{"document_id": "1984_1_621_645_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "~·.\n\nSTATE OF MAHARASHTRA\n\nNARSINGRAO GANGARAM PIMPLE\n\n October 27, 1984\n\nPrevention of Corruption Act~S. 5(1) (a) and 5(2) and •· 161. of 1-P.C:- . Accused prosecuted/or demdndlng and accepting Illegal gratification..:CTrial Court\n\nconvicted and sentenced the accused~High Court a, cquitted the accused-Whether and when Supreme Court should interfere.\n\nWhat ; hould be judicial .approaeh to ev.ldence of witnesses in a trap ca4e. _ ... ,\n\n. . . The respondent,~· Sublnpeto~ of Police, \\Vas charged under s. 161 , of . ihe Indian Penal Code and also under. SS. 5(1) (a) and 5(2) of the Prevention of\n\nCorruption Act. .The prosecution case was that one Rego had filed a complaint D\n\n. ainst his tenant Walawalker, that_ he:. was running a distillary. ·· On. a narch of Walawalker's house made by P.W .. 8 Gangure, a police officer subordinate. to. the respondent~ no trace Of distillary was found. The respondent\", told . RcgC that sijl.ce.ihe complaiJlt made by him was prima_facie fou_nd to: be fillse\n\nhe waS liable to:be prosecuted under-the Bombay Prohibition Act. The nspon .. dent demanded froln Rege Rs. 2000 on9-4-1972 as aratification for not taking E\n\n_a11yaction againt--him and rcpe8ted the same demand on 13-4:.1972. R, ege Was\n\ndirected to see the respondent nearabout thC poliCe-.statiOn at a .place calICd padavi. Rege out of despeation .. corit3.cted PW ll, M.S. haCnkar and.after narrating his story requested hirll to iay a trap in.order to catch the ccuscd, R.ege also gave 20 hun(fred-rupee notes _to PW 11-which _he proposed ·, to hand~ over to the accused-at the .. time of' the trap .. The raiding party. reached padavi , r.Ound iibout 7.c:>O P.M. and waited -for tho; respondent to come .. The respondent F appeared on tQe_scene- t about 8.30 P.M. and o~ seeing Reie. repeated hiS demand for the 3rd time, Rege gaye the mOney to tho repOndent. nits was watched by P.W. 11, P.W. 3 and soino others pf the raiding pacy. Thereafter Khamkar, PW 11, went into the room and tried fo hold the hands of the rcspon 4ent who had inad_e an attempt tb take-out the nte~ from the right sidC pOcket, - of hii pant but desi>fte this tbe re!pondon~.succeeded in throwing out t\\le notes: As the moi:iey tlius passed'had, already' been treated With 8.ntbracbie powder, the\n\n- .G handS and the fiSht side pocket of th~ Rccused were put before the ultra violet lamp and were found o bestaine'd wih-tbe said powder;\n\nThe trial court convicted and aentenced the respondent. under a:5(1)(ay and 5(2) of tho Prevention of Corruption Act. In appeal tho . High Court set .aside the conviction aria serit(lnces. imposed upon the respondent. HCnce this appeal J>y the State. The State argued that tliere was .. no real and meaningful <liscu•.sion of the important evidence produced by tbe prosecution in .•upport or\n\n, G\n\nSUPREMB COURT REPORTS (1984j I s.c.R.\n\nfrs cae and.the mgh, CoUft had mfely .Darrited-the !'Yiden~ without exaffiinina Hs intrinsic inerit and had sidetrac.ked an issue which was not at all germane for deciding this case. the respondent argued that the High Court having acquitted the accused. this Court should very rclrely interfere withthe judgment of the Hiah court and sh_otild do so only in cases where there was a grave error of law ot serious miscarriage of justice and that' too when the accused faced a trial for several years and had been reinstated and prompted as an Inspector.\n\nAllowing tho appeal,\n\n• HELD : The iudiment of the High Court suffers from serious and\n\nsbstanti81 errors of Jaw-:3.nd Jegai infirmities. This is-one.of those farestof rare cases where this:Court would be failing'. in jts duty if it did not interfere .with the order of acquittal and set aside the judgment.of the High Court. on a full and complete discussion of the facts and circumstances of the case the Court. is of the opiniOn tbaf thC Charges against the respondent-accused have .. been .clca~JY proved and his acquittal by the High Court was wrong both on law and, on facts.· [644 E, FJ\n\n.The resporident took .ao ingeq.ious though improbable defence that Rege attempted to thrust the notes intO his pocket in .the prcsencC of Khamkar but he pvea push and.the notes fell ori the ground; thereby he tried to explain the stains of.the.anthracine pow_der on.- his hands. While P.utting forward. this defence th~ respondent seems to have.forgotten that the notes bad. been taKen out of his pocket which was also .smeared with the powder 8.nd it is impo:ssible to\n\n-'acept that an ordinary person like Regi;-wouJd have the ourage and audacity to forcibly thrust as many as 20 notes of rupees 100 denomi'n3tion each into the pockCt Of the resporident when he knew that the respoilden.t was a police officer armed with a revolver. It is difficult to believe that Rege Would take such a grave risk an.d do so in tbe presence of Khani.kar and others. The testimony of. two _indepcnd_ent witnesses and one clerk hClwever reveals a different story which fulJy corroborates the prosecution version.- (63.o D-FJ \"'\n\nThe High Court seems to have devoted a major part of it$ judgmen~ tQ the varicius case diaries produced before the court in order to establish that the ae:(:used was n6t-pres\\:nt at ihe police statio~ either on the 9th~. or -on the 13th April 1972 when the first .two demands were made. According .to the High . Court this gave a sufficint alibi to _the respondent fro~ which \"it could be safety\n\ninferred that if he was not present at the J?ohcc statiori, there.could :be' no ocassion for. hiin to make any demand for bribe from the cotDplainant. Assuming that.the'recitl.s .in.the said case diaries are adinissible (though there Is serious doubt about, it) yet it dOes not at all exclude the presence of the respondent at the Aoibarnaih police station_ on the 9th and 13th because iiC\" Was not ent away to a pla'ce situated far from Bombay but .was in some other police station within a radius of a few miles only. Even if he Was deputed to. some other place he was in possession of a jeCp and he could visit the An1barnath police station for a few minutes on any of th'ese da(es.· Ii is well settled .that a.plea of alibi must be Pra:ved with certainty so as to completely exclude the possibility' of the presence Of the person concerned at the place of oc(furrcnce. Such,\n\nhwevcr, is .no_t the case here. Therefofe,. the discussion of the cae diaries, which enpled a . substantial portfon of the Hiah Court judgment was really •n omefst lo futility. [632 D-GJ ·\n\n\\ f\n\nMAHAl\\ASHTRA V. N.G, PIMPLE 623\n\nWe have 8:one-tbrOugh the ~tire evidence. led by the prosecution and~ in its opinion, the prosecuti_on cas~ was Fully proved because it has been supported by at least two indepnderi.t witnesses, v.iz., PW s 3 and 11 arid -to a great extent ~~~m .\n\nThis Court is' unable to be convinced by iny reason why the evidence of FWs 3 and 11 should be discarded parficularly. wheil neither of these wit-\" nesSes bore any grudge or animus against the respondent nor was any such .suggestion made to any or\" these witnesses. Certain mino~ contrad_ictions or inconsistencies have been Pointed out in the statements qf PWs 1 and 3 but-on. close examination they de) not appear to be material and, therefore, not suffi cient to throw_ out the prosecu.tion-case. pws 1 and 3 have fully supported.the prosecution case. [636 E-H] .\n\nThe High Curt was greatIY iprCssed by what it Calls a seriOus lacuna .in the prosecution casethat although both Rege ind Khamkar, along with\"the\n\nraidii:ig party, came to the Municipal. octroi Naka the first thing which Khamkar ciid was to ask Rege to stand outside (padavi)\" where. the [aiding party was also present. The lfigh coUrt further held thafitfrom the evidence of Rege it appears that after ihe raiing party came.there. Kharnkar' caught hold, ofihe hands of the accused and took pim inside the r6orn. The High Court has come to this finding .on a complete mjsreading of he evidence of PWs 1. and ll overlo.cikillg and ignoring_ the logic<il sequerice of events starting from the morning of 14th April up to the time when the money pas.sed. [637D-638C] \"\n\nTh.i: High Court seems to have been under the impression that PW 1 was not_sµbjected to the ultia Violet lamp light test which in fact was done and.here -the I-Iigh Court again con1mitted .an .error of record. {638 DJ\n\nThe High Cou1l did. _not make any attempt to scari and appreciate the intdnsic merits of the evidence of PWs 1 and 3 as corroborated by PW 7, which . by itselfwi_ls sufficient to prove the prosecution case.regarding the acceptance\n\n, and recovery of money, [638H-639A]\n\nThe High Court failed to consider\" as to What motive could Rege have fo . 'faJsely implicate tl)t a_ccused when he had not conducted the search nor Was he\n\n_, ircctl~ Connecte~.with the chagesheet which WaS going to-be_fiJed against hiµi.\n\nJndecd, the dominant question which the court should have put to itself-would l1a\\'e-been a:s to why a cOmplaint under s. 89 of thEi Prohibition. Act ¥.'as not filed i:igainSt Rege even though the chargeSheet was ready. The evidence of G8.ftgurcl!', PW 8 shows that he wets ready to file the chargesheet but the.accused directed him not to do so until the receipt of further instructions from hiin. _ .Thai bing_ th~ position w_by did. the ac'?used asked Gangu; de to dely the filing of the c, hargcs'heet ? This qucstioii has neither befn answered by thC High Court nor by the accused. It Seems that tle approach made by the High Court_ lo- war.ds the prosecution has not been independent but one with a .tainted eye and . aµ. innate. prejudice .. Jn .fact, the High COurt appears tci have been sO lnuch prejudiced aga.inst the J)roseCution that it magnified evry ffiinor detail or omission to falsify or throw even a shadow of doubt on the prosecution evidence. This is -the very ante-thesis of a e<;>rrect judicial approa-; h-o the eviden.;; e ·\n\nG •\n\n• G\n\n• <\n\n. . 624\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(19S4) 1 S.C.R.\n\nof witnesses in a-ti'ap ca~.' Indeed, if_such a harsh touchstOnc is prescribed tQ Prove a case-it Will be impossfble' for the prosecutioD to est3blish any case at\n\n•!I. (639 D-F; 640H-641BJ .\n\nThe Hih Court reiected vi.ta! evideneeof PWs I, 3, 8 and II on frivolous grounds and it did not make any attempt -to di cuss 'their evidence on itltrinsic merits and the superficil manner. i,; which it has dealt with the evidence and circllnistances in order io demolish the prosecution caSe is Wholly unacceptable and leaves.much to be desired. (644 B-CJ ·\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JuR1soic'r10N : Criminal Appeal No. 127 of 1977\n\nAppeal by Special Jeave from the Judgment and . Order dated the 22nd/23rd ian., 1976 of the Bombay High Court in Criminal\n\nAppeal No. I 02 of !974. . • •\n\nO.P. Rana, and M. N.Shrff, for the Appe1/oirt.\n\n S.B.Bhasme,\n\n0 Rom Jethmolani, and V.N; Ganpule, for .the. ·.Respondent. • ~\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was. delivered by\n\nFAZAt ALI,' .i. This appeal by special leave is directe\\I against a judgment dated 22/i3rd, January 1976 of (he <Bombay High Court . acquitting the respondent of the charges framed against him under s.161 Indian Pert.al Code and also under s.5(1) (a) and. 5(2) of. the Prevention of Corruption Act (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act').\n\nThe trial court after very detailed consideration of theevidence held that the charges under the aforesaid sections had been fully proved and the respondent-accused was accordingly sentenced to u11dergo two years rigorous imprisonment under. s.5(1) (a) and 5(2). of the Act and a fine of Rs. 2000 was also imposed and in . default of pay~\n\nment of fine further six month R.I. was imposed. The High Court . in appeal disagreed . with the cone] usion of the trial court allowed the\n\nappeal oft.he accused, and set aside the convictiOn and sentences imposed on him.\n\nWe have heard Mr. Jethmalani, ·.counsel for 'the respondent-· accused and Mr. Rana for the appellant and . have gone through the_, entire evidence and the Judgment of the High Court.. '\n\n~··\n\n\\ >\n\n• .•.\n\nMAHARASHTRA v. N.G. PIMPLE (Fazal Ali, J.) 625\n\nThis seems to. be a very strange case where. truth has been SO much polluted that falsehood has taken.its 'place and truth buried under deep debris. This.has been. possible by a clever polic.e officer. like the respondent, who tried to kill two bird.s with one stone, being . _)-. seized of an opportu\n\n0nity_ which .. came to him through a . complaint . filed by Pandharinath Shivram Rege ·(hereinafter. :_referred to as 'Rege')against his tehant.Govind Shantaran Wal!Lwalkar (for short, to be referred to as 'Walawalkar') to the effect that. the complaint\n\nsuspeced tha.t his tenant, Walawalkar, was running a distillary .. On a report by the police that on , searching the' premises no . trace of\n\n•. distillary was found, presumably an infere,1ce could be drawn that the said complaint was false, though the said complaint was yet to be tested in a court of law in a pr0seution under s.89 of the Bombay Prohibition Act (for facillity, to bi\\ referred to as 'Prohibition Act'); The police report -obviously made Rege .extermely\" nervous for fear\n\nof impending prosecution. Rege, as his background would show, was not an ordinary man in the street but a highly educated person who had got a M.Sc. degree and retired as a s_enio.r chemist before . settling down in his own -house called Prapanch, Therefore,, being\n\na respectabie person be attirally get perturbed by the adverse police report.: It was here that 'the acctised, having got an opportunity of his life through his dice, by aningenious device invit.ed the complain- ' ant to offer him bribe by.putting him in a tight corner on the one . hand; and in an inextricable _dilemma on the other.\n\n-. • - • ' # . . - . .\n\nTo begin with, the respondent-accused sensing the nervousness Rege staried by\" showing huinan sympathy that no harm would come - 'to hitri.\n\nFinding that he had cough! Rege in the net, he took undue J!:dvantage of Rege's helplessness and frustration and played his game by gradually making an offer to extricate him (Rege) if he could pay him a suni of Rs,. 2,000. .The demand was repeated and poor Rege found himself bween the d'evil and the 'deep sea. These repeated . '1 demands of the respondent drove Rege into desperation which took him to PW 11, M.S. Khamkar, to whom he narrated his st<ify _and - . requested him to lay a trap in order to catch the accused.\n\nHere; before narrating the facts, we might:tnention a few words about the nature of the approach made by. the High Court. Far from probing into the truth and heart of the matter the learned Judge , appears to have readily accepted the visibly ·attractive argument of the counsel for the Respondent. that by foisting a false charge of bribery on the rsp'ondent the coml'lainant displayed a cliabolica! ·\n\n• D\n\n• D\n\n. 626\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984] I s.c.R.\n\ncharacter in rendering the step taken by the police against Walawalkar nugatory and stal.led any further action.\n\nThis argument was reiterated before us by the counsel with all the force at his command but on.closer examination, in our opinion, thl: argument is completely witout substance. The learned Judge seems to have over- •·\\~ looked two importjnt.circumstances which completely negative the reasoning given by\" him. Jn the first place, assuming that the aUe- .l gation of bribery made by the complainant against the respondent . was false, how could it stop any action on the complainL which was being looked after and investigated by PW 8 Gangurde who categori- : cally states that he had prephred the chargesheet (Ex.66) on 11.(72 and sought permission from dte accused to take Rege to the court in order to present !he chargesheet but the accused directec! him not not to preceed with the chargesheet and' asked him not to file t!te . . \" same untilfurther orders from him: Therefore, it was. the accused who had stalled the prosecution of Rege.\n\nIn this connection Gangurde $lated as follows : . · ·\n\n\"On 13.4. 72 I again approached the accused and asked him whether the charge-sheet against ·. Rege should . be forwarded to the court. . He 'told me that there was no hurry about it and thai I should keep those papers with me .. He further told me that I should keep those papers till.he instructed:\".\n\n• It maythus be noticed that by the time Gangrude wanted to file the charge; heet the first demand for bribery had already been made on 9.4.72 and the second dcmad was yet .to be made on )3.4~72 which clearly shows that there was some \"method in the madness'.' on the part of .the respondent in directing his subordinate to withhold submission of the. chargesheet util. further instruction from Ji\n\nhi~ or there .was some hidden. oecn:it which compefled the iiccused to. give.such a direction. And.by a process of elimination it would appear that the only consideration which inspired the accused to take such.an' extraordinary step was to wait until he was able to get the money demanded so that after receiving the money he would get the matter dropped. Thi! inforence is fully supported by the state- ·) . ment of PW l who has stated. in categorical terms that on orie occasion he was assured by the accused that he would sec that Rege : would be acquitted and even on the 14th . when the . demand' .wa& • '- firially m'ade the accused had assured him in the following words:\n\n• •\n\n. MAHARASHTRA V, N.G. P1MrLE (Faia/A/i, J.) . 627\n\n\"You should not worry, I am arranging for the with•· drawal of that case, arid that I should not harbour any worry on that count.\n\nI said _that he should see to it.\"\n\n)---r. . There would therefore be no other earthly reason why the respondent should have kept the chargesheet pending even though it was ready.\n\nFurthermore, the. possibility that the allegations made\n\n'\\ I\n\n' by Rege against. his tenant may have been true cannot be rea§onably ' excluded because the complainant categorically states that . he used to get smell of liquor and_ see lot _of people. going and coming into.\n\nWalawalkar's house. It may be that Walawalkar having got sense of the matter, as he lived i, n the .same place, removed all the traces_ of the distillary before the police could reach the premises. Aftet 'an the compfaint filed by Walawalkar against Rege had yet to stand\n\nthe test of judicial scrutiny and remained in the domain of only an allegation n the basis of which a charge sheei was to be submitted to the .Court.· Thi<· inference is fully fortified, reinforced and rendered ve; y probable by the subsequent conduct of Wala.walkar who knowing full well that the complaint filed against him by Rege was false and baseless which seriously and adversely harmed his reputation and the police contemplated to take action .under section 89 of the Prohibition Act at his instqnce agains(Rege,\n\nhe kept quiet and made no aitempt.whatsoever to pursue his complaint or take proceeding nnder section 182 I.P.C. or for that matter file a snit for malicious prosecution: against Rege.\n\nIn view of such a meaningful silence on the part of Walawalkar a fair possibility of the allegation made by Rege against Walawalkar may have been afterall true, could not reas.onably be excluded. This, therefore, completely knocks the _bottom out _of the reasoning adopted by the Judge and the argunient pui forward by Counsel.\n\nFurther, it is not understandable why the accused after being infermed that the charge-sheet of Rege was ready to be submitted, > directed Gangurde, Ws subordinate. officer, to let it lie over until further instructions. TWs is, therefore, something more than meet's the\n\neye and provides an intrinsic, nay, a conclus_ive proof of the fctum . of the demand of bribe from Rege ai:td infereniially suggests that _the accused wished to wait until his demand was complied with by Rege in which case the proceeding against Rege might be dropped.\n\nThis is fully corroborrated by the evidence of Rege w(lo states that after the two demands on 9th & 13th April 1972, .even on 14.4'72 , the accused ass_urefl Rege that he would be acquitted. The fact,·\n\n'.A.\n\nl; I\n\n...\n\n628' SUPREME COuRT REPORTS\n\n' [t984) 1 s.c.I\\.,\n\nhowever, remains that the chrge shtet to be submitted against Rege • was put in a cold storage, vanished into . thin air and was never revived thereafter, which still remains ari unsolved m'ystery. Jn these circumstances to dub the complainant as a person of a. dubious or a diabqliCal character as :he. H!gh Cqu:t has clone .i; as most.' urifor- .... \\,. tunate and .amounted to, mfitctmgon.h1m,\"an unkmd cut mdeed.\".\n\nB •\n\n~·.-\n\nThe story of this dextrous drama staged by the respondent ith complete adroitness and alacrity begins wit)1 . a .complaint filed by Rege on the 25th of March 1972 at police station Ambarnath at 8.30 am. under the Prohibition Act. ·. Before the complaint was reduced .. in Writing Rege had narrated the facts to . the . respondent. who had .\n\nasked liim to give a written complaint. On tlie basis of the complaint, PW 8, Gangurde carri.ed out a search after.· prepadng a pancbnama and re.ported that. nothing was found in the house cif Walawalkar connecting him with the offence under s'.89 of the Prohibition Act.\n\nOn 4.4.72 Rege was sent for and in pursuance of the call from the police station )le'reached'there by about 8;30 a, in. where Gangurde was present but the accused was not there. Being fotally unaware. of the i.ngenious plan of .the responent, :Gangurde told Rege that.a case. under the Prohibition Act had been registered agai.nst hi'll and be was. to be prosecuted; arrested and couid be released ori bail on · furnishing a surety.\n\nRege. se'nt for PW 4, dr.V.'B. Sardar, to. stand . surety for him so that he could be released on bail. Before Dr. Sardar . . ' . came to the police station,.the accused, who had reached the police station by that time, impressed upon Rege that .since he had given a false complaint against Walawalkarwho was a. respectable man, a case had been registered against him. This seems to be the first' step taken the accued for spreading the het in order to catch his prey.\n\nOil 9.4.72 while Rege bad gone to play tennis .he. was · .summoned to the police station where he, ac.companied by. Sukh- .4 tankilr, reached at about 8.00 p.m. and saw the accused there. The . accusd then took Rege on the roaq and told hi~ that if he could pay Rs• 2o00 to him . h~ would see that he (Rege) was acquitted. It might be noticed here that PW 8 Gangurde has clearly .stated that he . had made a search of Walawalkar's house on 25.3.72 and recorded his statement on 28.3.72 on which date a case was regist.cred. against Rege under the oral orders cif the respondent .. The witness further . goes on to state that he had already pFepared the chargesheet against\n\nRege and even after the complai_nant was sent for to come to.the\n\nMAliARA; HTR,< i>. N.o. PiMPLE (Fazal All, J.) 629 ·.\n\npolice station and released on bail no chargesheet was subm.itted.\n\nGangurde states that the charge sheet was prepared on 1.1.4. 72 but as he wanted a clearance from. the respondent for submitting the \" ... charge-sheet h~ was told th.at there. was no hurry and that the.· ... . _/ papers . should be kept with hini till further . instructi.; ms. No\n\n). ..\n\nexplanation has been giveri by the respondent .for staying .the sub- . missipn of tbe chargeshet after it was fully ready in a case whic)l\n\nought tci have been put up before. the court immediately. This important factor intrinsically supports the case of Rege that the respondent Was holding up the chargesheet in order to make his drama complete -. by obtaining the.money demanded from him as illegal gratification: It is obvious that the respondent wanted to keep Rege within bis . control and allow the sword of damoclesto hang over him until the . . deal was completely finalised.\n\n, focidentally, we might mention that this .circums.tance completely . demolishes the argulDet of t:Ciunsel for the respondent that having filed a false complaint and having made a false representation io Kham.kar that the accused was damanding bribe and that a trap should be laid, t.he complainant succeded in sl!elving the cbargesheet from .being filed. In vjew of the aforesaid admited circumstances,\"\n\nthe argument cannot be acceptd even for a: moment. In 'fact, t'his argument as made the sheet anchor of the defence of the repondent, . hut we feel that so splendidly was the defence set up that even the experienced judicial .eye of th~ learned High Court Judge was. unable .\n\n- - . . to pierce or. penetrate, through the smokescreen . thrown by tl!e respondent (to concear his guilt) to . discover the bright star or the truth concealed behind the darkness of the smoke.\n\nThe trial court was wise enough to see through the game and refused to. be d11ped by . the visibly charming and beautifol picture of falsehood and convicted hi.m of the charges as indicated above. ·\n\nJn fact, one of the fundamental argumentsthat have been\n\nadva11ced before us by Mr. Rani, counsel for the State, is that there Gis no.real_ and .Illeaninegful discussion of the impoitant evidence produced by the prosecution in support of its. case and the High .\n\nCourt . has . merely narrated the evidence without examining. its intrinsic merit and has sidetracked an issue which was not at all germane for deciding this case -an aspect with which we shall deal H with a little later, ·. ·\n\nA ..\n\n630 SUPREME COURT llBPOR TS · 1i984l 1 s.c.lt\n\nComing back now. to the sequence of events the prosecution case- . was that after the first demand was made on 9.4. 72 and repeated on\n\n 13.4.72, Rege was directed to see the respondent ilearabout the police station at a place -called padavi. Rege then approaced PW .1.1 . Khamkar for laying a trap, and gave twenty I 00 rupee notes to _PW 11\n\nwhich he proposed to hand0ver to the accused at .the time of the trap.\n\nThe raiding party reached padavi. round about 7.00 p.m. and waited for the respondent to come who appeared on the scene at about 8.30 p.m. and on seeing Rege. repeated his demand for the 3rd time and after the money had been given to the accused, PW 11, PW 3 and some ot!ters of the raiding party watched the same.\n\nThereafter Khamkar went into the room and tried to hold the hands of the respondent who had made .an attempt to. take out the notes \"from the right side pocket of his pant but despite this the respondent succeded iri throwing oµt the notes. As the moriey thus passed had already been treated with anthracine powder, the. hands and the right' side pocket of the accused were put before the ultraviolet lamp and were found to be stained with the said powder .. The respondent took an ingenious though improbable defene .that Rege attempted to thrust the notes into his pocket in the presence of Khamkar btit he gave a push and • the notes fell on the ground; thereby be tried to explain the stains of.\" the anthracine powderon his hands. While putting forward this defence the respondent seems to have forgotten that the. notes had been taken out ofhis pocket which was also smered with the powder and it is impossible to accept that .. ati ordinary person like Rege would bave the courage and audacity to forcibly thrust as many as twenty notes of Rs. JOO de.nomination each into the pocket of the respondent when he knew that the respondent was a police officer armed with a revolver., . It is difficult to believe that Rege would take such a grave risk and do so in the presence of Khamkar and others •. . The testimony of two independent witnesses and one clerk. however.· reveals a different story which fully corroborates the prosecution version . . . . .\n\nPW-3 who was in no way connected with the police .and.was drawn from the zila parishad where he was working 11s a stati.stical officer had no axe to grind against the respondent so as to give false e.vidence to implicate him, As. previously. arranged,· Rant, PW 3, witnessed the entire inCident from a distance of a few feet as he was . sta.nding very near to the place where the van was parked. This witness fully supports the prosecution case and states that Rege took out the wad of notes from his . pocket and the accused took those\n\n>··\n\n' . ; )\n\nMAllARASllTRA v. N.G. Pl!APtiE (Fazal Ali, J.) 63i . ' notes in his righlihand and put them in his.right hand side pqcket of his pant. Immediately thereafter Rege made the· settled signal by tl!king out his spectacles and trying to wipe the saine. On seeing. this signal Khamkar and other members of the party a, rrived there.\n\nKbamkar then . disclosed his identity as an . Inspector of the. Anti Corruption Branch and a panchnama (Ex.51) was immediately. made ..\n\nWe have gone through .his entire cross-examination and we are . unable to find any material discrepancy to 'discredit bis evidence.\n\nThe only circumstance which seenis to have been taken against him\n\nis that about two years before the_ occurrence he was an accused ina maramari case which was ultimately compromised. Merely on this account he could not be \"held to be. an unreliable or ii.competent witness.\n\nShorn of minor contradictions or omissons, the evidence of this witness appears to contain a tinge.· of truth. Even PW-7, K.A.\n\nPatil, of the octoroi Department who was present _in the room, has testified that the aceused had taken out the notes from his\n\n0 pocket and then tried to throw them dowti, In this connection his statement may be extracted thus : . ·\n\n\"It also happen that accused took out the currency .. notes from bis right side P.ant pocket and threw it down.\n\nIt is not true that I made the first. statement on account of pressure from the accused.\"\n\n\" It is true that the statement was made after the public prosecutor was permitted to cross-examine the witness although he was not declared _hostile but that does not in apy way belie or weaken his evidence.\n\nHe was present at the Naka where the money was paid . and was, therefore, fully competent to depose to what he.had actually seen. There is nothing to show from his cross-examination that he made no such statement in the earlier stages of investigation when ke was examined by the Invesiigating Officer.\n\nApart from this there is the evidence of PW IJ, M.S. Khamkar an Inspector of police in the. Anti-corruption Department. Ther; . is no evidence to show that he bore. any animus against the respodent.\n\nHe was_subjected to a very searching cross-examination _but nothing. of any vital importance seems tO have be.en elicited from him so as to throw doubt n bis testimony .. In the sessions court some\n\nInsinuations were made in the course of cross-examination but in. · the High Court and before this (; burt learned defence counsel expressly abandoned the insinuations.\n\n• ..\n\n632 SUPiU!Mil ·.COtiRT REPORTS t1984J 1 s.c.ll .\n\n T)l.e frontal attack 111, ade by th.e learned counsel for the respon dent against the prosecution was tliat all the members .of the raiding party were subjeted to the anthracine powder test in the glow .0f the bulb.which must have taken about 10·15 minutes and yet e star witness, viz., the complainant, did not say anything about this <jemoµstrati6n which was held by PW II, Khamkar. That circums- tance even if it be true is not, lri our opinion, sufficient to throw the prosecution out of court,· So far as Rege is concerned. his test had alfeady been taken earlier and therefore he was not intere.sted in a secpnd test which. was ta((en. to exclude (he possibility of inter pofation. llence, if he did not see or remember the demonstraiion at'\n\nthe Naka tl\\at by itself Will not be a circumstance to discredit his entire testimony particularly when it has been .corroborated by two independent witnesses; viz., PW 3, 11 and also by PW 7 ...\n\nThe High .court seems to have devoted a major part of its judgment to the various case• diaries produced before the court in . order to esfablish that the accused was not present af the polic~ station either on the 9th or on the 13th ofAp.ril 1972 when the firsi two demands wer~ made. According to the .fligh Court this gave a sufficient alibi to the respondent from, which it . could be safely. inferred that if he was not present at the police station, there• could be no.occasion for hirn to make any dell!and for bribe from the complainant. Assuming that the recitals in the said case diaries are.· admissible (though.we have serius doubts about it) yet it does.not .at all exclude the presence of the respondent .at ihe Ambarna(h police station on Hie 9th.and 13th because be was not sent away to a\n\nplacesituated far from Bombay but was in some either police station within a radius of a few miles only. Even if he was deputed to .. some other place he was in possession of a jeep and he could visit . the Ainbarnath police .station for a few minutes on any of these dates. It is )Veil .settled that a . plea of alibi. m.ust be. proved with .. absolute. certainty so as to completely. exciude the possibility of the presence of the person concerned at the place of occurrence. Such; however, iS not the case here. Therefore, the .discussion of the case diaries, which engaged a substantial portion of the High Court judgment was really an exercise in futility.\n\n This bri.ngs us to certai~ ·.circumstances, evidence and reasons relied on by the High Court to reject' the prosecution case and reverse the order of conviction pass¢ by the tfial court. ·\n\n~.\n\n. '\n\n. ,';----p ;) .\n\n. . MAHAll.ASHtRA \\>. N.G. PIMPLE (Pazal Ali, J.) 693 . . .\n\nBefore approaching this problem, een at the risk of repetition, we might give a brief resume of the interesting drama starting from t\\le demand of illegal gratification by the accused and endin& with the passing of money and his subsequent arrest. The prosecution case is that Rege had filed a complaint\" against his: tenant, Walawalkar, and the same was prima facie .found to befalse because on a search of Walawalkar'.s house no trace of distillary was found.\n\nAccording to the prosecution, this furnished the ilil.f\\lediate. motive and the golden opportunity for the respondent.to demand money as•. illegal gratification from the complainant.\n\nWhile the investigation of the complaint was pending the respondent on .9.4:72 mada a demand of Rs. 2o00 from. Rege to shelve the case. This . demand was repeated.on 13.4.72 and ultimately the complaiant had agreed to pay him R:s. 2000. as bribe. Ii was settled that .the respondent was. ,10 receive the money at Ainbarirnth police station nearabout 7 .30 . p iii. on 14.4:72.\n\nBeing fed up with the persistent demands of the accused .and\n\n.I) the impending prosecution unders. 89 of the Prohibition. Act the complainant solicited the help of PW .11; Kbamkar and narrated rhe entire incident to him After hearing tile story of the complainant, Khamkar rang up Desbmukh, DSP, Anti corruption Branch., Bombay, . but as he was out he himself recorded the complaint of Rege. which E is Ex. 44 and sent a letter to District llealth Officer to depute two . persons from his office for the purpose of actfo.g as paiiches. Kham- . kar then. prepared an app.lication, addressed it to :the concerned\n\nauthorities for obtaining sanction to . investi.gate the matter .. 'file .. sanction was accorded after the Magistrate ha<I interrogated Rege,\n\nPW .l l, Khamkar then returned to his office and found two .persons,\n\n.. F viz. Raut (PW3) and Karve, :who had been. sentto him from the Zila Parishad office .. He introduced Rege to the panches and asked him to narrate his story which he. did.· Thereafter search of Rege\n\nwas taken in the presence ofthe panches and. besides' many othe.r articles; which are not . necessary .to be detailed, a sum of Rs. 2000 G was found from the prson .of Rege and the numbers of the notes were noted in the panchnama.\n\nPW l l then handed over . th~ notes .to constable Wagti an\"d directed him to hold demonstration as to how those notes would appear in the. usual light.· and in ultrviolet . lamp light after ihe notes are treated with anthracin•; powder. . The H constable performed .the said process and thereafter Rege was directed to 'put those notes in the left pocket of his pant. . The bottle containing the anthracitie powder was then sealed in order to obliterate\n\nStJPl\\EMil COURT REPORTS\n\n(1984) 1 S.c:i.:\n\nthe traces of the said powder. PW I I as also . the panch witnesses were then subjected _to the same process before proceeding to .the Ambarnath octroi Naka near the poiice station to which the accused was attac\\led as sub-inspector. It was also settled that while Ra.ut . wimld constantly remain with Rege to witness the talk and the\n\npassing of the money, the complainant would take out his spectacles and make a show'to wipe out his glasses which would. amount to a signal , for the raiding .party that .the money had been accepted by the acicused and they may at once reach the spot.. The panchnama con- tairiing all these facts was completed and signed by the . panches and cduntersigncd by the .witnesses. This seems to be the fi, rst and the preparatory stage to lay the trap.\n\nThe rai_ding party was directed to take a train bound foi Ambarnath and _get down there at about 6.35 p.m becanse the complainant had informed Khanikar that the accused was .not likely to. come to 'the police station before 7.00 p.m. The second stage. consists of the arrival' of the ra.iding party near the said police station and.waiting there upto 7.00 p.m: At that time Rege a'lld Rauf proceeded towards Tilak Road and after passing through the railway crossing kept waiting at'a convenient place at a distance of 40•50 ft. from the gate. PW 11, Khamkar and other members of the raiding party waited at the inner side . of the railway corner gate near\n\nthe railway track. -PW ! I further directed two constables of the raiding party to wait near the Canara restaurat which was just in front of the octroi Naka towards _the east.\n\n\" • The third stage starts with the arrival of. the police van from the side of Wimco Road, carryi'ng the accused, which halted near the octroi Naka al about 8.40 p.m. There were no constables inthe van and the only occupants appeared to be the accused himSelf anil the driver of ihe van. After getting down from the van the accused came to the 1\\ aka and sat on the chair in the padavi (veralldah). ·\n\nG . . The last stage_ of th~ show staffs when Rege and , Raut, who was introducedto the accused as one of his relations, approached • the accused who asked them to sit on the two stools on. the right side of the cbair occupied by the. accused. He funher requested\n\n).I_ Raut to find out the whereabouts of the driver of the van;. obviously H because he did not want that Rant should hear any talk between . Rege and himself.· Raut thereafter went towards the van but stood i . in. an angular fashion towards the accused and Rege so that he •\n\n• ).\n\n- - ., J\n\nMAHARASHTRA v. N.G. PIMPLE;(Faza/ All.' J.) , l)3:5 . could see what was happening there.\n\nThe accused inade a gesture by putting his right palm and twisting his finger, indicating thereby that he was demanding the money.· Thereupon Rege took outtbe currency.notes from the left pocket of bis pan( and .gave them to the accused, who after taking-the amount inserted lhe same in the fight side pocket of bis pant. Immediately thereafter. ege gave. the prearranged signal by taking .out bis spectacles ahd wiping the same with his handkerchief. On seeing tbe'signal, PW II, pancbes and. other members of the r'!iding party rushed to the verandah of the Municipal octroi Naka where PW 11 disclosed bis identity at which the accused rose up from. the chair and wanted to move about but be was caught hold of bis wrist. PW fl then informed him that. since be bad-accepted the bribe from Rege be wanted .to test bis hnds and clothes to ascertain whether traces of anthracine powder were there or not. Meanwhile he asked Rege to wait aside who went at the corner of the padavi. We might state here .that a mountain of a mole hill appears to have been made by the learned, High Court Judge of the factum of Rege being sent out to the padavi instead of remaining there or .in the room where the accused was taken. There- . after, the band and clothes of the accused were put in the light of the ultraviolet lamp which revealed traces of' anthracine powder on the handkerchief, the palm of bis hands, on . the right side of his pant and a portion of the busbcoat overlapplngon the right side of his pant. PW 11 then asked the accused' to produce -the money which he bad just accepted as bribe.\n\nAt the request of th~ accused -he was taken to the room of.the Naka where lie agreed to produce the money. On eniering the room, however, the accused took .out the wad of notes from his.right pocket and threw 'them down on the ground.\n\nPW 11 state~ that.a Naka clerk was sitting in the room and be may b; lVe seen the throwing down of the notes .by. the accused.\n\nManifestly, the accused threw down the note_s in ordei to make .out a defence that the notes were forcibly foisted on him which be resi sted and in that process threw the notes on tbe . ground. without allowing the .ntes to enter bis pocket . and which also is his niain\n\ndefnce i_n this case. Thereafter, the usual formalities of preparation of pancbnama, etc., were co.mpleted. It may also be.· mentioned that the. accused was armed with one country made two-.barrel pistol as also a service pistol which were also recovered from him. Arter all this ba4 bappen., d, Rege was summoned and on his search all the articles which had been recovered during the day in the presence of PW _I l were recovered, except the notes of Rs. 2000 which had ben passed on to. the acoused. PW 11 then recorded bis complaint ad\n\n636 i1984i I s.c.R.. ·\n\nforwa:tded it to the Ambarnath police station. Statem.ents of PWs Ganguide, tlaut, Rege and Karve were recorded by PW 11 and a challan was pesented before the court aftet obtai.ning the necess.ary ·\n\nsanction.\n\nThis in. brief constituted.the various stages of the occurrence starting from the demand of bribe to the payment of the. same and . recovery r; om the. person of the respondent-accused. In order to . understand. the sum and substance of.the prosecution case the same Diay be divided into four parts. - II) the. origin and genesis, (2) the • · first demand made by ihe. respondent on the 9ih, (3) tbe second demand made by the accused on the 13th, and ( 4) the passing of t!te money and it~ acceptance . by the accused and the incidents followhig . • .\n\nWe have gone through the entjre evide!lce. led by the prose- ·. .cution and, in our opinion,· the prosecution case was fully proved because it has been supported by at.least two independent witnesses,. .. vi~.,.PWs 3 and 11 and to a great extent by PW 7.\n\nMr. llhisme, who was followed by Mr. Jethmalani addressed the. mairi arguments,.· tried to support the judgment. on .various grouds but we are unable to be convinced by any reason why the . evidence of PWs 3 and 11 should be discarded particularly when ·\n\nneither of these witnesses .ho.re any grudge or animus against the . respondent nor was any such suggestion made to any . of these •witnesses. In fact the learned Judge , of the High Court himself had . . clearly helci that PW. 7 was a throughly .in<!ependent. witness but commented that he was not made a witness to .the actual passing of the money though he bas-fully supported the subsequent incident . that the respondent took out the notes from his pocket and . threw\n\nthem on the ground which lends a colour. of truth to the evidence of PW 1 ai1d other members. of. the . raiding party. Certain minor contradictions or inconsistencies have been pointed oiit by the counselo .in the statements f. PWs rnd 3 but on close examinatiol1 they do not appear to be materil and, therefore, not sufficient to throw out the prosecution case. PWs. I and 3 have fully supported the prosecution case but Mr. Jethma1ani was unable to urge any cogent reason for noi accepting the evidence of PW i -even though it was fully corroborated by the direct evidence of PW 3 as also by the circumstantial evidence which consists of the various stages ftom which the prosecution case has emerged. ,.\n\n. ,\n\n', -\"\n\n'MAHARASHTRA' N.G; PIMPLE (Fazal Ali, J.) 637\n\nThiS now brings us to examine the important. circumstances &!ld evidence elied on by the learned High Court Judge t() disbeliev, e the prosecution version. . . . -\n\nThe learned Judge was greatly impressed by what he calls a serious lacuna in the prosecution case-that although both Rege and .\n\nKhamkar, alongwith the raiding party, came to the Municipal ociroi Naka the first thing which Khamkar did was to ask Rege to stancl . outside (padavi) where the raiding . party was also present. The High Court further held from the evidence of Rege it appears that after the raiding party came there Khalllkar caught hold.of the hands . of the acc'used and tookhiin inside the room. With due respect to\n\n. the learned Judge he has come to this finding on a complete ini, s-· ·\n\nreading of ihe evidence .of PWs I and 11 overlooking and ignoring 'the logical sequence of events' starting from the morning of ,14th' April up to' the time when the money passed, Both PWs I and 11 have categorically stated. regarding 'the morning incident. and the arrangemenis !l1>ide t~ raid the police station for Jaylng a trap to • catch.the accused while taking the money. It is notat all cle; idrom the .observations of the High Court whether he was referring to the morning incident or to the evening incident or to the last part of the incident when after the passing of the money Rege was asked by PW 11 to go aside and he stood in . the padavi. . The matter having been settled and pre-arranged in the morning, various parts were allotte.d to the members of the raiding party. Neither Khamkar nor Rege says that immediately the raiding party approached the Naka, he (Rege) was asked to go out and stand in the Padavi which would mean that .he did not pass the notes to the accused, a fact which would completely destroy the very object of raiding the 'police 'siation ..\n\n> .\n\n.The learned Judge overlooked that the raidil)g party had reached llear .the police station. long before' the arrival of the accused and .when the accu.sed ardved at 8.30 p.m. Khamkar did not go. to the\n\npadavi nor , did he ev.en show his face t\" the accused. In fact, as narrated above, Rege and Rant together met the accued to exchange some talks and Raul was asked to look for the driver of the van and,. after his departure the accused deinnded, the money which was paid to hiin by PW L It was thereafter thanhe sigrial .was given which brought Khamkar and liis party for the first time at the padavi. As Rege's part to pass on the notes to the accused had been accomplished; there was no point in his remainiOg in the padavi. At any rate, no useful purpose would have been served if Rege was asked to . be present there after . tJie incid.ent was 'over •. He was, however,\n\nA ..\n\n. SUPREME COURT RBPORTS . il9S4j i s.C.R • ' called wheri the demonstratfon was to be done and the search taken in the presence of the panch witnesses. Perhaps the High Court was un<ler the impression that Rege, Khamkar and oilier members of the raidi!lgparty arrived atthe.padavi as.soon an the accused had come there and PW 11. caught holdof tile hands of'the accused and took him into the room. These observations are based on a gross misreading of the evidence of PWs I and 11.. Even the incident of catching the hands of the accused took place after the money had passed and the notes had been put in his pocket by the accused: • According to the evidence of PW 11 It was at the instance of the accused himself who iri order io avoid disgrace requested him to take hill! (accused) inside the roo.m where he would hand over the money.\n\nThus, the whole argument of the learned Ju_dge is based Oil a pack of cards or on circumstances which never existed. .\n\nThe learned Judge also seems to have been under the impre ssioil that PW l was not subjected to the . ultraviolet lamp light test which in fact was done and here the Ju.dge again committed an error •. of record. .. .\n\nThe next circumstance relied oil by the High Court is ihat evn after examining the notes and clothes of the accused in the ultraviolet lamp light which took place in the padavi outs.ide .the room and\n\nwhich must have taken about 10-15 minutes; this was not seen by PW 7, the clerk who was sitting in the room. The High Court seems to suggest that PW 7 himself being a .Naka clerk and an independent witness should have been included as one . of the persons to watch . the demonstration which had taken 10·15 minutes. It is difficult to . believe that the demonstratiol) of a few persons who were merely exposed to the ultraviolet lamp light would take more than 5 minutes.\n\nEven so; the non-inclusion of PW 7 becomes wholly irrelevant when he himself makes a positive statment in the court that he did see the . accused taking out the notes from , his.pocei and throWing them on the grou11d and, therefore, substantially supports the prosecution version. • .. \\\n\nThereafter, on the basis of conclusions arrived at by the learned Judge in t~ 11foresa!d. manner, which are purely speculative, he .tries to give' a sort of a sermon as to what should or not have been done.\n\nIt seems that the High Court did not make any attempt to scan and . appreciate the intrinsic merits .of the evidence of PWs I and 3 as\n\nMAHARASHTRA v. N.G, PIMPLE (Fazal Ali, J.) 639\n\ncorroborated by PW 7, which by itself was sufficient to prove the prosecution case regarding the acceptance and recovery of money. In coming to this speculative finding the learned Judge completely ignored as to what had happened previous to the raid, viz., the circumstances, the manner and the numberof times which led the accused to. make consistent demands from PW I as also the conduct of the accused in trying to delay the submission of the cbargesheet despite repeated requests by PW 8 (Gangurde) to permit him to file the same .. We have dealt with this aspect of the matter in an earlier part of our judgment and we do not want to repeat the same.\n\n\\ It is interesting to note that the learned Judge himelf puts the question as to what was the reason for falsely implicating the accused when be had actually made the demands on the 9th and 13th • of April 1972, yet he readily accepts respondent's argument that this was because PW i was a person of diabolical character and undesirable credentials in whose trap the accused easily fell.\n\nIn accepting this argument the High Court failed to consider as to what motive could Rege have to falsely implicate the accused when he had not conducted the search nor was he directly counected with the charge-\n\nRheet which was' going to be filed against him. Indeed, the dominant question which the Court should have put to itself would have been as to why a complaint under s.89 of the Prohibition Act was not filed against Rege even though the chargeseet was ready. If this was due to any fault or lapse on the part of . Gangurde, who was a subordinate official of the accused, as an honest officer the accused. should have taken him' to task fo•trying to. dilly-dallying the matter instead of filing the chargesheet immediately.\n\nBut the evidence to Gangurde shows that he was ready to file the chargesheet but the accused directed him not to do so until the receipt of further instructions from him, as indicated by us earlier. That being the position, why did the accused ask Gangurde to delay the filing of the chargesheet? Thus question has neither been answered by the High Court nor by the accused.\n\nThe next circumsance relied on by the High Court was regarding the credibility of the evidence about the meeting on 9th and 13th between Rege and the accused. According to the prosecution the first time Rege was summoned by the accused was on the 9th and some police constable went to his house but as he was. not there he told Mrs, Rege that the complainant was required at the police\n\n640 SUPREME COURT RBPOR'rS (1984] 1 s.c.a.\n\nstation. On coming back home, the complainant along with Sukhtankar saw the accused at the police station at g, OO p.m. Although this . part of the case has been fully proved by P.W I, Rege and Sukhtankar\n\n(PW 6) but.their testimony has been disbelieved by the High.Court merely on the ground that tlie constable who had gone to call Rege was not identfied either by Mrs. Rege or by Sukhtankar. This is indeed a most extraordinary process of reasoning.\n\nObviously, both Mrs. Rege and Sukhtankar saw the constable for a split second and were only asked to convey the message to Rege on his returning home. It was extremely difficult in such circumstance either for Mrs.\n\nRege or Sukhtankar to have identified the constable. Nevertheless, the fact remains that PW 10, B.L. Jadhav, has testified on oath that. while he was on duty at the Naka on the 9th of April 1972, the accused came to the Naka at 5. JO p.m. and directed him to go to the • house of Rege and summon him to the police Station. Acco, dingly, he went to the house of Rege where he found Mrs. Rege to whom he conveyed the message and thereafter he informed the accused that his message has been conveyed to PW 1. Thus, the evidence of this constable who •appears to be an independent witness is fully corro\\l.orated by the evidence of PWs 1 and 6.\n\nNothing has been elucidated in his cross-examination to show as to why PW 10 should depose falsely on this important link of the case which is an intrinsic circumstance to prove that the demand was made on the 13th April when the accu.sed came to the Naka. The only suggestion made to this witness was that the accused bad sent an application to the Circle Inspector on April 20, 1972 against him, Kachela and Gangurde to the effoot that these three persons were in league with bootleggers. This suggestion puts the cat out of the bag bec.ausc what the learned Judge completely missed was that the application to the Circle Inspector was made by the accused six days after accepting the money from Rege, the trap was laid and a challan was about to be Submitted before the court. It is obvious that if any such belated report was made by the accused it was merely to create evidende in order to throw out the testimony of PW 10.\n\nIn these circumstances the only reasonable inference that can be drawn is that Rege and Sukhtankar met the accused on the 9th at 8. 30 p. m.\n\nPresuming that Rege was a person of diabolical .character, the learned Judge without any evidence refused to blieve the incident of the night in the absence of any legal warrant for the same, It seems\n\n.MAHARASHTRA v. N.G. PIMPLE (Fazal Ali, J.) 641\n\nto us that the approach made 'by the learned Judge towards the prosecution has not been independent but one with a tainted eye and an innate prejudice. It is ibanifest that if one wears a pair of pale glasses, everything which he sees would appear to him to be pale. In fact, the learned Judge appears to have been so much prejudiced against the proseccution that he magnified every minor detail or omission to falsify or throw even a shadow of doubt on the prosecution evidence: This is the very ante-.thesis of a correct judicial a_pproach to the evidence of witnesses in a trap case. Indeed, if such a harsh touchstone is prescribed to prove a case it will be difficult for the pro.secution to establish any case at all.\n\nDuring the course Of discussion of the reasons given by the learned Judge we shall endeavour to show that the advcerse inferences against the prosecution with respect to small matters could have been easily ignored as they did not affect the credibility of the prosecution case. The glaring instances of such a wrong approach is to be found in.the criticism levelled against the prosecution by the learned Judge that PW 11 asked Rege tc\" stand in the padavi and sought to convey the impression that Rege never came to the padavi in order to give the money to the accused or that the raiding party arrived just before the arrival Of the accused. This is far from the truth as we have shown above. We have already held that the stroy unfolded by PW 1 about the incident of the 14th April was a very short and simple one and after having completed his assignment whether PW 1 was asked to stand in the padavi or was not. called into the roon are matters of no consequnce whatsoever so far as the acceptance of money as bribe was concerned.\n\nJn fact, the High Court seems to have cased its reasons not on the evidence which was given. by PW 1 on oath but merely on suggestions . which were categorically denied by him from which no inference could be drawn at all.\n\nAnother serious comment to falsify the incident of raid and payment of money was that Rege did not see the throwing down of the notes.\n\nHere again, the High Court completely misdirected itself because from the evidence itself it is clear that Rege had said that the accused had a talk with him and he then paid currency notes of Rs. 2000 to him ·(accused) which he inserted in his pant pocket, made a signal which brought the raiding party at the verandah and thereafter he went to the padavi. Whethet be Witnessed the s\\lbsequent throwing. down 9f the n9tes 9r !lot was\n\n• 642\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984) l S, C.!I.\n\ntotally irrelevant because as we hav~ shown above this incident took place after the accused was taken by Khamkar inside the room as desired by him (accused).\n\nAnother infirmity pointed out iu the protsecution was that PW 3 (Raut) was asked to stand near the van by the accused .instead of going to the padavi with the raiding party, It is ob'vious from the evidence of PW 11 that the previous arranaement was that PW 3 should also be present when the money was to be paid to the accused so that he may be a witness to the passing of the notes. In view, however, of the direction given by the accused to Raut to find out the driver of the van it was only natural that the previous arrange-· ment would have to undergo some change lest the accused may become cautious and suspicious which would have led to the failure of the trap. Therefore, PW 3 had to obey the order of the accused but he did it in a very adroit manner so that while standing near the van be selected a place from where he could see the accused and the passing of the money, to which he has clearly_ deposed. After the money had passed he returned to the padavi because bis purpose for leaving the padavi had been served. ·\n\nSome comment bas also been made by the High Court that the place from which PW 3, while standing near the van, witnessed the passing of the potes was so distant that he could not have witnessed the passing of the money. This is also a pure conjecture because PW 3 .has clearly explained that he was at a very short distance and not at 90 ft. as the learned Judge seems to think, and in that position he could easily see the passing of the money. No suggestion appears to have been made to PW 3 that be was standing at a place from which the accused was not visible or that he would not have been in a position to see the passing of the money.\n\nAnother disturbing feature of the High Court judgment is the adverse comments made 011 the evidence of PW 8 (Gangurde). To disbelieve this witness the High Court has readily accepted certain facts which could not possibly be true or even if true were wholly irrelevant and were made only for castigating a truthful and an honest officer. PW 8 was a bead constable who, on the complaint of Rege, was entrusted with the charge of conducting a search in the house of Walawalkar. There is no reliable evidence-to show that he was in any way friendly to or connected \"with the complainant.\n\nIf this was so, he could not have .conducted the scarab as he did.\n\n.. -\n\nMAHARASHTRA v. N.ci. PIMPLE (Fazal Ali, J.) 643\n\nThe High Court seems to disbelieve this witness only on the ground\n\nthat he states in his evidence that when he went to the house of Walawalkar the accused was not there although his name finds place in the panchnama. The panchnama is hurridely prepared and a number of names may find mention. He may not have recollected whether some of the persons mentioned were there or not.\n\nIn the instant case, this was a non-issue and therefore could not be considered. F11rthermore; PW 8 does not appear to have shown any kind of favour to Rege but he himself reported that the allegation made by Rege was false and as a result of which Walawalkar filed a complaint (Ex.66) which was investigated by this very witness and ultimately he decided to file a chargesheet against Rege under s.89 of the Prohibition Act. If he was in any way favourably inclined towards Rege he would have shelved the complaint of Walawalkar an:d submitted a final report saying that no prima facie case had been made out because Rege had not made a complaint in the real sense of the term but only expressed his suspicion. Therefore, there was no justification for the learned Judge to conclude that this witness was in any way in league with Rege.\n\nIn fact, what was really missed by the High Court was that PW 8 was extremely anxious to file chargesheet against Rege but it was the accused himself who directed him not to file the same and to keep the same pending till further instructions from him. If the accused, who was his superior officer, had not given this instruction there does not appear to be any explanation why the chargesheet though ready on 11.4.72 was not filed at all. Ifthe'liccused was that honest or innocent he would have taken PW 8 to task for not filing the chargesheet after it was ready.\n\nThis speaks _volumes against the case of the respondent.\n\nThe learned Judge then.drew support from some insignificant and minor circumtances to discredit the evidence of PW 8.\n\nFor > instance, he observed that tltere were some irregularities or that PW\n\n8 was absent without taking any leave. These are pure routine matters which happen in every office but this would not falsify the evidence of PW 8.\n\nSo far as the question of remaining absent without leave is concerned. PW 8 has positively stacted that he had taken leave for being absent and no attempt was made by the accused to call for the attendance register to show that the witness had absented himself without taking any leave nor was any action taken by the higher authorities for this lapse on his part. We are really baffled and amazed to find that the learned Judge went.to the extent of castigating PW 8 on the basis 'of such frivolous and flippant\n\n644 sui>ilBMS couil'i' ilEPOilTS (J 984J l S.C.R.\n\nallegations merely because the witness had stated the truth in the court, viz., that the chargesheet was ready for submission but the accused had stayed its .submission.\n\n.....\n\nThese are the main reasons and circumstances given by the learned Judge in disbelieving the entire prosecution case which we have already found to be wholly unsustainable in law. We regret to observe that the learned Judge has rejected the vital e\".idence of\n\n,,..._.\\\n\n. PWs 1,3,8 and 11 on frivolous grounds and he did not make any attempt to discuss their evidence on intrinsic merits and the superficial manner in which he has dealt with the evidence and circumstances in order to demolish the prosecution case is wholly unacceptable to us and leaves much to be desired.\n\nMr. Jethmalani vehemently argued before us that the High Court having acquitted the accused, this Court should .very rarely interfere with the judgment of the High Court and should do so only in cases w\"here there is a grave error of law or serious miscarriage of justice and that too when the accused faced a trial for several years and had been reinstated and promoted as an Inspector.\n\nFrom the reasons that we have given it is manifest that the juqgment of the High Court suffers from serious and substantial errors of law and legal infirmities. This is one of those rarest of rare cases where this Court\" would be failing in its duty if it did not interfere with the order of acquittal and set aside the judgment of th~ High Court. On a full and complete discussion of the facts and circumstances of the case we are clearly of the opinion that , the charges against the respondent-accused have been clearly proved and his acquittal by the High Court was wrong both on law and on facts. Once this is so, the other consideration mentioned by Mr, Jethmalani would be no answer to mai11taining the acquittal of the respondent. It may be rather unfortunate but the law must take its ' course and th.e accused himself is to be blained for having commlited such a daring offence and with such llextetity that even an experienced Judge of the Hign Court could not see.through the skilful game of the accused. '\n\nIn view of the seriousness of the offence and the blatant mariner in which it was committed we find it difficult to make a substantial reduction in _the sentence and we are afraid, having found. the respo_ndent guilty of the offences charged against him, it is not\n\n'.>..\n\n)-Y\n\nMAHARASHTRA ' N.G. PIMPLE (Fazal Ali, J.). 645\n\npossible for us to show any leniency.\n\nHowever, in view of the facts and circumstances of the case and having regard to the fact that the respondent would have to lose his service we would sentence him to six months' rigorous imprisonment. The result is that the appeal is allowed and the respondent is .convicted under s.161, I.P.C. and . s.5 (I) (a) and 5 (2) of the Act and sentenced to si_x months R.l. under each count to run concurrently and a fine of Rs. 2,000 and in default of the payment of fine, further six weeks' R.I. The accused must now surrender and be taKen into custody to serve out the sentence imposed.\n\nH.S:K.\n\nAppeal allowed .", "total_entities": 102, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF MAHARASHTRA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5, "end_char": 25, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF MAHARASHTRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "NARSINGRAO GANGARAM PIMPLE", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27, "end_char": 53, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NARSINGRAO GANGARAM PIMPLE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "October 27, 1984", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 56, "end_char": 72, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "STATE OF MAHARASHTRA\n\nNARSINGRAO GANGARAM PIMPLE\n\n October 27, 1984\n\nPrevention of Corruption Act~S. 5(1) (a) and 5(2) and •· 161."}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 74, "end_char": 102, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "S. 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 103, "end_char": 110, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "statute": "Prevention of Corruption Act"}}, {"text": "s. 161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 505, "end_char": 511, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "statute": "Prevention of Corruption Act"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 523, "end_char": 540, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "SS. 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 557, "end_char": 565, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Rego", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 652, "end_char": 656, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".The prosecution case was that one Rego had filed a complaint D\n\n."}}, {"text": "Gangure", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 804, "end_char": 811, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a narch of Walawalker's house made by P.W .. 8 Gangure, a police officer subordinate."}}, {"text": "M.S. haCnkar", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 1375, "end_char": 1387, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rege out of despeation .. corit3.cted PW ll, M.S. haCnkar and.after narrating his story requested hirll to iay a trap in.order to catch the ccuscd, R.ege also gave 20 hun(fred-rupee notes to PW 11-which he proposed ·, to hand~ over to the accused-at the .. time of' the trap .. The raiding party."}}, {"text": "Khamkar", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 1954, "end_char": 1961, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter Khamkar, PW 11, went into the room and tried fo hold the hands of the rcspon 4ent who had inade an attempt tb take-out the nte~ from the right sidC pOcket, - of hii pant but desi>fte this tbe re!pondon~.succeeded in throwing out t\\le notes: As the moi:iey tlius passed'had, already' been treated With 8.ntbracbie powder, the\n.G handS and the fiSht side pocket of th~ Rccused were put before the ultra violet lamp and were found o bestaine'd wih-tbe said powder;\n\nThe trial court convicted and aentenced the respondent."}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2509, "end_char": 2537, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Rege", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4074, "end_char": 4078, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "644 E, FJ\n\n.The resporident took .ao ingeq.ious though improbable defence that Rege attempted to thrust the notes intO his pocket in .the prcsencC of Khamkar but he pvea push and.the notes fell ori the ground; thereby he tried to explain the stains of.the.anthracine pow_der on.- his hands."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5856, "end_char": 5862, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Assuming that.the'recitl.s .in.the said case diaries are adinissible (though there Is serious doubt about, it) yet it dOes not at all exclude the presence of the respondent at the Aoibarnaih police station_ on the 9th and 13th because iiC\" Was not ent away to a pla'ce situated far from Bombay but .was in some other police station within a radius of a few miles only."}}, {"text": "An1barnath police station", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6036, "end_char": 6061, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "some other place he was in possession of a jeCp and he could visit the An1barnath police station for a few minutes on any of th'ese da(es.·"}}, {"text": "s 3 and 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6731, "end_char": 6741, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Rege ind Khamkar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7454, "end_char": 7470, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Curt was greatIY iprCssed by what it Calls a seriOus lacuna .in the prosecution casethat although both Rege ind Khamkar, along with\"the\n\nraidii:ig party, came to the Municipal."}}, {"text": "Khamkar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7562, "end_char": 7569, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "octroi Naka the first thing which Khamkar ciid was to ask Rege to stand outside (padavi)\" where.", "canonical_name": "Kharnkar"}}, {"text": "Rege", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 7717, "end_char": 7721, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The lfigh coUrt further held thafitfrom the evidence of Rege it appears that after ihe raiing party came.there."}}, {"text": "Kharnkar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7773, "end_char": 7781, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kharnkar' caught hold, ofihe hands of the accused and took pim inside the r6orn.", "canonical_name": "Kharnkar"}}, {"text": "s. 89", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8956, "end_char": 8961, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "O.P. Rana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10726, "end_char": 10735, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "O.P. Rana, and M. N.Shrff, for the Appe1/oirt."}}, {"text": "M. N.Shrff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10741, "end_char": 10751, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "O.P. Rana, and M. N.Shrff, for the Appe1/oirt."}}, {"text": "S.B.Bhasme", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10775, "end_char": 10785, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.B.Bhasme,\n\n0 Rom Jethmolani, and V.N; Ganpule, for .the. ·"}}, {"text": "Rom Jethmolani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10790, "end_char": 10804, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.B.Bhasme,\n\n0 Rom Jethmolani, and V.N; Ganpule, for .the. ·"}}, {"text": "V.N; Ganpule", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10810, "end_char": 10822, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.B.Bhasme,\n\n0 Rom Jethmolani, and V.N; Ganpule, for .the. ·"}}, {"text": "s.161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11097, "end_char": 11102, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11138, "end_char": 11144, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11167, "end_char": 11195, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s.5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11479, "end_char": 11485, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jethmalani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11819, "end_char": 11829, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have heard Mr. Jethmalani, ·.counsel for 'the respondent-· accused and Mr. Rana for the appellant and .", "canonical_name": "Jethmalani"}}, {"text": "Rana", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11879, "end_char": 11883, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have heard Mr. Jethmalani, ·.counsel for 'the respondent-· accused and Mr. Rana for the appellant and ."}}, {"text": "Pandharinath Shivram Rege", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12417, "end_char": 12442, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "filed by Pandharinath Shivram Rege ·(hereinafter. :"}}, {"text": "Govind Shantaran Wal!Lwalkar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12501, "end_char": 12529, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Govind Shantaran Wal!Lwalkar (for short, to be referred to as 'Walawalkar') to the effect that."}}, {"text": "s.89", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12941, "end_char": 12945, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "M.S. Khamkar", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 14283, "end_char": 14295, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 demands of the respondent drove Rege into desperation which took him to PW 11, M.S. Khamkar, to whom he narrated his st<ify _and - ."}}, {"text": "Walawalkar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14917, "end_char": 14927, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.\n\ncharacter in rendering the step taken by the police against Walawalkar nugatory and stal.led any further action.", "canonical_name": "Wala.walkar who"}}, {"text": "Gangurde", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 15505, "end_char": 15513, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was false, how could it stop any action on the complainL which was being looked after and investigated by PW 8 Gangurde who categori- : cally states that he had prephred the chargesheet (Ex.66) on 11.(72 and sought permission from dte accused to take Rege to the court in order to present !"}}, {"text": "13.4. 72", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15974, "end_char": 15982, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\"On 13.4."}}, {"text": "Gangrude", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16314, "end_char": 16322, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• It maythus be noticed that by the time Gangrude wanted to file the charge; heet the first demand for bribery had already been made on 9.4.72 and the second dcmad was yet .to be made on )3.4~72 which clearly shows that there was some \"method in the madness'.'", "canonical_name": "Gangrude"}}, {"text": "9.4.72", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16409, "end_char": 16415, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• It maythus be noticed that by the time Gangrude wanted to file the charge; heet the first demand for bribery had already been made on 9.4.72 and the second dcmad was yet .to be made on )3.4~72 which clearly shows that there was some \"method in the madness'.'"}}, {"text": "Ji\n\nhi~", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16668, "end_char": 16675, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "further instruction from Ji\n\nhi~ or there .was some hidden."}}, {"text": "MAHARASHTRA V", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17360, "end_char": 17373, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MAHARASHTRA V, N.G. P1MrLE (Faia/A/i, J.) ."}}, {"text": "Wala.walkar who", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18525, "end_char": 18540, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thi<· inference is fully fortified, reinforced and rendered ve; y probable by the subsequent conduct of Wala.walkar who knowing full well that the complaint filed against him by Rege was false and baseless which seriously and adversely harmed his reputation and the police contemplated to take action .under section 89 of the Prohibition Act at his instqnce agains(Rege,\n\nhe kept quiet and made no aitempt.whatsoever to pursue his complaint or take proceeding nnder section 182 I.P.C. or for that matter file a snit for malicious prosecution: against Rege.", "canonical_name": "Wala.walkar who"}}, {"text": "section 89", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18729, "end_char": 18739, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 182", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18887, "end_char": 18898, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18899, "end_char": 18904, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "4.4.72", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21168, "end_char": 21174, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 4.4.72 Rege was sent for and in pursuance of the call from the police station )le'reached'there by about 8;30 a, in."}}, {"text": "Gangurde", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21291, "end_char": 21299, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "where Gangurde was present but the accused was not there.", "canonical_name": "Gangrude"}}, {"text": "V.'B. Sardar", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 21624, "end_char": 21636, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V.'B. Sardar, to."}}, {"text": "Sardar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21714, "end_char": 21720, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before Dr. Sardar . . ' ."}}, {"text": "Walawalkarwho", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21890, "end_char": 21903, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "came to the police station,.the accused, who had reached the police station by that time, impressed upon Rege that .since he had given a false complaint against Walawalkarwho was a. respectable man, a case had been registered against him.", "canonical_name": "Wala.walkar who"}}, {"text": "25.3.72", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22509, "end_char": 22516, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "had made a search of Walawalkar's house on 25.3.72 and recorded his statement on 28.3.72 on which date a case was regist.cred."}}, {"text": "28.3.72", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22547, "end_char": 22554, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "had made a search of Walawalkar's house on 25.3.72 and recorded his statement on 28.3.72 on which date a case was regist.cred."}}, {"text": "Fazal All", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22841, "end_char": 22850, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PiMPLE (Fazal All, J.) 629 ·.", "canonical_name": "Fazal All"}}, {"text": "1.1.4. 72", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22986, "end_char": 22995, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gangurde states that the charge sheet was prepared on 1.1.4."}}, {"text": "Rani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24972, "end_char": 24976, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jn fact, one of the fundamental argumentsthat have been\n\nadva11ced before us by Mr. Rani, counsel for the State, is that there Gis no.real_ and .Illeaninegful discussion of the impoitant evidence produced by the prosecution in support of its."}}, {"text": "13.4.72", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25570, "end_char": 25577, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "72 and repeated on\n\n 13.4.72, Rege was directed to see the respondent ilearabout the police station at a place -called padavi."}}, {"text": "Rant", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 27879, "end_char": 27883, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "arranged,· Rant, PW 3, witnessed the entire inCident from a distance of a few feet as he was ."}}, {"text": "Kbamkar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28506, "end_char": 28513, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kbamkar then .", "canonical_name": "Kharnkar"}}, {"text": "K.A.\n\nPatil", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 29174, "end_char": 29185, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even PW-7, K.A.\n\nPatil, of the octoroi Department who was present _in the room, has testified that the aceused had taken out the notes from his\n\n0 pocket and then tried to throw them dowti, In this connection his statement may be extracted thus : . ·"}}, {"text": "13th ofAp.ril 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31934, "end_char": 31952, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "order to esfablish that the accused was not present af the polic~ station either on the 9th or on the 13th ofAp.ril 1972 when the firsi two demands wer~ made."}}, {"text": "Ainbarnath police .station", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 32718, "end_char": 32744, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Ainbarnath police .station for a few minutes on any of these dates."}}, {"text": "N.G. PIMPLE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33413, "end_char": 33424, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.G. PIMPLE (Pazal Ali, J.) 693 . . ."}}, {"text": "Pazal Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33426, "end_char": 33435, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.G. PIMPLE (Pazal Ali, J.) 693 . . .", "canonical_name": "Fazal All"}}, {"text": "Walawalkar'.s", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33860, "end_char": 33873, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The prosecution case is that Rege had filed a complaint\" against his: tenant, Walawalkar, and the same was prima facie .found to befalse because on a search of Walawalkar'.s house no trace of distillary was found.", "canonical_name": "Wala.walkar who"}}, {"text": "s. 2000", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34327, "end_char": 34334, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ainbarirnth police station", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 34412, "end_char": 34438, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "10 receive the money at Ainbarirnth police station nearabout 7 .30 ."}}, {"text": "14.4:72", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 34467, "end_char": 34474, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on 14.4:72."}}, {"text": "Kbamkar", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 34650, "end_char": 34657, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Act the complainant solicited the help of PW .11; Kbamkar and narrated rhe entire incident to him After hearing tile story of the complainant, Khamkar rang up Desbmukh, DSP, Anti corruption Branch.,"}}, {"text": "Desbmukh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 34759, "end_char": 34767, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Act the complainant solicited the help of PW .11; Kbamkar and narrated rhe entire incident to him After hearing tile story of the complainant, Khamkar rang up Desbmukh, DSP, Anti corruption Branch.,"}}, {"text": "Raut", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 35314, "end_char": 35318, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raut (PW3) and Karve, :who had been."}}, {"text": "Karve", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 35329, "end_char": 35334, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raut (PW3) and Karve, :who had been."}}, {"text": "Wagti", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 35789, "end_char": 35794, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "th~ notes .to constable Wagti an\"d directed him to hold demonstration as to how those notes would appear in the."}}, {"text": "Ambarnath", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 37081, "end_char": 37090, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The raiding party was directed to take a train bound foi Ambarnath and get down there at about 6.35 p.m becanse the complainant had informed Khanikar that the accused was .not likely to."}}, {"text": "Khanikar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 37166, "end_char": 37174, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The raiding party was directed to take a train bound foi Ambarnath and get down there at about 6.35 p.m becanse the complainant had informed Khanikar that the accused was .not likely to.", "canonical_name": "Kharnkar"}}, {"text": "Raut", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 38317, "end_char": 38321, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The last stage_ of th~ show staffs when Rege and , Raut, who was introducedto the accused as one of his relations, approached • the accused who asked them to sit on the two stools on."}}, {"text": "Ambarnath police station", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 41725, "end_char": 41749, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.. ·\n\nforwa:tded it to the Ambarnath police station."}}, {"text": "Ganguide", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 41770, "end_char": 41778, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Statem.ents of PWs Ganguide, tlaut, Rege and Karve were recorded by PW 11 and a challan was pesented before the court aftet obtai.ning the necess.ary ·\n\nsanction."}}, {"text": "tlaut", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 41780, "end_char": 41785, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Statem.ents of PWs Ganguide, tlaut, Rege and Karve were recorded by PW 11 and a challan was pesented before the court aftet obtai.ning the necess.ary ·\n\nsanction."}}, {"text": "Karve", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 41796, "end_char": 41801, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Statem.ents of PWs Ganguide, tlaut, Rege and Karve were recorded by PW 11 and a challan was pesented before the court aftet obtai.ning the necess.ary ·\n\nsanction."}}, {"text": "llhisme", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 42728, "end_char": 42735, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. llhisme, who was followed by Mr. Jethmalani addressed the."}}, {"text": "Jethma1ani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 43880, "end_char": 43890, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I and 3 have fully supported the prosecution case but Mr. Jethma1ani was unable to urge any cogent reason for noi accepting the evidence of PW i -even though it was fully corroborated by the direct evidence of PW 3 as also by the circumstantial evidence which consists of the various stages ftom which the prosecution case has emerged. ,.", "canonical_name": "Jethmalani"}}, {"text": "'MAHARASHTRA' N.G", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 44174, "end_char": 44191, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "', -\"\n\n'MAHARASHTRA' N.G; PIMPLE (Fazal Ali, J.) 637\n\nThiS now brings us to examine the important."}}, {"text": "Fazal Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 44201, "end_char": 44210, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "', -\"\n\n'MAHARASHTRA' N.G; PIMPLE (Fazal Ali, J.) 637\n\nThiS now brings us to examine the important.", "canonical_name": "Fazal All"}}, {"text": "Khalllkar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 44815, "end_char": 44824, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court further held from the evidence of Rege it appears that after the raiding party came there Khalllkar caught hold.of the hands ."}}, {"text": "Rant", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 46378, "end_char": 46382, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In fact, as narrated above, Rege and Rant together met the accued to exchange some talks and Raul was asked to look for the driver of the van and,."}}, {"text": "Raul", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 46434, "end_char": 46438, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In fact, as narrated above, Rege and Rant together met the accued to exchange some talks and Raul was asked to look for the driver of the van and,."}}, {"text": "9th and 13th • of April 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 50340, "end_char": 50368, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\\ It is interesting to note that the learned Judge himelf puts the question as to what was the reason for falsely implicating the accused when be had actually made the demands on the 9th and 13th • of April 1972, yet he readily accepts respondent's argument that this was because PW i was a person of diabolical character and undesirable credentials in whose trap the accused easily fell."}}, {"text": "s.89", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50924, "end_char": 50928, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sukhtankar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 52146, "end_char": 52156, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On coming back home, the complainant along with Sukhtankar saw the accused at the police station at g, OO p.m. Although this ."}}, {"text": "Sukhtankar", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 52283, "end_char": 52293, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "part of the case has been fully proved by P.W I, Rege and Sukhtankar\n\n(PW 6) but.their testimony has been disbelieved by the High."}}, {"text": "B.L. Jadhav", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 52855, "end_char": 52866, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nevertheless, the fact remains that PW 10, B.L. Jadhav, has testified on oath that."}}, {"text": "9th of April 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 52936, "end_char": 52953, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "while he was on duty at the Naka on the 9th of April 1972, the accused came to the Naka at 5."}}, {"text": "Kachela", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 53799, "end_char": 53806, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The only suggestion made to this witness was that the accused bad sent an application to the Circle Inspector on April 20, 1972 against him, Kachela and Gangurde to the effoot that these three persons were in league with bootleggers."}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984) l S, C.!I.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 57290, "end_char": 57329, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lot was\n\n• 642\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984) l S, C.!I.\n\ntotally irrelevant because as we hav~ shown above this incident took place after the accused was taken by Khamkar inside the room as desired by him (accused)."}}, {"text": "s.89", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60655, "end_char": 60659, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "11.4.72", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 61507, "end_char": 61514, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If the accused, who was his superior officer, had not given this instruction there does not appear to be any explanation why the chargesheet though ready on 11.4.72 was not filed at all."}}, {"text": "s.161", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65442, "end_char": 65447, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 65449, "end_char": 65454, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s.5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65462, "end_char": 65465, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_2_176_199_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "A 176\n\nKAILASH SONKAR\n\nV .. .\n\nSMT. MAYA DEVI\n\nDecember 16, 1983\n\n[S. MuRTAZA FAZAL Au, R.B. , MISRA AND M.P. THAK\"AR, JJ.J\n\nHindu la_w-Whether a Hindu on conversion to another religion loses the original caste.\n\nConvertee loses caste unless new religion accepts caste syste1n and pertnits conveTtee tO retain his original case and family laws.\n\nDuring conversion or}ginal caste remains u1ider eclipse_.:.Ec/iys€ Disappears on. reconversion' to original religion.\n\nOn reconversian to. old religion-Whether' the original caste revive~Factors which determine revfral of odginal caste .\n\n. Representation of the People Act-Person born of C!tristia1t parents-J!ducated and known as Christian-Reconverted to HiTidtiism voluntarily-Married a 1'zemher of scheduled caste-Performed shudhikaran ceremony-Accpted and welccilned by 1ne1n_bers of th\"at con1n1unity as schedided caste-Whether sµch person can contest state aSs~1nbly election as member 'o sched11led castefrom constituency reserved fof!inembers of scheduled castes.\n\nIn the nomi.nation papers fiJed by the respondent fOt contesting legislative\n\nssembly elections in May. 1980 .from a constituency which wa• resentd for. sche- ·\n\nduled castes, she descri.bed herself as belonging 'to the sCheduled caste 'Katia'.\n\nSeverai J?C\"rsons raised objection that the respondent, being a' Christian by birth, could not b6 treafed as a member Of the Scheduled caste. The Rsturning Officer rejected the objection <i.nd accepted her omillation papers. The respondent won the electi_on defeating the appellant. The appellant having unsucce\"ssfully challeng¢ the election Of the respondent in the High Court, aHeged in this appeai that the respondent after being bOrn a Christian \\Vas baptised according to .. Cb.ristian ri_tes; her mother's name was \"Eiizabetl\\; her rnarriµ.ge with Jai Prakash Shalwar, Who be1ongcd.to Katiacastc, wa<> not valid a_nd even on m.rrriage her caste could\n\nnot reviVe because ca, ste was determined not by marriage but by birth. The res- porident stated that she was never a- Christian nor was she bcirn a Christian. She .also averred that eVen her father or mother were not Christians. On the other hand, she alwaYs remained a member of the Katia _caste and was accepted as such by the members of that community because bet: .Qlarriage with Jlti Prakash Shalwar was perfoi'med acording to Hind~ rites of Aryasa.maj sect arrd waS attended by a n'umer of 1nembrs of her c.istc and due ubliCity was given to the. marriag; e.\n\n:nismissing the appeal,\n\nHELD : It Cannot be said that at ihe time when the respondent filed her nomi.nation papeFS, she was not a merpber of .the Kaia caste .. [199 OJ\n\n' A caste to which a Hindu belongs is essentially determined by birth and if a Hindu is convred to Chritianity or any other religion which does notrecogtlise\n\n• ...._ r !--. -\n\n(_ ,.\n\n_.,,\n\nKAILASH SONKAR v. , MAYA , DEVI . 177 • caste, the_ Conversion arnou.nts to a loss of the said caStc. Jn considering. whether . on conversion the loss .of the casle is absolutc,.irrevocable so as 'not to revive ndcr\n\nay circu~~.ie'nce .t?e guiding -princiPI_es_ r~ ·:\n\n(a) where a persO_n .be\\Onging to a scheduled caste in converted to Chnst1an1ty or. Islam, the same involves loss of the caste unless the religion to which he is converted is liberat e~1ough to permit the c:Onvertec t~ retain his caste or the family Jaws by 1, vhich he was originally governed. There are a numb.er of cases.where men1hcrs belonging to a particular caste having been converte'd. _tO Christiaity-.or even to Islam rct3.:ined _th_eir caste or family laws and .despite the new Order thy wer~ permitted to be governed by their old laws.\n\nBut this can happen only if the new religion is li.beral and tolerant enough to permft.such a course or action, nd (b) Jn all other _cases; COnversion _to Christianity or. Tslan1 Or any. othr religion Which docs not' accept the cas.te system and \"insist<; on re-linquishirig the ca<>te, -there is '.!- loss of caste on .. convcr. sion. [190C-F; 191 B]\n\nThe nopns and condil; ons undf'r which a caste could -re.vive on reconversion to the old religion as laid down bythe authorities of the High Courts and this Court .are; (1) where the .convertce exhibits by his 89tions and behaviour his\n\n0 cle<tr inten- tion of ajuring te ne\\V rligion on hi.S:.ow.n volition\\vithoutany persuasion and is not motivated by any benefit or gain, (2) where the community of the old .order to which the convertee originally belonged is gracious eilongh tp ad1nit hiin to. the original caste either ex:preSsly or by necessary intendiflent,.Und (3) Rules of the new Order in per_mitting the c.onvcrte, e to join tho llC\\.\\' caste. Unless the af6re: said conditions are fulfil!cd the loss of caste on 'conversion is complete.and nnot\n\nhe_ revived.\n\nBut _having rard to. the present setup and the circumstance.s pre- . vaiHng in ouf'-rri.odern society; it will be .difficult to insist on the second condition, viz., the ln-.istencc on the metnbers of the commuriity of the. caste to admit th_e convertee on reconversion.to the original. caste bC:cause such a course of actiQn may lead to dangerous co~seciuence.and. ill-coricieved .ex:pl.oitation.· [191 CG]\n\nG.M. Aru11wgr11n v. S. Ra}llgopa(& Ors., [1976] 3 S.C.R. 82; Sacred.Books of the \"\"East (VoL Vlfl) by F. Max Mu1!1:3r; Charlotte Abraha1n and Daniel Vincent\n\nAbralta1l1 v. Francis Abrahani, 9 rvt.t.A. 199: Chat11rbh11} Vitha(das Jasani v. Moreshwar Par{ishrrun &-Ors., [1954] S.C.R .. 817; S. A11ba/a/agn'v. B. Devarajan & : Ors., [1984] I.S.C.R. GOona Durgaprasada Rao &.Anr. i'. Goona Sudar:1anaswa111i. & Ors.; . ILR 1940 Madras 653; G. Michael v. S. Venkateswaran, 'AIR 1952 .Madras 47_4;\n\nDippala Suri Dora v. V. V. Giri AIR 1958 A.P. 724; Wilson Reade v. C.S. Booth&· Ors. AIR 1_958.Assani 128; and B. Shya1ns1111der v. Shankar Deo Vedalankar & Ors., AIR 1960 .. MySore, 27 t\\lferrcO to.\n\nS. Raj~1gopal v. C.M, An1111ga111 & Ors., [ l 969] J S.C:R. 254, distinguished.\n\nThe.\"1na, fn .tcSt for det.Crmi.ni1g th~ reviv.a-1 o.f th~ o; iginal aste on reconversion should be a genuine intention of the recOnvert to abj11rc his ricw religion' and con1pletely dissoCiate himsdf frotn it. ft n1:iy be added here that this' docs not 1nean that the reconversion should be only a ruse Or a prete'Xt or a cover to 'gain n1lH1d3ne woildly bnefits so that the TeconverSion bcco1ne.s n1erely a show for achieving a : pa:rticular Purpose Whereas the. real intention nlay be shfouded in mystery.\n\nTh6. reconvert n1ust'cxhibit a clear :nd genuine intention to go back tO hiS.old fold and adopt the ci.istoms andpractices of the said fold y.rithout any protest fi; on1 merhbers of his erst\\.\\_'hile ste. [ 192 C-El •\n\n\n•' .\n\nE ..\n\n17S\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS • [1984) 2 s.c.ll .\n\n When a child is born ·eithe~ has ])e an ' religion nor is he jJable of choOsing . . one _until he reaches the age of diScretion _and acqu!res j, foper understanding of t.he situation. Hence, the 1nere fact that the parents of a hild, who were Christians,\n\nwoul~ in ordinary course get _the_ usual baptisri1 certifiCate .and perform o_ther cere~ monies With9ut the child knowing what is being _done but after thC child has grown up an~ bec.omes. ft.illy 1!1a_ture.and abte io deeicte hiS future, he .ought.not tO_ be boUnd\n\ny wat his parents. n1ay hav~ done.\n\nTheefore, in SIJCh caSes, it is the irltention of t\\le convertee which would determine the revival of the -Caste. If by his clear and conclusive conduct the-person reconverts to his .old faith alld abjllres. the new -.. ..\n\n~ -relikio\"n in uneq!Jivoc~I terriis his cate automatically reviveS. [192_0.Jf; 193 A]\n\nAnothef dominant factor to -determine the fevivii.I of the caste of a con Vert from ChristianitY _to,.his old religion would be that in cases o\"f election to the State\n\nAssemblie~ or the Parliilmen\"t wher~ under the Presidential Ordef a particula'r constituency -is reserved for .a 111ember of the scheduled caste o~ tribe and the 'electo1:ate gives a majority verdict in his favou'r, then this woul. Pe dOubtless prOof\n\npositive of the fact thathis. community has accepted him back to his oldfold and this wOUld_result ina i-evival of the Original .caste to_ which. the- Sai.d. Candidate . belonged. [193 B-G] ·\n\nWhen a person is.converted to Christianity or son1~ other reiigion th!! origina) caste remains under eclipse' ahd as Sobn aS durrig hi_s/her lifetin1~. the persoh is reconverted tO the original religionthe cC1ipse 2lisapjJearS and the caste awtQn1atically revives .. [l,93 DJ ·\n\nWhether or not the revival of the caste dePends on the will\" and' discretiotj. of the melnbe.rs of the community of the caste is a qu*estion on which we refrain from gi°ving any; opirliOn beca\"use in the .instant case there is overwelmli1g vidence , Ji,: to shOw that the' respondent was accepted _by the co_mn1unity of her original Katia caste. Even so, if the.fact of the acce'ptance _. by the 1nembers of the c()n1rnunity is. • : mtidC condition precedent\"to the revival of -the caste, it \\vould lead :to grave. consequences and un1.1et:esSary exp!Oitation, 'son1etirnes n1otiva1ed by political . considerations. Of course, if.apartfronr the oral views of. the cn11nunity there is _any tecognised doCumcntary proof qf a custom or code of Condt:icr or rule of law binding On a particular caste, it may be necessary to_ insist on thC consent of the members of the co1nmunity otherwise in -notlnal cifcu1nstances the caStc \\Vould : \"rvivf: py ar)plying .. the principles o(dct.rine of eclipse.\n\nJt may be .added that 't'.\n\n. , vhere it appOars tat the person reconverted .to the. old religion had been convCrted ... to Christianity siilce several generations, it_ n1iy be difficult io apply_ the doCtrine.\n\nofclipscto tl~Cievivl of Case. (193 D~] ·\n\nIn the intat; J.t Case, on a full and comPlete appraisal of the oral and docwncntary evidence, :the following conclusions are inevitable.·: (I)- that the respondent \\Va~ born of Christian .parents and was educated in various schoolS or institutions \\Vhere she was known, asa Christian; (2) that 34 y{:ars before the election, the respondent was reConverted to- Hiildµ_sim v_oluntarily ahd married Jai. Prakash Shahvar, a_ member. of the Katia .c'a'ste, and also perfonned the shudhi . karan ceremony; .(3). that she was not only _accep'tedbuf-<'!.lso \\ve1comed by the\n\nimpo.tiant members, -including the-PreS.idellt nd. VicePresiden~, of the 'cpmmunify;\n\n(4) ·-there is no cvidCnce to show that there was any bar under the Christian religion\n\n\\vliich coUld ha-Ye prevented he~ fom recOn\\_'erting hersel~ to Hinduism; ahd (5) that .. . ,\n\nKAILASHSONKAR '\"MAYA DEVJ.(Faza/ Ali, J.) 119\n\n-there _., vas_no cvidCt1ce to sho\\~· that cvn her 'parent~ hqd bc;1 €h1'ltians from generation lo gcnc_ration.\n\nIn thcc circt.i1nslanccs, thercfo.rc; thiS ca5e fiilfils 'the cOnditlons .required for being reconverted to Hii1duiSn1 f ron1. chrisiianityln order to: revive the o'ri'ginal caste._' [198 G-ll; 199 A-D]_\n\nClvt.L Al>l; E~LATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 3118 0f 1981.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Oider dated th~ 25th September, 1981 of the .Madhya Pradesh High. Court in E!ectioff Petit; on No.· 2 of\n\n1980. .\n\n U.R .. La/it and A.K. Sanghi for the Appellant.\n\n. G.B. Pai and Vinet Kumar. for th.e Respondent.;\n\nThe Judgmenf of the Court was delivered by\n\n.. \"1.\n\nFAZAL ALI, J: By our Order dated October 20,.1983', .we had\n\nd.ismissed the appeal. we now proceed to give o11r reasons for the same.\n\nThe victory of our long <lrawn struggle l'or freedom from the . . British yJke came to us after one and a half century of perpetual\n\nand constant efforts soaked in cold blood and dipped in S)lprem'e sacrifice. The historical midnight of.August 15, 1947, which ushered\n\ni'n -a n')W era,' .\\vas merely a. _c.ompleti9n of a phasc and no:t the. end 'of an epJoh but only, the beg.ino.ing .of. the end.\n\nE \\- Scion thereafter the wise wizards and lhe f01.mding. fathers of C0nstitution: set out to '.devote their wholehearted atte;1tion' to\n\nour\n\nd)vis~. \\Vay; and ~ans to _give to Ollf stibcoritlncht a.so}id . and\n\ncJm:=ir.eh:!nivc Con?litution .Which ·.:t:nay .solvC Jnu_ltifarious and m1nifold dilfbulties, fulfil the burning needs of the nation and sort 'out c:Fnplex atld cJinplicatcd probleins \\vhich.arose after our hardw\n\nwon freedom which must have oaffied our leaders.\n\nThere was the qu,, tion of achieying a sec.uiar democracy, the largest ii1 the world;\n\nb.tse.i on a socia\\ist•paltern whichWou!d take care of all sorts and --kinds of. poplc having ~1iffernt cult~1his,· languages and rcli.gions; G to c':>:1T:!r and guarantee flln<la1nent'al rights of cit_izens tliro.ugh mand1tory prcwisions, to lay down directive principles ot\"State. Policy , which w.::te to b.:: the guiding Spirit of th~ Cl1nstitution, the question\n\nf achieving.ag.rarian refonns by. _displcing t~~ old British bureaucrafiC sy., tem and su\\3stitut!itg a new order, the isue 0f retoncilii1£. the :H irreConcifiablC and .variOus ohr thorny .and tricky lnatters. One\n\n• •.'\n\n!80 •\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984] 2_s.c.R.\n\nof the important objectives to be translated into action was to take special care of the backward classes, members of the .schcdulrd casks and tribes by bringing them. to the fore through pragfnatic reforms and providing adequate opportunities for thei.r amelioration and development, education, employment and the like .\n\nAs Mahatma Gandhi, father of the nation, said \"India lives in villages'' and so .do the backward classes,. hence the primary task -was to take constructive steps in order to boost up these classes .by giving them adequate concessions, opportunities, fadlities ard .representation in the serviCes and, last but net the least,. in the electo.-·\n\nrate so that their voices and vie,,; s, grievancesand needs. in the Parliament and State legislatures in .the country may be ·heard, felt and fulfilled.\n\nIn this election appeal which ha; bee~ filed against the Judgment dated October 2·5, 19 81 of the High Cort of Madhya Pradesh, we are really concerned with the last aspect mentioned al:iove. Despite odds and ends our Constiution has made exhaustive provisions for achieving these ends and how far. they have been implemented is difficult to say, for this is really a herculean task and one cannot expect miracles to be _performed within a span of three decades which in the history of ntions, is noi a very long pericd. The knotty and'\n\n~ I\n\ndifficult, puzzling and intricate issue with which we are faced is, to .'( put it shortlv, 'what happens if a member of.a scheduled caste or tribe\n\nleaves his persent\"fold (Hinduism) aqd rm braces Christianity or Ts lam . or any other religion'-does this amot\\_nt to a compkte \"loss of the -j original caste to which he belonged for ever and, if so, if he or his ' . ,. children choose to abjure the new religion and get reconverted to the old .religion after performing the necessary rites• and ceremonies, could . th.e original caste revive ? The serious question posed here -rarose ai\\d has formed the subject-matter of a large catena of decisions starting from the year 1861, travrsing a period of about a century ,\n\nand a half,_andculminating in a decision of this Co11rt in the case of . G.X( Arumugam v. S. Rajagopal -& _Ors: <ll . • .\n\n\"fhe Constitution has tried .to solve the problem to. a great extent by the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Ofder J 950 (hereinafter referred to as the '1950 Or,!er'} issued under Art. 341, which. fays -.<lowil a list of various castes prevailing in the ccuntry and the noims\n\nto determine the same. This Order has been amended from .time to\n\n(1)[1976] 3 SCR 82. •\n\n...,\n\n' •\n\nK:AILASH SONK:Ail. v. MAYA DEVI (Fazal Ali, J.) 181\n\n; . . time.. In our opinion, despite a genuine att€mpt to solve the problem the provisions do not provide a complete answer to the judicial .interpretation by this Court which lays dowll. the Jaw of the land .. It is true that the controversy has been narrowed d0wn to the minimum .. by the decision in Arumugan's case (supra) still there are some vital questions which remain unanswered.\n\nBefore dealing with the cases on the subject and starting the chapter of the issues involved in t\\lis case, it may be germane to give a short history of the nature, character, origin. and background of the. controversy. To begin with, the .caste system actually came into existence since the dawn of the ci.vilized races .in this country,\n\nviz.~ Dravidian followed by Aryan civilization which through Hinduism divided by castes.into three clearcut sub-divisions which started by virtue of the occupational pµrsuits followed by the various classes.\n\nThe priestsand the. scholars were known as the Bhrahmanas and looked after religious ceremonies, 'education, etc. This Class was supposed to be the highest .C1'1<is or atleast respected and regarded. as such.\n\nThen came the Kshatriyas who ere the people .engaged in fighting wars and ruling and administering the States. 'Thirdy, .. there were the Vaisa yas who carried on the occupation of trae and commerce. The Sudras were added as the fourth Class after fusion of the pre-Dravidian with. the Dravidian and Aryan. civilizations whichformed the basic\n\n0 fabric of Hinduism and the Hindu societ) ..\n\nThis Class wa_s treated as a little inferior and suffered from certain disabilities.\n\n• In fact, it seems to us that our large sub-continent was inhabited by a very large variety of peoples and races, indigenous and. olitsidersconsisting of Scythians, Yavanas, Kirathas, Kambhojas and Persians and others who. came to. India in ancient times and got mixed. up with . the old inhabitants of the. country and thus completely lost their .identity. It appears to us that all these races entered the wide and\n\nbroad fold of Hindusim, whkh is not only a religion but also a way or _poetry of life. a philosophy, an exhaustive and ethical code of i; v; ng which adapts itself to all forms and cultures. In view of this complex intermingling of various , kinds of people, as time wel)t by,\n\ncastes started multiplying, and in this process the avocations and occupations foflowed by members of such .castes from generation to generation were .labelled as a separate class to which the people practising various professions belonged and this institution had come to stay. The. origin, therefore of the fundamental basis of the castes . has now disappeared and given rise. lo individualism and spara ,.\n\n182 SUPREME COUR.T RrPORTS [1984] 2 s.c.R.\n\ntism .as a result of which it was duly recognised by all schools of Hindu thoughr. that birth alone would determine the caste and this . principle wuld have to continue wiles\"s the co.ricept of caste is banished for ever. In other \\VOrds, it is. l10w well settled-whether one accepts it or not-that caste is the result of birt.h and not of choice or volition . . .Without traversing. on any controversial i.ssue aild: coming back to .. the origin or'the caste system, we would like to refer to .\\he, most authoritative pronouncements ordained. bY Lord Krishna in Shree Bhagvadgita which would. demonstrate that tlie divis.ion of castes was riiade • purely on the basis of inherent qualities and aocations' . -of a person and hence the question of' superiority b.etween one or . tl; e other. lay not \"on te na(ure of the caste but on their act.ions and deeds .. This would be illustrated by a. refere.nce to the actual text of Sh:ri .Bhagvadgita as compiled . by F. Max MuUer in. his book entitled 'Sacred Books of the East (Vol' vmr and. we would like to extract . some passages and. injunctions of .Lord Krishna illusfrating the vices and virtues ofmen where castes also figure .. In .Shloka 13, Chapter 4 of Bhgvadri Geeta, Loh:! Krishiia clearly proclaimed that -\"Four Varnas, viz., lirahmanas,.Kshtriyas, Vaisyas and Sudras were created by him on the basis of inllerent qualities and avo.cati~J\\S of a particular indivi<iual''. (Translated into English from the original . text in Hindi).'. . . .\n\n. . . ·. . Further said Lord Krishna to the son of Kunti thus-: . . '\n\n.\"Whatever yo ti do, O'Son' of KuHti .: Whtever . you cat, . whatever sacrifies you make, whatever you give, whatever.-\n\npenance you, do that. as offered. to me , .. l ani alike to all beings; to .me none is hateful, norie di'ar, But those who w.orship .me. with devotion (dwell) in me, and I too in them ..\n\nE, ven if a very ill-conducted man worships me, not wor- . shipping any one else; he must certainly be deemed to be good, for he has well resolved ....... (You may) affirm, 0 son of Kunti : that my devotee is never ruined. For, O son of .. Pritha .:. eventhose lVho areof sinful.birth, ll'Onien,· VaisyqS.: and Sudras likeivise, resortiltg to 111e, attain the supreme goal.\n\nWhat then (need be said of) holy Brahmanas and royaf saints wh.o. are (my) devotees?\".\n\nThese passages clearly go to confirm the true pl1iiosoph'y of Mahatma Gandhi that the .Sudras or the meri1ben; of the scheduled\n\nH , castes are Harijans and h<lcondemrted untouchability ai; id the habit 'of looking down uf, on the scru; duled caste people merely because ..... . .\n\n. ·~\n\n. .\n\n. '\n\n. ) -\n\n-..\n\n- ~· -\n\n'~'\n\n....\n\nKAILASH SONKAR v. MAY!; DEVI (Faza/, j/i, i.) 183\n\ntliey belonged to .the Sudra. caste. Further, Lord Kri, l111a goes on to ordain as follows : ·\n\n \"The 'duties of Brahmanas, Kshatriyas .and Vaisyas, and of.\n\nSudras, too, 0 terror of your foes ! are-distinguished according to the qualities b()rn of nature. Tranquility, iestraiHl of'the sens.es., penance, purity, forgiveness, s!lrai.ght forward'- ness, .. also knowledge,. experience, and belief (in a future world), this is the natural duty of Brahmarias. Valom, glory,· courage, dexterity,. not a slinking away from battle gifts,· exercise of lord!~ power, this is the naturnl dufy of Kshatriyas .. Agriculture, , tending caitlc, trade, (this) is the natural. duty of Vaisyas. And the natural' duty of Sudras, too, coi1sists in service. (Ever¥) man intent on hi, s own respective duties obtain's perfection._ ... Worshipping; by (the performance of) his owri duty, him from whoin all . things proceed, and by who in all this is prmeated, a man obtains perfection.\" , ·\n\nIn another chapter, Vidura fs quoted as saying thµs :\n\n\"I arn born of a. Sudra womb; and do not like to saymore than what (! have said').· But _the intelligence of that youth,., I believe to be eternal. He who has come of a Brahmana womb, even though he may proclaim a great mystery; does .i10t thereby become Ha-ble to the.censure of the gods, Therefore do I say this to _you.\"\n\nIn view of the revealed injuncti_ons in the Shree Bhagavadgiia Mahatma Gandhi'& drea~ that .all distinctions of castes and creed must disappear and an mnsf be known by his action, to whatever , . .caste he may belong, has been realised to som, e extent and, , necessary\n\nprovisions io this effect have been made in the Constitution in order (O safeguard the interests of the backward classes. and members of the scheduled. castes and scheduled. tribes and perhaps, let us hope, a day comes. when the distinction. between caste and cree.d disappean;\n\ncompletely, ·\n\nOne of ihe most puzzling qu_estion that arises in this case is :\n\n'Is membership in a , caste or tib~ to , be determined solely by birth or by allegience or by the opinion of its members cir of the neighbourhood? Does one lose his caste on converSioft or by ex-Communicati'on ? . ' . . •\n\n. .\n\nG ..\n\nE •\n\n!84\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n\n :rhe decisions to which we would .refei hereaf.ter have thrown flood of Jight. on these questio;1s and the. generally accepted view seems to be the one \\vhich h&s been lai.d down in Charlotte'Abrahmit aiul Daniel Vincent Abraham v. Franci.1 Abraham\"' where the Privy Council observed thus :.\n\n\"li is plain that no rule as to. such use and enjoyment, which the ancetors may voluntarily have imposed on themselves,\n\ncould be of compulsory obligation on a descendant of theirs, acquiring his own wealth. If a Hindoo in an undivided family may keep his own sole acquisitions separate, as he undoubtedly may, 11 fortiori a Christian may do the same .. , .\n\nIf the spirit of an adopted religion improves those who become conyerts. to ii, 'lnd they reject, from conscience; customs to\n\nwhicl\\ their first converted ancestors adhered, must the abandoned usages be treated by a sort of fictio juris as still the enduring ciistoms of the family.\"\n\nSo far as this. Court is concerned., these questions were .clearly. an.swered in Chaturbhuj Vitha/das Jasani v .. Mores!n!'ar Parashram &\n\nOrs'., cii (herei_nafter referred to as 'Jasaniis, case'here a triple test was laid down thus :\n\n\"Looked a.t from the secular point of view, there ar~ tl; ree factors which have to be considerd :\n\n(I) the reactions of tile old body,\n\n(2) the intentions of the indiv.idllal himself aod. ·(3) the rules of the new order. If the old order is taler.ant of the new faith and sees no reason to. outcaste or ex-coi:nmuni' cate the convert and the individual' himself desires and intends to retain his old social and political ties, the con- . version is only .•110; l; nal for all practical purposes and when\n\nwe have to conside1 the legal and political rights of th~ old body the. views of the new faith hardly matter .... On •the other hand, if the convert has .shown by his conduct and dealings that his break from the old order is so complete and final that he no longer regards himself as a member . of the old body and rl•erc .is reconversion and readmittance to the old .fold, it would be wrong to hold that he can nevertheless claim 'temporal priv; Jeges and political advantai (I) 9 M. I. A. 199.\n\n(2) [1954] S.C.R. 817\n\n• •\n\n~··\n\n- ( .\n\n--- - ----. -\n\nKAILASH\n\n0 SONKAR v. MAYA. DEVI (Fazal Ali, J.) 185\n\n• I• .\n\nges which are special to the old order ... : ... Tlie only modi- A fication here is that itis not only h; s choice which must .tc taken into account. but also the views of the body whose religious tel)ets he has renounced, because here the right we are consitjedng is the rigl; t of the old body, the right conferred on it as a special privilege to send a member of its own fold to Parlhment.'' B\n\nThe obse.rvations cited above give the general test that can be applied in judging the question as to when a f!>ndu on conversion loses his c.aste.\n\nAlthough the .test laid down by this. case is fully supported by the original text of Hindu Law, it does not in so many words answer\"the other side of the picture, viz., if a Hindu after\n\n' C conversion to another religion is reconverted to his original fold, could his caste revive ? In fact, the case cited above was not a case of conversion from one religion to another religion or from one sect to another sect. By and large, the test laid down in that case can be usefully applied with alterations an\\! mocijfications .to suit the facts of a particular case in judging the. question whether on con-• n version the caste is completely lost.\n\nThe next case which throws. some Jighi on the question is S.\n\nRajagopal v. C.M. Armugam Ors.'\" In this case what ha.ct happened was that. the appellant (before othe Supreme Coui, t) had filed his nomination papers for a constituency reserved for members, of the E scheduled caste. mentioned under the 1950 Order but he was defeated by respondent No. I of that case, whose petition. succeeded.\n\nThe contention in the petition was that the appellant was not: a Hindu but a Christian and therefore not qualified to be a candidate for a constituency reserved for scheduled caste. The High Court found as a fact that the appellant had become a Christian in 1949 and his F later: reconversion to Hi11duisn1 ren; ained u.nprovcd. This Courts agreeing with the High Court dismissed the appeal. One important feature of this case may be noied which would at once di•tinguish this cae from the facts of the present case. The question as to . ·\n\nwhether a Chdstian on being reconverted to Hinduism would get back his caste did not arise at all in that case because on the facts G found, reconversion was not proved. Therefore, the question of caste being acquired or being revived on reconversion to Hindusim did not fall for detrmination and was left open. Even so, considering .Jasani's case and a number of other texts, Bhargava, J. made H\n\n(I) [19691 I S.C.R. 254 . ..\n\n186 SUPREM.E COURt REPORTS [1984] 2 s:c.R.\n\nthe following observations :\n\n\"Consider1ng the question of entry into the caste, .. Krishnaswami Ayyai1gar, J., held .. that, in matters affecting the. well-be.ing or composition of a caste, tl1e caste itself is the supreme judgec It was on this principle 'that a reconvert to Hiridusim could become a member of the caste, if the. caste itself .as th~ supreme judge accepted him as a full mem~ . ber of it.\" '\n\nWhile holding that if a person is reeonve1ted to Hinduism and\n\nth~· commu'nity of the caste to which he originally belonged accepts him, his caste would revive; nevertheless the question was left open.\n\nRajagopal's case (supra) merely reiterates what was held in Jasani':I case and does ·@t go .any further. . . . .\n\n . In .. our opinion: there is one ·spect which does not. appear to. have .been deal.I with 'by any of the cases. discussed. b)' us. Suppose, . . .. .\n\nA, a lliember of the scheduled caste, is converted to Christianity and marries a Christian girl and a dat1ghter is born.to .him who, according to the tenets of Christian religion, is b_apiised and educated. After she has attained the age of discretio1; she decides of'h!'r own volition to re-embrace. \\Jindusim, should in such a case rev.ival of the caste dpend on the views of the 1neniber.s o\\ the. com': munity of the caste concerned or would it automatically revive on her reconversion if the same is genuine and followed by the necessarri' rites and ceremonies ? In other words, is it not open for B (the . . dirnih.ter) to. say that because she was. born of Christian .parents their religion cannot be thrust on her when after attaining the age of discretion and gaining some knowledge .of the world affairs, she d<; cides to revert to -her old religion. It was not her fault that she\n\nwas horn of Christian parents and baptised.at a time when she was still a minor and knew nothing ab.out the religion, Therefore, should the rvival of the caste. depend on the whim or will of the members . of the community of her. original caste or. she would lose her caste\n\nfat .ever merely because fotunately or unfortunately 'she was· born\n\n. G in a Christian family ? With due respect, our confirmed opinion . . . . is that although the.views of the members of the coni.mnnity wuld •\n\n. be an important fac!Or, their views .should not be allowed to a com-·\n\nplete loss of the caste to which. B belo11gel Indeed, if too much stress is ulid on the views of the members 'of the community the same' ma): foad to dangerous ex plo; tation ... Perhaps, this factor was present in the . inind of Bhagwati, J., who delivered the leading judgment\n\nH .. •\n\n• -\n\n.~ . •\n\nKAILASH soNK:AR v. MAYA DEVI. (Fazal .Ali, J,) 187\n\nin a later. decision of this Ccirt ii> G.M. Arumugam v. S. Rajagopa' &\n\nOrs.<''. where, speaking for the Court, he made th~ following observations :\n\n;, it is sufficient to :state, that originally .there 1'cre only four inain castes; but gradually. castes and sub-castes niulti~ . plied as 1he social fabric expanded with ihe absorption of different groups of people belonoing' lo various cults and professing different religious faitls. The caste system in , its early. stages was quite efasti~ but in course of time it.gradua.Jly hardened into a rigid .framework based upon heredity ...... But that' immediate'iv reises the question;. what is . a caste. When we speak of a caste, we do not n1ean to refer.\n\nin this context to the four primary castes, but to the multi; :.plicity of castes and sub-castes which disfigure the Indi'an s.ocial scene ...... A caste is nwie a social combination than.· a eligious group.\n\nBut from that it does not necessarily follow as 'an inva-\n\nD ·. riable rule that whenever a pe1'scin renounces: Hindusini and embraces another religious faith, he automaticallyceases to be. a member of the caste in which he was born .and .to which he belonged. prior to his .. conversion ...... If the. struc- ture of the caste is 'such that its member must necessarily\n\nbelong to. Hindu religion, out .of the caste, because no 11011- . Windu. can be inth.e caste according to its rules and regula- • lions. Where, on the. other hand, haing regard to its\n\nstructme, as it has evolved over the years. a caste '. may C?nsist not only of perions professing Hindu religion but. ·\" also persons , professing some other religion as ,,; elt conver-. sion from Hinduism to 'that othe.r religion may not involve loss .of caste, because even persons , professing such other religion can be members of the caste ....... This i~ ifildeed ·\n\nnot an infrequent phc:aomenon 'in s,; uth India where; oin some of the castes, even after conversion tQ Christianity, a 'person is re garde~ as con(inuin~ to belong to . the caste.\n\n There are castes, particularly in South India, where , this consequence. does not folIO\\v Onconversion,· since stith castes comprise both Hindus and Christians._\n\n\n. ,\n\n)SS SUPREME COURT REPOR'rS (1984] 2<s.i:;.R.\n\nThese weighty observations.· support the view .. that after . . ' ' . reconversion the caste will normally.revive. On the question whether the caste will revive if the members of the: community accepts the reconvert, the. Judges are silent. Although Bhagwati, J. held that . . prima faci• on. conversion to Christianity the respondent would nor cease to pelong to the Adi Dravida caste, yet he refrained from expressing any final opinion on the point.\n\nIn a recent decision of this Court S. Ambalagan v. B. Devarajan & Ors.<U (which was also an election case), a three-Judge Bench reiterated the. principles enunciated by Arumugan's case (supra) and observed thus:. \"Unless the pactice of the caste. makes it necessary no expiatory rites need be performed and, ordinarily,. he regains his caste unless the community does not accept hinl ....\n\n. . . . The practice of caste however .irrational it may appear to our reason and however repugnant it may appear to ciur moral and social sense, is so deep-rooted in the Indian people that its niark does not seem to disapper .on conversion to a different. religion: If it disappears, it disappears only to reapfiear on reconversion . . _ ..... .\n\nIn fact, this piocess goes on continuously in India and generation by generatiqn lost sheep appear to return to the castefold and are once ngain assimilated in that fold.\n\nThis appears to be. particularly so in the case of members of. the Schedulc!d Castes, who embrace other religions in their • quest for liberation, buheturn to their old religion on finddini: th.at their disabilities have clung to them with geat\n\ntenacity,\n\n. (Emphasis ours)\n\nThe facts of .this case appears to be on all fours with the facts of the present ca•e. •\n\n A .number of Higlf Courts' have also takeri a .view similar t-0 .the one taken. i11 A.rumugam's case of 1976 (supra) basing. mainly\n\ntheir. decjsions on the leading case of Jasani. In the case :of Goona Durgapr\"s/Jda Rqo & Anr. v. Goo1ia Sudarsanaswaini & Ors./\" a Division Bench of the Madras High Court observed thus :.\n\n(1) (1984] 1 S .. C.R. (2). ItR 1940 Madras 653.\n\n• ...\n\n• •\n\nKAJLASll SONKAR l'. MAYA DEVI (foza/ Ali, J,) 189\n\n. \"It is hardly right. for the Court to erect a barrier which the auionomy of th> caste does n, ot see fit to do, simply because in some other caste or some other community It might be considered proper that ari expiatory ceremony should be performed. That a Hindu h, aving reno.unced Hinduism once can revert to it scarecely.admits of doubt.\n\n' A Similar view was expressed in G. Michael v. S. Venkat'e-·\n\n. _, swaran\"'. which may be extracted thus : ·\n\n.-\\\n\n\"A member of one of the castes or sub-castes when he is converted to Islam ceases to be a mem.ber of any c:aste.\n\nHe becomes jus~ a Mussalman find _his place iri Muslim society is .not determined by. the caste to which he belonged before his . conversion. Learned counsel also conceded that generally this is so even when th.ere has been a conversion · to Christianity. But he said that there were se.veral cases in which a member of one of ihe lower casls who has\n\nbeen converted to Christianity has continued not only to D consider himself as still being a member of the caste, but has also been considered so by other men1bers of the caste who had not been converted ...... But these are all cases of exception an~ the general rule is conversion operates as a11 expulsion from the caste; in other words, a convert ceases to have any caste: ~\n\n. Thus, it was clearly hinted that in some cases even converts to Christianity could retain their original caste. Jn the case of Dippala Suri D9ra v. V. V. (!iri'\" a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court made the following observations :\n\n\"Even if they come within the fold of Hiliduism, question would arise whether they have formed separate sect among themselves, or they would bdong to the 4th class, or to 'the twice-born class .. , ... Jn order to prove .that he ceased to be a member of that tribe, there should be. first of all,' evidence of intention, the reactions of the old body and that .. of the new body. Viewed in t)le light of these observations, the evidence discussed abovt, in our opinion, falls short of the test .. . • . . .\n\n(I) AIR J95i Madras 474.\n\n(2) AIR 1958 A.P. 724.\n\n...\n\ni90 ·\"' ..\n\n[1984]2 S.~.R.\n\nThis casC'Jnercly lays down the. tri.plc test enunciated in Jasa;1i's case.· To the same effect are the decisions in the cases of Wilson .\n\nRede ~: C.S. Booth & Ois., 11 ) and B. Shvainsunder v. Slwnkar 'Deo\n\n.· Vedalnkar: & Ors. tz) •. ..\n\nQa a careful consideration of the au; horities referr; d to above .\n\nB . ad the principles enuncialed by them, the position that emerges.\n\n ... fnay be stat>d t[urn : .'\n\nIt fa. true tl)at a caste to which a:Hindu. beloµgs is essentially . determind by birth and if [1 .Hindu is coverted to Christianity or . . any. other religion which does 110t recognise caste,. the conversion amounts 'to a loss of.the said •caste,\n\n, . Tl1~ question that arises for consideration is whc.ther the loss of ihe caste is absolute, irrevocable so as 119t torevive under any . cicumstafices? Tn _considering this qucstiOn the courts. have gGne\n\ninto the history. of.the caste system and have formulated the following guid.ing principles to .determine this question.:~· ' .\n\n(it) Where a person. belonging to a scheduledcastc is converted to Christianity or Islam, the same involves. IOss of the caste . . unless the religi~1i to which tie is converted. is ll'beral enough to permit theconvertee .to.retain his caste or the family laws by whic]l he was originally goveri\\ed. There are .. a number-of cases where members belonging to a paftiuclar caste havig been c<inverted to Christianity . or even to Islam retain their caste or fan; ily laws and despite the .. new 9ider they were permitted to be goVc.rned by their o.Jd Jaws.\n\n· Bt t1)is .can happen only if the new religion is liberal and tolerant enough to -pBrrriit suh a. course of action.\n\nWhere the .ne\"; religion, however does riofat alLaccept or believe in the caste .. system. t]; e less. of the caste: Would be fioal and complete. Jn ,; .large. area of South . and s0me of the }forth-Eastern States it is ,; ot urtusualto fir.d pers.ons\n\nconverted. 1 to Ctiristianity ; et\"inini their original caste \\v-ithot viola~· Ung the tel).6ts of the new. Order which is donC. as a 1naitc~ of commo1_1\n\npractie existing fro1n .times in11nemorial. .fn. slich a c3.tegory of\n\ncases~ it is ob.vj_ous that e; en_ if a person a~JureS hiS o)d rCligio~ anl is. con.vcrted_ to a ne\\v one,. there is no loss- 0f 1::aste.\n\nMoreover .. it --is a com:110n feature of n1a11)r c; onverts .to\" a ne\\v religion to belie\\1c\n\nor have faith in the Saints belonging to other religions. For instance, a number of Hindus have faitl1 in the Muslim Saints, Dargah5, 1niatn- . .. . ·. . .\n\n(J) AIIU958 Assam 12.8\n\n(2) A!R.1960 .Mysore 27.\n\n.. >-\n\n......\n\nKAILASH SONKAR v. MAYA ~EV! (Fazal Ali; .J.) 191\n\n~ . .\n\nbadas which becomes a part of iheir. lives and some Hindus even adopt muslim names after the .. Saints but this does not mean~ that thay have discarded the old Order and gotthemselves converted to m .\n\n(b) In all other cases, conversion to C]1ristia'nity .or Islam :\n\nor any other religion which does not .accept the caste system a.nd B insists on relinquishing ihe caste, there. is a 'loss of caste on convefL. sion. ·\n\n. The other. i1; portarit question which is to be answered and which is really the controversy in tlie present case is :if after a person . is converted to a new religion - in the irislant ease, Christianity - does hi; aste revive if he is reconverted to his old reiigion anci: if so, under what circumstances? . As indfoated above, starting from .the Privy. Cotincil io the present-day, authorities of the High Courts. and this Court have laid down certain norms and conditions under which a caste could revive. These conditions are as follows :-\n\n(1) where. the convcrtee exhibits by his actions and behaviour . .. his clear intention of abjuring the new religion on his . .own volition without any persuasion _and-. is not_ motjVated\n\nb)' any benefit or gain, ·\n\n' (2) • whe.re tiic comuniiy of the old order to which the con-\n\n. vertee 0riginally belongeil is gracious enough to .admit him to the miginal caste. either expresS\"ly or' bf necessary intendment, and ·\n\n (3) Rules of the ne\\v. Order in permitting the convertee to join the new caste.\n\nUnless. the aforesaid conditions are fulfilled to the loss of caste on conversion is. complete .and cannot be revived. In .our opinion, having regard to the present set,, ip and. the circumstances prevailing in our modern society; it will be difficult to insist' on the second condition, vi.z., the insistence on .the members of the co.mmunity of the caste to admit the co.nvertee on reconversion to the original faith because such a course of actio~ may lead to dagerous consequences and fll-conceived exploitatfon. The curse and cancer of untauchability despite thirty years of social reforms still persist and no quarter should be given to.further persecution\"of the. members -0f the sched).lled castes who, as. w~ ofteµ find, are subjected to all kinds of indignities,\n\n: '\n\n192 slJPREM.E COURT REPORTS • [1984] 2 s.c.il.\n\ninsuhs and arj lookeJ do\\vn ~1pon as lavc; s or vassals, mcai; t n1erly to serve the members :of the higher caste.\n\nJn' the case of Ganpa t v.\n\nReturniiig Officer & Ois. '1) this Court speaking through Alagiriswami, J. highlighted this particular aspect in the following words.;\n\n'.'The monstro.us curse of untouchability has. got to be eradicated. It has got to. be eradicated .not merely by making constitutional. provisions or laws but also by .eradicating it from the minds and hearts of men. For that it is even more in1portant that 111e1nbers of comffiuniies who ·.are untouchable• shoµld assert their self-respect an.d fight for . their dignity than that. members of the other communities should forget about it.\n\n1n our opinion, the tTiain test shoul.d be a genuine intention of the reconvert to abjure his new re1igion and completely dissociate himself from it.\n\nWe must hasten to' add here that this does not mean that the reconversion should be 011\\y a ruse or a pretext or oover to gain 'mundane worldly benefits' so that the reconversion becomes merely a show for achieving a particular vurpose whereas the real intention may be shrouded in mystery,. The reconvert must exhibit a clear and genuine inteillion to go back to his old fold med adopt the custms and practice; o( the said fold without any 'protest from . members of his erstwhil~ caste. Jn order to judge this factor, it is not necessary that there should be a direct or conclusive proof of 'the expression, of the. vie\"\\VS of the con1munlty' \"Of thC erst\\vhilc Caste and it would be sufficient compliance of this condition it no exception or protest is lodged by the community members, in \\Vhi.ch case the caste \\Vould rvive on the reconversion .of the person lo his. old. religion. ·\n\nAnother aspect. which one must not forget is that when a.child is born neither has he any religion nor is he capable of choosing one until he reaches: the age Of discretion and acquires proper un~r standi;1g of the situation. Hence, the mere fact that the parents of a child, who were Christians, would in ordinary course .get the usual baptism certificate and perform. other cere1nci.nies \\Vithout the child knowing that is being done but after tlie child. has grown up and becomes fully mature and able to decide. his future, he ought 'not to be bound by what his parents may have done. Therefore, in such.\n\ncases, it is the intention -Of the convertee which 'otild determine\n\n(1),(1975] 2 S.<:;.R. 923.\n\n\\-• •\n\nKAILASH SONKAR V; MAYA DEVI (Fazal Ali, J.) 193\n\nthe revival of the caste .. If by his. clear and conclusive conduct the A petson reconverts to. his old faith and abjures the new rc\\igio;, in nnequiyocal terms, his caste automatically rev.ives. . .\n\nAnother dominant factor to determine the revival of the caste of a convertfrom Christianity to his old rcligionwoul<lbe !bat in.· cases of election to the State Assemblies or the Parliament where B qndef the. Presidential .Order a. particulat Constituency is reserved. for a member of the scheduled caste m tribe a;1d th~ electorate gives a majority verdict in his favour, then this would be doubtless proof positive of the fact !hat his coi:nmunity has accepted him back to his o1d fold and t]lis would result in a revival of the original caste to which the said candidate belonged.\n\n.In our opinipn, when a person is converted to Christianity or some other religion the original caste remains under eclipse and as s:xlll as duriiig h1s/her lifi<-(ime the person is reconverted to the original religion the eclipse disappears and the caste auioinatically revives. . Whether or llot the. revial of the caste depends on the will and discretion of the .members of the community of the caste is a question on which we refrain from givillg any opinion because in the fostallt case there is overwhelminz evidence to show that the respondent: was accopted by the community of.her orlgii:i:n kati\"a caste. Even so, if the fact of the acceptance by the membe\"rs pf the community is made a condition precedent to the revivai of the caste, it would lead to_ grave c<?nseQUence_s ;_and unnecessary . expJOiiation, Sometimes motivated by political• con; idcrations. Of course, if apart frcm the oral views .of the community .there .is any ccogniscd documentary proof of a custom or code of cm>dnct or rule of law binding .on . a particular caste, it may be necessary to insist on .the consent of the\n\nmembrs of the conlmunity, othet:\\vise .in norm.af i£ircurnstances the caste would iovive by applying the principles of , d.octrine of eclipse.\n\nWe might pause here to add a rider to what \\Ve have said\", i.e.; where it appears tliat the person reconverted to the old religion had been c0t1verted to Christianity since several generations, it may be difficult . to apply the .doctrine of eclipse to the revival of caste. However, that question' does not arise here.\n\nComing now to the facts and evidence of the present case the position.may be briefly stated-as.follows :\n\nTh' appellant,· an M.A., LL.R from Ja.balpur University had contested election. from .the Madhya Pradesh Vidhan Sabha (here- ·\n\n194 ..\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS. .. [1984] 2 s.c.R.\n\ninafter referred to as. 'Yidhan Sabha) from Legislative Assembly constitu1mcv No. 195.in the general election of 1977 as a Janata Party candidate which was reserved for S.cheduled \"caste under Art. 332 of the .Constitution being item No. :l'O of Part IX-Madhya Pradesh of the 1950 Order: He was declared elected defeating his nearest rival. can!lidate, orie Rarnprasad Choudhary, a Congress candidate.\n\nThe Vidhan Sbha was, however, dissolved in February 1980 after which general elections for all the. constituencies were to be held afre.fu, as.notified in the Gazette, in the month of May 1980. The last date. for filing nomiuation papers was. 2. 5.1980, the date of scrutiny was 3.5.80 and the polling took place on 31.5.80. The results were declared. on. 2,6.&0: In thi.s election, the appellant submitted his\n\nnomination papers as. an Independent candidate from constituency No. 195 (Jabalpur East) and was opposed by Smt. Maya Devi Shahvar (hereinafter referred to as 'Maya Devi') who filed her nomination\n\nppers as a Congress (I) cadnidate. She described herself as belonging to the scheduled caste 'Katia' which is meniiol1ed.1t. seril No. 29 .Of Part IX-Madhya Pradesh of the 19SO Order. Jn view ofthe short and narrow compass of this appeal we are not concerned with other candidates ..\n\nJt may be mentioned that. originally the C!\\Ste 'Katia' was. not included in the list ·., r scllcduled castes \\ill the year 1977 but by the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tl'ibes Order (Amendment) tj.ct, 1976 E (Act .No. 108 of 1976) the schedule was aniended and replaced by a new Schedule in which Kalfa ca; te was includded as a. schedukd eagle.and sh0wn at serial No. 29. ·\n\n.. ft appC; rrs that at the tie of the scrutiny of the nomination papers of Maya Devi, several persons raised objection. that she, being a Cl1ristian by birth, could not be treated as a member of the .scheduled caste and therefor<!' her declaration as a . ; cheduled caste candidate was. false 'which merited dismissaf of her nomina\\ion papers. The Gase Of May~ Devi wns that she was a_n1e1nbe_r of the. scheduled Caste\n\nby birth and her husband, Jai Prakash Shalwar, also be.longed to the.\n\nKatia caste. She denied that she was a Christian by birth .and averred that her father\"s name was not John Wesley as alleged by , the appelbnt. Her plea found favour with the Returning Officer who acceptrd her nomination papers. After the po!l, Maya Devi received majority of votes, having. secured 16,770 votes; and was declared· elected, and the . appellant Jost the erection.. . • .\n\n'-)\n\nIt was furthecalleged by the appellant that Maya Devi. after\n\n\" .\n\nj \\\n\nKAlLASH SONKAR V. MAYA DEVI (F\"za/ Ali, 1.)\n\nJ95\n\nbeing born a Christian. was baptised according to Christian rites and her mother's name was Elizabeth. The appellant als~ averred j that Maya Devi's marriage. with Jai Prakash Shalwar was not a re~\n\ncognised form ef marriage and, therefore. not valid. A number of other pleas were also taken by the appellant in his petition but Mr. UR. Lalit, appearing on his behalf, confined his argumenfs to two important. quest.i0ns1: •\n\n(I) , whether Maya Devi havin.g. been born of Christian parents lost the. katia caste to \\Vhich She or fier ancestors originally\n\nblonged \" and • .(2) that after being baptise<! she continued .. to be a Christian and \\vas shown as. such. in various documents.\n\nIn this view of the matter it was contened thai even if. she .,,, • married Jai. Prakash Shalwar who belonged to Katia caste, her caste could 1iot revive because caste is determined not by marriage but by birth .\n\n. In proof of his pleas, the appellant adduced both oral and dooumontary evidence. The allegations made by him were denied by th~ .resp~)nde11t who categoric8-llystated that she was nev_er a\n\nJ Christian nl)r was shC horn -a Christian. She aJSo averred that even .E her father or mother were not Christians. On the. other h.and:.-sl•e al\\vays reinained a 111e1nbe_r of.the Katia caste and \\Vas accepted as\n\nu.ch by the meinbers of that com1nnity because her _marring~ .wi_th .\n\nJ\\1i Prakash Shalwar \\vas performed according to Hindu rites of Aryasamaj sect and was attended by a .number of inembers of her caste and due publicity \\Vas given to the 1narriage. • Both th<> p:\\rties have adduced evidence in support of their cases. One important fact which )llHY be noted here is that.the father of the rspondent. - John \\yeo.; Jeywho itccording \"to Maya Devi was John W:sley Singh, in spite.of being cited' as a witness did not enter\n\n~ .the witn'\" box to throw light on the origin of the religion qf the\n\nrespondent and a. huge Capital has been tnade of the non-appearance of the said \\Vitncss. -; hi ch ac.cordiigto the appellant is , the strongest\n\n~ possible circumstance to discredit the case of the respondent.\n\n. ..\n\nIt is true that the father of.the respondent was not examined as a witness but having regard to the naiure of the documents produced . . . .\n\n• D ..\n\n\n[1984) 2 S.C.I\\. '\n\nby the par\\j; s the m:ere fact that Johµ Wesley was not examined.as a witness is not sufficient to throw the case of '.the respondent abr.ard. \\ ..\n\nIt is also true that the respondent was ill-advised to deny the 'entire cnse .of the appellant by makihg an averment that she was .not born . of Christian parents at all. We would; therefore, take it as established. that the respondent was undoubtedly born of Chdstian parents. That by itsel, f does not advanee the case of the appellant any further because. . if it is proved that she' was voluntarily recoriverted to l:linduism then\n\naccording to th~ law referred to us and. applied to the facts of the .. present' case on reconversion her original. caste would automatiCaJly revive. We would.givS\" a brief summary of ihe nature of the evidence. prod.uced b;,' the parties. dn this .limited question. ·\n\nTo begin ith the appellant has relied on the birth certificate (Ex. P-il) which.shows that a female child wa.s bom to John Wesley's . wife. on 4.6.1947.' It is•also clearly mentioned , thereir. that John Wesley was a Christian. This was followed by baptism certificate ; Y which shows .that sh, c was baptised acording to the religious ceremonies of the Christians .. The appellant also .produced a Church mombership certificate to show. L'1at Maya Isabella John Wesley\n\n(respondent) was baptised and admitted as a rne.mbcr of the City\n\nMothodist Church in Southern Asia at Jabalpur, Madhya Pradesh.\n\nThe school transfer certificate dated 6.G.1956 shows that Maya lrnbeJla John Wesley was a:Christian and. remained a student of Peeli Kothi\n\nJ., Qirls; Primary School, 1abalpur from 1.7.1952 to 30.4.1956, and her date of' birth iii this certificate has been shewn as 4.6.J 947 which fully tallies with her 'birth cer:tificate. In view of the overwhelming~\n\nevidence: referred to ; bove; it is no'. necessary for :l's to consider the. t . oral and documentary evidence which cohclus1ve1y proves -(1) that the parents of the respondent were Christians.· and (2) that after her birth' she got faptised and remained a Chr; stian, and therefore it .cannot .be. de.nied that the respondent was born a .Christian andin -f\n\nthis view of the matter the moment she entered the fold of Christianity,·. her original•caste was completely lost. The respondent in her anxiety to succeed has overstated her case by wrongly aJleging that slie. was never born of Christian parents or that her parents were not.Christians, a ·.fact. which is cornpletely falsified by the oral and. d<icuri]entary. evidence pro.duced by the appellant ..\n\nAccepting, therefore, the evidence led by th.e appellant, the vital' 'question for determination in this. case remains as to . whether. or not the respondent was' voluntarlly reconverted to Hinduism and thereupon her caste revived. There' 'is.~ clear and. unimpeachable ·\n\n...\n\n...\n\nKAiLASH SONKAR v. MAH D~VI (Fatal. Ali, J.)\n\nIQ?\n\n0 evidence to show that the respondent . had reconverted herself to Hinduism voluntarily and with full publicity, making no secret of this fact. A Jetter, appearing ai page 22 of the Paperbook , shows that she accepted Hindu religion with all its .customs and rites voluntarily. . The relevant part of the letter reads thus : . . . . . .\n\n\"I am. prepared to own Hindu religion with all sincerity B ai1d to follow all its customs and rites. \"\n\nToday, on 6.11.76.I am fully major.· Hence the above decision is of my own wherein no extcrnal.intetforence exi.sts.\"\n\nImmediately thereafter she was. married to one Jai Prakash Shalwar and the marriage certificate dated 14.11.76 fully corroborates. this fact {page 24 of the Paperbook): . The . Marriage certificate states . that the marriage of Maya Devi with Jai Prakash was• performed on 6.11.76 in Arya Samaj Gorakhpur according to vedic rites; Another . certificjlte issued, by the . Secretary: of the Arya Samaj, Gorakhpur is also to the sa,; ne effect. .The aforesaid documents are amply corroborated by the oral evide11ce led by the respondent.\n\nThe evidence of Darshanlal Dharmak deservs special mention . because this witness was a prominent member and President of the Katia community for the last two-and-a haJC years. The witness goes on\" t~ state that the marriage was celebrated in the presenc~ of . 80 persons of his community, including elderly people and his pre- \\- sence at Jhe marriage clearly indicates that the c.of!1munily had fuliy\n\n accepted the respondent back to her caste. The marriage was followed by a reception 3-4 days later which was attei1ded by this witness also and at that .time nobodyraised any objection about Maya .as not\n\n\"\"!- belonging to the Katia community. The witness further states that F he had. gone to the house of the. respondent and that members of the , community had come. fo celebrate the \"birthday of her child.\n\nIt would appear from. the evidence of Bbaiyalal. Nag,• another witness j'Jrod!!ced by the respondent, tl\\at there was \"Katia Samaj Sanstha in Madhya Prdesh which was registered under the societies Registration Act 11nc\\ the w_itness was the Vice' President of this organisation ... He states that Jai Pra.kash was known to him and belonged to his. caste and that he was married to Maya Devi. He further states · that no objection was raised in the Organisaiiori '.\\bout this marriage.\n\nH~ .further stated that. Maya Devi had been attendig number of H marriages in his caste. He makes a very stark statement which is\n\nSUPREME C~RT REPORTS [1984 j 2 $.C.R.\n\nfully supported by the Abhinandan Patra and his. statement may be extracted thus :. ·\n\n.• \"We menti<, ned her in this Abhinandan Patra as bel_onging to Katia cas'te as we were proud as she was the first M.LA .. in our. caste. · ·\n\nEx. D-1.A is the Abhinandan Patra given to Maya Devi some .,.. time in the year 1977-78-, i.e. 3 years before the elections. Furthermore, the.re is the evidence of Keshav Pfasad. Pathak which is rather important. His evidence shows that a joint application was made by the (------- respondent and her husband regarding their consent to the marriage. . He further stated that before the parties are married, if either of them . is not a Hir; du then he is first converted to Hinduism (Shudhikaran) . -\n\nby religio'us rites. performed in accordance with the Mya Samaj rites.\n\nHe proves the applications. given by the respondent and her husba;1d 'f (Ex. P-8 and 9).\n\nHe has further stated that the marriage ceremony' is usual:y performed before the members of the Execµtive Cmmittee of the Arya Samaj: He further defines the term 'Shudhikaran to m2an '~Convert a non-Hindu to Hinduisn:i . He goes on to say that the marriage was celebrated .at the Arya Samaj according to vedic ceremony which included Sapla-padi and Haran,\n\n. '~ .. The appellant himself in his statement admitted that in Jabalpur there are live-six thousands peopJe of katia caste, He further admitted that he .did not make any enquiries alioui .the parents Pf the placc-j of .residence 0f Elizabeth, mother of the respondent. He further I admits at page 87 of the Pa:perbook that in 1978 he. was taken by Shri Dh.annak as Chief Guest in the Conference of Katia Samaj.\n\nA suggestion was made to hirn .that he was present when the Katia t° community honoured the respondent on her victory in the election.\n\nReading in between the lines of his evidence it is clear that he was fully aware that the respondent had been reconverted to Hinduism and had been accepted by the Ka.tia community. ..\n\nOn a full and complete appraisal of the rat .and documentary\n\nevidnce, the following conclusions are inevitable :\n\nI) That the respondent• was b9; n of Christian parents and ' was educ•ted in various schools or institutions where. she was known. as a Christian, ·. •\n\n2) that 3-4' years before. the election, the . respondent was\n\nJ..\n\n-!\"\n\n~---......; ...\n\n,._.\n\n' I\n\nKAILASH SONKAR v. MAYA DEVI (f'azal Ali, J.) !99\n\nreconverted to.Hinduisn1 and married Jai Prakash Shalwor, a member of the katia caste,' and also performed tire Shd!1i- . karan ceemoy,\n\nthat she was not only accepted but also. welcomed by the important. members, including the Presidrnt and Vice- President, of the community,\n\n• ' . tl-., re is no evidence to show that there was any bar under . the Christian ieligion which could have prevented her . from rec\\111verting herself to Hinduism .\n\n5) that there was no evidence t~ show that. even her parents c had been Christians from generation to generation. ·\n\nIn these circumstances,' therefore, thiS case fulfils the conditi0n~ required for being reconverted to Hi11duism from Christianity in . . order to revive the original caste.\n\nUnder cl. (3) of the 1950 Order only two conditions are required for being eligible for election to a reserved constituency,- ·\n\n(a) that the candidate' should not profc5S a religion different from the Hindu or the Sikh rpligion, and ·\n\n(b) that the candidate is a member of scheduled caste as shown in the schedules:\n\nin the instant case, it is not disputed that the Katia caste is mentioned as. a scheduled caste 1n part IX of the 1950 Order and shown at serial Numbet'.29.\n\nHaving .regard. to the circu1nstances diSci.lsscd above, it cannot be said that at the lime when the respondent filed her nomination papers, she was not a member of the .Katia caste.\n\nFor the reasons given above, the judgment of the High Court G is affirmed and the appeal is dismissed but in the circumstances with,- out any order as to costs. •\n\nH.S.K.\n\nAppeal dismisoed H", "total_entities": 92, "entities": [{"text": "176\n\nKAILASH SONKAR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2, "end_char": 21, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KAILASH SONKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MAYA DEVI", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 36, "end_char": 45, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Maya Devi Shahvar", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "December 16, 1983", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 47, "end_char": 64, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MAYA DEVI\n\nDecember 16, 1983\n\n[S. MuRTAZA FAZAL Au, R.B. , MISRA AND M.P. THAK\"AR, JJ.J\n\nHindu la_w-Whether a Hindu on conversion to another religion loses the original caste."}}, {"text": "MISRA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 95, "end_char": 100, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.B. MISRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 587, "end_char": 619, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Jai Prakash Shalwar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1821, "end_char": 1840, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant having unsucce\"ssfully challeng¢ the election Of the respondent in the High Court, aHeged in this appeai that the respondent after being bOrn a Christian \\Vas baptised according to .. Cb.ristian rites; her mother's name was \"Eiizabetl\\; her rnarriµ.ge with Jai Prakash Shalwar, Who be1ongcd.to Katiacastc, wa<> not valid a_nd even on m.rrriage her caste could\n\nnot reviVe because ca, ste was determined not by marriage but by birth.", "canonical_name": "Jai Prakash Shalwar"}}, {"text": "Jlti Prakash Shalwar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2310, "end_char": 2330, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand, she alwaYs remained a member of the Katia _caste and was accepted as such by the members of that community because bet: .Qlarriage with Jlti Prakash Shalwar was perfoi'med acording to Hind~ rites of Aryasa.maj sect arrd waS attended by a n'umer of 1nembrs of her c.istc and due ubliCity was given to the."}}, {"text": "[1976] 3 S.C.R. 82", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5247, "end_char": 5265, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Charlotte Abraha1n", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5325, "end_char": 5343, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Books of the \"\"East (VoL Vlfl) by F. Max Mu1!1:3r; Charlotte Abraha1n and Daniel Vincent\n\nAbralta1l1 v. Francis Abrahani, 9 rvt.t."}}, {"text": "KAILASHSONKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10625, "end_char": 10638, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "KAILASHSONKAR '\"MAYA DEVJ.(Faza/ Ali, J.) 119\nthere .,", "canonical_name": "KAILASH soNK:AR"}}, {"text": "U.R .. La", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11195, "end_char": 11204, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U.R .. La/it and A.K. Sanghi for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "A.K. Sanghi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11212, "end_char": 11223, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U.R .. La/it and A.K. Sanghi for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "G.B. Pai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11246, "end_char": 11254, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G.B. Pai and Vinet Kumar."}}, {"text": "Vinet Kumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11259, "end_char": 11270, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G.B. Pai and Vinet Kumar."}}, {"text": "FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11347, "end_char": 11356, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "FAZAL ALI, J: By our Order dated October 20,.1983', .we had\n\nd.ismissed the appeal.", "canonical_name": "Fazal .Ali"}}, {"text": "Cl1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12784, "end_char": 12787, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mahatma Gandhi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13407, "end_char": 13421, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As Mahatma Gandhi, father of the nation, said \"India lives in villages'' and so .do the backward classes,."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13451, "end_char": 13456, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As Mahatma Gandhi, father of the nation, said \"India lives in villages'' and so .do the backward classes,."}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13816, "end_char": 13826, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in the Parliament and State legislatures in .the country may be ·heard, felt and fulfilled."}}, {"text": "October 2·5, 19 81", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13974, "end_char": 13992, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this election appeal which ha; bee~ filed against the Judgment dated October 2·5, 19 81 of the High Cort of Madhya Pradesh, we are really concerned with the last aspect mentioned al:iove."}}, {"text": "High Cort of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 14000, "end_char": 14027, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this election appeal which ha; bee~ filed against the Judgment dated October 2·5, 19 81 of the High Cort of Madhya Pradesh, we are really concerned with the last aspect mentioned al:iove."}}, {"text": "Art. 341", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15468, "end_char": 15476, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1976] 3 SCR 82", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 15634, "end_char": 15649, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Arumugan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16021, "end_char": 16029, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Jaw of the land .. It is true that the controversy has been narrowed d0wn to the minimum .. by the decision in Arumugan's case (supra) still there are some vital questions which remain unanswered."}}, {"text": "Krishna", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19047, "end_char": 19054, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "bY Lord Krishna in Shree Bhagvadgita which would.", "canonical_name": "Krishiia"}}, {"text": ".Bhagvadgita", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19427, "end_char": 19439, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lay not \"on te na(ure of the caste but on their act.ions and deeds .. This would be illustrated by a. refere.nce to the actual text of Sh:ri .Bhagvadgita as compiled ."}}, {"text": "F. Max MuUer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19457, "end_char": 19469, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "by F. Max MuUer in."}}, {"text": "Bhgvadri Geeta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19705, "end_char": 19719, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "injunctions of .Lord Krishna illusfrating the vices and virtues ofmen where castes also figure .. In .Shloka 13, Chapter 4 of Bhgvadri Geeta, Loh:!"}}, {"text": "Krishiia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19727, "end_char": 19735, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Krishiia clearly proclaimed that -\"Four Varnas, viz.,", "canonical_name": "Krishiia"}}, {"text": "Kunti", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20048, "end_char": 20053, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Further said Lord Krishna to the son of Kunti thus-: . . '"}}, {"text": "Brahmarias", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21666, "end_char": 21676, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "experience, and belief (in a future world), this is the natural duty of Brahmarias."}}, {"text": "Vaisyas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21891, "end_char": 21898, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "duty of Vaisyas."}}, {"text": "Sudras", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21925, "end_char": 21931, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "And the natural' duty of Sudras, too, coi1sists in service. ("}}, {"text": "Vidura", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22213, "end_char": 22219, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In another chapter, Vidura fs quoted as saying thµs :\n\n\"I arn born of a. Sudra womb; and do not like to saymore than what (!"}}, {"text": "Bhagavadgiia Mahatma Gandhi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22623, "end_char": 22650, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In view of the revealed injuncti_ons in the Shree Bhagavadgiia Mahatma Gandhi'& drea~ that .all distinctions of castes and creed must disappear and an mnsf be known by his action, to whatever , ."}}, {"text": "KAILASH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 25705, "end_char": 25712, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "KAILASH\n\n0 SONKAR v. MAYA.", "canonical_name": "KAILASH soNK:AR"}}, {"text": "Supreme Coui", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 27124, "end_char": 27136, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the appellant (before othe Supreme Coui, t) had filed his nomination papers for a constituency reserved for members, of the E scheduled caste."}}, {"text": ".Jasani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28227, "end_char": 28234, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even so, considering .Jasani's case and a number of other texts, Bhargava, J. made H\n\n(I) [19691 I S.C.R. 254 . ..", "canonical_name": ".Jasani"}}, {"text": "Bhargava", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28271, "end_char": 28279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even so, considering .Jasani's case and a number of other texts, Bhargava, J. made H\n\n(I) [19691 I S.C.R. 254 . .."}}, {"text": "Krishnaswami Ayyai1gar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28450, "end_char": 28472, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "186 SUPREM.E COURt REPORTS [1984] 2 s:c.R.\n\nthe following observations :\n\n\"Consider1ng the question of entry into the caste, .. Krishnaswami Ayyai1gar, J., held .. that, in matters affecting the."}}, {"text": "Hiridusim", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28643, "end_char": 28652, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "well-be.ing or composition of a caste, tl1e caste itself is the supreme judgec It was on this principle 'that a reconvert to Hiridusim could become a member of the caste, if the."}}, {"text": "Rajagopal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28980, "end_char": 28989, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rajagopal's case (supra) merely reiterates what was held in Jasani':I case and does ·@t go .any further. . . . ."}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30930, "end_char": 30938, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "inind of Bhagwati, J., who delivered the leading judgment\n\nH .. •\n\n• -\n\n.~ . •"}}, {"text": "KAILASH soNK:AR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 31001, "end_char": 31016, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "KAILASH soNK:AR v. MAYA DEVI. (", "canonical_name": "KAILASH soNK:AR"}}, {"text": "MAYA DEVI", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 31020, "end_char": 31029, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "KAILASH soNK:AR v. MAYA DEVI. (", "canonical_name": "Maya Devi Shahvar"}}, {"text": "Fazal .Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 31032, "end_char": 31042, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fazal .Ali, J,) 187\n\nin a later.", "canonical_name": "Fazal .Ali"}}, {"text": "Windu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 32408, "end_char": 32413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Windu."}}, {"text": "South India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 33117, "end_char": 33128, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There are castes, particularly in South India, where , this consequence."}}, {"text": ")SS SUPREME COURT REPOR'rS (1984]", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33252, "end_char": 33285, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ")SS SUPREME COURT REPOR'rS (1984] 2<s.i:;.R.\n\nThese weighty observations.·"}}, {"text": "A.rumugam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 35112, "end_char": 35121, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "i11 A.rumugam's case of 1976 (supra) basing."}}, {"text": "Jasani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 35201, "end_char": 35207, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "decjsions on the leading case of Jasani.", "canonical_name": ".Jasani"}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 35315, "end_char": 35332, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. Goo1ia Sudarsanaswaini & Ors./\" a Division Bench of the Madras High Court observed thus :."}}, {"text": "KAJLASll SONKAR l'. MAYA DEVI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 35413, "end_char": 35442, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• ...\n\n• •\n\nKAJLASll SONKAR l'."}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 36958, "end_char": 36983, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "iri'\" a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court made the following observations :\n\n\"Even if they come within the fold of Hiliduism, question would arise whether they have formed separate sect among themselves, or they would bdong to the 4th class, or to 'the twice-born class .. , ... Jn order to prove .that he ceased to be a member of that tribe, there should be."}}, {"text": "Wilson", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 37740, "end_char": 37746, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To the same effect are the decisions in the cases of Wilson ."}}, {"text": "s0", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39461, "end_char": 39463, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Fazal Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 40245, "end_char": 40254, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fazal Ali; .J.) 191\n\n~ . .", "canonical_name": "Fazal .Ali"}}, {"text": "Alagiriswami", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 42775, "end_char": 42787, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1) this Court speaking through Alagiriswami, J. highlighted this particular aspect in the following words.;"}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 45477, "end_char": 45487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "cases of election to the State Assemblies or the Parliament where B qndef the."}}, {"text": "Art. 332", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47930, "end_char": 47938, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Rarnprasad Choudhary", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 48095, "end_char": 48115, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "can!lidate, orie Rarnprasad Choudhary, a Congress candidate."}}, {"text": "Vidhan Sbha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 48144, "end_char": 48155, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Vidhan Sbha was, however, dissolved in February 1980 after which general elections for all the."}}, {"text": "5.1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 48386, "end_char": 48392, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5.1980, the date of scrutiny was 3.5.80 and the polling took place on 31.5.80."}}, {"text": "31.5.80", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 48456, "end_char": 48463, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5.1980, the date of scrutiny was 3.5.80 and the polling took place on 31.5.80."}}, {"text": "Maya Devi Shahvar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 48665, "end_char": 48682, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Maya Devi Shahvar (hereinafter referred to as 'Maya Devi') who filed her nomination\n\nppers as a Congress (I) cadnidate.", "canonical_name": "Maya Devi Shahvar"}}, {"text": "Maya Devi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 49490, "end_char": 49499, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".. ft appC; rrs that at the tie of the scrutiny of the nomination papers of Maya Devi, several persons raised objection.", "canonical_name": "Maya Devi Shahvar"}}, {"text": "Cl1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49553, "end_char": 49556, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "May~ Devi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 49771, "end_char": 49780, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Gase Of May~ Devi wns that she was an1e1nber of the.", "canonical_name": "Maya Devi Shahvar"}}, {"text": "Jost", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 50266, "end_char": 50270, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "appellant Jost the erection.. . • ."}}, {"text": "UR. Lalit", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 50753, "end_char": 50762, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A number of other pleas were also taken by the appellant in his petition but Mr. UR."}}, {"text": "John Wesley", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 53687, "end_char": 53698, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P-il) which.shows that a female child wa.s bom to John Wesley's ."}}, {"text": "4.6.1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 53712, "end_char": 53720, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on 4.6.1947.'"}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 54153, "end_char": 54167, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L'1at Maya Isabella John Wesley\n\n(respondent) was baptised and admitted as a rne.mbcr of the City\n\nMothodist Church in Southern Asia at Jabalpur, Madhya Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Maya lrnbeJla John Wesley", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 54228, "end_char": 54253, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The school transfer certificate dated 6.G.1956 shows that Maya lrnbeJla John Wesley was a:Christian and."}}, {"text": "Peeli Kothi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 54297, "end_char": 54308, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "remained a student of Peeli Kothi\n\nJ., Qirls; Primary School, 1abalpur from 1.7.1952 to 30.4.1956, and her date of' birth iii this certificate has been shewn as 4.6.J 947 which fully tallies with her 'birth cer:tificate."}}, {"text": "6.11.76.I", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 56073, "end_char": 56082, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Today, on 6.11.76.I am fully major.·"}}, {"text": "Jai Prakash", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 56425, "end_char": 56436, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that the marriage of Maya Devi with Jai Prakash was• performed on 6.11.76 in Arya Samaj Gorakhpur according to vedic rites; Another .", "canonical_name": "Jai Prakash Shalwar"}}, {"text": "6.11.76", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 56455, "end_char": 56462, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that the marriage of Maya Devi with Jai Prakash was• performed on 6.11.76 in Arya Samaj Gorakhpur according to vedic rites; Another ."}}, {"text": "Gorakhpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 56583, "end_char": 56592, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Secretary: of the Arya Samaj, Gorakhpur is also to the sa,; ne effect."}}, {"text": "Darshanlal Dharmak", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 56734, "end_char": 56752, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The evidence of Darshanlal Dharmak deservs special mention ."}}, {"text": "Maya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 57314, "end_char": 57318, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The marriage was followed by a reception 3-4 days later which was attei1ded by this witness also and at that .time nobodyraised any objection about Maya .as not\n\n\"\"!-"}}, {"text": "Bbaiyalal. Nag,•", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 57572, "end_char": 57588, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the evidence of Bbaiyalal."}}, {"text": "Katia Samaj Sanstha in Madhya Prdesh which was registered under the societies Registration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 57653, "end_char": 57747, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Jai Pra.kash", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 57831, "end_char": 57843, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nag,• another witness j'Jrod!!ced by the respondent, tl\\at there was \"Katia Samaj Sanstha in Madhya Prdesh which was registered under the societies Registration Act 11nc\\ the w_itness was the Vice' President of this organisation ... He states that Jai Pra.kash was known to him and belonged to his.", "canonical_name": "Jai Prakash Shalwar"}}, {"text": "Abhinandan Patra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 58213, "end_char": 58229, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He makes a very stark statement which is\n\nSUPREME C~RT REPORTS [1984 j 2 $.C.R.\n\nfully supported by the Abhinandan Patra and his."}}, {"text": "Keshav Pfasad. Pathak", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 58585, "end_char": 58606, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Furthermore, the.re is the evidence of Keshav Pfasad."}}, {"text": "Haran", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 59435, "end_char": 59440, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He goes on to say that the marriage was celebrated .at the Arya Samaj according to vedic ceremony which included Sapla-padi and Haran,\n\n. '"}}, {"text": "Jabalpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 59507, "end_char": 59515, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~ .. The appellant himself in his statement admitted that in Jabalpur there are live-six thousands peopJe of katia caste, He further admitted that he .did not make any enquiries alioui .the parents Pf the placc-j of .residence 0f Elizabeth, mother of the respondent."}}, {"text": "Dh.annak", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 59797, "end_char": 59805, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was taken by Shri Dh.annak as Chief Guest in the Conference of Katia Samaj."}}, {"text": "Katia Samaj", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 59842, "end_char": 59853, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was taken by Shri Dh.annak as Chief Guest in the Conference of Katia Samaj."}}, {"text": "Jai Prakash Shalwor", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 60633, "end_char": 60652, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hinduisn1 and married Jai Prakash Shalwor, a member of the katia caste,' and also performed tire Shd!1i- .", "canonical_name": "Jai Prakash Shalwar"}}, {"text": "H.S.K.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 62159, "end_char": 62165, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H.S.K.\n\nAppeal dismisoed H"}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_2_200_247_EN", "year": 1984, "text": ". P.K .. RAMA.CHANDRA IYE.R & ORS.\n\nUNION OF INDIA & ORS.\n\nDecember '16, l 983 ..\n\n[D: A. DESAI & v' BALAKRISHNA EkADl, .TJ.] . . . . . . .\n\nC01tStitution of J1tdia, 1950 Ari{{:/cs J.2 and 32~Indian Gouncif of Agricuftllral Rcse<ircl;-Whether -instrunzentiifity of Cent.rat Govern1nent-Whetl1e~ covered by the exp'rssion 'other auihorities'~Whether antendable .to writ jurisdiction\n\nArticles 14, 16.and J9(d)-Pay , ctllc of posi of Professor revisetf-Existing i11ctunbents ndt ginted tlte benefrt oj ievised scale- New inCunzbents _ granted the revised scale-:Defence of e111ployer was there. was nzarginal rei, ision in qualifiCfl.fiohs for the post-Action whether disrilninatory a11J unfair. :\n\n. Article 16-Selection Co1;1ittee-hther.l:cis poer 10 relx .cssentl:al i; uli fications for the post-jurisdiction OJ Courts to interfere ttdtfl \"decision of. Selectiow.\n\nConunittce-When arises. ·\n\nA-falafides~Selectjon Co111n1itlee-Qua/ificatio11 f.equirenwit relaxed to suit preferred .candic(at~-Sck\"ction what/ler yiti\"ated.\n\n\": l'ubli~ e1np/yni~1u~Experience to be f value and utility 1nust be ai::{juired after educational qualificaiion obtained-Not while acquiring. Post-graduate qualifi-· catiun. .\n\n-\"Jndian Counil vf Agriculfui, al Research 1977, Rules.13aiu.\"14 ;. Fixation \"of\n\n- -.-J .. )1iinitnu111 qllalifying 1narks for tiliglhiiitJ . for viVa-voce test..,.-Further fixatiOn of ( quilti/yi11g 111ark.V to be Obtaid at viva-11oce for final selection-validity Of\n\nSupre, nw Court Ruie~ 1966 Order XL& Constiiution oj India, 19.!0 Aticle LJ1.: f¥rit petition disf!?lssed by .High Court al/owing prelilninciry objection that. it izad no jurisidiCtiOn ta entertaitrpeiition_.:...High Couri becoii1es functus officio and decisioi\n\n Oft 1nerits inconseqential-Suprf!tn\"e Colirt. in .later. case over-ruling the same pre-' litninary objeclion:........:.Si1p1em~ Court. e1ititled. to exa1nine matter n merits-Review .ffltition .n1fiintaii1able .\n\n. The Royal. Con1n1ission of <igriculturc coi1stituted in 1926 reconunende<l . tho setting .up of ihe\"Imp.erial Council Of AgriCult'uriil RescarCh-ICAR~ I~ July. 1929, JCAR \\Vas registered as a SociC.ty ·\\vlth its offici; in. the Secretariat. Jt \\vas , whq11y financed bY the Governn1ent of .Jndla. By a resolution dated. JanUary 5, 1939 the Governn1ent. of India.modified the-status of ICAR from a. department of the. Secretariate to one f ah attathed office of the Governent_ 9f India .. Rec ruitrnent to various posts in ICAR \\vas made through the Federal Public Service\n\nCorllmission. Its expenses were voted Upon as part of the expenses ·incllrred .in\n\nth~ Minstry Or Agriculture. The control of the Goenuneiit. of Indi~ perffieated\n\n....\n\nP. K. lYER v. UNION. 201\n\nthrough aµ its activities. To it was transferred the esearch Institutes set up\n\nA by the Government of India. In orde~ to make.it finil.nci.ally viable-a cess _was levied. and ihe pr~ds wete haned. over to ICAR .fl?r its use. ·\n\nOn the advent of independence, the linperial Council of Agricultural :RCsearch was redesignated as Indian Council _of Agricultural Rarc~. With. effect frotn April 1, 1966 administrative Con~J, Ul over IARI and IVRI and. other institutes was transferred to IC~~R. · . . . .\n\nRule 18 of the !CAR Rules provided that the Society shall establish and inaintain its ownom.ce, ResearchJnstitutes and Laboratories and that the appoint-· meats to the _various posts .should be made in ardan~- wiih the Recruitmea, t Rules framed by t\\le Governillg Body. .This rule \\Yich was kept in beyance. in January 10, 1966 was bro1:1g:hf into operation in. itS .. entirety .eft'eCtive_ from Apri1-1~\n\n1974. Tlie consequenCes of.this rule becoming operative was that e.secretariat o f~9AR ~<ised to pe an attached oce of the-Ministry of Food and Ag_ric; Ulture. ·\n\nThe Indian Veterinary. Research Institute \\vas one of the.institu(es und.Cr the adininistrative control of ICAR. The poSt of ProfesSor ln JVRI in 1958 carried the paY. s6a:le bf Rs. 700-1250.\" There were 6 psts of Proresor in. various disCiPInes.\n\nThree posts of Profe\"ssors were held by. the petitioriers in Wdt Petition N.o. 587/75.\n\nOn the introduCtioil of the pay-scales 'recOmmerided by the University Grants Comrnission, the p.iy-scale attached to tl1e Post cif Professor in the Institute -was ievised to Rs. 1100-1600 during the year 1970-71 and: six new posts o:f _ProfeSsOrs in .Various d.isciplines created. Each of the petitioners who was a1ready holding ..\n\nthe posts of Professor was not given the nefii of the upgraded pay-scales,- while the new incumbents recruited t(>the newly created post were awar.ded the revised\n\n'p\"yscales. This led to , disturbance in the inter se seniOritY in the cadre of .PfOfessors.\n\nIn the Wdt Petition \\V.P. No. 587/75 to this Court it was contended that 3.s the petitioners fulfilled the minimunl' qualification•· prescribed for thC post after ui)ward reviion Of the pay-scales4 denial of the revised Pay-scales was dis:. criminatory and violative of Article 14, and troughly .arbitrary and u_njustified.\n\nOn behalf of respondents it was asse(ted that the evised scale was not.to-~ autotnaticatly granted to the petitioners-the eisting holders, as the newly crOO.ted\n\npots in the cadre of PrOfessor was not the same as the. exist1ni-post~ as there Was margin.al revision in the qua!ifications for_ the post of Professor in the revised SCC'le.\n\n. Thpetitioner i.n the Re'viCw Petition.No .. 4J77 sought the reView f the]udginent of this Court dated 3d October, 1975 'in the Special Leave Petition No. 2339/ 15.\n\nHe had filed a.wi:it petition in the High court:questioning the conectness of tbe. setOCtion o{respondent No .. O.for.the post of Senior Bio-Cbemistas he dfd not possess the\" essential qualification, .and the order remOving him from the me'mber-ship of the post-graduate f~Culty' Or_ Indian Agriculture Research Jnstituie. ·.\n\nTh_iS petition was '.fesisted by the respondents, on the.ground that neither ICAR nor IVRI was either a 'State or other athoiity' Within the mecinlngof the epression -· in Article .12 of the Constitution. It \\Vas further colltended that the Selection.\n\nComffiittee.had the-po\\ver to relax the 6.ssential , qualificati0nS pf:itainh1g to expefi~ . ence, and t.hat the Committee consisted of experts who were highly qualified persons, able at evalu'ating and assessing the relative merits of each of the candidateS, and that, it \\voiild be w1wise to substitute eX.pert's decision by Court's decisions. The \\Yrit Petion was dismtsSed by the High Court on_ the groun_d that ICAR being\n\n: '\n\nF .\n\n S~PREME COURT REPORTS [19S4]\"2 s.c.R.\n\nA· \" a s?ciety registered utdc< he SocietieS Registration Act; it was \"neither a 'State\n\nor other authority' withih the contemplation of Article .12.. It was further bcld : that the relationship belw.:en the petitioner 3.nd iCAR was governed by fhe rules .aOd the bye-laws of the Society and ICAR 'vas free to fill the post of Senior Bio- :chCmist in any manner it liked, and that'as the Petitioner was not removed from the rrielnrship of the F3.culty,_but cased to -be a n1en1bcr, it was not necessary\n\nto hear hinl. ·\n\nThis Court upheld th~ decisiOn of the High Court.by its j, udgnrent in S.L.P.\n\nNo. 2339/75 and also rejected R.P. No. 79/76,\n\nThe Petitioner in Re'4l';'V .. Petition No. 80/76 so.ught review of the jud!; ment in S.L.P. No.702.of 1976 which was disposed of along with S.L.P. No. 2339/1975. . . . - . .\n\nThe appellant in C.A.· No. 1043of1981 filed a writ petition \"in the High Court allcigi'ng that he was selected_ f9r the post of Senio_r Computer in the indian Agriculture Statistics Research Institute~ an affiliate of lCAR.\" . The ICAR set up the.\n\n, Aricultur.11 Scientists ReCruittnent Board-ASRB which fran1ed rules in 1977 artd decided to hold a competitive examintion in 1978 to recruit scientists. S~Icc\n\ntion was to be made _by a competitive exan1inµtion Con1prisii1g a written test carrying ·. 600 marks in the aggregate and viva-vOce test carrying 100 marks. Jt _was furthCr 'prOvided that anYone to be elgile for bing ad1nittCd in the merit list should also : have the additional qualific~-tio.n .of at least obtaini.ng. 40 1narks in the viVa-vot:c\n\ntest.\n\nThe appellant contended that he has eCured 364. n1arks out of 600 in the written examination and 38 1narks out of 100 In the viva-voce tpst, ind that the actio11. of Boilrd in fixing ni.inimum qualifyiilg marks in the viva-vocc exa1nination\n\narid basing the final selection on this criterion lacked both the aO.thority of law and :rules. The High Court dismissed the Writ Petition in lilnine.\n\n' .\n\nAllowing the Review Petitions, Writ Petition and Appesa.l :\n\n- ' ~\n\nHELD : 1.\n\n(i) In writ petition No. 587/75, the !CAR is directed by a { mandamus to put tho thice petitioners in the revised scale of Rs. 1100-1600 sanctioned for .the post of Professor effective from ihe day when others selected as ProfC:ssOrs in sister disciplines. were awarded the revised scale of Rs.\n\n1100-1600. [247 A]\n\n(ii) In Special Leave Petition No. 2339/75, the !CAR is directed by a iniridamus 'tO. award to Dr. Y.P: Gupta the scale of Rs. 1800-2250 fron1 the date _the same was given to rpondent.No. '6,\".Dr. S.L. Mehta. The arrears payable \" putsuant to the direCtion shall be paid within 3 mon_ths.\n\nDr. Y.P. Gupta to be taken back as a men1ber of the Faculty ofthe post-graduate school of IARI with_in • periQd of > month•. [247 Bl\n\n(iii) In S.L.P; N:o. 702/76, it is directed that a'special Assessrr_ient Corimlittee may be set up to examine the case of Dr.\" T.S. Ra1nan for promotion to S-3 grade\n\n. . . within a p\"eriod. o.f 3 months. (247 DJ. . . . . ·\n\n(iv) ln.C.A. 1043/81, the ICAR. a'nd ASRB are directed to Prepare the merit list in respect of those candidates who were called for viva voce test, but were not included in the merit list On the aggregate of ffiatks obtained by them. If there · ls a vacancYand the aPpellant cOmes wihin the zone of selection he shall be\n\nP. K. IYER V. UNION 2o3\n\nappointed. The appoifltn1ent \\vould be prospective and would beeffective from the date of the appointn1cnt. [247 E-F]\n\n2.· (I) _Apart fro1n. the criteria devised by fhc jt.idicial elicta, the very birth of ICAR and its continued existence over half a century and its present p0Sitio1'l would Ieive no dOubt that ICAR. is almost an inseparable adjunct of the GOvern- 1nent of India having an outward forn1 of being a So_cif!'ty. it could be styled as a\n\nSociety set up by the State and therefore; would be_ an instrumentality or. agency B of the Central Governmcrit and therefore, it is 'other authority'. within the meaning of the expression in Article l~, and the writ ju.risdiction can be invoked against it. [216 BJ •\n\n(ii) !CAR.came intoexistcnce as an integral dcparti11c1H ofthc.Govern111ent of. 1ndi.-i. and liter on became an attached offi:_ce of the Central GoVerntttent. The composition of.the lCAR as evidenced by_Rulc 3 could not have been more gov~ crnn1cntal in character than any dcpartrii.cntof the Govermnent. The Governing . Body of the Society' Cbns, ist of a President of the Society,· \\Vho is n'onc other than a\n\nCabinet Minister of the Governriicnt of India.\n\nOther. n1en1bers of the Governing ' Body are en1inent scientistS. nof exceding nine in 1fun1ber to be appointed. by -the President; there is none outsirie the Governn1ent inthe GoV'c_riling . nady.\n\nRule, 98 1nakes it abundantly clear that the Rules of _the SOciety can neither be.altered nor amended exCep~ with the sanctio.n Of the Governn1ent of India. - Rllle 100 shows that the Rules becarnc ojJerative after they were approved by the Governn1ent . Of India. The audited accounts of the Society along with the auditor.'s report'\n\nthereon were to be placed before the Society at its An1iual General Meting and also on the table of the Houses of Parliament. Rule 18 provides that the appoint-\n\n1nert to various posts under the s.ociety shall be 1nade in accordance with the , Recruitment Rules frarned for the purpose by the GovenliJig .Body with the prior approval Of the Government of India. The ad1ninistrative ad -the financial con~\n\nteal of the Governn1ent is alf pervasive.\n\nThe rules and bye-laws of the Society can be framed, amended or repeal\"ect only. With the. sa'ncion of the GoVeinment of India. [219 E-F; 220 B-FJ •\n\nSabhajif Tewary .V. U.O.I. [l975J3 SCR 616 -distinguished and imited and.\n\nU; P. Warehousing .Corporation v._ Vijay. Narain [1980J 3 SCC 45~ referred to.\n\nThe guarantee of equ.alityin all its pervasive character enables. this F Court to ren1ove discri1ni1la.tion and to restore fair play in action . .{226.C]\n\nThe instant\" cil.se, is a glaring example of discrirrllnatory treatn1ent accorded .to old experienced and highly qualified hands with an evil eye and uneq'ual hand.\n\nNo attempt was made to sUstain tbe scales of l)ay for the post of PrfessOr on the doctr.ine of classification because the classification 9f existing incumbents as being distinct ai1d separate froni newly recfu.ited hands with fimsy change in essential qualification would be wholly irrationar and arbitrary.\n\nTe case of the petitioners fof being.put in the revised sccile of Rs fI00-1600 from the date\" on which newly created Posts of Professors in Sister disciplines in IVRI and other institutes were created and filled in revised scaie iS nanswer<' ble and mut be conCeded l226 .B~DJ\n\nRandhir Singh v U.O.l (1982] 1 SCC 618, referred to.\n\n4 . The mo1nent the High Court held that it had no JuriSdictiOn to entertain he writ petition, it becan1e /tfltctus officio and there[ore, its decision on the merit H\n\nof the C.ontcritionis or no consi;:Quen~ and.at any rate could not concltide the\n\nmat~Cr.- Now that.it has been held _that the writpetiion is maintainable.on the finding th!l-t IC~R and its_affiliates ae othCr authority within the mening of the_\n\nxpr.cssion in Article 12, justice ckmands that the court must examine th(: on tentions On merit. The ptelimii:ia:ry objeciion. over-ruled and ·e ievie\\v petition allowed. [229 F-G] I\n\n s. ,· It is wll--settfed -th; t expefience tol, Je .of valu~ and utility n1ust be acquired\n\nafr tl).e educ'1tonal qualification is obtained-and hot while acQUirtng the postgraduate quahficatiOn. [232 A]\n\n._in the ii!stant case, preParing thesis Clfter giadu<'tion {o'r acquiring post-~ graduate degree .would rtot count toWr:n:ds presCrlbed experienct -qua_lificatidn. ln\n\nth~ case of Ph.D °.cteg:eeawarded on research the situaticn nlay be diffe; e11:t. .[232 BJ\n\n6. 'The Court must IoOk \\Vith.resp~, ct tipbn th~ pcrformi>.nce Of dutieS by experts in. their respective. fields.\n\nHowever,_ the .task of.. ushering. z .Society based. 'on rule of law is erl1:rust.Cd io this court and it cannot abdicate its function$. Once'\n\nit is fllPSt satisfactorily establishedtl'l:at the Selection Conunitteci did O:ot. have thC power to relax i.:ssential qualification peftaining to expefience, ' .. the eritire process -Of 5\".ilec.tiOri of thi 6th respondent was in contr:avention of the established nom1s\n\nprescribed. by the advertiseinent and Power of the Sdectio~ Coffimittee and pro.; . ccdure for fair and jusl seleC.tio11 and equality in the ffiatter of public mployme1lt and. to_ rectify resultant inji.i.stice and esiabiish -constih.itional value this Court must interfere. [234 I>-EJ · ·\n\n_Stale \"fBihar v. Dr. Asis Ku111a~ Mukherjee [i975] SCR 894, referred .to.·\n\n. ' - ' ' .\n\nIn the instant CTJ$e, the first Selection Committee examined. the suit!lbility of seven crndidates including _the petiiiollef~ and pecifically recorded its, finding that none of the candidates .. interviewed or cOnside.red in absentia including : . respondent No. 6 Who w3.$ selected at. a la:ter. stage~ fulled al .the esseiltial quali_ficatio-ns laid down for : the post.\n\nTtie Committee recommended that .. the post be re-advertised -after mplyfying the essential qualificatiOn jn the . mt'ltter of exPerience, Viz. '10 yea1; s research exper.ienCe in the field of protein Chemis_try? .. The -post. was the post of Senior. Bio-chemist. Jnitialy experience . required wasin _the fiei<l of Nutrition with p:iticulilr reference tO Qu(l'ntity and · .Quality of protein in food grainS as.evidenced by published work i, yhile'the ampli- . fied esselltial qualification was-researchexperience ill the field of protein Cheffiistry ..\n\nIt is difficult to efface the ipression that the amplification was done .keeping in View the qualification'- whic~ respondent No;' 6 ha.d .. ·oreovcr respondent No. 6 , appeared not tc c8-rry on research. in th.e line of Nutrition o.r protein Chemistry\n\n 3rid therefore h~. did not fulfil the qualification at <'ll and he could not therefore haVe even bee~ Called for interview by the Selection Committee. The .Selection\n\nCommittee alsO did nOt h.ave thepower to relax the essential qu\"lificati'on, fo.r th~ . post; The seleCtjon of respOitdent NC1; 6 is. contrary to rules and orders. aiid in violation o( prescribed norn1s~ He. was ifieligible. for the poSt when seleCted a~~ his selcction .. nd appointment has to be quashed and set aside, [230 GG, 233 E-F, 234 F] '\n\n1.· Th~High Court wasclearly in err.or in.obsl.:\"rving that eiter Dr. Raw_n (petitioner in R.P. No. 80176) was not hopeful of getting the job or he had some ·\n\nother reasons for Dot applying for the same .and therefore his grievance cannot\n\n__ , ...\n\n~.·· ...\n\nP.\"K. IYER V. UNION. 205\n\nbe entert\"ined. This is clearly contrary to record. -He had applied earlier and - w_ s entitled to be called--fcir interview as noted in the proceedings. It w~~; obligatorY upon the second selection -Comrriittee 10 _inform -him to appear for te intervi'e and adequate .steps should have been taken to give the intirriation '\"because he was attached t9 the institute and .was in ctive sCr1ice of.the institute and intimaiion to him would not require any herculern effort on the. p?.rt :of the Committee.\n\nBut he.-has been-assesSed thrice 'by the Assessment Committee for p~Omoti0n to S-3 grade. and found wantin~. Te Insti.tute shll set up a speth.•l ~sessment Committye t9. 3ssess his sllitability. for promotio~ t, o .S-3 gr_ade by xamltfing his work.from 1976 .. He is.not entitled to any further relie.f. [239 0-240A, 241 EJ\n\nA combipd-re3ding. of_Ruies 13 and 14; indicate that, it i~ open to the Agricuitu:faI Scientist Recruitment Bciard to prescribe minirhtirn marks which the candidates must obtain at the written test before becoming eligible for viVa-voce test. After the Candiclaie obtain~ minimum marks or more at the written test he .becomes. eligible \"for being called for .viva-, voce test, nd he has t() appeir at the\n\nviva-voce test.\n\nNeither Rule 13 nor Rule 14 nor any other rule enables. tti~- ASR'B. ,'-to prescribe nlinimum qualifying marks to be obtained by the_ cilndidate at the\n\nviva-voce fus_t.\n\nThe language of Rule 14 clearlynegatiyes any s\"ucb power in the.\n\nASRB when it provides that after the, written test if the c..1.ndidate hfl, s obtaiqed 1Tiinim, um marks, he is eligible for being Cfllled for viva ... voce test and the final merit list would -be. drawn up according to the aggregate of marks obtained-by the candidate .-in. : wd°tten teSt plus viva-voce examination. {244 D-fJ ·\n\nIi:i the instant ase; (CA N~ .. 1043/81) ihe :adctiti6nal qualificat!On \\vhich :ASRB prescribed tO_ itself that-the candidate must have a further qualificatiori obtaining minimum markS in the viva-vocc. test dves not fi.nd place in Rules 13 ilnd and 14. If such power is 2!aimed, it hs to be explicit and. cannot be read by neces'sary .iinplication for the Obvious rcasoll that such deviation from the rules . is likely. to cause irrepearable and irre'versible ham1. onW an additional qualification Of obtainin.g.mininlun1. marks.at_thc viva-voce test fa adhered to, a candidate _who. may figure high-up in thC metit-list was likely.to be rejected on th\"e ground . that h~ .has not obtained n1ihimum. qualifying marks at vivavOce test.. s list prepared in contravention of the Rules caiinot be sustained. ·However, it\" is not possible at this late stage to reject' the entire seleCtion and it would be equally ii:nproper tO disturb the selec.tion. of those who had bn_ selected and :ppointed way back .in 1978. If there is avacancY.and if the appellant comes within.the zone of selection on the aggregate of inarks obtained by hin1. his case shall -be con~ Sidered for appointm<!nt prospectively and nOt rctropsectively. -1244 G-H; 245 C;\n\n~D;~ . . .\n\n ORIGIN~L JuRISDicTION : Writ Petition No. 587 of 1975 (Under article 32 of the ConstHution)\n\nwith.\n\nReview Petition No. 4 of 1977 (@SLP (Civil) No. 2339 •of 1975 &\n\nReyiew Petition No.' 79/76) .\n\n• H\n\nand\n\nReview Petition No. 80 of 1976 (Arising '0;1t of SLP (Civil) No. 702 of 1976)\n\nand\n\nCivil Appeal No. 1043 of 1981 . . . . .\n\nAppeal by Special leave from the Judgment ;111d Order ., dated .• tire Sth May, 1980 of the Delhi High Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 553 of 1980.,. ~\n\nc .YogeshwarPrasad and Mrs Rani Chhabra for the Petitioner in WP. 5.87/7.5 & RP. No .. 4/77.\n\nM.G. R amchandran for the Appellant in CA.· .No. 1043 of 1981.\n\n Abdul Khader, Mi.<s .A\" Suhhashini and Girish Chandra for the D Respondent in WP. 587/75.\n\nK.G. Bhagar~ Addi. Sol: Gene; a/ and Ms. A. Subhashini for the Rcspoudent in RP. No. 4/77. .\n\n'b,. Gobwdhan and C.V. Subba Rao for Resnc-1id.enl m CA.\n\nE No. 1043 of 1981.\n\n' ' .\n\nB.N .. Lokur, and C.N. Ralnaparkhi for Respondents. 2-7 in WP. No. 587 of 1975.\n\nJudgment of the Cour; was delivered by\n\nDESAI, .J.\n\nTn th.is group '.of writ pet1t1on, civil appeal. special leave ptitiqn and review petitions, a_ common que.:tion_ of la\\v. is raised whether Indian Council of Agricultural Re.search ('lC AR for short) and its affiliate Indian Veterinary . Research Institute (lVRI for shortfare either itself tlieSta{e or such other authority .as would be comprehended in the.expression 'other authority in Art. 12 of the Constitution 7\n\n. Re: 'W.P. No. 587/75 :\n\nNo.\n\n. . .\n\nPe; itioner No. l was Professor of. Animal Patholcgy, pet1ticmr 2 was Professor of Animal Genetics and petitioner No. 3 was\n\n',.c,,;,.....--.. . ( - •\n\n. . 1\n\nI ...\n\n-·~ -\n\n• ~. K. IYER \":UNION (Desai, J.) 207 • Professor of. Veterinary Parasitology, all attached to IVRJ. Six posts of Professors one each in Animal Pathology, Animal Genetics.\n\nVelerinary Parasitology, Animal Nutrition, Bacteriology and' Physiology were created on the i1itroduction of the post-graduate wing in IVRI in 195.8 .At the relevant time the post of Professor carried the scale of Rs. 700-)250. Of the six posts, first mentioned, three posts of Professors were held by the petitiners in their respective discipline, On lhe introduction of the scales recommended by th.e University Grants Commissio~. the pay scale attached to the post of Professer in IVRl was revised to Rs. 1100-1609: After the up-· ward revision during the year 1970-71, the cadre of Professors in IVRJ was expanded b'r -creating six ne\\\\'. . post of Professors in vafiouS disciplines. Surprisingly, ach of the petitioners, , who was already holding post of Professor, was not given the benefit of the upgraded scale attached. to the post of Professor wliile ol) the other hand. the\n\nnewincumbent recruited in . the newly created posts in the year\n\n1970-?°f were a warded the revised scale of Rs. 1100-1600. This led .to the disturbance in the inter se seniority in the .cadre of Professors and manifested an anomalous. position that the old incumbents of • the posts. of Professors such as petitioners, continued in the prerevised scale of Rs 7bO-l250 while .the new incumbents were put in the revised scale of.Rs I 100-1600 both having the.designation of Professor and there is no appreciable difference in the qualifications attached to .the post .. )Vhen this was. brought to the notice of the authori\\ics concerned, the ICAR With the con•urrcnce of the Minisfry of Finance ). resolved .'as per. decision dated April 6, 1972 to award the· revised scale of pay attached to the post of Professor to the peNioners, b11t this was subject to the condition that it wollld not be automatic but\n\n~ the existing incumbents of posts may be considered for revised scale \"\" along with other suitable .Persons.\n\nTt was imp'.ieit in the condition prescribed that the petitioners wi~ have to stand in. competition ;, ith others applications, if there be any, and go througli the ha+ard of a . . °\" fresh selection for tlle post each one was alreadv. holding.. This is\n\nthe' first grievance voiced by the petitioners in the writ petition con-. tending that the petitioners were qualified for the posts of Professor.\n\nand that eah of them was holding the post from 1963, 1970 and 1970\n\n•. respectively. TM petitioners made. various representations basing their claim inter a/ia on fair play, equality of opportunity.in.the matter of public employment arid equal pay for equal work as well as the provision co11tained in Fundamental Rule -23. The petitioners ~Jsci .contend that they fulfil the minimum qualification prescribed for the\n\n post.a_fer upward rt:, vision of the paysca1e; and they_have the. requfsi1&. experience and ihat they are performing the same or identical duties . . . .\n\n... •\n\nc '\n\n.. SUPREME COURT RF.PORTS\n\n. [1984] 2 S.C.R.\n\na; are being performed by ne\\VlY recruited. Professors in sister di~\" ciplines, and that denial to the1n of the revised pay scales for. foe post of Professor .aparf from being discriminatory .and violative of Art: 14 . . . . is thoroughly arbitrary ancf unjustified. lt .appears that pursirnnt to the didsion dated April 6,' 1972, the ICAR 'issued an adyertisement on May 21, 1974 inviting applications for the post of ProfeBsor in . . Animal Pathology,. Animal Genetic$ .and Veterinary Parasitology\n\n in the revised scale of Rs. I J00,!600: These were 'the posts alrea.dv held by petitioners. The advertisement set .out the .essent.ial and desirable qualifications for each post. Petitioners contend that the duties pertaining to the post of Professor in the upgraded scale\n\nare' the same as performed by the petitioners and that this action . of inviting fesh applications for post already held by the petitioners\n\ndisclosod a cover attempt t0 remove the petitioners. 'from the posts held by them for years. ·-Petitioners further contend that only three posts held by the. petitioners have been advertised inviting the aj:lpiications for fresh recruitment while there we.re others .\\vho were ho'ding\n\nposts .of Professors in the pre-revfsed scale .and. to whom bendlt of automatic upward revision was granted and this disclcscd n-0t cnly the bias of the ICAR but also subjected the petitioners to grcss discrimination. Serious allegations of bias :ind malafid.o have been madeagainst respondent No .. 6, the Director or' IVRI, and Director General ufJCAR, which.need not be set out here. It may, however, lie .stated that tho.ugh the \\aious functionaries workihg .in IVRI and TCAR are highly qualified persons, profesional rivalry had led to such poisonini; of the atmosphere and character assassination had become so rampant and the. environment had become so snffo- ,\n\ncatig that the Government of India had to appoint a Committee -·-1 presidedover by late Shri P.D. Gajendragadbr, retired Chief Justice · of the Supreme Court' with wide terms of reference which. amongst others included' the recruitment and personnel policies. of !CAR as\n\nwell as Institutes a!id Centres working under it and io suggest rnearnrcs '!\" for th, eir improvemen\\. It is alleged that absolutely incmrcct, imprc- ' per and prejudiced .entries are made. ii1 confidential reports with a vieiv to harming foe. areer of the persos who have fallen froin the grace of the Directo.r al)d that therefore, the C'ourt, should .lift the veil. of the so'called society and peep i1ito the realities of life. The . petitioners ,, ccordingly prayed for an appropriate writ, order or . direction to quash ihe advertisement dated May 21, .1975 inviting . applicatfons for the posts nf Professors in three subjects already held by th.e petitioners and to confirm 'the petitionerS'in the aforemeiltion(d p:ists and tc'i give them the benefit of the !'fOVised.scale from the date from whkh. fr was given try Professors in sister disciplines and to quash\n\n,. -\n\nP. K. IYER v. UNION.(Desai, J.) 209\n\nthe adverse entries in' the confidential eports of the three petitioners.\n\nOn these averments petitioners filed the present writ petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution.\n\nRe : S.LP. No. 2339/75 with R.P. No. 4/77 :\n\none Dr. Y.P. Gupta filed Writ Petition No. 276 of 1972 in the High Court of Delhi questibning the correc.tness of the order removing him as member of the faculty of the post-graduate school of Indian Agricultural Research Institute {IARI for short). Petitioner Dr.\n\nGupta alsll' questioned the. validity of appointment of Dr. S.L. Mehta respondent No. 6 in the High Court to the post of Senior , Bio-chemist in IARl and claim.ed. that he was entitled to. be appointed .to that post. This petition was resisted by the respondents primarily on the ground that neither ICAR not IVRl is either a State or• other authority within the meaning of the expression in Art. 12 of the Constitution, When the matter cameup before the Division 'Bench of the Delhi High Court, a .direction was given that in view of the importance of the questions that arise for determination in the writ . petition before the court and in view of the .various decisio.n which . 'have to be recpnciled, the petition should .be heard by a larger Bench.·\n\nPursuant to this direction, the matter came up before a Bench of five Judges. The larger Bench formulated four questions for its considerations :\n\n''.I.\n\nDo the petit1oners have legal right to chaUene the appointment of respondent 6 ?\n\nHas .the Director-General of the !CAR acted in con' .travention of any legal obligation in making the appointment. of respondent 6 .?\n\n.3.\n\nHas the said appointment vitiated by the mala fides of Dr. swaminathan and/or of Dr. Naik?\n\nWas it bad because of the want of qualifications .of Dr.\n\nMehta 0r non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in_ making it ?\" ·\n\nThe court answered the fint question against the petitioner\n\nhlding tQ.at ICAR is a society registered under the Societies Registra-\n\n. .\n\ntl'on Act and it is neither a State nor other authority within contempla- H tio< of Art. i2 of the onstitution. The court further held that\n\n• G\n\n210 SUP.REME COUl\\T REPORTS\n\n( 1984] 2 S C R.,\n\nthe. relaii.on between the petitioner and ICAR' is gMerned by a con- tract and the rles and the bye-la\\vs or tl1e Society .and !CAR was free to fill in the post of Senior Bio-chemiste in any manner it llked.\n\nThe court observed that .the petitioner being a mere employee, he has no legal right agafost the employer and in the .absence of 'any statutory elemen{ governing his emplo)'ment, the relation is governed purely by .a contract. and a breach. of contract, if any, would. not\n\npermit a declaration in favour of the petiticner. Bri<fly, the .court held that the remedy by way of writ is not available against !CAR.\n\nOn the second question the court held that the Director-General owed no obligation or legal duty in making the ppointment of the sixth respondent which can be. enforced by a writ. petition. Questions\n\nNos. 3 and 4 were cdea!Uogetber and it was held that the pleadings . were inadequate to permit a finding. of ma]a fide and in the absence\n\nof proof there. is nothing to show tl1at .the appointment of the sixth\n\nresondent was vitiated either by mala fides. or by non-compliance with procedure..\n\nConsistent wjth .these findings, the writ pe.tition . of Dr. Gupta was dismissed. Simultaneously, the writ . petition filed by one Dre T.S. Raman being Writ Petition Ne. 669/72 was dismissed. by the common iu4gmcnt:\n\nDr. Y.P: Gupta ii.Jed S.L.P. No. 2339 of J97.5 in this Court.\n\nOn O:ofober 6, 1975, this Court.directed a notice to be issued to ibc respondents to shw cause why special leave to 'appeal shoui<l 1iot be .. gra.nted. When the .m1ttCr came up again before this Cm.irt on July 2!, 1976, Mr. Lokur, 'learned counsel. appearing for the !CAR\n\n:'>._\n\n.stated to the Court that the respondent-council would consider the ·.: ·-f.\n\nquestion of taking back the petitioner as a member of the postgraduate faculty ofIARf. After recording this statemei1t, the Special\n\nleave potition was disljlissed. Petitioner. Dr. Gupta filed Review .Petition No. 79 or 1976 requesting the Court to review its. order dismissing the special leve petition. This review petiticn was rejected . y on October 27, 1976. As second review petition wns not .barrecl\" at the relevant time, Dr. Gupta filed Review Pctitien No. 4/77 which is.· directed to be heard in th.e present group of appeal, writ petition and special leave petition.\n\n J?e : R.P. No. so of1976. : Dr.T.S. Raman whose Writ Petitin No. 669 of 1972 was heard along with Writ Petiticn of Dr. Gupta and which was a!s'o dismissed by the common judgment, filed Special Leave Petition No. 702 of 1976 in this Court. This petition was\n\n R dismissed by the .Court on Augu.t 30, 1976. Dr. T:S. Raman filed Rovieiv P.otition No. 80 of 1976 which iS being heard i.n this group. . . .\n\n----.;.,' - ..\n\n..,...\n\nP. K. IYER v. UNION (Desai, J.) . 211\n\nRe: CA. No. 1043/81 : Appellant Dr. Om Prakash .Khauduri fifod Writ Petition No. 553 of 1980 in the High Court of Delhi alleging .. that he was selected for the post of Senior Computer with Ifidian\n\nAgricultural Statistics Research Institutes, ana affiliate of.JCA'R. iCAR set up Agricultural Scientists Recruitent Board (ASRB) which deCided to hold a competitive examination to recruit scientists to be appointc'd under various disciplines. ICAR framed rules setting out the terms and conditions for ac,\\mission to. the competitive examirition .. Appellnt applied for admission to the ompetitive examination iii 'Agricultural Statistics' . .'discipiline. The written test was ldd froni 1st to 4th February, 1978: The Board incharge of . the selection and appointment on. the comparative merits as evidenced by the performance in the w1'itten examination selected 20 candidates icluding the appeUant as aving obtaine~, e presribed qualifying marks for. the purpose .of viva voce examilra'tion which was held on . April !0th and llth, 1978. Aftedhe viva voce test, 13 candidates\n\n1iuro declared as successful.and were offered appointment as scientists in the di, eipline 'Agricultural statistics'. The appellant failed to qualify for the. same. According to the appellant, 21 vacal)cies iomained unfilled: Appellant contends that he h1!'il secured -364 marks out of 600 in tl\\.e written examination and 3il m'arks out of\n\nJOO in the. viva voce test. It is alleged that the appellant was declared . Un5uccessfu\\ because the .Board incharge of the examinqtion has by itself .determined without any authority that anvortc who obta; ned less.than40 marks atthe viva voce examination would not be eligible for selection for the posts. It is therefore, contended that the action 'of the BJard _in fixing minimum qualifying' in arks in the viva voce ·\n\nexamination and basing the final selection on this arbitrarily .fixed criteriou lacks both the authority of law and rules and. thai the B.o.ard has acted arbitrarily and without the authority of law; Appellant accordingly .. made representa.tions \\)ut failedto cvqke a sympathetic reply, and therefore, the appellant filed a writ petition in. the High . Court of Delhi which was dismissed -in limine on 'the ground that .the ·\n\nwrit petition against ·, the resppndent was not maintainabl~. Hence .,\n\nthis appeal by special leave.\n\nordinarily one would. sincerely .deplore th.e delay in disposal of a problem brought before the Court, but occasionally, one comes ac1:oss a case in which the sheer passage of time and the fast removing\n\n.. scenario of changing pattern of .law resolves the. dispute to some extent ..\n\nMr.- Lokur appearing for I<; AR raised a preliminary objection\n\n... . '\n\n... c\n\nthat ICAR is not an agency or instrumentality of the State and therefore it is not .comprehended in the expression 'other authority' within the meaning of the expression in Art. 12 of the Constitution and thereVire the High Court was fully justified in throwing out the petition at the threshold: Mr. Lokur directed a frontal attack drawing sustenance from the decision of Delhi High Court that JCAR being a Society registered under the Societies Registration Ac.t and being . neither a State ncrother authority within te tontemplaticn of.Art. 12\n\nnor an instrumentality of the State, writ jurisdiction of the High Court cannot .be , invoked against it. Sabhajit Tewary y. Union of : India & Ors. <ll was the sheet anchor of M;. Lokur's extensive sub-. missions because in.· that case a Constitution Bench presided over\n\n'-~-. c\n\nby the then Chief Justice ruled that the Council of Scientific and lndi1strial Research, a&J_ciety registered mider theSccieties Registra:\n\nlion Act, was neither a ST!\\te .nor other auothrity within the contemplation or Art. 12 and therefore, the writ petition was held not to he : maintainable against ii. And even though this matter had became part-heard .in 1980 and the hearing was resumed in 1983 before a different Bench, the vigour of the sustained attack was not the leasi dimmed even \"though the law expanding the width and ambit of the expression 'State· and 'other .. a.thuority' in ..<rt. 12 had taken strides culminating in Ajay Hasia tc. v. Khalid Mujib' Sehrarardi & Ors.\n\netc, <2> And Mi. Lokur continued his submission with unabated fury even though the learned Solicitor General Shri K. Parasharai:t appearing for the Union of India fairly conceded that in view of the circumstances disdosed in the case and the tre.nd of the decsioris, it is. not possible to contend that ICAR and its affiliates JVRI and JAR! walud riot be other authority.being instrumentalities of the Siate and . against which writ jurisdiction could be invoked . • A very brief resume of the history of ICAR commencing from its initial set up and its development into its present position would show that as a matter of form, it .is a society registered under the\n\nSocieties, Registration Act but substantially when set up it was an adjunct ofthe Government of India and has not unde.rgone. any noteworthy change .. On the advent of the provincial a'!tonomy under the Government of India Act, 1919, 'agriculture' and 'miimal lmsbandry' .ca1e under the heading 'transferred sUdject' with the result that they came within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Pre v)ncial\n\nGoyernent Development or agriculture and research in agriculture\n\nH co [1975) 3 s.c.R. 616.\n\n(2) [19811 2 S.C.R. 79.\n\n- P. K. IYBR v. UNION (Desai,.J.) 213\n\nbecame the_ responsibility of the Provincial Government. Even then a Royal Commission on agriculture was constituted in 1926 to enquire into the agricultural set up and the rural economy of the country a.nd to make recommendations to consider what firm steps . -are necessary to be tal<en by the Central Government in this behalf!\n\nThe Commission in its report recommended the setting-up of Imperial . Council ofAgricultural Research, Acting upon this recommendation,\n\nGovernment of India sent a telegram to the Secretary of. State on April 24, 1929 informing the latter that the process of setting up of the Council is under way and that when setup Council would be a Society.' On May 9, 1929, Secretary of State appr\"oved the proposal of the Government of India subject to variations mentioned therein .. By ·its Resolution dated May 23, 1929, the Central Government directed that Imperial Counci!\" of Agricultural Research should be registered as a Society under the Registration of Societies Act •. X.XI of 1860.\n\nThe Resolution further provided that with respeci to the grant to be . . made to the Co1; ncil to meet the cost of staff, establishment etc.; the Government of India decided that for reasons of administrative convenience, it should be in the same position as a department of the Government of Indi; t Secretariat. The Imperial Council of Agricultural Research was s.et up in June .1929.\n\nA direction was also given that the research institutes were to be m_aintained by the Council.\n\nIntheir counter-affidavit filed in the High Court of Delhi it was conceded in paragraph 27 that the Imperial Council of Agricultural Research should in future be an attached.office and not the department of the Government to be entirely manned by Government staff and the secretariat staff of the. Council was to. be paid from the grant to be given by the Government for its administration and they would be Government servants and' the Secretariat would be department of the Government of India .. In July, 1929,. ICAR was registered as a Society with its office_ in the Secretariat as an attached office of the Secretariat. By the Resolu\\ion dated August 4, 1930, Government of. India directed that for reasons of administrative convenience \"the Governbr-General in Council has now,. decided that the Imperial Council of Agricultural Research Department, as the Secretariat of the. Councir will henceforth be designated, should be. a regular departm_ent of the Government of India Secretariat under the Hon'ble Member incharge of the DCiJartment of Education,\n\nHealth and Lands\" .. A note was submitted .on December 29, '!937 to the then Viceroy conc.erning the status and position of the !CAR as a Department of the Government in which it was recommended that .JCAR should 1:wt only be maintained as a distinct entity indep_endent pf the Government of India and with a view to achkving\n\nSUPRIJME COURT REPORTS . [l 984] 2 s.c.R\n\nthis positici~. the office of the ICAR should not i~ future be a Department of the Government of Jn4ia but should 'be an attad1ed oijice. Thi.s prqpo, sa\\ was approved by the Viceroy on January 14, 1938 .simultaneously .expressing this anxiety io sustain the prestige cf lCAR. Ti, e .next step .; s one taken.by the Resolulio~ dated January 5, 1939 by which the Government of India modified the status oft.he !CAR from the Department of the Secretariat lo one of an attached office\n\nof the Government. of I;1dia; A letter was addressed to the. High Commissioner for India in London on January l 4, l939 intii\\iating to nim that the Secretariat of the !CAR will. cease to be a Departmer:l o(the Government ofIndia'and will be an attached office under the\n\nDepartmet of Educatioi1, Helth and.La.nds with effect from Jnuary\n\nJS, 1939. Till then recruitment.to various posts in !CAR was-made\n\nthrngh Federal Public Service Commission and this was to be con- -tinued even after the change in the stati1s of ICARas an attached office as evidei1cd by the Jetter dated August 24, J938 by the Joint Secretary.to Government of India to tl; e Federal Public Service Commission.\n\nAbilL was introduced in .the Central Legislature styled as the \"Agritultura\\ Produce Cess Bill, J 949''. The statement of object and reasons ccoinpanyi11$ the lii11 re_cited that the Central Government have provided grants to the tune of Rs. 84 lakhs for tl1e cxponditureor l\\le Council and took notice. orthe fac.t that the Coui1cil has practially no source of-income other \\ban the contriution from the C.entral Revenue which may be unstable. depending upon lhe . state of finances of the Central Government: It was further .observed that in order. to place Council on a more secured financial positicn, it has been decided to levy a cess at the_ rate of 1/2% on ihe valucof certain agricultural coi:nrnodities and the p; oceeds of theproposed . ..... .. .. ' . . . cess are estimated to amount in a normal year to about Rs, 14 lakhs.\n\nThe bill w.as moved.- In the debate upon the bill, a statement was F Iilade on behalf of the Government of lndfa that the .Central Legisla- . lure will retain its full .right of interpellation and of moving resolutions and will still vote on the grant of the.'petmaneni staff, and some of the activities of the CounciL . kother words, an assurance was given that .the Central Legislative Assembly \\Vil! have positive coi1frol\n\nover the affairs'.of the Council to the some extent and degree when it was a Department br an attached office of the. Government of India.\n\nOn the advent of!ndependece .. The Imperial Com:icil of Agricultura1 Research wane:, designated as Indian .Council of Agri.cultutal Research. 'With effect from April i, 1966, administrative contr~I over IARI and\n\nIVRI and other institutes was transferred. to ICAR simultaneously placing the Government staff of the institute~, at the disposal of JCAR/ as on foreign sevice. This is evidend by a cmmunkation dated\n\nP. K .. IYER v. UNION(Desa0J.) 215\n\n--< April 19, :J966 _addressed by the Ministry of Agriculttiral, Food, ..\n\nCommunity, Development and Cooperation to' the Directors of Central Research. Institutes. An option was given to \\he members of thestaff f. the Institutes, 'administrative control of which was transferred to ICAR and the date for exercising tlje.optlon was extended by the communication d.ated November 9., 1966. In .the meantime, the Government of Indfa enforced the new rules framed by\n\nthe ICAR effective from January 10, 1966 keeping rule 18 in abeyance .\n\n.,_ With the change in the status of the ICAR, Department of Agricul- . tural Research and Education ('DARE' .for short) was set up in the\n\nMinistry of Agriculture and \\t came into existence on December )5, -\n\n-- _,\n\n1973. Th.is Department was -set up with a view to providing necessary Government linkage with ICAR. Tue major fm\\ction of the Department was to look after all aspects of agricultural research and educe tion involving coordination between Central_ and State agencies; to attend io all matters relating to the ICAR; and to attend to all matters concerning the development of new• technology in. agriculture~ animal husbandry and fisheries, .including such functions a> plant and animal - . introduction and exploration, and soil and land use survey and planning. By this very Resolution, the Director General of ICAR was _ concurrently designated' as Secretary to Government of lndir, in the DARE. The posi!i011 of !CAR was clarified t.o the effect that in .:'. the reorganised. set-up, the ICAR will have the autonomy essential for the effective functioning of a scientific organisation and deal 'with sister Departmenis the Central . Government, with State .. Governments and also with international agricultural research centres t -tlir6ugh the DARE. Rule, 18 .of the. ICAR mies which was keptin. abeyance on January I 0, 1966 was bro right into operation. in its entirety effective from April l, !974 as per communication <!ated ' March 30, 1974 by the Ministry of Agriculture to the Secretary, ICAR r . The consequence of Rule 18 hecoming operative was that the Sec- ·\n\nretariat of ICAR ceased to be.:an attached office of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture and the Society shall fnnctiOn as 'wholly financed and controlled by the society'. This last sentence hardly' •makes any. sense: Till\n\n0 Rule 18 was .kept .in .abeyance, recruitment to rcAR was done through the Union Public Service Commission 'as evidenced by the le.tter date, d August 24, 1938 of the Government \"\n\nof India to the Secretary, Federal Public Service-Commission; Simla, Rule 18 as stated earlier became operative from April I, 1974. Rule ' 18 proides that 'the Society shall establish and _maintain. its own\n\n.office, Research- •Institutes and Laboratories. The appointment\n\nto_ the various posts under the Society's e.stablishment was to be made in accordance with the Recruitment Rules framed for the purpose\n\nG. ,\n\n' .