optimal both because it conflates reasoned and strategic motives  and forces participants to select one side, when it is possible that participants thought the action is both more strategic or reasoned 5.15.1.1https://osf.io/xr428/) as part of the Pre-Registration Challenge. We report all measures, manipulations, and exclusions in this study. All data, analysis code, and experiment materials are available for download at: https://osf.io/zf2dp/.Our design, hypotheses, and analysis plan were all pre-registered at the Open Science Framework (5.1.2N = 2), or failed a simple comprehension check asking them to indicate the decision their partner made in the dilemma (N = 41), leaving us with a final sample of 456 participants . Our sample size was determined through an a priori power analysis (see supplementary methods for details) and a sensitivity power analysis for our main 2 × 2 ANCOVA analysis, assuming an α of 0.05 and power of 0.80, indicated that the minimum effect size we had power to detect was a small effect of f = 0.13. All participants were paid $1.20 for participating, in accordance with an hourly US minimum wage of $7.25 and the survey taking approximately 10 min.In accordance with the pre-registration, 500 participants completed the survey online via MTurk. Participants were excluded from completing the survey if they had participated in related studies by us in the past, and were excluded from analysis if they completed the survey more than once  × 2  between-subjects experimental design, and the procedure was the same as in Study 2, except without an economic game and the addition of the three motives questions outlined in the introduction to this study.5.1.4Ms and SDs as a function of dilemma type and agent judgment, as well as p-values from a Mann-Whitney U test, and effect sizes. Again, see supplementary results for analyses looking at a 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVA in which we entered participant moral judgment as a fixed factor instead of a covariate, though like in the previous studies there were no significant 3-way interactions.The analysis plan for this study was identical to that in Studies 2–3. See 5.25.2.1The majority of participants endorsed the non-consequentialist option in the sacrificial dilemmas (59%), rejecting the sacrifice of one to save the lives of a greater number. Similarly, most participants endorsed the non-consequentialist option in the impartiality dilemmas (85%), endorsing helping a family member over impartially helping a greater number. Again, further results looking at participant judgment can be found in the supplementary materials.5.2.2F = 34.29, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.07; U = 33,548, p < .001, d = 0.54, and a significant interaction of dilemma type and agent judgment on how moral participants perceived the agent to be, F = 8.54, p = .004, ηp2 = 0.02. The non-consequentialist was seen as more moral than the consequentialist in both the sacrificial dilemma, F = 32.58, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.13; U = 9165, p < .001, d = 0.74, and the impartiality dilemma, F = 5.27, p = .023, ηp2 = 0.02; U = 7397, p = .050, d = 0.29, though the effect was stronger in the sacrificial dilemma.We first looked at character ratings see . For theF = 23.33, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.05; U = 31,901, p < .001, d = 0.42, and a significant interaction of dilemma type and agent judgment on how warm and sociable participants perceived the agent to be, F = 12.59, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.03. While a non-consequentialist was seen as warmer than the consequentialist in the sacrificial dilemma, F = 32.19, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.12; U = 8996, p < .001, d = 0.74, there was no difference in the impartiality dilemma, F = 0.95, p = .33, ηp2 = 0.00; U = 6795, p = .47, d = 0.11.For the two items measuring perceived warmth (α = 0.77), the ANCOVA revealed the predicted main effect of agent judgment, F = 1.99, p = .16, ηp2 = 0.00; U = 28,134, p = .12, d = 0.13, and no interaction between agent judgment and dilemma type, F = 1.52, p = .22, ηp2 = 0.00. Contrary to predictions, there was no difference in the sacrificial dilemma, F = 0.00, p = .95, ηp2 = 0.00; U = 6473, p = .99, d = 0.01, but the non-consequentialist was seen as more competent in the impartiality dilemma, F = 4.48, p = .035, ηp2 = 0.02; U = 7488, p = .032, d = 0.27.For the two items measuring perceived competence (α = 0.89), the ANCOVA showed no main effect of agent judgment, F = 122.74, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.21; U = 39,389, p < .001, d = 1.01, and a significant interaction between agent