\n\nby the govcrnmg body with the approval of the Government of India\",\n\nApart from the criteria devised by the Judicial diet the very . birth and its cofltlnued existence over half a century nd its present ·\n\nposition would leave no one in doubt that ICAR is alsmcst an inse-. _parable adjunct of. tlie Government of India having an outward form\n\nof being a Society, .it could be styled_ as a Society .set up by the , State and therefore, would be an instrumentality of the siate. ·\n\nlCAR start¢d as a Department of the Government of India having an office in-the.Secretariat even though it was a Scciety regietered under the Societies Registration Act. It was wholly financed\n\nby the Government of Iildia. Its budget was voted upon as prt of the expenses incurred in the. Ministry of Agricuitm:e. Even v.hrn its §talus underwent a change, it wr.s declared.as ai1 attached cfticc of the Gover.nment of India. The control of the Government cf India permeates through. all its activities and it is th~ bcdy to wliich tLc Government .of India transferred Research Institutes set up by it. .\n\nIn order to make it financ; ially viable, a cess was levied meaning thereby . . ' . . that tile taxation power of the Stale was invoked, and the proceeds of the tax were to be. handed over to ICAR for its use.\n\nAt no stage, the. control of the Government of lndia ever flinched and since its inception it was setup to carry out the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Agricnliure. In our opinion, this by itself is sufficient to make it an instrumentality of the siate.\n\n[twas however urged that The Council of Scientific and lr.dustrial Research (CSIR' for short).a society register<d under the Sccietks.\n\nRegistration Act and having an ident; cal set up as well as ccnstituti.cn: was held not t0 be an instrumentality of the State er 'other authority' under Art. 12. In Sabhajii Tewary's case, this Court held that the.\n\nCSiil did not .have a statutory character like the Oil and Natural Gas Commission, or the Life Iilsuranc<! Corporation or Industrial\n\nFiance Corporation, and it was a society .incorported in accordance with the provisions of the Societies Registration Act. The fact that the .Prime Minister is the presidei1t or that the Government appoints nominees to the Governing Body or that the Government may ter- · minate the inembership will not according to this Court establish anything more than the fact that the Government takes special care that the promotion, guidance and co-operation of scientific and. industrial research, the institution and financing of specific researches,' establishment of development' a1\\d assistance. to special instittions\n\n• ..\n\n\\----~\n\nI -\n\n',•.\n\nP. _K. !YER v. UNION (Desai, J.) 217 •\n\nfor scientific study of problems affecting particular industry in a trade,· the utilh; ation of tbe result of the researches conducted under the auspices of the Council towards the development of industries in the country are carried out in a responsible manner, and these aspe9(s are not sufficient to reach the eondusion that the Society was ari agency or ; nstrumentality of the Government. This Court also referred to. some decisions which have held that the companies incorporated under the Companies Act and the employees _of these companies do not enjoy the protection available to Goverrinient servants as contemplated in Art. 311. This Court accordingly concluded that CSIR is not an instrumentality of the Government comprehended in the expression 'other authority' within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution, and the writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked against it. Much water has flown down the 1amuna since the dicta.in Sabhajit Tewary's case and conceding that it is not specifically. overruled in . later decision; its ratio is considerably watered down so as to be a decision confined to its own facts. The case is wholly distinguishable on the facts apart from the later indicia formuld by the Court for ascertaining whether_ a body is 'other authority' withihn the meaning of Art. 12. A-mere c01riparison of the history of ICAR as extensively set out herein before and the setting-up of CSIR would clearly show that ICAR came into existence as a department ()f the Government, continued to be an .attached office of the Government even though it was registered as a society and wholly financed by the Government and the taxing power of the State was invoked to make it financially. viable. and to-, which independent research -institutes set up by the Government were transferred. None of these features was present in the case of CSIR and therefore, the deci_sion in Sabhajit Tewary's case.would .render no assistance and would be clearly distinguishable. . .\n\nThe ratio, if any, of the decision in Sabhajit Tewary's case was : ' F examined by a Constitutin Bench of this Court in Ajay Basia's case and.it was held that that 'decisio'n is not an authority for the proposition that a society registered under the Societies Registratio.n Act, 1860 can never be regarded as an authority withih the meaning of Art. 12.\n\nThe Court further held that having. regard to the various features enumerated in the judgment in Sabhajit Tewary's case, the conclusion G was reached that the .CSIR was not an agency of the Government, but the Court did not rest its conclusion on the sole ground that CSIR was a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860; and on the contrary proceeded to consider various other features of. the Council for ariving at the conclusion that it was not an ageny\n\nH - of the Government and therefore, it was not an authority for the\n\n. . . . • 218 SUPREME COtlRT REPORTS [1984] 2 s.c.R. ·\n\nA · proposition that a society registered under the. Societies Regisfration Act for that reason-alone would not be cowprehended in the expressiOn 'other authority'. Jn Ajay Hasia's _case, this Court after taking note of the decisions in Ram_ana Dayaram Shetiy v. The International Airport of India.& ars.'ll and U.P. Warehousing Corporatio~ v. VijayNarain, l'l and .after extracting _various . indicia for determinig whether B, the particular body was an agency or fost; umentality of the Siate within . the meaning of Art.. 12, prbceeded .to examine 1vhether the society which had establisheil Regional Engineering College, Srinagar a11d which was registered' under the_ Jammu & Kashmir Registration of Societies .· Act,· 189!1 was an .instrumentality or agency of the State and would ' be comprehended in the expression 'other authority' in Art. 12 .. fo C .. t)lis .connection the Court observed as under : .\n\nH ..\n\n' ' . ·- . . . . • \"It is in the light of this discussion that we must now proceed to examine whether the society in the present case is an \"authorit, y\" falling within the. ddntion of \"state\" in . Article 12. Is it an instrumentality or -gency of the Government ? The answer must. oviously be in _the affirniative . if we have regard to the Memorandum of Association and the .Rules of the_ .Society. The composition of the Society is dominated.by the representatives appointed by the_ Central Government and the Governments of Jammu & Kashmii; .\n\nPunjab, Rajastlian and Uttar Pradesh with the approval ·· of the' Central Government. The monies. required for running the college are provided entirely by , the Central . Government; and the Government of Jammu & Kashmir\n\n and even if any other monies are to _be received by the . Society, it C\\(n be done only with the approval of-the State\n\narid the Central Governments. The Rules to be made by the Society are also required to have the prior approval . of the St.ate and theCen_tral Governnients a_nd'the accounts of the. Society have also to be submitted to both the Governments , for fueir: scrutiny and satisfaction. The . Society is also t-0 comply with. all such .dfrections as may be issued by the State_ Government with the approval of the Central Government in respect oLany matters dealt with in_ the report of the Reviewing . Committee. . The _control of the State and the Central Goverments is indeed so deep and. pervasive that no immovable .property of the_ Sodety can be disposed .\n\n. (I) (19791 l S.C.R. 1014 at 1042.\n\n(2) [1980] 3 s.c.c .. 459: .\n\n., .\n\nP. K. IYER v. UNION (Desai, J.) 219\n\nof in any manner witl1out ilw approval of both.the G6verri- .· ments. The State and 'the Central.· G.overnmenis have even the power to ai>point any other_ person or persons to be members of the Soeiety and any member of-the Society other than a .member representing the State or the Cenlr_al\n\nGovernment can be removed from the membership of the Society by the State Government with the approval of the Central' Government. The Board of Governors, which is in charge of general superintendence, direction and conliol of the affairs of Society and of its income and property is a!So _largely controlled by nominees of the State and the Central Governments. It will thus be. seen tha.t the State Government and by reason of the provision fodipproval, the Central Government. also, have full coµtrol of tlie working .of the Society. and it would not be incorrect to . say tba't the Society is mereJy a projection of the Slate and the. Central Governments and. to use. the wotds of Ray, CJ. in Sukhdev Singh's case (supra), the voice is that of the Staie and the Central Governments wd the bands are also of the State and the Cental Governments. We mst, therefore, hold that t)l.e Society is an instrumentality or agency of the. State artd the Central Govern1nents ind it is an 'auihor'ity' .\\vithin .the meaning_ of Art. 12.'' .. \"\n\n. - . 4 -\n\nApplying _the criteria, there is little doubt that ICAR is . an\n\n•. E instrumentality or the agency of the State. It came into existence .. as an integral departinent of the Government of India and later on t-- became ari attached office of the 'Central Government. 'I.he com~ • pesition of the ICAR as evidenced by Rule 3 could .not. hllve beeri ·\n\n, .\n\nmore governmental in character-than any department.of the. Govern' merit. The Governing Body of the Society would consis.t of a President of the Society, who is none other than the Cabinet Miriistei' of the Government of India for the . time being incharge of Agricul, ture; the Director-General, a distinguished scientist to be appointed by Government of India would be the Vic~-President and the Principal Executive ·officer cif the Society. He is concurrently appointed as Secretary to Gove.fnmenfof India. Other members of the Governfog Body are eminent scientists. not exceeding nine in number to be . appointed by the President that' is the Minister; not more than five . . persons for their idterest in agriculture to be appointed by the President\n\nthat is the Minister, three. membets of Parliment and Aditiondal/ Joint secretary to the the Government of India in the Departinent of Agriculture to be nominated by that Department; one person, appointed\n\n. .\n\nS\\)PREME COURT REPORTS\n\n\nthe Financial Adviser of .the Society:· There is none outside the.\n\nGovernment in the Governing Body. Rule 91 deals with.the finances and.funds of the Society and thesources of income are the cess kvid by the Government under the Agricultural Produce Cess Act and the recurring and. non-recurring grants from the Government of India .. The Rules of the Society were initially framed by the Government of India and Rule 98 makes it abundantly clear that the.)' can neither be. altered nor amended except with the sanction of th~\n\nGovrnment of India. Rule 100 shows that the Rules at the relevant time in force become operative after they were approved by the Government of India,. and Came into force from the date to .be . specified by the Government of India. Rule 93 provides for audit of the accounts of the Society by such person or person as may be nominated by the Central Government. Rule 94 provides t)lat the Annual Report of the proceedings of the Society and of all work midertakeri during the. year shall be prepared by the Governing Bcdv for the information of the Government 0f India and the membe.rs of the Society,. and the report and the audited accoun.ts of the Society along with the auditor's report thereon shall be placed . before the Society at the Annual General Meeting and also en. the the .table of the Houses of Parria.ment .. Rule 18 .provides that the appointment to the various -posts under the Society shall lie .made in accordane with the Recriutment Rules. framed for the purpose. by the Governing Body with tJ:ie prior. approval of the Government of India but prior thereto it was by the Union Public Service Ccmmission. The administrative and the financial ccntrcl of ih Gc\\flnment is all pervasive. The rules and bye-laws of the Society can l:e\n\nframed amended or repea.led with the sanction of the Government. .of. India. The case before us is rnuch stronger than the one considered by this Court in the case of Ajay Hasia and therefore, the conclusion is inescapable that the Society is an instrumentality er agency. of the Central Government and therefore, it is 'other authority' within the meaning of the expression in Art. 12: As a necessary corollary the writ jurisdiction can be invoked against it and therefcre the decision of Delhi' High Court must be reversed on this .point. The preliminary objection i~ accordingly overruled; • • • Having rejected the preliminary objection; we must now'proceed to examine the contention raised in each petition and appeal on merits.\n\nBefore we proceed to examine the contentions on merits,\n\n--I • i\n\n_ ..\n\n_,_) -\n\n'>·\n\np, K. IYER v, UNION (Desai, J.) 221\n\nnhappy thoughit may appear to be, and howsoever one would like .to avoid reference to it, it is inevitable that , one mut take note of the deplorable state of'affairs in the administration orthe affairs of !CAR and the uncongeniel atinosphere in which :the highly qualified agri: cultural scientists in this country have to work. ICAR w~ s \"t up for undertaking Scientific Research in Agriculture, Animal Husbandry and allied subjects on which the entire economy: of this country\n\nrevolved till the advent of industrial r.ivolution. it wa_s set up 'with a view to imparting speed and momentum to research in agriculture and allied subjects. so that the countrv may move from the middle ages. to the modern methods in agricultural technology. Unfortu, nately, since its inception, the .domestic atmosphere has not proved congenial to the flowering of the' genius of the country's best talent in agricultural research. This came 1o light when on Mav 5, l 972, newipapers all over 'he country flashed the tragic news that a young agricultural scientists, Dr. V.H. _Shah, who was working as Senior Agronomist and Associate Project Coordinator in the IVRJ had committed suicide by hanging himself in his residence _the previous night.\n\nThere was a commotion in the Parliamnt and during the debate in the House, Membe'rs of Parliament regretfully referred to previous suicides commitied by agricultural scientists, one such . being of Dr. M.T. Joseph, Teaching Assistant, Divisian of Entomology, ·\n\nIARI who had committed suicide on Januar!f 5, J 960. These were - . . not stray incidents bui the outcome of persecution,· torture and harrassment emanating fr0<11 t_he polluted environment in !CAR and its affiliates. The then Minister for Fod and Agriculturestated in the Parliament that the Govenment of India was not happy with the procedure of selection of personnel in the !CAR and prcceeded to inform the House that they have not been too happy with the . present system of recruitment which necessitates a scientist applying for posts and being interviewed by selection committees thrcughcut his working career because the system inevitably provides frequent occasions for disappointment leading to frustration. Two decades thereafter we are constrained to note that the things have not improved at all. TM !CAR and the Institutes seem to be so backward looking in their approach to the members of the staff that as late as in 1983 considerable time of this Court was frankly wasted in disposing of the preliminary objection on behalf of the JCAR th.at It is not amenable to this Court's writ jurisdic; tion which would imply tba_t they have skeletons to hide and slrun their exposure to the Court's examination of the internal affairs. To continue the narrative, a committee was appointed under tlie Chairmanship of Shri P.B. Gajendragadkar, ; eitred Chief. Justice of .India and. Vice-Chancellor, University of\n\n• ... •\n\n.. • . .\n\n'E\n\nBombay and at the relevant time Chairman, Law commission with wide terms of reference inter alia to' enuqire into 'the recruitment : policies of ICAR 'and to review the recruitment' and personnel policies pf ICAR, Institutes and Centres working under it and to suggest measures. for their improvement. This Committee submitted its . . Report and we :take note Of oniy one of its findings which reads as ·\n\n:-under:\n\n \"AlLthe.sc complaints have been echoed .by several scientists wh_o met the Comniittee. In the opinin of the Committe, rizese complaints have some substance; The Panel of Advisers also hold the . same qpinion. The Committee is of the view . that most of these complaints a.re due to improper working conditions in the Divisions .. A scientist bcngs to a Divisicn . , where he carries out his work. The atn1osphere in. the\n\nDivisi_on and the fnstitu'te should be conducive to research actiVity. ,-~.u > ' (cmpl)asis supplied)_.\n\n. At another stage, the Committee hs observed that: 'in the pi-, esent circumstances where a crisis cif character and confidence\n\n.sees tohave overtaken the entire administra, t1on of the ICAR, we think it i;; absolutely necessary that recruitment of personnei_:jn all the Institutes with the !CAR should revert to the UP.SC.' Tiie Committee made it clear, it made th~ rcommendation, beta use it . was-satisfied that there is obvious dis-satisfacfrn with the recruitments_ made from J966 onwards.and the Report when browsed through would leave an inefaceable impression on the reader thatthe Committee was-- dissatisfied with internal atmosphere in !CAR and that there was an amount .of dis-satisfaction about the recruitment .policy and that it was such a perceived reality that it wculd be. idle to ignore the same.· Even the Director-General. who is concurrently also the\n\nSecret~; y t~ the DARE in charge f ICAR conceded before tlie Committe_e that it would b.e better if, for some time, the recruitn:rnt . in el) trusted to soeoutsfde agency. 1') In'Chapter XI of ihe Report, _\n\n-tile Committee noted that the complaintr, made against the Head\n\nof -the Division about. no~ giving adequate facilities forwork and the lack ofacademic atmosphere and an absence of. domestic apprcach • permitting free discussion on _researdi projects and results obtained. we're genuine and they required to be remedied.. There 'is further . . . . . . . . . H .(1) Reort of the !CAR Enquiiy Conunittee, 1973; Chapter VII\n\n0 page 54. , -\n\n(2) Report of.the !CAR Enquiry Cornmitee, 1973, Chapter II page 12.\n\n. , __ ...._ -\n\n) ,7\\·\n\n-i. ..\n\np, K. IYER V: UNION (Desai, J.) 223 . . . . . the recommendation with .regard to vertical structure of. Scientists and the scales of pay attached -to each cadre. H is unhappy to note thai things have hardly impoved siJJce the Report of the Commitiee because in. the first writ petitiori, petitioners were again to be exposed to chazards of a fresh .selectioll and the complaint of Dr. Y.P. Gupta is essentially tl)e same as noticed and commented upon by ihe Com- . mittee. · ·\n\nRe : W.P. Nd. 587175: Jn this writ peti(ion, 1he suqstantial grievance is that even though the three petitioners' were 'respectively holding the post of Professor in Animal Patliology~Animal Genetic.s\n\na~ Veterinary Parasitology from 1963, 1970 and 1970 respoctively,\n\nwil'en the pay-scale for the post of rofessor on the recomi:nendation C of the University Grants Commission. nnderwent an upward revisicn to. Rs .. 1100-1600, .the ICAR instead of straightway granting the .,. · scaleto the petitioners, the holder.s oftlie posts of. Professor, prccceded .• , ·. to.issue an advertisement on May 2i, 1974 inviting fresh applications for the .Post of Professor in the three subjects in. which the petitioners were already holding the post of Professor and simultaneously appoint-\n\n.. D ed some others in different subjects and disciplines as }'rofesscrs and ga vc them the revised stale while the petitioners wre .left to languish in the old scale. According to the petitioners, apart from gross discriniinatioll in. the matter of equal pay for equal work; the dire(:! consequence of this i, infair ana arbitrary action of the . third rospondent was the adverse affectation ill the seniority in the cadre of E Profeswrs because those who were appointed in the revised scale sec.red a. march: over the petitioneis who .continued to langufab in the prNevised scales. Petitioners contend that the. situation is recreated which was adversely commented upon 'by the Minister · in the, Parliament that the recruitment .policy adopted by ICAR nec; essitates a. scientist to apply for posts and being inter:vie, Wed by F. selecti.on committee with attendant hazard and consequent frustration. Petitioners tl1erefore pray firstly fo1 cencelling. tt, e adv~~•\"· . ment .issued for the purpose of inviting applications for the posts . already held by theni' a.nd secondly' forgrant1ng thmi .equali!y of.\n\ntreatment in .the matter of pay-scales with. other. Professors with whom they stand on terms of equality and are better equipped because\n\nG . of longer experience. Petitfonets ; ay that in 1970-71 si.x posts o.f Professor wre created in the.revised ocale cf Rs. 11(0-lf.CO at IVRI. in .the discipHne Of Poultry Science, Poultry .Pathokgy, Vet<rireiy . Public Health. (Calcutta Centre of IVRI), Biochemistry, Epid<miolc gy\n\nand Veterinarv Public Health (IV.RI Centre) .. The nviscd oca!e\n\nH -\\yas .sanctioned for thesf' newly created P<?sts pUrs112n1 to flie recrin~ ·\n\n• c\n\n• •\n\n.niendation of the University Grants Commission. Let it be made distinctly clear that the revised scales were ., meant for the post of Professor in IVRI not for the post in any particular discipline. Petitioners were holding posts o.f Professor in lVRI, and therefore the\n\np'otitioners contend that the posts of Professor held by them would be goyerned by the revised scale eff<; etive from the date on which new posts .were created and filled in, in the revised scale. Respondents' rosponse to this contention is that !CAR informed the Director of IVRias per its le(te.rdated Jauary 20 .. 1971 that three posts of Professor in the scale of Rs. 1100-1600 in Veterinary Bacteriolcgy, Anim1l Nutrin and Animal Genetics have be.en sanctioned suject to tho condition that°the existing _posts of Pro_fessor cbviousi in . the same disciplines in ihe sc,.Je of R's. 700-1250 stand abolished.\n\nShorn of embellishmcrit, it would mean that the posts in the aforem, ntioned three subjects shall hcncefort~ carry the revised w1:e cf Rs. llOOcI600.· The respondents assert that the revised scale was not b' automatically granted to the existing holders cf the posts but 1J.ey .• wo1tld bo considered with other applicants for P.ppoiutment. in the higher scales, if they are otherwise suitable. ll was also '\":cl th.t in th:e letter of appointment as Professor each of the petitioner was informod that as the post of Profesor is being upgraded, each of them will have to face selection test. Letter of appointment dated March 25, 1970 in respect of petitioner .No. 2 though relied upon was not on the record but when produced in the course of hearing with an affidavit; it belie1 the statement. There is nothing in the . letter of appointment of each of the petitioners that wh.en the revised scale for the post. of Professor will be introduced,· the incumbent of the _post will have to face a fresh selection. It is not clarified whether the three posk of _Professor. in Veterinary Bacteriology, Animal nutrition and Animal Qenetics in the pre-1evised scale were already filled in and whether the. holders of of the posts got the revised sca 1e . without any fuss of fresh selection .on the part of the respcndents.\n\n-h~ counter-affidavit on behalf of respondeng .Ncs. -1,2,3,4,5 and JJ ·\n\nis conspicuously silent on this point: However,. it is contended that the ·\"qualifieations for post of Professor while sanctioning .the 1oviscd scale was altered in as. much as when the. post of Professor carried the scale of Rs. 700~1250, the essential qualification required wcs cnl~ a. p3st:graduate. degreo in the specific discipl'nc' whereas in t_he post cre.ated in the revised scale; a Dcctroate degree in the subject along with the specialisation in the relevant discipl'ne 'was prescrihd ard which fact can be gathered from the model qualifications pmcribed for similar posts: in all the research institutes of!CAR. It was. further as.serted that sarlier the minimum experience required was about\n\nr -\n\nP. K, IYER v. UNION (Desai, J.) 225\n\n5 years whereas it was reiscd to' 7 years.\n\nNothing ·\\vould be 1nore misleading than this eye viash performance \"wl1ich really hides the true intendment namely, to ex.elude the present Incumbents of the .posts of Profess.or and to expose them t9 a competition with same rank outsiders who may as in the. case of Dr. S.L. Shah score a march in the na1ne.of 'scleCtion \\vhich cnerallv leaves a_ grey afea. Petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 do. hold a D; ctorate.in. their respective.discipline \\Vi_th.~Xperience-extending111orc tl1an 7\".)1ears in the isciplinc. _Petili~~ ner .No. I, who does !Jill hold a Doctorate has to his credit.M:R.C.V.S. which bas been recognised by the Government of lncfo as possessmg . post-giaduate qualifid1tion in Veteiinary qiid Ani.1nal SIOiences and teaching posts including the post of Directof of lVRl. and continu\" to be' recognised as guide/teacher for post-graduate degree courses.\n\nThe subterfuge was to expo.se the petitio1; ers to 'a fresh selection test w.ith all its consequential m1certaini.ties and that Was the exact thiilg found bv Dr. oajendragadkar Co.mmitte. That is .why it can be said that like the true Bourbons '!CAR has learn\\ noihing and. forgotten nothin.g/ The hard fact is that the petitioners were holding the. posts or' Professor when ti1c revised scale becarr.e effec!ive. 111 the letter d,1ted January 20, 197i sa11ctioning revised scale for the post. q.f Professor, there is not even. a whisper that the existing incumbent will tie denied. the benefit .. ·,,, fact, it is .well-known that the U:niversit\"y_ Grants con11nission regularly rccorr; n1cr:ds-- revised stales for very p1an periodfor teaching-posts and the revision .takes ncte of. i111dequn:te scales sanctioned till t.he date\" of re.vision.\n\nThe .onl);\n\njustifiation DITered by the respondents for denying the petiti,;11ers . the benefit of the revisedscale is to be found in the counter-affidavit of Dr. M.S. Swaniinathan .• It is conteride.d that tlie newly created . p )St in the cadre of Profrssor is not the same as the thri existing\n\np)st ai:id that thre was 1narginal revisicin in the· quali_fitations for.' the. PJ.ts of Professor in the' revised -calc and that petitjonefs _\\Vere . not discriminated because they• \\Vere giVen aq .Opporfunity to contest\n\nfor the pnstsin ; he reised scale. Thc.ju; tifitation is tea fti1my to merit any serious conSiderntion. _n1or.e so in view of.the fact that it . .is . . . . . . - . diffi.:u 1t tJ ~-11v.i':lage a sitllation insuch _institutes, :undertakin:gadv3nc~\n\nrosach in. Agriculture and Ani1m\\l Husbandry where persons holding Doctorate qualification and enjoying the status of thi: post .cf Professor would be governed by two different scales even though the' d, uties, resp:J'nsihilities. and func.tions in varios $istcr. disciplines are idenli::ai.' Ii} such., i situatio~·Art,. 39(d), trut assist us 'in reaching a fair and_ just. concll1s-ion. laborat.ing the underlying i.r.!endmenf of Ari. 39(d); Chinnappa Rcddv, J.· in' Randhir Singh v:· Union of\n\nIndia & Or.i.\"1 observed that construing Arts. 14 and 16 in the iighf of the Preamble and Art. 39(d), the Court was of the view that the principle 'equal pay for equal work' is deducible from those Articles and may be properly applied to , the ases of unequal scales of pay based on no classification or irrational classificaticn though those drawing the different scales of pay do identical work under the same employer. The case in hand is a . glaring example of discriminatory treatment accorded to old experienced and highly qualified hands with an evil eye and.· unequal hand and the liuarantce of equality in all its pervasive character must enable this Court to. remove discrimination and to restore fair play in action. No attempt was made to .sustain the scales of'pay for the. post of Professor en the doctrine of classification because the classification of existing incumbents as . being distinct and separate from newly recruited han.d with flilJlSY. change in. essential qualification would be wholly irraticnal and arbitrary. The case of the petitioners for teing put in the 'revised scale. of Rs,.) 100-1600 from the date on which newly created posts of Professors in sister disCiplines in lVRl and other i11stitutes were created and filled in in revised scale i.s unanswerable mid must' .be conceded.\n\nWhen the matter was discussed threadbare Mr. Atdul Khcer, .learned counsel for the Union of India stated that all the petjtioners would be put in the revised scales from the. time the post .of Professor iri upgraded scale was filled-in in sister disciplines. Mr: Khader stated .that petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 are already .in the higher grade . and any attempted fresh seletion to fill-in those posts has been cancelled.\n\nHe further stated that the first petitioner .bad to be uncfficially put in the same scale on accoµnt.of the failure of the first petitioner to exercise his option to be in the employment of the !CAR and that as by now he has exercisecJ.., his option he will enjoy the same benefit.\n\nTlius Mr. Khader fairly conceded thafall the petitioners will be put . in the revised scale !rom the date fresh recuitment was made 'in sister\n\ndisciplines in IVRI in the revised -scale, and if the seniority was disturbed on account of the earlier approa.ch, the same would be rectified.\n\nIfthe petiiioners are entitled to the reised scale as hereinabcve ·. indicated, and should be put in the -same pursuant to the mandamus 'we propose to issue in this case, it is immaterial whether the advertisement' which was issued is cancelled or not. If the respondents still want to pursue the a.dvertisement, they. may do so without i.n any\n\n(I) [1982] 1 s.c.c. 618.\n\n-,(\n\n' . \"\n\n•. -\n\nP. K. IYER .. v. UNiON (Desai, J.)\n\n. . . manner affecting the position of the petitioners and the petitioners A nee.d not expose themselves to the vagaries of a fresh selection. It is therefore, not necessary for us .to cancel the advertisement for the reasons herein indicated .. This would dispose of W.P. No. s:S7 of 1975.\n\nRe : R.P, No. 4 of 1977 in S.L.P. No. 2339/75.:\n\nDr. Y.P .. Gupta filed Writ Petitibn No. 276 of 1972 in the High Court of Delhi.. In this writ petition, he primarily raised two con- . tentions : (i) tliat the selection of respondent No .. 6 for the post of\n\nsnior Bio-chemist was illegal as he did not p0ssess essential qualifications, and (il) the removal of the petitioner from the m.embership of the Post-graduate Faculty was unjust and invalid. ·\n\nft was alleged that in December, 1970, ICAR advertised a post of Senior Bio-chemist in IARI in the scale of Rs. 1100-1400. The essential qualiiications were set out in the advertisement as under:\n\n,,(i) . Doctorate in -Biochemistry or Organic Chemistry or D agricultural Chemistry.\n\n(ii) JO years research experience in the field of Nutrition with particular reference. to quantity and quality of 'protein in food grajns as evidenced by publislied work .. . . '(iii) Ability to plan, organise and guide research .involving biochemical techniques as. applied to protein chemistry and radio-tracer studies.\"· ·\n\nAniongs.t others,' petitioners Dr. Y.P. Gupta, Dr. T.S. Raman and respondent No. 6 in the High Court Dr: S.L. Mehta applied\n\nfor the post. A Selection Committee was set up with Dr. J. Ganguly; F Professor. of Bioch.emistry as Chairman and Dr: P.K. Kymal a.nd Dr. , N.P. Datta as members. Intending candidates including petitioners Dr. Y.P. Gupta, Dr. T.S. Raman and respondent No. 6 Dr. S.L. Mehta were interviewed by the Selection .Committee. The Selection Committee found that none of the candidates interviewed , or conidered in absentia fulfils all the essential qualificaticno. laid G . down for the post and therefore, the Committee was unable to recommend any nanie at .that stage. The Committee further recommended that the post may be readvertised and essential qualificatipn No. 2 should be amplified by adding the clause 'JO years research experience in the field of protein Chemistry.' The. Selection Committee fJ further recommended that from amongst the candidates interviewed\n\n. 228 SUPllilME COURT REPORTS [1984] i S •. C.R .. . ; . . . ..,_ and 'considered in absentia tlwse whose names were set out in the report be calledfor.fresh interview whiCh may be held afier the post is advertised. afresh with expanded essential qualification, This list includes the names of petitioners Dr. Y.r: Gupta and Dr. TS. Raman as also respondent-No. 6 Dr. S.L Mehta ..\n\nA fresh Selection Corn-·\n\n.· mittee \\vas set up which included respondent No. 5 Dr: M.S. Naik\n\nagafost whom numerous allegations of maia fides have bee11 ade, The i1ew Selection Comtnittee interviewed Dr.. Y.P. Gupta along with others .. Ultimately, the second Selection Committee recommended pr. S:L. Mehta for th.e post .which led to the' filing.of the petition inter a/ia 911 the grund that Dr. S.L. Mehta did not satisfy the minimum es.sential qualification. .\n\nAnother griev.ance in the petitio'n ; s that petitioner Dr. y, p, Gupta was a member of the facuJty', in the post-graduate school at IART from 1965 to May 1971 and he was illegally and arbitrar; lv removed.from the membersh; p of the Faculty. Jn the communication dated Juno 15, 1971 by the Assistant Registrar to Dr. M.S. Naik, Head 6f the Biochemistry Department, Ann. P-1 to the petition hi the . High O)urt, it is stated that the letter of Dr. Y.P. Gupta dated May\n\n30, 1970 \\vas considered by the Academic Council which una.nimously\n\nesolved , that Dr. Gupta'. was not .interested in continuing as a member of the Faculty and hence the Council\" reg1et to utilise. Pis service as :i member of the Faculty to. the post:graduate school any more.'' Thus actording to the \"petitioner, he was removed from the membership of the Faculty wl1ilc accordi, ng lo the respondents by the letter dated May 30. 1970 Dr. Gupta submitted his resignation which was\n\naccepted by the .Academic Council with regret:\n\nThe High Court rejeted the petition primarily on the ground ihat no writ petition lies against TARI, a ground no more available to the petitioner. On the merits, the High Court held that Dr. YP. . Gupta has failed to subs(antiatc the allegations ofmala fides'.made\n\nagainst respondent .No. 4-DL M.S: Swaminathan and respondent\n\nNo. 5 Dr.· M.S. Naik. The High Court further held !.hat the Selection . Committee bad the power to relax the essential qtialificaticns and the vOl/y fact th.at respondent No. 6 Dr. S.L' Mehta was appointed on the recommendation of the Selection Committee it must have been done by necessary implication aftr. relaxing the essi.ntia! qualification and therefore, the appointment of respondent No. 6- Dr:\n\nH ~- S.L. Mehta was valid.and imquestionab.Ie. With respect to the second gdeyance, the High Court' held. that Dr. Y.-P. Gupta' ceased to be a men1ber of the Faculty and that he was not removed from the member- '\n\n').. . .\n\n\"'\n\n-1 ·. • -\n\n.\"'\"! .\n\n. .\n\nl '\n\n.l\n\nP. K. IYER v. U'JION (Desai, J.) . . 229 .\n\nship and it was not necessary .to bear. him because it was not.a case A of removal but ofcessation' of membership and thetefore no .relief can be granted to Dr. Gupta. •\n\nBefore' we proceed to examine the contentions raised by Dr.\n\nGupta on merits, we must dispose of .a preliminry objection raised on behalf of the respondents: It was submitted that not only the 'writ petition filed by Dr.· Gupta w&s dismissed by the High Court B on merits but S.L.P. 2339/75 against the decision of the-High court . was rejected by this Coµrt on July,-21, 197() after recording the statement of l\\1r. Lokur, learned counsel who appeared. for !CAR as .also the Institute that .the Academic Council .w9uld consider the questl~11 of taking back the petitioner as.a member qf the Faculty. Thereafter, Dr. Gupia filed R:P. No. 79/76. which was also. rejected by this court on Oct. 21/, .1976. At the 'relevant time as the successive. review petitions were not barred, Dr. Gupta filed R.P. No. 4/77. T)lis review petition .was kept pending and was finally directed to. be heard with the Writ Petition No .. 587/75, by the orde1' of this Co.urt' in C.M.P. No. 17350/79 dated Decemb.er 19, 1979.. Preliminar} objection .is that no case is 'made out b} the petitioner for review .of th.c decision of the Court rejecting petitio~ for special leave jjjcd by the\n\npetitioner. . The writ petition filed by Dr. Gupta in the High Court on a reference made by a Division Bench was heard by .a Bcnth of five Judges and the larger Bench .focussed its attenl'OJl on the maiii question whether the wiit jurisdiction can be invoked against ICAR and its affiliates .and i{was held that the .wtit. jurisdiction cannot be invoked. Once the High Court held that the writ juris<)iction. cannot be Invoked, it could 110t proceed to exami11e the contentions raised by Dr. Gupta on merits. The. moment th.e High Court held that it had no jurisdictiou to e.ntettain the writ petition,. it became functus 'officio and .therefore, its decision oil the .merits of the co.ntention is of no' consequence and at: ny rate could not conclude the matter against the petitioner.·. Now that it is held that the writ. petition is maintainable on the finding tha.t lCAR. and its affiliates are other .. authority within the maning of the 'expression in Art. 12 of the.\n\nConstitution, justice deman\"ds that the. Court must examine the contentions of Ik Gupta on merits. We. accordingly, overrule . the preli1ninary objection raised on behalf of responde.nts and p10cced to examiue the cont.erttions on merits by allowing the review petition No. 4of1977 and grant special.leave to appeal to' the petitioner .\n\n. Both the contentions may be separately examined. •\n\nTh~ first contentio.n is that respondent No .. 6 Dr. s.t. Mehta\n\n.. '.\n\nH ..\n\nwho was selected by the Selection Comittee for the post .of Senior Bio-chemist after the bizzare exercise undertaken to find a suita bk person to fill in the .post o'n the earlier occasion, did not fulfil Gue of the essentiai\" qualifications for the post:· 1t was urged. that in order t.o help respondent No. 6 to get selected .essential qualification was doctored to suit his requirements and respondent No. _5 was nominated on the second Selection Committee. When the post was first arlver; . tised, one of the essential qualifications was '10 ears research\n\nexperience i_n the field of Nutrition with particular reforeuce to quantity and quality of protein in food grains s evidenced by pllblished work.' It is nofin dispute tliat Dr. Gupta, the present pet't'cner, did satisfy th'.s and other.essential qualificat; ons. The first _Selection CcmmittEe examined the suitability of seven . candidats . including petitioner Dr.. Gupta; Dr. T .. S Raman, petitioner in cognate pe\\ition and respondent No. 6 Dr. S.L. Mehta. The Committee specifically recorded its finding that none of tl1c candidates. interviewed or considered in absentia including respondent No. 6,. selected at a later stage, fulfils all the essential qualifications laid down for the post. The Committee recommended that.the post be readvertised after amplifying the essen_tial qtialificaticin in the matter of experience namely '10 years research )OXperience in the field of Protein Chemistry'. The post was the post of Senior Biochemist. lniiially experience requlred was in the fieldof Nutrition with particular refere)lce to quantity and quality of protein in food grains as evidenced by published work wl1ilc . the amplified essential qualification was research experience in tlic field of protein Chemistry.\n\nIt is difficult lo eface the impression that the amplificatio11 was done keeping in view the. qualification which Dr . .S.L. Mehta had and event))en the question did arise whether. he satisfied the original or the amplified essential qualification. The.\n\nCommittee recommended that pursuant to fresh adve1tisement, ii\n\nould' ot be necessary for the petitioners Dr.\" Gupta, Dr. T.S. Raman and respondent\"No. 6 Dr. S.L. Mehta to submit afresh application and they should be interviewed again with other candidates available on readvertisement of post. The Selection Committee was reconstituted by nominating respondent No. 5, M.S. Naik, Head, Division' of Biocbemistry, IARL All members or' the first Selection Committee were available. ]'lo explanation is offered what necessitated expanding the Committee by nominating Respondent No. 5 on the Selection Committee. And let it be recalled that the relations between petitioner Dr. Gllpta and respondent No. 5 were by that time considerably strained. It )s. therefore difficult to escape the conclusion that the purported .amplification of. essential qualification appears to be a . device to exclude .Dr. Gupta who fulfilled the first prescribc, d essential\n\n.....\n\n• J'. K. IYER v, UNION (Desai, J.) 231\n\nqualificat on and oblige respondent No. 6 to fit into altered qualification.\n\nTwo errnrs are pointed out in connection with the proceedings of the second Selection Committee in which Dr. M.S. Naik participated, namely, that the proceedings were vitiated on account of the bias -of Dr. M.S. Naik and that the Committee failed to interview Dr. T.S. Ra marl and his case wet by default not on liccount of his fault but on account of inefficien.cy and inaction on the part of the administration responsible for intimating to Dr. Raman the date of interview.\n\n At the outset we must notice one development whiCh renders a detailed examination of the contentions raised by Dr. Gupta unnecessary. though we cannot refrain from expressing our distress about the recruitment .method adopted by the ICAR and its afliliats. This exercise, we are undertaking to satisfy ourselves. whether after the unravelling of despicable state of affairs in the internal administration of ICAR and its affiliate~ by Gajendragadkar\n\nCo1nn1itee, has any i1npr.ove111ent becon1c noticeable ?\n\nDr. Gupta challenged the selection and. appointment of respondent No. 6 as Senior Bio-chemist. The post of Senior Bio-chemist\" has since been abolished. Therefore, _setting aside _the selection of respondent No: 6 for the post of Senior Bio-cheist is .only of academic interest. However one aspect which we .cannot overlcok is that by this process of selection seriously questioned in this petitiop, Dr. S.L. Me\\lta has scored a march over petitioner Dr. Gupta and his co-petitioner Dr. T.S. Raman in the matter of higher scale of pay:\n\nThe firsi question to which we must, t\\lerefore address ourselves is whether there is any substance in the contention of Dr. Gupta . . . . that even applying the amplified essential qualification, r<spondent ·\n\nNo. 6 Dr. S.L. Mehta was not qualified for being selected for the post ? The finding recorded by the High Court in this connection is eloqµent to establish that Dr. S. L. Mehta did not fulfil either the original or the amplified .essential qualification, of pertaining to experience. Says .the High Court that the research experience .respondent No. 6 Dr .. S.L. hta started from October .1962 when he was preparing research thesis for M.Sc. The selection took place in February !972 with the result that the research experience of Dr. Mehta fell short of\"IO years. This finding was not only not controverted but is unassailable. And we do not subscribe to the\n\n. A\n\nview .that the period spent in. preparing thesis for M.Sc . .:..Cmark. not . Ph.D .. counts towards required. expei:ience. 1t'. is well-settled tht experience to be of value and utility must be cquited after the educational qualification ,.i.s obtai11ed and not while acquirinR the. post' :graduate qualification:· ln 'the case.of Ph.D .. Deoree awarded on researc)l he situation may be different, But' preparing thesis after graduation for acquiring post, graduate CJ.egree would not count \"· towards prescribed experience qqallfication.\n\nRespondent ]'lo. 6 qualified for M.S.c: in .1964 and Ph.D. toward the end of 1966 in .soil science and Agricultura'l. L:hernistry under the guidance of Dr. ,.\n\nN.B. Das a11d joined se1vice al JARl in July, l 969. These , facts are . uncontroverted and therefore,. the High 'Court ov,)ooked .\\he fact that respondent No. 6 Dr. s.L. Mehta had research experience extending only over hardly a. period of 5 years. Further the High Court failed' to notice that respond.en\\ No. 6 appeared ·at to carry on research in the line of Nuirition' or protein. Chemiury and therdore he. did not fulfil th.e qualificatiol) at all and in our opinion, he even could not have been. called for interview by the Selection Committee. Not onl.1 that. in .para' 10 of the writ petition i~ the H'igh Cou; t, it was speeificc\\liy asserted that respondent 'N,;.' 6. Dr. Mehta did not satisfy the original or amplified essential qualification pertaining to expnknce . . because the post was under the project 011 the protein qalityof illets, ..\n\nsorglrnm, wheat and either cereals concerned with studies on the nutritional quality of food :grains. whereas Dr. Mehta has never. done any work nor published any literature in. the Jine of nutrition nor was he ever basically trained in .this line. lilthe .. counter-affidavit fried on behalf of rnspondent Nos. ), and 4 that.is Director General atid Secretary to the Government oflndia, !CAR and Director General of !CAR, this averment was neither.· questione<l nor ccmli'overted\n\n'----\n\nnor .denied. Further the High Court upheld the slection and appoint~· ment of respondent: No: 6 Dr. Mehta hot.ding' that a5' the Selection Committee had power-to' relax the essential qualification, the appointmeht of br. Mehta was made after relaxing the essential qiialification.\n\nWe find it difficult to appreciate that the. High Court shmiid uphold . '\"\"'\n\n an appoh1tment of a person, to suit whose r.equirement, the ess.ential qualification was amplified. by providing an irrelevant additional amplification and yet who failed to qualify for tlie same by resorting to the power of relaxation. And we are not satisfied that the second . Selection .Committee .had the pawer to relax' essential qualification pertaining to experience ..\n\nIn .this <tn.nection, it is .ad.vantageous to refer to the. counter-affidavi.t of respondent No. 4, the Director-. : General. of !CAR, whe.rein he stated tha.t firsi essential qualification pertaining to educational attainment was relaxable. He is silent as\n\n• • ' .\n\n... . \\\n\nP. K. IYER '\" UNION (Desai., J.) 233\n\nto the second essential qualification pertaining to experience. The\n\nre.levant poriion may be extracted : A\n\n\"Doctorate in Bio-chemistry or Oganic Chemistry oi . Agdcultural Chemistry-relaxable to M.Sc. Degree or equivalent post-graduate qualifications in the case of capdidates . with exception.ally distinguished record of produtive B research.\" ·\n\nIt is not suggested that there was power. oT rel_axation with regard to second essential qualification. However, neither respondent. No. 6 nor respondent Nos. 2 and 4 ever asserted that but for power of relaxation claimed,. respondent No. 6 could ever be said to have satisfied the essential. qualificaiion pertaining lo experience. 'In. this connection, we may'refer w a counter-affidavit on behalf of respondents . Nos. 3 .and 5 to 7 which included respondent No.\" 6. the party con'\n\ncerned. In the. counter-affidavit, there is an sphinx like silence with ' regard to the averm_e,; ts madein-para JO that respondent No. 6 Dr..\n\nMehta did not satisfy tlie essential q1ialification pertaining to experience. . Sub si/entio _an ad1nissio1i can. be spelt on behalf of respondent No ... 6\n\nt!at he did not have requisite ese11tial quali.ficatiu1~ a.s to. experien1.:e .. . Therefore, the conclusion is inescapable that respo.ndent' No. 6 Dr.\n\nMehta did not satisfy the essential qualificaticn pertainirg to exViience even after the !CAR and. its affiliates and respondent No.' 4 amplified . the essential qualifications. And 'we could not trace the source of ·\n\npoer if any to relax essential qualilkalio1i'.as to experience. There- .fore; oi1 the face of it the slection of respondent No. 6 for the post of Senior Biochemist is utterly unsustainable. More so because there were others who fulfill\\:d all escntial qua!lflcatipn and one is .left to speculate the reasons which weighed with the Selection Coin- . mittee 'to reject them and .to .select a person who did riot fulfil. the essential qualification foi such a: post as Sei1io1' Biochemist, claiming non-existent pow'?r to relax the , qualification'.·\n\nJn this co.ntext one more submission may be disposed of. It was said thatlhe Committee consisted of experts and they were highly qualified persons who woµld be able to evaluate and assess the relative merits of each of the candidate °before it and the. Court is least com- . potent lo do so and therefore\n\n0 it-would bebnwise to substitute experts' decjsion by Courts' de(isiOn. In .this connectioi1,. re\\jance' Was placed on- Dr. M.C. Gupta&. Ors., v. Dr. A run Kumar Gupta & Ors.''' in\n\nwhich this _Court held as under '\n\n(1) [1979] 2 s.c.c .. 339\n\n\".When selection is made by the Commission aided a.nd advised by experts having technical experience and. high academic qualifications in the specialist field, probing teaching/research experience in technical. subjects, the Coifris ·.should be slow to interfere with the opinion expressed by experts unless there are allegations of mala tides against them. It would normally be prudent and safe for the courts to ]eave the decision of academic. matters to expeits who are more familiar with the problems they face than the • courts genera!ly. can be. Undoubtedly, even such a bod& if it were to contravene rules and regulations binding upon it. the court in excerise of exfraordinary jurisdiction to enforce rule of law, may _interfere in awrit pe.tition under Art. 226.\"\n\n' It was urged that once it is conceded that as the power of selection and appointment vests in the !CAR, the Court should not usurp that power merely because it-would have .chosen a different' person ·• as better qualified (See State of Biharv; Dr. Asis Kumar Mukherjee1\" Undoubiedly, the Court must look with respect upon the performance of duties by experts in the respective fields as bas been sa.id in Dr. M.C.\n\nGupta's .case .. However, the task of ushering a society based on rule of la.t'' is entrusted to. this Court and it cannot abdicate its functions.\n\nOnce it is lnost satisfiactorily established that the Selection Committee . . did not have the power to relax essential qualification pertaining to experience, the entire process of selection of the 6th respondent was in contraven-tio.n of t)le established norms prescribed byadver tisement and power of the, Selection Committee and procedure of fair and just selection and equality in the matter of pub lice mployment and to rectify resultant injustice and establ_ish constitutional , value this C.urt must interfere. Selection bf respondent No. 6 is contrary to rules and orders.and ni violation of prescribed norms of qualification. He was ineliibleg for the post• when selected. His selection and appointment\n\nwould b~ required to be quashed and set aside.\n\nThe present position however is that the post of Senior. Biochemist has been abolished. Undoubtedly, respondent No.· 6 by undeserved benefit of improper selection has scored a march over his co1leagues in the ma tier of pay scales to hich be would not be .entitled.\n\nPetitioner Dr. Gupta was put in the scale of Rs. JJ00-1600 in 1978 while respondent No. 6.Dr. Mehta was.put in that scale in. 1980 that .is two years after the petitioner. By the illegal selection respondent . . .\n\n(!) [1975) 2 S.C.R 894\n\n\" I\n\n\\---- (\n\n' -.\n\nP. K. IYER v. UNfoN (Desai. J.) 235\n\nNo. 6 has reached the scale of Rs. 1~00-2250 while Dr. Gupta is in the •cale of Rs. 1500-2000. Respondent No. 6 Dr. Mehta is enjoying this utterly undeserved \\Jenefit consequent. upon .his unsustainable selection as Senior Biochemist:\n\nNow that the post of Senior Biochemist is abolis)fed, how do we redress the wrong. At the hearil)g of this petition, it was suggested to the respondents .to put both Dr. Gupta and Dr. Raman .whose case. will be presently examined in t\\ie scale of Rs 1800-2250 from the date respondent No. 6 Dr. Mehta has. been elevated to that scale, That is the only way for securing justice to Dr .. Gupta andhe is entitled to it. ·\n\nThe second grievance of Dr. Gupta is that be was illegally removed from the membership of the Post-graduate Faculty by the . Academic Council. Few relevanf facts in this connection are that Dr.\n\nG!ipta felt that he was .unjustly treated by bis s.uperiors by not allocating students for Ph.D. to him and by not facilitating post-graduate teaching. There is a .fong drawn-out correspondence in this behalf which we consider unnecessary to refor to save and except the letter dated May 30; 1970 which has been treated by the Academic Council as a letter of resignation of Dr. Gupta from the membership of the _Faculty. By this letter pettioner Dr. Gupta informed. the Academic Council that even though he has been repeatedly assurd that his grievance would be theroughly eamined and full justice would be.done\n\nto him for the discriminalvn and victimisation to which he has been subjected in the m.atter of allotment of students .of 1968 and 1969 batches, nothing has been done in this behalf. He further states that he has been all along patiently waiting for the redressal of his grievance, yet justice has not been done to him. He then states as\".\n\nunder: ·\n\n\"As such, after showing so much patience in the matter, I am sorry to decide that fshould resign from the membership of the Faculty in protest against such a treatment and aga\\nst the disciiniination and victimization shown to me by the Head of the Division .in the allotment of students of 1968 and 1969 batches and departmental candidates.\"\n\nThis letter was .placed before the meeting of the Academic Council convened on May 3, 19nchaired by respondent No. 4. Letter dated May 30, 1970 of the petitioner was placed on the agenda at .\n\nItem No. 17 .. In this connection, the Academic Council resolved asunder:\n\n, D\n\n\"Yur Jette; was c01sidered by the Council at.its meeting held on \"3rd May, 1971 when the Council came to the unani.mous conclirnion that youyiere.noUnterestcd in ontinuing as Faculty Member and hence the Council regrets tq utilize your serices as a Faculty Member of the P.G. Schoo.I any ·more.\"-·\n\nThe callous and heartless attitude of th.e Academic .Council is shocking .. lt adds insult to injury .. Dr. _Gupta has been the victim Of unfair treatment because he raised a voice of dissent against certain c.laims made by the high-up in ICAR in the field of Research. Avoiding\n\ngoing .into t_he. details of it, this. resu.lted in Dr. Gupta. being denied the allocation Of students. 'He did not act in a p1'ccipi_tatc manner .. H.e went on writing Jeiter after letter even .including to respondent No. 4 b.e.seeching him to look into the matter and to ren<\\er justice to him: When everythirtg fell on deaf ears, out of exasperation be wrote letter dated May 30, 1970 in.which he stated that the only honourable e.ourse left\n\n0 open io him was to resign. rattier than suffer. The Council siezed upon this opportunity to .gel rid of Dr. Gupta: In this connection, it is worthwhile to point. out paragraph 11.l in Chapter .\n\nXl of the. Gajendragadkar Committee's report wherein the maj.or\n\ncomplints regarding working conditions in the Divisions were listed as under ; . .\n\n • \"(i) The Head of the Division does not give Jacitities for work. He favors those who \"\"l'k for l)im .\n\n. (ii) there is no academic atmosphere as there is no free_ dis-.\n\n cµssioJ\\ on.research projects and _res.ults obtained:\n\n(iii) \"Senior Scientists insert their names in research papers even thol!gh they do.not do the acfoal work.\n\n(iv) Purchase of chei.n\"icals, glassware _etc. take iuordinate delay.\n\n(v) .Scientists are not alJowed to. use certain equipments\n\nwhich are available in the Division or in 'the °Institute.\n\nFor. e_xample,, the equipments available in the Division ' of Biochemistry. of IARJ. ate no.t shared by all the colleagues of the Division.. The Nuclear .Research Laboratdry has several .equipments which scientists of other Divisions normally_ cannpt use.\" B . .\n\nAfter.listing these complaints, the Committee gave its cornidered opinio_n as under :\n\n'>-.\n\n\"-)\n\n,_,_ ( -\n\nP. K. IYER v. UJ'l!ON (Desai, J.) 237\n\n11.2 We feel that most of these complaints art genuin<' ai1d they should k remedied. The working conditions for scientists should be made attractive so that a. scientists would be encouraged to engage himself in research rather than engge himself in. unacademic aCtivities. So the conditions in a Division should be set right first.\" (underliningours)\n\nThe Committee proceeded to make numerous recommendaticm . to ameliorate. the situation. Jn. this co.ntext we would also like to refer to paragraph I 3 at page l 52 of the Report which reads as under: . .\n\n\"As more instances of allegatibns of uilscientiJ, ic attitudes, behaviour. and practices in IARI, we cite the following.· These com(; from the submissions made by three .scientists o.f the Bio-chemistry Division of JARJ, Dr. T.S. Rarran chaUen-ges the findings in the.Ph.D .. thesis of Dr. LS. Mehta, . . . a Bipchemist in, the Nuclear Resean:h Laboratory. Dr.\n\nRaman categorically asserts that certain data ccntain<d in Dr. Meht; r's thesis \"could not hr.ve been obtained by methcds he has. claimed to have. been used.\" Dr. Y.P. Gupta who appArently has himself worked. on the lysine content of different varities of wheat, states that in the half-yearly report for period ending October, 1968,.he had.reported the lysine content of Sonora-64 to be 3.26.%,- but that the Heed ofthe Division deli.berately changed it to 2.26 % so that the Sharabati . Sonora might appear in a more favourable light. Be seriously\n\ndisputes the data ori the protein and lysine-content of Sharabati Sonora published .by. Dr. Swaminath_an in - the November 1967 issue of the journal ;, Focd Industries'' .. . Dr. K.G. Sikka states that four varities. of Arhar (cajanus) have been recently released which h'e finds contain certain. toxk substance causing blindness a.mong rats. Within the short time available to us, it has not been possible for us to examine these allegations. We do not also think that it . would be a fruitful course for 'us to pursue .. It is obvious that these are very serious allegatons: Wheiher thay are substantiat.ed a careful .exairtaiion, the fact remains thnt there are many junior scientists in IARI who, rightly or wrongly, feel 'that they are not free to publish a. scientific'. filiding because it doesnot suit somebody higher. up or t.hat .in fact unscientific data are being. , passtd on to the hrgher, athorities in_ retufn Of favOurs and promotiOns.\n\n.F .\n\nG .\n\nSUPREME COUJ\\T. REPORTS [I 984] 2 s.c.R:.\n\nThe existence of this feeling is most regretable because it creates the conditions for breeding of unscientific behaviour and practices _if they do not already .exist. Mere refutation ofthe allegations will not iherefore do.\"\n\n. . . br. Gupta's complaint .was then noted and that is the complaint which awaits redressal. H clearly transpires that Dr. Gupta was hounded out ofthe Faculty_ membership and now the respondents try to hide this inconvenient fact by treating the cry oCagony in the letter dated May 30, 1970 as letter of resignation. Apart from being harsh, it is an unethical attitude on .the part of the !CAR. However, at this s!age, we would record a statetment made by_ Mr. Lokur, learned counsel appearing for ICAR and its affiliates before this Court on Ju.y 21, 1976 at the hearing of S.L.P. No. 2339/75preferred by petitioner. Dr. Gupta whic11' reads as under:\n\n'.'Mr. Lokur states that the respondent council would . . consider the question of taking back thepetitioner as a member of the Faci1lty.\"\n\nAfter recording. this statement the special leave pet1llcn was rejected. It was hoped that the respondents would act to honour the statement of their learned counsel. Now that the matter is being disposed of we direct the council to carry out. its statement made before this Court within three months from the date from. today. .\n\nRe: R.P. Nq.- 80/76 in S.L.P. 702/76 : . br. T.S. Raman filed the writ petition in the Delhi High Court challenging the selection 7 and appointmeni of respondent No._ 6 as Senior Bio.chemist en aHthe . grofmds which were utged by Dr. Y.P. Gupfa in his writ petitcn.\n\nF There is also an additional point in his favour in ihat even though the , first Selection Committee constituted to select' a Senior Biochemist -1\n\n>. had directed that the second Selection Committee shou'd interview \" -Dr. T.S. Raman along with other candidates, no intimation was \"nt\n\nto him about the date and time of the interview and he did not . have the benefit of the interview by the second Selection Committee which recommended respondent No. 6 Dr. Mehta for the. post of Senior Biochemist.· Dr. T.S. Raman questicr.<d th cc'rrcclr\"' Hnd validity .of the selection of Dr. S.L. Mehfa; respondent No. 6 in Special Leave Petition 702/76 whch was heard and disposed of along with the . writ petition of Dr. Gupta and met with the same fate. Dr. Raman preferred S.L.P. No. 702/76 which was dismis_sed by this Ccurt en . August' 30,. 1976. Thereafter, he filed Review Petition No~ 80/76\n\n' i\n\np, K. IYER~- UNION (Desai, J.) 239 • . which was directed to be heard in this group of petitions. The reasons\n\nwhich found favour with us for reviewing the decision of this Court dismissing the S.L.P. No. 2339/75 preferred by Dr. Gupta and admitting it and disposing it on merits would mutatis mutandi.1' apply to the review petition of Dr. T.S. Raman and we accordingly review the decision rejecting his special leave petition and grant special leave to , appeal and procetd to dispose of the same on merits .\n\nOrdillarily Dr. Ramari should get the sari1e relief which Dr.\n\nGupta is held entitled to, but certain facts were brought to cur notice which necessitate a consideraHon of Dr.\n\nRaman's case slightly differently. Before we prcicee.d to examine Dr. Raman's case, it may .be noted that the High Court found fault with Dr. Rman in not informing the concerned authority about the change in his address and therefore, if Dr. Raman did not receivethe intimaticn for inter' view, he should thank himself. This approacq dces not ccmmen(, I to us. Dr .. Raman was sti!J in the employment of the.Institute at the time when the Secod . Selection Committee decided to interview candidates and in .view of ihe findings of the first Select[on Cvmmitt<; e,\n\nDr. Raman was entfrled s a matter of right to be called for interview.\n\nThe High Court observed that Dr. Raman neither applied for the post nor appeared for the interview before the second Se!ecticn Ccmmittce: This is begging the issue became the High Ccurt wl1olly overlooked the prcceedings of the first Selection Committee in which it was decided that without any fresh applicaticn from Dr. Raman, he would be considered to be a candidate before the second Selection Committee arid would be <:ailed for interview. There is a further co1ifession in the observation of the High Court when it states that Dr. Gupta and .Dr. Raman were both at ihe relevant' time working in the _Biochemistry Department of the Institute and that Dr. Gupta appeared for the interview before the Second. Selection Committee while Dr. Ramn failed to do so and he cannot make a grievance about his own lapse. If Dr. Raman was at the relevant time a!fachd .to the Institute and was working with the Institute, we see no justi- .\n\nfication for the ministerial side of the Institute not informing Dr.\n\nR 1man to a'ppear for interview. The lapse was on the part of the Selection Committee and the same cani10t be wished away. The . High Court was clearlv in error in observing that either Dr, Raman was not hopefui of getting the job. ot he had some other reasons fer not applying for the same and therefore his grievance cannot be\n\nentertiried. This is clcarlv contrary to record: He qad applied e.arlier and was entitled to be called for interview as noted in the proceedings. \"It was obligatorv upcn the fcccrd Sekcticn Ccrrmittee\n\nc •\n\n• c\n\nto inform Dr. Ra; nan ti:l appear. fo( .the interview and aaequate steps sh.ould have 'qoe1naken to give. the intimation because he was attached . to the Tnstitute and was in active. service of the Tnstitute and intimation. to tiim would not requirn anv herculean effort on the part of th~ Committee.· If'the matter wece Id rest here, we. would have unhesta- . tingly given the same relif which Dr. G'upta is held entitled tc;, but certain additional .facts were put on re.cord which necessitate a different, np.proach. ··\n\n lt maf he recalled that since the re.vision. of tl1e icale attached to •fhe post of Professo; tci Rs, 1100-1600, further promotion was to the ·.scale of Rs. 1500-2000 and the next promotional stage was R>. 1800-2250. It no\\v transpires that Dr~ Raman was made a member of 'f\\gricu!tural Resea1'.ch Science .(ARS) with effect from o:ctober 2, 1975 and he was put in .the sba1e .S-2 Rs. 1100-1600 from the same date .. Rule 19 of the Agricultural Research Service Rules pi'ovided\n\nfor promJtion. from one grade to next higher g1ade on the basis of assessrfient of performance by Agrirnltural Scientific Recruitment Board (ASRB).. The screening for the .purpose of. promotion to higher gr:ide is pcri:O.dically undeFtake11'every. year as far.as practicable\n\nsJincwhre in Janu~1ry or so_on thGrafter. ·sucl11 a Screening was' . undertaken on October 26, 1977 by the Asessment Committee appoiiitta bv the Chairman of ASRB. The period under. Jssessment was upto nd in2iusiw of December 31, 1915.\n\nUnfortunately, or. Rama~ w.ts not recommended by the Committee for 'pro1110tion to S-3 grade i.e, .!ls: 1500,2000; but instead of promotion .lo the higl)ergrado, the Committee recolirn1ended that two .advance incrcme.nts te granted to Dr. Raman which recommendation was ca.rried out with effect from July I, 1976: Against the assessment by the Assessment Com- . mitteo, Dr. Roman made representation e1aiming that , he was eligible for promotion to , S,3 .gra.de. This represcntaiirn \"\"'s .rejcc1crl. ·.by the Director General concurring with the sssessir.cnt inrck by the\n\nAsscssmnf Cotnrnitti::e which. did 1ot find .Dr. Ran1an t for p'ron10~ tion to S-3 grad~: In 197.8 or. Ranian was requstcd to. gi:; e supplementary inforation about. the research \\vork und.ertcken by him for assessment for promotion.1o S-3 grade.\n\nIn. the. meeting of the Assessment Cori1mittee held on. May 28, 1980,. the i.nformaticn supplied .bY Dr. Raman wasJ1eldt~ be insufficient and this. can be cul!ed out from the observation'. of th~ Commit.tee that Dr. Ramai1 \"co.uld ri0t be a.ssessed for want. of material and CCRs for alI the years'. The case .of Dr. Ram.an for promotion to S-3 ·.grade again came up before the Assessment Committee which met on April. 22 .. 1982 and the Committee noted its' deision con'V(ycd by 'the woids\n\n•·.\n\n'II .1\n\n~·\n\nP. K. IYER v. UNION (Desai, 1.) 241\n\n'no change'. Now these assessments are not questioned in the writ petition filed by Dr. Raman and these are later developments and therefore, it would be difficult to give Dr. Raman any benefit at this stage wholly ignoring the later developments\n\nThe learned counsel for the ICAR after succintly pointing out the fact• hereinbefore mentioned, submitted that it is not possible to accord same treatment to Dr. Raman on par with Dr. Gupta wholly ignoring later developments. He however frankly and fairly stated that if the Court directs, the InstitUte has no objection to appointing afresh Committee for making a fresh assessment for ascertaining the suitability of.Dr. Raman for promotion to S-3 grade on the basis of the material regarding work done :ind achievements made by h; m for the period commencing from.becember 31, 1976 npto the period he bas been assessed or uptil now. It was further submitted that if the special Assessment Committee which may be set up to examine the case of Dr. Raman recommends his promotion to S) grade, the same can be given to him with effect from Jst of July of the year following the year upto which he submits his wofk done and other achievements. Dr. Raman is in the.grade of Rs. I 100-1600 since 1975.\n\nA period of 8 years has rolled by. He is undoubtedly a highly qualified person. It is equally true that he bas been asses'sed thrice and found wanting for promotion to the higher grade. However, we appreciate the fair attitude adopted by the learned counsel in this behalf and accordingly direct that the Institute shall set up a special AsscSfment\n\nCommittee to assess the suitability of Dr. Raman for prcmotion to S-3 grade by examining bis work from 1976 till today. This may be done within a period of three months from today.\n\nExcept for what we have recommended in the foregoing paragraph, it is not possible to give Dr. Raman any other relief which Dr. Raman would have been held entitled on the ground that it was an error of the second Selection Committee not to have interviewed him or not to have considered .his case in absentia as directed b'i the. first se.lection Committee. Though the lapse was on the part of the respondents, the resultant situatio'n has become irremediable and irreversible. Therefore, with the observations and directions made in the foregoing paragraph, the appeal arising from the special leave petition of Dr. Raman fails and is dismissed.\n\nRe: C.A. No. 1043/81 : Appellant Om Prakash Khauduri after obtainirlg post-graduate degree in the discipline 'Opcratirnal H Research' iri 1973-74 joined the post of Senior Computer in Indian\n\nAgricultiiral Statistics Institute, an affiliate of ICAR on December 4,\n\n1975. The Agricultural Scientists Recruitment Board ('ASRB' for short) has been constituted by the ICAR with the approval of the Government of India as a recruiting agency for the various posts in Agricultural Research Service (ARS' for short). ASRB issued an advertisement intimating that it would hold competitive public 'examination in 1978 to recruit scientists to be appointed under various disciplines of 'ARS'. For the information of the intending candidates, ASRB made available the rules framed by the JCAR on August 19, 1977 ('1977 Rules' for short) setting out the terms and conditions for admission to the competitive examination and the criteria fer selection of successful candidates etc. The competitive examination was to consist of written tesfhaving '600 marks followed by a viva\n\n.,,\n\nvoce test carrying 100. marks. The final selection was to be done according to the merit list, which would be arranged by the ASRB in the order of 1mrit in each category as disclosed by the aggregate\n\nm>rks f\\nally awarded to each candidate as per Rule 14 of 1977 Rules.\n\nIn response to the advertisement, petitioner applied on Oct. 26, 1977 for being admitted to the examination and his application was accepted and potitioner appeared in the written test.\n\nHe secured 364 marks out of 600 in the written te'st which qualified him for being called\n\n[or viva voce test. 'Tn all 20 candidates inciuding the petitioner were selected for viva voce test. After the viva voce test, the ASRB declared the names of 13 candidates as successful and finally selected them for ARS in the discipline 'Agricultural Statistics'. The petitioner was not am.ong the successful candidates. In fact, nearly 21 vacancies were left unfilled by the ASRB. Petitioner contends that ASRB contravened Rules 13 and -14 by prescribing minimum marks for qualifying at viva voce test at 40 out of 100 and those who did not secure 40 marks, even if on aggregate of the marks were eligible for being included in the merit list, such .candidates were wrongly excluded from the merit list. Petitioner further conteds that the merit list prepared in contravention of Rules 13 and 14 and the resultant '1 sefoetion based on such illegal and invalid merit list is liable to be q uashcd and a mandamus be issued directing the respondents to prepare a fresh merit list in accorda11ce with Rules 13 and 14. The p-; titioner made variou~ representations and he was satif:ficd that the ASRB had accepted the same method cif preparir g the .rr, erit list as the UPSC which followed the. method of arranging the merit\n\nlist according to the aggregate marks obtained at the writtrn test and viva vocc test and if the merit list was prepared according to I that method, he was eligible for being selected for one'Of the vacancies in ARS. Petitioner continued his 'search for justice and ultimately'\n\nP. IC. IYER v. UNION (Desai, J.) 243\n\nhe filed a Writ Petition No. 553/80 in the High Court of Delhi for the above mentioned reliefs. A Division Bench of the High Court held that the law as it then stood was clear that a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act was not other authority within meaning of the expression under Art. 12 and that as ICAR is a society, writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked against it and on this short ground writ petition filed by the petitioner was rejected in limine. Hence this appeal by special leave.\n\nThe narrow question that falJs to be determined in this appeal is whether under the relevant rules ASRB can prescribe minimum qualifying marks which a candidate µrnst obtain at the viva voce test before his name can be included in the merit list on the basis of aggregate marks obtained by him as required by Rule 14 of the 1977 Rules? . .\n\nASRB has been set up as a separate and independent agency for recruiting personnel for IASRT, an affiliate of !CAR. A competitive examination was held in 1978 to recruit scientists to be appointed under various disciplines of ARS including the discipline 'Agriculture Scientists'. There were 34 vacancies in this discipline.\n\nSelection was to be made by competitive examination comprising written test carrying 600 marks in the aggregate and viva voce test carrying JOO marks. The written test is held first and those who qualify in the written test alone are eligible to be called for viva vcce\n\nest. It is alleged and not controverted that\n\nASRB prescribed that anyone to be eligible for being admitted in the merit list on the basis of aggregate marks should also have the additional qualification of atleast obtaining 40 marks in the viva voce test. -It is seriously '\\-- contended that this additional qualification <lo!'s not have the authority\n\nf of law, and that it was arbitrarily devised without any rationale behind it.\n\nThe relevant rules are Rules 13 and 14 of the 1977 Rules, which may be extracted :\n\n.B.\n\n\"13. Candidates who obtain such minimum marks in the G the written examination as may be fixed by the Board in their discretion shall be summoned by them for viva voce.\n\n14.\n\nAfter the examination, the candidates will be arranged H by the Board in the order of merit in each category\n\n(professional subject-wise) as disclosed by the aggregate marks finally awarded to such candidate and such candidates as are found by the Board to be qualified by the examination shail be recommended for appointment upto the number of unreserved vacancies decided to be fiiled on the result of the examination.\"\n\nMr. Ramchandran, learned counsel for the petitioner contrndcd that Rule l3 does not. envisage obtaining of minimum marks at the ~, viva voce test even tho.ugh it contemplates obtaining minimum marks at the written test so as to be eligible for being called for viva voce test. It was.further urged that_Rule 14 specified the manner in which merit list is to be arranged. R\\1le 14 provides that after both written and viva voce tests are held, the candidates will be arranged by the Board in the order of merit in each category (Professional subjectwiee) as disclosed by the aggregate I]1arks finally awarded to each can- ,._ didate and such candidates as are found by the Board to be qualified by the examination shall be recommended for appointment upto the number of unreserved vacancies decided to be filled on the result of the examination. On a combined reading of Rules 13 and 14, two things emerge. It is open to the Board to prescribe minimum marks which the candidates must obtain at the written test before becoming eligible for viv~ . voce test. After the candidate obtains ';..._, minimum marks or more al \\he written test and he becomes eligible for being called for viva voce test, hehas to appear at the viva voce test.\n\nNeither Rule 13 nor Rule 14 nor any other rule enables thy ASRB to prescribe minimum qualifying marks to be obtained by the . - candidate at the viva voce test. On the contrary, the language of Rule 14 clearly negatives any such power in the ASRB when it provides that after the written test if the candidate has obtained minimum -1\n\nmarks, he is eligible for being called for viva voce test and the final l . merit list would be drawn up according to the aggergate of marks obtained by the candidate in written test 'plus viva voce examinatiou.\n\nThe additional qualification which ASRB prescribed to itself namely, that the candidate must have a further qualification of obtaining mil).imum marks in the viva voce test does not find place in Rules 13 and 14, itamounts virtua\\1~ to a modification of the Rules. By necessary inference, there was no such power in the ASRB to add ).. to the required qualifications. If such power is claimed, it\" has to be explicit and cannot be .read by necessary implication for the obvious reason that such deviation from the rules is likely to cause irreparable and irreversible harm. It howe¥er does not appear in the facts of the case before us that because of an allocation of JOO marks for\n\ny '\n\np. K. IYER v. UNION (Desai, J.) . 245\n\n\"iva voce test, the result has been unduly affected.\n\nWe say so for want of adequate material on the record. In this background we are not inclined to hold that 100 marks for viva voce test was unduly high compared to 600 marks allocated for the written. test. But the ASRB in prescribing minimum 40 marks for being qualified for viva\n\n voce test contravened Rule 14 inasmuch as there was no such power in the ASRB to prescribe this additional qualification, and this prescription of an impermissible additional qualification has'a direct impact on the merit list because the merit list was to be prepared according to the aggregate marks obtained by the candidate at written test plus viva voce test. Once an additional qualification of cbtaining minimum marks at the viva voce test iSadhered to, a candidate who may figure high-up in the merit list was 'likely to be rejected cin the ground that he has not obtained minimum qualifying marks at viva Voce test. To illustrate, a candidate who has obtain<d 400 marks at the written test and obtained 38 marks, at the viva voce test, if considered on the aggregate of marks being 438 was likely to come within the zone of selection, but would be eliminated by the ASRB on the g'round that he has not obtained qualifying marks at viva voce test. This was impermissible and contrary to Rnles .and the merit list prepared in contravention of the Rules cannot be sustained .\n\n• It may at this stage be pointed out that the Union Public Service Commission has framed its rules relating to competitive examination held by it in 1978 to recruit personnel to Indian Economic Service and the Indian Statisical Service. Rule 12 and 13 are relevant for this purpose. Briefly, it may be statd that rule 12 authorises the Commission to prescribe minimum qualifying marks for the written examination to be fixed by the Commission at its discretion. It further appears that those. who obtain the minimu~ qualifying\n\nmarks will be eligible for being called for viva voee test. Rule 13 F provides that after the examination i.e. both the written test aµd the viva voce test, the candidates will be arranged by the Commission in the order of merit as disclosed by the aggregate marks finally awarded to each candidate and in that order so many candidates as are found by the Commission to be qualified by the examination shall be recommended for appointment upto the number of unreserved G vacanc'es decided to be filled on the. result of the examination. There is a proviso to this rule which is imm•terial. It appears that when the petitioner drew attention of the ICAR that in prescribing the additional qualification of minimum. marks to be obtained by the candidates at the viva' voce test and not preparing the merit list accor-' H ding to the aggregate of marks by excludirtg those candidates who\n\nha<l not obtained minimum qualifying marks at the viva voce test! it contravened Rules 13 and 14 and more particularly Rule .I 4. the ICAR referred the matter to UPSC and enquired about the procedure followed by it. There is an admission in the counter-affidavit of Mrs. Rathi Vinay Jha. Secretary, ICAR and Deputv Secretary, Government of India, Department of Agricultural . Research and Education, Ministry of .Agriculture and Rural Reconstruction that after the UPSC intimated its procedure: the matter was placed before the Committee of ARS at its meeting held on July 11, 1979. Subsequently, the President, ICAR approved the procedure followed by the UPSC and recommended by the Committee of ARS, and the revised procedure was adopted for the examination 'held in January,· 1981. The re, ised procedure eliminates obtaining of minimum quali(ying maiks at viva voce test. May be that the ICAR has corrected itself but what about the da_mage done to the petitioner and those similarly situated.\n\nIt is not possible at this late stage to reject the entire selection on the ground that the ASRB committed a serious legal error in prescribing minimum qualifying marks at the viva voce test and drawing up merit list on this impermissible method.\n\nIt would be equally improper to disturb the selection of those who had been selected and appointed way back in 1978. Even though -it is true that a serious legal error has been committed in drawing up the merit list, at this late stage, it would be unwise to reject the entire selection, disturbing those who are a'lready selected and may have put in service of not less than 5 years. But it is crystal clear that 21 _vacancies were kept unfilled. It is not made clear whether the petitioner has been selected at apy later selection. If he is selected at the later selection, nothing further is required to be done: But if he is not selected, the ASRB may draw the merit list in respect of remaining 21 unlilkd vacancies from amongst •those who were called for viva voce test and who were not selected because some of them like petitioner did not obtained. minimqm qualifving marks at viva voce test. The merit list may be drawn in respect of those who though called for viva voce did not qualify for being put in the merit, ignoring the concept of minimum qualifying marks a merit list in respect of them be drawn up on the basis of aggregate marks. If there is a vacancy, and if the petitioner comes within the zone of selection on the aggregate of marks obtained by him, his case shall be considered for appointment prospectively, and not retrospectively. This is the only relief which we are inclined to grant to the petitioner.\n\n' '\n\np, K. IYER v .. UNION (Desai, J.) 247\n\nThat is the end of the journey. It is better to draw-up here A the directions in respect of each of the petitioner.\n\nIn Writ Petition No. 587/75, the !CAR is directed on their. concession and by a mandamus of this Court to put the three petitioners in the revised scale of Rs. 1100-1600 sanctioned for the post of Profossor effective from the day. when others selected as P1 ofrssors. in sister B disciplines were awarded the revised scale of Rs. 1100-1600.\n\nIn Special Leave Petition No. 2339/75, the !CAR is directed bv a mandamus of this Court to a ward to Dr. Y. P. Gupta the sak ' of Rs. 1800-2250 from the date the same was given to respondent No. 6 Dr. S.L. Mehta. The arrears payable pursuant to the direction shall be paid within 3 months from today.\n\nFurther the !CAR is directed to cam out the statement made by its learned counsol Mr. Lokur of taking back Dr. Y.P. Gupta as a member of the Faculty of post-graduate school of !ARI within a poricld or 3 months from .today.\n\nfn S.L.P. No. 702/76, it is directed on the concession of the learned counsel for the !CAR that a special Assessment Committee may be set up to examine the case of Dr. T.S. Raman for promotion to S-3 grade' \\Vithin a per; od of 3 months.• Dr. T:s. Ra1nan is not entitled to any further relief in his special leave petition.\n\nJn C.A. 1043/81, the ICAR and ASRB arc directed to prepare the 1nerit list in respect of those candidates who were called for viva voce test, but \\vere 11ot included in the n1crit list on the aggregate of m1rks obtained by them as directed hercjn and if there is a vacancv and the appellant/petitione;. comes within the zone of selection h~ shall be appointed to one such vacancy.\n\nThe appointn1cnt would be prospoctive and would be 'effective from the date of the appointment but this is subject to the condition that if the appellant/petitioner is already selected at a later selectic•n, nothing inore is required to be done.\n\nWe order accordingly. The respondent shall pny the costs of the petitioners in each petition.\n\nN.V.K.\n\nAppeals & Petitions allowed.", "total_entities": 248, "entities": [{"text": "RAMA.CHANDRA IYE.R & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9, "end_char": 33, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.K.RAMACHANDRA IYER & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "UNION OF INDIA & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 36, "end_char": 56, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "D: A. DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 84, "end_char": 95, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.A. 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IYER"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20523, "end_char": 20533, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": ".YogeshwarPrasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20949, "end_char": 20965, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~\n\nc .YogeshwarPrasad and Mrs Rani Chhabra for the Petitioner in WP."}}, {"text": "Rani Chhabra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20974, "end_char": 20986, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~\n\nc .YogeshwarPrasad and Mrs Rani Chhabra for the Petitioner in WP."}}, {"text": "M.G. R amchandran", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 21041, "end_char": 21058, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M.G. R amchandran for the Appellant in CA.·"}}, {"text": "Abdul Khader", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 21106, "end_char": 21118, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Abdul Khader, Mi.<s .A\" Suhhashini and Girish Chandra for the D Respondent in WP."}}, {"text": ".A\" Suhhashini", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 21126, "end_char": 21140, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Abdul Khader, Mi.<s .A\" Suhhashini and Girish Chandra for the D Respondent in WP."}}, {"text": "Girish Chandra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 21145, "end_char": 21159, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Abdul Khader, Mi.<s .A\" Suhhashini and Girish Chandra for the D Respondent in WP."}}, {"text": "K.G. Bhagar~", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21197, "end_char": 21209, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K.G. Bhagar~ Addi."}}, {"text": "A. 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Gajendragadbr", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27219, "end_char": 27237, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "environment had become so snffo- ,\n\ncatig that the Government of India had to appoint a Committee -·-1 presidedover by late Shri P.D. Gajendragadbr, retired Chief Justice · of the Supreme Court' with wide terms of reference which."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 27270, "end_char": 27283, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "environment had become so snffo- ,\n\ncatig that the Government of India had to appoint a Committee -·-1 presidedover by late Shri P.D. 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Raman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31736, "end_char": 31750, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "petition filed by one Dre T.S. Raman being Writ Petition Ne."}}, {"text": "Y.P: Gupta", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31826, "end_char": 31836, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "by the common iu4gmcnt:\n\nDr. Y.P: Gupta ii.", "canonical_name": "Y.P .. Gupta"}}, {"text": "Lokur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 32110, "end_char": 32115, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1976, Mr. Lokur, 'learned counsel.", "canonical_name": "Lokur"}}, {"text": "T.S. Raman", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 32855, "end_char": 32865, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr.T.S. Raman whose Writ Petitin No.", "canonical_name": "T .. S Raman"}}, {"text": "T:S. Raman", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 33133, "end_char": 33143, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. T:S. Raman filed Rovieiv P.otition No.", "canonical_name": "T .. 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Court of Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 35482, "end_char": 35503, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the High ."}}, {"text": "Lokur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 35956, "end_char": 35961, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "dispute to some extent ..\n\nMr.- Lokur appearing for I<; AR raised a preliminary objection\n\n... . 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The Imperial Com:icil of Agricultura1 Research wane:, designated as Indian .Council of Agri.cultutal Research. '"}}, {"text": "Government of Indfa", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 45142, "end_char": 45161, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In .the meantime, the Government of Indfa enforced the new rules framed by\n\nthe ICAR effective from January 10, 1966 keeping rule 18 in abeyance ."}}, {"text": "DARE", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 45371, "end_char": 45375, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By this very Resolution, the Director General of ICAR was  concurrently designated' as Secretary to Government of lndir, in the DARE."}}, {"text": "Government of lndir", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 46147, "end_char": 46166, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By this very Resolution, the Director General of ICAR was  concurrently designated' as Secretary to Government of lndir, in the DARE."}}, {"text": "Central . 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Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 49693, "end_char": 49721, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CSiil did not .have a statutory character like the Oil and Natural Gas Commission, or the Life Iilsuranc<!"}}, {"text": "Societies Registration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 49832, "end_char": 49858, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 50915, "end_char": 50928, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51049, "end_char": 51057, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "CSIR", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 51097, "end_char": 51101, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Court accordingly concluded that CSIR is not an instrumentality of the Government comprehended in the expression 'other authority' within the meaning of Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51217, "end_char": 51224, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51719, "end_char": 51726, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ajay Basia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 52525, "end_char": 52535, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The ratio, if any, of the decision in Sabhajit Tewary's case was : ' F examined by a Constitutin Bench of this Court in Ajay Basia's case and.it was held that that 'decisio'n is not an authority for the proposition that a society registered under the Societies Registratio.n Act, 1860 can never be regarded as an authority withih the meaning of Art.", "canonical_name": "Ajay Hasia"}}, {"text": "Art. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52750, "end_char": 52757, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": ".CSIR", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 52919, "end_char": 52924, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "regard to the various features enumerated in the judgment in Sabhajit Tewary's case, the conclusion G was reached that the .CSIR was not an agency of the Government, but the Court did not rest its conclusion on the sole ground that CSIR was a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860; and on the contrary proceeded to consider various other features of."}}, {"text": "Societies Registration Act, 1860", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 53068, "end_char": 53100, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Societies Regisfration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 53418, "end_char": 53444, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54208, "end_char": 54215, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Societies Regisfration Act", "statute": "Societies Regisfration Act"}}, {"text": "Article 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54482, "end_char": 54492, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Governments of Jammu & Kashmii", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 54797, "end_char": 54827, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The composition of the Society is dominated.by the representatives appointed by the_ Central Government and the Governments of Jammu & Kashmii; ."}}, {"text": "Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 54832, "end_char": 54838, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Punjab, Rajastlian and Uttar Pradesh with the approval ·· of the' Central Government."}}, {"text": "Rajastlian", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 54840, "end_char": 54850, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Punjab, Rajastlian and Uttar Pradesh with the approval ·· of the' Central Government."}}, {"text": "Government of Jammu & Kashmir", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 55024, "end_char": 55053, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Government; and the Government of Jammu & Kashmir\n\n and even if any other monies are to _be received by the ."}}, {"text": "Central Governments", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 55185, "end_char": 55204, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Board of Governors, which is in charge of general superintendence, direction and conliol of the affairs of Society and of its income and property is a!So largely controlled by nominees of the State and the Central Governments."}}, {"text": "Central' Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 56346, "end_char": 56365, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G.overnmenis have even the power to ai>point any other person or persons to be members of the Soeiety and any member of-the Society other than a .member representing the State or the Cenlral\n\nGovernment can be removed from the membership of the Society by the State Government with the approval of the Central' Government."}}, {"text": "Ray", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 56921, "end_char": 56924, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the wotds of Ray, CJ."}}, {"text": "Sukhdev Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 56933, "end_char": 56946, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in Sukhdev Singh's case (supra), the voice is that of the Staie and the Central Governments wd the bands are also of the State and the Cental Governments."}}, {"text": "Art. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57256, "end_char": 57263, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Union Public Service Ccmmission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 60254, "end_char": 60285, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "approval of the Government of India but prior thereto it was by the Union Public Service Ccmmission."}}, {"text": "Art. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60792, "end_char": 60799, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Delhi' High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 60904, "end_char": 60921, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "12: As a necessary corollary the writ jurisdiction can be invoked against it and therefcre the decision of Delhi' High Court must be reversed on this .point."}}, {"text": "Mav 5, l 972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 62215, "end_char": 62227, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This came 1o light when on Mav 5, l 972, newipapers all over 'he country flashed the tragic news that a young agricultural scientists, Dr. V.H. Shah, who was working as Senior Agronomist and Associate Project Coordinator in the IVRJ had committed suicide by hanging himself in his residence _the previous night."}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 62589, "end_char": 62599, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was a commotion in the Parliamnt and during the debate in the House, Membe'rs of Parliament regretfully referred to previous suicides commitied by agricultural scientists, one such ."}}, {"text": "M.T. Joseph", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 62704, "end_char": 62715, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "being of Dr. M.T. Joseph, Teaching Assistant, Divisian of Entomology, ·\n\nIARI who had committed suicide on Januar!f 5, J 960."}}, {"text": "Januar!f 5, J 960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 62798, "end_char": 62815, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "being of Dr. M.T. Joseph, Teaching Assistant, Divisian of Entomology, ·\n\nIARI who had committed suicide on Januar!f 5, J 960."}}, {"text": "Govenment of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 63057, "end_char": 63075, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The then Minister for Fod and Agriculturestated in the Parliament that the Govenment of India was not happy with the procedure of selection of personnel in the !"}}, {"text": "P.B. Gajendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 64093, "end_char": 64112, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To continue the narrative, a committee was appointed under tlie Chairmanship of Shri P.B. Gajendragadkar, ; eitred Chief.", "canonical_name": "P.B. Gajendragadkar"}}, {"text": "s. 700", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70583, "end_char": 70589, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "March 25, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 71233, "end_char": 71247, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Letter of appointment dated March 25, 1970 in respect of petitioner .No."}}, {"text": "S.L. Shah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 73069, "end_char": 73078, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "case of Dr. S.L. Shah score a march in the na1ne.of 'scleCtion \\vhich cnerallv leaves a grey afea."}}, {"text": "M.S. Swaniinathan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 74673, "end_char": 74690, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the benefit of the revisedscale is to be found in the counter-affidavit of Dr. M.S. Swaniinathan .• It is conteride.d that tlie newly created ."}}, {"text": "Chinnappa Rcddv", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 75724, "end_char": 75739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "39(d); Chinnappa Rcddv, J.· in' Randhir Singh v:· Union of\n\nIndia & Or.i."}}, {"text": "Arts. 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75818, "end_char": 75833, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 39(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75867, "end_char": 75877, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Atdul Khcer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 77141, "end_char": 77152, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the matter was discussed threadbare Mr. Atdul Khcer, .learned counsel for the Union of India stated that all the petjtioners would be put in the revised scales from the."}}, {"text": "Khader", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 77359, "end_char": 77365, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr: Khader stated .that petitioners Nos."}}, {"text": "S7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 78793, "end_char": 78795, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Y.P .. Gupta", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 78859, "end_char": 78871, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Y.P .. Gupta filed Writ Petitibn No.", "canonical_name": "Y.P .. Gupta"}}, {"text": "IARI", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 79346, "end_char": 79350, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ft was alleged that in December, 1970, ICAR advertised a post of Senior Bio-chemist in IARI in the scale of Rs."}}, {"text": "Y.P. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 79904, "end_char": 79914, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Aniongs.t others,' petitioners Dr. Y.P. Gupta, Dr. T.S. Raman and respondent No.", "canonical_name": "Y.P .. Gupta"}}, {"text": "T.S. Raman", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 79920, "end_char": 79930, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Aniongs.t others,' petitioners Dr. Y.P. Gupta, Dr. T.S. Raman and respondent No.", "canonical_name": "T .. S Raman"}}, {"text": "J. Ganguly", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 80050, "end_char": 80060, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Selection Committee was set up with Dr. J. Ganguly; F Professor."}}, {"text": "P.K. Kymal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 80112, "end_char": 80122, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of Bioch.emistry as Chairman and Dr: P.K. Kymal a.nd Dr. , N.P. Datta as members."}}, {"text": "N.P. Datta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 80134, "end_char": 80144, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of Bioch.emistry as Chairman and Dr: P.K. Kymal a.nd Dr. , N.P. Datta as members."}}, {"text": "S.L. Mehta", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 80256, "end_char": 80266, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6 Dr. S.L. Mehta were interviewed by the Selection .Committee.", "canonical_name": ".S.L. Mehta"}}, {"text": "SUPllilME COURT REPORTS [1984", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 80867, "end_char": 80896, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "228 SUPllilME COURT REPORTS [1984] i S •. C.R .. . ; . . . ..,_"}}, {"text": "TS. Raman", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 81190, "end_char": 81199, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "afresh with expanded essential qualification, This list includes the names of petitioners Dr. Y.r: Gupta and Dr. TS.", "canonical_name": "T .. S Raman"}}, {"text": "S.L Mehta", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 81229, "end_char": 81238, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6 Dr. S.L Mehta ..\n\nA fresh Selection Corn-·\n\n.·", "canonical_name": ".S.L. Mehta"}}, {"text": "M.S. Naik", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 81327, "end_char": 81336, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5 Dr: M.S. Naik\n\nagafost whom numerous allegations of maia fides have bee11 ade, The i1ew Selection Comtnittee interviewed Dr.. Y.P. Gupta along with others .. Ultimately, the second Selection Committee recommended pr.", "canonical_name": "M.S. Naik"}}, {"text": "S:L. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 81540, "end_char": 81550, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S:L. Mehta for th.e post .which led to the' filing.of the petition inter a/ia 911 the grund that Dr. S.L. Mehta did not satisfy the minimum es.sential qualification. .", "canonical_name": ".S.L. Mehta"}}, {"text": "y, p, Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 81769, "end_char": 81780, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Another griev.ance in the petitio'n ; s that petitioner Dr. y, p, Gupta was a member of the facuJty', in the post-graduate school at IART from 1965 to May 1971 and he was illegally and arbitrar; lv removed.from the membersh; p of the Faculty."}}, {"text": "M.S. Naik", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 82027, "end_char": 82036, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jn the communication dated Juno 15, 1971 by the Assistant Registrar to Dr. M.S. Naik, Head 6f the Biochemistry Department, Ann.", "canonical_name": "M.S. Naik"}}, {"text": "TARI", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 82805, "end_char": 82809, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1970 Dr. Gupta submitted his resignation which was\n\naccepted by the .Academic Council with regret:\n\nThe High Court rejeted the petition primarily on the ground ihat no writ petition lies against TARI, a ground no more available to the petitioner."}}, {"text": "YP. . Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 82901, "end_char": 82912, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the merits, the High Court held that Dr. YP. .", "canonical_name": "Y.P .. Gupta"}}, {"text": "Swaminathan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 83010, "end_char": 83021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4-DL M.S: Swaminathan and respondent\n\nNo.", "canonical_name": "swaminathan"}}, {"text": "M.S. Naik", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 83049, "end_char": 83058, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5 Dr.· M.S. Naik.", "canonical_name": "M.S. Naik"}}, {"text": "S.L' Mehta", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 83219, "end_char": 83229, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6 Dr. S.L' Mehta was appointed on the recommendation of the Selection Committee it must have been done by necessary implication aftr.", "canonical_name": ".S.L. Mehta"}}, {"text": "Y.-P. Gupta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 83557, "end_char": 83568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that Dr. Y.-P. Gupta' ceased to be a men1ber of the Faculty and that he was not removed from the member- '\n\n').. . .", "canonical_name": "Y.P .. Gupta"}}, {"text": "CAR", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 84378, "end_char": 84381, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CAR as .also the Institute that .the Academic Council .w9uld consider the questl~11 of taking back the petitioner as.a member qf the Faculty."}}, {"text": "Gupia", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 84536, "end_char": 84541, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter, Dr. Gupia filed R:P. No.", "canonical_name": "G'upta"}}, {"text": "Oct. 21/, .1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 84606, "end_char": 84621, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "rejected by this court on Oct. 21/, .1976."}}, {"text": "Decemb.er 19, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 84903, "end_char": 84921, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "17350/79 dated Decemb.er 19, 1979.. Preliminar} objection .is that no case is 'made out b} the petitioner for review .of th.c decision of the Court rejecting petitio~ for special leave jjjcd by the\n\npetitioner. ."}}, {"text": "Art. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86045, "end_char": 86052, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ik Gupta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 86141, "end_char": 86149, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Court must examine the contentions of Ik Gupta on merits."}}, {"text": "Mehta", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 86512, "end_char": 86517, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mehta\n\n.. '.", "canonical_name": "Mehta"}}, {"text": "Gupta", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 87270, "end_char": 87275, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is nofin dispute tliat Dr. Gupta, the present pet't'cner, did satisfy th'.s and other.essential qualificat; ons."}}, {"text": "T .. S Raman", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 87472, "end_char": 87484, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "including petitioner Dr.. Gupta; Dr. T .. S Raman, petitioner in cognate pe\\ition and respondent No.", "canonical_name": "T .. S Raman"}}, {"text": ".S.L. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 88435, "end_char": 88446, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".S.L. Mehta had and event))en the question did arise whether.", "canonical_name": ".S.L. Mehta"}}, {"text": "T.S. Raman", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 88693, "end_char": 88703, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Committee recommended that pursuant to fresh adve1tisement, ii\n\nould' ot be necessary for the petitioners Dr.\" Gupta, Dr. T.S. Raman and respondent\"No.", "canonical_name": "T .. S Raman"}}, {"text": "Gllpta", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 89245, "end_char": 89251, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "And let it be recalled that the relations between petitioner Dr. Gllpta and respondent No."}}, {"text": "T.S. Ra marl", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 89912, "end_char": 89924, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Two errnrs are pointed out in connection with the proceedings of the second Selection Committee in which Dr. M.S. Naik participated, namely, that the proceedings were vitiated on account of the bias -of Dr. M.S. Naik and that the Committee failed to interview Dr. T.S. Ra marl and his case wet by default not on liccount of his fault but on account of inefficien.cy and inaction on the part of the administration responsible for intimating to Dr. Raman the date of interview.", "canonical_name": "T .. S Raman"}}, {"text": "Raman", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 90095, "end_char": 90100, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Two errnrs are pointed out in connection with the proceedings of the second Selection Committee in which Dr. M.S. Naik participated, namely, that the proceedings were vitiated on account of the bias -of Dr. M.S. Naik and that the Committee failed to interview Dr. T.S. Ra marl and his case wet by default not on liccount of his fault but on account of inefficien.cy and inaction on the part of the administration responsible for intimating to Dr. Raman the date of interview.", "canonical_name": "Ram.an"}}, {"text": "Gajendragadkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 90561, "end_char": 90575, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "whether after the unravelling of despicable state of affairs in the internal administration of ICAR and its affiliate~ by Gajendragadkar\n\nCo1nn1itee, has any i1npr.ove111ent becon1c noticeable ?", "canonical_name": "P.B. Gajendragadkar"}}, {"text": "S.L. Me\\lta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 91039, "end_char": 91050, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "However one aspect which we .cannot overlcok is that by this process of selection seriously questioned in this petitiop, Dr. S.L. Me\\lta has scored a march over petitioner Dr. Gupta and his co-petitioner Dr. T.S. Raman in the matter of higher scale of pay:\n\nThe firsi question to which we must, t\\lerefore address ourselves is whether there is any substance in the contention of Dr. Gupta . . . .", "canonical_name": ".S.L. Mehta"}}, {"text": "S. L. Mehta", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 91548, "end_char": 91559, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The finding recorded by the High Court in this connection is eloqµent to establish that Dr. S. L. Mehta did not fulfil either the original or the amplified .essential qualification, of pertaining to experience.", "canonical_name": ".S.L. Mehta"}}, {"text": "S.L.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 91741, "end_char": 91745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6 Dr .. S.L. hta started from October .1962 when he was preparing research thesis for M.Sc."}}, {"text": "Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 91919, "end_char": 91924, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "972 with the result that the research experience of Dr. Mehta fell short of\"IO years.", "canonical_name": "Mehta"}}, {"text": "N.B. Das", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 92750, "end_char": 92758, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.B. Das a11d joined se1vice al JARl in July, l 969."}}, {"text": "s.L. Mehta", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 92916, "end_char": 92926, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6 Dr. s.L. Mehta had research experience extending only over hardly a. period of 5 years.", "canonical_name": ".S.L. Mehta"}}, {"text": "P. K. IYER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 95114, "end_char": 95124, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. K. IYER '\" UNION (Desai.,", "canonical_name": "P.\"K. IYER"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 98524, "end_char": 98532, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Biharv", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 98765, "end_char": 98780, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CAR, the Court should not usurp that power merely because it-would have .chosen a different' person ·• as better qualified (See State of Biharv; Dr. Asis Kumar Mukherjee1\" Undoubiedly, the Court must look with respect upon the performance of duties by experts in the respective fields as bas been sa.id in Dr. M.C.\n\nGupta's .case .. However, the task of ushering a society based on rule of la.t'' is entrusted to."}}, {"text": "Asis Kumar Mukherjee1", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 98786, "end_char": 98807, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CAR, the Court should not usurp that power merely because it-would have .chosen a different' person ·• as better qualified (See State of Biharv; Dr. Asis Kumar Mukherjee1\" Undoubiedly, the Court must look with respect upon the performance of duties by experts in the respective fields as bas been sa.id in Dr. M.C.\n\nGupta's .case .. However, the task of ushering a society based on rule of la.t'' is entrusted to."}}, {"text": "M.C.\n\nGupta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 98947, "end_char": 98958, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CAR, the Court should not usurp that power merely because it-would have .chosen a different' person ·• as better qualified (See State of Biharv; Dr. Asis Kumar Mukherjee1\" Undoubiedly, the Court must look with respect upon the performance of duties by experts in the respective fields as bas been sa.id in Dr. M.C.\n\nGupta's .case .. However, the task of ushering a society based on rule of la.t'' is entrusted to."}}, {"text": "[1975) 2 S.C.R 894", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 100349, "end_char": 100367, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Raman", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 100846, "end_char": 100851, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the hearil)g of this petition, it was suggested to the respondents .to put both Dr. Gupta and Dr. Raman .whose case.", "canonical_name": "Ram.an"}}, {"text": "G!ipta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 101277, "end_char": 101283, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Few relevanf facts in this connection are that Dr.\n\nG!ipta felt that he was .unjustly treated by bis s.uperiors by not allocating students for Ph.D. to him and by not facilitating post-graduate teaching."}}, {"text": "May 30; 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 101561, "end_char": 101573, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is a .fong drawn-out correspondence in this behalf which we consider unnecessary to refor to save and except the letter dated May 30; 1970 which has been treated by the Academic Council as a letter of resignation of Dr. Gupta from the membership of the _Faculty."}}, {"text": "May 3, 19nchaired", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 102664, "end_char": 102681, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This letter was .placed before the meeting of the Academic Council convened on May 3, 19nchaired by respondent No."}}, {"text": "May 30, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 102716, "end_char": 102728, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Letter dated May 30, 1970 of the petitioner was placed on the agenda at ."}}, {"text": "P.G. Schoo.I", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 103129, "end_char": 103141, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "17 .. In this connection, the Academic Council resolved asunder:\n\n, D\n\n\"Yur Jette; was c01sidered by the Council at.its meeting held on \"3rd May, 1971 when the Council came to the unani.mous conclirnion that youyiere.noUnterestcd in ontinuing as Faculty Member and hence the Council regrets tq utilize your serices as a Faculty Member of the P.G. Schoo."}}, {"text": "Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 103266, "end_char": 103271, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The callous and heartless attitude of th.e Academic .Council is shocking .. lt adds insult to injury .. Dr. _Gupta has been the victim Of unfair treatment because he raised a voice of dissent against certain c.laims made by the high-up in ICAR in the field of Research.", "canonical_name": "G'upta"}}, {"text": "IARI", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 105819, "end_char": 105823, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and practices in IARI, we cite the following.·"}}, {"text": "T.S. Rarran chaUen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 105952, "end_char": 105970, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These com(; from the submissions made by three .scientists o.f the Bio-chemistry Division of JARJ, Dr. T.S. Rarran chaUen-ges the findings in the."}}, {"text": "LS. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 106017, "end_char": 106026, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D .. thesis of Dr. LS.", "canonical_name": ".S.L. Mehta"}}, {"text": "Raman", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 106089, "end_char": 106094, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr.\n\nRaman categorically asserts that certain data ccntain<d in Dr. Meht; r's thesis \"could not hr.ve been obtained by methcds he has.", "canonical_name": "Ram.an"}}, {"text": "Meht", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 106152, "end_char": 106156, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr.\n\nRaman categorically asserts that certain data ccntain<d in Dr. Meht; r's thesis \"could not hr.ve been obtained by methcds he has.", "canonical_name": "Mehta"}}, {"text": "Sharabati Sonora", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 106696, "end_char": 106712, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Be seriously\n\ndisputes the data ori the protein and lysine-content of Sharabati Sonora published .by."}}, {"text": "K.G. Sikka", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 106819, "end_char": 106829, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. K.G. Sikka states that four varities."}}, {"text": "Ju.y 21, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 108419, "end_char": 108432, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "However, at this s!age, we would record a statetment made by Mr. Lokur, learned counsel appearing for ICAR and its affiliates before this Court on Ju.y 21, 1976 at the hearing of S.L.P. No."}}, {"text": "T.S. Raman", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 109045, "end_char": 109055, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T.S. Raman filed the writ petition in the Delhi High Court challenging the selection 7 and appointmeni of respondent No._", "canonical_name": "T .. S Raman"}}, {"text": "Y.P. Gupfa", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 109234, "end_char": 109244, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "grofmds which were utged by Dr. Y.P. Gupfa in his writ petitcn.", "canonical_name": "Y.P .. Gupta"}}, {"text": "S.L. Mehfa", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 109850, "end_char": 109860, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. T.S. Raman questicr.<d th cc'rrcclr\"' Hnd validity .of the selection of Dr. S.L. Mehfa; respondent No.", "canonical_name": ".S.L. Mehta"}}, {"text": "Desai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 110185, "end_char": 110190, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter, he filed Review Petition No~ 80/76\n\n' i\n\np, K. IYER~- UNION (Desai, J.) 239 • .", "canonical_name": "DESAI"}}, {"text": "Ramari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 110693, "end_char": 110699, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ordillarily Dr. Ramari should get the sari1e relief which Dr.\n\nGupta is held entitled to, but certain facts were brought to cur notice which necessitate a consideraHon of Dr.\n\nRaman's case slightly differently.", "canonical_name": "Ramari"}}, {"text": "Rman", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 110995, "end_char": 110999, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before we prcicee.d to examine Dr. Raman's case, it may .be noted that the High Court found fault with Dr. Rman in not informing the concerned authority about the change in his address and therefore, if Dr. Raman did not receivethe intimaticn for inter' view, he should thank himself.", "canonical_name": "Ram.an"}}, {"text": "Ramn", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 112232, "end_char": 112236, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Selection Committee while Dr. Ramn failed to do so and he cannot make a grievance about his own lapse.", "canonical_name": "Ram.an"}}, {"text": "G'upta", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 113436, "end_char": 113442, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "tingly given the same relif which Dr. G'upta is held entitled tc;, but certain additional .facts were put on re.cord which necessitate a different, np.proach. ··", "canonical_name": "G'upta"}}, {"text": "Agrirnltural Scientific Recruitment Board", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 114139, "end_char": 114180, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "from one grade to next higher g1ade on the basis of assessrfient of performance by Agrirnltural Scientific Recruitment Board (ASRB).. The screening for the .purpose of."}}, {"text": "Roman", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 114927, "end_char": 114932, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "mitteo, Dr. Roman made representation e1aiming that , he was eligible for promotion to , S,3 .gra.de.", "canonical_name": "Ram.an"}}, {"text": "Ran1an", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 115176, "end_char": 115182, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ran1an t for p'ron10~ tion to S-3 grad~: In 197.8 or.", "canonical_name": "Ran1an"}}, {"text": "Ranian", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 115230, "end_char": 115236, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ranian was requstcd to.", "canonical_name": "Ran1an"}}, {"text": "Ramai1", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 115591, "end_char": 115597, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of th~ Commit.tee that Dr. Ramai1 \"co.uld ri0t be a.ssessed for want.", "canonical_name": "Ramari"}}, {"text": "Ram.an", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 115692, "end_char": 115698, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case .of Dr. Ram.an for promotion to S-3 ·.grade again came up before the Assessment Committee which met on April.", "canonical_name": "Ram.an"}}, {"text": "ICAR", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 116197, "end_char": 116201, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now these assessments are not questioned in the writ petition filed by Dr. Raman and these are later developments and therefore, it would be difficult to give Dr. Raman any benefit at this stage wholly ignoring the later developments\n\nThe learned counsel for the ICAR after succintly pointing out the fact• hereinbefore mentioned, submitted that it is not possible to accord same treatment to Dr. Raman on par with Dr. Gupta wholly ignoring later developments."}}, {"text": "Om Prakash Khauduri", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 118380, "end_char": 118399, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1043/81 : Appellant Om Prakash Khauduri after obtainirlg post-graduate degree in the discipline 'Opcratirnal H Research' iri 1973-74 joined the post of Senior Computer in Indian\n\nAgricultiiral Statistics Institute, an affiliate of ICAR on December 4,\n\n1975.", "canonical_name": "Om Prakash .Khauduri"}}, {"text": "December 4,\n\n1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 118599, "end_char": 118616, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1043/81 : Appellant Om Prakash Khauduri after obtainirlg post-graduate degree in the discipline 'Opcratirnal H Research' iri 1973-74 joined the post of Senior Computer in Indian\n\nAgricultiiral Statistics Institute, an affiliate of ICAR on December 4,\n\n1975."}}, {"text": "Agricultural Scientists Recruitment Board", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 118622, "end_char": 118663, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Agricultural Scientists Recruitment Board ('ASRB' for short) has been constituted by the ICAR with the approval of the Government of India as a recruiting agency for the various posts in Agricultural Research Service (ARS' for short)."}}, {"text": "ASRB", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 118666, "end_char": 118670, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Agricultural Scientists Recruitment Board ('ASRB' for short) has been constituted by the ICAR with the approval of the Government of India as a recruiting agency for the various posts in Agricultural Research Service (ARS' for short)."}}, {"text": "August 19, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 119131, "end_char": 119146, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For the information of the intending candidates, ASRB made available the rules framed by the JCAR on August 19, 1977 ('1977 Rules' for short) setting out the terms and conditions for admission to the competitive examination and the criteria fer selection of successful candidates etc."}}, {"text": "Oct. 26, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 119744, "end_char": 119757, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In response to the advertisement, petitioner applied on Oct. 26, 1977 for being admitted to the examination and his application was accepted and potitioner appeared in the written test."}}, {"text": "Petitioner contends that ASRB contravened Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 120349, "end_char": 120396, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "UPSC", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 121135, "end_char": 121139, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The p-; titioner made variou~ representations and he was satif:ficd that the ASRB had accepted the same method cif preparir g the .rr, erit list as the UPSC which followed the."}}, {"text": "Societies Registration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 121720, "end_char": 121746, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 121810, "end_char": 121817, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Division Bench of the High Court held that the law as it then stood was clear that a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act", "statute": "Division Bench of the High Court held that the law as it then stood was clear that a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act"}}, {"text": "IASRT", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 122448, "end_char": 122453, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ASRB has been set up as a separate and independent agency for recruiting personnel for IASRT, an affiliate of !"}}, {"text": "ASRB", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 123004, "end_char": 123008, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is alleged and not controverted that\n\nASRB prescribed that anyone to be eligible for being admitted in the merit list on the basis of aggregate marks should also have the additional qualification of atleast obtaining 40 marks in the viva voce test."}}, {"text": "Ramchandran", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 124084, "end_char": 124095, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Ramchandran, learned counsel for the petitioner contrndcd that Rule l3 does not."}}, {"text": "Union Public Service Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 128058, "end_char": 128089, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• It may at this stage be pointed out that the Union Public Service Commission has framed its rules relating to competitive examination held by it in 1978 to recruit personnel to Indian Economic Service and the Indian Statisical Service."}}, {"text": "Rathi Vinay Jha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 129697, "end_char": 129712, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is an admission in the counter-affidavit of Mrs. Rathi Vinay Jha."}}, {"text": "July 11, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 129994, "end_char": 130007, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Research and Education, Ministry of .Agriculture and Rural Reconstruction that after the UPSC intimated its procedure: the matter was placed before the Committee of ARS at its meeting held on July 11, 1979."}}, {"text": "Y. P. Gupta", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 132715, "end_char": 132726, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CAR is directed bv a mandamus of this Court to a ward to Dr. Y. P. Gupta the sak ' of Rs.", "canonical_name": "Y.P .. Gupta"}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_2_267_277_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "--.\n\n.• __,,.\n\n267 A\n\nHINDUSTAN AERONAUTICS LTD ..\n\nv. '\n\nTHE STATE OF ORISSA\n\nDecember 16, 1983\n\n(V.I). TULZAPURKAR; R.S.\n\n)'ATHAK. AND SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, JJ.]\n\nCentral S11les Tax ACt, 1956 rebd with the Central Sales .Tax (OisSo) Rules, -1957-Sales tax levfab/e on transactiOii of sale .and not of works contraci-; Whether a transaction is contract for sale or Contract for works deflends_ upon main object of the partieS in the circrtmstancCs of (he transactiOn and. 110 fixed .rule is.OP_Plic'ale.\n\nAfter.the Government of.u.S.S.R .. under an agteenient, granti4 a licence to the Government'bf India -for manufaCturing and esserilbling of aircrafts, both the Governments signed a proto001 in the mii.tter of mii'nufacturing of MIG aircrafts . in_ India. The Government, of India in their tum entrusted. the mnufacture of ihci said aircrafts to the appellant, M/s Hindi.istan Aeroriautics Ltd., (H.A.L. for short) .. The GoVernmeilt of India 1infonned H.A.L. that the niaterialS imported by H.A.L. for 'this purpose arid other f:quipri1e:i1t etc .. w.ere the property of Government of India: .. Fof the imPlemen41t.on of. the entnlstment H.~.L .. had. _three diViSions namely, Koraput .(in the State of Otissa), Nasik (in the State of Maharsh tra) and Hyderabad (in the State of Andhra Prad.csh). ·,; The H.A.L. manufactured MIG aircraft engi!tes at Koraput.(Orissa) and se\"nt-SOme of thm to its Nasik Division for being. fitted to the MIG aircrafts to be supplied Jo the Govcmnl.ent of India and some to the IndianAi~ For~ direGtly as pf:r instructions from, tht Ministry of Defence. The H.A.L. :ceceived payments from Governmeilt .of India or Indian Air Force for the manufacturing programme:. Jn respect\" of payments so received, -th6 Sales Tax Officer, Kora put I Circleof the State of OriSsa levied. ccfitral .sales tax on the ground that the lransactions were inter-State sales. The Assistant Commissioner of Sales. Tax while confirming the order of the Sales Tax Officer obserVed. that\"H.A.L. J:i3d charged some prceniageof profit in the invoices sent to. the.\n\nGovernmeiit of India for the MtG engines as in a commercial transactio.n ill tase of sale which gave a clear indication tha\"t .this was a c8.se _of transaCtio~ of sale and not f agellcy. Ih ppeal the Sales T3x Tribunal negativecf the contention. ofH.A.L. that the .. transaction was a works contract and nof. a sa'l.e.\n\nHerice' this appeal.\n\nAlloing' the appeal,\n\n\\ ... ..\n\nHELD : ·· The transaction. is not\"a Con'tract for sale but a contract for work and Jabour. (275 DI ·\n\nThere is no rigid or inflexible rule applicable aHke to all traaCtioD.s which can indicate distiriction between a contract for sale and contr3ct for.work' and.- labour-. - Whether a particular. contract was on'e of sale or for Work and labour\n\ndepended upon the main object of the parties in the ii\"cumStance&- of the. trS:ns- actioRs. I11 a contract.for Sale, the main objt _of the parties is, to transfter proPerty. 'in and deliVery of possession of a chattel as a cha-ttel, tO the buYer ... Th~.primary\n\ndifference between a contract for work or service and a contract for sale of goods is that :n the formr there is in. the person performing or rendring srvice no pro- A perty in. the 1hirg produced as a whole notwithstanding that a part or even the whole material used by him may have been Qis property. In the case of a cOntract for le, the thing poduced as a whole\" haS individul existence as the sole property of the part'y who prod.uced it some time before delivery and the prop\"ity 'therein passes only under the contract relating .thcrerto to the other party for pricC. ·\n\n[275 E-F: 276 F-0]\n\nMis Hindustan Aeronautic~· Ltd v State of Karuatakti, [1984] 2 .S.C.R. -248. referred to.\n\nIn the instant case, taking into consideratiop the correspondence and circun1sta11ccs under which this cntfustment had to be understood, there was no transfer of property in the MIG Aero Engines by H.A.L. to the Government of India.\n\nThe n1aterials and equipments sCnt by the GOven1mcnt of u.S.s.R. and the MIG Aero Engines asseinbled by H.A.L. fron1 such materials belonged to the Government of India 'at all material ti1nes.\n\nThe Appellant had no ownership in the materials whkh were all supulied by the Gcivern1nent-0f USSR. norAi.n the finished products , and no question of sales tax-on the i1npugncd transaction could arise. Even on\n\nthe indigenous materialS procured or manufactured by theappe1lnt in the process of fitting in and assernblin.g, the-appellant had no disposing poWer <is the appellant was never the owner of these materials .. The H .A.L. only performed the job cntrus- . ted to the1n for and on behalf of the Government and all incidental steps naturally entering into contract,' procurement, pay1ncnt of price and , billing and invoices had to .be done -in that ligh.t.\n\nThe transfer of the Aircrafts to the Nasik DiVision was for the purpose of completion Of the job ahd the niaking of the invoices\" \"'as a matter.of accounting and carrying out the job of entrustinent\"'(275 0-H;- 276 A-B;\n\n275 B; 216 .E] . •\n\n' . -.\n\n,.1ii '.\n\nC1v1L .APPELLATE JuRISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1658 of 1982. . , ii Appeal by Special. leave fro1i1. the Judgment and Order. dated the 31st December, 1981 of the Member, Sales Tax Tribunal, Orissa,\n\nCuttack in Second Appal No. 29(C) of i978-79. ·\n\nA S.T. Desai, Y.S. Murty & C.S.S. Rao for the Appellant.\n\nV.S. Desai and R.K. Mehta for the Respondcni. •\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\n SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J. This is an appeal by special leave from the order dated 31st December, 1981 passed by the Sales Tax Tritunal, 'i- Orissa. The appellant who ivas the assessee un.der the .Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 went up in appeal against the confirming orders of Assistant Commissioner in respect of the assessment years 1974-75, 1975-76. and 1976-77. The Sales Tax Officer, Koraput l Circle, ·• ..\n\nHINDUSTAN AERONAUTICS v. ORlSSA (S: Mukharji, J.) . 269\n\nJeypore had made the orders under Rule 12(3) of the Central Sales A Tax (0, issa) Rules, 1957 making demands of Rs. 1,21,38,586.00 for the year 1974-75, Rs. 1,29,64,637.00 for the. year 1975-76 and R, s. l,37,72,652.00 for the year 1976-77. The appellant is a dealer registered under section 7(1) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 under Koraput I Circle in.the State of Orissa. . ,. .\n\n, B M/s Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (hereinafter r<femd to' as 'H.A.L.') of which appellant is a division was established en !st Octo- .. ber, 1964. The objective.of formation of the H.A..L. wa~ to carry on\n\nin India and elsewhere,. the business, inter alia, in aercplanes including manufacture, assembling, buying and selling etc. of the same. ln . its division at Sunabeda, manufacture of MIG engines for MIG aircrafts required for-defence and overhauling of .aero engines of IUdian Air Force were undertaken. Some of the .MIG engines manufactured by it were sent to NaSik Division of H.A.L. and some to • Indian Air Fore' as 'per instructi.ons from the. Ministry of Defence.\n\nThe appellant received payments from Gov.ernment of India or Indian Air Force for the manufacturing programme. In respect of payments so received, the Sales Tax Officer, Koraput I Circle levied Central Sales Tax on the 'ground that the transactions were ir •crstate sales.\n\nThis was disputed by the appellant according to. whom the latter was only an a, gent of the Government, of India .. In the alternative it was contended that the transaction~ were nothing but works cqntract and as such not exigible to Central Sales Tax . .,\n\nBing aggrieved by the dcision of the Tax Authorities as mentioned hereinbefore, the appellant had gone. up in appea'l before the Tribunal. The Tax Authorities had negatived both the contentions of !he appellant. As common.question of law on similar facts was raised, the same was disposed of by one order by the Tribunal. Before the Tribunal, only one ground namely, that the transation rpresented works contract was urged ..\n\nIt is necessary at this stage to understand the background !n which the manufacture .of MIG engines were undertaken by H.A.L.\n\nIn this conne'Ction it is material to refer to the ietter dated 22nd September, 1970 to the Chairman of the appellant company .for and on behalf of the President of India by the Joint Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Defence, Department of Defence Prcduc• tion. As the said letter is important, it is necessary to st out the letter :\n\n' • .\n\n210 SUPREME COURT REPORts [J984J 2 s.c.1c\n\n\"5iecl'.et \" . ·\n\n• '.\n\nThe Ch.airnfan,\n\nAnnexuri? ·\"A\"•\n\nEXTRACT OF\n\nNo. J 1(2?.8)/69/1/DP/Conlracls Government of India, Minislr 1 of Defence,\n\nDepartment of Defenc~ Prod, uction, New Delhi. the 22nd September, 1970.\n\n( Hindu, stan Aeronautics Ltd.,\n\n C . Indian Express Building, Vidhana Veedhi, Bangalore-I.\n\n.. -F\n\n. '\n\n' Sup, ~Manufacture of MlG,21 M A, ircraft and other equipment in India ..\n\nDear Sir,\n\nOn behalf of the President bf India, I have to state that' an Agreement was siged on 30th October, .J969 (copy . already. forwarded to ·. youfbetwecn the Government. of. Irtdia and the Government of Union of Soviet Socialist Rcpublid for tke manufacture under licence. . . . . ti . : . 2. The mai1ufacture of-the said Equipment as defined\n\ni;~ the above said Agreement is hereby ei1trustcd to Hindustan .. . . . . .\n\nAeronautics Limited, Bangalore in terms of the said Agree:\n\nment. Under this entrustment the responsibility for the proper implementation of the Agreement shall be exclusively that of Hindusian Aeronautics Limited except that the '.Government inay from time lo time advise the C.ompany . about the program111e of manufacture of. the said Equip- 1nent..\n\n3 .. All payments.falling due under the saisi Agreement io the Government of.the Union of Soviet Socialist epublics shall be made by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, Bangalore on behalf of the Government . •\n\n4. This entrustment shall remain in force till it is revoked or altered by the President of India. . ...\n\n• >,\n\n~· . '\n\n. ' .\n\n. HIND~STAN AERONAUTICS v .. ORISSA (S. Muk!ic.rji, J.) 271. . . -\n\n5. The Government of the Union of Soviet. Socialist A Republics is being informed. of this entrustment and they are being requested to COO]Jerate and deal diJ'ectly with Hindus- . tan. Aeronautics Lin; iited, , and do .. all thigs necessary for the effective operation of the said 'Agreement according to the terms thereof.\" . .\n\nThere was another letter regarding' tlie dete; mination of premium under Emergency Risks (Goods) Insurance Act,· 1962. The said. letter on behalf or' the Government of India stated, inter afia, as follows : , · •\n\n''That th~ materials imported by H.A.L. for manufacture/ assembly 'of Aircraft/Engines/Helicopter/other equipment and also goods, stocks and stores work-in-progress etc. for which 'on account' payments: have beens ade and are being made by DCDA(AF) are the property of I.A.F. and that the item; manufactured out of the catgories of 'materials stated above arc to be supplied only to the Indian Air Force or.as authorise.d by Government of India .. The materials therefore belong . to the Governll)cnt of Iridia.\" .\n\nIt may be mentioned as appearii1g from the order of the Sales Tax Tribunal that there was an agreement 'between . Government of\n\n U.S.S, R. and the Government of India .on 29th August, 1962 whereby E Government of U.S.S.R. had. granted a licence to tlie Government . of India for manufacture of special equipment and asseinbling of\n\naircrafts. Thereafter both the Government~ signed .a proiocol on 29th September, .1964 in the matter of manufacturing of MIG aircrafts . in . India. Government of India 'in their\" turn by the secret letter dated i2nd September, 1970 mentioned herein before entrusted the .\n\nF .manufacture of the sajd aircrafts io H.A.L., Bangalore. In:pursuanc, i:\n\nof t]\\e said entrustment: H.A.L. undertook the work of assembling and manufacturing 'of MIG engines. For the impleinent<ltio.n of the . . entrustmerit H.A.L. has three divisions namely Koraput (in th~ .\n\nStat\" of Orissa), Nasik (in the State of Maharashtra) and Hyderabad G (in the Sfate of Andhra Pradesh). At Koraput and Hydei; abad, engines which are eiectronic equipments were . respectively manufactured and the MIG aircrafts were finally assembled at Nasik for .delivery tcdhe Government f India, ;\n\nIn this backgr; und, the question that aioe before the Tribunal H was whether the contract between the Union of India and the appellant\n\nfor manufacture.and supply of MIG engines was a contract of sale as contended by the Revenue or a works contract as submitted by the assessee. There is no consolidated document on record to show the terms of contract between the\n\n0 Union of India and the appellant. Both sides for. this purpose relied upon some correspondence and invoices which are on record.· Mention in this conn'ection may be made to a communication which is in th• form of a corrigendum . to the Ministry's letter regarding 'on account' payments to H.A.L. for MIG Aircrafts, the letter dated 28th July, 1970 from the Under Secretary to the Government\" of India, Mjnistr,, of Defence, to the Chief Accounts Officer, High Commission for India i~ U, K. and the Chief Acconts Officer, Embassy of. India in Washington on the subject of \"Procurement of bought out items against th~ requirements of I.AR for !st and 2nd line servicing\", which dealt with th~ pro cedure sanctioned by the Government of India for the purpose of\n\n\"avoiding two customers viz. Hindustan Aeronautics Limit<d and the Indian Air Force going.to. the same supplier abroad for the same items\", the letterdated20th December, 1971, from the Under Secretary to the Government of , India, Rakslia Mantralaya, Raksha Utpadan Vibhag, .written to the .General Manager of the Nasik Division of the appellant, the Jetter of 28th April, 1969 on the.subject of \"On ..\n\nAccom).t' payments to H.A.L. for I.A.F. m'iinufacturing programmes of H.A.I.:. Nasik~ Koraput and Hyderabad\"; letter dated 8th December, 1972 from Under Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry\n\nof' Defence on \"pricing . of H.A.L. manufactured aircraft and margin profit etc.\" and the invoice dated 19th March, 1976.\n\nReliance was also placed on behalf of the Revenue before us, on :'I the order of the Assistant Commiisioner of Sales Tax for the assessment years 1974-75 and 1975~76, wherein he had referred to a statement F • - 'furnished. with a copy of the claim against price proposal for 6 F2S\n\ndetails engines as accepted by the Government by their letter dated j ., 4th June, 1976. That claim is against price proposal for 6 F2S details engines ccepted by the Governmeni.Tbeir break up i~ as fellows:-\n\n\"Imported materials.\n\nRs. 48,39,454.08\n\nIndigenous material and. MCH-Freight etc. Rs. 2,64,925. 79\n\nTotal material cost\n\nLabour. cost ·\n\nSundry direct charges\n\nTotal •\n\nRs. 51,04,579.27\n\nRs. 2;96,480.60\n\nRs. 12,87,865 :89\n\nRs. 56,58,724.36\n\n' ~-\n\nHINDUSTAN A~RONAUTICS v. ORISSA (S: Mukharji, J.) 273 . . .\n\nPront@ 1_5 % on HAL's effort Rs. 2,47,809 .00\n\nRs. 69,06,533.36 or Rs. 69,06,533. 00\n\nThe Break up of fIAL's effort also indicated as follows:-\n\n\"Freight\n\nMaterial Overhead •\n\nInd. materials\n\nLabour cost\n\nrrai ning cost & other expenses\n\n• Tooling expenditure\n\nLast test expenses\n\nInsurance freight ..\n\nTotal HAL's effort\n\n15 % profit on HAL's effort\n\nRs. 66,320.41\n\nRs.\n\nJ ,03,067. 55\n\nRs. 96,536.03\n\nRs. ?,64,925. 79\n\nRs. 2,96,480. 00\n\nRs. 6,000 .. 00\n\nRs. 1,50,000.00 ·\n\nRs. 8,34,342. 65\n\nRs. 1,00,347. 67\n\nRs. 16,52,096. 71\n\nRs. 2,47,8\\4.PO\"\n\n The Assitant Commissioner had observed that after the engines were despatched to, Nasik Division to be fitted in the Aircrafts, the bill used to be drawn by H.A.L. and the debit was raised against the Government of India. After sanctio_n of the price, the payment_ was made. The Assistant Commissioner had further observed that it appeared from this letter that six MIG engies' were. deliveml by H.A.L. to I.A.F.,. the cost of which was Rs. 69,06,530.00. He had further observed that it was significant to note th'at the sanction.had been accorded for payment towards the cost of 6 engines delivered to. I.A.F. According to the Assistant .Commissioner, the aument advanced on behalf of the assessee that the delivery was made to Nasik Division which was a branch of H.A.L. appeared to 'be inconsistent with the sanction order. He had further observed that MIG rngines were delivered to Nasik Division whereas the invoice was raised and payment received from the. Govrnment of Inia. TQe purpose of\n\nA giving physical delivery, according to .tfie .Assistant <:; ommisioner, of the MIG engines to Nasik Division was for the purpose of fitting in the Aircrafts. In thatevent, accoding to the Assistant Comrriissiciner, . Nlsik Divisfon became the custodian or the trustees of the. MIG engines. for which the price had already been paiti to H, A.Ic. The Assistant Commissioner concluded that the property in the engines B. passed to the Government ofindia and not'to H.A.L., Nasik Divisicn.\n\nHe had further obse.fved that' the break up .of the cost was towards, the material co.st, labo11r cost and sundry direct.charges .. The total cost came to Rs. 08,58,724.36. The .further break up of the total cqst of Rs. 68;58,724.36was imported materials, indigenous material and MCHfreight etc., labour cost an<l sundry direct charges.· Appa- C rently tlie cost of .the material. both imported as. well as procured . locally had been charged in the, bill. According to the Assisfant . Commissioner, further profit -of 15 % had been charged on' H.A.L'.'.s . effort which)neluded freight, material overhead, indigenous material, . labour cost, trajning cost a11d other expnses, tooling expehditure, last.test expenses, insurance and freight. The total cost of'these items.\n\nD · as per the bill stood at Rs. 16,52,096.71. J 5 % of this had been charged\n\ntowards the profit. The Assistant Commissioner had further obs.erved that profi.t was charged as in a cori1; nercia\\. trai1saction in case of sale: . Commission was allwed in case of agecy transaction between the.\n\nPrincipal and the Agent; .. But in the supply•ofMIG engines, a profit had .been cl1arged; The Assistant Coi:nmissioner concluded that this • E .gave a clear indication that this was a case of transaction of sale and. not of agenc!f. We are .unable to accept this reasoning of the Assistant Commis.sioner. According to us the procedure indicated in.the break . up has to be understhod in the background of the entire transactiori between the parties. The pricing procedure had to be: judged in the light <;>fthe entire facts and circumstances especiallyinthe background F !hat the. entire transaction was entrusted to ll, . .A,.L. Bangalore in terms of the agreement between the Government of India and the Government. of U$.S.R: for the manufacture on •behalf of the Government ofindia of MIG engines forwhich licences had been granted by the Government of U.s:s.R. t~ the Government c:if India . . 'J:'he .letter dated 22nd .September, 1970 set out herein before indicated\n\n. G clearly that under the entrustment the responsibility for the proper implementation of the aregement would.' be ·.exclusively that of the appellant except that the Government might fioin time to time advise the Company about the P.rogramme of manufacture 'of the equipments.\n\nThe various correspondence referred to .hereinbefore, in our opinion~ H !ad co the ifresistible conclusion that the property in the aircrnfts as well as in the e.quipments and spares used in.them were always in .\n\n~· '\n\n-~.\n\n~'.\n\n.·.\n\nr -\n\n..,,\n\nHl'NDUSTAN AERONAUTICS v. ORTSSA (S. Mukharji, J.) 275\n\n• the Governnient. These were procured for and bn behalf of the .\n\nA ' Government of India in pursuance ofthe agreement with the\n\nGovernment of India and U.S.S.R. The entrustment of jobs on behalf of the Government and the incidental necessary works to. be done in these connections had to. be performed by the appellant.\n\nIn this background .. the.pricing, the invoke, lhetratisacJicns have to be understood. ' . . B\n\n' . . . . ' We have referred to the several correspondence. which, according to us, indicate that the property in the aircrafts,· in the equipments and the materials had always been with ti1e. Government. The i:nate- ' rials ifnported under the licence of procured indigenously for the. manufacture were alway~ and )lad alway$ remained the property\n\n. C of the Government, The appellant hail nc property, in ar.v part thereof, and had no right to dispose of or disposal over these materials and spares, These had to be regulated. by the prcdceure envisaged in. the agreement between the parties: The test by '_which these transactions should be judged in deciding whether this was a works cc\n\n0 ntract or a contract \"of sa.le of any part of the material hcs\"\"bm1 cmphasisrd.\n\nD in .several decisions of this Ccurt. S®ie of these principles lrnve b<e_n reiterated in the decision of M/s Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. s. Sta/e of Karnataka iri Civil Appeol Nos. 1386-91 (NT) of J 977 of this Ccurt:\" >\n\nAs emphasis; d by this Court, ther<\\ is no rigid or inflexib!eruie applicable alike to all. transactions which , can indicote distinc1ic.i-. b< t-\n\n. E ween a contract for sale and a contract for wcrk and laMur. But the tests indicated in the several isions f thi; Couri merely fccused on one or the other aspect\" of the transaction and affmded some guidance in detefmining the qustiqn, but l:asic'alJy. -and prhl]a.ri!y, whether a., particular contract was one of sale -or for work and labour. ,' depe.nded upciri .the main object of tl1e parties in the cirrnmetan\"s\n\nof the transastions, In a contract fer sale, the main object cf the parties is to transfer property in and delivecy of possession. cf.a r.lrn!, tel . as a chattel to the buyer. It has to be. emphasised, taking _into consideration the corresponilence and circuinsiances under .. which this entrustment had to be undesto6d that at no point of tim<' before the delivery of MIG engines, HA:L. was tl1e owner of the. propertyeither . in the equipment or in the sparesor .in ihe aircrafts and as such _there . coald not have 'been transfer of any property frcm H.A.L. to. the Government-of fodia.· The H.A.L. only pcrfcrmcd the jcb entrusted to them for and. on behalf of the Government and all incidental steps\n\n(!) [1984] 2 S.C.R. 248.\n\n276 . SUPREME CoURT REPORTS. [1984] 2 s.c.R.\n\n11aturaily entering into contract, procureme1it, payment nf pri'e 2nd billing and. invokes had to be done in that light. There was no tram fer of property in the MIG Aero Engines by H.A.L. to the Government of India. The materials and equipments sent by the Government of U.S.s:R. and the MIG Aero Engines assembled by H.A.L. frcD1 • such niaterials belonged to the Government of India at all material .times. The appellant had no ownership in the materials which were all supplied by the Government of U.S.S.R. nor in the. finished products and no question of sales tax on the impugned transaction could arise.\n\nEven on the indigenous materials procured or manufactured by the appellant in _the process of fitting in and assembling, the appellant had no disposing power as the appel!ant was never the owner of these . materials. . . .\n\nThe payments required in the work of ''manufacture of MIG- 21M Aircrafis and other_equipments in India\" were to be made as indicated in the letter dated 22nd September, 1970 by the appellant on behalf of the \"Government of Jnda;.\n\nThe. entire correspondence and. the nature of the instructions from time-to time issued by the Government indicated that the function of H.A.L. was the implementation o.f the said entrustment.\n\n\"There cannot be any question, in our opinion, of any sales tax\n\ni~ respect of Aero-Engines transferred to the Nasik Division -of H.A.L. for installing t11e same in Aircrafts .. It was the transfer of the Aircrafts to the Nasik Division for the purpose of completion of the job and the making of tl].e invoices was a matter of accounting and carrying . ounhe job of entrustment. As had been emphasised by this .Court, that the primary difference between a contract for work or service and a contract for sale of goods is that in. the former there is in the person performing or rendering srvice no _property in' the thing produced as a whole notwithstanding that a part !Jr \"even the whole of material . used by him may have been his property .. Jn the case of a contract for sale, the tiring produced as a whole has individual existence as th> . sole property of the party who produced fr so\"\"me time before delivery and the property there.in passe~ only under the contract relating thereto to the other partyfor price.\n\nThis cannot be said to be in respect of any of the items involved in these transactions, These transactions were carried out in implementation of the entrustment job for the manufacture by H.A.L. and all payments and actions taken m this behalf were on behalf of the Government of India.\n\nWe arc therefore of th.e opinion that the Tribunal was _in error_\n\n• . .\n\nHINDUSTAN AERONAUTICS y. ORISSA (S. Mukhai}i, J.) 277 .. . in concluding that there was sale involv.ed in these transactions. It is not necessary for us in this connection to refer to the principles in detail which the Court should cept in deciding in each particular .case the nature or' the transactions. 'Fhese principles have : been reiterated in the dedsion of this Cour( in the case. of M/s Hindustan\n\nAponautics Limited v. State o/Karnataka.lll\n\nIn the above view of the matter, the appeal is allowed,. The assessments are set aside. Necessary adjustments and refund, if necessary, . of the tax paid should be done accordingly, In the facts and cirumstances, parties will bear 'their respective costs throughout.\n\nH.S.K. appeal allowed .\n\n(1) [i984J 2 S.C.R.. 248.\n\nB •", "total_entities": 56, "entities": [{"text": "A\n\nHINDUSTAN AERONAUTICS LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 19, "end_char": 47, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HINDUSTAN AERONAUTICS LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE STATE OF ORISSA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 58, "end_char": 77, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE STATE OF ORISSA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V.I). TULZAPURKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 99, "end_char": 116, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.D. TULZAPURKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 172, "end_char": 175, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Koraput", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1182, "end_char": 1189, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "three diViSions namely, Koraput .(in the State of Otissa), Nasik (in the State of Maharsh tra) and Hyderabad (in the State of Andhra Prad.csh). ·,;"}}, {"text": "Nasik", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1217, "end_char": 1222, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "three diViSions namely, Koraput .(in the State of Otissa), Nasik (in the State of Maharsh tra) and Hyderabad (in the State of Andhra Prad.csh). ·,;"}}, {"text": "Hyderabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1257, "end_char": 1266, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "three diViSions namely, Koraput .(in the State of Otissa), Nasik (in the State of Maharsh tra) and Hyderabad (in the State of Andhra Prad.csh). ·,;"}}, {"text": "MIG Aero Engines", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3924, "end_char": 3940, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the instant case, taking into consideratiop the correspondence and circun1sta11ccs under which this cntfustment had to be understood, there was no transfer of property in the MIG Aero Engines by H.A.L. to the Government of India."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3958, "end_char": 3977, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the instant case, taking into consideratiop the correspondence and circun1sta11ccs under which this cntfustment had to be understood, there was no transfer of property in the MIG Aero Engines by H.A.L. to the Government of India."}}, {"text": "Nasik DiVision", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4878, "end_char": 4892, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The transfer of the Aircrafts to the Nasik DiVision was for the purpose of completion Of the job ahd the niaking of the invoices\" \"'as a matter.of accounting and carrying out the job of entrustinent\"'(275 0-H;- 276 A-B;\n\n275 B; 216 .E] . •", "canonical_name": "Nasik DiVision"}}, {"text": "A S.T. Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5349, "end_char": 5361, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A S.T. Desai, Y.S. Murty & C.S.S. Rao for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Y.S. Murty", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5363, "end_char": 5373, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A S.T. Desai, Y.S. Murty & C.S.S. Rao for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "C.S.S. Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5376, "end_char": 5386, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A S.T. Desai, Y.S. Murty & C.S.S. Rao for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "V.S. Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5407, "end_char": 5417, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V.S. Desai and R.K. Mehta for the Respondcni. •"}}, {"text": "R.K. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5422, "end_char": 5432, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V.S. Desai and R.K. Mehta for the Respondcni. •"}}, {"text": "Central Sales Tax Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5695, "end_char": 5722, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Mukharji", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5947, "end_char": 5955, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Sales Tax Officer, Koraput l Circle, ·• ..\n\nHINDUSTAN AERONAUTICS v. ORlSSA (S: Mukharji, J.) ."}}, {"text": "Jeypore", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5968, "end_char": 5975, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "269\n\nJeypore had made the orders under Rule 12(3) of the Central Sales A Tax (0, issa) Rules, 1957 making demands of Rs."}}, {"text": "section 7(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6252, "end_char": 6264, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Sales Tax Act, 1956", "statute": "Central Sales Tax Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Central Sales Tax Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6272, "end_char": 6299, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Hindustan Aeronautics Limited", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6363, "end_char": 6392, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ", B M/s Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (hereinafter r<femd to' as 'H.A.L.') of which appellant is a division was established en !", "canonical_name": "Hindustan Aeronautics Limited"}}, {"text": "Sunabeda", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6723, "end_char": 6731, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "its division at Sunabeda, manufacture of MIG engines for MIG aircrafts required for-defence and overhauling of .aero engines of IUdian Air Force were undertaken."}}, {"text": "IUdian Air Force", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6835, "end_char": 6851, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "its division at Sunabeda, manufacture of MIG engines for MIG aircrafts required for-defence and overhauling of .aero engines of IUdian Air Force were undertaken."}}, {"text": "Ministry of Defence", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7014, "end_char": 7033, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ministry of Defence."}}, {"text": "Gov.ernment of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7073, "end_char": 7093, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant received payments from Gov.ernment of India or Indian Air Force for the manufacturing programme."}}, {"text": "Indian Air Force", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7097, "end_char": 7113, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant received payments from Gov.ernment of India or Indian Air Force for the manufacturing programme."}}, {"text": "Government, of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7402, "end_char": 7422, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "whom the latter was only an a, gent of the Government, of India .. In the alternative it was contended that the transaction~ were nothing but works cqntract and as such not exigible to Central Sales Tax . .,"}}, {"text": "H.A.L.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8114, "end_char": 8120, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "n which the manufacture .of MIG engines were undertaken by H.A.L.\n\nIn this conne'Ction it is material to refer to the ietter dated 22nd September, 1970 to the Chairman of the appellant company .for and on behalf of the President of India by the Joint Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Defence, Department of Defence Prcduc• tion."}}, {"text": "Government of Union of Soviet Socialist Rcpublid", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9121, "end_char": 9169, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Irtdia and the Government of Union of Soviet Socialist Rcpublid for tke manufacture under licence. . . . ."}}, {"text": "Hindustan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9329, "end_char": 9338, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The mai1ufacture of-the said Equipment as defined\n\ni;~ the above said Agreement is hereby ei1trustcd to Hindustan .. . . . . ."}}, {"text": "Government of the Union of Soviet. Socialist A Republics", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10116, "end_char": 10172, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government of the Union of Soviet."}}, {"text": "Insurance Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10536, "end_char": 10549, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Government of\n\n U.S.S, R.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11283, "end_char": 11308, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Government of\n\n U.S.S, R. and the Government of India .on 29th August, 1962 whereby E Government of U.S.S.R. had."}}, {"text": "Government of U.S.S.R.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11369, "end_char": 11391, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Government of\n\n U.S.S, R. and the Government of India .on 29th August, 1962 whereby E Government of U.S.S.R. had."}}, {"text": "Government . of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11423, "end_char": 11444, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "granted a licence to tlie Government ."}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12461, "end_char": 12475, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "respectively manufactured and the MIG aircrafts were finally assembled at Nasik for .delivery tcdhe Government f India, ;\n\nIn this backgr; und, the question that aioe before the Tribunal H was whether the contract between the Union of India and the appellant\n\nfor manufacture.and supply of MIG engines was a contract of sale as contended by the Revenue or a works contract as submitted by the assessee.", "canonical_name": "Union of India"}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12727, "end_char": 12741, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is no consolidated document on record to show the terms of contract between the\n\n0 Union of India and the appellant.", "canonical_name": "Union of India"}}, {"text": "28th July, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13059, "end_char": 13074, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to the Ministry's letter regarding 'on account' payments to H.A.L. for MIG Aircrafts, the letter dated 28th July, 1970 from the Under Secretary to the Government\" of India, Mjnistr,, of Defence, to the Chief Accounts Officer, High Commission for India i~ U, K. and the Chief Acconts Officer, Embassy of."}}, {"text": "Washington", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13269, "end_char": 13279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "India in Washington on the subject of \"Procurement of bought out items against th~ requirements of I.AR for !"}}, {"text": "I.AR", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13359, "end_char": 13363, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "India in Washington on the subject of \"Procurement of bought out items against th~ requirements of I.AR for !"}}, {"text": "Hindustan Aeronautics Limit", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13516, "end_char": 13543, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hindustan Aeronautics Limit<d and the Indian Air Force going.to."}}, {"text": "Raksha Utpadan Vibhag", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13738, "end_char": 13759, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the same supplier abroad for the same items\", the letterdated20th December, 1971, from the Under Secretary to the Government of , India, Rakslia Mantralaya, Raksha Utpadan Vibhag, .written to the .General Manager of the Nasik Division of the appellant, the Jetter of 28th April, 1969 on the.subject of \"On ..\n\nAccom).t' payments to H.A.L. for I.A.F. m'iinufacturing programmes of H.A.I.:."}}, {"text": "I.A.F.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15970, "end_char": 15976, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "deliveml by H.A.L. to I.A.F.,."}}, {"text": "Nasik Division", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16450, "end_char": 16464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He had further observed that MIG rngines were delivered to Nasik Division whereas the invoice was raised and payment received from the."}}, {"text": "Nlsik Divisfon", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16781, "end_char": 16795, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nlsik Divisfon became the custodian or the trustees of the.", "canonical_name": "Nasik DiVision"}}, {"text": "Government ofindia", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16996, "end_char": 17014, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Assistant Commissioner concluded that the property in the engines B. passed to the Government ofindia and not'to H.A.L., Nasik Divisicn."}}, {"text": "Nasik Divisicn", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17034, "end_char": 17048, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Assistant Commissioner concluded that the property in the engines B. passed to the Government ofindia and not'to H.A.L., Nasik Divisicn.", "canonical_name": "Nasik DiVision"}}, {"text": "cl1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18198, "end_char": 18201, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government. of U$.S.R", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18824, "end_char": 18845, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L. Bangalore in terms of the agreement between the Government of India and the Government."}}, {"text": "Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20980, "end_char": 21006, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S®ie of these principles lrnve b<e_n reiterated in the decision of M/s Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. s. Sta/e of Karnataka iri Civil Appeol Nos."}}, {"text": "[1984] 2 S.C.R. 248", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 22372, "end_char": 22391, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Government of U.S.s", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 22698, "end_char": 22717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The materials and equipments sent by the Government of U.S.s:R. and the MIG Aero Engines assembled by H.A.L. frcD1 • such niaterials belonged to the Government of India at all material .times."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 23374, "end_char": 23379, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The payments required in the work of ''manufacture of MIG- 21M Aircrafis and other_equipments in India\" were to be made as indicated in the letter dated 22nd September, 1970 by the appellant on behalf of the \"Government of Jnda;."}}, {"text": "22nd September, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23430, "end_char": 23450, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The payments required in the work of ''manufacture of MIG- 21M Aircrafis and other_equipments in India\" were to be made as indicated in the letter dated 22nd September, 1970 by the appellant on behalf of the \"Government of Jnda;."}}, {"text": "HINDUSTAN AERONAUTICS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25087, "end_char": 25108, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "HINDUSTAN AERONAUTICS y. ORISSA (S. Mukhai}i, J.) 277 .. .", "canonical_name": "Hindustan Aeronautics Limited"}}, {"text": "S. Mukhai}i", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25120, "end_char": 25131, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "HINDUSTAN AERONAUTICS y. ORISSA (S. Mukhai}i, J.) 277 .. ."}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_2_278_286_EN", "year": 1984, "text": ". c\n\n.. 278 •\n\nMITHILESH KUMAR PANDEY\n\nBAIDYANATH YADAV AND ORS .\n\n. January 2, ~984\n\n[S. MURTAzA FAz~L Ai, r; o. CmNNApPA REDDY AND . .\n\nRS. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.]\n\nRepreientation of the People Act, 1951, Sec.tion•81(3~Co11structio11 of ihe •.provisions of the sectiOn-Copy of ihe election Petition containing several mistakes Of Vital -ch'arater, not fo'und i'n the orig'inal-Election petition is not nwintainable and\n\nnJustbe disn1issed. ·\n\n' . . ' . ' . . . . .\n\nIn the genefal.electioiis held irrJune 1980, the appellant fought .is i. Congress(!) candidate from Harlahi Asscmb.ly constituency inBihar•and was.eclared elected. The respondent who was defeated filed an election petition in the. Patna High Court !is.ting a. large nwttber of persons through when corrupt practices werealleged to have been practised by the appellant. Siflce the copy of the petition, th6ugh attested. by the election petitioner under his own_ signature to he a true copy, contitined sCveral mistakes which ,\\vere of a vCry vitaJ 'c.haracter, the apj)ellant contested the petition atleging that the mandatory provisions of section 83(3) of. the Representatfon of People Act not having been cOil).plied vvith at an, thC petition should be dismissed in linine withoµt going into the merits of the Case. Though {he High Court found , as a faCt. that a Tafge number of mistakes were there in the copy of the electib-n.\n\npetition su.{, plied to the .appellant. Yef, as they were of a superficial and inSignifiw cant nature bordering_ on clerical or tY'pii1g mistakes, on the whole; there \"'.as a substantial compliance of ihe pro'vsions of Section 81(3) of the ACt. Hence the <ippeal ag; i.inst the interlcutory order.\n\nAllowing the appeal .and disrnis_sing the el.tioh petition, ihe c01:u{\n\n. . HELD : r: 1 A Perstia.1 'of Sections 81(3). and 86 Of the R6presentat_ion of _the People Act reveals ·-that the statUtc intended that before an election petition can be entertained~ th~ Copy sent tO the elected candidate n1ust be a 1-rue copy, railing which thcrC Would. be a serious diSobedience of the mandate Contained in . s.81(3) whichwould be fa tar to lhc maintainability of the saidpeition. (281 FJ ' . . . .· . ' . . ..\n\n1 :2 It is now well settled by a large catena Of atithorities of this Court that thc'clectoral process by Which the verdict of the people has'been given is a sacrosanct bne and ca-nnot be lightly set at naught unle;; s the groun_ds rrlendoned in the Act for seiting side an election a.re held to -be proved.\n\nJn these circumstances, it is manifest that the _provisions of .s.81(3) Of the act should be. G._onstred to te letter and spirit of the law because if the election petitioner docs not give full and Complete n9tice of the allegations inade against. the returned candidate, he runs the. risk of his petition being d.is1nissed in limine. (281 G-H]\n\n. '\n\nM.K. PANDEY v. BAID~\\NATH 279\n\n2 on a careful consideration and i; crutiny of the la\\\\ on the subject, the following principl.es-are Well established.;~\n\n(l). that where the copy of the eleCtion petition served on the returned candidate contains .only clefical or typographical mistakes Which arc of no consequence, the petition cannot be disn1issed straightway under s .. 86 of the Act, (283 F]\n\n(2) A true copy means a. copy which is wholly and substantially the same as the original and wher~ there arc insignificant or minimal° 1nistakes, the c.ourt n; i.ay _not tak~ notice thCreof, [283 G]\n\n(3) wh.ere the Cop~ cOn{ains important on1issions or discrepanics of a vital nature, which are likel:Y to cause prejudice t~ the defence of the returned candidate, it cannot be aid that there has been a substantial compliance o.f t.he provisions of s.81(3) of !he Act, (284 A]\n\n(4) Prime fade, the statute uses the words \"true copy'' and the concept of substantial con1pliance cannot be exten(\\Cd too far to include serious or.vital mistakes \\vhich shed the char<icter of a trtie copy so that the copy furnished.to the returned candidate cannot be said to be. a true copy within the meaning of s.81(3) of; thc Act, nd [284 Bl~\n\n(5) As s.81(3) is incant to protect and safeguard the sacrasanct electoral\n\np1'ocess so as not the disturb the verdici of the .voters, there is no room for giVing a .Jiberal -or bt-o<i.d irterpretation to the provisions of the said section. [284 CJ .. . .\n\nMurarka Radhey Shya111 Rani Kunwr v. Roop Singh Rat/u)J\"e & Ors. l1964] 3 SCR ~73; Jagat kishore Prasad Narain Singh v. Rajendra Ku111ar Poddar & Ors. [1971] t SCR 821; Satya Narain V. Dhuja Rain&. Ors., [1974] 23 SCR 20; Shari/-ud-\n\nDin v'. Ahd_ul Gpni Loni!, [1980].1 SCR 1177; M. Karunaidhi tc~ etc. v. H. y. Ha1ide & O•s: etc. etc. [1983] 1 SCALE 344 referred to. (284 D-E; 285 G; 286 A; 285 q\n\n.., 3. lfl the instant case, the mistakes iri the copy supplied. to the returned candidate related to corrupt practice-s, have to be proved to the hilt just like a criminal charge and any mistake 'vhich contains an ele1nent of vagueness \\Vould immcdia: tely vitiate the election petition and n1erit its disn1issal under' s.86 of the.Act. Among\n\n- 'tbe 1nany 1nore mistakes given in Shedule I, the '.few selected items then1selves are vital and may seriously prejudice the ct.fence of the appellant because it. will be very difficult for him to find out the pe_rsons, named. in the copy supplie.d to hin1At who are said to have indulged in corrupt practiceS a( his instance. The present case is a nluch\"\"worse case than Murarka Radhey Sh:va111 Ra111 Kunw;'s case (supra) \\Vherc onlY a slight difference in the title led this Court to hold that the mistake was a vital one was a valid one.\n\nFurther, the omission of names cannot be said\n\nt_o be a_ typing 1nistake but a very vital and serious on Which is sufficient to entail the dis1nissal of the election petition. [284 D~E; 285 G; 286 ~; 285 C]\n\nCLVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 5307 of 1983\n\nG.'\n\nAppeal by Special leave from the Judgmen.t and Order dated :H the 7th January, 1983 of the Patna High Court in Election Petition\n\nA No. 48 of 1980).\n\n.• S.N. Kacker, L.R. Singh aQd Gopa/ Singh for (he Appellant:\n\n R.K. -Garg and D:K. Garg for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgmentof the Court was delivered hy\n\n. . ·- ' .\n\nh .. • FAZAl L AWL!; J, By Orderddated}'fov 1 ember 29, Ijl83hwe hdd a 0 l!cd.wed ... ·~ t e a, rrea . . e. now procee to give t 1e reasons JOT t e sai r er.\n\nThis election appeal is directed agains't an interlocutory. Order dated Jnuary 7, 1983 passed by the Patna High Court overruling a . preliminary objection taken by the appellant (ele'ctd candidate) that the election petition of.the respondent (e!ectio1i petitioner) should be dismissed str.aightaway uiicter the: provisions of s:86 of the Representation or' the People. Act. l 951-a< .amended uptodate-(here'nafter referred to as the 'Act'.).,\n\n' .\n\nTheappellant's case is'that in the general election held in June. 1980 he fought s; a Congress (I) andidte 'from Harlakhi Assembly c.onsthu_ency in .Bihar in ·\\vhich 'he._ was deCJared elected, 'dfe; itini. the respondent who filed the. election petition in the. High Courl.\n\nHe further subm.itted that the copy of the <; lection 'peti'tion served on . him contained tt Jarge ~)Uinbet f)nistakesin respecf of Persohs through whom corrupt practices were alleged w h.ave been practised by the appellant c!uring -'the. election.. He . contended that in view of the very large number of mistakes, which were of a very vital character; !he mandatory provisions. of s.81 (3) c; r the Act were not complied ·.with at' all,' which. infirmly by itself woulil be sufficient to dismis the election petition in /imine without going into . the merits of the .· . . -~ case. . /\n\n. ' The stand taken by the respondent ~s tbat the I].listakes were. undoubiedly there but they were of a minor and significant nature ' . \\ . . and did not affect his case on merit.\n\nThe 1earned Judge .of the Hi, gh Court found as a fact that a large . n\\Jmber of mistakes were there in the copy of the election petition 'supplied to i\\1e appellantbut as they were ofa superficial and i;1significant nature bordering on clerical or .typing.mistakes, on the whole there was a substantial compliance of .the .provisions of s.81(3)' of. the Act. The learned Jucig:' has entered into a detailed discussion. of\n\n'-i\n\n. \\\n\n• -..\n\ni ..\n\nM-~· PANDEY\"· DAIDYANATH (Faza/ Ali, J.j 281\n\nthe various dcisions of this Court and also of High courts and has , correctly held that the provisions .of s.81(3) are mandatory and if the court finds that. they have not been cornpl\\ed with ii has no alte111ative bu\\ to dismiss the. election petition .straightaway, Unfortunately, however, in the process of applying the principles laid d°'vn by this Court he bas completely glossed over the nature of ilie 1:nistakes by describing them as merely clerial or typing ones. On a perusal. of the aforcsid mistakes (listd at pp. 64-65 of tne\"rarerbook) they .do not appear)o b<; so. , Section 81(3) of-the Act run' <\\rns:\n\n\"l. Presentafio\"n of petitions ,.\n\n(3) Every election petition shall be accopanied by. as many .copies thereof as there are respondents mentioned in th~ petition, and every such copy shall be attested 'by tb.e pe1; itioner under his O\\v1r signature to be.a truecopy of the\n\nPetition.~.' .\n\nThe cunsequen.ce of nOn-compliance of thi.s. section l12s. been D mentio11ed in s.86(1) which may be extacfrd thus '\n\n\"86 .. Tfia/ of' c!e\"cti\"pn petitions ..\n\n(!). Tl1e High Court shall dismiss a1{ election petition which does not compJy.with\"the prov'isions of sccticn 81 er • section 82 o'r sectiCn 117.' . .\n\nA pe1\"usal of.the above reveals that the statute intended that\" before an election peiition can be entertai1icd; the copy sent 'to if.e elected candidate niµst be a true copy, failing which there would be a serious disobedience of the mndate contained in s.81(3) whkh would be fatal_ to the maintainability of the said petition.\n\n\\ It is now .\\vc!I settled bv. a large catepa of aut.bcit.ics -cf 1l1.is Co.uri that the elec!oral procss by. vhcih th<\"vcrdici of lhc .people has been given is a sacrosanct en~ and cai1not .1--:c:li_ghtly Ht at n<1ught unless he gi-Ounds 1nentioned in the Act for setting aside an election a1\"e held to be'provcd.\n\nJn these circumstaHcs. it is ffanifrct :11oat th provisions of s.81'(3) of the Act should be construed to the letter and spirit of the law because if the election petitioner des not give full.. and coo1plcte 'notice of the aflegation.s made against the return(d . candidate. he runs the . risk of hi~. pctit(cn, _being disrnis~(d in lfmine. ,\n\n.. H\n\nA hi the instant case, it is the.a.dmitted case of the parties that the\n\nmistakes in the copy supplied to the. appellant rel.ted to corrupt• practices indulged in by him through various persons who liave been named at pages 64-65 of the Paperbook. In Murarkd Radhey Shylim Ram Kumar v. Roop Singh Rathore & Ors.<ll this Court made the . followitg obsrvations :--\n\n• \"Having'rcgard to the prov1s<0ns of Part VI.of the Act we are of the.viewthat the word \"copy\" does not mean an absolutely exaot copy.\n\nTt means a .copy so true that nobody ca.n by any possibility.misunderstand it..\n\nThe test whether. the copy is a true one is whether any varition frora the original_ is calculated to mislead an ordinary\n\nperson.'' . .\n\nIn other, words, this Court merely mrant to indicaie that where the variation isso minin1al and insgnificant that it is incapable of misleading any person as to the true purport of the allegation, it would be a substantial complia1ice of. the provisions of s.81 (3) cf the Act.. The High Court has largely relied on the ratio of this particular case.\n\nThere can be no dispute. regarding the principle laid down by this Court but the main difficulty.arises when we approach the facts of a particular case in. order to find .out whether the copy .supplied to the returned candidte is really a true copy or not •\n\nTn Jagat Kio}wre Prasad Narain Singh v. Rajendra Kumar Poddar & Ors.121 the same principle was laid down.\n\nIn this case, the mistake was that in the election petition it was stated that rnrney was offered to one Jctba Kisku by Munshi Hansda but in the 'opv served on the returned candidate instead of M).Jnshi Hansda the name of Paul Hansda was mentioned. Apparently, the mistake was a verbal one but this court held that it was sufficient to prejudice the defence and accordingly came to the conclusion that the petition was liable to\n\n .. -f '\n\nG be dismissed under s.86 of the Act.\n\nWe shall presently show that in the instant case the mistak.es were of a greater nature than those with which this Coµrt was dealing 1--\n\n(I) (1964] 3 S.C.R. 573.\n\n(2) [1971] I S.C.R. 821. .\n\n• -f.\n\n. .\n\n• M.K. PANDEY l'. BAJDYANATH (Faza/ ,4/i, J.) . . , 283\n\nwith in the aforeid ase. Jn Satya'Narin v, Dhuja Ram & Ol's.<1 1\n\nthis Court clearly pointed out that where the first.part of s.81(3) was n.ot complied with .. the provision being a peremptory one, total nqnc, compliance with the same would. entail dismissal of the election petitio'n under s.86 .of the Act.\n\nIn a later case in' Shari[-ud-Din v. Abdul Gani Lonei2> this Court observed thus ·\n\n\"It .is true that section 89(3) of the Act is purei'y procedural in character and that ordinarily prccedimil Jaw should not be given that primacy by cuurts a~ would defeat\n\nthe ends of justice, But if a Jaw even though it may be procedural in character insists that an act must be done in a particular mam, er .and further provides that certain consequences should follow'ifthe act is not done.in that manner, courts have no.option but to enforce the law as it is.\" . . . .\n\nIn a la(<:st decision of the Court in M. Karunanidhi etc. etc. v.- H.\n\nV. Hrmde & Ors. etc. etc.,<3> the following observations were mad!': .. \"It .is obvious that the photograph was a part of the \\\n\nverment contained in paragraph l S(b). Jn the absence of the photograph the averment contained in paragraph 18(b) ·, vould be incomplete. The photograph referred to in paragraph 18(b) was therefore ai1 integral part of the election petition. It follows that there was total non-ccimplia'nce \\vith the requirements of sub-s.(3) of s.81 f the Act by failure to. serve the appellant with a copy of the elcctidn petition.\"· · ' On a careful consideration and scrutiuy of the Jaw on the subject, the following principles are wen established :· - ' . . .\n\nI) that where the copy of the election petition. served on the returned candidate conta\\ns only clerical or typographical mistakes whiCh are of no. comcquence, the petition cannot be dismissed straightaway under s.86 of the Act,·\n\n2) A true copy _means a copy which is wholly and substantially the same as the original and where there are insignificant or minimal' mistakes, the court may not take notice thereof, ...\n\n(1)' [1974] 3 S.C.R. 20.\n\n(3) [1983) I SCALE 344.\n\n\n' .\n\n. .\n\nD ..\n\n3) where the, copf contains importai1t omissions or discrepancies of a vital nature,· which are likeiy to. cause prejudice 'to the defence of the returned candidate;· it cannot be said that there has been a. sbstantial com- . pliance of the provisions ofs.81(3) of.the ct. .\n\n~ 4)\n\nPri~1a facje, the tatute .uses the. words. \"true copy\"\n\n.. and the concept of'substai1tial compliance cannot be extended tdo .far to. include se1ious or vital itiisiakcs which :shed the character of a _true copy so that the copy furnished to the returned candidate cannot be said to be a true copy wiibin the meaning of s. 81(3) of ihe Aci,. ; nd\n\n. '\n\n. . . ·... . \\\n\n- . . . . . ' ..\n\nAs s.81(3) is meant to pr<ltect and safeguard the Bacrosanct. electoral process so as not to disturb the verdict of the .voters, there is no. room , for giving a liberal or broad interpretation to the provisions of the\n\n.sid secti.on. ,\n\nWe might mention here• that in the instant case the mistakes in the copy supplied .to the returned candidate related to corrupt practices' which, as has beert held by this Court in. a large number of cases, have to be proved to the hili just like a crii11inal charge and any mistake which co.ntains an eleme1it of vagueness would immediately vitiate the election petition and merit its dismissal. under. s.86 of the Ac( . .\n\nA . . .\n\nIn the view that. we lake, it.is not necessary for us t<i wade through a detailed dis<; ussion of the mistakes because a few mistakes pointed out by the Judge himself clearly reveal that they were .of a very vital and material nature so as to mislead the returned .. candidat~ . and prejudice him. in his defence. Schedule I to the election petition contained the.· list of persons through whon1 the corrupt practices were alleged to have been committed, An analysis of these mistakes may be plad in three cafego:fie~(l) where there is complete omission of some names which have .been mentioned in the election petition but riot in. the copy'\\upplie>[ to the returned candidate, (2) giving . absolutely .wrong names whic11 are bound to mislead the appellant . in his 'defence as the persons bearing the wrong names could not be t.raced out, and (3) some names given in the petition appear to be . . males but i(l the copy given to the appellant they ppear to be feales_.\n\nComing to the first category, a few exmples will suffice .to\n\n.·~\n\nM.K. PANDEY v. BAI~YANATH (Fazal Ali, i.)\n\n Q85 • illustrate our point ·\n\nSI. No. in .Name in the Name in the Schedule I orig; nal petitfon copy\n\n17 · Y ogendra Jha '.\n\nOmitted 37 Bufa.ri Devi Omitted .· ft.\n\nOmitted 188 Bal Bhogia 445 Ra1n<leo Pa'swan Omitted 486 ..\n\nJugeshwari Devi Omitted\n\nThe omission of names cannot be said to be a typing misiake but a very vital and serious one which is sufficient to entail the dismissal of the election petition. Under the secod categoy (.giving wrong names), the following names may: be mentioned . . . . .\n\n . There are many more mistakes given in schedule I but we have se!Ccted only those which are vitaL and may seriously prejudice the .'defence of the appellant because it will be very difficult for hini to find\n\nout the persons,' named in the copy supplied to him, who are said to have indulged in corrupt pradices at his .instance ..\n\n1~ . . . - . ·- Thus, on ,[n oyerall consiiierntion of the facts and circumstances ..\n\n~ -. ' A\n\n' .. A\n\n.286\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984] 2 s.c.R. .. of this case, we. are unable to agree with. the High Court that the 'mistakes in the copy were either verbal, typographical 6r clerical..\n\nThe present case appears to be a much worse case than Murarka ·\n\nRadhey Shyam Ram Kumar,'s case (supra) where only a slight.difference jn the title led this Co.urt to hold that' the mistake was a vital one .\n\n. . I\n\nWe are, therefore, of the opinioq.that the High Court. committed a serious error of law in holding that there had been a substantial compliance of the provisions of' s.81(3) of the Act so a~ to exC!ude the. applica'tion of s.86 of the Act.\n\n• For. the reasons given above, we allow the appeal and dismiss the election r.etitio1\\ filed in the High Curt but in the .circumstances without any order as to costs. As a result of our judgment, nothin.g now survive\"s iii the High Court. ..\n\nS.R.\n\nAppeal a/!'Oived.\n\n• . . . .. .,", "total_entities": 51, "entities": [{"text": "MITHILESH KUMAR PANDEY", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15, "end_char": 37, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MITHILESH KUMAR PANDEY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BAIDYANATH YADAV AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 39, "end_char": 63, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BAIDYANATH YADAV AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "o. CmNNApPA REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 111, "end_char": 128, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RS. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 138, "end_char": 160, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "E.S. VENKATARAMIAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Repreientation of the People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 163, "end_char": 201, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 695, "end_char": 711, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patna High Court !"}}, {"text": "section 83(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1104, "end_char": 1117, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Repreientation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "Repreientation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Section 81(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1616, "end_char": 1629, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 81(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1800, "end_char": 1814, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.81(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2099, "end_char": 2106, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.81(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2575, "end_char": 2582, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.81(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3708, "end_char": 3715, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.81(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4053, "end_char": 4060, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.81(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4094, "end_char": 4101, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1974] 23 SCR 20", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4548, "end_char": 4564, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s.86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5064, "end_char": 5068, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Murarka Radhey", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5462, "end_char": 5476, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The present case is a nluch\"\"worse case than Murarka Radhey Sh:va111 Ra111 Kunw;'s case (supra) \\Vherc onlY a slight difference in the title led this Court to hold that the mistake was a vital one was a valid one."}}, {"text": "S.N. Kacker", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6058, "end_char": 6069, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".• S.N. Kacker, L.R. Singh aQd Gopa/ Singh for (he Appellant:\n\n R.K. -Garg and D:K. Garg for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "L.R. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6071, "end_char": 6081, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".• S.N. Kacker, L.R. Singh aQd Gopa/ Singh for (he Appellant:\n\n R.K. -Garg and D:K. Garg for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "R.K. -Garg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6119, "end_char": 6129, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".• S.N. Kacker, L.R. Singh aQd Gopa/ Singh for (he Appellant:\n\n R.K. -Garg and D:K. Garg for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "D:K. Garg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6134, "end_char": 6143, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".• S.N. Kacker, L.R. Singh aQd Gopa/ Singh for (he Appellant:\n\n R.K. -Garg and D:K. Garg for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "s.81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7489, "end_char": 7493, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.81(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8216, "end_char": 8223, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.81(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8479, "end_char": 8486, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 81(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8954, "end_char": 8967, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.86(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9362, "end_char": 9369, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9561, "end_char": 9571, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.81(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9850, "end_char": 9857, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10304, "end_char": 10308, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11568, "end_char": 11572, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jctba Kisku", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12134, "end_char": 12145, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this case, the mistake was that in the election petition it was stated that rnrney was offered to one Jctba Kisku by Munshi Hansda but in the 'opv served on the returned candidate instead of M).Jnshi Hansda the name of Paul Hansda was mentioned."}}, {"text": "Munshi Hansda", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12149, "end_char": 12162, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this case, the mistake was that in the election petition it was stated that rnrney was offered to one Jctba Kisku by Munshi Hansda but in the 'opv served on the returned candidate instead of M).Jnshi Hansda the name of Paul Hansda was mentioned.", "canonical_name": "M).Jnshi Hansda"}}, {"text": "M).Jnshi Hansda", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12223, "end_char": 12238, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this case, the mistake was that in the election petition it was stated that rnrney was offered to one Jctba Kisku by Munshi Hansda but in the 'opv served on the returned candidate instead of M).Jnshi Hansda the name of Paul Hansda was mentioned.", "canonical_name": "M).Jnshi Hansda"}}, {"text": "Paul Hansda", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12251, "end_char": 12262, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this case, the mistake was that in the election petition it was stated that rnrney was offered to one Jctba Kisku by Munshi Hansda but in the 'opv served on the returned candidate instead of M).Jnshi Hansda the name of Paul Hansda was mentioned."}}, {"text": "s.86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12490, "end_char": 12494, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "(1964] 3 S.C.R. 573", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 12650, "end_char": 12669, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "M.K. PANDEY", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12714, "end_char": 12725, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• M.K. PANDEY l'."}}, {"text": "s.81(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12895, "end_char": 12902, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13060, "end_char": 13064, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 89(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13181, "end_char": 13194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14168, "end_char": 14172, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14600, "end_char": 14604, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1974] 3 S.C.R. 20", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 14812, "end_char": 14830, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 81(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15477, "end_char": 15485, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.81(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15547, "end_char": 15554, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16186, "end_char": 16190, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schedule I", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16530, "end_char": 16540, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schedule I", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17365, "end_char": 17375, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Murarka ·\n\nRadhey Shyam Ram Kumar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18488, "end_char": 18521, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the High Court that the 'mistakes in the copy were either verbal, typographical 6r clerical..\n\nThe present case appears to be a much worse case than Murarka ·\n\nRadhey Shyam Ram Kumar,'s case (supra) where only a slight.difference jn the title led this Co.urt to hold that' the mistake was a vital one ."}}, {"text": "s.81(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18816, "end_char": 18823, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18873, "end_char": 18877, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_2_287_289_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "287 A\n\nGAYA PARSHAD OIKSHIT\n\n' v.\n\nDR. NIRMAL CHANDER & ANR.\n\nJanuary:;,, 1984 ·\n\n[P.N: BHAGWATl, ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE AND D. P. MADON, JJ.]\n\nLitnitatio11 A.ct 1963, Article 65, 'title by adverse possession':Clabn of- Licence tenninated by itotice-Suit for possdssion-Licence to show by overt act that he is cla1ning adverse title . .\n\nThe respondents filed a suit for r.ecovery .of possession of the preniises (rorn the appellant after terfuination of his licence. The appellant cf aimed title _b.Y adverse possession.\n\n. The High Court held' that mere termination of the licence of a liccncee does not enable th, e .licence to clalin adverse JJOSsession, unless and uritil he -sets up a title hostile to that of the liccncer after tennination of hisMicencc, and decreed the suit for possession.\n\nDismissing the appeal,\n\nHELD : I. There nust be so1ne overt act on the pa-~1 of th~ licencee indiating assertion bf hostile title. Mere continuance o( unauthorised possession even for . a period of1nore tha'n 12.years is not enouh. [288 bJ\n\n2. It is -not n1erely unauthorised possession on -tenni11atio11 of his licence t_hat enables the licencee toclaim title by adverse possession but there must be some overt act on the part of the licencee to show that he is clain1ing adYerse title.\n\nIt is pos.sible that the licencor n1ay not file an action fur the purpose of recovering\n\npossessic:>n of the prcimises from the licencee after Jern1inatlng his licence but that by itself canot enable the licencee to claim thk:_ by adverse possession. (288 Cf\n\n. In th. instant case, the High Cout was riht •ill takingthe view that the appellant had not establisPed any title by adverse possession, and that the suit of\n\nthe first respondent for recovery of possession of the premises from the appellant G. was not barrd under Article 65 of the Lin1itatioil At, 1963. (288 E-FJ\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE J.URISDJCTION: Civil Appeal 'No ... J8)] of 1978.\n\nFrom the judgment and ordel' dated 24th August; fl78 of the H Allahabad High Court in sec?nd Appeal No, 1287 of _1974.) ·\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984] 2 s.c; R.\n\nA S, . Markendeya for the Appellant,\n\nBC Afarwala .for the Respondents .\n\n. The Judgment of the court was delivered bv\n\n~ .. •\n\nB. .\n\nBHAGWATl: ACTING CJ. We. Jiave'hard the learned counsel on behalf of the appellant and after hearing hi~ and persuing the judgment of the .High Court, we find ourselves wholly in agreement\n\nwith the' view t.aken by the. High Court that mere termintion of the licence' of a licencce does not enable the licencee to claim aderse . possession, .unless and until he sets up a title hostile io that of the\n\n C · licencor after termination of his licence,' It is not. merely unauthorised .\n\n~ possession 011 termination of his licence that enables ihe licencee to claitn title ):iy adver; e 'possession but there musi be some overt at ori the pat't of ihc licencee to sho~ that he is claiming adverse title: Jt is possible that the licencor may not file an action for the purpose of . recovering possession of the premises from the licencee after terminan ting his licence but that by itself cannot enable the licencee to claim title by dverse jlossession. °There must be some overt act on the part of the licence<1; indicating assertion of.hostiie title. Mere con- . tin1iance. of uriauthorised possession even for a period of more than . .12 years is n.ot enough: .Here in the present case there is nothing to\n\nshow that at any time after termination of his licence by Dr: Rama E Shanker or by tl; e first repodent' the appellant asserted hostile title in himslf. The High \\ourt was, therefore, rigl1t in t, aking.the view that t!J..e ·., ppellanf had not established any title by adverse. possession and iii that view of the matter,\" the suit of the first respondent for recovery of possession of the premises ffom the appellant was not barred under article 65 which is the only article of the LimitationAet, f 1963 applicable in the present .case. We accordingly confirm the\n\njudg111ent ofthe ]i:igh Co!Jrl and dismiss !lie appeal. ·\n\nMr. Markandeya,. learned. counsel appearing on behalf 6f the . appellant, has urged that the appellant has ben in possession of the premises which consist ofr9oms Nos. I, 4 and 5 shown in fhe Amin's map marked l6/5C since his birth and it would cause considerable hardship 10 him if he wereto be ev.icted from these room.s immediately and he.has, therefore; requested'that sufficient time may be granted fo the appellant to vacate these rooms. He has also stated that in the meanwhile the appellant is prepared to give up. possession of room No. i but he may .be allowed to continue in possession of room Nos. 4. & 5 for some reasonable period. This is a reasonable request on\n\nI. j.\n\nG.P .. DIKSHIT v. N!RMA~ CHANDER (Bhagwati, A cling, CJ.) 289 . . behalf of the appella1it. Jn view of the fact that the appellant ha& A been in possession of rooms Nos. I, 4 ad. 5 for a very loi1g perird and he has:, .son who is studying in school, we a.re' incilned fo grant . time to the appellant to hand. over possession of. room Nos. 4 and 5, provided he gives up possession of room No. 1 on or before 28th February, 1984. If the appellaiif hands over vacant and peacefu)\n\npossession of room No.· f and any other portio!ii of the house which B may be it1 his\" own occupation apart from room Nos: 4 and 5 on or. before 28th.February, 1984 and he.and his. son file an' affidavit in this Court on or before t.hesame datestating-that they are in possession and occupation of rooms Nos, 4 and 5 and undertaking that they . will not induct anyone else in possession or cccupatio'n of these two rooms and will hand over vac.ant and peqaceful possession of these\n\nC ' two rooms to the !st respondent on or before 30th June, 1987, 'the decree for possession against the appellant in respect of rooms Nos.A '\"and 5 will not be executed untii 30th 5-une,. 1987.· If vacant and\n\n. peacefu(possession of room No, i is not handed over by the appellant to the 1st respondent on or before 28th February, 19 84 or if the appellant and his son fail to file an affidavit in the aforeswd terms on or D before that date, the .qecree for possessi.on will beome executable forthwith. . • •\n\n . There will be no order as to costs throughout. ' . ' . '\n\nN.V.K.\n\nAppeal <lismissed .\n\n.. . . .\n\n. I\n\n• . ,\n\n. '\n\n' .", "total_entities": 15, "entities": [{"text": "A\n\nGAYA PARSHAD OIKSHIT", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4, "end_char": 27, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GAYA PARSHAD DIKSHIT", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "NIRMAL CHANDER & ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 39, "end_char": 59, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NIRMAL CHANDER & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "D. P. MADON, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 123, "end_char": 139, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.P. MADON", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Article 65", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 166, "end_char": 176, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 65", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1813, "end_char": 1823, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE J.URISDJCTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1865, "end_char": 1894, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "288 E-FJ\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE J.URISDJCTION: Civil Appeal 'No ... J8)] of 1978."}}, {"text": "BC Afarwala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2133, "end_char": 2144, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Markendeya for the Appellant,\n\nBC Afarwala .for the Respondents ."}}, {"text": "Rama E Shanker", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3498, "end_char": 3512, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".12 years is n.ot enough: .Here in the present case there is nothing to\n\nshow that at any time after termination of his licence by Dr: Rama E Shanker or by tl; e first repodent' the appellant asserted hostile title in himslf."}}, {"text": "article 65", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3876, "end_char": 3886, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Markandeya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4066, "end_char": 4076, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Markandeya,."}}, {"text": "Amin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4254, "end_char": 4258, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I, 4 and 5 shown in fhe Amin's map marked l6/5C since his birth and it would cause considerable hardship 10 him if he wereto be ev.icted from these room.s immediately and he.has, therefore; requested'that sufficient time may be granted fo the appellant to vacate these rooms."}}, {"text": "28th.February, 1984", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5371, "end_char": 5390, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "before 28th."}}, {"text": "30th 5-une,. 1987", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5885, "end_char": 5902, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A '\"and 5 will not be executed untii 30th 5-une,."}}, {"text": "28th February, 19 84", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6026, "end_char": 6046, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "peacefu(possession of room No, i is not handed over by the appellant to the 1st respondent on or before 28th February, 19 84 or if the appellant and his son fail to file an affidavit in the aforeswd terms on or D before that date, the .qecree for possessi.on will beome executable forthwith. . • •"}}, {"text": "N.V.K.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6282, "end_char": 6288, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.V.K.\n\nAppeal <lismissed ."}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_2_290_298_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "A 290\n\nV. S. RABI AND ANR.\n\nSMT. RAM CHAMBELI\n\nJanuaJy 3, 1984\n\n[E.S. VEN, KATARAMlAH AND R.B, MISRA, JJ.J\n\nDelhi Rent Cotro/ Act, 1958, (Act 59 '°f 1958) Sectio; 2J~W.hile invoking ·\n\nte re1nedial provisions of 'Section 21~ he lau; lllord Shot{!d conie with clean hads a . and not supprdss or falsify facis-Doctriue of suppressioverf will disentit/e hbn to get back possession later iiz such case; of stippression of facts- Duty of the Court- Meaning of collusion-Right to resile, when aval1able.....-Rule of oppression and illegal contract explained. ·\n\nThe respondent Smt. Ran1 Chambeli leased out the suit premises to the arpcllantS for a P.eriod o.f three yCars under an orQer dated December 22, 1977 passed bY the Additional Rent Controller in Suit No. M/?98/77 µnder section 21 of the Delhi Rent Contr9I ACt. . bii the expiry of the .said period, when the espondefil filed an application eforc the Rent Controller for possess'ion of the preinises, the appellants filed objections, highlighting how by suppression and falSifying facts the resporident resorted to the proYisions of section 21 of the :Rent.Act, arl'd challenged the need for personal Occupation. : The Additional Rent Cpiltroller, therefore, after hearing both sides revoked the perlnission granted in 1977.\n\nHOwever, the Rent Control Tribunal set aside the o_rdr of the Addi. Rent Controller. and ordered eviction. The High Court in Second Appeal confinned Tribunal's order. Hence \"the tenan(s'appeat\" by Special' Leave of the Court,\n\nAllo\\ving the appeal, the c;:ourt,\n\nHi5:LD .:\n\n1. On .the factsand ciicumstances of the\" case, the landlady is not entitled to invoke th'C ren; edy under section.21 _of the Delhi Rent Control Ac~.\n\nThe permission under section 21 of the Act had been obtained by her .on the basis of wrong statement, but for which the permission wollld not have been accorded._ .. These statements which were in the nature of half truths were apparently ma.de\n\nin Order to ffiake good the plea that_ there was only a .temBorary necessity to lease out t\\le building for a short period and that thCre wiS a bonafide anticipation that there would be a pressing neCeSsity to reoccupy the pren}ises at '1e end of the period, which wer(;! the two crucial factors governing an order under section 2_1 of the At.\n\n[296 F; E]\n\nS.B. Noronah v •. Prem Kun1ari Khaizna, [19.80] 1 S.C.R. 281; applied.\n\n. . . . . . 2: 1 It is true that the appellants who were the weaker.'of th6two parties did not. question ihe .truth of.the staten1ents made by the rspondentwhen.the . permiSsiOn was granted. But such \\collusion, if anY, between the two unequal parties dO'es hot confer any sanctity on the transaction in question; In cases of this 'Ilature it is always oPen to the weaker of the two parties to establish that the.transaction was only a camouflage used to cover-its true nature. [296 H; 297 A]\n\n)-.\n\n~ -\n\n~ ..\n\n• '\n\nv .. s .. RAHi v. RAM CHAMBELJ (Venkataramiah, J.) 291 .\n\n2:2.\n\nCollusion in1plies the existenCe of two or n1ore parties \\vho r;:an deal with each other independently with the object of entering into an arrangement which may seive as a cloak to cover up the real state of affairs. When one party can dominate over the will of the other, it would nOt be a case of Collusion but one of compulsioU; The ilbove view is fully in. cc; insonancc with the spirit behind the\n\nrule of oppression which , is recognised as an exception to the doctrine\" that a party cannot recover what he has given to the other P.arty under an illegal contract. The gro.und that the appellants cannot challenge! the permission , i_nitially grar.ted under section 21 of the ct is not, therefore) availa?le in this cse. (297 B-CJ\n\nS1nith v. Ci<ff[1817] 6 & S 160@ 165, quoted with approval.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JUR1So1CT10N: Civil Appeal No. 28<lJ of 1982.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated. the 23rd August, l 982 of the Delhi High Court at New Delhi in S.A.O. No. 277 of 1982'.\n\nB.X. Joseph and N.S. Das Behl for the Appellant.\n\nJ.M. Khanna for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by :\n\n~ V~NKATARAMIAH; J.· This is an appeal by spcial leave against the judgment of the High Cou•t of Delhi atcd Augm.t 23. 1982 in S.A.O. No. 277 of J982tJismissing the appeal filed by the appellants.\n\nThe respondent Smt. Ra1~ Chambeli leased out the premises in question to the appellan'ts under an order dated December 22 •\n\n1977 passed by the Additional R.enf Contr.oller in s.uit No. M/798/77 under section< 21 of tl1e Delhi Rent Control Act, I 958 (Act 59 of 1958) (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), the rckvant part~ wJ1ich reads thus :\n\n\"Statement of Smt. Ram Chambcli w/o SJ1.' G.L. Gandhi.\n\nI' am the owner-landlord of premises No. 637, Double Storey, New. Rajinder Nagar, New Delhi. The entire premises comprising of two rooms, kitchen, bath, ]aterine shown in the plan Exhibit-Al is surplus with me for a limited period of 3. years which I want to let out to the respondent for res'dential purposes fer the said rericd at rupees 425/- p.m. which is mentioned in Mark Il with effect from tl1e date of perm1ss1on.\n\nI have never let out the. portion to anybody earlier to it. My son and my mother were Jiving in the\n\n292 •\n\nSUPRHME COURT REPORTS [J 984] 2 s.c.R •\n\n. said premises. My mother has not been reeling well.· My\n\nson is studying in 9th class. After about three years my. mother will be alright and my son.will grow up and for them\n\n'J. spall require t-be pre111ies after three_ years. _\n\nRO & AC\n\nARC • Statement of Shri V.S. Rahi, son of Sh: Thakur Gopal Singh, 45 years, teachcr •ind Smt. Santosh Rahi w/o Shri V.S. Rahi, aged 45 years, teacher .resident of 33/52, Prabhat Rold, Karol Bagh, New. Delhi.\n\nWe want. tlw premises for three' yqrs for the residential purposes from .the date of pe.rni:iSSion.\n\nWe are not in possession of the premises nor were we.tenants In it. ·\n\n'RO & AC\n\nARC\n\nORDER . ' This order will dispose of application under Section 21 DRC Act filed by Smt. :Ram Chambel.i pplicant seeking pennissio1i to let out first floor of her premises No.. .637 Double Stof'ey, New Rajinder Nagar, New Delhi; It is stated • that the first floor4tif the said premises comprising of two living rooms, kitchen, bath and late.tine detailed in plan exhibit. A-I is.surplus with her for a lim.ited period. of three years cind she will req\\lire it after the said period of three. years. The'- petitioner and respondent have made statement on oath in. this connection. In view of the statement of the 'parties, permission u/s. 21 .of DRC Ac.t is 'granted to Smt. R'.lm Chamlieli, wife of Shri G:L Gandhi applicant\n\nto let out first floor of her p; emises No. 637, Double Storey, New Rajinder Nagar, New'Delhi to Shri V.S. Rahi and Smt. Santosh Rabi respondents fot resi<lei1tial pufposes for the said peri.od of three years with effect from the date. of the order. .. .\n\nJ. D: Kapoor, Add. Rent Controller''\n\nOn th_e cxpi1y of the period of three years mentioned in the above order the respondent filed an application before the Additional Rent Controller for possession or the premises.' The appell.ants filed objec; tions to the said application stating that. te respondent was coinfor-\n\n' ' . v.s. RAHi v. R.AM CHAMBELI (Venkataramiah, J.) . 293\n\ntably living with her husband and son in .the ground floor . of the\n\nb11ilding; that she was not .in need of the first floor of the bu; lding . . which had been leasedout intheir favour; that the statement that her mother was Jiving with her was not true; tliat her son was studying in the 7th class in 1977 and not in the 9th class as stated by her before ·\n\nthe Rent Controller in 1977 and that the Rent c'ontrollet had permitted the lasing out of the building under section 21 of the Act without applying his mind.\n\nH was further pleaded that the application had been .filed with a v\"iew to extracting higher r\"ent. The appellant.s also stated. that the statement of the respondent that she had not leased .out the building earlier to any body elsewas not.true. After. going through the affidavits filed by the parties in support of their cases the Additional Rent\" Controller' held that the respondent .. had obtained the permission under section 21 of .the Act by making . wrong statements and accordingly revoked the said perrnission .. Consequently the appellants coul.d not be evicted unde, r that section.'\n\nAggrieved by the or.der of the Additional Rent Controller, the respondeii't filed an ap1}eal before the Rent. Contr'o'I. Tripunal. The Tribunal allowed the appeal and directed the eviction of the appellants. The Tribunal observed that when the Conirollcr had been informed by tl1e respond.en ·, right atthe time when the permission was gran'ted under section 21 of the Act that the property was not required by her for a period of three years but wculd\"te. needed after that period foi the use of her son and her mother who was unwell at that time, there was no ground to hold that the transaction was not genuine.· Tl; e secnd appeal filed by the. appellants against . the order of the Tribunal was dismissed by the High Court. This\n\nappeal by special .)eave is filed gains! the judgment of the' High\n\n~~ ' '\n\n Section. 21 of tl)e Act reads . ·\n\n\"21.\n\nWhere. a lndlord. does not require the whole or any part of any premises for\" a particular period, and the landlord, after obtaining the permission of the Controller in the prescribed -. manner, lets the whk of the preinises or part thereof as a residence, for such period as may be .agreed. to in writing between the landlord and the tenant' and the tenant does not; on the expiry of the said period, vacate such :Premises, the~1, not\\vithstanding ;:iyq1ing contained in section 14 or in any .other law, the .Controller may,_ on an application made to him in this. behalf by the landlord within. such time as may be prescribed, place the\n\n' 294'\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1984) 2 S.C.R. .\n\nA landlord in vacant possession of the premises :or part thereof by evicting the tenant and every other person who may be in\n\nocupation of such premises.\"\n\nWhen section 21 of the Act was enacted it was believed that it would encourage landlords .. who would not ordinarily be willing B to lease out a building as a residence for a short time even though - 'they might not. be in need of it durig that pericd, to lease ii..out for such short period because qf the si1mmary remedy provided by that section to recover possession>of the building quickly from. the tenant instead of the usual eviction proceedings which would take c\n\na Jong tirnc to terminate. . .\n\nlt was not perhaps fully realised at the t'me of the enactment of section 2f .of the Act that many unscrupulous landlords would 'enter into arrangements purportjng tb be 'those .under that .seCt.fon\n\nbut in reality were ordinary leases and would utilise the threat of the summary remedy availabie under that section to realise higher rents or for any. other purpose considered to be contrary to the benign purposes sought to be:achievd by the Ace When one such case in • which the genui~1eness of a transaction entered irito under section 21 of the Act came before this Court in S.B. Norimah v. Prem Kumari Khanna, '1' Krishrni Iyer, J. observC'd :\n\n\"ft is easy to envisage the terrible blow to .the rent control Jaw if Section 21 were freely permitted to subvert the scheme . of Section 14. Every landlord will insist on a tenant going\n\n•through the formal exercise Qf Section 21, making ideal avermcnts in terms of that Section .. The consequence will be that . both the Civil Procedure Code which prescribes suits for recovery of possession and the Delhi Rent Control Act which prescribe.s grounds for evictiort \\vill be eclipsed. by the pervasiye operation of Section 21. , Neither grounds for evictioil nor suits for.cviction WiJJ thereafter be needed, and if the landlord moves the court for a mere warrant t~ place the Jandtdnl, through the court precess. in vacant possession of the premises, he gets it. No court-fee, no decree, no execution petition, no terminalion of tenanc);_ \\Vish for possession_ and the co\"urt is at. your Command . . Such a horrendous situation will be the negation of the rule of law in this area.\n\nSo it is that we deem it necessary to\n\n(I) [1'980] I S.C.R. 281.\n\n.. Alli •\n\n• I\n\nv.s. RAH! v. RAM CHAi.imi, LJ (Venk.alaramiah, J.) 295\n\n. lay down the law as implied inSecti.on 2!'.\n\nWhen anapplication under Section 21 .is filed by the landlord and/or tennt; the Contro!!er must satisfy himself by .such inquiry as .lie may make abqut the. compulsive 're-.· q11iremei1ts of that provision.' If he makes a mindless order,. the Court, \\Vhen challenged. at.· the time of execution, will go into the question aS to whether the twin cOnditiuns for sanction have .really been fulftlkd.\"\n\nThe appeal before us bas to be con'sidered agai1ist the above bac1\"ground. . . ' . . . ' .\n\nIt is urged by the appellants that the order passed under sedion\n\n21. '0fh_e Ai;; i in this Case-havir, g.hCt:n obt:::ined _en t:he basis.of statements which were wrong, the app!icaticn for eviction should be dis1nissed.\n\nWhile it is true that the Court should . proced with the initial presumption that the order under section 21 of the. Act was a regular one, the Court should. still examine the maierial plae<d befcre it by the. tena11t i'rrducted und9r that provision in order' to satisfy itself th.at there has riot b~~!) any mi-sus~ of the said proVision by th, e Jarid!Ord taking advantage of the helpless ·$itua1ion in \\Vhic~ the tenf}nt 'vas placed. a-t. the ti111c when such order \\.v\"as obtained.\n\n• _ fn the instdnt case .. it.is See;1 tha~ there weie three wrpng state- . ments .ma.<; teby the esponde:nt \\\\; hen. She apprcaChed !he AdditioTI31\n\nRent COnroller scekirig , pern1issinn 11nder secticn 21 cf the Act\" to lease out' the property. First, it is. not true thai the 'building had not bceri Jeas<; d out earlier.\n\nNow it is admitted before us that there was. on~ Katria occµJ)ying tl~-e 'buiiditlg a~ a ·.teriant an a. mothly rent, ofRs. 100/- oniy and .he had vacated the same abaut. four 'or live months before the, date on which.the orde~ was ma.de under section . 21 while it is. true that he had been there as• tenant even before the respondent purchased ihe building \"in the year l 972 .. After he vacated the building, .it was leased out to the appellants on a . rent ofRS. 425/- per mensem. Secondly, it is admitted that the respondent's mother was not living with her. It is now admitted before us that the wom'an who is more tliitn 75 years old described as the mother of the re.spondenl'in the statement of the respondent recorded by the Additional .\n\nRent Controlier vvhen pern1issiOn was given u~1d.er secti'cn. 21-- is the si'ster .of the 'respondeni's father although in the course .of the .pro-\n\nG -·\n\nff.\n\n• G\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS .\n\n(1984) 2 S.C:R\n\nceedings before the Additional Rent Controller out of which this appeal arises, she was described as the adoptive mother of the respondent. Itis now stated that she is the foster mother of the respon~ dent ad that she came with. the respondent to the residence of her husband after her marriage. It is stated that she was suffering from cataract in her eyes;. that it was not ripe for being treated in 1977 when the order was passed under section ·21 of the Act and that it was expcted that after the cataract was removed she would need the · - building in the occupaiio11 ofthe appellants which is equal in size . to the ground floor in the occupation of the respondent. Thirdly; the son of the respondent was an . young boy studying in the seventh class in !977 and not in the ninth class. From the foregoing it is obvious that-the respondent had suppressed that thj!re was a tenant iri the building who had vacated only a few months before the date of the .application under section 2fofthe Act; had made false statement about the relationship with her so-called foster mother; had not disolosed the nature of her sickness which was expected to be cured in three years; had stated that her son was studying in the ninth class to make it appear that he ould be sufficiently old at the end of the period of thre~ years and that he would be in need of extra accommodation. These statements which were in the nature of half-trµths were apparently made in order to make good the plea that t.here was only a temporary necessity to lease out the building for a short pericd and that the respondent bona fide anticipated that there. would be a pressing, necessity to reocc.upy the premises at the end of the pcricd which are the two crucial factors governing an order under secticn 21 of the Aci: The reasons given in this case are .quite unconvincing~ 'we arc not satisfied that the respondent honestly believed when she . applied .for permission under. section 21. of t]Je.Act that' she would. be in need of the premises in question at the end of the stipulated period. On a consideration of the material before him, the Additional Rent Controller' was right in holding thaLthe permission under section 21 of the Act had been obtained by the respondent ori the basis of wrong statements but for which the permission would not have been accorded. •\n\nIt is, however, urged that the appellants who had colluded with the respondent when po; rmission was granted under section 2i' of the Act should not be now allowed to resile from the stand they had taken then., It is true that the appellants who were the weaker of the two parties did not question the truth of the statements made by the respondent when the permission was granted. But sucl1 collussion, if any; beiween the to unequal parties does not confer any sanctity\n\n• I\n\nv.s. RAHi v. RAM CHAMBELl (Venkataramiah, J.)' ?,97 • • on the transaction in question. In cases of this nature it is always A open to the weaker of the two parties to establish that the transaction was only a camouflage used to cover its true nature. Collusion implies the existence ofo or more parties who can deal with each other independently with the object of entering into an arrangement which . . may serve as a cloak t-0 cover up the\" real state of affairs. When\n\none party can dominate over the will of the other, it would not be\n\n B a case of collusion but one of compulsion~ The above Vitw' is fully in consonance with the spirit behind the rule of ci]lpression which is . recognised.as.an exception to the doctrine that a party cannot recover . what he has given to 'the. other party under an illegal contract. 'It can never be pred.icated as pari de/icto where one holds the rod and the other bows to it'. (Per Lord Ellenborough in Smith v. Cuff C\n\n(1817) 6 M & S 160 at 165). Cases which call for appropriate relief . to be given to an innocent party where 'one has the power to dictate, the other has no alternative but to submit are not uncommon. Cheshire and Fifoot's Law of Contract (10th Edn.) referes to another type of case belonging to this category. At page 338 of that !realise is the '.' following .passage : D\n\n. \"Another type of case where the parties are not regarded as equally delictual is where the contr\"act. is n•ndcrcd illegal bya statute, the object of which is to proteci one class of persons from the machinations of another class, as for example where it forbids a 1and1;, rd to take a premium from.a prospec- E live tenant. Here, the duty of observing the law is placed squarely upon the shoulders of t.he landlord, a11d the protected person, the tenant, may recover an illegal premiu111 in an action jor money had and. received, even if the statutf' omits to afford him this remedy either expressly or by implication. In the words of Lord Mansfield :\n\n F\n\n. Where contracts or transactions are prohib.ited by positive statutes, for the sake of protecting one set of men from another set of men;· the one from their situation and condition being liable to be oppressed and imposed upon by the other; there the parties are not in G pari delicto; and in furtherance of these statutes, person injured after the transaction is finish<d and com, the pleted, may bring his action and defeat the contract.\" H The ground that the appellants cannot ch, allenge th~ permission\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984) 2 s.c.R. • A initially granted under section 21 of the Act is not therefore, available•. in this case:\n\n. .\n\n. . . .. .\n\nThe Tribunal and the High Court have approached the present case in a mechanical way ani, I have failed to apply correctly the ratio of the d.ecision in Noronah's ca.1e to the facts before thei11. We are of the view that on the facts and in the .circumstances_ of the case , the respondent is not.entitle<) to invoke the remedy under section 21 of the.\n\nAct to. recover possession of the premies.'.\n\nIn the result, the judgments of the High Court .. and of the T-ribunal - are set aside and the application filed b'y th& respondent unde~ section 21 of the Act for recovery f the premises is dismissed.\n\n. The appeal is accordingly allowed with costs .\n\n.. S.R.· , Appml allowed. fl\n\nI .\n\n.. :411 '", "total_entities": 53, "entities": [{"text": "290\n\nV. S. RABI AND ANR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2, "end_char": 25, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. S. 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MISRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 213, "end_char": 223, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 774, "end_char": 784, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1087, "end_char": 1097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1726, "end_char": 1736, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2272, "end_char": 2281, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Venkataramiah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2927, "end_char": 2940, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~ -\n\n~ ..\n\n• '\n\nv .. s .. RAHi v. RAM CHAMBELJ (Venkataramiah, J.) 291 .", "canonical_name": "Venk.alaramiah"}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3622, "end_char": 3632, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3696, "end_char": 3698, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S 160", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3722, "end_char": 3727, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "B.X. Joseph", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3944, "end_char": 3955, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B.X. Joseph and N.S. Das Behl for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "N.S. Das Behl", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3960, "end_char": 3973, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B.X. Joseph and N.S. Das Behl for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "J.M. Khanna", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3994, "end_char": 4005, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J.M. Khanna for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "NKATARAMIAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4077, "end_char": 4088, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by :\n\n~ V~NKATARAMIAH; J.· This is an appeal by spcial leave against the judgment of the High Cou•t of Delhi atcd Augm.t 23.", "canonical_name": "Venk.alaramiah"}}, {"text": "Delhi Rent Control Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4492, "end_char": 4514, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "New Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4756, "end_char": 4765, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rajinder Nagar, New Delhi."}}, {"text": "Section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5941, "end_char": 5951, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ram Chambel.i", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5975, "end_char": 5988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Chambel.i pplicant seeking pennissio1i to let out first floor of her premises No.. .637 Double Stof'ey, New Rajinder Nagar, New Delhi; It is stated • that the first floor4tif the said premises comprising of two living rooms, kitchen, bath and late.tine detailed in plan exhibit.", "canonical_name": "Ram Chambel.i"}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6521, "end_char": 6526, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "R'.lm Chamlieli", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6560, "end_char": 6575, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R'.lm Chamlieli, wife of Shri G:L Gandhi applicant\n\nto let out first floor of her p; emises No."}}, {"text": "V.S. Rahi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6714, "end_char": 6723, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "637, Double Storey, New Rajinder Nagar, New'Delhi to Shri V.S. Rahi and Smt."}}, {"text": "Santosh Rabi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6733, "end_char": 6745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Santosh Rabi respondents fot resi<lei1tial pufposes for the said peri.od of three years with effect from the date."}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7716, "end_char": 7726, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8190, "end_char": 8200, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8715, "end_char": 8725, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9689, "end_char": 9699, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10068, "end_char": 10078, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10634, "end_char": 10643, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11099, "end_char": 11109, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Krishrni Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11187, "end_char": 11200, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "other purpose considered to be contrary to the benign purposes sought to be:achievd by the Ace When one such case in • which the genui~1eness of a transaction entered irito under section 21 of the Act came before this Court in S.B. Norimah v. Prem Kumari Khanna, '1' Krishrni Iyer, J. observC'd :\n\n\"ft is easy to envisage the terrible blow to .the rent control Jaw if Section 21 were freely permitted to subvert the scheme ."}}, {"text": "Section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11288, "end_char": 11298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11348, "end_char": 11358, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11438, "end_char": 11448, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11732, "end_char": 11742, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Venk.alaramiah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12314, "end_char": 12328, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. RAM CHAi.imi, LJ (Venk.alaramiah, J.) 295\n\n.", "canonical_name": "Venk.alaramiah"}}, {"text": "Section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12411, "end_char": 12421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13197, "end_char": 13207, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15844, "end_char": 15853, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16816, "end_char": 16826, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17058, "end_char": 17068, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17327, "end_char": 17336, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ellenborough", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18620, "end_char": 18632, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Per Lord Ellenborough in Smith v. Cuff C\n\n(1817) 6 M & S 160 at 165)."}}, {"text": "S 160", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18666, "end_char": 18671, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cheshire", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18854, "end_char": 18862, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Cheshire and Fifoot's Law of Contract (10th Edn.)"}}, {"text": "Fifoot", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18867, "end_char": 18873, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Cheshire and Fifoot's Law of Contract (10th Edn.)"}}, {"text": "Mansfield", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19670, "end_char": 19679, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the words of Lord Mansfield :\n\n F\n\n."}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984) 2 s.c.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 20198, "end_char": 20233, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H The ground that the appellants cannot ch, allenge th~ permission\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984) 2 s.c."}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20264, "end_char": 20274, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Noronah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20501, "end_char": 20508, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Tribunal and the High Court have approached the present case in a mechanical way ani, I have failed to apply correctly the ratio of the d.ecision in Noronah's ca.1e to the facts before thei11."}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20682, "end_char": 20692, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20886, "end_char": 20896, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_2_299_306_EN", "year": 1984, "text": ".. AMAR KANT CHOUDHARY\n\nSTATE OF BIUAR & ORS.\n\nJanuary 3, 1984\n\n(E.S, VENKATARAMIA!l , AND R, B. MISRA, H.]\n\nNaturaltt1usticr-ruie o.f-a.dver~e report in confiifential .roil 'nl?f to be acted upon to deny proniotional ojJpOrtunitieS un!Css. con11nt1nicated and explanation con~\n\n_s, idered, a.ciing _otherwise vitiates: .decision. .\n\nThe appellant, a directly recruited Deputy, Superintendent of Police' in the Police Departmen, t .of the Respondent State was conSidered in 1976 for appointment as a ml;'.n1bcr of the Inl.ijan Police SerVice under the pr1Jvisions of the Indian Police ·\n\nService (Recruitn1ent) Rule~, 1954 read with.the Indian Police Service (Appointment by pro1notion) Regulations, 1955. The sclectioll' Committfe did not include the. appellant in the select list because of ·n adverse entrY. i~ his confideiit.ial ro1i. of\n\n1973-74. T.he appellant was cOrrmunicated the said adverse entry only in' J977. which was later on expunged by the .state Governn1ent in DCCenlber 1980. There were also adverse entries iri the Confidntial foll of the appellant.for the year 1974-75\n\nWhich were communicated tb him in 1976 and which we; e aJso later on expunged by the.State Government in February, 1978.and Octobet 1980. 'ThC Selection Con1n1ittee nlet again in March 198J, bi.It this tin1e illso did not include the appellant in the slect. list while son1e of his. junio.i:s were included .. The appellant. qu_estioned\n\nthe validity of the decision of the Sclecti-On- Colnmittce in a writ petition before the !Jigh Court: The High Court disnlisscd the 'writ pe.iition 'at the stage of adn1ission. ,. Heo, cethis appe:i.L ln this appeal the apj:icllant urged that the Selection\n\nComcTiittee was wrong in relying upon the adverse entries , vhich had been n1ade in his collfidential rOI.ls \\vhich had noi beep either. con1munica.ted to hin1 or against which he.had n1ade representation \\vhich hadr-emained undisposed Of and.which had been subseqlleJ?.tlY expunged. ' '\n\nApowing ihe apµ, eal,\n\n~Ef,, D: The principle is. \\veil settled tha~ in acord<ince With the rules of natural justice; an adverse rejJort n a. c011.fidenial roll cannot be acted upon to deny promoti.o\"nal oifportunities Unless it is comri; tUaicated to the person concerned\n\n, A\n\n' c\n\nso that h6 has an opportunity to improve hiS \\vork and conduct or to explain the\n\nG.> circumstances leading to •the report. Suen all opporturiitY:iS not <l; Il empty formality,\n\nits object, partiillly, being to enable the superior authorities to deeide on, a consideration of the explanation o.fferedby the Person concerned,. whether the adverse . . . report is justified. [302 F]\n\nGurdial Singh FUji v. State_ of unjab & Ors., [1979] 3 S.C .. R:.518; referred to.\n\nJn the instant c.'.l.se, the case of the appeilant for pro1notion to the Ttldian\n\nI c\n\nPolice \"Service Cadre .had not been considCrcd by the committee in a just and fair way and his case has been disposed Of contrary to the principles laid dow9 in the Gurdial Singh Ffjji's case.\n\nThe decisions of the Selection Committee recorded at its meetings in which thci case of the appellant was Considered are vitiated by reason of reliance being placed on the adverse rearks which were later on expunged~ ThC High-Court committed an error in. dismisSing the petition of the appellant. _The appellant hp.s made out a case for reconsideration of the question of his prornotion. to the Indian Police Service adre of thC State of Bihar as on Dece'mber 22, i976.\n\nThe Selec.tion _Co1nn1iUee has .now to /econsider 'the case of\"'the -appellatit accordingly. [104 B-G]. '\n\nR.L. i3utail v. Union of India & Ors., (1971] 2 S.C.R. 55. distinguished.\n\nIn order tO, avoid a contingency; as arose.i~ this case, the Gofcrnment 1nay consider the introduction of a system in which the officer who has to make entries in thci confidential roll-1nay be required to record his remarks. in the presence of the.,.Officer against Whom remarks are proposed to be made after giving him an opportunity to explain ahy circumstance that may apPear to be against him with the right .to -niake rePrcsentation to higher authorities agairlst any °adverse remarks. Another system which may be introduced. is to ask the officer who records the confidential remarks to serve a cop\"y of such remarks on the officer concerned before the confidential rOU is sllb1nittcd to the higher authorities so that hiS iespresentation against the remarks may also reachthe higher auth9rity shortly after th_e confiden- . tial roll is received. This would curtail the delay in taking action on the representa- iton. [105 B-0] .\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION ; Civil Appeal No. 8491 of .1983.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 5th October, 1982 of the .. ~Patna High Court at Patna in C.W.J.C. No. 1420 of 1982 .\n\n. P.R. Mridul, and M.P. Jha,. for the.Appellant.\n\ni. B.B: Singh, for the Respondents\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by,\n\n. VENKATARAMIAH, 1: This is an appeal by special leave against the order dated: October 5, 1982 inc.W.J.C. No'. 1420 of 1982 on the file of the High Court of Patna dismissing the petition filed by the .G appellant under Article 226 of the Constitution.-\n\nThe facts of the case are these ; The appellant was directly . . recruited and appointed as a Deputy Superintendent of Police in the Police Department of the State of Bihar in the year 1964. Jn 1973 H he was eligible to be considered for appointment as a member of the Indian Police Service under the provisions of the Indian.Police Service\n\nl a.. • l\n\nA.K. CHOUDEARY v. BIHAR (Venkataramfah, J.) . 301\n\n(Recruitment) Rules, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules') read with the Indian Police. Service (Appointment by Promotion) Regulations, !955 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Regulations_') framed under sub-rule (1) of Rule 9 of the Rules. His case was placed before . the Committee constituted under Regulation 4 of the Regulations for the purpose of preparation of the list of suitable officers for promotion to the Indian Police Service Cadre of the State of Bihar in 1973, 1974, 1975 and 1976. In the years 1973, 1974 and.1975, he could not be included in the select list as he was junior 50 thos_e who were included intheselect list. In the_ year 1976 his name was not. included in :the select list as there was an adverse entry \"in his confidential roll of 1973-74. The reasons given b, v the _Committee for superseding the appellant based on. the confidential roll were these : ·\n\n\"Delayed disposal of pending papers and supcrv; sicn notes. 'Inadequate control over office, judgment,\" initiative, sense of responsioility and anagement reported to be just fair. Censured by State Govt. order Cit. 20th Oct., 1975.\"\n\n. '\n\nThe Selection Co_mmiitee took_ the decision to supersede the appellant at its meeting held on Decembe.r 22, 1976 in. view of !le above entry in te confidential roll of the appellant. It. is not disputed\n\ntht the_ said adverse entry was communica.ted to the appellant in the year 1977 after the above meeting was over. It appears thaf there were also adverse entries in the annual confidetial roll of the appellant . . for the year 1974-7-5. They were communicated to tlfe appellant in the year 1976. The appellant made representations in respect of.both the adverse entries in time, His main 'grievance was that tly . had been made by his official superior who was biased against him.\n\nThe adverse entry made in the confidential roll for the year 1973-74 was expunged by the State Governent on December 3, 1980 and the adverse entries in the confidential roll for the, year 1974-75 were expunged by two orders dated February21, 1978 and October 7, J980. There was.no meeting of the Selection Committee from 1977 to 1980.\n\nIt, however, met on March ll/12, !.981. on thi; occasion the appellant represented to the Committee \\jlat the adverse entries in his confidential rolls had been removed by the State Governmrnt by various orders and requested them to consider his case for promotion to the Indian Police Service. Cadre. . On this occasion ti1e Committee did not look into the confidential rolls of the appellant for the years 1979-80 _and 1980:81 which eontaind entries' very favourable to the appellant for no fault of the appellant .. The' Co.mmittee,' however,\n\n. . , F\n\n' .\n\nclassified bi!n as.'good' .but did not inciude. him in the sekct list while\n\nsome of his juniors, were included. The appellant 'represented to the 'committee and the State Government ag,'.inst tl; e decision taken by the Committee. -the Committee again 'met on October 14, 1981.\n\nWhen nothing came outof therepresentations made by him,' tl'.c appellant filed.a writ petition questioning th validity. of the dccisioi:s of the Selection Committee before the,. High Court of Patna. The petition wasdismissed at.the stage of admissicn. This appeal is filed by special leave against the. ordef of the High Court;\n\n~. ' .\n\nThe main point urged before us is that the Selection Committee 411 had committed, ah illegali.ty in rejccting th.c daim .of the appl!ant fer being included in the select list in th~ Y.ear 1976 by relying upcn tle adverse entries whiCh had been made. in his confidential rolls which had' not been either' .commu;1icated to him or against which. he had .made representation which had remained undisposcd of and which _.had been subsequently expunged. .·\n\n' The true legal position governing such cases is laid down by this Court in Gurdial Singh Fijji Y. State~[ Punjab & Ors.'''. which was a case arising under. the Indian Adminis.trative Service (Appointment ·\n\nby Promoti:in) Regulations, 195~ which more or Ics.s correspond to the Regulations applicable to the Indian Po life Service.\n\nJn tbe 'aboyc case Chandrachud,.C.J. has observed thus : ' . . .\n\n\"The principle is weJl'.settled that in accordanc~. with the rules of natural jlistice, all adverse. rcpcrt ln a cOnfidtntial roll cannot be. acted upon to deny promotional opportu.nities unless itfs communicated to the .person con.cerned so. that. • he has .an opportunity 'to improve his work arid conduct or . fo explain: the circumst.ances leadjng to the )'eport. Such an oppoitunity is not _an empty fotmality, its object, .par- . tial!y, being to enable the superior authorities .to decide on a consideration of the explanation offered by the person concerned, whether the adverse report is justified. Un- , . fortunatel'y, for one reason or another.,. not arising out of any fauli on the: part of the. appellant, tliongh the adverse report was communicatd to hiin, the Government has not been able to consider his explanation and decide whether the report was justified. In these circumstances It i's didilcult to suppoti the non-issuance of. the integrity certificate to\n\n(I) [1979] 3 S.C.R. SIS.\n\n. '\"\"'\n\n...\n\n.....\n\nA.K. CHO.UDIIARY v. BIHAR cvenkataramieh, f)' 303\n\nthe appeJlimt. The chain or reaction .began with the adverse A report and. the infirmity in the link -of causation is that no one .has vet deciccd whether that rcpcrt was justified. We cann.ot speculate, in the absence cif a prper p!ea<, ling, whether the appellant was not four.ct suital;'e _otherwise, that. is to say, for reasons other than. those connected with the n<Ynisuarice of an .integrity .certifiC'ate to hin1.\" B . . ·. . .\n\nIt is ot disi:.uted that the c'.&csilirnticn d\" cfiicers whose ca><s are taken up forconsiderati()n into 'outstanding', 'very .l'ccd', 'geed' or 'bad' etc. for .pmposes o( promotion to tl\\e Indian 'folice ervice Cadre is mainly based upon the remarks in the confi<; lential rolls.\n\nOn December 22; J 976, when the Selection Committq' met, the adverse remarks, in the onfidential roll for 1973-74 had. not peen communkated.and the appellant's representatio11 1egarding a_dvetse remarks in the confidential roil for the year J<;74-7) and censure against him had not. been disposed .cif clthough it is alkged that one\n\nShri Yamuna Ram agai1lst whon1 dso r.dvcrse ren1rrks had been . . made was included provisicnally in, the '°!eel list When the Selection Committee met on March 11 and 12, 1981 despit~ State. Governm!'nl's suo nrofli decision not to retain actverse rem.arks for 01e year 1976-'77 on records, the same had not been removed froll) the confidential roll, This must have infim.nced ihe decision of the Selection Com- 1™ttee. lt is also seen that the confidential rolls of the appella; it for the year l 979-80. and' 1980-81 which contained eniries favour.able to the 'lppellant were n; t placed before the Selection Committee.\n\nOn October 14, 1981 when the Selection Committee met, it does not appear to haw considered _the representation made by_ the appellant against his non-selection.. hi addit.ion to all these, the State Government has expunged t\\1e adverse remarks by its orde!S made from time. to time. These facts are not controverted by .the respondents.\n\n' . . .\n\nThe fac'ts of this case are distinguishable fron1 the facts irivolved\n\nin the decision of this Court in R.L. Butail v. Union of India & -Ors,'\"\n\nwhich is relied on by the respondents. In that case the confidential report _of the appel\\ant !hrein for the year \"1964 containd an adverse entry and he had made a representation regarding it. When the Departmental Promotion Committee met in March, '1966, the appellant's . represetation regarding the adverse entry of ]964 was not placed before it and a decisio'n adverse to the ppellant was taken by the Commiitee witl1ont reference to the said 1; epresentation.. The\n\n(1) [!971] 2 S.C.R. SS . . .\n\nappellant contended before this Court tl\\at th~ omission to consider his 'representation before th~ date of meeting of the Commiitee vitiated \"\" its decision. The Court held that the .omission either to place the said representation before the Committee or its '.•non-corisideratin\n\nbefore the date of the meeting had no effect on the decision of the Committee as the represetation had actuaily been rejected subsequently with the result that the confidential report for the year 1964 remained unchanged. The position in the case before us is different. _Herc the adverse entries in question have in fact been expunged by · the State Government subsequently. It may be pertinent to state here that the\" practice of the Departmental Promotion Committee referred to in Butail's case (supra) was that if in such a case a rep- . . . . resenta.tion were to be accepted .and. in consequenc' the. confidential report .was altered or the adverse.entries were expun.ged the Committee would have to review its recommendations in the light of such a result. ' The appellant in the present case has pressed before us for a similar relief as the adverse entries made against him have been since expunged. . . .\n\nAfter giving our anxious consideration t.o the uncontroverled material placed before us we have reached the conclusion that the case of the appellant for promotion to the Indian . Police Service Cadre has not been consideied by 'the Committee in a just and fair .way 'and his case , has been disposed of contrary to the principles laid\n\ndown in Gurdial _Singh Fijji's case (supra). The decisions of the Seleo- -1' . tion Committee Tecorded .at its meetin-gs in which the case of the appellant was consideretl are vitiated by reason of reliance being ( placed on the adverse remarks which were later. on expunged. The 1 High Court :committed . an error in dismissing the petition of the appellant and its order is, therdorc, liable to be set aside. We accorditigly set aside the order of the High Court. . We hold that the appellaJ¥ has made oµt a case for reconsideration of the question )- • 0f his promotion tci .the Indian Police Service Cadre of the State of 'Bihar as oil\" December 22, 1976 and if he is not elected as on that date for being considered again as on March 12, 1981. If he is not sejected as on March.12, 1981 his.case has to be considered as on October 14, 1981. The Selection Committe has now to reconsider the case of the appellant accordingly after taking into consideration the orders pased by the State \"Government subsequently on any adverse entry that may have heen mde earlier and any other order ·-/. of similar nature pertaining to the service of the appellant If on such reconsideration the: appellant is selected he shall be entitled to the seniority and all other consequential benefits flowing therefrom. We issue a .dirction to the respondents to reconsider the case of the ..\n\n~-\n\n. '\n\nA.K. CHOUDHARY v, BIHAR (Venkataramiah, J.) . 305\n\nappellant as stated above. We hope that the above direction will be complied with expeditiously but not later than four months from today. ·\n\nBefore concluding we wish to state that the Central Government and the State Governments should now .examine whether .the present system of maintenance of confidential rolls should be continued.\n\nUnder the present system, entries are first made in the confidential roll of an officer b.ehind. his back and then he is given an opportunity to make a representation against any entry that may have been made against him by communicating the adverse. entry after considerable delay. Any representation made by him would be considered b~ a higher authority or the State Government or the Central Government, as the qse may be, some years later, as it has happened in th_is' case, by which time any evidence that may be ihere to show that the entries made were baseless. may have vanished. The preqicament in which .. the officer against whom .advese remarks are made. is then placed can easily be visualised .. Even the authority which has got to pass\n\norqers on the representation.of the officer will find .it difficult to deal with the matter satisfactorily after a long interval of time .. Jn the meanwhile the officer concerned would have missed many opportuties which would have advanced 'his prospects in the serviCe.. Jn order to avoid such a centingency, the Government inay consider the introduction of a systein in which the officer who has to make entries in the confidential roll may be required to record his. remarks in the presence of the officer against whom remarks are proposed to be made after giving him an opportunity to' explain any circumstance that may appear to be agafost him with the righ!'to make represe, ptation to higher authori.ties against any adverse remarks. This cou.rse may obviate many time~ totally baseless remarks being made in tJie confidential roll an\"d would minimise the unnecessary snffering to which the officer concerned will be exposed. Another system which. may be introduced is. to ask the officer who rec.ords the cc; mfidential remarks to serve a copy of such remarks on the officer concerned before the confidential roll is submitted to the higher authorities so . that his representation against th~ remarks may also reach the higher authority shortly after the confidential roll is received. This would curtail the delay in taking action on the representation. Suspensions,· adverse remarks in confidential rolls and frequent transfers from one place to another are ordered or made many a time without justification and without giving a reasonable opportunity to the officer concerned and such actions surely result in the demoralisation of the services. Courts can. give very little relief in such . cases.\n\nThe\n\nSUPREME COuRT REPORTS\n\n[1984]2 S.C.R.\n\nA Executive itself should, therefore, devise effective mearis to mitigate the.hardship caused to the officers who are subjected. to such treatmen\\. \"* These questions require to be examined afresh in the light of the experience gained in. recent years and solutions should be found to ell1,; inate as fr as p.ossible 6omplaints against mi; use of these powers by official superiors who may not be well disposed towards the officer\n\nB . against whom such action. is taken. It is needle<is to state that a non-disgruniled bureaucracy adds to the efficiency of administration .\n\n. The appeal is accordingly allowcc! with 'costs.\n\nH.S.K.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\n. /':-·\n\n~ .... -", "total_entities": 29, "entities": [{"text": "AMAR KANT CHOUDHARY", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3, "end_char": 22, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "AMAR KANT CHOUDHARY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF BIUAR & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24, "end_char": 44, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF BIHAR & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "B. MISRA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 94, "end_char": 102, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.B. MISRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Singh Ffjji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2987, "end_char": 2998, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jn the instant c.'.l.se, the case of the appeilant for pro1notion to the Ttldian\n\nI c\n\nPolice \"Service Cadre .had not been considCrcd by the committee in a just and fair way and his case has been disposed Of contrary to the principles laid dow9 in the Gurdial Singh Ffjji's case."}}, {"text": "(1971] 2 S.C.R. 55", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3625, "end_char": 3643, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "P.R. Mridul", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4787, "end_char": 4798, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.R. Mridul, and M.P. Jha,."}}, {"text": "M.P. Jha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4804, "end_char": 4812, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.R. Mridul, and M.P. Jha,."}}, {"text": "B.B: Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4838, "end_char": 4848, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "i. B.B: Singh, for the Respondents\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by,\n\n."}}, {"text": "VENKATARAMIAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4918, "end_char": 4931, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "VENKATARAMIAH, 1: This is an appeal by special leave against the order dated: October 5, 1982 inc.", "canonical_name": "VENKATARAMIAH"}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5136, "end_char": 5147, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Bihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6035, "end_char": 6049, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Committee constituted under Regulation 4 of the Regulations for the purpose of preparation of the list of suitable officers for promotion to the Indian Police Service Cadre of the State of Bihar in 1973, 1974, 1975 and 1976."}}, {"text": "December 3, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7503, "end_char": 7519, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The adverse entry made in the confidential roll for the year 1973-74 was expunged by the State Governent on December 3, 1980 and the adverse entries in the confidential roll for the, year 1974-75 were expunged by two orders dated February21, 1978 and October 7, J980."}}, {"text": "October 7, J980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7646, "end_char": 7661, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The adverse entry made in the confidential roll for the year 1973-74 was expunged by the State Governent on December 3, 1980 and the adverse entries in the confidential roll for the, year 1974-75 were expunged by two orders dated February21, 1978 and October 7, J980."}}, {"text": "March ll/12, !.981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7751, "end_char": 7769, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It, however, met on March ll/12, !"}}, {"text": "October 14, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8553, "end_char": 8569, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "-the Committee again 'met on October 14, 1981."}}, {"text": "High Court of Patna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8750, "end_char": 8769, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "High Court of Patna."}}, {"text": "Chandrachud,", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9716, "end_char": 9728, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jn tbe 'aboyc case Chandrachud,."}}, {"text": "December 22; J 976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11563, "end_char": 11581, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 22; J 976, when the Selection Committq' met, the adverse remarks, in the onfidential roll for 1973-74 had."}}, {"text": "Yamuna Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11899, "end_char": 11909, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "been disposed .cif clthough it is alkged that one\n\nShri Yamuna Ram agai1lst whon1 dso r.dvcrse ren1rrks had been . ."}}, {"text": "State. Governm!'nl's", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12078, "end_char": 12098, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "eel list When the Selection Committee met on March 11 and 12, 1981 despit~ State."}}, {"text": "Butail", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14277, "end_char": 14283, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be pertinent to state here that the\" practice of the Departmental Promotion Committee referred to in Butail's case (supra) was that if in such a case a rep- . . . ."}}, {"text": "Gurdial _Singh Fijji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15054, "end_char": 15074, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Police Service Cadre has not been consideied by 'the Committee in a just and fair .way 'and his case , has been disposed of contrary to the principles laid\n\ndown in Gurdial _Singh Fijji's case (supra)."}}, {"text": "December 22, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15687, "end_char": 15704, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We hold that the appellaJ¥ has made oµt a case for reconsideration of the question )- • 0f his promotion tci .the Indian Police Service Cadre of the State of 'Bihar as oil\" December 22, 1976 and if he is not elected as on that date for being considered again as on March 12, 1981."}}, {"text": "March 12, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15779, "end_char": 15793, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We hold that the appellaJ¥ has made oµt a case for reconsideration of the question )- • 0f his promotion tci .the Indian Police Service Cadre of the State of 'Bihar as oil\" December 22, 1976 and if he is not elected as on that date for being considered again as on March 12, 1981."}}, {"text": "March.12, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15823, "end_char": 15837, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If he is not sejected as on March.12, 1981 his.case has to be considered as on October 14, 1981."}}, {"text": "A.K. CHOUDHARY", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 16431, "end_char": 16445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A.K. CHOUDHARY v, BIHAR (Venkataramiah, J.) ."}}, {"text": "Venkataramiah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16456, "end_char": 16469, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A.K. CHOUDHARY v, BIHAR (Venkataramiah, J.) .", "canonical_name": "VENKATARAMIAH"}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16668, "end_char": 16686, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before concluding we wish to state that the Central Government and the State Governments should now .examine whether .the present system of maintenance of confidential rolls should be continued."}}, {"text": "SUPREME COuRT REPORTS\n\n[1984]2 S.C.R.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 19289, "end_char": 19326, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The\n\nSUPREME COuRT REPORTS\n\n[1984]2 S.C.R.\n\nA Executive itself should, therefore, devise effective mearis to mitigate the.hardship caused to the officers who are subjected."}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_2_307_332_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "·~ 307 A\n\n. \"f WORKMEN OF.Mjs HINDUSTAN LEVER LTD. & ORS,.\n\n. --t·\n\nMANAGEMENT OF M/S ttTNtius r AN LEVER LTD.\n\nB- January 5, 1984 .\n\n[D . .J\\. DESAI:'O. CHl, NNAPPA REDDY, AND. A. VARADARA; AN, JJ.]\n\nIndustrial Disputes Act 1947 .. . Industrial Dispitte-Jurisdiction oTindutrial trlh1nal~Deter11!i1,1ed fro1n the o.rdrr of reference-:--Status o, f person 1iot qustior1e:J hy en1ployer-TNhunal whe.tlier entit_led\n\n C ·\n\n1!!...f~'o !ll()fU decide as a prelin1i11ary iSsue.\n\nConcluded Agree1i1e11t betlt'een Ma1iage111e11t and U11ion-Manafreme11t acting on the. agl'een1ent for so1ne )-; ea.rs-Mm1agen1ent whethcir ·zater entitled to repudiate ancl, disown dgreen1ent-Dlffere11ce between unilateral rep1_rdiation -and tennination of agree1nent Indicqted.\n\nlil[lustrial dispute.\\:-:Adjudication pf-Con<;_ept of res judicata-Whth_er apj, li-. ble.\n\nThe appeJlant-UniOri and the respondcnt-Gomi, any through their communications dated January .. 24, 1951, April 24, )957 and May .1, 1957 :concluded an. agreen1ent relating to .various itms of industrial disptes which inter.Olia ptovided . that the en1ployer had agreed not to contest the issue-whether field foice including_\n\nsalesn1e11 were not '\\vorkn1en' within .the meaning of the expressiop in the Tndti.strlal DiSputes Act.and that disputes of an AH-India nture cotild be raised only at t>lhi. . .\n\nTwo empioyees of the Respondentcon1pany who were salesme.n and protected workmCn with the meaning Of the explesSion ln the Tndustrial Disputes Act, 1947 and who• were office\"· bearers of the union, were chaigci sheeted and fter a disCtp- Jinar.y enquiry their services ere terminated. .The appellant-union raised an industrial dispute-contending that the trmination of scrviCes of these two workn1en were ille£a! and.iil\"val.id, and that the enquiry was equally illegal,\"and i~Propc!,. and th\"at the action of_ the. emp!Oyer w::i.s an act of reprisal. and victimiz3.tion,\n\nQecause of their trade union activities. The Government referred the' industrial _ dispute tO the Indi1strial Tribu.naL . .\n\nThe eployer Contended. that the two Workn1en were not 'workmen' within the rrieaning Of the exprCssioninthe Act-and \"that the Government had no jurisdiction to refer the dispute to the lndust-fiii.1 -Tibunal. '1t was further co, ntCnded that, the s¢rvices of th~-wor, kmen were tern1inated not by way of p'Unishn1ent but under the contract of service and ihat the di\"scip'linary enquiry \\vhich was commenced was ~bsequently dropped. · , t '\n\n. .\n\nThe -appellant-unionhowever conteitded that the employer wa~ estopped from hall_cnging fe status of the: two workplen \\yitbin. the meaning of th'e expression\n\n- \\ ..\n\n•· B\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1984] 2 S.C.R.\n\nin the A_ct on account of the subsisting, valid~ conc!Uded agreement between' the parti_es and that in view of thC iward_ Of the lndµstria1 Tribunal, Delhi in 1.D. No. 46/66. The contentions about the existence of the agreement and the status of salesmen 'were res judicOta and could nOt be reopened so 109g as the agrment\n\nws in force and operative.\n\nThe Tribunal rejected the preliminary objections raised on behalf of the union and came to the conclusion_ that the three communications dated January 24, 1957, ·.April 24; 1957 .. and May I, 1957 Ex. W-2, W-\"· W-4 respectively did.not spell out a coniplete, concluded -agreen1ent between the parties on the points mentioned therein but it was art inchoate agreement in the stage of negotiations and the employer waS not bound to stand by its Offer made in the communication dated January 24, 1957 denYing itself the right to contest the status of .the field force including salesn1en as not being workman within the meaning of the Act. The a\\vard Of the Industriai Tribunal, Delhi in I.D. No. 46(66 in which it. was held that there Was a concluded agreement between theparties and therefore the industrial disputes raised therein could not be adjudicated at Delhi did not operate as .ra.s judicata because the issue in that a\\vard was not directly and .ubtantially in issue: in. the present reference.' The Tribunal set dciwn the reference forfufther hearing.\n\n Allowing the Apeal : • HELD : 1. The Tribunal committed a serious error, apparent on record in holding that there was Ii.o concluded agreement between the parties as emerging from Exs. W,2, W-3, and W-4. [329 F] '\n\nIn .. the instant case, having meticUlously examined various refecnces pertaining to various industrial disputes between the parties at different centres in :ni.ctia since the agreement in 1957 it unquestionabiy emerges that the emPioycr till the present reference never once even whispei:ed that 'the agteefnent was not. a concluded agrOOffient or 'that it w.as an inChoate one left hanging at the s_tage of. . \"'negotiations. It as only in the. present reference the contention raised was that the agreement was not a concluded agreement.\n\nThe.employer whichswore by the agreement and repeatedly succeeded in getting thown out certain reference.s at the threshold on account of the agreement contended tha'.t th_ere was no concluded agrement, and. ignoring the whole history, the Tribun; r\" fell into an eiior in accep:- ting this contention. The Tribu'nal wholly ignored the fact that it was ; solel)ln\n\nagrement~ of. which effective\" aand wholesome advantage had been taken by the employer and.when ii did not suit it; it wanted to turn round and not only repudiate it but disown it.\n\nNo court of justice an ever permit sch a thing to be done.\n\n[324 E-325 BJ .\n\nHindustan Lever Ltd .. v. Ram Mohan Ray & Ors., (1973] 3 S.C.R. 624; JVestern India Match Co. v. Their Workmen, [1964] 3 S.C.R. 560.at 566; and A(urniniu'!1 Factory Workers, Union v. Indian Aluminiton Co. Ltd.~ [i,962]]1 L.L.J. 210, referred. to.\n\nThe Tribun.al is directed to proceed to detern1ine the dispute on merits without conCerning itself with the consideftion of the question whether the concerned workmen were workmen w.ithin the meaning of the exp_ressiori under the Act. [332 E]\n\n3. ·-The concept.of .. compulsory adjudication of industrial disputes was statutorily _ushered ifi. with a view to providing a. forum and comP.elling the parties\n\nWORKMEN v. HINDUSTAN LEVER LTD. 309\n\nto resort to the forun1 for arbitrtion so as tp avoid collfrontation and.dislocatin in industry. A developing country like'India can ill-afford dislocation in ndust~1al production. Peace and harmony in industry an~ uninterrupted producton being the demands of the time, it was considered wise to arm the Government with powr to con1pcl the parties to resort to arbitration and as a necessary coronary to void corlfrontation and trial of strength, .which were cosidered wasteful from national and--public interest point of view.\n\nA welfare State can ill-afford to Jook askance at industrial unrest nd indUstri_al Q.isputes.' [326H-327B]\n\nDahyabhai Ronchhoddas Shah v. Jayanfilal Mohan/al., (1973} Lab. & Industrial Cases 96.7 .referred to.\n\n' 4.\n\nThe Act did. not confer till the introduction of. Chapters v-A and V-B, any special or enforceable benefits On the workmen. The Act was designed to provide a self-contained Code to compel the parties to resort to industrial arbitrationfor the resolution .of existing or appreherided disputes without prescribing statutory norms for varied and variega_ted industrial ielatiO.n, so that the forUms created for resolution of disputes may ren1ain unhan1pered by any statutory control and devise rational norrris keeping place with improved industrial relations reflectfiig and imbibing socio-economic justice. If this is the underlying object behind enactni.ent of the Act, the COurt by interpretative process must strive to reduce the field of conflict and expand the area of agreeinent a:nd show its preference for upholding agreements sanctified by mutuality and consesus in larger publiC interest, namel.Y to eshew in\"duStrial strife,· confrontation. and consequent wastage .. [327 C-E]\n\n5. It is inappropriate to usher in the. technical co.ncept of res judicata pervading the \"field of civil juticc \"into te field of industrial arbitration. The principle analogous to res judicata can be availed of to scuttle any attempt at raisig industrial disputes repeatedly in defiance of .operative settlenients and awards. But this highly technical concePt of· civil justice may be Kept in precise confined limits in the field o.f industrial arbitr<ition whi9h must as far as possible be kept:free from such technicalities which thwart resolution of industrial disputs. [326 D-G]\n\n\n6 .. Unilateral repudiation is .distini from terrriination and an agreement/ settleinttnt reniains in fOrcc and. binding till terminated and does not come to .an end by unilateral repuqiation. -[328 E]\n\nIn th~ instnt case; th~ parties enfered _intO a soi~n agreement. It s not suggested that the agreement has been tenninated. The only argument put forward on behalf of the em))lyer was that .the union has repuiated the agreement by raising disputes of an a11-India natu.re at a rgional level .and thereby committed breach .. of the agreement. This. con_t6ntion is entirely without rnetits. What has happened.is ttiat the Union raised ceriain disputes whicl! according to the Union were of a regional nature and which it was not estopped from raising in the teeth\n\nc;>f the tenns of the binding agreement behveen the parties. : On 'the Other b:ind, the employer contended that the disputes so raisCd were of an aJl-Jndia nature.\n\nBoth sides swore by the agreement, the difference in approach being whether the dispute was of an all-India na_turc _oi of regional nature.\n\nTh~ divergence in approach.\n\nG •\n\n\nW~· as .to the ihterPretation, _the coverage; the.ambit and the width of th_e agreh; ent' Both th~ pa.rticS sore by the agrec1n€nt but differe\"d in. their aPproach and inter-.\n\nprl:'.tation and the forun1 na1nely t, he Industrial Tribunai consisientlY upheid at tiW instance of the e1nployer that there was a biJld_ing valid agreement subsisting between the parties~ This. constitutes adherence to agrecmcrit1 pcrfOrn1an.ce of th:;: agree~\n\nffient, implementation of the ag'ree1ncnt and being _bound by the agreement.\n\nThis conduct in no sense c.1, n'be said tCrconstitti.te repudiation: [327 F-328 CJ . .\n\nThe Tribunl -derives_ its jurisdictin1i by the 9.rdc;. of reference and not 01_1.thc deteqninati<?O .. of a ju'risdictiOn.alfact whipji i(ryii.1st of necessity decide t9 ~'.\n\nacquir~ jurjsdiction. [330 G]\n\nIn industrial adjudictfon, is;; ues are of two typs : (i) thosereferred b:Y tht .OOvernn1ent for adjudication a11d.s.:t Out in the order -of 'reference,' and (ii) incidental issues invol-ving miXod question<; of l11w and facts.\n\nThe Tribunal may fran1e. preliminary iSues if the. point on which. Jhe parties, are at varia, cc, go to the. foot of the matter. But the -Tribunal cannot fraver beyond the ptCadings and aTrogate\n\n~ tO itself the pchvor -to. raise issues which the. ijarties to the refern\"e~ are precludf:d\n\nfro111 raising.\n\nIf the e\"nplqyCr does not question the statu~ of the workmen, the .Tribllnal callnot suo 1notu raise the isu~ 'ai1~ proceed to adjudicate Upon. the same and throw out. the reference on the sole ground that the Concerned workman was not n workmanWithii-i-tp, e -n1:.!ani:ng or he ?xprcssion under thi;: Act. [33.l G'-332 Al.\n\n9.· Whether aprticular pcrsn ·is a· workn1an or not depends -upan factual 1natrix. Worktnan is dfined in S0c. 2(s) of .the :Act. The ingn:dients and th~\n\nirtddcnts of thC definition when 'satisfied, thC person satisfy.ing. the sa1ne would. be a \\vorkman, Ngativcly if son1cone fails \"to sati<; fy one or othr ingredient or incident of the definition, -he-may not be.hpld to be workman witiin the meaning ' of th~ exprcssi011 ln the At: [3.30 C] .\n\n. t 0 .. There is no provision in the A.ct. -which ob11ges the r ndtistria\\ Tribui1al or other forums sJt up _under the Act Ip d.;:cidc iVen in thG absence o(a :contention froin the effip\\oyer, a preliminary issue. w.heth_cr th_c per<; Oll \\Yh.o has_ invoked its .\n\nju'isdiction is. <l work1nan or not. ·There is no- such oblig.1tion cas~ sth.tutorily\n\non th0 Ti:i.bunal.\n\nIf the employci ~Oc~. not raise the contention about the status of.thC \\Vorkm'.ln a.p.proaching the Tribunal, the Tribunal has no-obligation to decide the Statµ:s cif the person Whether he is a workman or uot. The TribHnal inust prbceed o'n the assrnnption hat n'o s\\ich _conte.ntiqn ls _raised and is requirCd. to be adjudicated upon. [J30 D-F] ·\n\nCML APPELLATE JURISDJCTfON: ivil Appc2l Ne. 1865 of 1982\n\nAppeal by Special leave . from the Order dated the 24th . Decembcr.'19.8.1 of the Labour Court, Delhi in LD. No. 120 of i977 .\n\nM.K Rammnuithi, VP. Choudhmoy . Jifendra Sharma and P. C, aur, for the Appellant.\n\n ·-G.B.. Pai, 0.C. Mathui, D.Nc Mishra, S. sukumaran and Ms. Meera. Mathur; for the Rcspndent.\n\n' l\n\nWORKMEN v. HINDUSTA~ ~EVER L'rU. (Desai, J.) . . . . . . . 311\n\n. j ' . . .\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered hy\n\nDESAI, J .. Tf solemn agr_eelt)ents _proposed. by t11e employer. and readily ac.ceeded. to by .the workmeio and holding:the forte for over a quarter of a: century Ure crud~Jy .disowned .cofr1pelli:ig. the workmen to knock at the door of the apex court for removing the \"roaJcblock in tJ1e access to justice set up by preliminary cbjectioi C'f\n\niechnioal nature>, _industrial peace and harmony chanted\" by the\n\nemploer. \\ould be not merely an empty 1;1a11trl1 buf a fliti!e (, xercise df chasi, ng a mirage and unfortunately that i~ the sltuati('i1 here. ·\n\n\\'.: . . . ·. . . . . -. . ,;. ' ._Hindustan Lev.r Ld., _a muhi:riitioa! co1ripany, respodent 1 herein addressed a communication d'::ted January 24,_ 1957 1-ccordjng\n\nthe out-come .. of mutual deliberaiiors betwcrn the .Hi1•dust211 Lever Ltd_. {'employer'. for short) and.· the Hindust_an Levq' Mazdcor Sabha\n\n;. uni-o-n' f Or' short) recognised represn\"tativu1lion o_f. th~. \\\\'0rkn1cn employed by _the employer.\n\nThe rckvan_t portion may be extrnct(d :\n\n\"Bx. W-2 24th January, 1957\n\n_The Presidrnt,\n\nHindt)Stan Lever Mazdoor Sabha,\n\nBomloay,\n\nDear Sir; .\n\n' . •'\n\nRferringto: our rcCent 1neeting: abriut 'field force;- \\ve \\VOlfld <:, c to p:ucc. on record that ~- •\n\n.!) . Wc.\"r~·:\"ognise you as tJ:ic· representjtive union. for aJl -F\n\nsctiofis of fic19foce all over In.din.\n\n2). Yoll'-h,, tve agred to tre<:1t_all 1nat'tcrs relating to \\vages/•\n\nsitlaries and ter-1ns and cdnditions cf $ervice on an aliITidia ·\n\nbasis and not_ on a regional haSi? as far as fi.efd forct is c:_, nccrne'd. -\n\n3f. For all -111atter~ of an .; ll~India natute re!nti1ig to field force, you will communicate ivith ihe Pcrs~1'nel Director.\n\nWe hope that all such .matters will he scttkd by dircc_l Megq!iatiOn hut.i.f at ony stage you decide to refer the matlcr to conciliation, you will. po w only at Bombay.\n\nW::., on our part, gi.ve you the assurance that if the 1naltcr\n\n• B\n\n\n[1984) 2. S.C .. R:\n\nis referred to a Tribuna!\"in llombay then its a\\vard will be applied by you to field force all.Dver India .. Fo~ thi~ !eason, you wiH agree that it will be only proper for the Tribunalto examine \\he matter in an all India perspective. . . . ,\n\n4)\"· Although we do not nnticipate. any problei11s of a.purely\n\nlocal nature .. i~ cas.c such probles do arise :; our rnem- ·. bers vvill first try to arrive at a solution by approaching their own managers. and if this fails, your loeal Committee should refer the matter to the local Commercial Manager nr Office Manage~. · . •\n\n5) . Foi future disputes. vshall not coniest. issues about\n\nfield. force 911 the basis of t.hejr not being 'wo-rmcn' bLit shal! \"contest issues only qn their 111erits in th.e same way a_s wego !£ir other e91ployces. ·\n\nPlease.confirm that yo~1-agree.with the points menticined above.\n\n...\n\nYours faithfully,\n\nSd/- B.K. B; nd1ni\"\n\n. '\n\nThe union respondi:d to this con1n1unication as elated April 24, 1957 which reads as under : per its letter\n\n\"nx: w.3 ·\n\n. The Personnel Manager>\n\nHindustan Lever Limited, Seindia House, R8lbrd Est.ate, Bombay-];\n\nDarSir,\n\n24th April; 1957\n\nWith reference to your letterPersonnl KSB/BN/49 dated 24.1.1957 and in the light of further discussions we had with you ori the subject. we would like. to sta1e as under :\n\nWe thank you for recognising u; as the Representative Union for all sections of the 'Field Force e11iployees all ovei India.\n\n• -~ \\.\n\n. { +\n\n• ---.i\n\nWORKMEN'V. HINDUSTAN LEVER L'fD. (Desai, J.) 313\n\nWe agree that certain major issues such as salary wages, bonus,.provident fund, Gratuity, leave etc. will be treated as far as nossible on an all-India basis. . . . .\n\nWe agree that for all matters -of an all-India. nature, we will communicate with the Personnel Director. As for the other points raised by i•ou, we agree to follow the procedure. as far as legally permissible. '\n\nLocal matters, if .nol settled by negotiations, will have to be dealt with otherwise.\n\nFor instance .. ihe Sabha may go in for co_nciliation or may be free to resort to .>iny other legitimate and/or peaceful method. ·\n\nWe are indeed glad to note tha.t you will not contest issues about fiel_d force on the basis of their n6t being 'Workmen' but you will contest issues only an their n1erits inthe san1e \\Vay 8-S you do for other emp{oyees-.\n\nWe wish to take the opportunity also to confirm your agreenlefit with us that {n. regard to deinal1ds relating to Field Force contained in Rer. N.48 of \"1956, now\n\npniling adjuQicatie, Rtat Delhi, you will not•contest the issue on the basis Of their not being 'Worl011{'1l' b'ut you\n\n\\viii contest the is.sue on the. n1crits of the dernands as_ you do for other cmpfoyces .\n\nYours faitlifully, Sd/- J?, Pullat President !st May, ,1957\"\n\nA further communicatiqn ensued from th\"- employer dated ' . May I, 1957. It is not necessary to reproduce the whole of it save F ahd cxc_ept that the e1nployer wanted .t~ be assured that the un.ion by its communicaiio11 dated April 24, 1957 uneguivccally intended.\n\nt'.) CJ; ifirm th:! iten1s of.agrceincnt relating to various iten1s 6f'indi1strial\n\ndisputs b:!t\\ven the parties as set out in its con1municatjon dated JanLJary 24, 1957 ai1d .further sought clarification of _the two points\n\nt\\l~d b); the uninn. • G\n\nTn~- substantial questio1_1 is vvhethcr there C-ft1:erged a concluded ag.ree.n12nl between thC parties and binding on the parties till it is\n\ntrrr)inated according to la\\v? the question of the existence of a\n\nc3nsluJd agrGemtnt a._1Hl its validity arises iJi the folk)\\vingcircumstances. · H\n\n.~\n\n. SUPREME COURT REl'OR\\~ [1984] 2 s.c, R .\n\n.Shri A.K', Sircar and Shri R.L. Gupta were protected workmen 'Pi thin. th~· meaning of the expression in the Industrial Dispute~·A<:t; ·\n\n1947 ('Ac!' for short) and were admittedly the. office-bearers of the miion a1id consequehtly leaders of the. workmen,. The employer served_ a charge-sheet on.Shri A.K. Sfrcar on April JO, 1974 and on the noxt•day. 'a charge-sheet. was served .on Shri R.T,. Gupta. There .followed .a disciplinary enquiry and ultimately the services of Shri\n\nA.K .. Sircar nd Shri R.L, Gupta were ierminated by the employer . . The union raised an industrial dispute contending that the termination . of services of the afore'nlCiltioned. two w0rkmenwaS illegal and invalid\n\n:and the enquiry was equally illegal and improper and that the acti.On\n\nof the employer was an act of reprisal and victimization because.of the trade-union .actiyities of the afor.ementioned two office-bearers of the 'union. The appropriate Governfrlent referred the industrial dispute to the Industrial Tribunal on July 16, )977.\n\nTl; e employer in its written tatement. intet a/ia contended that .\n\nShrl .A.K. Sircar and Shri. R.L. Gupta .were iiot workmen within the meaning of the expression in the Act and .therefore the appropriate Government had nojurisdiction to refer the dispute to the Industrial Tribunal and consequently-the Industi\"il.Tribunol had no jurisdiction to .hear and qeal' with 'the ref ereµ~~- .. _ It was urther -on_tendCd tat. in a referencebetween the employer and the union in ai1other dispute to the Industrial Tribunal in Maharashtra State, a contentio.n was\n\nals_ed-byJh~ en1Ployr tbat sJ!e~111f!Jl, off he el'nplcY.er.i~ not~ vor!(1~2n within the 1;1eaning or the expfes>ion .in the Act and• this objection was upheld.by the Industrial.Tribunal and a petition for.special leave against the decisbn of the Jqdu'str:a1 Tr<bunal to the Supreme Court . waS' rejected o~ O:tober l, 1975. ft' was furtl'er contended that'the\n\n-. services of.: the af~)remenJioned t\\Vo _\\vorktTien Were. terminated . not by way of punishment. but under the co; llract of sorvice and the dis-c; irlinary e11quify,_ WhiCh \\VaS' conniienced earl:er \\VOS slfbsequfntJy dropped.\n\n.~ ,.\n\n. ''?\n\n.·~\n\n\\ \\tf\n\n The union in its counter-affidavit iiiter al/a co1itcnded that .the ,. e;,, player '.was est0pped from chalhnging the Status 'of the fwo cQncerned workmen as not being \\VCPknieo withfo the meaning of the :ex- . \"pression in the Act on account of a subshting valid concluded agreement bet\\Veeo the parties inter a/ia ]Yrovi(ling that the einploycr \\Viii . nt contest the issue about statu~ .of field force (which expression includes salesman) on the basis of their not bing workmen but shall contest the issue.only on the nieri'ts ill the same way as they .do for other employees, It.· was also. contended that in view of Shri Roop,\n\n~··\n\n~- ' ;\n\nWORKMEN v. HINDUSTAN LbVER LTD. (Desai, J.) 315 . . ... .\n\nChandra award ti1e is.sue about existence of ihe agreement and the status of salesman is res judicatq and cannot be reopend iill the agree~ n1cnt remains i1r force and operative. . . . .\n\n• The rival pleadings led tci. the Industrial Tribunal framing the . following issues : ·\n\n. . . •· \"l) Whether the management .is estopped from challenging the status of these two concerned workmen as \"workman'. within the meaning ofthe Industrial Disputes Aet.\n\n2) .Whether -the awar<! dated 17-11-66 of the Additional Industrial Tribunal, Delhi wculd operate as res judicata between the parties ?'\n\n3) . lf issue No. I is answered inte negative whether the concerned (sic) are 'workman' within :the meaning .of · the I.D. Act ?\n\n'4) What is the effect of the order dated.6-1-75 passed D by the l.T. Maharashtra. in reference 203 of 1973 and order dated i.10.1975 of the Supre1m; Court in Petition for special leave 1602 of .1975? -\n\n5) Whether the reference is incomp.etent and bad iri law\n\n.for reasons mentioned in preL qbjections (III), (IV), (V) .· a11d (Vil) and (VIII) 1\n\nIssue Nos. 1,2, 4and 5 were directed to be he; ird as pre liminary issues. On Issue No . .J, the Industrial Tribnrtal held that the thte.communications.E~.W-2 ciated January 24, 1957, Ex. W-3. 'dated April 24, 1957 and Ex. W-4 dated May 1, 1?57 did not spell\n\nout a complete concluded agreement between the parties on ihe points set oµt therein but it \\V.as an inchoate agreement in the stage of negotiations and therefore the employer wa& not bound to stand by its offer made in the comm,; nication dated January 24, 1957 deny- , ing to itself' the right to contest the. status of the field force incfoding\n\nsalesman as not being workman within the meaning of the expression in the Aci. On Issue No. 2,.it was hied that the award of Shri Roop Chandra in LD. No. 46 of 1966 in. which it was held that there was a concluded agreement between the. parties as disclosed in Exs. W-2,\n\nW3 & W-4 and therefore 'the industri.al dispute therein 'raised could not be adjudkated upon at Delhi, it being an AU-India dispute and ought to have been rai$e<l at Bombay, did not:opei:ate as resjuqivata\n\n. .... 316 SUPREME COURl REfORlS\n\n. [1984) 2 S.C.R\n\nA because the issue in the award was not directly and s11bsta11tially in. issue in the present reference.\n\nParties did not advance any argument on IssuesNos.-4 .and 5 anc\\ tl1erefcire with reference to Issue No. 4, .the Ttibunal observd that the same. may not be disposed of without further hearii1g the parties and no findi.ng was recorded on Issue No, 5.\n\nThe Tribunal accordingly rejected the preliminary objectiorn raised B on behalf. of the union and set down the reference for further hearing.\n\nHence this• appeal by special. levc by the union. .\n\n. At the outset, we must xecord our unhappiness on the attitude adopted by the employer in eon tending as late.as .1981 tha~ the three commmiications Exs .. W-2, W-J and W-4 did not constitute a con-· eluded agreement between the parties with respect to the points settled\n\n.. therein and the Tribunal ignoing the l1istoiy and repeated advantage taken by the employer of this conclLided agreement . on numerous. oc.casions accepted. the conte1ition of the employer. It is therefore necessary first to point out how from 1957 till as' late as. 1966 ahd even thereafter the employer non, suited the union, if that is a proper. term, by .• setting up the ., very agrce1nent which now the employer wants to. urge that it is11ot a concluded agreemeni. The three impoi- ' tant clauses of the agreement emerging 'from the correspondence relevant to the present dispute are that (i) the Hindustan Lever fyfozdoor Sabha was tecognised by tbe employer as a representative union for all sctions. of field force all over lndia in the employinent of the. employer and (ii) the union agreed to bring all matters relating . to wages/salaries and ter'rns and conditions o'r service on an All-India basis and noton regional basis as for as field force is concerned.and\n\n(iii) that in future dispuics, the employer will not contest issue about member of the field forc.e being workmen but shall contest issues only on their .merits. in the same way as the employer would do for other employees. Freed from technical jargon, the employer agreed and undertook not to contest in any industrial dispute the status of the field. force as not being workman witl1in the meaning of the expression in the Act and that reference, if any, would M contested on tl\\e meri\\s of the industi-ial dispute in respect of which reference is made to the Industrial Tribunal. The out-tome of the agreement would be that if a dispute of an all-India nature in respet of the field. force . is raised at a regional level, foundi\\lg its contention. on one of the terms of the agreement, the employer would be in a position to get . any regional reference rejected on the ground that there is a subsistil1g valid agre.ement between the parties that such dispute .of an all-India . nature in respect of the field force can.be raised at Bombay only and\n\nwithiµ the jurisdiction of the Industr.ial Tribunal at Bombay only .\n\n. '\n\n'WORKMEN I'. HINDUSTAN LdER LTD. (Desai, J.) . 3l7 .\n\nThere is no dispute between the parties that if't\\1ere is_ an agreement such would bo the out-come of it. This is not only not in dispute but it is conceded 'that a settlement was arrived. at in respect of industrial disputes between the enwloyer and the 11nion concerning the field force including salesman in 1\"15\"1, 1959 and 1964: 'An averment to this effect is made in Paragraph 'H' of the petition for special leave and Anx .5 was annexed to the petition which purports to be the settlernent dated December 22, 1964.. Jt is signed by Shd C.J. Mahimkar, Joint Personnel Manager on . behalf of the employer and Shri A.K. Basu; General -Secretary of the union at the relevant time. The various industrial disputes 1n respect of which settlement is arrived at were between the employer and the workmen of the. company who were the members of the field fot'ce (salesmen, sales supervisors etc.) employed in any part of India. This settlement was arrived at _under the Industrial Disputes Act' and was registered according to the requirements 'of the Act. This implies ibat the status of the salesman as being workman within the meaning of the expression of the Act was not only not disputed but specifical)y conceded and that mtist obviously be pursuant to the subsisdng agreement. This is however an inference so it is better now to move on to adjudication and award by a forum with jurisdiction to decide the point.' ·\n\nThe Chief Commissioner of Delhi referred an.industrial dispute whether workmen whose names were set out in the order of reference l; Je paid compensation in addition to' the usual remuneratidn for the period they had marketed Erasmic Blades and what directions were necessary in this behalf. The reference was between the employer tl1e present respondent and the appelllnt Union.\n\nIn this reference~ the workmen whD claimed ren1uneratiun \\Vere Delhi based salesmen of the employer. The_ employer appeared and\n\nontested the reference. The only important contention raised on behalf of the employer which must be 1ioticed reads as under :\n\n' \"That the concerned workmen are members of the field force of the company; .that the field force unit is a seperate unit known as Field Force Unit; that they are liable to .be transferred anywhere in India; that the Field Force Unit\n\nis controlled by Company's Head Office .in Bombay; that it wa'.< agreed between the .company and the Hindustan Lever Mazdoor Sabha, Bombay that all matter.< relating to Field Force Unit would be dealt ivi_th by both parties at Bombay on all-India basis and_ if no settlement is reached; the dispute\n\n(:.\n\n' D\n\n. '\n\n. SUPREME C~URT .R~PORTS [l984J 2 s.c.R.\n\nshall be raised in Bombay in accordan.ce with Industrial Disputes Act; and. that any , sett/emen.t or Award tl; erein 1vo1dd be mde app/icaO/e and sha// (>e bindilj[5 Oil a// members of the jiefd force ail over. India.\" . (Emphasis supplied). . .\n\nThe employer .. also contended. that i1f view of .the agreement between the parties, the dispute. referred to the Industrial Tribunal regarding Hie field force could not be ; aised at Delhi. It was also contended ihat in view of the agreement subsisting betweeh.the paries, the employe.i had agreed not to contest the issue that its salesman were .. not lv.orkmen within tlie meaning of the expression in the. At'. . kfurther contentlo;1 was. raise.ct that the union has committed breach .\n\nof'the agreement by ri!ising t.he dispute at Delhi. ·\n\n' The union while conceding that there was an agreement between the parties as alleged w the employer contested the issue bysaying. that.:the dispute was)1ot of an all-fodia nature as it was concerning only some Delhi based .salesmen of the employer and therefore the dispute was not .covered by the agreement. . .\n\nThe Industrial . Tribunal. (Shri Roop Chandra) 61\\ the rival contentions of the parties, raised the. following issues : .\n\n. \"I)\n\n\"ISSUES\n\n.. Is theie any agreement between tl1e 'Cqmpany a1id its wo.rkme1i thiough the Hindustan Lever Mazdoor Sabha that all maUrs relating to members of the :field force • would be dealt with by .. both the parties in Bombay ou a:n ail India basis and that if no settlement is reached,· the dispute would be raised in Bombay.ii} accordance with the Indnsti:ial Disputes Act ? . ' -\n\nDoe.s the said agreement preve~1t the workmen in this case from raisi11g the dispute in Delhi ?\n\n3) Are the einployees concerned not 'w.orkmen' within the meaning of the term under tlie lndutrial Disputes Act? If so, has.the tribunal no juridiction? ·\n\n4) Whether workmen have committed a breach of. the\n\nagreement' alleged to have been entered .into between the. management and the µnion in 1957 and if so, is the\n\n.. ~\n\n( -1\n\n. . .\n\nWORK~1BN v .. HINDUSTAN LEVER LTD. (Desai, J.) . 319 • - . l\n\nmanagement not entitled .!() rai.se. the pl.ea that the salcs1nen .are not 'wofk1nen' within the: meaning of Industrial Disputes Act ? \"\n\nIt would thus appear at a gl!tnce that i( was the employer who wanted the refeence t-0 be rejected on the preliminary objection .that there was a valid subsisting c01icludecl agreement between the parties : which had a direct bearing on the industfi.al dispute involved in the reference and that because• of the agrce1nent and as a 11ecessary corollary of. the agreement, the Tribunal had no jurisdktion to entertain. tlie dispute. . . • Now sec the out-coib.e of this contention o(the employer. On Issue Nos. I and 2, Shri Roop Chandra as per bis a.ward dated November 17, 1966 held that in view of Exs. W-2, W-3 and W-4marked in evide1ice_i11 the reference before him .s Exs. M-1, M-2 and M-3 pro,\n\nduced aµd .relied upon bythe mai\\agement th~!. is the employer, t.he Industrial. Tribunal at Delhi would have no jurisdiction toentertai11 it. It was never contended by the employer.beforeShri Roop Chandra that the three documents did not end in a concluded agreement. On . a contrary parties were ad idem that there was aconcluded agreement . between the parties. The difference was in their approach as to the applicability of various clauses of agreement td the dispute raised in the reference before the Tribunal., The employer contended that the dispute was of an all-India. nature and therefore could not be raised at Delhi. The union, on the ot.Jier ha11d, contended tha the dispute was of a regional nature concerning only 1.6 Delhi based salesme1i of the Company and therefore the dispute could not be styled as an\n\n. all'lndia dispute. .\n\n. .\n\nThe. Tribuna.1 lield .ih11t the dispute was of ari all-India nature, related to the duties and liabilities of all members of the .field force employed all over India.and it involved suh a major issue as salary and.wages. Approaching the .matter from .this angle, the Tribunal further held on the basis oLthe agreement, that the dispuie could only be taken cognizance of at Bombay: The Tribunal .. was of the opinion that the agreement was valid and did not contravene Sec. 28 of the Indian C:ontra6t Act because where the parties .choose to h.ave the matter entertained in one of the two or more courts having jurisdiction to e1itertain the matter, such an agreement does not contavene Sec. 28 .. The Tribunal further held that the agreement had the sanctity . ofa 'contract and the parties must be held.to the c.ontract'. The Tribunal concluded by observing that the union was notjustified in raising . . .\n\n• c\n\n.ft\n\n• c\n\n320 .. [1984] 2 s.c.R.\n\nSUPREME.COURT REPORTS\n\nthe dispute. in. Delhi in vi; w of its agreement' with. the emp!o; er as evidence by the three documents and that it is.not expedient in the ._ interest of justice and peace and harmony in industry that the Tribunal should _adjudicate the matter of an all-India nature. So saying the Tribunal rejected the reference. The question is who took advantage and benefit of the agreement? 'unquestionably, the employer who now decades after. successfully contending before another Tribuna) that there was a valid and concluded agreement. wants to contend that the three doeun:ients, Exs. W-1, W-2.and W-3do not spell out a concluded agreement but ail inchoate one which remained at foe stage of negotiations only. Btil that is not the end .of th~ vacillation\n\nn the part of.the-employer. ·\n\nMr. Pai, learned counsel on. behalf f the employer on the \"other hand contended that\" the union has expressly repudiated the agreement 8.iid thrfore, it is not open no\\v ro the union to take rcourse to the . agreement. It was subniiiteil that if the union has committed a breach . of the agreement, if there was any, the employer is absolved from .. observing or complying .with the. agteement. To substantiate thi& submission, our attention was invited to a reference made by the Lt. Governor, Delhi to the Addl. Industrial Tribnnal constituted for the Union Tt'1\"ritory of Delhi; thcnpresided over.by Shri Hans Raj for adjudication of the following. , two issues :\n\n·1. whethor the deduction of leave\" by tlie management for\" the yearI967 is illegai and/or unjustified and if so, to\" what relief are the affec1, ed wo1kmen enti(led' and what directions are necessary in this respect ?\n\nWhether .the management was obliged to grant. _special increment to all of its workineil. in .Delhi Branch and if so, to what relief the affected workmen are 'entitled and what directions are necessary in this 1:espect ?\"\n\nThe. union filed a statement of claim and sulisequently filed an\" additionai or amended written statement in which inte1 alia it was. .-contended- 'that the .workmen of the concern \"throughout India were agitated becasue of this measure .and its wholly illegal implementation . and the applicant Sabha led the opposition of the scheme and the resistence of the workmen to it.' This averment was relied npon to urge that the unlon raised a dispute of ail all-India nature at Delhi\n\nwhich was the regional centre .und this would imply intentional breac.h or repudiation of the areeinent. Before we examine !his contention,\n\n'-j..· ,\n\n WORKMEN v. HINDUSTAN. LEVER LTD. (Desai, J.) 321\n\nit is. necessary to refer to p'ara IO of the amended st(ttement of claim in \\vhich the union statesas under : ·\n\n\"That th.e binding natre of the agreement has been flagrantly flou<ed by the Management and. the very basis of collective bargaining for industrial peace ha; been attac)<ed.\":\n\nThis would show that the unioi1 .accused the employer of breach of agreement. On the. other hand, the employer in its written state-· mcnt contended as under : ·\n\n,. \"No claim on behalf of the employees of the Field Force ca'il .be taken up by Hind\\1sta1i Lever Mazdoor Sabha, Delhi Centre and this Hon'ble Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain the same in view of an agreement arrived ai and between the. Company and the Hindustan Lever Mazdoor Sabha in )957.\" (emphasis supplied) ·\n\nIt would be crystai clear that the employer wanted the reference to be rejected at the threshold on the preliminary objection that in view of the concluded binding agreement betwee11 the parties, the dispute referred to for adjudication being of an all-India nature,' the . union was precluded from raising lne same at a regional level and the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the same. Apart frem the extracted specific contention i11 paragraphs 5 and 6, the contentio1i is elaborated by the employer and it was specifically contended that in the award dated Nov. 17, 1966 by Sh; i Roop Chandra, Addi.\n\nIndustrial Tribunal, Delhi, it' was held that a valid agreeme1it was in existence between the parties and no dispute pertainfog to the members of the Field Force can be raised anywhere except in the State of Maharashtra. It was further contended that the award of Shri Ro-0p Chandra was confirmed by the High Court of Delhi by summarily dismissing the Writ Petition No. 1163/67 filed by the union against the award and when the union approached the Supreme Court in Appeal . No. 42/68, the same was rejected thereby affirming the existence and : binding character of the agreement.. These assertions by the employer\n\nfiow from the ple. ad.ings. To. revert to the. narration, Shri Hans .Raj . proceed on leave and then retired and when a new Presiding Officer • was appointed, the reference with one application: filed by the union to summon certain documents ca!Jle up before. the Tribunal. . 'By a laconic order, unsupported by any. reasoning, the Tribunal observed that the salesmen are not w-0rkmen and so the documents neeu not be .summoned. lt was this order on the application which was cha\\-\n\n32~. . •\n\n. SUPREME ~OUR~ REPORTS\n\n. [1984}2 S.C.R,\n\nlenged i1rihe writ petition filed by the unicin .. It is difficult to appreciate what permitted the Tribunal 'to hold thar the salesmen are not\n\nworkmen.within the.meaning o!the qpression int.he Act and why it did not consider the specific contention that the .employer was estopped ·\n\nfrom caising the contention as to the status of the salesmen in view of the. i°nding agreemeit between tle paries. Bt, it forthe present purpose, it is sufficient to .notice that tlie employer and the UJiion both swore by the agreement and at any rate the employer mover contended that there was no concluded agnoe\\nent between 'the parties covering . one of the points in the dispute namely,:the status of the members of the Field Force including salesmen. ·\n\n Mr. Pal. next turned to another' round of litigation between the panics. It appears that <:ffective from September u, 1966, 'the employer J'e.organised its marketing organisation into .tivo divisions, the Main Liries Division and the Spe;:iality Lines Division. The Calcutta' Branch of the employer was coi1cerned only with marketing.·· The workmen at Calcutta were directlv. affected by 'the reorganiszation.\n\nOn a di°spute raise.cl by the union: the Governinent of West Bengal refei'red .the {allowing disJl.ute for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal · ·\n\n\"Is' the liun1an rarionttlisation as a n1easure of econon1ic ·\n\n' ' reorganisation. of the company : reflected through job-integration that. have either' been. effected or pro.posed to be effected justified ?\" .\n\n\" Pending adjudication of the dispute, some workmen filed applica- 1 lions under Sec. 33A of the Industrial Disputes Act before the Tribunal alleging .that during the pendency of the adjudication their service cdnditionshad been altered adversely and their salary for. the month of October, 1966 had not been paid. The Tribunal granted the applicaj tions of the workmen. and the employer approac)led the Supreme Court by special leave,. The main refer.!i1c~ was finally disposed of . infavo.ur of the employer upholding the reorganiatioil of marketing organisation. The union questioned the correctness of this award before the Supreme Court. Both the groups of appeals came up for hearing together and the decision of this Court is reported in Hindustan\n\nLeer Ltd. v. Ram Mohan Ray & Ors.'\" T[lis Conrt upheld the r.ight' of tlle employer to organise and reorganise its work)~ the mamier it\n\n I pleases. 'Accordingly the appeals 'filed by the union wern rejected.\n\n(I) [1973] 3 SCR 624 . ..\n\n~ -1(-\n\n• )\n\n\\--'('.·\n\n. ' ..\n\nWORKMEN v. HINDUSTAN LEVER LTD. (Desai, .J.) ' 32~ ..\n\nThe appeals:filed by the employr againstthe award in favour of the workmen in the applications under Sec. 33A were eqally rejected by . . this.Court holding that: non-payment of wages in the circumstances of the case amounts to an alteration in thecoi1ditions of service. Frankly,. this decision sheds no light o.n the point:under discussion because neither: side refo:d unon the agree.men! ncir did the agreement figure into the dispute. However, it is interesting to note that when the · main refejence was be.fore the Trlbui1al, a. prelminary objech011 was raised cin behalf of the employer to the effect that 'by an agreement entered into in January 1957 by and between the employer and union, it was agreed that all matters relafo; g to die matters of the \"'utdoor ' mal'keting staff, to wit members of' the field force can be raisd al Bombay only and as uch the company as well 0sthe Sal)ha are bouri.d by the aforesaid agreement. Therefore, 1iot only the employer affirmed the agreement, did not contend that it was an inchoate one but . specifically placed that it,'is a ncluded bindingagreement between the partie-s. · - ·\n\n It appears that .J.ttere was .one 1i10re reference I.D. No. 43/72 between the parties at Delhi. Following the. decision of this_ Court in the case just herein discussed, the !'cf.er.:nc; e \\Vas rejcled .\n\n. Mr. Pai nexi referred io an order in Refrp1ce (I.D}No. 203/70 by the :Indtistriai' Tribunal Maharnshtra bctwtci1 the.employer and the \\Vork1nenefnployeeS under -it: The clcLtland \\vhich \"'1as refei-red for' adjudicatin incfoded rvis, ion of pay sales with adjustment, re_visiof1 _of the y.:age-sale of sUb-cle-r-ial grade, gratuity disturbance allowance/and settling-in-al)o\\vance fo the Office staff,· allo\\\\'.ance t? office st.aff. whi-Ic 01r tOur, acting alloance,. ov.ertin1e. ages, caSh allowance and. leave tt'avel facilities. The. employer raised number of prelin1inary o.bjcetions, one SU!.lr being that Salesn1e11, Marl<eting Research Investigators, Market Research Supervisors, Sales' SupervisOrs, Trade Marks Jnv(;~HigQtors; Seed Byers and -Supervisors Or c:ler{caI staff arc no~· .\\vortnen.· within 'the 1neanig 9t' the Cxpression in, the ACt, and hence nO indl1strial dispute 3311 be rnisCd on their\n\nbehalf and consequently the .. Ti'ibunal had no'jurisdio.tion to adjudicate upon the sanie. ·The .un'ion ·counterQd this_ preliminary objection by asserting that the cDntentiori about the status <if the aforementioned\n\n.ctegorie.s is barred by the principle of resfudiat.a in view of.the \"'ard ·\n\ndated April 13,' 1967 made by .the 3rd Industrial Tribunal, Wc5t Bengal The Tribunal rcj 'cted the contention of the u'nion observing thai the dispute bei,;, een them is .not of ati all-In'dia nature and therefore, the employer is entitled to raise the question , about the status of the work- . - ' . . . . .\n\n' ..\n\n. c ' '\n\n• B •\n\n324 SUPREME COURT liTIPORTS\n\n[\\ 984] 2 S.C.R. •\n\nmen included in lh~ aforemntioned c'ategories. This. woul\\! imply that the reference was rejected not Oil the ground lhai there was no agreement but 011°the ground that the dispute involved ii1 the reference was not covered by the agreement.\n\nIn the same reference, a plea of estbppel rnised on behalf of the union to the effect that the company was precluded in view .of the subsisting agreCIJlCnt from quetioning the status f the salesmen and allied categories as workmm was . overruled bv the Tribunal observing that Exs. W-2, W-J and .W~4. . .. ' . . . . leave no :doubt thot the employers' agreement not to dispute the status of the Field Force was only on the clear undcrstandi1ig that it will be so, if' dispute. is raised on all India basis. The Tribunal tlien 'observed that the .dispute atlmittedlywas not an all-Tndia dispute and therefore, rejected the plea of cstoppcl.\n\nIt is at this stage necessary to refer to 6ne more reference between the parties being LT. No. 233}67. The dispute referred to was a demand by the .workmen to withdraw the reorganisation integration imposed on the Suporvisors attached to the Sales Department arid impending in the case of Field Force (Salesmeniand otherstaff attache.d to the Sales, Accounts, .Transport and alhed department. TlllS demand \\\\'as rejected by ihe Tribunal fol lowing the decision in Hindustan\n\nLever Ltd. v. Ram Mohmi Ray & Ors .. (supra) The rejection of the demand has no impaci at ali on the point under discussion.\n\nHaving rneticnlousl)r eXamined various references pertaining to various industrial disputes between the' parties al different centres\n\nin.lndia since the' agreement i.n 1957, it unquestionablyemeiges that' the employer till the present reference never once even whispered that the agreement was not. a concluded i1greemcnt or that it. was an inchoate one left hanging at the stage of: negotiations. But in the pr_esent reference the contention raised was that the agrement \\\\1s not a concluded agreern.ent because tha( is hdw the Tribunal 'has approache.d the pr0b:cm .. The Tribimal has ohserved in this behalf as under:\n\n\"Accordin-' to the inanage1nent the -three letters do ot constitute an agreement because in an agree1nent there should be an offer and the offer must be accepted as such.\n\nThey have.argued.that the offer. made in Ex. W-2'havc 'not\n\nbeenaccept~as.., uch in Ex. W-3 .. . -..... -....... \"\n\n' ' The employer hich swore by the agreement and repeatedly succeeded in getting thrown out certain references at the threshold on. [:ccou.nt of the' ag(ec1nent, no\\v \\VantS tO coritend that there \\vas no\n\nWORKMEN v. HINDUSTAN LEVER\"L'ID. (Desai, J.) ., 325 ..\n\nconcluded agreement, arid ignoring the whole history, the Tribunal falls into an error in accepting this corytention. The weight of evidence not only not at all referred to by the Tribunal but frankly wholly ignored clearly _and unmistakably leads to one and one conclusion alone that according to the employer there was .the concluded agreement between the parties. Tt is a solemn agreement, tht agreement of which effective and wh.cilesome advantage has been taken by the employer and when it now does not suit i_t, it in breach of the solerrrn agreement wants to turn round and not only repudiate it but disown it as having never been entered into. No Court of justice can ever permit such a thing to be done.\n\nMr. Pai, however, raised a very technical contention that the preliminary objection raise~ by the union that the employer is cstopped • from questioning the status of the salesmen or members of the Field ·\n\nForce being not workmen \\vith(n tho 1;, caning of the expression in the Actmust be rejected either on the princi pie of ·es judicata or pr!nciples analago1is to res judicata or 011 the pdncipic of isue of . estoppel or promissory. estoppel and neither of the three contentions is available to the union notwithstanding the foct whether the agreemeiit .exists or stands repudiated and therefore,. the Trihnnal was justified in .rejecting_the contention of thC union.\n\nMr. Pai in support.\n\nC?f the s.ub1nission urgd hat at no timC as the staus of the salesmen as not being \\Vork1nell or otherwise was ever directlv and stibstaritiallv !11 issue in c; rlier referc.nc_es, _the i.Ssue.cann_ot be rejcted on the grou.nd of res J1.1dicata and at any rate there:: \\vas no dee.is ion on tllis issue and therefore the principle of.issue \"st6Jl'pel cannot. preclude. the employer froi11 raising the contention. Mr. Ra1nan1urthi, on the Other hand, contended that' it is not the contention. of the union that the issue about tile status of thi; salesi11e_n is res judic<ita but ·, vJ1at is res judicata _is\"thc existence and bindin!! ·-character of the iigree1nent . . . . . ' . ., wb1ch was directly and st\\bstantially in issue .between the patties in the award given by Shri Roop Chandra and in various other awards.\n\nIn order to tlppfect-ate rival contentions it iS necessaiy to' focUs attention on the issue; framed by. Industrial Tribu.nal presided over G by Shri Roop Chandra in f. D. No. 46 of _1966.\n\nThese issues have been extracted earlier.\n\nThe most important issue was Issue No. J about the existence of a binding agreement between the parties which would preclude . the employer from ever guestioning the ; tatus of the salesmen till the airee1nent reinains subsisting and till it is tern1inUted. ; ff . The issue \\Vas : \"is there any agrcen1ent bet\\vcen the co111pany ·.and\n\nA .. ..\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984] 2 s.c.R . . . its worklneu coyering inter a/la the question aboi1t tlie status 'of sales- . meii ?' And the answer was : 'there is such a valid and subsisting . agreeinent and that posiffdn was adopted by noneother than the employerand the employer succeeded in getting the reference thrownout at tlie threshold on .the ground. that in view of the subsisting . valid agreement betw<; en the parties, the union was est0pped fro1n raising a dispnte of a0 all-India nature at.a regional level and it can . : only be raised i1t Bombay and .therefore the Tnd11strial Tribunal at\n\nDelhi had no.jurisdiction to entertain the same ... Even if the-teclinicaJ ·\n\npriciple .of res Judicta is imported In the field of industrial adjudication, the issue about the existence of an .agreemen(was substant, ially and directly in issue between the pa;:ties .in the earlier proceedings and was decided in the offirrnative that there exists.such an agreement.\n\nIn the reference fi:om \\vhich tlie present a.l.'pe3l arises, the employer • contended that theie is no such concluded' agreement as pleaded bji the union; and therefore, the issue that arises is: whether there is such an -agreement as piea\"ded on behalf ni1eunio11. But that was the specific issu.e in Reference I D. No; 46 of l966\"between the .same. p-arties. To. that extent, one.casay that unless Change f Circumstances are established, the issue would be res ; udlcata. But\" we consider it i1; appropriate. to usher in this techn.ical concept. of res judiqata pervading the field of aivil justice. into.the field of industrial arbitration.· The apprc\\lons; on' :vas voiced by this .Court in Slwhdara (Delhi) Saharanpur Light Raf/.ivay Co. Ltd. v. Shahdara (Delhi) Saharanp111 Railwav. Wor/.:crs Union'!) when it said that it is doubtful whether the w.' - • . principles anaJC, gous to resjudicaid C<ln properly be applied _to industfial\n\n'.ldjuicai-on: We are not una\\varof the legal pqtion that pr_inciplC: of res judicatri was invoked and applied by this --Court in Workmen of . Straw Board Mnufacturing. Co. Ltd. v, M/s Straw ·}Jom:d Manufac-.\n\n_turin\"ft Co. Ltd.(2> One can safely Say that prilicipte analogous tO res\n\njudicta can be aviled ; r to scuttel any atte; npt at raising' industrial\n\n- . disputes repeat\"'dly in deance uf Operative &ettlernens a1_id a\\vards.\n\nBut this hig'1'y technical concept of civil justice may be kept ia precise\n\nconlilld limits in the fild of -industrial arbitration \\vhich n1ust as.far as pOs.Sibie: be hept free from 'such t!'.lchni_caJities whiCh th\\vart resolu- tion _of industri{tl disputes. We however proceed on the assumption . that an industrial dispute may be rejected. on the principle ai:alogous to res ji1dicata. The matter however, may be fooked at from a s1ightly difforent angle.\n\nThe_ concept of compulsory adjuditation of industrial disputes \"''a.s .sttutqrily uShered in with .. a vic\\V to pro.viding a. forun1\n\n. .\n\n(1) [i%9] I L.L, j,734 at 742 .\n\n\n-~. -\n\n, WORKMEN l'. HINDUSTAN LEVER LTD\" (DesAI, J,) '327\n\n. arid compelling .the parties to resort to the forum for arbitration so as to avoid. confrontation and dislocation in industry. A developing country like India. can ill-afford dislocation h1 industrial production . . Peace and harmony in industry and uninterrupted production being\n\nthe demands of the time, it was considered wise to arm the Govern- . rnent with power to compel the parties to re5ort to arbitr,, tion a.rid ' as a necessary corollary to avoid confrontation at; d trial of strength, which were considered wasteful from national and public interest .poini of view. A welfre State can ill-afford. to 16.ok askance at industrhl unrest and industrial . disputes. (See 'JJahyabhai Ranch.· hoddas Shah v. Jayanti/a/ Mohanlat.\"l The . .Act die! not confer till the introduction of Chapters V-A and V-B, a1w special' benefits or enforce• able benefits on. the workmen.\n\nThe Att was designed to provide a self-contained Code to copcl . the. parties to resort to industrial arbitration 'for the resolution of existing or 'apprehended disputes without prescribing statutory norms for varied and variegated industrial relation norms so that the forums created tor resolution of disputes may remain unhampered by any statutory control and devise rational norms keeping pace .. with i, mproved industrial relations .reflecting and imbibing .socio-economic'justice. If this is the underlying object behind enactment of the Act, the Court by interpretative process mlist strive.to reduce the field of.conflict and expand the area of agreement and show its preference for uphcilding agreements sanctified by mutuality and consensus in larger public interest; namely,' to eschew industrial strife, confrontation and consequent wasfrge. . .\n\nThe parties fo .this case .entered into a solemn agreement. It is hot for a moment suggested that the agreement has been terminated.\n\nThe only argument put forward on behalf f fhe .employer was th.at the union has repudiated the agreement by raising disputes of an all, India. nature at a regional level and thereby committed breach of the. agreement This contention is entirely wiihout merits. What has happened is. that the union raised certain dispµtes which according to the 4nion we're of a,.regional nature and which it was not estopped froin raising in the teeth of the, terms of the binding agreement between the parties.\n\nOn the other hand, the employer contended that the disputes so raised were of an all-India nature; Both sides swore by the agreement, the ,<:iitfereiice in.approach being: whether the dispute was of an all, India:\n\nnature 'or of \\egional nature .. The emerging situation .would be th.at neiteer tile union repudiated the agreement nor the employer and till .the present dispute, both swore by the agreement. The divergence in·\n\n (I) [1'B] Lab; & Industrial C.ases 967, ·\n\nc •\n\nc ..\n\n. E ..\n\nSUPRFM~ COURT REPORTS\n\n[J 984]2 S.C R.\n\nthe approach was as to the interpretation. the coverage, the ambit . and the width of the agreement. Both the parties swore by .the agreement but differed in their approach and interpretation and .the forum namely the fndustrial Tribunal cimsistenly upheld at the instance of the employer that there was a binding valitl agreement subsisting between the parties forbidding the union from raising a dispute of an all-India nature at the regional level and .succeeded in getting the reference thrown out at the threshold on the ground that the tlispute was of an all-fndia nature and not of a regional level as contended by the'union .. This constitutes adherance to ag.reement., performance of tbe agreement, implementation of.the agreement and being bound by the agreement. This cond, uct in no sense can be said. to constitute . repudii\\lion of agreement by tbe union. Unilateral repudiation of an agreement, as contended by Mr. Pai, does not result in termination of;· solemn agreement because the. wrongful repudiation can be corrected by enforcement of agreement through machinery provided by the statute. And that.is what the employer has succeeded in achieving.\n\nThe employer relying on' the agreement got a number of refeiences rejected 'on the pr<liminary objection founded on the agreement. The employer cannot therefore be heard to say that the attempted repudiation by the union, if any, permits the employer to disown the sa1ne. when it sui.s it.\n\nUnilaterai' repudiation is.distinct fron1 terminrition .and an agree1nent/settlen1ent r.e1nains. In force :-ind binding till' terminated and does .not come to an end by unilatera 1 repudiation .\n\nBut it mlist be 1nade clear that there is no st1bstance in t11c contention of Mr. Pai that the union repudiated the agreement. If thus; the employer swore by Ilic' agreement, rdied upon it '1nd succes.sfully contested the clai1n 'of the inion, it cannnt now be penn; tted to back out from such solemn abgreement and apart from the technicality of the issue being res judicata or issue estojJpel, industrial peace and <harmony, good. behaviour and fair rel_atiofi \\vith \\Vorkn-!en estOpes\n\nthe _employer fr0m either repudiating the agreement or contending. that tl; e agreement as not a concluded agreement but <fn incl1oate one.\n\nJn this connectinn, we may profitably refer to Western India Match Co. v. Their Workmen'\" w'herein this . Court observed ; s\n\nurider :\n\n\"It is nqt out of place to 1nentioi1 in-this connection that l1n soe i)revious occasions the 1nanagement itself has treated. these categories as workmen within the meaning of the U.P.\n\nIndustrial Disputes Act. The management's contention that\n\n\n'r-'\n\ni ...\n\n..,-\n\n-<(.\n\nWORK'IBN v. HINDUSTAN. LEVER LTD. (Desai, J.) 329\n\nthe Tribunal has erred in thinking that the inspectors, sales-· men and retail salesmen are work1nen musttherefore be 'rejected.\"\n\n•• Same view was ado'ptcd in Alluminhm1 Factor)/ Workl's' Union v.\n\nIndian A!'.1111iniuin Co. Lfd. 11 > Jn. fRat case. Certain corresrnndcnce which passed before rnd after the awards betwec1i \\he parties as referred to.\n\nThi'> corre<; po:ide; ic(' sh,_, wed that the ar:~1Jlant/urti611 and the steff associetion of the \"'\"\"µqny foily accepted the principle that Supervisors wo<.ilcl no lr.nger be regarded as workmen and that Supervisors had resigned from-1ncmbership of.the wor-krnen's unions. . ' .\n\nThese ave.rtments in the correspondence regarding the status of the Supervisors being not workmen was held binding between the parties and both ihe Industrial Tribunaland this Court declined to examin.e . the. contention about the status on merits. If the union can be held bound to .such an inferred agreement from correspondence, the employer conceding the statUS or to be preCise concedii}g not t.o contest the status of salesmen would. equally be binding on the e1n']Jloyer.\n\nIt would thus appear that the employer/management was held hound\n\nnot y any speific agreemen.t but an agrcen1ent 5pclt-out of its con~· duct in Western India Matr;:h Co. case and asserti-Ons in correspondence in [ndia Alun1inium Co. case trcati'ng certain categorics ofthi:: workmen as. workmen or not as \\\\'Orkrne1} respctively \\Vithjn the meaning or the expression in the Act. then at a later stage, the employer and the\n\n- uion respectively \\Vere estopped frnn1 contendifig to the contrary.\n\nThe case before u.s is much_stronger. in that there is a conclude4 binding . agreement b2-tween th>;! parties neither repudiaj:ed nor. terminated till today which .provides that the \"employer on its part will not contest the.status of the membership of the Field Force including the salesmen em.ployed by the .Cmpany as workmen within the meaning of the\n\nexpession in the Act.\n\nTherefore, the Tribunal cnimitted a seriQus error, apparent on record i1~ holding that there .\\vas no ~Oncluded agr,:cmont between. the parties as. emerging from Exs. W-2, W-3 and\n\n W-4.\n\nTh.e Tribunal 1egaived the contention of the union that the employer was estopped from challenging the status of the workmen also. Oil the gr..ound that 'there Cbn be 110 estoppeJ against the Sat.ute.\n\nWe must confess th0-t ven.Mr. Pai 9id not appear to be very enthusiastic to support the finding of the Tribunal that even if there is a binding agreement etween the parties and th.erefore, the employe 1s estopped\n\n(1) [1962] 1 L.L.J. 210.\n\n, 'D\n\nG •\n\nH . .\n\nH ..\n\n.SUPREME. COURT REPORTS\n\n[1984] 2 S.C.R, \"\n\nfrom questioni1, g the status of salesmen as being. workmen, it cannot\n\nbe availed of by the union because there can be no estoppel.against • a statute. We. find it very difficult not only to unnderstand but to appreciate the approach and the finding of the Tribunal in this behalf.• .\n\nThere is no statutory proision that a status of a person invoking . . . , . .· . the jurisdiction of the Tribunal must be adjudicated upon notwithstanding that no contention io t!iaf effect is. raised.. No statutory pro- vis{on was brought to our notice which would. be rendered nugatory or ineffective if the. status of workman is not questioned. Nor it can he sid that the employer has contracted out of the. benef)tsof a statute. Whether a particular, person is a workman or not dependsupon factua.1 matrix .. Workman is defined ·; n Sec. 2(s) of the Act. The ingredients and the incidents of the definiti\"on when .satisfied, the . person sati; fying the same would be a workman. Negaiively, if someone fails to s\n\n0atisfy 6ne or other ingredient. or incident of the definiti'on, he may not be held to be workman within the meaning of the expression in ihe Act. The.re is no provision in the Act. which obilges the Industrial Tribunal or other forums set up under the Act . to. decide even in the absence of a contention from the employer, a\n\npreliminary issue w!iether the pcrson who has invoked its jurisdiction is a workman or not. There is no such obligation cast statutorily on the Tribu11al. , If the employer .does not .arise the contention , about the status of the workman approacliing the Tribunal, the Tribunal\n\n, hs no obligation, to ccide the status .of the persq11 whether' he , is a\n\nworkman or not. . Conversely, if the employer agrees not to ques!fon . the status in future it would only imply that such a contention would not only be not raised but if raised it would not bepressed and if pressed 'should be negatived in view o.f the binding agreement: The .. resultant situation would be that the Tribunal must proceed on the assumption that no such conten.tion is raised and required to be adjudicated upon: .lf the contention is not raised, the Tribunal is u.nder no. obligation, st10 1notil or on its own to raise and decide such a contention tci clothe itself with jurisdiction to.adjudicate. upon the . dispute. The Tribunal derives its.jurisdiction by the order of reference and not on the determination of a jurisdictional fact which it must of 1; ocessity decide to acquire jurisdjctioh.· Therefore, the Tribunal was clearly in error in holding that the contention canvassed o'n behlf of the union would permit it to taise estoppel against' a . statute. Undoubtedly,. it is true that there cari be no estoppel againsf\n\nthe Jaw of the land .. If a party is. estopped by doinga thing which it is under a legal disability to perform or forbearing to do something. which fr is his duty to do; the result would be an enlargement of the contractual or other rights ailowed by law or the'.r alteratio~: The\n\n't·\n\n.. '\n\nWORKMEN v .. HINDUSTAN LEVER LTD. (Desai. J-)' 331\n\nCourt e11forces 'the performance of statutory duty and declines to\n\n.• interfere\n\n0 for the assistance of persons who seek its aid to relieve the~ . aga, inst the express statutory provision. Approving the dicta Jn.\n\nMaddison v. Alderson(\", this Court observed in K. Romadas Shenoy . v; The Chief Officers, Town Municipal .Council, Udipi and Ors., t•l\n\nthat an excess of statutory power could not be validated by acquiescenc; e. in Or by the operation of stoppel. Is. that the -situation here ? The Tribunal observed. that notwithstanding the fact that the employer has agreed' to recognise the .union as representative of the Field Force including the salesmen, agreement between . the parties cannot override the statute and if th\\'refore Shri A.K.\n\nBasu is not . workman under the Act, the agreement between the union. and the emoloyer. cannot confer on the Tribunal any jurisdic- . lion to give anyrelief to him under the Act. Tb.c Tribunal. completely misdirected itself when it assumed and arrogated to itself tj:le . . obligatory duty in the absence of an impermissible contention, to .raise one and proceeded . to adjudicate upon, notwithstanding the fact if Hie agreement. is .subsisting no such contention can be raised and if raised has. to be ignored as an irrelevant pleading. In this. connection, it may be. recalled ihat when a reference ismade under\n\nSec. 10 of the Act; Rule .10-B of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rutes, 1957 obliges the workman involved in the reference to file. with tl1e Tribunal a statement of demands relating only to the issues as are included fo the order of reference and simultaneously serve a copy ofthe same to the employer. Sub-rule (2) enjoins the employer within two weeks .ohhe receipt of the statemeritof claim to file its rejoinqer aud simultaneously serve a copy ofthe same on the workman.\n\nOrdinarily,, the Tribunal after ascertaining on what issue the parties .· are at variance rais.es i.ssues to focus aitention on points in dispute.\n\nIn industrial adjudication,: issues are of two typ_es : (i)· those referred by the Governmei; it for adjudication aud set oat in the order of reference. and (ii) incidental issues which are sometimes the issues of law or . issues of mixed law and fact. The' Tribunal may.'as well frame pre~\n\nliminary issues if the poiut on which the parties are ai varia11ce, as . reflected in the preljffiinary issue, o/OU!d go to the root of the matter.\n\nBut the Tribun&l cannot travel beyond the pleadings and arrogate to itself the power to raise issues which the parties to the reference are\n\nprecluded or prohibited from r11ising; to wit if the employer. does riot q11estion the status of the worken, (he Tribunal cannot suo inotu raise the issue and proceed to adjudicate upoil the same and throw out\n\n(l) [18831 8 A.C. 467.\n\n(2) [19751 1 S.C.R 680.\n\nB·\n\n' .\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984] 2 ~.Cll.\n\nthe reference on the sole ground that the concerned -workman was . not .a workman .w; thin the meaning of the expression of the Act. And\n\nit is' not obligatory upqn the employer i1ecessarily to raise \\he conten- \"tion that the co.ncerned workman was not a workma1i within the.\n\nmeaning of \"the expression .under the Act. Therefore, the Tribunal was wholly in error in holding that if the contention of the union\n\nere to prevail, the well laid rnle of no estoppel against a statute would be violate<).\n\nHaving examined all the diniensions of the matter, it is crystal clear and is indisputably established that the agreement relied upon by the union is a valid subsisting agreement. It is in force.\n\nIt is neither . repudiated. nor terminated.\n\nTt is binding upon both the parties. Once the agreen:ient is held to be binding, the employer is estopped fro;,, contending that the workmen involved in the dispute wbo were sales1ncn wen~ not work1nen within the nleaning. of the expression undei the Act. Therefore, the Tribunal was in error in undertaking to examine that contention and answer it. That part of the order/award of the Tribunal is unsustainable and must be quashed and set aside. ·\n\nWe accordingly, direct the Tribui1al to proceed to deteni1inc . the dispute on merits without concerning itself with .the consideration of the question whether the concerned workmen were workmei1 within the meaning of the expression under the Act.. This appeal accordingly succeeds-and' the award of the Tribunal to the extent indicated herein is quashed and set aside' and the matter is remitted to the lndustri_al Tribunal with a direction lo proceed further in the light of the observations made in thi.• judgment. The respondent shall pay to the appellant cosis quantified at Rs; 3,000. ·\n\nN.V; K.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\n. \\\n\n\\.~'-. . '", "total_entities": 80, "entities": [{"text": "f WORKMEN OF.Mjs HINDUSTAN LEVER LTD. & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13, "end_char": 56, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "WORKMEN OF M/s HINDUSTAN LEVER LTD. & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 144, "end_char": 149, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DESAI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "NNAPPA REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 159, "end_char": 171, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 201, "end_char": 229, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Cn with the meaning Of the explesSion ln the Tndustrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1430, "end_char": 1504, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3921, "end_char": 3926, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was held that there Was a concluded agreement between theparties and therefore the industrial disputes raised therein could not be adjudicated at Delhi did not operate as .ra.s judicata because the issue in that a\\vard was not directly and .ubtantially in issue: in."}}, {"text": "(1973] 3 S.C.R. 624", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5554, "end_char": 5573, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1964] 3 S.C.R. 560", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5618, "end_char": 5637, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "HINDUSTAN LEVER LTD", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6172, "end_char": 6191, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "with a view to providing a. forum and comP.elling the parties\n\nWORKMEN v. HINDUSTAN LEVER LTD.", "canonical_name": "HINDUSTAN LEVER LTD"}}, {"text": "S0", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11404, "end_char": 11406, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "M.K Rammnuithi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12655, "end_char": 12669, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M.K Rammnuithi, VP."}}, {"text": "Jifendra Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12687, "end_char": 12702, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jifendra Sharma and P. C, aur, for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "P. C", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12707, "end_char": 12711, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jifendra Sharma and P. C, aur, for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "-G.B.. Pai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12740, "end_char": 12750, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "·-G.B.. Pai, 0.C. Mathui, D.Nc Mishra, S. sukumaran and Ms. Meera."}}, {"text": "0.C. Mathui", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12752, "end_char": 12763, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "·-G.B.. Pai, 0.C. Mathui, D.Nc Mishra, S. sukumaran and Ms. Meera."}}, {"text": "D.Nc Mishra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12765, "end_char": 12776, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "·-G.B.. Pai, 0.C. Mathui, D.Nc Mishra, S. sukumaran and Ms. Meera."}}, {"text": "S. sukumaran", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12778, "end_char": 12790, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "·-G.B.. Pai, 0.C. Mathui, D.Nc Mishra, S. sukumaran and Ms. Meera."}}, {"text": "Meera. Mathur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12799, "end_char": 12812, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "·-G.B.. Pai, 0.C. Mathui, D.Nc Mishra, S. sukumaran and Ms. Meera."}}, {"text": "HINDUSTA~", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12850, "end_char": 12859, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' l\n\nWORKMEN v. HINDUSTA~ ~EVER L'rU. (Desai, J.) . . . . . . ."}}, {"text": "Desai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12873, "end_char": 12878, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' l\n\nWORKMEN v. HINDUSTA~ ~EVER L'rU. (Desai, J.) . . . . . . .", "canonical_name": "DESAI"}}, {"text": "DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12960, "end_char": 12965, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered hy\n\nDESAI, J .. Tf solemn agreelt)ents proposed.", "canonical_name": "DESAI"}}, {"text": "WORKMEN'V. HINDUSTAN LEVER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16375, "end_char": 16401, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "+\n\n• ---.i\n\nWORKMEN'V. HINDUSTAN LEVER L'fD. (Desai, J.) 313\n\nWe agree that certain major issues such as salary wages, bonus,.provident fund, Gratuity, leave etc."}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REl'OR\\~ [1984] 2 s.c, R", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 18501, "end_char": 18539, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COURT REl'OR\\~ [1984] 2 s.c, R ."}}, {"text": "A.K', Sircar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 18549, "end_char": 18561, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".Shri A.K', Sircar and Shri R.L. Gupta were protected workmen 'Pi thin.", "canonical_name": "A.K .. Sircar"}}, {"text": "R.L. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 18571, "end_char": 18581, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".Shri A.K', Sircar and Shri R.L. Gupta were protected workmen 'Pi thin.", "canonical_name": "R.T,. Gupta"}}, {"text": "A.K. Sfrcar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 18846, "end_char": 18857, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri A.K. Sfrcar on April JO, 1974 and on the noxt•day. '", "canonical_name": "A.K .. Sircar"}}, {"text": "R.T,. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 18934, "end_char": 18945, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was served .on Shri R.T,.", "canonical_name": "R.T,. Gupta"}}, {"text": "A.K .. Sircar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 19024, "end_char": 19037, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There .followed .a disciplinary enquiry and ultimately the services of Shri\n\nA.K .. Sircar nd Shri R.L, Gupta were ierminated by the employer . .", "canonical_name": "A.K .. Sircar"}}, {"text": "R.L, Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 19046, "end_char": 19056, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There .followed .a disciplinary enquiry and ultimately the services of Shri\n\nA.K .. Sircar nd Shri R.L, Gupta were ierminated by the employer . .", "canonical_name": "R.T,. Gupta"}}, {"text": "July 16, )", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19556, "end_char": 19566, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appropriate Governfrlent referred the industrial dispute to the Industrial Tribunal on July 16, )977."}}, {"text": ".A.K. Sircar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 19646, "end_char": 19658, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shrl .A.K. Sircar and Shri.", "canonical_name": "A.K .. Sircar"}}, {"text": "R.L. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 19669, "end_char": 19679, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.L. Gupta .were iiot workmen within the meaning of the expression in the Act and .therefore the appropriate Government had nojurisdiction to refer the dispute to the Industrial Tribunal and consequently-the Industi\"il.", "canonical_name": "R.T,. Gupta"}}, {"text": "Roop", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21376, "end_char": 21380, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "contended that in view of Shri Roop,\n\n~··\n\n~- ' ;\n\nWORKMEN v. HINDUSTAN LbVER LTD. ("}}, {"text": "WORKMEN", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 21396, "end_char": 21403, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "contended that in view of Shri Roop,\n\n~··\n\n~- ' ;\n\nWORKMEN v. HINDUSTAN LbVER LTD. ("}}, {"text": "HINDUSTAN LbVER LTD", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21407, "end_char": 21426, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "contended that in view of Shri Roop,\n\n~··\n\n~- ' ;\n\nWORKMEN v. HINDUSTAN LbVER LTD. (", "canonical_name": "HINDUSTAN LEVER LTD"}}, {"text": "January 24, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23030, "end_char": 23046, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "W-4 dated May 1, 1?57 did not spell\n\nout a complete concluded agreement between the parties on ihe points set oµt therein but it \\V.as an inchoate agreement in the stage of negotiations and therefore the employer wa& not bound to stand by its offer made in the comm,; nication dated January 24, 1957 deny- , ing to itself' the right to contest the."}}, {"text": "Roop Chandra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 23263, "end_char": 23275, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2,.it was hied that the award of Shri Roop Chandra in LD.", "canonical_name": "Ro-0p Chandra"}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 23571, "end_char": 23577, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "W-2,\n\nW3 & W-4 and therefore 'the industri.al dispute therein 'raised could not be adjudkated upon at Delhi, it being an AU-India dispute and ought to have been rai$e<l at Bombay, did not:opei:ate as resjuqivata\n\n. ...."}}, {"text": "s11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23718, "end_char": 23721, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hindustan Lever fyfozdoor Sabha", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 25097, "end_char": 25128, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The three impoi- ' tant clauses of the agreement emerging 'from the correspondence relevant to the present dispute are that (i) the Hindustan Lever fyfozdoor Sabha was tecognised by tbe employer as a representative union for all sctions."}}, {"text": "Industr.ial Tribunal at Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 26556, "end_char": 26586, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "nature in respect of the field force can.be raised at Bombay only and\n\nwithiµ the jurisdiction of the Industr.ial Tribunal at Bombay only ."}}, {"text": "December 22, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 27157, "end_char": 27174, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "at in respect of industrial disputes between the enwloyer and the 11nion concerning the field force including salesman in 1\"15\"1, 1959 and 1964: 'An averment to this effect is made in Paragraph 'H' of the petition for special leave and Anx .5 was annexed to the petition which purports to be the settlernent dated December 22, 1964.. Jt is signed by Shd C.J. Mahimkar, Joint Personnel Manager on ."}}, {"text": "C.J. Mahimkar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27197, "end_char": 27210, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "at in respect of industrial disputes between the enwloyer and the 11nion concerning the field force including salesman in 1\"15\"1, 1959 and 1964: 'An averment to this effect is made in Paragraph 'H' of the petition for special leave and Anx .5 was annexed to the petition which purports to be the settlernent dated December 22, 1964.. Jt is signed by Shd C.J. Mahimkar, Joint Personnel Manager on ."}}, {"text": "A.K. Basu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27273, "end_char": 27282, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "behalf of the employer and Shri A.K. Basu; General -Secretary of the union at the relevant time.", "canonical_name": "A.K.\n\nBasu"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 27573, "end_char": 27578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "employed in any part of India."}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27622, "end_char": 27645, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Hindustan Lever Mazdoor Sabha, Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 29051, "end_char": 29088, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "< agreed between the .company and the Hindustan Lever Mazdoor Sabha, Bombay that all matter."}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29353, "end_char": 29376, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Industrial . Tribunal. (Shri Roop Chandra", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 30421, "end_char": 30462, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Industrial ."}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31539, "end_char": 31562, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sec. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33591, "end_char": 33598, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33809, "end_char": 33816, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Pai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 34882, "end_char": 34885, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Pai, learned counsel on."}}, {"text": "Hans Raj", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 35486, "end_char": 35494, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Industrial Tribnnal constituted for the Union Tt'1\"ritory of Delhi; thcnpresided over.by Shri Hans Raj for adjudication of the following. ,", "canonical_name": "Hans .Raj"}}, {"text": "Hindustan Lever Mazdoor Sabha", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 37388, "end_char": 37417, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Company and the Hindustan Lever Mazdoor Sabha in )957.\" ("}}, {"text": "Nov. 17, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 38020, "end_char": 38033, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Apart frem the extracted specific contention i11 paragraphs 5 and 6, the contentio1i is elaborated by the employer and it was specifically contended that in the award dated Nov. 17, 1966 by Sh; i Roop Chandra, Addi."}}, {"text": "Industrial Tribunal, Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 38064, "end_char": 38090, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Industrial Tribunal, Delhi, it' was held that a valid agreeme1it was in existence between the parties and no dispute pertainfog to the members of the Field Force can be raised anywhere except in the State of Maharashtra."}}, {"text": "Maharashtra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 38272, "end_char": 38283, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Industrial Tribunal, Delhi, it' was held that a valid agreeme1it was in existence between the parties and no dispute pertainfog to the members of the Field Force can be raised anywhere except in the State of Maharashtra."}}, {"text": "Ro-0p Chandra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 38333, "end_char": 38346, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was further contended that the award of Shri Ro-0p Chandra was confirmed by the High Court of Delhi by summarily dismissing the Writ Petition No.", "canonical_name": "Ro-0p Chandra"}}, {"text": "High Court of Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 38368, "end_char": 38387, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was further contended that the award of Shri Ro-0p Chandra was confirmed by the High Court of Delhi by summarily dismissing the Writ Petition No."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 38513, "end_char": 38526, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1163/67 filed by the union against the award and when the union approached the Supreme Court in Appeal ."}}, {"text": "Hans .Raj", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 38744, "end_char": 38753, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "narration, Shri Hans .Raj .", "canonical_name": "Hans .Raj"}}, {"text": "Pal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 39969, "end_char": 39972, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Pal."}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 40231, "end_char": 40239, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Calcutta' Branch of the employer was coi1cerned only with marketing.··"}}, {"text": "Sec. 33A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40822, "end_char": 40830, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 40838, "end_char": 40861, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "[1973] 3 SCR 624", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 41711, "end_char": 41727, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sec. 33A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41921, "end_char": 41929, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Pai nexi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 43165, "end_char": 43173, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Pai nexi referred io an order in Refrp1ce (I.D}No."}}, {"text": "Ra1nan1urthi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 49238, "end_char": 49250, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Ra1nan1urthi, on the Other hand, contended that' it is not the contention."}}, {"text": "Roop Chandra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 49791, "end_char": 49803, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Industrial Tribu.nal presided over G by Shri Roop Chandra in f. D. No.", "canonical_name": "Ro-0p Chandra"}}, {"text": "Tnd11strial Tribunal at\n\nDelhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 50799, "end_char": 50829, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "only be raised i1t Bombay and .therefore the Tnd11strial Tribunal at\n\nDelhi had no.jurisdiction to entertain the same ... Even if the-teclinicaJ ·\n\npriciple .of res Judicta is imported In the field of industrial adjudication, the issue about the existence of an .agreemen(was substant, ially and directly in issue between the pa;:ties .in the earlier proceedings and was decided in the offirrnative that there exists.such an agreement."}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53003, "end_char": 53005, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "DesAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 53246, "end_char": 53251, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "HINDUSTAN LEVER LTD\" (DesAI, J,) '327\n\n.", "canonical_name": "DESAI"}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 58772, "end_char": 58795, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Pai", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 61314, "end_char": 61317, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Pai 9id not appear to be very enthusiastic to support the finding of the Tribunal that even if there is a binding agreement etween the parties and th.erefore, the employe 1s estopped\n\n(1) [1962] 1 L.L.J. 210."}}, {"text": "Sec. 2(s)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62416, "end_char": 62425, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s\n\n0", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62594, "end_char": 62598, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "A.K.\n\nBasu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 65419, "end_char": 65429, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the parties cannot override the statute and if th\\'refore Shri A.K.\n\nBasu is not .", "canonical_name": "A.K.\n\nBasu"}}, {"text": "Sec. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66040, "end_char": 66047, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_2_333_343_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "~· ,\n\nVINEET KUMAR\n\n, ' V, , . ~\n\nMANGAL SAIN WADHERE • January, s, !984 •\n\n[A, P. SEN AND.R, B. MISRA: JJ.j\n\nUttar Pradesh Urban Buildings ·(Regulation of 1,, etting, Rent aud. Eviction.) , Act, l 972 Section 2---:-lnterpretation of-fVhethel the pretnises which was not ten\n\nyears did' on the date of the suit and wus exen1pted fro111 the operadon of t!te new\n\nRent Act can he goierned by it, if ten yeilrs e.\\pircd during the pe11de11c_v of the litiga- lion so a.s: to._ attract the be1iefit of S.39'fo the tentiut-Caue of action \", w1bsequen1 e1•C111s\"\n\nand \"a111end11rent\" explained\n\n Section 2 of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings '(Regulation of Letting, Rent and EViction) Act, 1972 exempts fro1n operation of the ;\\ct various .kinds of buil\n\ndings 'specified in sub section (1).\n\nSub section (2) of SectiOn 2 co:rite1nplritcs .that the new Re.n( Act \\viii. nOt apply to a building during a prfod of ten years, fron1 thC ct'ate On \\Vhich its cOnsLruction is completed.\n\nExplanation I to ub Glause (2) e1uunerates the dates on which the.building shall be dcen1ed to.have been completed , viz., (1) the date of which the con1pletion thereof is reported to or othenvisc re\n\nc\"ord, ed by .the local authority having jurisdiction; (ii) in the case of building subject to assessment that date on which the first assessment thereof comes into. effect.\n\n(iii) Where the said dates are different, the earlie.st of the said .dates and (iv) in the -absence of any report recorcl. or asscss1nent, the date on which it: is actually occuPied for the first time: •\n\n:rhe respondent lftndlord filed a. sUit for eviction afid for arrears of rent and da1nages for use and\" occupation p\"e'ndent iite and future on the allegation that the appellant was inducted as a tenant of the premises i.1i sult on a monthly rent of . Rs. 250 on 7th .February 1972, ihat the building in suit was con.structed 'in 1971 under the Cooperative Housing Scheme of the State Bank of India for whih ihe bank-adVanced loan. that the building was assessed to house,. and \\.vatcT tax on 1st of October 1971 and as such the bU:ilding was not covered by the u.P. Urban .\n\nBuiidings (Regulatiori of Letting, Rent arid Eviction) Act, 1972 and that the appellri.nt . defau'lted in the payn1ent of rent despite notice dated 24th March 1977.\n\nThe appellant' resisted the si.iit and coritended. that the new Act applied as the buildin_g in question \\Vas constructed in 1968, that he' had cleared rent upto 6th Apiil 77 and th<!-t as a n1.atter of fact a sun1 of Rs. •ODO spent by hi1n towards repairs etc was due fron1 the Respondent landlord. ,\n\nThe Third Additional District Judge negatived' the defence and decreed the suit for cfiction as also for recovery of arre<lrs of 1:ent and damags for use and , occupation. The Trial court found that not .only both the conditions stated in\n\n'.Section, 2(2) but also the 1 S years' exe1nption applied to the instanJ case.\n\nTh~ High Court in revision acCepted the finding of the trial judge that the\n\nbuilding in quesJion will be deen1ed to .have been co1npleted on 1st 0ctober 1971, the date of assessment of house tax and water tax and caiculating frOn1 that date the building .\\vas not. ten years old on the date Of the suit an<l there'forc, the RC'1 rCnt- Act' had no' application to the building. in suit and the appellant cannot get any proteciori of the Rent Control Act.\n\nThe .High Court confirmed the fi_ndihgs of .the'trial court on aU-other point~ except the fihding -about the amOunts 'of rent .and the allowe_d the aI,>peal in part'.'t.\n\nAllowing the appeal partialfy~ the Court • • ' HELD: 1 ~1. The_provision ofthe Uttar Pradesh Urban Building{R.egllla~ tion of Letting, Rent and EViction) Act_ 1972 will be attractd, .if the building coni- f>letes \"ten years during the couse Or litigation. [340 0-Hl .\n\n1 :2. 'In the instant\" case, tli:e bui.ldirtg will be deemed to.have beeRcompleted on the date of assessment which \"\".as.1st OCto.ber, 1971. Reckoning frm this dit.te oLcompletion, the new Rent A.ct woul.d become applicable. Admittedly the bui1dng was not ten yeitrs old on the date of sUit. But during the pendeiicy of t.he litigation it co1npleted. ten years by 23rd February l 982 wheri-the Additibnal pistrict Jll; dge decide.d the case; entitling the appellant tO claim the benefit of Section .39 of the Act. [340 B'DJ .\n\n' I ·~ . ' ....\n\nD 0111 Prakash Gupta v. Dii Vijendra1; al Gupta, [1982] '2 S.C.C. 61; ditinguished ·\n\nG.··\n\nff'.\n\nand held in applicable- .\n\n1 :3. In the present cae, the benefit' of the .ne~ Ret Act sh0u1d be given to the app~Jlii.nt who only .seeks the protettion .of the new Rent Act which became :(l; pplicable to the preiniscs in question during the .pendency of thC litigation~ ~\n\n• [340 C-D) .\n\nSection 20 of the New Rent Act .provides a bar to a suit for eVictiOn of a.-tenant eXcept on the specified _grounds as: provided in the section. Subsection (4) of s.20 stipuJateS that in any_ suit fof viCtion On the grourids mentioned in Cl.(a) tO subs.(2), viz. the arrears of ren't, if at the first hearing of th'e suit the tenant in default Pays all arrears of rnt tothe landlord or .deposits in court the erttire arhount of rent an~ damages for us~ and occupation of.the building due from him, such dam.agCs . for use and occupation being calculated at the san1e rate as renr.together with interest thereon at the rate of nine per cent per annum: and the .Jandloi'd's.cost of the suit . ..,.- . '\n\n....\n\n.. in respect thereof after deducting therefrom any amount ii.lready deposited bY the tenant under , sub-s. (l) of s.30, the court n1ay, in lieu Of passing a decr~'for eviction on that ground, pass on order relieving thetenarit agairist his liability for evictfon oll that 8:round. Sections 39 and 40 of thii: nev.' Rent Act.also indicate that the benefit Or the new Act' will be given to the tencint if the conditions contemplated in those sections are satisfied. Section 39 also indicates that the paities' are entitled to make necessary amendment in their pleadings and to adduce additional evid.c1tce .\n\nw1'ere necessary. [342 D-0] ..\n\n. ' 2:1. Normally the Court has to decide the case on the basis of cause of ac.t-io_n that accrued prior. to the date .of filing the suit and not on a rie\\v causC of ac)-iop.\n\nBut it can a:nd in many case~ must, take into acebunt events and developh1clits\n\nubscquent to the institution of the proceeding provided the rles of fairness to both . sides are scropidouslr obeyed\". [341 A; ~] · .· 11\\· . '' \" -, ........ ·. c .; •• .. ! ·~\n\n~·.,\n\n~·,' ~·\n\n.. ..._\n\n'..· I • -.,\n\nVINEET KUMAk i'. MANGAL SAIN (Misra, J.) 335\n\nPasupati Ve~1kateswarlu. v. MOtor qnd General Traile; j~ [t97SJ 1 S.C.C. 110; applied. ·\n\n' ' ' 2 :2. Normally amendn1ent_ is not allowed, i( it changes the cause df aCtion.\n\nBut it is well recognised that where the amendment does not constitute an addtion ' of a new cause of action, or raise a new case,. bt .amounts' to no tporc than adding to the. facts already on. record, the amendment would be' allowed even iiftet the ·\n\nstutory period .. -'of iimitation. [341 GJ . . , ··\n\nA.K. Gupta & Sons v Da1nodar vai!ey. Co1pora~1'on, '[1966] 1.S.C.R. 796;; referred 'to.\n\nC1v1t APPELLATE. JURISJJICTION: Civil Appeal No .. 10144 of 1983.\n\nAppeal by Special leave froin the Judgment and Order dated the 20th July, 1983 of the Allahabad High Court in Civil Revision No. 237 of 1983. ·\n\n• G.L. Sanghi, K.K. Jain, A.b. Sanger and' Pramod Dayal for the Appellant..·\n\n'.!.D. Jain, Mrs.' Kawaljit Kochar and S.J{. Yadav for the Resp0ndent. ..\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered b.Y\n\n., ' MISl\\A, J. The present appeal by special ·!eave.is.directed against the jugnient of the High' C'ourt of Aliaha'!iad dated 20th July, 1983 disposing of a revisin under s.25 of the Small Causes Curt Act arising out of suit for eviction of the appellant from the premises in suit. ' - · ·\n\nThe respondent filed a suit for viction and for arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation pendente lite and future.on.the allegation that the appellant was inducted as a tenant of the premises in suit on a monthly rent of Rs. 250 on. 7fh Fbruary, 1972, that the building .in suit was constructed in 1971 under the co-operative housing scheme of the State Bank of India for whkh the Bank advanced . Joan. T.he building in suit was assessed to house'artd water tax 'on !st October, !,971 and as such the buildin, g was ilot covered. by the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the New Rent Act for short), :and that the defendant defaulted in the payment of rent despite notice . dated 24th March, 1977. The Respondent therefore terminated the. ·\n\ntenancy of the appellant.\n\nThe clai111 was resisted by the appellant on the ground that the building in question was constructed in J968 and that it wa.s covered by the new Rent Act. His•flirther stand was th.at rent. had been cleared upto 6th April, 1977 and thre was no default in ihe payment of rent.\n\nHe also challenged the service and the validity of the notice . termiilati11g his tenancy. Tlie appellani also claimed; he adjustment\n\nof Rs. 1000 spent by him towards the repairs of the premises. By a later amend.men! it was further pladed that the plaint having not been amended so as to bring the uit under the provisions of1he new Rent Act the suit was barrnd by s.20 of the Act.\n\nThe. Third Additional District Judge negatived the defence and decreed the suit for eviction as also foT recovery of arrears of rent and damages for use and oceur.ation. Ti1e learned Judie held that thebuilding was exempt from the o-peration of the nrw Re.nt Act on two grounds. The first ground was based upon sub-s.(2) of s.2 which provides th, it nothing in this Act shall apply to. a building durii1g the period. of ten. years. from the date on which its construction is completed. The second ground. wJs based upon the proviso to sub-s.\n\n(2) .of s.2,' which contemplates that where a huildii1g has been constructed substantially out of funds by way of loan or advance from the. State Government, or. Life Insurance Corporation of India or a bank or a co-operative society,· and the period or repayment' of such loan or advance.exceeds the aforesaid period of ten years, then reference in this sub-section to a period of ten years shall be deemed to be a reference to a period of fifteen years or the period ending .with the date of actual repayment of . each loan or advance,. including° interest, whichever is shorter. As the last instalment of the loan was paid in Ma.rch 1981. instead of ten years the building should be fifteen years old to attract the provisions bf the new Rent Act. He also held th'!t the appeUant !md failed to prove that he spent Rs. 1000 towards repairs of the premises. The learned Judge overruled the other pleas of the appellant and decreed .the suit as prayed for.\n\nThe appellant feeling aggrieved preferred a revision in the Hig\n\n0 h Court. It was contended for the appellant that th.e building in question had been constructed by a co-operative society and the landlord had purchased it from the society and, therefore, the view taken by the learned Judge that the building was constructed substantial!y out of funds obtained rr; m. the sources mentioned in the proviso to s.2(2) of. the new Rent Act was manifestly erro11eous. The High Court, however, did not express any concluded opinion . and rest contended . by observing that it was not 1iecessary to examine the suqmission\n\n...\n\n~-··\n\nVJNEET KUMAR v. MAN(lALSAJN (Misra. J.)' 337\n\nin any detail or to express any cllncluded opinion abo.ut it for disposal of the present revision. The High Court, however, accepting the finding or' the learned Additional Distric\\ Judge that. the. building in question wiU be dec; ncd to have been completed on I st October, 1971, the date of assessment of house tax and water tax held that the building was not ten years old on. the date.of the suit and. therefore, the new Rent Act had n.o applica\\ion to the building iii suit and the appellant cannot get any protection of tlle new Rent Act.\n\nThe High Co.urt confirmed the findings of the trial Court on all other points except the finding about the arrears of rent. In the 9pinion of the High Court admittedly a sum of Rs. 1000had been paid by the appellant to the landlord through a crossed cheque dated !6th August, 1976 which was received by the landlord on .15th September, 1976.. 13ut when the plaintiff was in the witness box payment by cheque was not specifically plit lo him and it has noc been esta~\n\nblished as to for which period the payment by cheque was made.\n\nThe counter-foil of the cheque book also didnot specify the period for which this payment by cheque was made. The High Court, however, did not endorse the fir1ding of the Additional District Judge that the payment through the cheque may have been made by the appellant towards rent for some period. prior to April 7; 1976 and held it to be manifestly erroneous and •without any . basis.\n\nIn the result High Court allowed the 'appeal in part and set aside.the decree of the trial court relating to the recovery of Rs. '3158-30 as arrears of rent for the period between.AJ?ril 7, 1976 and April 25, 1977 and remanded the case to _the trial court for redetern1ination of the amount of rent in arrears payable by the appellant after affording opportunity to 'the plaintiff to explain the .payment of the amount of Rs. 1000- .through cl1eque dated A.ugust 16, 1976. The-trial court was further directed to afford opporiuuity to the parties to adduce further evidence in regard to this aspect. ·\n\n. E.\n\nThe appellant has now approached this Court with an pplication G for special leave to appeal.\n\nOn the date of summary hearing of the applicati6i1 under Art .. 136 of the Constitution.we granted special leave and with the consent of the coup.sel for t\\te parties ., ye finally :heard the appeal to obviate . further delay. • H\n\n'. . .\n\n338 SUPREME couR.t REPORTS\n\n. [1984] 2 S.C.R.\n\n'• . The only point argued before this Court is. whether the. premises which was not ten years' old on the date of the suit and was exempted from the oper.ation of the new .Rent AC!, ca'n be governed by it if ten years. expired during the pendency of the litigation. In order -to appreciate the cote'htion of the parties it will be relevent at this stage_ to refer to s. 2 of the new rent Act.\n\nIt pertinently reads : • ,\n\n\"2. Exemption fr'Om opertion of Act.-(1) nothing in this.\n\nAct shall apply to--\n\n(a) . . . . ; .. ' ....\n\n(b) . . . . . . . .....\n\n(c) .. . . . . . . . . . .\n\n(d) ............\n\n(e) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\n\n(f) ·any building built and held by' a society registered under the Societies registration Ac( 1860 (Act No. LVIIT of\n\n1860) or by a co-operative society, company orfi.rm and intended solely for its own occupation or for the occupation of any of its officers or servants, whether on rent ot free. of rent, or as a guest house, by whatever. name\n\ncad, for the occupation of persons having dealings with it in the ordinary course of business.· ·\n\n(2) Except as provided in sub-sectin (5) of Section. 12, sub-section.(IA-) of section 21; sub'section (2) of Section 24, Sections 2.4-A, 24-B, :>4-C or su_b-section (3) of Section 29,\n\nn<; ithing in this Act .shall apply to a building during a period of ten years froin the date .on which its construction is completed : ·\n\nProvided that where any· building is constructed substantially out of funds obtained by way of 10an or advance froin the Stae Government or the Life Insurance Corporation oflndia or a bank or a co-operative society or the Uttar Pradesh Avas Evam Vika:s Parishad, and 'the , period of repayment of such _loan or advance exceeds the aforesaid period .. of ten years then the referenc; e in this sub-section to the period often years shan be deemed to be a reference to the period of fifteen years or the -period ending with the date of\n\nactuarepayment of each loan or advance(including interest),. whichever. is shorter. ·\n\n...\n\n...\n\nVINEET .. KUMAR v . . MANGAL SAIN (Misra, J.) . 339\n\nExplanation J.-For the purposes of this sub-section,-\n\n(a) the construction of a building shall be deemec! to have been completed on the date. on which the completion thereof is reported to or otherwise recorded by the local authority having jurisdiction and in, the case ofa buiJ-· . ding subject to assessment; the date on which th.e first\n\nassessrnent thereof .comes into effect and where the said dates are different, the earliest f the said dates, and in the ab's.ence of any such 'report, record _or assessment, the date on. which it. is actually occupied (not . including occupation merely for the purposes of supervising the. construction or guarding the building under c constructtion) for th~ first time :\n\nProvided that there may be different dates of completio.n of construction .. in respec.t of different parts of a building which are .either designed as separate units or are occupied\n\n~ . . ·. separately by the landlord and one or more tenants or by. different tenants ;\n\nExplanation IL- .................................... .\n\nExplanation Jil.-A building shall be qeemeci to be con. structed substantiaJly out of funds obta.ined from sources mentioned in the p1:oviso, if the funds obtain.ed from one or more of such .sources account for more than one-half of the cost of construction.\"\n\n~ Section 2 of tlie Act provides various kinds of buildings. to which the new Rent Act has no application. Sub-sectio'n (2) of s.2 contemplates tha.fthe new Rent Act.will not apply to a building during. a period of ten years from the date oti. which its construciion is com- . pleted. Explanation I to sub-s. (2) enumerate~ the dates o~ which the building shall be deemed to have been completed :-\n\n(i) The date on which the completion thereof. is reported to or otherwise recorded by' the local authority having G\n\n(ii)\n\n. jurisdiction. . .\n\nIn case of °building subject to assessment, that date on which. the first assessment there~.f eornes into effect.\n\n(iii) Where ihe said date~ are different, the earliest of the said. .\n\nH . dates.\n\n.. •\n\n. 340\n\n(iv)\n\nSUPRfiME COURT REPORTS\n\n[I 984] 2 S.C.R.\n\nTn the absence of any such report, record or asse.ssment the date on which it is actually occupied for the first .. time:\n\nTn the case in hand thebuilding was subject to assessment therefore it will be deemed.to have been completed on the.date of assessment\n\nwhich was lst October, 1971.· The Additional District Judge has found that the building will be deemed'to have been completed. on the date of assessment of the house \\vhich ha....- been accepted by the High Court. ' •\n\nThe moment a building becomes ten years old .. to be reckoned from the date of completion. the. new Rent Act wot1ld become applicable. Admittedly the building was not. ten years old on the date of suit. But during th2. pendenc:y of the litigation it complet'd ten years .. Then the question arises whether the new Rent Act will be attracted i_f the building completes ten years during the course of litigation. The Additional District Judge decided tlic case .on 23rd February 1982: By that time the building in question had completed ten years.\n\n. The trial court. however, relying on a recent decision of this Court -in Om Prakash Gupta. v .. Dig Vijandrapa!. Gupta\"' refused to apply the new Rent Act to ihe building in question.\n\nTn that case a contention was raised that the building will be deemed to have been constructed on the date of occupation on 16th June, 1967 and not on the date . of the first assessment and if that be so, the appellant would be entitled to the bei1efit of s.39 of the Act on the. date when the revision came\n\nto b~ decided by the High Cofot on 23rd March, 1978. This cot1rt, 1 however, held that it is the date of the first assessme11t which will be deemed to be the date of completion of the c6nstruction in the circumstances of the case and in that view of the matter tile buildirtg had not becom' more than ten years old on the date when the revision '1 came to be decided by the. High Court and, therefore, there was no question of giving the benefit of s.3? of the Act to the appellant .It\n\nwas not al'.all necessary in .that case. to deal -WtJy the question \\Vhe1her _the appellant would be entitled to the benefit of s.39 as the building\n\nhad not beco1ne ten years old on .'the date when the reviSion petition was heard.\n\nJn the insta1lt case, however, the bniJding had become more thah _ten yea)\"s old durii1g the pendency of the l_igitation_ and, t!1erefo_re, th~ questio1~ assumes importance 111 the present case,\n\n. (I) [1982t 2 S.C.C. 61.\n\nVINEET KUMAR v. MANGAL SAIN (Misra, J.) 341 ' .\n\nIt may be argued that the Court had to decide the case on the A basis of cause of actwn that accrued prior to the date .of filing .the suit and not on a new. cause of action, bui this question need nc5t detain us as it is coveted by decision of this Cour! in Pasupati\n\nVenkates1ar/11 v. Motor and General T'rades01 Dealing with a similar question this Court observed :\n\n \"It is basic to our processual jurisprudence that the right to relief .must be judged to exist as on the date a suitor ins titutes the legal proceeding. Equally clear is the principle that procedure is th,. ha.ndmaid and not the mistress of the judicial process. ff .a fact, arising after the /is has come to\n\neourt and has a fundamental impact on the right to relief or the manner of moulding it, if brought diligently to the J10tice of the tribunal, it cannot blink at it or be blind to events which stultify or render 'inept the decretal remedy. Equity justifies bending the rules of procedure, where no specific provision or fairplay is not violated, with aview to pomote substirntial justice'-; subject, of course to the absence of.other disentitling . factors or just Circun1stances. Nor can 1.ve. conteniplate any 'limitation .ori this power to take note of updated facts to confine it to the friaI Court.. Tf the litigation pends, the power exists, absent . other special cirCu1nstances epeliing r1JSort to that course in law or ju_stice. Rulings on this point are 1egiC?n, even as situations for applications of this equitable ·\n\nrule are myriad. We affirm the' propositi.on that for maki1rnthc, right or remedy claimed \".by the party just and meaningful as also legally and. factually in accord with the current realities. the Court can, and in many cases must. take cautious cong\"' n.i.sancc of events and developments subseq,, uent to the institu-. tion of the proceeding provided the rles of fairness to both\n\nsids are scrupulously o.beyd. \"·\n\nNormally amendment is not allo;,.ed if it changes the cause o( action. But it is well reco.gnised that where th.e aine~1dment .does not COllStitute an addition of a llC\\V cause of action, or raise a new , case; but amounts to no more than adding to the facts already on the record the amendment, would be allowed even after the statutory period of lin1itation.\n\nTh~ questiqn in the present case is .whether by seeking the benefit of s,39 or the new Aci there . is a Change in the cause of action. 111 A.K. Gupta & Sons. v.\" Da111odar\n\n0). [1975] l s.c.c. 770.\n\nE •\n\nValley C; rporiion 10 this Court dealing with the observed as foilows : catis.e of action\n\n\"The expression \"cause of action\" il) the present context does llOt mean\" every fae\\ which it is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to .succeed\". as was said in Cooks v .\n\n. Gi/l12 ' in a differentcontext,. for if it were so. no material fact could evei: be amended or added and, of course, no one would want to. cha.nge or add an immaterial allegation by amendment. That 'expression for the. present purpose only means, a new clai, m made on a new liasi~ co.nslituteci by new . facts. Such a .view was taken in Rabinson v. Unicos Property Corporation LtJ.<3l and it seems to us to be the only possible view t~ take. Any oth~.r view would make. the rule futile.\"\n\nThe appellant' in th~ present case only seeks the protedion of the new Rent .Act whith becanie applicable to the premises in question during .the pendency of the litigation:· We. see no reason why the benefit of the new Rent Act be not given to the a ppelJant. Section 20 . of the new 'Rent Act provides a bar to a suit for .eviction of'a tenant except on the specified grounds as provided in. the sect.ion. Sub section (4) of s.20 stipulates that in a; ny suit for eviction on the grounds .. mep'tioned in cl, (a) to subS. {2),•.viz. the arrears of n; nt, if af the first hearing of the suit the tenant in default pays all arrears of rent .to the landlord or deposits. in court the entire. an1ount of rent and damages for use and occupation oft.he building due from him, such domages for use and occupation being calculated at th.e same rate as rent together with interst' thereon at the rate of nine per cent per 'tnnum and the land.lord's. cost of the suit in rcspeet thereof after . deducting there froin any amount al<eady deposited by the tenant under subs .. (I) of s.30, the court' may, in lieu of passing a decree for eviction on that ground, pass ail order relieving the tenant against his Fab'iity for eviction on. that' ground .. Sections 39 and 40.of the new rent Act. also indicate that the.-bcnefit of the new Act will be given to. the. tenant' if the conditions contemplated in. those sections are satisfied. Section 39 also indicates that 'the parties are entitled to make necessary arriendment in thei:r pleadings and to adduce addi~ . tional evidence where necessary.' . ' . .\n\nFor the reasons given above the appeal must' succeed, It is accordingly allowed in par\\ and_ the judgment and 'decree of the High ..\n\n(1) [1966] I S.C.R. 796. ,\n\n(2) [1873] LR B C.P. 107, 117\n\n(3) [1962] 2. All. E.R. 24.\n\nVINEBt KUMAR v. MANGAL SAIN (Misra, J.) 343\n\nCourt is set aside in so far as it relates io eviction but ihe judgment A of the High Court setting aside the decree for arrears of rent and remanding the case to the trial court remains intact, and the case is sent back to th.e III Additional District Judge who will apply the new Rent Act and give the protection of the new Act to .the appellant and wi11 give him an opportunity to deposit the dues contemplated by s.39 of the new rent Act after firsi determining whether any amoµnt\n\n• B is due from the appellant towards rent as directed by the High Court. The costs here will abide the result.\n\nS. R.\n\nAppeal alfowed in part.", "total_entities": 51, "entities": [{"text": "VINEET KUMAR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6, "end_char": 18, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VINEET KUMAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MANGAL SAIN WADHERE", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 34, "end_char": 53, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MANGAL SAIN WADHERE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 80, "end_char": 86, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "B. MISRA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 94, "end_char": 102, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.B. MISRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 202, "end_char": 211, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S.39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 497, "end_char": 501, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 589, "end_char": 598, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4750, "end_char": 4760, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4913, "end_char": 4917, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5573, "end_char": 5577, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 39 and 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5740, "end_char": 5758, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5923, "end_char": 5933, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "VINEET KUMAk", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6572, "end_char": 6584, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "VINEET KUMAk i'.", "canonical_name": "VINEET KUMAR"}}, {"text": "MANGAL SAIN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6589, "end_char": 6600, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MANGAL SAIN (Misra, J.) 335\n\nPasupati Ve~1kateswarlu.", "canonical_name": "MANGAL SAIN WADHERE"}}, {"text": "G.L. Sanghi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7403, "end_char": 7414, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• G.L. Sanghi, K.K. Jain, A.b."}}, {"text": "K.K. Jain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7416, "end_char": 7425, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• G.L. Sanghi, K.K. Jain, A.b."}}, {"text": "A.b. Sanger", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7427, "end_char": 7438, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• G.L. Sanghi, K.K. Jain, A.b."}}, {"text": "Pramod Dayal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7444, "end_char": 7456, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sanger and' Pramod Dayal for the Appellant..·\n\n'.!.D. Jain, Mrs.' Kawaljit Kochar and S.J{."}}, {"text": "Kawaljit Kochar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7498, "end_char": 7513, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sanger and' Pramod Dayal for the Appellant..·\n\n'.!.D. Jain, Mrs.' Kawaljit Kochar and S.J{."}}, {"text": "S.J{. Yadav", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7518, "end_char": 7529, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sanger and' Pramod Dayal for the Appellant..·\n\n'.!.D. Jain, Mrs.' Kawaljit Kochar and S.J{."}}, {"text": "s.25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7771, "end_char": 7775, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State Bank of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8249, "end_char": 8268, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "7fh Fbruary, 1972, that the building .in suit was constructed in 1971 under the co-operative housing scheme of the State Bank of India for whkh the Bank advanced ."}}, {"text": "6th April, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8951, "end_char": 8966, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "had been cleared upto 6th April, 1977 and thre was no default in ihe payment of rent."}}, {"text": "s.20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9383, "end_char": 9387, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9725, "end_char": 9728, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9952, "end_char": 9955, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Life Insurance Corporation of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10106, "end_char": 10141, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Life Insurance Corporation of India or a bank or a co-operative society,· and the period or repayment' of such loan or advance.exceeds the aforesaid period of ten years, then reference in this sub-section to a period of ten years shall be deemed to be a reference to a period of fifteen years or the period ending .with the date of actual repayment of ."}}, {"text": "s.2(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11311, "end_char": 11317, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "April 7; 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12963, "end_char": 12976, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "prior to April 7; 1976 and held it to be manifestly erroneous and •without any ."}}, {"text": "cl1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13484, "end_char": 13487, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14402, "end_char": 14406, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15190, "end_char": 15200, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15221, "end_char": 15231, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15233, "end_char": 15243, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15284, "end_char": 15294, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh Avas Evam Vika", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15658, "end_char": 15686, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "12, sub-section.(IA-) of section 21; sub'section (2) of Section 24, Sections 2.4-A, 24-B, :>4-C or su_b-section (3) of Section 29,\n\nn<; ithing in this Act .shall apply to a building during a period of ten years froin the date .on which its construction is completed : ·\n\nProvided that where any· building is constructed substantially out of funds obtained by way of 10an or advance froin the Stae Government or the Life Insurance Corporation oflndia or a bank or a co-operative society or the Uttar Pradesh Avas Evam Vika:s Parishad, and 'the , period of repayment of such _loan or advance exceeds the aforesaid period .. of ten years then the referenc; e in this sub-section to the period often years shan be deemed to be a reference to the period of fifteen years or the -period ending with the date of\n\nactuarepayment of each loan or advance(including interest),."}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17429, "end_char": 17438, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17554, "end_char": 17557, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Then the question arises whether the new Rent Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18980, "end_char": 19029, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "23rd February 1982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19170, "end_char": 19188, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Additional District Judge decided tlic case .on 23rd February 1982: By that time the building in question had completed ten years."}}, {"text": "s.39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19697, "end_char": 19701, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Then the question arises whether the new Rent Act", "statute": "Then the question arises whether the new Rent Act"}}, {"text": "23rd March, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19785, "end_char": 19801, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "date when the revision came\n\nto b~ decided by the High Cofot on 23rd March, 1978."}}, {"text": "s.3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20199, "end_char": 20202, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20365, "end_char": 20369, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24264, "end_char": 24274, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24430, "end_char": 24434, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25076, "end_char": 25080, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 39 and 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25245, "end_char": 25263, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25428, "end_char": 25438, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "III Additional District Judge who will apply the new Rent Act and give the protection of the new Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26096, "end_char": 26196, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s.39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26284, "end_char": 26288, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "III Additional District Judge who will apply the new Rent Act and give the protection of the new Act", "statute": "III Additional District Judge who will apply the new Rent Act and give the protection of the new Act"}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_2_344_347_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "344 \\ jLIGURI MUNICIP~UTY & OTHERS\n\n)',\n\nAMALF.NDU DAS & OTHERS\n\n. Jaouarr 6 I 984\n\n(A.P. SEN AND M.P. THAKK, IR, JJ.]\n\nComtitlllwn of India /950. Articlrs /J(j & ) ]6. [\n\nHigh Cmm-Procuding.< wulrr Articlt 2215-Vu/idity of tu.t or kr.r ~\"\"' tinntd-Stay. u! rccnvry cf 1~-'C o,. /vy c/aimrd-Fi1cturs to b~ tol/.fll/<'rfd bJ H;,; Court bt{uregro, rt o{Uurim sra.v~\n\nSuprmt Curl-/ntcr/rtm:e wlrh lnt, r/ocmory ort!r of Hixh Court grtD~:tq stay of rf!Cnvtr.Y of tax-When arf.r; r.\n\nTile appellant Muuic.:ip01lity in it> Appeal by Special U.we impugnoi ll< interlocutory order or the High Courl rcstmtnin.:. che lunicipaHiy from r..;..'()\\(!ir.: a graduated consohdate<l r.uc on the unnuai value of the holding' in t<nn<uf c'< amendtd provisions in soctioru .i:!J nnd 04 of the llcngal Munic1pal A<l, 19;:, amended hy the Bonsai Mumcipal (Amendment) Act, 19SO. '\n\nAllowing the Appeal,\n\nHELD : J. The H ish Coun •hould not in roin~ under Ar1iclc 2:!6,!\n\nI he Con)titution grnnl any \"t.ay of recovery qf tuX s., t\\'C unJc..r very . ''\"-cul circumstttncc:, The &r:tnt uf stay in uch matlcn, :JlouiJ be an cxc..rnon and I\" a rule. P45~1\n\nTh 1.. · • • ,. p zuioc• 2. e ..:')' ur unpOt do.:~ not bc.'\\:omc.; b . .ul a' 'Uun as a \\\\ nl c: tbc in, lltulc<i to a .. \"'il tt.c \\alidi l)' of lhc levy. 'fher..: i~ no \\\\:.trrant for rc, umnli .o( levy lu b~ rod at the V<ry thre>huiJ or !he l)rC.:t cthng,, The maul purpol< [l.J\\):nc an int:rim order is tu evolve u ork;•bl~ furmuJJ. of d \"'or'k:iblc ttrr_J\"st\" nt<llt to !he c.\"cnl t:llie<l lur by tho dcmaq\\h 1>f th~ si!uuuu. Thu on)} co>fil'lcl>\" !ion at that jullCturc i, to CH$Ufc that no prcjudo, c is octMionL\"tl 10 tha: tepa):\n\nzn c\"\"' I he~ ultimat.dy suc-=J. Thi• obie<:l un be :1twio\"l hy r\"~0\"\"-' -.1 Aulhority k't-yi11i •he i•nrn'l Ill lvo un uJcrwkius 111 n:funJ or •~Ju, tthc \"'~ .U•liOunt U¥--oin, t futun: doc;, in the CV\\!Ill uf the t:lltin: h,:vy Of a f\"UI the~ Nitf\n\nulhm:ucly h<ld 10 1>.: in\\'alid by zhe Court.· ('45 GH; 3~1> AI\n\n. 3 The . · · . ~, r\\•tol: m.un purpo...c of fM11\\IOg un Jnlc.c11n IJr\\Jr ~~•II) C:\\'ohc a . ('(~\n\nrmn~JJ or. a orkaql(; arrngclllcnt IO !he 'c.rcnl caJi<J fur hy lhO ,~,:IIlii~~ vf ell<\n\n'tt~111'~11 kcc:pmg IU n11Hd lht! t>n.:.lUITl(ltion rcg-..lrJ.in¥ the tomiiiUthlllhiJ _ e1t*\n\nkv~<luun and Ill~ vuln.:rahiilly of tc ch'lll.:nKe, llnly is llfl.kr lhat no zrn:l\" \"'1°'?' \" . O<C\"J>on..\"<l. The Court ha• th~., r,.,.e to moe a ddi.:tc t>J]a•., .. • o>JI\n\non, td~~H\\¥ the pros and cons uf tho Ol.ttter fe, l l.ugr lmblic ittttrCS' .s\n\nJ<OilJr~OLc-.1 and iohtitutional OlllbJrJ\"!tlcllt ;, ,..,.,.r.,.., cJ. [H6H; H7,\\} •\n\n.- :.:_=.:.- .;.....;- -- ~--·\n\nl . . ;\n\n~ 'I\n\n!I' ; . -: L'\n\n:-,_\n\nI ,_\n\n\\ .\n\nI~ i l ,.\n\nl~ r\n\nSII.IOURT MUNICIPALITY V. A. DAS ( Sc'l!, J.) 345\n\n4. The Court ha• to •h.ow aware~~· of .r_he fact tat in the case of a ftJ11ic•pllitY it cannot fncun or mc:cr •L, ~ancal oblig:lllons if !ls source of\n\n~ l$ blocked by an tntcnm order rcsrr.unmg ot from rcco, cring the taxes o.s ,.-nue . . · Tl M . • 1' h · • the impugned provrsoon. • te . umcopa tty as to marntarn es.cnrial civic scr- r run public institutioi\\S, purcha~ supphC$ and poy the salaries of irs cmplo)c..~ '\"'\"'The grant of an interlocutory order wo uld JY, lrlne the ac!ministrntion and ~tc the entire working. Th,-.c seriou• rnmilica1i0n• were lost siht of by The Hish Court' in The in.rant cn<c while makrng the imrrned order. [346 CD]\n\nCIVIL Arrr:tlATE JurHSr>rcnnN: Civi1 Arpcal No. 762. of 1984.\n\n;\\pp~:tl by sr~ial leave for an interlocutory <>rdcr dated August J5. !933 of th~ C:k-utta High Curt.\n\nK. K._ Venugnpol, N.N. Gnp111 and H K. Puri for the Appellants.\n\nS.L. A•rc, ja for til~ Rcpandc nt.\n\nThe Or.!Lr of tli~ Court w.1~ del ivcrd by ...\n\nSE-;, J. T;1i\\ appa l by sp:cial kavc is directed ag:tinst on\n\nimrltr.utory order dated Aur•~'t ::s. 1983 pas,; eu by the Calcutt<J Hrgh Court rstraining the Siliguri 1\\.Iuni.:ipality, the appellant herein.\n\n_frm covering a grtdl!Itld ct.•nsolid'!tcd rate on th~ annual valu~ of\n\nth~ holding~ in terms of the amcnd•d ptovisic-ns in ss. i23 and P4 of th: B~g:1l M u ni•:ipal Act. I?J:!. a~ amcndd b~ the Bengal Municipal\n\n{t\\ :n ~•t.lrn\"nt) Act, I 'J~O. . ·\n\nW~. arc constmin~J •o mke the obsct\\'ations which follows us\n\ne de, feel dima\\'cJ a t the tcndcncv on the part of some of the fl•gh C'nurt~ to g-rant interlocutory rdcrs for the mere usking. Nor~ rl!y, th~ lligh Court~ h\\.luiJ n u l, ; IS u rule. in proceedings under u ~~- .2:!1) of th~ Constitution gr!lnt any stay of recovery of tax save\n\nIll, r very ccpti, m;~ l cin:um, tance~. The gnnlt of st<Jy in such ·\n\nJl!cr~ h l . • ou d b~ ; Ill eccpllrn anu not a rult.\n\nIt . . . .\n\nh.td . h 01:\\:dl~\\ to strcs th •• t a leV)' or 1m post docs not become\n\noftha•~ soon~~~ a w6t p:titi,, n is intiru tcd in ortkr to assail the valiity ' b4d .\n\n0 levy. So als\" there i~ nn w:m ant for presuming the levy to be;. at th• v h Th 1 'd t'on at tl . . • •ry t rcltoltl uf the pwc.:ed1ngs. c on y con$1 era 1 1•tt Jun t .. · · d t the rJt• urc 1s to cnsur~ th; tt nn pr~Jud1 r.:e 1~ occastonc o\n\npr~ l~:r~ il1 cu.~~ th.:y ultimatdy succeed at the conclusion of the CqiJno, Tl · h b d r ijlh . e us oi:ljl'ct c:tn hL' att.:rincu b)' rcqumng t e c Y \" lrJ[y lc • fi d V>'Jng the imp.,~ t to give a n undertaking to re un or\n\nF ..\n\n :---.~~\n\n[l984J2~.c.l_ \\ adiust against future dues, the levy of tax or rate or a part tl\n\nSUPREJI!B COUR! REPORTS\n\n\" . f 1 • \\ereor as the case may be; m the event o t 1e entire levy or a part th • being ultimately held to be inv111id by the Court withouf oblor the taltpayers to institute a civil suit in order to claim the a~!:~ I already recovered from them. On the other hand, the Coun can pe unmindful of the need to protect the authority levying th~ ~~ for, at that stage the Court has to proceed on the hypothesis tha;\n\nthe challenge may or may not succeed .. The Court has to show .awareness of the fact that in a case like the present a municipalitv\n\ncannot function or meet its fiiiancial obligations if its source of re\\'111; is blocked by an interil!l order restraining the_ municipality from recovering the taxes as per the impugned provision. And that tt~ . municipality has to maintain essential civic services like water supply. street lighting and public streets etc., apart from running public institutions like schools, dispensaries, libraries etc. What is more, supplies have to be purchased and salaries have to be paid. The grant\n\nof an interlocutory order of this nature would paralyze the ac.lmini>tra 'tion'and disloJcate the entire working of the municipJlity. It ms\n\nthat these serious ramifications 'of the matter were lost sight of while\n\nmaking the impugned order.\n\nWe will b~ failing in our duty if we do not IHlvert to a fellute which causes us dismay and distress. On a. prvious OCCl>ion, Division Bench had vacated an interim order passed by a learned Single Judge on similar facts in a similar situatio11. Even so wl1c~ 8 similar matter giving rise to the present appeal cme up anain, tl\\CS3me lear11cd Judge whose order had been reversed earlier, granted a non sp!aking interlocutory order of the aforesaid nature.· This orMr was in turn confirmed by a Division .Bench without a speaking onler\n\n'J nhld art1cu at1ng reasoi)S for granting a stay when the earlier enc . vacated the stay .. W.:. m~n no disrespect to the High Court 10 emphasizing the necessity for self-imposed di6cipline in such mottel'l in obeisance to such weighty institutiOilJl considerations li~~ the\n\n' t • d1srt~· neeu o ma1ntam decorum nnu comity. So ulso we man no h p:ct to the High Court In ,; trl!ssing the need for self-discipline 00 ~\n\npart of the High Court in rasin\" interim orders without entern~ .\n\nI . • . . \"' . f I, thg\" mto t 1e question of arnphtude ond width of the powrs <1 1 1.' a\\ Court .to grant interim relief. The main purpose of passing un\n\n11;~; t~ order u to evolve a workable formula or a workable arrange~ nJ the extent called for by the demands of the situation kcepinll 1~ tn~ , g tl . ' J 1sloU• 1e presumptiOn regarding the constitutionality of the eg ble and the vulnerability of the challenge only 1n 0. rder that no irrePo~ 1e · · · • . deli\"~ InJury u occasioned. The Court hns therefore to st!lke a\n\n) __..\n\nSlLIGURl MUNICIPALITY V. A. DAS ( Sell, J.) 347\n\n: .. · baince after cosid; rin~ the pos and co_ns ?f te matter lest larger A ;;; ·. public interest ts not JCopardtzcd and msttluttonal cmbarassment .\n\n~· ·,\n\nI • • i\n\ni •' i : ..\n\nis eschewed.\n\n. . For these reasons, the jippeal must bc~; allowcd. The order passed . by the High. Court dated Augu; t 25, 1983 rcstraning the Siliguri\n\nMunicipality from recovering a graduated consolidated rate on the annual value of the holdings in terms of the amended provisions contained in ss. 123 and 12~ of the Bcogal Municipal (Amendment) Act, 1980 is set aside. We wish to pla~:c on record that Shri Venugopal appearing with Shri Naro Narayan Gooptu has given an undertaking on behalf of the Siliguri Municipality that the municipality shall rcrund the dil\\crcnce between the revised and the old rates within three months of tl1e o.rdcr of the High. Court in case the writ petition ·. is finally allowed by the .High Court... · ·\n\nTltcre shall be no order .as to costs.' ..\n\nN.V.K. .Appeal allowed.", "total_entities": 12, "entities": [{"text": "AMALF.NDU DAS & OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 41, "end_char": 63, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "AMALENDU DAS & OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A.P. SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 85, "end_char": 93, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SII.IOURT MUNICIPALITY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2704, "end_char": 2726, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l~ r\n\nSII.IOURT MUNICIPALITY V. A. DAS ( Sc'l!,"}}, {"text": "K. K._ Venugnpol", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3576, "end_char": 3592, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. K._ Venugnpol, N.N. Gnp111 and H K. Puri for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "N.N. Gnp111", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3594, "end_char": 3605, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. K._ Venugnpol, N.N. Gnp111 and H K. Puri for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "H K. Puri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3610, "end_char": 3619, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. K._ Venugnpol, N.N. Gnp111 and H K. Puri for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "s. 1983", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3823, "end_char": 3830, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "art1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7240, "end_char": 7244, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 123 and 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8781, "end_char": 8795, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Venugopal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8895, "end_char": 8904, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We wish to pla~:c on record that Shri Venugopal appearing with Shri Naro Narayan Gooptu has given an undertaking on behalf of the Siliguri Municipality that the municipality shall rcrund the dil\\crcnce between the revised and the old rates within three months of tl1e o.rdcr of the High."}}, {"text": "Naro Narayan Gooptu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8925, "end_char": 8944, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We wish to pla~:c on record that Shri Venugopal appearing with Shri Naro Narayan Gooptu has given an undertaking on behalf of the Siliguri Municipality that the municipality shall rcrund the dil\\crcnce between the revised and the old rates within three months of tl1e o.rdcr of the High."}}, {"text": "Siliguri Municipality", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8987, "end_char": 9008, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We wish to pla~:c on record that Shri Venugopal appearing with Shri Naro Narayan Gooptu has given an undertaking on behalf of the Siliguri Municipality that the municipality shall rcrund the dil\\crcnce between the revised and the old rates within three months of tl1e o.rdcr of the High."}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_2_348_385_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "• A\n\nG ,\n\nRAM CHANDRA MAWA LAL AND OTHERS ETC.\n\nSTATE OF UITAR PRADESH ANJ? OTHERS ETC.\n\nJanuary 9, 1984\n\n[S. MURTAZA FAZA)'., Au, A. VARADA.RAJAN AND M.P. THAKKAR. JJ.]\n\nDefence of India Rules, 1971 pro111ulgated under'De}ence of Jncli~ Act. 1971- Rllle 114-Inrerpretation of-Wh6ther State Govern111e11t can fix price of Im article declared to be essential c; ornn1odity under the Essential Conunodities Act, 1955 in , respect of which Central Government has alrearlv fixed priee under Fertilizer (Control)' Ofcler, 1957 pron111Jftated under the Essen; ial Co1111nodities Act, /955.\n\nDefence of flu/ia Rules, 1971-Rule 114 (3) (h)-Scope <~/'-Expression •any' article-includes fertilize_rs.\n\nInterpretation-Rule of-What is test for ascertaining whethe;. conflict between.\n\nCentral and State statf/tes irreconcilale . .\n\nUttar .Pradesh Fertilizer Prices (S11pple1nentary) Order, 1974-Validity of\n\nOn ()ctober 11, 1973, the Central Govenuncnt in en.:'ise of power under\n\ncl. (3) of the Fertilizers (Control) Order, 1957 pron1ulgated under s. 3 of the Essential Commoditic5 Act, 1955; issued a notification fixing the maximun1 retail selling price of certain fertilizer \\vhich de'alers t:ould charge from consu1ners leaving with the dealers a ve, y .low margin of profit.\n\nS1nnc time later in order to con1pcnsate the manufacturers for the higher cost of inputs, the Central Governn1ent issued another notification on June J, 197 4 fixing a very high retail selling price of the fertilizer to be charged by the dealers fro111 the consumers.\n\nThe dealers Started charging the higher price fixed by notification dated June I, 1974 even for the stcks of fertilizer acquired by them prior to June 1, 1974 at the lower rate thus earning fabulous profit.\n\nQn June l t, 1974 the State of Uttar Pradesh issued a notification-(Uttar Pradesh Fartilizcr Prices (Supplen1entary) Order, 1974) in exercise of power under rule.114 of the Defence of India Rules, 1971 promulgated under the Defence of India Act, 1971. This notification stated that the st0cks of fertilizer acqu1red upto May 31,1974 .PY 'the dealers and which remt:iincd unsold with them should be sold only at the.price fixed by the Central Govcrn1nent's notification dated October I J, 1973 and not by notification of June l, 1974. The appellant<; (dealers) challenged before the Hit; h Court the legality and validity of the Staie Governn1ent's notification dated June 14, 197 4 on the grounds: (I) that the fertilizer in qu'eStion having been declared an essential commodity under the Essential Co1ninodities Act, 1955, an Act specia-I!y enacted inter alia for regulating!prices of essential comn1odities, its price . could be regulated only under that Act and not under the Defence of India Rules;\n\n(2) that the notification being inconsi5tcnt with the Central <!overninent's notification dated June l 1974 was invalid; and (3) that the notification being discriminatory was violativ~ of Art. 14 of the C0nstiiution .. The High Court upheld the\n\nRAMCHANDRA MA\\VALAL V, U. P. STATE\n\n~ \\'.alidityof the impugned notification and dis1nissed the writ petitions.\n\n~;1ppeals. ·\n\nDisn1issing the appeals by 1najority,\n\nHELD: .. (Per Mu:taza.Fazal Ali and Thakkar, JJ.)\n\nHence.the.'$C\n\nBoth the Essential Con1111oditirs Act. 195?', as slso the Defence of India Rules of !971, are Central legislation:5 enacted b) the Parliament. There i.!I no\n\nonst1tutional or jurisprudential limitation on. th~ c.on1petcnce of the Parlian1ent to reate two avenues or sources of power for the regulation of prices of articles. (fince ParJian1ent cin constitutionally Jnd validly enact two statutes creating two • sources of power, and since, under both the statutes prices of fertilizers c.in be\n\n~ . n; gulated, there is no illegality in acting under 'either or 'both'. [357 DEJ\n\nUnder the DIR poer has been conferred, inter a/ia. to fcqulale the price of'any.' article. The expression any article' is wide enough in its mplitude to\n\nlilt.. , envelope 'fertilizers'. The fact that 'fertilizers' have been declared .as an\n\nessential commodity under the Essential Con1n1odities_ Act, .1955 and its price\n\ncan be reguhitcd under the powers conferred by that Act, iS altogether in1material. f357 H; 3~8 A]\n\nThe Centre and the State both cannot speak on the sa1ne cbannel and create disharmony..\n\nIf both speak, the voice of the Centro will drown the voice of the State. The State has to re.n1ain silent' or it will be •silenCc<l'.\n\nBut the State has the right to 'speak' and can 'speak' (with unquestionable authority)\n\nwhere. the Centre is 'silent', without introducing disharmony. If the Ceqtre sits only on a portiOn of the Chair, the State can sit on the rest of the portion with\n\narn1s throWn on the shoulders of each other.\n\nWhile the Sfate cannot sit .on the E lap or on the shoulders of the Centre, both can certainly walk handin-hand,\n\n~\\_ending support to each other, 1n a friendly nlanner, towards the sa1ne destina- , tion. If the Centre has buil_t a wall, <>nd has, left a gap from which intruders • can infiltrate, the State can fiJ(1he gap in the wall, and thus make its own contribution to the common cause. What is inore, each in theory? nU pdnciPle must be presumed to be conscious of the need for accord and need for • cornmodating each other in.the interst of •NATIONAL HARMONY'. [360CF] F\n\nA general statute applies to all persons . and localities w.ithin its_ jurisdl\\:·\n\n1. tional scope, prescribing the governing. law upo_n the subject it encompasSes, Unless a special statute exists to treat a refinement of the subject with particularity or to prescribe '1 different law for, a particular localit)r.\n\nWhere, however, the later spedal or local statute is not irreconcilable with the general statute to the degree that both statutes cannot have a coterminous operation, the general G\n\n~ statute will not be repealed, bat the special vr local statute Will exist as an exception to its terms. [361 BC]\n\nSuthtrland's Statutory Construction, 3rd Edition. Vol, L Page 488, referred to.\n\nOne of the tests forascertaining whether the inconsistency is an irreconcila- H ble or intolerable ?Ile, is to pose tis question: Can the State law he obeyed or\n\n• •\n\nrespecteCt without flouting or violating the Central law in letter and spirit? If 'the answer is in t!1e affinnatic, the State Jaw cannot be invaliatcd. .Not at any rate when ihe State law merely 'pro1notes' the real object of both the laws, and is in the real sense 'supplementary• or 'coinplernentary' to the Central law.\n\n[361 G-H; 362 AJ\n\nIn the present case, the Central notification is altogethCr silent on the ramification regarding sales from out of existing stocks acquired by the dealers a\"t lower rates. The impugned State notificatio'n, oh. the other hand, deals exclusiVely 'with this aspct. The State notificatiOn speaks on a.refinem'ent of tht subject about which the Centra) notification is blissfully unaware and on which it is altogether silent. Both notifications can therefore safely be construed as supplen1entary and friendly rather than inconsistent or hostile. [360 B-C] •\n\nIll the instant case, assumii1g that there is inconsistency between the Central Goverllment's notification and that of the State Government, it does not appear to 1, Je an irreconcilable or intolerable one, so as t6 invalidate .the Stite Govcrnm.erit's notification. In the Prcserit case the test, answers in favour of the validity of the impugned State notification. The Cci1tral notification is not violated if the dealers sell the fertilizers from out of the existing stocks acquired . at the lower rates, for both the notifications fix the minimum seJlin8 price and the maximum , selling price fixed under the State notification is not highCr than that fixed under the Centfal.notific3.tion. What is n1ore, the State notification 'promotes and serves' the object and purpose of bO.th the Centre and the state. 'Prorqotes and serves' in th~ sense, that the 1nanifest object of fixing maxin1u1n ceiling Price is to make available to the cultivators who grow 'the food for the NATION to obtain the inputs at reasonable. prices and to protect thein from exploitation so that the food production is not retarded. [362 A-C]\n\nArt..254(2) does not envision Presidential assent . to 'notifialions' issued' under an Act (as distinguished fron1 'laws made.by legislature'). [363 F]\n\nKera/a State E/ect1fcity Board~. Indian Alu111iniun1 Co. t19?°6] 1 S.C.C. 466 at p, 478, referred to ..\n\nThe impugned notification is nOt violative of Art. 14 Of the Consthution since the vry basis of the challenge on the score of hostile discrimination is F' found to be non-existent.[ 364 DJ\n\n(Per Vareiarajan J. dissenting)\n\nIt cannbt be assumed that Parliament which had already legislated in the Essential Commodities ACt, 1955, a permanent measure, in respect of fertilizer . intertdect to legislate once again and could have felt the need to le&islatC once aeaJn in the temporary Defence of India Act, 1971 in respect of the same article, cspecialJy because what could be done under the Defence of India Act and the Rules which. niay be framed thereun.der could as well be done with 'equal force under the Essential Commod'i\"ties Act and order's which may be passed thereupder. [377 B-C]\n\nSection 3(2) of the Essential Commodities Act lays down. that the Central Government may, havin'g regard. to the local conditions of any area and other relevant circumstances, fix different prices or rate~ in respect of d'!trerent areas\n\n)I\n\n•RAMCHANDRA MAWALAL I'. U. P. STATE 351\n\nand-for difl'erent classes of consumers. The' State- Government could have reqaested the Central G, overnment to act under s.3(2) of ihe Essential Con1modities Act and fix a different price or rate for the sale by dealers in that State of fertilizer carried over fron1 the stock held. on 31.5.1974. Section 5(b) of the Essential Commodities Act provides for delegation of powers and says that the Central Government may, by\n\n0 notified order, direct that th_e power to make or issue notifications under s.3 of that Act shall, in relation to such matters and subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified in the direction be exercisaJ>le also by such State or such otTicer or authority . subordinate -to a Sta.tc Government as n1ay be specified in the direction. The Central Government has not sslled any direction under s.S(b) of the Essential Co!Dmodities Act delegating hs power to issue notification.under s.3 of that Act to.the State Government or any officer or aut.hority 0 fthat Government. The State Gover11n1ent has thus not' resorted to the Provisions contained in s.3(2) or s.S(b) of the Essential Comn1oditics Act, but has proceeded to fix the price of fertilizer on its own under the Defence of India Rules, 1971 which it cannot do under those Rules and the Defence of India Act, 1971 in respect of the essei1tial commodity. [377 H; 378 A-D]\n\nThe Defence of India Act, J971, which was a general and temporary• ACt, and the Rules framed thereunder cannot apply to fertilizer which is an essential commodity governed by the Essential Co1nmodities Act, 1955 and the Fertilizer (Control) Order, 1957 made under the provisions of that Act. Therefore,· the .State Government canriot without delegation issue any notifi.cation under the\n\nD, efence of India ct and Rules, 1971 in regard to the price of - fertilizer, an essential commodity governed by the EssefJ.tial Commodities Act and the Fertilizer (Control) Order, 1957. [378 H; 379 A-BJ\n\nThere des not appear tO be any provision in Art. ~4(2) of the Cpnstitution for placing any notification made by a State Government under thC Defeace of India Rules, 1971 for conSiderafion by the President. [380 C] ·\n\nIf the Stat~ Government's impugned notifiyation is assumed to be a law enacted b.Y that State's Legislature on Entfy 26 of List II, since the Act of Parliament passed on Entry 33 of List III and the Fertilizer (Control) Order, 1957 passed under that Act were already in force,-the assent of the President had to be received in order that the State Government's notification assumed to be~ a law enacted by the State's Legislature may prevail in the State as required by Article 254(2) of. the Constitution. There is nohing on record to show that the in1pugned notification of the State Governmen, t Was placed before the President\" for his assent and that hi's assent has been received. Therefore, the State Govern~ meat's impugned notification even. as a law cannot prevail over the ear1ilir n.o!iftcation of the Central G?vernment. [389 F-G; 380 CJ .\n\nZaverbhai Amaidas v. State of Brnnbay, (1955] 1 SCR 799, referred to. . . .\n\nThere is a clear conflict be\"twcen the two notifications is respect of the same essential commodity, fertilizer, for under the Central Goverllment's notification dated I.6.1974 the price at which' a dealer can seH fertiiizer of the conCerned variety is Rs. 2000 per ton whil~ .under the Staie Government's notification dated 14.6.1974 is only Rs.1050 per ton though no doubt it is restticted to the stock carried over from 31,5.1974 which is in1material in judging the power of the State Oover.nment to fix the price of an essential commodity by a notification\n\n'r.\n\n' ..\n\nmade under.the Defence of India Rt; les, ~197 J in respect of which th; Central Government hact already fixed the price urilier the Fertilizer (Control) Order.\n\n1951. Once the Central enact1nent and the Central Oovernn1ent's notification\n\ngoern the price of an essential cotUinodity the State Gove'fn1nent's notification issued in exerci1; e of the clelega'ed authority under the Defence of ldia Act and the Rules framed thereunder cannnt preVaiJ. [380 F-H]\n\nThe two enact1nents have to be read in such a way that there is no conflict between them while giving effect to them in their respective fields of operation. If the Essential Cun1moditics Act; 1955 and tlle Fertilizer (Control)\n\nOrder, 1957 are considered to apply exclusively to fertilizer, an essential commodity, and the Defence of India Act, 1971 and the Defence of India Rules, 1971 are considered to apply to other co~1111odities excluding essential co1n nlodities there \\Vould be no conflict whatsoever between - the Essential Con1modities Act and the Defence of India - Act and between the notification issued under Fertilizer (Control) Order, 1957 and the Defence of India Rules,\n\n1971. [381 A;. 383 D-E]\n\nThe author of the two enactments, Essential Con1modities Act, 1955 anct Defence ofTndia Act, 1971 is the san1e, na1ncly, Parlia1nent; and Parliament 1nust be held to have not intended to contradict itself while dealing with distinct matters or situations under those enactn1ents. [f the State .Governments are free to fix: their own prices iri notiflcationS issued by then1 under the Defence of Tndia Rnles, 1971 when the Central Govenunent's notification fixing asingle price for the \\vhoie country in respec~ 'or an essential co1nn1odity is in force that notification of. the Central Oovern1nent will beco1nc otiose. The question is whether.Parliament would have intended such' a conSequence. The. answer can only be an emphatic no. [382 D-E]\n\nCraies on Statute Law (seventh edition) at Page 222 and Maxwell on..,, the\n\nfntepretation of Statutes, referred to.\n\n\\Vhat has been done by the State Qovernn1ent under the i1npugncd notification is utterly lacking in power and cannot be allowed to stand merely because it r, elates only to a co1nparatively small quantity of fertilizer carried over fron1 the stock of 31.5.1974 and was intended to benefit and protect agi-icultural consumers and p.revent dealers fro1n 1naking .. undue profits. [384 F] . . .\n\nCIVlL APPELLATE JURlSDICTION: CivilAppeaI Nos. 1568-76, 1609-!2,\n\n1656, 1672. 1675-80, 1707. 1616, 1644, 1645. 1646, J671, 1673, 1708 of\n\n1974. •\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 14th August & l.:lth September, !974 of the 'Allahabad High Court in Civil Writ Petition.\n\nNos. 34122, 3498, 3430, 346.:l, 3491, 3429, 3427, 3423, 3472, 3443, 3473, 3474, 3494, 3439, 788, 774, 786, 787, 791, 793, 869, 3428. 3502, 3420, 3421, 3528, 3478, 3477, & 3478 of 1974. •\n\nYogeshwar Prashad,\n\nS. C.\n\nManchanda,\n\nS. K.\n\nBagga,\n\nRAMCHANDRA MAWALAL v. u. P. STATE (Thakk!!r, J.) 353 ' Pramod Swarup, 0. P. Agarwal, Ms. Baby Krishnan G.S. Chatter; ce.\n\nA ..f Mrs. S. Dikshit, R.N. Tri1w/i & Miss R. Govind for the Appellants.\n\nThe following Judgments were delicred •· THAKKAR, J.. The Cortstitution which promises a socialistic pattern of Society in the preamble and traces. the contours of the socialistic philosophy which permeates the spirit of the Constitution, Can neither com1nand nof commend the.exercise of the Constituticnal Jurisdiction to issue HIGH PREROGATIVE WRITS under Art. 32, 226 or 227, in order not to remove injustice. but to do injustice, i.n order not to prevent exploitation of the poor by the rich. but to permit such exploitation. And yet the CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDJC- T!ON of the Court (as polar:zed from its 'ERROR JURISDICTION'\n\nhas been invoked in order to use the hand of the Court for transferring money from the pockets of poor cultivators (who feed the Nation) to the pockets of tlie dealers in fertilizers (who feed .themselves) by challenging a notification on technical gro1;1nds.\n\nSuch jurisdiction is invoked to enable the 'dealers' to reap , a 'rich' harvest of 'unjust enrich1ncnt' tluough the instrumentality of the Court at the cost and expense of the cultivators.\n\nWe firmly believe that the Court exercising CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION is not obliged to grant a writ in such circumstances. But we need not . elaborate on the theme furthermore as the High Court has rejected the p::tition on merits and as we are of th~ san1e opinion. ·\n\nEvents leading to the institution of the Writ Petitions under •Article 2)6 of the Constitution of India giving rise to this group of appeals (by certificate of fitness granted by the Allahabad High Court)\n\nhave l\"iken the follow; ng course :\n\n(i) On October 11, 1973 the Central Government issued a notification fixing the maximum retail selling price of certain varieties of fertilizers to the consumers. It was issued in exercise of powers under clause (3) of the Fertilizer (Control) Order of 1957 promulgated under\n\nSection 3 of the Essential Commodities Act of 1955 (referred to as 'Act' hereinafter).\n\n(ii) Some time later, on June I, 1974, the Central Government issued a Notification whereby the maximum retail selling price of different varieties of fetilizers was steeply revised upwards in or<le; to compensate the 'rnanufacturers' in the context of the spurt in the prices of various inputs. The extent of the rise may be illustrated by . taking the instance of 'Urea 46% Nitrogen'. Its price was revised upwards from Rs. 1090 per ton to Rs. ~000 per ton.\n\nB . (iii) O~ June 14, 1974 the State of tJttar Pradesh issued the Uttar Pradesh Fertilizer Prices (Supplementary) Order,\n\n1974 in exercise of the powers conferred by Rule 114 of the Defence of India Rules, 1'>71, . adverted to as . 'D, I.R.'-hereinafter. Under this notification the registered 'dealers' were prohibited froin charging to the cul~ C tivators price in excess of .the maximum price prevailing immediately prior to the upward revision authorised by the Central Government on June' I, 1974, in respect of stocks acquired at pre:revision .rates held .by the dealers on the eve of the upward rvision of prices.\n\n(iv) The net result of the two last menli, oned notifications was as follows ; The dealers could sell to the cultivators\n\nfctili'zers at the higher rates authorised by the notifica- .tion dated June I, !974 from out of the stocks acquired ·\n\nthereafter under both the notifications. As regard~,' the stocks acquired after June I, 1974 the.registered dealers were not affected by the notification issued by the State Government under the DIR inasmuch as the notification issued by the Central Government authorising the upward revision remained unaffected by the notification issued by the State. The dealers however could not sell the fertilizers at the higher rates from out of the existing stock acquired by them at the /owe; rates imme- . diatcly prior to the upward.revision effected on June' I, 1974, in view of the aforesaid notification issued by the State Government on June 14, 1974. Taking the ins- . tancc of •Urea 46 % Nitrogen' the net impact of the impugned State notification 'Was that the 'dealers' were not permitted to charge to the cultivators Rs. 2000 per , ton instead of Rs. 1090 per ton in. respect of st9cks\n\nacquired at the lower rates.\n\n(v) It was in this backgronnd that the dealers instituted the petitions giving rise to the present appeals by certificate, challenging the legality and validity of the\n\n' .\n\nRAMCBANDRA MAWALAL v. u. P. STATE (Thakkar, J.) 355\n\ni mpgned notification issued by the State Government A on June 14, 1974.\n\nNow; the follqwing facts are not in dispute :\n\n(i) The registered 'deaiers' were entitled to a fixed profit margin of Rs, 45 per ton (and no more) under the terms B and conditions of the licence held by them.\n\n(ii) The stocks acquired prior to .June I, .1974 were meant for sale to the cultivators at. the pre-upward revision rates at whiCh rates ihe dealers had acquired the stocks.\n\nThis stock had ·remained unsold with the dealers till then because the cultivatorshd not been a'ble to effect their purchases till that date. ·\n\n(iii) The price rise was authorised to compensate the 'manufacturers'. in the context of the spurt in the price of\n\n various 'inputs' and had no bearing on the selling price D for the 'dealers' who werenot concerned ith the cost of production.\n\n(iv) In case the State Government had not issued the impugned notification dated June 14, J974, the dealers would have been enabled to charge about twice the prices at which the stocks were made available to them for sale prior- .to the notification. For instance, 'Urea 46 % Nitrogen' made available to the dealers for effecting sales to the cultivator~ _at , Rs. 1090 per ton could have ·\n\nbeen sold to the cultivators at Rs. :2000 per ton. Thus they would have been enabled to make a wind fall bum• per profit of Rs. 910 per ton (in respect of 'Urea 46 % Nitrogen') as against permitted profit margin of Rs. 45' per ton (i.e. about 1000 % in place of about 5 %) and to secure 'unjust enrichment'. for themselves to such . an unconscionable C)\\tent at the cost of the cultivators.\n\nIt is in the backdrop of these undisputed facts that the, question regarding the validity of the impugned notification dated June 14, 1974 issued by the State of Uttar Pradesh came to be challenged before the High Court of Allahabad.\n\nThe impugned.notification was issned in.order to meet a problem\n\nA which arose in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the situation.\n\nThe problem arose apparently . because the competent authority exercising the powers of the Central Government under the Essential Commodities Act overloke~ that the dealers who were concerned with the distribution of the fertilizers to the cultivators, on a fixed and assured profit margin of Rs. 45 per ton: would be having with B them 'stook-in-trade obtained at the pre-enhancement prices.\n\nAnd that they, might tako. undue advantage of the situation by charging a higher rate .to the consumers even in respect of the stocks acquired at the lower rates. The dealers could and should have sold the stockin-trade acquired at .the pre-enhancement price at the hitherto prevailing rates till the o:d stocks were exhausted. That is what would C have been expected of them, having regard to the fact that they were getting a fixed and assured margin of profit of Rs. 45/- per ton .and that the enhancement of the price was. necessitated and made solely, to neutralize the rise in the. cost of the inputs, which phenomenon affected only the 'manufacturers' and .not , the 'dealers'. There was therefore no occasion o.r justification on their part for charging a D . higher price to the consumers in regard to the sales effected from the existing stocks acq.uired at the lower rates. The notification issued by the Central Government on June. I, 1974 was si/el/f on the question o(selling prices in respect of sales from out of stocks acquired earlier at , the !owe( rate.\n\nSince the said notification issued by the Central Government was silent, the State Government, which appears to E have been more vigilant,' stepped .in and exercised powers which were conferred on it by the DIR.\n\nThe challenge before the High Court .was made 011 thre~ main grounds, viz:,\n\n(Al The Central -Government having issued a notification in exercise of powers under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, the State Government could not have issued the_ impugned oiification under the Uttar Pradesh Fertilizer Prices (Supplementary) Order, 1974 issued in exercise of the powers conferred under Rule 114 of the 'D.l.R.\". The power to . fix the maximum price iri respect of fertilizers could be exercised only under the Essential Commodities Act, it being a special Act, and could not !)ave .been exercised by the Siate Government,\n\nby issuing an order under the 'D.l.R.'\n\n.(B) Even if the State Government had the 'power to -issue\n\n. .\n\n--+\n\nRAMCHANDRA MAWALAL v. u. p, STATE ('Thakkar, J.) 357\n\nthe notification under the D.T.R., the notification was invalid by reason of its inconsistency with the notification issued by the Central Government on June I, 1974 under the Essenti~I Commodities Act, 1955.\n\n(C) The impugned notification was violative of Article 14\n\nof the Constitution' of India.\n\nThe High Court of Allahabad negatived all the three contenticns by an extremely well considered and well reasoned judgment. Tn the present group of appeals by certificate, the original petitioners have reiterated the same contentions before this Court.\n\nRe: G1•ound A : The argument in substance is that Essentir.1 Commodities Act, 1955, is a special Act under which the price relating to a commodity declared to oe an essential commodity can be regulated.\n\nThe power to regulate the price in respect of such an essential commodity cannot therefore be exercised under Defence.of India Rules,\n\n1971 or under any other provision of law.\n\nNow, both the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, as also the Defence of '!ridia Rules of 1971, are Central legislations enacted by the Parliament. The 'D.T.R.: were brought into force by the Parliament in 1971 in order to meet an emergency situation. The legislative competence of the Parliament to enact the legislation on the subject in question, namely, fixation of prices of all articles, is not questioned. The Parliament having competence to legislate in regard to the subject has enacted both the legislations, one in 1955, another in 1971. ·\n\nThe impugned notification has been issued under the latter statute. The 'D.l.R!.' having been enacted later, it cannot, and it has not been, contended that the doctrine of repeal is attnrcred.\n\nSince there is legislative competence, since the statute is not eclipsed by the doctrine of express or implied repeal,. how can . the power exercised under the valid statute be assailed ? The only argument advanced, a misco.nceived one in our opinion, is, that since the 'Act' deals with essential commodities, and fertilizer has been decliired under the Act as an essential commodity, the power conferred by the 'D.J.R:' cannot be. oxercised in respect of regulation of the price of such a commodity or article. It is not disputed that u.nder the_ DIR power has been conferred, inter-alia, to regulate the price of 'any' article. The expression 'any article' is~ v.1idC enough in its amplit'ude\n\nto envelope 'fertilizers'. The fact that 'fertilizers' have been declared as an essential commodity, and its price can be regulated under the powers conferred by the Act, is altogether immaterial.\n\nThere is no constitutional or jurisprudential limitation on the conipetence of the Parliament.to create two avenues or-sources of power for the regulation of prices of articles. There is nothing in principle or precedent to support the proposititin .that two avenues or soucces of\n\npoer ca1inot be validly created. What then is ihe fabric of the challenge ? The only answer offered by the counsel is that the Act is a 'statute specially enacted, inter alia, .for regulation of the prices of\n\ncmmoditics declared to be essential and therefore in respect of such commodities, the power can be exercised only under the Act.. We . are unable to accede to this argument, Since, 'as discussed earlier, Parliament can constitutionally and vaiidity enact two statutes creating 'two sources of power; and since,.· under both the \"tatutes prices of , fertilizers can be regulated, there is no ilJegality in acting under 'either' or 'both'. Counsel; however seeks support from the following passage .from craies on statute Law\"' :-· .\n\n\"Acts of Parliamei1t some times contaiii general enact ments relating to the whole subject-matter of the statute, and also spei:ific and particular enactments relating to certain special matters; and if the general and specific enactments prove to be in any way repugnant to one another, the question will arise, which is to control' the .other? ln Pretty v.\n\nSolly, (1859) 26 Beav.606, 610, Romiily M.R. stated as follows what he considered to be. the rule of construction under such circu1nstances. \"The general rules,\" said he, '\\vhicl; t are applicable to particular and general en'actments in statutes are very clear; the only difficulty is in their applica tion. ~The rule iS, thai whenever there is a partictilar enactnzent\n\nand a general enactment in the same .statute, and the latter, taken in its .most comprehensive sense, would over rule the former, the pa'rticularenac(ment must be operative, and the general enuctment must be. taken to affect only .the other parts of the sta/11/e to which it may properly apply.\"\n\n(Emphasis added)\n\n' It is overlooked that the said passage deals with different pro-\n\n(1) Statute Law ofCraies, 7th Edition, 222\n\n, +-·\n\n• -\n\nRAMCHANDRA MAWA)., AL v. u. P. STArE (Thakkar,'J.) 359\n\nvisions in the \"same'.' statute. That when there is a special provision in the very same statute in regard to a subject matter,· the special provision -of the statute will orc)inarily prevail. in rivalry or competition with the general provision, is a proposition with which there is no quarrel. Btlt then we are not at all concerned with any rivalry . . . between two provisions of the 'same' statute. We arc faced with two enactments by the same legislaiure which create two sources of power to achieve the same purpose. To repeat what has been obser- ved earlier, there is no lega_I bar. tocreating two sourcc-s of po,.ve-r.\n\nAnd there is_ no authority in pri.nciple or precedent for contending that one source of power Is more valid than the other. Or that the power validly conferred by the same Jegislaturecan be exercised only under one, and not the other, of the two statutes, leaving aside the question of irreconcilable or intolerable inconsistenty. We, therefore, confirm the view of the High Court and repel the challenge.\n\n' .\n\nRec Groun<I B: The validity of the impugned, notification issued by the State undr the 'DIR' is assailed on the ground that it is inconsistent' with the earlier notification issued by the Centre: As discussed earlier, the Central notification does not 'specifically' deal with the question as regards selling price in respect of sales from the existing stocks acquired by the dealers at the pre-e11ha11ceme11t prices which remained' unsold with them as the cultivators could not effect purchases till then. fn other words the Central notification does not deal with this rami_fication at all. It does not show awareness or' this dimension and is altogether silent on the suhject. The impugned , State notification, issued later, on the other hand, deals, specifically,\n\npointedly, and solely, with this dimension. lt is in this perspective that the issue has to be judged bearing in mind the undisputed.position that there is no Centre-State conflict inyolved in the sense that (l) the Centre which is not even impleaded as a party, does not question the power of t_he State or the validity of the notification as impinging on its (Centre's) jurisdiction or at1thority; (2) Centre has not asserted its superior authority from the standpoint of Centrc-Statc-powere'quation in Order to supersede the State notificatibn.\n\nThe question clamouring for solution in this scenerio has .t', VO facets, viz :\n\n(!) Whether !here is any inconsistency between the Central notification on the one hand and the State notification on the other, and;\n\n' .\n\n. i>\n\n360 SU PREM~ c6URT REPORTS\n\n[1984) 2 S.C.R.\n\n(2) whether the inconsistency is .an irrcconcilabic er intoiern blc\n\none ..\n\n. ls there inconsistency ?\n\n. The Centra\"i notification, as discussed earlier, is altcgether silent on the ramification regarding sales from out of existing stocks acquirrd bY, the dealers at lower rats, The impugned State notification, on the other hand, deals-exdusively with this aspect. The state notification sp, aks on a refinement of the subject about which the Central n(\\ti- . . fication is blissfully unaware .and on. which it is altogether >il•nt.\n\nTh.e t\\VO do not ov.:rlap.' Ttiere is therefore no ral inconsistency.\n\nThe principle may be stated thus. The Centre and the State both ca_nnot spea!i on the same channel and creat~ disharmony. 1 f both speak, the voice of the Cenire will drown the voice of the State. The • State has to remain 'silent' or it will be 'silenced'. But the State\n\n• • I Ins the right to 'speak\", and can 'speak' (:vith unquestionabre authori_ty) where the Centre is 'silent,' without intrOducing-dlShar1ncl}y; If the Centre sits only on a p}rtion of the Chair, the State can sit on the\n\nrest' of the portion with. arms thrown on the shoulders of each other.\n\nWhile the State cannot sit on the lap or.on the shoulders of the Centre, both can certainly walk hand-in-hand lending support lo each other, 'in a frkn\"<lly manner, towards .the same destination: , If the Centre has built a wall, and has left. a gap from whic, h _inl, rudcrs can infiltrate, the state can fill the gap in the wall. and thus -make its own C:ontribu- . . tion t_o the Common Cause, What is more, each in theory and principle must be presun1ed' to b~ conscious o'f the need fot accord and nod for accomm-x!ating each other in the into rest of 'NATlONAL\n\nHARMONY'.\n\n'The Centre can object io the State speaking on the same c'l1annel, or sitti1ig on its should'irs, and perhaPs; even overrid'e the State.\n\nBut th_B-cntre and the 'State can certinly ci_ccomtnodate_ each othc'r in a friendl.y spirit in the overall NATIONAL INTEREST when both of\n\nlh::1n are trying to supplement each other. fn fhe present case both notifications can s-afely be construed as supplementary and friendly\n\nnther than inconsisterlt or hosti'le .. The Centre does not question th<; authority of tho State, and, evidently\". the Centre does net object to the' State SJYaig on the nuance .on which the Centre hC!s_ mtlint3ined\n\n.... silnc~.· There is therefore no real eJemeilt of inconsistency jn the t\\.vo . notifications: . The following -passage extracted from Statutory\n\n..;..._.\n\n. '-f\n\nJ..\n\n~ . -\n\n''•\n\n'RAMGHANDRA ,\\!AWALAL v._u. P. STATE (Thakkar, J.) 361\n\nConstructio.n by .;>utl; erland (para 2022< 1 l,)hows th.at the aspect tela', ting to 'refinement' is a well recognized factor and that the. state law can be treated as an exception when the inconsistency is not irreconcilable':~ ~\n\n, :, A gnenll Statue appiies to a.Ji persons and lora1ities within its jurisdictional scope, prescribing the governing law upon the sUbject it e 11c:::nnpass'.!~,, unless a speciql stlltute exists to treat a refinement of the subject with particularity or to p.resoribca .different law for.a particuJa:r 16cality .. Likewise \\Vhere a later statute adaP, ted for a pafticular locality conflicts with a general law of state-wide application, the special or local Jaw will supersede the general enactment. Where, however, the 1ater speial or local statute.·; s not irreconcilable with . the general statute to the .degree th;<! both statutes C.'.lnnot have a ter1ninous operation, te general statute wiJI not, be reRe.aled, but the special or /Ocal stqtute will exist as an cxception to its ternzs. ,, .. (Emphasis added)\n\nAssuming for the , sake of argument that i't is considered to be an incOnsistency, Jt does not apper to be. an irreconcilable or into- 1 :rable ne, SJ as UJ inVal!date it, as will be presently shown.\n\nf.ci the alleke.i inr:onsistency irreconcilableor intolerable.one ?\n\n,: There are dgreesof inconsi.stenc-yin the c_Qntext of conflict of laws. 'Fhec can be apparent or surface inconsistencywhich may be\n\nconsidr<; d as a n9i\\-hosti!e, tQlerable, benign, one, subject to the\n\nunqu~-si::>ned pcnvcr .of the Centre' to override the State if so .mirided. On prii:iciple1 evey apparet inconsitency cannot be presumed to be hostile or intolerable. MJre so when the Centre .does not even raise a 'whisper of discofd. One of the tests for ascertaining whether th:. inc'.)fisistency is an irreconcilable or in.tolrable On~, is to pOse this quostion: Can the. State law be obeyed or respecied without flouting or violating the Cent{al Ja\\v in letter.and spirit ? If the answer is in tho .tffirmative, the State law cannot be invalidated:· Not.at any rate when the State law merely 'promotes' the real object of both' the\n\n(1) SUthi:ralnd's. Statutory Construction,\n\n3rd Editic:_n .. Vo!. l; Pa2e 488\n\n. G.\n\n362 SUPREME COURT RBPOR'fS •\n\n(1984] 2 S.C.R.\n\nlaws, and is lri the real sense 'supplementary' or 'complementary' to the Central I.aw. In the present case the test answers in favour of the validity of the impugned State notification. The Central notification is not violated if the dealers sell the fertilizers from out of the existing stocks acquired at the lower rates, for both the notifications fix the' maximum selling price and the. maximum selling price fixed under the. State notification is not higher than that fixed under the Central notification. What is more, the state notification 'promoies and serve<' the obiect and purpose of both the Centre and the State. 'Promote' and serves', iff the sense, that the manifest object of fixing maximum ceiling price is to make available to the cultivators who grow the food 1for the NATION to obtain the in.puts at reasonable prices and to protect them from explo.itation so that the food production is not retarded. It is not contended even by the petitioners, for the ery good reason that it is incpable of being so contended, that the object of the price regulation is to enable the dealers to make unconscionable profit. Thus the impl>gned State notification promotes rather than 'defeats', the 'life-aim' of Cetral as also the State notifications. It :i, elps' rather than 'hurts' the objeciives and goals of the centre, and there is no.conflict whatsoever of 'interest', 'purpose', . or 'perspective'. The State has done only that which ihe Centre presumably would have r.eadily done if it was fully aware of the situac. tio.n from all angles of vision.\n\nFor, the only impact.of the impugned. notification is that the 'cultivator' for whose protection the price regulation is essentiallv made, is saved fr.om exploitation . without hurting the. legitimate claim .of the dealer, who, in any case, gets bis fixed profit margin of Rs. 45/- per ton.\n\nIn Australian Boot Tra.de Bmployees Federation v. Whybrow Co . .'ll the High Court of Australia in.a somewhat similar situation held that there was no inconsistency between a State law fixing a minimum wage for workers in the boot trade of 1$ per hour. and a federal law fixing a minimum wage for the same worlf.ers of l~ $ per hour. Speaking through Barton, J:. the court observed :-\n\n' , \"The determinations of the wages boards (in effect the State law} and. the proposed award (in effect, the Commonwealth law) are courched in the affirmative in respect of the material part of each, the provision as to the minimum wage.\n\nNone of them prescribed an inflexible rate. The (Stale)\n\ndetermination~ prescribe a. minimum. and it is in each case\n\n.(I) (1910) C.L.R. VoJ:IO, 266 at 299. ·\n\n. •\n\nRAMCHANDRA MAWALAL v. u. P. STATE (Thakkar, J.) 363 , lower than tile 'minimum named by. the proposed (Commonwealth) award. By paying the latter minimum . an employer will be obeying both laws. The affirmative words of the'\n\n(Commonwealth) award, therefore, do not \"impart a contradiction\" between it and the (State) determinations. It . is impossible lo say that the mployer cannot obey the one\n\nwithout disobeying the other. Therefore, the former and the.\n\nltter may stand together. Therefore, according to the proper test, they are not inconsistent.\" ·\n\n(Emphasis added)\n\nIt would thus appear that in a somewhat parallel situatioll. the Australian High Court.had taken the view. that sfoce both laws can be. obeyed without disobeying an)', there Is no conflict. In the present case also an endeavour must be made to place a harmonious interpretation hich would avoid•a collision between the two. Another . way o( looking at the problem is. this : The impugned notification, .\n\nthough issued by the State, has its source of'power in the 'DIR' which is a Cent£~! Statute enacted. by the Parliainent. The State is merely an instrumeutality for executing the purpose of the Central Act. The impugned notification which is 'later' in point of time must, therefore~ prevail to the extent it 'speaks' on the refinement or nuance of the matter on which nuance the earlier notification is \"silent'. In any view of the matter; therefore •. the challenge from\n\nthi• platform cannot succeed.\n\n:..\n\nft may be mentioned that a half-hearted argument was advanced that Art. 254(2) would be attracted and Preside1itial assent wotllm become necessary in. order to give effect to the impugned notification.\n\nThere is no merit in it in as much as Art. 254(2) does iiot' envision\n\nPresidential assent to '1iotifications' issued under an Act (as distinguished from 'laws made by legislature') as has been observed by a . Constitution Bench of this Court in Kerala Siate Bfectricity Board v .\n\nIndian .Aluminium Co.,'i' wherein Alagiriswami, J. speaking for • himslef and for Bhagwati, Goswami and Sarkaria JJ. says :-\n\n\"Was it necessary to get the President's assent for this notification as contended by some of the respondents '!\n\nQuite clearly no Presidential assent was possible to the\"notification. Article ~54(2) does not conten; plate Presidential .\n\n (I) [1976] I S.C.C. 466 at 478\n\n.. ,\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS. [19B4]2sc.R ·.\n\nassent to iwtifilYJtions itsued under th;. Act. The article contemp1ates Preside11tia/- assrnt onli' to lc.11's ad~ bv' the legislature of. a State.\" This gr.ound of attr.ch. also accordingly fails.\n\nRegarding gr<Jund (C) : The appellants contended that ihc impugned notification was violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution of . India and was t)1erefore invalid. The argument was advanced. on the asumption that the State Government had permitted govcrinen- . tai' ag, ncies falling within the definition of 'dealer' in .the FertiEzer Control Order, 1957 to sell. the stocks held by tlie said agencies immediately preceding the issuance of the im, pugnd. notificat, ion dated June I, 1974 at the h_igher. rates. This allegation has been controverted by the State of Uttar -Pradesh.\n\nA refereTice to the counter-affidavit sworn by the Accounts Officer, Fertilizers and Manuafs Dirccturni~ of Agriculture, field in :C.M.P. No. 6773 of ! 97j clearly shows that the State. Gcjvern1nent had nOt' granted any such pern1issi011.\n\nThus~ the very basis of the challenge on the score of hostile discrimination is found to be non-e><isten!.\n\nThe High CouTt was perfectly jus'tified in rejecting this contention.\n\nWe, therefore,' confirm the. view taken by the High Court.\n\n' Thus all the gounds called into aid. by the appellants for challenging the impugned notification are found to be dcvcid of substance.\n\n.. \"\"\" f\n\n. .l(\n\nU~<ler the circumstances the appeals fail and are disniissed. .), Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the cas.e there will b.., o order regarding cots. · . '\n\nrhe interim orders passed bv this Court are hereby vacated, In the result, the concerned District Magistrate will now have to take appropriate step~ to pass on and pay to the cultivator; the differential amount deposited by the dealers pursuant to this Court's orders dated\n\nSeptember~. 1974, and, Oetober, IO, 1974, as early as possible. And, in any event; within six months of this order: after proper verification~\n\nWe order .accordingly.' ·\n\nAppeals dismissed.\n\nInterim orders vacated.\n\n. J...\n\n...\n\n.. _ ..\n\n-ti\n\nRAMCHANDRA M., WALAL v. u. P. STATE {Varadarajan, J.) 365\n\nVARAD.