judgment and dilemma type, F = 4.78, p = .029, ηp2 = 0.01. The non-consequentialist was seen as more loyal in both the sacrificial, F = 37.28, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.14; U = 9081, p < .001, d = 0.77, and impartiality dilemmas, F = 92.72, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.29; U = 10,403, p < .001, d = 1.24, though the effect was stronger in the impartiality dilemma  = 55.12, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.11; U = 35,363, p < .001, d = 0.68, and no interaction effect, F = 1.13, p = .29, ηp2 = 0.00. In both dilemmas when the agent made a non-consequentialist judgment they were expected to make a better friend  = 34.59, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.13; U = 9094, p < .001, d = 0.77; impartiality dilemma: F = 21.10, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.09; U = 8494, p < .001, d = 0.58).Next, we looked at perceived suitability for different roles see . For perF = 48.53, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.10; U = 34,817, p < .001, d = 0.64, but no significant interaction, F = 0.02, p = .90, ηp2 = 0.00. The non-consequentialist agent was thought to make a better spouse in both the sacrificial, F = 21.81, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.09; U = 8589, p < .001, d = 0.60, and the impartiality dilemma, F = 26.83, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.11; U = 8706, p < .001, d = 0.67.For perceived suitability as a spouse, an ANCOVA revealed the predicted main effect of agent judgment, F = 3.58, p = .059, ηp2 = 0.01; U = 27,809, p = .17, d = 0.17, and no interaction of dilemma type and agent judgment, F = 0.40, p = .53, ηp2 = 0.00. Similarly for perceived suitability as a political leader, an ANCOVA revealed no main effect of agent judgment, F = 1.81, p = .018, ηp2 = 0.00; U = 23,441, p = .071, d = 0.14, and no interaction of dilemma type and agent judgment, F = 0.04, p = .84, ηp2 = 0.00.For suitability as a boss, an ANCOVA revealed no main effect of agent judgment, 5.2.4F = 65.63, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.13; U = 15,222, p < .001, d = 0.74, and a significant interaction of dilemma type and agent judgment, F = 41.39, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.08. In the sacrificial dilemma the non-consequentialist was thought as being more driven by emotion and the consequentialist by reason, F = 118.54, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.34; U = 2185, p < .001, d = 1.42, but there was no difference in the impartiality dilemma, F = 1.19, p = .28, ηp2 = 0.01; U = 5724, p = .15, d = 0.15.First looking at perceptions of whether the agents' decision was driven more by emotion or reason on binary scale, we observed a significant main effect of agent judgment, F = 107.04, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.19; U = 13,549, p < .001, d = 0.92, and a significant interaction of dilemma type and agent judgment, F = 74.39, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.14. In the sacrificial dilemma the consequentialist was thought as being more driven by strategic motives than the non-consequentialist, F = 227.48, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.50; U = 1235, p < .001, d = 2.04, but there was no difference in the impartiality dilemma, F = 1.14, p = .29, ηp2 = 0.01; U = 5859, p = .23, d = 0.16  = 17.96, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.04; U = 20,562, p < .001, d = 0.40, and a significant interaction of dilemma type and agent judgment, F = 11.73, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.03. In the sacrificial dilemma there was no difference in how much either agent was thought to be influenced by altruistic motives, F = 0.33, p = .56, ηp2 = 0.00; U = 6421, p = .93, d = 0.07, but in the impartiality dilemma the consequentialist was thought to be more driven by altruistic motives, F = 32.43, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.13; U = 3866, p < .001, d = 0.76.Finally, we looked at how much the agent's decision was thought to be influenced by altruistic motives. We observed a significant main effect of agent judgment, 5.3In Study 4 we conducted another pre-registered investigation of perceptions of non-consequentialist and consequentialist agents in both sacrificial and impartiality dilemmas, adding three new questions to assess perceptions of the agent's motives and addressing potential concerns with the manipulation of the agent's judgment.First, we saw that the consequentialist was seen as more influenced by strategic motives in the sacrificial dilemma, but more by altruistic motives in the impartiality dilemma. And while in the sacrificial dilemma the