~RAJAN, J. Ci.vil\"Appal 1656 of 1974 is by special !ave.\n\nThe other appeals are by certificate granted by the AHahaba<) High Court. All the app, als arise out of the judgment of a Division Bench\n\nofthat High Court in a balc)1 of Writ Petitions ouf of which 'W.P ..\n\nNJ. 342l of 1974 was treated as the leading case .. Civil Appeals\n\n1568-1576 of 19.74 and.batch have.arisen out of tha, t batch of Writ P; titions. fn the other set of Civir Appeals another, Writ Petition of 1974 is said to have been treated.as the leading case by the Higl1 Court. The decisions were renC:ered in Writ Petition No. 3421 of\n\n1974.foi one b:ttch and in another Writ Petition of 19'74 for the other batch. But in all the appeals before us, the judgment in !VP. No. 3421 of ]''}74 alone was referred to. ·\n\nThe Writ Petitions filed under'.Article 22G of the Co\n\n0 nsliiution . challenged the validity of a notificqtion dated 14'6'~ 974 issued by the Government of Uttar Pradesh in exercise of the power conferred by Rule 114 of the r:iofence of India Rules, 1971, qirecting. that no registered.dealer\n\n0 offerliJizer shall charge or retain. enter into or enforce an)I contract for charging, in respect of any fertilizer sold to any\n\nperson on or after 1.6:1974, from any stock held cln 3L5.1974, a prie exceeding the maximum price fixed by the Central Government for the sale of fertilizer under an earlier notification dated I I.JO. J 973 issued .under Clause 3 of the Fertilizer (Control) Order, 1957 made in exercise of the power conferred bys. 3 of the Essential Commodities kot, 1955, as it prevailed on 31-5-1974. The Writ Petitions challenged also an order dated 18.6. 1974 passed by the. Distriq Agriculturnl O:licers directing registered dealers of fertilizers to refund the excess\n\nprice charged on the sale of fertilizer effected on or after 1.6.1974 from out of the stock Which was in existence on_3l.5.1974.' The.\n\nWrit Petitions sought the. quashing of the said 'no.tification dated 14.6.1974 and also a direction to the District Agricultural Officers and other District Authorities not to ask' the dealers to refund the excess in respect of sales completed prior to the date of that notification . . The High. Court has, while upholding the. validity of the notification dated .,4 .. 6.1974 nd dismissing the prayer for quash°; ng the same,\n\ndirected the District Agricyltural Officers and other District Authorities not to enforce the order .for refuntl of the excess price. ryalized o.n the sale of fertilizer up to 14.6.1974. from the .stocks which were • in existence on 31.5.1974. This part of the High Court's order has become firial and has not been challenged by the State Government. • This Court ha.s. directed by orders dat<; d 2.9.1974 and 30.10.1974' that the excess price charged 0n the sale of fertilizer whi.ch was in the possession .of the appellants. before 1.6'1974 :should be deposited . . ,\n\nD ...\n\n• H\n\nwith the District M1gistratc concerned within a fortnight of the sales, .to rclll'ain in a separate account . .\n\nTile fertilizer in question is admittedly a commodity controlled under the Fertilizer (Co1; trol) Order, 1957 issued by the Central Governme11t in exercise of th~ power conferred liy s.3 of the Essential Co_mmodities Act, 1955. The.maximum price for sale of fertilizers by registered dealers to consumers is fixed under Clause 3 of .the Fertilizer (Control) Order, 15157 by no.tifications issued from time to tune. The sale price of one of the varieties of fertilizers with which\n\nw~. are concerned in these appeals has been fixed at .Rs:· 1050 per ton by a notification dated 11.10.1973 which was in force on 31.5.1974.\n\nThe price fixed in that notification.for the sale of that variety of ferti-· liizer. to rgistered dealers was,; Rs. 1005 per ton leaving a 1nargin of Rs. 45 P\"'ton in sale to consumers it Rs. 1050 per ton. The Cent- 1:al Government, ii1 supersession of the notification dated J l.10.1973 fixed the maximum sale price of that variety of fertilizer at Rs. 2000 per ton by a notification datect.1.6.1974;- thus giving an increaes of.\n\nRs .. 950 per ton for that variety to th(i dealers. The deakrs started scllmg at the new rates fixed in that notification for the several varieties of fertilizers. The Government of Uttar Pradesh being of the view tl1at the Central Government's notificatio11 dated 1.6.1974 was not intended to apply to old stock' procured by delers at consider\"ably lower prices from producers which was in existence oi1 31.5.1974, issued the impugned notification dated 14.6.1974 directing that the old stock should be sold at the old rate of Rs'._ 1050 per ton with elfect from 1.6.1974. The Writ Petitions were filed by the dealers, -some of them for quashing the State \"Government's notificat.ion 'dated 14.6.1974, some for quashing that notification as also for direi:ting the District Agr, icultural Officers and other District Authorities not to enforce the order me11tioncd above and some for the latter direction alone. .\n\n. The qaestion for consideration by the High Court was the validity of the .State Governme.11t's notification dated 14.6.1914 as regards ihe stock of fertilizer available with the dealers at the end of 31.5.1974, (e., whether that notification will prevail\"over tlie Central Govern- ·\n\nmcnt's notification dated 1.6.1974.\n\nThe first contention urged for the dealers before the High Court was that fertilizer was not a commodity essential to the community within the meaning of s.3 of the Defence d india Act, 1971 and, therefore, the State Government had no power to fix its price or give\n\n- \\\n\nt .\n\nRAMCHANDRA MAWALAL v. u. P. STATE (Varadarajan, J.) 367\n\nany other.direction in regard thereto. 1'he learned Judges of the High Court held tl1at chemical fertilizers being necessary for increased production of food crops and oil seeds crops-.under modern scientific methods of agriculture would be commodities essential for the life. ' of the cornmuni.ty and that the argument.that trade in chcn:iical ferti- lizers cannot be regulated m1d>0r s.3 of the Defence of India'Act, 1971 is untenable. Before us no argument was advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants that chemiCal fertilizers arc not essential\n\n0 commdites. 01\\ the other hand, it was repeatedly contended that it is an esseniial commodity within the meani1ig of s.2(1)(a) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 and is specifically mei1tioned as such in s.2(l)(a) (xi) of that Act. There is no dispute before us about this matter though there is dispute whether fertj_lizer can. be brought within the words \"any article\" mentioned in Rule 114(2) of the Defence of India Rules, 1971. Therefore, that question does not arise for detailed consideration by us.\n\nThe second ground of attack before\n\n0 the High Court was that the State Government lacked the power to control the price of chemical D fertilizer on the ground that no suc; h power is conferred on it by the Defence of India Act, 1971 and the rules framed thereunder in respect of chemical fertilizer as being needed forthe preparation of the defence or connected with the prosecution of war .. This contention was rejected by the learned Judges of the High Col!rt. It is not necessary for us to consider this aspect of the matter as no such argument was E advanced before us by the learned counsel for the appellants .. The dispute before us is as to whether chemical fertilizer would fall withi1; the words \"any article\" found in Rule 114(2) of the Defence. of India Rules framed in exercise of the power conferred by s.3 of the Defence of India Act, 1971 though it is not disputed that the impugned Stat.e Government notijication dated 14.6.1974 was issued when the\n\n. F emergency wiuch was lifted on 22.3.1977 was in , force.\n\nThe riext contention mged before the High Court was that as the Central Government had already fixed the .price of chemical fertilizer by the notification dated 1.6.1974 issued under the Fertilizer (Control) Order, 1957 made in exercise of the power conferred by s'.3(i2) (c) of G the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, the State Government had no power to fix its price under Rule 114(2) of the Defence of India Rules, 1971 by the later .notification dated 14.6.1974 in exercise of its delegated power.. This contention w\"Us rejected by the learned Judges of the High Court as being unacceptable. The argument of the H learned Advocate-General. appearing for the State of Ut):ar Pradesh\n\nbefore the High Co.ur'. was that by the impugned notification dated . '14.6.1974 the State Government had not fixed any price, but hid only . directed that certain stocks of fertilizers which were in the possession\n\n•Of dealers on 31.5.1974 shall be sold at the ra1es fixed by the Central' Gavernment in the. earlier Notification dated 11.10.1973 which had been superseded by its own 1iotifica!ion dated, J.6.1974, has not been acceptedby the. learned Judges of the High. Court as the basis of their decision. 011 the other hand, they have proceeded on .the basis th4t the State Government bas fixed the dealers' sale price of the fertiliiler bythe impugned notification in exercise of the .power conferre~ by Rule 114 of the Defence of India Rules, 1971.\n\n.The undisputed fact is that the price fixed for the sale of the fertilizer to dealers was Rs. 1005 per ton under the Central Government's previous notification dated 11.10.1973 which was superse(J0d by its subsequent notification dated J.6.1974 in whic!1 the price fixed for sale of the fame variety of fertilizer to dealers was Rs. 1960 per ton from the date. of that notificatio1i. The price. fixed for sale by dealers was .Rs .. 1050 per ton under the superseded notification \\lated ll.10.1973 and Rs. ,2)00 per .ton.in the notification dated 1.6.1974. The learned Judges of the High Court noted the obvious fact that the dealers would get an excessive margin of Rs. 995 per ton in respect of the old stock , purchased by themat Rs. JOOS p.er-ton by selling that stock at the new sale price of Rs. 2000 per ton fixed by the notiliction dated 1.6.1974, whereas .under the notification dated 11.10.1973 their margin was only Rs. 45 per ton. They liave expressed the view that it could be a legitimate circumstance to per- , suade' them to -exercise their discretion under Article 226 of the Con- .stitution against -the appellants.\n\nThe lef!rned Judges rejected the contention urged on bhalf of the de.alers that there is conflict. of power exercised by the Central Government and the• State Government in the same commodity, fertilizer, by the two notifications dateq (6.J974 and'\n\n014.6.1974.-bn the ground that the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. under which the Fertilizer (ContrO:I) Order, 1957 has been made and the Central 'Governmenj's notification dated 1.6.1974 has been issued. and. the\n\nI)efence of India Ac.t, 1971, under which the Defence of India Rules, 1971 have been fra,'.ned and. the State Governme.nt's notification dated 14.6.1974 has been issued, are both Central enactments crperating in different fields and have different objects, that it is only an · accident that the,. two notifications relate to the same !'ommodity, •\n\nfertilizer, considered as an essential commodity. by the Central Gov-\n\n~ A.\n\nIf ', ' -.;(\n\n' . . ~\n\n• RAMCHANDRA MAWALAC v. U.P, STATE (Varadarajan, J.) 369.\n\nernment under the Essential Commodities Act and as a commodity essential to the community by the State Govemment'lmdr the Defence . of Tndia Rules, that the State Government has unfettered power under Rule 114 of the Defence bf India Rules, 1971 to fix the price of . . . fertilizer and regulate its supply notwithstanding the fact that fertilizer is. an essential commodity qnder -the J; lssentiai. Commodities Act .. 19.55 and .that the State .Government can 'also. do under the Defence_ of India Rules,- 1971 framed under the Defence of India Act, 1971 what.the Cen!ral Government can do under the Fcrtil, izer (Control) Order. 1957 made under the Esential Commodities Act, 1955, The 1-'arned Judges rejected the argument of the learned Advocate-General that the Central Governme.nt's notification dated 1:6.1974 does not apply to .stock\n\nof fertilizer which the dealers had carried forward from the stock which was available on 3LS.1974 and held that in vie\"'. of:s.37 of the Defence of India Act, 1971 whicli says tht the provisions of that Act or any Rule made thereunder or any Order c::ade under any such Ru!' shall haw effect not withstanding anything inconsiSteni\n\niherewith co.ntalned in any enactm, nt other than that Act. or in any , instrument having ffect by vrtue of any enactment other ,!han that Act confers supremacy on the later State Government notification dated 14.6.1974 over that of the Central Oovernmnt <lale<l 1.6.1974,\n\n They held that the similar provision in s.6 of the Essentiai'Comni.odities Act, 1955 which says that any order made under s.3 of that Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith . in any other enactment or any instrument having effect by virtue E of any enactment other than that Act will not 'have any effect on the . power of the State .Government. exercised under the Rules made under the later Defence of India Act, 197-1 which also is a Central enactment bn the ground that the pr.ovisions of .the later enactment p(evail over those iri the earlier enactment of the same legislativejiody m view of s.37 of the later Act.\n\nThe learned J.udges 'of the High Court rejected .the contention urged ol) behalf of the dealers that the Essential Commodities Act ., is a speci•I Act deali1ig with essential commodities nd the Defence qf India Act, 1971 ls a general Act dealing with a!lother commodities and, thercfvre, the notification dated 1.6.1974 issued by the Central G Gowmment under the Fertilizer (Control) Order, 1957' made under the provisions pf that Act must prevail over the St.ate Government's notification dated 14.6.1974 issued u11der the Defence of India Rules, 1971, framed under the 'Defence of India. Act, 1971. Jhey. have. observed that no question of speciai or general Ac\\ arises fn these H cases in view of. tlii provisions contained in s.37 of.the Defence of\n\n, .\n\nA India Act, 1971 and that s.6 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 draws within its ambit only those Acts which were in existence and 1--\" in force on the date f commencement of that Act and that it cannot take within its ambit the later Defence of India Act, 1971.\n\nThe learned Judges of t)le High Court rejected the contention B urged on behalf of the dealers that the State Government's impugned notification dated 14.6.1974 is malafide and motivated and the result • of colourable exercise of power. There is no need to refer to this &round of attack in detail as no argument was advanced in this court about any su;:°h groud. .\n\nC The next contention urged before the learned Judges of the High Court on behalf of the dealers was that the State Government's notification dated 14.6.1974 was discriminatory on the ground that. some governmental agenc.ies falling. within the definition of \"dealer\" in the Fertilizer (Control) Order, 1957 were permitted to sell their stock o( fertilizer carried over fr6m 31.5.1974 at the new rate mentioned\n\n>-..\n\n~ .\n\n'!--\n\nD in the Central Govern~1ent's notification dated 1.6. 1974. The learned Judges rejected 'this contenton on the ground that . the impugned notification dated 14.6.i974 applies to all dealers of fertilizer equally and does not provide for any such discrimip.atory treatment.to gov• ernmental agencies and that the executive oder to that effect, if any, may be illegal and would not invalidate. the impugned notification as ...\\-'\n\nE being discrimintory. .\n\nThe learned Judges of the High Court thus upheld the validity of the State Government's impugned notification dated 14.6.1974 and held that it is only prospective in ope1; ation and would apply only to sales of fertilizer made from 14.6.1974 out or\"the stock which was available with the dealers at the end of 31.5.1974.\n\nThe appellants are dealers in fertilizer as defined in Clause 2(c) of the Fertilizer (Control) Order, 1957. According. to that clause . .\"dealer\" means any person carrying on the business of seJ!ing fertilizer, whether wholesale or retail. , According to Clause 2(d) of that Order, fertilizer means any substance used or intended to be used as a fertilizer of the soil and specified in column 1 of Schedule I and_ includes a . mixture •of fertilizers and a special mixture of fertilizers. Trade artd\n\nommerce in, and the production; supply. and disfribution of the products of any industry whet.e the control of such industry by the\n\nUnion .is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in public interest fall under entry 33 of the Concurrent List Ul in the Seventh\n\n• ' ,.(\n\nr J(\n\n.. ,...\n\n. ',. ··~\n\nRAMCHANDRA MAWALAL 1'. U.P. STATE (Varadarajan, .(.)\" 371\n\nSchedule of the Canstitution. Trade and commerce within the State subject to the provisions of Eutry 33 of List TIJ faH'under entry 26 of the State List II in the same Seventh Schedule, Fertilizer is an essen: tial commodity under s.2(a)(xi) of the .Essential Commodities Act,\n\n1955. The Fertllizer (Control) Order: 1957, has been made in exercise of the power conferred by s.3 of the Essential 'Commodities Act iri respect of fertilizer. Under Clause 3(1) of that Order the Central Government has power, with a view .to regulating equitable distribution of fertilizers and making fertilizers available at fair prices', by a notification ift the official gazette, to fix the maximum price or rates . at which any fertilizer may be sold. by a manufacturer or a dealer.\n\nThe Central Government had issued the notification dated 11.10.1973 fixing the maximum sale price by producers fo dealers as Rs. JOOS per ton .and the ma\\J<.imum sale price by dealers to consumers as Rs. 1050 por ton. in respect of the variety of fertilizer with which we are . concerned in these appeals. There. is nothing on record to show that when that. notification of the Central Government was in force. there was any notification of the State Government of Uttar Pradesh fixing the maximum price o( fertilizer for sale by dealers. Subsequently, the Central Government issued the notification :No: G.S.R . . 254E dated 1.6.1974 fixing th'e rria, ximum price at which a dealer could sell t_hat variety of fertilizer as Rs. 2000 per ton in supersession . of the earlier notjfication .dated 11.10.1973.· There is no dispute . that the price fixed for sale, of that variety of fertilizer by the producer to the dealer is Ro. 1960 per ton. Under s.3(1) of the Defence of Tn>[ia Act, 1971 the Central Government had power, by notification in the Official Gazette, to ))Jake such rules as appear to it necessary or expedient for securing the defence bf India and civil defence, the Jl.Ublic safety, the maintenance of public order or the efficient conduct , of military o'perations, or for maintaining suppiies and services sscntial\n\nto the life of the community. Section l (3) of that AGt said that the Act shall come into force at once and shalI remain in force during the period of opration of the Proclamation of Emergency and for six months thereafter. There is no dispute that the'.Emergency which was in force when that Act was pas sec\\. was lifted on 22.3.1977.\n\nRule 114(2) of the Defence of India Rules, 1971 made in exerCise of the power conferred by s.3(1) of the Defence of India Ad, 1971 says that if the Central Government or the State Government is, of opinion that it is necessary or expedient so -to do for securing the defence of India and civil defence, the efficient conduct of military operations , or the maintenance or increase of supplies anl services essential to the life of the community or for securing the eg_uitable distribution and availabity of any artfole or thing at fair prices, it may, by order.\n\nprovide . for rcgulatig or\n\n0 Jirohibiling uic production, manufacture. supply and di.stribution. use and cc; nsumption of articles or things and trad\\' and co111merce therein or for preventing any corrupt practice or abuse' of autho.rity in respect of anysueh. matter.. ·. ·\n\nRule l 14(3)(h) gives power to the Central :Government or the . State Government to fix the prices or rates at which articles or things\n\nof a1iy\"descriptio11 whatsoever may be· sold or. hired or for relaxing\n\ncl11y maximu1n or mininum limits otherwise imposed on suCh prices.or rates; It is under that rule that the State Government issued the impugned no'tification No. A-490(V}/XII-1974 <laird 14.6.1974 fixing the maximum prid .of th~. concerned variety of fertilizer in these terms : \"No registered dealer shall charge or retain or enter into or enforce any contract for charging, i°' respect of any fertilizer sold to any person on. or after June I. 1974 from out of any stock carried over , by him from May 31, 1974 a price exceeding the maximum price flxed\n\nunder Clause 3. of the Fertilizer (Control) Order, 1957 as it prevailed qn May 31, 1974\". The reference to .the price a.s it prevailed on May 3L 1974 is to the price fixed in the. Central Government's notilication dated IL 10. \\973 which has been specifically superseded by the Government's notification dated 1.6.1974. The High Court has. held that the impugned notification dated 14.~.1974 is prnspective . . in.operntioIJ and t:an apply only to sales made from 14.6.1974 of the fertilizer which was carried over from the stock held at the close of 31.5.1974. ft is. not dispted that the notification could be. only prospective in operation and would not apply to sales effected up to 14.6.1974 of the fertilizer carried over from the stock which was I\" Id at !_he.end of 3i.5.1974. Tt is al; o not disputed that the Slate Gpernment issiied the impugned notification with the object of preventing_ de.alers from profiting to the extra extent of Rs. 950 per ton in respect of the stock which had be.en purchased by them <prior to 1.6.1974 at Rs.JOOS per ton by selling the same at .Rs. 2000 per ton fixed in the notification dated 1.6.1974 while that stock could have been sold prior to l.6.1_974 only at Rs . .1050 porton. The question is which of these two notification is valid and should prevail in regard to the fertilizer carried ovr from .the stock held by dealers at the close of\n\n31.5.1974.\n\nThe Central Government's notification dated 1.6.1974 issmd under Clause 3(1). of the Fertilizer (Control) Order, 1957 ri1ade in exercise _or\"ihe power conferred by sJ(lj of the Essential Commodities Act 1955. and the State Government's impugned notification dated . . ' ..\n\n' .\n\n,_ -~·\n\nRAMCHANDRA MAWALAL v, u. p, ST_ATE \\Varadar<ijan,' J.) 373\n\n14.6.1974 issi; ed under ule ll4 of the Defence of India Rules, 1971 made in exercise of the powers conferred by. s.3(1) of the Defence of J'ndia Act; 1971 relate to -the same comm0dity, fertilizer, _which is declared to be an essential° commodity under s.2(a)(xi) of tlie Essential Commodities Act, 1955, and may ordinarily fall under. the term . \"article o.r things of any description whatsoever\" occurring in Rule 114(3)(h) of the Defence of India Rules, 1971 and 'both of them fix the. maxinium price at which dealers can sell the fertilizer. The Central Government's notification dated J.6.1974 applies fo the whole country while the impuged notification dated 14.6.1974 of the State\n\nGovernmnt cdrt apply only tothe State of Uttar Pradesh. ·\n\nThe appellants' attack on the impugned notification is two-fold.\n\nThe first ground of attack forcibly urged by Mr. P. Govindan Nair, senior'Counsel appearing for.one set of appellants is that the impunged notification is alto.gether invalid in.law .and non est on the grbund that the State Goverri1nent has no power whatsoever to isue the notification under the Defence of India Rules in respect of an essential commodity, fertilizor, covered by the Central Government's notifica- . tion issued under the Fertilizer (Control) Order, 1957, made in exercise of the powerconferred by the Essential Commodities Act .. The seccnd ground of attack urged by Mr. Yogeslawar Prasad, Senior Counsel\n\napparing for the other set of appellants is based on Article 14 of the Col1stitution, mimely, that it is discriminatory and, therefore, bad in law. Mr. S.C: Manchanda, -Senior Counsel appearing for the\n\nrespodents in all, the appeals naturlly subnif!ted tha't there is. no substance_ -in any .of these t; vo grounds.\n\nThe seco'nd ground of attack projected by Mr. Yogeshwar Prasad may be taken up first for. consideration. This ground has been considered by the learned Judges of the High Court as.the fifth ground of attack before them at pages 29 to 31 of the paper book in <:; ivil Appeals 1568-1576 of 1974, and rejected by them. The submission of Mr. Yogeshwar Prasad is that some governmental agencie.s ·,. falling within the definition of \"dealer\" in the Fertilizer (Control)\n\nOrder, 1957 \\verc permitted by the Stafe.Gaverriment to sell the .ferliljzer carried over from the st0ck held at theclo; e cf 31.5c1974 at the new enhanced rate of Rs. 2000 per ton fixed in the Central Government's notification dated 1.6.1974 and that it is. discrimina_tcry' against the_ private dealers who are required by the impugned notification to se!i at the old rnte of Rs.· 1050 per ton fixed in the Central Government's old notification dated .ll.10.1973. To shew that such a direction was given by the State Government, Mr. Yogeshwar\n\nPrasad invited attention to' the first sentence in the radiogrm 23.7.1974 issued by .the ChieJ Secretary\n\n0 to the Government of Uttar Pradesh.\n\nThat sentence 'reads as follows : \"All stocks of fertilizer available with ASO, AGRO Cooperatives and Cane Unions be distributed without any condition regarding purchase of fertilizers atntw rates';.\n\nIt is not possible to make out. what exactly was intended to. be conveyed by that sentence in the radiogram. In the counter-affidavit of the Accounts Officer, Fertil, izers and Manuares Directorate of Agriculture, Government of Uttar Pradesh, filed in C.M.P. 6773 of 1974 on the file of this Court, it is stated thanhe State Government .has not allowed any State owned agency to sell the stocks of fertilizer carried over from 31.5.1974 at the rates fixed in the Central Government's notification dated 1.6.1974, that the radiogram was not meant to permit Agricultural supplies Organisation and the Agro Industrial cbrporation and other governmental agencies to, sell the stocks carried over from 31.5.1974 at the revised rates and that it was issued to remove only the condition. There is no other materia_I on the record to show that any direction was given by the State Government for the -governmental agencies to sell the fertilizer arried over frol]'l 31.5.1974 at the enhanced rate fixed in the Central Government's notification dated I.6.1'174. Therefore, the very basis of the contention of Mr. Yogeshwar Prasa<l that. there is any discrimination. against private dealers like the appellants represented by him compared with governmental agencies in the matter of the sale price of fertilizer has not been establisi1ed.\n\nEven if any such direction had been given, it would certainly be bad in law as being discriminatory. ft would not, however, invalidate the impugned. notification which per se applies to all dealers of fertilizers in the entire State of Uttar Pradesh,\n\nwheth9r private or governmental.· Consequently, the impugned notification of the State Government cannot be held to be bad in law on . the ground of discrimination if it is otherwise valid.' Mr. Manchanda relied upon the aforesaid counter-affidavit in support or' his contention that there is no basis for the contention that there is any discrimination against private dealers. The second ground of a\\tack projected by Mr. Yogeshwar Prasad fails and has been rightly rejected by the .learned Judges of the High .Court. · .· • • The first ground is as regards the power of the state Government to issue ihc impugned .notilication dated 14:6.1974, fixing for the sale o! fertilizers by dealers to consumers a price different from the one fixed in the Central Government's notification dated I.6.1974. In considering this quesiion the fact that the notification was .issued by the State. Government with the. object of preventing dealers in the State\n\n...\n\n- )<\n\n• '1\\AMCHANDRA MAWALAJ, v. u; p, STATE (Varadarajm.i. J.) . 375\n\nof Uttar Pradesh from driving undue excessive profit from agricultural consumers in respect of the fertilizer which had been purchased by the deale'rs at Rs. 1005 per ton under the old. CentrarGovernment's noti' fication dated 11.10.1973 and. that it applies to the fertilizer which was in stock at the end of 31.5.1974, should not weigh with the Court,· for th. question is of the po'wer of° the State Government to issue the notification. The questfon is whether the State Government • has power to fix the price of fertilizer under the .Defence of India Rules, 1971, framed in exercise of the powers.conferred by the Defence of India Act, 1971 after the Centra I Government had already fixed the price under the Fertilizer (Contrql) Order, J 957 rnae in exercise ofthe power conferred by the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 .. If in iaw the State Government could fix 'the price in , respect of the • limited stock of fertilizer carried over from 31.5.1974; it can certainly fix the price of.the fertilizer received by the dealers even. after 1.6.1974 in respect of which the Central Government's notification dated L6,1974 would undoubtedly apply. ·\n\nThe Essential Commodities Act, 1955 in an enactment passed D by Parliament to provide, in tl; e interest.of.the general public. 'for the control of the production, supply and distribution and trade and commerce in certain cOmmoditic.s which have been notified under that Act'as essential commodities. The very objct of the. Essential Commodit\\es Act ls to check the inflationary trends in prices and to ensure the equitable d; Siribution of essential commcdities. Section .E 1(2) of that Act makes. it applicable to the whole of India. It is a permanent enactment in tf1e sense that its operation is not n::stricted to any particular pericd. 'The Fertilizer. (Control) Order .. 1957 has been made in exercise of the power conferred by s.3(2)(c) of the Essen~· tial Commodities Act, 1955 for controlling the price at which any essential commodity may be bought or sold. Fertilizer has been F declared to be an essential commodity under s.2(a)(xij of the Essential .\n\nC9mmodi.tics Act as mentioned above. Ther.efore, .the price fixed in the notification issued under the Fertilizer (Control) Order, 1957 squarely applies tO fertiliz~\"· The Defence of 1.ndia Act, 1971 also is an k:t of Parliament which was intended to provide for special measures to ensure the public safety and intere!t, the defence of India G and civil defence and for the trial of certain offences and for matters connected therewith. That. Act also extended to . the whole of India, but µnder s.1(3), it came' into force at 0°nce and remained in force 'tluring the period of' operatlon of ihe Proclamaticn of Emergency and for a period of six months there.after.\n\nSub-clause (a) of Subsection (3) of 's. ). saves anything duly done under the Act as if the\n\n.. •\n\n.• .\n\nAct had.not expired. As stated earfier the Emergency which was.in force when the .State G.overnment's impugned notific.atio.n dated 14.6.1974 was issued, was lifted 01; 22:3.1977: The life of the Deferice ofindia Act, 1971 thus extended upto si~ months after 22.3.1977, Jn .that way the Defence onridia Act, 1971 was. a temporary enactment intended to be in' operation for only a limited period.\n\n• . ...\n\nThe Defene of India Rules, 1971 had been 'issued iri exercise of the powercoi1ferred l:iy s.3 of the Defence of India Act, 1971. Under Rule .114(2) of thqse Rules; if t)1e. Central Government or the State .\n\nGovernment.is of opinion thatit is necessary or expedient. so t~ do. ) for securingthe defence of India .and civil defence, the efficient conduct ~· of military operations or the maintenance or increase of supplies and 1 services essential to the .life of the community or. for securing the .. equ. itable distribution aJ\\d. availability of any ar.ticlc. ~.r thing at fair . prices,. it may, by order, provide for regulating or prohib.iting the . production, manufacture, supply and distribution, use and consump- . tion of articles or . things and trade and comerce therein of for ) preve11ting any corrupt practice or abuse of. authority in respect of any such matter.\n\nSub-rule (3)(h) of Rule 114 said that without vrejudice to tlie generality of.t11c powers conferred by sub-rule (2) an order made .\n\nE thereunder may provide for controlling the p, rices or ratl'!l at which ' ' ) ' .\n\n,. articles or things of. any description whatsoever may be sold or ,- hired or'. for. relaxing any maximum G>i' minimum limits otherwise imposed on such prices or rates. .The State Government's impugned notification ]fas been issued, as already.stated, in exerdse of the power f, ·•conferro(l by this. sub-nile of. Rule 114,_ •.\n\n/ ' . . .\n\nThe Central Government had already. assumed power' under! the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 tO control the prfee of essential f CoJllmodities. includig-ferti!izer.as a perm.anent measure, and could do under the provisions ohhat Act in relation to that essential com- .. ;,, odity what it may do under the Defence 'ofJndia, Act, 197L a tem- G . poracy. measure, if frrtilizer . could be broi1ght under the .description . of '.'articles or things of , any description whatsoever\". Bqt si, nce it .J1ad already assumed the power under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 to control the price of fertilizer if was not necess:iry.for it to get itself armed oneeagain with the µower.to control theprice of •. - H the same essential commodity under the Defence .of India Act, 1971 .•\n\nwich came about 16 years l.ater. Therefore, the conlenticn cf Mr.\n\n' .. ,\n\n• RAMCHANDRA MA\\\\'ALAL v. u. P. STArn _(Varadarajan, J.) 377\n\n-1.\n\n! . '\n\n/~.\n\n• -Govindan Nair that the Essential .Commodities Act, 1955 is a special A enadmerit relating to only essential commodities an!i the Defence. of India' Act, 1971 is a general enactment relating to .all other commodi~ ties, and that the words \"articles .or things of any description what- _soever\" occurring i.n Rule l 14(3)(h} of. the Defence of India: Rules, 1971.cannot be understood to include essential commodities has. force and hs to b~ acceted. It cannot be ass\\lmed that Padianien.t which B had .already legislated in the Essential Comnicdities Aot, 1955, a\n\npermanent measure, .in. respect of fertilizer intended to -legislate once '. again and could have felt-the need to legislate once again in the t.em-. por; ry Defence of India Act, 1971 in respect of the same article, especially bec.ausc what .could be done under the Defence of india Act and the .Rules which may be framed thereunder cbul<) as well C be. done with equal force under the Essential Commodities Act .a.nd orders which may be passed thereunder.\n\nTherefore, the r; ontention that the state Government .has no power to fix the price of. esse!ltial ' commodities. covered bv the Essential Commodities Aet, 1955 and ·the Fertilizer (Control) Order, 1957 in exercise of:the. power con-· .ferred on it.by Rule 114 0fthe Defeqce of Jndi.a Rules, J.971 issued D\" und.er the Defence of Tndia Act, 1971 is we.II-founded and has to be accepted.\n\n. Section '.3(2)(c) of the Essential Comodities Act, 1'95.5, pursuant to which the Fertili, er .(Control) Order,.1957 bas been.made says that without prejudic~ to the generality of the powers conferred by sub- . section (l) an order made. thereunder may pFovide for. controlling the price at which any essential cpmmodity may be brought or sold.\n\nTh; s sub-clause of s.3 of the -Essential Commodities Act.has not left anything to be done under the Defence of India Act, 1971 in. the matter of fixation of price of any essential commodity whether it be for secur~ i.ng ahy essential commoditv for the defence of India or fer the effective military. operation or for'. securig th~ equitable distribution and availability of essential commodities at fair prices or distribution\n\ntherof. and trade and commerce therein as envisaged in s.3(1) of that Act ' 1\n\nlf the State Government felt th?rthere was any special. circum- stance to be t.aken into'a 0ccount for fixing the prit; e of'the essential . commodity, fertilizer,~ in the State of Uttnr Pradesh at a rate lower\n\nthan the one fixed by the Central Gov.ernmni in jts notification dated . 1.6.1974, it could. have achieved that objec~ by getting steps to be\n\ntaken under the Esscn.tial Commodities Act 'itself. Section 3(2) of that Act lays dowri .that the Central Government may, ha.ving regarg\n\nto the local conditions of any area\" and other relevant circumstances, tk different prices or rates in respect of different areas and for different classes of consumers. The State Government could have requested the Central Govrnment fo act under s.3(2) of the Essential Commodities Acbmd fix a different price or rate for the sale by dealers in that State of fertilizer carried over from the stock held on 31:5.1974.\n\nSection 5(b) of the Essential c6mmodities Act provides for delegati6n of powers and says thai the Central Government may; by notified . order, dir•ci that the power to make or issue notifications. under s.3 of that Act shall, in relation to such matters and subject to .such con~ ditiom. if any, .as may be specified in the direction be exerciMble also by such State or such officer or authority sul)ordinate to a State\n\nGovernment as may be specified in the direciion. The Central Gov' er.nment has ·-;10t issued any direction under s.5(b) of the Essential Commodities Act delegating its power to issue notification under s.3 of that 'Act to the State Government or any officer or. authority ·.of that Govern1nent. The State Government has thus not resorted to the provisions contained in s.3(2} or s.~(b) of the Essential Commo-. dities Act, but has. proceeded to fix the price of fertilizer .on its own under the Defence of India Rules; 197,1. which it cannot do under those Rules and the Defence of India Act, 1971 in respect of the essential commodity.\n\n. •·\n\nSection 6 'of the Essential Commodities. Act, '1955 saves any order made mider s.3 of that Act from the impact of any other enactment. .It is not possib]e to accept the cntention that theother Act or enactment referred to in s.6 of the Essential Commodities Ac(\n\n1955 would be only.ihe Act or enactmeht which was in force on .the date of commencement of that Act and. not any future Act or Acts. This contention has been wrongly rejected by the learned Judges. of the High Court. Section 6 of the Essential Commodities Act says that an order ·ade under s. 3 shall ave effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent the'rewith contained.· in any enactment other than .\n\nthat Act or any insrument having effect by virtue of any enactment other than that ,\\ct .. It is true that there is a similar saving provision . , in s.37 of the.Defence of India Act, 1971 which says that the provisions of that Act or any Rule niade thereunder or any ordr made under any such Rule shall haye effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent : therewith contained in any enactment other than that Act or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any enactment other than that Act.\n\nBut as stated above, the Defence of India Act, 1971, which was a general .and tempotary Act and the Rules framed thereunder cannot apply to fertilizer which is an' essential commodity governed . . .\n\n\\:~\n\n1< • f ..\n\n~. ·\"' ·•\n\n• -.II\n\n.,..\n\n\"\"\" -\n\n. '\n\nRAMCHANDRA MAWALAL v. u. P. STATE (Varadarajan, J.) 379\n\nby the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 and the Fertilizer (Control) A Order, 1957 inade under the provisions of that Act. Therefore, the State Government cannot without delegation issue any notification under the {)efence of India Act and Rule.s, 1971 .in regard to the price of fertilizer, an essential commodity governed .by the Essential Commodities Act and the Fertilizer (Control) order, 1957. The learned Advocate-General of\"the State was perhaps fully conscious of the\n\n B legal position that the State Government'ahnot fix the price of an essential commodity by any notification under the Defence of India Rules, )971 in the circumstances when he took the patently unacceptable stand before tbe learned Judges of the High Court that the State Government did not in fact .fix the price of fertiliZer ii{-its impugned notification dated 14.6.1'974 but it only directed that ertain stock of C fertilizer which. was in the possession of dealers at the end of 31.5'.1974 and ws carried .over by•thetn shall be sold at the rate fixed .in the Central Government's earlier notification. dated ll.10.1973, which . as stated above; has been specifically superneded by 'its .. ·ubsequent notification dated 1.6.1974. If the .State Government had not fixed the price at which fertilizer caµ be sold be dealers by the impugned D notification dated '14.6.1974 though it is no doubt in respect of the stock carried over from 31:5.1974, one fails to see what else it did or why it was considered necessary. Therefore, the learned Judges of the High Court have rightly rejected U1at submission of the learned\n\nAdvocate-GeneraL · ' ·\n\nAs stated above, tra<!e and; commerce in and the production, suppl:\\( and distribution of the products. of any industry where the control of such industry by the 1.Jni<in is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest fall under entry 33 of the Concurrent List Ill, and trade and commerce within the State suliject .to the provision~ of Entry 33 in the Concurrent List III fall under Entry 126 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution .. If the State Government's impugned notification is ass.urned to be a law enacted by that State's Legilsture on Entry 126 of List II, since\n\nthe Act of Parliamnt passeq on Eniw 3~ of List III and the Fertilizer (Control). Order, 1957 passed under that A.ct were already in force, the assent of the esident had to be received in order. that the State . Government's notification assumed to be a law.enacted by the Siate's Legislature may prevail in the State as .required by Article 254(2) of the Constitutio, n which reads thus : • •\n\n. ' ' . \"Where a law made by the Legislature of a State with H respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent ...\n\n\"-:\n\n380. '.\n\n. SUPR~ME COURT REPORTS ·, [198412 s.c.R.-\n\nList contains any provisi0n repugnant to the proisions of an earlier law !)lade. by Parliament or an existing law :with respect to that matter, then, t_heIaw, so made by the Legislature of _such State shall, if \"it has been reserved for tJ1e considera!ion of the President\"and has received his assent, prevail in that State : B' ' \".\n\n. c\n\n, F.\n\nProvided that nothing in this clause shall prevent Par- _ liament from enacting at any time any law with respeci to the samematter including a law adding to, amending, varying or repealing the Jaw so made by the Legislat11re of the.State.\" .\n\nThere is nothing :on record to show that the impugne(I notification of the State Government was placed before the President for his assent and. that his assent has been received: Therefore, the State Government's impugned notification cverr ~.a law cannot prevail over the earlier notification of the Central Government. - \" ... . ,\n\nThe learned Judges of the High Court-were not right in rejecting . the submission made before them that there is conflict between the two notifications of the Cental Government dated 1.6.1914 and of\n\nth~ State. Government dated 14.6.1974 and in holding that the State . ·Government has nilfettered power under the Defence of India Act, 1971 to fix the price of ferfilizerand regulate its supply notwithstanding the fact that fertilizer is an essential commodity under the_ Essential Ccimmodities Act, 1955 in observing and that what tl{e Central Government can d9 under the Fertilizer (Control) Order, '1957 _the State Government can do under the Defence of India Rules, 1971. There is a clear conflict betweeh the two;10tifications.in respect of the same .. essential\" commodity,· fertilizer,· for' under the Central Government's\n\noiification dated J .6.1974 the price at which a dealer' can sell fertilizer of the concerned. variety is Rs. 2000 per ton while under the State Government's notification dated !4~6;1974 it is only Rs. 1050 per ton though no (loubt il iS restricted to the stoc\\< carried over from\n\n31.5.1974. which is immaterial in judging the power of the State Gov' ernment to _fix the price of an essential commodity by a rtotificatio~ made under the Defence of fodia Rules, 1971 in respect_.of which the Central Government had already 'fixed the iJrtce under the Fertilizer (Control). Order,' 1957; Once the Central enactment and th~ Central Government's notification govern the pric~ of an essential -commodity• the State . Government's notification isued in exercise of ti\\e delegated authority under the Defence of India Act and the Rules framed thereunder cannot prevaii. The Two enac_tments have\n\n•, .\n\n--\n\n'.•\n\n...\n\n~ \\\n\n·.~·.\n\n.RAMCHANDRA MAWALAL v. u. P. STATE (VGradanjan, J.) 38J:\n\n. to be read in. such a way that ther~ is 110 co;1flict between them while giving effect to thel(jjn their respective fields of operation .. On the question of conflict and interpretation of statutes, we find the following passage in Craies nn Sttute Law (seventh edition) at page 222 :\n\n\"Acts of Par!iamept sometimes contain general enact- ,111ents relating to the whole subject-matter of the statute, and also. specific and particular enactments relating to certain . special matters;· and if the general and specific enactments prove to be in any way repugnant to 011e anot)ler, tl; e question . will arise, V.:hich is to control the othe1'? In Pretty v. Sol/yl11 .\n\nRomilly M.R. stated as follows what. he considered to be the rule of. construction under such circumstances. \"The . general rules,\" said he, \"whieh are applicable to particular and general enactments in statutes ar.e very clear; the only difficulty is in their application. The mk is, that wbenever . there is a particular enactment and a. general enactment in the same statute, and the latier, taken in its most comprehensive sense, wouH over rule the forme;., the particular enact- . ment must ' be operative,. and the general enactment msut be taken to affect only the other parts 0f the statute to which it may properly al'ply\".\n\nTh.e following passage foun<l at page 187 of the twelfth. edition of Maxwell on the \"Interpretation of .Statutes may also be noticed ;\n\n\"If two sections of the sa:me statute are repugnant, the known Fule is that the last must prevail\". But, O\\J. the general principle that an author must, be supposed not fo have intended to contradict himself, the Court will -endeavour to con- . . . . . \\ strue the language of the legislature in such a way as to avoid having to appl~ .the rule, leges pos(erioi\"es priores cont~ rarias abrogant. For exaivple, the provision in Order 47 of the Country Court Rules 1936 that ·\"the scale of costs in' an action for the recovery of a sum of money only shall be determined .... as .. regards tlie costs of the plan tiff, by the amount recovered\" was not construed as peremptory, for this woulp have brought it out of harmony with he • .· earlier provision in the same Order that \"the costs df proceedings in a Country Court shall be in the discretion .of the Court.\"\n\n(I) (1859) 76 Beav .. 606.\n\n.C •·\n\n. It\n\n. A . One way in which rewgnany can be avoided is bY\n\nregarding two. apparently conflicting priohs _as dealing with distinct matters .oi' situatins.\"\n\nThere -will be clear conflict between the .two notifications _if it is understood that the State Government also can_ fix the price of any_ essential comn10dity covei'ed by the Essential Commodities Act, ,1955 and th.e_ Fertilize~ (Control) Order, 1957 in exercise of the power - conferred _ori it by the Defence of India Act, 1971 and the Defence of India Rules, l-97L The conflict c:an be avoided only if it is held that the Essential Commdities Act, l 955 and the Fertilizer (Control).\n\nOrder, 1957 deal with essential commodities and the Defence of Jndi, a Act, 1971 and the Defence of India Rules, 1971 deal with all other articles and things of any description whatsoever. The author of\" the two enactments, Essential Commodities Act, 1955 and Defence of India Act, 1971 is the same, namely, Parliament, and Parliament must be held to have 1\\ot intended to contradict itself while dealing with -distinct matters or situations under those enactments. If the State Governments are free to fix their own prices in notifications issued by them under the _Defence of India Rulee;, 1971 when the Central Government's notification fixing a single price for the whole country in respect of. an essential commodity is in force that i10tification of the Central Government will become otiose. The question is whether Parliament would have intended such a consequene .\n\nThe answer can only be an emphatic no. That situation has to_ be clearly avoided by a proper interpretation of the respective powers\n\nor\"the Central and State -Governments under the two Acts, and by holding that the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, arid the .Fertilizer , (Control) Order, 1957 deal with essential commodities and the Defence of\" India Act, 1971 and the Defence of India Rules, 1971 dealt with all other commodities notwithstanding that fact that Rule I14(3)(h) mentions \"articles or things of any description whatsoever\", . - • In Municip.al COrPoration of Del/ti v .. Shiv Shankar 111 it ts observed:\n\n~---\n\n-f '\n\nG _ \"To determine if a later statutory provision repeals by • implication -\"''earlier one it is accordingly necessary to closely scrutinise and consider the \"true meaning and effect • + both of the earlier and the later statute. Until .this is done -it cannot be satisfactorily ascertained if a11y fatal inconsis- '\n\n• (I) '(1.973] 3 S.C.R .. 607.\n\nI . \\\n\n. RAMCHANDRA MAWALAL v. u. P •. STATE (Varadai'ajan J.) 383.\n\n!ency exists betwe.en them; The meaning, scope and effect of the two statutes, as discovered on scrutiny, determine the legislative intent as to whether the earlier law shall cease\n\nor shall only be spplemented. If , the objeefs of th~ two statutory provisions are, different and the language of each statute is .restricted'to its own objects or subject, Jhen they are generally.intended to run• in parallel lines without meet-· ing a.nd there would be no real conflict thougl; apparently it may appear to be. so on the surface. Sratutes in qari materia although in apparent conflict should also so far as\n\nreasonably possile, be construed to. be in harmony with each other and it is only . when there is an irreconcilable conflict between the new provision and the prior statute relati11g to the same subject rnat.ier, thai the former, being the later expression of the legislature, may be held to prevail, tlrnprior law yielding to the extent of the conflict\".\n\nIf the Essential Com; nodities Act, .1955 and the . Fertilizer . (Control) Order; 1957 are considered to apply xclusively to fertilitzer,\n\nan essentiat commodity, and the Defence of lndia Act, 1971 and the Defence of India Rules, W7 J are considered to apply to other commodities excluding essential commodities there would beno C()nflict whatsoever between the Essential Commodities Act and the Defence of India Act. aud .betwee>1 the notifications issued u.nder Fertili.zer (Control) Order, 1957 a1id the Defence of India Rules, 1971. If that is not done there will be real conflict between the two and, therefore, the two Acts must be so construed as to avoid conflict in the manner indicated above,\n\nMr. Manchanda invited attention to the foUowing. observation, in Zaverbhai Amidas v. The State.of Bombay<ll · ' · ..\n\n• ''It is true; as already pointed out, that on a question ' under ar.ticle :254(1) whether an Act of Parliament prevails against a law Qf the State, no question of repeal arises; but the principle on which the rule of implied repeal rests, namely, thit if the subject-matter. of the latet legislation is identical with thai of the earlier, so that they cannot both stand together, then the earlier is repealed by the later enactment, wiJJ be:equally applicable to a question under article 254(2) whether the further Jegisla}ion by. Parliament is in\n\n(1) [1955] J S.C.R. 799.\n\n' •\n\n. SUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1984) 2 S.C.R. . respect of the same matt.er as that of the State law.'\n\nThere is no question of placing the liter 1aw, Defence of India Act, 1911, for consideration bi the President under .Article- 2S4(2) of ihe Constitution for both the laws, the Essential Commodities Act, 195~ and Defence of India Act,. 1971 are laws passed by Par- Hament. There does not appear Jo be any ptovi; ion for placing .. any notification ma\"de by .a.State Government under the Defence of India Rules, 1971 for consideration by the President. As already stated, if the •impugned State Government's notification is, however, considered to be in the nature of a State law there'is nothing o~ the record to show that it was placed before the President .for coniideratiori and had. received his asse!1t as already stated .. .· ·• Relylng upon the above decisitm in Zaverbhai Amaidas v. The . State of Bombay (supra) Mr. Manchanda .made a half-hearted plea ·\n\nthat the impugned State Government's notification relates only to fertilizer which was carried over from. the •.gtock held t the close D . of 31.5.1974 and thaf it is intendd to protect agricultural consumers: from dealers making undue profit and should therefore, be held to be_; valid in law. It is not possible to acce]lt this submi.ssion of \"Mr. Manchanda. There. is no basis, whatsoever, to presume, and it will . be totally uncharitable to the Central Government to presume, that' the Centr~J. Government which had ·assumed powers nn\\ler the Essen, . E tial Commodities Act, )955 to control the distribution of fertilizer ,\n\narid make it a.vailable at fair prices to consumers was ignorant of or-, ' .. had overlooked: the fact while mhingthe notification dated 1.6.1974 .;\n\nfixing a higher price' for dealers to sell fertilizer to consumers with . effect from. tnat .date that there may be some stock of fertilizer on, 3).5.1974 .purchase!l by dealers at lower prices which 'may be carried; .\n\nF .aver for.sle stibseq\\lently. What has ben done by° the State Government under the ipipugned notification is utterly , lacking in power • and cannot be allowed to stand merely because i( relates only tq a . comparatively small quantity of fertilizer carried over from the stock\n\n031.5.1974. and was intended to benefit and. protect a\"gricultural consumers and' prevent dealers from making undue profits. For th~ ; G reasons stated above .the appeals are allowed and the .impugned State Government's notification dated .14.6.1974 is. quashed.' There will;,\n\nbe an: order directing the District Agriculiural Officers and other• l\n\nDistrict Authorities in the. State of Uttar Pradesh not to ask the dealers ·to Tefund the excess in respect of the sales completed prior to the. date: H of the impuged notificatioli. The District Magistrates concerned. shall return the. n; ionies deposited with them by the dealers pursuant\n\n•• '\n\n'f.\n\n RAMCHANDRA MAWALAL v. u: p. S'{ATE°(Varadarajan, J.) 3~5 ' .\n\nII\\ •\n\ntq. this Court's orders dated :2.9.1974 and 30.IOJ974. The respondents A shall pay the. appellants' costs. There ,.; ill be>one set_ of advo.cate's fees in the batch of appeals in whicl) _the appellants are represented by Mr. Govindan Nair.and.another set of a_dvocate's fees in t~ other . ' set of. appeals in which Mr. Yogeshwar Prasad appears.for the appellants. · ·. . . _ \" . : .. . · '\n\nRS.K.\n\nAppeals dtsmiSsed.\n\nI • .. . \\\n\n...\n\n. ' . . '\n\n• . .\n\n. . . .\n\n.. .", "total_entities": 247, "entities": [{"text": "RAM CHANDRA MAWA LAL AND OTHERS ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10, "end_char": 45, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAM CHANDRA MAWA LAL AND OTHERS ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF UITAR PRADESH ANJ? OTHERS ETC", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 48, "end_char": 86, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND OTHERS ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M.P. THAKKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 151, "end_char": 163, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M.P. THAKKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Defence of India Rules, 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 171, "end_char": 199, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Essential Conunodities Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 382, "end_char": 414, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 854, "end_char": 857, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Essential Conunodities Act, 1955", "statute": "the Essential Conunodities Act, 1955"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1037, "end_char": 1041, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Essential Conunodities Act, 1955", "statute": "the Essential Conunodities Act, 1955"}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1270, "end_char": 1272, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Essential Conunodities Act, 1955", "statute": "the Essential Conunodities Act, 1955"}}, {"text": "June J, 197 4", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1415, "end_char": 1428, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S1nnc time later in order to con1pcnsate the manufacturers for the higher cost of inputs, the Central Governn1ent issued another notification on June J, 197 4 fixing a very high retail selling price of the fertilizer to be charged by the dealers fro111 the consumers."}}, {"text": "State of Uttar Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1769, "end_char": 1791, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Qn June l t, 1974 the State of Uttar Pradesh issued a notification-(Uttar Pradesh Fartilizcr Prices (Supplen1entary) Order, 1974) in exercise of power under rule.114 of the Defence of India Rules, 1971 promulgated under the Defence of India Act, 1971."}}, {"text": "Defence of India Rules, 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1920, "end_char": 1948, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Defence of India Act, 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1971, "end_char": 1997, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "June 14, 197 4", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2414, "end_char": 2428, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant<; (dealers) challenged before the Hit; h Court the legality and validity of the Staie Governn1ent's notification dated June 14, 197 4 on the grounds: (I) that the fertilizer in qu'eStion having been declared an essential commodity under the Essential Co1ninodities Act, 1955, an Act specia-I!y enacted inter alia for regulating!prices of essential comn1odities, its price ."}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2940, "end_char": 2947, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Defence of India Act, 1971", "statute": "the Defence of India Act, 1971"}}, {"text": "Fazal Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3186, "end_char": 3195, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fazal Ali and Thakkar, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Thakkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3200, "end_char": 3207, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fazal Ali and Thakkar, JJ.)", "canonical_name": "Thakkar"}}, {"text": "Suthtrland", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5950, "end_char": 5960, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "361 BC]\n\nSuthtrland's Statutory Construction, 3rd Edition."}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8523, "end_char": 8530, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Vareiarajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8672, "end_char": 8683, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "364 DJ\n\n(Per Vareiarajan J. dissenting)\n\nIt cannbt be assumed that Parliament which had already legislated in the Essential Commodities ACt, 1955, a permanent measure, in respect of fertilizer ."}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8726, "end_char": 8736, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "364 DJ\n\n(Per Vareiarajan J. dissenting)\n\nIt cannbt be assumed that Parliament which had already legislated in the Essential Commodities ACt, 1955, a permanent measure, in respect of fertilizer ."}}, {"text": "Essential Commodities ACt, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8773, "end_char": 8804, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Jn in the temporary Defence of India Act, 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8939, "end_char": 8985, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Jy because what could be done under the Defence of India Act and the Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9026, "end_char": 9100, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9268, "end_char": 9280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Jy because what could be done under the Defence of India Act and the Rules", "statute": "Jy because what could be done under the Defence of India Act and the Rules"}}, {"text": "Essential Commodities Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9288, "end_char": 9313, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9334, "end_char": 9352, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that the Central Government may, havin'g regard."}}, {"text": "s.3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9674, "end_char": 9680, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Jy because what could be done under the Defence of India Act and the Rules", "statute": "Jy because what could be done under the Defence of India Act and the Rules"}}, {"text": "31.5.1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9839, "end_char": 9848, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on 31.5.1974."}}, {"text": "Section 5(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9850, "end_char": 9862, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Jy because what could be done under the Defence of India Act and the Rules", "statute": "Jy because what could be done under the Defence of India Act and the Rules"}}, {"text": "Essential Commodities Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9870, "end_char": 9895, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s.3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10054, "end_char": 10057, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Jy because what could be done under the Defence of India Act and the Rules", "statute": "Jy because what could be done under the Defence of India Act and the Rules"}}, {"text": "s.3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10470, "end_char": 10473, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10636, "end_char": 10642, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Defence of India Rules, 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10758, "end_char": 10786, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Rules and the Defence of India Act, 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10818, "end_char": 10858, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "India ct and Rules, 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11318, "end_char": 11342, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 254(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12197, "end_char": 12211, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Cpnstitution for placing any notification made by a State Government under thC Defeace of India Rules, 1971", "statute": "the Cpnstitution for placing any notification made by a State Government under thC Defeace of India Rules, 1971"}}, {"text": "(1955] 1 SCR 799", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 12620, "end_char": 12636, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Defence of India Act, 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14014, "end_char": 14040, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Defence of India Rules, 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14049, "end_char": 14077, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Defence of India Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14355, "end_char": 14377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Defence ofTndia Act, 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14477, "end_char": 14502, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14543, "end_char": 14553, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "383 D-E]\n\nThe author of the two enactments, Essential Con1modities Act, 1955 anct Defence ofTndia Act, 1971 is the san1e, na1ncly, Parlia1nent; and Parliament 1nust be held to have not intended to contradict itself while dealing with distinct matters or situations under those enactn1ents. ["}}, {"text": "Yogeshwar Prashad", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 16121, "end_char": 16138, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Yogeshwar Prashad,\n\nS. C.\n\nManchanda,\n\nS. K.\n\nBagga,\n\nRAMCHANDRA MAWALAL v. u. P. STATE (Thakk!!r, J.) 353 ' Pramod Swarup, 0.", "canonical_name": "Yogeshwar Prashad"}}, {"text": "Baby Krishnan G.S. Chatter", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16264, "end_char": 16290, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Agarwal, Ms. Baby Krishnan G.S. Chatter; ce."}}, {"text": "S. Dikshit", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16308, "end_char": 16318, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A ..f Mrs. S. Dikshit, R.N. Tri1w/i & Miss R. Govind for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "R.N. Tri1w", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16320, "end_char": 16330, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A ..f Mrs. S. Dikshit, R.N. Tri1w/i & Miss R. Govind for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "R. Govind", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16340, "end_char": 16349, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A ..f Mrs. S. Dikshit, R.N. Tri1w/i & Miss R. Govind for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "THAKKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16412, "end_char": 16419, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The following Judgments were delicred •· THAKKAR, J.. The Cortstitution which promises a socialistic pattern of Society in the preamble and traces.", "canonical_name": "Thakkar"}}, {"text": "Art. 32, 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16729, "end_char": 16741, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDJC- T!ON of the Court", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16913, "end_char": 16955, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "And yet the CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDJC- T!ON of the Court (as polar:zed from its 'ERROR JURISDICTION'\n\nhas been invoked in order to use the hand of the Court for transferring money from the pockets of poor cultivators (who feed the Nation) to the pockets of tlie dealers in fertilizers (who feed .themselves) by challenging a notification on technical gro1;1nds."}}, {"text": "Article 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17788, "end_char": 17797, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17807, "end_char": 17828, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "October 11, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17975, "end_char": 17991, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Events leading to the institution of the Writ Petitions under •Article 2)6 of the Constitution of India giving rise to this group of appeals (by certificate of fitness granted by the Allahabad High Court)\n\nhave l\"iken the follow; ng course :\n\n(i) On October 11, 1973 the Central Government issued a notification fixing the maximum retail selling price of certain varieties of fertilizers to the consumers."}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18245, "end_char": 18254, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Essential Commodities Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18262, "end_char": 18287, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "June I, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18358, "end_char": 18370, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(ii) Some time later, on June I, 1974, the Central Government issued a Notification whereby the maximum retail selling price of different varieties of fetilizers was steeply revised upwards in or<le; to compensate the 'rnanufacturers' in the context of the spurt in the prices of various inputs."}}, {"text": "State of tJttar Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18825, "end_char": 18848, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "iii) O~ June 14, 1974 the State of tJttar Pradesh issued the Uttar Pradesh Fertilizer Prices (Supplementary) Order,\n\n1974 in exercise of the powers conferred by Rule 114 of the Defence of India Rules, 1'>71, ."}}, {"text": "June 14, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20294, "end_char": 20307, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "diatcly prior to the upward.revision effected on June' I, 1974, in view of the aforesaid notification issued by the State Government on June 14, 1974."}}, {"text": "June 14, J974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21736, "end_char": 21749, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(iv) In case the State Government had not issued the impugned notification dated June 14, J974, the dealers would have been enabled to charge about twice the prices at which the stocks were made available to them for sale prior- .to the notification."}}, {"text": "High Court of Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 22648, "end_char": 22671, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is in the backdrop of these undisputed facts that the, question regarding the validity of the impugned notification dated June 14, 1974 issued by the State of Uttar Pradesh came to be challenged before the High Court of Allahabad."}}, {"text": "Essential Commodities Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22933, "end_char": 22958, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "June. I, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24145, "end_char": 24158, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The notification issued by the Central Government on June."}}, {"text": "Essential Commodities Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24661, "end_char": 24692, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Essential Commodities Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25006, "end_char": 25031, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Commodities Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25469, "end_char": 25490, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25540, "end_char": 25550, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Commodities Act, 1955", "statute": "Commodities Act, 1955"}}, {"text": "Commodities Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25899, "end_char": 25920, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "India Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26163, "end_char": 26174, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Essential Commodities Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26234, "end_char": 26265, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Romiily M.R.", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29275, "end_char": 29287, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ln Pretty v.\n\nSolly, (1859) 26 Beav.606, 610, Romiily M.R. stated as follows what he considered to be.", "canonical_name": "Romiily M.R."}}, {"text": "RAMCHANDRA MAWA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30054, "end_char": 30069, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Emphasis added)\n\n' It is overlooked that the said passage deals with different pro-\n\n(1) Statute Law ofCraies, 7th Edition, 222\n\n, +-·\n\n• -\n\nRAMCHANDRA MAWA).,", "canonical_name": "RAMCHANDRA MAWALAL"}}, {"text": "RAMGHANDRA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 35315, "end_char": 35325, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "''•\n\n'RAMGHANDRA ,\\!AWALAL v._u.", "canonical_name": "RAMCHANDRA MAWALAL"}}, {"text": "High Court of Australia", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 39599, "end_char": 39622, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".'ll the High Court of Australia in.a somewhat similar situation held that there was no inconsistency between a State law fixing a minimum wage for workers in the boot trade of 1$ per hour."}}, {"text": "Barton", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 39878, "end_char": 39884, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Speaking through Barton, J:."}}, {"text": "Australian High Court.had", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 40958, "end_char": 40983, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Australian High Court.had taken the view."}}, {"text": "Art. 254(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41874, "end_char": 41885, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 254(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42048, "end_char": 42059, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Alagiriswami", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 42326, "end_char": 42338, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Indian .Aluminium Co.,'i' wherein Alagiriswami, J. speaking for • himslef and for Bhagwati, Goswami and Sarkaria JJ."}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 42374, "end_char": 42382, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Indian .Aluminium Co.,'i' wherein Alagiriswami, J. speaking for • himslef and for Bhagwati, Goswami and Sarkaria JJ."}}, {"text": "Goswami", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 42384, "end_char": 42391, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Indian .Aluminium Co.,'i' wherein Alagiriswami, J. speaking for • himslef and for Bhagwati, Goswami and Sarkaria JJ."}}, {"text": "Sarkaria", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 42396, "end_char": 42404, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Indian .Aluminium Co.,'i' wherein Alagiriswami, J. speaking for • himslef and for Bhagwati, Goswami and Sarkaria JJ."}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43032, "end_char": 43039, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of Uttar -Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 43493, "end_char": 43516, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This allegation has been controverted by the State of Uttar -Pradesh."}}, {"text": "RAMCHANDRA M.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 44841, "end_char": 44854, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J...\n\n...\n\n.. _ ..\nti\n\nRAMCHANDRA M., WALAL v. u. 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Ci.vil\"Appal 1656 of 1974 is by special !"}}, {"text": "Article 22G", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45724, "end_char": 45735, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Government of Uttar Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 45835, "end_char": 45862, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "challenged the validity of a notificqtion dated 14'6'~ 974 issued by the Government of Uttar Pradesh in exercise of the power conferred by Rule 114 of the r:iofence of India Rules, 1971, qirecting."}}, {"text": "India Rules, 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 45930, "end_char": 45947, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Clause 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46339, "end_char": 46347, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "India Rules, 1971", "statute": "India Rules, 1971"}}, {"text": "31-5-1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 46494, "end_char": 46503, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3 of the Essential Commodities kot, 1955, as it prevailed on 31-5-1974."}}, {"text": "Distriq Agriculturnl", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 46581, "end_char": 46601, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Distriq Agriculturnl O:licers directing registered dealers of fertilizers to refund the excess\n\nprice charged on the sale of fertilizer effected on or after 1.6.1974 from out of the stock Which was in existence on_3l.5.1974.'"}}, {"text": "s.3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48121, "end_char": 48124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48258, "end_char": 48266, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1.6.1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 49257, "end_char": 49265, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government of Uttar Pradesh being of the view tl1at the Central Government's notificatio11 dated 1.6.1974 was not intended to apply to old stock' procured by delers at consider\"ably lower prices from producers which was in existence oi1 31.5.1974, issued the impugned notification dated 14.6.1974 directing that the old stock should be sold at the old rate of Rs'._"}}, {"text": "14.6.1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 49447, "end_char": 49456, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government of Uttar Pradesh being of the view tl1at the Central Government's notificatio11 dated 1.6.1974 was not intended to apply to old stock' procured by delers at consider\"ably lower prices from producers which was in existence oi1 31.5.1974, issued the impugned notification dated 14.6.1974 directing that the old stock should be sold at the old rate of Rs'._"}}, {"text": "14.6.1914", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 50024, "end_char": 50033, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The qaestion for consideration by the High Court was the validity of the .State Governme.11t's notification dated 14.6.1914 as regards ihe stock of fertilizer available with the dealers at the end of 31.5.1974, (e., whether that notification will prevail\"over tlie Central Govern- ·\n\nmcnt's notification dated 1.6.1974."}}, {"text": "s.3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50385, "end_char": 50388, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Defence d india Act, 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 50396, "end_char": 50421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s.3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50951, "end_char": 50954, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Defence d india Act, 1971", "statute": "the Defence d india Act, 1971"}}, {"text": "s.2(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51243, "end_char": 51252, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Defence d india Act, 1971", "statute": "the Defence d india Act, 1971"}}, {"text": "Essential Commodities Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 51260, "end_char": 51291, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s.2(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51334, "end_char": 51343, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Essential Commodities Act, 1955", "statute": "the Essential Commodities Act, 1955"}}, {"text": "Defence of India Rules, 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 51533, "end_char": 51561, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Defence of India Act, 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 51845, "end_char": 51871, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s.3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52457, "end_char": 52460, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Defence of India Act, 1971", "statute": "the Defence of India Act, 1971"}}, {"text": "Defence of India Act, 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 52468, "end_char": 52494, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Essential Commodities Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 52953, "end_char": 52984, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Defence of India Rules, 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 53062, "end_char": 53090, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State of Ut):ar Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 53330, "end_char": 53353, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "appearing for the State of Ut):ar Pradesh\n\nbefore the High Co.ur'."}}, {"text": "11.10.1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 53691, "end_char": 53701, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "earlier Notification dated 11.10.1973 which had been superseded by its own 1iotifica!ion dated, J.6.1974, has not been acceptedby the."}}, {"text": "Defence of India Rules, 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 54081, "end_char": 54109, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55186, "end_char": 55197, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Essential Commodities Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 55532, "end_char": 55563, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "I)efence of India Ac.t, 1971", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 55714, "end_char": 55742, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the\n\nI)efence of India Ac.t, 1971, under which the Defence of India Rules, 1971 have been fra,'.ned and."}}, {"text": "Defence of India Rules, 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 55760, "end_char": 55788, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Essential Commodities Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 56241, "end_char": 56266, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Defence bf India Rules, 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 56440, "end_char": 56468, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Defence of India Act, 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"PROVISION", "start_char": 59112, "end_char": 59115, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "India Act, 1971", "statute": "India Act, 1971"}}, {"text": "Essential Commodities Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 59123, "end_char": 59154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Act and that it cannot take within its ambit the later Defence of India Act, 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 59271, "end_char": 59352, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Clause 2(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60984, "end_char": 60995, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 2(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61184, "end_char": 61195, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schedule I", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61327, "end_char": 61337, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "RAMCHANDRA MAWALAL", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 61735, "end_char": 61753, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~\n\nRAMCHANDRA MAWALAL 1'.", "canonical_name": "RAMCHANDRA MAWALAL"}}, {"text": "U.P. STATE", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 61758, "end_char": 61768, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U.P. STATE (Varadarajan, .(.)\""}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61962, "end_char": 61978, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.2(a)(xi)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62025, "end_char": 62035, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Essential Commodities Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 62044, "end_char": 62069, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s.3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62168, "end_char": 62171, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Essential Commodities Act,\n\n1955", "statute": "Essential Commodities Act,\n\n1955"}}, {"text": "Clause 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62239, "end_char": 62250, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Essential Commodities Act,\n\n1955", "statute": "Essential Commodities Act,\n\n1955"}}, {"text": "State Government of Uttar Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 63008, "end_char": 63041, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "there was any notification of the State Government of Uttar Pradesh fixing the maximum price o( fertilizer for sale by dealers."}}, {"text": "s.3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63511, "end_char": 63517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 63716, "end_char": 63721, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under s.3(1) of the Defence of Tn>[ia Act, 1971 the Central Government had power, by notification in the Official Gazette, to ))Jake such rules as appear to it necessary or expedient for securing the defence bf India and civil defence, the Jl."}}, {"text": "22.3.1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 64222, "end_char": 64231, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Emergency which was in force when that Act was pas sec\\. was lifted on 22.3.1977."}}, {"text": "Defence of India Rules, 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 64253, "end_char": 64281, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s.3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64325, "end_char": 64331, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Defence of India Rules, 1971", "statute": "the Defence of India Rules, 1971"}}, {"text": "cl11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65283, "end_char": 65287, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65845, "end_char": 65853, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "May 3L 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 65977, "end_char": 65988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The reference to .the price a.s it prevailed on May 3L 1974 is to the price fixed in the."}}, {"text": "Clause 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67306, "end_char": 67317, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Essential Commodities Act 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 67418, "end_char": 67448, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "RAMCHANDRA MAWALAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 67528, "end_char": 67546, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ",_ -~·\n\nRAMCHANDRA MAWALAL v, u. p, ST_ATE \\Varadar<ijan,' J.) 373\n\n14.6.1974 issi; ed under ule ll4 of the Defence of India Rules, 1971 made in exercise of the powers conferred by.", "canonical_name": "RAMCHANDRA MAWALAL"}}, {"text": "Defence of India Rules, 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 67628, "end_char": 67656, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s.3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67702, "end_char": 67708, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Defence of India Rules, 1971", "statute": "the Defence of India Rules, 1971"}}, {"text": "s.2(a)(xi)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67842, "end_char": 67852, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Defence of India Rules, 1971", "statute": "the Defence of India Rules, 1971"}}, {"text": "Essential Commodities Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 67861, "end_char": 67892, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Defence of India Rules, 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 68022, "end_char": 68050, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State of Uttar Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 68310, "end_char": 68332, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Central Government's notification dated J.6.1974 applies fo the whole country while the impuged notification dated 14.6.1974 of the State\n\nGovernmnt cdrt apply only tothe State of Uttar Pradesh. ·"}}, {"text": "P. Govindan Nair", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 68452, "end_char": 68468, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first ground of attack forcibly urged by Mr. P. Govindan Nair, senior'Counsel appearing for.one set of appellants is that the impunged notification is alto.gether invalid in.law .and non est on the grbund that the State Goverri1nent has no power whatsoever to isue the notification under the Defence of India Rules in respect of an essential commodity, fertilizor, covered by the Central Government's notifica- ."}}, {"text": "Essential Commodities Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 68922, "end_char": 68947, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Yogeslawar Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 68992, "end_char": 69009, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "tion issued under the Fertilizer (Control) Order, 1957, made in exercise of the powerconferred by the Essential Commodities Act .. The seccnd ground of attack urged by Mr. Yogeslawar Prasad, Senior Counsel\n\napparing for the other set of appellants is based on Article 14 of the Col1stitution, mimely, that it is discriminatory and, therefore, bad in law.", "canonical_name": "Yogeshwar Prashad"}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69080, "end_char": 69090, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S.C: Manchanda", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 69179, "end_char": 69193, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. S.C: Manchanda, -Senior Counsel appearing for the\n\nrespodents in all, the appeals naturlly subnif!ted tha't there is."}}, {"text": "Yogeshwar Prasad", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 69391, "end_char": 69407, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The seco'nd ground of attack projected by Mr. Yogeshwar Prasad may be taken up first for.", "canonical_name": "Yogeshwar 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{}}, {"text": "Defence onridia Act, 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 76492, "end_char": 76517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Defene of India Rules, 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 76615, "end_char": 76642, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s.3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76701, "end_char": 76704, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Defene of India Rules, 1971", "statute": "The Defene of India Rules, 1971"}}, {"text": "Defence of India Act, 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 76712, "end_char": 76738, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Essential Commodities Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 78113, "end_char": 78144, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Essential Commodities Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 78589, "end_char": 78620, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "India Act, 1971", 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"source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Defence of India Act, 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 80847, "end_char": 80873, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s.3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81230, "end_char": 81236, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Defence of India Act, 1971", "statute": "the Defence of India Act, 1971"}}, {"text": "Section 3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81661, "end_char": 81673, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Defence of India Act, 1971", "statute": "the Defence of India Act, 1971"}}, {"text": "Central Govrnment", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 81963, "end_char": 81980, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State Government could have requested the Central Govrnment fo act under s.3(2) of the Essential Commodities Acbmd fix a different price or rate for the sale by dealers in that State of fertilizer carried over from the stock held on 31:5.1974."}}, {"text": "s.3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81994, "end_char": 82000, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "31:5.1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 82154, "end_char": 82163, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State Government could have requested the Central Govrnment fo act under s.3(2) of the Essential Commodities Acbmd fix a different price or rate for the sale by dealers in that State of fertilizer carried over from the stock held on 31:5.1974."}}, {"text": "Section 5(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 82166, "end_char": 82178, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 82369, "end_char": 82372, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Gov", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 82640, "end_char": 82651, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Central Gov' er.nment has ·-;10t issued any direction under 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"metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Rules and the Defence of India Act, 1971", "statute": "Rules and the Defence of India Act, 1971"}}, {"text": "s.3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 83310, "end_char": 83313, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Rules and the Defence of India Act, 1971", "statute": "Rules and the Defence of India Act, 1971"}}, {"text": "s.6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 83456, "end_char": 83459, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Rules and the Defence of India Act, 1971", "statute": "Rules and the Defence of India Act, 1971"}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 83711, "end_char": 83720, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Rules and the Defence of India Act, 1971", "statute": "Rules and the Defence of India Act, 1971"}}, {"text": "Essential Commodities Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 83728, "end_char": 83753, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": 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"start_char": 85036, "end_char": 85061, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "14.6.1'974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 85548, "end_char": 85558, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Advocate-General of\"the State was perhaps fully conscious of the\n\n B legal position that the State Government'ahnot fix the price of an essential commodity by any notification under the Defence of India Rules, )971 in the circumstances when he took the patently unacceptable stand before tbe learned Judges of the High Court that the State Government did not in fact .fix the price of fertiliZer ii{-its impugned notification dated 14.6.1'974 but it only directed that ertain stock of C fertilizer which."}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86767, "end_char": 86783, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 254(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87280, "end_char": 87294, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Government has nilfettered power under the Defence of India Act, 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 88720, "end_char": 88789, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Essential Ccimmodities Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 88922, "end_char": 88954, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State Government can do under the Defence of India Rules, 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 89062, "end_char": 89124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Defence of fodia Rules, 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 89719, "end_char": 89747, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Romilly M.R.", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 90931, "end_char": 90943, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Romilly M.R. stated as follows what.", "canonical_name": "Romiily M.R."}}, {"text": "Maxwell", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 91634, "end_char": 91641, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "edition of Maxwell on the \"Interpretation of .Statutes may also be noticed ;\n\n\"If two sections of the sa:me statute are repugnant, the known Fule is that the last must prevail\"."}}, {"text": "Country Court Rules 1936", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 92144, "end_char": 92168, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Essential Commodities Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 92933, "end_char": 92958, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Defence of India Act, 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 93061, "end_char": 93087, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Defence of India Rules, 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 93335, "end_char": 93363, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Essential Commodities Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 93470, "end_char": 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"STATUTE", "start_char": 97997, "end_char": 98052, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Govindan Nair.and.another", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 100732, "end_char": 100757, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ill be>one set of advo.cate's fees in the batch of appeals in whicl) the appellants are represented by Mr. Govindan Nair.and.another set of advocate's fees in t~ other . '"}}, {"text": "Yogeshwar Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 100827, "end_char": 100843, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "appeals in which Mr. Yogeshwar Prasad appears.for the appellants. · ·. . .", "canonical_name": "Yogeshwar Prashad"}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_2_386_400_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "A 386\n\n. B\n\nTHE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER, DAVANGERE . . v . •\n\nP. VEERABHADARAPPA ETC. ETC .\n\nJanuary 9; J984\n\n[A. P. SEN AND E. S. VsNKATARAMIAH]\n\nLand Acquisitio11 1894 .(/ of 1894) S. 23\n\nAcquisition of agricUlturaf lands in 1971 and 1972-paynient of C(Jmpensation- Market value fixed n basii of capitalisation Principl?-Multiplier to be adoptedexplained. •\n\nCo1npl1!J'{ltion-ckten11ination of-1nethod of capitalisation_:..whe1t w Qe resorted to. .\n\nt [n the.Y:ears 1971 and 1972, several \"thousand acres of agflcriltural lands in two villages were acquired by he State Governn1ent pursua1'tt to different notificatiOns issued nder section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act 1894. In response to notices under section 9(2), the respondents appeared before the Special Land.\n\nAcciuisition Officer and claimed co1npensation Varying between Rs.. 15,000 to Rs.25. 000.per acre for dry and wet lands ctePending. upn the natue.and the quality of t.h.e soil, and the ·]come derived therefron1.\n\nIn some cases -compensation .was claim:ed at more than Rs. 1 lakh Per acre\n\n0 for arecai1ut .garden lands. . .\n\nThe Special L; ihd Acquisition Officer, by his various awards adopted a multiple of fifteen and a Warded compensation.at a flat rate of'Rs 3,300 per acre for dry agricutural lands and Rs 5 000.per.acre for we_t agriulural land_s.\n\nOn feferences undc; section 18, the Civil , Tudge adopted a.1nultiple of fiftee times the net annu1T profits as there was no other method of determinillg the market valm: of the land, and enhanced the amount o( comp\"ensatiOn to Rs. 19,500 per acre for wet agricul tur•a\"t lands and Rs 1,10,000 for arecanut garden lands.\"\n\nOn appeals b.Y the Special Land Acquisition Officer,.the High Court also adOpted the capitalised value at JS years'. purchase of the net annalprofits bu~\n\neduced the amount of 9Jmpensation to Rs. 15,000 pet acre. for t agricultural lands an4 Rs.· 25,000 per acre for arecanut gar£1.en lands. . .\n\nG In the appeals to this Court. by the Special Land Acquisition Officer. it Was\n\ncontended relying on the unreported 'dccisioi1 of the High Court dated November 21, 1977 in MFA Nos. ssi-4/76 : . .\n\n. I The Special Land Acquisition Officer, [Javangere v. B. Basavarajappa & ()rs thiit the proper.· multipIC for computation o( the capitalized Value should be 12!, 8.nd that the High Court was wr-ong in adopting the multiple of _15 when the rate of return in the years 197l_and 1972 was~8 per cent per a:nnum:. · .'\n\n' -\n\nLAND ACQN. OFFICER V. P. VEERABHADARAPPA 387\n\nAllowing the Appeafs; ..\n\nHELD : 1. The funCtion of the Court in awarding compCnsation under the Land Acquisition Act 1894 is to acertain fhe \"markt va1ue\" o_f the land at the datC of th~ notification under section 4(1) of the Act; and the metho9s of valuation may .he; (1) OpiniOn of expert&: (2). Tne price paid withid.a reasonable time in bona fide transactions of purchase or sale of the lands _acquired, or of the lands adjacent to these acquired and possessing sifDilar advantaes, and (3) a number of years' pu~hase of th~ actual or in1Illediately prosPective profits of the lands acquired.\" [392 D-E] •\n\n2. The method 'Of-capitalising the actual or inunediately prospective profits or the rent of a nun1ber of years' purchase should nofbe reso, rted to if there is _evidence of comparable sales or other evidence for computation of the mafket\n\nValue-.. It can be resorted to only\" when no other_ n1ethod is available;. [392 E] C\n\n3. The caqing to be placed upon the phrase\"Market Value\"' of the land under s.23 of the Act, is he price the land acquired could actually be sold at the relevant time i.e. on the date of the notification _under s 4(1). The owner is-entitled to_ the value of the property in its actual condition at -the time of•expropriation, \" with an its advantages and with_ all its possibilities,, excluding any advantage due to the carrying out-of the scheme for the Purpose for which the Property is acquired.\n\nD .\n\nIts valbe is ineasured by a consideration of the prices that have been obtained9in the past for lands of similar quality and in similar positi_ons ... [394 H; 392 BC)\n\n4. In VaIuing land or an interest in Land for piJrposes of land acquisition procOOdings, the rule as to nun1ber of years' purchse is not a theoretical or legal rule but depends upon economic factors such as the prevailing rate o_f retu_rn_ which a prlldent investor in the class of properti_cs in. questjon would expect. The return which an invstor w_in expect from investn1ent will depend upon the characteristic of income as compared to that of idle security. The niost important of such eco 'nomic factors is the prevailing rate of interest at the relevant time i.e. on the date of the notification under s.4(1). . It is first necessary to acertain the gi-oss .incofti~ from the acquired property. The nextsteP should be ascertain the net income.\n\nHaving_ asckrtained the net annual in.come, it mut be capitalized by cornputin'g the number of years' purchase. • [395 B-C] .\n\nVyricherla Narayana Gajapatiraju v. Revenue Divfaiona/ Officer, Vizagapatnam, LR (193'9)66 JA 104; R11sto111 Cavasjee Cooper v. Union .Or India, 1970] 3 SC!\\. 530; Oriental Gas CO. Ltd & Ors v. state.of West Bengal, [1979] 1 SCR:617; Uni(Jn. of india & Aur v. S1nt. Shanti De1•i e_tc etc AIR [19~3J SC 1190; referred .to.\n\n5 In regard to investn1ent in agricultural 1ands there are many impon.dra -. bles inasmuch as the inVestor runs a much greater risk than the risk that he run~\n\n. G in investment in housing which corisists in vagarieS of wePther and other uricertainties. There is no security of principal, no liquidity of investntent nor any cCr- .. ta_inty 9f income.\n\nTh~ appreciation of princip\"I or in-come is also. uncertain. The reasons for these is th?.{ agricultUral lands are not rea<; lily transferable under the various l'!-nd refcirms legisJation, ex. laws relating to ceiling-on agricultural holding H and tc!iancy laws.\n\nJn evalu?ting the rate Or rturn which would ordinarily satisfy\n\na.11 investor in such a property, the risk factor ~;:is further to be-eValuated. There\n\nffiay. be total of partial fallure of crops throUgh the fai1Ure of rain o~ dr~ght, o~ r, i1:u1dequate r excessive rainfall:. There may be: failure of ctops on' account Of\n\nlocusts, insectS or Pests, The cost jnputs such as seeds, water, fertiHzer etc. var:Y ·· . , ' . from year to year. The fluctuations in price of agricultural pfoduce introduce a gteat deal of uncertainty. in egard to \"incorrie. In vieW of thee considerations, . . an investor wold expect a .much higher rate of return so.that the risk factor is . pr?perly discounted. [ 399 B-El : •\n\n. ' In the instant case-s, when the rate .of rettlri1 On investment was s:2s. pCr ce; nt .in the yea.rs 1971and1972, a petson investing'.his capita.I iQ. .. gric; ultu_ral lands would', ordinarily.accept .2 Pei cent tO 3 per cent more than What he could obtain from. £:ilt-edged securities or. other .forms of Safe investmeitt lnci 'therefore the proper multiplier to be applied for tl¥: purpose of capitalization could not i~ any .event\n\n- exceeded \"ten\", but.since the State Government in these cases contends that proper multiple for cover shold be .12f: [399 F-Gl .\n\n6. the multiple of l2l s\"hould be ai)pied in comPµta'tion of the capitaliied value oflandS. The judgments and.-CrW of the High COurt are modified.\n\nThe\n\n'compnsation awa.rded for <lcquisition of land reduced by one-siXth v.'heever the amount. of .coffiPenstion had. been determined .by the method of capitalization.\n\nThe. rcspqndentS 'shalJ. get solatiuin 15 % on the Compensation comPuted as afore~.\n\nD said1a.nd also interest.\n\n[399 H; 400 A-BJ ·· ·\n\n- . CIVIL APPEllLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appe11Js Nos. 290·348, 729-746, 802-805(N) oll980, 2328-31 &)!350~2388 of 1981. . ; .·\n\n(Appeals by Special leave from the Judgmetit and decree.s of .\n\n. E .the Karnataka High Courl daied 12.7.79, 30.10.79, 4.6.81, 22.8.80; ,..( 4.7.80, 10.7.80, 7.8.80, 24.9, SO, 21.8.79,. 27.7.79, 28.5.80, 13.6.so ..\n\n5.2.80, 10.12.79, 9.8.79,' 20.8.79, .8.8.79, 11.4.79, 26.3.79, 9.4.79, 24-.l-79,. . ' 12.4.79, 4.6;79, 1.12.78, 6.6.79, 13.6.79, 18.6.79,. 20.6.79 .. 26.7.79, . ·\" 23.10.80 & 13.7.1979 in M.F:A. Nos. 678, 681·83, 686/78, 836-841/77,\n\n150/78, 1~8-149/78, 8-16/79, 936-943/77, 567/7'7, 222·234/78, 256/78-\n\nF 259/78, 444-44&/78, ·. 458/78, 705~707/77, 211-217/78, 736-737/78, 923-24/77, 130-131/78; .443/78, 1313,1314,1311/79, 735f?8, 481, 482,. j-.\n\n687. & 688/78, 1432-35/79, 377-388/7-8, io87J80, 1352/79, rn67/78~\n\n77/SQ, 4156-98/78, 71J/77, 925/77. 622/80,:. 765/80 1702/79,' 717.-18/77, 184/79, 260-61/78, 657/77 & 914-915/77) . . .\n\nG 1 For the Appellants\n\n• s.N. Ka'cker, and Swaraj Kaushal\n\nFor the Respondent; :\n\nS.S.· Jdvali, B.P. Singh and Mr. RanJit Kumar •\n\n•. ' ~.\n\nJ. . \\\n\n.... :\n\nLAND ACQN.- OFFICER v. P. VEE~AB~ADARAPP/I (Sen, J.) • 389\n\nS.L. Bedikar, and K.C. Dua P.R. Ramaseslz K.R. Nagaraja, Naresh Kaushal and B. Krishna Prasad, Girish Chandra, A.V.-Rangdm . •and G. Gopa/akri.; han •.\n\nThe Judgment ofthe Comt was delivered by\n\nSEN, J. The short qii.esiio~ .involved in this appeal by special leave and.the further appeals under s.54. of the Land Acquisitiqn Act, 1894 ('Act' forshort) direct.ed against the judgment and decrees of the .\n\nKarnataka High Court dated January 24, 1979 and in the connect, ed appeals i~ whether there has been any error i.11 principle or in law in the. illethd of valuation arrived at by .the courts below in adcpting 'fifteen' to be the multiple fo[ computation of capitalized value cf certain .agricultural lands acquired in the. years J 97J and 1972. .Jn\n\nt.he' connected itppeals although te point was nt ?r, ecifically taken before the High Court, but the parties were given notice that that was\n\nthe real question to be determined. These appeals have accor.dingly been heard together as they involve common question. The .issue . involved is as to t.he proper muitiplier to be applied in determii1ing the capitalized. value of the lands 'acquired. and thar depends on the rate of return on investments .in 1971 and 1972. •· ·\n\nIn these appeals thejudgments were rendered by the High Court\n\nB •\n\non. appeals being preferred by the SpecfaJ Land Acqbisition Officer, Davangere against the appellate judgments and decrees of the District· E Judge, Chitradurga and of the Civil Judge, Davangere on vanous references made under s.18 of the Act.\n\n• The facts. giving ris.e to these appeals are more or Jess simi)ar, and the essential factsmily be shortly stated. Due to the construction . of D.B. Kere Pick-up Project, several thousand. acres of agricultural land in two villaoes in the State of Karnataka videlicet Budibar village in Harihar t';, luq and SiraganahaH1>' villge ;;, Pavangere taluq got submerged and\" were accordingly acquired by the State Govern, ment pursuant to different notiJkations issued u1tdn s.4(lj-0f the Act ·.published on divers<; dates. in the years 1971 and 1972 followed by the usual 11oiifications .under S.6. In response \"to noticesissmd under s.9(2) of the. Act, the respondents appeared before .. the Spceial .Land .\n\nAcquisition OfllGer, Dayangeie and. clin1cd comper1, s2tiGn varying . . . - . between. R.s. 15,000 per acre to Rs: 25,000 per acre for dry and wet lands depending Upon the. quality of the soil, the nafore of the yield . and-the income derived thcrefrO:ru. In soine cases they also claimed\n\nI . . . • . compensation at more t[lan rupees 011e lakh per acre for arecanut .\n\n• . ·\n\nH .\n\n. . .\n\nSUPRBME COURT REPORTS.\n\n[19~4) 2 S.C.R. . . . garden hinds. The Special Land Acquisition Officer however by his . various awards adopted a multiple of fifteen and awarded compensa- ·\n\ntion' at a. fiat rate of Rs. 3,300 per care for dry agricultural lands and R, s. 1, ooo per acre for wet agricultural lands. On reference under s.• I 8 of the Act in 'each of these cases,. the Civil Judge' Davangere enhanced. the amount of compensation to Rs. 19,500 per acre for wet agricultural lands and Rs. I, JG,000 for are.., nut garden lands. There was common evidence adduced by the parties in all these cases and the evidence disclosed that the acquired lanps were more or less similar in. nture and contiguously situated. On a considerntion of t.he evidence the Jearnecf Judge came to the conclusion t11at the lands affected were capable of yii°elding two crops in a year with assured facility, the first being o( pad.dy and the second of jowar, irrigation -groundnut, chillies etc. As there was no other methcd of determin.ing the market .value of .the land; the learned Civil Judge applied a multiple of 1.5 time_s. the net , annual profits ..\n\nOn appeal by the Special Lar.d' Acquisition Officer, the High Ccurt also adopted the e2pitalizccl value at 15 years' purchase of the net annual profits but reduced the amom1t of compensation to Rs. 15,000per acre for wet agricultural lands and · Rs. 25,000 per acr~ fat arecanut garden lands i.e. depending upon thenatiire of the lands acquired. It would therefore appear that the High Court and the courts below have both.adopted-fifteen to.be the proper multiplier for computaticn of the capitaliZ<d value of the lands acquired for the purpose. of determining the amount of compens<ition payable for acquisiticn thereof; t . . '\n\nShri Kacker, learned counsel appeerirg on behalf cf the appellant contenas that the High Court was wrong in adopting the multiple of-) 5 of the actual or immediately pro.spcctive .net anirnal profits of the lands acquired to be the .capitalized value thereof when the rate of return in the years 1971 and 1972 was 8% per annum. According to. the learned counsel, there is an error in priciple or in law in the method employed and he draws-0ur attention to the unreported decision of the High Court i'n The Special Land Acquisition Ojfi'Ccr , Davangere v.\n\nB. Basavarajappa & Ors.<1l layi~1g down. that the proper multiple for\n\ncomputation of the capitalized value should be 12t having r.egard to the rate of return afthe relevant time i.e. on the date of the notificatipn under s.4>(1) of the Act.\n\nThe contention must., i.n our opinion, prevail. • . • Tn. Basavara; appa's case, supra, a Division Bench of the High\n\n.. (1) Misc. First Appeals Nos. 881:4/76 decided on 21.fl.19,77.\n\n~.··\n\nI ,!--\n\n1' ...\n\n. I.\n\n• / .' ) -\n\n' LAND A, CQN. OFFICER v. P. VEERABHADRAPPA (Sen, J.) 391 • • Court while dealing with the determination of compensation payable for similar agricultural lands in the neighbourhood of the same two villages acquired at or about the same time adopted the multiple of 12t times the net annual profits for purposes of determining the . capitalized value thereof.· 11) c.oming to that conclusion, the. Hig~\n\nCourt observed :\n\n\"The rate of return from Government Security, which is Gilt-edged Security:, was around 6% ii1 the year 1971-72.\n\nA person investing his capital in irrigated land would expect a return of about 2 % more than what he obtains from Government Securities. That cans, a return of 8 % would be the the normal return expected by an agriculturist investing in . purchase of wet lands. If 8 %. was the return expected, the . nµmber of years' purchase value comes to l2t,\" ·\n\nWe regret to find that in these cases the High Court instead of having adopted the multiple of 12t times observed that the decision in Basa.varajappa's case, supra, was not applicable because. the lands acquired in these cases were for superior for which there is no rational basis. If the lands acqt1ired were of a superior quality, the actual or\n\nimmediately prospective net annual profits would be more and when multipled by the proper multiplier arrived at on the rate of return at the relevant time i.e. an the date of the notification under s.4(1) of the Act, the a'niount of compensation for acquisition of such lands would necessarily be more. The quality of the soil has no relevance . . to the proper\"multiplier to be adopted in determining the capitalized value.\n\nIn Vyricherla Narayana Gajapatiraju v . . Revenue Divisional Offiter; Vizagapatnam11 > the Privy Council adopted ihe traditional legal definitfon of value as the pric.e at which. th~ property would sell \"as between a willing buyer and a willing seller\".· In its narrowest sense it is designed to preclude a valuation based on an assumed forced sale; the property must be appraised at what it would probably bring if the. owner allowed a rasonab!e opportunity for negotiatiOQS.\n\nBut the Courts have invoked a mythical willing buyer to justify a valuation highe.r than any attainable sale price. According to the Privy Council, \"market value\" of the land within the meaning of\n\ns.i23 of the Act is the price the property may fetch in the open market if sold by a willing vendor unaffected by the special needs of a parti-\n\n(1) LR [1939] 66 IA 104\n\n~· . . .\n\n. [1984) 2 S.C.R.\n\ncuiar purpose .. The owner: is. eutitled to. the value of the property A . in its actual condition at the time of expropriation, with all its ail vantages and with all. its possibilities, excluding any advP;>tage due t~ . the ·.carrying out of the scheme for the purpose for which ihe propei:fy\n\nis acquired. It is not only realized possibilities but also the future possibilities that must .be taken into consideraiion.\n\nThe Privy Coun: . c:il further observed that there is not in general ariy market for land in .the sense that_ one spoaks of market for shares or commercial g0ods.\n\n The v~I lie o( any such ar!icle at any particular time cari readily be ascertained by the prices being .obtained for. siinilar artiCles i11 the: • mrket. . fo the case of land, its value can also be ruea$ured by a consideration of _the prices that have been obtained in the past for .lands of'similar quality and in similar positions; and that. is what must be 1fr, ant in g.eneral by the \"1i:Jarket value\" _in s.23. ·\n\nThe function of the Court. in awarding compensation. under the Act is to ascertain the .market value of the I arid at the date of the notification under s.4(1) of the Act and the methods. of vnluation D • may be : (I) Opinion of experts.' (2) The prices pi\\i.d within a reaso- \"'- nable time in bona fide transactions of purchase or sale of the. lands. acquired or of the lands adjacent to those acquired and possessing siniilar advantages. . And (3) A number of years•· purchase of the actual of immediately prospective profits of ihe lands acquired-.. _Nor- . · mally; the inethod.of capitalizing the actual or-immediately prospective E 1 profits or the rent ofll ; lU•nber of years' purchase should not.be resorted to if there is evidence of comparable sales or othe!' evidence for computation ofthe market value: It can be tesortedto nly when no other\n\nff.\n\nmethod is available. . .\n\nItds axiomatic that the best evidence to prove what a willing p11rchaser would pay for .the la1id under . acquisition would be the evidence of sales of comparable .properties, proxi1riate in time to •the date of acquisition,· .similarly situate, and possessing the same or similar advatages ad sUbject to tlie Same or sim_ilar disadvantages.\n\nhrket value is the price the property may fetch in the open market if so.Id by a willing seller untfected by the special need.sofa particular purchase. Wh¢re definite material is not forthcomig either m tl.e . shape of sales of similar. lands in the nei_ghbourhood at .of abo_ut the\n\ndate qf notification under s.4(l) or oiherwise, the Court has no oth~! alternative but to fall back on the method of valuation by cajJitalization. Iii valuing land or an interest in land for purposes of 1and acquisition proceedings. the rule :as to number of years' purchase is\n\nl ..\n\nl . ' -\n\n' -\n\n. .\n\nLAND ACQN. _OFFICER v. P. VEERAB~ADRAPPA. (Sm, J.) . 393\n\nnot. a theoretical or legal .rule but depends upon economic !actors such as the prevailing rate .. of interest in money invesiments. The return which an investor will expect from an investment wil!\"depend upon the characteristic of income as .compared to that of idle security: The main features are : (I) Security of the income; (2) fluctuation ; .\n\n(3) chances of increse; (4) cost of collection etc.· The most difficu)t and yet the most important and crudal part cif ihe whole exercise is the determination of the reasonale rate of return in respect of investment in various types 9f properties. Or:ce. this rate of return and'.\n\naccor<lingly the rate of -capitall~£tion are .determied, there is- no. problem in valuation of the prape1iy.\n\nThe traditional concept of capitalizati\"on was indicated by this Court in Rustom Cava<jee. Coopei .v. Un.ion of India. <1>. It was stated\n\nto be:\n\n• . \"Capitalization of the _net annual profit ouf of the property at a rate equal in normal cases to ihe return from gilt edged securities: . Ordinarily value of the property may be determined by capitalizing the net annualvalue obtainable in ihe market at the date of the notice of acquisition.\"\n\n. . . rt is thus clear from th'\" \" 11ne enunciation that the method of d'termining t)Oe value of the property by_ application of a multiplier to the. net annual income or profit should only be adopted when. there.is no evi<\\ence of comparable sales of similar lands in or about the neighbourhood at the relevant time i.e. on the date of the notification under. s.4(1) of the Aot. In certain circumstances however the Court h~~ no other alternative but to all back on the capitalized value.\n\n' Alfred D. fahr in \"Law of Emi1ient Domain\" (1953 edn:) after a general discussion regarding the valuation of property, sums up at . pp. 100-101 . . .\n\n\"!t is evident, therefore, from the foregoing definitioi1s . . . as well as from numerous other definitions whkh may be cited, that the fair market value of property taken by eminent d amain is the price that the property will bring. when offered for sale by one desiring, but riot .obliged, to sell; and purchased by one desiring to purch.ase but u11der no necessity\n\n• (I) [1_9YO] 3 s.c.R. 530.\n\n SUPREME GOURT REPORTS • [1984] 2 s.'c.R.\n\nof buying. It is. the price which a piece of property will . bring in the market when offered for sale' and. purchased by\n\nanother, taking into consideration all the elements of the availability of the property, its use, potential or prospective, . and all other elements. which combine to give a piece of . properti a market value.\"\n\n• The learned author then deals with the fixation of market value. ' on the basis of rental income at pp. :226-.229 and states : ·\n\n\"It is. far sounder practice to avoid the use of rental value capitalization, if better twidence of market value is available.\n\nIn any event, the courts are inclined to give a greater weight to sales of similar. properties in the market than to evidence of lease hold rentals.\" · •\n\nJahr then deals with the method of capitalization of income and says at p, 230 :\n\n\"It is quife evident 'from the formula that the lower the . rate of return applied~ the higher the capitalized sum will be.\n\nHo\\v ever, the rate of return on .money invested is depend ent. , upon many varied factors; (!) safety of principal; (2) liquidity of investment; (3) certainty of income; (4) possible market fluctuations; (5) appreciation of principal or income; and undoubtedly other elements too numerous to mention.\n\nThe interest rate current in the security market must 'be considered, as well as the fovestment rate to be obtained from high grade bonds .or common stocks and commodities traded on the several 'exchanges.\"\n\nThe principle ded.ucible from the above passage Is that the basic factor in applying the method of capitalization of income for ascertaining the market value of property is the rate of return that an ordinary investor would .. reasonably get. on his investment, having due regard to all the relevant circumstances.\n\n. In the classical economic sense, as adopted by the. :Privy Council in Vyricherla's case, supra, the meaning to be placed upon the phrase\n\n\"market value\" of the land under s . .23 of the Act is the price at which the land acquired could actually be sold at the relevant time i.e .. on the date of the notification under s.4(1) of the Act by a fictitious willing . buyer in a hypothetical market, with. the qualification that a forced ..\n\n. ' -\n\n\" .\n\nLAND ACQN. OFFICER v: p. YEERABHADl!.APPA (Sen, J.) 395\n\n.sale is not to be assumed. The pric~ at which the property would . sell \"as between a willing buyer and a willing seller\" raises the problem ·\n\nof valuation. The value of any object of wealth is simply a capitalization of the services or income which.· act'!al or potential owners of . the property expect to derive from it i.e.' earning power as a. basis ·\n\nof valuation. The .rule of number of years' purchase is not a .iheoretical.or legal rule, but depends upon the economk factors such as the.\n\nprevailing rate of return which a prudent il'vestor in the dass of properties. fo question would expect. The most important of such economic factors is the prevailing rate of interest at the releant time i.e. on \"the date .of the notification under s,4(1) of the Act. It is first. necessary to ascertain the gross income from th._. acquired property. The next step should be, to ascertain the net income. Having ascertained the net annual income, It inust be capitalized by computing the number of years' purchase.\n\nDuring the Imperial. days, investment in gilt-edged securities was looked upon as the only safe form of investment. But after\n\nthe attainment of independence, the country has taken long strides D in the gro~I!!· of. commerce and trade .. Due to growth .of indstries\n\nboth in the public as well as in the private sector investment of capital in such industries, if not anymore secure, have cbmc into the law merchant and such other alternative available securities have attnfcted persons who ate 'inclined. to invest, rather\"than gilt:edged securities alone, apart from mking Jtxed deposits' ii1 the scheduled banks. This E accounts for the variation of the , proper multiple to .be ; adopted. ' The line of inquiry in such ca&es must therefore be : What was the pre- . vailing rate of interes.t on long .term deposits with scheduled banks\n\nor in the public or private sector ?\n\nAt !he turn of the century, it was not uncommon for the Courts to adopt a rule of .c.!O years' purehase for arriving at the capitalized value of agricultural lands. It had long been the practice in the Courts of the then Madras Presidencrto calculate the profits J'rom any form of landed property as equal to :the profits made by investing\n\nof. money in the gilt-edged secuties.. Till the early SO's, the Coiirts Of the then Madras Presidency held that the capitalized value of agricultural lands should be arrived at :20 years' purchase having regard to the rate of interest on gilt-edged , securities at five per cent per annum. It was, however, observed that with respect to mell)'aram interest in a zamindari land or a vacant sjte, it was dilliculno acl:ept ., the current rate of interest on gilt-edged secutries as a safe guide to the multiple to be applied to ihe annual profits on 'ryotwari land. The\n\n....\n\n• G\n\nlandlord .in sue~ cases would not on!) xpect to get a return on the capital invested on the. Jand but also something in a<ldition tci that as compensation for his tro, rible in attending to the land and for the risks involved in thecultivation of land. It was observed. ttiat althou.gh the tenants might have , af!; reed to pay him a fix<d rent in mone.y, yet if a full crop was not niised on the land either through failure of rain or because .of pests or for any other 'reason, it was extremely difficult for the landlord \\o realize the rent.. For. these reasons.: the landlord naturally expected an appreciably lirger. return than he would expect froin gilt-edged securities which he lefts in the bank and for the realization of the interest of which h' is put to .no trouble whatsoevr.\n\nIt. ould be unrea{is; ic to adhre .to the traditional view of'\"\"', capitalized value being linked with gilt-edged securities when invest- . ment in fixed deposits with 11ationalized banks, Natio1ial :savings , Certificates, Unit Trusts and other fonils of Government secmities\n\n. and even in the share market in the shape of blue chips conimand a\n\n, muh greater return. More secure the capital and regular the return,\n\nlesser the rate of interest .. Most secured kind of investment is Government securities or deposits with scheduled banks ,, Unit Trust .. or National Savings Certificates. The rate ofinterest 6 Government of India bonds for a period of JO years in 1972 yielded 5. 75 % per annum. As per the Governn1ent of Karnataka publication called . ·\"Finance Accounts cif 1972-73\" the rate of interest on the Mysore . State Developniertt Loans issued in the ytiars 1967, 1968, 1969, 1970,\n\n1971 and 1972 was uniformly 5.3/4 % return. The rate of interest on fixd depoSits with State Ba11k. of India for a period ranging from .. 3 years upto 5 years yielded 7% while the rate on fixed deposits above .~ S years was 7.,25 %. '.The rate of dividend payable. on unit trusts in,\n\n.197~ was 8.25% per annum .. National Savings Certificates; 7 years,..\n\n2nd issue yielded tax-free interest af 6% on maturity, 7 years; 3rd i'ssue 6% tax-free payable annually and 7 years, 4th issue 7.5% payable\" j annually but subject to income-tax. . .\n\n.. In Oriental Gas Co: Ltd. & Ors. v. State of West Bengal.'\"Jhis . Ccmrt held for the acquisition of ii, n. industrial undertaking in ·:the\n\nState of' West Beng!ll that if 12! % of the capital invested was the annual return; the adoption of mu]iplier of \"eight\" could not be unreasonable in the year .1962. Thet cimtention based on the iraditional view expressed by Shah, J. in Cooper's case, supra, that the multiplier must be. related to the rate of interest on gilt-edged securities .. . . . ..\n\n(I) [19791 1 s.c.R. 6j.1. •\n\n~.\n\n. LAND ACQUN .. QFF!CER v. P. VEERAB!:IADARAPPA ( S!•n, J.)' 397\n\nwas repelled by Chinnapa Rddy, J. H was stated .that the .observ.a- A. tions of Shah, J. in Cbopel\"'s case that.'capifalization of the net annual value of the property, at a rate <:qua! in normal cases .to the return from gilt-edged securities' was all' important method of.determination of compensation, did not lay ddwn a rule of law of universal applica, tion.. It was observed :\n\n\"'Thevery use of th.e word \"normal\" by Shah, J. indicates . that it was not intended to lay down any invar.iable rule .that whenever a method of capitalization of net.profit was adopted,· the return from gilt-edged securities was to be thebasis .. Thai should depend on a vaiety of circumstances such as the . nature of the pro, rty, the norn1al return which may be expected on like investment, the state .of the ca.pital market' .and several such factors.,, .\n\n' In Union of India & A.nr. v, Smt. Sh.anti.Devi etc. etc. cv this Court recently had occasion to' lay down the<;!ijnciple as to the true' multiplier · of \"thirteen\" applicable in determining the capitalized .value of about . D: • ' 70,000 acres of agricultural land located In .the Kangra \".alley in the.\n\nState of Himachal Pradesh where the notification under s.4(1) of the Act had bee1i. issued in the years 1962 and, 1963, and' where there was no eyidence of comparable sales of similar.lands in the Kangra valley.\n\nAfter referring to the judgment of this Court in 'Oriental Gas CO:- Ltd.'s case,. supra, and several other dec.isions, one of us (Venkata- . ramiah J .) observed :\n\n, \"The number of years' purchase has gradually decreased as'the prevailing rate of interest realisa):ile from safe investments has gradually increased-the higher the rate. of interest, the lower the number of years\"purchase. This method of valuation involves capitalizing the Ile! inco1ne that the property. can. fairly be expected to produce >Ind the rate of capitalization is the percentage ofreturn.n.his investment that a.willing buyer would expe.ct from the property during the relevant period.'' ·\n\n. The Couri explained that although at one time it was felt .th.at . interest on gilt-edged securities or Gover1lment bonds s!lould alone\n\nbe taken into consideration, having regard to the safety .and liquidity of investment, but 'the circums.tances have now changed during the\n\n(I) AIR 1983. SC IJ90\n\n- JI..\n\n•. ,_.\n\n398 (.1984) 2 s.C.R .. ·\n\nA recent years and deposits with the Stale Bank . of. India and hther\n\n. nationalized banks and even in the share market there are many blue \\- chips which command stability and other attendant benefits such as\n\nissue of bonus ehares et cetera, and added : .\n\n\"A return of 10% per annum _on such safe investments is almost assured. Today nobody thinks of investing oii land which would yield a net income of just 5% to 6% per annum . .:.\n\nA higher return of the order of 10% is usually anticipated.\n\nEven in the years 1902 and 1963 an investor in agricultural -'land expected annual net return of at last 8 %· It means that if the lai1d yielded a net annual income of Rs. 8 a\n\nwilling buyer of land would have paffl for it Rs. 100 i.e.\" a little more than 1.2 times the annual net income.'.'.\n\n. . .\n\nThere are. certain \"general considerations which investors cif all types take more or less into acccount : yield and appreciation possibilities, the ability .readily to di$ose of-the investment (marketability)' and' safety.· Investments differ with respect to assural)ce of income and safety of principal. In the investment market, the quality of . investment is evidenced_ by the yield or return that is produced in relation to market price higher the quality, the lower the yield. Invcs- . tors. must take in(o account various: types of risks associate'd with\n\ndifferent investment 1nediums and therefore adopt a type of investment that is appropriate to their resources and particular investment objec- . tivcs.\n\nAs_ already stated, some. 20 to 30 years back i.e .. tiJI the early '50s, it was taken as a settled rule of practice, that the capitalized value. of agricultural ·(ands should be arrived at 20 years' purchase having regard to the rate of interest on gifr:edged securities at five .per cent. That rule no longer can be adhered to in view of the changed . economic situation. In the early-'70s, people believed that investment in housing was more secure. than other forms of .Government securities in respect of safety of inves\"tment. Investment in housing involves certainly\" of lbour and etfot such as maintenance, collection of ren\\, payment of taxes et cetera. The rate of return expected therefore was 1.1/2% to 2.1/2% more than what was expected from\n\ni!Hdged securities. A person investing his capital in agricultural rands would ordinarily expect a return of 2 % to 3 % more tha~ what he could obtain froQJ. gilt-edged . secu_rities or other forms. of afe . t t 1 °\" fixed deposits in scheduled banks. Nat10nal Savmgs 1nves 1ncn .sue t n.) - • • k d Certific1tcs, Unit Trusts ·\"' etera i!r on blue chips i.e. n stoc s an\n\n.. .\n\n·~ . . .\n\n~ ..\n\n- LAND ACQUN. OFFICER 1', p., VEERABHADARAPPA (Sen, J.) 399 .\n\nshares in the public or private sector which )ield a much greater return.. A\n\n~ Ia regard to investment in agricultural lands, there are many imponderables in as mucl:i as the.investor runs a much greater risk than the risk that He run.s in investment in housing which consists in vagaries of weather and other uncertainties., There. is no security of principal, no liquidity of investment nor any .certainty of income.\n\nThe appreciation of Principal or income is aiso uncerain. The reaSons . [or these is that agricultural 1ands are not readily transferable under\n\nthe various land reform legislations e.g. laws relating to ceiling on agricultural holdings under the existing State laws and tenancy laws. I\n\nwhich place restrictions on transfer of such lands with concomitant danger of effacement of the rights f the absentee-landlors and\"\"ihe c . creation of rights in the tillers of the soil. lri evaluating the rate. of return which would ordinarily satisfy ah investo1' in such a .Prperty, the risk factor has further to be evaluated. There may be total or partial f!iJure of crops either.tllfough failure of rain or drought, or inadequate or excessive rainfall. Ther.e . may be a failure 'Of crs\n\non account' of locust i)'ivasion or insects or pesis, The cost inputs such as seeds, water, fertilizer~ laboWI charges etc. would vary from year to yca, r. lf the, overall cost goes up, the income from agricultural produce would be comparatively Jess. The fluctuations in price of agricultural produce introduce a great deal of uncertainty in regard to the income that can be expected from the sale of the.produce.· If the yield of the .crop in .other producing countries is large, or the market prices prevailing in such countries are low, the prices of such agricultural produce in India would go down. In view of these considerations, an investor 'would expect a much higher 'rate of return so that the risk factor is properly. discounted. . • . . .\n\nIn the premises, when the rate of return .on investment was\n\nF 8.25% in the years 1971 and 1972,. a person investing his capital in. agricultural lands would ordinarily expect 2 % to 3% more than what he could obtain. from gilt-edged securities or other forms Of safe investment and therefore the proper multiplier to be applied for the purpose of capitaliiation could not, in any event, exceed \"ten\": In\n\nthe present case, the State Government however contends that the G proper multiple to be. applied.· should be 121, in computation of the capitilized value of the lands in these cases having regard to the rate <; if return of 8 % at the relevant time i.e. on the date of the notification under s.4(1) of the Act. 1n view of this, it must be held ihat the multiple of 12i shouliJ be applied in computation of the capitalized H value of the lands. '\n\n\\.-.\n\nA In the result,· the appeals must succeed ad are .allowed, The judgments and decrees of the. High.' Court are modified by d.irecting that the compensation awarded for acquistion. of land should be reduced by one-si; x:th, in these cases wherever tl\\e amount of com-· pensa:tion has been d.etermined by the method of capitaiiiation: The respondents shall get solatium.@15%.on the compensation com.\n\nB puted on the above basis and shall be paid intere.st aHhe rate decreed . by the courts bel<?w\n\n. .\n\nj .. · The costs shall be borne by tbe parties throughout as incurred.. ~\n\nN.V.K. •\n\nAppeals allowed. ' ...\n\n• • .:., r ' .. • • •\n\n.. I' •\n\n• •\n\n. .", "total_entities": 62, "entities": [{"text": "B\n\nTHE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER, DAVANGERE", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9, "end_char": 59, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER, DAVANGERE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. 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Krishna Prasad, Girish Chandra, A.V.-Rangdm ."}}, {"text": "Girish Chandra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8983, "end_char": 8997, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".... :\n\nLAND ACQN.- OFFICER v. P. VEE~AB~ADARAPP/I (Sen, J.) • 389\n\nS.L. Bedikar, and K.C. Dua P.R. Ramaseslz K.R. Nagaraja, Naresh Kaushal and B. Krishna Prasad, Girish Chandra, A.V.-Rangdm ."}}, {"text": "A.V.-Rangdm", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8999, "end_char": 9010, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".... :\n\nLAND ACQN.- OFFICER v. P. VEE~AB~ADARAPP/I (Sen, J.) • 389\n\nS.L. Bedikar, and K.C. Dua P.R. Ramaseslz K.R. Nagaraja, Naresh Kaushal and B. Krishna Prasad, Girish Chandra, A.V.-Rangdm ."}}, {"text": "G. Gopa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9018, "end_char": 9025, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "•and G. 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The short qii.esiio~ .involved in this appeal by special leave and.the further appeals under s.54."}}, {"text": "s.54", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9184, "end_char": 9188, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Land Acquisitiqn Act, 1894", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9197, "end_char": 9223, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "SpecfaJ Land Acqbisition Officer, Davangere", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10221, "end_char": 10264, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "appeals being preferred by the SpecfaJ Land Acqbisition Officer, Davangere against the appellate judgments and decrees of the District· E Judge, Chitradurga and of the Civil Judge, Davangere on vanous references made under s.18 of the Act."}}, {"text": "s.18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10413, "end_char": 10417, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11190, "end_char": 11192, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11226, "end_char": 11231, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "SUPRBME COURT", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11527, "end_char": 11540, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPRBME COURT REPORTS."}}, {"text": "Special Land Acquisition Officer", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11591, "end_char": 11623, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Special Land Acquisition Officer however by his .", "canonical_name": "Special Land Acquisition Officer, [Javangere v. B. Basavarajappa"}}, {"text": "s. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11789, "end_char": 11793, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Davangere", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 11917, "end_char": 11926, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Civil Judge' Davangere enhanced."}}, {"text": "Kacker", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13305, "end_char": 13311, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Kacker, learned counsel appeerirg on behalf cf the appellant contenas that the High Court was wrong in adopting the multiple of-) 5 of the actual or immediately pro.spcctive .net anirnal profits of the lands acquired to be the .capitalized value thereof when the rate of return in the years 1971 and 1972 was 8% per annum."}}, {"text": "s.4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14078, "end_char": 14081, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Basa.varajappa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15345, "end_char": 15359, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "nµmber of years' purchase value comes to l2t,\" ·\n\nWe regret to find that in these cases the High Court instead of having adopted the multiple of 12t times observed that the decision in Basa.varajappa's case, supra, was not applicable because."}}, {"text": "s.4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15757, "end_char": 15763, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17858, "end_char": 17862, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18020, "end_char": 18026, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.4(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19409, "end_char": 19415, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21293, "end_char": 21299, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Alfred D. fahr", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21425, "end_char": 21439, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' Alfred D. fahr in \"Law of Emi1ient Domain\" (1953 edn:) after a general discussion regarding the valuation of property, sums up at ."}}, {"text": "Jahr", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22767, "end_char": 22771, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jahr then deals with the method of capitalization of income and says at p, 230 :\n\n\"It is quife evident 'from the formula that the lower the ."}}, {"text": "Vyricherla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23873, "end_char": 23883, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Privy Council in Vyricherla's case, supra, the meaning to be placed upon the phrase\n\n\"market value\" of the land under s ."}}, {"text": "s.4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24122, "end_char": 24128, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 26629, "end_char": 26635, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "money in the gilt-edged secuties.. Till the early SO's, the Coiirts Of the then Madras Presidency held that the capitalized value of agricultural lands should be arrived at :20 years' purchase having regard to the rate of interest on gilt-edged , securities at five per cent per annum."}}, {"text": "State of' West Beng!ll", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 29496, "end_char": 29518, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ccmrt held for the acquisition of ii, n. industrial undertaking in ·:the\n\nState of' West Beng!ll that if 12! %"}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 29721, "end_char": 29725, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thet cimtention based on the iraditional view expressed by Shah, J. in Cooper's case, supra, that the multiplier must be."}}, {"text": "Cooper", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29733, "end_char": 29739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thet cimtention based on the iraditional view expressed by Shah, J. in Cooper's case, supra, that the multiplier must be."}}, {"text": "LAND ACQUN", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 29889, "end_char": 29899, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "LAND ACQUN .. QFF!CER v. P. VEERAB!:IADARAPPA ( S!•n, J.)' 397\n\nwas repelled by Chinnapa Rddy, J. H was stated .that the .observ.a- A. tions of Shah, J. in Cbopel\"'s case that."}}, {"text": "Chinnapa Rddy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 29969, "end_char": 29982, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "LAND ACQUN .. QFF!CER v. P. VEERAB!:IADARAPPA ( S!•n, J.)' 397\n\nwas repelled by Chinnapa Rddy, J. H was stated .that the .observ.a- A. tions of Shah, J. in Cbopel\"'s case that."}}, {"text": "Cbopel", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30045, "end_char": 30051, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "LAND ACQUN .. QFF!CER v. P. VEERAB!:IADARAPPA ( S!•n, J.)' 397\n\nwas repelled by Chinnapa Rddy, J. H was stated .that the .observ.a- A. tions of Shah, J. in Cbopel\"'s case that."}}, {"text": "s.4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31161, "end_char": 31167, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Oriental Gas CO:- Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 31369, "end_char": 31391, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After referring to the judgment of this Court in 'Oriental Gas CO:- Ltd.'s case,."}}, {"text": "Venkata- . ramiah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 31449, "end_char": 31466, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "supra, and several other dec.isions, one of us (Venkata- ."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 36850, "end_char": 36855, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If the yield of the .crop in .other producing countries is large, or the market prices prevailing in such countries are low, the prices of such agricultural produce in India would go down."}}, {"text": "s.4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37719, "end_char": 37725, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_2_401_414_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "401 A\n\n,•-·\n\nBHASKAR -TEXTILE MILLS LTD.\n\nJHARSUGUDA MUNICIPALITY & OTHER.\n\njanuary, fl, !984\n\n[R S. VENKATARMIAH AND .R. B. MISRA; JJ; J\n\nOctroi dufy1 imposition of-Validitf of-teiposition of Octroi. duty 'under secfio\"n 131(1)(kk) OJ-the Orissa Municipal Aci, 1950 to. a-village constituted as a Grama earlier under Section 3 .of the Orissa Gram P!Afi:hayat Act, 1964_ but la,_ter\n\n, C included in an.area of a MuniCip'ality under Section 4 of the-1950 Act-Constitution oflqJfia, 1950, Article 19(1)g. • ' -\n\nThe appellant Textile Mills is a COn1pan; duly.incorporated uder tfe Indi.an' Companies Act 1956, having its mil~ located at Village Ektali ui:ider the\" Jharsuguda police station in distriCt Sambalpur, Orissa. The company mainly carries on. sPinning of Cotton which in the 'Il\"Ui.nUfacturing process is. transformed from IoOse fibfes into finished yarll The area undeir the Ektali village 1n which the appellallt's factory .was located was earlier.OOnstituteci as a Graa by a declaration mad(:der Section 3 of the OriSsa Grama Panch3.yat Act 1964.~ .On or about March 25, 1976 Jhauguda Municipalit)' passed a resolution for ihe inciusionof the Ektali and other villages within ts jurisdiction: After considering the objec~ tiOns aad representations aganst. the inclusion of EktaH viliage in the Municipal Limit and after follo\\ving once again the othC_r statutory requireriient of furtheF notice.etc., .the stite 9overnment pbliscd.:in the O.rissa Gazette \"dated 1i;8.1975 a notification aiJl)rovirig. the inclusion. Soon thereafter on September .1. 1975. the said Jharsuguda MnicipalitY. sent a-)etter to' the appellallt 'dirdcting. it to .pay octroi dty at the rate of .1_ percent ad valorem on cotton as son as it entefed the Municipal check µOst for the purpose of its being spun into yarn;\n\nThe lvy of octroi was challenged b; :tiling. a .\"j, etitin under Ar.ts. 226 cind 227 of the Constitution on Various grounds. but :the writ PetitioO: .was, dismissed.\n\nPetition .seeking :Permission for issu8J?.~ of a ce-rtificate under Article 133(1) of . the Constitution was also dismissed. Hence the appeal aftci: phtaining SpeCiaI Leave of the Court. - -\n\nDismissing the apPeal the Cou.11.\n\nHELD : 1 .. cOnSidering fhe case from any -aspect\" the imposition of octroi duty under sOOtion 5 of the. Orissa Municipal Act, .1950 does not stiffer from any\n\ninfirmity\n\n[ 413 HJ ·\n\n2; The levy~ being neither an unrea\"so.Oable one nor alsO exeessive, cailnot\n\n- 'he cbllnged on the grourld that there is violation o.f Article 19(1)(g) .of the Con H stitution. [4130]- ·\n\n402 ..\n\n.. S.UPRBME COURT.REEPORTS [1984] 2 s.c.R, .. . :\n\n3. It is tr.ue that when a duly constituted Grama unde; sub-section (1) of\n\nSectio~ 3 of the Grama Panchayat Act is to go out of existence an order of the Magistrate cancel_lin, g the Notification in tenns of sUb-section (2) of Section 3 of the said Act is a pre-requisite. But in the instant case the Grain Pallchayat Dever challellged the Noification of inclusion of the Village Ektali in Jharsuguda Municipalit)'. Rather .. on the. other and the grain panChayat was -0onsUiteci•before the fmpugned notifi\"¢ation dated 12th August 1975 was issued.' [ 406 H; 407 .Al ..\n\n4. rhe prOviso. to sub-section 1 of Scctioil' 4 o( the Orissa Municipal Act, 1950 has no application to the present 9ase and th(lt cannot be taken to be a ground rOging thC.No-tific-ation fo2 inclusion of Village Ektau \"in th; JhITTsgUda Municipality..\n\nA bare pcrsUal of the proviso clearly indicates that the requircme.nt is that t\"'.Othirds of the adult .. , in1l~ population of theto\\v\"n to which it ; efers should be engaged in nonagricultural pursuits The proViso applies not to all the caluses of sU.b-section (1) of sccton.fit.' but it applies only to clau~ (a) of subsection (1) of Section 4, bocause it is clause (a) ofsection4 (1) which talks of town. [408 E-Fl . .\n\nThe contention that the .bjection\"'faised by the appellant agaimfi; fthe\n\nincluio2,_ of the. village in qustin ito Mnicipality has nOt beei1 consider_ed by the Stas no , force. The obJectlon 1S required to be made through. the Magistrate of the Ditrict. Naturally the District Magistrate. while f0rwarding the objection to. the State GOvernmerit made his comment. The Revenue Divisional Officer who intervenes. in the ch.annal of communication between the District Magistrate-and the Stat.e Government.had an occasion to processthe n1atter. The tate Government while dealing Withthe matter_ consulted the panchayai Raj Departrnent and ... ultimately notified in terms of the notification dated August 12, 1975. [408H; 40!lA-Bl\n\n. . -\n\n6. Section 131(1} of the Municipal Act e1npower the Municipal Council to impose various kinds of taxes which includes octroi as provided in Clause (kk) E witli the sanctio~ of the Govern1nent sice the.gods 3.re brought into the municipal\n\nlimits at least for the purpose of use\" ne of the three conditions laid down in\n\nclause(k -theimpositionofoctroi is valid.· . .- . . .\n\nBurmah Shell Oil-Storage & Distribution Co. v. The Belga1n.JJ.orough .\\1un1c1pal1ty [1963) Sapp 2 SCR 21~ referred to and held inapplicable. [409 D-EJ\n\n7:1. .. Tere is a statutory presumption under .section 392.of the Orissa Municipal Act. 1950 that the publication of the rules or regulations or bye laws in the Gazette shall be evidence , that' the rule or regulation or bye law has been. made as required by the section Therefore the court wiil assu1ne that the bye Jaw has been made in acCordance with law in the absence of anything inofe fom the si l of the appellant .. [410 F-GJ\n\n 7:i. The argument tht even assuming that tQ.c. bye.:.Iaws yvhen initially eh{orced Might be presumed to be in accordance With law ill the absence of similar\n\nteps being taken at the time of extcrttion of bye laws to the newy added area, te bye laws are not enforceable in the new areas is not correct as it has, proceeed tn . utter obliVion of the pfoisions of secti(Jn S of th Municipal Act. [410 H; 411 A]\n\nVishakhapatnam:-Municipqlity ~- Kandregu/a Nukarajau & Ors. [1976] ,1 ~-C~R. 544;.Atlas Cycle Industries Ltd. v. State of Haryana and Anr:, [1912] l S.C.R. 127; Bagalkot City.Municipality v Baga/kot Cement, [1963] 2 Supp S.C.R. 710; distinguished\n\n. llHASKAR TEXTILE v .. IHARSUGUDA MUN!CIPALJTY (Misra, J.) . 403\n\nCJ\\\\'1r: APPELLATE JuRISDICTION : Civil Appeal No; 487 of 1977.\n\n' . ' . -f Appeal by Special leave from the Judgment and Order dated\n\n. the 5th January, 1977 of the Orissa High Court in O.J.C. No. 810\n\no( 1976 .. •\n\nV.S. Desai, Parveen Kumar and A.shok Mathur for the Appellant.\n\nC. V. Murty, Y. Prabhakar Rao and C.'¥. Murty for the Respondents.·\n\nR.K. Mehta for Respondent No. 3.\n\nB.D. Sharma for Respondent No. 2. . . .\n\nThe Judgment of the Court. was delivered by\n\n~· MISRA J. The present appeal by special ieilve is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Orfasa dated 5th January 1977 D dismissing a petition under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution for quashing imposition of octroi under s. 131(1)(kk) of the Orissa Municipal Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as .the 'Act') and for . a declaraiion that the notifications dated 31st July 1973 and 12th August, 1975 issued by the State Government in exercise of powers •· vested under s.4 of the Act arc illegal and unenforceable and for a E further declaration that the Octroi Bye-laws of the Jharsuguda Muni-\n\n/~ -.. -¥\n\ncipal Council are also void and inoperative. .\n\n• · Jharsuguda MuniCipality; respondent No. I, is a municipality incorporated under the Act. In March 1962 the. Stat~ Government accorded sanction for the imposition. of octrc°i in terms of s.131(1) of. the. Act. A set of octro( bye-laws were framed by the Municipal Council in terms of s.388 of the Act and the same were also appro.ved by the State Government in exercise of powers under s.390 of the Act on 19th March, .1968. Octroi was levied. for the first time after 31st March 1962 when the State Gvernment accorded sanction under sJ3l{i)(kk) of th' Act.\n\nThe appellant is a company duly incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, 1956 having its mi!Js located at viJJagc Ektali under the Jharsuguda poli.ce station ii) District Sambalpur, Orissa. The said area of the village was included within the Ektali Panchayat.\n\nThe company mainjy ca.rries on fillinning of cotton which in the manu\n\n. facturing proc.ess is transformed from loose fibres into finished yarn.\n\nThe area under the Ektali village in which the appellants' fatory was located was constituted, along with other viJlages as a Gram by . a declaration made under. s.3 of the Oris'sa Grama Panchayat. Act, . 1964 .. On or ab0ut. 25th Much, 1970 Jharsuguda Municipality'. passed a resolution for the inclusion of Ektali and other viilages in the Jharsuguda Munfcipality and t.hus extending the area of the said . Munic'pality. Against the proposed extension t.he appellant made a r.epresentation to the state Goveniment inter alia on the ground that the said village Bkta!i could not und.er the relevant rules be included in the Municipaiity under s.4(I)(c) of the Orissa Municipal\n\n1 Act; 1950 in view of the proviso to s.4(1) which contemplates that a declaration shall not be made under this, sub-section unless the State\n\nGove.rnment.re satisfied tha1 !wo-thi.rds ofthe ad, ultmale population of the town to which it refers are chiefly employed in pursuits other than agriculture and that .such a town contains not less than 10, oOO inhabitants and an average number of not less than 1000 inhabitants .. to a square mlle of the area of such a town: The. appeliant alleged that the male population of the ; aid village Ektali was 2640 as. per\n\n1971 census report; out of which only 1586 were cniefly employed\n\n- in pursuits other than agriculture and ths twc-thirds of such male population were not employed in non-agcicultural pursui5s. ·\n\n : The State Government,. however, by a notificafon dated 31st July 1973 dedarcd their intention under s.4(I)(c) of the Municipal Act, 1950. t1 include withi11 the Jharsuguda Muicipality, the local area of a number of viilages including the village Ektali. By the said • notification published in Orissa .Gazette Extraordinary dated 22nd August,· 1973 tlle Govrnment iilvited objctions within_ six week$ from the date of pubiication. - The appellant did. file objection to. : the said notification. Objection was also filed by Grama Panchayat\n\nof __ Ektali. to. the effect that the Ektali Grama was duly constitutted by the State .Government in Com1nunity Development and Panchayat Raj Department in exercise of powers under s.3(1) of the Orissa Grama .\n\nPnchayat Act and in the absence of any notification µnder s.3(1) and s.149 of the Grama Panchayat Act, village f\\ktali .still continues to be a Grama. · • The objections were examined by the District Magistrate, 'Sambalpur and the Revenu~ Division Commissioner.Northern Divisio'n,\n\nSainbalpur an<j the'.same were rejected.· On 12th August, . 1975e, notification :under s.4(3)(b) declaring the•inclusion. of the said vj1!agsa\n\n•·-\n\n...\n\n- . '1\n\n' . -\n\n' ....\n\n....\n\nBHASKAR. TEXTILES v. JHARSUGUDA MUNJCIPAUTY (Mirsa, J.) 40?\n\nincluding the villae Ektali, into Jharsuguda Municipality was iSsued. . Sooil thereafter on 1st 'September, 1975 the said Jharsuguda' Municipality sent 'a letter to the appellant directing it t<; pay octroi as per provisions of s.5 of the Orissa Municipal Ac.t.. Tie said octroi was payable at the rate of 1 per.cent_ ad-va!tJ1:em on cotton as soon as it entered the municipal check-post for the purpose of its being spun. into yarn.\n\nThe levy of octroi duty was challenged_ by filing a petition -under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution 0•1 various grounds viz.,(a} the inclusion. of village Ektali in the area of Jharsuguda Municipality was illegal and ultra. vires' the proviSions of the Orissa MniCjpal\n\nAt, and (b) the levy of octroi duty at the rate of 1. per cent ad valorem was arbitrary, coercivend violative of Art. _301 of the Constitution ·:and, therefore, the appellant prayed for. quashin.g the nctification.s referredto above.\n\nThe writ petition was, however, dismissed by. a .Division Bench of the Orissa High Court hy it_s o.fder _dated 5th January, I 977. The appellant filed an application under Art: 133(1) of the Constitution for the grant of a certificate-for leave tc appeal to this Court, which was dimissed by the High Courr by its order <lated 19th January, 1977._ The appellant has_ now filed the-present appeal after obtaining special leave from this Court. • ·\n\n.. The learned counselforthe appellant raised the following contentions : · ·\n\nInthe absence ofa notification canceiling the declaration constituting Ektali village. as part of Grama, it was not· legally permi.ssible for t.he. State Government acting Under theOnssa Municipal Act 1950 to include within the area of the municiphlity the area of the said Grama .\n\n. 2. Themandator;' requ.irements of proviso to:sub-s.(J) of sA ·\n\nof the Orissa Municipal Act, 1950 have pot been satisfied.\n\nThe objectio1; filed by the appellant uiider sub-'s.(2) of s.4 has not been considered by the State vernment.\n\n•· 4.\n\n(a) The libility to .ocfroi arises when any of the three alternatives mentioned in s.Bl(l)(kk) of the Municipal Act is satisfied viz., wlien, the, goods are brought\n\nB •\n\n406 SUPREME CClURT REPORTS [1984] 2 s.c.R.\n\nwithin the mu\\1icipal limits f9r (i) consumption,\n\n(ii) use, or (iii) sale . .• (b). Th!!' tax alre.11dy imposed within the limits of the Municipality oj Jharsuguda could riot be automati- .. cally made applicable to the extended limits of the - municipaiity without obtaining the sanction of.the\n\nState Governm'ent under s.131(1) (kh) of the Act.\n\n(c) The rate leviediis per se unreasonable an'a arbitrary.\n\nWe take up th1ese grounds seriatim. . . . ·.\n\nAdmittedly village Eki:lli where. the factoy of \\he appellant is located was a part of the d1:1ly constituted Ektali Orama Panchayat prior to 1973, within the meatffng of s.3 of the Orissa Orama Panchayat Act.· Sub-section (1) of. s'.3 authorises the State Government to constitute any village. or gro1'.1p of contiguous villages as a Orama by a. declaration notified in the C)iazette arid assign to such Grama a name which shall be of one of the villages. comprised w.ithin the Grama.\n\nSub-section (2) of s.3 provies that whenever the State Government deems it fit so to do, they rr:.ay cancel any notification in respect of a\n\nOrama under sub-s.· (l)'or rnay alter the area co\"mpriscd in a Orama . by. reducing. or adding to t'he number of villages comprised within s.tich Orama by a dec!aiation notified in the Gazette constituting such altered area or areas s a Orama or Gramas, as the case may be. ·\n\nThe. precise contentioi1 raised on behalf of the appellant is that there was a declaration b}· notification for the constitution of th_e Orama within the meaning!of sub-s.(I), but there has been.no notification as tequired by sub-s'.(2) of s.3 for taking village Ektali out of .Grama panchayat and, therefore, vi'llage Ektali continues to be a Orama and the inclusion o!' village. Ektali in Jharsuguda Municipality by notificati'ons dated 31st July, 1973 and 12th August; 197) will have no. effect. · ..\n\nThis contention has' considera bie force.\n\nWhen a duly constituted Orama is;, o go out ofexistece an order pf the Magistrate cancelling the notification , i11 terms of ub-s.(2) of s.3 of the Grarria Panchayat Act is necessar:( But there are circumstances whkh take away the force of the argument. The Orama Panchayat never chaHenged .the notijication of mclusion of the village Ektali in Jhar-\n\n. ,,; -\n\nBHASKAR TEXTILE v. JHARSUGUDA MUNICIPALITY (Misra,!.) 407\n\n' suguda Municipality.\n\nFrom un-controverted averment made in para 6 of the counter-affidavit of the State filed before the High Court it appears that the Gra;,, a Panchayat was consulted befote the impugned not'fication. Therefore, we do not feel persuaded to accept the contention at the instance of the appelJant. This leads us to the second ground.\n\nIn order to appreciate the second ground it is appropriate at this stage to refer t<i the provisions of s.4 in so far as it is relevant for the purposes of the case :\n\n\"4.(1) The State Government may, by notification declare their intention-\n\n(a) to constitute any town, together with, or exclusive of, any railway station, village, land or building in the vicinity of any such town, a municipality under this Act; or\n\n(b) ................................................. .\n\n(c) to include within a municipality any local area .contiguous to the same and defined in the notification ; or\n\n(d) ............... .\n\n(e) ............... .\n\n(f) .............. .. •\n\n(g) .............. ..\n\n(h)\n\nProvided that a declaration shall not be made under this sub-section unless the State Government are satisfied that two-thirds of the adult male population o( th_e town to which it refers, are chiefly employed in pursuits other than agricultural. and that such town contains nor less than ten thousand inhabitants and an average number of not less than one thousand inhabitants to the square mile of the area of such town.\n\n408 SuPREME COURT REPORTS • , . [1984J2.s.c.R ..\n\n(2) Any inhabitant of the town or local area, or any,, .· rate-payer of the rnimicipality, in respect of which an~,·:\n\n' such notification has beenpublished urider sub-section (1) . ·\n\nmay, if he bjects to anything contained in the notificatfo~ •. submit his objection in writing to the State Government,,: through the Magistrate of the district within six weeks from, B: . the date of the publication of the notification and the State.\n\nH ' '\n\nGovernment shall take his objections into consideration . . '\n\n(3) ........ \"\n\n . The emphasis of the appellant is .that two-third of the aduh ,.--..'< male popu)ation 'or the Grama sho'uld be ch.iefly employed in pursuits j , other than agricultural. The appellant has referred to 1971 census · figures,.: On the basis or' these cerisus figures it is argued that out of . , the.total male population of 2640 of Grama Ektali only 1586 adults were.engaged in non-agricultural pursuits but the requirement of law was that two-third of the male population should have been employed 'P in the non-agricultural pursuits, which. comes to 1760.\n\n ·· The argument proceeds on the assption that the proviso to s.4(1) applies. 8ut a bare persual of the proviso clearly indicates. that the requirement is that two-thirds of the adult male population of the town to which it refers should be engaged in non-agrlculturar \"\" pursuits. The proviso, to our mind, applies not to all the clauses of > sub-s.(I) of s.4 but it applies only to cl.( a) of sub-~.(!) of s.4, because it is cl.(a) of s.4(1) which ta1ks of town. Therefore, the proviso, in ,.;_ our opinion, has no application to the present case and that eanot f\"..) be taken to be a ground for challenging the notification for inclus10n of village' Ektali in the 1harsuguda Municipality. This takes us to the third ground.\n\n'The appellant had filed an objection under sub-s'.(2) of s.4. The said objection was examined by the District Magistrate, Sambalpur and the Revenue Divisional Commissioner fNorthern Division), Sarnbalpur: They over-ruled the objection treating it to be of general nature. Thereafter, the Community Development and the Panchayati Raj (Grama Panchayat) Department were consulted to agree with this proposal, to which they agreed, and it was thereafter that the Urban Development Department issued a final notification dated 12th August, 1975 to include the above village into the municipal limits -0f 1harsuguda .Municipality. The contention of the appellant that the objection had not been considered by the State Government\n\n• l\n\nBHASKAR TEXTILE r. JHA.RSUGUDA MUNICPALITY (Mirsa, J.) 409 . cannot be accepted in as mnch as the objection is required to be made through the Magistrate of the district.\n\nNaturally, the District M1gistrate while forwarding the objection to the State Government made his comment. The Revenue Divisional Commisioner intervenes in the channel of communication between the District Magistrate\n\nand the State Government and he, therefore, had an occasion to process the matter. The State Government while dealing with the B • matter consulted the Panchayati Raj Department and ultimately .... . notified in terms of notification dated 12th August, 1975. In the\n\ncircumstances it cannot be acceptd that the objection filed by the . '(appellant had not been considered by the State Government.\n\nIt was next contended that the liability for qctroi arises when any of the three alternatives mentioned in s.13l(l)(kk) of the Municipal Act are satisfied, namely, when the goods are brought within the.municipal limits for (i) consumption, (ii) use, or (iii) sale. Section 131(1) of the Municipal Act empowers the Municipal Council to impose various kinds of taxes within the limits of the Municipality with the sanction of the State Government. One of the taxes contemplated by s.313 (!) is octroi, .as provided in cl. (kk).\n\nAccording to the appellant the .goods are brought into the municipal area not for the purpose of sale or for consumption but for the purpose of manufacture of yarn. The appellant took support from Burm2h Shell Oil Storage & Distribution Co. India Ltd. v. The Belgam Boro2f; h, Municipa/ity11 l in which this Court had an occasion to consider the word 'consumption'. This Court took the view that the word 'consumption' in its primary sense means the act of consuming and in ordinary pariance means the use of an article in a way which destroys, wastes or uses up that article, but in some legal contexts, the word 'consumption' has a. wider meaning, and that i.t is not necessary that by the act of consumption the commodity must be destroyed or used up. On the strength of this authority it is contended that the goods were brought into the municipal limits neither . for consumption, nor for sale. Assuming the contention to be correct1,\n\nthere is no escape from the conclusion that the goods are brought into the municipal iimits at least for the purpose of use. In this view of the legal position the imposition ·of octroi by' the Municipality cannot be challenged on this ground.\n\nThe next ground of attack is based on s,372 of the Orissa Municipal Act. Section 392 pertinently reads .: ..\n\n{I) [1963] Supp. 2 S.C.R, 216 .\n\n\"392. The State Government before making any rules under sub-section (2) of section 81 and section 387, and a municipal council, before making any regulation or by-laws under section 388, shall publish, in such manner as the State Government deem sufficient for giving information to persons interested, the proposed rules or regulations or by-laws together with a notice specifying a date on or after which the same will be taken into consideration; and shall before making such rules or regulations or by-laws, receive and consider any objection or suggestion which may be made by any person with respect to the same before the date so specified.\n\n• •\n\nEvery such rule or regulation or by-law shall be published in the. Gazette in English and in Oriya and such publication shall be evidence that the rule or regulation or by-law has been made as required by this section.\" ~\n\nIt is contended tliat the mandatory requirements having not been complied with the imposition of octroi is vitiated on this account.\n\nThe appellant in para 3 of the Writ petition had alleged that the bye-laws were not published in the State Gazette either in Oriya or in Englis]1. This allegation has, however, been controverted by the State Government in para 18 of the counter-affidavit. It was specifically averred that the bye-laws were approved and confirmed\n\nby the Government in Urban Development Department vide order No. 1903/Legis-43-67/UD dated. nill published in. Orissa Gazette for information of the general public on 23rd May, 1969 at pages 691 to 697. There is a statutory presumption under s.372 of the Act that the publication of the rules or regulations or by-laws in the Gazette shall be evidence that the rule or regulation or bye-law has been made as required by this section.\n\nJn view of this statutory presumption the Court will assume that the bye-law has been made in accordance with law in the absence of anything more from the side of the appellant.\n\nAs a second limb to this argument it was contended by the appellant that even assuming that the bye-laws when initially enforced might be presumed to bein accordance with law, in the absence of similar steps being taken at the time of extension of bye-laws to the newly lidded area, the by~-laws are not enforceable in the new area.\n\nJ I\n\nBHASKAR TEXTILE v. JHARSUGUDA MUNICPALITY (Mirsa, J.) 411\n\nThis argument has proceeded in utter oblivion of the .provisions of A ..., s.5 of the Municipal Act. It reads : -1 .\n\n, •\n\n\"5. When any local area is jncluded in a municipality, by a notification under clause (b) or (c) of sub-section (3) of section 4, all the provisions of this. Act and of any rules, by-laws, notifications, or orders made thereunder, which immediately before such inclusion were in force tl1roughout such municipality, shall be deemed to appli to such area, unless the State Government, 111 and by the notification, otherwise direct.\" .c The learned counsel for the appellant, however, has placed\n\n~ ...\n\nstrong reliance upon Visakhapatnam M¥nicipality v.\n\nKandrequla Nukaraju & Ors. 11 ' In that case the question that fell for considerac tion was whether the property tax which could lawfullv be levied under the Dis.trict Municipalities Act 1929 can be levied after the repeal of that Act, on property situated in the areas included within the municipal limits after the constitution of the municipality. Section 391(1) of the Andhra Pradesh Municipalities Act 1965 expressly repealed the District Municipalities Act, 1920 from which it must follow that ordinarily no action can be taken under the Act of 1920 after April I, 1966 when the repeal became effective on the coming into force of the Act. It was, however, contended in that case that\n\ncl. 12 of Schedule 9 of the Act keeps the repealed enactment alive for tax purposes and, therefore, the municipality had the authority . to impose the property tax under the Act of J 920 notwithstanding . \\il its repeal by the new Act. This Court, however, took the view that ·\" the provisions contained in the Schedule re of a transitional nature.\n\nThey were intended to apply during the period of transition following upon the repeal of old municipal laws and the introduction of the\n\n~ ..- new law. The object of clause 1~ of Schedule 9 was to authorise the levy of taxes which, on the commencement of .the Act, were levied ' • 'under the repealed laws. This Court further added that the muni.- cipality might have been levying property tax since long on properties situated within its limits, but until April I, 1966 the villages of Ramakrishnapuram and Sriharipuram were outside those limits. Qua the • areas newly included within the municipal limits, the tax was being imposed for the first time and therefore it was incumbent on the \"\"' municipality to follow the procedure presribed ]ly the first proviso to section 81(2). Residents and tax payers of those areas never had\n\n(!) [1976] I S.C.R. 544.\n\nff,\n\nan pportunity to object to the iposition of the tax and that valuable opportunity cannot be denied to them. It i's obligatry upon the municipality not only to invite objections to the proposed tax but also to consider the objec; tions 'received by it within the specified period.\n\nFor the State, however, reliance was placed in that case on s.3(4) of the Act to contend that the inclusion of the two villages within the municipal area attracts of its own force every provision of the Act with effect from the date on which the final notification is published by the Govero, ment under s.3(3). In support of this con: tention it cited the decision of this Court in Atlas Cycle Industries '\n\nLtd. v. State of Haryana & Anr. (ll This argument on behalf of thtf )' State was, however, repe!Jcd and the Court observed : ,\n\n\"Far from supporting the argument, we consider that the decision shows how a provision like the one contained in Section 3(4) cannot have the effect contended for by the appellant. In the Atlas Cycle case, section 5(4) of the Punjab Municipality Act, 1911 provided that when any local area was included in the municipality; \"this Act and ... all rules, bye-laws, orders, directions and powers made, issued or conferred under this Act and i.n force throughout the whole municipality at.the time, shall apply to such areas.\".\"\n\nBut this Court took the view that since section 5(4) of the Punjab Act did not, significantly, refer to notifications and since section 62(1) of the Punjab Act spoke of \"notification\" for the imposition of taxes, ..t., it was not competent to the municipality to levy a.nd collect octroi f from the company on the stre11gth '!lerely of. the provision contained in s. 5(4) of the Punjab Act. That case, however, is distinguishable and cannot be of much assistance for solving the problem before us.\n\nSection 5 of the Orissa Municipal Act makes all the provisions of the Act and of any rules, by-laws, notifications, or orders made thereunder which immediately before such inclusion were in force\n\nthrouhout such municipality, applicble to such area, unless the\n\nState Government, in and by the notification, otherwise direct. This section, therefore, includes not only the provisions of the Act, rules and bye-laws but also includes notifications. This distingnishes the present case from the Visakhapatnam Municipality's case (supra).\n\n(I) [1972J I S.C.R. 127.\n\n• -\n\n.. -\n\nI ;\n\n.'I.\n\n''.BHASKAR TEXTILE v. -JHARSUGUDA MUNICIPALITY (Mirsa. J.) . 41J .•\n\nFor the appellant, next reliance was pl.aced upon Bag~!kot City Municipality v. Bagalkot Cement.<\" In that case also at the time o( the imposition of the octroi duty the respondent's factory was situat.ed . outside the municipal district and w:is not subject to the ectroi duty. Subsequently, the Government extended 'the municipal district so that. t\\1.e _factory ca.me to be included within that district. The appellant ii1that case contended that upon such extension its octroi limits .. also stood extended to include the factory and the respondent became liable to pa.y octroi dnty in respect of goods brought into the factory.\n\nThe majority view was that the expression \"municipal district\" in _the bye-law referred to the municipal district as existing when the bye-law was framed.\n\nThe context preventea the definition. of ·\"mnnicipal district\" in. the Act, naniely, the municipal district as from time to time existing from being applied und0-r s.20 of the Bombay General Clanses Act to interpret the bye-law. The bye-law had been made without being published to the respondent, and if it was so read referring to the municipal district from time to time existing it would be invalid for non-compliance with the provisions of s.48 of the Act. this case again is distinguishable in view of the wording of s.5 of the Orissa Municipal Act.\n\nLastly it is urged that the octroi duty levied in this case by the Municipality is unreasonable and excessive.· The Municipality is required to provide certain amenities not only for the permanent residents within the municipality, but also even for .casual visitors who may on occasions enter the limits of the . municipality. The entry of large quantities of goods within the municipality almost daily from outside necessarily creates innnmerable problems such as provisions .of water supply, lighting facilities, facilities for conservancy, sanitation, maintenance of good roads and markets etc. which the .\n\nJharsuguda Municipality has done and theie is no allegation to the contrary by . tlie appellant. From the material placed before us we are of the view that the levy is not an nnreasonable one. It is not also excessive. The imposition qf .octroi cannot, therefore, be challenged on the ground that there is violation of Art. 19(1)(g) of .. the Constitution.\n\nConsidering tlie case from any aspect the imposition of octroi duty, in our opinion, does not suffer from any infirmity.\n\n(!) (1963] Supp. I S.C.R. 710.\n\n.:E\n\nA For the foregoing discussion the appeal cannot succeed. It is accorrungly dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, h. owever, ] we allow the parties to bear their own costs. ,\n\nS.R.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\n,..\n\n. •", "total_entities": 114, "entities": [{"text": "BHASKAR -TEXTILE MILLS LTD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13, "end_char": 39, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHASKAR TEXTILE MILLS LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JHARSUGUDA MUNICIPALITY & OTHER", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 42, "end_char": 73, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "JHARSUGUDA MUNICIPALITY & OTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. B. MISRA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 119, "end_char": 130, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.B. 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S.UPRBME COURT.REEPORTS [1984] 2 s.c."}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2860, "end_char": 2869, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Orissa Municipal Act", "statute": "Orissa Municipal Act"}}, {"text": "Ektali", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3013, "end_char": 3019, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But in the instant case the Grain Pallchayat Dever challellged the Noification of inclusion of the Village Ektali in Jharsuguda Municipalit)'."}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3227, "end_char": 3236, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Orissa Municipal Act", "statute": "Orissa Municipal Act"}}, {"text": "Orissa Municipal Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3259, "end_char": 3285, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ektau", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3417, "end_char": 3422, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to sub-section 1 of Scctioil' 4 o( the Orissa Municipal Act, 1950 has no application to the present 9ase and th(lt cannot be taken to be a ground rOging thC.No-tific-ation fo2 inclusion of Village Ektau \"in th; JhITTsgUda Municipality..\n\nA bare pcrsUal of the proviso clearly indicates that the requircme.nt is that t\"'."}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3795, "end_char": 3804, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Orissa Municipal Act, 1950", "statute": "the Orissa Municipal Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "section 392", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5191, "end_char": 5202, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jn S of th Municipal Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5947, "end_char": 5971, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Misra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6286, "end_char": 6291, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "llHASKAR TEXTILE v .. IHARSUGUDA MUN!CIPALJTY (Misra, J.) .", "canonical_name": "Misra"}}, {"text": "V.S. Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6521, "end_char": 6531, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "810\n\no( 1976 .. •\n\nV.S. Desai, Parveen Kumar and A.shok Mathur for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Parveen Kumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6533, "end_char": 6546, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "810\n\no( 1976 .. •\n\nV.S. Desai, Parveen Kumar and A.shok Mathur for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "A.shok Mathur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6551, "end_char": 6564, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "810\n\no( 1976 .. •\n\nV.S. Desai, Parveen Kumar and A.shok Mathur for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "C. V. Murty", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6585, "end_char": 6596, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. V. Murty, Y. Prabhakar Rao and C.'¥. Murty for the Respondents.·"}}, {"text": "Y. Prabhakar Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6598, "end_char": 6614, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. V. Murty, Y. Prabhakar Rao and C.'¥. Murty for the Respondents.·"}}, {"text": "C.'¥. Murty", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6619, "end_char": 6630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. V. Murty, Y. Prabhakar Rao and C.'¥. Murty for the Respondents.·"}}, {"text": "R.K. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6654, "end_char": 6664, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.K. Mehta for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "B.D. Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6688, "end_char": 6699, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B.D. Sharma for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "Arts. 226 and 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6937, "end_char": 6954, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Jn S of th Municipal Act", "statute": "Jn S of th Municipal Act"}}, {"text": "s. 131(1)(kk)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7015, "end_char": 7028, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Orissa Municipal Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7036, "end_char": 7062, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s.4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7262, "end_char": 7265, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Orissa Municipal Act, 1950", "statute": "the Orissa Municipal Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Jharsuguda MuniCipality", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7452, "end_char": 7475, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• · Jharsuguda MuniCipality; respondent No.", "canonical_name": "JHARSUGUDA MUNICIPALITY & OTHER"}}, {"text": "s.131(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7638, "end_char": 7646, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Orissa Municipal Act, 1950", "statute": "the Orissa Municipal Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "s.388", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7735, "end_char": 7740, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Orissa Municipal Act, 1950", "statute": "the Orissa Municipal Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "s.390", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7837, "end_char": 7842, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Orissa Municipal Act, 1950", "statute": "the Orissa Municipal Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "31st March 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7920, "end_char": 7935, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "for the first time after 31st March 1962 when the State Gvernment accorded sanction under sJ3l{i)(kk) of th' Act."}}, {"text": "appellant is a company duly incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8014, "end_char": 8091, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s.3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8584, "end_char": 8587, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The appellant is a company duly incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, 1956", "statute": "The appellant is a company duly incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "s.4(I)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9066, "end_char": 9075, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The appellant is a company duly incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, 1956", "statute": "The appellant is a company duly incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "s.4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9139, "end_char": 9145, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.4(I)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9965, "end_char": 9974, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Municipal Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9982, "end_char": 10001, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s.3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10587, "end_char": 10593, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Municipal Act, 1950", "statute": "the Municipal Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "s.3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10675, "end_char": 10681, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Municipal Act, 1950", "statute": "the Municipal Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "s.149", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10686, "end_char": 10691, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Municipal Act, 1950", "statute": "the Municipal Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "s.4(3)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10986, "end_char": 10995, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Municipal Act, 1950", "statute": "the Municipal Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Mirsa", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11127, "end_char": 11132, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "TEXTILES v. JHARSUGUDA MUNJCIPAUTY (Mirsa, J.) 40?", "canonical_name": "Misra"}}, {"text": "s.5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11371, "end_char": 11374, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Arts. 226 and 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11646, "end_char": 11663, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jharsuguda Municipality", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11761, "end_char": 11784, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of village Ektali in the area of Jharsuguda Municipality was illegal and ultra."}}, {"text": "Orissa High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12160, "end_char": 12177, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a .Division Bench of the Orissa High Court hy its o.fder dated 5th January, I 977."}}, {"text": "State Government acting Under theOnssa Municipal Act 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12764, "end_char": 12821, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Themandator", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12904, "end_char": 12915, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Themandator;' requ.irements of proviso to:sub-s.(J) of sA ·\n\nof the Orissa Municipal Act, 1950 have pot been satisfied."}}, {"text": "Orissa Municipal Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12972, "end_char": 12998, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s.4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13084, "end_char": 13087, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Orissa Municipal Act, 1950", "statute": "the Orissa Municipal Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "s.131(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13680, "end_char": 13688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Orissa Municipal Act, 1950", "statute": "the Orissa Municipal Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Eki", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13832, "end_char": 13835, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Admittedly village Eki:lli where."}}, {"text": "s.3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13984, "end_char": 13987, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Orissa Municipal Act, 1950", "statute": "the Orissa Municipal Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "s.3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14319, "end_char": 14322, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14959, "end_char": 14962, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "31st July, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15158, "end_char": 15173, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ektali in Jharsuguda Municipality by notificati'ons dated 31st July, 1973 and 12th August; 197) will have no."}}, {"text": "12th August; 197)", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15178, "end_char": 15195, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ektali in Jharsuguda Municipality by notificati'ons dated 31st July, 1973 and 12th August; 197) will have no."}}, {"text": "s.3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15404, "end_char": 15407, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16145, "end_char": 16148, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18350, "end_char": 18356, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18645, "end_char": 18648, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18696, "end_char": 18699, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.4(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18725, "end_char": 18731, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1harsuguda Municipality", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 18955, "end_char": 18978, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "our opinion, has no application to the present case and that eanot f\"..) be taken to be a ground for challenging the notification for inclus10n of village' Ektali in the 1harsuguda Municipality."}}, {"text": "s.4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19074, "end_char": 19077, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sambalpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19139, "end_char": 19148, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The said objection was examined by the District Magistrate, Sambalpur and the Revenue Divisional Commissioner fNorthern Division), Sarnbalpur: They over-ruled the objection treating it to be of general nature."}}, {"text": "Sarnbalpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19210, "end_char": 19220, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The said objection was examined by the District Magistrate, Sambalpur and the Revenue Divisional Commissioner fNorthern Division), Sarnbalpur: They over-ruled the objection treating it to be of general nature."}}, {"text": "12th August, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19539, "end_char": 19556, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter, the Community Development and the Panchayati Raj (Grama Panchayat) Department were consulted to agree with this proposal, to which they agreed, and it was thereafter that the Urban Development Department issued a final notification dated 12th August, 1975 to include the above village into the municipal limits -0f 1harsuguda .Municipality."}}, {"text": "s.13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20643, "end_char": 20647, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 131(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20801, "end_char": 20815, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.313", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21015, "end_char": 21020, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 392", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22322, "end_char": 22333, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22468, "end_char": 22478, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 387", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22483, "end_char": 22494, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 388", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22567, "end_char": 22578, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "23rd May, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23902, "end_char": 23916, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Orissa Gazette for information of the general public on 23rd May, 1969 at pages 691 to 697."}}, {"text": "s.372", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23977, "end_char": 23982, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24822, "end_char": 24825, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24989, "end_char": 24998, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Municipalities Act 1929", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25592, "end_char": 25615, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 391(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25775, "end_char": 25789, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Municipalities Act 1929", "statute": "Municipalities Act 1929"}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh Municipalities Act 1965", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25797, "end_char": 25835, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "District Municipalities Act, 1920", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25859, "end_char": 25892, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "cl. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26116, "end_char": 26122, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the District Municipalities Act, 1920", "statute": "the District Municipalities Act, 1920"}}, {"text": "Schedule 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26126, "end_char": 26136, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the District Municipalities Act, 1920", "statute": "the District Municipalities Act, 1920"}}, {"text": "clause 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26632, "end_char": 26640, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the District Municipalities Act, 1920", "statute": "the District Municipalities Act, 1920"}}, {"text": "Schedule 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26645, "end_char": 26655, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the District Municipalities Act, 1920", "statute": "the District Municipalities Act, 1920"}}, {"text": "Ramakrishnapuram", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 26953, "end_char": 26969, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Court further added that the muni.- cipality might have been levying property tax since long on properties situated within its limits, but until April I, 1966 the villages of Ramakrishnapuram and Sriharipuram were outside those limits."}}, {"text": "Sriharipuram", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 26974, "end_char": 26986, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Court further added that the muni.- cipality might have been levying property tax since long on properties situated within its limits, but until April I, 1966 the villages of Ramakrishnapuram and Sriharipuram were outside those limits."}}, {"text": "section 81(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27233, "end_char": 27246, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.3(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27671, "end_char": 27677, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27915, "end_char": 27921, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Atlas Cycle Industries", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 27994, "end_char": 28016, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In support of this con: tention it cited the decision of this Court in Atlas Cycle Industries '\n\nLtd. v. State of Haryana & Anr. ("}}, {"text": "Section 3(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28261, "end_char": 28273, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28354, "end_char": 28366, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Punjab Municipality Act, 1911", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28374, "end_char": 28403, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 5(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28714, "end_char": 28726, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Punjab Municipality Act, 1911", "statute": "the Punjab Municipality Act, 1911"}}, {"text": "section 62(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28802, "end_char": 28815, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Punjab Municipality Act, 1911", "statute": "the Punjab Municipality Act, 1911"}}, {"text": "s. 5(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29038, "end_char": 29045, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Punjab Municipality Act, 1911", "statute": "the Punjab Municipality Act, 1911"}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29173, "end_char": 29182, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Punjab Municipality Act, 1911", "statute": "the Punjab Municipality Act, 1911"}}, {"text": "Visakhapatnam Municipality", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 29666, "end_char": 29692, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This distingnishes the present case from the Visakhapatnam Municipality's case (supra)."}}, {"text": "s.20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30781, "end_char": 30785, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31062, "end_char": 31066, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31140, "end_char": 31143, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jharsuguda Municipality", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 31786, "end_char": 31809, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jharsuguda Municipality has done and theie is no allegation to the contrary by ."}}, {"text": "Art. 19(1)(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32105, "end_char": 32118, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_2_415_418_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "~··\n\n\\ii. '<\"\\ .\n\n415 A\n\nAVTAR SINGH BRAR\n\nTAJ SINGH & OTHERS\n\nJanuary I 6, I 984\n\n[S. MuRTAZA FAZAL Au, A. VARADARAJAN AND RANGANATH MISRA, JJ.J\n\nRepresentation of the People Act, 1951-S.123(2)-Corrupt practice-Scope of\n\nThe first respondent, Tej Singh; won in legislative assembly election defeating the appellant by 123 votes and also 3 other candidates including Ruplal.\n\nThe appeIIant challenged the election of Tej Singh on the ground that he was guilty of committing corrupt practices. The 1nain corrupt practice said to have been indJ; lged in by Tej Singh was that he had got circulated pan1phlets and posters arµong the voters of the constituency Wherein he had mentioned that Ruplal had withdrawn his candidature and any vote given to him (Tej Singh) would be deemed to be a vote for Ruplal, and the said posters were Printed not by Ruplal but at the instance of Tej Singh.\n\nAllowing the appeal,\n\nI-lELD ; The effect of the posters was to mislead the voters so as to make them beliC've that one of the candidates, Viz., Ruplal, had withdrawn and any vote given to Tej Singh would be considered as a vote given to Ruplal.\n\nTn other w0rds, the effect of the posters .was that v.11 the voters who would have voted for Ruplal would now cast their votes in favour ofTej Singh.\n\nAs the margin of votes between the defeated and the returned CalldidateS was very small, viz., 12·3 votes, if such a misrepresentation was not made, in .all probability the votes \\vould have gone to the appellant (Avtar Singh) and, therefore, the result of the election would have been materia11y altered. On a perusal Of the evidence-both oral and documentaryadduced by the parties and in the circumstances of the case, the irresistible inference and inescapable conclusion that can be arrived at is that Tej Singh had actually paid for the posters which were printed at his instance and Ruplal was not connected with the printing of the posters. In these circumstances the appellant has proved beyond reasonable doubt that Tej Singh. had indulged in corrupt practices particualrly when the printing of the posters by Tej Singh has been clearly admitted by him. [417 D-E; G; 418 BJ • .\n\nCl.VIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal (NCE) No. 735of1982.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated the 22nd April, 1981 of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Election Petition No, 6 of 1980.\n\nK.L. Sharma, A..S, Sohal and MC Dhingra for the Appellant.\n\nM. Veerappa and A.shok Kumar Sharma for Respondent No. I.\n\n416 . ,-\n\nSUPREME COURT RJ!PORTS [1984] 2 s.c.R.\n\nA A..S. Pundz'r for Respondent No. 2.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL Au, J. This election appeal arises out of an election to the Baghapurana Constituency {District Faridkot) to the Punjab Legislative Assembly. The polling took place on May 31, 1980 and the counting was done on June 1, 1980. Tej Singh, respondent, secured 25694 votes whereas Avtar Singh (appellant) secured 25571 votes. There were three other candidates also in the field, viz., (l).Sathi Ruplal, (2) Bhogat Puran Singh, and (3) Jagdish Chander. 4\n\nRChupladl securedd\n\n1 1 4 3 0 47 vdot 2 e 8 s 56 while Bhagat 1 . Pu 1 ran\n\n1 Singh and Jhagdihsh .. - .. an er secure an votes respec 1ve y. t appears t at t e margin between the votes secured by Tej Singh (respondent) and Avtar Singh (appellant) was only 123.\n\nAvtar Singh filed an elecfon petition in the Punjab & Haryana High Court against Tej Singh alleging that he was guilty of committing D corrupt practices, detaile~. in the petition and in the Statement of facts: Ruplal supported the appellant but Bhagat Puran Singh and Jagdish did not put in any appearance despite service and, therefore, the proceedings were taken ex parte against them. Tej Singh denied having indulged in any corrupt practice as alleged by Avtar Singh.\n\nE It is not necessary for us to go into further details because, in our opinion, the appeal must succeed on a short point. The main corrupt practice said to have been indulged in Tej Singh was that he had got circulated paophlets and posters among the voters of the J constituency wherein he had mentioned that Ruplal had withdrawn ;'r\" his candidature and any vote given to him (Tej Singh) would be deemed F to be a vote for Ruplal, and the said posters were printed not by Ruplal but at the .instance of Te~ Singh. ·\n\nOn a perusal of the evidence-both oral and documentaryadduced by the parties, we are clearly of the opinion that the allega-· tions of corrupt practices indulged in by Tej Singh have been clearly G proved. The posters said to have been printed and circulated are Annexures P-1 and P-2 which appear at page 42 of the second paper book and it may be necessary to extract certainportions thereof-\n\n\"Keeping in view the present conditions in the country H it is imperative to defeat the dictatorial Congre;'!; in these electiens.\n\n~ y\n\n> \\ -\n\nAVTAR SINGH v. TAJ SINGH (Fazal Ali, J.) 417\n\nTherefore, I fervently appeal to all the voters ofBagha- purana Constituency to vote and elect Shri Tej Singh, the joint front candidate of the Akali Dal, because Shri Tej Singh is the only candidate who can defeat the Congress ...... In . the end I submit that every vote cast in favour of S. Tej Singh\n\nwill be deemed to have been cast in my favour.\"\n\nAccording to PW 4 (Roshanlal) in whose press the posters were printed, the order for the printing was placed by Darshan Singh and Mukhtiar Singh. The witness goes on to state that a few days before Tej Singh had come to his printing press and informed him that he (Tej. Singh) would be sending some work for printing. Soon thereafter the witness was approached by Darshan Singh and Mukhtiar Singh. Roshan Lal also. admitted that Tej s; ngh was known to him.\n\nThe witness further proved Ex, P-5 and P-6 (vouchers) which were issued by his press and signed by him; and he stated that the payment was made to him by Darshan Singh and Mukhtiar Singh.\n\nThe effect of the posters>was to mislead the vo.ters so as to mlke them believe that one of the candidates, viz., Ruplal, had withdrawn and any vote given to Tej Singh would be considered as a vote given to Ruplal. In other words, the effect of the posters was that all the voters who would have voted for Rnplal would now cast their votes' in favour of Tej Singh. As the margin of votes between the deteated and the returned candidates was very small, viz. 123 votes, if such a misrepresentation was not made, in all probability the votes would have gone to the appellant (Avtar Singh) and, therefore, the J:esult . , of the election would have been materially altered. We find a good deal of substance in the argument of the appellant. Tej Singh (R.W.\n\n28) has not disputed that the payment of the vouchers (Ex. P-5 and\n\nP-6) was made by him and the vouchers were appended by him along with the return of expenses incurred during his election campaign, which was verified by him to be a true and correct statement.•\n\nIn these circumstances, therefore, the irresistible inference and inescapable concll.'sion that can be arrived at is that Tej Singh had actually paid for the posters which were printed at his instance and Rup Lal was not connected with the printing of the posters. Tej\n\nSingh further admitted that Bhum Raj was incharge of his eleciion office at Moga and that Exs, P-5 and P-6 were taken by him from Bhum Raj. He further admits that whatever expenses were incurred by\n\ni.lhum Raj were incurred on his be)lalf. In other words, Tj Singh\n\nf~Jsely tepresented to the. voters that the posters were circulated by\n\n• 418\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984] 2 s.c.R.\n\nRuplal whereas the same was done by or with the consent of Tej Singh.\n\nTherefore, it is clear that Ex-P-1 and P-2 which contained the appeal purporting to be of Ruplal were in fact printed at the instance of Tej Singh and Ruplal had no connction with the same.\n\nIn these circumstances, we are satisfied that the appellant has proved beyond reasonable doubt that Tej Singh had indulged in corrupt practices particularly when the printing of the posters by Tcj\n\nSingh has been clearly admitted by him, as indicated above. It is also clear to us that in view of the very narrow margin of votes (123) between Tej Singh and Avtar Singh, a strong presumption and possibility that the votes polled in favour of Rup Lal would have gone to Avtar Singh cannot be ruled out and that would have doubtless male- . rially altered the result of the election. Leaving aside other grounds taken by the appetlant which were in fact not pressed before us, the appellant is entitled to succeed on the ground of corrupt practices (referred to above) as contemplated by S. 123(2) of the Act having been adopted by the first respondent JTej Singh) which have been fully proved.\n\nThe result is that the appeal is allowed, the judgment of the High Court is quashed and the election of the first respondent (Tej Singh) is set aside. In the circumstances, we make no order as to costs. •\n\nH.S.K .\n\nAppea! allowed. •", "total_entities": 47, "entities": [{"text": "A\n\nAVTAR SINGH BRAR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 22, "end_char": 41, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "AVTAR SINGH BRAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "TAJ SINGH & OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 43, "end_char": 61, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "TAJ SINGH & OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. VARADARAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 105, "end_char": 119, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A. VARADARAJAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RANGANATH MISRA, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 124, "end_char": 143, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RANGANATH MISRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 147, "end_char": 185, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "S.123(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 186, "end_char": 194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Ruplal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 367, "end_char": 373, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "415 A\n\nAVTAR SINGH BRAR\n\nTAJ SINGH & OTHERS\n\nJanuary I 6, I 984\n\n[S. MuRTAZA FAZAL Au, A. VARADARAJAN AND RANGANATH MISRA, JJ.J\n\nRepresentation of the People Act, 1951-S.123(2)-Corrupt practice-Scope of\n\nThe first respondent, Tej Singh; won in legislative assembly election defeating the appellant by 123 votes and also 3 other candidates including Ruplal.", "canonical_name": "Rup Lal"}}, {"text": "Tej Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 555, "end_char": 564, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The 1nain corrupt practice said to have been indJ; lged in by Tej Singh was that he had got circulated pan1phlets and posters arµong the voters of the constituency Wherein he had mentioned that Ruplal had withdrawn his candidature and any vote given to him (Tej Singh) would be deemed to be a vote for Ruplal, and the said posters were Printed not by Ruplal but at the instance of Tej Singh.", "canonical_name": "ofTej Singh"}}, {"text": "ofTej Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1270, "end_char": 1281, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tn other w0rds, the effect of the posters .was that v.11 the voters who would have voted for Ruplal would now cast their votes in favour ofTej Singh.", "canonical_name": "ofTej Singh"}}, {"text": "VIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2175, "end_char": 2201, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "VIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal (NCE) No."}}, {"text": "Punjab & Haryana High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2301, "end_char": 2328, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From the Judgment and Order dated the 22nd April, 1981 of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Election Petition No, 6 of 1980."}}, {"text": "K.L. Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2366, "end_char": 2377, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K.L. Sharma, A..S, Sohal and MC Dhingra for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Sohal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2385, "end_char": 2390, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K.L. Sharma, A..S, Sohal and MC Dhingra for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "MC Dhingra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2395, "end_char": 2405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K.L. Sharma, A..S, Sohal and MC Dhingra for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "M. Veerappa", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2426, "end_char": 2437, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. Veerappa and A.shok Kumar Sharma for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "A.shok Kumar Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2442, "end_char": 2461, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. Veerappa and A.shok Kumar Sharma for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "A A..S. Pundz'r", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2535, "end_char": 2550, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.\n\nA A..S. Pundz'r for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "FAZAL Au", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2618, "end_char": 2626, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL Au, J. This election appeal arises out of an election to the Baghapurana Constituency {District Faridkot) to the Punjab Legislative Assembly.", "canonical_name": "Fazal Ali"}}, {"text": "l).Sathi Ruplal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3004, "end_char": 3019, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l).Sathi Ruplal, (2) Bhogat Puran Singh, and (3) Jagdish Chander."}}, {"text": "Bhogat Puran Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3025, "end_char": 3043, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l).Sathi Ruplal, (2) Bhogat Puran Singh, and (3) Jagdish Chander.", "canonical_name": "Bhogat Puran Singh"}}, {"text": "Jagdish Chander", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3053, "end_char": 3068, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l).Sathi Ruplal, (2) Bhogat Puran Singh, and (3) Jagdish Chander."}}, {"text": "s 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3117, "end_char": 3121, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bhagat", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3128, "end_char": 3134, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4\n\nRChupladl securedd\n\n1 1 4 3 0 47 vdot 2 e 8 s 56 while Bhagat 1 ."}}, {"text": "Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3151, "end_char": 3156, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pu 1 ran\n\n1 Singh and Jhagdihsh .. - .. an er secure an votes respec 1ve y. t appears t at t e margin between the votes secured by Tej Singh (respondent) and Avtar Singh (appellant) was only 123."}}, {"text": "Jhagdihsh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3161, "end_char": 3170, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pu 1 ran\n\n1 Singh and Jhagdihsh .. - .. an er secure an votes respec 1ve y. t appears t at t e margin between the votes secured by Tej Singh (respondent) and Avtar Singh (appellant) was only 123."}}, {"text": "Bhagat Puran Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3582, "end_char": 3600, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Avtar Singh filed an elecfon petition in the Punjab & Haryana High Court against Tej Singh alleging that he was guilty of committing D corrupt practices, detaile~. in the petition and in the Statement of facts: Ruplal supported the appellant but Bhagat Puran Singh and Jagdish did not put in any appearance despite service and, therefore, the proceedings were taken ex parte against them.", "canonical_name": "Bhogat Puran Singh"}}, {"text": "Jagdish", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3605, "end_char": 3612, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Avtar Singh filed an elecfon petition in the Punjab & Haryana High Court against Tej Singh alleging that he was guilty of committing D corrupt practices, detaile~. in the petition and in the Statement of facts: Ruplal supported the appellant but Bhagat Puran Singh and Jagdish did not put in any appearance despite service and, therefore, the proceedings were taken ex parte against them."}}, {"text": "Avtar Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3796, "end_char": 3807, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tej Singh denied having indulged in any corrupt practice as alleged by Avtar Singh."}}, {"text": "Te~ Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4316, "end_char": 4325, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The main corrupt practice said to have been indulged in Tej Singh was that he had got circulated paophlets and posters among the voters of the J constituency wherein he had mentioned that Ruplal had withdrawn ;'r\" his candidature and any vote given to him (Tej Singh) would be deemed F to be a vote for Ruplal, and the said posters were printed not by Ruplal but at the .instance of Te~ Singh. ·", "canonical_name": "ofTej Singh"}}, {"text": "Fazal Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4895, "end_char": 4904, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~ y\n\\ -\n\nAVTAR SINGH v. TAJ SINGH (Fazal Ali, J.) 417\n\nTherefore, I fervently appeal to all the voters ofBagha- purana Constituency to vote and elect Shri Tej Singh, the joint front candidate of the Akali Dal, because Shri Tej Singh is the only candidate who can defeat the Congress ...... In .", "canonical_name": "Fazal Ali"}}, {"text": "S. Tej Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5206, "end_char": 5218, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the end I submit that every vote cast in favour of S. Tej Singh\n\nwill be deemed to have been cast in my favour.\""}}, {"text": "Roshanlal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 5288, "end_char": 5297, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to PW 4 (Roshanlal) in whose press the posters were printed, the order for the printing was placed by Darshan Singh and Mukhtiar Singh."}}, {"text": "Darshan Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5381, "end_char": 5394, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to PW 4 (Roshanlal) in whose press the posters were printed, the order for the printing was placed by Darshan Singh and Mukhtiar Singh."}}, {"text": "Mukhtiar Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5399, "end_char": 5413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to PW 4 (Roshanlal) in whose press the posters were printed, the order for the printing was placed by Darshan Singh and Mukhtiar Singh."}}, {"text": "Tej. Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5534, "end_char": 5544, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The witness goes on to state that a few days before Tej Singh had come to his printing press and informed him that he (Tej.", "canonical_name": "ofTej Singh"}}, {"text": "Roshan Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5667, "end_char": 5677, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Roshan Lal also."}}, {"text": "Tej", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5698, "end_char": 5701, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "admitted that Tej s; ngh was known to him."}}, {"text": "Rnplal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6223, "end_char": 6229, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In other words, the effect of the posters was that all the voters who would have voted for Rnplal would now cast their votes' in favour of Tej Singh.", "canonical_name": "Rup Lal"}}, {"text": "Tej Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 6655, "end_char": 6664, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tej Singh (R.W.\n\n28) has not disputed that the payment of the vouchers (Ex."}}, {"text": "Rup Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7141, "end_char": 7148, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'sion that can be arrived at is that Tej Singh had actually paid for the posters which were printed at his instance and Rup Lal was not connected with the printing of the posters.", "canonical_name": "Rup Lal"}}, {"text": "Tej\n\nSingh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7201, "end_char": 7211, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tej\n\nSingh further admitted that Bhum Raj was incharge of his eleciion office at Moga and that Exs, P-5 and P-6 were taken by him from Bhum Raj.", "canonical_name": "ofTej Singh"}}, {"text": "Bhum Raj", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7234, "end_char": 7242, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tej\n\nSingh further admitted that Bhum Raj was incharge of his eleciion office at Moga and that Exs, P-5 and P-6 were taken by him from Bhum Raj."}}, {"text": "Moga", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7282, "end_char": 7286, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tej\n\nSingh further admitted that Bhum Raj was incharge of his eleciion office at Moga and that Exs, P-5 and P-6 were taken by him from Bhum Raj."}}, {"text": "Tj Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7462, "end_char": 7470, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In other words, Tj Singh\n\nf~Jsely tepresented to the.", "canonical_name": "ofTej Singh"}}, {"text": "Tcj\n\nSingh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8045, "end_char": 8055, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In these circumstances, we are satisfied that the appellant has proved beyond reasonable doubt that Tej Singh had indulged in corrupt practices particularly when the printing of the posters by Tcj\n\nSingh has been clearly admitted by him, as indicated above.", "canonical_name": "ofTej Singh"}}, {"text": "S. 123(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8638, "end_char": 8647, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "JTej Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8703, "end_char": 8713, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Leaving aside other grounds taken by the appetlant which were in fact not pressed before us, the appellant is entitled to succeed on the ground of corrupt practices (referred to above) as contemplated by S. 123(2) of the Act having been adopted by the first respondent JTej Singh) which have been fully proved.", "canonical_name": "ofTej Singh"}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_2_419_430_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "DAULAT RAM CHAUHAN\n\nANAND SHARMA\n\nJanuary 16, 1984\n\n(S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND RANGANATH MISRA, JJ.]\n\nRepresemation of the reople Act 1951 (43 o/1951) Sections 82(h), 86and123(2).\n\nElection Petition-allegations of corrupt practices against two candidates-Candidates not impleaded as parties to elettion petition-Elecaon petition whether liable to be dis1nissed.\n\nCorrupt Practices-Allegations of-To be proved like a crin1ina/ charge without\n\n_'f ad1nitting of any doubt.\n\n-,.{\n\n,_\n\n-~,\n\n• •.\n\nPractice & Procedure :\n\nPleadings in Election PetUions-Allegations of corrupt practice-Necessity to -he clear and specific. ·\n\nThe respondent filed an Election Petition challenging the election of, the appellant who was declared clcted to the State Assembly on the ground that the appellant, his. election agent and other persons along with two other candidates\n\nmade libelous slogans at a rally and displayed pamphlets to alienate the voters from the respondent and this constituted a corrupt practice within the meaning of section 123 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. Upholding the . respondent's contention the High Court set <1.Side the eleCtion.\n\nTn the appeal to this Court, a preliminary objection was raised on behalf of the appellant .that since the two candidates who \\Vere alleged to have coriimited corrupt practices had not been made parties to the Election Petition, the petition\n\nshould haye been disn1issed in lbnine for non cbn1pliance with the requirements of section 82(b) read with section 86 of the Act.\n\nOverruling the preliminary objection :\n\nHELD: 1. The combined effect of section 82(b) and section 86 of the Act is that once allegations of corrupt practice are made against a candidate it is incumbent on the lec.tio11 petitioner t? join h!~ as a party ad failure to do so woul~ lead to the d1sn11Ssal of the Electron Petition i.:inder section 86. But before section 82(b) or section 86 could come into play it must be proved that the allegations of corrupt practice made agai1.1st the candidate amounted to corrupt practices as contemplated by the provisions of section 123. [423 F-G]\n\nSection 82(b) co11.tains the salutary provision of audi a/teram parrem and ff requires that an allegation m, ust be proved to the hilt in the presence of the Person\n\nalfected, failing which the election petition will stand dismissed. [ 426 EF]\n\n. 3.\n\nTn orde~ that n act of the cand.idate may amount to a corrupt practice, It must be committed either by the candidate himself, his agent or by any other person wfth./he consent of the candidate or his election agent. An allegation of corrupt practice must be proved like a criminal charge without admitting of any doubt.. [424 CJ ·\n\n.4. The Election Petition must contain the followi.ng pleadings: (1) Direct\n\nan~ detailed nture of corrupt practices as defined in the Act, (2) details of every important particularly tex. the tin1e, place, names of persons, use of words and expressi6n_s, etc. (3) that the. corrupt practices were indulged in by the candidate himself, or his authorised agent or any other person with his express or implied .consent. {428 E-FJ • 5.\n\nA person may, due to sympathy or on his own, support the candidature of a particular candidate. but unless a close and direct nexus is proved between tJ1e act of the person and the consent given to him by the candidate or his election agent, the same would not amount to a pleading of corrupt practice as contemplated by law. It cannot be left to time, chance or conjecture for the court to draw an inference by adopting an it'l.volved process o~ reasoning. The aliegation must be clear and specific that the inference of corrupt practice will admit of no doubt or qualm. [ 428 G-H]\n\nIn the instant case, it was shown that the hvo candidates who participated in the rally mighr have shouted libelous slogans. But there is nothing to show that they were election agents or workers of the appellant or that they participated or shouted slogan with the express and implied consent of the appellant. Whenever, there is a rally, crowd or a gathering a nun1ber of persons participate.\n\nThat by itself would not give rise to an inference that their participation or presence was at -the instance of the person in whose favour the cro\\VS gathered or the rally was organised. [429 CDf\n\nUdhav Singh v. Madhav. Rao Scindia, [1976] 2 S. C. R. 246 ; Haji C. H.\n\nMohammad Kaya v. T.K.S.M.A. Muthukoya, [1979] I S.C.R. 664 and Samant N.\n\nBalakrishna etc. v. George Fernandez&: Ors., (1969] 3 S.C.R. 603; refcrrcd to.\n\nCiv1L .APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 453 of 1983,\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated the 28th December,. 198f of the Himachal Pradesh High Court in Election Petition No. 1120 1982.\n\n).., -\n\nShanti Bhushan, N. M. Ghatate and S. V. Deshpande for the )...\n\nAppellant.\n\nH M.C. Bhandare, T. Sridharan, Ms. S. Bhandare and Ms. CK Suchqhta for the Respondents.\n\nD. Jl.. CHAUHAN v. ANAD SHARMA (Fazal Ali. J.) 421\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL ALI, J. This election appeal is directed against a judgment dated December 28, 1982 of the Single Judge of the Himachal Pradesh. High Court, WPO was assigned as an election Judge under the provisions of the Representation of the People Act (hereinafter referred to as the 'Ac.t'). The appe~I arises out of an election to the Himachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly from the Simla constituency. The poll was held on M; y 19, 1982 and the result was dedared on May 21,\n\n1982 whereby the appellant was declared elected by a margin of 2745 . votes. The respondent, Anand Sharma. filed an election petition in the High Court challenging the election of the appellant on theground that he (appellant) was guilty of indulging in Stveral corrupt practices as envisaged .by the provisions of the Act. The High Court, after .going through the entire evidence of th\\: parties and considering the documents, came to the conclusion that the allegations of corrupt practices against the appellant were fully proved and accordingly set aside his election, hence this appeal to this Court by the elected candidate, Daulat Ram Chauhan. We may also mention here that two other candidates; besides others, K.D. Batish and Poora!i Chand .Sood (hereinafter referred to as 'Balish' and 'Sood' respectively) were also in the field but they had withdrawn.\n\nMr. Shanti Bhushan, appearing for the appellant, raised a preliminary objection which, according to him, if accepted, was sufficient to dismiss the election petition of the respondent in /imine. We had decided to go into the validity of the preliminary objection because. if it was accepted then the election petition would have to be dismissed and it would no.t be necessary to hear the appeal on merits but if the preliminary objection was overruled the~ the appeal would .have to be heard on merits. .\n\nThe only important point raised by the counsel for the appellant before us is that as the election petitioner (respondent) had alleged that Batish and Sood, committed corrupt practices with the consent of the appellant and yet they were not made parties to the election petition, the High Court should have dismissed the lection petition in limine under the provisions of s.82(b) read with s.86 of the Act.\n\nIt is not disputed before us that Batish and Sood were candidates for election to the Simla constituency and that they were not made parties to the election petition filed by the respondent in the High Court. Section 82(b) runs thus :\n\n\"82. Parties to the petition\n\nA petitioner shall join as respondents to his petition.\n\n(b) any other candidate against whom allegations of corrupt practice are made in the petition.\"\n\nSection 86 provides that where there is a violation of s. 82, the High Court shall dismiss the petition.\n\nThe dominant question for consideration is as to whether or not the respondent had alleged that Balish and Sood indulged in corrupt practice as defined in s.123 of the Act.\n\nMr. Bhandare, appearing for the respondent, however submitted that the allegations made against the aforesaid persons pid not amount to corrupt practice as contemplated by s.123 because from the avertments mae by the respondent there is nothing to show that these two persons had indulged in corrupt practice either at the instance or with the consent of the appellant, or his election agent.\n\nIn view of the arguments of the parties the matter lies within a very narrow compas.s because Mr. Shanti Bhushan with his usual\n\n. , -\n\ningenuity and brevity has invited us to consider the effect of the allega- ,. ....\n\nE tions made in para 16 of the election pertition read with para 4, which \"\n\naccording to him, is a sort of an index to para 16. It appears that an additional issue regarding the allegation contained in para 16 was • raised in the High Court in the following terms : ~\n\n\"Whether any allegations of corrupt practices have been made in the petition against Sarva Shri Kali Das Balish. and Puran Chand Sood who were admittedly candidates at the election. lf so, to what effect?\"\n\nHowever, this additional issue was later on not pressed on liehalf of the respondent and it was conceded that the court may take G it as established that no allegations of corrupt practices were made against Batish nd Sood: ln this view of the matter, the High Court without going into the issue decided it against the appellant. The ' counsel for the appellant submitted that once an issue was raised it was not open to the parties to make any concession as, according to H law, the issue had to be tried whether pressed or not. In support of his contention, the learned counsel relied 0n a, decision <5f this Court\n\n. ~\\\n\n' t\n\nD.R. CHAUHAN v. ANAD SHARMA (Faza/A/i, J.).. 423\n\nin Udhav Singh v. Madhav.Rao Scindia'\" .where the Court made the following observations while interpreting section 82 of the Act :-\n\n. \"Behind this provision is a fundamental principle .;; if natural justice viz., that nobody should be ·. condemned unheard. A charge of corrupt practice against a candidate, if .established, ntails serious penai consequences. It .has :\n\nthe effect of debarring hiin from being a candidate ... at an election 'for a considerably long period. That is, why, s.82(b) ia clear, perempiory terois, obligates. an election-petti.oner to join as respondent to his petition, a candi.date against . whom allegations of any corrupt practice are made in the petition. Disobedience of this mandate, inexorably attracts. s.86 which commaiJds. the High Court, in equally imperative . language, to~\n\n\"dismiss an election petition which does n0t comply with th~ provisions uf section 82.\"\n\nThe Tespondent canot by_ consent, express or tacit, aive\n\ntese provisions or Condone a noncompHance ith .the imperative of s.R2(b). Even inaction, lathes or delay on the part of the respondent in pointing out the lethal defect of hon-joinder cannot relieve the Court of the statutory obligation cast on it by s.86. As soon as the : non-compiia.nce with S:82(b) comes or is broughtto the notice of the cour.t, no' matter in what'inanrier and at w)lat stage, during . the penq.ency o.fthe pe.tit.ion, it is bound to dismiss the petition in unstinted obedience to the.C:ommai:d of s. 86.\"\n\nThis Court furthr held that orice allegations of corrupt' practice were made against a candidate it was incumbent on the election petittioner t~ join hnn as a party and faiiure to do so would autcmatically lead to the dismissal of bis petition under s. 86. There can be no doubt that this is' the combine.d effect ofs.82(b) and s.86 9f the Act.\n\n'.\n\nBut before s.82(b). o~ s:86 could come into play in the instant case, it must be pro.ved whether. or not the allegation of corrupt pctices . G made against . Batish and Sood am9unted to . corrupt practice as .contemplated by the provi.sions of sA23 of the Act.. It was thus\n\nargued that the 'a]legations made. in para ]6 come within s.123(2) which may be extracted thus :- , · .H\n\n(I) ['1976] i S.C.R. 246: . '\n\n...\n\n•, ' \\\n\n..i\n\n424 A\n\n• B\n\n\"123. Corrupt practices-The following shall be deemed to be corrupt practices for. the purposes of this Act :- .\n\n(2). Undue influence, that is to say, any direct or indire, ct interferente or attempt to interfere on the part of the candidate or his agent, or of any otherperson with the consent of the candidate.or his election aget with the free exercise of . any electoral right :\"\n\nIt is manifest that in order that an act of the candidate concerned may amount to an allegation of corrupt practice', it must be committed . .4 C either by the candidate l\\imself, his agent or by any other person ~.·\n\nwith the conse11t of the candidate or his election agent. Jn . order to ~\n\ndetermine whether the ingredients of s. 123 have been fulfilled in the present case, it. may ?e necessary to wade t11rough the contents of para 6, the relevant portions of which may be extracted thus :\n\n\"16. That after tlie conclusion of the meeting, a rally was organised by the respondent, which passed through the main bazar of Simla town. Jn the rally also, t11e following persons of the Bhartiya Janata Party participated : . . .\n\n The persons in the rally including the respondent raised the . following slogans :- f\n\n'INDIRA KAISi HAI PHULAN DEVI JAISl HAI' 'DESH KA NETA KAISA HO ATTAL BIHARI JAlSA HO' 'JITEGA BHAl JlTEGA DAULAT RAM CHAUHAN JJTEGA'\n\nThe aforesaid libelous slogans and displaying of pamphlets were made to alienate the v<>ters from the petitioner.'.'\n\n An analysis of the aforesaid extracts shows that there is no clear and specific allegation that Batish and Sood' took active part in . raising libelous slogan and displaying the pamphlets with the express\n\n)..\n\nD. R .. CHAUHAN v. ANAD .SHARMA (Faza/ Ali, J.) 425\n\nor implied consent of the appellant or of his election agent. It is common knowledge.that whenever.there is a rally or a crowd or a gathering,\n\n~ a nuinber of persons attend or participate in the same but that by itself would not give rise to .an irresistible inference that their participation or presence was at the. instance of the person in whose favour the crowd gathered or the .. ralfy was organised. Mr. Shanti Bhushan however stressed the fact that'the words.\"persons in the rally including the respondeni raised the Jibelou.s slogan\" would lead to an inevitable conclusion that the persons who participated in the rally raised the slogan with the express or implied consent of the appellant.. We, _,. are, however, unable to• draw this inference because it is well settled that an allegation of corrupt practice must be proved like a criminal\n\nycharge without admiWng of any doubt. '\n\n:;. .. \\ .\n\nIn Haji C.H. Mohammad Koya v. T.K.S.M.A. M1it/111koya11 ' this Court made the following observations :\n\n\"It is well settled by Jong course of decisio.ns of this\n\nCourt that such practices must be clear!~ alleged with all D the necessary particulars and proved .nM by the standard . ·\", of preponderance of probabilites but beyond reasonable doubt.\" ' .\n\nI . .\n\nJn these circumstances, therefore, before s.82 could apply it was incumbent. o'n the part of respondent to allege that the appellant had • given his consent to Sood or Balish for raising' the slogan. There .is _.., ·:also no allegation in the passage, extracted above, that Bath or'\n\nSood had .obtained the consent of the appellant or his election agent ..\n\n• \\ .\n\nRealiing the futi.lity and the frailty of his arguents M~. Shanti\n\n~ Bhushan tned to call mto aid the averments made m para ll of the electio'n petition, .ihe relevant portion of which may be extracted F thus: .4\n\n\":~ . \"That the respondent, his election agent and other pmons with the consent of the respondent or his election apnt have committed several corrupt practices with the full . knowledge and conseni of t.he respondent and his. election agent, which have prejudiciously affected the election of the\n\npetitioner .... The. catalogue of corrupt practices committed by the respondent, his election agent and other persons with \"the consent of the respondent and his election agent\n\n(I) (1979J 1 S.C.R .. 664 .\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1984} 2 S, C.R . . . ' A is detailed hereinafter.\"\n\n. . . ~1 Even if this allegation is taken a tits face value, there is no mention at all about Sood or Batish having taken the consent 0f the appellant ;.: for indulging in corrupt practices. Strong reliance was placed on .the second part° of the. recitals which disclose t.hat there was a ca ta''\n\nlogue of corrupt practices committed by the appellant. his election agent. and othei persons as detailed iii the petition. The learned counsel for the appellant wants us to read para 4 in conjunct; on wit)1~\n\npara 16 and then to arrive at the. conclusion that libelous slogans .. were shouted t)y Sood and Ratish with the consent or the appellant: .' ..\n\nWe arc however not .in a position. to acccp( this s0mewhat complex 1. process of reasoning. In our opinion, such a disjointed scheme of averring particulars so tnat one has to read one.part of the allegation\\\n\nwilh an0ther ari.d then. by joining the two pr0duce a particular result to infer an allegation of corrupt practice is not contemplated bys. 123 · .. . of the Act and is in fact foreign to the principle of giving all necessary\n\nparticulars and statement of facts, viz,, time, place,_ ma1iner, mode and the consent of the candida, te or h.is election agent. Suen an -, i. approach wuld naturall)I suffer from the vfoe of vagueness. Jt is even against the well settled rules of pleadings .to interpret or read °Suc.h a s;:rious allegation as that of fraud by joining one. port.ion of\n\nth~ al\\cg1t;0n with another and then connect the head of one wi.th tho t1i1 of the other in order to. present. a composite picture. The da'ngr of inaing such an approach would raily amount tQ basing the. decision of 'the court on pure conjectures or spcculatioir and is . )>.. agai1'st •the very spirit and ienor of s.82(b) of the Act. This scdion contains a salutary provisign. which is. that nobody should be condemned unheard so as. to amount to an in. fraction of th.e well settled r..I.. practice of audi alteram partem (rules of natural justice) and requires ... • that an 11lle-gatio11 mst be prnved to the hilt in the presence. of the ·\n\nperson.affected, failing wh; ch the electio, n petit:on w0uld stand.dismissed. lf such a conscque.1ce were to follow it is obvious.that 'the -allega.tions n1ust be interpreted as they are ad n'ot by adding or f .subtracting one frein the other. · ·\n\n. ' . . . . . • Moreover, the scheme followed by the respondent would itself show.that the allcgationi.inJiara 4 .are not meanfto be an inde~ pr glossary for the recitals in para.16 because wherever other corrupt· practices have. been averred, it has been clearly ment_ioned' in those very averments that the consent of the. appel\\ailt or his ekcfion.age1\\t . }.. .was obtained. In: para J6, however, this is completely absent. For instance, in para.IS where the respondent has made a cleat allegation . . . .\n\n. ;\n\nD: R. CHAUHAN v. ANAD SHARMA (Fazd/ Ali, J.) 427\n\n--I regardi, ng th~ slanderous campaig~ against him, he has in th~ dearest .\n\nA possible terms mentioned that these acts were committed by the appellant, his.election agent and workers with his tacit consent. .In this connection, the relevant portio.n of the averineht may be extracted thus .. :\n\n\"That the respondent, his workers and .election gent did not c.hoose to rest there and it appears l\\ad devised wellknit and calculated slanderous campaign against the petitioner. ·-The respondent,. his election agent and wo.rkers with his .• '( consent to further the prospects of the responde_nt by denig- -· rating the petitioner in the eyes of pepple launched a character assasinatimi ..... : The re.spondent, his agent 'and workers knew that the contents contained in Annexure 'G'. are fa!Se and the respondent does not beHeve it to be true.\"·\n\n- ..l!'.\n\nIf, therefore, the intention of the respondent was to allege corrupt practice as contempiated by Jaw against ·.Ba ti sh and. Sood, the. averment in para 16 should have been either.identical or of the nature of D averments cotained in para J8{which is-in respyct of other persons).\n\nThis is yet another reason why w.e cannnt accept the argument or Mr. Shanti Bhushan that the .averments of pa1'a 16. must be read ...(.with the averments made in para 4.\n\n. . \\ '.\n\nIn Samantl'{. Balakrishna etc. v. George Fernandez & Ors. 1'' this\n\n E .... urt poinfrd out thus : · . . .\n\n.. -t\n\n\"But the corrupt practices are vie.wed separately according as to who commits them. The first class consists of. corrupt practices committed by the candidate or his election, agent.or any other person with the consent of the. candidate or his elcctlon agent. These, if established,. void the election without any further condition. being fulfille.d.\n\nIn the scheme of election law they ate separate corrupt practices which cannot' be sai<l to grow out of the material facts relatd to another•person. 1'11blication of false statements by an agent is one cause of action, publication of false statements by.the candidate is quite a diffetrent cause\n\n(I) [1969] 3 S.C.R. 603.\n\n. H.\n\nofactiou. -Such a cause of aetion must be alleged in the material facts before particulars may be given. One cannot under the cover. of particulars of one corrupt practice give \"' particulars of a new corrupt practice. They constitute. different cause off action. . - • ..\n\nSince a single corrupt practice committed by the candidat<l'. by his election agent or by another person with the consent of the andidate or his election agent is fatal to the election, the case must be specifically pleaded and strictl:; proved .. If it has not been pleaded as part of the material facts, particulars of such corrupt pi actice cannot be supplied later on.\"'\n\nWe must remember that in .order to constitute corrupt practice, . which entails not only the dismissal of the elct;.on petition but also other serious consequences like disbarring the candidate concerned from contestng a fµture election for a period of six years, the allegations must be very strongly and narrowly construed to the very spirit and, letter of the law. In other ivords, in order to constitute corrupt practices, the followi11g necessary particulars, statement of facts and essential ingredients. must be coi)tained in the pleadings :'--\n\n(I) nirect and detailed nature of corrupt.practiCe as defined in the Act, ·\n\n(2) details of every important particular must be stated giving the time, place, names of persons, use of words and expressions, etc. ·\n\n(3) it must clearly appear. from the allegations that the corrupt practices alleged were indulged in by (a) the candidate himself (b) his autho.rised election agent or any other person with his expres~ or implied consent. •\n\nA person may, .due to sympathy or on his own, support the candidature of a particular candidate but unless a close and direct nexus is proved between the act of the person and the con.sent given J. to him by the candidate or his election agent,· the same would. not amomH to a pleading of corrupt practice as con tern It cannot be left to time, chance or corijecture for l b ' . , 1 an inference by adopting.an.involved process of reasoning. In fine, the allegation must be so clear and specific that the inference of corrupt\n\n. .l.\n\nD. R. CHAUHAN V. ANAD SHARMA (Faza/ .A/i, J.) • 429\n\n. practice will irresistibly admit ?f no doubt or qualm.\n\nAs a logical conseguence of the principles enunciated by us, jt follows that where the .allegation of fradulent practice is open to two equal possible inferences, the pleadings of corrupt practice must fail.\n\nFor instance, A, or in this case Sao~ or Batish; joined or participated .\n\n. or was present in an election rally or crowd and may have shouted B slogans on his own without taking the consent of the candidate concerned, this would. not be. a corrupt practice within the. meaning of s.1J3(2) because the element of consem is wholly wanting .\n\n( , Applying these tests to the averments 'made. in para 16, th~ .. .• \\ . position is as follows. : . c\n\n\"·\n\nThat Batish and Sood doubtless .participaled in the rally and may have shouted libelous slogans but there is nothing to show that they were ejther the election agents or workers of the appellant or that they participated 6r shouted skigans with the express or. implied consent of the candidate. ·\n\nIn these circumstances, it is difficult to accept the argument of Mr. Shanti Bbushan thatreading the averments in para 4 alongwith\n\npra 16, the irresistibfo inference would be that Sood and Batish had shouted the slogans with. the consent of th.e appellant.\n\nThe fundamental core and tlw pivotal basis of the argument Of the appellant tliat in view of the specific allegations of corrupt practices having been made by the respondent and yet Batish and\n\nSood were not made parties to the election petitioi:ds not proved and, therefore, the requiremeni of s.8!2(b) read with s.86 Of the At has not\n\n. F been fulfilled in this case so as to reject the election petition at the very behest .\n\nWe are, therefore, in agreement with the argun1ents of Mr.\n\nBhandare, counsel for the respondent, that the averments contained in para 16 cannot by any ;!retch of imagination be construed to. constitute allegations of corrupt practice as envisaged by s.123(2) . of the Act. The additional issue is, therefore, decided against the\n\nappelli'nt.\n\nFor the reasons given above; the preliminary. objection raised H by Mr. Shanti Bhushan is overruJ¢ and it is held that the election\n\n...\n\n430 SUpRBME COURT. REPORTS •\n\n(1984]2 $.C.R.\n\nA petition was not .liable to be dismis.sed in ljmine under s.86 of the Act.\n\nThe appeal will now. be posted for hearing. on: merits .in respect of · otheF iss\\jes. . ·\n\nN. V.K.\n\nPreliminary ob jection overruied.\n\n. .\n\n.. , .\n\n.... ·.\n\n,. •", "total_entities": 83, "entities": [{"text": "DAULAT RAM CHAUHAN", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 18, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DAULAT RAM CHAUHAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ANAND SHARMA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20, "end_char": 32, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "ANAND SHARMA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 16, 1984", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 34, "end_char": 50, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "DAULAT RAM CHAUHAN\n\nANAND SHARMA\n\nJanuary 16, 1984\n\n(S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND RANGANATH MISRA, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 53, "end_char": 73, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RANGANATH MISRA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 78, "end_char": 98, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RANGANATH MISRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Represemation of the reople Act 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 101, "end_char": 137, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sections 82(h), 86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 150, "end_char": 168, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Represemation of the reople Act 1951", "statute": "Represemation of the reople Act 1951"}}, {"text": "section 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1017, "end_char": 1028, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Represemation of the reople Act 1951", "statute": "Represemation of the reople Act 1951"}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1036, "end_char": 1074, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 82(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1484, "end_char": 1497, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "section 86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1508, "end_char": 1518, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "section 82(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1604, "end_char": 1617, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "section 86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1622, "end_char": 1632, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "section 86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1868, "end_char": 1878, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "section 82(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1891, "end_char": 1904, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "section 86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1908, "end_char": 1918, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "section 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2095, "end_char": 2106, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 82(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2119, "end_char": 2132, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1976] 2 S. C. R. 246", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4349, "end_char": 4370, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "(1969] 3 S.C.R. 603", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4504, "end_char": 4523, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Shanti Bhushan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4741, "end_char": 4755, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ").., -\n\nShanti Bhushan, N. M. Ghatate and S. V. Deshpande for the )...\n\nAppellant.", "canonical_name": "Shanti Bhushan"}}, {"text": "N. M. Ghatate", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4757, "end_char": 4770, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ").., -\n\nShanti Bhushan, N. M. Ghatate and S. V. Deshpande for the )...\n\nAppellant."}}, {"text": "S. V. Deshpande", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4775, "end_char": 4790, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ").., -\n\nShanti Bhushan, N. M. Ghatate and S. V. Deshpande for the )...\n\nAppellant."}}, {"text": "H M.C. Bhandare", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4817, "end_char": 4832, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H M.C. Bhandare, T. Sridharan, Ms. S. Bhandare and Ms. CK Suchqhta for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "T. Sridharan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4834, "end_char": 4846, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H M.C. Bhandare, T. Sridharan, Ms. S. Bhandare and Ms. CK Suchqhta for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "S. Bhandare", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4852, "end_char": 4863, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H M.C. Bhandare, T. Sridharan, Ms. S. Bhandare and Ms. CK Suchqhta for the Respondents.", "canonical_name": "S. Bhandare"}}, {"text": "CK Suchqhta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4872, "end_char": 4883, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H M.C. Bhandare, T. Sridharan, Ms. S. Bhandare and Ms. CK Suchqhta for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "ANAD SHARMA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4925, "end_char": 4936, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. Jl.. CHAUHAN v. ANAD SHARMA (Fazal Ali.", "canonical_name": "ANAND SHARMA"}}, {"text": "Fazal Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4938, "end_char": 4947, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. Jl.. CHAUHAN v. ANAD SHARMA (Fazal Ali.", "canonical_name": "Fazal Ali"}}, {"text": "FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5002, "end_char": 5011, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J.) 421\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL ALI, J. This election appeal is directed against a judgment dated December 28, 1982 of the Single Judge of the Himachal Pradesh.", "canonical_name": "Fazal Ali"}}, {"text": "WPO was assigned as an election Judge under the provisions of the Representation of the People Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5149, "end_char": 5247, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Pradesh Legislative Assembly", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5342, "end_char": 5370, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appe~I arises out of an election to the Himachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly from the Simla constituency."}}, {"text": "Simla", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5380, "end_char": 5385, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appe~I arises out of an election to the Himachal Pradesh Legislative Assembly from the Simla constituency."}}, {"text": "Anand Sharma", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5567, "end_char": 5579, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent, Anand Sharma.", "canonical_name": "ANAND SHARMA"}}, {"text": "Daulat Ram Chauhan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6105, "end_char": 6123, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court, after .going through the entire evidence of th\\: parties and considering the documents, came to the conclusion that the allegations of corrupt practices against the appellant were fully proved and accordingly set aside his election, hence this appeal to this Court by the elected candidate, Daulat Ram Chauhan.", "canonical_name": "DAULAT RAM CHAUHAN"}}, {"text": "K.D. Batish", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6193, "end_char": 6204, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We may also mention here that two other candidates; besides others, K.D. Batish and Poora!i Chand .Sood (hereinafter referred to as 'Balish' and 'Sood' respectively) were also in the field but they had withdrawn."}}, {"text": "Poora!i Chand .Sood", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6209, "end_char": 6228, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We may also mention here that two other candidates; besides others, K.D. Batish and Poora!i Chand .Sood (hereinafter referred to as 'Balish' and 'Sood' respectively) were also in the field but they had withdrawn."}}, {"text": "Shanti Bhushan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6343, "end_char": 6357, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Shanti Bhushan, appearing for the appellant, raised a preliminary objection which, according to him, if accepted, was sufficient to dismiss the election petition of the respondent in /imine.", "canonical_name": "Shanti Bhushan"}}, {"text": "Batish", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6985, "end_char": 6991, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The only important point raised by the counsel for the appellant before us is that as the election petitioner (respondent) had alleged that Batish and Sood, committed corrupt practices with the consent of the appellant and yet they were not made parties to the election petition, the High Court should have dismissed the lection petition in limine under the provisions of s.82(b) read with s.86 of the Act.", "canonical_name": "Batish"}}, {"text": "Sood", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6996, "end_char": 7000, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The only important point raised by the counsel for the appellant before us is that as the election petitioner (respondent) had alleged that Batish and Sood, committed corrupt practices with the consent of the appellant and yet they were not made parties to the election petition, the High Court should have dismissed the lection petition in limine under the provisions of s.82(b) read with s.86 of the Act."}}, {"text": "s.82(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7217, "end_char": 7224, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7235, "end_char": 7239, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Batish", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7287, "end_char": 7293, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is not disputed before us that Batish and Sood were candidates for election to the Simla constituency and that they were not made parties to the election petition filed by the respondent in the High Court.", "canonical_name": "Batish"}}, {"text": "Simla constituency", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7339, "end_char": 7357, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is not disputed before us that Batish and Sood were candidates for election to the Simla constituency and that they were not made parties to the election petition filed by the respondent in the High Court."}}, {"text": "Section 82(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7462, "end_char": 7475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7673, "end_char": 7683, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7728, "end_char": 7733, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Balish", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7875, "end_char": 7881, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The dominant question for consideration is as to whether or not the respondent had alleged that Balish and Sood indulged in corrupt practice as defined in s.123 of the Act.", "canonical_name": "Batish"}}, {"text": "s.123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7934, "end_char": 7939, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bhandare", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7957, "end_char": 7965, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Bhandare, appearing for the respondent, however submitted that the allegations made against the aforesaid persons pid not amount to corrupt practice as contemplated by s.123 because from the avertments mae by the respondent there is nothing to show that these two persons had indulged in corrupt practice either at the instance or with the consent of the appellant, or his election agent.", "canonical_name": "S. Bhandare"}}, {"text": "s.123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8125, "end_char": 8130, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sarva Shri", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8922, "end_char": 8932, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that an additional issue regarding the allegation contained in para 16 was • raised in the High Court in the following terms : ~\n\n\"Whether any allegations of corrupt practices have been made in the petition against Sarva Shri Kali Das Balish."}}, {"text": "Kali Das Balish", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8933, "end_char": 8948, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that an additional issue regarding the allegation contained in para 16 was • raised in the High Court in the following terms : ~\n\n\"Whether any allegations of corrupt practices have been made in the petition against Sarva Shri Kali Das Balish."}}, {"text": "Puran Chand Sood", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8954, "end_char": 8970, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and Puran Chand Sood who were admittedly candidates at the election."}}, {"text": "Batish nd Sood", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9252, "end_char": 9266, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "However, this additional issue was later on not pressed on liehalf of the respondent and it was conceded that the court may take G it as established that no allegations of corrupt practices were made against Batish nd Sood: ln this view of the matter, the High Court without going into the issue decided it against the appellant."}}, {"text": "section 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9830, "end_char": 9840, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.82(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10212, "end_char": 10219, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10463, "end_char": 10467, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10615, "end_char": 10625, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10938, "end_char": 10942, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11207, "end_char": 11212, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11466, "end_char": 11471, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11544, "end_char": 11548, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.82(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11577, "end_char": 11584, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.123(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11899, "end_char": 11907, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12724, "end_char": 12730, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Simla town", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13018, "end_char": 13028, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That after tlie conclusion of the meeting, a rally was organised by the respondent, which passed through the main bazar of Simla town."}}, {"text": "Bhartiya Janata Party", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13079, "end_char": 13100, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jn the rally also, t11e following persons of the Bhartiya Janata Party participated : . . ."}}, {"text": "INDIRA KAISi HAI PHULAN DEVI JAISl HAI' 'DESH KA NETA KAISA HO ATTAL BIHARI JAlSA HO' 'JITEGA BHAl JlTEGA DAULAT RAM CHAUHAN JJTEGA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13212, "end_char": 13343, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "following slogans :- f\n\n'INDIRA KAISi HAI PHULAN DEVI JAISl HAI' 'DESH KA NETA KAISA HO ATTAL BIHARI JAlSA HO' 'JITEGA BHAl JlTEGA DAULAT RAM CHAUHAN JJTEGA'\n\nThe aforesaid libelous slogans and displaying of pamphlets were made to alienate the v<>ters from the petitioner.'.'"}}, {"text": "s.82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15039, "end_char": 15043, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s0", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16860, "end_char": 16862, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.82(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17918, "end_char": 17925, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1969] 3 S.C.R. 603", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 21150, "end_char": 21169, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "D. R. CHAUHAN V. ANAD SHARMA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23354, "end_char": 23382, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. R. CHAUHAN V. ANAD SHARMA (Faza/ .A/i, J.) • 429\n\n."}}, {"text": "Batish", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 23715, "end_char": 23721, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For instance, A, or in this case Sao~ or Batish; joined or participated ."}}, {"text": "s.1J", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23955, "end_char": 23959, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shanti Bbushan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 24493, "end_char": 24507, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In these circumstances, it is difficult to accept the argument of Mr. Shanti Bbushan thatreading the averments in para 4 alongwith\n\npra 16, the irresistibfo inference would be that Sood and Batish had shouted the slogans with.", "canonical_name": "Shanti Bhushan"}}, {"text": "s.8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24977, "end_char": 24980, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24996, "end_char": 25000, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bhandare", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 25172, "end_char": 25180, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are, therefore, in agreement with the argun1ents of Mr.\n\nBhandare, counsel for the respondent, that the averments contained in para 16 cannot by any ;!", "canonical_name": "S. Bhandare"}}, {"text": "s.123(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25363, "end_char": 25371, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25700, "end_char": 25704, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "N. V.K.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 25810, "end_char": 25817, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N. V.K.\n\nPreliminary ob jection overruied."}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_2_431_437_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "STATE OF MAHARASHTRA\n\nIA YANTl LAL AND OTHERS\n\nJanuary I 7; 1948\n\n[S; MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND RANGANATH MISRA JJ.).\n\n. ........._ Forward Cont; acts (Reguliition) ACt, i9_52 Section 22A .. and 22B as if!serted bji · Y 1heAmending Act 6_2 of 1960, .:__ Whether the two newly iitserted sections exclude tht\n\n..... \\, irpplicatiOn of secii\"on S(i) Of Criminal Procedure f!ode--Whelhf!'.' the pte'sumptio\"ns.\n\nprovided under section 228 of the Act would be available in_ respect of /:Jaoks of account\n\nand docume':lfS_ seized ilz investigations u11de.r the Code, -'.where _actio'n has not been\n\ntaken under section 22A.\n\nJf Dismising t.he appeal by Speci8.I Leave, the\". Court,_\n\nHELD : 1 By stions 22 A and 22B, inserted into the Forward Contracts (Regulation) Act; 1952, by the Amending Act 62 of 1960, the app!ication\"ofthe provisibns of secti0n_5(2) of the Criminal .Procedure Code in resPect o.f offences under the Act was not excluded. Therefore, even with these provisions.in the Act, it wa1 . open tothe prosecution to make investigations under the Code and in exercise of the powers vestedunder Section 165 therf, sear-ch..at)d seizure could be effectc:; d .\n\n[436H, 437 A]·\n\n2. Seetion 22A of the Forward:.Contract (Reglllaiion) Act is a Special pro vision prescribing a . P\"rticular procedure .. Section 22B(1) doeS refer. to documents seid from any pla. ce as referred to ins. 22Aq). dr<lin8ril.y, iri a criminal\n\n' \\ prsecution the. burden to prove the charge is on te pros\"ecutor. , A special rule of\n\ncvidcehas been providd by raising a presumption as a result of _which the burden whichordinitrily lay o~ the prOsecutioh has been shifted to the defence.\n\n[~5C-E]\n\nThe mannC~ in -which~ the two riew .. prviions .have come into thC .ct.\" theplicement of tbe two proyjsionS; reference to books of aCcollnt an.Ci dOcuffientJt\n\nseizea from any place in s. 22B(l) which are words used in s.22A(i), and tho fac -that Parliament has prescribed a specia1 procedute of authorisation by a magistrate and has prescribed s.pecia~· cred_cnce. to be given to these documeiits seized pursuant to the particu1.ar procedure prescribed, Jead to the oti1y conclusion that. the benefit of s. 22B of the Act is confined to books of account and doCu.menrs which have.been seized Pursuant to a warrant authorising a police officer pot below the artk of sub-inspector as prescribed in s.22A(l) of the Act .. A sia1. mode was prescribed requiring magisterial warrant; althotisation of a police officer not.below the rank_ of a sub-inspector, the Plaee to be searched.was required to be specified in warrant; magisterial cOntrol was prescribed overthe investigation and when these condi~ . . tions Weft'. satisfied,.the special rule of evjdenCe becae S:pplicable,. .. \"[435 ~-G] .,\n\n. Admittedly the~. is n~ indication in. s.\",22B of the. Ac't as .to Whether eQii:ies in\n\nA the books of account and doculnents seized without the aid of s.22A(l} would have the benefit of such presumption. But since a special procedure has been indicated in -s.22A and s. 22ij which is with referenc; e to s. 22A has.provided the special n1ode .of evidence, that in order to have the benefit of s. 22B of the Act, the prosecution must have carried on the' search and seizure of.ihe books of account and documents in the manner J:?fescribed uncfef s. 22A(l) of the Act. Unless the st)ecial procedure has bn followed, the special rule of ev:idencd under s. 22B of the Act would not B be attracted: [ 4J5H, 4l6A-Bl\n\n3. Since it would be open to the prosecution to carry on investigation of offences under the nor1nal pfov:isions _of tha Code as also by invoking the Special • Provisions in s. 2iA of the Act, 'two separate positiods would arise 'vith reference 1 to seiz.ed books of account and .other'documents. Whens. -22A of the Act has been invoked the presumpti_on under s.22B of the Act would. arise. when investigation C has been carried under the Code without the aid of s. 22A of the Act, the presumption . \"-\\ would not arise and the prosecution will have to prove the documents according to ' the Ordinary rule of evidence. There is nothing anon1lous because in one case the ...-\n\nnorinal rule ofevidence would apply and in.the other, whefe the spedal _inode has\n\nbee~ invoked, the presumptions would arise. Such a situatiOn is no.t unkno\\vn in law. [~36 B, D, El .\n\nState of.U.P.' & Anr. v. Cha1nbers ofCofnmerce (Regd.), Chandausi, District Moradaba4 & Ors. (1970) All. LT. 182; M.R. Pillai v. M/s. Moti/al Vrijbhukhandas & Ors., AIR 1 '70 Bont 24 approved.\n\nThe Bullion & Agriculrural Produce ExChange Private Ltd. v. The Forward Markes Commission, Bombay&: 'Jrs., AIR 1968 338 overruled.\n\nE. •i lCRIMlNAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION ! Criminal Appeal No. 447of1979. )' . .\n\nAppeal by Special leave from the Judgment and Order dated . the lst/'>nd February, 1979 of_ the Bombay High Court (Nagpur. Bench) . i. in Criminal Appeal No .. 76, ?1-30, 33 and 36 of 19'.75 and Criminal F Revision Application Nos. 82 & 83of1975:\n\n. 1).P. Rana and M.N. Shroff for the Appellant.\n\nN.M. Ghatate and V.D. Deslipande for tlie Respondents.\n\nG The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ·\n\nRANGANATH MISRA,· J. This appeal by special leave at. the instance of the State of Maharashtra is directed. against the decision .\n\nof a Full Bench of the High Court of Bomba!Y dealing with an interes- tillg question under the l<orward Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1952 H ('Act' for sh6rt). Several prosecutions were launched against tha respondents for offences punishable under sections 20 and 2L of the ,\n\n.. -\n\nMAHARASHTRA v. JAYANTl LAL (Rangtinath Misra, J.) 433\n\nAct on the. basis of investigaiion carried under section 5(2) of the A Code of Crim; nal Procedure, 1898 ('Code: for short).and seillirecif .documents as a result of search conducted under s.165 of.the Code.\n\nTwo cases ended in conviction anc\\ seven prosecutions resulted in acquittal. Against the conviction two separate appeals we~ c.arried to the Court of Sessions which were dismissed. . The convicted accused carried two cdminal revisions to tl.ie High Court. Against acquittal in other prosecutions the State preferred appeals to the High Court.\n\nThe seven criminal appeals and the two criminal revisions were ultimately referred to Full Bench for deciding the question raised, viz., as to whether or not the cases in question would be governed by t.he provisions of s.21B of the A.ct.\n\nThe Full Bench has come to the following. conclusions (State of Maharashtra v. Jayantilal Popat/al Chandrani, etc)\">': . . ' .\n\n(!) By sections 22A and.21B inserted into the Act by Amending Act 62 of 1960, the application of the provisions of s.5(2) of the Code in respect of offences under the Act was. not excluded. Therefore, even with these provisions in the Act it was open to the. prosecution to . make' investigation. under the Code and in exercise of powers vested under s.165 thereof search. and seizure could be effected;\n\n(2) The manner of search and seizure under the Code and\n\nunder s.22A of the Act were different. The new provisions were inserted into the Act with a view to obviating the difficulties in successfully prosecu!irtg the delinquents- . for offences under the ACt ; ·\n\n• (3) T, ne presumption contemplated in s. 22B is confined to books of account and other docJiments seized pursuant to a warrant issued.under s.:22A (1) of the Act and not to documents seized iri exercise of powers under the Code.\n\nThe High Court referred to an earlier decision of the Division Bench of the same Court where it had been held that the insertion of the two provisions by Act 62 of 1960 did not .have the effect of. excluding the application of the Code to prosecutions under the Act . but in view of the conclusions indicated above, it did not agree with\n\n(1979) Cr!. L. ;, 1231. .\n\nSUPREME COURT REP OR TS . [1984] 2 s.c.R ·\n\n'A the earlier, view of th~ Division Bench ihat 'the presumption under s. 22B of the Act also. e_xtended to docu.ments seized in invesiigation . under tiie Code without the aid of s.22A of the Act.\n\nB . '\n\n...\n\nNeither counsel contended before us _that the insertion of ss. 2_2A and 22B had the effc.t o.f excluding the application of s, 5(2) of the Code. We are in agreement with th<: view expressed by the Fun Bench .that the provisions of th~ Code still apply to investigation of offences under the .Act. :\n\n \" . The only question ;_, hich has bee~ seriously debaied at tlie Bar is as to whether the presumptions' provided under s. 22B of the Act C would be available. in.respect of. books o( ace-0unt and documents seized in .investigations under the Code where action has not been taken under s. 22A of the Act ? The two sections inserted by Act 62 of 196_0 provided : · .\n\n' -\n\n. .\n\n\"22A. . (1) Any presidency magistrate oi a magistrate of the. first class may, by warrant, authorise any police officer not below the rank of sub'inspector to. enter upon\n\nnd search any place where books. of acco1.mt. or other docume_nts relating to forward contracts or options in goods entered into in contravention of the provisions of this :,\\ct, may be or may be reasciuably suspected, to be, and such· police officer may seize any such book ·;, r document, if in his opinion;, it relates_ to any such forward contra(:! or option in . goods;\n\n(2) The provisions of the Code -0f Criminal Procedure, . 1898, shall, s-0 far as may be, apply to any searth or seizure made under sub-section (!) as they apply to any seaich or ·• seizure .inade under the authority of a warrant issued under section 98 of the said Code; '\n\n:22B. (1) Where arty_ b_ookS of accoun, t or other docu, ments are seized from any place and ihere are entries _therein making reference to quantity., qnotati_orts, rates, _months of delivery., receipt or payment of differences or sale or purchase :or goods or option in g(\\ods, such books of account or other documents shall be admitted in evide11ce without witnesses having to appear to prove the same;' and such entries shaH be. prima fade evidence of the matters, transactio_ns. and\n\naecouts purported to be iherein, record_ed;\n\n.~ . • • )\n\n- . (\n\nMAHARASHTRA v. JAYANTI LAL (Ranganath Misra, J.) 435\n\n(2) In any trial for an offence punishable under section 21, it shall be presumd, until the . contrary is proyed, that the place in which the books of account or other documents referred to in sub-section(J) were seized, was used, and that the pewns found therein were present, for the puq1ose. of comitting the said offence.\" . .. . There is no dispute that these provisions. came >to be inserted when it became difficµlt to successfolly prospcute. offender.! under \"the Act on account of want ; of evidence, particularly with reference to the .. accounts w1d othr documents. Both _the sections .\\vere intro-\n\n_duced at the same time. Section 22A(I) empe>wers the presiqency magistrate cir a magistrate of the first. class, b.y warrant, to authorise\n\n C . .a police officer not\" below the rank of a sub-i.nspector to en_ter_ upon and search any place where books o.f , iccount or oiher documents relating to forward contracts o.r options i'n goods entered into in contravedtion of the ptovisios of the Act may be or may reasonably be suspected to be availabie. This indeed is a special provision pres~ cribing a particular procedure.· Section 228(1) does refer.\" to docu-\n\n. D . ments seized from any place as referred to in s. 22A(I) .. Ordinai:ily, in a criminal pro8'cl1tion the burden to prow the charge is .on the . prosecritor. A speciai rule of evicjence has been provided l)y raising\n\nof a presumption as a result of whih the. burden which ordinarily lay on .the proseeut; on has been shifted to the defence. The manner in. which the.two new provisions have come into the. Act, the placement E of the two provisions, reference to: bo.oks. of \"account and documents seized from any place in s. 228(1) which are words used in s.~2A(l), . and the fact that Parliament has prescribed a , special procedure of . authorisation by a magistrate and has. prescribed special credence to be given to these documents. s.eized _j:Jurlsuant fo the particular procedure prescribed, lead to the only concusion that the benefit of F s.:?2B of the Act is confined to books of account arid documents which have been ~-eized pursuan_t to _a Warraflt authorising a police officer not below the _rank of sub-inspector as. prescribed in s. J.:iA(l) of the . 'Act.\n\nA special mode was prescribed requiring magisterial warrant, . authorisation of a police officer not below the rank of a sub-inspect01, the pliice .to be searched wasdequfred to. be spe_cified iti warrant G rllagistefial control ws pr\n\n0 esCribed ov~! the investigation and whe~ these conditions were satisfied, the. special rule of exidence became applicable.\n\nAdmittedly there is no indication ins, 22B of the Act a~ to whether entries in the books of acceµnt and documents .seized without the aid H\n\n. .\n\n A . ofs. 22A(l) would have the benefit of such presumption. But since a\n\npecial procedure has been indicated in s. 22A and s. 22B which fs with reference to s. 22A has provided the specialmodt of evidence, • we agree wi.th the view of the Full Bench. that in order to hav.e the benefit of s. 22B of the Act,.the prosec1ition must have carried on the search and seizure of the.books of account and documents i~ the B . manner prescribed under s. 22A(l) of the Act. Unle.ss the special\n\nprocedure has been followed', the special rule of evidence under s. 22B of the Act would not be attracted.\n\nAs we have held that it would lie open to the prosecution to carry o'n investigation of'offences under the normal provisions of the Code as also by invoking the special provisions ins. 22A of the Act, . two separate. positions would arise with reference to seized books of accotini and other documents. Wheu s. 22A of the Act has been invoked the presumption under s. 22B of the Act would arise. When investigation has been carried under the Code without the aid of s.:22A of the Act, the presumption would not arise and the prosecu- . tion will have to prove the documents according to the ordinary rule' of evidence. It was canvassed before us that such an anomalous position could not have been intended by Parliament and it must have been the legislative intention to extend the benefit of s. 22B to books of account and documents seized by the prosecution with or without the aid of s. 22A of the Act.· We are not inclined to accept this submission for the rei'sons we have indicated and in. our 0pinion there is nothing anomalous because in one case. the normal rule of evidence woulci apply and in the other, where the special mode has been invoked, the pres.umptions would arise. Such a situation is not unk11own in law and we uphold the view oHhe Fuli Bench.\n\nAt the hering some decisions of the d.ifferent High Courts were placed before us. A learned single Judge in the Bullion & . kriculiural Produce Exchange Private Limited v. 'Phe Forward Markets Commission, Bomba]' & Ors;, '1 l took the view that search conducted without the requisite warrant from a magistrate was ab initio void.'\n\n'I~ view of the conclusions we have reached, this decision is certainly bad and canriot be accepted as laying down good law .. In State. of\n\nU.P. & .A.nr. v. Chambers of Commerce (Regd.). Chandausi, District Moradabad. & 01's., <zl a Division Bench had taken the view that under s. 5(:2) of the Code offences under the Act could still .be investigated\n\nH (I) A.I.R. 1968 Born. 338.\n\n(2) 1970 All. L, J. 182.\n\n• 1\n\n1 r .\n\n. ,;;'\n\n• •\n\nMAHARASHTRA v. JAY ANTI. LAL (RangdnathMisra, J.) . 437\n\nand s.\"165 of the. Code was not inconsistent with but supplemental A . to s, 22A of the Act. So far as this decision goes .there is nothing ii1cori.sistent with what we have said. A single Judge of the Bombay High C9uri iri M.R. Pillai v: M/s. Moti/a/ Vr{Jbhukandas & Ors.;<1> took .the view thats. 22A of the Act did not debar the police from exercising the pow.ers under s, 165 of the . Code. This is in accord\n\nwith the conclusion reached by us.\n\n' . B\n\nThe appeal is dismissed and the decision of the Full Bench is affirmed. . ·\n\nS. R .\n\nA.ppea/ dismissed.\n\n(I) AIR 1970 Bom. 24.", "total_entities": 57, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF MAHARASHTRA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 20, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF MAHARASHTRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "IA YANTl LAL AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22, "end_char": 45, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "JAYANTI LAL AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MURTAZA FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 70, "end_char": 87, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RANGANATH MISRA JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 92, "end_char": 111, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RANGANATH MISRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Section 22A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 172, "end_char": 183, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 228", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 419, "end_char": 430, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 22A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 601, "end_char": 612, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Forward Contracts (Regulation) Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 725, "end_char": 759, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 165", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1098, "end_char": 1109, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 22B(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1301, "end_char": 1315, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22B(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1859, "end_char": 1868, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.22A(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1893, "end_char": 1901, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2179, "end_char": 2185, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.22A(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2371, "end_char": 2379, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3419, "end_char": 3425, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3654, "end_char": 3658, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.22B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3840, "end_char": 3845, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3943, "end_char": 3949, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1).P. Rana", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4998, "end_char": 5008, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1).P. Rana and M.N. Shroff for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "M.N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5013, "end_char": 5024, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1).P. Rana and M.N. Shroff for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "N.M. Ghatate", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5045, "end_char": 5057, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.M. Ghatate and V.D. Deslipande for tlie Respondents."}}, {"text": "V.D. Deslipande", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5062, "end_char": 5077, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.M. Ghatate and V.D. Deslipande for tlie Respondents."}}, {"text": "sections 20 and 2L", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5528, "end_char": 5546, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5667, "end_char": 5679, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.165", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5807, "end_char": 5812, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.21B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6391, "end_char": 6396, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 22A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6546, "end_char": 6558, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6654, "end_char": 6660, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.165", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6890, "end_char": 6895, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.22A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7007, "end_char": 7012, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7248, "end_char": 7254, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7921, "end_char": 7927, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.22A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8030, "end_char": 8035, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8120, "end_char": 8125, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8482, "end_char": 8488, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8648, "end_char": 8654, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 98", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9529, "end_char": 9539, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10216, "end_char": 10226, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 22A(I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10803, "end_char": 10817, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 228(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11303, "end_char": 11317, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22A(I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11393, "end_char": 11402, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11438, "end_char": 11441, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 228(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11866, "end_char": 11875, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11930, "end_char": 11940, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and the fact that Parliament has prescribed a , special procedure of ."}}, {"text": "s. 22A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13039, "end_char": 13045, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13050, "end_char": 13056, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13084, "end_char": 13090, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13216, "end_char": 13222, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22A(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13369, "end_char": 13378, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13477, "end_char": 13483, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13828, "end_char": 13834, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13885, "end_char": 13891, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14314, "end_char": 14320, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14408, "end_char": 14414, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(:2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15400, "end_char": 15408, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "RangdnathMisra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15585, "end_char": 15599, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "LAL (RangdnathMisra, J.) ."}}, {"text": "Bombay High C9uri iri M.R. Pillai v: M/s. Moti/a/ Vr{Jbhukandas & Ors.;<1>", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 15814, "end_char": 15888, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A single Judge of the Bombay High C9uri iri M.R. Pillai v: M/s. Moti/a/ Vr{Jbhukandas & Ors.;<1> took .the view thats. 22A of the Act did not debar the police from exercising the pow.ers under s, 165 of the ."}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_2_438_439_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "A . 438\n\n,. .. '\n\nLT. coL. s. J; CHAUDHARY\n\nSTATE (DELHI ADMINISTRATION)\n\nJanuary 17, 1984\n\n[9 CmNNAPPA REDDY, E.S. VENKATARAMIA.H AND R. B. MISRA, Jlj , l\n\nCriminal Procedure-Trial by.sessions coutt to poceedfron1 di:ly to dliy. Triill- when coulcf be adjotrned. · . . \"' ..\n\nractie-Duty oi Advocate.\n\nThe petitioner sought modification of the Court's order that the tri3.l -should proCeed from daY to day on the ground .that his advoCates werenof prepared to\n\nappar in the. case fr6m -day to day as the trial Was likely to be. prolonged.\n\nD. .--D.ismissing the. ptition,\n\nHELD : It will b~ in .. the l.Oterest of both the prosecution and the defence . th.at the trial proceeds fro1n day-_tO-day.\n\nBefore commencing a trial, a Sessions Jud&e rn.ust satisfy him5~1f that all nxessary evidence iS available: If it is not, l1e . .may _postp::>ne the case, but only _on the stron'g:esi Possible grourid and for e shortest\n\np_ossible period. Once thi: tfial commences;· .he should, except for a very .piessing E , reason which make:~ an adjoUrnment inevitable, .Pfoceed de die_ in .diem un.til the '7-- trial is concluded: [439 CDJ ·\n\n. It _is th~ duty Of every advocaie who _acccPts. the brief in a criminal case to --'- • ·· attend. the tria! from day-to-day.. -Having accePted the briet he will be committing -7 ....\n\n~ beachof his prfessional duty, if he.so fails to attend. r439 B-F']\n\nF . CRIMil'i~L APPELLATE JuR1SmcrmN : Criminal Misc. Petition No.· 284\n\nof 1984 in Sp, cia:l Leave Petn. (Cr!.) No: 3000 of 1983.\n\n . K. L. Sharma, K. K. Mohan and Mrs.' Geetaiali Mohari for the Petitioner,·\n\nG K.G. Bhagat, Additiooal Solicitor General, R.D. Agarwaz and . R.N. Poddar for the Respondent.\n\n• The Order of the Court_ was delivered by :\n\nH CiUNNAPPA REODY, 1.\n\nBy an order dated December l!, 1983, this.court while dismissing a petition fo~ speCial leave to appeal filed:\n\n; .\n\n.. ·,.A\n\n. ( ...... \\\n\ns. J. CHAUtn~AR)' v. STATE (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 439 ..\n\nagainst.an order of the Del.hi High Cout refusing to grant bail to the\n\np;, titioner until after examination of Rani Chaudhaj as a witness, gwe a direction that on the commencement of the ttial, it should pro'if'ed from <:lay-to-day. Alleging t)lat his two Advocates are not prepared .to appoar in the case from day-to-day as the trio! is Hkelv to be prolonged. tho petitit'~1er has. fikd the present application for\n\nmodification•or the earlier 6rder of this cout t by the deletion of• the 'direction tint. the trial should proceed from day-to-da:y. .\n\n• • • ...\n\nWe think'it is an entirely.wh0leso111e practice for the trial to go on :from day-io-dav .. It is .most expedient that the tr; al before the court of a Session shoukl proceed. and be dealt. with continuosly from its incepcion to its finish: Not only ,;111 it rcsuJi.in expedition, it will also result in the elimination of.mailOeuvre. and mischief, It will be in the interest of both the pros, ecution an.d the defence that\n\n~ • the trial proceeds from dav-to-dav.\n\nIt' is necessary to realise that Sessions cases must not. bo tried. pi\n\n0ecemeul. Before commendng a trial, a Sessions Judge. must satisfy himself that all necessary evidence. is available. u it is noi, he.maypostpone the case, but only on the strongest possible ground and for the shortest possibl!' perfod. Once the trial commences, lle should, except. fof a verv press'lng reason \"'hich makes an adjourrAllent hievitable, proceed de die in diem .. until the trial .is concluded, . . . . . . . . .\n\n. ·.\n\n- . We are µable to.appreciate the difficulty said to be experienced\n\nE -. ·. \"r by the 'petitioner.· It is stated that his Advocate is finding it difficult . _to attend the court from day-to-day: It is the duty of every Advccate, who accepts the brief in a criminal case to a.ttend the trial frcmday-tcday.\n\nWe cannot over-stress the duty of ihe Advocate to attend to\n\n-~ the trial froth day-to.-day. Having accepted the brief, he will be\n\n F committing a breach of his profossional duty; if.he so fails to attend . . The Criminal Miscellaneous Petition is, therefore, dismissed. . •\n\nH.S.K.\n\nPetition dismissec(. ' G '", "total_entities": 14, "entities": [{"text": "LT. coL. s. J; CHAUDHARY", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 18, "end_char": 42, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "LT. COL. S. J. CHAUDHARY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE (DELHI ADMINISTRATION", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 44, "end_char": 71, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE (DELHI ADMINISTRATION)", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "9 CmNNAPPA REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 93, "end_char": 109, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. B. MISRA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 135, "end_char": 146, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.B. MISRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "K. L. Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1521, "end_char": 1533, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. L. Sharma, K. K. Mohan and Mrs.' Geetaiali Mohari for the Petitioner,·\n\nG K.G. Bhagat, Additiooal Solicitor General, R.D. Agarwaz and ."}}, {"text": "K. K. Mohan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1535, "end_char": 1546, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. L. Sharma, K. K. Mohan and Mrs.' Geetaiali Mohari for the Petitioner,·\n\nG K.G. Bhagat, Additiooal Solicitor General, R.D. Agarwaz and ."}}, {"text": "Geetaiali Mohari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1557, "end_char": 1573, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. L. Sharma, K. K. Mohan and Mrs.' Geetaiali Mohari for the Petitioner,·\n\nG K.G. Bhagat, Additiooal Solicitor General, R.D. Agarwaz and ."}}, {"text": "G K.G. Bhagat", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1596, "end_char": 1609, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. L. Sharma, K. K. Mohan and Mrs.' Geetaiali Mohari for the Petitioner,·\n\nG K.G. Bhagat, Additiooal Solicitor General, R.D. Agarwaz and ."}}, {"text": "R.D. Agarwaz", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1641, "end_char": 1653, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. L. Sharma, K. K. Mohan and Mrs.' Geetaiali Mohari for the Petitioner,·\n\nG K.G. Bhagat, Additiooal Solicitor General, R.D. Agarwaz and ."}}, {"text": "R.N. Poddar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1660, "end_char": 1671, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.N. Poddar for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "H CiUNNAPPA REODY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1739, "end_char": 1756, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• The Order of the Court_ was delivered by :\n\nH CiUNNAPPA REODY, 1."}}, {"text": "Chinnappa Reddy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1930, "end_char": 1945, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "s. J. CHAUtn~AR)' v. STATE (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 439 ..\n\nagainst.an order of the Del.hi High Cout refusing to grant bail to the\n\np;, titioner until after examination of Rani Chaudhaj as a witness, gwe a direction that on the commencement of the ttial, it should pro'if'ed from <:lay-to-day."}}, {"text": "Rani Chaudhaj", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2071, "end_char": 2084, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "s. J. CHAUtn~AR)' v. STATE (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 439 ..\n\nagainst.an order of the Del.hi High Cout refusing to grant bail to the\n\np;, titioner until after examination of Rani Chaudhaj as a witness, gwe a direction that on the commencement of the ttial, it should pro'if'ed from <:lay-to-day."}}, {"text": "H.S.K.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4082, "end_char": 4088, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H.S.K.\n\nPetition dismissec(. '"}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_2_440_450_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "• B\n\nI D\n\n; . • • 440\n\nH. ANRAJ AND OTHERS ETC.\n\nV.· • STATE OF .. MAHAR'-sHTRA\n\n•• January 23, 1984\n\n[Q. CmN~A~PA REDDY •. E. S. VENKATAAA~IAH AND R. B. M1sRA, JJ] l\n\nConstitution ?f India 1950\n\nArticles. 73 alld 298-GOvern'!lent of State-Whether could organise. lotteries-.\n\nWhether competent to. ban sale of ti'ck\"ets of lotteries conducted by other Sta'te Govern ments. ·\n\nEntry 40 List I VIII Sc/1edule, Emry 34 List II VIII Schedule & Articles 246(1) . • 't' and (3). ·\n\nState LegiSlatµre-whether co1npeten.t 10 enact a law touching lotteries organised by the Govenunent of India or a State'Government. .•.\n\nLotteries Sale of_tickets of lotteries c_onducte; J _by oiler State Governments-State\n\nGo1 1rn1nent---· Whether competent to iJaJt .wiJhin in _own State. ·\n\nBy a press release, the Government of Maharashtra declared that the sale of lottery tickets of Stales other than the State of Maharashtra was .unlawful an(l w\"arped the public .that no lottery ticket o~ other States should be sold within the\n\nState. ·\n\n•The petitioner.s who were agents for the Sale of tickets for lotteries coll ducted .by various:State Governments other.thait the State'of Maharashtra contended in their writ-petitions, that the aforesaid ban that was soµght to be irriposed had no lega:l authority. Under the Constitlltion lotteries organiSed by the GoVernment of India or. the Government of a State was a subject which was within the exclusive legisiative comPeience of Paliaent and that it was not open ·.to the Governnient of any State pu_rporting to A.Ct in exercise of its executive power to in1pose such a . ban .. On behalf of the Sti.te aovernment-respondent it was•Contended . .that the_\n\nUnion Government's execut_ive power wa's co-extensive with the power to make laws, that the President in exercise Or his\" power Under Article 258(1) ha_d ehtr-Usted to the State Government the executive power of the UniOn through a Presidential.\n\nOrder dated April 2, 1969 in respect of lotteries run by the State, and therefore it was competent for the St; i.te Gc;:>vernment to imp.ose. the ban.\n\nAllowi;1g th~ writ Petitions. ..\n\nHELD : 1. The Government of M.aharashtra cannot purport to ban the\n\nH. ANRAJ v. MAHARASHTRA ..\n\n.. 441 t# sale of lottC:ry tickets of other State by ,; irtue oJ the entrustment of power under Article 258(1) of the Constitution. [447 DJ\n\ni. Entry 40 of Lfst I of the VIIIth SChcdule to the Constitution is. \"Lotteries organised by the Governn1ent of India or the Government of a State\". Entry 34 of List II of VIiS Schedule is, \"Betting and ga:inbling\".\n\nSinc.e the subject 'Lotteries organised by the Governni.ent of India or the Govcrnnient 'of a State' }J.as been taken out from-the legislatiV_e field comprised by the exprcssi&n \"Betting and gamb 1illg\" and .reserved t6 be dealt with by Parliament, wifhin its exclusive legislative competence it must follow, in vie\\\\' of Articld'-246(1) and (3) that no legislature of a State, can n1ake a law touching i9ttcries organisid by the Government of Tndia .Or the Government of a State. [444 P-El\n\n-.......\n\n3. Articl, e 73 extends the executi\"ve power of the UniOn to the matters with ( respect to which Parliament has po:wer to make. Ja:ws.\n\nBuhe executiv~ p~\\\\'er ' .of the UQidn, I;>y the very opening words of Art. 73 is \"subject to the proV:isions of .the Constitution\". It thefefore follows that the .executive power of the Unjon with rCspect to 'lotteries organised by the GOvernment of a .State has necessarily to be exercised subject .to -the provisions of the Constitution, .including Art. 298, which expressly extends the execi.itive power of the State to the.carrying on of any trade -If or business subject Only to legislation Qy Parliament if the trade or \"business is not one with respect to which the state Legislatur\"en1ay make laws. [4470-H; 440A-B\n\nReading and c; on'sidering Articles 73 and 298 together, it is clear that the executive power of a State iii the n1atter of carr)ring on any trade on business. with respect tb_ which i.he State legislature may noi make la~NS is subject to lcgislatiop by Parlian1ef!.t but is not subject tb the executive power of the Union. The Goyernmnt of a State is qot required to obtain the Permission of the Union Government in order to organise its lotteries; in the absen~.of Parliaffientary legislatjon. Even assuming that such pe, nnission is .necessary, a condition inlposed by such permission that lottery tickets of one State may not be sold in another State cii:nnot'be enforced\n\n~Y the other State. The other State J:tas no power to make any Jaws in regard to lotteries organised by the first State .. lts.ex.ecutive power, by virtue of Article 298, extends to logtteries oranised. b~· itsel_f but no.t to lotteries organiSed by the othe'r State. [448C-Ej .\n\n5. If.a State acts in breach of the condition in1posed by the President while en\"trusting power under Article 258 it i, s op.en to the President to revoke the.· per~ . mission o.r to tke such further or other aCtio\"n.as may be consitutionally permissible but it cannot possibly enable the Government of the other State to do anything\n\nbot it except to con1plain perhaPs to the Union Government. [448 E-F] .\n\nIn the instant case the source of power fo\"r the ban is claimed to be the entrust~ mei1t of poWer by the President under Act 258(1). through. the Pridential Order nated April z', 1969. But the terms of the entrus1ment do not justify the claim The entrustffient of power is Only 'ill respect of lottrics organise'd by th<:i~ Govern-· nient' .. The l.xpression 'that Government' in.the conrext of the entrustment of power to the Governinent of Mahara$htra can , only _ffiean the- Oovernment of Maharashtra and no other. [447 B.-C]\n\n• G\n\nL.B. Paradise Lottery Centre v. State, ATR 1975 AP 50 Shri T11drci11ada11 Cha1\"iln\n\n H La/\"Thacker v. Staie of Gujarat, S.C.A. 1309/70 approved: ,\n\n Kamal Agency v. State, AIR 1971 Bonibay 332 and H.G. Jain v. State af Ta1ni'ln\"du, ArR 1973 Madras 402; ovcr; ruled.\n\nORIGINAL JuRISDICTION : Writ Petition. Nos. 9333 or 2J36 of 1983:\n\n. (Under Arti~Ie 32 of the Constitution of India). , .. . . . .\n\nAdvOates for the rctitione.s ; '.\n\nL.M. Sin.hvi, A .. M. Singh vi, Vimal Dave,. and Krishan Kumar.: A\n\n\" T.S. Krishnamurth)• Iyer, Naresh Kumar Sl1arma and Vineet Kumar.· ...,-y \"' . . . . '.\n\nDr. Y.S. Chitale,. (Not present) Mrs: Sadhano Ramhandran and Raju Ramchandran and.Ha1jinder Singh (Not present) ·•\n\nAdvocates for .the Responents :\n\nA.V. Rangamand Mrs. Sm la Chandt~ for the State of Tamilnadu. . .\n\n_ N.H. Gurusahani, A.shwani Kumar, N. N. Keshwani and M. N.\n\nShroff a1id A..S. Namhiar Not Present.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\n. CHJNNAPPA REDDY, J.\n\nThe seve.ral petitioners in these writ petitions are agents for the sale of tickets. for the lotteries conducted by n1e Governments of various States other than Maharashtra. They question the ba11 sought to be imposed by the Government.of Maha~ rashtra on the sale within the State of Maharashtra of ticket~ of lotteries conduc.ted by the Government o(otherStates. They, generally, seek a writ in the . nature of it Mandamus directing'.the State or Maharashtra.to forbear from interferring with the sale or distribution of lottery tickts inrespect of the lotteries organise'd by the Governments bf States. other than Maharashtra.\n\nThere is no express notification or order of the Government of Maharashtra imposing a ban on the sale of lottery tickets of o.ther .States in .the State of Maharashira. The ban is sought to be spelt 'out from a Press relcase of the Director of Publicity, Sachivalaya, Bombay dated Septeniber 24, 1969 and a •communication dated August 24, 19ill addressed by the. Government of Maharashtra,.\n\n.. . . >\n\n.. > - / ( ' ' -\n\nH. ANRAJ 'v. MAHARASHTRA (Chinndppa f!rddy'. J.). 443\n\nFinance Department, to some of the petitioners individually. The .Press release is as follows :\n\nSALE OF LOTTERY TICKETS\n\nOF OTHER STATES UNLAWFUL\n\nWarning to' Pul:ilic . ..\n\nOn September 16, the Minister for Finance in a Press conference, followed by q''press note, made it dear to agets who arc selling lOJJery tickels that the sale pf lottery tickets of other States in this State is .unlawful. The Government\n\n. of India, in giving permission for conducting State lotteries C had made a condition: that the lottery tickets should not be sold in another_ State, without the express consent of that State, No such permission has been given in Maharashtra · for the sale of outside State. !ottecy tickets. Despite the . warning given .by the Minister, nnautl!orised sales of lottery tickets of outside States continues, and the Government D is therefore .taking steps to stop these obviously unlawful practices by seizing all stocks of tickets of other. States' lotteries. T.he public are warned ihat no tickets other that the Maharashtra State Lottery tickets can' be sold within : the Maharashtra State\".\n\nThe communications addressed to the petitioners are m the following terms :\n\nSir,\n\nI am directed io refer to your letter No. DA/PL/81/6~, dated.22.6.1981 on the above mentioned subject and to 'state that there is ban on the sale of other State Lottery tickets in State of Maharashtra. It is, therefore, regretted that your request to permit you to sell your Slate Lottery tickets in this State cannot be. accepted. .\n\n• Yours .faithfully, .\n\nSd/- State. Lottery Officer, Finance Department.\n\n The basic subrnissfon on behalf of the petitioners is that there.\n\n. '\n\n'•,\n\n• '\n\n• 444\n\nA is no legal 'authority for the imposition of the ban. It is argued that under the Constitution, .'Lotteri.es organised by the. Government of India or the Government of a State' is a subject which is within the exclusive legislative competence ofParliament and that it is not 0pen to the Government of any State purporting to act in exercise of its executive power to impose such a ban as that sought to be imposed by the Government of Maharashtra. On the other hand, it is sought to beargued on behalf of.the Govern1ftent of Maharasht.ra 'that the Union Government's executive power is co-extensive with the power of\n\nParliament to make laws, that the President in exercise of his power _1 under Art. 258(i) has entrusted to the Government of Maharashtra . the executive power of the Union in respect of lotteries run by the -\\ State and therefore,: it was competent for the Government of Maha rashtra to impose the ban.\n\nEntry 40 of List I of the V!Ith Schedule to the Constitution is \"Lotteries .organised by the Go.v.ernment of India or tk Government of a State\". Enirv 34 of List II of Vllth Schedule is, \"Betting and gambling\". There is no dispute before us that the expressin \"Betting and gambling\" includes and has alwys been understood to have included the conduct of lotteries. Quite obviously, the subject 'Lotteries organised by the Governmerrt of India or the Governmen.t of a State' has been taken outfrom the legislative field comprised by the expression \"Betting and gambling\" and is reserved to be dealt E with by Parliament. Siilce tii.e subject 'Lotteries organised by the Government of India or the Governmnt of a State' has been made a subject within the .exch!sive legislative competence of Parliament, it must follow, in view of Aci. 246(1) arid (3), that no legislature of~ j State can make a law wuching lotteries organised by the Government of lnd'a or the Government of a State. This. much is be; ond controversy and the Maharashtra legislature has acknowledged the position, as indeed it must, in Sec. 32 of the Bombay Lotteries (Control and Tax) and Prize Competitions (Tax) Act,· 1958. It is an .ct to control and tax lotteries and to tax prize competitions in the State of Maharashtra. Section 32(b) expressly provides that nothing in the Act shall apply to \"a lottery organised_ by the Central Government or a State G; overnment\". This, as we said, is but' a recognition of the. prevailing situation i!nder the Constitution. The Constitutional postion cannot be. alterd by an ct of the State legislature.\n\nIt appears that the Government of Maharashtra and various . 0ther State Governments requested the :Union Government to • authorise them to conduct lotteries for the purpose of 'finding funds\n\n.. -\n\nIi. ANRAJ v. MAHARASHTRA (Chinnajlpa Reddy, J.) 445.\n\nfor J'inancing their development plants'. Such authorisation was, of course, strictly, not necessary in the absence of a law made by Parliament pursuant to Entry 40 of List I ofthe VIIth Schedule to the Constitution ... Article 298 of the Constitution extends the executive power of the Union and ach State to the carrying .on of any trade or business and to the acquisition, holding and disposal.of property . and the making of contracts for any purpose; with the stipulation that if the trade, business or purpose is not one with respect to which Parliament may make laws, the said executive power of Parliament shall be subject in each State to legislaticJn by .the State and if the trade, business or purpose is not one with respect to which the State legislature may make laws, the said executive power of the State shall be subject te. Jegislation by Parliament. Thus, while the Government of a State is free. to earry on any trade or bsiness in respect of which it may not have. the power to make laws the power to carry on such trade or business shall be subjectto legislation by Parliament. Therefore, the Government of a State has the rig ht to conduct lotteries subject to legislation by Parliament. Since there is at present no legislation by Parliament on the subject of lotteries organised by the Government of India or the Government of a St; i.te, the Government of every State has the unrestrictect' right to organise lotteries of. its own.\n\nWe will consider the effect of the impact of Art. 73, Art. 258(1) and . Entry 40 of List I read with Art. 246 on this right a little later. • • • To continue the expose of facts, in response to the request <if . the several State Governments, the Minisiry of Home Affairs, Government of India, addressed a communication dated July 1, 1968 to the Chief Secretaries to the Government of all States. It was stated in the letter that though the Central Government was opposed to the idea of lotteries being cond1Jcted by Governments, they had decided . to authorise the State Governments to conduct lotteries in view of the representations of some of the State. Governments that it w<; mld help theni 'to mobilise savings and to find funds. for financing their development plans'. However, it was added : - . \"At the same time, it is also felt that suitable steps should be taken to safeguard the interests of s11ch State Governments, who, as a matter of policy, do not desire to start State Lotieries or permit sale of tickets of lotteries organised in other States, within their jurisdiction. In order to avoid objections frbm .such States, it has been decided that the . Central Government's permission for conducting State Lotteries is available on the condition that tickeis to such a iottery will\n\nA not be sold in another State without the express consent of the State Government concerned. I am. to add that in order to achieve this object an amendment of Section 294-A. tPC is being undertaken to make sitle of tickets, .without . ~·.\n\nthe consent. of the State Government concerned, .a penal . offence\" ..\n\n.We may mention )1ere lhat the proposal to :imend Section 294-A IPc to achieve the object. of preventing the sale of lottery tickets of . on~ State being old in States which are opposed to the conduct of lotteries .as a matter of policy has rema'ined a static proposal and no\" 1_ uch amendment ha.s so far been attempted to be made. . •\n\n'The communication dated July' l', 1968 from. the Government '..·~ of India was followed by Presidential Order under Art. 258(1) of the Constitution. .The' Presidential Order relating to the State of Maha-, rashtra w; th which we are concerned, is as follows :-'\n\nNo. 29/29/63-P.IV . Governmeii.t of India . Ministry of Home Affairs New Delhi, the 2nd Aptil, 1969.\n\nORDER\n\n Wheas the Government of Maharashtra propose to organise a State lottery;\n\n' And whereas the Central Government has no .objection to it ; ·\n\n. Now, therefore, the President is pleas.ed to permit the.\n\nGovernment of Maharashtra to conduct a State . lottery, subject to the .condition. that the ti.ckets of the lottery shall not be sold in another State without the permissiOn. of the Government of-that State. ·\n\nThe President is further pleased to entrust to. the . Government of Maharashtra under clause(!) of Article 258 of \\he Constitution the .executi:ve power of the Union in : respect of lotteries. organised by that Government. .\n\n. .\n\n. , Sd/-\n\n(D.D. JOSHI) Deputy Secretary to the Government of India.\n\n. . )'-\n\n. .\n\n'r .' ...\n\n- ·\"'\n\nH. ANRAJ v. MAf!ARASHTRA (Chinnappa Reddy, !.). 447\n\nIt was after this entrustmeni of executive power of the Union A to the Government of Maharashtra 'i)l respect oflotteries organised by that Government' .that the Government of Maharashtra proceeded to. issue the Press release and thereafter the individual communications, earlier referred. to, making it known that the sie of lottery tickets .of other States was banned in the State of Maharashtra.\n\nThe source of powerfor the ban is claimed to be the entrustmenf of power by the President under Art. 258(1) of the Constitution. But . the terms of the entnistment.do not justify the claim; 'The entrust-· . men.t of power, as is seen, is only 'iii respect of lotteries organised by that Goveru.ment'. The expression 'thatGorermrient' in the context\n\nof the entrustment of power to the Government of Maharashtra . C cajl only mean the Government of Maharashtra and no other. Nor can it ever be that such executive power as the Union Government may possess -in respect of the trading,. bu.siness or, for tha.t matter, .. any other activity of the Government of one State may be entrusted to the Government' of another State. That would be destructive of the very scheme and structme of our Cnstitution. The Govern- D ment of Maharashtra cannot therefore purport to ban the sale. of lottery tickets of other States by virtue of the entruslinent of power . under Article 258(1) of the Constitution. ·\n\nIt is. then said that the permission granted to each State to conduct its lotteries is expressly subject to the condition that the tickets of the\n\n E lottery shall not be sold in another State without 'the permission of the Government of .that State. We have already pointed out that 'Ai:ticle 298 of the Constitution extends the executiv.e power of every,. ·\n\nState to the carrying on of any trade or business even if such trade or business is one with respect of which Parliament alone has. the exclusive power to make laws, \"Subject to the tipulation. that such F . executive \"power of the State shall be subject to Pariiamentary legisla- ·\n\ntion. It is true that in view of Entry 40 of List r of the VIIth Schedule to the Constitution Parliament has exclusive power to make laws .with• respect to \"Lotteries organised by the Government of India or the · Government of a State\", that Article '73 of the Constitution extends the eltecullve power of of the union .to .the matter~ with respect to G which Parliament bas power to make laws and, therefore, the executive power of the Union must extends to the subject \"Lotteries organised by the Government of India of the Government of a Slate\". But tlie executive power of the unioii, b; the very opening wbrds of Article 73, is \"subject to the provisions of this Constitution\". It follci)VS that the executive power of the UniQn with respect to lotteries\n\nA organised by the Govrnment of a State has necessarily to be exercised\n\n.. '\n\nsubject to the provisions of the Constitution, including Article 298, which expressly extends the executive power of the State to the carro/ing on 'of any trade or business subject only to legislation by Parliament if the trade or business is not one with\n\nrespect to which. the . State legislature may. make laws.\n\nIt is to B.. be .noted. that Article 298 does not open with the words 'subject to the. provisions of Che Constitution', .as does Article 7,3.\n\nReading and considering .Articles 73 an1 298 togetiier, .as thev should indeed be read and considered, it is clear that the executive power .of a' State in the matter of carrying on any trade or bus.iness with respect to which the State legislature may not make laws iS subject to legishtion by Parliament but is not subject to the executive' power of the union. That is why we mentioned earlier that tl:)e. Government. of a .State is not . required .to obtain the permission of the Union Government in order to orgai1is; its lotteries, in the absence of Parliamentary legislation.· Even assuming that such permission is necessary, D we dci not see how a condition imposed by such. permission tht lottery . tickets of oe State may not be sold in another State m•Y be enforced . by the other State. The other State has no power to make law~. in . . regard to the lotteries .by the first State. Its executive power, by virtue of Article 298,. extends io lotteries organised by itself but not .to lotteries.organised by the other State. If a State acts in breach of E.\n\nArthet_co 1 ndition imposed.by the President while e.ntrustthing po\"'.er_underr ·.\n\nJc e 258, it is open to the President to revoke e perm1sswn o. to take such further or other action as may be constitutionally per-\n\n• missible but it cannot possibly enable the Government of the other.\n\nState. to do a thing about it except to complain, perhaps, t~ the Umon Government. The Government of India is quite obvwusly ahve to the position that there is no way of enforcing the.stipulation that lottery tickets of one Stateshall not be sold in another except by . . Parliament mahing a law in that behalf.· The awareness is reveal;:d\n\nby the last sentence in the letter dated July 1, 1968 which says,\n\n\"I am to add that in order to achieve this object an amendment of 'Section 294-A IPC is being undertaken to make sale of tickets, without .the consent of the State\n\n. ed • penal offence\" ..\n\nGovernment concern ' .\n\n. the light of dav. . ent is vet to see 7.'he rfrf'lnno;:; if :imenc\\m ..\n\nfound favour with the appears to have • A submission which '\n\nf \\ - ' '\n\nH .. ANRAJ v. MAHARASHTRA (Chinnappa,_ Reddy, J.) 449\n\nHigh Court of Bombay in Kamal Agency v. State\"> and the High_ A Court of Madras in H.G. Jain v. State of Tamil Nadu( 2> was that in Entry 40 of List I and the respective loca.l Acts, a lotter1 organised by a State must be colistrued to refer to a lottery Jawfully organised by a State and that if a lottery is not lawfully organised by a State it would not fall within Entry 40 of List I but. would fall under the head 'gambling' under Entry 34 of List II and the State -legislature would then be empowered to legislate in respect of the same. Where the State Legislature could thus legislate, it was said, th' State Gover.nment cou'd take execuUve action in . respect of lotteries organised\n\nbf another State if they were unlawfl11. The Gujarat and Andhra .\n\nPradesh High Col'rts have dissented fwm this view.\n\nJn Special .\n\nCivil Application No. 1309 of 1970 Bhagwat;;. C.J. presiding over a Didsi0n Bench of the Gujarat High Court. and in L.B. Paradise Lottery Centn v. State(3> cine of us sitting singly in the Andhia Pradesh High Court have explained !hit there is no justification for first reading.\n\nthe word 'lawfully' into Entry 40 of :List I and the1i proceeding to interpret the expression !Lottery lawfully organised' as meaning a lottery rganised persuant to the entr.ustment of executive power of the Union under Article 258 of the Constitution. It was observed \"legislative power cannot be fed into Entry 34, by feeding the word 'lawful' into Entry 40 oi List I and thus artifici11ly. restricting the scope of Entry 40':. It was pointed out that if the Go; ernment of a State otgenised a lottery without the entrustnient of executi\\ie power . as contemplated b; ,(\\rtide 2 58 o_r in disregard or defiance of any\n\ncondition that ma/ have been imposed while entrusting executive power under Arti& 258 it would IJever be a matter for the legislature of one State to take upon itseif the power to declre unlawful the lottery run by the Government o.f another State; anci even less so could the Government of a State declare unlawful a Jottecy run by the Government of another State and thereafter bari the sale of the tickets of the lotteries otganised by that State. In the .Madras case it was also obsered that the entrustmcnt order carried with it all powers which the State Government might take to realise the maximum collection.\n\nWe ca1111ot subscribe to this view .. That would really amount to the entrustment of vital legislatiye powers to the St.ate Government which would be conslitutionaH; impermissilile. We do.not think it necessary to refer in any further detail to the decisions . of the Gujarat, Andhra Pradesh, . Bombay and Madras decisions\n\n(1) AIR 1971, 332.\n\n(2) AIR 1973 Madras 402.\n\n(3) AIR 1975 A . . P 50.\n\n...\n\n. .\n\nA except to say that we generally agree with the reasoning in the Gujarat .\n\nand Andhra Pradesh ded.sions and disagree with ihe reasoning in the . Bmbay .and. Madras decisions.· Jn the t:esJ.Ilt we allow the Write .\n\npetitions and direct the :;>tate of Maharashtra , to forbear from giving .effect to the ban on the sa.Je or distribution of tickets of lotteries organised by other States. There is no order regarding to costs. ·\n\nRV.K.· ·,\n\nAppeal allowed:\n\n• •\n\n..,, . ,", "total_entities": 77, "entities": [{"text": "440\n\nH. ANRAJ AND OTHERS ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 18, "end_char": 46, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "H. ANRAJ AND OTHERS ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Q. 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ANRAJ v. MAHARASHTRA ..\n\n.. 441 tsale of lottC:ry tickets of other State by ,; irtue oJ the entrustment of power under Article 258(1) of the Constitution. 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Krishnamurth)• Iyer, Naresh Kumar Sl1arma and Vineet Kumar.· ...,"}}, {"text": "Naresh Kumar Sl1arma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6269, "end_char": 6289, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A\n\n\" T.S. Krishnamurth)• Iyer, Naresh Kumar Sl1arma and Vineet Kumar.· ...,"}}, {"text": "Vineet Kumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6294, "end_char": 6306, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A\n\n\" T.S. Krishnamurth)• Iyer, Naresh Kumar Sl1arma and Vineet Kumar.· ...,"}}, {"text": "Y.S. Chitale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6335, "end_char": 6347, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Y.S. Chitale,. ("}}, {"text": "Sadhano Ramhandran", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6369, "end_char": 6387, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Not present) Mrs: Sadhano Ramhandran and Raju Ramchandran and."}}, {"text": "Raju Ramchandran", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6392, "end_char": 6408, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Not present) Mrs: Sadhano Ramhandran and Raju Ramchandran and."}}, {"text": "Ha1jinder Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6413, "end_char": 6428, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ha1jinder Singh (Not present) ·•\n\nAdvocates for .the Responents :\n\nA.V. Rangamand Mrs. Sm la Chandt~ for the State of Tamilnadu. . ."}}, {"text": "A.V. Rangamand", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6480, "end_char": 6494, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ha1jinder Singh (Not present) ·•\n\nAdvocates for .the Responents :\n\nA.V. Rangamand Mrs. Sm la Chandt~ for the State of Tamilnadu. . ."}}, {"text": "Sm la Chandt~", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6500, "end_char": 6513, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ha1jinder Singh (Not present) ·•\n\nAdvocates for .the Responents :\n\nA.V. Rangamand Mrs. Sm la Chandt~ for the State of Tamilnadu. . ."}}, {"text": "N.H. Gurusahani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6549, "end_char": 6564, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "_ N.H. Gurusahani, A.shwani Kumar, N. N. Keshwani and M. N.\n\nShroff a1id A..S. Namhiar Not Present."}}, {"text": "A.shwani Kumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6566, "end_char": 6580, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "_ N.H. Gurusahani, A.shwani Kumar, N. N. Keshwani and M. N.\n\nShroff a1id A..S. Namhiar Not Present."}}, {"text": "N. N. Keshwani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6582, "end_char": 6596, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "_ N.H. Gurusahani, A.shwani Kumar, N. N. Keshwani and M. N.\n\nShroff a1id A..S. Namhiar Not Present."}}, {"text": "M. N.\n\nShroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6601, "end_char": 6614, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "_ N.H. Gurusahani, A.shwani Kumar, N. N. Keshwani and M. N.\n\nShroff a1id A..S. Namhiar Not Present."}}, {"text": "A..S. Namhiar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6620, "end_char": 6633, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "_ N.H. Gurusahani, A.shwani Kumar, N. N. Keshwani and M. N.\n\nShroff a1id A..S. Namhiar Not Present."}}, {"text": "CHJNNAPPA REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6694, "end_char": 6709, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CHJNNAPPA REDDY, J.\n\nThe seve.ral petitioners in these writ petitions are agents for the sale of tickets.", "canonical_name": "Chinnappa,_ Reddy"}}, {"text": "Maharashtra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7332, "end_char": 7343, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "other than Maharashtra."}}, {"text": "H. ANRAJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7766, "end_char": 7774, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ">\n\n.. > - / ( ' ' -\n\nH. ANRAJ 'v. MAHARASHTRA (Chinndppa f!rddy'."}}, {"text": "Government\n\n. of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8223, "end_char": 8245, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government\n\n."}}, {"text": "Art. 258(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10210, "end_char": 10221, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Government of Maha rashtra", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10389, "end_char": 10415, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the executive power of the Union in respect of lotteries run by the -\\ State and therefore,: it was competent for the Government of Maha rashtra to impose the ban."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11105, "end_char": 11124, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Siilce tii.e subject 'Lotteries organised by the Government of India or the Governmnt of a State' has been made a subject within the .exch!sive legislative competence of Parliament, it must follow, in view of Aci."}}, {"text": "Government of lnd'a or", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11369, "end_char": 11391, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "246(1) arid (3), that no legislature of~ j State can make a law wuching lotteries organised by the Government of lnd'a or the Government of a State."}}, {"text": "Maharashtra legislature", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11461, "end_char": 11484, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "much is be; ond controversy and the Maharashtra legislature has acknowledged the position, as indeed it must, in Sec."}}, {"text": "Sec. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11538, "end_char": 11545, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 32(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11730, "end_char": 11743, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11831, "end_char": 11849, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 32(b) expressly provides that nothing in the Act shall apply to \"a lottery organised_ by the Central Government or a State G; overnment\"."}}, {"text": "Government of Maharashtra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12071, "end_char": 12096, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that the Government of Maharashtra and various .", "canonical_name": "Government of M.aharashtra"}}, {"text": "Article 298", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12523, "end_char": 12534, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 73", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13807, "end_char": 13814, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 258(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13816, "end_char": 13827, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 246", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13863, "end_char": 13871, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "July 1, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14088, "end_char": 14100, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the several State Governments, the Minisiry of Home Affairs, Government of India, addressed a communication dated July 1, 1968 to the Chief Secretaries to the Government of all States."}}, {"text": "s11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14668, "end_char": 14671, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 294", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15222, "end_char": 15233, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 294", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15425, "end_char": 15436, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 258(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15830, "end_char": 15841, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 258", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16597, "end_char": 16608, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "D.D. JOSHI", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16740, "end_char": 16750, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sd/-\n\n(D.D. JOSHI) Deputy Secretary to the Government of India."}}, {"text": "Art. 258(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17379, "end_char": 17390, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 258(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18242, "end_char": 18256, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 73", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19545, "end_char": 19555, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 298", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19824, "end_char": 19835, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 298", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20112, "end_char": 20123, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20212, "end_char": 20221, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 73", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20251, "end_char": 20262, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 298", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21153, "end_char": 21164, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 294", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22056, "end_char": 22067, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "IPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22070, "end_char": 22073, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Chinnappa,_ Reddy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22379, "end_char": 22396, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ent is vet to see 7.'he rfrf'lnno;:; if :imenc\\m ..\n\nfound favour with the appears to have • A submission which '\n\nf \\ - ' '\n\nH .. ANRAJ v. MAHARASHTRA (Chinnappa,_ Reddy, J.) 449\n\nHigh Court of Bombay in Kamal Agency v. State\"> and the High_ A Court of Madras in H.G. Jain v. State of Tamil Nadu( 2> was that in Entry 40 of List I and the respective loca.l Acts, a lotter1 organised by a State must be colistrued to refer to a lottery Jawfully organised by a State and that if a lottery is not lawfully organised by a State it would not fall within Entry 40 of List I but.", "canonical_name": "Chinnappa,_ Reddy"}}, {"text": "High Court of Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 22407, "end_char": 22427, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ent is vet to see 7.'he rfrf'lnno;:; if :imenc\\m ..\n\nfound favour with the appears to have • A submission which '\n\nf \\ - ' '\n\nH .. ANRAJ v. MAHARASHTRA (Chinnappa,_ Reddy, J.) 449\n\nHigh Court of Bombay in Kamal Agency v. State\"> and the High_ A Court of Madras in H.G. Jain v. State of Tamil Nadu( 2> was that in Entry 40 of List I and the respective loca.l Acts, a lotter1 organised by a State must be colistrued to refer to a lottery Jawfully organised by a State and that if a lottery is not lawfully organised by a State it would not fall within Entry 40 of List I but."}}, {"text": "High_ A Court of Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 22463, "end_char": 22486, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ent is vet to see 7.'he rfrf'lnno;:; if :imenc\\m ..\n\nfound favour with the appears to have • A submission which '\n\nf \\ - ' '\n\nH .. ANRAJ v. MAHARASHTRA (Chinnappa,_ Reddy, J.) 449\n\nHigh Court of Bombay in Kamal Agency v. State\"> and the High_ A Court of Madras in H.G. Jain v. State of Tamil Nadu( 2> was that in Entry 40 of List I and the respective loca.l Acts, a lotter1 organised by a State must be colistrued to refer to a lottery Jawfully organised by a State and that if a lottery is not lawfully organised by a State it would not fall within Entry 40 of List I but."}}, {"text": "Bhagwat", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23268, "end_char": 23275, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1309 of 1970 Bhagwat;;."}}, {"text": "Article 258", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23734, "end_char": 23745, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": ".Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 24593, "end_char": 24600, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the .Madras case it was also obsered that the entrustmcnt order carried with it all powers which the State Government might take to realise the maximum collection."}}, {"text": "AIR 1975", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25128, "end_char": 25136, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(3) AIR 1975 A . ."}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_2_451_452_EN", "year": 1984, "text": ".• 't\n\n-I .\n\n. '\n\n• . .\n\nRAMENDRA .SINGH\n\nSTATE OF MADHYA P'lADESH AND OTHERS\n\nJanuary 23, !J84\n\n[E. S. VENKATARAM!AH AND M. P. THAKKAll JJ.] . ,. . .\n\n. .\n\nMadhya Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultilral Holdings Act, j960 (.Act No~ 20 of\n\n~ 1960); SeCtion 6 and read with SeCtionJ2(gg). c.ons_/rfl.lu!tiOn of:-Whether, in. vitw of ihe wordi,; g in section 6 (ii) viz \"eaeh 1ne111ber of the/ptnily, including a n_1inor son would bcoine a holder entitled to a separate unit ofihe _ceiling area'', the. 11tintJr son will be.entitled to-clllifn a separate ceilifiC.are.a independently.\n\nDismisS_ing the Special Leav~ Petition, -the Court,\n\nHELD : Section .. 6(ii) of the M: P .. Ceiling on Agricultural Holdin:; s ACt, 1960 does not have any eff'eCt. on the _ceiling area to which a fainily as defined. in; Section 2{gg)· iS entitled under Section 7.\n\nA m.inor.Son who is diemed tci -be entitled to an itea .of Joint Family liind proporiionate to his Share under. s. 6 (ii) ·\n\nTs not entitied to a .separate ceiling area independently. His share of tanct can -be clubbed with the land which can be _claimed by h_is father as his ceiling area. [45-2D; B]\n\nBegulld Bapi i:-aju etc. e1c_\"v. State of of A. P. (1983) 2 Scale l41 followed.\n\nSarjibai_& -Ors. V. State of M. P. ~Ors. (Misc. Ptitlon No. 811 of 197' of M. P .. High Court} appoved.. • . . • ·.\n\nCIVIL APPHLLATB .JURISDICTION~ Appeal (Civil) No' 14604 of 1983 ..\n\nPeiition for Special Leave to ...,\n\nFrom the Judgment and 'Order dated the 2nd September. 1983 . of the Madhya Pradesh High Coi1rt (Indore Berich) .in Civil Miscellaneous Petition No. 193 of 197&.\n\nG.L. Sanghi, S.K. Gambhir and A.shok Mahajan for the Petitioner .. . - . Ravbidrq )Jana and A.K: Sanghi for. t.he Respondent.\n\nThe Order of the Court was delivered by.\n\n• VENkATARAMIAH, J.\n\nThe con.iention of the petitioner in the above case is that on a tttie construction .of.section -6 read with section 2(gg) ·:of. the 11adhya Prad.esh Ceiling on Agric\\i!tural Ho!din2s Ad,\n\nF ..\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1984] 2 S.C.R . •\n\n1960 (Act No. 2o of 1960) (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') each member of the family, including a minor son would become a holder entitled to a separate unit of the ceiling area. In other words, it is argued that a minor son who is deemed to be entitled to an area of joint family land proportionate to his share under sectfon 6(ii) of the .Act is entitled to claim a separate ceiling area independently. It is contended. that his share of land cannot be clubbed with the lan<l which can be claimed by his.father as his ceiling. area ..\n\nWe have heari:! Shri G.L. Sanghi, learned counsel for the petitioner. He .'has taken us through the relevant provisions of the Act viz. section 2 (gg), section 6 and section 7 of the Act. The High Couri has 10egat'ved the above .wntention of the petitioner relying upon its ear.lier decision in Sarjubai & Ors.· v. State ofMddhya Pradesl1. & .Ors.\n\n(Misc. Petition No. Sil of 1979). We have gone through that decision.\n\nOn going through the said decision, we find that it is correctly decided.\n\nWe agree with the reasons given .in support of th~ said .decision. ft is in conformity with the view expressed by this Court in Begulla Bapi Raju etc. etc. v: State of Andhra Pradesh.\">\n\nSection 6(ii) of the Act does not have any effect on the ceiling area to which a family as defined in section 2(gg) is entitled under\n\nsection 7.\n\nThe petition is atcotdingly dismissed.\n\nS; R.\n\nPetition dismissed.\n\n(I) ,[1983].2.SCALE141.\n\n. ' .•", "total_entities": 21, "entities": [{"text": "RAMENDRA .SINGH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 25, "end_char": 40, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAMENDRA SINGH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF MADHYA P'lADESH AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 42, "end_char": 77, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultilral Holdings Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 157, "end_char": 209, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 342, "end_char": 351, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madhya Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultilral Holdings Act", "statute": "Madhya Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultilral Holdings Act"}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 797, "end_char": 806, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madhya Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultilral Holdings Act", "statute": "Madhya Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultilral Holdings Act"}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 830, "end_char": 839, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madhya Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultilral Holdings Act", "statute": "Madhya Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultilral Holdings Act"}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 954, "end_char": 958, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madhya Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultilral Holdings Act", "statute": "Madhya Pradesh Ceiling on Agricultilral Holdings Act"}}, {"text": "G.L. Sanghi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1609, "end_char": 1620, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G.L. Sanghi, S.K. Gambhir and A.shok Mahajan for the Petitioner .. . - .", "canonical_name": "G.L. Sanghi"}}, {"text": "S.K. Gambhir", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1622, "end_char": 1634, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G.L. Sanghi, S.K. Gambhir and A.shok Mahajan for the Petitioner .. . - ."}}, {"text": "A.shok Mahajan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1639, "end_char": 1653, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G.L. Sanghi, S.K. Gambhir and A.shok Mahajan for the Petitioner .. . - ."}}, {"text": "Ravbidrq )Jana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1682, "end_char": 1696, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ravbidrq )Jana and A.K: Sanghi for."}}, {"text": "A.K: Sanghi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1701, "end_char": 1712, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ravbidrq )Jana and A.K: Sanghi for."}}, {"text": "VENkATARAMIAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1780, "end_char": 1793, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• VENkATARAMIAH, J.\n\nThe con.iention of the petitioner in the above case is that on a tttie construction .of.section -6 read with section 2(gg) ·:of."}}, {"text": "section 2(gg)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1908, "end_char": 1921, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "G.L. Sanghi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2602, "end_char": 2613, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri G.L. Sanghi, learned counsel for the petitioner.", "canonical_name": "G.L. Sanghi"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2717, "end_char": 2726, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2733, "end_char": 2742, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2747, "end_char": 2756, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 6(ii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3263, "end_char": 3276, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(gg)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3365, "end_char": 3378, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3398, "end_char": 3407, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_2_453_465_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "i~ - '\n\n453 A\n\nANOOP JAISWAL\n\nv. ...\n\nGOVERNMENT OF INDIA & ANR .\n\nJani; pry 24, 1984 ·\n\n{ E. S. VBNKATARAMIAR AND R .. B. MISRA, .JJ)\n\nConstitution of India-Art. 311 (2)-.-Applicability of. Protectton . under Art. 311 (2) available if the order of dischcirge is JOund to be by way of .1untshment.\n\nTo. see whether an \"order of discharge is, by way of pllnishment, form oftheorde; ti irot decisil'~. Court must g~ behilid the form and ascertain the tru~ character of\n\nthe order.\n\nThe appellant who had been selected for appOintment in the\"' Indian Police Service was undergoing training'lfis probationer in the National __ Police Acdemy.\n\nOn June 22, 1981 due. to rain the appellant as well .other probationers reached late by a few minutes 3.t the _changed venue for conducting :P. T. For this delay explantion was cal.led from all the probationers. In his explanation the appellant sincerely regretted the lapse. The ap~lant was\" considered to beone ofthe ring-leaders. who was resonsible for the delay. The Director of the Ac3.derny wiihout holding an enquiry into the alleged misconduct recommended to the Government that the appellant should be discharged from service. On the basis of that iecommendation the- Government by its order dated November Q, 1981 discharged the appellant from service. The Government rejeCted the appellant's\n\nrepiesenttion against the order discharging him. The appellant challenged the vaiidity of the order under Aft. 226 of the Constitution.\n\nThe High Court dismissed the petiti0n at theadmis.sion sta_gc. Hence this appeal. The appeUat contend.ed that the order discharging him wa~ in reality an' order terminating \"his\n\nservices on the ground of rilisconduct and f'S415uch could not have been passed without Holding an enquiry as contemplated under Art 311 (2) of the Constitution and. the relevant rules governing such an enquiry. ' .\n\nAllowing the appeal ..\n\nHELD : The impllgned order of discharge is set aside .\n\nWhere uie form of the order i_s mere_Iy a cam<; iufiage for an order of dismissal for misco_nduct t is always _open to the Court before which the order js challenged to go behind the fo~ and_ascertain t_he true character of the order .. If the Court G . holds. tat the .order -though in_ the_ form is merely a determination of employ~\n\nment is in reality a cloak for an order of punishment, the Court would not be debarred, merely bause of the formof the order, in giving effect to the rights' <Wnferred by law upon the employee. [563 E-F]\n\nParshotam Lai Dhingra v. Union of India, [1958] S. C. R. 828; Shl/msher ff .Singh & Anr. v. State oj'Punjab, [1975] I S. C, R. 814; State of Punjab & Anr.\n\n. E\n\n. SUPREME COURT REPORTS f!984] 2 S.C.R .. . . .\n\nv. Shri Silkh Raj Bahadur, (1969] 3 S.C.C:. 603;· Stale of Bihar & Ors. 'v. Shiva .· Bhikshuk Mishra, (1971] 2 S. C.R. 191; R.S. Sia/ v . .The.State of U. p, & Ors.,\n\n. [197.4p S. C. R. 754; State .of U.P. v; Ram Chandra Trivedi, [1977] 1 s. C. R ..\n\n462; and I. N. Sakseno v.\n\nState of Madhya Pradesh; [1967] 2 S. C. R. 496;. referred to. , .\n\nIn the instarit case, on. gOing through the rccQrd and taking. intojaccount all the attendant 'circumstances the Court, \"is_ satisfied that the __ alleged l'ct of mis-. condl.!:ct On JunC 22, 1981 Was t.he : real f0und-ation for the action taken. against the aPPellant.-:lnd _that the otheiiristances stated .in the course of the conter '' affl.9.avit re mere allegations which ar~ put forward orily for purposes of 1\n\nstrengttining the defcllce which is otheiwise ve'rY weak.· The case is one which attracted ArtiC1e311 (2) of the.Constitution as ·the. iffipugnCd order amounts tp a tefmination of se.rvice by. way Of punish1nent anctan eilquiry should have been -~\\ held in accordariCe with-the -said Constitutional provision.\n\nThat admittt:dlY. havirtg hot ~n.d.one, tfie .impgned. o.rd_er is liable. to _be Struck dowq. ,[4~5 BC]\n\nC1VIL APPELLATE Jrni.iS; ICTION : Civil Appeal No. 3040 of 1982 .\n\n. . . ·. . .•.... Appoal by Spo.cia] leave from the Judgtnent and Order dated the 30th August, 1982 of the Delhi High Court in Writ Petition No. 1580 of l 982j. . ·\n\nK.N. Bbatt for the Appellant. . .....\n\n• M.S. Gujra/ and G.S. Narain for the Respondent .\n\n.The Judgment of the Court was delivered by :\n\nVENKATARAMIAH, J.\n\nJune 22, 1981 was really a bad day f°' the . appllant A1ioop JaiswaJ w))n having .. been selecied by the Union\n\nPublic Service Commission for appointment in the Indian Police Service was. undergoing training as a proba.tioner at the Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel National Police Academy, Hyderabad alongwitk ofoer probationers, On that day all the probatio.riers were expected to. be present at 5.50 A.M. at the field where the ceremonial ilrill practice was to be conducted.· Sinceit as raining at that time it appears thar the. venue was shifted to the Gymnasium .Hall wtete it was proposed. to cond.uct P.T./unartned combat practice. and intimation was sent ta the .trainees at the: Mess. When .the Assistant Director (Outdoor\n\nTraiing) reached the Gymnasium at S.50 A.M. none of the prba: tion.ers had ·.reached there. They ali reached the place 22 minutes late i.e. by 6.15 A.M. when the rains had abated ad the parade cm~ menced at 6.15 A.M .. It appears that earlier when a.messenger sent . by the Assistant Director had gone to rnll the probationers tl1ey had\n\n. ,\n\nANOOP. JA!SWAL v. oovr: OF INDIA (Venkataramiah J.) . 455\n\nasked for a vehicle to go to tile place as it was. rining. This , delay . was considered as an inddent which called for an enquiry. Explapa- .+ tion was called from all 'the probationers. The appellant was coy- sidered to be one of the ring leaders who:was responsible for the delay. • When t.he appellant was asked lfbout ihe incident, he gave his explana, t1on to the Director of the National Police Academy which read thus:\n\nJ, The .Director, National Police Academy, • Hyd.erabad.\n\nDear Sir, . fn reply to your Momo. dated 22nd June,.1981 I.humbly\n\nsbmit that as for iny being late in P, T. by IO mts,, I sincerely regret the lapse: But the second charge that I instigated\n\noihes to do 'so is totally baseless and without a single iota of truth. . I request you .Sir to make a thorough enquiry foo.\n\nsuch an allegation.\n\nI never had nor have such plebian . mentallv. .\n\nJ ••\n\n Thanking you,\n\n~ 'j)\n\nYours'sincerely,\n\nsd/- Anoop Jaiswal'~\n\n. E\n\n. ·• ..\n\nIt would appearthat .the Director without holding an enquiry \\ into the alleged misconduct recommended to the. Qovernment of India that the appellant should be discharged from the service. On •ihe .basis of the above report, the G'overnment of India passed the order of discharge dated November 5, 19Sland 'communicated it .to\n\n_.., the , appellant. The material part of the order.reads thus.:\n\n''No. Ic220l 1/9/81 Pers. HI Government of India/Bharat. Sarkar\n\nM nistry of Home Arfairs/Grih Mantralaya\n\nNw Delhi-110001, the 9 Nov. 1981\n\n' ·•\n\nORDER\n\nWhereas the Central Government is satisfied that Shri H Anoop Jai3wal, appoiti; ci to the lndi.an Police Service on pro- •\n\n' 456,\n\nSUPRE'J:E COURT REPORTS\n\n(1984] 2 S.C.R. . ' bation on the result of the c; vil Service Eamination held in\n\nthe year 1979, is unsuitable for bein, g a membr of the said service, he is hereby discharged under clause (b) of Rule 12 of the Indian Police Service (P•cbation) Rules, 1954.\n\n. The order\\ of discharge. will take dfect from the date on which it is served on the said Shri Anoop Jaiswal. ' .\n\nIn the name of and on behalf of the President of India .\n\n. , sd/-\n\n(NARENDRA PRASA~ . ,\n\nD'IR.ECTOR\" ; •\n\nOn, receipt of the above order of discharge, the app€llant made a representation on November 14, 1981 to the Government of India .\n\n.. :· to reconsider the ma tier. It appears that the Director of the jlational\n\nPolice Academy on this occasion recommended that the appellant may be rei11stated. That representation was rejected by the Government of India 'On April° 8, 1982. Thereafter,. he filed a petition under Art.icle 226 of the Constitution before the High Court of Delhi\n\ncontending that the.order of discharge was violative of Article 311(2)\n\na1d Article 1.4 of the Constitution. That petition was dismissed by . •the High Court at the stage of admission on August 30,1982 after hearing the counsel for the .Union of India. Against the judgment of the High C:ourt.-ihe appe:lant has filed this appeal with special. leave under Article 136 of the Constitution. ' . \" :r The main contention of the appellant before us is that the order ' djscharging the petitioner though on the face of it appears to carry• . .no stigmais in reality an order terminating his service on the ground of misconduct alleged to have been committed by him on June: 22, 1981 in acting as one of the ring leaders who were responsible for tlie delay of about twenty-two minutes in the arrival of the probationers at the Gymnasium and that such an order could not have been passed without holding an enquiry as contemplate51 under Article 311(2) of \" the Constitution and ihe relevant rules governing such an enquiry.\n\n• He has also contended that the m•tler is based on conjunctures and surm.ises and by way of illustration he has referred us to paragraph , , 13 of the counter affidavit which reads thus ; ~\n\n\"P.ara 13 ;\n\n( . -\n\n(.'\n\n\\,_\n\nl \\ i\n\n...\n\nANOOP JAiSWAL v. GOVT .. OF INDIA (Venkataramiah, J.) 457\n\nThe petitioner did not conduct himself fully in accordance with the pesotibed rules and regulations during his training\n\nperiod. On one. occasion\"when he was sanctioned '!eave for\n\n16 days in the month Qf May, 1981, he did not report himself for duty in time. He absented himself wilfully o.n !.6.1981 without applying for. leave for the day. For this action, he was warned by the Director against recurrence of such conquct The period of his wilful absence fof one day was treated as leave without pay. On two earlier occasions; the petitioner's conduct ws found prejudicial to good order • and discipline, on the first occsion lie was verbally counselled by the Chief. Drill Instruc_tor and.on the.second occasion a • Memo mas issued to him. ·\n\nThere was no gradation maintained Jn tile Atademy · about the aitendauce, in terms of which the petitioner had the record of being second (or may be third) highest in the Academy. However, -thisrecord in this respect was other.wise satisfactory,\"\n\n The reply of the appellant to the above allegation is found in paragraph 6 of the rojoinder.affidavit filed by the appellant which reads : ·\n\n\"Re: Paral3: The avermentsma de in; iara 13 of the petition are reiterated and the contentions of, the respondent to the contrary are denied as incorrect. It is reiterated that the petitioner conducted himsel( full f in accordance with rules and regulations. The allegatiol). made by the respondent that I absented myself wilfully on 1.6.1981 without applying for leave for. the day is highly misleading.· The correct fact is that J was sanctioned my Earned Leave on 1s:s.81 for a period o( 16days, and I was to report back for duty on 1.6.81 before 12.00 noon. I made arrangemen_t .to reach Hyderabad l:iefore 8.00 a.m. on 1.6.1981. However' en account.of late running of train in which I wµs travelling and C<rn1; equently missing the connecting train, I could reach Hyderabad only around noon and I report 'lt 1.00 p.m. .AU-these facts were duly.explained to the Asstt. Director, Outdoor Training; and he permitted. to attend the afternoon classes on 1.6.81 which J did. (However, at this sugg<slion, !applied f6r leave for the day and the leave was sanctioned without pay). It is\n\nF .\n\n. G.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1984] 2 S.C.R.\n\nincorrect to say that I was warned for'this. AU that the Director said was that o.n suc.h situations, the proper course was to .apply for a day's leavt which I did as stated earlier.\n\nIt is, therefore, very unreasonable to characterise the said incident as wilful absence:.\n\nThe further allegation. that . on the earlier occasions, the petitioner's cnduct was found\n\nprej\"dioial to good crrder and disoipline, is very vague and without any . particulars. Counselling by the Instructor . concerned i; a routine affair and, in fact, the Instructors are - . .. . \\ meant. to counsel.· Even rega, rding the second occasion, wlien a memo was said to. have issued, it is not stated as to. what the offence was. His significarti to note that ·the. respondent has not denied tl\\e allegation made by me that J ' . ' . . was not the only one who received such memos and that without exception all the probationary officers had at some time or the other received such me;,., os. J de11y tlie rest of the .allegations an<>l reiterate the. averments made in para l3 of tlie petition.'.'\n\nThe .. Jearned counsei for the parties have cited a number of. decisions before us in support oftheir respective cases. On going 'through theh1 we are of the view that there is not much divergence in them as to the true Jega./ principles to be follo;,, ed in ma!ters of this nature but the real proble~ appears to be one of applicati_on\n\nof thpse pricipl's iri a given case in determining whether the parti- . cular action taken amounts to a punishment attracting Article 311(2} of the Constitutin or a mere discharge s; mPJiciter not requiring the holding of .an: enquiry as contemplated under Article 311(2). .We shall now deal with two leading cases having a bearing on the question before us. In Parshotam• Lal Dhingta. v. Uni~1i of India<\" this Court after. a.n elaborate consideration of the relevant provisions of the \\:onstitution and judicial decisins cited before them observed.: . . . ' ' . ... . . - .\n\n:'The net 1; esu!t is-that \"it.iS cnly iri thcsc_ C-asrs l.cre 11.e . Govcr,)Jnnt intends to inflict those_ three fcnns of punis)1ments .tl1at the Govern1nent S:'!Jva'nt must be give\"n a reasonable opp0rtunity:ofsho\\Ying caue against the actibn proposed fo be taken ill regard to them. It fol!O\\vs, therefore, that ff the termin.c1tfon of nvice is sought to be brougU about otherwise than by way of punishment then the Gove.rnment _servant \\Yhose service IS so terminated Cannot claim the\n\nI .\n\n. (I) [1958] S.C.R. 828 .\n\n ....\n\n' ,\n\n'\\. '\n\n.. +\n\n'°' ,.\n\n1 • \\\n\n~.\n\nANOOP JAIS~AL v. GOVT. OF INDIA.(Ve11kataramiah, J.) 459\n\nprotection of Art: 3 I I (2) and the decisions cited before us and refetre.d to above, in so fa\n\n0 r as they lay.down that principle, must be held to be rightly decided,\n\nThe rofegoing conclusion, however, does not .sol.ve the .. entire problem, for it lias yet to be ascertained as to when\n\nan order for the termination of service is inflicted .as and by\n\n B way of punishment and when it is not\" .. \"\" \" ......... .\n\n. Wliere a person is appointed' to a permanent post in a\n\nGovernmnt service on probation, the terminati.on of his service during or at the end' of the period of probation will not ordinarily and by itself be a punishment, for the Governme.nt servant, so appointed; has no right to continue to\n\nhold such a post any more:thaq the servant employed on pw-. batio.n by a private empl0yer is entitled to do. Such a termination does not operate as a forfeiture ·.of any right of the servant to. hold th.e post, for he has no such right and obviously cannot. be a dismissal, removal or reduction in. rank by way of punishment .. ... _ ...................... .\n\nft does not~ however, follow that;.exceptin the three cases . mentioned .above, in. all\" other cases, fer1niii.ation of service of a Government servant who has no right to h{s post, e.g., where he was appointed to a post, temporary or permanent, either on probation or on an officiating basis and had not acquired a quasi-permanent status, the termination cannot, in any circumstances, be a dismissal or removal from service by way of punishmet. , ....... : ' , ................ : ..... .\n\nJn short, if the termination of service is founded on the right flowing from contract or the service rules then, prima facie, the termination is not a punishment and carries with it no evil .consequences and so Art. .311 is not attracted .\n\nBut even if the Govermpeni has, by contract. or .under the rules, the .right to terminate the empioyment without going thro\\Ighthe procedure prescribed for inflictihg the punish1'1ent\n\nof dismissal or remo.val or reduction in rank, .the .Govern' m>:nt may, nevertheless, choo.se to punish the se.rva1\\t and if the temination of servite is sought to be founded on miscond net, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification, then it is a punishment and the requirements of Art. 311 must be complied with.\"\n\n' • 464\n\n'SUPREME COURT RNPORT.S\n\n[1984] 2 S.C.R.\n\nA fate at the G¥mnasium and acting as oile of !he ring leaders on the occasion and his explanation was obtained. Similar explanations we.re called for from other probationers and. enquiries were made\n\n. behind the back of the appellant, . only the .case of the appellant was dealt with severely in the end. The cases Of other probationers who were also considered to. be ring leaders were not seriously_taken note of. Even though the order of discharge may be non-committal, it .cannot stand alone. Though the notfog in the file of the Government . may be irrelevant, thecause for the order cannot be ignored. The recommendation of the Director which is the basis or foundation for the order should be read alongwith the order for the purpose of determining its true character. Jf on reading the two together the Court . teacll!'s the .conclusion that the alleged act of misconduct was the cause of the order and that but for that incident it would not have been passed then it is inevitable that the order of discharge should fall to the ground as the appellant has not been afforded a reasonable opportunity to defend himself as provided m Article 311(2) of the Constitution.\n\nThe Union of India has placed before us.all the relevant material including the recommendation of the Directo~ of the National Police Academy that the appellant may be reinstated.· In this ca; e, as stated above, explanation was called for form the appellant and. other probationers: Bx, planations were received and an the probationers , Including the aJ?pellant were individually interviewed in order to ascertain' facts. Explanation submitted by him .and the answers given by others had weighed with the Director before making the recci1l!men- dation to the Government of India on the basis of which action was\n\ntakn. The only ground which ultimately prevailed upon the Director was that the appellant had not shqwn any sign u( repentance without informing him that his case would be dealt with leniently if he showed anv sign of repentance. In fact in the very. first reply he gave to the Director on being asked about the incident which took place on June 22, 1981, the ppelhnt stated '.I sincer.elv regret ti1e lapse,' Neither in theletter which the Director first wrote to the Central Government, nor in the counter affidavit filed fo. this Court, due importance has been given to the said expression of regret and it is further seen that no additional lapse on the part of the appellant between June 22, 1981 and the date on which the Director wrote the letter to the central Government, which would show that the apP\"llant had not shown any sign of repentance is pointed out, although thre is a reference to his reporting to duty late on an earlier date oil June !, 1981. On . goihg .through. the above record before the' Court and .taking into\n\nI A\n\n·~\n\n .•.\n\nANOOP JAISWAL v. GOVT. OF INDIA (Ven, kataramiah, J.) . 465 '\n\naccount all the attendant circumstances we are satisfied. that the Director wished to make the case of the appellaµt an example for others including those other probationers who were similarly situated so that they may learn a. Jesson therefrom.\n\nA narration Of the facts of the case leaves. no doubt that the alleged act of misconduct on June 22, 1981 was the real foundation for the action taken against the appellant and that the other instances 'stated in the course of the counter affidavit are mere allegations which are put forward on!)' for purposes of strengthenipg the defence which is otherwise ver 1 weak. The case is one which attrac.ted Article 311(2) '(. .. of the Constitu'tion as the impugned order amounts tb a termination • ' of service by way of punishment and an enquiry.should have been held in accordance with the said' constitutional provision. That admittedly having not been done, the impugned order is liable to be struck down. We accordingly set aside the judgment of the High Court and the impugned order dated November 5, 1981 discharging\n\nthe appellant from service. The appellant should no\\\\ be re-· instated in service with the sa.me rank and seniority he was entitled to\n\nbefore the impugned order was passed as if it had not been passed at all. He is also entitled to all consequentiai benefits including the appropriate year.of allotment and the arrears of salary and allowances upto the 'date of his reinstatement. The appeaHs accofdingly allowed.\n\nThe appellant had to face this case just at the ommencement of his career. We ha, ve allowed his claim in the name of the Constitution. This should help him to regain his spirit and also encourage him to turn out to be a public servant in the true sense of that expression.\n\nHaving regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we 'feel that the parties should be directed to bear their own costs. 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Shri Silkh Raj Bahadur, (1969] 3 S.C.C:."}}, {"text": "(1971] 2 S. C.R. 191", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2809, "end_char": 2829, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1967] 2 S. C. R. 496", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3010, "end_char": 3031, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "C1VIL APPELLATE", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3887, "end_char": 3902, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4~5 BC]\n\nC1VIL APPELLATE Jrni.iS; ICTION : Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "K.N. Bbatt", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4120, "end_char": 4130, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K.N. Bbatt for the Appellant. . ....."}}, {"text": "M.S. Gujra/", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4161, "end_char": 4172, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• M.S. Gujra/ and G.S. Narain for the Respondent ."}}, {"text": "G.S. Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4177, "end_char": 4188, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• M.S. Gujra/ and G.S. Narain for the Respondent ."}}, {"text": "VENKATARAMIAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4258, "end_char": 4271, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".The Judgment of the Court was delivered by :\n\nVENKATARAMIAH, J.\n\nJune 22, 1981 was really a bad day f°' the .", "canonical_name": "VENKATARAMIAH"}}, {"text": "A1ioop JaiswaJ", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4331, "end_char": 4345, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "appllant A1ioop JaiswaJ w))n having .. been selecied by the Union\n\nPublic Service Commission for appointment in the Indian Police Service was."}}, {"text": "S.50", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5037, "end_char": 5041, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Venkataramiah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5380, "end_char": 5393, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "JA!SWAL v. oovr: OF INDIA (Venkataramiah J.) .", "canonical_name": "VENKATARAMIAH"}}, {"text": "H Anoop Jai3wal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6965, "end_char": 6980, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sarkar\n\nM nistry of Home Arfairs/Grih Mantralaya\n\nNw Delhi-110001, the 9 Nov. 1981\n\n' ·•\n\nORDER\n\nWhereas the Central Government is satisfied that Shri H Anoop Jai3wal, appoiti; ci to the lndi.an Police Service on pro- •\n\n' 456,\n\nSUPRE'J:E COURT REPORTS\n\n(1984] 2 S.C.R. . '"}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7660, "end_char": 7679, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D'IR.ECTOR\" ; •\n\nOn, receipt of the above order of discharge, the app€llant made a representation on November 14, 1981 to the Government of India ."}}, {"text": "High Court of Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8009, "end_char": 8028, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "he filed a petition under Art.icle 226 of the Constitution before the High Court of Delhi\n\ncontending that the.order of discharge was violative of Article 311(2)\n\na1d Article 1.4 of the Constitution."}}, {"text": "Article 311(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8086, "end_char": 8100, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8106, "end_char": 8115, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "August 30,1982 after", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8217, "end_char": 8237, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "•the High Court at the stage of admission on August 30,1982 after hearing the counsel for the .Union of India."}}, {"text": "Article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8386, "end_char": 8397, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 311(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8961, "end_char": 8975, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s.81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10950, "end_char": 10954, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hyderabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11072, "end_char": 11081, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I made arrangemen_t .to reach Hyderabad l:iefore 8.00 a.m. on 1.6.1981."}}, {"text": "1.6.1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11104, "end_char": 11112, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I made arrangemen_t .to reach Hyderabad l:iefore 8.00 a.m. on 1.6.1981."}}, {"text": "1.6.81", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11434, "end_char": 11440, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to attend the afternoon classes on 1.6.81 which J did. ("}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16510, "end_char": 16518, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT RNPORT.S\n\n[1984] 2 S.C.R.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 16554, "end_char": 16593, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' • 464\n\n'SUPREME COURT RNPORT.S\n\n[1984] 2 S.C.R.\n\nA fate at the G¥mnasium and acting as oile of !"}}, {"text": "Article 311(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17737, "end_char": 17751, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17778, "end_char": 17792, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Union of India has placed before us.all the relevant material including the recommendation of the Directo~ of the National Police Academy that the appellant may be reinstated.·"}}, {"text": "National Police Academy", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17892, "end_char": 17915, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Union of India has placed before us.all the relevant material including the recommendation of the Directo~ of the National Police Academy that the appellant may be reinstated.·"}}, {"text": "June 22, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18730, "end_char": 18743, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "first reply he gave to the Director on being asked about the incident which took place on June 22, 1981, the ppelhnt stated '.I sincer.elv regret ti1e lapse,' Neither in theletter which the Director first wrote to the Central Government, nor in the counter affidavit filed fo."}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18858, "end_char": 18876, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "first reply he gave to the Director on being asked about the incident which took place on June 22, 1981, the ppelhnt stated '.I sincer.elv regret ti1e lapse,' Neither in theletter which the Director first wrote to the Central Government, nor in the counter affidavit filed fo."}}, {"text": "Article 311(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20158, "end_char": 20172, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "November 5, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20547, "end_char": 20563, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We accordingly set aside the judgment of the High Court and the impugned order dated November 5, 1981 discharging\n\nthe appellant from service."}}, {"text": "H.S.K.\n\nA.ppea/", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21398, "end_char": 21413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H.S.K.\n\nA.ppea/ allowed."}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_2_466_475_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "A 466 .\n\nJ. D. SHRIVASTAVA\n\nV •\n\n. . STATE OF M. P. & OTHERS\n\nJanuary 24, 1984\n\n[O. CmNNAPPA REDDY, E. S. VBNKATARAMIAHAND R. B. MISRA, JJ.]\n\n• ·. Fundan1ental,, Rules, Rule 56(3)(a) _Compulsory Ret(rement.::,..;-Adverse entries_. in c?nfidentia/ rePorts relating to a re1n<?te pe_t'.io.d-Reliance. on-Whethf:r v(llid.\n\n. . .\n\nThe appellant\" was a State Judicial Service Officerin the grade of Additional District& s~'>sions J11dgc. Qonsequent up0n the .. decision of the Stat.e Government to reorg\\}nise the Higher Judicial Srvice it was decided that a number of pOs_ts of the cadre of Additional District & Sessiolls Judges be abolished and the incumbents . of those posts be absorbed as District & Sessions Judge\"s. The High Coµrt' at one of the Full. Court meetings held, to screen the Officers in the cadre of Additional District & Sessions Judges, deCidcd to retire the appellant compulsorily on his at taining the age .of 55 years under Rule 56(3)(a) . of the Fundamental Rules. It was also decided not tO recommend him for promotion .. to the cadre Of District and\n\nSessions Judges. the appellant was served With an order of ompu_lsory retirement ·\n\ndated August. 28, 1981.\n\nThe Division' Bench or the High Court dimissed the .appellant:s. wdt petition\n\niinpuging-,_hi~· compulsofy retirement.\n\nIn the appeal to this Court, it was contended that the High Court had n1ad~\n\n- the recOmmendatloii to retire the appellant compulsorily withoUt applying its mind\n\nand thit the decison was based on collateral considerations and was arbitrary. On behalf of-the High Cort it Was contended that\" the personal confidential reCords of the appellant wer~ co'ns!derOO by the Full Court MOOting and the d&:isicin to retire the appllarit under Fundamental Rule 56(3)(a) - was taken after due conside ration of the entire record .\n\nAl_lowing .the appeal:\n\nHEt.D~-: 1. it ;~ld-~ ari act borderiOg on peersity, to dig out old files o find out some matirial to make.all ordciagainst an officer. _Dependen\"ce on entries abOut 20 year~ before the date on which the_decisi.on Of ·,; ompulsory retirement Was takeQ. cannot b~~ Placed ror retiring a person compulsorily, par'ticularly whe~ such persOn .concerned has bOOn prof!lotecl subs.equent tosuch_ entries. [474I:J; 47~A}\n\nD.Ramaswami v. State of Tamil Nadu, {1981] 2 S.C.R. 75 referred to.· ' . ff\n\n2. The\"PoWer to retire a.G.Oveffi.ment servant compulsorily in pllblic. inte reSt in tcfms qf a servi~ r.ule is, absolute provided the authority concerned forms\n\n) .\n\nr I\n\nJ. D. SHRIYASTAVA v. M. P. STATE (Venkatai'amiah, J.) . 467\n\nah opinion bona fide that it was necessary to pass such an Orderin public interest.\n\nBut if such decision was based on collaterel grounds or if the dcision ,; as ~.rbltr<lry, it.is liable to be interfered with by Courts. [469 B-C] ' . . -.\n\n• ·, , '. • I '. ·_ • Union of India v. Col. J.N'. Sinha & Anr., i-1971] 1 S.C.R. 791; Union of India\n\nv. M.E. Reddy & Anr., [1980] I S.C.R. 736; Swami Saran Saksentfv. State of U.P., (1980] 1 S.C.R. f2~ Baldev Raj Chadha v. Union of India & Ors. [1981] 1 S.C.R. 430; and Brij Bihari Lal , Agarwf v. High Court Of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. [1981] 2 S. C.R. 297; referred to. . ' ' .\n\nIn the instant case the High Court relied on some adVerse reffiarks relating to 1959-60 or: .tlieK:abbuts. I twas true that in the early part of the appellant's\" career the .entries did not appear to be quite .satifactory. Some were \"good, some were\n\n'I, . ......._, _nOt good and some wCre of a mixed kind. But being rePortS relating to a remote\n\nperiod, they are not quite relevant for the purpose of. determining whether he should ' be retired complllsofily or not in 1981. The scrutiny should have. bCen Confined to ·\n\nthe reports for about ten years 'prior to ihe dafe on which action wits Proposed to be taken. All the reports except for 1972-73 and 1973-74 were good and. quite satisfactry. Even i_n the cports. of the said years there .was nothing to doubt his inte~ grity. He was punctual. in attending to his oi-k. The reports'for the years 1976-77 .'to 1980-81 speak in, favour Of the appellant a_nd not against him. A perusal of'the said reports showed _that there was nqthing ._against him .. In these circumstances it waS imposib!e to tae the view that the appellant was liable to be compulsorily retired. [470 I;-H] ..\n\n_3.\n\nThq. resolution of 'the High Cqurt recommending tO the Government . that the. appellant should be cotnpulsOfily_ retited, and the in1pugned order passed ui:i..der. Fllndamental_ Rule_ .56(~)(a) are qU!she~. The rsqlution of the High_-Court . that the appellan~ was not fit fo.r promotion to the cadre of .District and Sessions iudges is also qashed .. [ 474 E] ·\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JuruSDJCT!ON ; Civil Appeal No. 3429 of 1982\n\nAppeal by Special leave froni the Judgment and orde~ dated ·. the 29th July, l 982 of the M1dhya Pradesh. High Court in Misc.\n\nPetition No; I )69 ... of 1981. ' , . · ·\n\nG.L. Sooghi a.ncl Aihok Srivastava for the Appellant.\n\nI Di., Y.S. Chitale, Mrs. AK. Verma, D.N. Misra, AM. Dittia and A.K. Sanghi for the Rspondents.\n\n'The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMJAH,\" J.\n\nThe i\\ppellani is a judic'al cfficercf'the ·• Stac of Madiiya Prndesh, , who •. would have ordinarily rnir(d on January 31, 1984 on attaining 58 years of age.\n\nHe was appintcd\n\n. t .\n\n\" A\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n\nas a. Munsiff-Magistrate in the erstwhile State of Bhopal 'in 1953.\n\nOn roorganisation of States on November I, 1956, he became a\n\nmeml'ler of the Judicial .Service of the Staie of Madhya Pradesh.. He\n\nwas promoted as an Additi.onal District& Sessions Judge on January\n\n8, 197?1 and was confirmed in that post with effect from Noveber 25, 1974. Consequent upon the decision of the State Government . to reorganise the Jiigher Judicial Service of the State of Madhya\n\nPradesh in acco.rdance with the advice of the High Curt of Madhya Pradesh; WI posts of the cadre of Additional District & Sessions\n\nJudges came to be abolished and the incumbents of those posts were . to be absorbed as District & Sessions Judges as per. Government\n\nM:emoraildum dated February 24, 1981. On the issue of the said \" ·• Memorandum, the High Court of Madhya Pradesh decided to. screen the officers in the cadre of Additiopal Dislrict & Sessions Judge.s for the purpose of making recommendation to the State Government about the promotion of selected officers to the cadre of District & Sessions Judges, For this plirpose, Full Court Meetings of the Madhya Pradesh High Court were held on February 27 and 28,\n\n1981 and March 1,.1981. The case of.the appellant was also.considered in that connection. It is stated that .at those meetings, the High Court first resolve.d to scrutinise the cases of all the judicial officers .who were to attain the age of 55 years in the year, 1981. fo the course of such scrutiny the High Comt decid.ed on February 27, 1981 to retire the appellant copulsorily on his attaining .the age of 55 years under Rule 56(3) of the Fu.ndamentaLRules. On March J, 1981 it decided not to recommend him for promotion to. the cadre of District & Sessions Judges. Accordingly, the State Government was addressed by the High Court to retire the appellat compulsoriiy.\n\nThe appellant thereafter continued as an Additional District & Sessions Judge until he was served wjth the order of compulsory retireJY.ent dated August 28, 1981. Aggrieved by that order;' the appellant filed\n\n; writ petition before the High Court. The petition was dismiss<d by a Division Bench of the High Court on July 29, 1982. This appeal is preferred by special_ leave against the judgment of the High Court.\n\nClau; e (a) of the Fundamental Rule 56(3) as amended in 1976 \\ which governs.the ca:sc of the appellan~ reads thus:\n\n• \"F.R.56(3)(a) A. doverrunent servant may, in ihe publi~ interest, be retired at any time after he attains the age of fiftyfive years without. assigning aDY reason by giving him a notice in writing.\"\n\nJ. D SHRIVASTAVA v. M. P. STATE (Venkatrnmiah, J.) 469\n\nIt is contended that the. ord.er of compulsory retirement is A unsu; tainable on various grounds and the principal ground urged is that the High Court had made the recommendation to: retire the appellant compulsorily without appl1ing its mind to the case as required by law; that it was a decision .based on collateral considerations and that it was arbitrary. • ·\n\nIt is DO\\; firmly sottied that the power to retire a Government servant \"compulsorily in pub.lie interest in terms Of a scrvie rule is abso.lute providi:-d the authority concerned. for1ns 1.n opinion bol1(l_fide that it is necessary to pass such an order in public interest. . It is\n\n. equally well settled that if &uch decision is based on collateral grounds\n\n0r if the decisio;'l is arbitrarv, it is liable to he interfeied with by courts.\n\nC (See Union of India v. Col. J, N. Sinha & Anr.)1' 1 We have also gone through the following decisions, namely, U1iio11 f India ~- M.E.\n\nReddy & Anr.,''> Swami Saran Saksenil v. State of U.P.,'31 Baldev Raj Chadha v. Union of India & Ors.,'41 Brij Bihari Lal Agarwal v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh & Ors., '\"and J).Ramaswami v.State of Tamii NaJu'\" which have a bearing on the question before us. We shall D no\\v proceed to deal with the facts of the case ih the light of the principles enunciatedin te .above_ decisions.\n\nIn Para JO of the counter.affidavit o[ Shri A\".K. Pandey, Addi- . tional Registrar of the High Court of Madhya \"Pradesh filed before\n\nthi.s Court, it is stated as follows :\n\n\"It is not disputed that Full Court Meeting was held bn._\n\n27th/28t~ February, as well as ht March; 1981 to consider the cases of Additional District & Sessions Judges for promotiti0n in the Higher Judici.al Service. It .is also not disputed that the petitioner stood at serial No. IO in the seniority list of Additional District & Sessions Judges. It is also not disputed that he was confirmed as Additina 1 District & Sessions .Tuige in August,\" 1976. The personal corifidetial record of the petitioner iS placed before this Hon'ble Court and (it) speaks for itself . (Annexure' R-Xl fo XXXVITI).\n\n(1) [1\"971] I S.C.R. 79L\n\n.(2) [1980] I S.C.R, 736.\n\n~3) [1980] I S.C.R. 921.\n\n\"(4) [1981[ 1 S.C.R. 430.\n\n\n- ..\n\nc .\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS . [1984] 2 .s.c.R:\n\n. It is wrong to say that any extraneous consideration operated in .the Full Cour\\ fyleeting against the. petitioner and it is wrong t.b say that the resolutions in the Court Meeting were unjust, arbitrary or malafide. ............ : . .. As already pointed out, the deci9ion was taken in Full Coui't Meeting - after consideation of the entire. re.cord of the petitioneL The decision to retire the petitioner under Fundamentai Rule 56(3) was after due consideratiqn of the entire record . of the petitioner\" (Confidential entries are Annexures R-XT\n\nto XXXVlll).'1 , _,\n\nOq gdlrig through_ the' said counter affidavit we are satisfied that apart from the confidential records, nothing else appears to havi;\n\nbeen relied on by the High Court to reach the decision that the\n\nppellant si10uld be c6mpulsorily retired. We shall now. proceed-to examine the confidential rolls maintained in respct of the appellant.\n\n The Confidential Reports in respect of the appellant are placed before .µs.\n\nTt is sta!ed by the Registrar of the High Court in Para 13 of the col\\nter affidavit that-the appeliant's performance.for 28 years was takeninto consideration for .screening under ::Fundamental .Rule 56(3), . The High Court has relied ;; n some :adverse remarks relating to 1959-60 or theieabouts, It is true that in the. early part of bis .. car, eer, the entries made 'do not appear to be quite satisfactory. They are of varied i<inds .• Some are good: some are not gocd arid some ., are of a mixed kind. But being reports rela.ting to a remote period,\n\nthey are not quite relevant for the puivose o.f determining whether he . should 'be retired compulsorily or not. in th•' year 1981/ as it would l:ie an act bordering on perversit')'to dig out old files to' find ouf so_me material to make an order against an officer. We, therefore; confined our scrutiny to the reports.made in respect of the appellai>t for about . ten years prior to the date on which .action was taken against him lo retire hi in compulsorily. We find that all of the.m except for J 972: 73 and 1973-'74 are goo and quite , satisfactory. Even in 1972-73 and 1973-74 it is stated that there was notl\\ing.to d0Ubt his integrily and .that he was punctual iq ttcndiii-g lt tO Ji5 w_ork.\n\nIt may be noted that the app.illani was.promoted ,\\s a a:n Additional District & Sessions Juige on fanuary 8, 1974 and was ,; Jso confi'rrnced wilh effoct from\n\nNJvembor 25, 1974 by an order passed in 1976. Any adverse report in respect of .an eri.rlie_r .p.ericd uniess it had sonie connectio_n w.ith any event which too_kplace subsequently cannot, therefore, reasonably · form a basis for forming an opini.on about the work of the appellant. - ' ' . . .\n\ni ..\n\nJ. D. SHR.lVASTAVA r. M P. STATE (Venkqtaramiah, J.)\n\n' ~7I\n\n\" We give below a few relevant extractsfrom the Confidential Reports A for the period subsequent to 'March. 31, 1974:\n\nYear : 1975\n\nOn confidential enquiries from the members of the llar and from other sou.rces nothing was found against him in respect of his integrity. During surprise check he was found on the board.· in time.\n\nEnquires from other sources also disdosed that he usually comes in time and does not rise early and engages himself in judicial work. This impressioi:i was ga1hered from judicial diary _also.\n\nAfter scrutiny of the cases, the following impression . was gathered. Knowledgeabout rules and orders, law and procedure is adequate but the number of the interlocutory application is sometimes not entered in the margin of ihe connected•order-sheet in red ink. Judgments are good with proper discJJSSion of evidence. Interlocutory matters are not kept unduly pending for long time. Rules regarding pleadings, and evidence etc. are followed.\n\nPunishments were adequate.\n\nExamination of accused is proper. Charges fralT)ed are proper. .Record is egible. '\n\nControl and supervision over the staff is satisfactory.\n\nJudic.ial diary calls for no particular comments. His rela-- ti\"ons with the Bar are cordial, with no complaints of any\n\nmisbehaviour with any litigants. His average disposal during. the period in question was of very good category.\n\nThere is nothing else to comment in particular..\n\nYear : 1976\n\nKnowledge of law and judicial capacity:\n\nRemarks about his promptness in the disposal of cases :\n\n'Remarks about ftputatio\"n 0f integrity and impartiality : ·\n\nGocd\n\nPromptness satisfactory\n\nNothing was found 'agains\\ . his .integrity or impartiality ..\n\nHe was mostly punctual and\n\n. E\n\nSUPREME COUR'I' REP OR TS [1984] 2 s.c.R.\n\n' t .4.\n\nNet Result.:\n\n' ., . (lid not rise early. Judgments were proper and.contained the required discussion of evidence Charges and examination of accused and issues were. proper. Prom.ptness in framing of ·\n\nissues was marked in recent . months.\n\nControl and super- . vision ove~ the staff was satis-· • factory. Settling dates should not normall 1 he of more than two weeks as was noticed in certain cases. interlocutor¥. matters . !Vere generally not kept 1induly pending.\n\nGood\n\n. Year 1976-77 ··\n\nKnowle.ge of Law and Judicial Satisfactory capacity :\n\nRemarks a bOut his promptness in the disposal of cases : .\n\nPercentage of .average . monthly disposal :\n\nGenerally prompt\n\nBe)1aviour towards members of the.· Cordial F Ba.r and Public:\n\nGeneral Remarks:\n\nNet Result:\n\nSa\\isfactrily managing heavy . and exclusive civil file. Mostl)' .punctual. .\n\nGood\n\nYear 1977-78 ,\n\n: Knowledge of. Law and Judicial\n\n<:apacity:\n\nGocd.\n\nEntry against almost all the\n\n• J .. D. SHRIVASTAVA v. M. P. STATE (Venkataramiah, J.) 473 -. . rnlum.ns in th~ Report-Good A\n\nGeneral Remark\n\nNet Results\n\n Has good grasp -Of facts and . law. Judgments in proper form and well writteri. ..\n\nGood .. •\n\nYear 1979-80\n\n(a) Shri ShJivastava begis his judicial work punctully. at !LOO.AM. and worksthroughout the Court hours. So far, it appears that he has arranged his Cause List judicious.l:t fixing civil work for the day.\n\nThis Judge . understands that there can be no subsequent pleadings ecept by way of amend ment of pleadings. fo other words, he understands the purport of Order 8 rule 9 ond Order 6 rule 7 of the Civil .Procedure Code. He .also understands what 'is pleading i.e.\n\nOrder 6 rule I of the Civil.· Procedure. Cod.e as compared with oral stateme'nt.\n\nHe sq far. appears to be equally conversant with Order 17 rule 1 of the Civil Procedure.\n\nCode i.e .. adjournment is only granted for sufficient cuse ..\n\nHe does fi,,, find any difficulty in applying law relati-ng to pleadings and interlocutory matter>.\n\nSo far, his procedure co.nfornis to .rtiles of pleadings; filing,'tf documents, framing of issues. UnCr fecordlng of evidcnc~.\n\n. .\n\n(b) So far, on the criminal sir.le, he frmes charges with care, records evidence with such care an~ prepares examinaa lion of accused with equal care. . . .' ' . ' '\n\n(c) .So far, he makes a neat .and legible record. He\n\ngnerally su~'erv)ses the_ wofk o~ riiinisterial ta ff.\n\n(d) His judgments, both on .civil and criminal, so far, appear to. be well written.\n\nHe is prompt in .his disposals l1h.Juding doing 1, vork herein: -His \\vork, as a whole, so . far, has been found to be of high quality. He also takes up civil work.\n\nHis relations with the Ba\" so far, app.ear to be cordia I. . .\n\n' (e) The above remarks are subject to thc'O.O. No. 462/C.\n\nR.s/1979 Jabalpur date.d 6.3 .. 80 of th'e High Court .\n\n. .\n\n• . • '\n\nSUPRE\\IE CO'. JTZT RBPORTS\n\n(1984] 2 S.C.R.\n\n(NJte : The Mmo. se:it to the appellant in M1rch, 1.980 only informed him of two remarks-,--(!) that the did not dispose of Sessions trials quickly and (2) that he did not follow the amended provisions µoder Order 39 rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Code. The Memo. also disclosed that the appellant di9 not write judgments iti civil appeals according to the pattern prescribed; that Sessions trials were not conducted\n\nquick; ly ; nd that (he) granted unduly long adjournments of . about a month oi so for examination of accused and defence witnesses. The appeilant sent .a prompt reply to it .on March 28, 1980 refuting the correctness ofthe above remarks. We have gone through the said reply. On going through the facts mentioned therein, we foe! that the remarhagitinst him appear to be tgtally uncharitable.\n\nIt shows that the appellant has disposed of mor~ number at <:ases thc•1 what ordinarily could )le di.sposeci of during the relevant enod. We are not informed of what action was taken on his prayer for expungini the said remarks). ·\n\nYear:. 1980-81\n\nHis out turn during the year was about 200 percent The quality of work may be cl1ssed as good. 'B' category. No specific coplaints we\\e r:eceived aga; nst him about his behaviour or ; ntegri~.\"\n\nThe a hove reports no doupt speak' for themselves as stated in the counter affidavit of the Additional Registrar. But they all speak in j favour of the appellQnt and not against him. A persual of these~., reports shows. that there was nothing against the appellant which necessitated the action which was taken against him .. Jn the state of the above record it was impossible to take the view.that the appellant was liable to be cqmpulsorily retired, unless there was any other cir- ~\\·. cuimtance which was adverse to him. We .have found it necessary to incorporate in this judgment the re!vant confidential remarks in Ii great dct1il only to show that the action of the High Court was not called for.\n\nWe may state here that the learned counsel for the High Court very fairly stated thai there was no other circurostancc again•t the appellant during the period subsequent to )-971' which wopld t support the order of compulsory retirement. 't'rom what has been\n\n. L. stC1ted we find that the decision taken by the High Courf in respect of - the ,,\"ppellant is arbitrary as it was mainly based on :he entries that were made about 20 years before the. date on which the decision was\n\n1. D. SHRIYASTAVA v. M. P .. STATE (Venkatmmiah, J.) 475\n\n~ taken. Dependence on such stale entries cannot be placed forretir, ;, A ing a person compulsorily, particularly when the officer .concerned has been promoted subsequent to such entries,. as held by this Court iu . D. Ramas1vamf's .case (supra). In that case one of us (Chinnappa\n\n( -\n\nReddy, J.) observed thus at pages ~O:\n\n''fn the face of the promotion of the appellant just a few months earlier. and nothing even niildiy suggestive of ineptitude or inefficiency thereafter,-it is impossible to sustain the order of the Government retiring the appellant from service. The iearned Counsel for the State of Tamil Nadu argued that. the. Government was entitled to li'ke intoc-; m:· si4eration the entire history of the appellant including that part of it which was prior to his promotion .. We do not say that the previous history of a Government' servant.should be compietely ignored, once he is promoted. Sometimes past events may help to assess present wnduct. But when there.is • nothing in the present conduct casting any doubt bn tlie wisdom of the promotion, we 0ee no justification for needless • digging into the past.''' · ·\n\nJn the result ihe judgment of the High Court i.s .reversed and the ,\\-. res.olution of .the High Court recommending to the. Government . that the. appellant should be compulsorily retired and the impugned\n\norder passed thereon under Fundamental Rule 56(3) are quashed.\n\n• E -, The. res.olution of the High Cort that the appellant. was not fit for . \\promotion to the cadre of D•stnct& Sessions Judges 1s also quashed.\n\n The High Co4rt should now considet in the light of this decision ·whether the appellant was entitled to be promoted as a District & Sessions Judge as on the date on whih his immediate junior was -j, promoted and make appropriate recommedafon to. the State Govyrn-' F ment.\n\nThe, appollai1t is entitled to all con.sequential financial .and I other henefits as if the order of compufsory retirement had not been passed. ' • ·\n\nThe appeaJ is accordingly allowed with costs.\n\n~ N .. V.K.· Appeal allowed.", "total_entities": 33, "entities": [{"text": "J. D. SHRIVASTAVA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9, "end_char": 26, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "J. D. SHR.lVASTAVA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF M. P. & OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 37, "end_char": 60, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF M. P. & OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "O. CmNNAPPA REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 81, "end_char": 98, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "E. S. VBNKATARAMIAHAND R. B. MISRA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 100, "end_char": 139, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.B. MISRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "1981] 2 S.C.R. 75", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2300, "end_char": 2317, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "1971] 1 S.C.R. 791", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2881, "end_char": 2899, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1981] 1 S.C.R. 430", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3061, "end_char": 3080, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1981] 2 S. C.R. 297", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3150, "end_char": 3170, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "G.L. Sooghi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4930, "end_char": 4941, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G.L. Sooghi a.ncl Aihok Srivastava for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Aihok Srivastava", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4948, "end_char": 4964, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G.L. Sooghi a.ncl Aihok Srivastava for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Y.S. Chitale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4992, "end_char": 5004, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Y.S. Chitale, Mrs. AK."}}, {"text": "AK. Verma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5011, "end_char": 5020, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Y.S. Chitale, Mrs. AK."}}, {"text": "D.N. Misra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5022, "end_char": 5032, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Verma, D.N. Misra, AM."}}, {"text": "AM. Dittia", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5034, "end_char": 5044, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Verma, D.N. Misra, AM."}}, {"text": "A.K. Sanghi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5049, "end_char": 5060, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dittia and A.K. Sanghi for the Rspondents."}}, {"text": "VENKATARAMJAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5127, "end_char": 5140, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMJAH,\" J.\n\nThe i\\ppellani is a judic'al cfficercf'the ·• Stac of Madiiya Prndesh, , who •. would have ordinarily rnir(d on January 31, 1984 on attaining 58 years of age.", "canonical_name": "VENKATARAMJAH"}}, {"text": "High Court of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6177, "end_char": 6205, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the issue of the said \" ·• Memorandum, the High Court of Madhya Pradesh decided to."}}, {"text": "July 29, 1982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7541, "end_char": 7554, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petition was dismiss<d by a Division Bench of the High Court on July 29, 1982."}}, {"text": "Reddy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8962, "end_char": 8967, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J, N. Sinha & Anr.)1' 1 We have also gone through the following decisions, namely, U1iio11 f India ~- M.E.\n\nReddy & Anr.,''"}}, {"text": "A\".K. Pandey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9393, "end_char": 9405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Para JO of the counter.affidavit o[ Shri A\"."}}, {"text": "J. D. SHR.lVASTAVA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12993, "end_char": 13011, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "i ..\n\nJ. D. SHR.lVASTAVA r. M P. STATE (Venkqtaramiah, J.)\n\n' ~7I\n\n\" We give below a few relevant extractsfrom the Confidential Reports A for the period subsequent to 'March.", "canonical_name": "J. D. SHR.lVASTAVA"}}, {"text": "Venkqtaramiah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13027, "end_char": 13040, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "i ..\n\nJ. D. SHR.lVASTAVA r. M P. STATE (Venkqtaramiah, J.)\n\n' ~7I\n\n\" We give below a few relevant extractsfrom the Confidential Reports A for the period subsequent to 'March.", "canonical_name": "VENKATARAMJAH"}}, {"text": "Venkataramiah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15817, "end_char": 15830, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Entry against almost all the\n\n• J .. D. SHRIVASTAVA v. M. P. STATE (Venkataramiah, J.) 473 -. .", "canonical_name": "VENKATARAMJAH"}}, {"text": "ShJivastava", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16024, "end_char": 16035, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Good .. •\n\nYear 1979-80\n\n(a) Shri ShJivastava begis his judicial work punctully."}}, {"text": "Order 8 rule 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16375, "end_char": 16389, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Order 6 rule 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16394, "end_char": 16408, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Order 17 rule 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16615, "end_char": 16630, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Order 39 rule 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17930, "end_char": 17945, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "March 28, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18317, "end_char": 18331, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeilant sent .a prompt reply to it .on March 28, 1980 refuting the correctness ofthe above remarks."}}, {"text": "cl1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18860, "end_char": 18863, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "D. Ramas1vamf", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20436, "end_char": 20449, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D. Ramas1vamf's .case (supra)."}}, {"text": "Chinnappa", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20491, "end_char": 20500, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case one of us (Chinnappa\n\n( -\n\nReddy, J.) observed thus at pages ~O:\n\n''fn the face of the promotion of the appellant just a few months earlier."}}, {"text": "State of Tamil Nadu", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 20820, "end_char": 20839, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The iearned Counsel for the State of Tamil Nadu argued that."}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_2_476_494_EN", "year": 1984, "text": ".. ..B\n\n. A. S. PARMAR & OTHERS\n\n.-sTATE OF HARYANA & OTHERS\n\n''January 24, 1984\n\n[E. s. V~NKATARt\\MfAH AND R. B. MlsM.'JJ.]\n\nConstitution of .lndfa, Artie/~ 3 I l a11d )09 proviso thcrtl<>-Prumation of (mpolyeufrom Class 11 service to i:asst surkt In the P.W.D.(Irrlgotiun hranth~\n\nPun}ab-Poss .. sion of a •lt•cree Is noJ a pre-.requlslte fur pvrmotion fiom doss lito class I itnlct!t-P/If!]ab sen•lce of Englnetr Cluss I, P. W.O. (lrr/gillian Branth) Ralu, 1964 Rule 6(a), lnterpretalion of\n\nPromot/Qn of Assistant Enxlnnrs In claM II •crvkt, nut pusscssiltlf Ut!lfT\" to til# cadu of Eucutive Elrg/Jrccrs Cla.u I, but S<Jtlsf)'lng the requiremtll/s ufclause(b) ·· •f Rule 6 of class I Rule.t-Wlr<th; r In onid or whrther Rule 6 (u) will be llpp/icubk- Compor/om betwwt P\"n]ab Stnic11 of Enginursc/uss /{ P.W.D. (Bui/JilflJ an<!) Roods Brandt) Rules 1965, Rule.r 6 & 7 wtrll Punjab Sen•fre of Elf[llneeTJ dos./.P.\n\nW.D. (Bui/Jin¥s' and Roods OrOII<h) Rules 6 J.a) and 6 (6).. ·\n\nEil; bt Officers including the appcllanlS cntt:rcd th.e class II scrvkc in &<.'CUr• danc:ewitb the Punjab Service of Engiac.:rs class U, P.W.D. (Building$ and !Wad!\n\nBranch) Rules, 196$. They ora all holden of diplomas in Enainccriog. TheY fitn ' promott:d •longwith nino others from 'the cla:.s I( scri.e to the class l seoi•-e by\n\nan ordor da!ed May 7, 1981, passed by tho Haryna State Government on at~\n\npornry basis aubject IP approval of the Haryana Public Service Comnthsioo. ln tho case of these officers, the GoverllJllent of llaryuna pusSc:d an onlcr rda!in& !be 'condition of dcan:c q.ulifw:atlon in public interest. The above orders of protoolioo\n\nin so far as lhc>e persons were c.onocmed were qucstloncd by eleven oflktrs in ~. class ll service, who were below th= in the gradation list uf lho class 1,1 bavina eott:red that service In 1972 In tho writ petition out of which lhcsc appe:l~ arise. Tho officers who lilo<l th.o uid plltion wom all huh.k'rs of degr~ in E11$1\n\nnoerin~. Their principal c.ontt:ntioo w; u tl>at an ofliccr in tho? cfilM II se.rvicc co~J 1101 be promottJ tu the cla.n J \"\"rvice unl011s bo po=sed 11 degrco In Enainct:n,; J as prcri)led by Rule 6(a.l o r tho Punjab ScrviC<~ of I!nghers, cW.. J, P.W.D. (ll\"\"\"' illl' and Roads Hrancbl ftula, 1960 whil:h • ovcrncd the rcc:cuitn..:nt to tbecld • . • n~· to r service In the State or llaryana and the n:luxu, jOII of that requirement a \\llO bavo been ordered by the Statt:· Governtrk!nt In exercl$0 of the p<.>l''tl undtt ch 1 the proviso to R ulc 6 (b) in the c..<;<: of tho ufiiccrs whose pro otl ans had beeP ~~ lcnatd 'IW\\ lllc&nland .void. The l'unjab & Hnryana Hi~:h Court acceP_red the al\n\nntention and di.mi,..-J tbe pctitiun. Hence the appeals after obtaulfDI IPI\"' . f:c*vc of the Court,\n\nAllowla tho a:>peals the .Court,\n\nH!!LD : 1.1. A 4:sroe is not a po-rcquisitc for beloa promoted from the dut II aervk:o t.o the eta.. 1 scrvico:. [493 01\n\n~ --\n\n....\n\n) . . ~. ·\n\nW\"',\n\nA. s. PARMAR. v. HARYANA 477 .\n\n 1.2. A comparison between the 1956. Rules and tho. 1964 Rules makes it' clear that there was no insistance upon the qualification of a degree in the said 1956.\n\nRules in th.e case of the promoteedrom the class II service . . When the 1964 Rules of the Irrigation Branch; class i were promulgated, the pattern of the Rides\n\nA ..\n\n.was changed. While doing so, in the new Rule 6, the word ''directly\" which was in the old Rule 7 was no doubt omitted but the new Rule 6 referred to both .\n\nkinds of appointment namely direct .. recruitment and. promotiofroni the cla.ss II. serviee. It was not a case of just repwducing the old Rule 7 and omitting one word\n\ntheefrom, : but the introd~tion of a new Rule 6 with a different st; ucture. [ 493A-Bl\n\n' . ' O.P: Bhatia & Anr. v. siate of Haryalla & Ors .• .ILR£1980]1 Punjab & Haryana\n\n470. overruled.\n\n1.3. In these cases, the State Government having first consumed Rule 6 of the class I Rufes reqUired that a promotee should also have a degree, tried to relax that condition by making orders relaxing as it found that' its construction had led to injust results: In view of the.fact that the question of interpretation of New Rule (>of the clasS I Rules was raised, @hd serv:ice Rule 6. (a) of the class I Rules is ; not applicable to the class II officers who are to be promote.d to the class I service, the .\n\nquestion wheter the order of relaxation made in the case of promotees is validly passed or not. becomes twllesi. [493.E; 494~]\n\n2. ( It is indisputble that if .the Govrnment' wishes to appoint i:>nly hoi del'S of degrees fo the class I service •. it QtaY do so by proulgating appropriate rules. That power is beyond question, and classification on the bas.is of' educational qualifications of officers belong\\ng to'a cadre for purposes of promotion to a higher. cadre is permissible. But, the. class I Rules as they now exist do .not debar the pr~-· motion of an Assistant Engineer in the class II service who does not possess a degee to the cadre of ExecutiveEngineers even when he.satistles the requirements of clause.\n\n(b) o'f Rule 6 of the. 9lass I Rules and is selected by the Public Service Co~Ssioo. ·\n\n[493GH] . . 2:2. Rule 6 of the class J Rules treats the. possession of a degree plus the selection at the competitive examination and t.he passing of the departmental examination after appointment as sufficient for gettihg into the cadre of Assistant Exe cutive Enginc<,:rs or to thG, cadre of Executive Engineers when. direct recruitment is made to . those posts and the experience . in the class rr Servic.C for a .mipimum period\n\nof eight years plus the passing of the departmental examinations before promotion\n\n F of an Assistant Engineer in the Class 1I Service as sufficint qualification for promotio}l.to the cadre or Executive Engineers. [487 E-FJ '\n\n • 2.3 . The distinctio~ between t)le two mthods of filling the posts of Executive Engineer by p(omoticinis clear: Tf that post is to. be filled up by. promoting a~ Assis:. . tant Executive Engineer; the Assistant Executive Engineer, concerned should poss .\n\ness five years expel'iencc and should have PasSed the Departmclital.Examination prescribed by Rule 15 of the Class I RUles. If that ))Ost'is.to be filled up by p'romo-\n\nG . tion Qf an Assistnt Engineer in the cia~ II Service, th~ A?sista.nt Engineer to be promoted should possess eight years experience in the Class 11 Service and should have passed the Departmental Examination prescribed by Ruie 15, :rhat means . that whereas an stant Executive Engineer .who is a holder of a degree needs have . only ~e years' experience in the .Public Works Department, an Assistant Engineer. • in the <:lass II Service who m;:y or may not possess a degree should have eight years' H e;'tpcrience. in the P!!blic Works Dep!lrtmont for being proofed to the cadre ·f . , . . . ..\n\n• . . 478\n\nSUPREME•. COURT REPORTS\n\n[1984} 2 S.C.R.\n\nA Executive. Engineers.'This extra expenence of three years appears to have been treated as being sufficient to make good the deficiency, if any,. that may a rise by .reason of the Assistant. Engineer in the Class II Service possessing only a diploma • and not a degree. [487 l:t; 488 A-C1 ·\n\n.~.4. In the circumstances it could not have been the intention of the rule\n\nB.\n\n making authority tha~ no person without a degree should be allowed to enter the Class 1 service_ If the construction placed by the petitioners in the writ petition and tlie Government is accepted every diploma holder who is an Assistant Engineer. would have to retire only as a Class II Officer and cannot hope to become an Executive Engineer till his retirement.\" If that was the intentiofi, Rule 6 (b) of th'e Class I Rles would have contained necessary words conveying that meaning. Clause\n\n. (b) of Rule 6 appears to be exhaustive of the qualifications of the Assistarit Engineers .who can seek promotion from the Class II Service to the Class 1 Servic~; So Rule 6 of the Class I Rules will re<~.d in so far as .the promotees are concerned as nq person shall be appointed to the Service unless in the case of an appointment by promotion has elght years completed service)n Class II and ha.s passed the PrC!fes- .sional Examination of the department as provided in Rule 15\" andclause (a) of Rule 6 sbuld be read as being applicable to the other mode o.f recruitment. [490 B.Dl'\n\n3. In such a case, it cannot _be said that the exPtirtncss of the Class 1 Service would very much suffer if persons without degr\"s .but with only diplomas are alloWed to get into it. In administrative an~ professional services a combination of. high ed1,1cational qualifications and long experience is always preferred so that the\n\nsrvices may be efficient by each of them supplementing the other. Experienced administrators have opined that in the higher cadres of services high educational ' .qualifications alo~eor long experience alone would not be in the' interests of the public. In order to see that there is no lack of proficiency in the hight; r post in the Class I Service, Rule 5(2) of the Class I Rules expresslyprovides thavecruitment to the Service shall be so regulated that the number of posts filled by promo~ tion from the Chiss IT Service. shall not exceed fifty per cent of the nwnber of posts in the Class 'I Serv.ice excluding the posts of Assistant Executive Engineers. It provides fot a healthy blend of.the two classes. The effect of Rule 5(2) is that more th.an fifty per cent of the Class I Srvice posts would always be held by direct recruits because the strength of promotees from . the Class II Service cannot be more than fiffty per cent of the total strength of the Class I Service minus the number ot'Assistant Eecutive Engineers .. The promo tees from the Class II Service will, therefore, always be less than fifty per cent of the total strength of the Class I Service. Even amongst them 26 out of.40 are graduates because of Rule 6 of the Clas!; Il Rules which prescribes the quota of direct recruits who should always be the holders of degrees. So diploma holders who may get into the cliss I Service by promotion will be only 14 out of 40 promotees. Therefore it cannot be said that the 28 diploma holders with the minimum length of experience prescribed by clause (b) fRule <i of the aass I Rules who are selecteu by the Public Service Commission on the basis of merit and suitabulity (see Rule 8 (4) of the Class I Rles) and with the educational qualifications they may possess as prescribed by the Class -u Rules would dilute the Class I Service so much that the efficiency of the Class I Service would go down to. such an extent that the Class I Service will become unequal to the tasks to be performed collectively by the entire service. Further, if a ClP.ss II.officer js found wanting in merit and is othei:wjse unsuitable, he would not be selected by the Public . Service Commission. This is not like a nurse in an operation theatre carrying out. surry. Nor is it like a laboratory assistant teaching stro-physics. [488D-Ii;489A-B; F-G] . . .\n\n- . \"\n\n,. . . ..\n\nr .,\n\n. . ..\n\nA• S. PARMAR v. HA.RYANA (Venkataramiah, J.) 479 ·\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION :.Civil Appeal Nos. 10585 &·. ift.. 10586 of 1983\n\n1t... . •\n\nAppeals by. SpeCial leave from the Judgment and Order dated the )rd Match, 1983 of the Punjab & Haryana High Court hf Writ Petition No. 2018 of 1981.\n\n. .\n\nF.S. Nariman anq P.C. Bhartari for the Appellant in CA.1058.5/83 ).\n\n. , . .. . .\n\nP.p. Rao ad Prem Malhotra f0rthe Appellant inCA.i0586(83.\n\n' • I '• y-- _.. \\ . . K.G. Bhagat, Add!. Solh; itor General and R. N.'Poddar for the State of Haryana.\n\nC \"'\n\nS.K. Mehta, P.N. Puri, M.K. Dua and EMS Anam for Respondents in Both the Appeals.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delive, red by\n\nVENKA.rARAMIAH, J.\n\nThese appeals are filed against the judgment • dated March, 3, 1983 in Civil Writ Petition No. 2018 of 1981 on the file of the P_unjab and Haryana Hig~ Court quashing the prootion of eight officers of the Class II Engineering ervice of the Haryana\n\nPublic Works Department (Buildings and Roas Branch) (hereinafter. referred to as 'the Class II Service') as Executive Engineers in the \"' .. Haryana Service of Engineers, Class I, Public y.rorks Department.\n\n\\ ·(Buildings and Roads Branch) (ereinafter referrd to as 'the Class I Service'). The said officers are S.L. Gupta, I.C. Dewan, S.K. Chopra,\n\nBodh Raj, A.S. Parmar, O.P. Gupta,. Sumair Chand Jain and G.L.\n\nSharma. They entered the Class II Service in. accordanc~ with the .\n\nPunjab Service of Engineers, Class II, P.W.D. (Buildings and Roads\n\n' F.\n\nBranch) Rules, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Class II Rules')\n\n( . on the dates mentioned aganst their names in the following. table:\"\n\nName\n\n1. S.L. Gupta\n\n2. I.e. Dewan\n\n3 .. S.K. Chopra '\n\n4~ Bodh Raj\n\nDate of entry \"int9 Class II Service\n\n19.8.1969 29.1.1970 29.1.1970. 14.8.1969\n\n; .\n\nS. No. tn the gradation list of' .G Clas-s II Service\n\n54 68 63 \"H 65\n\n480 SUP~BME COn, T REPORtS ·\n\n' . !\n\nA s. A.S. Pamar\n\n6. O.P. Gupta\n\n7. Sumair Chand Jain 8.. o.L. Sharma\n\n20.2.1970. 14.8.19()9 10.4.1970\n\n9.4.1970\n\n66 70 71 72\n\nThey are all holders of diplomas in Engineering. They do not . u possess a degree in Engineering. They were promoted alongwith nine -.others from the Class II Service to the Class l Service by an order\n\n... dated May 7, 1981 pass~~ by the Haryana State ~Government on a . \"'-\n\ntemporary basis subject .to .approval of the Haryana Public Service Commission .. In the case of these officers, the Government of Haryan~ -· . passed an order relaxing the condition of degree qualific_at'iot1 in public .~ .\n\n. C interest. The .abo,.ve .order of promotion !rtso far as .these persons. ._ were concerned was questione<i by eleven officers in the Class II Service, who were below them in the gradation list of the Class II Service, having entered that service in 1972 in the writ peition out of which these appeals arise, The officers \\YhO filed the said petition' were .. )- all holders of degrees in Engineering: Their principal contention was D that an officer in .the Class n Service could _not. be promoted to the .\n\nClass I Service unless he possessed a degree in Engineering as prescibed by Rule 6(a) of the Punjab Service of Engineers: Class I, P.W.D .• (Buildings and Roa9s Branc.h) :Rules, 1960 (herei'!af\\er referred to as . 'the Class I Rules') which gover~ the recruitment to the Class I Service\n\nin the State of Haryana and the relaxation of that .requirement alleged\n\n E to have been ordered by the State Government in exerCise of the power under the. proviso to Rule 6(a) . of the Class I Rules in the cases of the _officers whose promotion lia_d been challenged was illegal f and void:. [t was, therefore, urged that the promotions of the said persons should be quashed. The State Goverrunent and the offiters .\n\n whose promotions had been callenged stated that the order of relaxa- tion was jutified in the circumstances of the case artd the promotions were not liable .to be annulled.. .The question: whether the qualifica- . t tion of a degree in Engineering was necessar; y or not in the case of officer.s iti-the Cla, ss II Service for promoting them to the Glass I Service • . was; however, not raised before .. the High. Court.. After hearing the parties, the High Cout held that the order of relaxation' passed by the .. G . State Government was unsustainable and hence the impugned pro- 1 motions were liabie to be. set a_side. Accordingly the writ petition t • was allowedquashing the impugned promotions. Aggrieved by: the J judgment of the High Couit;. these appeals have 'been filed by special\n\nleave of this. Court. . il ... ..\n\nCivil Appeal No. 1058.5 of 1983 is filed by A; S. Parmar, I.C ..\n\n, . • ·•\n\n-~ -\n\n; ..\n\nAs. PARMAv . - HARYANA (Venkataramiah, J.) 481 \\.\n\n •Dewan and S.K. Chopra. Civll Appeal No. 10586 .Of 1983 is filed by S.L. Gupta-, O.H:Gupta and'Svmail Chand Jain. Bodh Raj and G.L. Sharma h~.e already retired from snvice. Sumair Chand Jain . is stated to have died in May, 1_983 after the_ special Leave Petition \\\\:as\n\nfiled.· When the spe<; ial Leave Petitons out of. which these appeals arise came up for orders on Marc}l 23, 1983;. a Bench of this Court consisting of .three -learned Judges (A.P. Sen, Venkataramiah and _ R.B. Misra, JJ) TeJt.that:Ru!_e 6(a) of the Class I Rules was prima facie\n\n-B\n\nnot applicable to promotions made 'from the Class .n Service to the Class I service and, therefore, specifically. raised the .said question. and\n\ndirected -the parties inch1ding t.he State Government to address the Court on it.. Then on November 25, 1983, a Bench of two Judges. ..., . (A .. P. Sen and vnkatarmiah, JJ) _after hell-ring all the parties granted . C special leave to appeal to this Court limited t(i the qustion , whether -...this was a case of direct recruitment to tl-ie Class! Service and therefore,\n\n whether Rule 6(a); of the Class I. R!Jies ws a-pplicable,_ on-the assump~ : tion that if it was a promotion from the. Class II Service to tb.e Clas 1\n\nService, Ru.le -~(a)· would not be applicale. It should be mentione~ .• here .that this. q_Llestion was not argued .before the High Court. apparently because of the decision-in O.P. J3hatiu & Anr. y. State of Hatyana\n\n&' Ors: <I lin whicf1 a similar qtiestim1 had arisen under lhe Rules appli~ cab!{ to the , Irrigation Banch of the Harya Public Works Dpart~\n\nrrient. The only point now argued before us relates to the applicability of Rtile 6(a) ofthe Class I Rules to the pt:-omotions referred to above.\n\nIn ottler to determine the said question it is necessary t~ refer bri.efly to some of the provisions of the Class II Rules and of the Class !- Rules. · .. ·\n\n-'D\n\nRule 6 of the Cl<iss II Rules provides that recruitment to the Class II Service for cadre and ex•cadre posts should be made against F a lot of 40posts in the following proportions : 0) d(ret recruitment-'- . 26-posts, (ii) promotion from the me.I?J.bers of Punjab P.W.D. (B & R)\n\nSectional Officers (Engineering) Service:-8 posts,· (iii) promotion from draftsmen member.s of the Draftsmen and Tracers Service-2 . pots, (iv) promotion from members of the Punjab P. W.D. (B & R) . ·\n\nSectional Officers (Engineering) Service. and the Draftsmen members G of the Draftsmen and Tracers Service and possessing qualificatins . • prescribed in Appendix 'B' -of the Cl, ass II Ri.lles;-4 posts. Rule 7 of the Class II Rules prescribes the qualifications for entry .into Class\" II Serv_ice. -It .reads: · · H\n\n(1) LLJ.ll980 (I) Ptinjab.and Haryana 47o: , .... ·\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984]2 s.c.R.\n\n\"(7) Qualifications : No person shall be appointed. to the 4 iervice unless he :- \"' . -\n\n(I) in the case of person appointed by di.rect appointment.\n\n(a) possesses. one of the degnies of a recognised u_niversity .or. other qualification prescribed in Appndix '.B'. . . .\n\n(b) obtains from the Standing Medical Board a certificate of mental and physical fitness after being examined in accor-\" dance with the regulations prescribed in Appendix 'C' and is ·\n\nconsidered by the Medical. Authority to be' fit in all respects for active outdoor .duties; • . . . .\n\n(c) is a person with a satisfactory character and antece- - dents, verification . in respect of which shall be arranged. ·· through appropriate Government agency except in case where . such verification may have already been made at the time of\n\nhis entry into Government service.\n\n(2) . In the case of appointment y promotion from sources 2 aud 3 under rule 6(1) is a member of the Punjab . PWD (B&R) Sectional Offices .(Engineering) Serv1ce, or a Draftsman member of the B&R Branch Draftsmen and\n\nTracrs Service and hs put in a service of ten years; •\n\n(3)(i) In case of the appointment by. promotion from source 4 under nle 6(1) is a member of the Punjab PWD (B&R) Branch Draftsmen & Tracers' Sectional Officers Engineering Service or a Draftsman member of the B&R Branch Draftsmen and Tracers Service.\n\n(ii) Possesses any of th~ quaiifi.cations included m Appendix 'B' and has put in five years service tn case he possesses , A.M.I.S. qualifications and two years service in case he is. a degree holder.\n\n(4) In case of appointment by transfer, possesses the qualifications prescribed for the members of the service.\n\n(5) Hs not more than one wife iivi~~ or in. the case of womu, isat married to a person already having a wife living .\n\n~ -\n\n) ;.\n\nY . .. 4\n\n~ \\\n\nA. S• PARMAR v. :HARYANA (Yenkataramiah, J.) 483\n\n'Provided that the Government may if satisfied .that there\n\n.'re special grounds for doing so, exempt aJ; ly person from the ·\n\noperatiov of this clause.\" .\n\nIf is thus seen that in the Class II Service 26 out of 40 vacancies are filled up by direct recruits who are holders of degrees in Engineering of recognised unive-rsities or o'ther .equivalent qualifications. 10 vacancies are filled up by promotion from soures (2) a'nd (3) ?f Rule 6(1) ofthe Class II Rules 6f members who have put in ten years of service and the remaii1ing 4 vacancies are to be filkd up by promotions-from the fourth source referred to in Rule 6(1) of jhe Class II 'Rules of persons who possess the prescribed qualifications and'have\n\nput in five years or two years service, as the ca'se my be. The. direct recrujtment is made on the basis of a competitive_ examination held by • tlie State Public Service (:ommison and promotions are-made on the basis of recommendations made by a Selection c ommittee presided\n\nover by the Chairman or a Member o(the Public Sen ie Commission\n\n01~ the basis of merit and suitability withdue regard 1.o sciority. ·The members of the Class II Service are designated as Assistant Engineers (See Rule 4 of the Class II Rules) and they are officers. incharge of sub divisions or incharge of po'sts of equal responsibility in the . Public Works Department (Building and Roads Branch). They are\n\nGazetted 0 meers.\n\nW; shall now proceed to deal with the .Class I Rules. The Ciass l Service comprises of four cadres.:_Asslstant Executive Engineers, Executive Engineers, Superintending Egineers and Chief Engineers (Rule 3). A 'member of service' . means an officer appointed sub- stantiveJy .to a cadre post and includes (a) in the cas~ of direct app.oint- ·· ment an officer on probation or sucli an officer .whO having successfully_ • completed his. probll-tion .awaits appointment to a cadre post and in the case of appointment by transfer an officer who is _on probation or who having successfully completed his probation awaits appointment to a cadre post provided such officer does not have a liep. on a substantive p::lstin any Gov~:rnmcnt Department (Rule- 2(12)). 'Assistant'\n\nExecutive Engineer' mfans a methber of the service in the junior scale of pay. (Rule 2(2}). All thers in the Class I Seryice are in the senior scale 'or in a higher scle. Rule 5 of the~ Class l- Rules provides that the recruitment to' Class J Service ohall be. m de by the\n\nGov~men' in any one or more of the f9Iiowing methcds (i) ~Ydirect appbmtment, (ii) by transfer of an <;>fficer already in_the serv1ce. of a\n\n_Stat~ Government or of he U niori or (iii) by pl;'omotion from . Class li\n\nSrvJce. All first direct ppointments to the Class I Service can be only to the posts of Assistant xecutive Engineer (Rule 5(4))..\n\nAJJ.\n\n. A .\n\nSUPR!!ME COURT REPORTS lJ984] 2 S.C.R.\n\nA . officer promoted from the.Ciass II Service has to be ren)ited to the\n\ncadre of Executive Engineers (Rule 5(S)). • The po.sts of Executive\n\n:. Engineers a.n .be filled up by promotio.n or Assistant Executive Engi- . neers also (Rule 9). 'Direct appointment' means an appointment by\n\n' open competiionbut does not i.Jiclude:(a) an appointment by promotion and (b) an appointnl.ent y ransfer of an officer already. in the 8 service of a State .1Jovernment or~ ot the Union (Rule. 2(7)). The Explamition.to Rule 2(7) provides that a Class U officer. who enters the Class I Service by open wmpctitive selection shalJ,.fot th<; purposes ·\n\nof. Class I Rl; lles, 'be deemed to have entered tl1e Class I Service by direct appointment. This :means that a membr of the Class II' Sendee can either be recruited directly to the cadre of Assis.tant Execu-·· C . tive .ngineers . Cvidc. Rule 5(4)) or proino.ted .to the cadre of Bxecutiv.e\n\nEngineers (vide Rule 5(5)). : Now we set out below Rule 6 of. the Class I Rules \\vhich lays ow~ ttl~ qu'llifitations for enterfng tl1e Cfass 1\n\n• F\n\n-Service. Rule .6 reads : . . ..\n\n;,6: Qualifica.tions .. .-:.Noperon siHill be appoi, Jted tl) the Service, unless . he- .\n\n(a) possesses one of the Unive(sity. Degrees or other qualifications prescrjbedin 'Appendix B of these rules : Provided thai Government may waive this qualification. in the case of a particular officer belonging to• Class TJ Service:, .\n\n. (b) iri. the cas~ of an appoi.ntment by promotion from ClasslT Set vice has eight jears completed service in Class IT; :and has passed the Profssional Examination of the Dcpar~- ment as provided in rule 15 infra; . . .\n\n(c) beinga person to. be appoi.nted to the service by direct recruitment, ob.tains from the Standing Medic~ I Board acertificatin of mental and ·. physical fitness after being examined in aco rdance with . the regulations. prescribed in\n\nApp~ nCl.ix C and i's consiered hy the Medical Athority to b:: fit in all respects for active out(loor cl.uties; ·\n\n (d) is a _person \\jtha sa•isfnctory character and antec dents, verification in r_espcct or which . shall. be l?rranged :· .through appropriate Government Agency, except in cases.\n\nwhre sucli. verificatiGn ll1CJY have alr\\'acl.y been made at the tim\\; of his entry into Govc.rni.,:r.t servie ;\n\n'( .\n\nI ,;\n\n. ~\n\n..... ..\n\n• t\n\nA. :S PARMAR V. HARYANA (Venkataramiah,. J.) 485\n\n(e) has not more than one wife living or, in .the case of a woman, is not ma:rried to a person already.havinga wife living;\n\n\"· ' .\n\nProvided that Government may, if satisfied that there are special grounds for doig so, exempt any person fro in the .\n\noperation ... of this condition.\" ·\n\nClause (a) of Rule 6 ot the 'Cias_s I Rules says that no person\n\n; . shall be appointed to the Service unless he possesses one o~ the University degrees or other qualifications prescribed in Appendix ·of the Class I Rules. It is further provided therein that Government may ·\n\nwaive this qualification in the case of a particular officer belonging . rto the. €lass II Service .. Clause (a) of Rule 6 no doubt applis t9 all , . ~\\ .· direct recruitments. If a Class II Officer ee'ks to enter tb.e Class I' • .\n\nService by direct 'n!crifment i.e. by recruitment by open competitiQn as providd by the Explanation to Rule 2(7), he should possess a degretis provide!i in Rule 6(a) unless under the proviso to. Rule 6(a) Government waives the aid qualification in his case~ A direct recruit has also t_o satisfy the condition in clause (c) of Rule 6 which deals with the product!on. of a l)lCdtca] certificate aS provided there_in and the condition in clause (d) of Rule 6 which provides for the verification of , his charater. and antecedents except where uch verjficatin may have already J)een made at the time of his' entry into Government\n\n-t 8\n\n service: He should alsb ot suifer from . the disqualification men,· -\n\n-+- tioned in clause (e) ofRuJe6. A direct.recruit shall also have'to comply with Rule 15 of the. Class I Rules .which provides that unless he has not already done so, he should pass such departmental examina~ tion nnd within such period as .may be prescribed_by the Go:vernment.\n\n. .\n\nRule 6(b) of the Class I Rules provides that \"in the case of an appointment by promotion/ram Class II Service (the officer) has eight\n\n-~ . _years completed service in Class Jl and has passed the professional\n\nexamination of the /Jepartment .as proyided ili Rul~ 15\"~ The question is whether an officer in the . Cias~ II Service should Satisfy both the qualification mntioned in clause (a) and the qttalific.itions mentioned\n\n'in clause (b) of'Rule 6 ofthe Class I Rules or he shcu\\\\ satisfy oniy 'the qualificc; tions under ylause (b) for purposes of promotion tQ the\n\nClass I Service. If clause {b) of Rule 6 .had contained tl1c words 'also' or 'in addition to what is contained in clause (a)' or ny other word or wo.rds c'onveying tl}at meanit)g, there. would have: been no difficulty in construing that clause as'then it woulct have c!carly .meant that an officer in the Class II Sericc who seeks promotic'n tq,· the cadre of. Executive Engineers should, possess a degree as provided in\n\n. I\n\n.. , fl\n\n.:: ... ~~--=-- ·~~:\"'- ~:...·:.. ~- 486\n\n. . SUPREME COURT RIJPORTS\n\n(19S4\n\n.l\n\nA laue (a) .unless it has peen waivcd hy' the Government a;,~\n\n::c.a. 1\n\nalo 'sati,; fy the .:onditions mentioned in clause (b). But we oQ~Id · find any such words in clause (b) o.f Rule 6 o! the Class~ Rule~. Cia t {b) of Rule 6 of the Class I Rules opens W!th the words 'in th u .. ~\n\n. .\n\nII S • h ntlt(d B by pr,, m:Jtwn. f rom he Class . erw; c to t c. cadre of E., cuti~\n\no~ an appointmcndt ~~ ?romo1tion .ffrom ClasshJT Service'. !ted~~ . {I with a separate an utsl!net c ass o persons w o :rrc to be rcc .\n\nEngineers. The questton whether aU the clauses In Rule 6 .hould b: read cumulatively or sparately d~?end~ upon the structure r.f the sentences and the contcn1s of the.ddfcrcnt clauses. Ttl Rule 6. l\\1: <!-> not have the word 'and' used at the end of any of the clauses (a) to (d) . . clause (e). being the last one. Clause (c) of Rule 6 d•!als with only C dii!ct recruits and d'JCS not apply to promotccs and that is cle5r by its languigc. Clause (d) of Rule. G-app!ies only to direct recruits\n\nwho enter the . service for the first time nnd those pcrons who are :- a!re:dy in Govrnmcnt service and in whoe cac th~ vcrific?.tion of\n\n. character and a!llcccdnts ha~ ndt already_ been done, Clause (e) or Rule 6 can apply only to those who colter the service for the first tim~ D and cannot apply to. thoc who arc nlrcady in the Class II Scrkc before appointment to the Cla~~ l Service because there is a corr<\"S ponding provision even in the Cbs 11 Rules creating similar disqualification for being appointed to thu Governmcl)t sc1vice in .' ulc 7($) of the Clas 11 Rul!s.\n\nN<lW wr: are left with clau1cs (a) and ·(b) of Rule 6 of the Class 1 Rules. In Rule 7 of the Class Il Raks E (which is .extracted in. the earlier part of this judgment) which nrc analogous Rules d•:aling with the qualifications for entry into the Class H Service there is no room for d'JUbt for cbu,; e (I) b<gins with\n\nthe wonk 'in the case of pcrsnn appointed by ctin!d sccruitnwnt; c.lause (2) begins with:Jne word~ 'in the cnsc ofappuintmcnt.by promo \" twn from sources (2} and (3) undr Rule 6(1)'; clue (3) begins w•th F the words 'in the case of th1 appointment by promotion from sourL\"C 4 un~r H.ulc 6(1)' and clau~.: (4) begin; with the words 'in the cu~-c.of appoJntmcnt by tran, fcr'. Each of the abow clauses is ppurently an independent claue. It tnfan~ tht pcrons fallinl1 unMr one\n\nclauc do nut r., n Und.!rany of the other l•t uses and they stand eciijdld G from the other clauses.\n\nEch claue d.~· a is with a $p<!cific c!a~' E'\"n though the opning word; of Rul~ 7 of tl1e Class II Rule; are~~\n\npcron hall be appointed to th\\! Service unlc; s )1c\" as ilwY are f>~U~' in Rule 6 of the Cla\\s I Rules ulso thce words have t>~ be rcd 1' 1th ' each of the du\"s (I) to.(~) of Rule 7 of the Cl; s~ it Rules. lf.h: 11 >:unc methu'l 1~ ud0ptcd m the c; tse of clau; cs (u) und (b) >f Ru. of the Cl:t'1 J Rules, then there wculd be nf• .room for ambiru•t)'.\n\nClau>c (a) of Ruk 6 5ecm~ to upply 'to direct upp<'lnlmtnts lo the\n\n, . . .... - .. .\n\nA. S. PARMAR v. HARYANA (Venkataramiah, J.) 487\n\nClass I Service which ordinarily can be to the posts of Assistant Executive Engineers in view of clause (4) of Rule 5 of the Class I Rules and only in exceptional circumstances for reasons to be recorded in writing to the posts of Executive Engineers. Clause (b) of. Rule 6 which specially deals with appointments by promotion from the Class II\n\nService to the posts of Executive Engineers exhaustively deals with the qualifications of officers to be promoted from the Class II Service .•.\n\nThe special clause excludes the application of the general. That appears to be the intention of the rule making authority because\n\nelause (a) of Rule 6 deals with educational qualifications and clause (b) deals with the qualification of experience for eight years in the Class II Service and the passing of the departmental examination. So far as direct recruitment through competitive examination is concerned the\n\n. y minimum educational qualification has to be prescribed in the Class I Rules themselves and it is accordingly prescribed by clause (a) of Rule 6.\n\nSo far as recruitment by promotion from the Class II Service to the post of Executive Engineer is concerned it is seen that as regards Class II officers the minimum educational qualifications which they should possess have been fixed in the Class li Rules where 26 out of\n\n40 vacancies are to be filled up by the holders of degrees in engineering of recognised universities and the remaining are to be filled up by promotion from amongst persons with certain educational qualifications and experience of ten years in the lower cadr'e or such other\n\nexperien~ as stated in the Class H Rules.\n\nRule 6. of the Class T Rule treats the possession of a degree pi Lis the. selection at the competitive examination and the passing of the departmental examination after app:>intment as sufficient for getting into the cadre of Assistant Execlltive Engineers or to the cadre nf Executive Engineers when direct recruitment is made to those posts and the experience in the Class II \\ Service for a minimum period of eight years plus the passing of the\n\ndepartmntal examinations bE/ore promotion of an Assistant Engineer in the Class H Serdce a sufficient qualification for promotion to the cadre of Executive Engineers. We may here note that under Rule 9(3) of the Class I Rules an Assistant Executive Engineer who i~ recruited directly to the Crass I Service would not be eligible for promotion t0 the post of Executive Engineer unless he has rendered five years service as an Assistant Executive Engineer and has passfd the Departmental Professional Examination as provided in Rule 15 of the Class I Rules.\n\nThe distinction between the two methods of fllling the posts of Executive Engineers by promotion is now apparent.\n\nTf that post\n\ni~ to b~ filled up by promoting an Assistant Executive Engineer, the\n\nA .\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1984] 2 S.C ..\n\nAssistant Executive Engineer concerned should possess five years. experience and should have passed the Departmental Examintion\n\nprescribed by Rule 15 of the Class I Rules. If_ that post is to be filled up by. promotion of an Assistant Engineer in the Class II Service, the Assistant Engineer to be promoted should possess eight years\" experience in the Class II Servjce and should have passed the Departt mental Examination prescribed by Rule 15. That means that whereas . an Assistant Executive Engineer who is a holder of a degree need have onli five years' experience in the Public Works Department, an Assistant Engineer in the Class II Service who may or .may not possess a degree should have eight years' experience in the Public Works Department for being promoted to the cadre Ol Executive Engineers .. This extra experience of three years appears to have been treated as being sufficient to make good the deficiency, if anv, that may arise by reason of the Assistant Engineer in the Class II Service possessi!lg only a diploma and not a degree. .\n\nTt is seriously urged that the expertness of the Class I Service would very much suffer if persons without degrees but with only' diplomas are allowed to get into it. It is not, however, suggested that no diploma holder has ever been promoted to the Class I Service in our country. While we are aware of the difference between the proficiency of person with a degree who enters service by direct recruitment and of a person who is promoted after he has acquired certain experience in the same kind of work in a lower cadre, we should state that in administrative and professional services a combination of high educational qualifications and long experience is always preferred so that the services may be efficient by each of them supple- ,· menting the other. Experienced administrators have opine~ that in the higher cadres of services high educational qualifications alone or long experience alone would not be in the interests of the public. _It is true that it is not wise to have only persons with diplomas in all the posts in the Class I Service. In order to see that there is no lack of proficiency in the higher posts in the Class I Service, Rule 5(2) of the.\n\nClass I Rules expressly provides that recruitment to the Service shan ·\n\nbe so regulated that the number of posts filled by protmotion from the Class II Service shall not exceed fiftv p('r cmt of the number of posts in the Class I Service excluding the posts of Assistant Executive Engineers. It provides for a healthy blend of the two classes. What is the effect of this clause ? More than fifty per cent o( the Class I Service posts would always be held by direct recruits because. the strength of promotees from the Class II Service cannot be more than\n\nfifty per cent of the total strength of the Class I Service rriinus the\n\n+ ·! .1.\n\n( \\\n\nA. S. PARMAR V. liAR:YANA (Venkataramiah, J.) . 489\n\nnumbr of Asistant Executive Engineers. The promotees from the Class II Service will, therefore, always be less than fifty per cent of the total strength of the Class I Service.\n\nEven amongst them 26 out of 40 are graduates because of Rule 6 of the Class II Rules which pres- . cribes the quota of 'direct recruits who should always be the holders of degrees. SJ diploma holders who may get into the Class I Service\n\nby prom.:>tion will be only 14 out of 40 promotees. It would be easier to ascrtaih llJW tm.ny non-degree holders can get into the Class. I\n\nService by th~ following illustration. (Note : This illustration is adopted without reference to the actual strength in the Class I Service). ·.Let us assume that there are 240 Class I posts and out of them 40 are posts of Assistant Executive Engineers. Then there will be In the Class I Service :\n\nAssistant Executive Engineers who a're graduates (because of Rule. 6(a) of the Class I Rules).\n\nBeing 50%- of 200~0-.--160 degree holders (because of Rule 5(2) of the Class I Rules).\n\n52' Degree holders at the rate of 26 but of 40 from amongst 80 promotees (because of Rule 6 of the Class II Rules). . -\n\nTotal : 172\n\nD \"' ~\n\nE \\ '. • The balance of 28 posts alone will be available for diploma holders. , Can it be said that the 28 -diploma holders with the minimum\n\nq. length of experience prescribed by clause (b) of Rule 6 of the Class I Rules who are selected by the Public Service Commission on the basis of merit and suitability (see Rule 8(4) of the Class I Rules) and with the edtlcational qualifications they may possess as prescribed by the\n\nClass II Rules would dilute the Class I Service so much that the efficiency of the Class I Service would. go down to such an extent that the Class I Service will become unequal to the tasks to be per- . formed collectively by the entire Service? It has also to be noted\n\nthat if a Class II officer is found wanting in merit and is otherwse G unsuitaOle, he would not be selected by the Public Service Commission. •\n\nThis is not like a nurse in an operation thea!re carrying out surgery. :Nor is it like a laboratory assistant teaching astro-physics. Who, are after all these members of the Class II Service who seek promotion to the cadre of Executive Engineers ? They are all Assistant Engineers H who have held the office of a Sub-Division for eight years.\n\nEven' 1\n\nw c\n\n490 SUPREMll COURT REPORTS\n\n{1984] 2 S.C.R.\n\namongst these diploma holders who are so selected by the Public Service Commission how many can possibly teach even the cadre of Superintending Engineers, let alone the cadre of Chief Engineers in view of their entering the Government service earlier than the direct recruits ? We are of the view that in the circumstances it coutd not have been the intention of the rule making authority that no person without a degree should b~ allowed to enter the Class I Service. If the construction placed by the petitioners in the writ petition and the Government is accepted every diploma holder who is an Assistant Engineer would have to retire only as a Class II officer and cannot hope to become an Executive Engineer till his retirement.\n\nIf that ' was the intention, Rule 6(b) of the Class I Rules would have ontained ,.._ necessary words conveying that meaning as it .is pointed out earlier.\n\nWe feel that clause_ (b) of Rule 6 appears to be exhaustive of the qualifications of the Assistant Engineers who can seek promotion from the Class II Service to the Class I Service. So read Rule 6 of the Class I Rules will read in so far as the promotees are concerned as 'no person shall be appointed to the Service unless in the case of an appointment by promotion has eight years completed service in Class II and has passed the professional Examination of the Department as provided in Rule 15\" and clause (a) of Rule 6 should be read as being applicable to the other mode of recruitment.\n\nOur attention is drawn by the learned counsel for the petitioners\n\nn the writ petition out of whi.ch thse appeals ais~ to the decision _1 lll O.P. Bhatia's case (supra) m which a rule similar to Rule 6 of the Class I Rules arose for consideration. That Rule is Rule 6 of the\n\nPunjb Service of Engineers, Class I, -P.W.D. (Irrigation Branch) ' Rules, 1964. The relevant part of Rule 6 of the said Irrigation Branch Rules reads as follows : .~\n\n\"6. Qualifications.-No person shall be appointed to the Service unless he-\n\n(a) possesses one of the University Degrees or other qualifications prescribed in Appendix B of these rules;\n\nProvided' that Government may waive this qualification in the case of a particular officer belonging to Cla~; s II Service;\n\n(b) in' case of an appointment by promotion from Class II Service, has co mpleted in that class of Service, for a-period\n\n; \\_\n\n:.t\n\nA. S. PARMAR v. HARYANA (Venkataramiah, J.) 491\n\nof ten years from the commencement of these rules, six years service and after that period ciht years service; .\n\nProvided that. if it appears to be necessary to promote an Officer in th~ public interest, the Governmentmay for reasons to be recorded in writing, either generally or in any individual case reduce the period of six or eight years to such extent as it may deem proper in consultation with the Finance\n\nDpartment.\n\nExplanation.-For the purposes of this clause in computing the period of six or eight years any service rendered as a temporary Engineer shall be taken into account. ........ \"\n\nThe High court held in that case that a member of the Class II Service in the Irrigation Branch of the P.W.D. should possess a degree to be eligible to be promoted as an Executive Engineer in the Class I Service in the Irrigation Branch of the P.W:D. _ The High Court was of the view that the omission of the word 'directly' which was in D Rule 7 vf tiD 1956 Rules which wer~ replaced by the Irrigation Branch Rules of 1964 led to the inference that Rule 6(a) of the 1964 Rules was applicable both to the direct recruitment and promotions from the Class ri Service. In order to understand the above reason, we have ourselves looked into the said 1956 !i-ules. Rule 7 of the said 1956 Rules which dealt wit~ only direct appointments to the posts E of Assistant Executive Engineers read as follows ~\n\n\"7. Qualific:;1tions for appointment-No person shall be appointed directly to the Service unless he-\n\n(a) possesses one of the university degrees or other F qualifications prescribed in Appendi:v B to these rules;\n\n(b) has iri the case of a candidate for appointment on the advice of the Commission passed such competitive exminanation or such other .test as the Commission may prescribe for appointment to the Service; and G\n\n(c) has obtained from a Standing Medical Board in the State of Punjab, a certificate of mental and physical fitness as prescribed by the regulations in Appendix C and is considered by the Board to be fit in all respects for active outdoor H duty;\n\nA .\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS tl984l2 s.c.R.\n\nProvided that in the case of officers belonging to the Class II Service the State Government may, after consultation with the Commission, waive the qualifications required by clause (a): •\n\nProvided further that other things being equal, preference will be given to a candidate who has himself worked for the cause of national independence or has rendered some outstanding social or public service.\"\n\nThe above Rule did not contain any reference to recruitment--~ by promotion from the \"Class II Service to the post of Executive Engilit neer. The promotion to the cadre of Executive Engineers was dealt ' with by Rule 15 of the said 1956 Rules. Sub-rule (7) of Rule 15 of the said 1956 Rules read as under :\n\n\"15. (7) A member recruited by promotion from Class II Service, who is reported to be fully qualified to l10ld charge of a Division will be promoted as Executive Enghi.eer on completing 10 years qualifying service as in sub-rule 4 at.ove, but such promotion shall not establish the right to be plaed in charge of a Division or draw pay in the senior scale of pay unless a Divisional charge is available.\" . -\n\nClause (4) ofRule 15 of the said 1956 Rules laid down the method of determining ten years of service in the Class II Service as follows;\n\n\"15. (4) In the case of members promoted from the Punjab Service of Engineers, Class II, the equivalent length of :1\n\nF service shall determine the seniority. This will be worked out as under :- ~\n\n(a) Service in the Punjab Service of Engineers, ~\n\nf:-\n\nClass I Full \\.'\n\n' G\n\n(b) Service in the Punjab Service of Engineers, Class II 0.8\n\n.• ..\n\n(c) Service as Temporary Engineer 0.64 ;\n\n(d) Service as officiating Sub-Divisional Officer or Assistant Design Engineer (Non-gazetted) 0.4\"\n\nA. S. PARMAR v, HARYANA (Venkataramiah, J.) 493.\n\nThere was no insistence upon the qualification of a degree in the A said 1956. Rules in the case of promotees from the Class II Service.:\n\nwhen the 1964 rules of the Irrigation Branch, Class I were promulgated, the pattern of the Rules was changed. While doing so, in the new Rule 6, the word 'directly' which was in the old Rule 7 was no doubt omitted but the new Rule 6 referred to both kinds of appointment, namely, direct recruitment and promotion from the Class II Service. It was not a case of just reproducing the old Rule 7 and\n\nomi_tting one word therefrom but the introduction of a m:w Rule 6 with a different structure. 'The High Court also appears to have overlooked while relying upon Rule 9 of the Irrigation Branch Rules\n\nof 1964 that the proviso to Ru)e 6(a) 0f the said Rules was applicable ;-_T' :-onl:Y to a Class II officer who wanted. to get6jnto the Class I Service by direct recruitment as provided in the Explanation to Rule 2(7) of c\n\nthe Irrigation Branch Rules which cor!esponded to the Expianation to Rule 2(7) of the Class I Rules with which we are concerned. The .\n\nHigh Court has not examined the Irrigation Branch Rules as fu11y as we have examined the Class I Rules. The judgment of the High Court is very cryptic. We do not agree with its conclusion that a degree is a pre-requisite for being promoted from the Class II Service to the Class I Service for the reasons we have already given above.