non-consequentialist was thought as being more driven by emotion and the consequentialist by reason, there was no difference in the impartiality dilemmas for perceptions of being driven by reason or emotions.Second, we addressed the potential concern with the previous studies that the consequentialist expressed awareness of conflict for the impartiality, but not sacrificial, dilemma. When ensuring that all agents expressed no recognition of competing moral reasons, we broadly replicated the findings of Study 3, with some minor differences. Like in Study 3, in the impartiality dilemma the non-consequentialist was seen as more competent, more loyal, and expected to make a better friend and spouse. However, while in Study 3 the non-consequentialist was thought to make a better boss, there was no difference in Study 4; and while in Study 3 there was no difference in perceived morality, in Study 4 the non-consequentialist was seen as more moral. In neither study was there a difference in perceptions of warmth or suitability as a political leader. It seems clear, then, that our pattern of results cannot be explained simply by the agent's (lack of) expression of moral conflict: regardless of whether they expressed conflict or not, the non-consequentialist in the impartiality dilemma tended to be favored for direct, interpersonal roles. This mirrors our previous work showing that expressing internal conflict through reported emotional difficulty when making a consequentialist decision reduces, but does not fully eliminate, the preference for a non-consequentialist over a consequentialist . It will6Much work over the last decade has focused on the psychological processes underlying judgments about whether it is moral to sacrifice one innocent person to save a greater number of people. In recent years, befitting the fundamentally social role of moral judgments, researchers have begun to consider the social consequences of these judgments: how are consequentialist individuals who endorse harming for the greater good perceived? Previous work has shown that the judgment a person makes in these sacrificial dilemmas influences how moral, warm, and competent they are perceived to be, and even how much cooperation is extended towards them in economic games e.g. . But whiinstrumental harm”, which can be theoretically and empirically distinguished from impartiality dilemmas that tap the more positive, impartial welfare-maximising dimension  of consequentialist theories and consequentialist tendencies in ordinary people. Because this previous work on perception of consequentialist agents has focused almost exclusively on sacrificial dilemmas, it has remained unknown whether the preference for non-consequentialists over consequentialists operates similarly in impartiality dilemmas in which someone faces the decision to help someone close to them or a greater number of strangers.As outlined in the two-dimensional model of utilitarian psychology , judgmenIn four studies, we investigated perceptions of consequentialist and non-consequentialist decision makers in both sacrificial dilemmas tapping instrumental harm, and impartiality dilemmas tapping impartial beneficence. Pre-registering our analyses and predictions, we included the most comprehensive range of dependent measures used in this literature to date, using different economic games (the Trust Game and the Prisoner's Dilemma); examining the distinct dimensions along which the agent's character could be perceived ; exploring the different processes or motivations perceived to influence the agent's moral decision ; and considering the different social roles and relationships in which the agent would be preferred .6.1In the domain of sacrificial harm, our findings strongly confirm previous work highlighting the cost of being consequentialist. We show in three studies that non-consequentialists were consistently preferred over consequentialists. We argue that this is perfectly explicable on a partner choice account of non-consequentialist moral intuitions . The con6.2What about impartiality dilemmas? As discussed in the introduction, how people are perceived in the domain of impartial beneficence remains largely unknown, because almost all previous work has focused on sacrificial dilemmas. The pattern of results in the impartiality dilemmas was much more nuanced than the unequivocal preference for the non-consequentialist in the sacrificial dilemmas, though simply counting overall results suggest that the non-consequentialist has the edge over the consequentialist in the domain of impartial beneficence too: overall, we saw few cases where the consequentialist was preferred, typically seeing either a null effect or that the