\n\nIn these cases the State Government having first construed that Rule 6 of the Class I Rules required that a promotee should also have a degree, tried to relax that condition by making orders relaxing it as it found that its construction had led to unjust results. It did not make any attempt to reconsider its interpretation of Rule 6 even when the matter came up before the High Court. It only tried to justify the order of relaxation but ultimately failed in its attempt.\n\nIt~ is only in this Court that the question of interpretation of Rule 6 of the\n\nClass I Rules was raised.\n\nIt is indisputable that if the Government wishes to appoint\n\nonly holders of degrees t.o the Class I Service, it may do so by promulgating ppropriate Rules. That power is beyond. question and it is not, therefore, ncessary to rder to those decisions which lay down that classification on the basis of educational qualifications of officers G belonging\\to a cadre for purposes of promotion to a higher cadre i<:\n\npermisible. The question, however, in these cases is whether th/ Class I Rules as they now exist debar the promotion of an Assistant Engineer in the Class II Service who does not possess a egree to the cadre of Ex ·cutive Engineers even when he satisfies the rcquiremeJ.ts H of clau-se (b) of Rule 6 of the Class I Rules and is selected by the Public\n\nSUPRBMB COURT REPORTS\n\n[1984}2 S.C.R.\n\nA , Setvic~ Commission. Our answer is iri the negative.\n\nSince Rule 6(a) of the Class I Rules is not applicable to the Class II officers who are to be promoted to the Class I Service, the\n\nquestion whether the order of relaxation made in the case of the promotees is validly passed \"Or not becomes immaterial. We, therefore, B set aside the judgment of he High Court and dismiss the writ petition filed before the High Court. Since we have disposed of these appeals on a ground different from the ground urged before the High Court, we express no opinion on the validity of the order of relaxation.\n\nFJr the foregoing reasons,· the appeals are allowed but in the circumstances of the cases without any order as te costs.\n\nS. R.\n\nAppeals allowed.\n\n. .", "total_entities": 57, "entities": [{"text": "A. S. PARMAR & OTHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10, "end_char": 31, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A. S. 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S• PARMAR v. :HARYANA (Yenkataramiah, J.) 483\n\n'Provided that the Government may if satisfied .that there\n\n.'re special grounds for doing so, exempt aJ; ly person from the ·\n\noperatiov of this clause.\" .", "canonical_name": "VENKA.rARAMIAH"}}, {"text": "Public Sen ie Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 21495, "end_char": 21519, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "direct recrujtment is made on the basis of a competitive_ examination held by • tlie State Public Service (:ommison and promotions are-made on the basis of recommendations made by a Selection c ommittee presided\n\nover by the Chairman or a Member o(the Public Sen ie Commission\n\n01~ the basis of merit and suitability withdue regard 1.o sciority. ·"}}, {"text": "Class I Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21924, "end_char": 21937, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "PARMAR V. HARYANA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25681, "end_char": 25698, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~\n\n..... ..\n\n• t\n\nA. :S PARMAR V. HARYANA (Venkataramiah,."}}, {"text": "Qn as providd by the Explanation to Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26591, "end_char": 26631, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Class I Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27328, "end_char": 27341, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT RIJPORTS", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 28568, "end_char": 28590, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COURT RIJPORTS\n\n(19S4\n\n.l\n\nA laue (a) .unless it has peen waivcd hy' the Government a;,~\n\n::c.a."}}, {"text": "Class II Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31178, "end_char": 31191, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Class I Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36818, "end_char": 36831, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "A. S. PARMAR V. liAR:YANA (Venkataramiah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 37463, "end_char": 37503, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "( \\\n\nA. S. PARMAR V. liAR:YANA (Venkataramiah, J.) ."}}, {"text": "Public Service Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 39510, "end_char": 39535, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has also to be noted\n\nthat if a Class II officer is found wanting in merit and is otherwse G unsuitaOle, he would not be selected by the Public Service Commission. •"}}, {"text": "O.P. Bhatia", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 41570, "end_char": 41581, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Our attention is drawn by the learned counsel for the petitioners\n\nn the writ petition out of whi.ch thse appeals ais~ to the decision _1 lll O.P. Bhatia's case (supra) m which a rule similar to Rule 6 of the Class I Rules arose for consideration.", "canonical_name": "O.P. J3hatiu"}}, {"text": "Irrigation Branch Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 41824, "end_char": 41847, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 44258, "end_char": 44264, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Qualific:;1tions for appointment-No person shall be appointed directly to the Service unless he-\n\n(a) possesses one of the university degrees or other F qualifications prescribed in Appendi:v B to these rules;\n\n(b) has iri the case of a candidate for appointment on the advice of the Commission passed such competitive exminanation or such other .test as the Commission may prescribe for appointment to the Service; and G\n\n(c) has obtained from a Standing Medical Board in the State of Punjab, a certificate of mental and physical fitness as prescribed by the regulations in Appendix C and is considered by the Board to be fit in all respects for active outdoor H duty;\n\nA ."}}, {"text": "High Court has not examined the Irrigation Branch Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 47377, "end_char": 47432, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Class I Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 48771, "end_char": 48784, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_2_495_557_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "I . ,. -\n\n495 A\n\nR. S. NAYAK •\n\nA.R.ANTULAY\n\nFebruary, 16, 1984 ·\n\n[0. A. DESA!, R. S. PATHAK', 0. CHJNNAPPA REDDY,\n\nA. P. SEN AND V. BALA!<RISHNA ERADI, JJ.J\n\nPreventfoi1 of Corruption Act, 1947-S . ... : 6-Jnterp'retatiOfl of Whether court C can tak~ .co_gnizance of o.(fences enu\"1rateu iii _s. 6 agiiihst public S[YV'!_nf withouf sanction 9/ co1npetent authority-Which is co1npetent authority to givk sanctio11-\n\nWhat is r'e!evant date on which sanction be there_,:...For. attracting s.6 acCu.sed should. he a public serl'ant both on date oj o.lfenCe and on date when court, .takes cognizone pf offe'nce. In cases Where accused holds several offices each One of. which makes him publi.c serVaiit-Whether sanction of corripeteizt -athorilies of all the. . offices necessary\n\nor whether.· sanction o.f that cdmpetent authoritY alone under which public servant has\n\nD ·\n\nlnisusd his offipe is sufficient.\n\nIndian Penal Code-s.21, clauses (3}, (7) and 02) (a)-Defenition 'of ~Public •servant'-$cope oj....:....Whether Memf?er -of State Legisltive Assembly .a 'public' Ser- vant'. \"Express qns 'Qr, 'pay', in the pay \"of, and 'Government, nsed 1\"n s. 21, eXp/afned. + .Constructionof Statutes-.Rule of:._Const1;11ct on n1ust advance objct Of Act- Court 1nust give' effect tO natural 1neaning of words-In case of atizhig_uity court must .E ascertain. intenatio~1 oflegisfature behind Act;_Cour{ can. take hlp of external aids-· \"r While.c, onstucting anc_ient. statute court can.look.at surrOunding circumstances when\n\nstatute was endcted. ·\n\nWords and Phrases-Wordf 'or and 'pay,11iea1iing_of, Phrase 'in ihe flay of;- . . ' . .\n\nExplained. • }- The. appellant, R:S. Nayak, llleda complaint against the reSpondent,· A.R.\n\nAntulay, ·:i public servant -being the Chief Minister of MaharaShtra siate, under ss: 161, 165 I.P.C. ands. 5f tl:ie Pi\"evCntionof Corruption Act, 1947 (1947 Act)\n\nalleging_abus~· of offi.Ce of Cliief Ministef. The complaint.was rejected on account. of absence of nrcessary sanction of the GovernOr of Maharashtra State under s.6\n\nof the 1947 Act t6 prOsecutc the i'espondcn, t. .Aftet the Gvemor issued neceSsary sanction, the apJ:, ellaht\" filed _a fresh complaint in the Court of .Special Jud~ aiainst . the, respondenf on the same grounds. Hciwe\"ver, . on the date of.. filing fresh corn- . G plaint the_respi:>derit had a'Iready resigned as Chief Minister. The respondent cOn-· !.. . tended that the SpeCial Judge ha~ no jurisdiction to try him under. s. 7 of the Cdmi. ...\n\n' . nal Law Amendment Act, 1952 and that no cognizance could be iake!l n~ private\n\ncomplaint. The Special Judge rejected both the contentions. Jn the rneantinie the State GoVernment issued a notification under s. 7(2) of tlie Crii:ninal Law. Amendment Act~ 1752 under whi.ch the case was transfer¢ to another. Sia.I JudgC'. In\n\n~ crin1inal revisiorl. applic_atioO filed. by the repsondent aga.inst the order of earlier\n\n• H\n\n• H\n\nSUPREME CQURT REPORTS [1984] 2 s.c.R.\n\nSpecial Judge, a Division Benh of th~ High Court held .that the Soecail Judge had jurisdiction to try ihe reSpondent 3.nd that the private complaint vas maintainable. 'Wh.en the latter Spial Judge-proceeded with the case th_e respondent fi!C:d an appli- cation for his discharge on the grounQs that the charge agaist hin1 was baseless \"\"and that he beiilg a Me1nber of Legislative -Assenibly (M.L.A) requisite sanction. under s .. 6. of tht 1947 Act waS necesSary. The Special Judge discharged the respon-\n\n)... ;\n\ndent holding that the -respondent being ML A \\Vas a public servant within s. 2-1 (ll)(ri) of LP.C~ and in the absence Of the sanction of-the Legisl{ltivc- Assembly 'he \"could not take ognizapce of 6ffehe: The sPecial Judge ai_so held that the 'inater.ial date fo1 deciding the ap'pliciLbilityof s .. 6 Of the 1947 ACt was the date on whicl) th¢ Court waS askbd to take cognizance of the offence. The.appel!ani challenged the order of the Spial Judge in this Appeal.·\n\nThe questions which arose for consideratio11 were:-\n\n(a) What isthe relevant date with 1eference to which a valid sanction is a\n\na' prerequisitc .for the prosecutiOn of a public servant' for offences enumerated-ins. 6 of the 1947 Act ?\n\n..\\.\n\n(b) If the accused hcilds_ Several_ offices occupyi.ng eah of w'hich n1akes _)- hin1 a public-servant, is sanction or each one of the competent authori~ ties entitled to.remove hi1n.froin each one of the offices held b~' hin1 neces~ sary. and if anyone of the Competent authorities fai!S or declines to grant sanction, i\" the Court precluded or prohibited froni taking cognizance_'\n\nof the offence with \\vJ:tich the public servant is charged, or. is it implicit in s. 6 of the 1947 Act that stinctiOn of that -competent authority lo*::\n\nI ,_\n\n, is necessary wbich is entitled to renove the public servant from the office\n\nwhich is alleged to have been abLiSed, or' 1ni_sused for corrupt n1qtives ? -+ .\n\n(C) ~Js M.L.A. a'public .servant within the !neaning of the expression in cl_auses\n\nl2{a), 3 and 7 of s. 21 l.P.c;. ? · '. . --(\n\n(d) Is sanction as contemplated by s. 6 pf the 1947 Act ncCesary for prose-\n\nCution of M.L.A. and if so, 'which is the. sa1lctioning authority con1petent tO reffiovc M.L.J\\. fron1 the office oJ Meinber of the Legislative Asse1nbly ?\n\nAllowing theappeal. . · · ·\n\nHELD; The provisons of he Act mst rccive sch construction at the hands a of the Court as would advance the o.bject and purpose underlying the _Act and 'Ut any rate not defeat it. If the \\vords of the s\"tatuTe arc clear and unan1biguous, it is is the 'pliinest duty, of the court o givr effect tO the natural meaning.of the _words,, ·used in the provisions. Tn the event of an ambiguity of the plain n1ean'ing of the .wor4s used in -the statute being sclfdfeating, the court s entitleQ to sascertain the intention of the legislature to remoye the ambiguity by cnstruing the provisio!1 of .. . the.statute as a Whole keeping in v.lew what was the mischief when the sta{ute was\n\nCnacted and to remove which the legislature enated the statute.· Wheneevei a question of construction arises upon an1biguity or where two vie'ws are poss-ible of}· o'f a-provision, it would be the duty of the court to adopt that constrJJction which would adva-ce tlie object underlying the_ Act. ·[512 A-C] -\n\nThe basic purpo'se underlying all canons of\"constraction is the ascertainment\n\n• ,.\n\nfl ).\n\n.4y. -\n\n. '\n\nR. S. NAYAK V. A. R .. ANTULAY 4<).7\n\n\\Vith reasonable certainty of the \"intention of Parliament in enacting the legislation..\n\nA F.or this purpose whY should the aids whiCh. Parliament availed of such as .report:of a speCial committee precedin.e enactment, existing state of law, the envirnrnent '\n\nnecessitating enactment Of legislation, and the object. sought to be achieved, be denied tO cotlrt whose function is primarily to give. effect to the realintetion of the _Parliament in Cnating the legislation. Such deniai would deprive the court of a substantia) and illuminating aid to construction. Therefore, departin~ from the earlier English decisions, the reports Or the committee which pre_ceded the enactment B' of a legislation, reports of Joint Parliamentary Committee, report\"of a commission Set up for c_olleCting iriforma1ion lading to the.enatment are permissible external aids to cOnstructi.?n. [527A.; D-, EJ\n\n. In cofistruing <i statut.e more especially the ancient statute, the court may look at th~ surrounding circumstances when the statute was eacted. -The .construction of ancient statutes may be e!udicatcd by.what in the language' of the courts is ca11ed C contettiporaf1ea expoSitio, that is, by seeing how they Were understood at the time when they were passed. [528F-G]\n\nStandard dictionaries as a rule give in respect of each word a:s many meanings in which the word has either been used or it is likely to be used in different contexts ana. connections~ While it may be pennssible to refer to dictionaries to find - out the meaning in :which a W.ord is capable of being used or understood incommon parlance, the_ well-known cannon of construction should not even for a minUte be overloohed that the meaning to the words and expressions Use'd in a statute ordi\n\nitaily tak:e their Colour from the context' in which they appear. [539F-G] • Deputy Chief Control/er of bnports & §xports, New Delh v.: K.T. Kosa/ram & Ors., [1971] 2 S.C.R. 507 at 517; and State Bank a/India, v. IN., Sund<va Money, [1976] 3 S.C.R. 160, referred to.\n\n- Sction 6 of the P.reventio-n of Corruption Act, 1947 bars the Courts from takii:ig c0gnizance of the offences therein eriumerated alleged to have been coinmitted. by a public servant exc(\"pt wi.th the previous sanction of the competent authority emp_owered to grant the requisite.sanction.\n\nTefefore, when the cOurt is called upon to take cognizance of such offences, it rpust enquire whether there is a valid sanction to prosecute the public servant for the offence alleged to have been committed by him cis public servant. Undoubtedly the accused must be a public ervant when he is atleged to have corhmitted the offence of which he is accused because ss. 161, 164, 165 I.P.C. and s. 5(2) of the 1947 Act clearly spell out that the Offefices there in definec.1 can be committed by a public servant/ A tdaI without a valid san- Ction where one is necessary under s.6 would be a trial withqut jurisdiction by. the court. lt is well settled that the relevant date with reference to which a valid sanction is s)ne qua n'on for taking cognizance of an offence committed by a public servarit as required by s.6 is the date when the court is called upon to take cognizance of theoffence of whicQ. he is accused. If, therefore, when the. offence is alleged t'o have been committed, the accused was a public servant but by the time the court is called upon to take cOgniZ?-nce of the-offence cornniitted by him as public servant, he has ceased to be a public servant, s. 6 will not be attracted and no sanctiori Vi'ould be necessary for tahing cognizance of the offence against him. This approach iS in accOt; d with the policy undei!Ying s.\"6 in that a public srva.nt is not to be expOsed to harassn1cnt of a frivolGLiS or spc_culati...-prcect.tic n. Tf h~ has ceased to be a public\n\nSU~REME COURT REPORTS\n\n[!984] 2 S.C..R.\n\nA servant in th::nt;>aritime, this vJtaJconsideratioit cc.a5es to 6:idst. [512D; .. H; ~13\n\nA-El .\n\nC.R. Ban, i v: Stilt~ oiMah\"arashfra, [1971] }fs.C.R. 236; R.R. Chari v .. State of U.P., !1963] 1 S.C.R. 121; s.N. Bose v. Staie of Bhar, [1968] •.3 S, C.R. 561;.\n\nMahcf. Iqbal Ahmed v. State of A.P., p979j 2 .s.C.R. 1007; S.A.\n\nVe1lkatarama11 v. ·The State. [195~] S.C.R. l04Qat 1052; K.S. Dha;1nadatan v. Central Govenunent &-·\n\n\nIn the instant case, lol}g befOrc the date orl which the togniza.11cc \\VaS takeJ1: by.the Special Judge, the accused had ceaSedto hold the office of , the Chief Minister. and ~S-. sUch had ceased to he a public.servant i_n his. capaCity as hief Minister. A fortiori no sanction as_ cont6n1plated _by s. 6 was necessary before co&nizance of th~\n\noffence could .be taken against the accusCd for offences alleged to have been conunit- . .. ' . . ., \"ted in his fon:ner capacity as public servant.. [514D......!.E]\n\n. 1·\n\nThe subn1ission that if the accused has held. or hold$ a plurality. of offices occlpying each One of which kes him a pubiic sefvaJ1t, under s. 6 sariction Or\n\neah Ohc 9f the competet authorities entitiCct to . .ren1ovc _him from each one of the offices held by hith, would be necessary and if anyone of 'the co1Tipetcnt .authorities ·fails orcteclines tri graiit sanction,_the court iS prluded or prohibited from ti:ik.ing cognizance of the C?ffcnce with \\Vhich the public servailf is charged, is ncit acceptable ..\n\nSuch an interpr'.etation Of s.6' would fender . it as a shield .to .an unscrupulous publc ~~.rvant. Soineorie intrested in pfotetingmay shift bim:from one office of pltbli.c • se_rv<l;_nt fo anothef and there by.defeat the pro.cess of Jaw. Such an interpretation. is confrary to ail cannons of 'i., OllStruction.andJeads to afi absurd end ptoduct .wich of.necessity must be avoideO. [5200; 518F..,......O] . \\ ' , Tlfe Stat~· (S,}'.E. Hyderabad) v. Arr Conifnodore Kai/ash\" Chand, [19801 2 S.C:R. 697, referred to and partly dissented from.\n\nThe expression>office' in the. three uh-clauses. of s.6(1) clearly denotes. that o'flice \\Vhich 1f1e pubiic. servan.t misused or abused for corrupt motive<> fo.r which he is to be prosecuted and in reSpect .of which a sanCtion to PrQsecutc .him. is 'nec.essa.ry • by the COmpetent authority entitled to remove him fron1 that office which he has . 3.bused.\n\nTe sanction ·tb prosecute a public sCrvnt can be given .PY an authority compCtent tO remove him from the offi.Ce which .be has misused or abused because\n\ntht authrity alone would Qe able. to '<no'I\".' \\\"1hether th6re hs beell a 1nisuse or.\n\n'. abuse f the Office by the public servant and 1\\ot some rank outsider:. The authority entitled to graht sanction n1.us't apply its mind to the facts of the case, 'evidf; ll~ cot-· lected and other incidental facts before aCcording sanction. .A grant of sanc!ion is not an idle forn1<1lity. but a soJe1nn arid sacrosanct act which ren10Ves the u1nbre!la of protection of.govermnent servarlts gainst frivolous. prOsecutions and the aforesaid req1\\iren1cnts n1ust; therefore, be.strictly Con1plied with before any jjroseclition ·\n\ncoul~ be launched agairis~ publjc !'iervants. Therefore, it i~ i1nplicit in s.6 that . sanction of th; it. con1pet.ent authority alone would be necessary which is co1npetcnt . to remove te public servant.from the Office which he is aileed to have misused or abused for corrupt motive and for \\vhich a prosecution is intended to be launchecl a aii]st him: [5!6H; 517A~D] . ; ......\n\n.Mohd. Iqbal Ahmed v. State •f A., p., [1,7,] 2 s.c.R. !007, referred to.\n\n) .. ,'\n\nR. S. NAYAK V. A. R. ANTULAY 499\n\n~ .\n\nThe fi1iding of the Special Judge that the respondent being M.L.A. was a.public servant within clauses (12)(a) (35 and (7) of s.21 I.P.C: and sanction of the Legislative Assenlbiy to prosecute hin1 was necessary, is riot corfect.. A person.· would be a -public seaOt under clauSe {12)(a) of s. 2-1 T.P.C: if he falfs under any of the following three categories: (i) if be is in the service of 'the Governn1ent; or ·(ii) if h_e is in the pay of the Govrninent; or_(iii) if heis remunerated bY fees or commission for ihe performance of any public duty by the Government. Looking into the history . and evolution of s.21 I.P.C. as fraced and .adopted as anexternal aid to construe~\n\n\"\"-~ tiOn, it is clear that M.L.A .. was not and is not a. 'public ervatlt' , Vithin the _meaning of expression .In any ofthe clauses of s._ 2J J.P.C. AssLming that' it wou:ci .not\n\nJ.. be legally sound Or correct according to well-ftCcepted carir.cn_'Of constn.:ctior: of a .. stafute to construe s. 21(12)(a) by n1ere.historkal eYo}ution of !he. recticr,, 11:ecoJ'istitutiohaliy viilid api)roach would be to look at the ln.nguage coiploycd in te rccticn to ascertian whether M.L.A. iS a public servant within the n1eanir, g of t11e expression in that section. Dependiti'g up'on the context, 'ot' may be read as 'ar;<r Cut the COlil t would not do it unless it is so obliged bee-a use 'or' dces ot genei tliy n1ean '<!-r.d: h.nd 'and' does not generally nlean ·or'. The use o(the expression 'or' in the con- . teJ\\t iii' which it isused incl.(12) (a) does appear tO be a disjunctive .. Therefore, these three qategories are independent categoris and :if a pe1son falls in any of .hen1 _he Would be a public servant. The que'stiori is whetliet M.; L.A. falls-uridr any of the above three ciitegories ?. It Was .coflccded that M.L.A .. is flot in the service o:J: the Government but it was contended that M.L.A, is in ihe pay of the Governn1ent.\n\nUJJ-doubtedly, M.L.A. receives a salary ahd allowaiices in his.capacity as M.L; A Under the relevant statute. But does it rnak_e him-a person 'in tJ1c Pay of the Governn1ent'? The word 'pay' _standing by itself is open to various_ shades of meaning and when the Word is used in a phrase in .the pay.- of' itis more iibely to have R different\n\n_.+... connotation. than when standing. by itself. The pbra£e 'in the pay of' would oidi~· narily import the elen1ent of:employrnent or paid c:n1plo)rr:etit or <n1p1C.yt.d and paid -by the en1p1oyer. The_ phrase does -not import of _necessity a nlaster-srn ant 4--· rclatio'nship. In its setting the phrase. in the pay of the GoveuJn1ent' in cl. (l2)(a) n1ay comprehnd a situtation that the persOn may be in the pay of tl1e Goverriment\n\n.;. without beiug in the employment of the Gnverriment or without lhe:fe te; r g a irasft1- Servant rlatiOnship between the person receiving the pay and the- Gov_ernmen't as\n\npayer~ NeXt what does the expression 'dovernme:ti.f in cl.(12)(3.) of s. 21' I.P.C. con- A: note? Section 171.P.C. 'provides thafthe word. •Government' denotes the Central Government or the Governrhent of a State. Sec. 7 I.P.C. provides that 'every ex.:' pre.sslon which js explained in any patt ofthE:_Code, is used in-every part Of the Code \" in conforrriity with the expJanation'. Let it be note{L that Unlike th6 n1odern statte , s. 7 does not provide unless the context otherwise indicate', a pllrse that prefea}:es\n\nthe dictionary clauses of a modein statute. Therefore, the expressi'on \"Gove1Tnment' ins.21(12)(a) mi.ist either mean the . Central Government or the G:overnment . \" of a State .. _The eentraIGovernment being out of consideration the-question is whether M.L.A-. is in the pay_ of the Qoverrunent of a State or. s remunerate~ by -:.\\ fees for the performance Of aily public duty by the Government of a State. Even . thoilgh M-.L.A. eives pa~ and aiioWances, he is not in thepa.f.of the Stat~ Government because \"tegislatore of a State cannot' be com_prchended in theexpress_ion 'State G.overnmen_t'. This conclusion would go\".etn alsothe third part of cl.'. (l2)(a) i.e . ..; 'remunerated by fees foi: performance of any public cJuty by the Government. ThCre~ fore, if M.L.A. i~ not in the pay of the Government ~-the Sense of executive goYernment or is notromuneI'a1:ed It~ fees for perfofm'a•_ce of anx public_c:u1f by ttaeexe-\n\n• D\n\nSUPREME COU.RT REEPOR TS\n\n[1984] Z S.C.R,\n\ncuti\\le government, rtainly he would not be cotriprehended in the expression 'public servant' within the meaning of the, exPression in cl: (12),(a). He is thus not a public servant withiri the nieaning of the @pression in ct (12)(a). This conclusion rein forces the earlier conclusion reached after examining te historical ev01ution. or cl. (12)(a). l537 A-B; ;360; E; H; 537. H; E; 539 D-E; Hl A; D-F; 543 D-E; 551 A~B]\n\nEvoluuon of Par11a1nentary.Privileges by S. K. Nag,' Leg1s!at1ve Bodies Corrupt . Pradtices Act, 1925; Pre'Ventwn of Corrupnon Act, 1947 by S'\"etlu .and Anand P. 60;\n\nSanthanan1 Co1nm1ttee Report dt. 31-3.-1964; Lok Sabha Debates_. (Tlurd Senes) Vol. 35, Ck 729 and 731; The Ant1-Corrupt1011_ Laws (Amendment) B1//. 1964 (enacted as Act 40 of 1964); G.A. Monterw v. The State of Ajmer, [1956] S.C.R. 682; The State of Ajmer Y. Sh1vj1 Lal. [1959j Supp. 2 S.C.R. 739; Prabhashanker Dw1ved1 and Anr. v. The State of .Gujarat, AIR 1970 Gujarat 97; State , of Gujarat v. Manshankr Prabhashanker DwzVedi, [i973} l S.C.R. 313; Green v. Premier Glynrohonwy Slate Co. Ltd., [1928] 1K.B.561at568; Bab1 Manmohan Das Shah & Ors. v.\n\n\n20 fd1t1Q1t. p. 149, referred to.\n\nThe sbffiission that the accsed wuld be a public servant within the ~nint of the expression any person empowered by law to diiCharge any adjudicatOry functiOns, incl. (3) of s.21. l.P.C. must be rejected. Participation ina debate on a motion of breach of privilege or fOr taking action for contempt of the House and voting thereOn in a coastitutional -function discharged by the members and therefore, it . cannot be said .that such adjudicatory functions' if it t:an be so styled, -constitutes\n\nadjudicatory function undertaken by M.L.A. a( empoWerd by law. [554 E-Fl\n\nSpecial Ref No. 1of1964, [1965) 1 S.C.R. 413 at pages 490, 491 and 472; .. I.C. Golaknath v. State of Punajab, [1967] 2 s.c.R. 672'; Snpadangalavpru v. State\n\ndf Kera/a and Anr., [1973] Supp~ S.C.R. 1 referred to.\n\n,. . .\n\nThe Slibmission that M.L.A. would be a public servant within cl. (7) of &21 i.P.C. must be rejected: Cl. (7) takes within its ambi(; every person who holds any office by vir.ture .of which he is emPowered to place or keep any person in confinement'. Broadly ., stated the expression comprehends police and prison authorities or those. under a.n obligaion by law or by virtue of offiCe tO take into custody and keep iri Confinefnent an:Y person. To say that M.L .. A. by virtue of his Office. is prforining 'Policing or prison officers' duties woulcj. be apart from doing violence to language lowerillt hiin in status. Additionally cl.(7) does not speak ofany adjudi catory function. It appears to comprehend situatioO.s where as preliminary to or an end_\n\nproduct of an adjudicatory function in a criminal case, wh_ich inay-lead tci imposition of a prison sentence, and a prson in exercise of the duty t~ be dischar&ed by him by virtue of his office places or keeps any p'erson iri confinement. [554 G'; 555 F-Hl . - . . ' ' H ~In viw of tlie finding that M.LA. is not a public servant under clauses (12)(a)~\n\n(3) and (7) of s.21 l.P.C. and no sanction under s.6 _of the Prevention -of Conuptiori . '\n\nR. S. NAYAK I', A. R: ANTUIAY 501\n\nAct, 1947 is necessary to proseCute hitn, .it is not necessary to ascertain hich would be.the authority con1petent to sa.nction 'prosecution of M.L:A. (557 C]\n\nrn the instant case, the allegations i1t the complaint afe all to the effect 'that the aCcused misused or abused his office as Cgief Minister.for corrupt motives. By the time the Court was called upon to take cognizance df those offences, the accused had ceased to hold the office of Chief Minister. The sanction to prosecute him . was granted by. the Governor of. Mahafashtra but this aspect is irrelevant for concluding that no sanction was necessary to prosecute him under S.6on the offenCes alleged to have been Committed by the accused. Assnting .that as M.L.A. the ac:Cused wouid be a ptJ.blic servant under s.21, in the absence of any allegation that he misused or abused his office as M.L.A. that\" aspect becomes immaterial. Further s.6 posf\"lates existellce of a valid sanction .for proSeoution of a pubi.ic servant fo.r offene<aP Punis'hable ·undr ss.161, 164, 165 J.P.C. 3.nd s.5 9f the 1947 Act, if they are allege~ to hil-ve bfen committed by a pul?lic servant. Jn view of the finding that M.L.A. is not a public servant within .the ineaning of the expres~ sion in s.21 I.P.C., no sanction under s.6 is necessary to prosecute him for the offences alleged to have been committed by him. [556 G; 557 A~Bl -,\n\nCJi1MINAL APPELLATE JuRISDICTION: Criminal Appeal .iw. 356.\n\nof' 1983\n\nFrom the judgment and order dated 25-7-83 of the Special Judge, Bombay in Spetial Case No. 24 of 1983. ·\n\nAND\n\nTransferred Ca?e No. 347 of 1983\n\nA.ND\n\nTransferred Case No. 348 o/ 1983\n\n....\n\nRam Jethmalani P.R.\n\nVakil, Ms. Rani Jethmalani, Mukesh Jethma/ani, O.P. Malviya, Shailendra Bhardwaj and Harish Jagatlani for the appellant.\n\nDr. L.M. Singhvi, ])a/veer /Jhandari, A.M. Singhi, S.S. Parkar, H. Bhardwaj, u, N. Bhandari, H.M. Singh, Ranbir .Singh ad S, G.' Hasnain for the respondent. .\n\nA.shok Desai and Mrs. J. Wad for the petitioner in T.C. No. 34g of 1983.\n\nM.N. Shroff for s'tate of. Maharashtra\n\nK. Parasararr, .Attorney General, Ms: A; SubhaSltini, . Gopa/ H Subramanian, R.N. Puddar and C. V. Subba Rao for Union of India.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPO.RTS [1984] 2 s.c.R.\n\nThe Judgment ol' the Court was ci.eliered\n\n DESA.I, J: Respondent Abdul Rehman (\\ntulay (hereillafter referred to as the accused) was the Chief Minister of th.e State of Maliarashtra from 1980 till' he submitted liis resignation 011 January 12, 1982, which became effective. from January 20, 1982. He thus ceased io hold th.e office of. the Chief Minister from January 20, 1982 bui continues to be it sitting' member or\"the Maharashtra Lgislative As&<mbly till today, • · · ·· ·\n\nAs the contention\"s canvassed before this Court are mainly questio.ns df law, facts at this stage having a peripheral relevance in the C . course of discussion; it is unnecessary to set onl the prosecution case\n\n• . as disclosed in the complaint filed by. complainant Ramdas Shriniv.as Nayak (complainant for short) in detail save and except few a perti- . neni and relevant allegations. In the process the brief history of .the\n\n litigation. may a!so be traced.\n\nThe complainant moved the Governor of Maharashtra by his application dated September I, 1981 requesting him to grant sanction .. . to prosecute the accused as required by Sec. 6 .of the Prevention of Corruption .Act, Hl47.(' 1947 Act' for short) 'for various offences alleged to have been committed by the accused-nd neal>ly set. out in the application. Conwlainartt then filed the first complaint in the Court; of Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, 28th Esplanade, Ijombay on Septem-\" ber ll, I98! being Criminal Case No. 76 iMisc. of 1981 against the accused and others known and unknown collaborators alleging 'that the accused in his capacity as Chief Minister ad thtreby a public\n\nservant' within the meaning of Sec: 21 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) has committed offences under Secs. 161; 165 IPC and Sec. 5 'of the 1947 Act, Sec. 3S4 and Sec. 420 IPC read with Secs. 109 and 120-B IPC. Th\\l complaint runs into 31 closely typed pages and carried the . .Jist of 37 witnesses. The learned Metropolitan Magistrate invited the ciiniplainant to satisfy him as to how the complaint for offences under Secs. i6I, 165 IPC and Sec. 5 of the 1947 Act is maintainable wiiliout a valid. sanction ~S. contemplated by Sec. 6 of 1947 Act ad ultimately -held that in the absence of a valid sanction from the Governor of Mahatashtra, the .complaint filed .. by the complainat for the afore. mentioned three offences was riot maintainable. The learned Metropolitan Magistrate accordingly held as per order dated October 6, 1981 . that the complaint was maintainable ohly for offences alleged to have been committed by the accused under Secs. 384 .aqd 420 read with Secs. 109 and 120B of the IPC and directed that the case be fixed for\n\n' ··~\n\n. '\n\n~-· .,\n\n' ,,. ...\n\nR: s. NAYAK v. A. R. \"ANTULAY (Desai, J.) 503\n\nexamining the' complainant as required by Sec. 200 of the _Cr. P.C. . The complainant questioned the correctness of this order in Special\n\nCriminal Application No. 1742 of 1981 filed in <he High Court of Judicature at Bombay.\n\nIn (he meantime, another development had taken place which may be briefly noticed. One. Shri P.B. Samant, who has also filed an identical complaint against ..the accused, along with several. others filed a Writ Petition No. 1.165 of 1981 in the High Court of Judicature at Bombay challenging the method of distributicn uf ad hcc allotmfnt of cement in the State of Maharashtra -as being contrary to the ru)e of law and probity in public life. The accused was. the second respondent in this petition, the first and third respondents being the\" State of\n\nMaharash.tra and Union oflndia respectively. By ah exhaustive speaking order dated September 23, 1981, a learned Sillg1e Judge of .the High Court granted rule nisi and made it returnable on November 23,\n\n1981. The writ petition came up for hearing before another learned Single Judge who by his judgment dated Januar; y 12, 1982 made the rule ab'jOlute: Probably. as _a -sequef to this decision of the High Court, the .ac.cused tendered his resignation .as Chief; Minister on _the same day\"and when.the resignation was accep.ted he ceased to-hold the office of the Chief Minister with effect from January 20, 1982.\n\nSpecial.Criminal Aplication; No. 1942 ofl981 filed by the co~-.·. plainant against the order of the learned Chief Mttropolitw Mag.i- ' strate waS' dismissed by a. Division Bench of the High Court on April 12, 19&2. Not the accused but the State of Maharashtra preferred an appeal by special leave under Art. 136 of the Constitution against the decision of.the Division Bench of the High Court rejecting the special criminal application.\n\nThi~. Court rejected the· application for special _leave at the threshold on July 28, 1982. (See State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Shrinivas. Nayilk and Others<ll ), Promptly, on the\n\nheels of the. judgment of this Court. the Governor of Maharashtra\n\non the same day granted the sanction under Sec. 6 of the 1947 Act to prosecute the accused in respect of specific charges set out in the order according sanction, Armed with this sanction, the complainant filed .. G. ·. a fresh complaint in the Court b( the Spedal Judge1 Bombay registered as Criminal Case.No, 24.of 1982against the accused.as Accused No.\" l and others knowri and unkno\"'.JL In this complaint it is broadly alleged that the. accused who was the Chief Minisier of the State of Ma.ha-\n\nH {I) (1982] 2 s.c.c. 463 .. . ' .·\n\n.SUPREME COURT REPORTS (l 984] 2 s.C.R.\n\n' . . tashtra between the period August 1980 to September 19.'l.J conceived a scheme of aggranQ.isement involving obtaiPing o( funds from the members of the public and putting tbem. substantially under his own control for the disbursal of the funds so obtained. The complaint proceeded to refer to the setting up of various trusts and alleged that the corner-stone of the scheme involved.receipt by the accused of illegal gratification other than legal remuneration as motive or reward for doing or forebearing to do any official act, or for showing or forebearing to show in te exercise of his official functions, favour or disfavour to persons, or for rendering or attempting to render any service or dis-service to such . persons who dealt with the State Governmen.t in general and with public serv; rnts who formed part of the Government. It was specifically alleged that the scheme devised by the accused was a .flagrant abuse of hi.s official posifion as Chkf Minister for obtaining control over funds which would be used. for purposes 'conducive to. the interest of the accused himself. The\"cnmplainant proceeded to set out the abuse of office of Chief Minister by the accused citing various alleged ii1stances such as distribution of ad hoc cement contrary to law and the binding circulars, granting ]iguor licences as and by way of distribution of Government largesse, issuing no objection certificates for letting out premises by obtaining a price. for the same. The running thread through various allegations is that the accused by abusing or misusing his office of Chief Minister obtained or attempted to obtain gratification other than. legal remunerations a. ll]Otive or reward for doing or forebearing to do any official act as Chief Minister or for showing pr forebearing to show in th.e <ox.cercise of his official functions, favour or disfavour to persons etc. To this complaint, the order granting sanction to prosecute the accused made by the Governor of Maharashtra was ltnnexed. and produced. After recording the vericfiation of the complainant, the learned Spec.ial Judge took cognizance of the offences and issued process by directing a bailable warrant to be issued in the sum of Rs.10,000 with one surety and made it , returnabl\" on September 3, '1983. ·\n\n On the process being served the accused appeared and sought exemption from personal appearance which was granted for a day and the case was adjourned to October 18, 1982 for \\'ecording. the. evidence of the complainanfand.his witnessesfor the proserntion.\n\nWhen the case was called out on October 18, 1982, an application was . moved on behalf of the accused inter alia contending that the Court of the learned special Judge had no jurisdiction i, n view of.the provision contained in Sec. 7 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act,\n\nR s. NAYAK v. A R ANTULAY (Desai, J.) . 505\n\n1952 E'l952 Act' for s]lort) and that no cognizance can be taken of. offences punishable under Secs. 161, 165 IPC and ec. 5 of the 1947 Act on. a private complaint. The case was at that time pending in the Court of the special Judge presided over by\" one Shri P.S. Bhutta. _The learned special Judge by his order <lated October 20, 1982 rejected -both the contentions and-set down the case for November 29, 1982 for recording evidence of the posecutipn. The lrnrned special Judge made it abundantly clear that under no circumstance the case would be adjou; ned on the next. occasion and if any revision or appeal is intended to be filed against the order, the.learned counsel for the accuse_d should-give advance notice to theJearned counsel for fhe complainant.\n\nThe accused filed Criminal Revision Application No~ 51_0 of 1982 against the order of the learned special Judge dated October 20,\n\ni982 rejecting his application. 01) January 16, 1983, the Government . of Maharashtra 'issued a notification in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 7 of 1952 Act and in modification of the earlier Government Order dated April 12, 1982, directing that in Greater Bombay on and after the date of the. notification the offences specified in sub, sec. (I) of sec. 6 of the 1947 Act which are investigatec'. by the Anti-Corruption Bureau of Police fo Greater Bombay, except special cases No. 14, 15 and 16 of 1977 and Special Case No. 31 of 1979 to 37 of 1979 (both inclusive) shall.continue to be tried by Shri R.B. Sulc.\n\nThe net outcome of this notification was that Special Case No. 24 of 1982 pending in the. Court _of Special Judge Shri P.S. Bhuita would stand transferred to .the Court Df Shri R.B. Sule, Additional Special Judge for Greater Bombay. •.\n\nOn a reference by the learned. Siugle Judge, a Division Bench F of the Bombay High Court heard and dismissed .on March 7, 1983 Criminal Revisio~ Application No. 510 of 1982 filed by the accused against the order of learned special Judge Shri P.S .. Hhutta dated October 20, 1982. 'The Division Bench in terms held that the private complaini was maintainable' and as the required no.tification has aleady\n\nbeen issued, Shri R.B. Sule will have jurisdiction to try Special Case G No. 24 of 1982. The learnecl trial Judge Shri R.B. Sule on receipt of the record of the case issued a notice on April 27, 1982 calling upon all parties to appear before him on Apri121, 1983. It appears .on July 8, 1783, two applications. were moved on behalf of the ai; cued u; ging the learned trial Judge; (i) to discharge the accused inte.r a/ia on the H ground that the charge was groundless and that even though the accused\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS.\n\n[1984] .2 S.C.R •.\n\nhad ceased to lie. the Chief Minister, on the date of taking cognizance . . of the offences, he was a sitting member of the Maharashtra Legislative . Assembly and.as such a public servant and in that capacity a sanction . to prosecute him would have to be given by the Maharashtra Legisi~\n\ntive Assembly and the sanction granted by the Go Vernor would. not be valid in this behalf. The second petition requested. the .learned Judge to postopone the case tiII the petltion for sprc'ialleave fired by · . the accused against the decision. of the DiviSicn Bei1ch of the High .. Court holding that the private ccmplaint was rraintai1, ab!e is dispo.scd of. Both thes.e applications came up for hearing before Shri RB.. SUic, who by his order dated July 25, 1783 upheld the contention of .the accused that M.L.A. was a public servant within the meaning of the expression in Sec: 21 (12) (a) lPC and.that unles.s a sanction to prosernte him by the. authority. competent to remove him from his offiGe as M.L.A. was.obtained which in the opinion of the learned Special Judge .• was Maharashtra Legislative Assembly, the accused is entitled to be discharged. So saying, the learned Judge discharged the accused. : The complainant Jiled a petition for special leave io appeal No. l 850\n\n. of 1983 and a Writ Petition (Cr!.) No. 145 of i983 against the deciskn\n\nof the. learned special Judge. Both these matters came up before this Court on August 3, 1983 when the matters were adjuorned to August ' 10, 1983 to enable the petitioner, original complainant to fik a criminal E revision application against the order or the learned special Judge in the High Court. Accordingly, the coinplainant filed Criminal RevisiOn.Application No. 354 of 1983 in the High Court against the order of learned special Judge Shri R.B. Sule. This. Couri ultimately granted speciaqeave to appeal as also ruie nisi in the writ petition. By n order: •\n\n'made by this Court, the criminal revision application filed by the peti~\n\nF . tioner stands transferred to this Court. ·\n\n.It may be mentioned that .ihis Court has granted special leave . to the accused against the decision of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Courtholding that.a private' complaint is maintainable, etc. Crimi- nal Appeal No. 247of1983 arising out of the said special leave petition G is being heard along with this matter but that \\Vill be dealt with separa~ .\n\nWhile discharging the accused, the learned special Judge held } that the. material date for deciding the applicability , of Sec .. 6 of the\n\n194i Act is the date on which the court is asked to take cognizance 'ff of the offence. Proceeding further it was held that even though 1he accused had ceased to hold the office of the Chief.Minister on the date . .\n\n. ).\n\n .. ~· -·\n\nR; s. NAYAK v. A. R; PNLULAY ((Desai, J.) 507\n\non which cognizance 'was taken by the learned special Judge, Shri Bhutta, yet on. that date 'he was a sitting M.L.A: and was therefore, a public servant wit.bin the meaning of the expresS!on in Sec. 21 (12)(a) in amuch as the M.L.A. is a person in the pay of the Government or at any rate he is remunerated by .fees for performance of public duty . by the Government .and therefore, he is a public servant.. As a corol. . lary, the learne~ Judge held that as on the da.te. of taking cognizance of the offence the accusd was a public servant, he could not be prose, cuted without a valid sanction as contemplated .by Sec. 6 of ihe )947 ..• Act. The learned Judge further held that the M.L.A., holds an office . .and he can be removed from that office .by the Legislative Assembly because the latter has the, power to expel a member which would amount to . removal from office. The learned Judge further held that as there was no sanction by the Maliarashtra LegiSJative Assembly to prosecuteo the accused and as the Governor\\had no power to san-\n\n ... ction prosecution of the accused in his.capacity as M.L.A.; the accused is entitied to be discharged forthe offences under Secs. 161, 165,' J20•B, .\n\n109 IPC and Sec. 5 of the. 1947 Act for walit of a valid sanction for prosecution, and in respect of the other otfences, the acuscd is entitled D to be discharged on the. ground that, the court of the special Judge had no jurisdiction to try the. accused for those offences.' In respect •of those other offences, the learned Judge directed the complaint to'.be returned to . the complainant for presenting i~ to the proper court. Jt may be mentioned that by. a .commoh order in Special Case No. 3 of 1983 instituted upon the complaint of Mr. P, B. Samant, t.he accused E , was discharged. ... '\n\nSec. 21 IPC defines a 'Public Servant'. The releva.nt clauses may be .extracted as under:\n\n''21. The words 'public servant' denote , a person falling unde, rany of the descriptions hereinafter following, namely:~\n\n. \\ .. . .\n\nThird-very Judge including. 'ay person empowerd . by law to discharge, whether.by .himselfor as' a member of\n\nany' body of persons, any adjudicatory functions.\n\nsevnth: Every person who hold; any offie by virtue of whih he is empowerd to place or keep any person in copfininent.\n\nTwelfth-,-:Every person~·\n\n{a) in the service or pay.ofthe Goernment or rem~erated\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n (1984] 2 S.C.R.\n\nby fees or commission for tlie performance of any public duty by the Government ·\n\n' . . '\n\n(b) in the service or Pay of a local authority, a corporation established by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act or a Government Company as defined in Se.ction6J7 of the Companies Act, 1956.\n\nExplanation I: Persons falling under any of the atove descriptions are public senmnts, whether appointed by the Government or not\". •\n\nSec. 17 defines the expression 'Government' to. denote the Cen- . tral Government or Jhe Government of a Siate: Sec. 14 defines the expression, 'servant of Government' to denote any officer qr servant continued, appointed or empJOYed in lndia by or under the authority of Government.\n\n•· ' Sec. 19 defines the word '!udge'as under.:\n\n. \"The word \"Judge\" denotes not only every person who is officially designafrd as a J'udge, but also everyperson\n\nWho i.s empowered by law to gi\\'e, in any legal proceeding, civil or criminal; a definitive judgment, or a judg- . men! which if not appealed against, 'would be definitive,\n\nma judgment which, if confirmed by some other au.thority, would be definitive, or who is one of a body of persons, which body of persons 1s empowerd by law . . . . ~~ to give such a judgment.\" ..\n\nSec. 7 provides that 'every expression which is explained in. any part of the Code (!PC), is used in every part 6f this Code in coriformi!y with the explanation.' ·\n\nSec. 5 of the 1947 Act defines the offence of criminal misconduct and a public servant who commits an offence of criminal misconduct is liable to be punished with imprisonment for a term which sh.all not . be less than one year but which may extend to seven years anc1, shall also be liable to fine. • .\n\n.Sec. 6 provides for a sanction as a pre-condiiion for a valid prose-\n\n. '\n\n• '\" -\n\n. ).\"\n\n-~.\n\nR. s. NAYAK v, A. R. ANTULAY (Desai, J.) 509\n\ncution for offences punishable under Sec. 161, 164, 165 JPC and Sec. 5 A of the 1947 Act. It reads as under: •\n\n,;4(1) No court shall take.cognizance of n o!fence punishable under Section 161 or Sction 165 of the lhdian . Penal Code, or under subsectipn (2) of Section 5 of this Act, alleged \"to have been com!l'itted by a public servant, except with the previous sanctio~,\n\n(a)\n\n(b)\n\nin the case of a person whois employed in connection with affairs of the Union and .is not removable from his office save by or' with the sanction o.f the Central C'overnment, .\n\nin the case of a person who is. employed in connection with the affairs of a State and is not removable from his office save. .by or. with 'the sanction -of the State' Government,\n\n(c) in the case of ariy other person, of the\"lluthorit)'\n\ncompetent to remove him from his office. • . . .\n\n(2) Where for any reason whatsoeve any doubt arises whether the previous sanction as rreqliired under\n\nsub-sectio~{l) should be given by the Central or State Government or any other auihority, such.sanction shall be given by that Government or. authority which would . have been competent to remove the publi_c servant from his office at the time when the offence was alleged to have been commiited''. •\n\nWith a view to eradicating the. evil of bribery and corruption, the Goveniment of India set up a Committee to make recommendations. for the iqiprovement of the laws 'relating to 'bribery and corruption under the Chairmanship of Dr. Bakshi Tek Chand. The recommen~.ations of the Committee led to the enactment of the Criminal Law G Amendment Act, 1952. By the 1952 Act, power wa~ cnferred on the\n\nStte Government to appoint specia!Judges as may be necessary for such area or areas as may be specified in the. notification to try the following offences namely; offences punishable ur.der Sections 16], 162, 163, 164, 165 and 165A IPC and Sec. 5 ofthe 1947 Act and any H conspiracy to commit or any attempt to commit or 'any .abetment of\n\n. '\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984) 2 S.c.R. . ' . . . . . . .\n\nany f.the -offences heteiabove mentioned. Sec.-. 7 conferred exclusive jurisdiction on te special Judges appointed 1, mder Sec. 6. Sub-sec. (2) of Se, c. 7 provides for.specific territorial jrisdiction of a special Judge. $ub-sec~(3) conferred power on the special Juge also to fry any offence . other .than an i;>ffeilce specified in Set. 6 with which the accused may, urider the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, be charged at the same triaL Sec. 8 prescribed the procedure to be'follwed by the special Judge in the trial of the offences. The Court of special Judge was deemed'to be a Court of Sessions trying cases without a jury within\" the local li, mits of the jurisdiction_ of the Higli Court for the purposes\n\nof .Chapter XXX! and XXX!I of the Code of Criminal Procedure as . proviJ.ed by Sec: 9. . . . The appellant, the original complainan( contends that the learned special.Judge was in error in holding that M:L.A. i; a public servant\n\nwithi~ the meaning of the expression under Sec. 21(12)(a). The second submission was that _if the first•question is answerd in the affirmative,' . it would. be necessary to exa111i'ne whether a sanction .as (;~template~ .. by Sec._ 6 is necessary. lf the ai1swer to the second :question is. in the • a\"ifirmative 'it would be necessary to identify the sanctioning '1Uthority.' The broad sweep of the-argument was that the complainant in his oni-\" plaint has alleged that the accused abused his office of Chief Minister and not his office, i_f any, as M.L.A. and therefore, eveh if on the date . oi' taking cogniznce of the offence the accused was M.L.A., nonethe- .\n\nless no sanction to prosecute him is necessa.ry as envisaged by Sec. 6\"\\ .. of the 1947 Act. It was. u_rged tl1at as the al1eg1ttion against the accu-sed. in the complaint isthat he abused or misused.his office as ChiefMinister anc! as by the time the complai, nt was filed. and cognizance was .taken, he had ceased to hold the office of the Chief Minister nq san- · c\\ion under . Sec. 6 .was necessary to prosecute him for the offences alleged to have beencommitted by him when.the accused was admittedlya public servat in.his capacity :is Chief Minister. '\n\n (h behalff the accused, 'it was contended tht not only the accused would be.a public servant asfaJlihg within. the'meaning of the expression in Sec. 21 (12)(a) but he would also be a public servant within the contemplation of-clauss (3)and (7) of Sec. 21. The next limb of the argumentwas t_hat if an accused hold pluralityof offices. ach\n\nof which confers on him the status of a public servant and even if it\n\ni~ alleged that e has abused or misused one office as ; public servant, notwithstanding, the fact that there no allegation of abuse or misuse . of other. office held as public servant, sanction of each authority com-\n\n...... .\n\n,._.,·\n\n),-\n\nI/; I\n\n-. ' ).\n\n,-( -\n\nR s. NAYAK v. A. R. ANTr..fLAY(Desai, J.) 511\n\npetent to removehim from eaG]1 of the of!kes would be a sine qua non A under Sec .. \"6. before a valid , prosecution can l:Je launched. against the accused. · ·\n\nOn th.ese\"ival contentions some vita! and s.ome note> vital points arise for consideration, some ea'sy cir answer and soine' none-' tooeasy. For their scientific and logical . treatment they .may be B formulated :\n\n(a) .. What is the relevant date with reference , to which a valid sanction is a pre-requisite for the prosectution of a public . servant for offences enumen, ted in Sec: .6 of the 1947 Act?\n\n(b) If theaccused'holds plurali xofoffices occupyingeach of\n\nwhic'.1 makes him a public servant, is sanction of each . one of the c-0mpetent authorities entitled to remove hii:J1\n\nfrom each one of the offices held b~ him ncessary 'and if anyone of the competent authorities fails. or declines • to grant sanction~ .is the Court precluded or prohibited from . takiog cognizance of the offence with . which the public servant. is charged. ?\n\nE ..._ ..\n\n(c) Is it implicii in Sec. 6•or tlie 1947 Act ihat sanction of 'that competent authority alone is necessary, which is entitled to remove the public servant from the office which is alleged to have peen abused for mishsed for\n\nc; Orrupt motives ?\n\n(d) Js M.L.A. a public servant. within the meaning of'the ·\n\nexpres sion in Sec. 21(12)(a) !PC.?\n\n(e) Is M.L.A. a public servant within the meaning of the'\n\nexpression in Sec. 21(3) and Sec. 21(7) ICP ·? ·\n\n(f) Ts sanction as contemplated by Sec. '6 .ef the\n\n. necessary for prosecution of M.L.A: ? 1947 Act\n\n(g) If the answer to (f) 'is in the affirmative, .v.hilh is the Sanctioning . Authority competent . to remove M.L.A. · from the office of Member of the Legislative Assembly?· ·\n\nRe. (a): The 1947 Act was enacted, as its long title shows, to make m'ore effectiv~ provision for the prevention of bribery and corrup- H tion., Indisputably, iherefore, the provisions of the Act mmt receive\n\n\n[1984] 2 SC.R.\n\nstich constrliction at the hands of the couit us \\vculd <idvanc('htc object and purpose umblying the Aci and at any.rn'te not def, at it.\n\nIf the wor~.1 of the statute are clear and unambiguous, it is the plaines\\ • · d•.tly of the court to give effect to thenatural mct>ning of the words used Othe provisicn. The question of construction arises only in the event of an ambiguity or the plai'n meaning of the words used in the statute would be self-defeating. The court is entitled to ascertain the\n\nintention of the legislature to remove .the ambiguity by construing the\n\nprovision of the statute as a whole keeping in view what was the mi,. ..i.._' chi bf When _the staru't~- _ws ena_cted anC( to !·~1no:e \\VJ1iel~ :-he legislature ~, enacted the statute. This rule of construction rs so umversally accep- ·-i ·\n\nted that it need not be supported by precedents. Adopting this ru\\C , - of construction, 'vhcnev.er a question of coristruction _aries upon ambiguity or where two views are possible of a provision, it would be the duty of the court t-0 adopt that construction which would advance\n\nthe object underlying the.Act namely, to make effective provi.sion for * ihe prevention of bribery and corruption and at any rate not defeat it ..\n\nSedion 6 bars tl:e court from taking cocnizance of the offences· therein enumeratecl. al!egeJ to have been oim; ittd b~ \" public cervant ecept with the previou.s sanction of the .co1npctc1lt authority empowered to g.rant t, he requisite sanction, Sec. 8 of l 952 Act prescribes procec\\urc and powers of special Judge cnipowerecl. to try offences -t set out ih Sec. 6 of 1947 Act. Construction of Sec. 8 has b<'en a subject or vigorous d<:ba:..? in the cognate appeal. Jn this apped we will prccee_d .... on the assu1npt1on that a spect<:.I Judge can take cognizance of offences ·· he.is co1npetent to try 01T a private coniplaint. Sec. 6 creatE~ a bc:r t.o. the ourt from ta.king cogniznce Cf offences -therein ('num fratcd cx:cept with-the. previous sanction of the authority set out ifi \\·h:usf (a),\n\n(b) & (c) of subcSec. (!). The 0bject .underlying si; ch pro•ision\" w;:s 'j, tu save the public servant from the harassment of frivolous or unSJ,1hstantiated al!egcitions. The policy underlying Sec. 6 vn_d sin1ilar \" sections, is thit there hould not b~ unneccs.'aty haras<>nlent_ cf pµblic servant. (See C.R. }lansi v. State of' Maharashtra'\" ). Exhlrnie tJrs o.f a valid sanctfOn is a pre-requisite o thC tltking cf cOgniza~1ce cf the en\\nnerated offences alleged to ha.ve been com milled by a public 'servant. The bar is to the taking of cognizance of offence by the court.\n\nTherefore, when the , ourtis called upon to take cognizances of such.,,. offe1'1.ces, it must enciure .whether there _is a valid sanction to proseCUte 1\n\nthe public servant for the offence alleged to have_ been rnnimitted by i\n\n... _ •. ;~J . _ (fi' ('i 97'jj 3. S.<;.R. Z36.\n\n, ......... ..\n\n• J_ -\n\nR. ~· NAYAK v. A. R; ANTULAY. (Desai, J.) . 513\n\nhim. as pttblic servant. Undoubtedly, the <!Cc.used must be • public servant when he is alleged to have committed the offence of which he .is .accused because Sections 161, 164, 165 !PC and .. Sec. 5(2) of the\n\nJ 947 Act clearly spell out that 1$le' off< nccs therein r.efinerl, rnn be commi.tted by a public servant. . If it is contemplatded to prosecute Pl!blic s'fv; rnt wfo has committed such off.:nces, when the court is called upon to tke cognizance of the offnce, a sanction ought to be avail-· able oti-i r; v:se the court WJu 1d have no juris0.iction to take !bgniZauce of the offence. A trial without a valic( sancticn wh.ere one is necessary under Sec. 6 has been held to be a trial without jurisdiction by the COl!rL (See. R.R. Chari v: State o/U.P.'\". and S, N. /Jose v. State of /3ihar<21) Jn Mohd. Iqbal Al, med v. State of.A..P. <ai, it ; yas held that a trid. Withollt. a sanction rnders the proceedings ab initio vbic\\, But , the terminus a quofcr a valid sanction is the time when thecourtis called upon to tahe coignizance of the offence. If therefore, 'whe~ the\n\noffen, e is alleged to hove been committee'., th.e accued. was a public servant but by the time the court is called upon to take cognizar.ce of the offence committed by him as public servant, he has ceased to be . . public servant,.no sanction would be necessary for taking cognizance of the offence against him. This approach is in accord with the polic~ underlying.Sec. 6 in that a public servant is not to be exposed to harssmont of a frivolous or. speculative prosecution. If he has ceased to be a public servant in the meantime, this vital consideration ceases to exist. As a necessary coroJ:ary, if the accused has ceased to b~ a\n\nublic servant at the tiiv.e when the court is called upon to take <ogni Lance of the offence alieged to have been committed .by h]m as public servant, Sec. 6 iS. not. attracted. This aspect: is not more res integra.\n\n111 S.A. Venkataraman v. The State\"' this Court held .as under:\n\n'' n or opinion, j~ givi1g Cffect to the. ordinary meariing of the \\Vvr,\\s used itl s. 6. of the Ac;, the conclusion is inevitable thatat\n\nt11e i ne , l CJ-; ir~ is .tsked to take cogtlizance not only the offence must have been committed by a pub:ic servant but the person\n\n~1.:cused. is still a pub'.ic servant. re1novab:e rrOm his uffice by acompetent authority before the provisions of s. 6 can apply.\n\nIn the present appeals, admittedly, the appellants had cease to be 'public servants alleged to have ben commited by them\n\n.15 pJblic servants .. Accordingly, the pi'oyisions of s.6 of the Act\n\n(I) [19631 I S.C.R.. 121.\n\n(2) [1968f 3 S.C.R. 561.\n\n(]) [197912 S:C.R. 1007.\n\n(4) [1958] S.C.R. 104 at 1052\n\nSUPREME COURT RBPOR.TS [1984] 2 s.c.R.\n\n__ did not applv and the prosecution against.them was not viiiated by the. Jack of a previ?us -snction by a coi:npetent authority\". _ -\n\n And this viewhas been comillJ.ently folfmved i-n- C.R. j)ansi's _ case and KS. Dliarinadatan v. Centrd7 Governmenl & Ors.iil _ Tt there-- - fore appears we!l-settled that the relevant date with refer.,.e to which- ' a valid san<'tioh is sine qua nmifor taking cognizance of an offence\n\ncomrn_it!jfl by a public servant as required b~ Sec. 6 is the date on which - :the court is called upon to take cognizance of the offence of which-he is accused.\n\nthe accused tendered resig1iation of his office' as-Chief Minister Cand ceoscd to hold the office of Chief Minister with effect from Ja; iuary 20, f!982. The complaint from which - the present a ppcal arises and which was registered as Criminal Case No. 24/82 appears lo have been .fi!e<i on August 9, J9S2 and _ihe cognid'hce. was taken by the\n\n- learned Magisttatc _01i th same day_ -It unquestionably transpires that\n\nloJ1g b; fore the d'lte on .\\Yiich the cogniza1ce wasaken bY the Jcarn('d D special Judge, \"the accu>cd had ceased to hold the office of the Chief --Minister and as such had ceased' t_o be a pubii-c servant. In other words; ·\n\nhC was not.a p1.l~J!ic srvan.t in hi_s capacity ::is Chief Minister 01i Augus~ -9. 1982 when the court tok cognizance o( the offence agrrihst -him. A fortiori no sanction as conte1J1plateci_ by Sec, 6 was necessary befNe cognizance of the offence co.uld be taken against the-accused for offe11- - E ces alleged to have been .comrn]tted in his former capaciJy as public _servant_ Re: (b) and (e): It was strenuously cntended that if the\n\n- accused ha\"s held or holds ,, plurality of offices occupying each one -\n\nof which' makes him a public servant, sanction of each one of the-_\n\ncompetnt authorities entitled to remove him from each one of the .offioes held by him, would_ be necessary and if anyone df the competent F authorities_ fails or declines to grant sanction. the court is precluded or prohibited fame taking cognizai1ce __ of the -offence with the public _SC\\Vant is charged. This submission was -sought lo be repelled urging that it is implicit in Sec. 6. that sanction of that authority alone is . ~. necessiry \\vh-iCh· is corppC.tent to -remOye the pUbliC servan1 :from the , G -offioe which he is alleged to have m-isuscd or abused for corrupt motives.\n\nSec. 6(l)(c) is the only provision re-lied upon -on beh_alf of the accused -.. .to contend that as M.L.A. he was a public servant oi1 ihe date of taking\n\n- cognizance._of the offenc¢s; and therefore, sanction-of that authoriy_ competent to remove him from that office is a sine qua 11011 for taking. cogni.zance of offences. sec. 6 (l)(c) bars taking cognizance of an H:\n\n(1) [t979J 3 s.c:R. 832\n\nR. s.' NAY AK v. A.' R. ANTULAY (Desai. J.) . 515\n\noffence alleged to have been co.mmitted by public servant except with ihe: previous snaction of the authorty competent to remove h1 m\n\nfrom his office.. .\n\n In orderfo appreiaie the rival contentions e fact situaticn , rclc~\n\n'J.\n\n.vant to thetopiC under discussion may be notied .. ta genera.I .election held in 1980, accused was elected as Member of the-Legislal.ive Ashfmh ly of Maharashtra' State fom Shrivardhan Assembly Constitutency.\n\nHe was appointed as Chief Minister. of Maharashtra State, and he was\n\ntiolding that office at the time he is alleged to have committe.d the offences set out in the complaint filed. against .him: He tendered his resignatio!1 of ttie office of the ChiefMin.ister and ceased to hold that .offioe with effect from January 20; 1.982. However, he coninued to retain his seat as M.L.A. The contenion is that as M.t.A., he was a publiC servant •. a si1bmission seriously controverted, which we would pre.sently examine and.that he was such public servant even on the date . on which the court took cognizane of the offences £et out.in the com\n\nplaint without a v,; lid sanction and therefore the court had no jurisdic . ti on to take cognizance of the offences. Jn support ofthe suinbission it was urged.that if the polic; y undelying Sec .. 6 and similar provisions ,. . iike Sec. 197 Cr. P.C. was to spare the harnssmentto the public servant\n\nconsequent upon !aunchipg of frivolous or speculative prosecutions: > the snie would be defeated if it is held that the sanction to prosecute is necessaxy from an authority competent to remove the public servant . from the office which he is alleged to have misused or abused. Proceed. \"Y1ng along this line it was urged that even if the accused has cased 'to\n\nE -·\n\npe a public servant in :one capacity by ceasing to hold the. office which\n\nhe 'is alleged to have misused or abused yet if be continued to be a .public servant in an\"ther capacity, the authority competent to remove .II him from the latter office ivould have to. decide whether the prosecuticn\n\nis frivolous or speculative and in larger publie interest. to tl1wart it by declining to grant the sanction .. It was also urged that if a public servant has to discharge' some public duty and perform some p'ublic functions and .he is made to cool his Jfeels in law courts, public interest\n\nwould suffer by keeping him away from his public duty and therefore, t.o advance the object underlying Sec, 6, the couit must hold that if G . the public servant who i.s being prosecuted holds more than one public .... office occupying each one of which makes him public servants,' a san\n\nction to J:lrosecute of each competent authority entitled fo remove. him from each office is necessitus before taking cognizance of offences against him .. It was uri:ed that this approach would advarice. and\n\n- 516\n\n\n[J 984] 2 S.C.R.\n\nbuttress the p:ilicy underlying Sec. 6 and the contxary view would 'defeat the same.'\n\nOffences prescribed in Sec: 161, 164 and 165. JpC ancl Sec. 5 of the 1947 Act have au intimate and inseparable relation with the office.· of a public servant. -\\ public servant occupies office which rena.ers him a public servant and occupying the office carries with it the powers conferred on the office. Power generally is not conferred on an individual person. In a so_ciely governed by ru:e of law power is conferred. on offioe or acquired by statutory status and the individual occupying the office or on whom status is conferred enj:iys the power of office - or power flowing from the status. The holder of tl'e office alone would have' opportunity to abuse or misuse the office. These sections co.dify a well-recognised truism that power chas the tendency to corrupt. It is the holding of the. office which gives an opportunity to use it fN . corrupt motives. Therefore, the corrupt conduct is drectly_ attr; butable and flows from the power conferred ori the office. This interrel&.- tion ahd interdeperr(\\ence betwet; n individ;.ral and the office he holds is substantial and not serverable_ Each of the thrc_e clauess nf sub-s. (I) of Sec. 6 uses the expression 'Office' and the power to grant sanction is conferred on the authority competent to remove the public servant from his office and Sec. 6 requirc.s a sanction before. tak; ng cognii; nce of offences committed by public servant. The offence cu!d be c9mmitted by the public servant by misusing or abusing the power oCoffice and it is from that office, the authority must be competent to remove\n\n.--\n\nhim. so as to be entitled to grant sanction. The. removal would bring\n\n:--J(. about ceasation of interrelation between the office and abtise by the ' holder of the office. Tlie link between pOl)'er with opportunity to abuse. I and the holder of office would be severed by removal from office.\n\nTherefore, when a public servant is accused of an offence of taking gratification other than local remuneration for doing or forebearing to do an official act (Sec. 161 IPC) or-as a public servant abets offences punishable under Secs. 161and163 (Sec. 164 IPC) or as public servant obtains a valuable t_hing without consideration from person concerned in any p'toceeding or business transacted by such public servant_ (Sec.\n\n165 !PC) or commits. criminal misconduct as defined in Sec; 5 of the 1947 Act, it is implicihn the various offences that the public servant has misused or abused the power of office held by him as public servant.\n\nThe expression 'offices' in the three sub-clauses of Sec. 6(1) would clearly denote that office which the public servant misµ; ed o.r abused for corrupt motives for which he is to be prosecuted and in respect ·of which' a sanction to prosecute him is necessary by the competent authority entitled to remove him from that office which he hu> abustci .\n\n.J -\n\n...\n\nR. s. NAYAK v. A. R. A1'TULAY (Desa.;. J.) 517\n\nThis interrelation between te office and its abuse if scr11-cd wou1d render s'ec. 6 devoid of any meaning. An this interrelation clearly .rrovideS a Clue to the understandiilg,-cf the: Pre vi:ic n in ~r. 6 rovic!; i~g\n\nfor sanction by a competent authonty who WCU!d be abte to Judge tl, e action of the public servant before removing the bar, by fr\"ntir.g sanction,, to th~ taking of the cognizanr.:e ofDffences by the .court agaitst\n\nthe puhlic sevant. Therefoe_. 1.t urlquesticna~!y fellows -t-ha~ 1h~ sane lion to_ prosecute can be given by an .'luthcnty cpm.petcnt to 1emove the public servant from the office which he has mJSsused or abused because that authority alone would be able to know whether there has been a mil; use or abuse of'the office by the public servant and.not some rank outsider. By a catena of decisions, it has been held that the authority entiiled to grant sanction rn11st apply its mind to the facts of the case,. evidence collected.and other incidental facts before according sanction. A grant of sanction is not an idle fo1mality but a solemn and sacrosanct act which remo:xes the umbrella of protection of govern-\n\n1nent servants against frivolous proseciltions and .the aforesaid re-quire-· ments must therefore, be strictly compli<ti with before any prosecution . . ,....., _c9uld be launched aganst ptrblic servants. (See Mohd. Jqba/ A.hnwd v.\n\nState oJ'Andhra Pradesh). The Legislature advisedly.conferred pcwcr ·. on the authcrity competent to remove the public servant frcm the office to grant sanction for the' obvious reason that that authority alcrnc w, ould be ab1e, when facts and evidence are placed before him, .to judge whether a serious offence is committed or the prosecution is either. frivolous or speculative: TLat authority alone would te competent to judge whether on the facts alleged, there has been mi abuse or misuse of office held by the public servant. That authority. would te in a position to know what.was the power c01iferred en the office which the public servant hold, how that power could be e.busecl. for'corrurii\n\nmotive and whether prima facie it has been so done. That competen_L authority alone would know the nature and functions discharged by the public servant holding the offiSe e.nd \\vh'cther the same h\"s been abused or misused. ]t is the vertical hicr; irchy between the auti10rity. competent to remove the public srvant from that office and the nature of tile office hold by the public servant against whom sanction is. sought which would indicate a hierarchy and which would therdore; permit inference of knowledge about 'the functfons and duties of the office and its misuse or abuse bv the public•servant. That is why the legislature clearly provided that that authority alo1; e would be competent to grant sanction which is entitled to rerrovc the public sen mt against whom sanctio\"r1 is sought froin the office ..\n\nS18\n\nSUPREME COURT.REPORTS . • [1984] 2 s.c.R.\n\nA ·.Now if the public servant holds two offies ind he is accused of havi.1g. abused' one and froin which lie i; rell1ovcd but continues. to ?old the other which is neither alleged to have been used nor abused, is a san., tion .of the authority competent to remove him frm the office which is neither alleged or shown to have be~~ ahused or misused _necessary?_ The sub1nision is_ that if the harassn1ent , uf the public ser~ B vant by a frivolous prosecution and criminal waste of his time in law courts keeping him away fr0m discharging .p.ublic duly, ate the objcts underlying Sec. 6, the same would be defeated if .it is held that the sanction of the. latter authority Is not necessary. The submissio;1 .does ' not commend. to use. We fail to see h.ow 'the competent authority\n\nentitled io remove the public servant from an office which is neither\n\nC aUeged to have been .used or abused would be able to decide wehether the prosecution is frivolous or tendentious. An illu>tratio;1 was posed to th~ learned counsel that a Minister. ivho is indesputably a pttblic. servant gr<ased his palms. by abusing his olfr:e as l\\1inister, and then ceased to hold the oflke before the court was called upon to take cognizance of the offence against him and therefore, sanction as contein-.\n\nD . plated' by Sef. 6 would not be' necessary; bui if after committing the\n\noffnce and before the. date of taking of cognizance of the offence, he was elected. as ;1 MuniCipal President .in which capacity he was a public servant under the relevant Mtinicipal iaw, an<I was holding that office on .the date on which court proceded to take cognizance of the.\n\nE offence committed by him as a Minister, would a sanction be.netessary ·. and that too of that authority competent to remove hin.i froni the.office of the Municipal President. The answer was in affirmative. But .the very iHustration wo.uld show that such. cannot be the law. Such an interpretation of Sec. 6 would render it as a shield .l•i en unscrupulous public servant. Someone interested in protecting, ri:tay shift' hiin from\n\n: F o.rie office of public servant to another. and thereby defeat the process . of iaw. One .can legitimately envisage a situation wherein a person. may hold a dozen different offices; each .one clotlung him with the\n\n.. . .. status of a public servant under Sec. 21 rrc and even if he has ab.used •.\n\nonly one office for which either there is a valid sai1ction to prosecute him or he has ceased to. hold that offic!: by the 'time court was called G . upon to take cognizance, yet oJL this assumption, sanctiOn of 11 different\n\ncompetent autl1orities each of which ws entitled lo remove him from H different publie office~ would be necessary before the court can take cognizance of the. offence .comrnitted by such public servant, while abusing one office whkh he may have ceased to.hold. Such an inter-_ ..\n\nH pretation in contrary to all canons of construct10n and leads to an_, absurd and. product which of necessity must .be avoided. Legislation\n\n. \\\n\n .....\n\n....\n\n.. -).\n\n. R. s. NAYAK v. A. R. ANTULAY (Desai, J.).: .\n\n. 5J9 ..\n\n. must at all costs be intrpreted in such a way t]'1t it woulc\\\"not.operate as a rougue's charter. (See Dmis & Sons lt.i. v. ·\"tkini)ui . . ' .\n\n. Support was sought to be dra1n for the subrr, ission from the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Air Commodore Kai/ash\n\nCh; ird v. The State (S.P.B. Hyderabad)<2> and the affirn]ance of that decision by this Court in The State (S.P, B.Hyderabad) v. Air Commo- • . . dare Kai/ash Chand.<•> fn that case accused Kailash {; hand was a n\\ember 0°ft11' Indian Air Force having entered the service on 17th November\n\n1941. Hrctircd from the service.01i 15th June, 1965, but was re-employed for a period of 2 years with e.ffcctfrom 16th June, 1965. On 7th September, 1966, the respondent was transferred to the Regular Air ·. . Force Reserve with effect from June 16, 1965 to June 15, 1.970 i.e. for. a period of 5 years. On 13th March, 1968, the re-employment given to the respondent ceased-and his service was terminated with effect from April 1, 1968: A charge-sheet was submitted against him for ·\n\nhaving . committed an offence under Sec. 5(2) 0f the Prever, lion of Corruption Act, 1947 during the period March 29, 1965 to March 16,\n\n1967. (..contention was raised on behalf of the accused that the court could not take cognizance or'the offence in the abse_nce of a val'd sanction of the authority competent to \"remove himfrom the office held by him as a public servant. The learned special\" Judge negatived the the contentiori. In the revision petition filed by the accused in the High Court, the learned Single J_udge heki that on the date\" of taking ·-cognizance of the offence, \"the accused was a member of the Regular Air Force Reserve set up under.the Reserve and Auxifiary Air Force,.\n\n19.52 and the rules mde there under. Accordingly,. it was held that a sanction to prosecute him was necessary and in the a.bsence of which .the. court couldtnot tahe .cognizance. of the offences and. the prosecution was quaslied. In the appe<il by .certificate, this Court upheld . the decision of the High Court. This Court held following the deci . sio.n .in S.A.. Venkataraman 's case that if the public servant had ceased 1. to be a public servant at the time of\"taking cognizance of the offence, J.\n\nSec, 6 1s. not attracted. Thereafter (he court proceeded to examine whether the accusecl was a public servant on the date when the •court took cognizance of the offence and concluded that once the accused was transferred to tlie Auxiiiary Air Force, he retained his character as a public-servant because he was required to undergo training and\n\n~- (I) [1977] Imperial Court Reports, 66 '. (2) (1973) II Anhra Weekly Report 263 OJ [l9SOJ 2 s.c.R. 697.\n\n, . ..\n\n\n(1984] 2 S.C.R.\n\nto be called up for service ns and .when required. The court further held that as such the accused was\"( public serw; nt as an active member of the Indian Air Force a11d a sanction to prosecute him under Sec. 6. was necessary. This decision is of no assistance fer tle obvious reason that nowhere it was contended before the court, which office was alleged to have been abu_sed bv the accused nd whether the hvo offices were separate nd distinct. It is not !lk1de clear whether the a.ccused continued to hold the office which wasalleged to have been a bused or . misused even at the time of takit1g cognizance. of the offene. But that. could not be so because the service of the accused was terminated on April !; 1968 while the cognizan_ce was sought to be taken in June, 1969, Indisputably, the accused had ceased to hold that office as public servant whichhe was alleged to have misused or abused. The court was however, nqt invited to consider the contentiOn canvassed before us. Nor was the court informed specificatl;' whether the subse- quent office held by the accusec' in that case was the same from which his service was terminated meaning lhereb). he was re-employed to • the same office. The cision appears to proceed on tbe facts of the case/We.would, however, like to make it abundantly clear that if the two pecisons purport to lay. down that even if a public servant has \\ ceased to hold that office as public servant which he is alleged to have ) abused or misused for corrqpt motives, but on the date of taking cognizance of an offence alleged to have been committed by him as a public servant which. he ceased to be and holds an entirely different public office which he is neither alleged t~ have misused . or abused for corrupt motives, yet the sanction of authority competent to reniove him !rom . such latter office would be necessary before taking cognizance of the\n\noffence alleged to have been com;.., itted by the. public servant while holding an office which he. is alleged to have abused oI misused and which he has ceased to hold, the deciions in our opinion, dQ notlay down theco.rrect law and cannot be accepted asmaking a correct interpretatfon of Sec. 6.\n\nTherfore, upon a tlue construction of Sec. 6, it is implicit therein , that sanction of that competent authority aioue would be necessary whfoh is .competent to remove the public servant from the office which he is alleged to have misused or abused for corrupt motive and for which a prosecution is intended to be launched agamst him.\n\n In the complaint fited against the accused it _has been rcpeatedty alleged that the accused as Chief Minister of Maharashtra State accepfed gratification other. than legal remuneration from vanous sources\n\n.. f\n\n. ·-I'\n\n.·~.\n\nI ....\n\n. . ~\n\nR. s .. NAYAK v. A. R. ANTuLAY°(Desai, l) 521\n\nand thut°co~itted variou; offences, set out in the complaint. No' A where, not eyen by a whispe!·· it is alleged that the accused has misus<d or abused for corrupt motives his office as M.L.A.\n\nTherefore, it. is. crystal clear thatthe complaint fi.]ed against the accused charged him • with cri.minal abuse or misuse of onlv his office as Chief Minister. By. the time, the court was callei. upon to take cognizance of the offences, . so alleged in the cornplai;1t, the accused had cea.sed to hold the office B of the Chief Minister. On this short ground, it can be held that no .sanction to prosecute him was necessary as former Cf!ief Minister of\n\nMa_harashtra State. 'The appeal can succeed on this short ground. However, as• the. real bone of contention between the parties was whether as M.L.A. the accused was a public servant and the confontion was canvassed at some length, we propose to deal with the same. C\n\nThe learned special Judge held that the accused .as M.L.A. is a public servant because he .is in the ray of the Government or he is\n\nreunerated by fees for the performanc of public duty by the Government. The learned special.Judge simultaneously rejected the contention canvasse~. on behalf of the accused that the accused is a public .servant because .he is a person empowered by law to discl; arge as a member of a body of persons adjudicatory functions as contemplated by the Third cla.use of Sec. 21. ·\n\nRe: (d): We wou:d first examine the correctness or otherwise E of' the finding of the the learned special Judge whether the nccu.ed ni M.L.A. w.s in the pay of the Governmment or was remunerated by fees for the performance of any public duty by the. Government so as to be clothed. with the status of a public servant within the .meaning of cl. .(12)(a) .of Sec. 21 IPC. Cl. (12)(a) provides-that every person in the service or pay of the Government or remunerated by fees or com- F mission. for the performance of any public duty by the Government would be a. public servant. The three limbs of cl. (12)(a). according. to the learned special Judge are:. ·\n\n(i) Every person in the service of the Government; or\n\n(ii) Every person in the pay of the Goven\\ment; or\n\n(iii) Every person reinunerated byfees or commission for the performance of ariy public duty by the Government.\n\nH If any peno.n fall• in any of the three limb• .accordin& to the ·,\n\n522 SUPRBMJl COURT R.BPORTS\n\n(1984) 2 S.C.R.\n\nA •\n\nlearned special Judge, he would be a pblic. servant withinthe eaning .of. the expression in Sec. 21. IPC.. ·\n\n\n It wa.s cnceded before the learned special Judge and not retracted before us that the case of the accused does not fali in the first limb i.e. the ac;; used as M.L:A. could not b~ said to be in the service of the\n\nGJvernment: The contention is that the accused while receiv'ing his.· -salary as M.L.A., under th; Maharashtra Legislature Members' Salaries\n\nand.Allowance~ Act, 1956 was and is in the pay of the Govcrnmeni.\n\nThe second limb of the submission w; is. that even if the pay which . the accu ed received s M.L.A. tinder the relevant Act would not make the accused a person:in the pay of the Government, nevertheless. the 'ray recoiyed .bv !1im would be the remuneration which !lie accused would receive for p:orformance of public dty from the Government, It was Contended on behalf of the compJaina1it that the. expression' 'in tlie pay of the Government' would, in the c; ontext in which te expression i< u;,, J in S'G. 21(12)(1), mean only one thing that the pay- n1ent must be by-, i. inasterto a servant and i111Jess there is relationship of master and serva.nt or rehtiqnShip of comn1and and 6b~ience between the payer and the payee, mere paymen.t even if styled as pay would hoi mean that the payee is in the pay of the payer. Proceeding along it was submitted that. M.L.A. cou'ld not be said to be subject to obedience of any coinmand by the G, overnment, and therefore .the accused as M.L.A .. could not be said to be 'iri the pay of the Government'. And as , regards the third limb, it was urged that. the accuse\\! as M.L.A: was notperforming any public: duty for the performance. of which he was remunerated by the Govcrnm; nt. Additionally, it was urged that\"the expre$sion 'Government' in cl. (12) (a). musi receive the same meaniug'assigned to it in Sec. ,17 Ti>C.meaning thereby that it denotes the Central Govern.;, ent or. the Gvvernmenl of'a State as the context requires. It was ourged that in that s.ense the expression 'Government' in cl. (12)-(a) would mean 'Executive Government' and it would be adding insult.to injury if it can ever be .said that M.L.A. is in tl19 pay of the Executive Government or State Government. On behalf of the accused' these submissions were repelled by urging that . the use of word'or' signifies a disjunciive and not conjuctive and;.that\n\nvie.wed from this augle .the first part of cl. (12) (a) 'in the service of the Government' would iinport the notionof master servant or command \".· obediehce relationship, b.ut the expression 'in the pay of the Govern-\n\n,_. ment' would signif.v someone otl1er than. that included in the first limb and as th) legislat>tre couldnot bo accused oftautofogy or redundancy the expression 'in the pay of the Government' would exclude any.notion ef master servant or command o\\!edience relationship. lt was submit-\n\n) ..\n\n. \"'\n\n• } .\n\n. ;. .\n\nR.'$~ NAYAJ: V, A. R. ANTULAY (Desai, i) 523 .·\n\nted that conceivably there can be a person in the service of the Government though nobpaid by the Government and conversely there' can be . a person 'in the pay of tlie Government; .without being in the service of the Government. It was also submitted on hehalf of the accused that it would be constituti; rial lmpertinence to say that M.L.A .. does n9t perform any public.duty. His duty may be political or mo\"ral as urged. on behalf of the complainant but it. is nontheless a constitutional duty whi.ch he is performing and that duty would be comprehended in.the\n\n'.J. expressin 'public duty' fn cl. (12) (a). As a corollary it was submitted\n\n. .L_ that the remuneration in the_ form of pay which !he accsed receives \"}. and has been receiving since he ceased to be the Chief Minister under\n\n. ·~\n\n. , t.he relvant Act is remuneration for oe performance. of .the public duty by the Gi)vernment. The neat question that emerges on the rival contcntionS iS-.one of Construction_ of _the expre-ssiori 'in' the. p8y Of' and the expr_ession 'Government in cl. (12).(a). ·\n\n. .\n\nAt the thresh01.d learned cunsel for the accused sounded a\n\nnot~ of caution that the Court should steer clear of-the impermissible . attemDt of the i:tppe11ant to arrive_af.a true meaning.'ofa lcgisJ::itive\n\nprovi; ion by ci.elving deep into the l10ary past anct .tracing !he histoii-. cal evolution of the provision. a\\vaiting construction; lt was sub1nitted with emphasis that this suge.sted exteri1al aid to construction falls in the exclusionaTY rule .and cannotbe availed- _of. Therefrc, it hns\n\nbecome necessary to exan1ine this prlin1inarv'objectioi1 to the court\n\nrsorting to thi; exte!'nal aid to-construction. \"sec. 21 (12) (a) acquired its present form in, 1964. ·\n\nMr. Singhvi contended that even where the words in a statute\n\nare-'amb~-guou; and rniy-be -open .to.-ffiofc than oe meaning or sense, a referenceto the debats in PatJjaTI1e11t Or the rCport of a Comn1isSioi1 or a Committee which preceded the enacth1ent of the statute under . consideration is.-not a pern1issible µid t6 constrctio~1. ThiS is hat is cti\"lld the exclusionary rJ.Jlc. in sUppot of the' sub1nission, rliance. was placed. upon Assa n Raiht'ays and Trading Co. Ltd. v. Inland Rcvenue:comniiss; onersr11 in \\vhich the House f Lords declinectto Jook into fue Report of .the Rc, yal Commission en lncome tax in order to ascertain the me<:fling f certain \\\\'c..rds in 'the Inccme Tax Act, 1920 on the ground that no such Cvfdence for the purpose. of showing the intention, that is the purpose or objcet, cf an Act is admissible. The iii!ention of the legislature must. be ascertained froin the words of the\n\n(l) [1934]<AJI. E.R. 646 (Reprint)\n\n'.'\" c\n\n• D\n\n524 SUPREME COURT REPOR'fS\n\n[1984] 2 S.C.R\n\nstatute .which such extranuous assistance as is. legitimate. This view appears to. h1Vi' been comhtently followed in United,,, Kingdorri bfc.rnse in Katikiro of Buganda v .. Attorney General''', the Priv¥. Council held . in agreement with the Court of Appeal of Eastern Afi ica that the con- · ients of the White Paper were not admissible in evidencefor the purpose of construing the schedule. Simi1arly in Central Asbests Co. Ltd. v. Dor/112', the House of Lim\\srleclined to look at the Committee Report which precede1nhe <\\rafting.of the Act. ln the Administrator General of Bengal v. Prem/al Mvllick & Ors131, .the Privy Council ct'isapprovec\\ the teferene to' the pr?ceer\\ing of the Legislature whic.h resulterl in the pasing of the Act II. of 1874 as legitimate aids to the construdion of Sec. 31 by the Appeal B\"j, ch of Calcutta High Court. Relying on these decisions, a valiant plea was mar\\e to persuar\\c us not to depart' from this wellaccepter\\ proposition of!aw in England. The.tren<l of law manifeste<l by these r\\ecisions .broa<llv ii, dicat.e that in the days gone by the courts i11 Englanr\\ were of the view that reference to the recommenr\\ations of a Commission or Committee appointer\\ by the Government or statements in White Paper which shortly prece<lerl the statute underconsi<ler:-ition .were not legitimate ai<ls to construction\n\nof thC statute even_ if the word<; in the Statute v.; ere ambiguous . .\n\nThe trenr\\ ce'rtainlv seems to be in the reverse gear in that ia order.to ascertain the lf~C meaning of ambiguous words i.n a statute, r\\!ference to the -rcpor-tS an<l reco1nmenctatior:is of t!ie Ccim111is-s_ion or Committee which prece<le<l the enactment of the statute are hel<J. legitimate external air\\s . to construction. The modern approach has to a considerabl.e extent roded the exclusionary rule even in Englan<1..\n\nA Cohstitution Bench f this Court after specifically referring to Assam RailwayB and Trading Co .. Ltd. v. I.R.C. in State of Mysore v. R. V. . Bidap\"' observer\\ as uµr\\cr: • \"The trend of acar\\emic opinion an<\\ the practice in the European system suggest that interpretation of a statute being . an exercise in the ascertainment of meaning, every thing which\n\nis logically relevant should be admissible ................... , .. . . There is a strong case for whittling down the Rule of Exclusion followed in the British courts and for less apologetic reference to legislative proceedings an<\\ like materials to read the meaning\n\n(I) [1960] 3 All. E.R. 849 (2) [1972] 2 All. E.R. 1135 at ll38.\n\n(3) l, L.R. 22. Cal. 788 (4),(l974jl S.C.R. $89 at 594. •\n\n.. -.)-\n\n'j. -\n\nR-. s. NAYAJ( v: A .R. ANTULAY (Desai, J.)\n\n52S •\n\nof the words of a statute .. Where it is plain, the language prevails, but where there is ol.Jsctirity or )ackof harmony with other provisions and in other special circumstances, it may be legitimate to take external assistance such as\"the o bjec( of the provisions, the mischief sought to be remedied, the social context, the words -ofthe authors and other allied matters.\"\n\nApproaching the matter from this angle, the Constitution Bench looked info the proceedings of the Constitutent .Assembly and \"The Framing of India's Constitution; A Study' b.v 13. Shiva Rao. It was however urgeJ. that liefore affirmatively saying that in. JJidap's case this Court has fi.o, allv laid to rest this controversy, the court. may refer to Comniissioner of Income Tax, Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabarrv. Jayalakshmi Rice and Oil Mills Contractor Co. <i> At page 368 a be~ of three fudges of this court without sci much as examining the. principe\n\nun~.erlying the exclusionary rule dissented from the view of the High Court that the report .of the Special Committee appointed by the . Government of India to examine the provisions -of the Bill by which\n\nSec. 26A was added to the Income-tax Act, '1922 can be taken into consideration for the purpose of interrp, teting relevant provisions of the Partnership. Act. However it may be stated that the _Court did not refer to exclusionary rule. It dissnted from the view of the High . . Court on the ground that the statemeni relied upon by the the High Court was relating to clause 58 corresponding to Sec. 59 of the Partner'.· ship Act and that Statement cannot. be taken into' considerat.i6n .for the purpose of interpreting the relevan\\ provisions of the Partnership Act. This decision was not noticed in Bit/op 's case but the decision in Assam Railways & Trar/i11g Co. Ltd. relied upon by Mr. Singhvi was . . . specifically referred to. This decision cannot therefore be taken as an a1ithority for the proposition canvassed by Mr. Singhvi. Further. even in the lane\\ of its birfi, the exclusionary rule _has received a seriou• jolt in Black-Clawson International Ltd. v. Papienvorke Waldhef Aschejfenburg AC '2 ' : Lord Simon of Claisdale in his speech while examining the questio~ of admissibility of Greer Report observed a• under: . ·\n\n\"At the very least, ascertainme>; lt of the statutory objective . can immediately eliminate many cf the po.ssible meanirigs th.at the language of the Act might bear: and, if\n\n~91i1TS.c.R. 36S.\n\nC (2) [1975] l All. E. R. 810 ..\n\n,26 ..\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS. [1~84] 2 s.c_.R.\n\nan ambiguity still remains. consideration of the statutory objective is_ one .of _the means of resolving it.· ·.·\n\nThe stalurory objctive is primarily_ to be cllected frorri the provisions of the ·statute .. itself. Jn these days> when the long title\"can be amended in both Houses, I can see, no reasoi1 for havig recourse to i_t.onfv i~ cus~ of an . ambiguity'--'i't is the plainest of an the guids to the general objectives of a statute. But it wilf. not always help as . to partiCular provisions: As to the statutory objective of these, , a report leading to the Act is likely to .be the most ·potnt. aid; and, in myjudgment, it would be' more obscurantism.not to avai.1 oneself of it. here is, indeed clear and high. auth- · • ority that fr is availabJe for this purpose\". .. . .\n\nAnd in support of this statement of law, a number o_f cases. were relied upon by ihe learned Law Lord. it may also be mentioned that\n\nPer curiam.it was held that \"where there is an ambiguity in a staiute, the court may have regard fo the' Report of a Committee presented to Parliament containing proposals for legislation which resulted in t.he eqactment of the statute, in order to determine the mischief which the statute was intended to remedy\": Though. the unanimous view .was that the.report of a committee presented to'Parliament precding\n\nthe statute could be seen for finding\" out the then state of the law ad .. . : the mischief required to be reme.died, if must be stated that the majo-\n\n. rity were of the opinion that report could hot be looked at to asccrtaii1\n\nthe .intention of .Parliament. The minority (per Lord Dilporne and Lord Simon) were of the opinion that wheii a. draft bill was enacted in a. statute withoi1t any alteration, Parliament clearly manifested its intention to accept committee's recomITtendation which would imply that Parliament's inten.tion. was to .do wha.t committee wanted_ .to achieve by. its. recommendations. A referenee .to Halsbury's Laws of England,. Fourth Edition, Vol. 44•paragraph 901, would leave no one in doubt that 'reports of commissions or committees preceding. the enactment of a statute may be c0nsidered as showing the misc.hief aimed at and the s\\ate of the Jaw as it was u.nderstood to. be by the !Cgislature when the sfatute was passed.' Jn the footnote under the\n\nstateent of law cases qupted amqngest others are R .. v. Ulugboja''' • R. v. Blexham''' in which Eigth report of Criminal Law Revision\n\nCommittee was admitted as an extrinsic aid to construction .. :fherefore, it can be confidently said that the exclusionary_ rule is flickering in.its ------.-------\n\n(!) [1981] All, E. R .. 443\n\n(2) [19'2] I All. JO. _R. 5i2\n\n• ·.-l -\n\nt \\.\n\n...\n\n--r -\n\n...\n\nR.S. NAYAK v, A.R. ANTULAY (Desai, J.) . 527\n\n<lying <:mbers in its native land 0f birth and has been given a decent burial bv this Court: Even apart from ·.precedentS tlie basic purppe.\n\nunc!orlyig all canons f construction is the ascertainment with reasimable certafoty of the intention.of . Parliament in encting the . Iegi~Iatian. Legislation i$ enacted to achieve a certain object. The . object may be to remedy a mischief or to create some rights, obligations or imppse c!uties. Before undertaking the.exercise of enacting a statut~, Par!aiment can be taken to be aware: of the cot1stitutional principle of j\"ucl.icial review meaning thereby thelegislation would -be dissected . and subjected to microscopic.. examination. More often an expert\n\ncommittee or a Joint Parliamentary committee. examines the provisions of th.e proposed legislation .. But language being an inadequate vehicle •\n\nof thought co\"mprising intention, the eyes scaning. the statute ould be presentecl. with varried meanings. ff the basic purpose underlying construction of a legislation is to ascertain the real intention of the Parliament, wy should th~ aids which Parliament avitilcd of such as .report of a special Committee preceding the ena.:.tmeni, existing state of law, the environment necessitating enactment of legislation,. and\n\n-111' ohject sought to be achieved, be denie\"d to court\" whose function\n\n;, p,-iinarily to give effect to the real inteniion of !he Parliament in e; u, ting the legislation .. Such denial would deprive the court of II\n\nsubstantial and illuminating aid to construction. Therefore; departing\n\n\"rro~1 the earlier. English decisions we are' of the opinion that report• . of tbe committee which preceded the enactment.of a legislation, re- . ports of Joint Parliamentary Committee, report of a commission: set\n\n' 1 up for .collecting information leading to the enatment are permissible . -'~/ • external aic\\s to construction.· fo this connection, it would be advantageous to re.fer to a passage from Crawford on Statutory Construction (page 388). It reads as, under:\n\n \"The judicial opinion on this 'pofot is certainly not 'quite uniform and. there are America~ decisins to the\n\neffect that the general. history of a statute and the various steps leading.upto an enactment including .amendments or modifications of the origfoal bill and reports of Legislative , Cominittees can be looked at for ascertaining the intention of the legislature wher_e it is in p6ubt1 but th.ey . hold definitely that the legilative history is inadmissible when there is no obscurity int.he meaniRg of the s_tatute\".\n\nIn United states v. St, Paul, M.M. Rly. Co.'1> it is observed that ·\n\n(!) 62 Law ed. 1!30aLl134 • • •\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS . [1984] 2 s, c.R.\n\nthe .reports Of a commi!tee, including the bill .as int01duced, changes 'made in the. frame of the bill in. the course of its passage and the statement made by the committee chairman incharge of it, stand upon a . different footing, and may be resorted to under proper qualifications'.\n\nThe objection therefore of M~- Sihghvi to our looking into the history of the evolution-ofthe section with aH its clauses, the Reporis ofMudi- . man Committee and K. Santha'nam Committee and such other external aids. to constructiou must be. overruled. • . ·\n\nTracing the history of cl. (12) .of. Sec. 21 lPC with a view to as- i. certaining whether M.L.A. Wou]d be comprehended in .any of the clauses of Sec. 12 so as to be a public.servant, it must be ncitited at . ..('. . . . the outset that Indian .Penal.Code is a statute of the year 1860 when there were no elected legislatures and a fortiori there were no M.L.As.\n\nEven if Macaulay is to b_e adjudged a visionary, who coi11d look far beyond his t.imes yet in 1860 it was incoi1ceivable ltlr hi.in to foresee 'the constitu\\ional <levclopment ofJndiastages by stages or.0.\n\nto envisage -.. .the ettingup elected legislatures, the members of which wculcl. without anything more'be comprehended a.s public servant in any ofthe subclauses of'Sec. 21. Undoubtedly, framing of a legislation is generally riot of a-transient nature but it is enacted.and put on the statute book for reasonably long period until the society for which -it is meant undergoes a re_volutionary transfo.rmation so as to make the law irrelevant or otiose. A visionary can foresee possible changes which may ' , be .in.ter-connccted with the present situation one leading to the other.\n\nBut the East India Company rule which had just ended; in 1857after the first war of independence, it was difficult to devin'' the possible --<-{ revolutionary changes !hat may come in by 1919. At any rate at the time when the Indian Penal Code was enacted. there was no elected F legislature ano:therefore, there was no M.L.A. ln con_struing a statute more especially the ancient statute, the court may look at the surrounding circumstances when ·!_he statute was enacted. In Halsbur)l's Laws of England, Fourth Ed.ition, Vol. 44 paragraph 898, it is observed that . the construction of ancent statutes may be eludicated .by what in the\n\nlanguage of the courts is called contemporanea expositio, that is, by G seeing how they were understood at the time when they v, ere passed . . Undoubtedly, this doctrine cann9t be applied to modern stctutes or indeed to any statuie whose meaning appears to .the court to be plain and unambiguous. At 'any rate, one can justifiably say that M.L.A. could not be comprehended in any of the clauses of Sec. 21 to be a\n\n. .,.: H public servant when the Indian Penal Code. was enacted in 1860 .\n\nR.S. NAYAK v. A.R. ANTULAY (Desai, J.)\n\nThe next stage in the historical evolution of the Ia w with regard Al lo corrupt actions of members of public bodies is the one to be found in a Bill introduced in 1925 called Legislative Bodies Corrupt Practices Act, 1935. This Bill 'was introcfoced, to give effect to th.e rec0mll).encl.a• tions of the Reforms Enquiry Committee known as Mudiman Committee. In. the. book 'Evolutton of Parliamentary Privileges', by Shr.i\n\nS.K: Nag, the author t-raced the steps which led to the introd.uction of the Bill. In the statement of objects and rea'sons accompanying the Bill, it was stated that the corrupt influenci0g of votes of members of the legislature by bribry, intimid1tion and like should be made pend\n\n..i' offences under the ordinary criminal law and para 124 in.dicates that -~ tb, is recommendation was a unanimous'recommend1tion of the Committee.as a whole. Then comes the more important stato111ent which may . be qtracted:\n\n\"Tlie tender of a bribe to, or the receiving of a bribe by, a member of a lcgisl<tture in India as an induomont for him t~· act. in a particular manner as a. member of the legislatur is not at present an offence_..'' ·\n\n-The Biilso'ught to fill in the lacuna. It thus follows that Viii 1925. it was clearly un<1.erstood that the M.L.A. as the ho Icier of that office, . which must .have come into .existence by the time under the Owvern- ment of India Act, 1919, was not a pu.blic servant falling in any o.f the\n\ni::lausesof Sec. 21 and this .lacuna )vas sought to be remedi•d by in-· .J.. troducing Chapter 9-B bearing the heading 'Of offences by or relating\n\nYfo members of Legislature Bodies'. The dictionary clau§c in the Bill ..\n\nwould have included M.L.A. in the expression \"Membor of Legislative Bdics'. The object of the BiH was to provide for puni•hment of corrupt practice by or relating to members of Legislative Bodies )\\' constitute<'. unJ.er the Government of India Act. This was to bo passer\\\n\nby (he Central Legislature. It was an abortive attempt by members themselves to be brought within the purview of the penal law. One Can write a finale by saying that the Bill was l\\Ot enacted in.to law. That is the second stage in the history of evolution.\n\n. .\n\nG Before we proceed further in the journey, it is neces .. ry to tiike note of one intermediate stage to which our attention. was not drawn \" during the arguments. Jn. Prevention'. of corn!vtion Act, 1947 by ·\n\nSethi and Anand at µage 50, it is mentioned that till Criminal Lr.w (Amendment)-Act, 1958 (Act No. II of 1958) was put on the statute H book, Sec. 21 of the JPC consisted only of eleven clauses. Clause 12\n\n.. . 530 suPREME. COURT REPORTS\n\n\nwas introduced by the aforementioned Act and it read: 'Every officer in the service or pay of a local authority. or of a Corporation 'engaged ·.).. in any trade or industry which is established by a Central, Provincial or tat~ Act or of a Gqvernment Company as defined in Sec. 617 of the Companies Act, 1956'. .Obviously, as incorporated clause 12 would not comprehend M.L.A. and cl. 9 as it siood till then, could not haye . comprehended him as would be presently pointed out. Cl. 12 intro- . duced bv Act JI of, l958 is:re-enact'd as cl. 12 (b) and it is nobodv's case that M.LA. is c.overed in cl. 12 (b ): . ~·\n\nThe next stage. of development ma.1 now be noticed. While . participating in the debate <!n the demand for grants for the Ministry:[· . of Home affairs in Jilne 1962, som.e members of the Lok Sabha specifically referred to the.growing menace of corruption in administration.\n\nIn reply to the debate, the then Home Minister suggeste~. that some 'Members of Parliament and if possible some' other public men do sit with the officers in order to review the problem of corruption.and make ,._\n\nuggestions. Pursuant to this annourtcement, a comittee chaire~. by Shri K.Santhanam, M.P.was appointed with nine specific terms of referei; ice which ilitr a/ia included~ ''to suggest changes whkh would ensilre speedy trial of.cases of bribery, corruption and criminal misconduct and make the law otherwise more effective'. This Committee submitted its report on March 31.. 1964 . While examining the fourth term of reference extracted hereinabove, the Committee in Section 7 of_ its report considered the question of proposed amendment to Indian Penal Code. The Committee focussed .its attention on the definition' • . of 'public servant' in Sec. 2L Paragraph 7.6 is most important fa!.(\"\n\nthe present purpose.· It reads as under: . ' . . . .\n\n. '.'7.6 .Seciion 21. dfines . \"public servant'. 1welye categories of .Public servants have been -mentioned, but the preSei)f definition requires to be. enlarged. The riinth category describes a large variety of officers charge~. \\vith the performance of different kinds of duties relating to pecuniary inter~. ests of the State. The last sentence of this category, namely, \"every officer in the service or pay of the Government •or\n\nremunerted by fees or coihmission for the performance'of any public du y'\" sh9.uld be put as a generai definition. After the. word '.'governmen:e.',-he twOrds \"local alithoity\". \"public corporation\"; or \"govetnment company\" should be added.' The words \"engaged in any trade or industry'.' may also be deleted from the twelfth clause of Section 21 as these words\n\n....\n\n~ '\n\nR.s. NAVAK v. A.R. ANTULAY (.Desai. J,). 531\n\nhave a restrictive effect. ff should also be. made clear that all Ministers,· Ministers of State, Deputy Ministers, Parliaentary Secretaries and members of local authorities. come . . under the definition of 'public servant' A futhei' category should be addedto include all persons discharging adjudicatory functions under any Union or State. Law for the time being in fdrce. we .. also ce>1'6ider it necessary to include the following categodes . within ihe, definition of the tei:m. 'pulbic s.ervant' :~\n\nPresident, Scretary and all .members of Managing Committee or a registered Co\"operative Society; •\n\n• c\n\nOffice bearers and employees of .eductional, social,. religious ancj other institutions; in whatever manner\n\nestablished, which receive aid in ariyform from the Central or State Gayernment''.\n\n• . This :recommendation led to 'three irhportan.( amendments in\n\nD . els. 3, 9 and 12 .of Sec. 21. The unamended clauses and the effect of\n\nthe amendment ill 1964 must be brought out in sharp 'contrast so as\n\nto appreciate the cha!Jge made.and its effect on the language employed ..\n\n ). Clau.se as they stood prior ro the. 1964 ,-.mendment Third: Every Judge: ..\n\nAmendded by the. 1964\n\n .Amendment\n\nThird: Every Judge in- .including any person empo- . werecj by law to discharge, whether by himself or as a member of any body of persons, any adjudicatory functions;\n\n• Ninth: : Every officer whose duty it Nmth Every officer is_, as mch officer to take, receive, keep, whose duty it is, as such or expend any property on behalf of. officer to take, -teceive, keep,\n\nthe Governinent, or to make any sur or expend' ariy property on .\\ vey, assessment, or contract on bebehalf of the Government, half of the Government or to execute or to make ariy survey, asany revenue=-prcicess,. or to investi.· sessment or c.ontract on be &ate, or. to report, on any matter affechalf of the Governmentt or to\n\n.H\n\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS ..\n\n\nting the pe.cuinary interest of the cxcctit~ any rfvri1uC-proccss, GoVcrriment or t9 1n2kc authenticateor to i11vcstigate,.or 10-rcport, or keel' any document.relating to the '>n any matter ;; ffecting the pecuniary interest of the Government, • pecuniary ii1tere; t_ of the Gear to prevent }le infraction of any law vernment, or make authentifor the protection of.the pecuniary incate or keep any document terests. of the-Government, and eVt!'rj! relating. to the pcuniary in-· officer in the service. or pay of .the terests of the Government, Government or rem11nerated by fees or to prevent the infraction of or commission for the pe1formanc~ of any law for. the proteciion\n\nany pubiic duty. of. the pecuniary interests of . • {l!l'nderlining ours); the Government.\n\n' .. Twelfth: Every officer in the .service or pa; of a local authority or of a cor- poration engaged in any trade or industry ·.whioh is established by a Cen\\tal,\n\nPrvi\"nCial or State Act or of a Government._Company as defined in section 617 of tlo.• <::ompanies Act, 1956.\n\nTwelfth : Every person:\n\n(a) in.the service or pay of the .Government or fe1Yiuncrated by fees or commission • 'fot the performance of any\n\npublic. dut_v by the Govern- . 1nent;\n\n (b) in the service or pay of a --4. local authority, a corporation established by or under Central, Provincial or State,..../'\n\nAct or a Government Com' ,,, pany as defined in section 617 of the Companies Act, 1956. 'f\n\nA bare c9tnparison of tle two els. (9) and (12) \\vould reveal. the . change brought b?Y (he Amending Act 40of1964. The last part (underlfo_ed portion) ii1 the unamended cl. (9): 'ev_ery officer in the scrvi£e or ·\n\npay of the Government or remunerated by fees or commission for the performance of any 'public duty' has been severed from the 9th clause and incorproaied as an independent clause (I 2) (a). The origi\" i nal clause (H) was deleted and has been re-enacted, as d .. (12) (b) . with minor modifu:atiops. This history of development is noteworthy for a1very compelling reason to be presently nient!01ied.\n\n• • l!..S. NAYAK v. A, l!.. ANTULAY (Desai, J.) 533\n\ndiscretionary powerand this includec1; Minister both Cabinet and State,, A Deputy Ministers. and parliamentary Secretaries. ML.As were not considered holding political offices capable of abuse of power. The Committee recomended amondment of.the Jefinition of the .expression •public servant in Sec. 21 IpC so as to include Ministers of .all rank of Contra! and State level and Parliamentary Secretaries in the . definition of public servant'.\n\nThe Committee did not\n\n B recommend that the proposed amendment shoul.d comprehend M.L.A. 'The Committee separately dealt with the. M.L.As in p; iragraph 11.4 in Sec. Ir of the Report'. After stating that, \"next to the Minister, the integrity of Members of Parliament an<\\ of legislatures in the State will be a great factor .in .creating a favourable soical climate against corruption .... .It is desirable that a Code of Conduct . for legisla- C tors embodying tb.ese and 'other priciples should be framed by a speeial committee of reprsentatives of Parliament and the legislatures nominated by the Speakers and Chairman. This Code should be formally approved by resolutions of Parliament and the legislattires and any infringement of the Code should b.e treated as a breach of ') privilege to be inquired iJto by the Committee of privileges,. and if D a breach is established, action including termination of membership may be taken. N''cessaty snaciions for.enforcing the Code of Conduct\n\nshould also be brought into existence\".\n\nThe Governtnent minutely examined. the Report. The recommen~ ~-. dations of the Committee which were accepted by the Govemment led to tho introduction of 'The Anti- Corruption Laws (Amendment) J!ilL 196.4 (Bill No. 67 of !964j in the Parlirment. The salieni features of the Bill worth-noticing are that cl. (3) of Sec. 21 was proposed to be amended as recommended. with minor s!rrctural .change. Cl. (9) of Sec 21 was dissected as recommended and its last part 'and every officer in the service are pay .of the GJvernment or remunerated by fee's or commission for the performance of any public duty' was detached and re-enacted as cl. (12) (a) and the original cl. (12) ,;, as\n\nrenumbered as Cl. (12} (b) with slight modification. This would imply that no attempt was made to bring fo M, L.A: within the conspectus of clauses in Sec. so as to make him. public servant. The position of the Minister was slightly fluid but a clear picture <?merged. during. the debate on the Bill in the Lok Sabha. Mr. lfathi Minister-incharge while piloting the Bill, on November 7, 1964 amongst others stated that the will not deal with those recommendations which had not been accepted by the Government, but would explain them fater, if any point is raised in that behalf, (See Lok Sabha Debates (Third\n\n. 534 SUPREME . COURt REPORTS ..\n\n[1784]2 S.C.R .•.\n\nthat hewill n0t deal with those recommendations .. whi.ch, had noJ not , been accepted by the Govermrient, but. would explain then; later, if any point is raised in that behalf. (See Lok Sabha Debates (Third .\n\nSeries), Vol. XXXV, Col. 245) While replying to th.e debate, Mr'. Hathi stated that the ccideof conduct has already been evoled for Mini_>ters. because the recommendation of Santhanarn Committee for including .\n\nMinisters of all .tanks arid Parliamentary Secretaries.in the definition ·.of 'p_ublic servant' .as not accepted by the Government. But there is an interesting caveat to this statement.to which we would presently revert.\n\nHe further stated ihat th.e speCi-fic recommendations about the definition 'p.llblic servant' to include Ministers-lrns not been accepted and included in the Bill because Ministers are not mere.Jy public servants .but they have a greater moral and social responsibility towards : the people. Later on in the debate it was conceded that the Minister is already included _in the definition of 'public. servant' evc11 before the proposed afuendment in view of the decision of the Supreinc Court in SiiivBahadur Singh's cas~ in whih Minister was held to be a public servant. It was 'further stated that in Yiew of thisjudgment, the Govern- inent was advised that the recommendation: ofthio Santhanam Commit, tee for inclusion specifically of Ministers of ail rank and Parliamentary Secretaries was rodundant. (Sec Lok _Sabha Debates. (J; hird se, ie~) Vol. 35 cols. 729 and 731). Whatever that may be the concfosion is inescapable that till 1964 at any rate M.L.A. was not :comprehended iri the definitioi1 of 'public servant' in Sec. 21. And .the Santhanam ·\n\nCommitteedid not recommend its inclusion in_the definition of 'public,:. servant, in Sec. 21..\n\n.. Bill No.47 of 1964 as nacted as Act 40 .of 1964. Now if pior :to the enactment of Act 40 of 1964 M.L.A. was not comprehended . as a public servant in Sec. 21, the next question: is: did the amendment\n\n. make any difference in his pos_itioti. The amendment keeps the law virtually unaltered. Last part of cl. 9 was enacted as. cL 12 (a). If M.CA. was not comprehenc!ed in clause 9 before itsamendment and dissection, it would make no difference in the meaning of law if a portion of.cl. 7 is re-enacted as cl. 12 (a). It musdollowas a necessary corollary that the amondment of Cls. (9) and (12) by Amending Act 40 of 1964 did not bring about any change In the interpretation of cl. (9) and cl. (12)(a) after th~ amendmentof 1964. In 'this connectfon, it wou](t be advantageou& to refer to G.A.. Monterio v. The State of A.jmer\"' followed and approved in The State of A.jmer v. Shivji Lal''' in both of\n\n;_~~~~~~~ H\n\n(1) (1956] S.C.R .. 682. r (2) (1959) Supp,'2 S.C.R. 739. .\n\n' f\n\n_.,_\n\n' .\n\n. f ..\n\nR.S. NAYAK v .. A.R. AN1ULAY (Desai, J.)'\n\nwhich c!. (Q) as it 'stood. prior to its amendment came pp fOfconstniction. fa \\he first . mentioned, case, the accused was a 'chaser in the Railway Carriage Workshop at Ajmer. He was. held to be an officer\n\nin the pay of the G wernment, comprehended in the last part of cl. (9) of Sec. 21 as it then stood. fo the second case, accused was a teacher in a r\"ilway school at Phu!era. His contention was that he was not a. public servant and tht .contention had found favour with 'the learned Judicial Commissioner but in reaching the conclusion, .he appeared • to have ignored the last.part of cl. (9) prior to. its amendment in 1964.\n\nIi1 .the appeal by the Siate, .. this Court held that the case of the accused -.\n\n-)_ would be covered by the last part of cl. (9) because the accused fuffilled the tw'inconditions of either being in the. seryice or pay of the Govern, ment and was entrusted with the performance of a. publiC duty. It may. ·\n\nal; o be mentioned that the last three Words 'by the Government' found\n\n...\n\nin cl. (12) (a) after the mendment were riot t.here in the last part of cl. 9'. . Tb.e question was whether addition. of words 'by the Government' )( made any difference in the interpretation of last part of d. (9) which • is substantiaHy re-enacted as c1. (12)(a). The Gujarat High Coui't in Manshanker P; abhashanker JJwivedi and Anr. v. The .State of. GujaratnJ traced the history of amendment that payment by the Government was implicit in cl. {9) though the words 'by the Government' were not_ there and were added to cl. (12)(a) after re-enacting the last part of\n\ncl. (9) as (12)(a) .. This beco1nes clear from the decision of this Court in the appeal against the judgment of the Gujarat High Court in\" the . State of.Gujarat v. Manshanker Prabhashanker Dwivedi .. 121 The accused ·:~_ in that case was cha, rge<! for having committed'ffenccs under Sec. 161 IPC and. Sec. 5 (2) of th~.1947 Act. The facts alleged were that the . a.ccused-'-respondent before this Court was an examiner appointed\n\n, by the University for the first year B.Sc .. examination .. He was alleged\n\nto have accpted gratificatin of Rs. 500/- other than legal reniuneta-\n\n~ tion for showing favour to a candidate by giving him more marks than he deserved in the Physics practicai examination; The learned special Judge convicted him. In the appeal, the High C-ourt aft'e~ taking note of cl. '9 and cl. 12 of Sec. 21 pri@r to their amendment J?y Act 4() of 1964 held that for cL 9 to apply the person should be an officer 'in.\n\n• t.he service or pay of the Government ii; remunerated by fees or commission for the performance of any. public' duty 'and that such pay or remm1eration or commission must come from the Government'. It .was further held 'ihat the context of the whole of the Ninth Clause, as\n\n(i) AIA J970 Gujarat n\n\n(2) [1973! I S.C.R. 313 ..\n\n-A ,\n\nB . '\n\n53{•\n\nSUPREMB COURT REPORTS ii 984j 2 $. t.k.\n\nremuneration or in respect of the pcrformncc of public duty.' It.was furthe{ held that the use of the word 'officer' read in the context of the \\Vords imm, diately precding the last part wou'd indicate that the remuneration contemplated was .remuneration by Government.\n\nThe High Court further held that the amendment made in 1964 and in particular the addition of the words 'by the .Governmn:t' in subcl\n\n(a) of clause .Twelfth showed the legislative inforpretion of the niatc- : rial portion of clause Ninth as.it stood before the. amendment under ·\n\nconsi'deratio)l.. After extraction these reasons which. appealed to 'the High Court, this court observed than the reascir\\ing of the High C;>urt does not suffer froin any imfirmity. It would transpire that payment 'by the Government was iplied without the use af the expression, by the Government in cl. 9. The wbrds 'by the Government' are added in cl. (!2)(a} amennded. This apparently do.es not make any differe.nce.\n\nIt would therefore necessarily follow that the amendment' of els (9) a.nd (12) did not bring abo.ut any chauge in the coverage and construe-. ti on ofth• two dauses prior to and sinoo their amedment. If that bg so, it would follow as nece5'ary corollary that if M.L.A was not a public servant with in .the meaning of the expression prior to Act 40 of 1964, since the Act, the law, legal effect and• onverage ofexprisstion public servant remains unaltered and hance-, M.L.A. is not a 'public sorvarit' comprehended in cl. {12)(a). Thus .looking to the history and\n\n evolutipn of Sec. 21 as traced, it is clear. that-till .1964 M.L.A. could not have b'en conceivably comprehended in expre•sion 'pUblice ser- vant' and the law did riot undergo any change si11ce the amendment.\n\nnthe.contrary~ the.recommendatio11 of the nthanam Committee which recominended inclusion of Mini•ters and Parliamantary Secreta'ties but not of M.L.A separately reommended a co<; ie of conduct for M.L.A for seving them from the spectre, of corruption would clearly and unmistakably s.how that till 1964 M.L.A. was not comprehended in expression,'public servant' iri Sec. 21 IPC and the amenment\n\n by Amending Act 40 of 1964 did not bring about the slightest change in this behalf concerning the position of M.L.A. Therefor,, apart . from anything else,. on historical evolu.tion of Sec. 21 . adopted as an external aid to construction, one elm confidently say that M.L.A. was iiot and is not a •public servant' within the meaning of the\n\nexpte~ion in any 0f the clauses of Sec. 21 JPC.\n\nAssuming that it would not be legally sound or correct accordinl! , tg well-,-accepted canon of co.nstruction of a statute to construe Sec. ff,: 2.t (12) (a) by mere .historical evolution of the seation and the constitutionally valid approach .would be to look atthe language em-\n\n.e-f· ..,\n\nRs. NAYAK v. A.R. ANfVLAY (Desai, J.). 531 . .Sec. 21 (12) (a) by mere historical evolution of the section and the\n\nconstitutional!/ valid approach would be to look at the language em'. '\n\nployed in the section and upon its true construction, ascertain whether M, L.A. is a. public servant within the meaning of the. expression i_n\n\nthat sub-clause. The learned special Judge held that M.L.A. is a public servant because he is. either in the pay of the Government or is remunoratect by fees for the perform1rnce of any public e\\uty by the Government.\n\nA person Would be a public servant.under cl. (12) (a) if (i) he is ia the service of the Government; or (ii) he is .in the pay of the Governent; or (iii} he is remunerated by fees or commission for the perfor-. mance of any public duty by the GovernmenF. •\n\n{); i_ behalf f the complainant-app~!Jant, it was contended that in order to make a person a public servant on the ground _that Ile is in the pay of the Government, there must exist a master-servant relationship or a .command-obedience relationship, and if these. elements are absent even if a person is in ihe pay of the Government, he would not be a public servant. On behalf of the. re'spondent, it was countered asserting that the concept of master servant relationship er command-\"obedience relationship is comprehended in the first part of cl. (12) (a) which provides that every person in the service of\n\ntile Government would. be a public servant. It was urged that if even for being comprehended .in the second part of._the clause namely, a • J!Orson would be a public servant if he is in the pay of the Governme1ii,\n\ntli.tir ought to be•a master-Servant. or command-obedience relationship, the Legislature would be guilty of tautology nd the disjunctive 'or' would lose all significance. The use of the expression 'or' in the contex't in which it is found in cl. (12)(a) does appear to be a disjunctive. Read in this manner, there are three independent categories comprehended in cl. (12) (a) and if a prson fa]ls in any one of them, he would be a public.servant. The three categories are as held by the learned special. Judge; (i) a person in. the service of the Government;\n\n(ii).~ person in. the pay of the Government; and (iii) a person remuner.ated by fees or commission for the performance 'of any public duty\n\ny the Government. One can be in the service of the Government and may be paid for the same. One can be in the pay of the Government ll'ithout being in.the service of the Government in the sense of manifesloting maste'r-servant or . command-obedience relationship.\n\nThe 1t•• of the.expression 'or' does appear .. (o us to be a disjunctive as contended on bekalf ., f the respondent. Depending . upon the context,\n\nB .•.\n\n. .\n\nD .\n\nE.:\n\nF •.\n\nJ'\n\n, .. ·\n\n538 . '\n\nS\\JPRBME C<)URT REPORTS [1784), 2. s.c R ..\n\n'or'\n\n0 111ay .be .read as 'an~' bt the ctirt would not do it unless it is so oli\\iged because 'or' cbes not generally mean 'and' a, nd 'and' docs not .generally mean 'or'. (S_ee Gr<; en Y. _Pre1i1ier Glyrhon1vy .. 'llat~ COnipany Ltd.''ll Babu .. Manmohan Das & Ors . . v. Bis/11111 Das,'\"'Ramta\n\nP•asadA garwal etc. v. Executive Enginer, . Ballabgarh' & Anr. <a\" and serveral. others which we coqsider it unnecessary to enumerate h\"ere. .... - ' ·•. . 01Ce it is accepied that 'a person .in the pay of the Government' connotes a specific and independent c:ategory of public servant other than' a porson in the .service of the GovernmeriC does not inhere. a m1ssCer-servant or command-obedience . relationship between the G1vernment as the payer and .the public servant as the payee,•no. part <>f the section is rendered superfluous. Each part will .receive.its own construction. We therefore consider it unnecessary to refer to those decisions,. which were cited on behalf of tlie respondent that the correct canon of construction to be adopted in such. a situation is that effect must be given, if possible, to.the words used in the statute,· for. the Legislature is deemed not to wast.e its words or to. say. anyting in vain. -. \"\" What° then is\" the true. iterpretation of the expession ; in the pay of the Government'. In other words, is M.L.A: a person 'In the pay of the Government' so as to , be public servant within fue meaning of\n\nte expression in See. 21 (14) (a). The expressions that call for con. struc'tion are (i) 'in. the pay of' and (ii) 'Govrnment'.. ·\n\nArt. 195 of the <; onstitution proviLtes that 'Membets of the Legis- 1ative Assembly and the Legislative Council of.a State shall be entitled to receiye., such salaries and allowances as mayfrom time to time be determined bv the Legislature of the State by law and, until provision: in that° respect is so made, salaries and allowauces at such -rates and upon such.conditions as were immediately before ilie commencement of the Constitution applicable i~ the case of members Of the Legislative Assembly of the corresponding Province.' Armed with this power, •.\n\nthe Miharashfra.State Legislative Assembly has enacted 'The Maharashtra Legislature M'mbers' Salaries and Allowances Act, 1956 (Bombay Act XUX of !956)'. Sec .. 3 (!) provides that 'there shall be paid to each me .lier during the whole of his term of office a salary at the\n\n(I) [1928] l K. B .. 561 at 568. (2)[1967] l S.C.R. 836 at 83'.\n\nPl [19741 2 s, c.R. 821 at 830 .\n\n. .\n\n. '\n\nR.S. NAYAK v. A.R.\" ANTULAY (Desai, J.) 539\n\nrate of Rs. 450/-pr month' aqd snb-sec. (2) provides that 'there shall A be p1id to each Member during the whole of his term of office per month a sum of Rs. 400/- as a consolidated allowance for a11 matters not specifically provi.~.edl or by or tinder the provision of the. Act~_. Sec. 4 provides for daily allowances to be paid to Members. Sec. 5 provides .\n\nfor travelling allowance to be paid to Meinbers.· Sec. SAC provides for a free travel by mil way and steamer by a Member subject to the B . conditions therein prescribed, _Members are also .eligible for some allowances as.specified in various sections of the Act. The Maharashtra Legislature Member\"Pen'sions Act, 1976 makes provision for payment of pension with effect from April I. 1981 at the.rate of Rs.\" 300 per . month to evey person who has s.rv.:d as.a Member of the State Legis-. lature for a term of 5 years subje\"Ct to other conditions. prescribed in <:: . the section, There is .a similar Act which makes provision:s for salaries and allowances of the Ministers of Maharashtra State.\n\n Undoubtedly, M .. L.A. receives a salary and allowances in his ' . . _, - . . capacity _as M.L.A. Does it make him a person 'in the pay of theGovernment'? Our attention has been. drawn to the meaning of the word '•pay' in differ.ent dictionaries and to the decision in M. 'Karzmanidhl\n\nv. Union of lrfo 111 . wherein after as:ertaining the meaning of the word 'pay' given in: different dictionari'es, the Court. observe<'. that .the expression 'in the pay of' doe$ not.sigri.ify .astr-servant relationship. The word, 'piy'_ standing by itself i11 open to various shades of. meaning and when the word is used .in a p'.uase 'in the pay.· of', it is more likely to have a different connotation. than when standing by itself. Before referring to the various shades .of meariing. set out in the dictionaries; it would be a~.visable to caution ourselves. against an unrestricted . roference to dictionaries. Standard ~.ictionaries as a rule giv-o in r?spoot of each woad a; meaningL in which the word has either been used or it is like!~ to be used in different contexts and connections. While it may .be permissible to refer to <1.ictionaries to find outthe meaning in. which a -word is capble'of being \\rse~. or\n\nunderstood in. commqn parlance, the we11-known canon of construt.:tiOil should not even for a minute be overlooked that the meaning of the . words ancl expressions used in a statute ordinarily take their colour\n\nfrom the co!\\tet in which they appear. '.In Dy. Chief Controller of Imports & Bxpom, New /)e/hi v .. R. T. Kosalrotn & 01'5:121 this Court observed as under ; . '\n\n(I) [1979] 3 S.C.R; 254.\n\n(2) [19711 2 S.C.R. 507 @' 517.\n\n.E\n\n- F\n\n•s4o\n\n\n(1784] 2 S.C.R.\n\n\"It is not always a safe way to construe a statute or a contract by dividing it by a process of etymological dissection anc\\ after separating words from their context to give each word some particular dfinition given by lexicographers and then to reconstruct the ins.truments upon the . basis of those definiti9ns. What particular meaiin& sholcl. be. attach.ed to words and phrases in a given .instrument is usually to '.be gathered from the context; the 'nature of the subject matter, the purpose of the intention of the author and the .effect of giving to them one or the other permissible me aning on the object to be achieved. Words are after all used merely as a vehicle to convey ihe idea of the speaker .' or the writer ancl. the words have naturally, therefore, to be\n\nSO construed as. to fit in with the idea which emerges Oil. a consid0 ration of the entire context. Bach word . is but a\n\nsymbol which may stand for one or a umber of objocts. , The context, in which a worcl. conveying different shacl.es of meanings is' used; is of importance in determining the pr<!tisc sen1e wllich fits' in with the context as intended to be conveyed by tht~ iuthor\".\n\nIn State Bank of India v. N. .Sunda-ra Money!J', Krishna Iyer, J. speaking for the Court observed in his inimitable style that\"rl.ictio- . nries are i:iot dich~.ors of statutory cons_truction whre . the benignant 'mo.od of a law, may furnish adifforent denotation'. With this caution, . we .may briofly refer to the meaning of the expression 'pay' and 'in the , pay of' given by different dictionaries.\n\nAs far as the expression 'pay' is CO!fcerned, a Constitutioll Bt•nclt of this Court in Karunanidl!i's case referred to various dictionaries and concluJ.ec( that the word odinarily means 'salary, compensation; wages or anv amount. of money paid to the person who is deioribed as in the p; y of' the payer'. Serious exception was taken .on behalf of the appeallant, that. no canon of construction would permt' pickin2 out. shades of nieaning of' word 'pay' and then read the phrase 'in the pay of' as synonymous. with the word 'pay'. On the other hand, it . .,; as asserted that the point is concluded by .the cbservation of the CcLStilu-·\n\ntion Bench that 'so far as the second limb of the clause, 'in the pay J>f. the Government' is concerned, that appears to be of a much wid<'r amplitude. so as to include ,, iithin its ambit even a public servant who\n\n(l) [1976] 3 S.C, R. 160 .\n\n. ' ..\n\n> • \"\n\n• )(\n\n_.. •\n\n~-!'\n\n)( ,\n\n......\n\n' 'R.S. NAYAK v. A.R. AN1ULAY (Desai, j,) 541\n\npav of the other person anb yet there may not bo a master 'Servant relationship between them. The court did not ascertain .the meaning . ascribed to phrase 'in the pay of' in. different dictionaries.\n\nThe phrase 'in the pay:of' would ordinarily import the element of employment ot paid employment or employed and paid by the employer. Jn Concise Oxford Dictionary, 7th edition at page 753, the meaning assigned . to the expression 'in the pay of' is 'in the employme11t of'.· Jn New Collins Concise English Dictionary at page .. 831, 'in the pay of'carries one meaning as 'one in paid employment'. In Websters New World Dictionary, the phrase 'in the pay of'. carries the meaning employed and paid by'. Relying on all these shades ofmening: it was urged . that the phrase 'in the pay.of' lbcs necessarily import the element of master-servant relationship and its absence cannot be countenanced .\n\nIt was submitted even if. A is p0id by B a sum styled as pay unless B is servant of A, it cannot be said that B.ls in the pay of A. We see force in this submission. However, it is not implicit in the expression 'in the pay of' that there ought to exist a master-servant ·reiationship. between payer and payee. 0 te can be in the pay of another without\n\nbing, in employment or service of the other. We are not inclined to accept the submission that 'in the pay of' must in the context,-imply master-servant relationship for the obvious reason th.at the court has to.construe the phrase 'in t'.:e pay of' in its set.tirg Where _it is prcceC.'='d by the expressiuri 'in the S'~Tvice 'of the o)verilmei1.t' and sucCecded by the expression remunerated by fees o.r con11nission for the prfor-. mance of any public duty by the Government'. The setting and the context are very relevnt for ascertaining the true meaning of the expression. In order to avoid. tho charge of.tautology. the phrase-'in the pay of the G wernment' in c!. (J2) (a) may comprehend a situation that the person may be in the pay of tl1e G, ivernment without being in the. employmertt of the Government or without there being a master-servant relationship bet\\Veenthe prsonrceiving the pay and the 'Government as payer.\n\nn was however, contended that the question whether a person 'in the pay of the Governn1i1f' is ipso far:to a public servant is no more . res integra and concluded by the decision of the Constitution Bench\n\nin Karunanidhi's case? In that case before adveiiing to .t)1e d.ictionary meaning of the expression 'pay', the Constitution Bench speaking through Fazal Ali, J. observed as unt\\er at page 282: ·\n\n\"We are of the opinion. that so far as the second limb 'in H the pay of the Governments' is concerned, that apj)ears .to be of\n\n. 542 •\n\n~UPREME COURT .REPORTS\n\n[1784] 2 S.C.R,\n\n\"We lire of the opiionthat so far as the second limb 'in the pay.of the Government'. is concerned, that appears to be of a much. wider amplitude so as to include within its ambit even · public se.rvant who maynot be a regular employee recei\"ing salary from his master\".\n\nThe Court fµrther ob•erved that \"the expression 'in the pay of' pomwte that a person is getting Salary, compensation, wages or any\n\n. ,\n\n. amount of money. This. by itself however, does not lead to the inference , that a relationship of master and servant musf necessarily exist in all + cases where a pe.rson iS paid salary\". We are, also Of the opinioi; i that the phrase\"in the pay of the Government' does llOl import of necessity _\"(- . a master-servant relationship. lt i• perfectly possible to say that a person can be in the pay of .the Government if he is paid in considera- . tion.ofdischarging an assignment entrusted to him b; the Government without there necessarily being a master-servant relationship between them, It is not .unusual in common parlance. to speak of. a person being in. the pay of another .if he is paid for acting at the behest or ' )( acc9rding to the desire of the other without the other being his master and he the servant, that is io say without the control over the manner of doing the work which a master-servant relationship implies. It is . such a category in addi, tiqn to the one 'in the service ofihe Government' that is sought to be comprehem\\ed in cl. (12)(a). In respect of the extractecj. obser\\tation of the Constitution Bench, there 'Is no attempt\n\nto distinguish the dicision in Karunanidhi's case and therefore, it is ·.-4 not necessary to consider the dicisions cited in support of hie submission ihat a jugment of th~ Supreme Court sespecially ofthe Constitu-. -'-)/I, tion Bench cannot •be d1stmgmshed hghtly .and is bmdmg on us and \\. ' unless questions of fundamental importance to national life are in- . volved .. need not be by us. yte mµst however poin~ out that the ratio of the dicision in Karunanidhi's case is not what is extracted herein' before but the ratio 'is to be found at page 290 where the Constitution if .. Bench held-the Chief Minister to be a public sera11t as comprehended in cl. (12)(s) of Sec. 21 on the fihding: . • 1\n\n. \"1. That a Minister is appointed or 0.ismisso,\\ hy the . Governor and is, thc; refore, subordinate to .him whatever be. the\n\nnature and status of his constitutional functions.\n\n:2:. That a Chief. Minister or a Minister gets alary for . the public work done or the public duty performed b'y him. j\n\n'3. T.hat the sai~. salary .is paid to the Chief Minister er Ui.t Miniiter from the Government fiinds\". ' . . . .\n\n,,,_\n\n' .;;; i\n\nR.S. NAYAK v. A.R., ANTULAY (Desai, J.)' 543\n\nIt wnuld appea:r at glance that no argument was advanced and . A none has hen examined by the Constitution Bench bearing on the interpretation f the. expression 'Government'. in cl. (12)(a). It was assumed that salary and allowances paid to the Chief Minister are by , Cbvernment. What does expression 'Government' in the cla.use connote was not even examined. And it is on the aforementioned finding that the Chief Minister was held to be a public servant but that ~.oes B not conclude the matter. ·\n\nThis is not the end of the matter. The question may be posed thus: 'Even if M.L.A. receives salary and allowances under the relevant statute, is he .in the pay of the Government'? In other words, what ct).:s !he , expression 'Government' collflote? c\n\nThere'is a short and a long [lnswer to the problem. Sec. 17 iP\"c provides that 'the wor~ Goyern, ment' denotes the Central Govrnment or the Government of a State'. Sec. 7 IPC provides that 'ever expression w'1ih is explained in any part.of the Code, is used in every part ('f t1• (:'ode in conformity with the explanation'. Let it be noted that u,1like the modern statute Sec. 7 does not provide\"unless the context otherwise indicate' a phrase that prefaces the dictionary clauses of a modero tatute. Therefore, the expression 'Government' in Sec. 21 (11)(') must either mean the Central Government or the. Government of, a S:ato. Substituting the explanation, the relevant portion of Sec. 21\n\n(12) (a) would read tl)us: 'Every p•rson in the pay of the Central\n\nJ_. . G , v, rnmen t or the Government of a State or remune'rated by fees or commission for the performance of any public duty by the Central Gwetnment or.the Government of a 'State' .. At any rate, the Central G >vernment is out of consideration. Therefore, the question boils d0wn to this: whether M.L.A. is in the pay. of the Government of a State or' is r<munerated by fees for the performance of.any public duty\n\nF ,\n\nby the Gowrnment of a State ? ·\n\nIn the ctehate between the Presidential form.and Parliamentary •form of , lemocracy, during t)le eariy days of the Constitutent Assembly, the. bal.ance .tilted in favour of Parliamentary form of Government.\n\nG Mr. K. M. Munshi, one of the members qf the Drafting~Committee spoke in this connec; tion as ilnder : ·\n\n \"We must not forget a very important fact that, during the last hundred years, In~.ian public life has largely drawn upon H the traditioq.s of British Constitutional Law . Most of us have ..\n\n• 544\n\nSUPRE~IE C'Ol!P.T REPORTS\n\n[1984] 2 S C.R .\n\nlooked up to the British medel as the. best: Fe>r the last thirty or forty years, some hind of responsibility has been introduced in the governance of the country. Our constitutional traditions have become p3rliaentary and we have now all our Provinces functioning more or lss on the British inod\"J.\"<1 J .\n\nB fn Rai Sahib Ram Jaivaya K11p1ir & 01's. v. Th.e State af Punjab'\"·\n\na Constitution Bench of this Court observed as under:\n\n\"Our Con'stitution. though federal iii its structure, is modelled on the British Parlaiamcntai:y system whe1:e the executive is deemed to have the primary responsibility for the formulatio'.1 of gover.1mentaI p01ic:y and its transmis-:i0n into Jaw though the condition precedent to tl1e 'xerc; se of t\"i' responsibility is its -retai\"riing tJ.1e confidence of the legislutive branch of the\n\nState\".\n\nIt was further observed that \"in the Indian Constitution executive as in England and the Counci' of Ministers wd1ave the same system of p1rliamcntary con; isting, as it does, of the members of the legislature , is. like the British Cabinet, 'a hyphen which joins, a buckle which fastens the legislative .Part of the State to. the executive part\". In Shamsher Singh & Anr.v. State of Punjali'•1, a seven Judges Bench unanimously overruled the dee ision in Sardari Lal v.\n\nUnion tJj' l11c1ia an.t. Gts. r4J a11d held that 'our Constitution c111br: 1.--1ies generally th~ Pili-lia1ne11tary or C2binct systeti1 of Govrrnrnent of the British Model both for the Union and the States'. Thio view has not been departed from. NJW in parliamentary form of'Governent\n\nmodelled on Bdtic'1 moc'.el. the executive, legislature an<l juciici2 I 11owers are in the 1nain entrusted to separate instrumc11ts of.the St;:te.\n\nIt iS\n\nno~ for a 1nOment suggested that.thefe is strict or \\vater-f1ght division of powers, but the functions are certainly ctiviJ.ed. In Halsbury's Laws of Englan1j, Fourth Ec.ition, Yd. 8 para 81.3. sep.-raticn of executive, Iegislittive an~. judicial pc\\\\1ers in tle Wrst1riin.stcr MrC.el have\n\nben adverted to. rt reads as under:\n\n. \"rt is clear that the powers of government arc c'.ivided . . T.he executive, legislative and judicialpo\\vers arP in the tnain\n\n(l) (See Constituent Assembly Debates, Ve!. VII p.· 984)\n\n(2) [l.955] 2 S.C.R. 225 a< p. 236.\n\n(3) [1975] I S.CR. Sl4.\n\n(4) [197JJ 3 S.C.R. 461.\n\nj •\n\nR. !. NAYAK v. A.R. ANTULAY (JJesai, J.) . 545\n\nentrusted to separte instruments of the Stater and local government is further administered separately. Thus the original con c'1tration of pow\" in the S ; voreign nci longer exists; in the eigthteenth century this divisibn of the p'owrs of government s\"m'J.t0. b' suoh an ossenfrl'I c:uracteristic of the English Con-. ->titutio11 th:it it w1s made the basis for the doctrine of separation of pJw,, s.\" This doctrine, which is t0 the effoct that in a nation which has political liberty as the direct object of its constitution no one person. or body of porsons ought to be allowed to control the kgislative, excutive and judicial powers, or any two of them, has never i!l its strict form corresponded with the facts of English govornme\"r1t mainly because, although the functions and powers of governm, nt are largely separated, the membership of the. sep1rate illgtrumnts of state overlap. Only in one aspect of the\n\n<; ontitufrn can it b) s1id that th~ d0trine is strictly adhered to, namely, that by tradition, convention and law the judiciary is insulated from p0litical matters\".\n\nPJrliament that ls the Legislature exercises control over the executive branch of the Government because it is a postulate of Parlia-\n\n.&. mentary form of G:>Vernment that Executive is responsible to the r Vgis\\,1ture. In. otha words. the Government of the country is con\n\ntrollect hy a ministry and Cabinet chosen by the electorate which E J.. . while rem1ining responsible to the elecforate is responsible directly .,,,,,.- t-1 th' Legi; lature and such effective means of exercising control is that any exp.ense from Consolidated Fund of the State must h 1ve been earlier placed before the Legislature. In Halsbury's La-ws o;· E1gla id, Fourth Edition, Vol. 34 para 1005, ii is stated that Parlia- '* r.1'nt ex?rci ; es control over the actions of the executive government F and ti1e 1d•.ninistration of the laws it has enacted in various ways, one sttch beiag by the d ictrine of the constitution by which supply is granted annually by the House of Commons and must receive legisla tive sanction each yoar and the supply granted must be appropriated t'.) the p:1rticular purposes for which it has been granted. It may also • bO noticed. that t::ie stafj; of the House of Commons is a.Ppointed. h G the H.)uso of Commons Commission comprising the Speaker, the Y Lea,\\er of the House of the Commons, a member of the House nomi natect by the the Leader of the opposition and three other members app:Jintcd by the House. This Commission is charged with a duty to determine the._number and remuneration and. other te.rms and condi: H tions of service . .This Commission is also _responsible for laying before\n\n546 SuPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1984) 2 $.C.R •.\n\nA the House an estimate of the expenses of the Hoµse departments and of any other expenses incurred for the service of the House of Commons.\n\n(ibid P.ara 1.155). ·\n\nLet us turn to releva11t provisions of the Constitution. Part VI ·.of the Constitution .prov.ides that 'the'. executive power of the State shall be wsted in the Governor and shall be exercised by him either directly or through officers subordinate to him in accordance with. the Constitution.' C.hapter Iii in Part VI provides for State Legisla- ture. Every State 'is to have Legislature which shall consist of the Governor and. it can be unicameral or bicameral as the case may be.\n\nWhere the State has a unicameral legislature, the assembly is called Legislative. Assembly .. Art. 170 provides for members of the Legisla- . tive Assembly being chosen by direct election from territorial consiituencies in the State. Arts. 178 to 186 provide for .officers of the State Legislatures such as the Speaker and Deputy Speaker of the Legislative Assembly and Chairman arrd Deputy Chairman of Legislative Council as the case may be, their powers, functions. and their either vacating the office or removal from the office. Art. 187 (1) prrovides that \"the House or each Hou.se of the Legislature of a State shall hav• a separate secretarial staff'. Marginal note of the article is 'Secretariat of State Legisl:itnre'. Sub-art.(2) of Art. 187 provides that 'the Legisla- ture of a State maf by laJ.v regulate the recruitment, and the conditions of serice of persons appointed, to the secretarial stff of the House or Houses of the Legislature of the State'. Art 266 obliges the State to set up.its Consolidated Fund. Art. 203 prescribes the procedure with -...\n\nrespect to .. estimates. The estimates as relate to expenditure charged upon tlie Consolidated Fund of a state shall not be submitt<:_d to the vote of the Legislative Assembly bufthe discussion in the Legislature is permissible_ ihereon. f!over, so much of the said estimates as relate to other expenditure shall be submitted in the form of demands for grants to the Legislative Assembly, and the Legislative Assei:nbly shall' have power to assent, .;, to refuse to assent, to any demand; or to assent to any demand subject' to a reduction of the amount specified therein. In other word,, Legislative A.sembly has complete power of purse. Art. 204 casts an obligation to introduce a Bill to provide for appropriation: out of the Consoli<; lated Fund_ of the State of all moneys required to meet-( a) the grants so made .by_ the Assembly; and (b) the expen~.iture charged on the Consolidated Fund of the State but not exceeding-in any case the amount shown in the statement previoJ1$ly laid before the House or Houses. A conspectus of these provisions clearly indicate that the Legislature enjoys the_ powe_r of\n\n-~: ...\n\n' . >·\n\n~- ....\n\n... _,..\n\nR.S. NAYAK v: A.R. Al'\\TULAY (D\"esai, J.) 547\n\n. purse. Even with regard to expenses charged on the Cosbli4ated\n\nFund .of the' State to. be set up under Art. 266, an appropriation bill has to be moved and adopted, undoubtedly, the same would be .non-· votable, And it is not disputed that salaries an'd al_lowances payable to M.L.A. are not charged on the Consolidated Fund of the State.\n\nThis probably is an emulation of the situation in England where saiary and allowances of the members' of the l'adiament are not charged .mnthe Consolid_a.ted Fund. As a. riccessry corollary, it _would ]ie\n\na votable .item. '\n\nThere thus is a. broad division of functions such as executive; legislativ.e and judicial in our Co!1stifotfon. 'The , Legislature lays down the broad policy and has the power of purse. The executive eJ<ecutes · . the policy and speds from the Consolidated Fund of the State what\n\nLegislature ha_s sanctioned.· .The LegislatiVe Assembly enacted the Act .enabling to pay to its i; nembers salary and allowancts. And tlie members . vote the grant and pay the;; selves. In this background even if the\n\ni• an officer to disburse this paYmen:t 9r that a pay biHhas lo be drawl! up ate nqt such faC!ors.. being decisive of the matter. That is merely '.a mode of payment, but the M1L.As. by a vote retained the fund ear- . , marked for purposes of disbursal for pay and allowances payable to\n\n'thein under the relevant statute. Therefore, evii'though M.L.A.·ecei\n\nves pay and allowances, he is'not in.the pa•, of'the State Government . b'cause Legislature of a. State cal!not be comprehended.in theexpres-\n\n, sion 'State Goverllment'. ·\n\nThis beeomes further clear from the provi\"in .contained in Art. 1·2 of the Constitution which provides that 'for purposes of Part III, unless the cotext otherwise requires, ·ihe State\" includes the Govern, merit and Parliament' of India and the oovernment anci the Legislature ef each of the Siates atid all .local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of'the Government of !ndia'. The\n\n- c, xpressiori 'Government arid Legislfitllre', two 5eparate entities,.·.a~ ·\n\nsought to be included iri iheexpression 'State' which would mean that _otherwise they are distinct and separate entities, This conclusfon .is\n\nfurther reinforced by the factthat the eecutive sets up its own secretariat, while Art. 187. provides for a secretarial staff of the. Legislature urider the. control of t_he Speaker, whose terms and conditions of the service. will be deteruiied by the. Legislature and not by the executive. When all these aspects are pieced together, the expression 'Government' in Sec, ii (12)(a) clearly denotes the executive and not the Legislature. M.L.A. is certainly not in the pay of the executive. Therefore,\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS.\n\n(1984] 2 S.C.R. ' : ' '\n\n- . . ; the conclusio.n is ihescap2.ble that even though M.LA. receives pay ; rnd allowances, he can not be said to be. in the pay oftl1e Govermnent i.e. the exec_utiv_e. Th's conclus.ion would govern also the thin\\ part -0f\n\ncl. (l2)(a) i.~. 'remunerate.I. by fees for performance of any pub'ic duty\n\nby the _Governmnt'. In other words, M.L.A. is not remunerated by fees paid by the Goverm11ent i.e. the .executive. . · : . . '\n\n. I\n\nIt wa! also con'tei1ded that M.L.A. is not performing any public du_ty. It is not necessary to examine thi.s aspect bee,, use .it would be . i'.:. rather difficult to accept anm; idly vide submissipn thaiM.L..A. is not. -performing any public. duty. Ho.Wever, it is unquestionable that he is\n\nnot performing any public duty either directrd by the Govencmcnt or i...t. for tho Goyernment. He no d_oubt performs public duties _cast .on him . by the Coi1stitu[ion' and his electorate. He thus 'discharges constfru~ tional fndions for which he is remunerated by fees under the Ccnstitution and not. by•the Executive.\n\nIt was flirther contended that oi1 the analogy of the decision in His Majety tile King v. Boston & Ors}1 • M.L.A. would be a public servant. In Boston's case, the allegation \\vs that Harrisn and Mit~ . chelmore paid to defendant Boston in his offici.itl crrpacit)' as a Member of. the Legisla}ive Assemblx of New South Wales and the later car·\n\n ruptly accepted in thct capacity as inducqncnfto him ii: viclation cf his official duty t-0 use his .position as such m_ember; (a) to secure the acquisition. by the Government.of the State of New South Waies of certain e5t:\\tes '.•nd the payinenffor ilch estc.tesout of the public fmids\n\nof the Staie; and (b) to put pressure upon the Minister for Lands al1d . _.:) · othor officers of the Crown to acquire and pay f0r such estates. The 'contentiOii \\as that the 'agreeme11t between the.defendants might rave.\n\n,,.\n\nF. .been to pay money to Boston to induc_e him to use his pcsitici1 .ex- . elusively outside Parliament, and not by vote or speech in the Assembly,.\n\nand thadhe transaction in connection with which he was io use. his t' positioµ to put pressure on the Minister miglit consistently with the information, be one which would never come before Parliament and .which, in: his' opinion ancLin the opinion of those who paid.him, \\as G highly beneftcfal to the State; that such an agreenient . would not amount to a criminal offence, and that consequently the information is bad .. Negativing this conteRtion,; it was held that •it is scttl_ed law. that an agreemmt or coinbination to.do an a_ct-which tends to produce a. public mischief amounts to a criminal conspiracy~ It was further H\n\n(I) (1923'24) 33 Commonweelth Law Repo1t J86\n\n• R.S. NAYAK v._A.R. ANTULAY'(Desai, J.) 549 ... held.by the majority that.the payment of money to, and the receipt • A of money by, a member of Parliament to induce hiin to use his cfficial . position, whethc•r inside or outsi_de Parliament, for the purpose of influencing or putting piessure on a Minister or other officer of the Crown ·\n\nto enter into or cnrrY ollt a transaction jnvol'ving pay.1nenr of-nioneY , , out of the pliblic fmids, _are acts tending to the public mischief, and an ., . agreement or combination to do sucli acts. amounts to a criminal\n\n1 B bffence. The quostiOn has been' examined in the light of the settled Jaw that an agreement or combination to do an act which, tends to produce a public mischief am?unts to a criminal. conspiracy . .Isaacs and Rich, JJ posited the question: how far a memberof the Legislative Assemblv of New. South Wales can, without incurring any real perso11al respnsibilityc-that is-other than political rcjection,:.....ake c his public position the. subject 9f profitable.traffic by engaging in depart' mental intervention on behalf; of individuals in return for private pccnniary c01; sider!llion to himself? The concurring judgment exami- , ·\n\nned the .general position of a member of Parliament and then-proceeded to examine the special provisions of the relevant clause. On this point it was concluded thai the fmidamental obligation, 'which is the key .· D to thls case. is the duty to serve and, in. serving, to act with fidelity and with a single-minded1iess for ihc welfa.re of the community. It wa• . further observed that a member of P&iliament is, therefore, in the highest seilSe, a sei'vant'or the S.tate; his duties are those appertainig to the position. he fills, a position of ;10 transient or tmporary exi~\n\nstence, a position fo(m; nga refognizcd place in the constitutional I .machinery of govern1hent. It was also held thathe holds an office. -~-- In the.third cirncurring judgment of Higgiris,.J, ,\\.hile concecl.ing that the m'mbcf of Parliament has to discharge;,. duty in which the public is interested, but after examining provisions of.the public Service Acts, it was held tlat he is not a public officer' withi11 the meaning of that Act . becanse he is n6t required to obey the commands of the King or of the departmental heads. It was. hwever mncluded that as .a member ofl>ar!iament, he holds a.fiduciary relation towards the public, and that is enough. The minority judgment of Gavan .. Duffy and -Starke, JJ . . clearly proceeds on teir holding that a member of Legislative Assembly\n\nof New South Wales is not the holder of a publii: office wiihin th\\' . G meaning. of the. common law and, even if he. could _be regarded as the holder 'of such an office, the acts charged as intended to be done by the ·\"' defendant Boston, ho\\vever improper they may be;\\Vould not 'Ile mal- ... versation in his oifice or acts done in his office, unless they wi:.re done in the discharge of his legislative fundions. As we are concerned with H . a legisiatie enactment-Sec. 21{12)(~), tliis decision .based on the\n\n. '\n\nSUPREME comn REPORTS\n\n[1984] 2 . 3.C.R ..\n\nconcept of .common law and so1ne of the slatl!tes as prevailing in Australia would not be very helpful: It mav be mentioned while comparing\"M.L'.A. and M.P. in India with M.P. in U.K. that the M.P. iri . . U.IC. is neither covered by the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1906.not .. the Prevention of C6rrugti6n Act, 1916. It may also b.e mentioned> . that The Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act, 1889 does .not cove~ fy.{.:f in U.K. 'The acceptance by artymember of either House of Par- ' liamn~. of.a bribe to influence him in his conduct as such member m;\n\nof any.fees, compensation or reward in connectio[l }vith the promotio!l .~ . of, or opposition to any bill, resolution, matter or .thing submitted or intended to be. submitted to the Bouse or any committee thereof i~ .. ·, ..• a breach of privilege:<\" Attempts to bring fyl. P: in U.K. either\n\nunder the provisions of the Preverition of Corruption Ad or the Public \" Bodie3 Corrupt Practices Act ha vc not met with success. Even such\n\nmodicum of decency in public life 'as disclosing ; elevant, pecuniary interest or benefit of whatever nature .whether direct or indirect that. he may have had or may be ext; cting to have while_ participating in )( adebate or proceeding in Bouse by M.P. in '[J.K. waS'stoutly resisted in .1974. But Paulson Affair stirred many and Royal Commission on Corri1ptiori in.Public Life headed by Lord Justice Salmon was set up.\n\nThe Commission inter alia recommended in 1976 that M.Ps. 'should be brought within the scope of the c.orruption laws regarding their actions : inside as well o.utside Parliament. No follow up legislative. action ;-4, appears' to have .been taken since. then.\n\nIfM, L.A. is not In he pay of the Governent in the sense oL../~ Executive government or isnpt remunerated by.fees fo.r performance .· Of anypublicduty by the Executive. Govetnment,.certinly he w9uld .. not be comprehended 'in the expression 'public servant' within. the. 111eaning of the expression in cl. (12) (a). Be is th.us not a public servant within the meaning of the eJCprssion in cl. (l:i) (a). This conclusio'n ·-treinforces the earlier conclusion reached )Jy us. after examining. the •· . (' historicai evob.1tion of cl.· (12) (a). ' J\n\n Mr.Singhvi, however; strenously coµtended that M:L.A. would G be comprehended in cl. (3) or cl. (7) of Sec. 21 IPC to be a public' servant He went so far as to suggest that, his emphasis would have been more .on cl: (3Jcomparatively and not on Cl. (12) (a). \"Therefore, it may now ·\n\nbe \"examined whether M.L.A. is comprehended either in cl. (3) or ti. (7). '.\"f of Sec. 21 IP'C. . .\n\nH (lJ. See Earokine May Prliamentary .Practice 20 edition, page 149.\n\n. '\n\n>-·\n\n' -; t\n\n... ~\n\n• R.s. NAY AK , V, A.R,. ANTULAY.(Desai,_ .n 551\n\n' . . _. . ' '.\n\nRe (e) : Cl.(3) of Sec. 21, as it at present lands, takes within its purvit<w 'every Judgdncludili.g any person empowered by law to dis-. ·. charge whether by himself, ot as a 111ember of any body of persons,\n\nay adjudicatory. fanctins. Prir to its amendment -by Act 40 of 19.64 the cl. (3) read simply :Every judge'. Cl. (3)' was amended to read, as it at 'present stands, pursuant to. ihe recommertdatioµs of the Santhanam Committee. In Para 7.6 of the Report, it was recommended t)iat .\n\n'a further category should-be added to include all, persons discha-rgi.ng adjudicatoryfunctions under .any Unfon or State Law for the time being in force'o . Wlththis end in view,. the Committee recommended that cl. (3).should read: 'Every Judge including any person entrusted with adjiidicatciry functions in the course of .enforcement of any law ' for.the time being in force'. At the B.ill stage, t)le clause was recast so as to give full effect to tM'recommendation of'the Committee and ihi• equally, becomes clea~ from the Statement of O):Jjects and Reasons\n\n. accompanying Blll No. 67 of 1964 wh.ich when adopted became Act 40\n\nof 1964. In para 2 (a) of the Statement of Objects and Reasons, it is stated , that .'the definition of public servant in Se.c .. 21 of ihe Ihdian .. Penal Cod~ is proposed. to be amended so as to bring within\"its purview D certain _additional' categories of persons . such as persons performing . . adjudicat.ory functions under any law, liquidators, receivers, commis\"\n\nsioners etc.' If we recaH the earlier discussion about the history of evolution of cl, (12l(a) and the entire range of tecommendasions of the .SaiJ.thanem Committee, it canbe. confidently sa.id the M.L.A: . was rteer inten?e<l .to be brought 'within the conspeetus of clauses of Sec. 21 so as to clothe him with the status of a public servant.\n\nIndepondent of.this historical evolution an!l focussing attetion on the)anguage of cl. (3) it is diftiCult to hold that :M:L.A. as amefllber of a body' of persons such as the 'Legislative Assembly perform~ any ad.judicatory function$ empowered by law to discharge that function.\n\nIn fact, Santhanam Committee contemplated covering such officers like. liquidators, receivers .• commissioners etc. each of whom is empowerd by different statutes to discharge such adjudicatory functions as .prescribed by the concernd law. ·\n\n. .It was how, vor, contended that expression 'Judge' has. been defined in Sec. 19 IPC to denote 'not on)y every person who is offidaily designated as a Judge, but also every prson who is empowered by law . to give, in any \\egai proceeding, civil or criminal, a definitive judgment, or a judgment which, if not appealed against, would.be definitive, or -a judgment, if confirmed by some other authoritj, would be definitiv1l,\n\n. '\n\n• 552 '' •\n\nSUP.RE.ME. COURT REPORTS '\n\n(1984] 2 C.S.R.\n\nor w;1o'is one of a bq_dy of persons:whiclNi; d.v of 'persons is mpower- ed bv hw lo give such aj1c\\gm'11r.'and in cl: (3) this definition cannot be subStituted b-:cause it' is i.n 'inclusiv~ dCfiriition hich 1neahs it is\n\nxte:1sie in .character. ;\\cc.cpting .tlc position .Lhat. inclusi_ve.d~nitioit extends the specific meaning of the expression which it wo\\lld not othenvis.e bear, it is necessary to determine whether this extensiol) of the epression 'Judge' is' so .wide as to'•. cover within its umbrealla .M.L.A.· on the ground that while voting upon\n\na motion for breach of privilege or for contempt of the .House, he is . , discharging adjudicatory functions: and that. he is s~ empowered by . . la.w .to d~ so. When with the pcr;, nission' of the Speaker, a motion for ' breach of privilege is moved i.n the Legislattve Assembly or a motion __(- for taking action for co•. tempt 'of the House is nioved, undoubtedly,: every .member of the House has a right to participate and after the . motion is debated upon, the maioritYvote is recorrted. as a decision\n\nof the H; use. D.oes thitt make M.L.A. a person as a member of a body persons: who discharges adjudicatory functi0ns? The definition of expressio'n 'Judge' comprehends, adjudication in an'y legal p'roceeding; civil or c; iminal and in which tJ1e, person as a Judge is empowerd to give a definitive judgment. It is. difficult to accept the 'subpiission that the proceedings before .the House either upon a motion for breach of privilege br for contempt is a ivil or criminal proceeding, as these terms ordinariiy connote. A rnotion for breach of privilege or for coi1telnpt 'of \\he House is brought before the House when the mover feels' that , the powers, privileges and 'immunities of th~ f(ouse have bee\"' violated. 'Tile . .House ha.s the power , to pm{ish for r, o!ltempt' andJ \" \"the penal jurisdiction of the House is not confined to their own Mem- •--,.:.t·\n\n' '\n\nbers norto offenc.es committed in. their presence, but extends to all , contempts; of the Houses; whether committed .by Members or by per-. j' . sons who 'a.re not .Members, irrespective of whether the the offence\n\njsccimmitted within the House or beyond its w~Us'. (See Earskine May :Parliamentary Pra¢tice 20 ed .. p. 122). This power of commitment i\" is truely described as a. key-stone of Parliamentary, Practice. lt wa• • pointed out tbat 'the origin of the power which: is judicial in 'its nature is to be. found naturally in the medieval conception of Parliament as primerily ,;:court of justii;:e-the H; gh.Court of Parlfamenf (ibitl page 124).' It is however; difficult to say'tnat a State Legislature functioning under 'our Constitution. can be described as High Court of Legislative Assembly. 'in blindly tailoring our Constitutional Law to .the Parliamentary Practice in U.K., one is. apt to ovedook the obvious 'fact that House, of Lords always possessed the judicial power as any Court of Westminster. Hall. (ibid p. J24). In this connection 'in. Special\n\n---So\n\n.. ,,, .\n\n• _R.s .. NAYAK v .. A.R. AN\\ULAY(Des.ai,},) 553\n\nRe/ No. 1 of I 964, 0 ' it wa~ clearly statd.that the result of the provi- . sion co.11t:,; ncct in tho latter part of Art.· J94(3) wa; not.intended to be co1ifer on the State Legislatures in India the status of a superior Court of Record. Jt was further ooservcd. that ', he Home and . indeed all Legislative. Assemblies in India never discharged ai1y judicial functions aud their historical and constitutional background does not support the claim that they can be regarded as Court of Rec9rd in any sense'.\n\nUndoubtedly, the Legislative Assembly in view f the provisions contained Jn Art. 194(3) has. the poi-er to i1iflict punishment for breach . of privilege and for contempt of the House. And when a motion is.\n\nmoved omplailling breach of privilege or for taking action for the contempt of the House, the me_mbers would participate in the debate, analyse evidence and absence t11ereof in support of the motion and\n\nagainst_ the motion and ultimately decide as a b0dy by a democratic process whether the motion is affirmed or rejtctc,'.. The , question is whether'this process can be styied as an adjudicatory prcess discharged by. M.L.A. as empowered by l~w. If th_e expression 'law:.'wre to include the Constitution; certainly this power is enjoyed by .M.L.A. _but expression 'law' ordinarily.does not include the ConstiUion. Art.\n\n13(1) of tho.CJnstitutiouprovides that 'a!l-l; iws in force in the territory of. India iih1llediatelY before the co1:ii.encc1nent. of the Con.stitution, in so far as they are .consistent with the provision of° Part III shall, to the extent of inconsistency be. void.' Sub-Art. (2) imposs a restric,. lion op. the _legislative pJWer of the State to make any law' whih te.kes away or abridges the: rights conferred by Part Ii! aml .any law made in contravention of sub-Art (2) shal{ to the extents of the contraver tion, be void 'Expression 'Jaw' as.used here would.be law other than.\n\nConstitution, in other. words, law enacted in exercise of the legislative power. The majotity view in /. C. Gof(lknath. v. State of Punjab; u> that mondment of the Constitution is part of the legislative process.does not survive as vali_d any longer because.it was admitted that Constitution _(Twenty Fourth) Amendment Act, 1971 in so far as it tansfers , the power fo amend the Constitution from the residuary entry or Article 248 of the C0nstitution to Article 3'68 is valid. After so .saying the -trend of uiscussion ih various judgments in H.H. Keshvnanc/OBharathi.\n\nSripac/anaga galavanu v. State of Kera/a and another''' hows. that when the power amend the Constitution _is exerci>ed by Parliament, it exercises Constituent power arid this is independent of the oridinary\n\n(1) [196,] 1 S.C.R°. 4ll at pages 490, 491 and 49.2.\n\n(2) [19671 2 S.C.R. 672. ·' .\n\n(3) (1973] Suppi. s.c.R. 1. .\n\n• . ? •\n\nG ,.,>'•\n\n. '\n\n•, ' 554\n\n\n[1984] 2 S.C,!<. \"\n\nl9gislative process. And this. appro'lch is borne out by a refrence to . the definition of expression '.Indian law' in the General clauses Act whic!1. does not inoludethe C)nstituttioiL' A passing reference may arso be mar\\' to the form of oQtl} prescribed for a Judge of the Supreme\n\nCourt 'ahd the Judge of the High Court in the' Third Schedule which. ·.separately re.fore to the Constitution :ind the laws. . . . .\n\nPrtidpation in a dbate on motio.n of breach of privilege or for taking action for contempt of the House and voting thereon is a constitutional function d\\schargetl by the members and therefore,, it cannot be said that such adljudicatory function if.it can be so styled,' constitutes adju_dicatory function undertaken by l\\'.[.L.A. a.• empowered . by law. 'viewed from this angle it is not necessary to examine the contention' that adjudication and a resultant judgment. presupposes a !is bet,;, een persons other thn adjridipitor, and M.L.A. has n~_ lis. before him as a body of persons when passing upon the. motion for contempt or brech of privilege. Accordingly the sumbi•sion that . ; the accused would be a public servti.it .within the meaning of the ex- • pressiimin ci. (3) of Sec. 21 IPC must be rejected. ' ' ' . ;\n\n\" The last iimb of the submission was that at any rate, the accu••rl. . would be a public servant within the meaning of cl. (7) of Sec. 1!1 IPC,.\n\n'which takee within its ambit 'every person who holds any office by virtue of which he is empowered to place or keep any person in confi . 'nement'. 0 This limb of the submission \\Vas not placed for consideration .. of the learned'tr, ial Judge. And it has merely to be stated to be rejected. .\n\nWe, however, did not wnt to rejecdt on this narrow ground. Expand- ;-{'' ,)ng this contention, it was urged tha.t M.L.A. is empowerd to adjudg•\n\n: a person guilty of breach of privilege .or contempt of the House and\n\nwhen prison sentaence is imposed to keep him in confinment. Assum~. illg for the purpose of this argument that M.L.A. holds an, office, is ·-t lie a person empowered to pface or. keep any person in c\"onfinement.\n\nPower to impose punishment is independent of the power to keep a , person in confinement. First is the power to impose a 'prison sentence. but second is the power flowing from the execu!ion of the :Sentence to place or keep any person in confbement meaning thereby, the'.e is an execution 'Of' wamint. Persons whose duty it is to deprive a person directed 'to be imprisoned tb . deprive him of his liberty to remain free and to keep. or place him in confinement. in drie .. execution of the warrant would be comprehended in cl~ (3). It is difficult to accept th.e submission that M.L.As. as:a body can keep or pface any person: in. confinemint. Reference was, however, made to some of the passages\n\nR.s. NAYAK v. A.R. ANTULAY (Desai, J.).\n\nin Parliamentary: Practice . by farskine May, 20th Edn. as alsq to Practice and Procedure.of Parliame11t, Jhird Edition by Kaul and; Shakdher, p, 20s .. The authors-.observed at page 208 that 'each House . of the Legislature of-State, has the power to secure the attendence or . persons pn matters of privilege and to punish. forbrack of privilgy\n\nor contempt ofthe House and commit the offender to custod.y orpri , son'. Afpage 212; it is observed. that 'each House has the power to '\\ . ·.enforce it• brders including the'power for its officers to break open + the doors o[ 'a house for that purpose, whert ;;-ecessary, and eecute .L its warrants in connection with contempt proceedings'. We fil to see\n\n--.,~ .. ho.w these olJ.servations 'assist' us in. understanclirlg the expression 'em~\n\npowered to place or keep ny person in, corifin.ement.' Broad.ly stated,~ the expression comprehends Police arid Prison Authorities or those under an. obl_igation by law or by virtue of office to take into custody and keep in confinement any person:. in MP: Dwivedi s casr!, this.· Court observed that Seventh arid Eighth claues of Sec. 21 deal with persons who perform mainly policing drities. To say that M.LA. by virtue of his office is performing policing or prison officers' duties would.be apart form.doing vio, lence to l~guage'!owei\"ing him in itatus.\n\nAdditionall&', c!. (7) does not speak of any adjudicatory function. It <appeai:s t6 c61nprehcnd situatiOns 'Nhere as p'ri1iminafy to or ttri end~\n\nproduct of an adjudicatory function in a crirr1i;1~! ·.case, whicl\\ may .. 1ea.d to i;11Position:or_a:.priS9n sentene, and a person in: exercise .or the duty to be discharged by hiin by virtue of his office places .or keeps any pers; n in confinement. The decisio11s in Homi .D. Mistry v. Shree Nafisul H1s; an & Ors. \" 1 ,' Harendra. NathBariia v. J)ev 'Kanta .. Bawa & Ors.(•' and JHward Kzlley v. William Carson, John Kent& Ors.'?1\n\n, hardly shed ayJight on this' aspect, Therefore, th, e submission that M.L.A. \\vould .be CQmpreherided in cl. (7) of- Sec. 2·1 so _as to be a _public ; er.van! must be, rejected. . . -. . -·,.\n\nHaving. meticlously examined the subm'issfon .. from diverse . angles a.s . presented to us, it appears that M._L.A. is not a public ser- ~\n\nvant withil). the m'aning of the 'expression in cl..(12)(a), cl. (3).and cl.(7) . of Sec. 21 IPC. · . .\n\nRe: (f) & ·(g) : The learned Judge after recording a tindfog tha(M.L.A. is a public _servant within the comprehension of ct (12)(a) , and further recording the finding that as on the date.on which the Court\n\n(I) ILR 1957 Bombay 218, {2) AIR 1959\"Assam, 160, .\n\n(3) (184l-42) 4 Moore Privy Council Cases 63, _:..] -·---· . ..\n\nE-'\n\n•ff\n\n. SUPREME GOURT REPORTS\n\n(1984] 2 S.C.R .\n\n. was invited to take cognizance; the accused was thus a public servant . proccc, ded to examine wl1ether sanction under Sec. 6 of the 1947 Act\n\nisa pr~-requisite to taking cognizance of \"offences enumerated hi.\n\nSec. 6 aJ'leged lo have been committed by him. He reached the conclusion ti}at a sanction is necessary before cognizance can be taken.\n\nAs a. coroJlary. he proceeded to illvestigate and identify,\"which is the sanctioning authority \\Vho would be able to give a valid sanction as required by Sec. 6 for t.he . prosecution of the accused in, his. capcity ' as M.L.A;? We have expressed our conclusion that where offences as set out in Sc. 6 are alleged to have been cmmittd. by a public servant, sanction of only that authority would be necessary who would be entitle~ lo r<; niove him from that office which is alleged to have been inisused or abused for corrupt motives, If the e.ccused has ceased to hold that office by the date, the co_urt is called upon to take cogniznce of the offences alleged to llavebeen committed by such public servant, no sanction under Sec. 6 would be necessary despit~ the fact that he may be holding any other office on the rdevant date which inay make him a.rublic servant as understood in Sec 21', if there. is no allegation that office has been abused or misused for corrupt motives.\n\nThe allegations in the complaint are all to the e.ffect thatthe accused\n\nmisused.~~ abused his offi:e as Chief Minister for corrupt motives. •· By the time the Court was called upon to take cognizance of those offences, the accue'd had ceased to' hold the office of Chief Minister. The sand ion to 'prosecute him was granted by the Governor ofMahara-, shtra b.ut this ?spect we co, nsider irrelevant for concluding that no sanction was necessary to prosecute him under Sec. 6 on the dare on which the' court took .cogniz1nce of the offences alleged to have' been committed by the accused. Assuming that as M.LA. the 'accused would be .a public servant under Sec. 21, in the absence of any allegatiori that he 1nisused .or abused h; s office as M.L:A. that aspect. becomes immaterial. Further Sec. _6 postulates exist, nce of a valid sanction for prosecution of a pi..tblic servant for c\\ffences punishable uncter Sec~ . . :161, 164, 165 !PC and Sec. 5 of the 1947 Act, if they are alleged to have .-bce.n coinmitted _by a public servant. Jn' view of our further finding that.M.L.A. is not a public servant within the meaning of th, e expression in Sec. 21 TPC, no saµciion iS necessary tO prosecute hin1 f<.. r thb offences alleged to have been committed by him . . ' .\n\nfn view of the c0.1; clusions reached by us, we consider it unnecegsary to asertain which wold be. the authority competent to sanction prnseeution of M.L.A. as envisaged by Sec. 6, thought it must be fra11kly confessed that considerable time was spent in the cl.eliberati.ons\n\n.··~,\n\n• ..\n\nR.S.· NAYAK v; A.R. ANTULAY, (Desai,_ J.) 557 . .\n\nin search of competent sanctioni<Jg authority. The vit; J question has . beco1ne one of' academic interest. W_e propose to adhere to\" the accumulated wisdom which has ripened into a settld practice of this Court not to' decide academic questions. The question is:left ope~. ' . . . •.\n\n. .\n\nBefore we conclude let it be clarified that more often in the curse\n\n0t'this judg,'.nent, we have used .ihe words 'Office of M.L.A.' H wal debated whether the M.L.A. holds seat or office ? O, lf use of the expression 'office' should not be construed to mean thai we have accepted that the position of M.L.A. can be aptly described as one holding- 'pub!.ic 0 -e· or office' for. that r1attCr. ·. .\n\n. To sum up, the learned special 1uclge was.· clearly in. error in holding that M.L.A. is a public servant _within the meaning of the .. ,. _expression in Sec. 12(a), and further erred in holding that a sanction\n\n)i of the Legislative Assembly of Maharashtra or majprity .of the members was a cond.itiori precedent to ta](ing cognizance of offences conimitted by the.accusxl. For the reasons herein stated both th~ conclusions\n\n_are wholly unsustainable and must be quashed and set aside .\n\n• • This .appeal accordingly succeeds and .is allowed. The order and decision cif the ]earned Special Judge Shri R.B. Suk c\\atecl July 25. >c '1983 d.ischarging the accused-in Special C'se Ne. 24 of 1982 and Sp:cial Case No. 3/83.is hereby set aside and tbe trial shall proceed further I. from the stage ;;-here the accused ws cl.ischarged, -~\n\nThe accused was the Chiel lVrinistcr of a premier State-the State . of Maharashtra.'By~ prosecution launched as early ai on Sepiember\n\n11, 1981, his character and integrity came under a cloud. Nearly 2}/ years have rolled 1:.y and the case has not. moved an inch -t further.\n\nAn cxpe'ditius trial is ptimarily in the inteest of the accused and a manc'.ate of AJ'l. 21 .. Expeditious d.isposal of a criminal case is in the interest of both; the prosecutiorf nd the accused. There, .fore, SpcciUI Case No. 24 of 1982 and Special Case No. 3/8'3 .penr.ing\n\nin the C,6urt r, f Special Judge, Greater Bombay Shri R.B .. Sule are withdiawi1.and transferred to the High Court of-BombBy with a request tO.the lea'r~1e<l ChiefJus_tice to assign these twocases-tn a sitti1g Judge 1\",' of thc, High Court. On being so a>Signed,'the learned Judg<; may proceed to expeditiously dispose cf the cases preferably by holding the • trial frcm day to' dav. ·\n\nH.S.K.\n\nAppeal allowed. ·\n\nG -.", "total_entities": 407, "entities": [{"text": "A\n\nR. S. NAYAK", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 14, "end_char": 28, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A\n\nR. S. NAYAK", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A.R.ANTULAY", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 32, "end_char": 43, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.R. ANTULAY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. S. PATHAK", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 81, "end_char": 93, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A\n\nR. S. NAYAK", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "0. CHJNNAPPA REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 96, "end_char": 114, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. P. SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 117, "end_char": 126, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. BALA!<RISHNA ERADI, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 131, "end_char": 156, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. 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Nayak, llleda complaint against the reSpondent,· A.R.\n\nAntulay, ·:i public servant -being the Chief Minister of MaharaShtra siate, under ss: 161, 165 I.P.C. ands."}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1816, "end_char": 1821, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Cntionof Corruption Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1843, "end_char": 1872, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s.6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2047, "end_char": 2050, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cntionof Corruption Act, 1947", "statute": "Cntionof Corruption Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2478, "end_char": 2482, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Cntionof Corruption Act, 1947", "statute": "Cntionof Corruption Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Law Amendment Act, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2509, "end_char": 2532, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 7(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2711, "end_char": 2718, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Law Amendment Act, 1952", "statute": "Law Amendment Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3559, "end_char": 3563, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4661, "end_char": 4665, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5002, "end_char": 5007, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5065, "end_char": 5069, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "R. S. NAYAK", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6384, "end_char": 6395, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. S. NAYAK V. A. R .. ANTULAY 4<).7\n\n\\Vith reasonable certainty of the \"intention of Parliament in enacting the legislation..\n\nA F.or this purpose whY should the aids whiCh.", "canonical_name": "A\n\nR. S. 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Malviya, Shailendra Bhardwaj and Harish Jagatlani for the appellant.", "canonical_name": "Rani Jethmalani"}}, {"text": "Rani Jethmalani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 23170, "end_char": 23185, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "348 o/ 1983\n\n....\n\nRam Jethmalani P.R.\n\nVakil, Ms. Rani Jethmalani, Mukesh Jethma/ani, O.P. Malviya, Shailendra Bhardwaj and Harish Jagatlani for the appellant.", "canonical_name": "Rani Jethmalani"}}, {"text": "Mukesh Jethma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 23187, "end_char": 23200, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "348 o/ 1983\n\n....\n\nRam Jethmalani P.R.\n\nVakil, Ms. Rani Jethmalani, Mukesh Jethma/ani, O.P. Malviya, Shailendra Bhardwaj and Harish Jagatlani for the appellant."}}, {"text": "O.P. Malviya", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 23206, "end_char": 23218, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "348 o/ 1983\n\n....\n\nRam Jethmalani P.R.\n\nVakil, Ms. Rani Jethmalani, Mukesh Jethma/ani, O.P. Malviya, Shailendra Bhardwaj and Harish Jagatlani for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Shailendra Bhardwaj", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 23220, "end_char": 23239, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "348 o/ 1983\n\n....\n\nRam Jethmalani P.R.\n\nVakil, Ms. Rani Jethmalani, Mukesh Jethma/ani, O.P. Malviya, Shailendra Bhardwaj and Harish Jagatlani for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Harish Jagatlani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 23244, "end_char": 23260, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "348 o/ 1983\n\n....\n\nRam Jethmalani P.R.\n\nVakil, Ms. Rani Jethmalani, Mukesh Jethma/ani, O.P. Malviya, Shailendra Bhardwaj and Harish Jagatlani for the appellant."}}, {"text": "L.M. Singhvi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 23285, "end_char": 23297, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. L.M. Singhvi, ])a/veer /Jhandari, A.M. Singhi, S.S. Parkar, H. Bhardwaj, u, N. Bhandari, H.M. Singh, Ranbir .Singh ad S, G.' 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Subba Rao for Union of India."}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPO.RTS [1984] 2 s.c.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 23685, "end_char": 23721, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COURT REPO.RTS [1984] 2 s.c."}}, {"text": "January 20, 1982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24086, "end_char": 24102, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Chief Minister from January 20, 1982 bui continues to be it sitting' member or\"the Maharashtra Lgislative As&<mbly till today, • · · ·· ·\n\nAs the contention\"s canvassed before this Court are mainly questio.ns df law, facts at this stage having a peripheral relevance in the C ."}}, {"text": "Ramdas Shriniv.as Nayak", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 24473, "end_char": 24496, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "complainant Ramdas Shriniv.as Nayak (complainant for short) in detail save and except few a perti- ."}}, {"text": "Sec. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24840, "end_char": 24846, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Conwlainartt", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25023, "end_char": 25035, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Conwlainartt then filed the first complaint in the Court; of Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, 28th Esplanade, Ijombay on Septem-\" ber ll, I98!"}}, {"text": "Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, 28th Esplanade, Ijombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 25084, "end_char": 25138, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Conwlainartt then filed the first complaint in the Court; of Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, 28th Esplanade, Ijombay on Septem-\" ber ll, I98!"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25397, "end_char": 25414, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "IPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25416, "end_char": 25419, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "IPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25465, "end_char": 25468, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sec. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25473, "end_char": 25479, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Sec. 3S", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25498, "end_char": 25505, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Sec. 420", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25511, "end_char": 25519, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "IPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25520, "end_char": 25523, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "IPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25554, "end_char": 25557, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "IPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25783, "end_char": 25786, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sec. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25791, "end_char": 25797, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Sec. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25877, "end_char": 25883, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Mahatashtra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 25977, "end_char": 25988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6 of 1947 Act ad ultimately -held that in the absence of a valid sanction from the Governor of Mahatashtra, the .complaint filed .. by the complainat for the afore."}}, {"text": "IPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26346, "end_char": 26349, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sec. 200", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26511, "end_char": 26519, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 26659, "end_char": 26693, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1742 of 1981 filed in <he High Court of Judicature at Bombay."}}, {"text": "P.B. Samant", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26789, "end_char": 26800, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri P.B. Samant, who has also filed an identical complaint against ..the accused, along with several."}}, {"text": "State of\n\nMaharash.tra and", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27239, "end_char": 27265, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the second respondent in this petition, the first and third respondents being the\" State of\n\nMaharash.tra and Union oflndia respectively."}}, {"text": "Union oflndia", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27266, "end_char": 27279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the second respondent in this petition, the first and third respondents being the\" State of\n\nMaharash.tra and Union oflndia respectively."}}, {"text": "Mttropolitw Mag.i-", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27979, "end_char": 27997, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "plainant against the order of the learned Chief Mttropolitw Mag.i- ' strate waS' dismissed by a. Division Bench of the High Court on April 12, 19&2."}}, {"text": "April 12, 19&2", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 28064, "end_char": 28078, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "plainant against the order of the learned Chief Mttropolitw Mag.i- ' strate waS' dismissed by a. Division Bench of the High Court on April 12, 19&2."}}, {"text": "State of Maharashtra", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 28104, "end_char": 28124, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Not the accused but the State of Maharashtra preferred an appeal by special leave under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28168, "end_char": 28176, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "July 28, 1982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 28380, "end_char": 28393, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thi~. Court rejected the· application for special _leave at the threshold on July 28, 1982. ("}}, {"text": "Sec. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28594, "end_char": 28600, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Spedal Judge1 Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 28809, "end_char": 28829, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a fresh complaint in the Court b( the Spedal Judge1 Bombay registered as Criminal Case."}}, {"text": "State of Ma.ha-\n\nH {I) (1982] 2 s.c.c. 463", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 29035, "end_char": 29077, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "accused who was the Chief Minisier of the State of Ma.ha-\n\nH {I) (1982] 2 s.c.c."}}, {"text": "Maharashtra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 31105, "end_char": 31116, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To this complaint, the order granting sanction to prosecute the accused made by the Governor of Maharashtra was ltnnexed."}}, {"text": "September 3, '1983", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31389, "end_char": 31407, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After recording the vericfiation of the complainant, the learned Spec.ial Judge took cognizance of the offences and issued process by directing a bailable warrant to be issued in the sum of Rs.10,000 with one surety and made it , returnabl\" on September 3, '1983. ·"}}, {"text": "Sec. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31898, "end_char": 31904, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Law Amendment Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31912, "end_char": 31938, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "IPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32096, "end_char": 32099, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "P.S. Bhutta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32246, "end_char": 32257, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case was at that time pending in the Court of the special Judge presided over by\" one Shri P.S. Bhutta.", "canonical_name": "P.S .. Hhutta"}}, {"text": "October 20, 1982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 32306, "end_char": 32322, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned special Judge by his order <lated October 20, 1982 rejected -both the contentions and-set down the case for November 29, 1982 for recording evidence of the posecutipn."}}, {"text": "Government . of Maharashtra", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 32939, "end_char": 32966, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "01) January 16, 1983, the Government ."}}, {"text": "Sec. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33045, "end_char": 33051, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "sec. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33257, "end_char": 33263, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Anti-Corruption Bureau of Police fo Greater Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 33312, "end_char": 33362, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "by the Anti-Corruption Bureau of Police fo Greater Bombay, except special cases No."}}, {"text": "R.B. Sulc", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33509, "end_char": 33518, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "31 of 1979 to 37 of 1979 (both inclusive) shall.continue to be tried by Shri R.B. Sulc.", "canonical_name": "R.B. Sulc"}}, {"text": "P.S. Bhuita", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33640, "end_char": 33651, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Court _of Special Judge Shri P.S. Bhuita would stand transferred to .the Court Df Shri R.B. Sule, Additional Special Judge for Greater Bombay. •.", "canonical_name": "P.S .. Hhutta"}}, {"text": "R.B. Sule", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33698, "end_char": 33707, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Court _of Special Judge Shri P.S. Bhuita would stand transferred to .the Court Df Shri R.B. Sule, Additional Special Judge for Greater Bombay. •.", "canonical_name": "R.B. Sulc"}}, {"text": "P.S .. Hhutta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 34000, "end_char": 34013, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "510 of 1982 filed by the accused against the order of learned special Judge Shri P.S .. Hhutta dated October 20, 1982. '", "canonical_name": "P.S .. Hhutta"}}, {"text": "R.B. Sule", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 34181, "end_char": 34190, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Division Bench in terms held that the private complaini was maintainable' and as the required no.tification has aleady\n\nbeen issued, Shri R.B. Sule will have jurisdiction to try Special Case G No.", "canonical_name": "R.B. Sulc"}}, {"text": "July 8, 1783", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 34442, "end_char": 34454, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears .on July 8, 1783, two applications."}}, {"text": "Maharashtra Legislative . Assembly", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 34834, "end_char": 34868, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the offences, he was a sitting member of the Maharashtra Legislative ."}}, {"text": "RB.. SUic", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 35420, "end_char": 35429, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Both thes.e applications came up for hearing before Shri RB.. SUic, who by his order dated July 25, 1783 upheld the contention of .the accused that M.L.A. was a public servant within the meaning of the expression in Sec: 21 (12) (a) lPC and.that unles.s a sanction to prosernte him by the."}}, {"text": "July 25, 1783", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 35454, "end_char": 35467, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Both thes.e applications came up for hearing before Shri RB.. SUic, who by his order dated July 25, 1783 upheld the contention of .the accused that M.L.A. was a public servant within the meaning of the expression in Sec: 21 (12) (a) lPC and.that unles.s a sanction to prosernte him by the."}}, {"text": "Maharashtra Legislative Assembly", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 35784, "end_char": 35816, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "competent to remove him from his offiGe as M.L.A. was.obtained which in the opinion of the learned Special Judge .• was Maharashtra Legislative Assembly, the accused is entitled to be discharged."}}, {"text": "Bhutta", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 37603, "end_char": 37609, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".. ~· -·\n\nR; s. NAYAK v. A. R; PNLULAY ((Desai, J.) 507\n\non which cognizance 'was taken by the learned special Judge, Shri Bhutta, yet on."}}, {"text": "Sec. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37731, "end_char": 37738, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38153, "end_char": 38159, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "M.L.A.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 38221, "end_char": 38227, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Judge further held that the M.L.A., holds an office ."}}, {"text": "Maliarashtra LegiSJative Assembly", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 38481, "end_char": 38514, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Judge further held that as there was no sanction by the Maliarashtra LegiSJative Assembly to prosecuteo the accused and as the Governor\\had no power to san-\n\n ... ction prosecution of the accused in his.capacity as M.L.A.; the accused is entitied to be discharged forthe offences under Secs."}}, {"text": "IPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38742, "end_char": 38745, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sec. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38750, "end_char": 38756, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "P, B. Samant", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 39280, "end_char": 39292, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3 of 1983 instituted upon the complaint of Mr. P, B. Samant, t.he accused E , was discharged. ... 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"metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47820, "end_char": 47826, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 21(12)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48121, "end_char": 48135, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 21(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48216, "end_char": 48226, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 21(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48231, "end_char": 48241, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": ".v.hilh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 48403, "end_char": 48410, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1947 Act\n\n(g) If the answer to (f) 'is in the affirmative, .v.hilh is the Sanctioning ."}}, {"text": "Sec. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50249, "end_char": 50255, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50362, 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N. .Sunda-ra Money!J', Krishna Iyer, J. speaking for the Court observed in his inimitable style that\"rl.ictio- ."}}, {"text": "Karunanidl!i", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 127156, "end_char": 127168, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As far as the expression 'pay' is CO!fcerned, a Constitutioll Bt•nclt of this Court in Karunanidl!i's case referred to various dictionaries and concluJ.ec( that the word odinarily means 'salary, compensation; wages or anv amount.", "canonical_name": "Karunanidl!i"}}, {"text": "Karunanidhi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 130438, "end_char": 130449, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "res integra and concluded by the decision of the Constitution Bench\n\nin Karunanidhi's case?", "canonical_name": "Karunanidl!i"}}, {"text": "Fazal Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 130582, "end_char": 130591, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that case before adveiiing to .t)1e d.ictionary meaning of the expression 'pay', the Constitution Bench speaking through Fazal Ali, J. observed as unt\\er at page 282: ·\n\n\"We are of the opinion."}}, {"text": "Sec. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 133049, "end_char": 133056, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 134363, "end_char": 134370, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 134475, "end_char": 134481, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "IPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 134482, "end_char": 134485, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sec. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 134683, "end_char": 134689, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Sec. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 134854, "end_char": 134861, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 134891, "end_char": 134909, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "21 (11)(') must either mean the Central Government or the."}}, {"text": "Sec. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 134996, "end_char": 135003, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "K. 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Keshvnanc/OBharathi."}}, {"text": "General clauses Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 164511, "end_char": 164530, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Supreme\n\nCourt", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 164664, "end_char": 164678, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "does not inoludethe C)nstituttioiL' A passing reference may arso be mar\\' to the form of oQtl} prescribed for a Judge of the Supreme\n\nCourt 'ahd the Judge of the High Court in the' Third Schedule which. ·"}}, {"text": "Third Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 164720, "end_char": 164734, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amendment Act, 1971", "statute": "Amendment Act, 1971"}}, {"text": "Sec. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 165591, "end_char": 165598, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "IPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 165599, "end_char": 165602, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sec. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 165763, "end_char": 165769, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "IPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 165772, "end_char": 165775, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Kaul", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 167368, "end_char": 167372, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "as alsq to Practice and Procedure.of Parliame11t, Jhird Edition by Kaul and; Shakdher, p, 20s .. The authors-.observed at page 208 that 'each House ."}}, {"text": "Dwivedi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 168296, "end_char": 168303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in MP: Dwivedi s casr!,"}}, {"text": "Sec. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 168370, "end_char": 168377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 169301, "end_char": 169307, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 169603, "end_char": 169610, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "IPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 169611, "end_char": 169614, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sec. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 170123, "end_char": 170129, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Sec. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 170215, "end_char": 170221, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Sec. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 170505, "end_char": 170511, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Sec. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 171078, "end_char": 171084, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 171235, "end_char": 171241, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 171801, "end_char": 171807, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 171990, "end_char": 171997, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 172277, "end_char": 172283, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "M.L.A.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 172407, "end_char": 172413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M.L.A. is not a public servant within the meaning of th, e expression in Sec."}}, {"text": "Sec. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 172480, "end_char": 172487, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 172776, "end_char": 172782, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 12(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 173788, "end_char": 173798, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "R.B. Suk", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 174237, "end_char": 174245, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order and decision cif the ]earned Special Judge Shri R.B. Suk c\\atecl July 25.", "canonical_name": "R.B. Sulc"}}, {"text": "Sepiember\n\n11, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 174593, "end_char": 174612, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'By~ prosecution launched as early ai on Sepiember\n\n11, 1981, his character and integrity came under a cloud."}}, {"text": "High Court of-BombBy", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 175126, "end_char": 175146, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3/8'3 .penr.ing\n\nin the C,6urt r, f Special Judge, Greater Bombay Shri R.B .. Sule are withdiawi1.and transferred to the High Court of-BombBy with a request tO.the lea'r~1e<l ChiefJus_tice to assign these twocases-tn a sitti1g Judge 1\",' of thc, High Court."}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_2_50_66_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "STATE OF PUNJAB\n\nJAGO.EV .S.INGI-i TALWANDI.\n\nDecember 16, 1983\n\n. [Y.V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J., P.N. BHAGWATI, AMARllNDRA. NATH\n\nSEN, D.P. MA.DON AND M.P .. THAKKAR, JJ.]\n\nA Con'Stifution of Jndfa, ]950, Artic!e 22 (5)-Pr_eventive Detention-Duty OJ detaining Authority-Con1p(iance with strict terlns of the Constitution is a . 1nust-National Security Act (Act LXV of 1980) section 3.\n\nB .Preventiv'e.Detentio~-, vational Securiiy Ac/ (Act LXV) of 19o-seCtion 3 read. w; th Article 22(5) of the Constitution of Jndia, 1950-Ful.' details of the :Prejudicial activi11:es (dated, tinte pnd place) mentioned in the grout'ds of detention,-'\n\nbut not in the supporting particulars-Whether non~1nention fr1 the ·, supporting particulars vitiate the entire pdoceedings\" ? .\n\nPreventive Detention-Evidence gathered need not be furnished to the Deten1,1. ..\n\nPrl}Vt:ntive Detenton matter.J-Corllzter-afjidavits, by the detaining authority 01i receipi of notice of the writ, ilot bein'g /lirnished...:._Effect of non-Jurnishing-\n\nConstitution of India, 1950 Article 22(5).\n\nPractice & procedure-Pronouncing final order without reasoned j1idgment and reserving the .Janie in Preventive .Det\"ention CaSes-Prac1ice deprecated Conrlilution Of India Ar_ticle 226, 136 read with Civil Procedure Cod~ sections 33,107 ' aizd. Criminal Procedure Code, Section 354, Dif!ernce' betwetn_High Court & Supreme Cour~ Proceffures, explained. ·\n\n. The respondent challenged the order of his detention Passed y the District Magistrate, Ludhiana on October 3',1983 under section 3 (::i) read with section 3 (2) of .the Natio'nal Security Act,1980. through Criminal \\Vrit Ptition '.No. 516 of 1983 .. :\\ccor<ling 'to ihe Petitioner fespofldcnt. 'the' ground:; of detention served on. hin1 ori Oct. 6, 1983.showing hat he was detained On t:1c, basis of two sPeeches made by him on 8.7.1983 and 20.9.1983 as recorded by the Crime Investigation Depart.Jnent of the Punjab Police contained certa n particulars, which were. totally' absent from the supporting n1a:tcrial and ihcrCfore no. 'reasonable Person could have Possible Passed the 4etention order on the basis' of such material. The High Coui-t accepted the contention and Ola.de the rule\n\nabsolte. Hence the appeal by th, e State after obtainiilg special kave.\n\nAllo\\ving the appeal and rcmandin~ the n1attei to the Jfir, h Court of •• Punjab, the.Court\n\nH H'E.LD : ! :J. -While passing orders of detaining. great care JU~ st be brought t b their task by the detaining authorities.\n\nPrevellive d!tention is .a o ear .on . , •\n\n,....\n\nPUNJAB V. J.S. ; TALWANDI 51\n\nnecessary evil but essentialJy an evil. Therefore: deprivation oi Personal liberty, if'at all, has to be on the strict tenns of the Constitutiori. Nothing less. [61 BC]\n\n1:2: In the instant.case, the detaining authority should not have adopted a somewhat casual and unimaginative approach to his task.' The original version contains almost every one of the material details. pertaining ta. the meeting, . which are mentioned in ground '.No.1. The detaining authOrit:Y needlessly\n\npplied his scissors excising the data which mentioned the date, place, the iime and the. occas.ion of the meeting. It is this IaCk of thoughtfllIIless on the part of the detaining authority which furnished tQ the respondent the semblance of an argument. f61 A-BJ\n\nThe contention of th; respondent that he could not fnak~ n effective representation in bhalf of ground No.1. because.of the inadequacy of data i~· the supportig particulars supplied to him i.s .incOrfect. The .. i'nadequacies from which the supplementary particulars furnished to the respondent along with ground No.J suffer, cannot affect that pcisition because,_ they do -nOf introduce any obs_- Curity in the facts stated in that ground or detract from the substance of thC alle- . gatiQns. mentioned in th<it ground. The fii'st ground of detention mentions that the detenu Was right only form\"aily or technically. That is because, the C.I.D;.\n\nReport was suppJied to him along with the grounds of detention with the express stipulation that it for'med \"the bas'e of th~ grounds of dctentiOn.\"·. The\n\n?rou!Jds mention every one of fhe details which need have been mentihned. Tiie C'.l.J?. report was .frnished to the. detenu as forming the source 9f information leading to. the conclusion that he had inade a speech which. necessitated his , dete\"ntion in 1he interests of public Order. In the ircumstances, the grounds and'\"\n\nthe material furnished to thedetenu have to be read together as if the material in the form. of the c.J.D. report was a continuation of the. gr:ounds of detention. [57 C-E, 60 F-HJ . .\n\nDr .. Ramakrishna Bhardwaj v: The State of Delhi, [1953] SCR 708, I<hudirnm Das v. The'State of West Beng; l, [1975J 2 5.C.i<. 832,@ 838 & 840; Mohammed Yusuf Rowther v. fhe Stqte of J & K, [1980J l SCR 258@268, 269;_\n\nState of BomQav. Atmaram, [_1951].S.C.R. 157; shibbanlal Saxena v. State of Uttar PradesJ,, {1954] SCR 418;\n\n0Dwarkadas Bhattav. State of Jammu & KiJshn:ir. [1956J S.CR. 948; referred lo.\n\n3. The detenu is noi entitled to be informed of the source .oi informa:tio'n received againt, him \"ar the cvidence-hich may\" have been. collected against him as for example, the. evidence corroborating that the report of the C.I.D. is true and correct .. His right is to receive eery material _particul:ir without which. a full . and effective representation cannot be n1ade. If the order of the detention' refers to or relies upori any docu01ent, statement or Other material, copies thereof have, of course, to be supplied' to the detenu. It is not the Jaw t]lat evidence gatered\n\nby the detaining authoify against .the detenu n1ust also be furnished to liim. [62 G-H; 63 A-BJ\n\nBeni Madhob Shaw v. The State of West Bengal, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 2455 Har JasDev Singh v. St; te of Punjab, [1974] I SCR 281 @288; Vakil Vakil Singh:\n\nv. State of Jammu & Kashmir, A.I.R. 1974 2337@2341; icchu Devi Chorar_ia V.\n\nUnion of India, [1981J l SCR 640@ 650; refer.red to. \"\n\n4:· Th~ .failure to furllish the counter-affid~Vit of the District Magistrate who h'1-i. p1ss:!1 the. ord:;:r-of 4\"Ctentibn. was an improprietY though in most of the cases\n\n:D'\n\nG ..\n\nit m1y not be of milch coruequence, especially if there was no llegation of maJa fides against the detaining authority.\n\nThere are no allegations of ma/a fides against the District Magistrate and so,-his failure to file a counter-affidr, vit Will not vitiate the order of detention. [65 A-DJ ·\n\nShaik Hanifv. State of West Bengal, [1974] 3 SCR 258; Naranja11 Singh v.\n\nState of Madhya Pradesh, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 2215, referred to.\n\n [The Court emphasised the in1[10rtance of the detaining authority filing his own affidavit in cases of the present nature and observed that-\"Thcfc are degrees of i_mpropriety and the line which divides grave impropriety from illegality is too thin to draw and even more so toJudge. Conceivably, there can be c:_:ises in which Sllch impropriety arising out of the failure of the detaining authority in filing his owri affidavit may \\itiatC the order of detention.J [65 C-D]\n\ns. It is desirable that the final order which lhe High Court intends to pa!is should not be \"announced until a reasoned judgment is ready for pronouncement.\n\nIf the objoctof passing such Orders i! to ensure sp'cedy compliance with them, that object is more of.ten defeated by-the aggrieved party filing a special leave petition in this Court against the order passed by the High Court.\n\nThC!; t places this Court in a predicament because, without the benefit of ihe reasoning cif the High Cotlrt it is difficult for this Court to <.lllow the bare Order to be implcn1ented.\n\nThe result inevitably .i! that the operation of the order passed by the High Court has to be ..\n\nStayed pending deliver)\\ of the resoned judgment. [65 H; 66 ACJ ·\n\nCRIMINAL APPEALATE JURISDICTION : Criinal Appeal No. 692 of 1983.\n\nFrom the Judgment .and Order dated 29th November, 1983 of the Punjab & Haryana High , Court at Chandigarh in Criminal Writ Petition No. 516 of 1983. ·\n\nK. Parasaran, Attorney Genl. of India, Bhagwant Singh, Advocate General (Punjab), Gurmukh Singh, Addi Adv. GenL of Punjab, D.S. Brar, Asst! Adv. General, G.S. Mann .. Deputy Adv.· General, R.D. Aggarwal, Govt. Adv0caie, Miss .4 S11bhashini and S.K. Bagga for the Appellants.\n\nHardev Singh, G.S. Grewal, N.S: Das Behl; R.S. Sodhi' and J.S. Sndhawalia, for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRACHUD; C. J. This is an appeal by special leave against the judgment dated November, 29 1983 of a lear_ncd Single Judge of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Crimir.al Writ Petition No. 51.6 of 1983: That Writ Petition was filed by 1he resc\n\npndent, Shri Jagdev Singh. Talwandi, to challenge an order of dotention pased by the District Magistrate, Ludhiana, on Octob.cr 3,\n\n• , .. ....\n\nPUNJAB v. J.S. TALWAN!:>I (Chandrahud, C.J.) 53\n\nJ 983 whereby the respQildent was detained under section 3 (3) read with section 3 (2) of the .N'aiional .security Act, 1980.\n\nThe respondent was arrested in pursuance of the order of de- · te'ntion on the night between October 3 and 4, 1983: He was first ladged in the central Jail, Patiala and from there .he was taken to A'nb1la, Baroda and Fathegarh (U, P.). He filed a Writ Petition . . (No. 463 of 1983) in the High Court .to challenge his transfer and detention in a place far awity fr, om .Ambala .. He withdrew that\n\nptition on an assurance by the Government that he will be sent back to /\\:nbila. whi<; h the Government did on October 28.\n\nThe grounds of detention were served on the respondent on 'ootobtr 6. 1983.\n\nThose gr6unds show that the petitioner was detained on the basis of two speeches allegedly made by him : one on July 8. I 983 at .N'ihang Chhowani, Baba Bakala, District Amritsar and the ot.her on September 20, 1983 at Gurdwara Manji Sahib.\n\nA11ritsar. The grounds furnished to the petitioner read thus ~\n\n\"(I) That yo!} in a Shaheedi Conference which was held from 11 a.m. to 4.45 p.m. on 8-7-1983 at a place kn<>wn as 'Nihang Chhowaui' at Baba Bakala, District Amritsar, delivered a provocative speech to a .Sikh gathering comprising about 2000/2200 Persons wherein you made a pointed reference to the incident dated 2-7-1983 of encounters between Nihangs and police at Baba Bakala and TaranTaran and stressed that in order. to take revenge Sikhs would kill their (Police)' four persons in lieu of the two Nihangswho _had been killed 'in the said enccunters.\n\n(2) That while addressing a conference . convened by • the AISSF (All India Sikh Students Federation) on 20-9-1983 at Gurdwara Manji Sahib al Amritsar and attended by about 7000/8000 Sikh students, you made a provocative.speech wherein you said that all efforts made for the su.ccess of the Akali Morcha having failed, it was still time to establish in Punjab a Government parallel. to the entraf Government and that you are in a position to form such a Government.· You further exhorted that the establishment < .of Khalsa Raaj wasthe only solution to the problems.\n\nYou lso made a suggestion that . the Govern'meri!\n\nc '\n\nwill not accept aqy demand dnless it was compelled by force to do so. This statement was also published ·.in the various newspapers. A case F.I.R.\n\nNo. 295 dated 27-9-1983 under section,· 124-A Indian Penal Code, and section 13 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, l967, was registered at Police Station 'E' Division 'Amritsar, which is under investigatiO)l.'i ' •: .The detaining !'uthority stated in, the last .paragraph of the . detention order that the espondent was being supplied the grounds , _ of detentionin Punjabi (Gunnukhi script) together with an !lnglish\n\ntran.slation thereof and the \"'supporting material forming the base ofthe grounds of det(; ntion\". The \"supporting material'', b)'. which i.s meant , particulars of the. grounds of detention; was supplied to .:)he .respondent. along with the. grounds. These particulars consist\n\nof what is alleged to. be, a report of the speeches made by the-respondent, as recorded by the C.I.D. branch of the. Punjab Police. The ·particulars, of which an English translation was produced in the High Court at Elio AL read thus : . ' ..\n\n. G\n\n\"While .speaking he said that on July 2 by bringing B.S.F., Punjab Police and 'other police the unarmed Nihangs were fired at. There is no count as to how many of .them\n\nivere killed, because no rollcall is taken 6f the Sikhs; how many came and how many went.\n\nFurther said that in Punjab hundreds of : innocent Sikhs have beeq made the target of bullets. The Government has . seen that the Sikhs .go away after paying homage to thC martyrs.. Now we will have to decide as to what steps should be taken. The beloved army oi' Guru' (Nihangs) have pro- . tected our dress and scriptures. It is true that some of them do commit mistakes also.· They should be punished. We . should see that we should kill as many police man as they kill ours, otherwise othey ·;.., ill sloly finish us. . .\n\n. The_ new Iiispector-General of Police Mr. Bhindr, has .stated ihat there are no extermists in Darbar Sahib. Further ' ·\n\nsaid that Congress wants to finish self respect among you. .cha which is launched by A)<ali D . l, is to save the The M; rcha, which Js lunched by Akali Dal, is to sve fhc H Sikh appearance. The awards have been given to policl:, have they wpn any war? Such a big attack upon the Nihans was_\n\n,___ ----\n\n.i: -\n\n. '\n\nPU'NJAB v. J.S. TALWANDI (Chandra.chud, C.J.) 55\n\nou a pre-planned programme: I say .if tlrcy have killed A onr two men, then you should kill four. J.f they come to idll me like this, then I will die after killing them .. I wil! never go back. Further said 'that' if we get a judicial enquiry\n\nmade, it becomes meaningless. Nothing comes out of them.\n\nNow the judicial power has been given to Executive Officers . . They may kill any-body and they complete the enquiry and fill B the file.''. ·\n\nOne of the grounds on which the order 6£ detention was challenged in the High Courf 'was that the State Government had failed to. discharge its. obligation under Article. 22 (5) of the Constitution by denying to. t1le respondent an effective opportunity to make a rec· presentation. to the Advisory Board-against the order of detention.· On being asked by the learned Judge \"to be more specific\", counsel for the respondent statoo in th.e High Court that the State Government had not supplied to the respondent the supporting material on which Ground No. 1. o.f the , grounds of detention was based. Shri\n\nHardev Singh, who appears' on behalf of the respondent, adopted D that contention by clarifying that the case of the respondent is that the relevant facts stated in the !st ground of detention are totally absent .from the supporting material supplied to him and, therefore,. nJ reasonable person could have possibly. passed the detention order on the basis of that materfal. The learned .counsel l!rged. that the order of detention was bad either because the detaining authority E did not apply its mind to thi<. material before it or, in the alternative, because there was some other material on the basis of which the detention order was passed and that material was not supplied to the respondent. . ·\n\nFor the purpose of focussing attention on the true nature of .the respondent's colltention an<! the .Prejudice said to have b, een caused to him. the learned Judge of the High Court resorted to an ingenious . device.\n\nHe coined a conversation betwee~ the detaining authority and the detenu on the subject of their rival contentions in this case.\n\nThat imaginary onversation may be reproduced, at least fr the merit of its novelty : '\n\n\"(The detaining' authority and t:he detenu come face to face.) • , • ' \"\n\nDetaining authority: (After reading -0ut Ground N:o. I to H the detenu) : You had made that objectionable speech.\n\nDetenu : ~. Sir, you eem to have been wrongly informed.\n\nI did not deliver any speech, provocative or otherwise, ill a Shaheedi Conference at any such . time, date or place known as 'Nihang Chhowni' at Baba Baka!, District Amritsar, before a Sikh gathering of 2000/2200, as read out by you from ground No.· I. ·\n\nDetainingauthority : (Being cock-sure qf its facts, takes out\n\nthe. <'.:.I.D. report and puts it in the hands of the detenu.) : Go through this C.I.D. report . carefully, as ground No. 1 is based on ihat report.•\n\nDetenu Sir, this report does not refer to any speech being made bY. me in a Shaheedi Conference .at a given time, on a given date, at a given place, at Baba Bakala and before a Sikh gathering numbering 2000/2200.\n\nDetaining authority : (Taking back the report from the detenu's hand and subjecting it to a close scrutiny, says somewhat wryly) : Yes, you are right.\n\nThe vital data which finds a mention in ground No.\n\nI is missing from the supporting materail. (Regaining quickly-his repose, tlie detaining authority continues): Never mind if the given vital faets\n\nare missing from the supporting material. The supporting material at least reveals that yoµ did utter the objectionable words somewhere, sometime, on some date and before some , persons.\n\nDetenu Sir, but that was not the speech on which you we.re going to .act.\n\nYou were going to take action\" against me on the basis of the speech mentioned in Gri:mnd No. I. ·\n\nDetaining authority : Very well. (So saying, the detaining authority orders. the detention of the detenu on two grounds by adding one more ground on the basis of another speech.\n\nThe detaining atitho- . rity, serves' the order of detention upon the deteliu, containing two grounds of detention. Simultaneously, the detaining authority supplies the supporting material to tile detenu.\")\n\n• •\n\nPUNJAB ~. J.S, TALWANDI ( Chandrach¥d, C.J.) . 57\n\nWe must mention in order to put the record straight and in fair- . ness to the learned Judge, that he has narrated this c.onversation in a manner which is slightly different in so far as the form, but not the substance; is concerned. He has narrated the conversation in a running form. We have reproduced it like a dialogue in a play, witho.ut adding anythiµg of our own. Indeed, we have taken care not to make any changes at all in the fictional conversation imagined by the learned Judge because, the questi0ns and answers which suggested themselves to him are,. in a sense, tlie heart of the matter and, in any case, constitute the esseµce of his judgment.\n\n- With respect to the learned Judge, the basic error of his judg- . ment lies in an easy,. unexamined assumption which 'he has made on a significant aspect pf the matter.\n\nThe detenu reminded the detaining athority that the C.I.D. rport did not refer to any speech made by him \"in a Shaheedi Conference at a given time, on a g\\ven date, at a given place at Baba Bakala .and before a Sikh, gathering numbering 2000/2200\".' The detaining author[ty could have not p)nibly replied to that question by saying merely that the detenu was right. The detenu was right only formally or technically. That is bcause, the C.I.D. report was supplied to hirri alnog with the grounds of dJtention with the axpress stipulation that it formed \"the )Jase of the. grouiids of detention\". The grounds mention every one of the details which need have been mentioned. The C.I.D. report was furnished to the detenue as forming the source of information leading to the conclusion that he had made a speech which necessitated hi~ detention in the interests of public order. In the circumstances, the grounds and .the material furnished to the detenu have o .be read together as' is the material in the form of the C.I.D.\n\nreport was a continuation of the grounds of detention. ·\n\n' The unqualified reply given by the detaining authority to the detenu, as imagined by the learned Judge, betrays considerable unfamiiarity with the true legal position of the part on the detaining authority. Not only that; but it shows that .the detaining authority forgot that the particulars and the grounds were expressed to be inter-\n\nc '\n\nJinked, the forer being the base of the latter. .The detaining autho- G rity. should have explained to the detenu that though the particulars supplied to Wm did not mention those various details, the particulars \"\" were supplied to him along with the grounds, that it. was expressly clarified contemporaneously that they related to the facts stated in the grounds, that the two had to be read together.and that the grounds H contained the necessary facts with full detils.\n\nThe dialogue should .\n\n' c\n\nF ,.\n\nSUPREME COURT REFORTS\n\n[1984),2 S.C.R'\n\nhave cded there and the curtain tung down. Indeed, the, dialguc, though carofuJly improvised by the learned Judge, assumes what is to be decided, namely, whether the particulars furnished tp tbe, dett:nu suffer. from the infirmity alleged•.\n\nNvertheless, we will examine independently the argument of the respondent_ th~! he coul>\\ not' make an effective representation against the order of detention because the material supplied to him, that is to say, the 'C:I.D . .report of the speech alleged to have been. made by him at the Shaheedi Conference, did not contain the material 'particulars which formed an important' consititlient of the grounds served upon him. His grievance is.that t.he C.I.D. 'report of his speech does not mention that : (!) the Conference was held on July 8, !'983;\n\n(2) it was held at Nihang Chhowani; (3) it was held between the hour~ of u: AM. and 4.45. P.M. (4) it was a \"S)iaheedi Conference\"; (5) them was a gathering of 2000 to 2200 persons at the Conference; and that, (6) the speech made by him referred to an ncounter at Baba Bakala and Tarn Taran.\n\nArti_cle 22 (5) of the Constitution, around which' the argument of the respondent revolves, reads thus\n\n\"When any person is detaine4 ill punuance of an order , made under any 'raw providng for p; eventive detention, the .. authority making the order shall, as soon as may be,\n\ncommunicate to such pei; son-the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity\n\n+ ol' m1king a. representation gains! the order.\" r , .\n\nThis Article has come up for consideration before .this Court in a large number of cases. One of the earliesi°judgments of this Court on the interpretation of this Article is reported in. Dr. Ramkrishna Bhardwaj v. The Sfate of Delhi, (ll in which Patan)ali Sastri, C.J. observed that under Article 22 (5) of the Constitution, the detrnu has the right to be furnished with particulars of .the grounds of his detention, \"sufficient to enable him to make a representation which, on 'being considered, may give relief to him\".\n\nKhudiram-Das v. The State of West Bengal,• is a Judgment.of a four Judge-Bench of this Court in a cas~ which arose under the Main-\n\n,. ·. ,\n\n(1) [1953] S.C.R. 708 •\n\n(2) [1975] 2 S.C.K. 832, 838, 840.\n\nA\"'r'\n\n',.\n\n'r-\n\n,. '\n\n' >\n\nPUNJAB v. J.S. TALWANDI (Chandrachud, C.J.) 59\n\ntenance of Internal' Security '!'\\ct,\n\n1971. One of us .. Bbag\\\\ali, J.,\n\n A ' who spoke for the Court, surveyed the decisions bearing on the ques-· ticin of the obligation of the detaining authoirty and explaind the nature of that obligation thus' :· ·\n\n\"The basic facts and material particulars, therefore, - which are the foundation of the order of detention, will also B be coverei! by 'grounds' within the contemplation of article 22 (5) and sectiop 8 and are Tequired to be communicated to the detenu unless their disclosure is considered by the autho. rity to be against the public interst.\n\nThis bas ahvays been the view consistently taken by t!iis Court in a series of decisions.'' C.\n\nIn Mohammad Yosuf Ratherv. The State oj Jammu & Kashmir,(ll Chinnappa Raddy, J., in a concurring judgment, deah with t.he im- -'. plications of Artie](> 22 (5) of the Constitution thus :\n\n\"' .\n\n\"The extent and the content of Article 22 (5) hve been the sullject matter of repeated pronouncements by thi1; Court .(Vide State of Bombay v. Atmaram (2), Dr. Ramkrishna Bhardwaj v. State of Delhi('), Shibbanlal Saxena v. State of Uttar Pradesh (3) Dwarkadas Bhatia v. Stille of Jammu & Kashmir (4). The interpretation of Article 22; consistently ac!opted by this Court, is, parhaps, one of the outstanding• contributions of the Court in the cause of Human Rights.\n\nThe law is now' well settled that a 'detenu has two rights . . under Article 22 (5) of the Constitution : (1) To be iI1formed, as soon as may be, of the grounds on which the order of detention is based, that is, the grounds which led to th~ subjective 8atisfactioii of the detaining authority and (2) to be .. afforded the earliest opportunity of making a representatfon\n\nagainst the order of detention, that is, to be furnished with sufficient particulars to enable him to make a representation which on being considered may obtain, relief to him.\" ·\n\n.In Khudiram JJas v. The State of We.-t Bengali\" it was observed G -that. these two safeguards 'iare the barest minimum which must be\n\n' . . . . .\n\n(1) [1980] 1 $.C.R. 258, 268; 269.\n\n(2) [195tJ s.c.R. .. 161.\n\n(3) J1954] S.C.R. 418.\n\n( 4) [1956] $.C.R. 948.\n\n• E\n\n observed before an executive authorij:y can be permitted to preven , tively detain a persbn and thereby drown his right of personal librty\n\nin tho nanie of public good and social security\". ,\n\nThe q[1estion which we have to consider in the light of these decisions iS whether sufficient particulars of the first ground of detention were furnished to the respondent so as to enable him to exerci'e effectively his constitutional right of making a representation against .the order of Jetenlion.\n\nThe obligation which rests on the detaining authority in.this behlf admits. no exception and its rigour cannot be relaxed under any circumstances.\n\nHaving given our anxious consideration to this questc'n~ it seems to us impossible to accept the view of the High Ccurt that sufficient particulars of the first ground of detention were not furnift.ed to the detenu so .as to enable him to make an effective representaiion to tho detaining authority, that is to say, a representation 'll'hich en .being accepted may give relief to him.\n\nThis is not a case in which the groun\\l of d'etention contains a bare or bald statement of the con<; lusion to which the detaining authority had come, namely, !hat it was necessary to pass the order of detention in order to preW, nt the detenu from acting in a manner prejudicial to the interests of pub] ic order.\n\nThe first ground of detention with which we are concerned in this appeal, mentions each and every one of the material particulars which the respondent was entitled to know in order to te able to make a full and' effective representation against the orci er of detenticn.\n\nThat gr01!nd mentions the place, date.and time of the alleg<d rr.eeti1ig. describes the occasion on which tl1e meeting \\\\'as held, that is, the 'Shaheedi Conference'.\n\nIt mentions the approximate number of persons who were present at the meeting. Finally, it mentici:s 'll'ilh particularity the various statements made by the respondent in his speech..\n\nThese particulars mentioned in the grcur:ds of detention comprise tlie entire gamut of facts which it was necessary fer the res- .pondent to know in order to make a wellinformed representaticn.\n\nThe inadequacies from Which the supplementary particulars furnisl:rd\n\nto tile respodent along with ground No.1 suffer, cannot affect that position because; they do not introduce any obscurity in the facts stated in that ground-or detract from the substance. of the allegations mentioned in that ground. The argument of the respondent that he could not make an effective representation in behalf of ground N~. 1 because of the inadequacy of data in the partieulars supplied to him, has therefore to be r_ejected.\n\nHowever, w~ are somewhat surprised that in a matter of this nature,\n\n. .\n\nPUNJAB v. J.S. TALWANDI (Chandrachud, C.J.) 61\n\nthe detaining authority should have adopted a somewhat casual and unimaginative approach to his task. We asked the learned Attorney General to produce before us the original .version of the C.LD. report o( which an extract. was supplied to the respcndent by way of particulars; The original version contains almost evEry one of t)le material details pertaining to the meeting which are mentioned in ground No. 1 The detaining authority needlessly applied his scissors excising the data which mentioned the date, tH place, the time and the occasion of the meeting. It is this lack of thpughtfulness on the part of the detaining authority which furnished to. the respondent the semblance of n argument. This Court has observed in numerous cases that, while passing orders of detenticn, great care must be brought to bear on their task by the detaining authorities: Preventive detention is a necessary evil but essentilly an evil: )hercfore, deprivation of personal Jibhty, if at all, has to be on the strict terms f the Constitution. Nothing less: We will utter the oftgiven warning yet once more in the hope that the voice of reason will be heard.\n\nShri Hardev Singh contended, in the altematiVe, that the order of detention suffers from a total non-application of mind because, that order could not have been pass.ed on the basis of 1!1e C.J.D. report . wnich docs not refer to any cif the facts which are mentioned in .the order of detention. It is und.oubtedly true tliat the case of the appellants is that the order of deiention is founded upon the report of the C.I.D., relating to the speech made by the respondent at the Shaheedi Conference. But the argument of the learned couneel overlooks that what was furnished to the respondent was an extract from the C.J.D. report and not the w)10le of it. However, that has not caused any prejudice to the respondent since the .grounds. and the particulars we.re served upon him simultaneously and ground\n\nNo. I mentions every concejvable detail whicl) it was necessary hJ mention in order to enable the respondent to make a proper representation against the .order of detention. . Evidently; the . detaining authority had before it the whole of the C.I.D. report on the basis of which it passed the order of detention. What was omitted from the extract furnished to the respondent was incorpo'rated in ground No. L It is therefore not .possible to accept ihc argument that the order of detention is bad because the detaining authority did noi apply its mind to the question as to whether there was material on the basis of which the respondent could be detained.\n\nIt was further argued by the .]earned counsel that tbe detaining H. authority should have disclosed the evidence on the basis of which , .\n\nthe order of detention .was passed because, in the absence of knowledge\n\nof such evidence, the respondent could not have made an effective representation against the order of detention. There is no substance . in this .contention. It is not .the 'law that the evidence gathered by the detaining authority. against the detenu must also be furnished to him,_ . ·\n\nfoBeni Madhob Shaw v. , The State of West liengal,'\" .it was argued on behalf of the detenu that the details of the activities attributed to him were npt disclosed to him, as a resul~ of which his right to make .a repr.isentation to the Government was seriously prejudiced. It was hold by fais Court tliat since the activities forming the grounds ; f d:itenion woro disclosed to t[1e .detenu in clear terms and since such\n\ndiclosure furnished adequate information to the detenu to enable hiin to make an elfectiv, e representation against his detention, the lluQ-disclosure of sources of information or the exact words of the . information which formed the foundation of the order at detention could not be complained o(\n\nIn Har las Dev Singh v. State of Punjab,'2' it was held that the _conclusions drawn from the available facts constitute 'the grounds' and that the ground must be supplied to the detenu. The Court observed that the detenu is not entitled to kMw the evidence nor thesource of the information : What must be furnished to hi~ are the grounds of detention and th? particulars which would enable him to make out a case, if he can, for the consideration of the detaining authority. . -\n\nIn Vakil Singh v.' State of Jammu and Kashinir,'Zl it was held that since the basic facts, as distinguished from fctual details were\n\ninorporat-od in the material whih was suppiied to the detenu, nothing more was required to be .fotimated to .him in order to enable him to make an effective representation. ·\n\nThese cases show that the detenu is not entitled to be infor1'Jed of the sou•ce of information received against him or the evidence which may have been colletcd against him_as, for example, the evi<lence corroborating that the report of the C.I.D. is true and correct. His rightis to receive every material partici1lar without which a fo\\l and\n\n(!) AIR 1973 SC .2455.\n\n(2) [19741 I S.C.R~ 281,' 288'\n\n(3) AIR 1974 2337, 2341. ·\n\n. ---(\n\n}'UNJAB v. J.S. TALWANDI (Chandrachud, C.J.). 63\n\n effective representation canno( be made. If the order of detention refers to or teles upon any document, statement or other material, copies thereof have, of course, to be supplied to the detenu as 4eld by this Court in lchhu.Devi Choraria v. Union of lndia.lll That question does not arise here since no such thing is referred to or relied upon . in the first ground of detention, Indeed the furnishing of the C.I.D. report, of which a truncated extra9t was furnished to the respondent, was a suprfluous 'exercise in the light of _the facts of the instant case. , .\n\n Shri Hardev Singh relied upon the folloWing passage in the judgment in Khudiram in support of his conteniion that the entire miterial. which was before the detaining authority, including the evidence gathered by him, must be furnished to the detenu :\n\n\"But if the grounds of detention ar.e not communicated to him how can he make an effective representation ? The opportunity of making a representation would l:J~ ren\\!ered illusory, The communication of the grounds' of detention is1 therefore, also int\\mded to subservc the purpose of enabling the detcnu to make U)l effec\\ive representation .. If this be the true reason for providing that the grounds on which the order of detention is made should be communicated to the detenu, it is obvi.ous that the 'grounds' mean alt the . basic facts and materials which have been taken into account by the detaining uuthority . in making the order of detention and on which, therefore, the order of detention is. based.\"\n\nThese observations cannot be construed as meaning, that the evidence which ,/, as. collected by !he detaining authority must also be furnished to the detenu. As the very same paragraph of th~ judgment at page 839 of the report shows, what was meant was that the basic facfs and th.c material particulars which form.the foundation of the order of detention rriust be furnished to the detenu since, in the true sense, they form part of the grounds of detention and without being apprised of the same, the detenu cannot possibly make an effective representation. '\n\nShri Hardev Singh found serious fault i.th the fact that in answer to the writ petition filed by the respondent in the High Court, the counter-affidavit was sworn by Shri K.C. Mahajan, Deputy Secretary in the Honie Department, of the Government of Punjab, and\n\n(1) [1981] 1 S.C.R. 640, 6~0. ,\n\nD ..\n\nnot by the District Magistrate, Ludhiana, who had passed the order\n\nof detention; We are not prepared to dismiss this submission as of no relevance or importance. In matters of a routine nature, if indeed . .there are any matters of a routine nature in the field of detention, .. a counter-affidavit may be sworn by a person who derives his knowledge from the record of the case. Howewr, in sensitive matters of the present nature, the detaining authority ought to file his own affidavit in answer to the writ petition and place the relevant f.ats before the CoiJrt which the Court is legitimately entitled to know.\n\nIn Shaik Hanif v. State of. West Bengal,' the counter-affidavit on behalf of the State of West Bengal was filed by the Deputy Secretary (Homo), who verified tlie correctness of the averments in his affidavit on the basis of the facts contained in the official records. The District Magistrate, who passed the order of detention, did not file his affidavit . and the explnatioh.which he gave for not doing so was found to be unsatisfactory. Following an earlier judgment in Naranjan Singh v .. State of Madhya Pradesh,2 it was held by this Cou, rt that, in anser\n\nto a Rule issued in a habeas corpus petition, it is incumbent upon the State to satisfy the Court that the detention of the petitioner is legal and is in ·onformity not only. with the m; rndatory provisions of the Act under which the order of detention is passed but is also in accord with the requirements implicit in Article 22(5) of the Con-' stituti<in. Sarkaria, Jobserved. on behalf of the Court :\n\n\"Since the Court is precluded from testing the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority by.objective standards, J it is all the more desirable that in response to the Rule Nisi, , the counter-affidavit on behalf of the State should be sworn to by the District Magistrate.· or the authority on whose subjective satisfaction the detention order under s.3 was passed. If for. sufficient reason shown to the satisfaction of the Court, the affidavit of the person ,;, ho passed the order. of detentiori under scctioi1 3, cannot be furnished, the counte~ .. affidavit should be sworn by some responsible officer who personally dealt with or processed the case in the Government . Secretariat or submitted it to the Minister or other Officer duly authorised under the rules of bnsiness framed by the Goverrior under Article 166 of the Constitution to pass orders' on behalf of the Government in such matt.ers.\"\n\nH (I) [t974J 3. s.c.R: 25s, 262.\n\n(2) AIR 1972 SC 2215.\n\n..._.\n\n. PUNJAB v~ 1.S. TALWANDI (Chandrachud, C.J.).. 65.\n\n. .\n\nAfter reviewing certain other decisions, the Court held .that the failure to furnish tlie counter-affidavit of the District Magistrate . who had passed the order of detention, was. an hnpropriety though in most of the cases it nray. not be of niucli consequence, especially jf there was no allegation of malafides against the detaining authority.\n\nIn the result, the absence of the affidavit of the District Magistrate .was held not to vitiate. the order of detention.\n\nIn tqjs case too, there are no allegations of.ma/a fides against the District Magistrate and so, his failure to file a counter-affidavit will not vitiate the order of detention. We cannot, however, leave this subject without emphasising once 11gain the importante of . the detaining authority filing his own affidavit in cases of the present nature. There. are degrees of impropriety and the line which. divides grave impropriety from illegality is todtthin to draw and' even more so to judge. Conceivably, there can be cases. in which such impr'o; priety arising out of the failure of the detaining authority in filing his own affidavit' may vitiate the order of detention;\n\nFinally, Shri Hardev Singh has cbutenqd that the respondent was unable to give proper instructio1'!' to his counsel when the matter was ho; ard by the Advisory Soard. Counsel says that the respondent . . was transferred from place to place an.d ultimately, he was produced . before the Advisory 'Board an hour or so before.the commencement of proceedings before the Board. Thai left no time for hfm to instruct his counsel. We do not see any substance in this. grievance. The respondent was .represented by an. advocate.before the Advisory 'Bo;1rd. The learned advocate argued the case of the respondent . along with the cases of two other dtenus. It does not appear that any grievance was made by him that he was not able to 'obtain ioistructions from the respondent so as to be able to represent bis case effectively before the Advis.ory Board.\n\nFor these reasons, we allow the appeal and set aside the judgment of the High Court A• desired by counsel for the respondent, we ramand the matter to the High Court for disposal of the remaining\n\nE. ,\n\n.coiitentioris raised by the respondent in his Writ Petition. G\n\nWe would like to take this oppqitunity to point out that' serious diffiJnlties arise on account of the practice increasingly adopted by the High Courts, of yronouncing the. final order without a reasoned judgment. It is desirable that the final order which the If4gh Court inte.nds to pass sh!iuld not be announced until a reasoned judgment H\n\n. '\n\n\"66 SUPREME COUl\\T REPORTS\n\n[!984] 2 S.C.R.\n\nis. ready for prorionncement. Suppose, fot examnle, that a final , order without a reasoned judgment is announced by the High Court that a hous~ shall be demolished, or that the custody of a child shall be handed over to one parent as against the order, or that a person\n\naccused of a serious charge is acquitted, or that a statute is 'unconstitutional or, as in the 1nstant case, that a detenu be released frcm detention. Ifthe object of passing such orders is to .ensure speedy • compliance with. them, that object is more often defeated by the aggrieved party filing a special leave petition in this Court against the order passed by the High Court. That places this \"court, in a . predicament because, without the benefit of the reasoning of the High Court, it is difficult for this Court to allow the bare order lo be implemented. The result inevitably is that the operaticn cf the order passed by. the High Court has. to be stayed pending delivery of the reasoned judgment. • ·\n\nIt may b~ thought that such orders are passed by this Court . and therefore tl)ere is no reason why the High Courts should not '\n\n. do the same. We would like to point out rspectfully that the orders\n\npassed by this Court are final and no appeal lies against them. The\n\nSupremeCourtis the fin1l Court in.the hierarchy of our courts. Besides, orders without a reasoned judgment are passed by this Court very rarely, under exceptional circumstances. Orders passed by the High Court are.subject to the appellate jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution and other provisions of the concerned .statutes. We thought it necessary to make these observations ..in .. order that apractice which is not very desirable and which achieves no useful purpose may not groiv out.of its present infancy. . . . •\n\n.S.R.\n\nAppeal allowed qnd Case remanded to the High Court\n\n. )-", "total_entities": 79, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF PUNJAB", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 15, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF PUNJAB", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "December 16, 1983", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 46, "end_char": 63, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "December 16, 1983\n\n. ["}}, {"text": "Y.V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 68, "end_char": 90, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Y.V. CHANDRACHUD*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P.N. BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 92, "end_char": 105, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.N. 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J.S. ; TALWANDI 51\n\nnecessary evil but essentialJy an evil.", "canonical_name": "PUNJAB V."}}, {"text": "Vakil Vakil Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5858, "end_char": 5875, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "62 G-H; 63 A-BJ\n\nBeni Madhob Shaw v. The State of West Bengal, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 2455 Har JasDev Singh v. St; te of Punjab, [1974] I SCR 281 @288; Vakil Vakil Singh:\n\nv. State of Jammu & Kashmir, A.I.R. 1974 2337@2341; icchu Devi Chorar_ia V.\n\nUnion of India, [1981J l SCR 640@ 650; refer.red to. \""}}, {"text": "State of Jammu & Kashmir, A.I.R. 1974 2337@2341;", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5881, "end_char": 5929, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "62 G-H; 63 A-BJ\n\nBeni Madhob Shaw v. The State of West Bengal, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 2455 Har JasDev Singh v. St; te of Punjab, [1974] I SCR 281 @288; Vakil Vakil Singh:\n\nv. State of Jammu & Kashmir, A.I.R. 1974 2337@2341; icchu Devi Chorar_ia V.\n\nUnion of India, [1981J l SCR 640@ 650; refer.red to. \""}}, {"text": "[1974] 3 SCR 258", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 6526, "end_char": 6542, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "K. Parasaran", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8058, "end_char": 8070, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Parasaran, Attorney Genl."}}, {"text": "Bhagwant Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8097, "end_char": 8111, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of India, Bhagwant Singh, Advocate General (Punjab), Gurmukh Singh, Addi Adv."}}, {"text": "Gurmukh Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8140, "end_char": 8153, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of India, Bhagwant Singh, Advocate General (Punjab), Gurmukh Singh, Addi Adv."}}, {"text": "D.S. Brar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8181, "end_char": 8190, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "GenL of Punjab, D.S. Brar, Asst!"}}, {"text": "G.S. Mann", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8212, "end_char": 8221, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "General, G.S. Mann .. Deputy Adv.·"}}, {"text": "R.D. Aggarwal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8247, "end_char": 8260, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "General, R.D. Aggarwal, Govt."}}, {"text": "S11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8286, "end_char": 8289, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S.K. Bagga", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8302, "end_char": 8312, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Adv0caie, Miss .4 S11bhashini and S.K. Bagga for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "Hardev Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8334, "end_char": 8346, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hardev Singh, G.S. Grewal, N.S: Das Behl; R.S. Sodhi' and J.S. Sndhawalia, for the Respondent.", "canonical_name": "Hardev Singh"}}, {"text": "Das Behl", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8366, "end_char": 8374, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hardev Singh, G.S. Grewal, N.S: Das Behl; R.S. Sodhi' and J.S. Sndhawalia, for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "R.S. Sodhi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8376, "end_char": 8386, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hardev Singh, G.S. Grewal, N.S: Das Behl; R.S. Sodhi' and J.S. Sndhawalia, for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "J.S. Sndhawalia", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8392, "end_char": 8407, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hardev Singh, G.S. Grewal, N.S: Das Behl; R.S. Sodhi' and J.S. Sndhawalia, for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "CHANDRACHUD", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8474, "end_char": 8485, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRACHUD; C. J. This is an appeal by special leave against the judgment dated November, 29 1983 of a lear_ncd Single Judge of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Crimir.al Writ Petition No.", "canonical_name": "CHANDRACHUD"}}, {"text": "Jagdev Singh. Talwandi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8740, "end_char": 8762, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "51.6 of 1983: That Writ Petition was filed by 1he resc\n\npndent, Shri Jagdev Singh.", "canonical_name": "Jagdev Singh. Talwandi"}}, {"text": "Chandrahud", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8899, "end_char": 8909, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Talwandi, to challenge an order of dotention pased by the District Magistrate, Ludhiana, on Octob.cr 3,\n\n• , .. ....\n\nPUNJAB v. J.S. TALWAN!:>I (Chandrahud, C.J.) 53\n\nJ 983 whereby the respQildent was detained under section 3 (3) read with section 3 (2) of the .N'aiional .security Act, 1980.", "canonical_name": "CHANDRACHUD"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8970, "end_char": 8979, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8994, "end_char": 9003, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Baroda", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9254, "end_char": 9260, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent was arrested in pursuance of the order of de- · te'ntion on the night between October 3 and 4, 1983: He was first ladged in the central Jail, Patiala and from there .he was taken to A'nb1la, Baroda and Fathegarh (U, P.)."}}, {"text": "Fathegarh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9265, "end_char": 9274, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent was arrested in pursuance of the order of de- · te'ntion on the night between October 3 and 4, 1983: He was first ladged in the central Jail, Patiala and from there .he was taken to A'nb1la, Baroda and Fathegarh (U, P.)."}}, {"text": "Amritsar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9818, "end_char": 9826, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I 983 at .N'ihang Chhowani, Baba Bakala, District Amritsar and the ot.her on September 20, 1983 at Gurdwara Manji Sahib."}}, {"text": "Baba Bakala", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10089, "end_char": 10100, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in a Shaheedi Conference which was held from 11 a.m. to 4.45 p.m. on 8-7-1983 at a place kn<>wn as 'Nihang Chhowaui' at Baba Bakala, District Amritsar, delivered a provocative speech to a .Sikh gathering comprising about 2000/2200 Persons wherein you made a pointed reference to the incident dated 2-7-1983 of encounters between Nihangs and police at Baba Bakala and TaranTaran and stressed that in order."}}, {"text": "TaranTaran", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10336, "end_char": 10346, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in a Shaheedi Conference which was held from 11 a.m. to 4.45 p.m. on 8-7-1983 at a place kn<>wn as 'Nihang Chhowaui' at Baba Bakala, District Amritsar, delivered a provocative speech to a .Sikh gathering comprising about 2000/2200 Persons wherein you made a pointed reference to the incident dated 2-7-1983 of encounters between Nihangs and police at Baba Bakala and TaranTaran and stressed that in order."}}, {"text": "20-9-1983", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10615, "end_char": 10624, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "convened by • the AISSF (All India Sikh Students Federation) on 20-9-1983 at Gurdwara Manji Sahib al Amritsar and attended by about 7000/8000 Sikh students, you made a provocative.speech wherein you said that all efforts made for the su.ccess of the Akali Morcha having failed, it was still time to establish in Punjab a Government parallel."}}, {"text": "Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10863, "end_char": 10869, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "convened by • the AISSF (All India Sikh Students Federation) on 20-9-1983 at Gurdwara Manji Sahib al Amritsar and attended by about 7000/8000 Sikh students, you made a provocative.speech wherein you said that all efforts made for the su.ccess of the Akali Morcha having failed, it was still time to establish in Punjab a Government parallel."}}, {"text": "27-9-1983", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11296, "end_char": 11305, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "295 dated 27-9-1983 under section,· 124-A Indian Penal Code, and section 13 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, l967, was registered at Police Station 'E' Division 'Amritsar, which is under investigatiO)l."}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11328, "end_char": 11345, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11351, "end_char": 11361, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11369, "end_char": 11405, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "High Court at Elio", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12193, "end_char": 12211, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The ·particulars, of which an English translation was produced in the High Court at Elio AL read thus : . ' .."}}, {"text": "Punjab Police", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12300, "end_char": 12313, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G\n\n\"While .speaking he said that on July 2 by bringing B.S.F., Punjab Police and 'other police the unarmed Nihangs were fired at."}}, {"text": "Bhindr", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13072, "end_char": 13078, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The_ new Iiispector-General of Police Mr. Bhindr, has .stated ihat there are no extermists in Darbar Sahib."}}, {"text": "Darbar Sahib", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13124, "end_char": 13136, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The_ new Iiispector-General of Police Mr. Bhindr, has .stated ihat there are no extermists in Darbar Sahib."}}, {"text": "Nihans", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13431, "end_char": 13437, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Such a big attack upon the Nihans was_\n\n, ----\n\n.i: -\n\n. '"}}, {"text": "Hardev Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14569, "end_char": 14581, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri\n\nHardev Singh, who appears' on behalf of the respondent, adopted D that contention by clarifying that the case of the respondent is that the relevant facts stated in the !", "canonical_name": "Hardev Singh"}}, {"text": "PUNJAB", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17747, "end_char": 17753, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• •\n\nPUNJAB ~. J.S, TALWANDI ( Chandrach¥d, C.J.) .", "canonical_name": "PUNJAB V."}}, {"text": "Chandrach¥d", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17773, "end_char": 17784, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• •\n\nPUNJAB ~. J.S, TALWANDI ( Chandrach¥d, C.J.) .", "canonical_name": "CHANDRACHUD"}}, {"text": "July 8, !'", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21384, "end_char": 21394, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Conference was held on July 8, !'"}}, {"text": "Baba Bakala", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21664, "end_char": 21675, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.M. (4) it was a \"S)iaheedi Conference\"; (5) them was a gathering of 2000 to 2200 persons at the Conference; and that, (6) the speech made by him referred to an ncounter at Baba Bakala and Tarn Taran."}}, {"text": "Tarn Taran", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21680, "end_char": 21690, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.M. (4) it was a \"S)iaheedi Conference\"; (5) them was a gathering of 2000 to 2200 persons at the Conference; and that, (6) the speech made by him referred to an ncounter at Baba Bakala and Tarn Taran."}}, {"text": "Patan)ali Sastri", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22396, "end_char": 22412, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Ramkrishna Bhardwaj v. The Sfate of Delhi, (ll in which Patan)ali Sastri, C.J. observed that under Article 22 (5) of the Constitution, the detrnu has the right to be furnished with particulars of .the grounds of his detention, \"sufficient to enable him to make a representation which, on 'being considered, may give relief to him\"."}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22439, "end_char": 22449, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bbag\\\\ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23009, "end_char": 23018, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One of us .. Bbag\\\\ali, J.,\n\n A ' who spoke for the Court, surveyed the decisions bearing on the ques-· ticin of the obligation of the detaining authoirty and explaind the nature of that obligation thus' :· ·\n\n\"The basic facts and material particulars, therefore, - which are the foundation of the order of detention, will also B be coverei!"}}, {"text": "article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23379, "end_char": 23389, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23871, "end_char": 23881, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24163, "end_char": 24173, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24376, "end_char": 24386, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Jetenlion", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25609, "end_char": 25618, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The q[1estion which we have to consider in the light of these decisions iS whether sufficient particulars of the first ground of detention were furnished to the respondent so as to enable him to exerci'e effectively his constitutional right of making a representation against .the order of Jetenlion."}}, {"text": "Chandrachud", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33017, "end_char": 33028, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "}'UNJAB v. J.S. TALWANDI (Chandrachud, C.J.).", "canonical_name": "CHANDRACHUD"}}, {"text": "Khudiram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33682, "end_char": 33690, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Hardev Singh relied upon the folloWing passage in the judgment in Khudiram in support of his conteniion that the entire miterial."}}, {"text": "K.C. Mahajan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 35311, "end_char": 35323, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Hardev Singh found serious fault i.th the fact that in answer to the writ petition filed by the respondent in the High Court, the counter-affidavit was sworn by Shri K.C. Mahajan, Deputy Secretary in the Honie Department, of the Government of Punjab, and\n\n(1) [1981] 1 S.C.R. 640, 6~0. ,"}}, {"text": "[1981] 1 S.C.R. 640", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 35405, "end_char": 35424, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State of West Bengal", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 36138, "end_char": 36158, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "West Bengal,' the counter-affidavit on behalf of the State of West Bengal was filed by the Deputy Secretary (Homo), who verified tlie correctness of the averments in his affidavit on the basis of the facts contained in the official records."}}, {"text": "Article 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36939, "end_char": 36952, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s.3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37384, "end_char": 37387, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 166", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37844, "end_char": 37855, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "AIR 1972 SC 2215", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 37978, "end_char": 37994, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "PUNJAB", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 38006, "end_char": 38012, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PUNJAB v~ 1.S. TALWANDI (Chandrachud, C.J.).. 65.", "canonical_name": "PUNJAB V."}}, {"text": "Article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42244, "end_char": 42255, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_2_558_563_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "• ,.\n\n• ...• . . 558 A\n\n.• VIVEKA NAND GIRi\n\nv ..\n\n, NA VI AL K!Sf!:ORE SAHI\n\nFebruary 16, !984 ..\n\n. [S. MURTAZA FAZ~L ALI, A. VAAADARAJAN AND\n\nRANGANATH MISRA, .JJJ\n\nRi!presentatton of _the People At. 1951 Section 36 (4}-Nomiffation papeTiiscr, pancy in age of candidate as mentioned rn.'the nom1ndt101r paper. and tn electoral roll-Rejectron .of no1n1nation pdper-Whether vcil1d and proper.\n\nT, li.e ap_pellant was elected to tJie State Legislative Asseffibly and the first rspon ient, the defeated candidate. -filed an Election Petition for settingaside the election '\"as being void bn accotint, of, iffiproper erjection of the nomination paper's .of one of the candidates by the .Returning Officer. t was c:Ontended tha.'t. the Returning Officer rejected four ri01nination papers submitted-by the candidate, three on the ground that 'the serial 'number aUd part number o'f 'the caD.didates Wiere wrong withreference to_ the el_ectoral roll, .and the fourth on the. ground-that there was. dlfferenfe in the ageof the candi_date.\n\nThe High Court beld, that no nomination pit per cOUld be rejected qnless the defect was of a substantial character,· and that the difference in the age of the candidate ·as given in the electoral.roll arld the nomination paper Was not a material enor and no. opiJortunity haviilg been given to ihe.cindidate when the nOmination papers were filed tO re.move an:Y defect, the rejection of the nomination papers by the.Return- . ing Officer Was_ improper, and the election of the appeJlant \\vas set sside as being VQid on that grounp.: ' '\n\nDismissing 'the appeal,\n\nHELD: 1. The rejettio:n of the n.Omination paper on the grond of difference in the age. was improper, fof having rcgafd to the :provisions of sectiofl 36(4) of :the or the Repreentation 'Of the Peop'!e Act, 1951 the defect is not,. of a substantial . character. The' appellant's election. iS 'consequently void under sectio.n 1 oo (l)(c) .of the Act on th_e gound of improper rejection of the nomination paper.- [564 E-F]\n\nIn the :instat _cise, the differ.;:nc~ in the age of the cadidate,· as entered i~ the G electoral ro_ll arid the omination paper wollld fall under th, e categoryof 'inaccurate\n\nde3Cripti.on' mentiond in the prC>viso tO\" section 33(4) and it was theefore.obligatory ·\n\non the_ part of.the .Returniilg Officer to have it corrected or to overlook it having regard to the-language f the said proviso. [563 H; 564.A]\n\n. 2.\n\nA. p:!rsori to be entitfoci to be registered in the electoral. roll for a consti- ·. tUency should be~ 21 years of age on thi qualifying._dateand. a pers_on to be chosen, . . ' -\n\n\" . - I\n\n)ia·\n\n' ~~~\n\n!(\n\n~· ...\n\n....\n\n., ·~\n\n...\n\n. '\n\nVIVEKA NANO v. NA WAL KISHORE (Voradarajah, J.) .. 559 . ' . . .\n\nto fill a seat l-n 'tle Lcgislat.ute .. of a. S_tt~· hOuid iot be. iess. than .25 yars f age.\n\nThe sbstanti.il_requirment as regards'-the questiori of the age bf the candidate, _at . fhe tin1:! of sc, utin.Y of nqrnitiµ.tion papef'iS that. he_'shOuld have completed. 25 'Years of age and :=; hould l1a.ve b~:::n registered in the elcctora-1 roll for that constituency and\n\n.•, notw!tet~r threwas_a differe11ce of 4.Years in the age of th_c candidate as n1entio'ne'd .' in th;;: clect?ra~ roll an~ , th:) no'mination pap'ei.-as in, the in_stant case. The (Jifference\n\ninagc is \"'not t'n error of subStantif1T character. [562 G-B\"; 564 C-D] ~. . . . . . . . . i .\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JuRJSD!CtION : Civil Appeal Nti: 1081l. of 1983•'\n\nll~ ' From the judgmeut and''oi:der d•ted 11-1.0-83 otthe .Patna High Court in, t.P .. 27 of i980. , ' , ' . '• .\n\nDr. f;,.M. Si11ghvi, KN. Rai and A.M. Singh vi for th7 appellant.\n\nk ...\n\nL:R. Singh, A.Shara11 & Svlama11 Khurshid. ror the. respondent. ' . ' '. .\n\nD.P. Si11gh; and D, P, MukhiHjee for the intei'vener. . . .• ·, ..\n\n.. - . ·~ The Judgment, of the court was delivered by\n\n', VARADA.RA.JAN, .t. This appeal under s. I 16(A) of-the Represerita- :.tion of People Act, 1951, hereinafterrefqrcd to as, the. 'Ac( arises out , of the judgment ofa learned Single. Judge.ofthc Patna High Court in Elyction Petition, No. 27 of 1980, setting aside the apr.ellant's, elec- , !ion to the Bihar Legislative' sse; nh'y from No~ 64, Rui Saidi:mr' I .constituency on the ground tl1at t.he election is V<{id on account , of\n\n:··~;1.1n~_roper .rjection Of thy: ndmination papers 'of one 'Ram Kumar . . Jin. The election petition was filed by the first respondent, Nawal\n\nKcshore Sah;'. 'tl1e defeated candidate. The : el.ection : 'was' .• held ori\n\n3.1~5,)980 and the results were announced on 1:6-1980 after, the.cgun- i' ting._ Tho appellant who contested as the Congress <Jl. andidate secure:\\ 38;463 votes while. tne tespondent who eontested as the Janata.\n\nParty candidote secured 26,991 votes'. The other candidates secured\n\n• . ' ' 4 . - . \" . much less ai1d tlie appcllaµt who secured a majority of 11,472 .votes over the respovi:bi\\t was. de_clared elected by the Returning Officer. After having heard the learned counsel.' for (he parties w6 dismissed ·. the appeal without co; t& on 8-2-I9S4'for reasons to follow: Now we\n\nprceed to give. the reasons . ..\n\n. t' . ' ' . . . •. . .. . . The respondent ore.ssed onlY. ohe ground during the trial before\n\nth~ 'ie.tr.1:d Single Judge a_nd thai was the alleged improper rejectidin\n\n. .\n\nE \"\n\n.G, ..\n\nor the nomination papers of Ram Kumar, Jha who filed four nom-\n\n. H _nation papers nun; ibered.as 39 to 42. The proposer in tQ.e nomination,\n\n• ' ...\n\n, .\n\n560 . .\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1984] 2 S.C.R.\n\npaper No .. 39 was cine Nand Lal Sah while the proposer in the nomination paer No. 40 was one Ganesh Pt'asad Ciarir. The proposer in. 'ihe'nomination papers Nos. 41 and 42 was am Kumar Jha's own brother Birendra Kumar Jha who has given evidence on the. side of the appeltatas R Wc9, Ail, the four nomination papers of Ram Kumar Jha were presented to the Returning Officer RW-7 .on 2-5-1980 and he\n\nscrutiised all' the nomination papes.of Ram Kumar 'Jha. Ram Kumar 'Jha had mentioned.the serial number and part number as 415.and 1.3\n\nrespctively in the nomination paper No. 39, as 391and17 in' the nomi' ·.nation.paper N9. 40, as 324 and 14 in the nomination paper N~. 41:, and it$ 326 and 14 in the nomination paper o. 42 .. The Returning Officer.rejected the nomination papEr No. 39 on the ground that the seriid number .and part 'number of the candidate were wrong with reference to ihe electoral roll Ex. 4, noniinati.cri paq No. ~O on the ground that the serial number and part number of the candidate. were . wrong -ad t_he 'age of the candidate was 'not mentioned, nomination. paper.No. 41 on the ground that the serial number of the candi~.ate was wrong and _nomination paper No. 42 on the i; round that there was difference in the age of the candidate. Ram Kumar J.ha had decla- . red in bis nomination paper No. 42 dated 2-5-1980 in regard to wicb ·\n\nthe argument was confined before ns that he. has completed 33 years ;(age while it.iscommon ground that in the electoral roll Ex. 4 prepa- ' . red iii. the year 1980 bis age is mentioned as 37 years: The Returning Oflber has deposcd as RW~7 about the rejection of those four nominaton p1pcts Ex. 2 to 2, (c) on the above grounds by his orders Ex. B to B-3. . .\n\n. . • ij . . . S. ; I 00 (!) ( c )of the Act provides that if the High Court is of the . opinion that any nomination paper has been improperly rejected if shall declare the election of the returned candidate to be void. On a consideration of the evidence ava.ilable on the record and the arguments of the learned counsel for the. parties iti the light of the authorities placed .before him the learned Single Judge found that no. nomination paper conld be rejected unless the defect is of a substantial character as pointed out even in para 13(i) of the Handbook for Returning\n\nOfficers issued by the Election Commission of India and that lhe diffe- rencc in the age of t.h~ candidate as given in the.electoral roll ar.d the nomination paper is not a material error and' no opportunity was given to the candidate; Ram Kumar Jha wben the nomination papers were filed on 2·5-1980 to remove ani:, defect' though s, 33(4) of the Act iays down that on the.presentation '6f \\he nomination papers the Returning Officer shall. satisfy himself that the names and electoral roll numbers\n\n... (\n\n't'\n\n. viyEKA N:AND V. NA WAL ]\\!SHOR~ (Voradarajan, J.) 561.' , . . . • of the candidates and' their .proposers as enterd in the nomination., A papets are the. same as those .entered in the electoral roll. The learned ..\n\nJu<ige held 'that the rejection ol, the nomination papers, Exs. 2,2-a and 2, c by the Returning'OJ!lcer was improper., I~ that view he allowed, the election. petition without costs only to the. extent of setting a.side ·. . the appeallant's election as being void whidi was the only relief prayed • • for in the election petition.\n\n. '\n\n'. , .\n\nBefore ·.us, Dr.· L.M. Singhvi, Senior Counsel who appeared for the appellant proceeded to draw our attention to .the evidence of cer-\n\n.-1.: .. ·.· tain witn!'sses including that of Ram Kumar Jha's brother Birendra\n\n' Kumar Jha, RW-9 for proving that Ram Kumar Jha had. tiled the nomination p1pers pursuant io some collusion with the object 6f enab- . ling ali. . election. petitfon .beingj)led against' any successful candidat•. • But for want of specific aitegation about any collusion .or fraud and also an issue regarding any call.usion we cl.eclincd to hear any argument on the question. of collusiJn. Consequently, the only point which was call'\\lassed before us 'by .Dr . .Singh vi appearing. for the appellant and , Mr. L.R. Singh appearing for the respondent was as. to whether the nomination papers of Ram Kumar Jha were improperly rejected by the Returning Offic_er and th6 -appeilailt's election -i~ \"therefo\":fe void under. s, JOO (1) (c) of the !he Act.\n\nS. 33(6) 0f the Act lays down that nothing in .that ieetion shall prevent any cahdidate from being nominated by mo're than one nomi- ·. i. .. . nation paper. Bt t~ proviso theretp says that not more than four . nomination.papers shall be presen\\ed by or.on behalf of any candi.date or a=pted by the R.etun:iirig Officer for. election in the .same constituency.· s.· 19 of\"the.Ad lays down ihat subject to the earlier provisions contained in Part 3 of the Act every person who is noJ kss than 21 't . years of age on the qualifying date and is ordinarily resident in a constituency shall be:entitled to be .registered in tlie electoral roll.for that c01{stitutency: Therefre, a person to be entitled to be registered ifi . the electtoal ·.roll loi the constituency should ordinarily be a resident:\n\nin that constituiency and should not be less tha.n 21 years qf age on\n\nF' '\n\n. \"tho qualifying d•te, Article 173 of the Cqnstitution prescribing the ·\n\nqualification for membership .of a Staie Legislature lays down that a person shall not lie qualified to be chosen to fill aseat in the Legislature of a Sfafe unless he is a citizeri of India, and makes and subsripes before some person authorised in that behalf by the Election Commission an oath or affirmation according fo the-form set ·uHor the pilr- . pose in tlie Third Schedufe, and is, in the case of a seat in the Legisla-\n\nH: .\n\n,. - ) . -- . ·' - . - . .\n\n. '.!\n\n.. ·~ . . '~' -\n\nSUPRE\\!E COURT\n\nR,~PORTS\n\n[1,84] 2' ~.C.11. •\n\n. \\ . . . . ' . - . ' . - tive Assembly, not less than 25 years of age and, in. the'caie of a seat in the Legislative Council, not less than 30 years of age,- and possesses such other qualifications as may be prescribed fit that behalf by or . . under any la vi mad~ by Parliament:- Therefore, a person to be :entitled to be chosen to.fill a seat in the Legislative Asembly of a State should be not\\ess than 25 years of age. In the present case Ram Kumar Jha B. -' is noted in' the electoral roll, Ex.'4 prepared in 1980 as being 37 years old while he has declared in the -nomination paper No. 42 marked as Ex, 2-c tha.t he had compJeted 33 years .. of age. As stated earlier the\n\n nom\\!lation paper had been rejected by the Returning Officer; RW-7 on the ground that tliereis differeJ1ce'in the age of the candidate bet- . . . . •' , \\veon w:nt h'3 been m'ntioned in fhe electoral roll arid the nomination paper and it :is not based on any ther ground, It is nobody's\n\n.· ' case that the Returning Officer found any difficu.lty regarding the ·\n\nidentity of.the candidate, Ram Kumar Jha on account of this difference in the age mentioned in an \\'lectoral toll'and the nomination paper.· ·.The point fo(consideratin therefore is whether therejection of this .nomination paper by the Returning Offioer on the ground .of difference D :'. inJhe age in the electoral rol and the nomination paper is improper .•\n\nS. 33(4) of the Act lays down that on the.presentation ofa nomination paper, tl{c Returning Officer shall satisfy himself thar the names and electoral roll numbers of t)le ca1ididate,' and his proposer as entered in'the nomi1ption paper are the same as entered in the elecforal roll• .•\n\nG· •\n\nTh~ pr, oviso to that sub-section reads thus: . . .\n\n\"Provided that no misnomer or inaccurate description or clerical, . technical or printing error in regard to the name of the. pn4idate > \" '.or his proposer or any other. person, or in regard to any place\n\n-· mci1tioned in the electoral rol! or the norilinatfoJ! pap.er andn9\n\ncl\"ilca'l, technical or printing error in regard to the electoral roil .numb•rs of any such person in\" the electoral roll •or the nomi' 1iation paper, haH affect the full operation of ihe electoral roll: . . or the nominationpaper with respect .to such. person br place in any case whether t)1e descriptio.n in regard to the n.aine of the person or place is such as.to be commonly understood; and tho . retn; ning officer shal! permit any. such misnomer or inaccurate . ' description or clerical, technical or printing rror to be corr7cted ·\n\nand where necessary, direct that any such mi'snomer, inaccurate . \" descript!on, clerical, technical or printing ert0r i, n the eleetorill\n\n--ro)l or.in the nomination paper shall be ovrlooked:\" ··\n\n· H - .\n\nWe are of the opinioi1 thalthe difference in.the age of the aandate, Ram Kumar. Jha as entered in the electoral roll and .the no111i- . . . . '\n\n...\n\n• c\n\nJ,/\n\n~· ., .\n\nvrvsi:A NAND v .. NAWAL''KISHOR.r(Voradarajan, J.) 563\n\nnation paper would fall uniter ihe .catgory of 'inaccl)rate description' rrientio\"ned in the abbve proviso andlhat it wasobligatory on the part of the Returning Officer to .have it corrected or. 'to overlook it having regard to the .language of the proviso. .\n\n. ·.' • .. , I , ' ,\" . '' ·.\n\nS. 36(4) of the Act lays down that\" the .R, eturnirig Officer shall ' not reject any nomination paper on the ground of any defect which '\n\nis not of a substantial . character.· As stated earliei;, a person to be '.i. e.n.titled to be registered i11 the electiiral rol\\for a constiti1tency should , . be 21 years of age on the qualifying cjate:and a person to 'be chosen\n\n-\\. _to fill a seat iri the Legislature :of a State should not be less than 25 years of age. Ram.Kumar .Jha had declared in the n:ominafion paper No. 42 tilat he had completed 33 years of age: Therefore, the s.ubstan-\n\n• G.~. tial requirenieni as regards the question of age of the candidate, Ram.\n\nKumar Jha was that at the time of scrutiny of nomination paper he\n\n. \"\n\nshould have completed 25 years of age and should hiive been .registered\n\n' • It .• ,.., in the electoral roll for thatconstituency and not whether. there was a difference of 4 years in the age of the candidate as mentioned in the electoral roll and the nomination paper: The difference .in our opinion is not u error of s.ubstantial tharactcr. As tlie.rejectlon of ihe.nomi-. nation pap;:r No>42 was-not on the groun'd that there. was any difficulty as rgards iderttiiyl.?n account of the difference i_n the age ineuti<1ned .'in the elctora.I roll .arid the nomination pa per we are , clearly >- efihe opinion that ihe rejection of the nomination paper on the grouna of difference in the age ll'as improper, for having tiogard to provisions )...._. f s. 36(4) of the Acdhe defeC!, s not. of a sllbstantial c.haracter and we J.oJd that the appellant's election 1s consequently void under. s-c.100\n\n(1) (c) ofthe Act on the ground of improper rejectio1i of the nomiution paper. It is for this reason 'that we dismissed the appeal without\n\nany or<ler as to cpsts s , mentioned above. 't.··\n\nAppeal, dismissed.\n\nu,\n\n' .", "total_entities": 38, "entities": [{"text": "VIVEKA NAND GIRi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 27, "end_char": 43, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIVEKA NAND GIRI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. MURTAZA FAZ~L ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 103, "end_char": 123, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RANGANATH MISRA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 145, "end_char": 160, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RANGANATH MISRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Section 36", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 208, "end_char": 218, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 33(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2240, "end_char": 2253, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "M. Si11ghvi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3595, "end_char": 3606, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. Si11ghvi, KN."}}, {"text": "KN. Rai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3608, "end_char": 3615, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. Si11ghvi, KN."}}, {"text": "A.M. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3620, "end_char": 3630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rai and A.M. Singh vi for th7 appellant."}}, {"text": "R. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3663, "end_char": 3671, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "k ...\n\nL:R. Singh, A.Shara11 & Svlama11 Khurshid.", "canonical_name": "R. Singh"}}, {"text": "A.Shara11", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3673, "end_char": 3682, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "k ...\n\nL:R. Singh, A.Shara11 & Svlama11 Khurshid."}}, {"text": "Svlama11 Khurshid", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3685, "end_char": 3702, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "k ...\n\nL:R. Singh, A.Shara11 & Svlama11 Khurshid."}}, {"text": "D.P. Si11gh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3737, "end_char": 3748, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D.P. Si11gh; and D, P, MukhiHjee for the intei'vener. . . .• ·, .."}}, {"text": "People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3941, "end_char": 3957, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ram Kumar . . Jin", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4357, "end_char": 4374, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ion to the Bihar Legislative' sse; nh'y from No~ 64, Rui Saidi:mr' I .constituency on the ground tl1at t.he election is V<{id on account , of\n\n:··~;1.1n~_roper .rjection Of thy: ndmination papers 'of one 'Ram Kumar . .", "canonical_name": "Ram Kumar . . Jin"}}, {"text": "Ram Kumar, Jha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5353, "end_char": 5367, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "E \"\n\n.G, ..\n\nor the nomination papers of Ram Kumar, Jha who filed four nom-\n\n.", "canonical_name": "Ram Kumar . . Jin"}}, {"text": "Nand Lal Sah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5554, "end_char": 5566, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1984] 2 S.C.R.\n\npaper No .. 39 was cine Nand Lal Sah while the proposer in the nomination paer No."}}, {"text": "Ganesh Pt'asad Ciarir", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5624, "end_char": 5645, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "40 was one Ganesh Pt'asad Ciarir."}}, {"text": "Birendra Kumar Jha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5733, "end_char": 5751, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "41 and 42 was am Kumar Jha's own brother Birendra Kumar Jha who has given evidence on the.", "canonical_name": "Birendra\n\n' Kumar Jha"}}, {"text": "Ram Kumar Jha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5848, "end_char": 5861, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "side of the appeltatas R Wc9, Ail, the four nomination papers of Ram Kumar Jha were presented to the Returning Officer RW-7 .on 2-5-1980 and he\n\nscrutiised all' the nomination papes.of Ram Kumar 'Jha.", "canonical_name": "Ram Kumar . . Jin"}}, {"text": "Ram Kumar 'Jha. Ram Kumar 'Jha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5968, "end_char": 5998, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "side of the appeltatas R Wc9, Ail, the four nomination papers of Ram Kumar Jha were presented to the Returning Officer RW-7 .on 2-5-1980 and he\n\nscrutiised all' the nomination papes.of Ram Kumar 'Jha."}}, {"text": "Ram Kumar J.ha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6791, "end_char": 6805, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Kumar J.ha had decla- .", "canonical_name": "Ram Kumar . . Jin"}}, {"text": "2-5-1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6860, "end_char": 6868, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "42 dated 2-5-1980 in regard to wicb ·\n\nthe argument was confined before ns that he."}}, {"text": "Voradarajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8377, "end_char": 8388, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "viyEKA N:AND V. NA WAL ]\\!SHOR~ (Voradarajan, J.) 561.' , . . . •"}}, {"text": "L.M. Singhvi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8923, "end_char": 8935, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before ·.us, Dr.· L.M. Singhvi, Senior Counsel who appeared for the appellant proceeded to draw our attention to .the evidence of cer-\n\n.-1.: .. ·.·", "canonical_name": "L.M. Singhvi"}}, {"text": "Birendra\n\n' Kumar Jha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9112, "end_char": 9133, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "tain witn!'sses including that of Ram Kumar Jha's brother Birendra\n\n' Kumar Jha, RW-9 for proving that Ram Kumar Jha had.", "canonical_name": "Birendra\n\n' Kumar Jha"}}, {"text": ".Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9585, "end_char": 9591, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".Singh vi appearing.", "canonical_name": "R. Singh"}}, {"text": "L.R. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9634, "end_char": 9644, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "for the appellant and , Mr. L.R. Singh appearing for the respondent was as.", "canonical_name": "L.M. Singhvi"}}, {"text": "S. 33(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9875, "end_char": 9883, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 173", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10774, "end_char": 10785, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11010, "end_char": 11015, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "tho qualifying d•te, Article 173 of the Cqnstitution prescribing the ·\n\nqualification for membership .of a Staie Legislature lays down that a person shall not lie qualified to be chosen to fill aseat in the Legislature of a Sfafe unless he is a citizeri of India, and makes and subsripes before some person authorised in that behalf by the Election Commission an oath or affirmation according fo the-form set ·uHor the pilr- ."}}, {"text": "Election Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11093, "end_char": 11112, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "tho qualifying d•te, Article 173 of the Cqnstitution prescribing the ·\n\nqualification for membership .of a Staie Legislature lays down that a person shall not lie qualified to be chosen to fill aseat in the Legislature of a Sfafe unless he is a citizeri of India, and makes and subsripes before some person authorised in that behalf by the Election Commission an oath or affirmation according fo the-form set ·uHor the pilr- ."}}, {"text": "Ram Kumar Jha B.", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11806, "end_char": 11822, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the present case Ram Kumar Jha B. -' is noted in' the electoral roll, Ex.", "canonical_name": "Ram Kumar . . 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{"document_id": "1984_2_564_581_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "' ..\n\nII ,\n\nPRITAM DASS MAHANT\n\nv ..\n\n• SHI~OMANI GURUDWARA. PRABANDHAK COMMlTTEE\n\nianua; y 16, 1984 - ' \\ .\n\n[D. A, , DESAI, R. B. MISRA AND RANGANATH MISRA; JJ.] ,\n\n' ' . _)~ 'Sikh Gurudara Act, 1925, as a1J1e11ded by the A111end111e11t Act I of 1959- SeCtion 16(2)-WIJtfler the institution Dera Bhai Bhagtu wGs a Sikh Gu'rudwara?.\n\nWhethef mere recittiotz of Guru Granth Sahib withotit anyihing nwre ?-Distin_ctive ieatures of Sikhism and Sikh te111ples-Court's ciuty to racord poSitive findings, in tet111§\n\nOJ SectiOn 16-Appreciution of the evidence of a witness.- -Ti1e fact that he be!Ongs\n\nto~ particll/ar polilial Party o~· the other does 1101, change .the veracity.a/ his.evidence. \"\"\"'(\n\nSixfy five persons claimin~ to be meffibers f the 'Sikh community moved a:n application before the State Goverment under Section 7(1) of the Si, kh 'Gurudwara\n\nAct, 1925 to hayea.ieligious institution in yillJ.ge Ramga:rh (also known <is Bbagtuana of. Faridkot tehsil, 9.eclared to. be a Sikh Gurud\\vara:. -The State Goverrtment -nOti.fied the said applicatiori in the Punjab Governillent Gazette in terinS of Stion.\n\n7(3) of thi.! Act on 18th October, 1963~ Upon this the appellant made ap application under Sectioi1s 8 atid 10 of ihe Act clain1ing that the institution was µota Sikh Guru- Y- 'dwara but an Udasi ii1stitution known as Dera Bhai Bhagtu. The applic'ation W?-s :-4.\n\n_r:efetred tO the Sikh Gtirudwaratribunal for.adjudication. The petition Was esistcd\n\nby the rsPOndcnt Shiron1ani Gurdwara Prabandhak coOOnittce on thi-cc groUnds:\n\n~· (i) that, the <ip.pelbnt as not ompetent to move': hi:: petition urider section_ 7 or' t~ --I'--..\n\n' Act as he was not a hereditary offi.Ce-holder, (ii) that the provisions of the Act arc noi ·. ultravjres the Constitution; and (iii) that thi\"institution in disput~ was a· Sikh Guru- ,,,.. dwara. The Tribunal held against the respondCnt arid in favour of the -ppellant on Contention(!). Since the second Contention wasnot preSsed and the thfrd questio)l ' _was the\n\n0 only issue, the Tribunal held-that the institution was a Sikh Gurudwara.\" ·\n\nlnappal, ths Pu.1jab and Ha:ryana High Court confirnied the Tribunal's findings. :-t .Hence the appeal by Special Leave of the Court. . .\n\nAllowing_ the appeal, the Court\n\nHELD: 1.1. Thi religious institution, Dera Bhai Bhagtu is not Sikh Guru- 'dwara. on th~ materials on record: the findig~ recOrdd byt he Tribunal as well as the High COurt are wholly unsupportable to satisfy the tests indicated in Jaw for .deternlining.'thc character Of the institution ... l5_81D]\n\n~ 1.2. -'The fiindings.of the High Court clearly shOw that the.four impo.rtant and ost relevant.aS_pects of the case as disclosed in. the eidence were comPlcteli oyerlooked.Or side-traked.by the \"High Court. Thy are: (i' there a; c Satnadhs . on the premises of the institution; (ii) _there are idols and photos of Hindu _deities; (iii} Bhai Bhagtu was a Udasi' Saint; and (iv) suCcession was frcim Gurq, to. Chclai ) ' .. •·\n\n' .\n\n• . - ' ' PR!TAM DAss'v .• GURUDWARA l'RABANDHAK yOMMlTTEE 565\n\nTh~ petition. filed by _the ppellat .under s.8 of the._ Act contained a clearavcnnent that the_ institution' had beeri set up.b)r.Bhai Bha£, tu who was a _:Udasi Saint and t4e presence of th.rc.c Sainadhs of (1).Bhai .Bhagtu, (2) Baba Para~ Rain Ji; and (3) Mahant Sahib\"DassJi, was also asseitcd. In the written statement the resPondent, after' a vage denial, had admittedthe institution to have been founded by Bhai Bhagtu. Pritani Dass, the <ipPellant did support his case. OrdinarjlY his evidence would have been treated a'S interesied as he happens to be. the party b'ut his assertions ; \"have ben _well corroborated.\"The same is sti:engtheied by the evidence of all-re!i_on~\n\ndent's witnesses. The eVidence of witnesses cJe<i, rly indicates: (i) that there are atleast to samadhs in the premises. 'of the\" institution,....one being of. Bhai Bhagtu and the other.of hi.s moth¢r; (ii) the. existence of the \"idol or Baba Srichan~, the founder of the U<lasi Sect in the pre1biscs. clearly the Sikhs'\\VOuld notpepnit the idol of Baba Srichand in a Gurudwaa, while Udasis would oi:\"dinarily install such an idol to perptuate the neil1ory of the founder of heir sect; (ifi) the sucession .was from Guru to Chela; aUd (iv) there are photos of Hindu deities in. the institution. These faCtS without an.Ything n1ore .wOuld be sufficient to reject the case bf the respondent that the institutiOn is a Sikh GufudwaFa. [579A-C; G; 580G-HJ . ·. . .\n\n/· . 1.4. Fron1 the verY fact thilt-Guru Granth sahib was fecited in he intitution 'i1ci support can b~ drawn for the claim that. the institution as a Sikh Gurudwara. lt is w.il established that Udasis are midway b\"etween Sikhs on*-the ·.one band ilnd. t!1e 1-lindus on the other. Srichand son of Guru Nanak; the founder of Sikhism, 'had_ broken awa.Y and set up the Udsi sect. [581 B-C]. . . . . . ' . , .\n\n. 2: I.\n\nAlthough. for the -purpose of historical rcseafch and analysis on the subject like Sikhs arid Sikh tcrriPies., the forrn of a coitrt of Iii.w is not ideal,· yet, if the statute enjoins the coutt to decide such questions tfie court has gdt to dischar£c. . . ' t - ' ' . . the responsibility. [569D]. . . . · ·. ·- ·\n\n2.2.\n\nThe court• has been called upon to decide whether the institution ill . ciuestion is a s.ikQ,, G:un.id wara:- While conSidcring this qu.estion the Court has to take into consideration all the cir.cu111stanceS. which favour or milita.te against the inStiWtion being.a Sikh Gurudwara . .In the vCry nature of thigs and ii1 view f the requirenients of Sub-s.(2) of s. 16 it become.s necessary to conSider whether the in- Stiiution_ being in charge of an udasi saint, the eisten& of samadhs. f Uda:; i saint~ and , W.orsh.ip thereof, o' the existnce of the id6ls and absence of a gr.lnthi<lnd sUcce~ sion t6 the ii:istitution from guru t6 chela_ are all relevant considc'rations and the Court has. to_ consider them if there. is evidenCe on th~ record. In the \"instant. case. evidence h<is been ad_duced on behalf of the appellant abollt .the existence of sanH'l;(:lhs: and th;;: Various idols, the' ab_sence oi a granthi and succession to the.institution fion1 guru to chela.· The appellant cannot, therefore, be prevented from urging the aforesaid circumstance~. (573F-H.; 574A] ·\n\n2.3.' Courts Ca.nnot discard \"the ev.idc'iice Of itnsses. or\" one side by s.in1ply saying thaf the oial testirnony is interested and 'hardly ally credible, -when witnesses on either side have come to depose on o.lth. Here, the grounds on Which the evidence. addllced on behalf of the appeftant bas been discarded may equa'.Ily aply to the evidence aduced On behalf of _the respondent. ·rhe Court should. h<ive considered the worth of\"the evidenCe of each witness .and should have given reasons for dis be- . lieving the same on _merit.: A bald observati6ll that the Witrisses producid on behalf fo the _appe~!ailJ _are interested must oe deprecated:. The courts hd to decide te\n\n, .\n\n'\" ....\n\nquestion in,_view of .the provisions of sub-s.(2) of s'.16 of the_Act and they had to reJOrd a Positive finding inthe light of sub-s.(2) of s.16. Unless the ~14itn falls within one or the other of the catcgoiies enumei; ated in stib-scction(2) of s.16, the insti(utioi; cannotb.:: i:le~Jal:-ed to be-a ikh Gu_rdwara [577B-D; 578CJ . ·\n\n 3.l. 0.1J. of thi 11iJ3t, r.i; citllting aspcts of Sikhisn1 fa the pro:.:.css which bcg<1.n with h:.i-.lll'l G..1iu~,·contl.'luo!d durin~ th; pcrjOd of duality iti which thefe . '.Were hun1:ttl Gun; ts and a collection of'sacred wrlti~1gs :and ended \\Vith the prCsnel \"\"\n\nsituation ln which fl:lil' authority is cjo'incd _by-the sClipture. Jn. every rt:spcct the scripture is what the aurus \\Vor~. [569GJ ' .\n\n. . \\ .. . , . aoth the Gur~1s t~(J the Book deserv~ i\"espectt \\Vhich they are accorded because of the Ban~ \\Vhich 'they xpress, 'theord of divine truth.\" Therefore, it was possible fur Guru Adan, the fifth-in the hi1man line, to bow before the colli::ction vhich. he had cotnpiled ad .inst.ailed in the. newly.· built Darbar Sail.ib in jG04 for he was ac.kn.owledged the higher authority of the B:lni due 10 the'pec:sonal i111portance and \"significance' 'v\\lich he possessed as GUru .. [5691-l; 570AJ\n\n. .\n\n. .l'he. Sikh oLirus have n1uh }h co • .(nmon.W.iih thr preCeptors ip indian .. tradition.but .their history and contribution is. distinctive.\n\nThey~\\verc 'not Bhihntins, they did not se~ their caliing to be that of expounding VCdas~ they taught in vCrna~ cu!a( n.it S;.nskrit ;1nd their n1essage was for everyone. Th.ey Were \"ten in nutnber e'ach re_; naining f'ait, hfui to the teachingS of Guiu Nanak, the firSt Gufu arld when. lhcir line wis c;1ded by a conscious.·ctecision of Guri'.1 Gobind Singh, the1ast Guru,\n\nsuCession was ii1vesfod in a collCction of teachings .which' was given the title of Guru Gra!Hh Sahi6.This i~ now the G.uru Ofthe Sikhs. [570B-C]\n\n' <; An iiripoi:ta1\\t CharaCteristic of the teachings of the Siich Guius is thefr ciuphasis\n\nupn the message, the Ba1; L 1t is this st1:ess .\\\\1hich rri<i..dc possible\". the transfer o1 GurushiP to the sripture. The human Gurus .\\cr1: the iristru1nents thrOugl1 whc1i1\n\ntlic, voice of the God bea1ne audiblci. [57QDJ~\n\n' . ', . . ..\n\nThe holiest book of th~ Sikhs ; s G~~U Grin th Sahib co111Pi!cd b; the Fifth ~; stCi,.\n\nGuru.Ai:ia.11. 1t is t.he Bible of Siklis. After giving, his followi:rS a central plcc OJ worship, Hari-Ma:ndir, he wanted to give thein a holy 'book. So he collected the\n\nhlnnS of the first four' Gurus and to \"these he added his on. , Now this Sri Guru\n\nGanth Sahib is a living Gru of the Sikhs .. Guru mealls the gilid, c. Gur Granth ·. Slhib giYes .Jight and sho\\VS the' path to. the suffering hun1anity. Wherever a believer in' Sikhism fa.in troub!~ OT is depressed he reads hyrii.\"ns from the Granth. WhenCver the Sikhs needed guidarice or couns(; il, they. should assemble before the d-ranth in all siricerity ad decide their future line of action in the light of teachings o.f tjlc\n\nMstcr, as' embodied ill the ci-ranth-. The noble ideas e1nbodi.cd in .the Granth would\n\niiv~ fot ever arid sho~ ve0plc .the path tO bfisss and-happiness. [570E-F; 571B]\n\n • 3.2. , Teinples re found almost in every reiigion but there .arc.'so1nc ilifferenc¢s bctwcen,, thc .Sikh ten1p1cs; and .. those Of other religlons. The. Sikh Qurudwaras have the follo\\ving distinctive 'features: f57JCJ , , . f . '\n\nL , Sikh. teinples ire nr the place of idol worship a.s the H:inqu temples.are. , . Ther~ is no, place for idol wOrship in a Gurudwara. The ntral object of worShiP\n\n'. '\n\n. '\n\n PRIIAM oAss.v GURUbw/,.RA, PRABANDHAK COMMITTEE .567'\n\nin a GurudWar<i fa Stj Gur~ Granth Sakib; the hol.Y book. The pattern of wo-rShiP consist& of two 'main iteins: reading of the .holy hymnsfollOwed bY their cxplaiiation\n\nby sorri~ learned n1oi.n; not necessa'rily a partiCular Grµthi .and thell singing of sOmC r..i.ssages fron1 the Holy Gra1itJJ.. The. fOr'ni.er is called Katha and the seco_nd is caJld l<irtau.--A Sikh thus .\\vorship_s the 1-IoIY- Words that.are :Written in the Granth Sahib, . the word.S or shabada about ihe Etcrllal. Truth Or God.-No id'ol or painting of any\n\nGuru can be ·.;,,, orshippcd. [571CD] ·, •\n\n2: Sikh warship iii. tHc Gurudwara i_s a co~'rcgatiO.na:.l worship, whereas~ -Hilldu tniples an/meant for indivi<lLial worship,,.A ikh:does the individual \\vors!UP 'rat ho1ne when hC recites- Gu:rbani daiiy. So~ scriptu.fes meant for this purpoe are . Japji; Jaap, Rcliras,' Kirtan So.hila.: Sa!1gat is the collectitc body of Sikhs who_ meet\n\nevery day in . the . Gurudwara. {571E-F] . . ' ' ·· ' ·. : · . ·, . \" ' .\n\n' 3. • Gurudwai:a is .a plaCe WhCre a cOpy of GutU Gr'anth Sa'l;, ib is inStalled. ·, • The Unique. and distinguishillg feture wold always be the Nishan Sahib, a fiagstff ,.\n\nWith a. yellow fla8; of .Sikhism flying. from it. This srvCs as a yn1boi of. the Sikh\n\n'presnce. It enables the travellers, whether th6y. be Sikhs or not, to know where hOspitality is aviilabie. There rriay be. conip1exity Or rooms.· in a Gurudwara for the bail- ding may also. Se_rve <; lS 'a school, or, where children are taught the rudi.ments. o'r SikhisI_U .· .•. :a~ well as.a rest centte for travellers. Often there Will be a kitchen where food ~n.\n\n-~ be prepared though_ langar itself might take place in the yawning. omees the Gurudwara will also be. usecfas a clinic. But itspivotal point is tho place of worship and .ihe .111a'in roo1n ilf be that in Which ihe Guru Granth Sahib .is installed where\n\n- the comrrfunity g:a; thers for \"diwan: Th~ focal pin, t_i°q thisroom ... Will be the bok itst:lf\n\n, ' [571j3H; 572A]\n\n3.3.. The sine qua. nJ11: for an i~Stitutio'n being a Sikh Gurudwara is that ihere should be esta.blishcid GLfru Granth Sahib and tl, le w.orship of the same by the con•• .gregatioll.\" aild a Nishan Sahib aS_indicated in the earlier part of the Judgment. ..\n\n~ E, There may be other rooms of the. institution nleant fOr oth\"er purposes but the crucial _test is the existence of Guru ·.Granih Sahib and the worship_.thereofby the Congrega- tion nd Nish<i.n.Sahib. It is'nOfnccesaty that.there lust bea.gra\"nthi in a Ourud- .. :.wara. Any learned person, can, read Guru Granth Sahib and explain to the cong[e- · . . . ' . gation; .[572BC] . . > ... .\n\n,'II Hem Silwfi and Others v. Basant Das & Anr. (1935,36) L.R. 631 rA 180; . . ,. . . . . ' ' ,.\n\nF -Baw, a lshar Dass'& Others v. l)r. Mhan Singh.and Others, AIR 19\"39 Lah .. 2~9\n\n.,,~Arjan $1i1gh v. Inder .. DaJ:. 15 Lah. 4,47; · •\n\n'Harnani Sir!'ih v.;, Gurdial-· Singh _[1967] ,2 SCR:7_39 .. ., ,, ' ' . . . . . ' .\n\nMahai11 Dharq.on [Jas e(c. v._ State of Pimjab & Ors. [l.9751 3. SCR 160 .\n\nSolum Das v, Bela Singh & Ors. AIR 1934 Lab .. ISO . referred .fo • G\n\nC1v1L APPELLATE Jii.R1SoICTioN : Civil Appeal No. 1983_of 1970 . . . . ' . , Fro.m Judgment and Decre dated 29-7·69 of the \"Purijab & Haryana'; Eligh Curt in F.A.O, No. 35/66. :. ,, ·. .\n\n. . ' • , '\n\n, B\n\n.. t\n\n' '\n\n, Naimit Ll, K. V{1sdev and .Mv. V. Gr()verfor the appellant.\n\nV.M. Phadke and Harl>ans Singh for the responde1it.\n\n' ' The Judgment of the court was deiivered by\n\n• I •• • • MtSRA, J. The _present appeal by special leave is 'directed aginst the Judgment andord6r dated_ 29th July, ,1969 of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh. ' . , .\n\nThe dispute in this appealcentres around a . religious institu- . : _., ._ tion in village; Ramgarh {also kn9wn. a Bhagtuaa), tehsil Faridkot, If district Bhatinda. This village was previously. in the erstwhile Nabha • ;: State which merged with Pepsu and after the reorganisation . of the States, became a part of the Punjab State in 1956. Sixty-(ive persons cfaiming to be members of the Sikh, community moved ai1 application. before the State Government under .s. 7 (!) of the Sikh Gurdwara Act._ \"f 1925 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), .as ameiidecj by the Amend-· ment Act I of 1959, to have the institution deelared to be a Sikh Gurdwara. The State Goyernment notified the said applic'ation in the Punjab Gazette in l>rms of s. 7 (3) of the Act.on 18th 6ctober, 1963.\n\nUpon th1s the appellant, made, al1 app'lication under SS. 8 and 10 of the Act claiming .that the institution was not a Sikh Gurdwara but an Udasi institution known as Dera Bhai B iagtu: This. application was ...4, referred by the State Government to the Sikh Gurdwara Tribunal for. adjudication. It was , cbntended by the appellant that throughout its kng history the institution has been an. Udasi institution. This ~\" institution was not established for use by Sikhs for pub.lie worship. .• not was it founded in the memory ofa Sikh Martyr, saint or ahistorical person. It has never been used for public worship by the Sikhs. The institution wast he Dera of Udasi Bhekh and t!J, e objects of worship i' _ are idols of Gola ahib and of Baba Sricharid, and the various sama<!hs.\n\nThe petition was resisted by'the respondent Shiromani Gurdwara' . Prabandhak _Committeeon three' grounds: (l) that the app.ellant was . not competent to move the petition under s.7 of the Act because he\n\n. was riot a hereditay office holder, (2) that the .provisions of the Act are not lira vires the Constitution, and (3) that the institution in dispute,\n\nwas a Sikh Gurwara. • . , : . · . . i . ' -. ' ' '\n\n- ' On the pleadings _of tli.e parties the Tribunai framed three issnes\": •.\n\n(1) w!JFther the provisions of te Act are ultra: vires the Constitution,\n\n·\\.'\n\n...\n\n. ' '.· ,' . ·~ .· ·· .. ' .\n\nPRL'fAM DA~S ·,., GURUDWARA PRABANDHAK COMMITTEE (Misra, J.) 569\n\n(2) whetherth~ appellant iyas~ hereditary office holde~. and(3) whether the institution in dispute was a Sikh Guradwara. Issue No. 1 was notpressed and, therefore, the Tribunal in. conformity with. the previous decisions held the Pf<;>visions of th~ Act. to bf intra vires the.Constitution. On the second issue the Tribunal r<icorded a finding in favour of the appellant. On the third issue, the Tribunal held that the disputed institution was a Sikh Gurdwara.' ·\n\n'B .\n\n. The.app~Uant feeling aggrieved by the judgment of the Tribunal tooh up•ti, e matter in appeal to the High Court and the High Conrt in its turn confirmed the findings of the Trbunal and dismisse.d the . atppeal by the impugned judgment .. The appellant. has now comt; to . his Court on obtaining -special leave and the only issue that' survives for consideratfon by this Court is issue No.3 , that is; whether the : institution .in dispute is a Sikh Gurdwra. .\n\nBefre .'dealing with the poin\\s urged by the counsel forthe parties i.t woulli be appropriate at this stage to know tlie distinctive features.\n\nc .\n\nof Sikhism and Sikh temples. Althongh-for the purpose of historical D research and analysison such subject, the forum of a court of la.w is . not ideal yet if the statute enjoins the. Court to deci.de such c)uestions, . ·.the Cour.t has .got to discharge the respons1bility. Section 16 (1) of • the. Act. provides: . ·\n\n\"16 (!), NDtwithstandiiig anything contained in any\n\n. E other law in force if in .. any .proceeding before a tribunal it is . , disputed that a gurdwara should or should not be declared to be a Sikh Gurdwara, the tribunal shall, before.enquiring into any\n\nother matter in dispute. relating to the said gurdwara, de.cide whether it should or should not be declared a Sikh Gurdwara in. accordance with the provisions of sub-section (2).\" .\n\nF . . ' . .\n\n;: .\n\nOne of the most fascinating aspets of Sikhism is the process which, ' began With human Gurus, continued during the period of duality in which there. were human Gurus and a collection of sacred ; vritings and ended with the present situation in which full autliority is 'enjoined by the scripture. In. every respect the scripture is what the Gurus ; vere. . ,_ . . - . . .. .\n\n. .. ' -\n\n- . . . . ; . . - · Both the. Gurus. and the Book deserve respect, which they are : aceorded becau.se of the Bani which they express, the word of divine\n\ntruth: Therefore; it was possible for Guru Arjan'; the fifth in 'the human line to bow before the collection which he had compiled and installed • , • • '' • < • ' • - • -· ' H\n\n. 570\n\n. .\n\n' .{ . . ' . . in' the<imvly bui.lt Darbar Sahib in 1604 for , he was acknowledged the highe,· au\\hoiity of tho Bliliduo to the p'Tsonal 'importance and ·significance which he. possessed as Gur~ .\n\n. ' The 'Sikh Gurus have much in con\\mon \\Vith. other preceptors in Inqiantraditio.n but their htory and contribution is distinctive, They were. not Brahmins, they cl.id not sc; e .their calling lo be that of expoi111~.i!1g Vedas, they taught in vernacular not Sanskrit and their message was for everyone: They\" were .ten in number each remaining . faithful to the teachings of Guru Nanak, the first Guru and \\\\'hen their line \\yas c1; ded, tiy. a conscious decision of Guru Gobind Singh, the last Guru, successin was invested in a co!lectfon of teachings which was given 'the :title of Guru Gra'nth Sahib. This 1s is no;.v the Guru of the . ' ' . .\n\nSikhs.. '\n\n, An important characteristic of the teachings of the .Sikh Gurus . is thir emphasis upon .the .message, the Bani. It is tliis stress which ma.de possible the transfer of Guruship to the scriptur.e. The human Gurus were the instruinenis through whom the voice of God became audible_, . ' r • • . • • . . • •.\n\nThe holiet book' of tl; e Sikhs is Guru Gra;1th Sahib compiled by the Fifth Mater, Guru Arjan. It is the Bible of Sikhs. After givillg his 1follo\\Vers a central place of worship, Hari-mandir, he wanted to i:; ivethem a holy bo.ok. So he collected the hymns of the first four Gurus\" and to these he addCd his own: Now this. Sri Guru Granth, Sahib is a living Guru of.the .. Sikhs. Guru means the guide. Guru' . Graqth Sahib gives light and shows the path to.the suffering humanity. , Whetevera believer in\"-Sikhism is in trouble or is depressed he rads\n\n~)'.]llll~ from the Granth. · · ·\n\n- When Guru Gobind Singh felt \"that his worldly sojeurn was .. near, he niade the fact known to his disciples. The disciple~ asked him as. to who. would be t.heir Guru in future; The Guru immediately ' placed five pies and a coconut b.efore the holy Granth, bowed his head\n\ne.fore it and said:-· ' , ·\n\n. : '~The Eternai Father willed, and I raised the Panth. . • .\n\nAll ipY Sikhs are ordained to believe the Grant? is their preceptor. ·\n\n!fuve faith in the-holy Grailth as yolir .Master andco nsider it~ lhe visible manifestation. of the. Gurus.· He who hath a pl!re heart will seek guidance from its holy W?rds\".\n\n...\n\n• PRITAM nAss v. dUJiDWARA i>RABANDHAK COMMITEE(Misra, J.) 571 '\n\n- .. ~- ' .. . . '• . . '.. ·. . .. . . \"\"'\n\n_;), . The Guru repeated thse ords and told the di; ciples. not to A . grieve at his departure. H .\"was true thaHhey wculd. not see, hi~ body\n\n .in its physical manifestation but .he wJuld be ever present among the Khalsas. Whenever the: Sikhs needed.giiidance or. counsel, tney should · assemble liefore the Gr.anth in all sincerity and dec{de their future line of ction in tho light of teachi;1gs or the Master, as embodied in the Granth, Tho noble ideas emboc(ied i.~ th~ Granth would:live for ever B artd show people the pati, to bliss and happiness. '\n\n. . .\n\nTemple.s are fou.nd almost incvrv teligion but there. are s; me differences between the Sikh temples and th6se of other religions. The Sikh Gurdwars have the foll(iwing distinctive .features:\n\n~ ..\n\n'i. , Sikh temples are n:it the place of id0l worship as the Hindu .temples are. There is no place for idol. worship 'in a Gurdwm:a. The .central object of worship in a Gurdwara isSri Guru Granth Sahib, the\n\nholy. book. TJ\"te paitern ofwJrship conists of two main items: reading of the holy hymns followed by their explanation by some learned man, . . . . . not necessarily a particular Granthi and .then singing of some passage~ from the Holy Granth.' Th; forme\"r is called Katha .and the second is; cal)ed Ki\\tan. A Sikh thus worships the Hofy Words thtpre wrilfon ' in the.Granth SJhib, the Words or Shabada about the Eternal Truth ·.or God: No idol or painting of any Gu; u ca1.1 be worshippecl.. .\n\n2 .. Sikh worship.in the Gurd;,, ara is a congregational worship, \" \\.. .• whereas Hindu temples arc meant for individual worship .. A Sikh ~.oes\n\n''. ., -, the indivic.ual.worship at home when he rcitcs Gurbani daily: Some ·\n\nscriptures meantfor, this purpose are Japji, Jaap, Rehras .. KirtanSohila.\n\nSangat Is tl1ecollectivc body of-Sikhs who meet every day in the Gurd•\n\n' . ' - ' . .\n\nwara .. .\\ . ·,\\·\n\n. , 3 .. Gurdwara is a place where a copy of' Guru-Granth Sahib is installed. The unique'and distinguishing fature would always. be. the \"Nishail Sahib, a flagtaff with a yellow flag of Sikhism flyin'g from it.\n\nThis serves a:l'a symbol of.th~ Sikh presence. It enables the travellers,_ whether they be Sikhs r nt, to know where hospitality is .aailable. ·· There may be complexity of rooms in a.Gurdwara for the. building\n\nrti.yalsoserve as' a schooi, or where children are taughi the .. rudiments\n\nof Sikhism as welhis a rest centre for travellers.\n\nOften •ihere will be ·. a )dtehen where food can'be.prep3red though Jnngar itself might ti.kc place iii the yawning. So.metimes tlie Gurdwara will also be used as a clinic, But its pivotal point is the place of worship.and the main room .. . - . . .. ..\n\n: E\n\nwill be tl{at in hich the Guru Granth Sahib is installed where the\n\n.· communiiy gathers. for diwar!.: _The. focaf poi.nt in this room will .be the book itself. ·\n\nFrom the foregoing discussion it is evident that the sine qua non for an' institution befog a Sikh Gutdwara is that there spould be established Guru Granth Sahib and the worship; of the same. by the congregation, and a Nishan Sahib as indicated in the. earlier part of the judgment:'There may be .other rooms of the institution meant. for . . other purposes but the crucial test is the existence o.f Guru Granth\n\nSahi.b and the worship therebf by the congregation and Nishan Sahib.\n\nIt is not ncssary th.at there must be a granthi in a Gurdwara. Any learned person can read Guru Granth Sahib and explain to the-congregation.\n\nWith this preliminary about the distinctive features of a Sikh _temple we proceed to deal with the contentions of the counsel for the parties. ·. ·\n\n• ' Shri Nlunit Lal, counsel for the appellant contend.ed that the High. Court has misread the evidence and that'has itiated its finding.\n\nHe referred to the material porticns .o(the judgment and , the evidence of the parties to support. his contention. On perµsal of. the judgment.· and the r~Jevant evidence we do not find any misreading of evidence by the IJ:igh Court: This contention, therefore, has no .force. We, however, nnd that the High Court proceeded on the assumption that. adniittedly Bhai Bhagtu was a Sikh saint ana that the disputed institu-. tion was established in his memory. This would be evident from' the f9llwing observation made by he High .Court.\n\nl . /,\n\n\"On an overall coilsideration of this aspect we are ina, clined to• accept the contention cf Mr.\n\nShan!· that admittedly Bhai.Bagt_u was a Sikh saint and this. institution was' established in !is memory arid as such the case of the respondent wauld •\n\nals~, come within the amblf of s. 16 (2) (iv) of the• Sikl1 Gun\\- . . dwrira Act\". , • \"' '\n\nBut this observatibn is not warranted from the pleadings or the the evidence of the parties. Pritam Dass, the appellant, as P.W.S, in\n\nhis deposi\\ion has categorically stated: ''Bhai Bhagtu was an- Uda.si Fahir\" . .In the pleasdings also .the appellant set up that Bhai 1\\hagtu was.an Udasi saint. and the in.stitution was a Dera of the Udasi sect, . i . . . . . . -' . . .\n\n• . _j' . .r-.....r \"·\n\n' ,...\n\n.....\n\nPR!TAMDASS.V; GURUDWARA PRABANHDAK COMMITTEE (Mi<ra, J.) 573 . . . '\n\n. . . .· '. . . while the respondent, on the. other hand, in its reply sta!e<l that Bhai Bhagtu was a Sikh aint and. the institution was established In the momory of that Sikh saint. In this state of pleadings and the evidence , adduced by the. parties.it will not be corr, eGt to say that admittedly Bhai Bhagtu was a Sikhsaint and that this institution was established in his memory. Rthe~ this was the only disputed question to bfi decided bv the Court. Thus while holding, that there is no misreading of evidence we find that. there is misreacjing of the pleadin¥s of the parties.\n\nIt was next cotended for the appellaf\\t that ihe appellant 6f udasi set being incharge of the institution in question, the succession to the institution being from Guru to Che la, the institution. being recor ded as Dera of Udasf'sect in sme of the revenue recods, the existence and worship of 'vario.us fdJ'ls.and sainadhs within the .precincts, of the institution and the absence of a: granthi in the institution are all ip.-compatihle wi.th the institution being a Sikh Guidwara.\n\n• .. ' .Shri M:. N. Phadke appering for. the respondent n th.e other harid has contended that'(!) the points which were never urged in the courts below could not'.be allowed t0 be raised for the first time in this c;; ourt; (2) in a11y 'case the existenoe ofsaniadhs ai; cl. idols within the precinots of the institution and thl worship thereof, and the absence. of a granthi and the ; uccession to the institution from guru to chela are not destructiv;'of the institution being a Sikh Gurdwara; (3) the finding of the H.igh Co.urt that the institutiofl in question is a il<h Qurdwara is fully warranted by.the .evidence on record, and (4) the nature of the institution has to be decidedi'n•the light of sub-s.: (2) of s. 16 of the Sikh Gurdwara Act. · . '•\n\nThe Co.urt has been clled upon to. decide whether te institution in question is a Sikh Gurdwara. While. considering this question the\n\nCourt has to take into consideration all the circumstaces which favour or militate against the institution ing a Sikh Gurdwara. In the v; ry nature of things arid in view of the requirements of sub-s. (2) of s. 16 it blcomes necessary to consider whether the institution being in charge of an Uadasi saint, the existence of samadhs o(Udasi saints at\\d worship:thereof, or the existence-'of the' iclbls and. absene of a' granthi and succession to the institution from guru to chela itre all rnlevant consideratio, ns anil the court has to consid\" them ifthere is evi<; lence on the record. rri the instant case evi~.ence has beenadducd on behalf of the appealla., nt abut the existece of samadhs and the various idols, the absence of a granthi and suc9ession to the i.nstitution . .. . . . - . ~\n\n' '\n\n574 :\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS. [lcJ~4l 2 s.c.~.\n\nA from guru to chela. We see no reason why the appeallant be prevented •. froni'. -urging the aforesad c!rcumstances, ' ~\n\nCh tho quostion whether the existence of samadhs and of the . - . # . idols and the absence of a granthi or succession to the institutioil from 'gunl'to chela militates aginst the institution being a Sikh Gunl.wara the counsel for the parties have dduced evidenc.e iii support .of .tleir respective contentions. The counsel for. the parties have also cited cases insupport of. their re.spectie conteritios. .·. ·\n\n\" ..The counel for the appellat relied' on' Hem Si;1gh & Ors. v. . JJa.<ant Das & Anr<ll, In that case the qustion for consideratoin was .\n\nwhether Udasis are Sikhs. The courfhcld that Udasis areno't Sikhs for the purpose~ of .Sikh Gurdwara Act. Although Guru Nanak founded Sikhism as a new religion by sweeping awaf idofatry and polytheism, Sri Chand; \"the son of Guru Naiiak the founder of the Udasis, was hhnself not a Sikh but a Hindu. No rcconciliatlpn bet\\Veen the Sikhs and the U<hsis ever took place. The Udasis are in consequence not Sikhs,· hut. schismatics who separated in. the earliest days of Sikhi.si.n and never morged with the foliowors of the .Gurus. .. , ' . .\n\n, Reliance was next placed upon Bawa lshar Dass & Ors. v: Dr. Mohan Singh & . Ors<\" The .. Court h.eld: ·\n\n. '\"\"it. has' been established that the ·.Mahants- have all along been Udasis, 'that the-institution was an Udasi monastery, that.the Guru Granth Sahib was read there by the UdasiMahant\n\nad that Sikhs. may have attendee! thes~ readipgs but that all other ceremo1)ies; observed by Udasis and Hindus, were performed at the institution, fi cannot be held from the n1ere fact that the lJdusis also read the Guru Granth Sahib a book which . they d0 venerate, that tho Sikhs.should be associated i-n the mana~ . gemenf of this geritiine.Udosi insfituli0i1. It was held.by a Division B'nch of this Court in 15 Lah. 247101 that the Udasi order\n\ncnstittes a separate sect, ' distinct, from tl\\e orthodox Sikhs and that though they -have retaiiied many Hindu .beliefs ar.1\\ practices, .yet in the wider sense o.f the term they:may also be Sikhs'. They occupy an intermediate position between strictly orthodox Sikhs and Hindus. The Udasis are in fact a monastic . ' . r .\n\n(1) [1935-36] L.R. 631 !.A: 180.\n\n(2) AIR 19j9 Lah. 239. . •\n\n , (3) Arjan Singh v. lnder Das .\n\n. ..\n\n' ; . • •\n\n.··:r'\n\n\\. '\n\n: i :....\n\n• . . . . . . . . \\\n\nPRITAM ass v .. GURm{ARA PR~BANDHAK coi.imrE~ (Misra, J.) 575 •\n\norder in their origin and are folio{Yi:rs of Bawa Siri :Cfoicl.. son of t'1e first Guru. Though they worship smadhs, etc. they~\n\nd~ reverence .the.Granth Sahib without completely renouncing Hinduism. They are often in charge of the village Dharamsala or GJrdwara, which is .a Sikh institution, but in othe, r cass tlie Sadh and his qhelas constitute a monasetry or. college: Owing to their intcrl)lediate position, it is possible for Udasfa t~ be in\" charge of~ Sikh Gurdwara, properly so callad, but it . c'.oes not follow that thlt institution is a Sikh Gurdwara and not a tius Udasi institution lllerely because the G\\nth Saliib is r.eap.\". ·\n\n In Harnain Singh v:.Gurdial decisions this Court held:\n\nSingh''' 01i ari analysi• of various\n\n, I .\n\n'°'T;1e; e d'cisio\"'. cleariy indicate. the . principlo that though the Sikh. Guru Gr'anth Sahib i_s read 'in the shrines managed b¥ \" the m:mbers :ofih; Ud1si sect, that was not enogh to hold V'at those shrmes were Sikh Gurdwaras. In the case before-us, the 1nore fa.ct that at some stage there was a Guru Gran'th Sahib i.n\n\ntfiis Dera cannot.thus lead to any con~Iusion that'\"this institution Vias ffieant for; r belonged -to,.-the roJlowers,. of the Sikh r, e1igion. :· Clearly, the Dera was miatafoed for. an entirely <1.istini sect b9wn as, the Ni'rn{aia Sadhs who 'cannot be regarded as Sikhs and, consequently, in their mere capacity of foll@wers of Sikhs religion residing in village Jha~,'.awal_a,. the plaintiffa/respcindents could not be held to have sitchim interest as could entitlei hem\n\nto institute the suit t!nder s. 92 of the Cod• of Civil Procedure.\"_\n\n Shr.i P1adke appearingfo,\"the re•j1odent.o~ the 'other hand . . . h 1~ citd.M,., fiant Dharam Das etc. v. State of Pun/ab & Grs.'2> .. . D, aling with the tenets of the Sikhs this Court observed:\n\n \"Ti1e Sikhs believe in the ten Gurus.:__the last of whom was 'Guru Gobind Singh. They further believe 'that there is no otl; cr,\n\nGuru after Guru Gobind Singh ;.vho enjO{led on his followers that after him they should consider Guru Granth Sahib as tho Guru. They .do not sbscribe to idol worship and polyteism, nor do they hav' any Samadhi in their shrines. The teaching pf Sikhs was against asceticism.' They believe ih Guru Granth 'Sohib., which is a Rosary of sacred poems, exhortations; etc.\n\n(l) r1961(2 s, c.R. 739.\n\n(2) (1975) 3 s.c;.R. 160 ..\n\n.- .\n\n·.D.\n\nE ..\n\nF .\n\n~: A\n\n''c\n\n' .\n\n. I . ,. ' '\n\nDuing :th~ time of the Sikh Gurus the Gurdwaras were under their d\\rect supervision and conirol or. under their Masends or• ' missionary agents. After the death 6f Guru Gobind Singh the , .Panth ls re'cognised as the the corporate representative or'the Guru o)l earth and thereafter they were managed by the Panth through their Granthis and other sewadars who were under direct 'S'upervision of the locai Sangt or congregation.-' The posi!ion of the Gurdwaras changed during British regime. The\n\n~: ·~. ' .- '_\" mahants who were in charge pf the Sikh Gurdwaras could either be a S\\kh Mahan! or., Udasi Mahan! .... Though there v; as no ·.\n\nreconciliation between the Sikhs and Udasis, it did not matter ;_J\" if the M1hant ofa Sikh Gurdwra was not a Sikh Mahan! because •. , the' PaAtbc.or Sarigat exercised control over the 'Gurdwaras\". j\n\n~ ·.\n\nNext r; liance was placed o Solian , Das v. JJc/a Singh & Os.M ' . : ,_ ,, - . It - - ' ., ' ' ' . - Dealing with\\s. l6(2ff of the Sikh Gurdwara Act the Court oberved:\n\nI '\n\n:· \" \" . ._,.,..;,. \":Thedocumentary evidenc.e therefore establishes, that the dharams.ala has been a place of public worship since 1853, and that such worship has been connected with.the Gran th Sahib· · I' am prepared to accept th evidence of the objectors that the '\\' . existenc~ of a samadh dates only from recent times, morethan\n\npobab!y after t!,1e Sikh Gurdwara controvetsy had beconie acute a1id he. imprtance of a samadh had l:i'een realizec\\ by the .lJdasi Mahants, I hold therefore that the evidence supports tile conlusion of the majority f the Tribunal that this institution , falls withins. 16 (2) (iii) of the Act\".\n\n~- ' . .\n\n~ . ' , In view of the divergen! cases cited by the cou'nsel: f,)r the parties we have(jto take into consideration the distindive features of a : :Sikh Gurdw:{ra .as discussed in the :earlier part of the' judgment., so '\n\nviewed; the 'disknce and worship of Gum Granth Sahib and the exi', stence of Nishan Sahib are the determinative factors. \" ·\n\nThe Tribunal c!id not take into consideration the oral evidence adduced by the parties. Eight witnesses were prcduc<) en behalf - . ' ' \");' . ' . . .· ', of the appellant while six.witnesses were produced on behalf of the the respondent'. The High Court also did not give a proper deal to the oral evide)ie addt; ced by the appellant., The only consideratin\n\ngiven by'the 'High court to the oral testimony of the witnesses on\n\n~ - . _, . behalf, of thefappellant was in the following terms: . , ,\n\n(I) AIR 1934 Lilh. 180.\"\n\n' ' '\n\n.. ,,\n\n• <\n\n\"(.\n\n,·:.I..\n\n' ....\n\n. ;·.\n\nP'IUTAM DASS v. GURVDWARA PRABANPHAK COMMITTEE (Misra, J.) 577. r • . '' 1 •\n\n. . . ( ._' ' ,. ·. '-- - ' ' \" -, 'lit ' . \"As regards the oral testimony on . the point that the\n\nI'. A . ' - ' '• . '. ' . . _,. institution was a Dera ot an Udasi Sadhu, the same is obi- • ·. ously inte1ested, and hardly credible. The Tribunal has not attac thed any weight to the mi; and we are wholly in agreement .\n\n' . with the finding 'of the ,1)ribunil. on that poi.nt.\" . . .\n\n The witnesses, on either side have cgrneto depose on oath. The .. &rounds on which the evideqce adduced on behalf of the ·appellant. J has been: discarded mafequally apply to the evide.nce adduced on. be- ' :Jialfof the respondent The Court should have considered the worth '\"- of the evide.ne of each witne. ss and sh. ould ]lave given reason.s for d. is- .\n\n-- . . \\ believing the same on merit. A bald .observation that the' witnesses.\n\nproduced on' behalf of the .. appellat are interested must be deprecat\\:d. .\n\n'.;, . ' . ' ' ; - ' Even otherwise the.co.urts below have no.t approached the case . from .the correct angle. (The. our ts hail to cl.eciile the question in view . . efthe pr0visions of mb-s.(2) of s. 16 of the Act nd they had. to recor_d\n\na psitive fitiding in the Iigllt of sub-s. (2) of s. 16,) which reads: ·;.~,.. ' .\n\n\")6 (2) If the tribunal finds that the gurdwara_,, . . . . - ' . - . -\n\n .. (i} was es\\ablished by, ; r i~ memoryof.any of the Ten Sikh.\n\nGurus,.or in commemoraticil of any incident in the life of _: any of the Ten Siklj Gnrus and was used for public worship ··.by Sikhs, before and at the 'time of the presentation of the : of the petition nnder 'sub-section (I) of section 7 ;'.or . . ' . . ..\n\n(ii) owing to some tradition co'rlnectecl' with one of the Ten Sikh .\n\nGums, was used. for public worship predominantly by Sikhs, • before and at the time of the presentation of thepetition .. u.nder sub-section•(I) of scctio~ 7; or . . . ' \\ . . ' (iii) as etablishedfor use by Sikhs for thepu; pos~\\f pblic .\n\nworship and was usd for such worship by Sihks, before\n\nand at the time of.the presentation' of the petition under .\n\nSub-section (I) of section 7 qr. - · ·\n\n\\:' .\n\n.G.\n\n(iv) was established in memr~· of.a Sikh martyr,'saint or histori- . 1\n\n. cal person: and was used for public worship by Sikhs,'before:\n\nand at the time of the pfesenttion of the petition under H sub-section (1) of section 7; or ·~ · .\n\n. \\ . \"\n\n·. ;-'\\_\n\n_ \"'\n\nSUPRE~JE COUQT REPORTS [198~] . 2 s.c.R.\n\n(v) owing to some .incident connect\"d with the Sikh religion was\n\n, used for public worship predpminantly .my Sikhs, before ' ad at the time ti~ the presentation of the petition under\n\nsi1b-section (1) of section 7; . . . ' '\n\nthe. tribuna1 shall decide th.at it shciuld be declared to be a Sikh , , Gl\\rdwara, and record an <:rc\\er accordingly.\" . .'\n\nUhless the.claim falls within one-or the\"other of the catO:go1ies enumerated in sub-section (2) .of' s: 16, the institution: cannot be declared to be a .Sikh Gurdwara.\n\n, The Court hacl, therefore, first to consider as pleaded by. the parties, as to whether Bhai Bhagtu was a urlasi saint or a Sikh saint, . and then. to decide on the basis of evidence whether the institµti.on in question is one or. the other of the types indiated'. This was the only.\n\n, question for consideration before the High Court but. unfortunately it assumed, what was to be proved. '\n\n' Oo t!1~ fo1'egoing discussiqn we are satisfled that the Hi; h 'court' has not given a 15ro]l, er deal to the matter and has not considered the or, al evidence .add.riced on behalf'of the parties. Nor has it approached case.form the cotre.ct perspective of law. .- • .\n\nOrdinarily, iii a situation as here, the matter should have gone.\n\nbak. to he High Court for rec.ording findings on the bai:Sis of appreciation of evidence but, we are not incl ind to remand the matter as it is a very old dispute. We .-a're, ihrefore, prepaJed to take that,, burden o'urselves and finally decide the. dispute.· As would.· appear, parties were aware of the nature of ciaim and the tvidence . - - . , ' . ' \\ ·.to oe led' and, therefore, par.tie~ concentrated their attaention_ on .the aspects which would be decisive of. the poiflts in dispute. It is unfortunate that the Tribunal and the High Court did not keep the \" . proper perspective in view whils dealing with the matte1.\n\n. ; O• behalf of the appellant Rain Saran Dass, P W I, Charan Dass, PW 2, Bishan Dass, PW 3, Jagraj Singh, PW 4, hajju :Ram,\n\nPW 5, Zora Singh Patwari, PW 6, Surjit Sin1ih. PW 7 and the appel- lant; PW .. 8, were examined. On. behalf of the respondent, Hardev Singh, RW I, B1chan Singh, RW 2, Ba!bir Singh, .RW 3, Balwant Singh, R W 4, Hazura Singh, R W s: a11d Gurdial Singh, RW 6, were' . '-. ' . - exammed as witnesses.\n\n' .\n\n\"f.·\n\n• I ' PRITAM DASS v: GURDWARA PRABANDHAK COMMI:rTEE. (Misra, i.) ~79\n\n• ' < • '\n\n' _,,,;,· . .\n\nTh_e finding of the High Court as extracted hereinbef9re clea-\n\nA . . rly show tilat the four tmpqrtant and most relevant aspects of the \"case ·\n\nas disclosed in the evidence were completely ovrlooked or side-tracked by the Hlg'1 Court, They are . : (i) there are Samadhs on tiw premis?S _of th' institution; (ii) there ate idols and photos of\"Hindu deities; (iii) Bhai BhagtU was a Udasi Saint; and-(iv) succession was frdm Gurll so Chcla .. The petition filecl by the appellant under , ,. .B\n\ns.8 of the Act co11tained a clear averm?nt that the instituiion \\lad' ' been set up by Bhai Bhagtu wl\\o was a Udasi Saint and the pre ... sence of three Samadhs of (1) Bhai .Biiagtu, (2J Baba Paras Ram Ji \"~ and (3), M\"fhant Sahib. Dass i, was' also. asserted. In the . wrilteq\n\nstatement the' respontlcnt, after a vague denial, had admitted the in'.titutiOn to have been foundect' by Bhai Bhagtu.. ' . .\n\n. ' .\n\nPW I, Rani Saran Dass stated that there 'was an id0l.ofBaba Srichand in. the institution and there were pictures of Lord Krishna' a1\\d oth\"r Hincl.u deities. .This '.statement wao elicited in crossexaininaticin made by the respondent.\n\nPW 2 has. stated that there is ah idol of Baba. Srichand and. Gola Sahib in the institution and 1 D they are objects of worship.\n\nPW 3, Bishart Dass; referred to the, idol of. Baba Srichand. PW 4, Jagial stated that there. were three or fouc'Sarn\"dhs on the premises of . the institution and those are objects elf \\vorship. , There wa~ no challenge to this statement in. examiaati9a-in-chief by cro'ssexaniination .. P\\Yi 5 as _asked iii cross examination whether there . were Samadhs on the. premises of the .-'\";;'. . inslituti~:nd his answ'C is revealing. He stated that there are ·-three Sa ·:is on-the premises of the institution and there is a. dome over tl10 Samadh of Bhai Bhagtu. He .added t)lat there are other pictures of Hindu deities and Hindu festivals are celebrated, in the instituti9rl. PW 7, Surjit Singh, the local Sarpanch stated that the\n\n'. '1. institution -.yas of ljdasi Fakirs, He also stated that there is a: Samadh\n\n. F of\\Bhai Bb.agtu on the premises of the institution and it is an 9bject of worship. He indicated that the Samadh ofBhai Bhagtu was worshipped .iil a grand ; cale while the other two Samadhs were not .treated qn equa.l basis. Thete was no cross-examinatio~. o.f this wit • . ness on this aspect. Pritam Dass, the appellant did support. his case,,\n\nOridinarily his evidenc~ would have been treated as interested as he G happens to be the party but his assertions have well corroborated .\n\n• Coming to the respondent's side:· the first witness Hardev Singh in his examination-inchief stated tha.t there is a Samacih of Bhai Bhagtu in the institution and another Samadh of his mother. On the basis of\n\n: H . this adission of the. principal witness of the respondent there can be\n\n. . . ' I. : ' . ·.\n\nI. '\n\n_:~·\n\n-~-\n\n' ' '\n\n•.,.,.\n\n.B.\n\n''' ' ' .--/ 580\n\n, SUPREME COURT.REPORTS [1984] 2 , s.c.!l. I no ; doubt that Samadhs eist within the institutio~. At the hearin~.\n\n' . . . . . - I ,_; ' counsel had pointed out that this .witness was a ll).ember of the Commu_nits Party. We do not think _that would at all be a proper /V~Y of appreciating the evidence o(the witnesses; He was a witness called by the respondent and was notl declared hostile, if he made admissions in his examination-in-chief. On the other hand, the fact that he dots not belong to .the groups of either party and is a Communist would lend credence to his evidence as coming from an, impartial source.\n\nThenext_witness; RW 2, Bachan Singh admitt.i'd the existence of the 'Samadhs but denied that the Samadh of Bhai Bhagtu was an objet ·\n\n'' \\,..,\n\nof worsliip. RW 3, Baibir Singh, admitted pie presence of Samadh of _;,.j,:-\n\nB_hai Bha'gtu as also oC:his mother. It.is in the evid<ince.cifthis witn•u '\\·. that he also belongs to the C:omoiun!st Party. What. we hvo &aid about RW I 'equally. applies. to thls )vitness: RW 4, Balwani \"singh aditted the_ presence of Bhai Bhagtu's Samadh; while_ RW S, ·\n\n Hazura Singh stated that' there were two Samadhs oh the premiwr-, one of Bhai Bhagtu and the' other of his mother. The last witness, RW 6, c; urdia( Singh in his eidence admitted the existence offue tw\" Samadhs--o-of Bhai }lhagtu and liis mother. ' ·\n\n• I • . . • \" This'. analysis of the evidence clearly indicates that it has been ·\n\n'\"( '\n\nunquestioriably established without the' slightest shadow or'a doubt that there are at least two Samadhs on the premises of the institution--. . , . one being of-Bhai Bhagtu and the other of his mother; ' .\n\n. .\n\nTh~ existence of the idol of Baba Sricand, the' rofder o~ the~--~. ' Udasi sect in the premises. also ; eems to bjivebeen fully establisheli. ' • - . As already stated, Sikhs would not permit the idol of Baba Srichand ' in a Gurdwara while Udasis would oridinarilyinstall such an idol to perJ?eluate the memory of the' founder of their sect. '' ' ' --r\n\n' What emerges from this disu'ssion is tliat as found by the .Tribu\n\n1 nal; .the succession was from Guru t.o Chela1 that Bhai Bliagtu was a Udasi Saint and there are Samadhs on the premiseso11e of Bhai G Bhagtu' and .the other of hls mother. Evidence 'shows that there are photos of Hirtdu deities in the illstitution. These. three fads, • Without anything more, would be su:(llcient to rejectthe case of.the respeorident i that the institution is aSikli Gurdwara: We\" would like to, reiterate , i that existence of Samadhs and succession from Gum to Chela would'\n\nH . ·\n\n.. I clearly b~ destrhctive of ~Iiaracer .of, , the institution.' as S!kh. ·.\n\nGllrdwara because they are 1ncons1stent with. the tenets of the Sikh . ' \\ ' ,. ' ' ';- ' . . - ,_ -· .\n\n. --~ .\n\ni,_.r .. , .. .\\\n\n• . - '}.,\n\n~~-,• . ._ -\n\n~ ,\n\nPAITAM DASS v. GUR~WARA:PRABANDHAK COMMITTEE (Misra,!.) 581' . . . .\n\nreligion. The issue before the High Court as . also the Tribunal' was • whether the institutiOn Dera Bhai .Bhagtu .was a Sikh Gurdwara. . -- ( ·.. ' - ' '\n\nileference to ; nother aspect would be relevant here. Counsel for the respondent-emphasised the, featnre that there. was evidence .. to, 'show that Guru Graiith Sahib was recited and read in this institution. . It.is wellestblislied that Udasis.are mid:way behveen Sikhs 0n the one hand aitd Hindus 'on the .other. Srichand, son of Guru Nanak, the founder of the .Sikhism, had, as already indicated, broken away and set up 'the Udasi sect. Udasis ile venerating Guru Grantk Sahib, - retained Hindu practices and -~!so showed their veneration to the\n\n.~ Samadhs: From -the very fact. that .Guru Grant4. Sahib' was recited -\n\n'ih this institution, no; support can be drawn, forifh~_.claim that the. institution was a Sikh.:· Gurdwara. . . ' . -\n\n: On the fuateriaTS on record, we_ are .of the view that the findings\n\nrec.01:ded by the Tribunal as a.lso the High Court are wholly unsllppor-,,\n\n- table to satisfy the tests indicated in law for determining the character of the inttitution. We allow the appeal, _reverse the decision of the . Tribunal as , upheld by the High Court and declare . that Dera '\n\nBhai Bhagtu is not Sikh Gurdwara. In the circumstances of the case there would be .no order as to costs. , . -\n\nS.R.\n\nA.ppeal allowea.\n\n/ --\n\n-I -\n\n- \\\n\n-.·~:\n\n; ' I\n\n.c:\n\n•, ~\n\ni&.'", "total_entities": 105, "entities": [{"text": "PRITAM DASS MAHANT", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12, "end_char": 30, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PRITAM DASS MAHANT", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SHI~OMANI GURUDWARA. PRABANDHAK COMMlTTEE", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 40, "end_char": 81, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SHIROMANI GURUDWARA PRABANDHAK COMMITTEE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 119, "end_char": 124, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.A. DESAI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. B. MISRA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 126, "end_char": 137, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.B. MISRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Sikh Gurudara Act, 1925", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 178, "end_char": 201, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 7(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 820, "end_char": 832, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Sikh Gurudara Act, 1925", "statute": "Sikh Gurudara Act, 1925"}}, {"text": "Act, 1925", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 859, "end_char": 868, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bhai Bhagtu", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2904, "end_char": 2915, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on the premises of the institution; (ii) there are idols and photos of Hindu _deities; (iii} Bhai Bhagtu was a Udasi' Saint; and (iv) suCcession was frcim Gurq, to.", "canonical_name": "Bhai .Biiagtu"}}, {"text": "PR!TAM DAss'v .• GURUDWARA l'RABANDHAK yOMMlTTEE 565", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3009, "end_char": 3061, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PR!TAM DAss'v .• GURUDWARA l'RABANDHAK yOMMlTTEE 565\n\nTh~ petition."}}, {"text": "s.8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3106, "end_char": 3109, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Baba Para~ Rain Ji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3293, "end_char": 3311, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhai Bha£, tu who was a :Udasi Saint and t4e presence of th.rc.c Sainadhs of (1).Bhai .Bhagtu, (2) Baba Para~ Rain Ji; and (3) Mahant Sahib\"DassJi, was also asseitcd.", "canonical_name": "Baba Para~ Rain Ji"}}, {"text": "Mahant Sahib\"DassJi, was also asseitcd. In the written statement the resPondent, after' a vage denial, had admittedthe institution to have been founded by Bhai Bhagtu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3321, "end_char": 3487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhai Bha£, tu who was a :Udasi Saint and t4e presence of th.rc.c Sainadhs of (1).Bhai .Bhagtu, (2) Baba Para~ Rain Ji; and (3) Mahant Sahib\"DassJi, was also asseitcd."}}, {"text": "Pritani Dass", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3489, "end_char": 3501, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pritani Dass, the <ipPellant did support his case.", "canonical_name": "PRITAM DASS MAHANT"}}, {"text": "Baba Srichand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4094, "end_char": 4107, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "clearly the Sikhs'\\VOuld notpepnit the idol of Baba Srichand in a Gurudwaa, while Udasis would oi:\"dinarily install such an idol to perptuate the neil1ory of the founder of heir sect; (ifi) the sucession .was from Guru to Chela; aUd (iv) there are photos of Hindu deities in.", "canonical_name": "Baba Sricharid"}}, {"text": "Srichand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4787, "end_char": 4795, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Srichand son of Guru Nanak; the founder of Sikhism, 'had_ broken awa."}}, {"text": "Guru Nanak", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4803, "end_char": 4813, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Srichand son of Guru Nanak; the founder of Sikhism, 'had_ broken awa.", "canonical_name": "Guru Naiiak"}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5607, "end_char": 5612, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7158, "end_char": 7162, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7265, "end_char": 7269, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ganth Sahib", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9616, "end_char": 9627, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now this Sri Guru\n\nGanth Sahib is a living Gru of the Sikhs .. Guru mealls the gilid, c. Gur Granth ·.", "canonical_name": "Graqth Sahib"}}, {"text": "Gurudwai", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11689, "end_char": 11697, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gurudwai:a is .a plaCe WhCre a cOpy of GutU Gr'anth Sa'l;, ib is inStalled. ·, •"}}, {"text": "Mahai11 Dharq.on [Jas e(c. v._ State of Pimjab & Ors. [l.9751 3. SCR 160", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13660, "end_char": 13732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahai11 Dharq.on [Jas e(c."}}, {"text": "Solum Das", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13736, "end_char": 13745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Solum Das v, Bela Singh & Ors."}}, {"text": "Bela Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13749, "end_char": 13759, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Solum Das v, Bela Singh & Ors."}}, {"text": "K. V{1sdev", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14037, "end_char": 14047, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ", B\n\n.. t\n\n' '\n\n, Naimit Ll, K. V{1sdev and .Mv."}}, {"text": "V.M. Phadke", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14087, "end_char": 14098, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V.M. Phadke and Harl>ans Singh for the responde1it."}}, {"text": "Harl>ans Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14103, "end_char": 14117, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V.M. Phadke and Harl>ans Singh for the responde1it."}}, {"text": "Faridkot", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14509, "end_char": 14517, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a Bhagtuaa), tehsil Faridkot, If district Bhatinda."}}, {"text": "Pepsu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14622, "end_char": 14627, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in the erstwhile Nabha • ;: State which merged with Pepsu and after the reorganisation ."}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14840, "end_char": 14844, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15113, "end_char": 15117, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "18th 6ctober, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15136, "end_char": 15154, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State Goyernment notified the said applic'ation in the Punjab Gazette in l>rms of s. 7 (3) of the Act.on 18th 6ctober, 1963."}}, {"text": "SS. 8 and 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15211, "end_char": 15223, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sikh Gurdwara Tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 15411, "end_char": 15433, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "application was ...4, referred by the State Government to the Sikh Gurdwara Tribunal for."}}, {"text": "Gola ahib", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15877, "end_char": 15886, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The institution wast he Dera of Udasi Bhekh and t!J, e objects of worship i' _ are idols of Gola ahib and of Baba Sricharid, and the various sama<!hs.", "canonical_name": "Gola Sahib"}}, {"text": "Baba Sricharid", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15894, "end_char": 15908, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The institution wast he Dera of Udasi Bhekh and t!J, e objects of worship i' _ are idols of Gola ahib and of Baba Sricharid, and the various sama<!hs.", "canonical_name": "Baba Sricharid"}}, {"text": "Shiromani Gurdwara", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15981, "end_char": 15999, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petition was resisted by'the respondent Shiromani Gurdwara' ."}}, {"text": "s.7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16114, "end_char": 16117, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17963, "end_char": 17973, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Guru Arjan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19045, "end_char": 19055, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and the Book deserve respect, which they are : aceorded becau.se of the Bani which they express, the word of divine\n\ntruth: Therefore; it was possible for Guru Arjan'; the fifth in 'the human line to bow before the collection which he had compiled and installed • , • • '' • < • ' • - • -· ' H\n\n."}}, {"text": "Sikh Gurus", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 19404, "end_char": 19414, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The 'Sikh Gurus have much in con\\mon \\Vith."}}, {"text": "Guru Gobind Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19865, "end_char": 19882, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a conscious decision of Guru Gobind Singh, the last Guru, successin was invested in a co!lectfon of teachings which was given 'the :title of Guru Gra'nth Sahib."}}, {"text": "Guru Granth", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20694, "end_char": 20705, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sri Guru Granth, Sahib is a living Guru of.the .. Sikhs.", "canonical_name": "Guru Granth 'Sohib"}}, {"text": "Graqth Sahib", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 20777, "end_char": 20789, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Graqth Sahib gives light and shows the path to.the suffering humanity. ,", "canonical_name": "Graqth Sahib"}}, {"text": "Guru Granth Sahib", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22635, "end_char": 22652, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "worship 'in a Gurdwm:a. The .central object of worship in a Gurdwara isSri Guru Granth Sahib, the\n\nholy.", "canonical_name": "Guru Granth 'Sohib"}}, {"text": "Sangat", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 23458, "end_char": 23464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sangat Is tl1ecollectivc body of-Sikhs who meet every day in the Gurd•\n\n' . ' - ' . ."}}, {"text": "Nishan Sahib", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25008, "end_char": 25020, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "other purposes but the crucial test is the existence o.f Guru Granth\n\nSahi.b and the worship therebf by the congregation and Nishan Sahib."}}, {"text": "Guru Granth Sahib", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25114, "end_char": 25131, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Any learned person can read Guru Granth Sahib and explain to the-congregation.", "canonical_name": "Guru Granth 'Sohib"}}, {"text": "Nlunit Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 25324, "end_char": 25334, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• ' Shri Nlunit Lal, counsel for the appellant contend.ed that the High."}}, {"text": "Shan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 26095, "end_char": 26099, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\"On an overall coilsideration of this aspect we are ina, clined to• accept the contention cf Mr.\n\nShan!·"}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26280, "end_char": 26285, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bhai Bhagtu", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 26520, "end_char": 26531, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pritam Dass, the appellant, as P.W.S, in\n\nhis deposi\\ion has categorically stated: ''Bhai Bhagtu was an- Uda.si Fahir\" .", "canonical_name": "Bhai .Biiagtu"}}, {"text": ". N. Phadke", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 27911, "end_char": 27922, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• .. ' .Shri M:."}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28615, "end_char": 28620, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28998, "end_char": 29003, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sikh Gurdwara Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30403, "end_char": 30420, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Guru Naiiak", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30541, "end_char": 30552, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Although Guru Nanak founded Sikhism as a new religion by sweeping awaf idofatry and polytheism, Sri Chand; \"the son of Guru Naiiak the founder of the Udasis, was hhnself not a Sikh but a Hindu.", "canonical_name": "Guru Naiiak"}}, {"text": "PRITAM ass", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 32087, "end_char": 32097, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PRITAM ass v .. GURm{ARA PR~BANDHAK coi.imrE~ (Misra, J.) 575 •\n\norder in their origin and are folio{Yi:rs of Bawa Siri :Cfoicl.. son of t'1e first Guru.", "canonical_name": "PRITAM DASS MAHANT"}}, {"text": "Misra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32134, "end_char": 32139, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PRITAM ass v .. GURm{ARA PR~BANDHAK coi.imrE~ (Misra, J.) 575 •\n\norder in their origin and are folio{Yi:rs of Bawa Siri :Cfoicl.. son of t'1e first Guru."}}, {"text": "Sadh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 32471, "end_char": 32475, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They are often in charge of the village Dharamsala or GJrdwara, which is .a Sikh institution, but in othe, r cass tlie Sadh and his qhelas constitute a monasetry or."}}, {"text": "Udasfa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 32586, "end_char": 32592, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "college: Owing to their intcrl)lediate position, it is possible for Udasfa t~ be in\" charge of~ Sikh Gurdwara, properly so callad, but it ."}}, {"text": "s. 92", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33732, "end_char": 33737, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Guru Granth 'Sohib", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 34393, "end_char": 34411, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They believe ih Guru Granth 'Sohib.,", "canonical_name": "Guru Granth 'Sohib"}}, {"text": ".lJdasi Mahants", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 36057, "end_char": 36072, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "imprtance of a samadh had l:i'een realizec\\ by the .lJdasi Mahants, I hold therefore that the evidence supports tile conlusion of the majority f the Tribunal that this institution , falls withins."}}, {"text": "Sikh Gurdw:{ra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 36387, "end_char": 36401, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "cases cited by the cou'nsel: f,)r the parties we have(jto take into consideration the distindive features of a : :Sikh Gurdw:{ra .as discussed in the :earlier part of the' judgment.,"}}, {"text": "Gum Granth Sahib", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 36498, "end_char": 36514, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "so '\n\nviewed; the 'disknce and worship of Gum Granth Sahib and the exi', stence of Nishan Sahib are the determinative factors. \" ·", "canonical_name": "Guru Granth 'Sohib"}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38345, "end_char": 38350, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38437, "end_char": 38442, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38838, "end_char": 38847, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39316, "end_char": 39325, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39564, "end_char": 39573, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39858, "end_char": 39867, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Rain Saran Dass", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 41567, "end_char": 41582, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "O• behalf of the appellant Rain Saran Dass, P W I, Charan Dass, PW 2, Bishan Dass, PW 3, Jagraj Singh, PW 4, hajju :Ram,\n\nPW 5, Zora Singh Patwari, PW 6, Surjit Sin1ih."}}, {"text": "Charan Dass", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 41591, "end_char": 41602, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "O• behalf of the appellant Rain Saran Dass, P W I, Charan Dass, PW 2, Bishan Dass, PW 3, Jagraj Singh, PW 4, hajju :Ram,\n\nPW 5, Zora Singh Patwari, PW 6, Surjit Sin1ih."}}, {"text": "Bishan Dass", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 41610, "end_char": 41621, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "O• behalf of the appellant Rain Saran Dass, P W I, Charan Dass, PW 2, Bishan Dass, PW 3, Jagraj Singh, PW 4, hajju :Ram,\n\nPW 5, Zora Singh Patwari, PW 6, Surjit Sin1ih."}}, {"text": "Jagraj Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 41629, "end_char": 41641, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "O• behalf of the appellant Rain Saran Dass, P W I, Charan Dass, PW 2, Bishan Dass, PW 3, Jagraj Singh, PW 4, hajju :Ram,\n\nPW 5, Zora Singh Patwari, PW 6, Surjit Sin1ih."}}, {"text": "hajju :Ram", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 41649, "end_char": 41659, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "O• behalf of the appellant Rain Saran Dass, P W I, Charan Dass, PW 2, Bishan Dass, PW 3, Jagraj Singh, PW 4, hajju :Ram,\n\nPW 5, Zora Singh Patwari, PW 6, Surjit Sin1ih."}}, {"text": "Zora Singh Patwari", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 41668, "end_char": 41686, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "O• behalf of the appellant Rain Saran Dass, P W I, Charan Dass, PW 2, Bishan Dass, PW 3, Jagraj Singh, PW 4, hajju :Ram,\n\nPW 5, Zora Singh Patwari, PW 6, Surjit Sin1ih."}}, {"text": "Surjit Sin1ih", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 41694, "end_char": 41707, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "O• behalf of the appellant Rain Saran Dass, P W I, Charan Dass, PW 2, Bishan Dass, PW 3, Jagraj Singh, PW 4, hajju :Ram,\n\nPW 5, Zora Singh Patwari, PW 6, Surjit Sin1ih."}}, {"text": "Hardev Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 41789, "end_char": 41801, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "behalf of the respondent, Hardev Singh, RW I, B1chan Singh, RW 2, Ba!bir Singh, .RW 3, Balwant Singh, R W 4, Hazura Singh, R W s: a11d Gurdial Singh, RW 6, were' . '-. ' . -"}}, {"text": "B1chan Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 41809, "end_char": 41821, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "behalf of the respondent, Hardev Singh, RW I, B1chan Singh, RW 2, Ba!bir Singh, .RW 3, Balwant Singh, R W 4, Hazura Singh, R W s: a11d Gurdial Singh, RW 6, were' . '-. ' . -"}}, {"text": "Ba!bir Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 41829, "end_char": 41841, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "behalf of the respondent, Hardev Singh, RW I, B1chan Singh, RW 2, Ba!bir Singh, .RW 3, Balwant Singh, R W 4, Hazura Singh, R W s: a11d Gurdial Singh, RW 6, were' . '-. ' . -"}}, {"text": "Balwant Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 41850, "end_char": 41863, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "behalf of the respondent, Hardev Singh, RW I, B1chan Singh, RW 2, Ba!bir Singh, .RW 3, Balwant Singh, R W 4, Hazura Singh, R W s: a11d Gurdial Singh, RW 6, were' . '-. ' . -"}}, {"text": "Hazura Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 41872, "end_char": 41884, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "behalf of the respondent, Hardev Singh, RW I, B1chan Singh, RW 2, Ba!bir Singh, .RW 3, Balwant Singh, R W 4, Hazura Singh, R W s: a11d Gurdial Singh, RW 6, were' . '-. ' . -"}}, {"text": "Gurdial Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 41898, "end_char": 41911, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "behalf of the respondent, Hardev Singh, RW I, B1chan Singh, RW 2, Ba!bir Singh, .RW 3, Balwant Singh, R W 4, Hazura Singh, R W s: a11d Gurdial Singh, RW 6, were' . '-. ' . -"}}, {"text": "PRITAM DASS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 41977, "end_char": 41988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\"f.·\n\n• I ' PRITAM DASS v: GURDWARA PRABANDHAK COMMI:rTEE. (", "canonical_name": "PRITAM DASS MAHANT"}}, {"text": "GURDWARA PRABANDHAK COMMI", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 41992, "end_char": 42017, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\"f.·\n\n• I ' PRITAM DASS v: GURDWARA PRABANDHAK COMMI:rTEE. ("}}, {"text": "Bhai BhagtU", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 42432, "end_char": 42443, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "i) there are Samadhs on tiw premis?S _of th' institution; (ii) there ate idols and photos of\"Hindu deities; (iii) Bhai BhagtU was a Udasi Saint; and-(iv) succession was frdm Gurll so Chcla .. The petition filecl by the appellant under , ,.", "canonical_name": "Bhai .Biiagtu"}}, {"text": "s.8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42562, "end_char": 42565, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bhai .Biiagtu", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 42730, "end_char": 42743, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".B\n\ns.8 of the Act co11tained a clear averm?nt that the instituiion \\lad' ' been set up by Bhai Bhagtu wl\\o was a Udasi Saint and the pre ... sence of three Samadhs of (1) Bhai .Biiagtu, (2J Baba Paras Ram Ji \"~ and (3), M\"fhant Sahib.", "canonical_name": "Bhai .Biiagtu"}}, {"text": "Baba Paras Ram Ji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 42749, "end_char": 42766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".B\n\ns.8 of the Act co11tained a clear averm?nt that the instituiion \\lad' ' been set up by Bhai Bhagtu wl\\o was a Udasi Saint and the pre ... sence of three Samadhs of (1) Bhai .Biiagtu, (2J Baba Paras Ram Ji \"~ and (3), M\"fhant Sahib.", "canonical_name": "Baba Para~ Rain Ji"}}, {"text": "M\"fhant Sahib. Dass", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 42779, "end_char": 42798, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".B\n\ns.8 of the Act co11tained a clear averm?nt that the instituiion \\lad' ' been set up by Bhai Bhagtu wl\\o was a Udasi Saint and the pre ... sence of three Samadhs of (1) Bhai .Biiagtu, (2J Baba Paras Ram Ji \"~ and (3), M\"fhant Sahib."}}, {"text": "Rani Saran Dass", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 42981, "end_char": 42996, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PW I, Rani Saran Dass stated that there 'was an id0l.ofBaba Srichand in."}}, {"text": "Baba. Srichand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 43253, "end_char": 43267, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "stated that there is ah idol of Baba.", "canonical_name": "Baba Sricharid"}}, {"text": "Gola Sahib", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 43273, "end_char": 43283, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gola Sahib in the institution and 1 D they are objects of worship.", "canonical_name": "Gola Sahib"}}, {"text": "Bishart Dass", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 43347, "end_char": 43359, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PW 3, Bishart Dass; referred to the, idol of."}}, {"text": "Jagial", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 43408, "end_char": 43414, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PW 4, Jagial stated that there."}}, {"text": "Surjit Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 44021, "end_char": 44033, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PW 7, Surjit Singh, the local Sarpanch stated that the\n\n'. '"}}, {"text": "Pritam Dass", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 44452, "end_char": 44463, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pritam Dass, the appellant did support.", "canonical_name": "PRITAM DASS MAHANT"}}, {"text": "Bachan Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 45651, "end_char": 45663, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thenext_witness; RW 2, Bachan Singh admitt.i'd the existence of the 'Samadhs but denied that the Samadh of Bhai Bhagtu was an objet ·\n\n'' \\,..,\n\nof worsliip."}}, {"text": "Baibir Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 45792, "end_char": 45804, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RW 3, Baibir Singh, admitted pie presence of Samadh of _;,.j,:-\n\nBhai Bha'gtu as also oC:his mother."}}, {"text": "Balwani", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 46050, "end_char": 46057, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to thls )vitness: RW 4, Balwani \"singh aditted the presence of Bhai Bhagtu's Samadh; while_ RW S, ·\n\n Hazura Singh stated that' there were two Samadhs oh the premiwr-, one of Bhai Bhagtu and the' other of his mother."}}, {"text": "urdia( Singh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 46271, "end_char": 46283, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The last witness, RW 6, c; urdia( Singh in his eidence admitted the existence offue tw\" Samadhs--o-of Bhai }lhagtu and liis mother. ' ·"}}, {"text": "Baba Sricand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 46714, "end_char": 46726, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Th~ existence of the idol of Baba Sricand, the' rofder o~ the~--~. ' Udasi sect in the premises.", "canonical_name": "Baba Sricharid"}}, {"text": "Bhai Bliagtu", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 47161, "end_char": 47173, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "--r\n\n' What emerges from this disu'ssion is tliat as found by the .Tribu\n\n1 nal; .the succession was from Guru t.o Chela1 that Bhai Bliagtu was a Udasi Saint and there are Samadhs on the premiseso11e of Bhai G Bhagtu' and .the other of hls mother.", "canonical_name": "Bhai .Biiagtu"}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_2_582_597_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "---- . c\n\n. -G\n\n582 ....\n\nJA:VfD RASOOL- BHAT & ORS; ETC.\n\n-· \"' . v.' : -STATE OF JAMMU &'KAS!-lMJR AND ORS.\n\nFebruary 16, 1984 ' \"\n\n(0. CH!NNAPPA REDD¥, E.S. VEN](AJ:ARAMIAH AND R:B. MJSRA, JJ.]. .-. . .\n\nEducationaJ. lnstitutions-Adniisston to .\n\n. M; dical. Colleges-AJn1ission to-Viva vote 1est-W!ieti1er Court Could io .into relewu.1cy of qiestions pu1'o candidates. ·· . . -~ . - . . .\n\nNat, ura/justice: .Medical Col/eges-Ad111issionto_:_Ca11did.tte elated to Mrnber of Selection Com11litee-SeleCtlo11 whethei vitia(ed. • .\n\nThe' State Governtnent issued an adveitiS111ent _inviting. application for ac!mis sion -to t)le fir.st year MBBScourse in the two medical colleges in'.the State. Jt ·.Was nlentio'ned therein that the candidates would have to appear ina written'tcst which would be followed by a ViYavoce test and that 85 points were _allowed for thewritten test 'and 15 pOints -were Vivavoce test. The 'SeleCtion con1mittec for the selection. was constitut.cd t_o conSist of the Chahn1p.n of the State. Public, Service Co1nmissi'on as Chainnan; and two members. vii., the Principals of the two -Medicil Colleges .. The quorun1 for a nJeeting of the Cori1111ittee was stipulated as the chair.man and .one me1nber. When the Selection Corrimittce held its -first n1eet i.ng Orle Or the 1nnbJrs, thC Principal of the College inforn1cd the~ Com'1nittee that as his daughti::r was one of the cartdidates con1peting for adn1ission, it' would nOt be desirabl~ for him to bC associated, at ny stage, with the wrlttcn test, arid that he, would not like to be preseht when liis.daulihtcr \\Vas interviewed>The Com1nittce took'note of ih_e inform<j.tiorl and agreed with the suggeStion ...\n\n. The petitioners in their writ petitions under Article 32, questioned the seleCt ion'ofcani:lidates for admission: It -was .. contendcdoi1 their behalf that.: (l)the entire selection_ was vitiated by th(: prescrice on the Comi:nittee of the father of a caddida.t~, and this was a 'gross violatiOn of one the .principles of najural Justice :\n\n(2) the entire procedure was ad as the marks obtained by the candidates at the qualifying examination (T.DC.:_art I Medical group) were not taken into account and 'not giVen any We_ight3.ge; (3) the viva.....:.....voce test provided for 1points for . general kno\"'.ledge and general 'inteIIi£-ei:iSe whereas it \\\\{ould have been_ mOre appro- . priate to test general knowlege ail(( general ii, telligencc' of t; andidate by holding..·\n\na written instead of a viva-voce test;. (4f gerieral knowledge and general intelligence ere not matters to be tested in a written exaininatiOn; ·(5) there . w_as delay in the-annOuncement of the results and the delay made the seICction suspect, and (6) the regulaiionS made by the , Indian Medical' Councii prescribed .thilt the marks obtained in the -qualifying examination Should be taken in to Conside1ation. . . . . ' :DismiSsing the writ petition ; . - HELD: 1. I{ is not unusual for Candidates.related to inembers ofthCService Commissiou. or othe'r Selecticin Committee t~ sek . elnp~yrneu~ .. -_Whenever St1ch a\n\n' '\n\n. . \\\n\n. } I.AVID RASOOL.V._J & K S~ATE (Chinnappa Rei/4y,_J.) 583 .\n\n\\' sitution arises, the' praCtice genreally is for, the' n1en1ber concerned io.exuse himstlf ~- <. .wlreii'thc parti'cular candjdateis interVieWed.\n\nIri the iristant cas~, .the Pricipa[ of th~·. Medicl college, wf1osc d~Ughter Was a canOfctai~ for adffiission to the Medical College .informed the Selection\n\nCommittee at the very outset about fhis f<Lct 3.nct told theQl that h~ woUJd 'not ·have anything to do with the writtentest and woul.i not be present When his daughter as inierviewect.-.\" The other members' -of the Selection COmtrtittee\n\ncepted th'C sugges'tion Of the PrinciPal\\ and did not addrc;:ss the G.overnmnt 'to appoint a sllbstitute member of the Selection. Committee, since ihc Govern-' .4.. ment had :(ixcid the quor 1 um -for a meeting of te Selection Committee, as_tbe\n\n 1.\n\nChairman and one o her member and it was possible to have a qudru_m -{ without ihe Pfincipal. The procedure adopted by the SeleetiOn Cornri::iitteC aod ·\n\n~ ... - ' the. !member' eonCerned was -m. accord with. the quite well-known.and generally accepted procedure adoptCd by the Public- Service Coihmissions 'everywhere.\n\n- ' - ' . . .\n\nNagarajan v. State of Mysore, Jl966J3- S.C.R. 682, . referr. d. to .. [5%A-CJ\n\n2. It is no't for.the Court tCI ·sit'.!. in judgmcµt. Over tc nature of the ...... ·- questiol1s t? be put' by, the membefs of. the_ Selection' Committee.\n\n'f'F _'It is for the, members' of the. Seleqtion Committee, to dec_ie what they should ask and so ong as the questions arc notSuch as to indicate-that the intefvicw' \\Vas nothing but. a ake--belicve, 'the matter mUSt be allov.ed\" to rest . there. It i~ not the function oftheCoµrt to weigh e:aCh questioll io find out the extent\n\nto which it is ·~\\.:.latedto aptitude,·. general knowledge_ or gerieraJ ntclligencc. If tl1e . question is riot fJ.ipparit, it is not for the cOurt to say that the question was irreleVant\n\nand ShO'qld not have beeti. asked. at any -inierview. Perhaps. irrelcv.allt questiolls , may also~ be asked to explore the candid3.te's capacity' tO detect: .irrelcyancies. lt is j..... not for the Court to clain1 to hself the task of determining the na, ture of the questions\n\n _ ./to be pi.it to candidates., apPearing t an i1:1terview .. , The persons consti.tuting the _; .. ?\" Selection Co111fQ.ittect who. may generally be assumed _to be n1en i of experience. and\n\n...--t~. _ knowledgCable in regar4 to men and nlaiters may st1rely be expe-ctCd to pu~ the fight\n\nquestios .. In th absence of rnalafidcS, th~ mitter, is bet left t~ the-n1. [58.9E'.GJ\n\n. ' \":3{i) Th qutin a-S to the subjects in wlic~· ~~ entran~ test may be heI~ is hardly a natter fof the Court, unless, of course, ihe subjects arq_ sO arbitrarily chosen as to.\\.ave not. the slightest-cnneciion witli the objeC~ of , th~ exami1a1ion.\n\nSuch a ; ituation is Uot likely to arise B.s:the authO}itieS rllay be expects:ci\" tO .act reasonably. Again it.is 1; ot fof the COurt to lay .down whether an interview test\n\nsliouldbe held .at 'all or how illany marks -hould be allOted for the intei-v:ieW test.\n\nOf coufse,. thernai:-ks n1ust-be. mini_mal so as .to :H.void charges of arbitrarinCss bllt not necessarily al\\vayS. There may be. posts and appoihtrrients whefe. the only proper method of selection may be by an interview test Even iii the case of admission to\n\n/ F\n\nhigher degrees courses, it may sOnietimes be necessary to allot a fairly high percentage. ' . G of nlarks for the interview test. -That'is why rigid iules cannot bC laid down in these.\n\natters, ahd.· not by -purts .. The , experts ae generally the -best.judges:. TheCourts\n\n~: duty IieS in pretenting arbitrariness and. denial ofeqUal opportunity. [592C-E,592B]\n\n. -3ii) , s interfere when the risk of arbitiariness 'is so high that\" arbitrafiness is inevitable .. AgaifJ. the Court is not the best judge of.what questi9ns :ffiay be asked at .the inter-view. All that is' 'nc6ssary is that the questions should not be H.\n\n_. ... amere pretence. [592F] · , ..\n\n'_,. . '•\n\n, .\n\n', -\n\n' Ajay Hasia's case, [1981] 2 S.C.R. 7.9 ;' Chitra 1i\"ekha a1!d Ors. 11. State of Mysore and Or_s.. [1964) 6 S.C.R. 368; A. Peeriakaruppan v.\n\n\n 4(i) Tle Selcctin Co1n1nittee appa:rentl; r 'bought it would be better .to have ' . va comrµon entrance test. It appears to be a perfectly reasonable procedure. Even otherwise it is always open to a Selection Co1nn1ittee to insist on taking into consideration marks Obtained at the exan1ination held by it and eXcluding from Considera'.'tion 1narks obtained in examinations held by Other bodies. There is nothing-' wrong in this procedure, [595C-D]\n\n4(ii) It wa's a matter for .the Selection. Conm1ittce to decide whether ., gfneral kno\\Vledge and general intelligence could be more appropriately .tested in the vivavoce tCst or in the written test. That is not a matier 'for the court to decide: [595F].\n\n5. There ,.was in fact no delay in The announcement of results and the suspicion, if.anY, was uounded. [595G] ' . ' -\n\n6. 'The regulation of the-Indian Mddical Council prescribing tha.t the marks otbiained, at the qualifyipg examination should be taken into consideration has no application becatise, ithere are two Medical colleges .in the sta'.te. Though only one Board conducted .. the qualifying exan1ination, the examinations ere conducted. separately for Jamr'nU and Srinagar areas and. on tv-io different occasions.\n\nMoreover, 'the-regulations of the Council haYe been held to be directory and ilot mandatory by this Court. [597 D-E) .\n\n' Madhya Prdesh. ;_ Kr. Nivedita Jain [1981] 4 S.C.C. 296, referred to. - ,_ ,,------ - OmGINA'L JumsmcTION : WRIT PETITION (C1v11)Nos. 13325-37. 13366, 13683 to 13687 ef 1983, 256-260 & 579-81 of 1984 (Under article 32 of the Constitution of India).\n\n~ '\n\n. .__,_ ' __,. ' Ani/ Dev Singh, As/wk S.en and S.B. Bhasme R. Satish; S.S. Gupta, J.b. Kotidhar 11nd S.S. Khanduja, for the Petitioner's.\n\nY.S. Chitale, G.L. Sanghi, S.N. Kacker •and V.M. Tarkunde. 'Alta/ Ahmad for Respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of .the Court was deiivered by ..\n\nCHINNAPPA REDDY, J. Writ petitions questioning admissions to the medical colleges at Srinagar. and Jammu appear to have become an annual feature in this court. In the previous years, there was some\" justification. It does not appear to be so this year. In these writ petitions, the selection of candidates for. admission to the two medical. colleges at Srinagar and Jammu as well as the _nominations by the\n\nGovernmentof Jammu & Kashmir to medical colleges outside the State are in qustio\\l On Max 24, 1983, the Governmen.t ofJammu\n\n...\n\n.JI\n\n' { -\n\nI•~•\n\n• ' ' ..\n\n' . . ~-·\n\n...\n\nJAVID RASOOL v, J & K s:rATE (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) ·.' 585\n\n.· & Kashmir issed an advertisement inviting applications from per-\n\nA .. manent residents of Jammu & Kashm'rState 'for admission to• the first year MBBS in the medical colleges it Jammu & Srinagar. One\n\nof the conditions of eligibility was that a candidate should have passed the \"First toe (Medical Group) xainination from Jammu & Kashmir . Boardof School Eduction wi!h ·at less than 50'.Y., oft.he total marks' in English , and Science subjects taken. together\" ... There w&s some re: · B laxation in favour candidates belonging to the Scheduled Castes, etc. with 'which we are not no\\;; coricernd, We are also riot concerned in these. wiit petitions with the 'reservations' made in favour of various , lasses. We are only concerned with the sea!s or. places available for ' open competition. The adve.ftisement expressly .mentioned, that the . candidates would have to appear in a wriiien test of 'TDC-Part I Stan-\n\n.. C 1\n\n. dard' comprising of two papern,\" one' paper consisting of .the subjects, .· Physics and Chemistry' and the other, .Biology -and English, It wao; - alsomentioned in'the advertisment that the candidates would be requ- , ired to appear at a' Viva-voce examination .. _on 7th July, 1983, the . Government of Jammu & Kashmir.published a notification called the · Jammu & Kashmir Government MediCal Colleges (Siection of Candi-. , D •\" •' . _ _,) dates for Admission tb First Year MBBS _Course) Procedure Order 1983, Paragraph 4 of the . order which is relevant is as follows:. - .\n\n,_,:\n\nI \"4. Merit :-:-:The inter-se•merit of the candidtes determined on the basis of the following:- . . . - .\n\n'(i) Written test\n\n(ii) Viva voce\n\n' .\n\nTotal\n\n., 85 Points\n\n.. 15 Points\n\n 100 Points '\n\nshall , be\n\n:..----:<.,...-..\n\nThe points earmarked for .. viva-voce will . further be sub- . divided into the following factors: . ' ' ' . ' ' . ~' .,. ,. .\n\n\\· '\n\n(a) Apptitude\n\n(b)G.K.GI\n\n8 Points.·\n\n•· . ; . 7 Points\n\n. ~~~~-'--~~~~~ Total.' .. 15 Points\" ,,\n\n>. ..\n\n':1'\n\n- E\n\n'i86 [l 984] 2 s.c.R.\n\n: 011 26th August 1983. a Selection Committee was constituted consisting of the, Chairman of the Jainmu and Kashmir Public._Se1'ice ' Commission as Chairman nd two members, namely, the Principals t of the two, Government Medical C~Ilegcs at Srinagar and Jammu.\n\nThe quorum for a meeting of the Committee was• stipula, ied as the Chairmanand one.member .. On the. same day by another notification it was directed that the Selection Committee should arrange and conduct the written test andevo\\ve its own procedure for appointing examiners and for .. the yonduct of. the examination, etc: n.e Selectio1; 'Commiitee held its first meeting , on September 2, 1983 when one of t]1e members~ the Principal of the Government Medical College; Srinagar informed the Committee'that his daughter was one of the candidates and that it would not be desirable for him to be associated, at any'stage, with the written.test to be conducted by the Corrimittee and further that he would not like to be pfesenr when his daughter was interviewed. The Committee took note of the information and agreed with the supgestion. As tlic.Govrnment had also fixe(L1 quorum for a rrteeting of the Committee, it was not conside.red necessary to have a substitute member appointed. Thereafter a &tailed' procedure was evolved for the written test and intcrviews.'_The Charirman waautho Tised to consult the Chairman of the Jan:unu & Kashmir Board of School Eduction and select the required number of cxainihcrs and paper-settors. The written test was conductd simultaneousiy at Jammu & Kashmir on Septembe_r 22, 1983. The written test was followed by. interviews from September 26, 1983 to October 11, 1983. One important factor wl\\ich requires to be.mentione.d here is that the marks secured in the written test by the respective cari~.idates was not available• to the Selection1Committee when the Committee interviewed the candidates .. The Committee met again on October 25, 1983 by which time 1 - ' - , the results of the written test were also available. The Selection Committee proceeded. with the task'or'finalising the selection. Jhe selected candidates were sent indiviudal intimations and on December 3. 1983, a notification was published by tlie Government of :rammu & Kashmir informing the public that the.result of the written test/Viva Voce:held\n\nfr admission to the First year of the_ MBBS Course for the Medical Colleges of the State was available in the offices of the Principals of the Government Medical Colleges atJamtnu and Srinagar. Candidates were also told that marks card would be issued on payment of a fee . of Rs. ~/- and that any candidate interested in seeing his/lier answer book could do so on payment _of Rs. 20/- as fee for each paper. Some of the facts mentioned above were taken by us from the counter affidavits filed on behalf of th<> Government of Jarrrrnu & Kashniir and were ncit admitted by the petitioners. Wedo not however have the slightest\n\n. _\n\n .\n\n...\n\n. '\n\n. JAVID RASOOL v. J &KSTATE (\\hinnappa .Reddy, J.) 587,\n\n. .· . . ; ' .' ·, ' , doubt about the coriectness of these facts, as they are fully supp0rted . . l)y tontepraneous official records,,\n\nThe. petitifjers,'have fil, ed these writ. petitons inipunging .the : se/ection made 'by the Committee .on various grounds. Jn their-peti~. !ions, they have inc1.ulged in serveral , allegati.Ons and insinuations for whic there is no basis whatsoever. Shri Anil Dev Singh, .learned coun. . sel for some of the petitioners raised .th'.ee tonteptions: The first was ·\n\n'that the entire selection was vitiatecl~ by the. prese, iJce o_n the C_ommji- . , 'tee (if the father of a candidate.' The second contention was th2t tho\n\nntire. procedure was.bad ciS the .tnarks 0b!.aii1ed by the- Candidates\n\n·~·· at the qualifying examination (TDC, PartfMedicai Group) were not taken into.account and not given , any, weightage whatever; The third contention was that the viva-voce test provided for 7 points for general knowledge 'and general intelligence wher.eas it would have been more. appropriate to t, est:the general knowledge and general intelligence of\n\n''l\"'\n\ncandidates by holding a written test i, nstead of a viva voce. test. Shri Anil Dev Singh also general 'y submitted that the viva voce , test was a rnere manoeuvrdesigned to bring in candidates who had.fared badly iii the written test Shri A.K. Sen, le.arned counsel who appca; ed for .'some of the other petitioners made only 'one 5ubmisionand it '..Jas.that . . 'the viva voce est .. Iiad wofked in an unreasdnal; Jc 'arid arbitir:fy n-·: nner; ir{Jact and as a matter of principle'. -He i:- 1aboraTfd tf:r subndssiori by arguing that though the two papers in. the writt•:n te~V curried\n\n550 marks, they were reduced to 85 points as against 15 points for the ·\\; viva voce test. The .result, according to him, was ihat candidates who ;'i.. got a lead of 20-?5 marks in the writtentes1 had to'bow dc\\\\n to f3ndi,\n\n~ dates who got a lead of 3 or 4 points in the viva vcce test as the marks . . . ' '- ' . ' .\n\n...\n\n·~\n\n' '\n\nobtained in the written test were reduced to points in the ratio of 550 to 85. Sh.ri Sen also 'submitted that the questions put lo the candidates .at .the iliterview were not designed to(test.ithH aptitude or general\n\nhnow!edge or general intelligence and for that reason, the selection\"\n\nwas vitiated, He suggested that the final results bcre 'c!c c; uont lesti.C 'inony t? te ij_ustice dQne tO t_he_ miority_comunity in -te State.~·\n\n\\ ~- We find no substnce whatever in any .of tlie subm'issions made by Shri Anii Dev Singh and Shr, i A.K,.\n\nSe11. We may straightway\n\nobserv.e tat the .insinuatio1i that the interviews were so cn, ductd as to do injustice to 'the minority community appears to us to be unchari- . table and impetuous. We find that there ai; e candidates belonging to both the majority and the minority communities among the cndi-· dates who were able, to' secure admi.s'sion because of the points scoed by them in the viva voce , test, as.also amongst the candidtes who\n\n'' '.\n\n' \\\n\n' '\n\n.. ----·\n\n•. -.\n\nA failed to secure admission because of their low score in the viva voce test. The inconsiderateness of the allgatioif is evident from the fact that the marks obtained by the candidates in the writien test were not even available to the Selection Committee when, they conducted the viva v.oce test. This circumstance is sufficient to repudiate the broad allegation freely made by Shri' Anil Dev Singh that the viva voce test B was designed to facilitate tlie selection of candidates who had fared badly in the written test.\n\nThe submission that the questions put ti:> the candidates at the intervie\\v were not designed to test either the aptitude, general hno\\'{- ledgeor gerieral .intelligence of the candidates is equally without sub-· stance. In the writ petitions, no such averment was made nd no instances were given. In the petition a general allegation was made thaUhe viva voc; e test had been abused to dilute the otherwise high merit of the. petitioners. On behalf of the respondents, one of the members of the Selection Committee;· Dr. S.L. Verma, Principal of the Government Medical College, Jammu filed a counter-affidavit in which, he stated'. ....... Notless than six minutes were. spent on each candidate though\n\n0 in certain cases interview lasted for more than. ten minutes. All the candidates were. fully and fairly assessed and it is denied that .the candidates. were interviewed only to mainpulate the results. The candidates were questioned by the members , of seJectfon Corµmittee only in respect of factors of interview prescribed in SR0-380 dated 7-7-1783 and the entire process was above board and extremely fair. I submit that. the result of the written test became available to .the members of the selection committee only after. the interviews had . been completed\", After this couhter-affidavit had been filed, some of the petitioners chose to file 'rejoinder affidavits' to suggest that their 'interviews lasted for about two to three minutes only and that questions relating to the aptitude, general knowledge or. general intelligence of the candidates were not asked. It was .stated that some some of the candidates were asked the names and occuptions of their /\n\n. '' ' . parents or brothers, and some were asked why he or she wanted to becbme\n\n0 a doctor and so on.Aarti Kaul stated in her affidavit that1 G she was also asked to give an example of Collard (?) of the human' body, that she replied that it was blood and she was then asked what the constitution of blood was, to which s\\le replied \"Plasma Haemoglobin RBC Serum''. Rajesh Gupta,.another cano.idate, stated that his interview lasted for .two or. three minutes and apatt from questions 'relating to the name and oocupatin of his father and brothers, h~'was\n\nalso asked to define 'absolute zero' and 'international ampere': He answered both the questions. He claimed that he was asked no que- . ' .\n\n. '\n\nJAVID RASOOE v. J & K\n\n00STATE\n\n0 (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) \\- - . 589\n\nstin relatillg to aptitude, generaJ.kno:.vledg~ or general Intelligence.· A-\n\n' . . ' . ' ' - ' ' ~.' . , . . -· We are of theveiw'thatthere is no genuine basis for any compfaint in regard to the nature of .the questions which the can4idates were\n\nasked in the. viva voce test. We accept. the statement ofD.'Vrma that the Selection Committeeput relevant qriestion to the candidates to test their aptitude, general knowledge , and general intelljgence .. Anyoe who has served on aSelection Con1mit(ee and interviewed candidate.s ·\n\nknows that a large number of candidates are nervous and inorder to \"... put them at ease.'it is wcessary to' ask thenitostart with, innocuous . _ 4-, . questions, such: as what is vour father's occupation'? whi@h part of the country do yo~ cbme f;; m ?, 'what is your m'other-tongue? and .. so on.' .Such qustions are intended to enable the candidate, to fec; l at ease and get over his nervousness. No complaint can surely to made that' candidates were put .such questions. We also fail to see. h'ow any . . complaint can be made of the fact thai questions t>n science subjects . _ ·~ were asked of candidates seeJdng admission to medical colleges, Surely\n\n. such questions are at .least as good as questions about the name ofthe\n\n'capital of n obscure Latin American State or .who captained India\n\n D , in the SeconU test ma, tchagaii1st Pakistan.in I?SO, W~ entertain on'\n\ndoubt that the questions asked .were proper and relevant. We add that it is not for the co.urt to sit in judgment over the nature. of the questions to be put by the members of the Selection Committee. It is\n\n....\n\n~ for 'the members of. the . Selection Co1nmittee . to' decide what questions they should ask and so log 'as the q; i-estions are not _. &uch as to. indicate' that the i;\\erview was nothing but a make-believe.\n\n-\"'-we rnst allow the matter to rest ther~ .• It 'is not the function of the ·\n\nEI'\n\n'°Cburt to weigh eacl; question to find out the extent to whcih it is related\n\no aptitude, general knowledge or gep.enral intelligence. ff the question \\ ..\n\nis not flippant, it is not for the court to say.that the question was iire- ·\" Jevant and should riot have been asked at an interview. Perhaps irrele' :,- . vant questions !nay also be asked to_explo're the 'candidate's capacity !> to detect irrdevancies~ It is nt for the court tolaimto.itselfthe task ·.: 'r . of determining tlie nature 9f the questions to be put to carididates appearing at an interview: The persons constituting. the Selection . Coin'mittee who may generally be assu!\"ed to be. men ofle, Wrience,\n\nand knowledgeable rn regard to men and matters my surely be expe- G cted to put the right questions. 'Jn the absence of malafides, the maatter is best'left to them.\" ; · -~\n\n. ;--, /\n\n. . . .. . / .. . .. ' . ' / Mr. Sen made a complaint that \\he mrks obtained in the writ' ten 1:est :.vere reducec to pomts and this -hail ·-resulted in ca11didate• who had fared well in the interview stealing a march over •oine candi- . ' •\n\n,_,\n\n:H-·\n\n. \\.\n\n'~ ,_\n\nI n:\n\n. H\n\n590 SUPREME COURT R!Sl'ORTS\n\n\n' dates whn had fared well .in the wriUen test. The rules require that 85 points should be awarded for the written test and 15 points for the viva voco test. Therefore, although the written tests carried a total of 5~'.) m irks, the marks obtained by each candidate had to be necessarily reduced to points onthe basi's that 85 points equalled 550 markS The gr.ievance is plainly imaginary. ·. • ' \" Both.Mr.. Anil Dev Singh and Mr. A.K. Sen invited our attentiOn to the observations of this courl'•in Ajay Hasia 's'11 case in regard to the desireability of holding viva voce test !Cl) select candidates for ad1nission to p'rofessional colleges and in regard to the manner of conducting suchtsts. The Qourt after referring to the criticism levelled against viva voce test observed:. \"Now this criticism cannot be said to be whoHy. unfounded and it reflects a point of view whi'ch has certainly some validity'.' The court then quoted M.P. Sharma on Public Administration'. in 'Theory and Practice'. and Gle1\\n Stahl on •Public P 'Cs Jnnel Admi'nistration' a.nd observed \"But, despite all this criticism, ihe oral interview mefod con1inues to be' very. much ; in vogue as l suppelmentary test for assessing the suitabi!jty of candidates wherpver test pf personal traits is con;; idered essential. Its relevance as' a .test for determ'ning suitabilty based on personal characteristics h3.S been recognis6d ih a number of decisions of this court which. 1 are1Jinding Up Jn us\". The Court then quoted from rhitra Lakita and\n\nOthers v. Slate' of My.iore and Others\"> and A. Pseriakarupfan v.\n\nState of Tamil Nadu & Others<a> and observed: . / . ' . ·,\n\n\".ft is therefore, not possible to accept the contentions of the .Petitioners that the oral interview test is so defective that\n\neJ.ecting candidates for admission on the basis of oral intervciw in addition to written test must be regarded as arbitrary. The' oral interview test is und<mbtedly not a very satisfactory test for assessing and eva]u;1ting the capacity and calibre of candi-\n\n' ' ' da teS, ~'ut in the absenc2 of any better test for measurin, g perisonal ,\n\n, ch, iracterLstics .and traits, the oral iTiterviev.1 test '.must, at the , pNsent stage be regarded as 11ot irrational or irrelevant though \\ ' ' . ' _it is subjective and based on first i.mprcssion_; its result is jf!ue:-iced by m1ny uncertain factprs and it is capable of abuse. We would, however, Ji ke to point out th, it in the matter of admis, sion to college or even in the matter of public employment, the\n\n• \\ I ' • 0 ' '\n\n\n(3) {1971) 2 S.C.R. 430. .. .\n\n' '\n\nJAV!D RASO()L v. J & K STATJJ' (Chimzppa Reddy, J.) . 591.\n\n oral inte; view test as presently held should not be_ relied upon A. • as an exclusive test, but it niay be resorted to only as a1i additfo- .. - . . . e .. - . nal or supplementary test and, moreover; great care must. be be taken tci see that persons who are appointed iO_ conduct the_ ornl in, rview test are inen of high integrity, calibre and qualification' . . . . . . . . . .. .• . e . _The Court the_n pro.cceded to consider whether the allocation of •.. as _high percentage as 331/3 of t)je .total marks for the viva voce test did: .not render the-· admissio_n procedure arbitray. Jt was held• that . ..., ·· .it did make the skctiori procedure arbitrary but even so theselec.tio\"n\n\n_.I . was_ not _set .. aside _as 18m_onths had 'elapsed since the selection and. -'!:;' no rr, iala fids had bee1iestablished. _The court finally considered the C. \"argument that each candidate wa:S not in-tervhved for more than two\n\nr three minutes and rele_vant questions were .not asked. Taking . note. of the cii'cunisfahce , that .no affidavii had been filed either by a member pf the Seection Committee or by any other officer who_ was present at ihe interview, ihvas thought that the allegations of tne.\n\n• .• -. ' ' '. ' >'-· ' ' ' - ' ,. .. petitioners had tobe accepted: It was then said that \"if that be so, the D .' oialo iuteriew test must be hCld to be. vitiated and the selection made\n\non the basis ot such test must be hold to b~ -rbiirary\". However, for the reason that IS months had already elapse; i., it was not thought proper to strike down the' :selections alr.ady made. Threafter the.\n\n. ,. ··. folloWing obervation, s. \\vee .. mad~: · E\n\n, J. .. . \"Vie may point out. that, in our opinion, if 'the marks allocated for the. oral interview do not exceed J 5% of the total . marks ad the candidates ·. are properly interviewed . and ...\n\n- ~-'-:\n\n•· .. ..\n\n .. releva1\\t questions are aked with a view to _assessi1ig their .suit- ability.with reference to the factor~ equired tci ·.be taken into\n\nconsid, ration, .the oral interview test would satisfy the critr ion of reasona_bleness an_d non-arbitrariness. • We thii1k that it wottld. also be desirable .if the interview of-the candidates is tape-reeorded, for\" in that eventhere will _be conteinpo, .\n\n.r~cousevid~11ce to. s~()w. wl1at''were the C}_ueStions asked to ihe candidates by the interviewing committee and what were . . the answers give11 and _that will eliminate _a lot of unnecessary ·\n\ncontraversy besides acting as a clieck on the possible_. arbitrrine_ss of. the intervieWing co!llmittee\". . ·\n\nF .·\n\n• It wold be noticed tha_t niost of the observations were. made . with a vie_; to enable the Government to devise a selection prncedure H , which would he above r.eproach, H: was never intended to lay down .\n\n: . .\n\n. F\n\n--' .•\n\nany hard and fast rules; In the very nature ofthihgs it would not .b~ . within the proviric.e or even the competence of the Couri and the.court would not venture ; into such exclusive thickets to discover ways out, . when the matte{$ ate mere appropriately kft to the. wise expertise of medica 1 academicians intllres!ed in the quality and intety of medjcal ·• . education and public administrators conversant with various adini.'\n\nstrative nd socio-economic problems.\"., needs and requirements. The Court's duty'iil's in preventing arbitrarines.s and denial of equal opporc tun.ity. The question as to the subjects in which an entrance test may · · be held ishardly a matter for' the cou; t, unless; 'or course, the subjects ' . . .:: are so arbitrarily c!iosen as to have not the slightest connection with\n\n, the object of the examination.' S.uch a situation is not likely to arise : -j. . as the aut)iorities may be expected to. act reasonably. Again it is not 1 for the court to lay down whether.an interview test should be. held at . all or how many marks should .be allotted for the invefview test.\n\nOf course, the marks must. be mininiaPso as.to avoid charges'ofarbitrariness but not necessarily always. There may be posts and appoint-.. ments where the only proper method pf selection may be by an intervew test. Even in the case of admission to higher degree courses, it may some .times be necessary to allot afrurly high percentag~ of nlllrks .. forthe interview test; For'admission tq a Ph. D course, for example, :' · ·.candidates niay have to be consumn1ately interviewed, each of them\n\n.•. t :for a few hours;. perhaps; efore any decision can be taken a.s to 'who. inay be admitted_. That. is why we say rigid rules cannot be_ laid in t]lese matters, and not by Courts~· The xpert bodies are generaliy the bestjudges, 'An that we may say is that allocation ofa high percentage of marks for admission to.under-Graduate courses should be avoided as thee isa risk of a certain amount of arbitrariness which may lead to frustration of the very object of t_he selection. ai1d disrepute. of the .\n\nsvstem.· Courts interfrre when the rlsk of arbitrarine.ss is so high that\n\nabitrariness is invitable. Again the. court is i1pt the best judge of .\n\nwhat questions may. be asked at the interview. As mentiol'led by' us ._. oatUer; all that is nece'ssary is that the questions should nvt be a ri\\ere ,. pretence. . .. . . . . ,•\n\nAU thit we lia ve said above i~ oly to supplement wat has been said in Ajay Hasia\"s case ai\\d in the case .of Lila Dhar -vs. State of Raja' sthan'\". In the. latter .case after refefring to the K_othari Committee's report on Recruitment Policy a_nd Selection Methods, we said: .\n\n. .\n\n. (I) [1982] l S.C.R. 320.\n\n_,_._.\n\n. .-\n\nJ AVID RASOOL V. J\n\n' - . .. . . -. ; . .~,· . . . . . &. KSTATE (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 593 . . . . - ~\n\n.· ·. ''It is now well recognised that while a written examina~ . tion assesses it caJfdidate'sknowledge and intellectual ability; ·· . ari interview test is valuable io assess a candidate's oerail . · inteliectual and perional.qualitie~: whil~~ writtenexaminqtiori has. certaindistinct dvantage . over the: inter~; ew test ti1ere are yet rio writteri tests. whiCh ,<:an evaluate a candidatcs's initiative, alertness, rsourcefulness; dependableness, coope- . ·. rativeness, capaciil' for clear and logical' presentation, cffecti' .\n\n 'VMess, in discussi_on: elfetiveness in IJleetingand dealing with others,\"adaptability,. judgment, ability . to make decision, \"ability to lead, fotellectual arid moral integrity:. Sbme of. the.se\n\nqualities may be.evaluated, perhaps ; vith soine .. degree . of error,. by. ap interview fest, much depe.nding on thecoristitu- . ti oh of iJie ·.interview Board.\" ··\n\nWe then .re!erred to CJlrtn Stahl on .'Ptibli~ PersnneF Adlnis- .. . . tration and the United Nations Hanel.book ri Civil.Sorvice Law and\n\nPfactice\". We furt1i\"er said:\n\n- • . ·.,.\n\n\"Thus, the written examinatio~ assesses .ihe Jna~'s inieliect a.nd theinterviw te.stthe man himself and \"the twain shall njeet\" .• for a proper skction.: ifbpth written exainination ancHnterview . . test are to be esseritjal feiturcs of proper.selectin, .the question\n\n. may aris.e as to. ihe weight to be attached respectively. to them ..\n\nIn the case of.admissio11 to 'a college; :for instance, where the candidate's petscinality is yet.to develop arid it is too' erly to. idontify thepersonai qualities for which greater impo\"riance may . have to be attached in later !ifo, gceate(weight h.as per. for.ce td . ·.be given to .performance in.the written examination. The imper' . '\n\ntantc to be attached to the.interview testmust be minial..That\n\n- ws what was decided by this Court in Perfakaruppai1 v. State' .\n\nof Tamilnadu, Ajay Basia etc. v. Khalid Mujib Seharvardi & ors:ctc.; (supra) and other cases. on th.ii other han'd, in the case of services.to wbkh .recruitmeni has'nccessarily fobe made\"from .persons• f m:; ture personality, interview test may be \"the only\n\nway,\".stibject'to basic: and essenti~I acadeinic and professiori0.l . requirements being satisfied. 'ro.subjecJsuchpersons to a written\n\nexamination . may yield unfruitful and. negative re§ults, apart fron1 its being an act of cr11elty to those perso:fis, There a.re/of co Urse~ many services to WhiCh tecpJit:illerit .is made ffom: yo\"unger'. cimd\\dates whos~ personalities areoihhe threshdld of ct6velopc. ment nd , who show signs of great pr6Il)ise, ahd the' ·.discerning may in an intervie1~ test, catch a glimpse of.the future personality .. ·\n\n.~·. '' .•\n\nD .\n\n. F\n\n594 -SUPREME com\\T' REPORTS\n\n. Iri the case of such services, where sound. selection mµst combine . academic ability with p'ersonality promise, sonie weight has to\n\n- be given, though not much too great weight, t<;> the interview test. There_ cannot -be-any-rule of thumb regarding the 'precise . weight to be given. It must varylromservice to.service according .\n\nt,0 the requiremets of the service, the 1ninimum qualifications .prescribed, the age group from which the selection-iii to be made, the body to' which the tasl<-of holding th!) interview test is proposed to be entrusted and a host of other.factors.: it'is a matter fer determinatiori by experts. It is a matter for research. It is not._ 4 , for Courts to proriouce upon it unless exaggerated weight has been given with proven or obvi_ous oblique motives. The Kothari _ ~: .\n\nCommittee also suggpted that in view o( the o_bvjous importanc~ · ( of the subject, it may be exami1icd in detail by the Research Unit of the Union of' Public Service Commission.\". ·\n\n. . , At this.juncture whilewe are quoting froin the earlier decision -. _, . of the court in Liladhar v. State Of Rajasthan, we may as well refer to the criticism of. Shri Anil Dev Singh that block marks should not have been _allocated. for' general knowledge and general intelligence.\n\nOur observationsin Liladhar's case, which we have extracted below, _. answer this point. alsci: .\n\n'.'The rules 'themselves do not provide for. the allocation of . marks under different heads .at .the in\\ervi(:w test. The ct'ite.ria for the interview test has been laid down by the. -rules. It is fqr ihe intervie1ving. body to take a geceral ·\n\ndecisibn whether. to allocate mark.sunder different heads or to award marks in a single Jot: The award of marks under different heds ma~Jad to a distorted picture of the candidate on occasions. On the other hand the totality cf the impression created by the candidate on the interviewing bcdy may ' give. a more accurate picture of the candidate's personality.· It is f<;>_r the interviewing body to choose. the appropriate' method of marking at the selectjon to each service. There cannot be any magic formulate\"in these matters and courts cannot sit it judgment over the, methods C:f marking employed by i1ter, viewing bodies unless, as we said, it is proven or obvious that the: method of marking was chosen wlth oblique motive.\n\n\"It is frue that in Periakafoppah's case the. Coqrt held that the n<iriail9catioff Of.mar.ks under variolls heads in the interview test was illegal but that was bccau_se the ins!ructions\n\n-, ..\n\n,..\n\n. , .. ·,\n\n• JAV!D RASOOL v. J .& K STATE(Chbinappa Reddy; J.)_ .. 595 . . . ' . . . .\n\n to the -Selection Committee . 'provided that marks were to c · be awarded at the interview on tJie basis of five disti11ct . tests. H was thought that the failllre to allocate markS.\n\nunder each bqd or distihCt tet~ wa'n illegality''.\n\nThe criticism thatthe Selection procedurcwas bad becalis~ the marks obiained , by the candidates at the respective qualifying exami- :., nations wore not taken into account; but only the niarks in the written test a1id. the oral test conducted by the Selection Committee, has also\n\n {c-, · no force. We we1'e told that the qualifying examination, that is,· the . , First TDC (M, a, ical Group) exawination was held at diffrent times\n\n ih Jamnrn and Srinagar. Naturally the question papers,, etc.··must have been different. The Selection Committee aprarently thought that it would be better to have a :common entrance te'st. It appears to us to be a .perfectly reasonable procedure. Even otherwise it is always.· open to a Seledon Committee to insist on taking into' c-0nsideration marks. obtained-at the examin_alion held by it only and excluding from cansideration marks. obtained ih examinations held by other bodies.\n\nWe are unable to see anything .\\vrong .in this procedure. A similar . contention was negatived in Ajay Rasia's case alo where. 'it was obser- ., ved:\n\nJi....: . '~It is diflic.ult to appreciate how aprocedurc for admission w, hich\n\n•• I\n\n. C'\n\n.. does not. take· into account the . marks bbtjlineUat the qualifying .· .J..[_, exa1nination, but prefers fo test th.e comparative merit of the candidates E by insisting on an entrance hamination can every Ile said to be arbi:.. rary\"; •.· · -\n\n. !.:., .....\n\nTwo. other submissiohs which were made in the . course of the · 'r argument n\\ay also be disposed of here. Orie was.th<t_t general knowc \" ·;;.ledge and, gerieral inteHigcnce were not matters to be.Jested in 4:he jva ' vocetest, but should _have been tested in a. written examination. That is not a. matter for this Court t6 .decide. It was .a matter for the Selection Committee. to de.cide whether general. knowledge ad general .intelligence could be more appropriately tested in the viva voce test or in tlie written test. The other sµbniissiori was tl; iat there was delay jn the anno.uricement of results and the delay made the .selection suspect. We .... ·, find that there was in fact no delay and.we only add that the.suspicion, ·\n\nif any, was unfounded. _. ·\n\ndi; j _We finally come to the submission on which Shri Anil Dev-Singh laid considerable emphasis, namely, that the entire selection was vitia- ted. by the presence cmthe Selection' Committee of theJather of oe\n\n_, ,_,\n\n.G •\n\n. R\n\nG ;\n\n~ of the candidates .. This was said to be a gross violation of one ofthe '\n\n. principles otnatural justice. The grivance is not reaL The .Principal .\n\nof Medical. College, Srinagar,' whose daughter. was a caric\\idate; for admission to the Medic:al College informed. ihe Selection Committee at the very outset aboutthi.cact and told them that he would not have' • . anything to do. with the written test e.11d would no.t 'be present when • . . . ·,' . . . . . his daughter was interviewd; The 9ther members •of the. Selection\n\nCommittee accepted the suggestion of ibe Principal and did . not . think it ne.cessary t~ add; ess the . Governm.ent to appoint a . snbsti- ·\n\n. ...: . '\n\ntute •member of the: Selection Coriimittee since the Government had :1' fixed.the quo'rum fot a meetingof the Selection Co, mmittee as:th~ Chairman.and' one other member and'it was possible to have a quorum. without the .Principal of the Medical College, Srinagar. The prccedure adopted by the Selection Commit.tee ad the member .cqncerned .was in accord.with the quite well-known and generaIJy:acceptedyrocedure : adopted bi the Public Service Commissions every \\\\.here. It is not umisual for candidatenelated to members of the Service Commission .. er other Selection Committee t<) seek employment Whenever such\n\na situation arises, the practice generaJ'Jy is. for the' m<mber concerne.d to ecuse. 'himseif . when the pa1:ticlar candidate is. inter.viewed. We notice. that such a 'situation had also .been noticed by this court in: the case of Nagarjan ~- State of Mysore w where it was polnted out'that . in ihe absence of mala fides, it would not be' tight to.set aside the slec- '* tfon merely because one, of tlie c; andidates happened t\" be reiated . ·\n\nto 'a . me1nber •of the Selection Commission who had abstained froin. parliipating-in the interview of that candidate. Nothing\" unusual was ~~\n\ndne by 'lhe preseni Selection Committee, The girl's fat]1er wat not present .when she was interviewed, She was one among several hundre.d cadidates. The marks obtained by her. in the written test were not. ·\n\n.'f. . eveii :kno,;, n: when she was interviewed, And, in fact, ;,., e .find that as\n\n· a resu. It of her P.erformance at the \"interview, slie l.st rather.than gainecl . . ~· . soine ·.places. - · · · • • I . ' .\n\n. Great re.liance was. placed by the learned couns.cl 011 A..K,· Kraipak .·& Ors. v, Union, of india 12.i on \"the question of natilral justice. We. do J; ot .think that .. the case is of any assistance to the petitioners. It was a case where one of the person~, who sat as member oLthe Selection\n\nBoard,. was. himself one of the persons to .be considered for selection:· . He participated in the deliberations of the Selection Boad when. the claims. of bis rivals were.considered. He participated in thedecisions\n\n' (1}{1970] I S.C.C, 457,\n\n(2) [1966) 3 S.C, R. 682.\n\n.. ' '.\n\n.. .\n\n597' •\n\nI . . . relting to the prdors'.or preference and s<mioriiy .. He particiated at . A . : . 'every stage\" in the .. delibeq!.ions of the Selecti.on .Bo.ardan<l at every\n\nrstage there 1vas a cortffict between his'hiterest arid dnty. The court bad1 '\n\n.· no hesitation in.coming lo the :tonc!Bsion that.there was a rea~'9nab!e. .. Iikelihoqd of bias and therefore, ther, e wai a xiolatioii of the principles\n\nof natt:ral justice. Jn the' case , before us .. the \"Principal of the Medical . College~ Srinagar, dissociatedJiimself from the Written test ai{d did. :fl Ir.;. nofpartici.pa te in. the proceedings. when his daughter was interviewe<l .. . ·.When the other candidates were interviewed, he '.ctid not know 'the\n\n::~ ; .marks bfained .eiiher by .. his dai.lghter .or by ny of the candidates. ·\n\n. There ;.va~ no occasion to: suspet his. bona ftdes even remotely .. There .. was not eyen suspicfon of bias.leave alone a reasonable Jikelih.ood 'of bias. There was no viola.lion of the principale_s of natural justice.\n\n. C ',·. ., ':\", . ,,. _ ..\n\nOne last submissio11, which we may note: was that there was f a contravention of one Of the regulations made.by .the Indian Medical . CounCil._It was. said. that .the regulation pescrili6d that the marks . . .. obtained at the qualifying examination should be taken into .conside~·\n\n fatiori in States l)aviµg only one Medkru College and one University/. . D Board/Examination BJdy . conducling .the qualifying examination .. ·.\n\nThis . iegi.tfatio, n., has no. application because the<e are two Medical ._ Coilegesfo this , Sfate. Though olily one Board conductec1 theiqualify~ .. fog , eaniination; .the, examinat)ons:•were ·. Conducted. separateiy .'.for,\n\nJamiriu .and .Srinagar aroas and on fwo different' occasi6ns; In the );. .. second. place; these regulationshave benheld. to be directory and not E 'mariilatory by th.is court , in State of Madhya Pratfesh v; Kr. Nivediia . J.ilin; 11 >\n\n-?' ~- \\ .. . We hayeconsidered the various points 'raised by the petitioners. r. ·at sonie length, .we have said so much and we 11ave quateariom ihe\n\n. :F previous judg1nents of thisC<iurt in exterise not because we find any ... ' : substance in' any of the contentions, but .because these .conten, tionsare '. .\n\nb.iirig reeatedly. rai, sed in many such cases and .we desire to .discou- . .. ra.ge, the raising. of un, necessary hope'in th.e minds .cif thC. young:men : . arid wome~ seeldng the aid' of courts for itdinission into professional. collegis, ready as t\\ley are t~ chich at any straw .. We dismiss all the . G: ·\n\nWrit petitions but in the circums.tances without costs. . • . . . . . ' ..\n\n' Petitions dismissed. : .. '\n\n: - I • ' . '\n\n., =:·", "total_entities": 61, "entities": [{"text": "JA:VfD RASOOL- BHAT & ORS; ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 26, "end_char": 56, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "JAVED RASOOL BHAT & ORS. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF JAMMU &'KAS!-lMJR AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 74, "end_char": 108, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1742, "end_char": 1752, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1981] 2 S.C.R. 7", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 7197, "end_char": 7214, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State of Mysore", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7249, "end_char": 7264, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State of Mysore and Or_s.. [1964) 6 S.C.R. 368; A. Peeriakaruppan v.\n\n 4(i) Tle Selcctin Co1n1nittee appa:rentl; r 'bought it would be better .to have ' ."}}, {"text": "[1964) 6 S.C.R. 368", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 7276, "end_char": 7295, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Tle Selcctin Co1n1nittee", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7326, "end_char": 7350, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State of Mysore and Or_s.. [1964) 6 S.C.R. 368; A. Peeriakaruppan v.\n\n 4(i) Tle Selcctin Co1n1nittee appa:rentl; r 'bought it would be better .to have ' ."}}, {"text": "Srinagar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8500, "end_char": 8508, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "separately for Jamr'nU and Srinagar areas and."}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8880, "end_char": 8890, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8898, "end_char": 8919, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S.B. Bhasme R. Satish", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8976, "end_char": 8997, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ani/ Dev Singh, As/wk S.en and S.B. Bhasme R. Satish; S.S. Gupta, J.b."}}, {"text": "S.S. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8999, "end_char": 9009, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ani/ Dev Singh, As/wk S.en and S.B. Bhasme R. Satish; S.S. Gupta, J.b."}}, {"text": "S.S. Khanduja", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9030, "end_char": 9043, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kotidhar 11nd S.S. Khanduja, for the Petitioner's."}}, {"text": "Y.S. Chitale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9068, "end_char": 9080, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Y.S. Chitale, G.L. Sanghi, S.N. Kacker •and V.M. Tarkunde. '"}}, {"text": "G.L. Sanghi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9082, "end_char": 9093, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Y.S. Chitale, G.L. Sanghi, S.N. Kacker •and V.M. Tarkunde. '"}}, {"text": "S.N. Kacker", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9095, "end_char": 9106, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Y.S. Chitale, G.L. Sanghi, S.N. Kacker •and V.M. Tarkunde. '"}}, {"text": "V.M. Tarkunde", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9112, "end_char": 9125, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Y.S. Chitale, G.L. Sanghi, S.N. Kacker •and V.M. Tarkunde. '"}}, {"text": "CHINNAPPA REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9206, "end_char": 9221, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of .the Court was deiivered by ..\n\nCHINNAPPA REDDY, J. Writ petitions questioning admissions to the medical colleges at Srinagar.", "canonical_name": "CHINNAPPA REDDY"}}, {"text": "Jammu", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9572, "end_char": 9577, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "colleges at Srinagar and Jammu as well as the _nominations by the\n\nGovernmentof Jammu & Kashmir to medical colleges outside the State are in qustio\\l On Max 24, 1983, the Governmen.t ofJammu\n\n...\n\n.JI\n\n' { -\n\nI•~•\n\n• ' ' ..\n\n' . ."}}, {"text": "Governmentof Jammu & Kashmir", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9614, "end_char": 9642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "colleges at Srinagar and Jammu as well as the _nominations by the\n\nGovernmentof Jammu & Kashmir to medical colleges outside the State are in qustio\\l On Max 24, 1983, the Governmen.t ofJammu\n\n...\n\n.JI\n\n' { -\n\nI•~•\n\n• ' ' ..\n\n' . ."}}, {"text": "Government of Jammu & Kashmir.published", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11068, "end_char": 11107, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Government of Jammu & Kashmir.published a notification called the · Jammu & Kashmir Government MediCal Colleges (Siection of Candi-. ,"}}, {"text": "Jainmu and Kashmir Public._Se1'ice ' Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11960, "end_char": 12007, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a Selection Committee was constituted consisting of the, Chairman of the Jainmu and Kashmir Public._Se1'ice ' Commission as Chairman nd two members, namely, the Principals t of the two, Government Medical C~Ilegcs at Srinagar and Jammu."}}, {"text": "September 2, 1983", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12504, "end_char": 12521, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the examination, etc: n.e Selectio1; 'Commiitee held its first meeting , on September 2, 1983 when one of t]1e members~ the Principal of the Government Medical College; Srinagar informed the Committee'that his daughter was one of the candidates and that it would not be desirable for him to be associated, at any'stage, with the written.test to be conducted by the Corrimittee and further that he would not like to be pfesenr when his daughter was interviewed."}}, {"text": "Jan:unu & Kashmir Board of School Eduction", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13253, "end_char": 13295, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'The Charirman waautho Tised to consult the Chairman of the Jan:unu & Kashmir Board of School Eduction and select the required number of cxainihcrs and paper-settors."}}, {"text": "Jammu & Kashmir", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13408, "end_char": 13423, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The written test was conductd simultaneousiy at Jammu & Kashmir on September 22, 1983."}}, {"text": "September 26, 1983", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13498, "end_char": 13516, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "interviews from September 26, 1983 to October 11, 1983."}}, {"text": "October 11, 1983", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13520, "end_char": 13536, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "interviews from September 26, 1983 to October 11, 1983."}}, {"text": "October 25, 1983", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13796, "end_char": 13812, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One important factor wl\\ich requires to be.mentione.d here is that the marks secured in the written test by the respective cari~.idates was not available• to the Selection1Committee when the Committee interviewed the candidates .. The Committee met again on October 25, 1983 by which time 1 - ' - , the results of the written test were also available."}}, {"text": "December 3. 1983", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14032, "end_char": 14048, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jhe selected candidates were sent indiviudal intimations and on December 3."}}, {"text": "atJamtnu", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14362, "end_char": 14370, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1983, a notification was published by tlie Government of :rammu & Kashmir informing the public that the.result of the written test/Viva Voce:held\n\nfr admission to the First year of the MBBS Course for the Medical Colleges of the State was available in the offices of the Principals of the Government Medical Colleges atJamtnu and Srinagar."}}, {"text": "Government of Jarrrrnu & Kashniir", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14703, "end_char": 14736, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Some of the facts mentioned above were taken by us from the counter affidavits filed on behalf of th<> Government of Jarrrrnu & Kashniir and were ncit admitted by the petitioners."}}, {"text": "Anil Dev Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 15286, "end_char": 15300, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Anil Dev Singh, .learned coun. .", "canonical_name": "Anil Dev Singh"}}, {"text": "A.K. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16226, "end_char": 16234, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Anil Dev Singh also general 'y submitted that the viva voce , test was a rnere manoeuvrdesigned to bring in candidates who had.fared badly iii the written test Shri A.K. Sen, le.arned counsel who appca; ed for .'some of the other petitioners made only 'one 5ubmisionand it '..Jas.that . . '", "canonical_name": "A.K. Sen"}}, {"text": "Sen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16995, "end_char": 16998, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sh.ri Sen also 'submitted that the questions put lo the candidates .at .the iliterview were not designed to(test.ithH aptitude or general\n\nhnow!edge or general intelligence and for that reason, the selection\"\n\nwas vitiated, He suggested that the final results bcre 'c!c c; uont lesti."}}, {"text": "Anii Dev Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17422, "end_char": 17436, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "te ijustice dQne tO the mioritycomunity in -te State.~·\n\n\\ ~- We find no substnce whatever in any .of tlie subm'issions made by Shri Anii Dev Singh and Shr, i A.K,.", "canonical_name": "Anil Dev Singh"}}, {"text": "Anil Dev Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 18321, "end_char": 18335, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This circumstance is sufficient to repudiate the broad allegation freely made by Shri' Anil Dev Singh that the viva voce test B was designed to facilitate tlie selection of candidates who had fared badly in the written test.", "canonical_name": "Anil Dev Singh"}}, {"text": "S.L. Verma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18982, "end_char": 18992, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On behalf of the respondents, one of the members of the Selection Committee;· Dr. S.L. Verma, Principal of the Government Medical College, Jammu filed a counter-affidavit in which, he stated'. ......."}}, {"text": "7-7-1783", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19507, "end_char": 19515, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The candidates were questioned by the members , of seJectfon Corµmittee only in respect of factors of interview prescribed in SR0-380 dated 7-7-1783 and the entire process was above board and extremely fair."}}, {"text": "Aarti Kaul", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20235, "end_char": 20245, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Aarti Kaul stated in her affidavit that1 G she was also asked to give an example of Collard (?)"}}, {"text": "Rajesh Gupta,.another", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20500, "end_char": 20521, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rajesh Gupta,.another cano.idate, stated that his interview lasted for .two or."}}, {"text": "Chinnappa Reddy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20872, "end_char": 20887, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "JAVID RASOOE v. J & K\n\n00STATE\n\n0 (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) \\- - .", "canonical_name": "CHINNAPPA REDDY"}}, {"text": "ofD.'Vrma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 21208, "end_char": 21217, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the statement ofD.'Vrma that the Selection Committeeput relevant qriestion to the candidates to test their aptitude, general knowledge , and general intelljgence .. Anyoe who has served on aSelection Con1mit(ee and interviewed candidate.s ·\n\nknows that a large number of candidates are nervous and inorder to \"... put them at ease."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 22229, "end_char": 22234, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "such questions are at .least as good as questions about the name ofthe\n\n'capital of n obscure Latin American State or .who captained India\n\n D , in the SeconU test ma, tchagaii1st Pakistan.in I?SO, W~ entertain on'\n\ndoubt that the questions asked .were proper and relevant."}}, {"text": "A.K. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 24423, "end_char": 24431, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr.. Anil Dev Singh and Mr. A.K. Sen invited our attentiOn to the observations of this courl'•in Ajay Hasia 's'11 case in regard to the desireability of holding viva voce test !", "canonical_name": "A.K. Sen"}}, {"text": "Ajay Hasia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24492, "end_char": 24502, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr.. Anil Dev Singh and Mr. A.K. Sen invited our attentiOn to the observations of this courl'•in Ajay Hasia 's'11 case in regard to the desireability of holding viva voce test !", "canonical_name": "Ajay Hasia"}}, {"text": "M.P. Sharma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24923, "end_char": 24934, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The court then quoted M.P. Sharma on Public Administration'."}}, {"text": "1971) 2 S.C.R. 430", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 26548, "end_char": 26566, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Chimzppa Reddy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26611, "end_char": 26625, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' '\n\nJAV!D RASO()L v. J & K STATJJ' (Chimzppa Reddy, J.) .", "canonical_name": "CHINNAPPA REDDY"}}, {"text": "Lila Dhar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31993, "end_char": 32002, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "AU thit we lia ve said above i~ oly to supplement wat has been said in Ajay Hasia\"s case ai\\d in the case .of Lila Dhar -vs.", "canonical_name": "Lila Dhar"}}, {"text": "State of Raja", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 32008, "end_char": 32021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State of Raja' sthan'\"."}}, {"text": "J AVID RASOOL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32209, "end_char": 32222, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J AVID RASOOL V. J\n\n' - . .. . . -. ; ."}}, {"text": "Union of' Public Service Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 36023, "end_char": 36058, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Committee also suggpted that in view o( the o_bvjous importanc~ · ( of the subject, it may be exami1icd in detail by the Research Unit of the Union of' Public Service Commission.\". ·"}}, {"text": "Liladhar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 36372, "end_char": 36380, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Our observationsin Liladhar's case, which we have extracted below, _.", "canonical_name": "Lila Dhar"}}, {"text": "Periakafoppah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 37452, "end_char": 37465, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\"It is frue that in Periakafoppah's case the."}}, {"text": "Ajay Rasia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 38976, "end_char": 38986, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "contention was negatived in Ajay Rasia's case alo where. '", "canonical_name": "Ajay Hasia"}}, {"text": "Anil Dev-Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 40207, "end_char": 40221, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "di; j _We finally come to the submission on which Shri Anil Dev-Singh laid considerable emphasis, namely, that the entire selection was vitia- ted.", "canonical_name": "Anil Dev Singh"}}, {"text": "Nagarjan ~- State of Mysore", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 41915, "end_char": 41942, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that such a 'situation had also .been noticed by this court in: the case of Nagarjan ~- State of Mysore w where it was polnted out'that ."}}, {"text": "cl 011", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42748, "end_char": 42754, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Principal of the Medical . College~ Srinagar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 43747, "end_char": 43791, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jn the' case , before us .. the \"Principal of the Medical ."}}, {"text": "Jamiriu", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 44997, "end_char": 45004, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "separateiy .'.for,\n\nJamiriu .and .Srinagar aroas and on fwo different' occasi6ns; In the );. .."}}, {"text": ".Srinagar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 45010, "end_char": 45019, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "separateiy .'.for,\n\nJamiriu .and .Srinagar aroas and on fwo different' occasi6ns; In the );. .."}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_2_598_613_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "' .\n\n .. '.\n\n. RAMENDRA SINGH\n\nv ..\n\nJAGDISH PRASAD. AND ORS.\n\n Febf'uary 17, 1984\n\n. [ E.S. VENKATARAMIAH .AND R.B. MISRA, JJ. :J •\n\nCit-ii Se; dcc: ersons.1161 qua!ijiefi'appoilit¢d to higher p; stS to n1eet e1nei'gC111 siturition--1! could be given senioity over person~.' apjJoli1ted under . ru!s subsequently. . . . . . .. .. .\n\n. In ontcc; tion ·.\\Yith tle cxccu\"tion of _a \\Volli Banl(,· 1rocct. on _an ~!11.e; gcil.cy . basis, which was required .to be completed within a short tin1e, the Public Works .\n\nDepartment of the State needed a nu1nber of mechanical ov'erseerS. Since at that time there as accute shortag~-.or qu<ilified overses the Dcpartn1ent had al?pointcd; as.oversee.rs on provisional basis against th© sanctioned posts, certain persons who \\Vere worki1; g in the depart1nent as sub-overs~s even though. theY had orily appeared. in the dipfrn110· ~Xamination in engineering but hc.d not yet passed it. ln the 1n1::a1time, the respontjets ·(petitioner~ befoe; the High Court) W'.ere selte\"d . by a S;:tection Con1nlittce constituted inaccordancc withdie procedure laid down in. Bih<i.r Public. Works Depa!'h11ent Co.de. After they passed .the d-iplotna CxaminJ.tio:~, h..: Cili_..:r E_:-._g:ine;._r had in ·~964 apoi_nted the ·appel.lants (contst.ing respondats ofor~· tr1~ 1-llgh .-...outl) as ten1porry overseers against the sanctioned posts frOm the date of publica ticin of results of.the diplo1na examintion. In 1973; a grad~ .tion list \\Va's. prepared and so1ne Of the appellants wre subsequently pronlotcd to\n\nhigh.er' posts. . ·\n\nTh~ respondc;.:ntS in a writ petition fitCct in the High Court had inlpugned the order of th.e C_!, k:f Engincci appointing the _appellants retrospectively as oversee.rs on the. ground that while they were apr)oirite<l after folloWinti the procodure pres\" .cribed under the rules, ti-le a\"ppllants t the time of their appointment as overs$eCrs--.\n\nwere nejthr qualified .to be appointed s overseersnor were they selected by a Selec\n\ntio~ 'Con1mit~ consfitutCd under the rules .and that in any event the apP.cllarii-s .could not Qc aPvoiuted with etrospective efre'ct. secondly. thoµgh .the ·.appellants\n\nshown aS seniors to the respondents by th~ chief Engineer.'soi:dersof 1964, _the\n\naP1J~1lants were in rac'c junior to them anct that their tater\" pron1otion was imp.roper.··\n\n' . . ·-.\n\n-j: .. \\\n\nThe Higll Court held that tbc Publi~ W-0rks :Ocpartent Code n accoljj61_1ce with \\Vhich-thy respondents wete recruited. directly contained. merly devartmental irlstri.tctions and .. hvd. not ac(tuired -statutory force .and that, theiefon::, tbe appciint~ inent o.f thC appellants. Could nOt be held to be invii.lid on the ground thnt the department had no poWer to illake retrospective appointments.· It ho, vever held that the~ .fevised , gra4l.tio(l isi, showing .the appelri.nts above . the resp, endents, on. the _bas.is . Qf -the 1964orders was bad.in law .. Consequently, the. Iiigh Court qua.shed that part of the two ofders which.had fixed the date of pi, iblic; atiori Of the resU1t of diploma\n\ncx:afuiation as, the cp1nmenCe1ei-it of length of se1vi~ of tenip6rary oversees.\n\nk:c\n\n/':\n\nRAMENDRA SINGH v. JAGDISH PRASAD ...\n\nIn appeal..fo this Cort is was cOnteded on behalf Or\" the appCllJ.nts that since the Cxccutivc power .. of the State is co-extensive with its lbgiSlativC pow¢f, n the :absericc of a statutorY .rule.framed :under. Article 309 of the. CoiistitUtion, it was opetf ·to the executive.\" in eXercise of its excuiive power :Uni; Ie\"r-Art. . .162 of.the Collstitu•: tion, !O njake \"appoiritment~$to meet' the\" exigC1cics of a sitlltioll. . .. ..\n\nDiSn1issing the appeal,\n\nHELD The impugned order oi 1964 which prported to appoitthc s~ ov'crseers as temporary overseers from the date Of publication of their. rc~1:1lt of diplonl'a examination are clear_l.Y vlolatlve Or Articles 14 _and 16 of. the c;:'onstitution ·-inasmuch as the respondents hi:tdalready b\"een appointe_d as ovei:eers by. a Seie.:- tion committee. conStitutC<l under the rules contained in.the public Works :i;:>ep_art- .. merit COde.· The 1964-order making. the tempoa:rY. appointments conferred . natiOnal seniority on the appellarits for the period heY aie. actua1ly working as subOverseers fri the lower scales. Ciutside the cadre of Overseers: ·The impugned orderS.inay.llot bave'esultedjri.reduction of rank but yet theydid.· affect the seniority of the .respondents which eventUaUy inight result. ill' reducing thCir cha_nOes for promotion. [613 D-F] ·\n\nft\"~.\n\nThere'\"iS no gain-sayin& _the fact that the .executive i:iower of the .&ate .is co-· ex!ensiVe with the legislative Power and that. it is.not necessary that. there' should be~ -\n\nlaw ill existence before the executive is enabled to flinction and the power of the executive is limited.me_rely to the carrying oiit of the laws. Th_e;.e.is nothing in terms. of Article 309 which abridges .the powers or the executie to .act. under Article 162 o'f the Contitution without a la~.· hilt.yet if there i~ a statutorY nile or anAct'On a n'atter the . exercise of its. executive pciwer uder. Art. -162, ignore -Or a.ct Contrary: td .-m~~~ . . .\n\n-1. -· B.N; Nagarajan & Ors.' v. State of My; ore '& Ors, [1966]3 SCR.682; Ram \"\"'-·-· JafVayll Kapur v. State oj Punjah.[1955] 2 SCR 225; Rajendr.a Narin Sitlih &Ors. . v. State of Bihar & Ors .. [1980] 3 SCR 450; S.B. Patwardhan's case [1977] 3 SCR ns . . ..\n\n-.·\n\nand R.N. Nanjundappa v. T. Tiiinimiah & Anr. [i972] 2 SCR 799, referred to. . . . . .. .\n\nC1v1L APPELLATE'JUR1smcnoN : Civil Appeals NM.\n\n1977.'\n\n308,313 Of\n\n, Appeals by Special leave frol)l the Judgment and Orderdated ' .the 8th September, 1915 of the l'atna IDgh Court in C, W.J.€. Nos.\n\n1419/73; 467/74 and522 ofl974, . . .\n\n. i,, N, Sinha, R.P. Singh., R.K. .Jaiii, Suman Kqpur: for the Appellant in CA. No. 308 of 1977. , . _. .... ' . '\n\nR.K. Garg, R, D., . Singh,\n\n~ Appellat in CA. 309 o( 1977. . '• .• _, . ' .\n\nR.K. Jin & Suman. 'Kapoor, for il1e . ..\n\n.. ·,\n\nG ,,\n\n600 . '. ·SUPREME. COlJRi' REPORTS. .. . . . . R.K:. Jai!l for the Appellaht in CA. 310/77: ' . s . .. . .\n\n(1984) 2 S.C.R ...\n\n.L.N. Sii1gh and D. Gpbiirdhan for•thc AP,, olfa:; t in. Cs. 311-13 .. . •. . .. ,. \" .... L.N, Sinha, D. Goburdha;, for Respondents 3-7 in CA.,30S/77 and '.or Respondents Nos. 7-6 in CA. 309/77 &for Responiknts 2 to. 4 tn CA No: 310/77. .\n\n.•;_- •\n\nI ? ··· M. K. Ramamurthi D.P. Mukherjee for .·.CA: No. 308/77 & RR 9'10 in CA. 310/77~\n\n' '\n\nRespondents 12, 13 in.\n\n. . U.S. Prasad for Rspondent No .. 4 in CA. 309/77. ·· .\n\nD .. • G.L. Sanghi, Radlia Mohqn & M.L. 'Verma for RR. !, 2 & 16. in CA. 509/77 & for R-11 in CA: 3iO ofl977.\n\n, . . .... ,. '.. .\n\n. \" '._ . . Jaynarai11, R.P;. Singh; R.K. Jain & Suman Kapor. for. Respondents in CA. 311-313 of 1977. ·-* . 't'. -- ' .. ..\n\n. ; A.K. Sen, Radha Mohan.Prasad& M.L. 'Ve/,;,; for R.R. I &.2 iq CA. 313 of 1977:. . • . \" .· .. . Th~ judgment of the Court ;,, as delivered by · . . , . , .\n\n. MISRA; 1. This ]mnch of appeals is directed agaist a 'commdn .. judgment and order of the Patna High Court dated 8th September, . 1975 all.; wingthree petitions under Art. 2:26 of the Constitution ln part.· . ' ' . ' .\n\n. . ·. ·. ·. . ·,,. . : .. \"- . . The materfal facts to bring .0ut the points for consideration in . these appeals lie in a narrow compass. The Public Works Department · in Ilihar had a very smaU mechanical organisation. In_ 1962, however;. it undertook the execution.of a.WorldBank project. In that conneO:. tion a numt)er or mechanical\" overseers were needed. As the project had to be, executedon an ernergency basis within a short time and ' . . . .\n\n' .. ·,.../'\n\n. RAMETDRA: sn:iGH v. J~GDISH PRASR~ (Misra}.). 601\n\n.'there being dearthor'qu; lified overseers, persos ho were .. working . '\n\nortly as sub-ove.tseers or persons who haCt appe.arcd at the diploma .exaillination in engineering, but had npt passed the sanie.; were appoiil_.,.\n\nA.\n\nted against the sanctiQl!d posts on a provisional basis. There were.··. . some.others who .were also .. appointed as niechankal overseers on •· '\n\n'.·. teip.porai:y basi~ iilthe World Bartk project; a .wing of the Public Works . • '\n\n~.\n\n...\n\n'- ·-·\n\nDepartment, after appearing before a seiection committee dly con, stituled according to r. 1, Appendix II cif the.Bihar, Publ.ic Works Department. Code, !st Edi1., 1958, VoL IL Thi.s rule. readi: · .\n\n' \"All j, ermanent appoiritmc'nts to the .. Bihar Subordinate , Engineering Service either by absorptiqn ofJempornry or. work; - ,, charged Overseers a1id Estimators; or by direct recruitment,\n\nwiH. be made by the CJ;1iefEngineer, provic; led that in the pase .oC' direct recruitment :(permanent o.r teniporaty)'; appointment will . be mde o.n th; e advice of the fOmmitte of senior officers con:\n\nstitutedfor the purpose. The committee will consist of.·.three members including the Chief. Engineer, who:will be the Chair~· : man .of the committee; Tb.e. other two members will be nomi- . nated by him with the approval of the Government in the Public\n\nWorks Department from' time to time\". · ' -· - . - .\n\nThe: Chief Eilgiileei by oders ~-dated 18th A; gust and 26th'\n\n..i,,..~ Septeiribe~, 1964 , appointed among . others the following. persons,. al- ·\n\n teady working. as sub-overseers in the department as temporary qver- · seers aginstthe sanctioned posts m their pssing the.diploma eX:ami- . , nation from the .date of j:mblicatipn of their results of the diploma -in .\n\nmechanical/elcctricai engh1eedng examination: ·\n\n. .,·,\n\n~· .\n\n-. __.. ...\n\n1. Ramendra Singh 2.. Keshav'Singh . . .. 3 .. Bho\\a Nath Chaudhary • A Awadesh 'Kumar Singh. ·\n\n5. Raje; hwar Sirtlla .6. Ra;,_ Chandra Prasad\n\n7. Udai Narain Singh, ·\n\n_ .. 8~_. Siillil I<llmar ' 9; . Rajnandan Pd. Singh 10, Gopa!Ram ..\n\nIL Sidh Na!Ji Singh_ .\n\n. -'\n\n, ..\n\n' ..\n\n. i\n\nc ..\n\n. 602\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS . [1984] 2 s.c.R.\n\n...\n\n12. '. Prem Chand Prasad, nnd many other? who_ are. not parties ,. here,\n\nIt; ppears ihat a provisio11al gr_adation list of overieers was wepared. Certain overseers who fdt aggrieved by the provisional ·]ist inade: various respre_sentations and eventually a revis.ed gradation list dated 17th November, 1973 was prepared.\n\nSome. of the aforesaid twelve persons were promoted as Mechanical Sub-Divisional Officers lby an _order dated !3th __ March,~ 1974.\n\nThe revised gradation list dated 17th November, 1973 and the two orders dated J8th' August and 26th September, 1'!64 appointing the aoresaid twelve'Persons as temporary. overseers with retrospecfive . effect and the order dated 13th March, 1974 promoting some of them .. ,\n\nas .Mechanical Sub-Divisional Officers were challe.nged -by three sepa rate writ petitions: (I) writ. Nv. 1419 of 1973 filed. by Shyam Dayal\n\nPandey, (2) writ No. 467 of 1974 filed by Fu! Chand, and (3) .writ No. 522 of 1974 filed by Jagdish Prasad and Mohammad Shamsuddin.\n\nThe respondents in the three petitions includirtg,.the aforesaid twelve persons were. common, though differently numbered.· .... ·.\n\nIt wouldbe convenient to identify_ the parties with , reference.\n\nto the writ.petitions .. The writpetitioners therein will be rcferre.d to ~~>(' \"'hereinafter as the petitioners and th~:above mentioned twelve persons,: 1 ;.. l whose retrospective appointment has been challenged, as the c.0ntes- . ,_ting respondents. . . .. -.. 81 The _case. of. the petitioµers in the three petitions b.s .been th.at they were ppointed as mechanicaloverseers on temporary basis in. t_he World Bani< prqject, a unitofthe'Public Works Department after appearing before a selection committee duly constituted according to r. 1 referred to above. The appointment of the . contesting respon dents by orders dated 18th August and 26th September, 1964 with retros' pee.live. effect. has been challenged on the ground that they were tern-., porarymechanical sub-overseers and had not got the requisite qualift- · ' cation for being appointed asoverseers' n6r did they appear pefote~ co=ittee as required by r. 1 of the PW.D Code and in any case they could n, ot be appointed with retrospective effect. It was further pleaded that the contestii.1g respondents were-junior tci the petitioners but in •\n\n~··.·\n\nRAMENDR.A SINGH v. JAGDIS.B .PRASAD (Misra 1.) . .603.\n\nthe <revised gradation .list-the contesting respondents wete. shown . above .the P'titioners on the basis of the aforsaid two o.rders dated ·.18th August aiid.26th September, 1964. T, he promotion of some.of nhe contesting respondents as mechanical. sub-divisional officers was\n\n'also bad on that account. ' ·\n\nThe contesting_respondents as well as the State of Bihar flied a return justifying .. the appointment of !lie contesting respondents as ': wen as the promotion given to some of tM contesting respondents as m?chanical SuiJ.-diVisjO:nal offiers. On thccoi1tntions 9fthe Parties, .., the !Iigh Curt formulated the'following points for consideration:, ... c\n\n. '\n\n i .. Whthcr .the impugned gradation listhad been prepared in .. acco.rdane with law ? . ·\n\n2. Whether the promotion or various respondets on the basis . of the said grac!otio;1 list is ji.1stified? •\n\n3. Whether th.¢ app0intmentofthe respon~.ents w.1S bad as they. , haf.n?t apPeared.'.bef~e .he sele.qjion. con:-in.itte?· ·. 'I\n\n. 4. Whethe.t the orders dated 18th August and 26th Scptemb7r;\n\n.1964 appointing t.he respondents, and some of the petitioners . as tcmp9rary overseers from. the date of publication or'' their\n\nresults of diploma in rii.echanical/electria( engineering ex; mi\" ·.\n\nnation, are justiflect.and in c\\ccordance with .law .and whether' . the same cm; kl . have beeff made the basis for preparing.\n\nthe graciatio1i~.l.!Sr?· •\n\nWhile supporting. the' app::>!htnient of contestitig respondents on, merits two prelimitiary objctions \\V.ere raised on behalf of the ~G contesting res.ron(!ents' about the 'maintainability of the ,,; it petitins: ,\n\n1. None _of the requi; i(es of r: l of the PWD Cod.e was coin plied ,\n\n... with.whiie const.ituting the selection coffimitiee and this.being the position the petiti61\\ers: themselves were not selected . by\n\n6,04'\n\n. 'SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984] 2 s.c.R,:\n\n. '\n\na dilly constitted committee; and. therefore. they had no right to asail the gradation list and to challenge theappoil1t . '.. .. ment of the contstin.g respondents under Art.. 226 of .the\n\nConstitution.. ·\n\n2. rhe petitioners could not challenge the gradaliordist without assailing the. orders dated. 18th Augusfand 26th September, 1964 on whfoh the.gradation list was based, nd the petitionrs · col)Jd not be allowed to asail those o.rders after a lapse of .. abou't!O years and if they were allowed to challenge the grada\n\ntion Jlst that would' virtually amount to permitting the petitioners to challenge those orders. · J\n\n'' ..\n\nThe High Co11rt overruled both the preliminary objections . . Thditst. preliminary objection was overmfod qh the ground, ihatthe\n\n. requirements of. r. l of the PWD Code are not mandatorv, they are .\n\nmerely dopartmetal instructions which had .not. acquired the statutory force:[u1d. the petitioners .could not be non-suited merely because there was no compliance ofr. l 'of th~ Code. The cond preliminaty objec-. tion was also overruled on the:grounds: (a) that the petitioners had not'prard for the quashing of the entireorder.s but they were ggrleved ·\n\n...; i,. o.nly with that' portb'n of the orders by which the contesting' res, pon- E donts were appointeq. retrospectively from the date of the publication . of the results of diploma iri 1nechanic; al/cleotrical engineering exatni-. . • . nation, which affected the seniority of the petitioners in the revised ---X' gra'dation list; (b) thatthe petitioners'came to kno,;, ofthe two orders . after.the preparation of tl; ie revised 'gradatiOn list on.· 17th November, :. · 1973 wherein the coatesting responde)ltS were placed above the peti- . F . tioners; (e) that .the. Court was mainly. concerned. with the revisd\n\n. ; gradation list, but. 'vi-th a view.to find out the •btsis for preparation of\n\n ..• ...\n\n~· the rvised gradation.list the.Court had'to examine as to whether the,.·. retro, spective appointment of the contesting respondents by the afore, said two .. orders .in the .circnn\\.stan2es was vaiid .. If, the Court holds that they could not.have been appoint,, d. retros, pectively that w<)ulc'.\n\nG . simpiy cha11ge their positi<in in the revised gradation list and 'that ' would ncit affect !lie. appointment' of'thc contesting respondents; and\n\n(d) that ignoring the claim. of the petitioners on th.c ground of !aches 'or delay is not a rule' of law btii'a rule of practice; .<\n\n-·· .' .. ' - ' . . ' .. ..\n\nH r .. Coming to the ; neri.ts; the appointment of the contesting respon- . •\n\n R~ MRNDRA SINGH v, 1A.onrsH .PRASAD ( Misra.J:) . . . ' . - ' . 605\n\ndents was challengd by the.potitioncrs on ti1e grond .that thev had.\n\nA , not appoard before the selectioll committee as requ.ired.by r. i and '\n\nther('f9re their appointment was i'llegai and .'al a11y.ratethey.coulci noi . . hve been'pla2erl'higher than di.e petitioners. in th.e r~ised gradatibn list. - .~\n\n:· ' . .\n\n. B .. The High Court negatived the 6onteniion on ihe selfsame ground op which thOJ preliminary objection No.l was ovef,; uled: Rule 1 of the PWD Code was inerely a departmental instruction. and· if had not .\n\n·~·.· acquired the staiutory force. therefore,. the app<jintmc1i(of the 6on-\n\nI · tesiig respondents culd not be 'held to \\Jc invalid merely because\n\n. -.. '\n\n~, .~~. they had.not appeared before the selection committee. Besides, there· C ·\n\n was o 'such stipulation in their initial ordet ofappointment 11orwere -\n\n~. . ' .\n\n~·.\n\n• ...\n\n. \"\"'\n\n.. '. - - . . . ' ' ·.\n\n- . ,, . . . . .they calle, d for. appearing before the selection committee: Keshav. .. Singh and Sunil Kumar, t\\Vo of thecotitesting resporidentsan<lqne Shyam Dayal.Pahey, cme of the petitioners hi.: one of the .writ petitions, who were placed in similar sitation'as the c01itesting respondents . , Wh() were phced in siinihr situation as the coniesiing respondents D\n\nappeaed befoe ihe sekdion committee 'but , it was due to .. soine\n\n•• misunderstanding onthe part of the Executive Engineer (Workshop , Divisi9n) under whom they happened :t0 be' posted although thei.r ; . Originl Jr:t't, er-c_:.f apPo'intrp:e1:1-t c.onti.ne.d-n0 such s_ti_pt.Ilatior1-that tJ1y\n\n. would 'have .. 'to appear l)efore the selection committee, .