non-consequentialist was favored. Most interestingly, our results using the impartiality dilemmas appear to suggest a predictable pattern of when non-consequentialists are preferred – and when they are not.Impartial consequentialists were consistently disfavored for roles involving a direct interpersonal relationship, even if they were not explicitly rated as being deficient in morality and warmth. In all four studies, the impartial consequentialist was thought to be less loyal and thought to make a worse friend and spouse, even if they were not always explicitly rated as being deficient in morality and warmth. And in Study 3 - but not Study 2 - the impartial consequentialist was also disfavored as a future partner in a Prisoner's Dilemma and was thought to make a worse boss. This makes sense given the theoretical basis we draw on in the introduction: consequentialism's requirement for the impartial maximisation of welfare is often inconsistent with the nature of special relationships like friendship and familial duties that are a fundamental part of common-sense morality . When weWhile it makes sense for non-consequentialists to be favored for direct, interpersonal relationships, it is much more reasonable – even preferable - to favor a consequentialist for distant, impersonal roles like a political leader, and this what we what found in Studies 1 and 2. The job of an effective political leader can be plausibly described as to make constituents better off, and part of this requires acting impartially to not favor one's own self-interest or the interest of one's immediate family. Indeed, recent work has shown that people do not endorse efficient maximisation in charitable giving unless one is in a position of responsibility, like a political leader . Of courOverall, then, while the pattern of results is weaker than for sacrificial dilemmas, a tentative conclusion can be drawn: there may be some costs of being consequentialist in the domain of impartial beneficence, and this is especially manifested when considering suitability and desirability for direct, personal relationships.6.3harm for the greater good, compared to a non-consequentialist agent who refuses to help for the greater good. There are of course important differences – both theoretical and psychological - between instrumentally killing someone to achieve the greater good and impartially maximising welfare by privileging strangers over our family  and their preference for non-consequentialists in interpersonal interactions (c.f. the other results) cancelled each other out. When playing a game in which the implicit social contract is stronger (for example through players knowing each other), it is possible that we would see a preference for the non-consequentialist.First, we acknowledge that the anonymous economic game context may not be ideal to study partner preferences in the context of impartial beneficence: the consequentialist agents explicitly indicated they thought it better to impartially maximise welfare even with strangers, and participants were themselves strangers to the agent. And while they seemed to understand that they stood to benefit from the agent's impartial beneficence in an anonymous economic exchange, they Second, even if participants did not cooperate more with either agent in the anonymous economic games, they did consistently rate the non-consequentialist as being a better friend and spouse, in line with previous evidence that non-consequentialists in sacrificial dilemmas are favored as long-term mating partners . Given that most people do tend to be more prosocial towards their close friends and family, if in real life non-consequentialists were preferred as friends and spouses, this would also lead to the same partner choice mechanisms occurring.6.5Finally, our work has practical implications concerning how in everyday life groups and individuals who advocate a more impartial, welfare-maximising consequentialist approach to moral decisions – such as the “effective altruism” movement – might expect to be perceived, and how this might limit their advocacy. Peter Singer is the most influential living utilitarian thinker, and in part because of his utilitarian consequentialist moral views is a leading proponent of effective altruism: a movement built around the idea of using reason and evidence to find the best ways to help others. In particular, effective altruism is concerned with using one's resources to have the most impact in helping others, and many effective altruists have pledged to give at least 10% of their income to cost-effective charities . In prac


There are at least three errors in the manuscript, they are as follows:Models with time-varying parameters” paragraph after equation (4), for the sentences- In the “εi(t) describe the clustering of the population  but can also describe a reduction in the population due to voluntary avoidance behavior or social distancing. However due to the absence of structural identifiability properties  it should be very difficult to estimate simultaneously both β(t) and εi(t).”“εi(t)” must be replaced by “εi(t)” in accordance with the rest of the manuscript. Then these sentences become:“εi(t) describe the clustering of the population  but can also describe a reduction in the population due to voluntary avoidance behavior or social distancing. However due to the absence of structural identifiability properties  it should be very difficult to estimate simultaneously both β(t) and εi(t).”“β(t) must be read as:- In the Fig 3 caption the equation of β(t) = β0.(1 + β1 sin(2πt/365+2πϕ) + β2 sin(2πt/(3 365)+2πϕ) + β3 sin(2πt/(0.5 365)+2πϕ))“and not:β(t) = β0.(1 + β1 sin(2πt/365+2πϕ) + β2 sin(2πt/(3 365)+2πϕ)) + β3 sin(2πt/(0.5 365)+2πϕ))“SIRS model” paragraph after equation (5), the sentence- In the “σ, the reporting rate ρ and the initial conditions γ(0) by β(0) but to reduce problems linked to practical non-identifiability materialized by correlation between some estimates, informative priors were used for ρ .”“Initially non-informative priors were used for the volatility must be replaced (as in the uncorrected proofs) by:σ, the reporting rate ρ and the initial conditions (S(0), I(0), β(0)) to reduce problems linked to practical non-identifiability materialized by correlation between some estimates, informative priors were used for ρ .”“Initially non-informative priors were used for the volatility


Nature Communications 10.1038/ss41467-019-08723-y, published online 15 February 2019.Correction to: ρc = 0.075 m−2 within a specified domain31. Four connectors representing the fibers are defined for each cross-link based on a random-weighted sampling process with uniform orientation distribution and a distribution in length resembling the shape of a Poisson distribution with mean Lc = 10 m, if not specified otherwise.’ The correct version states ‘ρc = 0.075 μm−2’ in place of ‘ρc = 0.075 m−2’ and ‘Lc = 10 μm’ rather than ‘Lc = 10 m’.The original version of this Article contained errors in the third and fourth sentences of the ‘Computational material models’ section of the “Methods”, which incorrectly read ‘The model is generated by randomly placing cross-links at a density of ρc = 5 × 10−4 m−3 within the domain of a representative volume element (RVE) of the membrane. Fibers were then defined by four random connections between these crosslinks, uniformly distributed within the membrane plane and sampled from a distribution27p leading to a von-Mises distributed out-of-plane angle φ, controlled by the concentration parameter β = 3, and Poisson-like distributed fiber lengths with mean Lc = 10 m.’ The correct version states ‘ρc = 5 × 10−4 μm−3’ instead of ‘ρc = 5 × 10−4 m−3’, and ‘Lc = 10 μm’ instead of ‘Lc = 10 m’.The second and third sentences of the fourth paragraph of the same section originally incorrectly read ‘The network was generated by seeding cross-links at a density This has been corrected in both the PDF and HTML versions of the Article.


This report re-introduces the Ramachandran number (ℛ) as a residue-level structural metric that could simply the life of anyone contending with large numbers of protein backbone conformations . Previously, the Ramachandran number (ℛ) was introduced using a complicated closed form, which made the Ramachandran number difficult to implement. This report discusses a much simpler closed form of ℛ that makes it much easier to calculate, thereby making it easy to implement. Additionally, this report discusses how ℛ dramatically reduces the dimensionality of the protein backbone, thereby making it ideal for simultaneously interrogating large numbers of protein structures. For example, 200 distinct conformations can easily be described in one graphic using ℛ (rather than 200 distinct Ramachandran plots). Finally, a new Python-based backbone analysis tool—B Proteins are a class of biomolecules unparalleled in their functionality . A naturi can be almost completely described by only two dihedral angles: ϕi and ψi  it serves as a map for structural “correctness” , since mWhile the Ramachandran plot has been useful as a measure of protein backbone conformation, it is not popularly used to assess structural dynamism and transitions . This is because of the two-dimensionality of the plot: describing the behavior of every residue involves tracking its position in two-dimensional  space. For example, a naive description of positions of a peptide in a Ramachandran plot  needs moBeyond Ramachandran plots, tracking changes in a protein trajectory is either overly detailed or overly holistic: an example of an overly detailed study is the tracking of exactly one or a few atoms over time ; an example of a holistic metric is the radius of gyration . With our understanding of protein dynamics undergoing a new renaissance—especially due to intrinsically disordered proteins and allostery—having hypothesis-agnostic yet detailed (residue-level) metrics of protein structure has become even more relevant. But unfortunately, there has been no single compact descriptor of protein structure. This impedes the naïve or hypothesis-free exploration of new trajectories/ensembles.number [ℛ or simply ℛ]—with little loss of information , these pictograms are named multi-angle pictures (MAPs). BackMAP is presently available on GitHub (https://github.com/ranjanmannige/BackMAP).It has recently been shown that the two Ramachandran backbone parameters  may be conveniently combined into a single number—the Ramachandran ormation . In a prormation . This reormation , and furThe Ramachandran number is both an idea and an equation. Conceptually, the Ramachandran number (ℛ) is any closed form that collapses the dihedral angles ϕ and ψ into one structurally meaningful number . Mannigemin, ϕmax) and ψ ∈                      13 # Finally, creating (but not showing) the graph                 14 backmap.draw_xyz                                18 # Now, we display the graph:                              19 plt.show # ... one can also use plt.savefig to save to file      20The code above results in D1) and previous structure (D−1) within the trajectory, etc.Additionally, by changing how one assigns values to “X” and “Y,” one can easily construct and draw other types of graphs such as time-resolved histograms, per-residue fluctuations when compared to the first .for chain in grouped_data.keys:                                    11  models, residues, Rs = grouped_data[chain]                             12                                                            13  'Begin custom code'                                          14  X = ; Y=; Z=; # Will set X=model, Y=R, Z=P(R)                       15  # Bundling the three lists into one 2d array                            16  new_data =  np.array))                     17  # Getting all R values, model by model                               18  for m in sorted): # column 0 is the model column             19   # Getting all Rs for that model #                                20   current_rs = new_data[np.where] # column 2 contains R     21   # Getting the histogram                                      22   a,b = np.histogram)                   23   max_count = float(np.max(a))                                   24   for i in range(len(a)):                                      25    X.append(m); Y.append((b[i]+b[i+1])/2.0); Z.append(a[i]/float(np.sum(a)));     26  'End custom code'                                            27                                                            28  # Finally, creating (but not showing) the graph                         29  backmap.draw_xyz"       31    ,cmap = 'Greys', ylim=)                                  32  plt.yticks)                                33  # Now, we display the graph:                                     34  plt.show # ... one can also use plt.savefig to save to file               35Other types of graphs can be easily created by modifying part three of the code above. For example, the following code creates histograms of The code above results in ackMAP provides two new colormaps: “Chirality” , and “SecondaryStructure” . Right twisting backbones are shown in red; left twisting backbones are shown in blue. ackMAP do. In case it is known that the protein backbone accesses non-traditional regions of the Ramachandran plot, a four-color schematic will be needed (see below for more discussions).Aside from the general color maps (cmaps) that exist in matplotlib , BackMAP can be used as a stand alone package by running “> python -m backmap -pdb <pdb_dir_or_file>.” The sectons below describe the expected outputs and how they may be interpreted.BIn particular, each column in As compared to the conformationally stable protein above, protein 2fft is much more flexible. The diverse states occupied by each residue  and 11D Yet, interestingly, s; The Ramachandran number increases in value from the bottom left of the Ramachandran plot to the top right in sweeps that are parallel to the negative sloping diagonal. As discussed in L helix region becomes relatively prominent). On the other hand, prolines are known to form polyproline-II helices  the positively sloped diagonal i.e.,-signed” within the command line implementation or by adding “signed=True” when making backmap.R calls.To accomodate the situation where achiral backbones are expected , an additional Ramachandran number—the s, s easily distinguishes αD from ppII.As an example of the utility of ℛs, while useful, would be important in very limited scenarios, as more than 96% of the amino acids in the PDB occupy the upper-left region of the Ramachandran plot (with 3% of “rule breakers” contributed mostly by glycines).Note that the signed ℛackMAP) has been provided in an online GitHub repository to promote the utility of ℛ as a universal metric.A simpler Ramachandran number is reported—http://scop.berkeley.edu/downloads/pdbstyle/pdbstyle-sel-gs-bib-40-2.06.tgz, contains 13,760 three-dimensional protein conformations (one domain per conformation) with lower than 40% sequence identity. Secondary structure annotations were assigned using the DSSP algorithm (Statistics about single amino acid conformations and secondary structures (excepting ppII) were derived from the Structural Classification of Proteins or SCOPe website  describe single conformations and the last two  describe ensembles. ℛ-based MAPs were created for each structure The output of this command line implementation were used in D1), and deviation in structure compared to the previous conformation in the trajctory (D−1). For any residue r at time t, these equations can be described as follows:In order to describe changes in structure, this report uses two metrics for structural deviation: deviation in present structure when compared to the first conformation in the trajctory  and ϕ ∈  rounds x to the closest integer value, σ is a scaling factor, discussed below, and λ is the range of an angle in degrees . Effectively, this equation does the following: (1) It divides up the Ramachandran plot into (360° σ1/°)2 squares, where σ is a user-selected scaling factor that is measured in reciprocal degrees  to the integer value (Rℤ) assigned to the divvied-up square that they it exists in. Further discussions on this process are available in the previous publication  or [−π, π),σs indicate higher accuracy, Conformation of this limit is shown numerically in Assuming, a different range ), the Ramachandran number in that frame of reference will be


AbstractNA In our recent publication , there are errors in Table 1 (Column: GenBank accession numbers). The corrections are as follows:Page 125:MN453513”Accession number of ZMKU AM 01442: “MN453508” should be “MN453514”Accession number of ZMKU AM 01446: “MN453509” should be “MN453515”Accession number of ZMKU AM 01451: “MN453510” should be “MN453516”Accession number of ZMKU AM 01467: “MN453511” should be “MN453517”Accession number of ZMKU AM 01475: “MN453512” should be “MN453518”Accession number of ZMKU AM 01479: “MN453513” should be “MN453519”Accession number of ZMKU AM 01485: “MN453514” should be “MN453520”Accession number of ZMKU AM 01493: “MN453515” should be “PageBreakMN453521”Accession number of ZMKU AM 01498: “MN453516” should be “MN453522”Accession number of ZMKU AM 01503: “MN453517” should be “MN453526”Accession number of ZMKU AM 01516: “MN453518” should be “MN453527”Accession number of ZMKU AM 01520: “MN453519” should be “Page 126:MN453508”Accession number of ZMKU AM 01418: “MN453520” should be “MN453509”Accession number of ZMKU AM 01423: “MN453521” should be “MN453510”Accession number of ZMKU AM 01425: “MN453522” should be “MN453511”Accession number of ZMKU AM 01426: “MN453523” should be “Page 127:MN453512”Accession number of ZMKU AM 01430: “MN453524” should be “MN453523”Accession number of ZMKU AM 01507: “MN453525” should be “MN453524”Accession number of ZMKU AM 01509: “MN453526” should be “MN453525”Accession number of ZMKU AM 01511: “MN453527” should be “


In Abstract, the term “(DEP)” should be “(PED).”µm, NS; M12: 312 ± 84 µm, NS; M24: 312 ± 12.3, NS)” should be corrected to “Change of CRT did not reach the significant difference at any time point of the study .”In Results, “Change of CRT did not reach the significant difference at any time point of the study  Refractory to Ranibizumab” , there w


Sympathetic nerve innervation is required for beigeing in white fatQiang Cao, Jia Jing, Xin Cui, Hang Shi, Bingzhong XuePhysiol Rep, 7 (6), 2019, e14031.https://doi.org/10.14814/phy2.14031In Xue et al. (2019), Figures 2A and 4A has labeling errors.In Figure 2A, group 3 that was originally labeled as “iBAT‐C & iWAT‐6‐OHDA,” should be corrected as “iBAT‐6‐OHDA & iWAT‐C”.In Figure 4A, group 3 that was originally labeled as “iBAT‐C & iWAT‐6‐OHDA,” should be corrected as “iBAT‐6‐OHDA & iWAT‐C”.The authors apologize for the errors.