\n\n On the cruCial point. whether th.e.twciorders. dated .18th Augttst and .26th Septmber .1964 'making reifospectivc. appoiµlmetits were the various authorities. Cited liefor.e. it. ·\n\n~ •.\n\nThe c;; rt fudner hl.d that the petitioners were initially appin- . ted provisionally but after they appeared before the (election committee ·. . !liey were appointed temporarily nd, therefore, the services of the . petitioners: from the date cf their appointment could be cm.; nted while\n\n. fixing their seµi6iity, whereas those.cif the contesting respondents, who\n\nwre. pr6visionally'. appointed' c.o'uld not have Meli ounted for fixing . their setiioritf. Tl alsu heki'that\" thc revised gradation liot showing the.·\n\ncontesting respondenis above the petitjoners. on the basis. of the .two orders .dated !8th .i\\ugust and 26th September 1964 was badjn law. . - . . . -~...... . - . - ' ,,\\' . ., .\n\n.· a:msequentJy; .tlie High cciurt quashed only that parfcifeth\n\n..... ·\"' _' \"\n\n. ' .,·\n\n.G ....\n\n, J(\n\nc .·\n\n606 SUPREME QOliRT REPORTS [1984] 2 S.l_:.R •.\n\n. two. xirders whicl{ had fixed the date of publication of the result of. diploma i_n n\\echanical/electrical enginecring.ex'amination as the date of commencement of length of services of' temporary .overseers. The seniority list prepared in pursuance of the order dated 17th November ·\n\n1973, insofar as it relates to the contesting rc.spondents vis-a-vis the . petitioners inthe three peiitions was also qushed. The order of pro1;, o-~ tiqn of some .of the contesting respondents, namely,· Ramendra Singh,\"· Bhola Nath Choudhary, Rajeshwar Sinha, Ramchandra Praad an.d\n\nUdi Narain 'Singh was also quashed .\n\n.The contesting respondents .have n<;>w come to challenge the . orcjer of the High Court by special leave under Art: 136 of the Con• . stitut.ion. The State of 13ihar has also flied three separate appeals against. the same order and for the same relief. ' .. •\n\n• The cru¢ial question fot consideration in this case is whether . . . . the appointment of the contesting respondents, arrayed as . ppellatits fo th\" first b.ttch ofthrceappoals, bythe two orders dated 18th August\n\nad 26th Septeinber, 1964,. with retrospective effect is bad in law.·\n\nShri A.K. Sen . along with Shri G.L. Sanghi apparing for the petitioners, now arrayed as tespondents in these appeals supported the judgment of the High Cou\"rt. Their .mai)l contention was that the contesting respondents had not acquired .the requisite qualification on the date of their appointment and, therefore, their appointment by orders dated 16th August and 26th- Sept.ember, 1964, witji.·, retrospective effect was in the teeth of r. I .of the PWD Gode, and •in an1{ase there can be no retrospective appointment o.f the CQntesting respondents f; om the date of p1ss.ing their ·, Jiplma exc'mination inasmuch as it affected the senioritY of the petitioners in the revised gradation list:·.\n\nShri Lal Narain. Sinha ssisted by She R.K. Garg appe, iring . for. the (petitioner~) contesting respondent appeJlants, raised the follo\n\nwing three contentions:\n\n• . . j\n\n- . . . . ·.\n\nI.. TM impugned orders are about ten years ol.d and the., petitioners could not be permitted to cha1knge those orders after the lapse of such. a l9i::. time .\n\n,,.. .\n\n.....\n\n.,,.,\n\n, .\n\nf! /' - .. •\n\n. ' ' . . . . .\n\nRAMENDRA SINGH v. JAGDISI! PRASAD (Misra J.) 607\n\n•' .\n\nI ---' .. \"\" , • 2. The High Curt itself.; fi;; ld inade a discriinaiion inasfnuch as tl1c writptitions agaist Kesli\"av Singh and A\\vadesh Kumar'r • \" Singh have already been dismisse.d. . ·\n\n' J\n\n3. In the absence of. any statutory. rule 'or. rules framed under Art. 309 of the Con'titutidiL it cWaS open to the .Govern- • ment to'make apoointments to suit the exigencies of the situa~;' ·., • . .\n\nI, . . • at1on.· .- \\, \\\n\n• '\"'.\" .The High Court. has given detailed reasons. for not accepting .\n\nthe. c, ontetion of unde dealy in filing the . writ petitions .. It is ot . necessary to' repeat those grounds over again. We fl!IIY agree with the view t.aken by the High Court that the writ petitions filed by. the petitio)'ers cold nt be dismisssd on the groun(! of ]aches.. : .\n\n. I .\n\nAs -regards the second contention of Shri Lal Narain Singh; we are of the .view that. the mere fact that the writ petitic)ns have been. dismissed' against Keshav Singh ·.\"·::i.nd: A\"vl{es11~ Kum.ar Singh, will not be a ground.for setting aside the inpugned order of the High '\n\n. . . #\" ' . ' ' : Court. The contesting respondents have to ; how that the llvo orde1s\n\ndated 18th .August and' 26th .September,1,1964 making retrospective\n\n'apointments, were valid one. , . '\n\nAs regards the third contention, Shri Lal Narain Sinha.submits\n\n., that the executive power of the State is co-extensive with its !egisla.tive\n\npo1ver ancf\"therefore, ifthe Statecan nass an enactment so also it can,,· pass .orders :in .exereise .. of i.ts executive power, as contemplaied by Art. 162 ofthe Constitutlon to.suit the eicigencies.ofa particular situa- {ion. In the instant case, as stated eaiJier, the World' Bank project.was undertaken by tbe.PWD inJ962. A large number of mechanical over-' seers WeFe needed as thC project had t~ be executed on emergency , basis within~ short time and thee being dearth of qualified hands\n\n'I, , -·\" -': ' , .. - ., ;4;' 'persons .who were. working only as sub_-overseers or who had appeared ,· atthe diplbma exmination.but had not passed wre appoillted\"against \" sanctioned posts and werepern\\itted to draw the pay scale of oversees • fromJhe date \"of tli.e .passing of the diploma examinatiQn: . ' . . ' .\n\n' ., .\n\n~' . l ..\n\nJ * There is no denying_ the fact that\\ the executive power oLthe\n\n, rt~ ' ':.1\n\n'.c\n\n~- E\n\n' '\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984],2 S, c.R.\n\n. . . .\n\nState is irrno way narrower than the legislative power. But the question ·.is whether in exercise of that power tl1e State in violation of Art 16 of the' Constitution could make retiospective appQintment of the con, testing respondents in the instant case so as to affect seniOrity of tile.\n\nptitio•1ers. . . ' For the respondents reliance was placed on Staid of Punjab v. kishan 'Dass<il. Jn that case pursuant to c?rtain charges against a .police constable hlS entire se'rvice with permanent effect was forfeited, 'whic; h . meant reducing .his salary to the starting point in the time scrtle for constables. The co'nstable challenged the order by filing a regular suit.~ The two courts below decreed the.suit holding that there was flgrant violation of Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution as the impugncd\"prder amoucl'ted to reduction in rank. This Court interpreted the expression 'reduction' in rank' arid held': · '\n\n.\"The expressi; n 'reduction in rank' in the article, .therefore rrteans reduction from a higher to ~\"lower rank or post when imposed as,~· pe!1altY: T, herefore, an order forfeiting' the past\n\nservie whi'ch has .. earned a .govern.mcnt servant incren1e111s in.the post or faille he hqlds, however adverse it is to him, affcctirig\n\nhis seniority within the rank to which 110 belongs, od1is..future chances of promotion 'does not attract the article. His. remedy, therefore, is confi(\\ed to the rules of. service governing his post.\" . ' The impuged orders in the instant case may not have reulted ii\\ reduction of rank but all the same they affected the s1miority of the petiotioners whiCh eventually might result in reducing their chances for promotion.\n\n/ ' . .. . · Reliance was next placed on B.l'f Nagarajan & Ors. _v. ' State.\n\nof Mysore & Ors\"l. () 1e of the arguments advanced in that case was that till the rules are made in that behalf no recruitment could be ma& to any service.- This argument was, however, repelled. by this Court;· firstly becat\\se, it was not obligatory under proviso to Art. 3o9 to mqke nilts of recruitment, etc. before a service could be consiitute<t'o'r i. - . ' .\n\n-·--<1)rr97])'3 sci. is9 ..\n\n(1) [1955] Z S.C.R. 225. ..\n\n'.\\\n\nI j\n\n'--+\n\n\\ , • .j\n\nj -\n\n' .....\n\n~·· ..\n\nRAMBND(lASINGH v. JAGDISH PRAS.AD (Misra J.) 60~ . . . . . . . .\n\n.~~·\n\npost'created .or filled; seciindly the State Government had executive power in relation to all matters wlth\n\n0 respect to whtchthe.Iegisiature of the State has power to make rules; and it follows' froni this that the tate.Goyernnient will have executive power fn respect of List II, Entry 4L State public Services .. Relying .on Ram.Jawaya Kapa.or .\n\nv. State of l!unjab11l. Rani was held that it was.n9t necessary ihat there should be a law already in existence before the executiv1\\.is. enabled to function and that the pdwers of the execi1tive were liniited' merely to the carrying out of these laws. There was nothing in the terms 'of Ari. 309. of the Constitution which abridges .the power: of the exe' cutive to .act under Art. 162 of the Costitution without a la iv. the Court, h6wevet, piit a word ~[caution in mentioni;1g that f there . 'is stautoty rule or an Act on the J11lltter, the Executive iioust abide\n\nby.that Act or ruie'and it' coilld not in exercise f executive power. under .Art. 162 of the .. Constituti011 ignore or .act contrary to. that.\n\nrule or. Act ..\n\n·.I\n\nThe secod contention in the above case wa; that the Executive could 1ut frame rules retrospctively unless the Act; peciflcally'em- ,' . powers it to do so. This Court, however, r, frafnect. from deciding this point because in. their .opini)in the :i;:iioal could be disposed of on ·, another ground .. This Court observ.ecf that assuming for the sake of aglifi1ent that . the r.;{ysore State , Goyerninent could not make mks retrospectivtily.and.tlia1 tl\\erules were thus void.so.far.as they operated '\\',.:_ retrospectively, proceeded to )gnore th6se rules, and td. examine\n\n.;.hether the appointmenttmad\\; on Ootober'31, J961 _could be upheif!. . The Court came to the conclusion that those appointments. could'\n\nbe considered to have been validly made in exercise of the' ex('cutive\n\n, I\n\n.. '(\n\npower.of the Staie under Art. 162 'of.the GonstltulimL · ·- F ., \"\n\n~·.\n\n,. . ' . , ,. ' . : ' ( . - - '' pot the appellants.siro\\1g reliance was also placed upoh Rajentira' Narain Singh & Ors:v. State of Bihar & Ors. 12 ) It was laid down in that case that in the absence of anylegislation oh th~ subject on a rule framed :.under !he proviso to' Art. 309 of the 'Constitution, the State Government could rezulate' itspublic seryices in the exercise 'of its executive power. In the above case. there wa~ no st.atut!' or any rule frarried under the provision to Art. 309to determine the seniority as between the direct . recruits a1id the. prol\\1otec~.\n\n1The detennihat~_oi1 of the sniritv 1op. the\n\n(1) [1906] 3 S.C.R. 68i.\n\n,.:(2) [1980] 3 S.C.R 450. ,\n\nI ..\n\n. I\n\n\\. , .\n\nSUPREME 1::0URT .REPORTS\n\n. '\n\n\nA basis of contin'uous officiat'on was held to be valid on the bais .of the decision in S.B. Patwardhmi.'s case.(1) There is no gainsaiing the fact that the executive power of the State is co-extensive 'with the legislative power.- but whctl:ier the exercisz of the -power can be in st1ch a \\vav as 't6, offond (\\rt. 16 of the Constitution. Th~ retrospective appointment -of the n; sponqents in the aforeasaid writ petiti'ons affected the senioi'ity\n\n. ...i-.\n\nB of the respondents. ' .\n\n. '\"\".\n\nThis question, however, need not detain us as the point in question is covered by R.N. Nanjundappa v. T. Thimmiah & Anr: \"' rn \"'. that case. the respondent 1 Thimmiah was appointed ti\\rough the Public Service Conunission as an Assistant Geologi'St in the Depart\n\nment of Geology in the Mysore Government in 195! in the grade of Rs. 125-10-175. When the Kolar GolJ. Fields School of Mines -\n\nwas set up in foly 1'957 the respodent was se1it on deputation;.for two years as. Vice-'Ptlncipal of, the School of Mines. , When the, then\n\nPri.ncipal of the School of Mines, who was employed on. a part\n\n'I' '\n\ntime basis o;, an a!1owarice 0f Rs. 200/- left\\ on 22nd July 1958, the respondent who was Vice-Principal and wqs also doing the duties .of Principal since 15th Ft>bruary 1958, was appointed as officiating .Principal with effect from 22ncl July, 1958 in the .grade of Rs. 500-30-800 by. an order dated 25th .September, 19 58. On 3rd April, 1959' the Sfate Government in mdification or' the notification dated 25th September, 1958 appointed the respondent as tem- ., porary of!Liating Principal with effect from 15th February, 1958. _ .. ){ The Mysore Education- Department Service Rules' 1967 regularised the appointment of the responde.nt. The revelant portion of the the Rules reads\n\n,; Notwithstnnding a; y rule made under the proviso to artfole 309: of the Constitution of India, or any other' rules or Order in force, t any time, Dr. T. Thimmiah, B.Sc. (Hons.) Ph:D. (Lond.) F.G.S. shall be deemedt~ have been regularly appointed os Principal, School of Mines, Ooragau1w, ., Kolar Gold Fields, with effect from 15-2-1958. ''\n\nThis rule was challe!'ged by the appellants on various grounds :\n\n(I) [197.7] 3 S.C.R. 775 .\n\n(2) [1972) 2 S.C.R. ,799 •.\n\n. ,, .... \"\n\n-~\n\n' .--· 'I' . . ' . . .. •\n\n. RAMENDRA SINGH v. JAGDIS~•PRAS~D(Wisra, J.)\n\n' . ' ) , ' l!f, . ~\n\n(a) That the respodent as 'governed.by the Myoe Servife.\n\nRc•ulati6ns, 1943, the Mysore State Civil•Serviees General\n\nRiruilmen\\) Rules, 1957, as well as the Mysore _Education Departinent. Servies (Technical Education Deyartment)\n\n~ ..\n\n(Rccruitmnt) Rules,. 1964'\n\n(b) That the respondent was in Class JU servic'e and his appointment by the imougned regulation amounted tO his. promo~ lion' from Class III service to Class I. If so, it is hedged\n\n by two limittions as contcpla:ed by sub'cluses (a) and -\n\n(b) of rule 4 (3) of the Mysore s.tate Civil Services Rules;\n\n1957, i :e. (!) it has to be hn the basis of merii and suitability . with due regard to se'nio'rity frm among persons eligible fol\",\n\npromotion, and (2) it ; has to be on the basis. of senioritycum-merit from among persons. eligible for promotion .\n\n• . -\n\n\"\"··\n\n, The stand of the rspondent, however, was .that (l) l\\eqyas a\n\n. D:\n\n!cal cndidate in service and, therefore, the aforesaid rules , did not ' apply to him andJhe egularisation of his appointment was valid; (2) . under \"Art.-162 of the Constitution regufarlsation would in itseff be: a mode of exercise of power of appointment .of•thc Execuiive Goverri- -, men!. Such n appointment even If made in.the slrnpe of rules.under : Art. 309 cold not be attacked on the ground of being made forwne\n\nE .. person just as a piece of leglslatjon could not be r.ttacked on the ground of being ma<\\flor a particular. person oi entity. .\n\n. 'The High Cpurtcame fo the .conclusion that:the appointment of the .respondent co\"illd .be regulrised with .effect fron1 any date as\n\n F he was a local candidate within the meariing of the Mysore Govern-. , merit Seniority Rules, 1957. This Cnurt in .appeal, however, reversed-. the\"judgment of the fligh Court and observed:\n\n. ~\"No one can deny th~ power of the Government to appint. · .. G If it were a case ofclirect appointment or if itwere a case of appoint' :.inent. of. a candidate by competitive examination or if itjwere\n\na case of appointment.by selection. recourse to rule under Article 309 for regularisation would not be necessary. Assume that\n\n• ' • , 1'f - ' ' r_ules under Attic!~ 309 conld be made in respect of appoi_ntment . , H of one man but thereare two limitations.· Article 309 speaks 'of •\n\n• '.\n\ng '\n\n' ' ' - ,\n\n612 ..\n\nSUPRBME COURT REPORTS [1984] 2 s.c.R.\n\n\" : J . ·, ,,. •. rules for appointment and general conditions of service. Regularisation of appointment by stating that notwithstanding any rules the appointment is regularised strikes at the root of the rules ahd if .the effect of the regularisation is . to nullify the . operation and effectiveness of the rules, the rule' itself is open to\n\n. criticism on the ground that it is, in violation of current rules.\n\nTherefore the relevant rules 'at the materitd time as to promotion ,1nd appointment are infringed and the i111pea.ched rule cannot . be permitted to stand to operate as a regularisation of appoiritment of one perso'n in utter defiance, of rules requiring condsideration of seniority and merit in the case of promotion and co11- . sideratiml' bf appointment by selection or by competitive exami-\n\n.. nation:' .. . . •\n\nThe 'court gave further rasons for holding the. regularisation to be bad in law. It obseved · ·\n\n\"This regularisation is bad for the following reasons, 'Ffrst, regulai:isati; n is not itself a mode of appointment. Second' . .ly, the modes of appointment are direct reoruitmen\\ or selection or promotion or appointing for .reasons to be recorded in }Vfiting . an officer holding a post of an equivlent grade, by transfer,\n\n ·from any other service of .the , State. The Government did' not contend it to be a case of promotion. If it were a case of promotion it would not be valid because it would be a promotion not on the basis of senioritycum-merit but a promotion of some pne who was in Class III to Class I. Even with regard to appoint- . ment under rule:I6 by transfer of a person holding an.equivalent \" grade the appointment would be . offending the rules because it\n\nwould nht be . transfer from an t!quivalent grade. Again/ merit . and seniority could nt be disregarded because tJ_ie respondent\n\nwas not in the same class as the Principal of the School ofMines . . Tlie pay of the Principal was s. 500'800 where as the respondenlr\n\nwas getting a salary of Rs. 165 in the grade of Rs. 125-165 plus an allowance of Rs. '75\".\n\n . The Court also prought out the distinction. between the scope of Art. 309 and Art:J/62 of the Constitution. It observed i\n\n-~· ,\n\n' .\\\n\n. '\n\nRAMENDRA 'SINGii ..\n\n.. . . \\\n\nv. JAGDISH lsAD (Misra[) 613\n\n''There were 1957 rules which s'pokO o.f appointment by\n\nompetitive efamfnation or by selection or by promotion.Even\n\n'i(spcific rules of recruitment [or, such srviceuvere not made the rule as to a1pointment by competitive examihatiiii1 or\n\nSeiection or by promotion \\vas there. Article 162 does not.confer po'wer of regularisation. Article> 162 does not confer power :•on the Goefnmer; t to make rules! for the recr.uitment or . conditions of service. Rules are.not for the'purpose ofvalida- . 'tfog al)illegal appointment or for making appointments orpromotions or transfer. Rules n11der Article\" 30'9 ire for the ' • ) ' . ' . l_ ; ''• ·'#' . purpose of laying down the con.ditions of serice ahd recuritment..\n\n ' Therefore, regularisation by tl'e way of .rules under Article 309 in the present case by stating that. notwitl)standing'any!]:ling .in the rul1:s the apppihtment of the. respondent' was being regula- . rised was in itself iolation of therules as to appointment and as'\n\nto cadi; e and also. as .to the proper selection\".\n\n,· ' -\n\n' In view.of this cfoarauthorlty,. it cannot )le argued Jo;· ilie 'appellants that they conld be appointed with retrospectiveeffect so as to affect\n\nth~ seniority of the respondents. The orders dated .18th August and 26th Septeinbe.r, 1964.which purported .to appoint the sub-overseers.\n\nnamed tb, ern as temporary '.wer, seers from.the date of Publicati?n of their result.of diploma .examination. are clearly violative of Arts. 14 ·.,. and 16, of the Constitution i.nasmuch as theipetitioners had a.leady. \"'-, f , eenappointed as overseers by sel)'ction comniiltee consitituted, uhder the rules contained inP.W.D. Code. The orde'r of temporary appoint- .·· men! by ihe impugned orders dated 18th Angus! and 25th September, -- 1964° onferted national seniority o'u the contesting resp011dents for\n\n the period while they were actually\"w0rking as sub-overseers in the ' ' - . . ·- . 1 . . lower scale outside .the cadre .of overseers.· The ~:ligh Court in. our\n\nopinion ivas fully justified .Jn a110wing the writ petitions in' part. .\n\n'...,.\n\n~ •, - ! ' For the reasons given above the appeals must.fail. They are' accordingly dismissed; In the circumst)liices of the c.'\\se,, b, owever, •we allow the parties to-bear their own costs. . - * . . '\n\nP.B.R.\n\nA.ppe§l!S dismissd.\n\n' I . . . .\n\n' ..\n\n/ '.,\n\n1,/\"\n\n. ' .\n\n. \\\n\n. '\n\n.·'\n\nG ..", "total_entities": 98, "entities": [{"text": "RAMENDRA SINGH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15, "end_char": 29, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAMENDRA SINGH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "JAGDISH PRASAD. AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 37, "end_char": 60, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "JAGDISH PRASAD. AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "E.S. VENKATARAMIAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 88, "end_char": 106, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "E.S. VENKATARAMIAH*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R.B. MISRA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 112, "end_char": 127, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.B. MISRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Article 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3407, "end_char": 3418, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3854, "end_char": 3865, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4879, "end_char": 4890, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4949, "end_char": 4960, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1955] 2 SCR 225", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5278, "end_char": 5294, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1980] 3 SCR 450", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5354, "end_char": 5370, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S.B. Patwardhan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5372, "end_char": 5387, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. State of Bihar & Ors .. [1980] 3 SCR 450; S.B. Patwardhan's case [1977] 3 SCR ns . . ..", "canonical_name": "S.B. Patwardhan"}}, {"text": "Sinha", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5762, "end_char": 5767, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "i,, N, Sinha, R.P. Singh.,"}}, {"text": "R.P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5769, "end_char": 5779, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "i,, N, Sinha, R.P. Singh.,", "canonical_name": "R.P;. Singh"}}, {"text": "R.K. .Jaiii", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5782, "end_char": 5793, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.K. .Jaiii, Suman Kqpur: for the Appellant in CA.", "canonical_name": "R.K. .Jaiii"}}, {"text": "Suman Kqpur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5795, "end_char": 5806, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.K. .Jaiii, Suman Kqpur: for the Appellant in CA.", "canonical_name": "Suman. 'Kapoor"}}, {"text": "R.K. Garg", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5869, "end_char": 5878, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.K. Garg, R, D., ."}}, {"text": "R.K. Jin", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5946, "end_char": 5954, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.K. Jin & Suman. '", "canonical_name": "R.K. .Jaiii"}}, {"text": "Suman. 'Kapoor", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5957, "end_char": 5971, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.K. Jin & Suman. '", "canonical_name": "Suman. 'Kapoor"}}, {"text": "R.K:. Jai!l", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6048, "end_char": 6059, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.K:.", "canonical_name": "R.K. .Jaiii"}}, {"text": ".L.N. Sii1gh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6129, "end_char": 6141, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(1984) 2 S.C.R ...\n\n.L.N. Sii1gh and D. Gpbiirdhan for•thc AP,, olfa:; t in."}}, {"text": "D. Gpbiirdhan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6146, "end_char": 6159, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(1984) 2 S.C.R ...\n\n.L.N. Sii1gh and D. Gpbiirdhan for•thc AP,, olfa:; t in.", "canonical_name": "D. Gpbiirdhan"}}, {"text": "L.N, Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6220, "end_char": 6230, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L.N, Sinha, D. Goburdha;, for Respondents 3-7 in CA.,30S/77 and '.or Respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "D. Goburdha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6232, "end_char": 6243, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L.N, Sinha, D. Goburdha;, for Respondents 3-7 in CA.,30S/77 and '.or Respondents Nos.", "canonical_name": "D. Gpbiirdhan"}}, {"text": "M. K. Ramamurthi D.P. Mukherjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6387, "end_char": 6418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. K. Ramamurthi D.P. Mukherjee for .·.CA: No."}}, {"text": "U.S. Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6500, "end_char": 6511, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U.S. Prasad for Rspondent No .. 4 in CA."}}, {"text": "G.L. Sanghi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6562, "end_char": 6573, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D .. • G.L. Sanghi, Radlia Mohqn & M.L. 'Verma for RR. !,"}}, {"text": "M.L. 'Verma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6590, "end_char": 6601, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D .. • G.L. Sanghi, Radlia Mohqn & M.L. 'Verma for RR. !,"}}, {"text": "Jaynarai11", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6699, "end_char": 6709, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jaynarai11, R.P;."}}, {"text": "R.P;. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6711, "end_char": 6722, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jaynarai11, R.P;.", "canonical_name": "R.P;. Singh"}}, {"text": "R.K. Jain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6724, "end_char": 6733, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Singh; R.K. Jain & Suman Kapor.", "canonical_name": "R.K. .Jaiii"}}, {"text": "Suman Kapor", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6736, "end_char": 6747, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Singh; R.K. Jain & Suman Kapor.", "canonical_name": "Suman. 'Kapoor"}}, {"text": "A.K. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6817, "end_char": 6825, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A.K. Sen, Radha Mohan."}}, {"text": "Radha Mohan.Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6827, "end_char": 6845, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A.K. Sen, Radha Mohan."}}, {"text": "Art. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7143, "end_char": 7149, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ilihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7369, "end_char": 7375, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Public Works Department · in Ilihar had a very smaU mechanical organisation."}}, {"text": "Ramendra Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9554, "end_char": 9568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ramendra Singh 2.. Keshav'Singh . . ..", "canonical_name": "RAMENDRA SINGH"}}, {"text": "Keshav'Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9573, "end_char": 9585, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ramendra Singh 2.. Keshav'Singh . . ..", "canonical_name": "Keshav. .. Singh"}}, {"text": "Bho\\a Nath Chaudhary", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9598, "end_char": 9618, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3 .. Bho\\a Nath Chaudhary • A Awadesh 'Kumar Singh. ·", "canonical_name": "Bho\\a Nath Chaudhary"}}, {"text": "Raje", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9651, "end_char": 9655, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raje; hwar Sirtlla .6."}}, {"text": "Ra;,_ Chandra Prasad", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9674, "end_char": 9694, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ra;,_ Chandra Prasad\n\n7."}}, {"text": "Udai Narain Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9699, "end_char": 9716, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Udai Narain Singh, ·\n\n .. 8~. Siillil I<llmar ' 9; .", "canonical_name": "Udai Narain Singh"}}, {"text": "Siillil", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9731, "end_char": 9738, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Udai Narain Singh, ·\n\n .. 8~. Siillil I<llmar ' 9; ."}}, {"text": "Rajnandan Pd. Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9754, "end_char": 9773, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rajnandan Pd."}}, {"text": "Gopa!Ram", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9778, "end_char": 9786, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Singh 10, Gopa!Ram ..\n\nIL Sidh Na!Ji Singh_ ."}}, {"text": "IL Sidh Na!Ji Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9791, "end_char": 9810, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Singh 10, Gopa!Ram ..\n\nIL Sidh Na!Ji Singh_ ."}}, {"text": "Prem Chand Prasad", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9904, "end_char": 9921, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prem Chand Prasad, nnd many other?"}}, {"text": "Shyam Dayal\n\nPandey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10756, "end_char": 10775, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "by Shyam Dayal\n\nPandey, (2) writ No.", "canonical_name": "Shyam Dayal\n\nPandey"}}, {"text": "Fu! Chand", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10811, "end_char": 10820, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "467 of 1974 filed by Fu!"}}, {"text": "Jagdish Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10861, "end_char": 10875, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "522 of 1974 filed by Jagdish Prasad and Mohammad Shamsuddin.", "canonical_name": "JAGDISH PRASAD. AND ORS"}}, {"text": "Mohammad Shamsuddin", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10880, "end_char": 10899, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "522 of 1974 filed by Jagdish Prasad and Mohammad Shamsuddin."}}, {"text": "State of Bihar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12630, "end_char": 12644, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The contesting_respondents as well as the State of Bihar flied a return justifying .. the appointment of !", "canonical_name": "State of 13ihar"}}, {"text": "Keshav. .. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17818, "end_char": 17834, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "appearing before the selection committee: Keshav. ..", "canonical_name": "Keshav. .. Singh"}}, {"text": "Sunil Kumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17839, "end_char": 17850, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Singh and Sunil Kumar, t\\Vo of thecotitesting resporidentsan<lqne Shyam Dayal."}}, {"text": "Shyam Dayal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17895, "end_char": 17906, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Singh and Sunil Kumar, t\\Vo of thecotitesting resporidentsan<lqne Shyam Dayal.", "canonical_name": "Shyam Dayal\n\nPandey"}}, {"text": "Ramendra Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20012, "end_char": 20026, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order of pro1;, o-~ tiqn of some .of the contesting respondents, namely,· Ramendra Singh,\"· Bhola Nath Choudhary, Rajeshwar Sinha, Ramchandra Praad an.d\n\nUdi Narain 'Singh was also quashed .", "canonical_name": "RAMENDRA SINGH"}}, {"text": "Bhola Nath Choudhary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20030, "end_char": 20050, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order of pro1;, o-~ tiqn of some .of the contesting respondents, namely,· Ramendra Singh,\"· Bhola Nath Choudhary, Rajeshwar Sinha, Ramchandra Praad an.d\n\nUdi Narain 'Singh was also quashed .", "canonical_name": "Bho\\a Nath Chaudhary"}}, {"text": "Rajeshwar Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20052, "end_char": 20067, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order of pro1;, o-~ tiqn of some .of the contesting respondents, namely,· Ramendra Singh,\"· Bhola Nath Choudhary, Rajeshwar Sinha, Ramchandra Praad an.d\n\nUdi Narain 'Singh was also quashed ."}}, {"text": "Ramchandra Praad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20069, "end_char": 20085, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order of pro1;, o-~ tiqn of some .of the contesting respondents, namely,· Ramendra Singh,\"· Bhola Nath Choudhary, Rajeshwar Sinha, Ramchandra Praad an.d\n\nUdi Narain 'Singh was also quashed ."}}, {"text": "Udi Narain 'Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20092, "end_char": 20109, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order of pro1;, o-~ tiqn of some .of the contesting respondents, namely,· Ramendra Singh,\"· Bhola Nath Choudhary, Rajeshwar Sinha, Ramchandra Praad an.d\n\nUdi Narain 'Singh was also quashed .", "canonical_name": "Udai Narain Singh"}}, {"text": "State of 13ihar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20281, "end_char": 20296, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of 13ihar has also flied three separate appeals against.", "canonical_name": "State of 13ihar"}}, {"text": "Lal Narain. Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 21382, "end_char": 21399, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Lal Narain.", "canonical_name": "Lal Narain Sinha.submits"}}, {"text": "She R.K. Garg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 21411, "end_char": 21424, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sinha ssisted by She R.K. Garg appe, iring ."}}, {"text": "A\\vadesh Kumar'r • \" Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 21966, "end_char": 21992, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "fi;; ld inade a discriinaiion inasfnuch as tl1c writptitions agaist Kesli\"av Singh and A\\vadesh Kumar'r • \" Singh have already been dismisse.d. . ·"}}, {"text": "Art. 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22099, "end_char": 22107, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Lal Narain Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 22667, "end_char": 22683, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As -regards the second contention of Shri Lal Narain Singh; we are of the .view that.", "canonical_name": "Lal Narain Sinha.submits"}}, {"text": "Keshav Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22780, "end_char": 22792, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "dismissed' against Keshav Singh ·.\"·::i.nd: A\"vl{es11~ Kum.ar Singh, will not be a ground.for setting aside the inpugned order of the High '\n\n. . . \" ' . ' ' :", "canonical_name": "Keshav. .. Singh"}}, {"text": "Lal Narain Sinha.submits", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 23136, "end_char": 23160, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As regards the third contention, Shri Lal Narain Sinha.submits\n\n.,", "canonical_name": "Lal Narain Sinha.submits"}}, {"text": "Art. 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23390, "end_char": 23398, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 24222, "end_char": 24227, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State is irrno way narrower than the legislative power."}}, {"text": "Art 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24361, "end_char": 24367, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24978, "end_char": 24986, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25796, "end_char": 25798, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26244, "end_char": 26250, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ram.Jawaya Kapa.or", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26850, "end_char": 26868, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Goyernnient will have executive power fn respect of List II, Entry 4L State public Services .. Relying .on Ram."}}, {"text": "State of l!unjab11l. Rani", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 26875, "end_char": 26900, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. State of l!unjab11l."}}, {"text": "Art. 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27250, "end_char": 27258, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27518, "end_char": 27526, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28432, "end_char": 28440, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28754, "end_char": 28762, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28968, "end_char": 28976, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1906] 3 S.C.R. 68", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 29110, "end_char": 29128, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1980] 3 S.C.R 450", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 29139, "end_char": 29157, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S.B. Patwardhmi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 29301, "end_char": 29316, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A basis of contin'uous officiat'on was held to be valid on the bais .of the decision in S.B. Patwardhmi.", "canonical_name": "S.B. Patwardhan"}}, {"text": "Thimmiah", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 29868, "end_char": 29876, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the respondent 1 Thimmiah was appointed ti\\rough the Public Service Conunission as an Assistant Geologi'St in the Depart\n\nment of Geology in the Mysore Government in 195!", "canonical_name": "T. Thimmiah"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31073, "end_char": 31094, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "T. Thimmiah", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 31151, "end_char": 31162, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The revelant portion of the the Rules reads\n\n,; Notwithstnnding a; y rule made under the proviso to artfole 309: of the Constitution of India, or any other' rules or Order in force, t any time, Dr. T. Thimmiah, B.Sc. (", "canonical_name": "T. Thimmiah"}}, {"text": "Civil Services Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32124, "end_char": 32144, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32836, "end_char": 32844, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Civil Services Rules", "statute": "Civil Services Rules"}}, {"text": "Seniority Rules, 1957", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33250, "end_char": 33271, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33627, "end_char": 33638, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Seniority Rules, 1957", "statute": "Seniority Rules, 1957"}}, {"text": "Article 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33827, "end_char": 33838, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Seniority Rules, 1957", "statute": "Seniority Rules, 1957"}}, {"text": "s. 500", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35858, "end_char": 35864, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36055, "end_char": 36063, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "RAMENDRA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 36131, "end_char": 36139, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RAMENDRA 'SINGii ..\n\n.. . . \\", "canonical_name": "RAMENDRA SINGH"}}, {"text": "JAGDISH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 36165, "end_char": 36172, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. JAGDISH lsAD (Misra[) 613\n\n''There were 1957 rules which s'pokO o.f appointment by\n\nompetitive efamfnation or by selection or by promotion.", "canonical_name": "JAGDISH PRASAD. AND ORS"}}, {"text": "Article 162", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36471, "end_char": 36482, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36963, "end_char": 36974, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Arts. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37662, "end_char": 37670, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_2_614_624_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "A 614\n\nc •\n\nRAVI DUTT SHARMA\n\n' '\n\nRATAN LAL BHAR.GAVA •\n\nFebruary 20, 1984 '..\n\n'• S, MuRTAZA FAzAL Au: A. VARADARAJAN & R, N. MISRA, Jl l •\n\nConstitution of India 1950, Article 14: Sections 14A, 25A and 25B of Delhi Rent Control Act 1958 whether ultra vires Article 14:\n\n, Slull) Areas([nif, rovement and Clearance~·.At-1956, s, 19 Delhi.. Rent Contrl Act 1958, Ss.14 (!) (e), 14A, 25A, 25B & 25C: suit by landlord for eviction of tenant under s.14.(1) (e) or s.l4A of the Rent Act-prior permiss(on ofCompetant Authority urider Slun1 Clearance Act-Whether necessarr.\n\n~ .. '-.\n\nThe appt::hant-tenant was induct~ into the suit prenrises as for bck as 194~.\n\n.:..-\n\nThe respondent landlord a, pplied _under section 19 _(!)(a) of the Slum Areas Irilprovc-. \\ ~:.., ment and Clearance) Act 1956 before the Competent Authority for pennitting .him_ J to institute a suit for eviction or the appellant but that application was dismissed. I aod thC order was confirn1ed ill appeal by the Financial Conunissioner: Thereafter the respondelit field a1 suit for eviction in April 197!? under section 14 (1) (e) read with seCtiori 25B of the Delhi Rent Control Act 1958. The tenant applied for leave ... \"'to defend the suit but the same was rejected and an order of eviction was passed A revision filed by the tenn~ Jin the High' Court was dismissed.\n\n- \" . ' 'n the appel to this Court .fs el1 as in the connected Special LeaV\"e Petition lt, \\Vas.contended that: (1) under seetion 19 (1) (a) or the Slum Act it is incumbent on the landlord to obtain iJenni36ion frQm the Competent Authority before insti~ . tution of a suit for evicting a tenant and without such permission the suit . was no \"' 1naintainable, and (2) sections 25A and 2~'.B were ultra vires of Article 14 of the Constitution aud \\Vere inconsisterit wit~ the Slun1 Act which was an existing Statute and, , therefote, the prqcedure substituted under: Chapter, IIlA, particularly sections 25A and 25B should be invaljdated. \\\n\nDiSmissi~ the Appeal and Spcciill Leave Petition;\n\n• IF\n\nI '\n\nRAX' ouTr v. )lATAN LAL 615\n\n. , HELD: A.(i) The High Court was cotret in rejecting the applications of 'A the tennts-for setting as_idc the ofder;-ef eviction. ['624\n\n1.§] - . ~.. '\n\n, B.(l). sctions 14A; 25A;25B firld 25C Of the Rent Act arc sPecial ·revisions so far as the landlord and tenant arc concerned an, f in view Of. the nonobstante clause\n\nthse proviSions verridc the existingla\\V So far as. the neW procedure is oncemed; .[624Al B\n\n, J..._. (2) Thef; is lio._differenCe ei_ther on principle or in Ia_w between sections 14 (l)(e) and 14A of the Rent At even though these two: proviSios rdate to Cviction. of tenants under different situationS; [624B] ' .\n\n(3) ;-, The prOccdtire inca'fporated in Chpter IIIA ar _th~ Aending Act into the Rent Act is in public .. interest and is not vlotatiyeof Artir.fe 14 of the Constitu:. ti on; [624C] ' •\n\n::t: .--\n\n. ·\"{ . ....,.\n\n' ,/\n\n- . \\ . . (4) ~1n vieW of the prOcedure in Ch3pter IIIA of the Rent Act, thC Slum Act\n\ni~ reqdered inapplicabJe to the extent of inconsiStency and it is not; therefore, neces~ - sary for the landlord to obtain permission of the Compcent Authority_ undCr s. 19 (i)(a): of ihe Slum Act. before 'ihstitufing a sUit for evicti-00 arid corning _within .s.14 _(.l)(e) or 14A of the Rent Act.. [624D-E] ·\n\nC.(1) The_dominant object of' the Amending~Act f 1976 was to provide a speCdy, expeditio-us -and effect ieffiedy for a.' claS:s of landlords contemplated 9Y seCsections 14(1)(e) and J4A and foi avOidinf'unusual dilatorY process pfOvided other.,\n\nwise by the Rcq.tAct. Suiis'for evicti6n.under the Act take a Jong_time commc'ncing with the Rent eOntroller arid ehctlng up with\" thO ~.upn .. Jnc- COurt.· ln many caes by 'the 'time. thC eviction decree becanie final several :years elapsed and either 1:the . - •) ' ' landlord died or the necessity which provided the cause of action disappeared. It waS this n1ischief Which the.legisl_ature intended _to ayoid by incorporatingthe.new procedure in Chapier IDA: It cannot therefore be said that the tlilssification of\n\nsue~ landlords- wouid be an ureasonaPle one because such a classification has. got a clear nexus withlith_e objects of the Alnending Act or 1976 and tP, e purposes which-~\n\nit seeks to subServe. [619D-F; G] ·. -. ·, , . :\n\n-.' :'1l : I . :, ',) ,\n\n(2) The ne'v sections 14A, 25A, 25B and 25C had been introduced for the purpose Or meeting ~~. pa_Fticular ntingencY as spelt out in 'the object and reasons behind the\" new proViSionS. once it is recognised that the nCwly a'dded sections are in the nature uf a spedal law inte\"nded to apply to speci(\\1 classes of landlords, the . inevitable Conclusion would be that the ; pplication of the Sl'um Act st2.nds with-.\n\n''drawn to iha:t exterit and any SUit falling.within the scOpi_ of sections 14(1)(e) 'and\n\n14Awould not be governed.or controlled by section 19(1) (a) of'the Slum Act, r\n\n. ' '\n\n[621CD-J\n\nE.\n\n. F\n\n, -\n\n•' i\n\nA '\n\n• I 616\n\nSUPREME COURT . REP, ORTS (1984] 2' S.C.ll. \\.\n\nJ • (3)\n\n1 It is open to the egislaturc to pick ut 'one class of the '1anillords out of sever.al covered by sectioq 14(J)(e) of thc.Re1lt Act so long as they fonned a class\n\nbythemslves and the lcg1slaturc \\Vas fr9c to prOvidc the be.ncfit of the special prncedure to them in the matter of eviction of their' tenants as long as the legislation had an object tci achieve and the special procedure had a rc.asOnable nexus with such . object , to be secured. [621F-G] ·\n\n, (4). The new povision in the Ariiending Act wre.intended to haveoverri ..\n\ndi~ ffect an(.f all prcedural. laws wer.e to give waY to .he ew procedure. [623pj ' .\n\n. ' ' ew.al .Sing/I v. Lajwaftti [1980] 1 S.C.R. 854; Sar.wan Sing11 & Anr. 'v.,, Kasturi Lal [.l9Tlj 2 S.C.R. 421; Vinod Kun1ar , Chowdhry v. Narain DeVi Taneja [1,80) i S.C.R. 746 referred to.\n\nSmt:'Krislma Devi Nigpm ~Ors. v. Slryan1 Babu Gupta & Ors. AIR 1780 Delhi\n\n.165 pproved. ; ·~\n\nC1v1L APPELLATE JuRIS4lICTION : Civil Appeal No. 212 of 1981\n\n. Appeal by specie! .leave\n\nthe 26th.August, 1980 of the\n\nof 1979:\n\nfrom the judgment and order dated Delhi .High Court in C.R. No. 790 .\n\n' ..\n\n. WITH\n\n\\ \\ . . - , .\n\nSPBCIAL LFIAVB PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 2948 OF 1982\n\nFrom the judgment and order d, ated the 17th December, ofthe Delhi High Court in C.R. No. 873 of 1981. . . . .\n\nV.M.' Terkunde, P:M. Parekh, Ms, .Jndu Ma/hotta, Ms. Kaila!h Mehta & Vima/ Dave for the Appelant/Pctitioners.\n\nBikarmjit Nayer aicd D.D. Sharma for the Respcident in CA.\n\n212/81. .. • ( ''\n\nRAVI DUI? v. RATAN LAL (Faz'al Ali, J.) 617 . . . . ' ' ' \\ ' .\n\nT.s,,.Kawatra & NJ{, Agarwaia•fo'r the Respondent in S.L.P.. A No .. 2948 bf 1982, . ' . , ' , , . ·~-'\n\nThe Judgment .of the Couft was delivered by ·\n\n·•'' • B\n\n4FAZAL Au, J. This Appeal'b;.spedal' leave is directed against\n\n':Jo an order passed by the\" Delhi High Court ori August 26, 1980 .· affirmillg an order of eviction of the appelarit , madeby .the 'Rent ,-Tontroller.The.f(lcts of the ase '.ie \\thin.a yery, narrow compass / ·\n\n. ,; r.\n\n. and the appeal mvolves a pure .Polilt ofraw w)11ch 1s already convered C' by decisions of this coµrt to which we shall presently refer: : . ' , . , . I , . : . ' '\n\n\" . . ,...\n\nThe tenant, Ravi Dutt Sharma, ;;, as inducted into the suit premises as for back as 1945, Tl(e .landlord Ratn Lal Bhargava applied undj:r' section 19 (I) (a} of the Slum Clearance Act ('Sluin Act' fot'. . short) before the . Competent Authority for .permitting .him to institute. a suit for eviction of the ,' appellant but that. application was . dismissea on'July 28, 1973. An appeal against this order was dismissed by t]je Financial Commissioner 'on October 4,, 1974. Thereafter ,...\n\nRespondent filed a suit (or eviction of theienant. under s: 14 (I) (e) read with s. 25 (B) of the Delhi Rent Control Aci (\"Rent Act' for •\n\n- - \\ - •' ' #\" , , ' • I\n\n1 short) on April 13, 1979. Qrn:Ler the provisions of. !he Rent Act, as , . \"-.wended 'in 1976 it is'incun1bent upon the. defendant tenant to apply\n\n for leave to defend 'a sit for eviction before. entering contest; The tenant applied for sucb leave but the same was rejected and an order. •.\n\nof his' eviction was passed, on September J 4, 1979: A revision by ihe.\n\ntenant to the High Court was dismissed and that has '1ed to the appeal •, to this Court.' · '\n\nIn the special. leave' petition Smt. Puspa Rani filed' a stiit for eviction against her tenant, Swara~ .Kumar and .others, which also\n\n.· G • ws allwed by the Rent Controller and a revision therefrmit has' been . dismissed l)y the High Court, Ij:ence the petition for special leave \"\". a, gainst judiiment, of the High Court h_as been filed and that was directed ,\n\nto be heard along with the Civil Appeal. It is unnecessary to giv' the ractsfovolved in the case in which special !eave . has been asked H for because the poin( of law. for cosideratfon is one and the same. . . . . ,.\n\n. I\n\n, . . . ~\n\n. \"\n\n' ..\n\n,,/\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984] 2 s.c.R.\n\nAdmittedly the houses for which eviction )1as been asked for.in\n\n' these two cases are located within the slum areas as defined under the _.__. .\n\nSlum Act. It was contended on behalf of the t\"nants that .the .suits . for eviction by the landlords were not competent in view of want of\n\n permissio~ from the competent Authority under the Slum Act. Under section 19 (1) (a) of t]].e Slum Act •it' is incumbent'on the landlord to B obtain permission from the Competent Authority before instituting a suit for evicting a tenant all(! without such permission the suit is . iot maintainable. · .•\n\nt This argument was co11ntercd by the respondent on the ground \"\"\" C .. that by virtue of the. Amending' Act of 1976 (referred to as the 'A'.mending Act' for short) a 'new procedure has been substituted for two types of eviction of tenant-one of . which was covc, red by. s . .14 (I) (e) and the other by . section 14 (A).\n\nIn the instant case we ate mainly concerned with eviction. applications covered by s'. 14(1) le) ' and' the special procdure provided in D Chapter III-A. introduced by the Admending Act. It was contended by the respqudent that by virtue of the Rent Act a specialprotection was gtven to a particular class of landlords who fell within the provisioi:is of s. 14 (l).(e) of the Rent Act (personal necessity) and in such\n\n. ,\n\n cases a procedure different rrom the procedure fo)lowed in other\n\nases had been prescribed. Section 25 (A) and 25 (B) soght to simplify the procedure by insisting on the tenant to obta;,; permission\n\nto enter defence. In other word.s, so far as \"suits for eviction on the ' . ground of personal necessity weae conered, the case for eviction_....>-' \" was put at par witlis.uits m1der Order 37, Code of Civil' Procedure . where the Court was satisfied that the tenant had-an arguable case,· 1eave to defend would be. granted;. otherwise the order of eviction would be passed straightway. ,\n\nLearned counsel for the tenants then argue<! that. sections 25(A) 'and 25 (B) were 1:1ltra vires of Article 14 of the Constitution and were inconsistent with the Slum Act which was an existing statute and, therefore, the procedure substituted under Chapter III-A, particulary in ss. 25(A)°and 2'5 (B) sho11ld be invalidete<l. On the other hand, counsel for the landlords contended that by virtue of the Amending Act a new procedure has been added in respect of evictions . under s. 14(1) (e) as also the newly added 14(A), and sections 25(A) and 25(B} have been brought into the 'Statute to give efiect to the intention of the legislature by providing a Special .procedure and\n\n' \\ . .\n\n.. , .\n\n- v\n\n' -\n\n/ . ' •\"-. \" . . ·.RAVID, UTT V. RATt, NLAL (Faza/A/i, J,) 619\n\nalso making provision at the. existing lawto the contl'ary.\n\nriew • procedure would override the\n\n. In 'order to appreciate 'this contention it niay be necessary to give: an extract of Statement of objects and resons of'the Amending\n\n\"\"'\n\n. , B Act : , , ·\n\n ..\n\n' .\n\n~ ' . . ' ·.· . ' ' ' \"There I.as been a persistent demand for amendments to the iDelhi Rent Control Ad, 1958 with a view. to ccfnferring1 a right of tenancy on' certain heirs/successors of a dceased .. statutory, tenant to that they may be protected froril eviction , by landlords and also for simplifying the procedure,, for\n\neviction of tenants in case. the landlord requiresthe pre!llises . bona. fide for his personal occupation. Further Government\n\ndecided on tlle 9th Scotenber J9i5. that, a prso11 who owns his own ho us~ in his place of ;.ork should vacate, the Government accommodation allotted'. to him before the 31st DEX<em- - ber 1975. do\\)rnm-nt cmisiiered that in the circumstances, the Act requi..rcs to be a111cnded_ urgntly.\", .\n\nThe dominant objct of the Amending Act was, therefore, to provide a spoody, expoditious .and effective remedy for a class of landlords . . ;·{_ contempbt1'd by ss. _14 (l)(C) .and 14 (A) and ror avoidin'g unusual 1\n\ndilatory process provided .otherwise by the Rent Act. Jt is commo'n experience that su_its fo~ eyiction under the Act take a long time. cmninencirig with the Rent Controller and endi1ig up with the Supreme Court. In many cases experience-has indicated thatby the time the eviction .tiecrec became final' several years elapsed and eitlie[ .. the. hndlord died _or the necessity which provided the cause of action dissappered and' if. the're wasfurther delay in securing eviction and tfor family of t_he landlord' ha\\:l by .then expanded, in the absen.ce of acc6mmodation _the 1ncnibers of the family ,_were virt-11ally. thrown on the road. It.was this mischief wihch the legislature intended to avoid by incorporating _the new procedute in Cliapter'III:A. The legislature in its wisdom thought that -in cases where the landlorils required their own premises for bona fide and personal necessity they shriuid< be treated as a .. ieparat~ class along with the landlords .\n\n• covered-by s .. 14 A and should be allowed to reap the fruits of decrees for eviction wiihin the. quickest possible time. It cannot, . therefore, be said that the Clssification. of such 'landlords would be\n\n, .\n\n. ,,,,\n\n' \\\n\n. '.\n\n620 SUPREME COURT REfORTS [1984] 2 s.c.R.\n\n. I\n\nA. an unreasonabl~ one because such a classification has got a clear nexus with the objects of the Amending.Act and the purposes which : it seeks 'to subserve. Tenants cannot complain of any discrilnination\n\nbecause .the' Rent Aci merely gave . certain protection to them in public i;1terest and if ihe protection 'or part of'. it afforded by the Rent Act was .withdrawi1 and the common law right of the tenant: : nden the l'ransfer of property Act was stilL preserved; no genuine grievance could be made. This wa~ clearly held in the case of\n\nE . .\n\n[(ewaf Singh v. Lajwan!i.(1) . '\n\n~ ' ' The matter )s no longer res, integra and is coverecf by' two' : .- decisions of this Court which.ate directly in •point. The first cine is\n\nthe' case of Sarwan Singh & Anr. v. Kasturi Lal, 1\" hi which, ari . identical point came up for.consideration, It.was held by this Court that sections 2'5 (A), 25 (BJ and. 25 (C) of the Rent Act (introduced .- by the Amend, ing Act) were special provisions with reference to s. 1 14 (A) thereof 'which superseded all existing Ac!s to the contrary. ..\n\nIt .was also pointed out 'that thefo ilewly added sections in :the)lent Act were to app)y only to. a ciass Of landlords and, therefore, the question of violation of At. 14 of the constitution did not arise.· While considering verious ,; spects of the aforesaid provisions, Chand- . rachud, J. (as.lie then was): spoko for t1ie Court th.us . ._,, •\n\n~'When\"two or more !all's operate. in \\he same field and _ _.}-'.\n\neacl;, contains a non7obstante clause stating that its provisions will override those of any other law, stimulating and inoisive problems' of interpretation 'arise. Since statutory inter, pretat.ion has no conventional protocol, cases of such 'conflict . have to be decided in refe'rence Jo the object and purpose JI of the laws under con'sid.eration ...... For resolving such inter\n\ns~. conflicts, one other t.est may also be applied though the • persuasive force of such a test is but one of the factors which : combine to give a fair, meaning to the language of the' faw.\n\nThat test is that the later. en'ilnctment mwst prevail ayer -the earlier one. Section 14 A and Chapter I.II A .having been ena- . . , cted with effect from December I 1975, are lat•; enatinents . in reference tO. s. 19 of' !, he Slum 'clearance Act which in its present form,. was placed 'on the statute book with effect\n\n' .\n\nJi ..; (I) [1980fl S.C.R. 854.\n\n(2)[1977]'2 S.C.R. 421.\n\n. \\\n\n...\n\n. '\n\nI ~\n\n' '\n\n' ' .' ' ' 1 !\\AV! DUTT •. v. RATAN LAL' (Faal Ali, J.) 621,\n\n•' '~ '\n\n>!O I • ,'' f .. from February28, 1965 and in reforene to s. 39 of the same Act, which came into force in 1956 wh.en the Act itself was passed. The .legislature gave over-riding effect to s. 14 A and ' Chapter III A with the knowledge that SS.' ]9 and ,39 'of the\n\nSluin Clearance Act contined non-bstante clauses.of equaI efficacy. Therefore, .the later eactment must prevail:overthe former .. , . Bearing iii' mind the langu:lge of the two fuws, their object and putp9se, and the fact that one.ofthem is later in point of.time and was ei; cted with the knowledge of the 'non-obstante 'ciau, ses in, the earlie, law, e hcwe' ome to the . .conclusion .that tl).c p'rovisions of s. 14 A.and ChapteflJI. A of t!).e Re11t Control Act must preva'il over those c0ntained u1 ss, 19 and 39'of the. Slum Clearance Ac't.\"\n\n\" An analysis of. the aforesaid dediion ~]early revels. thaf the.new sections 14A 25(A)i 25(B) and 25(C) had been intr0dced tor the purpose of meeting a particular contingency aespelt out\\ in the objects and\n\n' .\n\nreasons behind the , new provisions. Once it is. recoginsed that the D newly aaded sections are .in the nature of a special law. intended to ' . ' ' - - ' ' . .· . ' . ' - ' . apply to special classes of landlords, the inevitable conclusion would 'be that the applica:tiol) of· the Sulm Act •stands withdraw~ to that extent and any suit falling within the scope of the aforesaid seetions-\n\n14 (!) (e) and 14A ,\":ould not be govcnied or controlled bys. '19 (!) (a} of the Slum: AcL · ·\n\nE ,\\ __ . '\n\nJt was; however, ; ul:imitted that s. 14A of the Rent act dealt with a specil contingehcyfor which .a. different procCdure had been provided ii1 the mder of evicting tenants by the 'landlords iii bccupation of preni.i; es allotted by the Central. Governinet or any local authority.\n\nThis was• to .enable them to get their dwn residntia!' accommodation so , that thby would be. in a position to vacate , the premises alloted to them by the Centrai.Government., It was coriten- ·,\n\nF •,\n\n-. ..\n\n'. ded that as. the. Central GJvernment a11d persons. in occupation as\n\ntenants pf premises providd. by Central Govern.men! were a dhss by themselves, section 14 A could be taken as a. special provision but 1.4 (I) (e) of the Act could nrit.be levated to .that pedestal. We are no\"t able to accept this 'ilrgument. .. It was open to the legislature to pick out 'one class of landlords out of the 'seeral covered by .s. 14' · . (1) (e) of the Rent act so long is they formed a class by themselues and legislature was freeto provide the benefit of a special procedure to , them in .the matter of e.vi6tion o'(their , tenants is long }he legisl; i-\n\n' .\n\n• . ' ,· \" .\n\n.' ..\n\nI \\\n\n, 622 SUPREME COURff REPORTS,\n\n[1984] 2 $.C.R.\n\n' \\ - ' ' .. 6on had art object to achieve and the , specaiJ procedure had a reas- ·\n\nonaple naxm with such object to be secured.·\n\nr ' ' '. . \\ . • ' ' ,,. .\n\nI .\n\nDespite.the ingenius and attractive arguments of Mr, Tarkunde, it seems to us tha~ the distinction made by the learned counsel between ss, 14 (l) (e) nd 14 A is really a distinction without any difference. Moreover, the newly added sections, viz., ss, J4A, 25(AJ, 25 (B) and 25 (C) do constitute parts of a special scheme and have the effect of makin, g the Sulm Act inapplicable. fo view 'of the pronouncement of this Court as referred t<;> above, it is impossible to accede to the contention advanced on behalf of the tenants. In Kewal Singh's case (supra), a decision to which one of us was a party (Fazal Ali, J.), this Court observed as follows~ ' '\n\n' \"The Act actually re_plac\\d the Ordinance which was promulgated on Jst December, 1979, The objects and reasol)s clearly reveal that the amendme, nt has been made or simplifying the procedure for evictio'n of tenants in case the landlord requires the premises bona fide for his per.son'al occuration, It -is a ' matter of common knowledge that even though the landlord may have an in1n1ediate and imperative necessity for. vacating the house given to a tenant he , is compelled• to resort to the time consuming and dilatory procedure of a suit,:wb:ich takes years before the landlord is able to obtain the 'tiecree and in most cases by the tfm, e the d'cree is psscd either the landlord dies or the need disappears and the landlord is completely , deprived of getting any relief. It appears to ns that it was for\n\nthes~ reasons that the legislature in.its wisdom thought that a short ancl. simple procedure should be provided for those land- ' ' lords who generally want the premises , for their bona fide necessity so that they may be.able to get' quick and expec.itious relief. ... , . The landlords having personal necessity have been\n\n- '\n\n- ' ~ brought together as a separate class because of thei1' special needs and .such a classification cannot be said to be unreasonable, particularly when the legislature in its wisdom feels that . tl:ie landlords should get this reli_ef as quickly as possible\n\nThus taking an overall picture of the situation, the circu~ stanccs under.which the landlord's needs have been calssified and the safeguards given by the statute it cannot be said by\n\n...\n\n, r.\n\n-..·\n\n....\n\n. -\n\nRAVI DUTT, i:: RATAN LAL (Faza/ Ali, J.) .. \" .. -~·· 623\n\nany stretch of imagination that section 29B and its sub-scti~ . ons are violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India,\n\nor that section 29 B suffers from,.t}le vice of excessive delega-\n\n• ' 1 -· I tion of powers.\n\nIn fact section 29 B contain• valuable and sufficient guldclines'which completely exclude the exercise of uncanalised or arbitrary power~ by the Rent Cotroller: .\n\n .. ti' . - ..\n\n-The .ratio ofcthis case reinforces ih~ ruie laid down in Sawaii Singh'/case'sµpra and in Vlnod Kumar Chowdhry v. \"Naraill Devi\n\nTaneja,11 1 it .was clearly pointed out that wheneyer there . was any conflict b.etween. section 29A and 'any .other provision of law. s.' 29 A was to override and prevaiL Here again one of . us (Fazal Ali, J.)\n\nobserved; ' ' · · '\n\n~.The non-obstant.e cluse occurring in sect.ion 29 A . makes it quite c, Lear that whenever there is a conflict between the provi- \\ sions of Chapter III A on the one hand and those of the re&t of' the Act or qf any other law foi the ti;,, e bein, g irl force o.n the other, the former shall prevail:\" · \" ·, I\n\nD ' '\n\nIt is; therefore, clear frDm_ the' new provisipn in the Amending . . Act thatrthe procedure indicated tj1er., in was intended to have ovej,- / . riding effect and au procedural laws weri: to give way 'to the new .E proceclure. 'Applioations under. s.; 14 (I) (e), theref9re, clearly fell within the protective umberlla of the new procedure in Chapter IIIA.\n\n.An iden\\ical view has been tak'en by , the oelhi High. Court tn the cdse of Smt. Krishna Devi Nigam & .Ors. v. Shyam }Jabu, Gupta & Os., '•' In this decision it has been clearly held that.the pro- . . . . .. - visions of s. 29A carniot be controlled by the provmons of the Slum Act. We fully app-rov\" and endors~ the ratio laid down in that decision as it is in conformity with 'the consistent opinion of this .Court.' .,, • , .\n\nOn a consideration, therefor~. of the 'ract~ and irc1imsta~Ces 'of tho case and .the , law referred to' above, we' reach the fo)lowing\n\n_/\n\nconclusions :\n\n. ' (I) [19801 2 S.C.R. 747 .. (2)\n\nAIR.1980 Dellii 1~5!\n\n' ' .·~\n\n. )\n\nH -.\n\n(1)\n\nI . • \\\n\n SUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n\nThat sections 14A, 25A, 1513 and 2SC of the Rent Act are special pmvisions so far: as the landlord and tena1\\t are concerned and in view of the non-obstante clause\n\nthes,6 .provisions woul.d override. the existing law so far . as the new procedure i's concerned;.\n\n(2) That there is no difference either on principle or in law .\n\n, between sections. 14(1) (e)and !4A of the Rent Act even\n\nthough these two provisions rebte to tenants under different situations;\n\n- 'f'\n\n(3) That ihe procedure incorporated. in .Chapter lllA of the\n\n(4)\n\nAmending Aci into the. Rent Act is in , public interest and 1s not violativ, e.of Article 14 of the Constitution;\n\nI . -\n\nThat in'view of the procedure in Chapter ITTA of the Rent Act, the Slum Act is rendered inapplicable to the extent of inconsistency a'nd it is !lot, therefore, necessary . for the landlord to obtain permission of th.e Competent\n\nAuthority udet s. 19 (I) (ii)of the Slum Act before instituting a suit for 'eviction and coming withins. 19(1) (e)\n\nflt •· ' or 19A of the-Rent Act. - . ' ~\n\nWe are: therefore; of the opinion 'that the High Cour.t i\\-as correct in rejecting applications of the tenants for setting rs'de. the. order of•_eviction. The appeal is acordingly dismssed but without\n\nany. order as to coSts ..\n\n' As. a result of o:ir decision, the special leave petition has to be dismissed. In both these.cases time to hcate the premises i~1 exten ded till June 30, i 984, subject to filing f the usual undertaking within four weeks from today failing which the landlords shall be free to a1k for possession forthwith through the 'executing court.·\n\n'N.V.K.\n\nAppeal & /'etition dismissed. ..\n\n' '\n\n.. ' .... ·.\n\n\"4·", "total_entities": 85, "entities": [{"text": "RAVI DUTT SHARMA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12, "end_char": 28, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAVI DUTT SHARMA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RATAN LAL BHAR.GAVA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 35, "end_char": 54, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RATAN LAL BHARGAVA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MuRTAZA FAzAL Au: A. VARADARAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 87, "end_char": 119, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A. VARADARAJAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "N. MISRA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 125, "end_char": 133, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.B. MISRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 143, "end_char": 164, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 171, "end_char": 181, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Sections 14A, 25A and 25B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 183, "end_char": 208, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Delhi Rent Control Act 1958", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 212, "end_char": 239, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 260, "end_char": 270, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Delhi Rent Control Act 1958", "statute": "Delhi Rent Control Act 1958"}}, {"text": "Rent Contrl Act 1958", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 342, "end_char": 362, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ss.14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 364, "end_char": 369, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Rent Contrl Act 1958", "statute": "Rent Contrl Act 1958"}}, {"text": "s.14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 446, "end_char": 450, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Rent Contrl Act 1958", "statute": "Rent Contrl Act 1958"}}, {"text": "section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 707, "end_char": 717, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Rent Contrl Act 1958", "statute": "Rent Contrl Act 1958"}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1082, "end_char": 1092, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Rent Contrl Act 1958", "statute": "Rent Contrl Act 1958"}}, {"text": "Delhi Rent Control Act 1958", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1131, "end_char": 1158, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sections 25A and 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1709, "end_char": 1727, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Rent Control Act 1958", "statute": "the Delhi Rent Control Act 1958"}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1752, "end_char": 1762, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Rent Control Act 1958", "statute": "the Delhi Rent Control Act 1958"}}, {"text": "sections 25A and 25B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1935, "end_char": 1955, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Delhi Rent Control Act 1958", "statute": "the Delhi Rent Control Act 1958"}}, {"text": "sections 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2568, "end_char": 2579, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Aending Act into the Rent Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2773, "end_char": 2802, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "IIIA of the Rent Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2983, "end_char": 3003, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3186, "end_char": 3191, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IIIA of the Rent Act", "statute": "IIIA of the Rent Act"}}, {"text": "s.14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3280, "end_char": 3284, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IIIA of the Rent Act", "statute": "IIIA of the Rent Act"}}, {"text": "sections 14(1)(e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3491, "end_char": 3508, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IIIA of the Rent Act", "statute": "IIIA of the Rent Act"}}, {"text": "IDA", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4035, "end_char": 4038, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sections 14A, 25A, 25B and 25C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4358, "end_char": 4388, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IDA", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "sections 14(1)(e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4829, "end_char": 4846, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IDA", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "section 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4895, "end_char": 4908, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IDA", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "[1980] 1 S.C.R. 854", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5697, "end_char": 5716, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "V.M.' Terkunde", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6347, "end_char": 6361, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V.M.' Terkunde, P:M. Parekh, Ms, .Jndu Ma/hotta, Ms. Kaila!h Mehta & Vima/ Dave for the Appelant/Pctitioners."}}, {"text": ":M. Parekh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6364, "end_char": 6374, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V.M.' Terkunde, P:M. Parekh, Ms, .Jndu Ma/hotta, Ms. Kaila!h Mehta & Vima/ Dave for the Appelant/Pctitioners."}}, {"text": ".Jndu Ma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6380, "end_char": 6388, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V.M.' Terkunde, P:M. Parekh, Ms, .Jndu Ma/hotta, Ms. Kaila!h Mehta & Vima/ Dave for the Appelant/Pctitioners."}}, {"text": "Kaila!h Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6400, "end_char": 6413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V.M.' Terkunde, P:M. Parekh, Ms, .Jndu Ma/hotta, Ms. Kaila!h Mehta & Vima/ Dave for the Appelant/Pctitioners."}}, {"text": "Vima/ Dave", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6416, "end_char": 6426, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V.M.' Terkunde, P:M. Parekh, Ms, .Jndu Ma/hotta, Ms. Kaila!h Mehta & Vima/ Dave for the Appelant/Pctitioners."}}, {"text": "Bikarmjit Nayer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6458, "end_char": 6473, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bikarmjit Nayer aicd D.D. Sharma for the Respcident in CA."}}, {"text": "RAVI DUI? v. RATAN LAL", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6537, "end_char": 6559, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RAVI DUI?"}}, {"text": "Faz'al Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6561, "end_char": 6571, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. RATAN LAL (Faz'al Ali, J.) 617 . . . . ' ' ' \\ ' .", "canonical_name": "Faz'al Ali"}}, {"text": "Kawatra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6608, "end_char": 6615, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kawatra & NJ{, Agarwaia•fo'r the Respondent in S.L.P.. A No .. 2948 bf 1982, . ' . , ' , , . ·"}}, {"text": "4FAZAL Au", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6764, "end_char": 6773, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~-'\n\nThe Judgment .of the Couft was delivered by ·\n\n·•'' • B\n\n4FAZAL Au, J. This Appeal'b;.spedal' leave is directed against\n\n':Jo an order passed by the\" Delhi High Court ori August 26, 1980 .·"}}, {"text": "Ravi Dutt Sharma", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7240, "end_char": 7256, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The tenant, Ravi Dutt Sharma, ;;, as inducted into the suit premises as for back as 1945, Tl(e .landlord Ratn Lal Bhargava applied undj:r' section 19 (I) (a} of the Slum Clearance Act ('Sluin Act' fot'. .", "canonical_name": "RAVI DUTT SHARMA"}}, {"text": "Ratn Lal Bhargava", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7333, "end_char": 7350, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The tenant, Ravi Dutt Sharma, ;;, as inducted into the suit premises as for back as 1945, Tl(e .landlord Ratn Lal Bhargava applied undj:r' section 19 (I) (a} of the Slum Clearance Act ('Sluin Act' fot'. ."}}, {"text": "section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7367, "end_char": 7377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7798, "end_char": 7803, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Puspa Rani", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8383, "end_char": 8393, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Puspa Rani filed' a stiit for eviction against her tenant, Swara~ .Kumar and .others, which also\n\n.·"}}, {"text": "Authority under the Slum Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9320, "end_char": 9348, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9356, "end_char": 9366, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Authority under the Slum Act", "statute": "Authority under the Slum Act"}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9902, "end_char": 9912, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Authority under the Slum Act", "statute": "Authority under the Slum Act"}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10273, "end_char": 10278, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Authority under the Slum Act", "statute": "Authority under the Slum Act"}}, {"text": "Section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10435, "end_char": 10445, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 25(A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10984, "end_char": 10998, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11033, "end_char": 11043, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "ss. 25(A)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11212, "end_char": 11221, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11412, "end_char": 11420, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": ".RAVID", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11656, "end_char": 11662, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".RAVID, UTT V. RATt, NLAL (Faza/A/i, J,) 619\n\nalso making provision at the."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13133, "end_char": 13146, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "cmninencirig with the Rent Controller and endi1ig up with the Supreme Court."}}, {"text": "sections 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15059, "end_char": 15069, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15192, "end_char": 15196, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16339, "end_char": 16349, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16474, "end_char": 16479, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Faal Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16712, "end_char": 16720, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "DUTT •. v. RATAN LAL' (Faal Ali, J.) 621,\n\n•' '~ '\n!", "canonical_name": "Faz'al Ali"}}, {"text": "s. 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16799, "end_char": 16804, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16929, "end_char": 16934, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17419, "end_char": 17424, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 14A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17624, "end_char": 17636, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18303, "end_char": 18309, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18912, "end_char": 18922, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19177, "end_char": 19182, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Tarkunde", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19705, "end_char": 19713, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Despite.the ingenius and attractive arguments of Mr, Tarkunde, it seems to us tha~ the distinction made by the learned counsel between ss, 14 (l) (e) nd 14 A is really a distinction without any difference."}}, {"text": "Kewal Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20184, "end_char": 20195, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Kewal Singh's case (supra), a decision to which one of us was a party (Fazal Ali, J.), this Court observed as follows~ ' '\n\n' \"The Act actually re_plac\\d the Ordinance which was promulgated on Jst December, 1979, The objects and reasol)s clearly reveal that the amendme, nt has been made or simplifying the procedure for evictio'n of tenants in case the landlord requires the premises bona fide for his per.son'al occuration, It -is a ' matter of common knowledge that even though the landlord may have an in1n1ediate and imperative necessity for."}}, {"text": "Fazal Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20255, "end_char": 20264, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Kewal Singh's case (supra), a decision to which one of us was a party (Fazal Ali, J.), this Court observed as follows~ ' '\n\n' \"The Act actually re_plac\\d the Ordinance which was promulgated on Jst December, 1979, The objects and reasol)s clearly reveal that the amendme, nt has been made or simplifying the procedure for evictio'n of tenants in case the landlord requires the premises bona fide for his per.son'al occuration, It -is a ' matter of common knowledge that even though the landlord may have an in1n1ediate and imperative necessity for.", "canonical_name": "Faz'al Ali"}}, {"text": "RAVI DUTT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21927, "end_char": 21936, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RAVI DUTT, i:: RATAN LAL (Faza/ Ali, J.) .. \" .. -~·· 623\n\nany stretch of imagination that section 29B and its sub-scti~ .", "canonical_name": "RAVI DUTT SHARMA"}}, {"text": "RATAN LAL", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21942, "end_char": 21951, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RAVI DUTT, i:: RATAN LAL (Faza/ Ali, J.) .. \" .. -~·· 623\n\nany stretch of imagination that section 29B and its sub-scti~ ."}}, {"text": "section 29B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22018, "end_char": 22029, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22071, "end_char": 22081, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22089, "end_char": 22110, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22121, "end_char": 22131, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22216, "end_char": 22226, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Sawaii Singh'/case'sµpra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22446, "end_char": 22470, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The .ratio ofcthis case reinforces ih~ ruie laid down in Sawaii Singh'/case'sµpra and in Vlnod Kumar Chowdhry v. \"Naraill Devi\n\nTaneja,11 1 it .was clearly pointed out that wheneyer there ."}}, {"text": "section 29A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22606, "end_char": 22617, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 29A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23649, "end_char": 23655, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 14A, 25A, 1513 and 2S", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24135, "end_char": 24165, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24749, "end_char": 24759, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Chapter ITTA of the Rent Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24822, "end_char": 24850, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25033, "end_char": 25038, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter ITTA of the Rent Act", "statute": "Chapter ITTA of the Rent Act"}}, {"text": "30, i 984", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25557, "end_char": 25566, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In both these.cases time to hcate the premises i~1 exten ded till June 30, i 984, subject to filing f the usual undertaking within four weeks from today failing which the landlords shall be free to a1k for possession forthwith through the 'executing court.·"}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_2_625_633_EN", "year": 1984, "text": ";:\"\n\n' .\n\n•••\n\n:->\n\n. '\n\n' f\n\n~ .\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF WEALTH TAX, PATNA\n\n' v.\n\nRAGHUBIR NARAIN SINGH\n\ni \\\n\nPebruary 20, 1984\n\n_.,.....~. - [ V.D .• TULZAPURKAR AND SABYASACHI MUKHARi1, JJ. J\n\n\"'Net wealth\"-~·-\"V, aluation of''n~; wealth.\": unde~ section 7 _re'ad with ser_tiqn 2(m) Of the Wealth Tax A.ct,...J.951-Treatnu!llf of (a) co1npensation an10u11t'receiv'ah!e under. the Bihar Lands. Refor1~~-Act'; (b) the eh~ i~ ihe nati1re of Agriculture Inconie Tax due to Government, and,.ded_uctible ffo1n the receivable con1pensatio11; (c) the a1nou1lt of money -decree'sfully attached 'by Garnishee orders of competent court and (d) claims ttder aecrees not yet e.xeruted, expldned.\n\n\"y The ssesee is an individual and hi~ estate stood csted in the State of-Bikar U_nder the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950'as and lrom 1st or' July.1952, ad he -is\n\n.~--._, I entitled to receiVC cOmPens'atio~ under the Acf rron1 , the Govern\n\n1 ment .. 'The; assessr, e . \"\"-., during the relevant asessment year5 had obtained twdiim<?netary . decrees' from his debtors, but the amolinfa receivable by the-'\"assessee were attached by two~7 gatnish\"e.e ... orders iss'uCd bythe Cak!u\"tta High Court on \\3th January-1960 and 21st Jn:e ,\" 1961.\n\nThe asseisee also\n\n0had some claim. decrees but as th_eY were -not yet exeCuted: they were sho\\Vll in -:'his book of accounts as Still Outstanding. The assesseci had to pay.\n\nAgricultural Incofile Tax to the Government and thi$ deb? has.to-be deducted _from\n\n,•\n\n\"'' . the conipenSation receivable by th~ assessc~: Jn these five appeais oY certificrite of fitneSs, question arose as to whether thC answers of the Hjgh <;:::ourt of. atna Given .. in the Tax reference!': on the questi9n of correctness of valuation of the \"net wealth\"\n\nunder soction 7 Or the weilth Tax Act, :1957 are correct. ·• . '\n\nThe Revenue Urged be followirl& five propositions:1 -\n\n' (I) For t?c urposes_ Qf compUtation of neiwealth of an_ a\".!ssoc: each assCt\n\n, belonging to ; irn-and (lach de'bt owed by.him haS to -be valutd separatcIY.\n\n(2)· The differencetbetwCell the ggre.!iat~ value of the assets and the awe~\n\ngate value of the.-debts represCts his ctwealth.\n\n' , F\n\n•,,.; . ,,\n\nG . ~.\n\n(3) I? ~!ermining th~ mar~t vlue,.of an. asst (or_ the resi9ue of the aSset\n\n.?1n1shd by a~ over-nd1ng title on the asset itself),' any liability or debt 1ncurre_d in relation to it has _to e ignored as the debt or liability hits to be separately evaluated: ·\n\n(4) What i~· the ~rke.t value of a ce1iain asset or the reside asset s referred to above, iSa quetion of fact, to be detcrnlined finally by the Inco1ne-tax Appellate Tri_bunal t.; iking into acCollnt he relevant evidence a1-icl consld~\n\nratios put. forward by both the sides and the High Court Cannot interfere with such a finding of fact unlt:ss it is found to be based on irrelevant consideration or is arrived at by ignorir:g\"relevr.nt eVidcnce. ~·\n\n• • (5) ./\n\nWhen the debt is represented as an asset, its ma1:ket value has to be determiii.Cd )n the san1e Iha.oner as ttie market value of any other ass\"et irres- Pec:tive of the fac.t whether such an asset-det is encubercd J;:iy another debt-0wed fro111 the asses~, .becallse __ the later-tmlntioned debt can qualify\n\nfo~ deduction at its rriarket V<i.lue indcI?ndcntly. ·\n\nDismissing_ the appeals.the Coµrt, . -\\· , •\n\nHP, LD:· 1.l. Sect_ion 7 and 2(M) of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957, though ust be rea4 harmoniously, apply at two different stiges.' Section 7 deals with theestimation of the market value of the asset, while section 2(M) enjoins that froii1 the same, the .debt owned by the assessee to be dedi1cted. The debts may. be deducted ., from the value of assets bUt the valution ~Of all asse~ hfls to be done in lerms of~ Section 7(1) taking into considerationS all the hazards incluctmg tbe possibility of . an an1ount orl account of debt being deduct.ed fron1 t~1e .value of the asset is a factor.\n\n \\Vhicb:_, vill _influence a ;>respective buYer in the ope1t market, depending upon-the facts and drucumstances of each q:ise.\n\n[633-EF] • 'f\n\nJ 1.2. ,.:Agricultural income tax dties from the assessee which are deductible fro1n the compensation under Section 4(c) of the 'Bihar Land Refonns Act, .1950, if the \"s3.me bas not been dectuCted before the issue of the cornpensation bond,' then the possibility and the hazard of its being duducted fron1 the, compcnsniion involv<.\"d~ is a faCtor which has to b~ taken into acCount in estimating the value of the right. of comp6ns:i.tion for the purpose of eS:timating the net \\Vealth of the as~; essee on the valuation date\" under the Wealth Tax Act. TI1e arrears of agricult\"ural incon1c-tax is .not to. be' deducted from the nt wealth as such but is a factor which willing Pui--\n\n0 _...., chaser will take into consideration in estimating the value of thCse assCls and that is afactO'r which should be taken into consideration .. The Tribunal will estimate' the alue -taking iilto consideration the ptis.sibility of dcduc; ti\"on on account of the liability of the assessecon ::i.ccount of 3.gricultural iii.Come-tiix if it had not been already dedUcted in accordilnce With the prov1sioris of the At and determine the net valueof the assets of the aSsossee, 3.ccOrdingly. [629A-D] ' .\n\nc. v. T. w. RAGHUBIR NARAIN. 627\n\n. Commi'ssion'er Of Wen/th Tax,'B(har, Patna'Vs. M'1haraja Kuffiar Kamal~Singh '-A (Civil Appeal Nos. 1238 to 1240 (NT)/J,973 decided On 20-2-84 relied on'. ·\n\nI . '\n\n2.'1. Ir .here is. an asscf which is. ~bject. to certain hazards ihcludng the liability or\"certain debt to be deducted from the said asset, then th:it factor would -be a relevant factor dimini~}liug the -marhe~ va!Ue o.f the asset in Open market and has to. be estimated> taking into consideration tat factor. [633D]_, '\n\n'B , .\n\n. ' ' ...,.. 2.2.\n\nMerely becalise the asscssee had shown the fu11 dccretal amo_unts in his hooks as stillduc,_ would. nt rpso /aero lead to the conclusiOn tha(ihey -should , be. . _ Valued at thOse suhls whhoUt taking into consideratioll the hazards of realisation . -·.of te ctecre.es.\n\nThese ctccrei:-.s had o-t ri executed and in the process of execlition- . there may be hazards ai1d the \\Vea.Ith Tax , Officer n1ust .estlate the priceof the decree by anticipat'ing what a willing prirchaser wouidhavC paid for those decrees taking the haz<1rds'-into consideration in open inarket on the valuation ct'a.tc-arid\n\nhould .estimate the price of the asset ill.questirt accordingly: .: .[631C-D]\n\n::'..3.\n\nWhen assessee .had c: .daim , decfce ::i.gainst hs debtor, thC Wcalih. Tax Officer should ascertain the - price that a rcasOriablc. person would have paid fo11 it on the relnt _date, and \".alc , jn oPen m3.rket cnsidering .that this~ claim decree Can only bO satified, wholly opartly fr6m the compensation which the .debtor would receive under. the Bihar J--aqd Reforms At, 1950.'\\The clailn decree iS hn asset, but-it shf?uld bevaI_ucd by estimating What it would fetch in tho open market on the'valuatiOn date taking int~ .coasideration all the hzards_. [631H, 632A] ·\n\n. I , 3.1. For the pUfp6ses Or con-iputR_tion of net-wealth o~ n aSi; e1See each. agset ·--4.._;'-belonging to him and each dfbt owed 1?Y , him haS tO br valued scpaiatd)r. [632E] ..\n\n3,2. The difference between the aggregate value of the assets alld the atgri\n\n:'F gate value of. the debts represet~ his net-wealth. [632F] -,. . ·\n\n. '\n\n. C;'Y!L APPBLLATH JUKIIDICTION•: Civil Appeal Nos. 1233-1237of1'973.\n\nAppeals from t!; e Judgment and Order dated the .5th May, 1972 efthe Patna High'\\ourt in Tax Cases Nos. 64 to 68 of'l967. . ! '.\n\nG.C Sharma~ JJ. B, . A.hufa & Miss A. Subhashini fo; the\n\nAppellant.,~\n\n·.,...\n\n. SUPR!ME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1984} 2 S.C.R • , .\n\nA P.X. Chatterjee and Rathin Dass for the Respondent. .\n\n. E\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\n.. '\n\nSABYASACHI .MmrnARJJ, J., These appe.als from the judgment of the High Court of Patna have come to this Court by certificates l!lranted under Section 29 of the Wealth Tax Act, .1957. The questions upon which the. certificates. of fitness of appeal to this Court have licen granted are question Nos. (2), (3) and (4) in Tax Cases Nos. 64 to 68 of 1967. The questions are as follows: <, •\n\n\" \"Qu.stion No. 2. Whether, in the fact• and circumstances of the case, the decrees obtained by the assessee against Shri A.H.\n\nI, al arid Shri D'.D. Tulsi for Rs:. 1,11.747 and Rs. 51,525 respectively, have been valued under the Wealth Tax Act, 1957, by. correctly applying the provisions of section 9 of the Act for the ' purpose of including their values fa th~ net walth of. the ustssee?\n\n' Question J'{o. 3~Whether, , the sum of Rs. 32,266, the amount of Agricultural income-tax due from. thb asessee, falls • for deduction in hands of the assessee in arriving at his total\n\n. .\n\n-·-··\n\n' I\n\n. wealth for the years 1957-58, 1958-59, 1959-60 and 1960:61? .. ,.).,·\n\n011.stion No .. 4-Whether, the sum• of Rs. 597909 due from Tikait Girja .Prasad Singh,+.Rs. 40001 due (rom Sri\n\nGangeshwar Prasad Singh, Rs. 64000 due from Mahanth Mahabir Das, Rs .. 37773 due from Sri Lakshmi Narain Singh, Rs. 2600 due from Sri Jamuna Prasad Missir, Rs. 1250 due from Sri. Sarjg Kumar, Rs. 15344 due from Sri .NandJoshore Singh, and Rs. 388760 due from Raja Prithivichand Lal Chaughiiry under claim decrees obtained against them by. •ne .assessee under the Bihar Land Reforms Act are. assets of tno as.essee within . the meaning of Wealth Tax Act, 1957, and have been valued under the. 'said Act by correctly applyin~ , he orovisions of section 7 of the Act for the purpose of incl.ud.ing their values in 'the net wealth of the assessee\"? j.\n\n' \\ c.w.T: v. RAGHUllIR N.ARAIN (Mukharji, 1.). 629 •\n\nRegarding Question Na.· 3 which is the question whether!the f\n\n. • amount of agricultural income-tax dues from the assessee is a factor which has to be taken into account for 'valuing the compensatfol} pay-· able to the assessee, wehave held that agricultural.income-tax ~.ues from the asscssee which are deductible from the. compensation under . Section 4 (c) of the -Bihat Land RefotmsAct, .1950, if the sal]le has not • been deducted .before the issue <if the compensation bond, then the · .. 'possibility a11d the hazafd of its being ~.eduded fro, m th~ compensation involved is a factor which has.to be taken into account in esti- \"· mating the value of the right of compensation for the purpose of esti- 'ffiating -'tI1e net wealth cif the assessee on the valuation dte under the :• ·. Wealth Tax Act. The ·dears, of a_gricultural incofTle-tax is not io be deducted frcim the net wealth as such but is a factor which a willing purcha.ser will take into consideration in estimating the .value of these assests and .that isa factor which should be taken into consideration.\n\nThe point h&s been discussed by this Court in the case f Comissioner '.\\ of Wealth. Tax,'Bihar, J!atna v. Maharaja Kumar Kamal Singh (Civil\n\nAppeal Nos. 1238 to 1240 (NT) of 1973)~ , The qµestion, is, therefore aµswered as•the ans>yere~ given in the said appeals and the Tribunal will estinwte the Value by taking into C'<nsideration the possibility for deduction on account. of the liability of the assessee on account. of agricultural income-tax if it had not be2n already deducted in' accor-. dance wi_th the\" provisions of the Act a:nel determine the net value of . the assets of the assessee, accordingly. , . ,\n\nI - ,. ~· \\ . ·: .; . . .\n\n• \\, ' . • I .\n\nThese. questions are for the wealth ta-x assessments of. the asses- ., ' ' ' ..... sec for the assessment years 1957-58, 1958-59, 1959-60, 1960-61 and\n\n1961-62. J'he assessments involved were for those years in which the relevant valuation dates we're 20th September, 1956,.2lst March, 1958;\n\n21st March, 1959, 21st.March 1%0 and 20th March 1'96hespectively.\n\nIn the firs\\)'ear the'assessee had filed return of wealth for Rs. 447065.\n\nThe Wealth Tax Officer, however, determined the total wealth of the .assessee at 'Rs: 1608863.\n\nThe Wealth Tax Officer included in the net wealth of the assessec, vrious amounts of money due under. the\n\nI ' decrees which the assessee hal, l obtained against certain debtQrs, as•,\n\nwell as t.he compensation payable to him under the Bihar 'Land Reforms A.Gt after valuing the bonds.· It may be mentioned that the asses see had appealed to the Appellate Asistant Commissioner arid thereafter he . had carried appeals , to the Tribunal also and had obtained. snme srelief in _the processc For the subsequent assessment years of 1958-59. 1959-.60, 1960-61 and 1961-6.2, 'similar considerations had come \\IP before the Wealth Tax Officer, o~ the assessee filing separate returns and similar results were followed. In each year\n\n\\ '\n\nA.'\n\n.c ' .. \"'\n\n'H '\n\n.. .,,_\n\nL ,, ..\n\nthe asessee had claimed ertain deductions: including an amount of . n . .\n\nR•. 32266 due as agricultural income tax. The later sum hns . been consi5tently disallowed. This point we have 'd, isposed of in terms of tlo.o deeisioa of this Court in Civil Appeal Nos. 1238 to 1240 (NT) of 1973. . . . .\n\nSo far as Question No. 2; is concerned, while' computing the net wealth, the Wealth Tax Ofi\\oer had incluc:e<l the sums of Rs. 8000 and\n\ns.'130.11 for the ; iear 1957-58, due from S; i A.K.Hazr~ and Sri N.\n\n Sabay respectively, on the bsis o( l)sufructuary mortgatge in favour of the assesee as his assests. On th~ last point the assessee has obtained ~- . relief from the Appellate Tribunai for the year 1957-58 and for .that reafon thes~ two sums were excluded from .the net wealth of the asses- see for the subsequent assessment years and that point had given rise -' to the reference in Tax Cases Nos. 23 to 27 of 1966. On the other\n\nquestions raised by the assessee, reference in Tax. Cases No~: 64. to ' 68 of 1967 had arisen.\n\n. •\n\n. .\n\nNo,,; the facts thaterial for Questin No. 2 are.as follows: . . ' ' The assessee had obtained civ]J court decrees for Rs. 11 i747. and Rs. 51525 against Sri A.H. Lai and Shri D.D. Tulsi. The decrees are sti.li pending eecution. In the books of the assessee'lfthese two decretal aniounts were showff as tstill outstanding. So far as the decree\n\nobtained against Shri D.D. Tulsi, th~ position seems to be that .Tulsi\n\nowed a decree to the assessee and the assessee owed money to the bank.\n\nIn .c; onnection with the decre obtained against D.D. Tulsi, it liad\n\nl>een contended before ihe Tribunal that at the instance ofo the Official Liqwdator, the Calcutta High Court had issuef.1 a Garnishj order on 13th January, 1960 for setting off the assessee's liability to the Pacific Bank and, therefore, the decree-.did not represent wealth wh.ich could . be valued under the Act. It was recorded by the Tribunal that the order .of the Caltuita High ¢ourt had been passed after the relevant dates\n\nof the first three assessment years and it held that even for the assess~ m.ent years 1960,61 and 1961-62, tlie 'order of attachment could not indicate that the value of the decree was 'nil', as was the assessee's\n\nse. Hence, the decree against. Sri tulsi was valued by the Wealth Tax Officer at Rs. 51525.\n\nAs regards the decree against Sri A.H.\n\nLal, tlie attachment order passed by the Calcutta High- Court was on :m1t 1'!11e, 1961, hat, is to say,. even aftet the valuation date for the ..\n\nc.w.T. v .. RAGHUll!R NA~AiN' (Mukharji, J.) 631\n\nassessment year 1961-62. Tl; ede'cree.was therefore valued by the Wealth Tax Officer at the figure of Rs.· JI 1747. It wasdie contention. of the assessee. that the hvo decrees had been erroneously valued and 'the . . . principles for valuation unde'r Setion 7 (I~ had hot been followed:\n\nOn the other hand it was cbntended 'on. behalf of the revenue !bat . decrees had been correctly valued unde~ Section 7 (2) (a) of the .AC't.\n\n'The High Court held and in our opinion rightlythat .two d.ecrees had :not been.valued under. Section .7 (2) of the Act at all and. had been valued under Section 7 (I) of the Act., We are in agreement with the . High Cour~ that merely becausetJ; e assessee had shown the_ full dec; etal amounts in his books as still due, would notdpsofacto lead to the conclusion that they would be valued at those sums without taking.into .. cosideration tlie haz_ards of realisa6on pf the decrees. These decrees\n\nhad not been executed and in the process of execution, there may be hazards and the Welath'Tax Officer n!ust, sJimate the price of the decree by anticipating what a willing purchaser won.Id have paid for those ..\n\ndeerees taking the hazards Into consideration ·-in open market on• the . val_uation date and should estimate the price of thi; asset in question accordingly. The High Court. answered this question in the negative ..\n\nWe are of the opinion that in view of the well-settled principles which we have discussed In the case of Cimimisioner of Wealth Tax, Bihar, Patna v. Maharaja Kumar Kaina/ Singh '(Civil A, ppeal Nos~ 1238 to:· 1240 (NT) of 1973, the.High Court was right in its decision' ·\n\n{ .\n\nsf r ar as the~ Question. No. 3 is concerned,. the same question\n\n~-.; would. have to be answered in the manner indicated above and the . High Court has done the same and we affirm the said decision in view of the decision of this Court in Civil Appeal Nos.· 1238 tci J240 (NT) . of 1973. The facts regarding question. No .. 4 after taking into coside~\n\n.. \\:\n\nration statement of this. case as also the suppiementary statement 6f . . the .case sent to the High Court pursuant to its. dirc.tions are as . follows : . /\n\n' •.'\n\n., .\n\nD ..\n\n- In respect of sums due from. Tikait Girja Prasad Singh; . the . High Court-hs liserved that assessee was entitled in respect; of the\n\nG ·. , zamindari compesation of Tikait Girja Prasad Singh which had. vested in the G, overnn1ent and the. valne of.the compensation 11ad Men\". estimated 'at 75 per cent . of' certain, figure.\n\nThe High Court directed that . when assessee had a claim. decree against . its debtor, the Wealth Tax.Officer should_ ascertain the price that areason- H al:lle. person would have paid for. ii on the relevant -date, . valuation ...\n\n. '\n\n. ' ' ..\n\n\\ A\n\n• G\n\n' . . in opn market Considering that this claim decree Cal) only be Satisfied\n\nwholly or partly from the compensation which the. 'debtor would receive under the Bihar Land Reforms Act. 1950.~ The claim decree was an aset, the High Court held, but -it was wrongly valued by the authorities and directM to be valued by estimating what it would fetch in the open market on the valuation date taking into considc- ration all the hazarils.\n\n.,__ _ '\n\non the same principle, the other decrees mentfoned in the. qestidns . .-\n\nhae been disposed of by the High Court. We are of' the opinion th'at ·\n\ni~ view of the principles :discussed by this Court in the case of Commis- ~·\" . s10ner of JV, a/th Tax, B1har, Patna 'v. Maharaja Kuma.r Kaflutl Singh ,,,_\n\nthe High Co, urt was right in its conclusion. Indeed this question was hot seriously pressed before us sewrately ...\n\n• We. may. reiterat<; that learned. counsel before U& certain propositions, namely: ,,\n\nfor the revenue urged ·\n\n(1) For the purposes of computation of. net-wealth of an assessee ech asset belongini: to him and each debt owed by hill} has to be valued s.cparately, · • '\n\n(2) , The difference between the ai:i:reagate value 0f .:r the 'assets and the agrcgate value of the debts , represents his - . net-wealth. ·\n\n' ,\n\n(3) In determining the market value of an asset( or the_ residue \"I of the asset diminishCd by an over-tiding title. on the asset itself), any liability or debt incu\\red in relation to it hs. to be ii:nored as the debt or liability has tci be separately evaluated. '\n\n(4) What is the market value of a certain asset P• he residue asset as referred to 'above: i; a question of fact, to be deter~ i~ mined finally by the Income-tax Appellate ·.Tribunal taking .' ir1Jo account 111e relevant evidence and: consid\" utions put\n\nfore ward by both the sides and the High Cow cannot in\"·, ..\n\n'' ,,,\n\nJ' .\n\n: .. :o . ;; ;\n\n• ---..:i.\n\nj ..\n\nC.W.T.)'. RAGIIUBIR NARAIN (Mukhar}i.-J.)\n\n' . ~' . \\' 633\n\n,# terfere with such a finding of fact nless it isJoud t~. be\n\nbasect n irrelevant consideration or is arrived at by' ignoring 'relevant' evidence.\n\n'---.\n\n' ' - . '\n\n(5) When the debt is representedasm) asset, its market. value has. to be determined in the same manner as the. market\" . value of any other asset irrespective of the fact whether such an asset-debt\"is encumbered by another debt owed from the assessee, because the later-mentioned debt can qualify for deduction at its markt value independently: ·\n\nI About proposition No. (l) and (2) above, there cannot be' any dispute.' But as regards Proposition No. (3), as this Court has discussed in Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Pihar Patnq v. Mahdraja Kumar . Kamal Singh, if there is an' asset, whicli_.is -subject 'to certain hazards including the liability. of certain debts to be deducted from the .said ttsset, then that factor ould be relevant factor diminishing the market .\n\nvalue of the asset in open market and has to be estimated taking into consideration that fct9r. Regarding Proposition No. ( 4), it may be stated that while it is a question of fact but if the Tribunal has arrived at the conclusion by takit1g wrong principles into consideration, then\n\n-·-·.\n\n such a findi'ng )VOU!d not bind the High Court. Regarding Propositon No. (5), it 'may be stated that (de bis may be deducted from' the value\n\n...\n\n. ..;;. i of a$, sets but the valuation of an asset has to be \\!one in terms of Section / 7 (I) taking into considerations a!I the hazard$ including the po.sibility \"---. of au amount on account, of. debt being deducted fron\\ the value of the\n\nasset is a factor which will. influence a prospective buyer in the open market, depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case .. . ' . . . ' ·~\n\nIn the aforesaid view of the matter, we affirm the decision of the\n\n.· High Couri in all these points and dism.iss thee appeals with costs:\n\nS.R.\n\n.&pplifals dismissed. ·\n\n.A ..\n\n/ ''", "total_entities": 52, "entities": [{"text": "COMMISSIONER OF WEALTH TAX, PATNA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 35, "end_char": 68, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "COMMISSIONER OF WEALTH TAX, PATNA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RAGHUBIR NARAIN SINGH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 76, "end_char": 97, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAGHUBIR NARAIN SINGH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V.D .• TULZAPURKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 138, "end_char": 156, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.D. 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T. w. RAGHUBIR NARAIN.", "canonical_name": "RAGHUBIR NARAIN SINGH"}}, {"text": "M'1haraja Kuffiar Kamal~Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5332, "end_char": 5361, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M'1haraja Kuffiar Kamal~Singh '-A (Civil Appeal Nos."}}, {"text": "20-2-84", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5420, "end_char": 5427, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1238 to 1240 (NT)/J,973 decided On 20-2-84 relied on'. ·"}}, {"text": "G.C Sharma~", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7596, "end_char": 7607, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G.C Sharma~ JJ."}}, {"text": "A.hufa", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7617, "end_char": 7623, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A.hufa & Miss A. Subhashini fo; the\n\nAppellant."}}, {"text": "A. Subhashini", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7631, "end_char": 7644, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A.hufa & Miss A. Subhashini fo; the\n\nAppellant."}}, {"text": "A P.X. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7723, "end_char": 7740, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A P.X. Chatterjee and Rathin Dass for the Respondent. ."}}, {"text": "Rathin Dass", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7745, "end_char": 7756, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A P.X. Chatterjee and Rathin Dass for the Respondent. ."}}, {"text": "SABYASACHI .MmrnARJJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7835, "end_char": 7855, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "E\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\n.. '\n\nSABYASACHI .MmrnARJJ, J., These appe.als from the judgment of the High Court of Patna have come to this Court by certificates l!lranted under Section 29 of the Wealth Tax Act, .1957."}}, {"text": "Section 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7977, "end_char": 7987, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "A.H.\n\nI", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8345, "end_char": 8352, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Whether, in the fact• and circumstances of the case, the decrees obtained by the assessee against Shri A.H.\n\nI, al arid Shri D'.", "canonical_name": "A.H.\n\nLal"}}, {"text": "Wealth Tax Act, 1957", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8453, "end_char": 8473, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8516, "end_char": 8525, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Wealth Tax Act, 1957", "statute": "the Wealth Tax Act, 1957"}}, {"text": "Gangeshwar Prasad Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9005, "end_char": 9028, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "40001 due (rom Sri\n\nGangeshwar Prasad Singh, Rs."}}, {"text": "Mahanth Mahabir Das", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9049, "end_char": 9068, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "64000 due from Mahanth Mahabir Das, Rs .. 37773 due from Sri Lakshmi Narain Singh, Rs."}}, {"text": "Lakshmi Narain Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9095, "end_char": 9115, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "64000 due from Mahanth Mahabir Das, Rs .. 37773 due from Sri Lakshmi Narain Singh, Rs."}}, {"text": "Jamuna Prasad Missir", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9139, "end_char": 9159, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2600 due from Sri Jamuna Prasad Missir, Rs."}}, {"text": "Sarjg Kumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9184, "end_char": 9195, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sarjg Kumar, Rs."}}, {"text": ".NandJoshore Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9220, "end_char": 9238, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "15344 due from Sri .NandJoshore Singh, and Rs."}}, {"text": "Raja Prithivichand Lal Chaughiiry", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9264, "end_char": 9297, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "388760 due from Raja Prithivichand Lal Chaughiiry under claim decrees obtained against them by."}}, {"text": "Wealth Tax Act, 1957", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9443, "end_char": 9463, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9548, "end_char": 9557, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Wealth Tax Act, 1957", "statute": "Wealth Tax Act, 1957"}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10056, "end_char": 10065, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Wealth Tax Act, 1957", "statute": "Wealth Tax Act, 1957"}}, {"text": "Wealth Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10501, "end_char": 10515, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "A.K.Hazr~", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13237, "end_char": 13246, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8000 and\n\ns.'130.11 for the ; iear 1957-58, due from S; i A.K.Hazr~ and Sri N.\n\n Sabay respectively, on the bsis o( l)sufructuary mortgatge in favour of the assesee as his assests."}}, {"text": "N.\n\n Sabay", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13255, "end_char": 13265, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8000 and\n\ns.'130.11 for the ; iear 1957-58, due from S; i A.K.Hazr~ and Sri N.\n\n Sabay respectively, on the bsis o( l)sufructuary mortgatge in favour of the assesee as his assests."}}, {"text": "A.H. Lai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13953, "end_char": 13961, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "51525 against Sri A.H. Lai and Shri D.D. Tulsi."}}, {"text": "D.D. Tulsi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13971, "end_char": 13981, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "51525 against Sri A.H. Lai and Shri D.D. Tulsi."}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 14443, "end_char": 14462, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In .c; onnection with the decre obtained against D.D. Tulsi, it liad\n\nl>een contended before ihe Tribunal that at the instance ofo the Official Liqwdator, the Calcutta High Court had issuef.1 a Garnishj order on 13th January, 1960 for setting off the assessee's liability to the Pacific Bank and, therefore, the decree-.did not represent wealth wh.ich could ."}}, {"text": "Pacific Bank", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14563, "end_char": 14575, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In .c; onnection with the decre obtained against D.D. Tulsi, it liad\n\nl>een contended before ihe Tribunal that at the instance ofo the Official Liqwdator, the Calcutta High Court had issuef.1 a Garnishj order on 13th January, 1960 for setting off the assessee's liability to the Pacific Bank and, therefore, the decree-.did not represent wealth wh.ich could ."}}, {"text": "tulsi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15036, "end_char": 15041, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sri tulsi was valued by the Wealth Tax Officer at Rs."}}, {"text": "A.H.\n\nLal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15128, "end_char": 15137, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As regards the decree against Sri A.H.\n\nLal, tlie attachment order passed by the Calcutta High- Court was on :m1t 1'!11e, 1961, hat, is to say,.", "canonical_name": "A.H.\n\nLal"}}, {"text": "Calcutta High- Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 15175, "end_char": 15195, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As regards the decree against Sri A.H.\n\nLal, tlie attachment order passed by the Calcutta High- Court was on :m1t 1'!11e, 1961, hat, is to say,."}}, {"text": "Mukharji", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15312, "end_char": 15320, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T. v .. RAGHUll!R NA~AiN' (Mukharji, J.) 631\n\nassessment year 1961-62."}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15728, "end_char": 15737, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15915, "end_char": 15924, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Tikait Girja Prasad Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17676, "end_char": 17701, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "zamindari compesation of Tikait Girja Prasad Singh which had."}}, {"text": "s10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18767, "end_char": 18770, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "RAGIIUBIR NARAIN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20025, "end_char": 20041, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RAGIIUBIR NARAIN (Mukhar}i.-J.)\n\n' ."}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_2_634_645_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "A 634\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF WEALTH TAX, BIHAR, PATNA.\n\n-..\n\nMAHARAJA KUMAR KAMAL SINGH .\n\nFebruary 20, 1984\n\nc [ V.D. TULZAPURKAR, R.S. PATHAK an dSAnYA~ACHI Muu1ARJI, JJ.] ..,,.. ' . -· .\n\n Wea/ih Tax Act, 1957, s.2'..m}-Net wclth~Ho~ to co1npute net wealth , for wedlth tax assessnient-First estimate value of a;!J':sets as per s.7(1) and then deduct the debts owed by i1ssessee except debts':excluded by s.2(in).-Any factdi' dtt:act1n1 fro1n Value of aSSet which a willing purchaser , would pay for. buying that assci i11 D ope, JJmarket 1n11st be. taken into acconnt. POssibility of deducti'or/ofduesofassessqe 'for agricu!iura/inco111etax froinan1ount of con1pensation rmcfer s.4(c)ofBihar Land.\n\nRejOnns Act, 1950 1\"s Q factor to be taken b1to consideration in esti\"1ati11g the. value of te righi to .CQlnpensalion which it would/etch if Juld in opeh litarket. ·\n\n, .\n\n, Bi'har Land tforms Act, 1950--s. 4 (c) -interpretation of. ... ,\n\nWhile computing the net wealth of the respondent-\"\"assessce for purposes -of \\11ealth tax assessfl}eht unde'r the Wealth Tax Act, 1957, the wealth tax officer ,. incllided certain atnOunt as the valuC of theasscssee's right to compensation which\n\nhad accrued to hi1n on vesting of his estate in the Stci.te f Bhar under the Bihai Land Reforms Act, 1950 on the bais of market vaJUe on the vaiuatio~1 date. ~is , was contested by .. tl)-e assessee on the grouncj.'that after adjµsting his outstandingag, ricultural jncon1e tax liability the compensation .Payable t6 him was nil.\n\nTh~ . assessee also produCed Collector's letter to show that the amount of con1pensation\n\nreceivable by th~ assessee would be r{jJ. The Appeallate Assistant Con1missioner .agreed ·ith the yiew of the Wealth Tax Officer. In appeal-before the Tribunal the\n\nasSe$see contended that the unpaid agricultural income-tax as a debt was deductible\n\nwhile CotnPuting his net wealth. The Jribnal accepting the Revenue's contention held that the an1ouiits claimed by .the aSsessee were not deductible as a debt-under s.2(n1) as .the arrears of agricultural incoIDe-tax Were outstanding for inore than . - _. \" . ' twelve -n1onths. On a reference being made, a Full Bench of the High. Court \\vas of the, opinion that the market value of the right of ihc assessee to receive ad-interim. compen.sation. shotild be deterritlned in view of the provisions of s.4(c) of the Bihar . Land Reforms Act, 1950 and held that in the facts and circumstances of the cae as\n\nnothing was receivable by the 'sSessee fro1n the State of .Bihar in vie'Y .of the arrear$ of agicultral, inco1!1e-tax, the value of e asset to the assessoe was nil,\n\n,°\"\".'-.\n\n- '\n\n- •.\n\n---r. -\n\n~·.·\n\nI ··-{_\n\n\"l,.·\n\n'' .\n\n635. ' Hence this: 'appeal.\n\nDisn1issing the appeal,\n\n' frEL'ri: For con1pu.ti\"ng net wealth Under' s.2(m) of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957 ·\n\ntcre are two different steps. Th'e fi1st and essential step would be to estimate. the value of the assets iil accordance v;:ith the provisions of the Act arid the second step\n\n.· B \\vould be-to deilct thcrefro~ the debts O\\Ved by the assesSee -eXcept the debts excluded by thatse, ction. Forestimating the value of the a\"sscts the material prov:isio1{ would be s.7(1) oft.he Act \\vhich 'enjoins the Wealth Tax Officer to estimate the price \\vhich, in !tis. opinion, an ai;;.5c( ot11cr than ca.sh \\Vouk\\.fetch if sold in the open rharkct on the valuation 'ctate. The Wealth Tax Officer n1ust\n\n1 take into aCcoullt any factor 'which detrcts fron1 the valuC o(an asset which a willing purchasef v:rould ·\n\npay for buY.ing that asset in, ppen market.\n\n[~43 ~-C] ·\n\n- C\n\nSection 4 of the Bihar land Reforins Act, 1950 deals with the cons_equences of the vesting of.a)i\" estate or tCiiurc in-.the State and stipulates' different coneQue1lces.\n\nClause .(c) of s.4 provideS_ tht the arrea.rS of rve~e arid cesses rcn1aining lawfully due in reSpect of the estate.or tenure shall continue-to be recoverable it). .spite of'the vesting Of the estate and sh.ill without prejudiCe to any o.the'r mode of .recovery, be rocoverabie,' when so ordered by the Collector, by th6 deduction thereof from the\n\namout paYable. [~;1-3 -Gli] ' - •\n\nI11 the instant caSc; the possibility of deduction of the dues -of the nsscsSefor ai?; ricultural 'incon1e tax undr s.4(c) of the Bihai:· Lilnd Reforms Act from the con1peo.Sation n1oney .is a factor tha_._t affects price or v.ilue of the co1npensatioi1 money' . receivable by ihe asseSsee under t~16 Bihar Land Reforms Act and until it has Peen\n\nfinally determined that no.- arrears of agriculturl inco1}1c tax }s payable at all, will remain a hindrance and the value of which rriust\"be' quantified and deducted before\n\na P. oper csti,~C1.tc of the.value of_ the asset mone'y reCeiv!:J.blc bY the asess.ee-is prepa~ \"._\n\nred. _Exce'PtJn cases whee the 9uestion of arrears_?[ ag1icu1tural incon:ie tax is sttie~,\" this is a factor which goes to the dimination of the value of the asset. To._what extent ttiRt wbuld affect the Value of the _aSsct js a 1nattet of quantification.. The c-Ourt is not cOncerned wfrh the questiorl of_ actual quantificati_o~ .. , The 4\n\nCourt, is concerned with the question whether thai .f3.ctor , is a. matter which _has tope tak, en iii.fir, consideration in e<>timating the value of the asset i_n question.·\n\nThe court is of the opin_ion that i.t is a facto/ certainly to 'be talcn into cOside.ration in estimating wht. it w6u1d fetch in the <'ipen n1rke.t\" (644 H; \"645 AMC],\n\n,- i .,\n\n' The-coiitention that a debt \\Vhkh _ls not deductible ·:becaus~ of _, povisions. 0 (.\n\n~.2(m) should not 6e t'aen into considration in estimating the value of au asset\n\nis not acceptable in the facts and circnn1stances of this se. (645 F] 1. , ' \\\n\nCtVIL APPEL~AT~}URismcT; ON : Civil Appeal_ Nos. 1238 to 1240\n\n H', 'of 1973. ·\n\n'1 , I\n\n. From th~_Judgment and Order dated the 17th s\"eptember, 1971 of the Patna High Court in T; ix Cases Nos, 2of1965 and 19 and 20\n\nof 1966.\n\n. \"J\n\n, B.JJ. Ahuja & Ms. A,. Subhashini, for the Appellant.\n\nl>r.Y.S. Chita/e, and U.P. Singh, for Re•pondent .\n\n. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\n•J .\n\nSABYASAcHI MuKHARJJ, J. These appeals by certificates arise . . . against a decision of the Full Bench of tho Patna High Court. Several. questions were referred to the High.Court of Patna under Section 27 (1). of the Weahh Tax, Act, 1957, hereinafter re.ferred to as lhe Act. Two of these qu; ztions have been answered .against the assessee, one was held to be not entertainable and one misconceived. The question answered against the revenue in that reference before the High Court\n\nwa• question No. (iii) meationec'. in the judgment of B.D. Singh. J . . and .th~ question ic. as follows:-\n\n\"Whether, 01, the facts and circumstances of the case, t)le Tri.bunal was right in . including in the assess's net wealth. a positive figure, on account of Zamindary compensation wito\\Jt taking into consideration th.e arrears of agricultural . income tax instead of.taking the figure of compensation receivable from Government of Bihar at mil'.\n\nTn ordr to appreciate the question, it may. be ncessary to nofer to some facts. The question involved before the Full Bench was for the ssessment years I 959-60, 1960-61, and H6I-62, .rnrresponcl.'ng .. valuation .dates of which were the 3lst October, 1958, 3rd Octobr, '1959 and 31st October,.1960:lThe assessce is an individual. His estate vested in the State of Bihar under the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950\n\non and from' 1st July, 195_2, and he is entitled-to recieve compensation\n\n\" under the Act from the government, Under Section 3 of the. Act, the question arose about the inclusion in the, assessee's \"net wealth\" the value. of the estimated amourit of compensation receivable by him\n\n• ' , ; ' .....\n\n_ .. ,.\n\nc.w.T. v. M.K. KA, MAL SINGH,:(Mukhaii J.) .\n\n.. • ·~ I . ..\n\n. 637\n\n~~ fro, m the Bihar Government under the Bihar Land Reforms Act,, J 950. , A In the assessment year 1959-60, the Wealth-tax Officer estimated the ' value at is. 10,25:123 and included it in the n•i wealth onhe assessee. For the assessment vears l 960-6r and 1961-62, the assessee produced a Jetter from the District Cllector; Arnih, to show that the. , assessee is entitled to compensation of Rs. 4,39,713 only .. The . ; wealth-tax 'officer estimated 75% the, eof as the market value of the B right of the assssee to receive the compensation. Accordingly he 'J included 1n the assessee's net wealth Rs. 3,29,784. On appeal, tlie ' Appeilate Assista.nt Commissioner 'reduced the valuati01i for the. Jst -< year to Rs. \\29;?84.\n\nFor the riext two .years, namely 1960-61 and -. 1961-62, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner held that it would be reasonable to est1rnate the market. value of the compen<ation to\n\nC be'received by the ssessee at.65°1, of the face valu~.\n\nThe assessee preferred appeals before the Appellate Tribunal regarding assessments for the aforesaid three years and reiterated his contention tliat the' right to receive compensation under'. the Land Reforms Act WdS not aq asset within the' meaninr: or' Section 2 ,(m)\n\n., of the Act and. cou1d not be inclu{i.ed in the assessee's net wealth. The --Tribllnal held that the estiniatd amount of za1nind1ri colTjpensation ,..,. .. payable to th~ assessee 'was an as'set and had1to. be iuclu(l.ed in the assessee's net wealth, However, it directed the Wealth-tax Officer to . . ' , ,1 .. estimate !he value atid compensation t<? be reeiveci. by the assess_ee .at . L65% even for the rst year, i.e 1959-.60, as w!'ts <'.one by, the Appellate\\ ·.Assistant Commissipner whh regard to .th.e scond and third yearn i.e.- 196Q-61 and 1961-62. l ''~\n\nThe contention: of the asessee fUrther W?S that the unpaid agricu.i-\n\n• -.F tural income-fax as a .debt was lieductihe while computing. his net\n\nwealth. , , His claim was that this. debt was Rs.' 5,10,831 in the\n\n' ' ·-\n\nfirst year,> Rs. 4,76;46LOO in the second year an\\i Rs. 4,75,706 in the 'third year. A sum of R < ' 24.430 being agricultural income-tax demand for 1363 fasli was allow.er. to be. ~.<'ducted by the Wealfh-dx: _Officer .for the second and third yCars\" arrears of agric.111turft1 inCome~ G tax, ihe assessee had. pro<1.uced Government letter io show that the . . amount of compensation receivable by the assessce would be nil. Accor-·.\n\nding to the enquiries fron1 the re.venue depart1nellt. 11 also ppcarect that the final con; ipcnsation money.payable in respet of th• assessee's zamindari was less than the agricu'ltµral ii\\com.,., tax dues outstanding H. aganist him,.andso.it was hot possible to effect r.ealisatiort of te dues\n\n.-.\n\n1 \"\" • I of ai; ricu1tural income-tax only by adjustment from the final compensation muney. The Triqunal, therefore, held that except Rs. 2(430 which was agricultural income-tax demand for 1363 fasli and .which. was allowed to be deducted by the wea!th-.tax Officer, thi; other amounts as 'cla.i; ned by the assessee were not 'deductible as the arrears were outstanding for more than 12 months, in view of th<i provisi01; is contained under Section. 2 (m)of the Act and the Government Jetter was.· . . ' not f>t all h.elpful to the assess.ee. Then reference wasmade to the High\n\nCourt under Section 27(1).of the Act raising five questions out of which .. question No._ (iii) as set out hereinbefore is before us.\n\nThe questiOns before the High Court including' t\\le question w, hich is before us were referred to a Foll Bench of the court and the reference was disposed of by .the 'Full Ben.ch o( Patna High Court on 17th September, 1~'71: anil the decision is reported in 84 LT.R. p. 240. ,\n\n• • The Fu'H-Bench decided.the. question , in issue before us against the revenue and in favour of the assessce holding thereby that in the facts arid circumstances of the case as nothirg was receivable 1'y the assessee--in view of the arrears of agricultural inCcmc-taX, t.he value of\n\n.. .'jj . ' -·- the asset to the assessee was nil. · . . .\n\nThough at one point of time .there was certain controversy as ·•r.} . '\n\n11. to whether the right t~ receive comp!nsati9n on the vesting of the • estate of the appellant m the\" Government was an asset a11d as .such fts .value had to bi; taken in computing the net value of assets or not,. . There is t\\o doubt that it is and it was not urged before us that it is not \"!'. an; rsset. The only questioil, is:· how should it be va.lued.\n\nH was cori-. tended before us that the Act pcohibit~ setting off of deductions of debts which are outstanding for more than .. 12 months .on account of the arrears of 'tax on income, agricultural or otherwise. - Therefore .it was urged that if the arrea; s of agricultural inc0111e-tax. due as in .this case are taken into account against the value of the. compensation \\.: receivable by . the asse.ssee, then it would not •be in accordanc.e with the scheme of the .Act and it would permit defeating the intention of . \"~ . ·, the legilature, namely, permitting deduction of arrears of .agricul\\ural income-tax•outstanding for more than 12. months by indirect meihod which is prohibited c\\irectly in terms .of Section 2 (m) (iii) of th.i; Act .. This.is the que.stion for our consideration in these app.eals. .. ·\n\n' ...\n\ni c.w.T. v. _M.K. KAMAL SINGH.(Mukh11rji, J.)\n\nwe may at a glance examine. the proisiori,\" or\"the llihar Land Reforths Act, under which compensation was pa'yable .t0 the asseisee and the 'value of which was under consideratio.n in this case. Before we do that, it is necessary to note the rlevant proisions ofthe Wealth Tax Act and to find out the scheme under ih~ W_ealth 'fax Act~. to how the assets have to be valed. Section 3 of the said Act is the charg- . ing section which imposes 1a tax for. every assessment year in respect of' _ • th!' net wealth on the corresponding valuation date. Section 4 make.•\n\n'-, I, . some deeming inclusion of certain assets as assets ofthe assessee. It i•· not necessary to deaLwith these in c'.etail ii'iitit may be mentione<l that\n\ncertain assets which are not standing in the name .cif th~ asses see ire\n\n ·included .in the net wealth, for exa, mple,. assets •transferred to spouse : or minor child or partner of a firm etc. These deal with the assets wh1'ch\n\nare not in the name or standing in the name.of assessee but .which .. really belong to the a.ssessec acc\\mi.ing. to the scheme. of the legislation •.\n\n-~ _ we may note }iere as-it.w~:.S conVaS-scrl. before us.that under sub-sectjon\n\n(3) of Sectio~ 4 of the Act which provides that w.here the value ohny asset is to, be ihcluded. in the net' wealth of a~ assessee ii~ accordance\n\n- with cbuse (a)' of sub, setion (l) or sub-sMion (JA).11\\ere shall be\n\nded'uced from such valuQ>any debts owing on the valuation <late by the tfansferree mentioned i~ that clause in so fr as such debts are ' . . ' .. . ' . --. . . referable to' such assets; .and the provisions of Section 5 shall apply\n\n.. ._ inrehitiOn to scli.ssets as Ir sucJi a}sE:ts'.were assets -beJoJ1ging o th.~ assessee. Sction 5 deals with the exemption of certain assets.\n\nI Section 6 excludes .. ce.rtain -l,; sets an_d debts ?utside India_: . Section '-<l.-1 1s import.ant which provides~ the metho0 .. how the .1• . to be assessed. n -provides th.at it shall be esti'matec\\ to be the price\n\nwhich in the. opi, Jlion of the Wealt!Hax Officer ii wol)ld fetch if sold in the open market on the valuation .date.' Section 2 (m) clea1' -..ith ,,.\n\n-, '_'nt wealth\" _upon wliich tax is levied and read• as follows :\n\n~-·\n\n( ..\n\n. \"2 (m)-\"nei wealth\" mens the mount by which. the i aggregate value coputed. in accordance . with the. provision• of\n\nthis .Act of all tlfe assets,· wherever located, belonging, to tho , assessee on the Valuation date, including assets required to b6\n\ninduded in his net wealth as on that date under thi• Act, ii i11. excess.of the. aggregate value pf all the debts m;, ed by the aoie .. ec\n\non the valuation c.,; te other than-. . . •\n\n- 'C\n\n(i) .debts which under section 6are not t• bO tak•a isl@ H account; ,\n\n' .\n\nA . ' ' .\n\nc '\n\nSUPREfE COURT REPORTS [1984] 2 s.c.R.\n\n(ii) debtnhich are secured on or which !)ave been incurred in . relation to, any property in respect of which wealth-tax is not chargeable under this Act;, and •\n\n. (iii) the amount of the tax, penalty or interest apayable inconsequcnce of any order passed under or in pursuance of this.· Act or any law relating to taxation of income or profits,\n\n/ '\n\n- or the Estate :buty Act, 1953 (34 of !953j, the Expe.rlditure -'<' Tax Act, 1957 (29 ofl957),.j)r the Gift-tax Act, 1958 (18 of •. 1958),- . . . - -~\n\n, (a) which is outstanding on the valuation date andis claimed by the assessee in appeal, revision or other proceed-\n\n.J .\n\ning as not being payable by liim; or ~\n\n(b) which, although not claimed by the assessee as not\n\nbeing payable by 'him, is rit!Vertheless, outnding for a period of more than twelve months on the valuation\n\nI , date\".\n\nThe main contention of the revenue is •that the amount of tax, penalty 01; interest payable in consequence o'f any order passer. unc'.er or in pursuance of the ACt. or any lawrelating to taxation of income___}- - or profits, or the Estate Duty Act which is outstanding on the valuation date and is claimed by the assessee in appeal, revision or other proccedillgs as not being payable by him and which, although not claimed by the assessee as not .being payable by him, is ll!'vertheless_ outstanding for more than twelve months on the valuation date should not be f'\n\nconsidere~. to be debt entitled to be deducted from net wealth. 'Net wealth' as we have noticed mearis the amount by which the aggregate ..;, value computed in accordance with the P!ovisions of the, Act, of all\n\nthe_ assets wherever.located, belonging to theassessee 'is in excess of the aggregate value of all debts exclml.ing the debts mentioned in Section 2 (m) of the Act. Therefore the scheme ofimposition of wealth tax in , case of an assessee which is not a company and the present assessee\n\nis not a company ahd the c0mputation f the wealth tax of an asses see\n\nwhich is a company might be done under s.ub-sectlon (2) of Section 7 of the Act,. must be done by firt estimating the value of the assets in in acc_ordance with the provisions of .'the Act. That is the first 'step. Therefore the estimation of the value of the assets is first necessary '\n\n c:w.T, v. M.K. KAMAL SINGH (lefukharji, J.)' 64\\\n\n\\ . ' ' ' _ _,,_ in accordance with the provisions of the-Act: The material provision of the Act forthb-1:mrpcise in the' said Act would be Section 7 (I) _which enjoins, hc-, Wea•thtax Officet\"rn case Of an asset other _t:ha!'- cash(to estimate the. prk'- which, in his opinion, it would fetch if sold in t]\\~. open market on rne valuation date. 1:hcrefore tlw first step in the facts and circumstances of this case was .that the Wealth-tax Officer to esti! mate the. price .which in his opinion the right to compensation of the\n\n' .\n\nB. . ' assessee would fetch if sold ju the open market, and after determining the value in the manner aforesaid to deduct therefrom debts owed by . the assessee excluding however the debts which are m'entioned in clause ' '~~ (i), (ii) and (iii) of Section 2 (m) of the Act.\n\n.. . . . ' ' ( - . ' .. _ Keeping this scheme Jr, the Act in \"mird. we have to examine the nature of compensation under Bihar Lant! Reforms Act, 1950 ..\n\nSection 3 provides• for th~ notification vesting an cstte 'or tenure in the .State and from-'the date specifiedin the notification, the estates or . '\n\ntenures of a proprietor or te_nureholder,·pecified in the notification,\n\n-~, will pass oi: to and become vested in the State. , It is 'not dispted that D iii\"this case this has happened in respect of, the property in question. / . , section'. 4_ deals with the consequences of the vesting of an estate or r\n\n•-y ' tenure in the State and stipulates different conseque&es. We are riot ! really concerned with-.all the various consequences. We may,'h-.; wever, •\n\nmention clause (c) of SectiQn 4 which is important for our piesent\n\nE . f purpose. It provides as it in<\\icates .that the arrears of re.venue and\n\n'-.....:. QCSSCS remainin)I ]awfully due in respect of the estate Of tenure shall\n\n_. coritinue to be recoverable from him in spite othe vesting of the estate\n\nand \"shall without_ prejudice to any other 'rnod, e af recovery, be recoverable (emphasis supplied) ••. when so ordert:<l, by the Collector, by the (!, eduction thereof from the amount payable to such interrne- . .. • .\n\nI , diary under Section 32, Section 32A or Section 33\". Reference was made to Section, 14 which _deals with__proisions rlating to certairidebts of proprietors and tenure-holde!S. 'sections 19 '23 arid-24 were also referred to. which we do not thiJi, k are material for our present purpose. Section 26 onwards deal with the p1iblication ofCompeustion Assessmeni-rdll. Section. 32 provides for the .manner of pay- . ment of compen•ation. 'Secti-on 32A provides as follows:- - ' ...... ' ' . . . . - .\n\n\"32A-Where the Compensation Officer considers that delay is likel,- to occur in.payment of compensation under section 32, he may, subject to the provisions of section 32B, pav).n the H . manner, io far as may. be applicable, provided in section 32; ·\n\n. .\n\n' l\n\n642 '\n\n.. I\n\n.~.~\n\n' '-\n\n\"--..\n\n• ,. •• I F\n\n' ...\n\n. . \\ I to the person entitled thereto under thi~ Act a sum not exceeding .fifty per centum of the approximate aniount of compensation payable in him under .section 32. calculated in the mal\\l)er prescribed in this behalf. ·\n\nProvided that, if subsequently it .is tund.by th~ Compensation Officeror the Collector that any amount has been paid to ahy person fo excess of the amount payable to him under section .\\ ' 32 or that the person to .whom the aomount has been paid was . not entitled to it under this Act. the amount so paid shall, after~ giving the , person concerned , a reasonable opportunity of being, - heard, be recoverable frnm him together 'with interet at 6t per centum per annum as if it were a public d.e1nand\".\n\nsectio~ 40 is also. important and is as follows~ \\ ..\n\n. ) . . ' . ' ' . \"40--(1) The Collector, the Claims Officer or the Compensation0fficer may,.at any time either before or after the date of vesting, by a written order served in the presecribM manner, 'require any intermediary or any other, person in possession of ar\n\nestate or tenure or any part thereof or any agents or employees of such intermediary or other person, as the case m;\\y be, 'to pro- ' . duce, at a tifl!e and place specified in the order, such documents,. __ ).. or.to furnish an affidavit otherwise such information relating to hny estate or tenure of s.uch intermediary as the Collector; Claims Officer or the Compensatipn Officer may, from time to time require fr any of the purposes of this Act or for giving effect to any provision thero( ·\n\n(2>) Where any intermediary or other person, referred to in ·l!b-scctiol\\ (!), if so required by'a written order of the Col)ector, fails without sufficient cause, to prcc.uce s11ch docments, or to furnish such information at' such time and pla~ as may be specified in the circler, such intermediary or other person, as the .case may be:shall be liable to.a, penalty which may; extend to fifty rupees for eveiy day after the expiration .of such time until such documents have been produced or such infotmatfon has ·\n\nben furnished and such penalty' shall be realised as a public demand:. ·\n\n. \"\n\nC.W.T. v. M.K. KAMAL' siNGH (M_ukharji, J.) 643\n\n- ; . .\n\nProvided that where the sum of sch penalty exceeds five hunded rupees, the Collector shall 'refer the mauer to. the Commissioner .whose orders thereon shall be final: ' .\n\nI - .\n\n' Pr0vided further that the Commissioner may at any time, of his own motion or oh the _application of any iriterinediary.- .revise any .order of the Collector imposing any pe.iJalty and the\n\norder of the Commisionr on revision shall be fia]\".\n\nI . .\n\n- section 33 which provides for !]laking ad interim payments to\n\n1 proprietors, sub, scction (2) of. which contains the . followirig\n\n'-.C proviso :.\n\n' ' ' . • \".Provided that the Collector. shall 'have the . power. to refuse, suspend or stop any sue\\\" ad inteq111, payment in the case . of any proprietor or tenure-holder wh6 in his opinion has failed tpr neglected to comply wii)l any.order under sectioii: 40\":.\n\n. ,, ft . . . . '\n\nThe Patna High: Court was of the opinio;· that in view .of the ' ; facts an<l spocially. the letter given by the Collector, the market value of the right of ihe asseSsc _to rece!e 1 ad, intefim coJhpt;:satiori' • ..,, .. shul,<l be Mtennined in veiw, of the p'rovisions of Section 4(9 of\n\nBinar.Land Reforms Act, 1950, and. keepjng in .view' the correspon-· . . - - \"(_ dence passing. behveeri the collector.and the' assessee. It is frue.ihat the tax1.ng authority has adopted 65 % of the fa_ce value of the amount discounting the rest oi\\ accouJ!t bf delayed payment. It may be .mentioned tha.t these compensations were payable in 40 years .. That is a factor which has to be taken into. account and discounted but the other vital factor affecting the value of the asset namely, the liability. aiid the obligation to have the amount deductedmider Section 4 (c} of the Bihar Land Reforms Act has not'beentaken into account at. 'all. 'In case ; here bonds have_' been issed .after' taking inio °C9nsidera- - . tiqn the_Iiability under Section 4.(c) of the BiharLand Reforms Act\n\n\\ '\n\n' ''\n\nor where liability , under .Section 4 (c) has been determined and dedu- • '' G \"cted frm' the compensaiton,\n\n0 in such a cas.e up question of <le_duction · ' • on accouiit of the arrears of agricultural incorrie-tax mentioned in c Section 4 (c) of the, Bihar Land Reforms' Act' would.arise but in all 1 other. cases, !his is a liability; a hzard, a factor, .. a clog or a jeopardy whiCh _detracts from' the val.ue. of the asset and. in estimating ' the value which-, one_has todo on the bas.is .which a. wiliing purchaser\n\n' . ' ~'\n\n... 1\n\n• 644\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1984] 2 S.C.:R ' . . ' would pay for buying the said asset in open market, the Wealth-ta;\n\nOfficer must take that factor into account, otherwise it woi.ild be an unreal estimate. This chance and hazard inust influence all .buyers. . . . . - , . . There are two different stages. One is estimation o{ the value of\n\nthe assets agd the other deduction therfrom the debts owed by the\n\nassssee .. In last mentioned stage, surely in view of the provisions of Section 2 (m), the.debt in respect of income-tax which is outstanding for more than 12 months ca11not be dtdui:ted. But in estimating the .:....- value of the assets, this possibility, which is indeed in the nature of an j . • • obligation of the Compensation Officer, is a hazard,. a clog or a hindr:ince which if a proper estimate is made under Section 7 (1) by the W<ealth-tax Officer, he has to take into consideration. It is not a quc •. stion of deducting the,. debt 'but a quest1n of estimation of the alue of tl11: asset rn question. •\n\n.-.,. ..\n\n.....\n\n. / ~,\n\n'';~ . Learned counsel for the aS:Sessec drew our attention to the 'i:cision of this Court in the case of Standard Mills Co. ; Ltd. v. Commissioner of Wealth-tax, Bombay\"> and to Bench decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Commissioner of Wealth-tax Bombay City II , v: Purshottam N. 'Amersey and Anoth&r121• These decisions; in our opnion, are not relevant at an.: Reliance was also pliced on a dCcison of1this Court i.n the case, of Pandil Lakshmi Kant Jha v. Commissioner of Wealth-tax Bihar and Orissa'l. This question was not in issue but it was reiteratd that under e Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 as soon.'_) as the esta.te or,1 tenure of a proprietor or tenll!l' holcler vested in the State, he becan1e entitled-to receive compensation. The rjght to receive compensation from the State was a valuable right. The fact that com- • pensation was not . payable immediately and its P';'Yment might be • spread over a period of 40 years would be relevant only for the purpose .. of evaluating his right of compensa, tion. The right to receive compen- . • sation even though the date of payment ls d•ferred fa property and constituted an asset for the pwpose of Wealth _Tax Act.\n\nWe are ~!early of .the opinion that the possibility of deductjn of the dues of the assessee for agricultural income tax under Section -;-·-------- (!) 63 I.T.R. p. 470. . (2) 71 I.1.R. p. 180.\n\n(3) 90 I, T.R.j p, 97. .\n\nc.w.T v. M.K. KAMAL SINGH (Mukharji, J.) . 645 . . . , . . ' 4 (c) of the Bihar Land :Reforms Act from the compensation money . is a factor that aifects•price or value of the compensation money recei:\n\nvable by the assessee .under .the Bihar Land Reforms Act and nntil it has been finallydetermii1ed that no arrears of agrienltural income tax is payable at all; will remain a hindrance and the value of which must' be quantified and deducted before a proper estimate of the value of the asset money recivable by the asessee is prepared ... Except in cases where the question of arrears of 'agricultural income. tax is settled, this is a factor which goes to the , diminution.of thevalue of the asset.\n\nTo what extent thatwould affect the value Of the asset is a matter of\n\n, .. - I, ' ' . • . . ' . quantification. We are not concerned with that question. of actual\n\n-,,.:-~--quantification: We are concerned. with _the question whether that . \" factor is a matter which hastb be taken into ccrnsideration in estimating the value of the asset in question. We are of the opinion that it is a factor cerfainly td. be taken into cnsideration in estimating what it . • would fetclt in the pen market. ft is .not a case as was contci1ded on . behalfof the revenue, that this was permitting indirectly deduction of debt hich ;.s prohibited by the legislation. Sectio; 7 and 2 (m) of the Act though must be read harmoniousiy apply to two different stages. Section 7 is the estimation,..of the market valu~ of the asset, section 2 (m.) enjoins that from the same the debt owed by the assessee to be deducted. Such debt owed ·, would be computed in acordance\n\nwih ection 2 (in) but the estimat, i.on of the value of asset is on. the basis which such as, set :vould fetch i~ the open market taking intqlcl'-- . sideratfon the view pomt of a willmg purchaser. .\n\nF .\n\nI ( We ust mention-that' our attention was drawn to certain citer '--\"provisions of the Inc.ome-tax Act. ad also Wealth. Tax Act. and it was contended that any debt which is exclude<\\ under thie provi; ions of · Wealth Tax Act cannot be deducted . and on the same principle a .i.ebt which is not deductible befanse of provision of Section 2 (m) should .not be takewinto-consideration in estimating the vluc.of an asset. 'we are unable to accept this position in the facts and circumstnces of this case. . . . · .. :.our attention was .dr~ t~ certa.in other. rules namely,··\" Rule 34 of'the Bihar Land Reforms Rules, 1951. We do not think it fa. material , to discuss these ruies any further.\n\nIn the view_ we have taken, we.are of the opinion that the Full Bench of the Patna High Court was ight in its conc!U:sion. The'appeais thGrefore fail and are accordingly dismissed with costso\n\n/ . '\n\n,. . . .. •ff\n\n\"'H.S.K'.\n\nAppeal . dismissed.,\n\n, I", "total_entities": 88, "entities": [{"text": "634\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF WEALTH TAX, BIHAR, PATNA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2, "end_char": 47, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "COMMISSIONER OF WEALTH TAX, BIHAR, PATNA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MAHARAJA KUMAR KAMAL SINGH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 55, "end_char": 81, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MAHARAJA KUMAR KAMAL SINGH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V.D. TULZAPURKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 108, "end_char": 124, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.D. TULZAPURKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R.S. PATHAK", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 126, "end_char": 137, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. 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KA, MAL SINGH,:(Mukhaii J.) ."}}, {"text": "MAL SINGH,:(Mukhaii", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7785, "end_char": 7804, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T. v. M.K. KA, MAL SINGH,:(Mukhaii J.) ."}}, {"text": "Arnih", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8161, "end_char": 8166, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For the assessment vears l 960-6r and 1961-62, the assessee produced a Jetter from the District Cllector; Arnih, to show that the. ,"}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9058, "end_char": 9067, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 27(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11192, "end_char": 11205, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13086, "end_char": 13095, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "M.K. KAMAL SINGH.(Mukh11rji", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13211, "end_char": 13238, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T. v. _M.K. KAMAL SINGH.(Mukh11rji, J.)\n\nwe may at a glance examine.", "canonical_name": "M.K. KAMAL SINGH.(Mukh11rji"}}, {"text": "Land Reforths Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13303, "end_char": 13320, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13618, "end_char": 13627, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Reforths Act", "statute": "Land Reforths Act"}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13792, "end_char": 13801, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Reforths Act", "statute": "Land Reforths Act"}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14860, "end_char": 14869, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15032, "end_char": 15041, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15369, "end_char": 15378, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15948, "end_char": 15957, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Tax Act, 1957", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16478, "end_char": 16491, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Gift-tax Act, 1958", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16513, "end_char": 16531, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17823, "end_char": 17832, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18101, "end_char": 18110, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "M.K. KAMAL SINGH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18342, "end_char": 18358, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therefore the estimation of the value of the assets is first necessary '\n\n c:w.T, v. M.K. KAMAL SINGH (lefukharji, J.)' 64\\\n\n\\ . ' ' '", "canonical_name": "M.K. KAMAL SINGH.(Mukh11rji"}}, {"text": "lefukharji", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18360, "end_char": 18370, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therefore the estimation of the value of the assets is first necessary '\n\n c:w.T, v. M.K. KAMAL SINGH (lefukharji, J.)' 64\\\n\n\\ . ' ' '"}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18522, "end_char": 18531, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19166, "end_char": 19175, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Reforms Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19325, "end_char": 19342, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19347, "end_char": 19356, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Reforms Act, 1950", "statute": "Reforms Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Section 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20505, "end_char": 20515, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 32A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20517, "end_char": 20528, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20532, "end_char": 20542, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20669, "end_char": 20680, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20779, "end_char": 20789, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21099, "end_char": 21109, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 32B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21148, "end_char": 21159, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21226, "end_char": 21236, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21460, "end_char": 21470, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23029, "end_char": 23032, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "M_ukharji", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23478, "end_char": 23487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C.W.T. v. M.K. KAMAL' siNGH (M_ukharji, J.) 643\n; . .", "canonical_name": "M_ukharji"}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23939, "end_char": 23949, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Patna High: Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 24377, "end_char": 24394, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Patna High: Court was of the opinio;· that in view .of the ' ; facts an<l spocially."}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25490, "end_char": 25499, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25693, "end_char": 25702, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26486, "end_char": 26495, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26833, "end_char": 26842, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Purshottam N. 'Amersey and Anoth&r121•", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27337, "end_char": 27375, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Learned counsel for the aS:Sessec drew our attention to the 'i:cision of this Court in the case of Standard Mills Co. ; Ltd. v. Commissioner of Wealth-tax, Bombay\"> and to Bench decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of Commissioner of Wealth-tax Bombay City II , v: Purshottam N. 'Amersey and Anoth&r121• These decisions; in our opnion, are not relevant at an.:"}}, {"text": "This question was not in issue but it was reiteratd that under e Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27576, "end_char": 27669, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "M.K. KAMAL SINGH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28476, "end_char": 28492, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T v. M.K. KAMAL SINGH (Mukharji, J.) .", "canonical_name": "M.K. KAMAL SINGH.(Mukh11rji"}}, {"text": "Mukharji", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28494, "end_char": 28502, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T v. M.K. KAMAL SINGH (Mukharji, J.) .", "canonical_name": "M_ukharji"}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29916, "end_char": 29925, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29980, "end_char": 29989, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Wealth Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30536, "end_char": 30550, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30655, "end_char": 30664, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Wealth Tax Act", "statute": "Wealth Tax Act"}}, {"text": "Bihar Land Reforms Rules, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30914, "end_char": 30944, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 31094, "end_char": 31110, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the view_ we have taken, we.are of the opinion that the Full Bench of the Patna High Court was ight in its conc!U:sion."}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_2_646_663_EN", "year": 1984, "text": ". €\n\n.... . ·\"\"\n\n'4' .\n\nSMT. M.M. AMONKAfl &. OTHERS\n\ni v.\n\nDR. S.A. JOHARI\n\nFebraury 21, J 91l'4\n\n[ V.'D. TULZAPURJ::AR AND SAnYASACHI MUKHARn; JJ. ] . - ,.\n\n\"'1-iQtitution of India, .1950, Article 221 Scope of-Justification of interference with a uni:urrent finding of fact recoYifed by bOih the lower courts inreSjJect of the 1111tur6 of ccupationofpr~1nises by_ the lessee aµd in favour of the lessor by the High\n\n€ourt-Jf'heth1r the less'' of the cabin a ''protected licensee. under th~ Bombay Rent A•! (N•. 57 •/1947) •s •mi\"d<d hy the Maharashtra Act XVII o/1973. \\ _ .\n\nTh• Rospondent original plaintiffa doctor by profession was .in occupation\n\n. (~\n\nof~ small cabin (adm~suring appro':timately.115 sq ft) Whiph is a part of the_ Pl,\"crµieos of Dr. Amonkar hospital of which the appellilnts are tho propi:ictors. The Life Insurance Corp6ration of India is the Owner of the building. The appellants furcatoned the ResQondcnts to evict him after issuing a .Q.otice dated March 20, 1973 iaforming tho Repondent that his atachment as Honorary Surgeon was Ilolnger .)· required with effect from 1-4-1973 and that he should make hls own arrangements __ for his_ private consultation. The ResPondent filed a suit in the Sn1aU causes Court of BOmbay ecidng a dlaration that h.e was a \"protected lincensee,, (having becdme a deemed tenant) of the suit premises under section 15A of the Bombay Rent Act (Acl 57of1947).as amentled by the Maharashtra Act XVII of 1973 and for injunciion rastraining: the appellant-defendants from taking forcible possession. of the --~ suh premises and or disturbing or interfering Witli bis.use anci employment thereof / :OChenvise th3.n in due course of Jaw. ThC suit was resisted by the. appellant-dcfCndants on threc•grounds: (a) that the cabin was never givell to the resporidnt-defen .. danc QJ; l:leaveand licence basis, that' he wtis-never in exctu.sive' use arid occupation thereof but the user of the cabin was given to .. him because of his' attachment as Honorm_-y Surgeon to Dr. AIT!-onkar hospital tlrough the good offices Or one Dr . . Rawaiia and after obtaining a writing an stamp paper reflecting the true nature and\n\neharacter of the arrangement between.the appellants and the ReSpoildent p1ii.lntitf;\n\n(b) that tbe cabin in q'uestion Was not \"premiseS\" within the meaning. of SectiOn 5(8)(b) of th~ Rent, At. in as 'much as the sa\"me could not'be said to have been given on. licence \"separately\" because the respondellt plairtiff was permitted the user . ; thereof only fQr 2-/2 hours in the evening on week days between S P.M. and 7.30 : PM. and for the rest of the time it was being used by the h0spital staff and that one 1 of che i:t1Y'• of at ca.bin always remaincd'with the itaff of the hospita~ and henco\n\n.... ..\n\n_,; .•\n\n, I\n\nM.M. AMONKAR V. S.A. JOHARI 647\n\ndisentitling to any protectio~ of the Rent Act, and (c) that ihe cabin in question. rn;.\n\nA ing admittedly'.' a room in the hospitai•; feJI .. within the eXclusiOnary. part of the dcfin_ition of the .. licensee\" given SeCtiOn 5(4A)•and as such wa~ outside the protc:- : •. tion conferrer! on licensees bY section 15A of the Rent Act;\n\n; ' '- I •, '\n\n. , !he appella1its also fife~ an Ejection A_pf)Jication _<1 gainst the res_pondent plaintiff seeking his eviCtiori from the suit premises undCr secti'on 41. Qf the Presidency\n\nSmall Causs Courts Act on the S; roulld .that the rcSPondent's right t9 occupy the suit cabin had come t9 an cnd, alohg wit_h the termination of his'it'tachment as Honorary SUrgeon to Dr. Amonkar hospita'L The rspondent plaintiff _resisted the said suit. Both thC.suits_ were therefore heard-togethC_i: and coillmon evidencerecorded._ On an appreciation of the or.ii arid. documentary evjdence and 'the surrounding circumstancei, the tral court cam~ to te cpn'Clusionthat the user Of the sui Cabin~,\n\nhad been permitted to the rCsponpent-plainti'ff not on leave' and licence basis but because _of.his attachment as HonorarY \"Sur&eon to Dr. Ainonkar Hospital a\n\n1nd' that Ex. No .. 1 'Which s igned byhim after ri:iny reaUsing its Jn1plications, as. a genuine writing fcflecting the true nature of the. arrangement' between th~· parties and so as suh the reSpondent plaintiff was not entitled to the protectiO.n of stion\n\n- . l 5A of \"the RCnt Act and. triat Whh the tCrmitlation of his attachment as Honorary\n\nSurg'eol'l to Dr. AinOnkar hospital his right to occupy_ the suit cabit-caflie to an epd.\n\nThe Trial iudgC decreed the suit.- In-ai>peal preferred by the respondent-plaintiff;\n\nhe Appellate ·-Bench of the sma.1rcallses Court On rCappraisal of the entire material oh record confifmed the: findings of the trial court both .on _the.· factual and on legal issue4 and 'dismissed the fPPeal. The respon_.dent-Pl!lintiff' when .approached _the High Court under Articla 227 of. the Constituti9'!! the High Court interferred with ... the concurrcrlt findin.gs_ of facf found by .the two \"16wer courts and reversed the deci-\n\n1io.ns both on the factual issue and the two.le&al issues. HenCe the appeal aftef obtain ...\n\nin.i the siaf.Jea:vc)of the Court.. , · '1 .• ' ,\n\nAllowing the appeal:;,· the Cotirt\n\n. ' . . .\n\n~HELD: J.\n\nThe H:iih Court was nOi rieh~ ifi reversing the concurreni finding \\ f fact rorded by bo~. th~ courts bdoW oid eve~ on me; rts, the Hih Court. Jtidg-\n\n.:ment cannot be sustained. (663 C]_ \" _ , ..\n\n• I .2.1. The Opinion of the.High Court th\"at there.were two diturbing features', revealed in the respectivC procecdinBs: and judjtlnents of the courts below which were suggestive Of non-judicial aPproach,. $Omc bias andpartiality (in favour Of\n\nthe ap_Ddlant .defendants nd agains( the resPonderit__:.pl11intiff) on their part which\n\n\"\"n~_ssitated a-full and unresfricted cX¢rCise .of its power of superinten.dencc by going\n\nt~ the extent Or reapprcciating the cvidcne 1n depth. as if it were a 'first Appellate\n\nourt _was nOt_correct. [65~ F~GJ ,. •\n\n' . ., ' I ' ' ' . . • -The com~nts of the High .Court that th~ rejectio~ of an ap'plic<il!on to ~Ii one of the witn~Sts -viz._ Dr. Rawalia and. to direct him to produce hi_s Income Tax\n\n. ,\n\nG ·.\n\nA •\n\n ..\n\n. SUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1984] 2\" S.C.R .\n\n• ,!e!_urns b~ the trial court on 18-10~1976 was a disturbing feature suggestive of non-judicial approach, son1c bias or so1nc partiaity sho, vn by tbe Trial .Judge, would have had : been _si1nply dismissed. \\Vithcut .giving• any reason ·.bu( the learned ;.._trial Judt.e. passed a lengthy rder giving three. Teisons for the rcjr.ction of th~ application: (a) ihat vague averinent_s .L were made in the application aboµt the r.eceipt of theJ infarllliltion regarding Income Tax ·.Returns of :Dr. Rawalia on 8th qctObei, 1976 ithout the occasion -for receiving the information or thC source of information being indicate9. and thit when the court made a Querry in that behalf bis cou.nsel Was not willing to give particulars or disctoSe the source of information and .it was, therefore, difficult to believe that the rcspon detit-plaintiff came in possession of the said information after the cross-cxamiw nation of.the witness was over and after the closure of a.Ppellant-defendant5' .ease;\n\n(b) that under section'!38(1),(b) of the. Income Tax Act, 196.1 the respondent-plaintiff could have and should have obtainc:dithe ilecessary information or n1aterial from the Commissioner of Income-tax by making an application in the prescribed form\n\nand.sine he.had not done so it wollld not be proper to helP him to get the infor mation through thd court; in other words, if be had attcn1pted and failed to get the information by following the prescribed proCedure the court cold have helped: hirrli{and (c) thil.t the Court's power to recall and examine any witness at any sta£; e of the suit under _Order-XVIII Rule 17 of CPC on which strong relia1ice was placed by counsel for the respondent-plaintiff Was to be exercised in exceptional circum stances and. no exceptional circumstance had been mado out by the respondentplaintiff inasmuch as th\"ese documents would have bycome a vailablc to him before he started .. the witnCss's: cross-ex.amination. May be iri the exercise its discretion another Court n1ight have; taken\"a different_ view and allowed lhe application.\n\nBut -unless -the reasolls give11 by the learned trial Judge could be se.id to be moon-shine, flimsy or irrational the rCjcction of the applicatiOn cannot be dubbed as suggestive of no~-judicial approach or biaS Or partiality on his part. -It is also pos!.ible that the reasons for giving a_ ruling ona point'. or for rejecting an apJ)lication n1ay be wrong of diSclose a nonjudicous exercie of discretion and . open tO correction in appeal, but non motive of non-judicial apprpach r bia~ or partiality could be attributed unless the reasoi:i given are moon-sbire or so fl]msy or irratio.nal that there arc unreal: Considere'.d dispassionately, such a thing:could\n\n~1ever be said about thC reasons given by the trial Judge for rejectin, g the application.\n\nIn any' case, the rejection Of thC application could nbt be regarded as having stemmed from any. oblique motive or purpose. [656BH, 657 A-C] .\n\n' Further. the so called disturbing feature noted by the High Court jn the Judgment of the First Ai:>pellato Court is so innocuous and inconsequential that it c6uld hardly afford al)Y jutification to reappfeciat\"e the whole evidence as done by it.\n\nOn the contrary. the broadfeatures eJUGrging from the evidence on record clearlY support the appellant-defendants' case that the user of th\"e suit cabin wa_s allowed to the respondent-plaintiff not on leave and licence basis but bect1:use of his attach .. ment s-Honorary surgecin to Dr. Amonkar hospital. [663 B~C]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTI'JN: Civil Appeals Nos. 104:105of198r\n\nAppeals by Special leave from the Judgment and Order dated . ( . . . - .\n\n. I. , ' . . . . , '\n\n' \"I . . . ' M.M. AMONKAR v.' s.A. JOHAR! (Tulzapurkar, J;) '649\n\n~ ' . . . '; the 18th August, 1980 of the Bombay High Court in Writ Petition A.\n\nNos. 30 aud 115 of 1979. ' . , . \\,\n\n' . ' V. M. Tarkunde, P.H. Parekh, Mrs. Manik Karanjeial and Miss.Ind11 , Malhtra for the Appellants.· . ..\n\n\"\\ J .\n\nA.nil n(ivan, Respondent.\n\nDalveer. B!tant/ari and R.:f.· Yatfav for the\n\n- ,.,\n\n' The Judgment of the Court was. delivered by . '\n\nI TuLzAPURKAR, J. These appeals by special leave rai•e tll'o questions for oilr determination: (I) Whether the High Court in exer-· oise .of its powers of superintendence 'under Art. 227 was justified in . interfering with a. concurrent finding of fact. recorded. by, both the\n\n.lower Courts .in favour of the appellants?_ and (2) Whether the respon-\n\n_dent was a protected licensee in respect of the'suit pre111ises under the\n\nBombay Rent Act (Nd. 57 of 1947) as amended by the Maharashtra Act XVII of 1973? i_ . This unfor.tunate litigation between eminent medical. practic ••.\n\n-lloners of Bombay has been hotly.contested before ).IS since it relates' ·\n\n.· to professional accollll11odation of which. there is great dearth in that\n\ncity: The accommodation in question consists or a small cabin admeasurillg 15'-6\" x 1-1'-2\" (approximately 175 sq. ft.) which'is a-part of •\n\nthe. premises of Dr. Amonlcar Hospital located on the fourth floor of - Boip.bay Mutual Terrace at 534, Sandhurst Bridge, Bombay, of whieh . one Dr. M. D. Amonkar; since decea-sed, was the propri.etor (whose heirs and legal representatives are the appellant-defendauts before us, befog his widow and two soils 1and three daughters-of whom one. son and two daughters are medicos). ' . . . .\n\nDr: J'ohari (the respondent-plaiatiff) an M.B.B.S. of Bombay, ' '\n\n- F.R.C.S. of London and Edinburough and' Hoi10urary Surgeon attached to G.t. Hospitaiand Bombay Hospital, . filea a suit (R.A. Suit , .... ' , - . '\n\n• '111111 ' • ' • • • :\n\n• .. . '\n\n'.\n\n• .. 650 .\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS.\n\n. (1984] 2 S.C.R;\n\nNo. 779/2893 of 1973) ; n the Sn1al!' Causes. Court at Bombay s~king a declaration that he was a \"protected' licensee' (having become a deemed tenant)• of the .suit premises @der s. 15A of the.\n\nBombay Rent Act (No. 57 of 1947). as amended by the Maharashtra Aet xvn of 1973 and for injunction restraining the appel\\ant-defen .. dants from taking forcible poSS\\'SSion of the suit premises and or disturbing or interfering with his\"usc and enjoyhient thereof otherwise than in due course of lalv.\n\nBis case was that he came to occupy exclusively the suit premises (being the cabiil admeasuring about '175 sq. ft. with . the 'facility of using the adjacent common waiting rooJll. together with the facility of water and electricity) on ISt May, 1970 on leave and licence bas!s under an oral agreement ith late Dr.· All).onkat o~ payment of monthly com-\n\n.Pnsation of Rs .. 201 for doing his private consultation surgical practice. ms further case was that though within a few days of his occupation laie Dr. Amonkar had obtained from him a_ writing ' purporting to state that he was attached as an Honburary Surgeon • . to Dr; Amonkar Hospital. and was, therefore, allowed to have his private cohsultation practice in the premises, that he had agreed to .bear and pay rateably the expenses.of telephone, us!:' of fwniture, etc. and that he was neither a tenant nor a licensee, the said writing had' . been obtained from Iiimmerely as a safeguard for Dr. Amonkar. against'. a possible objection that might be raised by the Life Insurance Corporation the landlords of . the building, and was not to be ate, d upon. According to him, he had cordial relations with late Dr. Amonkar and that even after his death which occurred towards the end of\n\nJ..-\n\n,.· 1971 he was regularly paying Rs. 201/- per month to his heirs till Jan- _),,\n\nuary 1973 but since threats of forcible di'spossession were held out to him by the appeliant-defendants, particularly l5y, appeallant-cl.cfendant 'No. 3 Dr. Suman Gaitondey (the married. daughter of' the deceased) on her return to Bomb'ay from Calcutta, and since by. a notice dated .20th-March, I ~73 he was .informed ,.that his attachment as honourary Surgeon was no longer required with effect from 1-4-1973 and tha.t he should make hiS own arrangements for his pfivate consultation, he. was forced to file the suit seeking reliefs of a declaration: and injunction mentioned above. .. ·\n\n\\ .\n\n. The suit' was resisted by . the appellantefend, ants on three grounds: (a) that the cabin was never given to' the respondent-plain tiff on leave and licence basis as alleged by him; that he was never in\n\nexclusiv~ use and occpatio~ therC<; if<but the user'o/the c:; bin was given\n\n~ \\\n\n- M.M. A:MON_KAR l'. S.A . .JOHAR! (Tu.fzapurkar, J.) 651 .· ' ' . . to him because of his attachment . as .' Fionouiary .Surgeon to Dr.\n\nA, monkar Hospital, through thegood offices of one Dr. Rawalia'; that\n\n• • I ..\" - ' ' the writing on the stamp paper of Rs. J.50 bearing date 4th May, 1970\n\nsigned bJ' the respondent...!..plaihtiff reflected the true nature and . character of the .arrangement.between the parties,;, it was emphatically denied that the sai~.\n\n1 writing was obtained .by late br. Amo11kar, for the purpose r moti~~ suggested by the respondent-plaintiff or was not intended to be acted upon, (b) that the cabi.nfo question was not \"ptcmises\" withi.n'the meaning of s. 5 (8) (b) of .the Act, inasmuch as the same> .could n-c.t be sa'd to have been given on J.icence. 'separately' .. ,~, because the respondentplaintiff was permitted the user''thereof only' for '.r-1/2 hrs. in.the evening on week days hete.en 5.00 p.'m. to 7.30'\n\np.m.an~. for the .rest of the time .it was being used by the hospital staff.and thaton~ of the keys qf that cabin alyiays remained wi.th the , staff of• the hospital and hence .the plaintiff was not entitlrd to cny ..\n\n-..,;... . . _protection of the .Rent Act;. and (c). that the cabin in question.being admittedly 'a room in the hospital' fell within \\he 'e'xclusionary pert\n\nof the definition of the licensee' given in s. 5 (4A) and as such was outside the protection 'cm1ferred bn licensees by s. J5A of 'i'he Atl. j ' ' ,, ____\n\n, Jt may te stated th'at.while the aforesai<1. suii'was per.ct.iiig. the. ' , appellantdcf<11<1.ants on their 'part filed an .eviction petition being\n\n.1 . EjectmentApplicaticn No. 259/E of 1976 against the plaintiff-respon-\n\n~ d•nt seeki1\\g his eviction from the• suit pre111ises uncl.er s .. 41 of , the • '\"· Presidency Small Causes Courts Act on the.ground that.the plaintiff's\n\n~ > right. to eccupy the suit cal:!in had come to an .end alongwitli the termination of is attachment as Honourary Surgeon to Dr .. Amonkar Hospital and the plaintiff resisted the said' evicticn en.the ground that he was a, protected Jicensee under the Bombay Rent Act as ani.end.ed by the Maharashtra Act XVII of 19(3 and was,' thereforto, not liable . ' to be evitcd therefrom. The two proceedings were '.heard together\n\nand common evidence wiis recorded in the &c!aratory suit .being R.A:. \"\" ' - . ' N0. 779/2893 of .1973. . \" . . . .. .\n\nt • • • •\n\nIt is clea.r that on .the 'be.sis of the rival pleadings of tl; e two .parties in.the two pr?ceedings before the SmallCauses Court princip:illy\n\nthree isSl\\es aros, e for .qetermination, namely, (1) v.:hat was the true . nature ofthearrange, ment.between the part; is regarding the user of the suit cabiti by t11e plaintiff, whether the plaintiff's user oftbe cabin was on Jeave and Jicente. l]asis on payment of mon.thly _compensatio~ or it .H\n\n,, A •\n\n,. B\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1984] 2 S.C.R. ,. . • was on account of his attachment as Honurary Surgeon to Dr .\n\nAmonkar Hospital? In other .words, wether•the writing on the .stamp paper signed by. the plaintiff (E.xt. N; o. 1)' was a, genuine doument reflecting the true nature of the arrangement between the parties?\n\n(2) whether the .suit cabin was not 'premises' within the meaning.of s. 5 (S)(b) of the Act? and (3) )Vhether the suit cabin was 'a room in in the hopital' falling within rl)e exclusionery part of the definition of 'licensee' under 5 ( 4A) and, therefore; outside the protectionc ontemplated by s. ISA of the Act? It is obvious thatthe first issue raised purely a question ill fact, the determi; iation whereof depended on appreciation of the evidence led by the parties before the Court while . the other two isues raised questions of Jaw:rather mixed questions\n\nof \"law and fact. ' • · . . . ~\n\n( - At the trial parties Jed oral frs well as documentary evidence on all the is$ues arising in the case. TM evidence on the side or th~. fespondent-plaintiff consisted only of his oral testimony, during the course of•which he asserted that the user of the abin had been given to him by late Dr. Amonkar 'On leave and licence basis on payment of monthly colnpensation. On the side of the appellant-defendants , the o)'.al testimony consisted of depositions of two witnesses (i) Dr.\n\nD.M. Amonkar (defendant No. 2) and (ii),, Dr. Rawalia and the.do.c\\J.- mentary :evidence consisted of two writings obtained by late Dr. _).\n\nAmonkar-'--one from the respondent-plaintiff and the either from Dr. Rawalia. Ext. No.\" I is a writing 'on a stamp paper of Rs. 1.50. bearing date 4-5, 1970 obtained. from the respondenf-plaintiff recor-· ding the arrangement with him, and Ext. No. 2 is a. writing on a. stamp paper dt. 23'4-1962 .signed by Dr. Rawalia recording the arrangement with him .'Both Bxts. No., I and'No. 2 are identical in terms and appears that Jong before respondent-plaintiff was allowc'c'. the use . of the suit cabin, Dr. Rawalia had been allowed the use of another cabin in the hospi!al prmises by late Dr. Amoi1kar on the sa1ne terll).s.\n\nEach writing signed by.the occupant in terms .states: ''I am an Hen.\n\nSurgeon to Dr. Amonkar Hospital•.\n\nI am allowed to practice may. private consultation in the premises. I am neither licensee nor subtenant. I have to bear rateably the expenses incurred tcwan\\s teleph.one,. electricity, use of furniture and instruments\". Dr. Rawalia, through . .)¥hose good offioes the respondent--:-_plaintiff got the suit~· •cabin from late Dr. Amonkai; 'fully supported the appellant-defendants' case that late Dr. Amonkar had permitted the respondent-plain- ·\n\n' . '\n\n' .\n\n'\"\"\n\n.. :-l-- ' •\n\n.M.M. AMO~AR v. S.A. JOHAR! (fohap; irkar, J.). 653\n\ntiff to make use of the suit cabin because-of his attach'ment as Hano- . . rary Surgeon to/ Dr. _Amonkar l; Iospjtal•. On an ppieciation of the.\n\nofal and documentary evidence and the surrounding circm{1stances, .. the trial Cout came. tq_ th, e ·onclusion that the user of the suit cabin' . had been ipermittcd to the respondent-plaintiff not on leave and, . licence basis but because of his attachment as Honorary Surgeon to Dr. Amonkar Hospital and that Ext. No. I which was signed by liim , after fullv .realising its .implications/ was a gem1ine writing reflecting\n\n_the true ature of the . arrangement between the parties and as. such <~ theplaintiff was not.entilted to the protec!ion of s. 15A of the Rent\n\n 'Act and with the termination of his attachment as Hortourary Surgeon\n\nto Dr. Amonkir Hospital his right to coccup~ the' suit~ cabin came to . end, The trial Court also decided the legal issues in appellantdefen- . . dants' favour with the result that the respo_ndent-plaintiff's detlara- . tory. suit was dismissed and. the ejectment application of the appel- rant-defendants \\vas decreed.In appeal preferred by the respondent- . plaiii.tiff the Appeliate Bench of tJ; te Small Causes Court on a re-appraisal of the entire 'material .. on record confirmed the findings of. the\n\ntriaJ.ourt on the factual isue as also' on the. legal issues. The appeal was dismissed and the ejectment decree passed by the Trial Court in favour f the appellant-defendants was confirmd.' ' ·\n\n' \\\n\n. . ·ai11St the dismissal of his declaratory suit nd the ejectmen! ( decree passed in E.A. N8. 2?9 /F of 1976. the respondent-plaintiff ·- --- approacheti. the High Cort undei Art. 227 of the Constitution by preferring two procee<J.ings ~Special Civil Application No. 30 o/,1979 a_nd Writ Petition No. 115 of .1979 bo_th of hich were disposed of by the High Court by common judgment rendered on 18th August,_ ,_,,. . 1980. The High Court was of. the opinion 'that there were two distur\" ·\n\nbing features revealed i1] the respective proceedings/judgrcent's of the . Courts below which were suggestive of non-judicial apprnach, some bias and partiality (in favour of the appellant....:..defendants and again.st . the respondent__:plaintiff) on their part which necessitated a full and\n\nlinteS.tricted exercise of its pow.er. bf superintendence by going to the extent of re-appreciating the evidence in depth.as if it were a first'Appel- . late Court; anq. after briefly.indicating what it felt were the two distur-\n\n~ bing features, the High Caur_t re-appreciated the entire evidence fully . and in depth and came to the conclusioJf that the user of the suit\n\ncabin was given to the responden!-'-plaintiff on ieave and licence basis and the. writing _Ext' No.\" I did not' repesent the real state of affairs' as far as the. re.pondent-plaintiff's fight to use the .. suit cabin was concerned and that the sanie had been iaicen by late Dr. Amonkar only\n\n!..\n\nI .\n\n\\. .E\n\n. ' H\n\n'--. __\n\n( •\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS.\n\n[1984] 2 S. C.R:\n\nfor his' protection against his own. landlord, namely, Life Jnspraiice Corporation. The High Court also negativ.ed the findings recorded by the Courts below.on the two lega).tssues\"and held that the suit cab.in was \"premises\" within the meaning of s .. 5 (8) (b) of the Bombay Rent Act, the same having bee~· given on licence 'separately' to the respondentplaintiff and that the suit cabin was not 'a room in the hospital' and as such the respondent-plaintiff could be and was a 'protected\n\nJicenee' entitled to. Claim protection under s. 15A: of the Act. ·The\n\nHigh Court's illterferenee with the concurrent finding of fact recorded by 'the two Courts below .on the factual issue as also its conclusions\n\nn the two legal issues are assailed befre ·s in the instant appeals.· . '\n\nThe first contentfon urged by counsei' for the appellant-defend: ants is that the question whether the ser of the suit qabin had been\n\nallowed to the, respondent,-plaintiff on leave and Jience.o!Jasis or because of his attachment as Honou.rary: Surgeon to Dr. Amonkar ·\n\nHospital and'whethor the writing fat.· No. J was a genuine document • and reflected the tnie nature of the artangement .between the partjes - or not was purely a question f fact depending upon the evidence Jed by the parties and it was on an appreciation of , theoral and cl.ocumentary evidence ancl. the surrounding circmstances that both the lower\n\nCourts, had come to 'the conclus, ion that. the' respondentplaintif('s occupation of the, suit cabin: was not on leave and licence basis but\n\nE ·, onaccountofhisa\\tachmentasanHoiiourary Surgeon to' Dr.Amonkar Hospital and that the writing Et. No. I was not any camouflage or facade obtained by late Dr. Amonkar for the purpose suggested by the respondent---'p)aintiff b.ut was' a genuine document which nfii'ctcd the real arrangement betwee11 the parties and, such a. concurrrn.t fir.ding of fact, unless it was perverse, which it was not because there wqs ample evidence 011 record to support it, could not be intrfer<d with by the flig)!_Court under Art: 227 .. CouriSl further urged that the justifi- F\n\ncation given by the High Court for inierfering with such ccncurrcnt finding uf fact was unsustainable inasmuch as the socalifd two disturbing features wer~ not really auy distrubing features much less .were theY suggestive of any !'lon:judicial approac)1 or some 'bias or partiality on the part of the lower Courts in favour of. the appellant-cl.cfenc.ants and /against tl\\e respondent.....plai!'tiff. Counsel' strongly urged that '' , the suggesti.on of non-judicial approach or of bias 9r of partiality on the part of the .learned single Judge and the two learned Judges of the\n\n H Appellate Bench of the Couhrt ofbSeme al\\ CdaeuseBvs we nas 0 nunmwea~;:~~:dH~:~ • called for and ought not to ave n ma . , ~.\n\n' ;,,:.\n\n. -.J •\n\n...\n\nI: ' . , . . . .\n\nI M.M. AM~NKAR v .. S.A. IOHARl (Tulzapurkar, J.) .\n\n6SS\n\nCourt's view. on the factual issue. was wrong. It was.also , contended. that evid, nceclearly showed that the suit c, abin.had not been 'separately' given to the respondent-plaintiff: and in 'any case it was 'a rocm fo the hospital' and as s.uch' the respondent-plaintiir'was not , entitled to claim any protection of the Bombay Rent Act. Of\\ the, other hand, cou;, sel for the respondent-plaintiff supported the .. High Court'g findings on all the issues and urged that there was no 'reason to disturb the judgment !ll)der appeal. ·\n\n. . . This necessitates a.close scrutiny of the two disturbing featutes~ ;~ one pertaining to theproceeding bef0re the, trial .. Court and the other pertaining to the judgment of the Appellate Bench-which according\n\nio the High Court ma(\\, e it to undertak.e a re-appredati<Jn of the entire . evidence in depth 1as if it were a first appellate Court. lU-theirial Court\n\n.~--\n\nafter examining their two witnesses (he appellan(-defendants clc.sed their case on 18th September, 1976 and the case was fi\"ed for ari; u,. ments 'an 4th of October, 1976,' o;, which day, however, argumen\\s could npt be heard and the matter was adjdun1ed. Ii appears that On.\n\n18th September, 1976 during the .course of his cross-examination it was .suggested to\"'Dr. Rawalia that in his Income-Tax Returns he ha~.· been showing payment of Rs. 223 per month to Dr. Amonkar as.rent;. he denied the suggestion and asserted that he had been only showing\n\n'~ . the amount as paid to Dr. Amonkar. In other words, he had merely . shown the payment as expenditure without indicating its character. / On !2th of October, 1976 the resllondent-plairitiff mae an appljcation .A-statmg that on 8th October, 19\"6, he had come to know that Dr. . Rawaiia had filed his Income Tax Returns showing that he , had paid Rs.1870lis rent for 1972-73, Rs.2250as rent for 1973-74 and Rs .. 2275_,,<is rent for 1974-75 and had daimed deductions of the sai~. amounts as expenses and, therefore, (a) Dr. Rawalia. be nr~ Jkc'.Jcr further cross_,, xamination anU (b) tha1 his Jnccme Tax Rturns for the said thiee years be got produced through a witness summos or . le, tter of request being issued t~ the Co.minissioner of Income Tax, Bomay. Obviousiy, the application was made with a view to confront\n\n' ...\n\nDr. Rawalia by.his own Income Ta7Returns which he had fi~d for provmg (1) that Dr. Rawaha had made a false statement and (11) that ·• payments made by him to the apptllmit-defenc!:lnts bore the charac- · ter of rent. It cannot be disputed that the aspects sought to be proved by recalling Dr. RawaHa and by geting liis,.Jncome Tax Returns prcf.ued were relevant to the issue involved in the case, though it is well'_ settled that a particular nomenclature .given fo paymentiymade . by a paliY is not conclusive or decisive of the wetter. 'fhe applicaticn :at£·\n\n,.._'_\n\n'';\n\nSUPRBME COURT Rl!PORTS.\n\n[1984) 2 S.C.R.\n\ndismissed. by the learned trial Judge on 18th of October, J 976 and according to the High Court this rejection o! the application was a disturbing feature. suggestive of a non'::judicia.J approach, some bias '.or some partiality in favour of the appellaµt-dfend.ants on the part'\n\nof the learned trial .lud.ge .. In our vi.ew the comments of the !Iigh Court . in the matter of rejection of this applicati01{ would have had ; ome\n\nB . r force if the, application had been 6mply dismissed w.ithout giving any\n\nreasons but the learned trial Judge passed a lengthy order giving three reasons for the rejection of the application: (a) that vague averments . I 'nvere made in the application about the -receipt of the information\". '{:. regarding Income Tax Returns of.Dr. Rawalia on 8thOctober, 1976 .. without the 09casion for receiving the information or. the. sonrce of..._,,_ C information, being indicated and that' when the Cm1rt made a qu'erry . in that behalf his counsel was not willing to give particulars or disclose the source of information and it was, therefore, difficult to believe that .. 'the respondeht-plaintfff came, i~ PC!ssession of the. said inf9rmation . after the cross-exarllination of , witness \\Va'S over arid afte; th_c closure .of appellant-defe'ndants; case; (b) that under s. 1°38 (I) (bi of the D Income Tax Act, 1961 the respondent-plaintiff could have and should have obtained the necessary information or material froin the Co~;\n\nmissioner( of Icome Tax by making an application in the. prescribed c form and, since he had not done so 1t would not be pi:oper to help him \"' . t-0 get the information through the Court; in other words, if he had\n\n.attempted and failed to get the information by followillg 'the prescri- E bed procedure the Court could have 11elped him; and (c) that the Co1,1rt's power to recall, and exainin~ any witness at any stage of the \\ suit under Ozrder XVIII, Rule 17 of C.P.C., on which strong reliance-_..; A-, was placed by Counsel for the respondent-plaintiff was to be execised _ . in exceptional circumstances and no exceptional circumstance had been made out by the respondent_:_, plaintiff inasmuch as these .docu- F . ments would .have become available to him before he started the witness'~ cross-examination. May be in the exercise of iis dicretion . f anot.her Court might have taken a different view and allowed the application. But unless the reasons given by the learned trial Judge could be said to be nioon-&hine, flimsy or irrational the rejectiJn of the application cannot be dubbed as suggestive of non-jµdicial approach e .. o~ bia.s or partiality on his part. It is also possible that the reasons - . for givlng a ruliii.g on a point or'for rejecting an'applic;:ttion may be\n\nwrong or disclose a non-judicious exrcise of discretion and open _to oorrection in appeal, but no motive of a, non-judicial app!oach or bias or partiality could be attribuied unless, as we have said above, the H reafons given are moon .. shine or so flimsy or irrational that they are • 'llarcal. Cousidered dispassionately, such a tlling can never: be said\n\n' •\n\n...\n\n. -. '\n\n• M~M. 'AMO!oUU.R v ... S.A. JOHAR! .(Tu/zapurkar, l.) ' . 657 \\ - : . . .- . . . f~;·. '.\"'-'. . . . . , about th<i\"reasous given by the trial Judge for rejecting the application. ·\n\nIt is true that the appellafe Court has not dealt with this point though iu ground No. 27 of the Memp. of Appeal a point had been.taken that 1 the application .had beeu '.wrongly rejected but in all , probability it .\n\nwas not argued by counsel otheru, ise the appellate. Court would have dealt wi.th it. In the High Court no asscrti.on was made that the point was actually argued or pressed before tjle Appellate Bench but it was ,· meidy urged that althbugh a complaint against the rejection f the\n\n~ .~. ,,, appllcationhad been made in Ground .No. 27 of the Memo.of Appeal\n\n f, the' anpellate Court has tj°ot dealt with.it. This alo .shbws tht the.\n\nejection was not' regi; rded by the respondent-plaintiff or hjs counsel .\n\n,~ before the appellate Court as any serious or disturbing feature. In any .. -._ case, as stated earlier, the rejection of the appliciition could not be C regarded as hving stemmed from anx_ oblique motjve or. purpose.\n\nThis soalled .disturbing feature., therefore, did not afford any justification to the; I{igh Court to undertake a .re-appreciation. of the .entire\n\n~- evidence in depth for reversing a concurrent .finding of fact .recorded by the. two Courts below. ·\n\n~· ...\n\nTurning 'to the judgment of the' Appellate Court, the so-calkd disturbing feature 'noted by the High Court, is, in our view, so. innocqous and inconsequential that it cO'uld hardly afford' any justification\n\n~.... to reappreciate the whole evidence as clone by it. It appears that during the. hearing of the appeal after .supporting the trial Court's finding on ' . {t~ factual issuy as .also .th<o'firidings on' the legal issuj)s and' pressing\n\n to their acceptance, counsel for .the , appellant\"rllefendants put for- -. . ' ward an alternative lstsubmissicin that even proceeC!ing. on the assumptfon that allc ora1 licece h.a4. been created in. respondent--'plaintiff.'s favour by-late ill. Amonkar, as alleged by him, the material on record . . '\"\\ showed that the'sai~ Jicen.cedid not subsist on the relvant date,.namely, .\n\n1-2-1973, mentioned in' s .. 15A and, therefore,, he was not entitled to .\n\nan~ protection under the Act, and in -that behftlf an averment made by . . the respo, ndent-plaintiff in paragraph 4 of his Complaint dated. • f li4-3\"1.973 addressed 'tothe Inspector ofJ>olie, Gamdeyi.Police Statlcm\n\nwas relied, which avermen!' runS'thus: ·\"Ever since ihere has been a , publicity in the newspaper. that the Govt. of Maharashtra is aboJ;.. shing he leave and licence system (meaning thereby that the Govern-· ,,;... ment is t!tinking ofconveting occupa.pisunder leave and licence basil\n\ninto 'deemed tenants') Dr.· (Miss)· Usha .Amonkar and Dr. D.f>.C. Amonkarare asking him to vacate the premises\",' and the. contention was that .since the Bill amending the Bombay Rent Act (snbsequentlf numbered as Act XVII of 1973) had. been introduced or publiihet'I itl. .\n\n'_. . . ' . ,. . .. . -... · .\n\n' '\n\n. \\\\ \\ I ., '~ • ' .\n\n.)\n\n~' . c\n\n658 ' . '\n\n[1984] 2 $.C.R.\n\nS\\iPRBMfl COURT REPORTS . ~~ :::~.,:±~ . ·( August, 1972 the respondent-plaintiff's licence, on his own aforesaid .'\"\"-' averment, was\"not subsisting and had come to an end long before. 1-2-1973. The. appellate Court accepted this argument on the footing that the Bill had been intrddnced (not in the Assembly) in 'newspapers for, information to the public in August 1972 and held that the respon- Mnt-plaintiff's .licence, iftany. was not subsisti11g 011 Isl of febn\\ary,\n\nI. 973 am! he w. as riot enti.tied to protection ev. en if his.·ase were assumed cL. to be true. 'According to the High Court such a conclusion drawn b)•\n\nthe appellate Bench ws an impossible one having regard to the plead-· >--- l. ings and the cyidence on record, foi-, according to•the High Court, it was by notice dated 20th March; 1973, issued by the.widow of I~ Dr. Amonkar that the respondent-plaintiff was.categoriclly told that ' he should make altefnativc arrangment for his consultation practice elsewhere with effect from 1-4-.1973 which showed that his licen£e was tenninatedwith effect from date. It must however be bcrne in mind that whi1t was termiatcd h'' the notice dated 20th. , March, 1973 was the respondeJ1t_,:plaintiff's attachment as an Honow .., rary Surgeon to Dr. Amon kar Hospital and. not his licem:e. ln fact, it was never the case of the appellant--defendants that the respondentplaintiff was a. licensee and. _therefofc,_ neither their pleac\\ing nor their notice could be used for showing that the. respondent-pl,, intiff's licence. continued upto Jst f April, 1973. The appellat-e Court while accepting the alternatiye sbmission was proceeding on theassumption ··~-~ . that the resopondent-plaintiff's occupation was as a licensee and on that basis it considered what would be the effet of the avermrnt made • by him in para A of his complaint which suggested that his oral lice\".~~}.. had been terminated by being 'asked to vacate the cabin long before 1-2-1973. Now in the first place assuming. that the appellate Court's conclusion in that behalf was not justified on the evidence on recorc, the same! contd at the highest be regarded as a 'rong conclusion but it is impossible to say that it was suggestive of a non-juc\\icial apprcach y or bias or partiality on its par!.. Secondly, it amounted to acceptance of the alternative contention on an assumed basi.s after the appellate Court had already, on a re-appraisal of the entire material in' the case, recorded its finding on the factual issue in agreeent with the trial Court in favour of the appellant-defendants: In other words, theconclusion. qn the_alternatiVc subrnssin ·, vas not 1nere1y i.nnocuous i.e. unmotivated by any oblique purpose but inconsequential to the dispcc -lsal of the case. Ha'{ing regard to the above discussion we are clearly \"\"\"' • of the view there was no justification for the High Court to undertake ·· . ' a' re-appreciation of the evidence: and it <iutght !'ot to ha.ve interferred .\n\n'with the concurrent finding of fact recorded by t]·, e two Courts below\n\n on tb.e factu.al isse arising in the case. •\n\n, .. ,./\n\nM.M. AMONKAR _v. ~.A. JOHAR! (Tulzapurkar, '.!.) . 659\n\nThough _the aforesaid conclusion of ours would be sufficient to ' dispose of the appeals, even on-merits we feel that the broad faturc• , emerging from the, evidence ori reeord make it d.ifficult to accept t.he:\n\n: respondent-plaintiff's case that .the user of the 'suit cabin was penriitted to him on leave and licence basis as claimed by him. Admittedly, Dr. Amonkar H'ospital was never exclusieiy a Maternity and Gynaeocological Hospilal and had a 'Nursing Home Department where general\n\ne>perations were undertaken and as such.attachment of couple of doctors as Honourary S.urgeons to it would he most natural and. since r.t the : materi<il time. both the _senior Dr. Amonkar_ (since deceased) an<\\, the .. junior Dr. Am?nkr (defendant N~. 2) were on account of their ill-\n\n~Jiealth, unable lo work with full vigour, with only <1.octors (Dr. Mi•s ' . Usha Am0nkar and.pr .. Rawalia) in attendance the resp<'m.dent--'-plain-\n\n'tiff's attachment as Hlriourary Surgeon to it for temporary dt\\ration\n\ntill Dr, IMrs.) Gaiton.de rurned from Calcutta, couldnct be said to be unecessary s opinefi by 'the High court but wis.more probable ..\n\nEven. the High Court has observecfthat late Dr .. Amonkar had obliged '\n\nthe~ respondent-,, p)aintiff by accommodating him in the suit cabin tempi>rarily when he was suddenly made. to fowe his premises o.n the\n\nthird floor. of the very building and that the respondent-plainti, ff had iakenadvantage of the gesture shown to him by late Dr. Amonkar as Dr. (Mrs.) Gaitonde was away at Calcutta. ' . ~. . ,\n\n. Secondly,. even the High urt ha• accepted the po_siiion thaf the ( user of the suh cabin became. available o the respondent-plaintiff .0._as a result of his d!fect approach to late Dr. Amonkar but through the • .\n\nI . . . _intervention and good offices of Dr. Rawalia, arid l)_e has fully supported ti1e Appellants-Defendants' case that such user was allowed to the\n\nrespondent~-plaintitfan the.same terms on hich he had been permitc. ted the user of his cabin In-that Hospital, namely, b; causeof attach- .\n\n'-:-<( • ment as Honourary Surgeon to -Dr. Amonkar Hospital. But Dr.\n\n...\n\n'Rawalia's evidence has been discarded by the High Court.for reasons which are, in our \"view, not sound.· Aprt from some minor contradictions (which were really omissions) that appeared in his evidence in light of the averments made by hiin in his earlier Affidavits filed in the_\n\nG proceedings, the main reason for° discarding his evidence has been that he could not be regarded as disinterested witness because of his close ties with the Amonkar fall)ily and that he had displayed-an >-,\"). attitude of befog ever willing to sign any afii.davit or to swear to any~.,. thing'lo help whom he had come to help; for instance, he had gone to the extent of saying \"so. far I am not asked to go out but I an\\ prepared .\n\n;; ...... ; i.·,~~\n\nto go .as and when they will tell me to get out\", wh1clt showed tltat ·. ·\n\n'\"\n\n~ \"\n\n• • '\n\n'660 illJ!'REME COURT REPORTS\n\n(\\1)84] _2 S.C.R.\n\nhe had identified himself with.Amonkars. In cur.view these aspects r f':would. not be good reasons for discarding his evidence. True, s0md of .:'.his.answers do show that he was having dose ties .with the Amonkar\n\nfamily but.this is not unnatural if itis borne iQ mind th~.t he has been. •' i<'.wotking with them ii:t that Hospital since 1954 and the.mere fact tht:t 'lie' hass'tated that he was prepared to \"go ;., hene:ver Amonkars would rask him to go would not show that there was any private or secret- : understanding between him and Amonkars as was sought to be. sug- ; gested by counsel for. the respon, dent-plaintiff. Since, he , was a signa-. i' tory to writing Exh. No. 2 all that he wanted \\o convery was that his 'user of the cabin wasbecause of his attachment as Honourary Surgcot~ : to Dr. Amonkar Hospital'and as such his ri'ght to occupy the cabin\n\n•·; __ would. come t\" an end as and when his attachip.ent woula cease, that\"· . ' is to say, as and when Amonkars would ask. him to go. Far from show- . ing any interestedness in the Amonkars his aforesaid statement was . ·-\n\n. 11.1! admission against bis own interest, as it exposed him to imminent __ / .i.,. , risk .of eviction, and as such deserved commendation. Honouring one's · , . ' ' . ~·\n\n\" D\n\n, , word has. become a rare virtue tbese days and it would become_ rarer . ' still if those who'display it are to be discredited like this. To disbelieve\n\n... ' .\n\n\" Dr. -Rawalia who showed his willingness to honour his word by stick-:\n\n. ing to the arrangement to which he \".\"a~ a signatory and fo5net behaving: '\n\n111. the manner as :respondent-plamttff has done, would be a travesty._, 'of justice. .; ; ' j\n\n: Thlrdiy: turning to the do, oumentay eyidtinc, itmustheobserved J; . Uhat the three.or fo11t receipt produced by the respondi:nt-plaintiff'\n\n; showing monthly payments made by him would be of no avail bec!'nse I' \\he nature or the character of th<i payment, whether it was by way of ' compensation or towards ratable expenses, has no where been indicated\n\nI . . . \"\" 'in any of them. But s.o far as Exh .. No. 1 is concerned it is clear, that 'r , :. this document in terms indicates that the respondent-plaintiff was\"\n\n; \\permitted, to use the suit , cabin not on leave and licence basis but be- ' -cause of his attachment as Honouiary Surgeon to Dr. Amonkar Hospi-\n\n~ tal and truiJ it contains a.categorical admission on'h.is par!'tJiat he was ·\n\n... neither a tenant nor a licensee thereof. In crosxamination respon_- .\n\nG .. dent_:plaintiff admitted that be had signed this documen.t after. fully ..\n\n\"' .. :understa, nding the contents thereof. If that be so, .his oral _testimon, Y, j\n\n. ·:.which runs-counter to the document cannot obv10usly .be accepted ' :.;._,..,.\n\n:unless, of, course: the document'is showu to have,, been obtained. by- ' late D~; monkar from. him °for the purpose of avoiding a p_ossible ~\n\nobjection that might be raised by 'the LI.C: and was not to be acted Up ..\n\nOllllti lillgjlested by the FOspoudent:._plaintifr,, As. regards the motive or ..\n\n• '\n\n• ...\n\n. . • M.M. AMONKAR. v. S.A. JOHARI.(Tu/zapurkar, J.) ' ' . . . ' .\n\npurpose for which the document wassaicl to hae be;, iiobtined.there are two cir£umstances which militate against it., Jn _the first place nt the material time that is in May l 970 uniawful subletting of promises '\n\nwas a. ground for eviction and not ihe giying it on leave and licence bas'is:and. late Dr. Amonkar might have faced some difficu.Jty from his own landlord, namely, L.I.c. if he had sublet t~, e aid cbin to the respondent-plaintiff but at that time it coufrf not be within the contem plation.of anybody to.seek protection gains! givlngpreises.on licence ' a!So, and even so Ext. No . .! in terms records that respond.ent-pleintiff was neither a ienarit nor a licensee -of the suii' cabin. Sucha double ., ir---: protection wa~ un\"necessary as agalnst the L.I.C. but: i.t was necessary\n\n.. as against therespondent-plaintiffto.whoin late Dr. Amonkar want<d ' . to ensure tht the use'r of the cabin ws allowed only .fo the capacity of anattachea Honourary Surgeon to the Hospital and in no ther - \"\" - ' ' .\n\n.A -\"'f\n\nand that is-what\" Ext. No: J says, In our vi.ew, the. motive suggested by the re.spondent-'plaiiitiff does noi fit in with the sifoati0n or stilte of affairs that existed in May,_1970 and. the document really records the true transactin between-the parties; namely, that the respondent- . plaintiff wasalJowd 'the user of the suit cabin because df his attacliment as, H<iuorary Surgeon to' Dr, Amonkar .H:ospital.·:_Secondiy, if\n\n. E.xt. No. 1 was not to beacteci upon and it wassigned byrspondent plaintiff on the representation made.to him by late Dr, \"Amonhr that it wa~ simply for the purpose of protecting hli; nself against the L.fC. and was not to M nsed against the respo.ndent-'-plaintiff, ihe re'spondentplaintiff could 'have obtained froiii later Dr. Amonkar.a writing I , .. . . . . . ,1.._tl]at effect which he could have preserved'. or hjs own safety but no .. such \\Vriting was obtained by bin). from late Dr. Amonkar and, in our view, if.the respond.ent-plantiff's yersion were true that ExL No. 1- had been obtained on.'tbe alleged representation two writings coul_d have been execute<\\ and preserved by each for his own safety'but this was not done. Iftberef0re, resp6ndent-p1aintiff's suggestiop as to why Ext. No. 1 was obtained by late Dr. 'Amonkar from him' is not' believable-and for the reasm; tS indicated above it is.riot-the respon-. dent-'-plaintiff must be held boundby the writing E>:l .. No. !; which he execute~ after fully understanding the contents thereof and .his oral\" testimonythat the user of the cabin was giveu to him on leave and licence basis cannot be. acceptd. _ 1 · ,\n\n. .\n\nIt may be stated that the main reafon why the.-High Court felt that Ext. No. I did not reflect the true' nature of the transaction between the parties was that no documentary evidence was produced by the . appellantefendants to show that actually medical sorviees were\n\nG .\n\n. F\n\n• 662 SUPRJlME COURT REPORTS -\n\nI [1984] 2 ~.C.R.\n\n_rendered by the respondent-plaintiff to Dr. Amonkar Hospital. On his point there was merely tlie respondentplaintiff's word as against ,.:ot)l.e testimony of defen{!a, nt No. 2 and Dr. Rawalia. Respondent-plain- .\n\n. tiff claimed that he had not rendered any services to Dr. Amonkar\n\nHosJ:itaras .an attached Honourary surgeon thereto while bo!l; the\n\nwitnesss on the side of the appellant-<lefendanis asserted that con~ aultations were held with the respondent--plaintiff whenever occasions arose in maternity cases done in the Hospital. Leaving aside the High Court's view about the unsatisfactory nature of evidence of Dr. Rawalia, there was no reason why the evidence of defendant. No. 2 (Junior Dr. 'Amonkar)--who had as per the High Court's view given evidence in\" responsible and restrained manner-shouid not have been accepted 1 • on the point. Defendant No. 2 had clerly stated in his evidence that oonsultations with the respondent-plaintiff were ll.e!d whenever preoperative or :post-operative problems arose in maternity cases and this was don~ at least 4 or 5 times a month and he was consulted in his capacity as an Honorar¥ Surgeon ;:ittachec\\ to the Hospital. t is true that no documentary recorg of such consultations was produced but whether any record of consultafions would be maintained or not would depend upon the nature. and t:vpe of consultations made and it is eq1hlly possible that due to lapse of time 'that had occurred between auch consultations and the trial such record may not have been preserved. In 'our view defendant No. 2:s evidence in this behalf heed not have been rejected simply.' because no record of such consultations I, was produced. Furthermore the respondent No. 2 admitted in his \\ evidence that he had made use of the Operation Theatre together with _ the facilities attached thereto of Dr. Amorikar Hospital for performing . operations ,;-n his private patients a.nd though there is a controversy as to whether such user of the Operation 'Theatre was freJ; .of charge or on payment, in our view such user of Operation Theatret 2gether with the facilities atiached thereto would not have beell) perrnittd to respondent.....:plaintiff. if he were an independent licensee of the suit cabin and was. not. connected with and attached to the Hospital. Lastly, the evidence clearly shows that right. from commencement of his occupation of the suit cabin till January 1973 (when the respondentiaintiff obtained an interim injunction) the respondent . plaintiff had\n\no servant of liis own attached to the suit'cabin but he was getting the iervices frothe inembers of the Hospital staff in the matter of sweeping, cleaning and dusting. of hi~ cabin, ceivig .his. patients. m the . , commoi:i waiting room and ushrmg the~ mto his cabm for which no ..\n\n5eparate payment was bing. made hr him. Were he _an mdepenent.'.' · lioeaiee of. the liuit cabin :!lnd not attached-to the Hospital such service. ,\n\nI . .\n\nM.M. AMONKAR v. S.A. JOHAR! (Tulzapurkar1) . . 663 ,. would noLhave been mai!e available to him free. of charge.\n\n' \" Jn our~\\iew the aforesaid broad features emerging from the evidence on record clearly ·)upport _thee.ppellanis-i.\\efeno.ants' cose .. that the .user of the suit cabip.was allowed to. the respondent-plainti(f not on leave and icence basis but because Of his attachment\" as: Honou-·\n\nrary Surgeon to Dr., Amonkar Hoplta'I.' Such being our\n\n4 conclusion on the factilal'issue it is un-necessary for us to deal with or discuss the . '\"-\"' other two sen!i_'.legal isses that wore argµed before vs in theppeals. • . . We are clearly of the view that the High_Court was .not right' in revers- , . -~ ing the concurrent , finding of fact recorded: by bpth the courts below\n\nand even on merits the High Colirt judgment cannot be sustained: ~.\n\nThe. appeals are therefore allowed and the High Couri -judgment is\n\nset aside and the concurrent firi!).ing of both the lower courts n the. facttial issue .is restored. 'The dismissal of the declaratory suit and\n\nthe findings in tii.e Eject:lnent Appiication E.A. No. 259/E of 1976 are • confirmed. Parties will bear their re~.Pective costs tbr6tigho.ut.\n\n.tf\n\nS.R.\n\n.-f ••\n\n.__\n\n.---\n\nB 1", "total_entities": 71, "entities": [{"text": "M. AMONKAfl &. OTHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 52, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M.M. AMONKAR & OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S.A. JOHARI", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 64, "end_char": 75, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S.A. JOHARI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Article 221", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 191, "end_char": 202, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1-4-1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1099, "end_char": 1107, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "required with effect from 1-4-1973 and that he should make hls own arrangements  for his private consultation."}}, {"text": "section 15A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1367, "end_char": 1378, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Maharashtra Act XVII of 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1436, "end_char": 1464, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Rawaiia", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2081, "end_char": 2088, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rawaiia and after obtaining a writing an stamp paper reflecting the true nature and\n\neharacter of the arrangement between.the appellants and the ReSpoildent p1ii.lntitf;\n\n(b) that tbe cabin in q'uestion Was not \"premiseS\" within the meaning.", "canonical_name": "Rawaiia"}}, {"text": "section 15A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3123, "end_char": 3134, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Small Causs Courts Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3345, "end_char": 3367, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Income Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7212, "end_char": 7226, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "CPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7796, "end_char": 7799, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Amonkar hospital", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9683, "end_char": 9699, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the broadfeatures eJUGrging from the evidence on record clearlY support the appellant-defendants' case that the user of th\"e suit cabin wa_s allowed to the respondent-plaintiff not on leave and licence basis but bect1:use of his attach .. ment s-Honorary surgecin to Dr. Amonkar hospital. ["}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTI'JN", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9712, "end_char": 9741, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "663 B~C]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTI'JN: Civil Appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "P.H. Parekh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10079, "end_char": 10090, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. M. Tarkunde, P.H. Parekh, Mrs. Manik Karanjeial and Miss.Ind11 , Malhtra for the Appellants.· . .."}}, {"text": "Manik Karanjeial", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10097, "end_char": 10113, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. M. Tarkunde, P.H. Parekh, Mrs. Manik Karanjeial and Miss.Ind11 , Malhtra for the Appellants.· . .."}}, {"text": "Ind11 , Malhtra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10123, "end_char": 10138, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. M. Tarkunde, P.H. Parekh, Mrs. Manik Karanjeial and Miss.Ind11 , Malhtra for the Appellants.· . .."}}, {"text": "A.nil n(ivan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10174, "end_char": 10186, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A.nil n(ivan, Respondent."}}, {"text": "I TuLzAPURKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10306, "end_char": 10319, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I TuLzAPURKAR, J. These appeals by special leave rai•e tll'o questions for oilr determination: (I) Whether the High Court in exer-· oise .of its powers of superintendence 'under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10484, "end_char": 10492, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Maharashtra Act XVII of 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10785, "end_char": 10813, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Amonlcar Hospital", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11205, "end_char": 11222, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "premises of Dr. Amonlcar Hospital located on the fourth floor of - Boip.bay Mutual Terrace at 534, Sandhurst Bridge, Bombay, of whieh ."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11306, "end_char": 11312, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "premises of Dr. Amonlcar Hospital located on the fourth floor of - Boip.bay Mutual Terrace at 534, Sandhurst Bridge, Bombay, of whieh ."}}, {"text": "M. D. Amonkar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11333, "end_char": 11346, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "one Dr. M. D. Amonkar; since decea-sed, was the propri.etor (whose heirs and legal representatives are the appellant-defendauts before us, befog his widow and two soils 1and three daughters-of whom one.", "canonical_name": "M. D. Amonkar"}}, {"text": "J'ohari", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11579, "end_char": 11586, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr: J'ohari (the respondent-plaiatiff) an M.B.B.S. of Bombay, ' '\nF.R.C.S. of London and Edinburough and' Hoi10urary Surgeon attached to G.t."}}, {"text": "s. 15A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12066, "end_char": 12072, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Rent Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12082, "end_char": 12097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Amonkar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12893, "end_char": 12900, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ms further case was that though within a few days of his occupation laie Dr. Amonkar had obtained from him a_ writing ' purporting to state that he was attached as an Honburary Surgeon • .", "canonical_name": "Amonkar H'ospital"}}, {"text": "Amonkar Hospital", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13012, "end_char": 13028, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to Dr; Amonkar Hospital."}}, {"text": "Suman Gaitondey", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13873, "end_char": 13888, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3 Dr. Suman Gaitondey (the married."}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13960, "end_char": 13968, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "daughter of' the deceased) on her return to Bomb'ay from Calcutta, and since by."}}, {"text": "Tu.fzapurkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14636, "end_char": 14648, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tu.fzapurkar, J.) 651 .· ' ' . ."}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15285, "end_char": 15289, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15972, "end_char": 15976, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Presidency Small Causes Courts Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16396, "end_char": 16430, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Jicensee under the Bombay Rent Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16701, "end_char": 16735, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17865, "end_char": 17869, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "D.M. Amonkar", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 18876, "end_char": 18888, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the side of the appellant-defendants , the o)'.al testimony consisted of depositions of two witnesses (i) Dr.\n\nD.M. Amonkar (defendant No."}}, {"text": "Rawalia", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 18922, "end_char": 18929, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2) and (ii),, Dr. Rawalia and the.do.c\\J.- mentary :evidence consisted of two writings obtained by late Dr. _)."}}, {"text": "Rawalia", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19329, "end_char": 19336, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "23'4-1962 .signed by Dr. Rawalia recording the arrangement with him .'Both Bxts.", "canonical_name": "Rawaiia"}}, {"text": "Amoi1kar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19609, "end_char": 19617, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the suit cabin, Dr. Rawalia had been allowed the use of another cabin in the hospi!al prmises by late Dr. Amoi1kar on the sa1ne terll).s.", "canonical_name": "Amonkar H'ospital"}}, {"text": "Amonkar Hospital•.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19727, "end_char": 19745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Surgeon to Dr. Amonkar Hospital•.\n\nI am allowed to practice may."}}, {"text": "Amonkai", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20076, "end_char": 20083, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".)¥hose good offioes the respondent--:-_plaintiff got the suit~· •cabin from late Dr. Amonkai; 'fully supported the appellant-defendants' case that late Dr. Amonkar had permitted the respondent-plain- ·\n\n' . '", "canonical_name": "Amonkar H'ospital"}}, {"text": "s. 15A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20973, "end_char": 20979, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21949, "end_char": 21957, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 15A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23839, "end_char": 23845, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Rawaha", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 28599, "end_char": 28605, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Obviousiy, the application was made with a view to confront\n\n' ...\n\nDr. Rawalia by.his own Income Ta7Returns which he had fi~d for provmg (1) that Dr. Rawaha had made a false statement and (11) that ·• payments made by him to the apptllmit-defenc!:lnts bore the charac- · ter of rent.", "canonical_name": "Rawaiia"}}, {"text": "RawaHa", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 28809, "end_char": 28815, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It cannot be disputed that the aspects sought to be proved by recalling Dr. RawaHa and by geting liis,.", "canonical_name": "Rawaiia"}}, {"text": "s. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30434, "end_char": 30438, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income Tax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30459, "end_char": 30479, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31061, "end_char": 31066, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Govt. of Maharashtra", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 34889, "end_char": 34909, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that the Govt."}}, {"text": "Usha .Amonkar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 35104, "end_char": 35117, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of Maharashtra is aboJ;.. shing he leave and licence system (meaning thereby that the Govern-· ,,;... ment is t!tinking ofconveting occupa.pisunder leave and licence basil\n\ninto 'deemed tenants') Dr.· (Miss)· Usha .Amonkar and Dr. D.f>.C. Amonkarare asking him to vacate the premises\",' and the.", "canonical_name": "Usha .Amonkar"}}, {"text": "D.f>.C. Amonkarare", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 35126, "end_char": 35144, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of Maharashtra is aboJ;.. shing he leave and licence system (meaning thereby that the Govern-· ,,;... ment is t!tinking ofconveting occupa.pisunder leave and licence basil\n\ninto 'deemed tenants') Dr.· (Miss)· Usha .Amonkar and Dr. D.f>.C. Amonkarare asking him to vacate the premises\",' and the."}}, {"text": "Amon kar Hospital", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 36708, "end_char": 36725, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March, 1973 was the respondeJ1t,:plaintiff's attachment as an Honow .., rary Surgeon to Dr. Amon kar Hospital and."}}, {"text": "1-2-1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 37404, "end_char": 37412, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that the resopondent-plaintiff's occupation was as a licensee and on that basis it considered what would be the effet of the avermrnt made • by him in para A of his complaint which suggested that his oral lice\".~~}.. had been terminated by being 'asked to vacate the cabin long before 1-2-1973."}}, {"text": "M.M. AMONKAR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 38555, "end_char": 38567, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ", .. ,./\n\nM.M. AMONKAR _v. ~.A. JOHAR! (", "canonical_name": "M. D. Amonkar"}}, {"text": "Amonkar H'ospital", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 38972, "end_char": 38989, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Admittedly, Dr. Amonkar H'ospital was never exclusieiy a Maternity and Gynaeocological Hospilal and had a 'Nursing Home Department where general\n\ne>perations were undertaken and as such.attachment of couple of doctors as Honourary S.urgeons to it would he most natural and.", "canonical_name": "Amonkar H'ospital"}}, {"text": "Am?nkr", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 39333, "end_char": 39339, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "both the senior Dr. Amonkar (since deceased) an<\\, the .. junior Dr. Am?nkr (defendant N~. 2) were on account of their ill-\n\n~Jiealth, unable lo work with full vigour, with only <1.octors (Dr. Mi•s ' ."}}, {"text": "Usha Am0nkar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 39466, "end_char": 39478, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Usha Am0nkar and.pr .. Rawalia) in attendance the resp<'m.dent--'-plain-\n\n'tiff's attachment as Hlriourary Surgeon to it for temporary dt\\ration\n\ntill Dr, IMrs.)", "canonical_name": "Usha .Amonkar"}}, {"text": "Gaitonde", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 40111, "end_char": 40119, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the very building and that the respondent-plainti, ff had iakenadvantage of the gesture shown to him by late Dr. Amonkar as Dr. (Mrs.) Gaitonde was away at Calcutta. ' ."}}, {"text": "Amonkars", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 41650, "end_char": 41658, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Amonkars.", "canonical_name": "Amonkar H'ospital"}}, {"text": "s0", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41753, "end_char": 41755, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Amonkars", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 42044, "end_char": 42052, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "hene:ver Amonkars would rask him to go would not show that there was any private or secret- : understanding between him and Amonkars as was sought to be.", "canonical_name": "Amonkar H'ospital"}}, {"text": "Amonkar Hospital'and", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 42425, "end_char": 42445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 all that he wanted \\o convery was that his 'user of the cabin wasbecause of his attachment as Honourary Surgcot~ : to Dr. Amonkar Hospital'and as such his ri'ght to occupy the cabin\n\n•·;  would."}}, {"text": "-Rawalia", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 43060, "end_char": 43068, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\" Dr. -Rawalia who showed his willingness to honour his word by stick-:\n\n."}}, {"text": "Amonkar Hospital", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 47789, "end_char": 47805, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F\n\n• 662 SUPRJlME COURT REPORTS -\n\nI [1984] 2 ~.C.R.\n\n_rendered by the respondent-plaintiff to Dr. Amonkar Hospital.", "canonical_name": "Amonkar H'ospital"}}, {"text": "Rawalia", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 47930, "end_char": 47937, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 and Dr. Rawalia.", "canonical_name": "Rawaiia"}}, {"text": "appellant-<lefendanis", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 48125, "end_char": 48146, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "witnesss on the side of the appellant-<lefendanis asserted that con~ aultations were held with the respondent--plaintiff whenever occasions arose in maternity cases done in the Hospital."}}, {"text": "Amonkar)--who", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 48450, "end_char": 48463, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 (Junior Dr. 'Amonkar)--who had as per the High Court's view given evidence in\" responsible and restrained manner-shouid not have been accepted 1 • on the point."}}, {"text": "Amorikar Hospital", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 49586, "end_char": 49603, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 admitted in his \\ evidence that he had made use of the Operation Theatre together with _ the facilities attached thereto of Dr. Amorikar Hospital for performing ."}}, {"text": "Amonkar Hoplta'I.", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 51114, "end_char": 51131, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the respondent-plainti(f not on leave and icence basis but because Of his attachment\" as: Honou-·\n\nrary Surgeon to Dr., Amonkar Hoplta'I.' Such being our\n\n4 conclusion on the factilal'issue it is un-necessary for us to deal with or discuss the . '\"-\"'", "canonical_name": "Amonkar H'ospital"}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_2_664_692_EN", "year": 1984, "text": ". ,\n\n'GRAMOPHONE coMPANY OF IN~IA LTD.\n\n:,.\n\n-J v.\n\nB!R.ENDRA BAHADUR PANDEY & . ORS.\n\nFtbraury 21 ,' '1984\n\n. ' } . [0. CHINMAPPA REDDY, E.S. YENKATARAMIAH A..'ID R.B.MISRA, JJ.j ' . '\n\nCl1pJ'rltht Act, 1955-J.O, 51 11rrd SJ-w11rd 'import'-maninz of. Char\"-\n\ntr oferdtr uruhr s. 53-quasi-judicial,\n\n. JntD1tt1tlona/ La,.._WMtlJU bet:oms part of municipal law without aid of\n\nmipa} ltD!ui~Whtt!Je~ OoemQt mwt/cipa~ {uw /fl COIC of cl!/ffct.\n\n/ltter~atlona{ Law-Rule rttardill¥ ri¥1tl of land: locked states of innoctnl I''\"Ml¥' of too<h acr; ss a'fiOthtr state.\n\nl'ractice-Couru nu., t lnterprtt Mtlona/ law in a way io as '\" a•oid con /rolltallDn Willr lntvnatlo1111l low.\n\n. lnterprttatk,,._p, u[e of-While lltrpretlnt \"\"'rds tJf•rcfinarypar{artt:l ufi rnrct 111 dlctlonar/n of 110 tZYI/, • • •\n\nlly trea;~ and by inlematiooal convcntibn. lndia allo;,., s transit fac!liti~ to Nepal, ha lltlJ.'lbour and a land-locked country.\n\nA companY bouc:d 111\n\nK3thnandu\n\nN~\"'1 ned . • t•- froiD . ' : .- •mPO a consramuent of pro-recor.Jcd cassc ''\" S•apporo whidt ..,.._ waitin; itt despatch to Nepal at Calcutta Port. IU tbo\n\n• ..\n\n. J\n\n. '\n\n. ____..\n\n\"· ' . ..\n\nI •\n\nI. 'oRAMOPHONE ell). v. B. B: P.ANDI5Y 665 ,.\n\n~ apellant crupany suspected those cassettes. toJbe unauthorised' rep, roduction' of\n\nits rords' and • cassettes, 'the import of which ipJo India :was , Prohibited, tlte\n\nappe!)ant-c_ompal, lY nro\"9ed. the Ragistrar 4>f Copyrights for actionunder s.53 of the cOpyright Act; 1957 which enables the. Rgistrar, after. lil.aking such en~\n\nquaries .as he deeme.4 fit, to order that copies made ' out of india of a work .whk.h if made in india .would infringe copyright, shall .110t be importe<l. A.s the Registrar~ did. not take expenditius action,• the ippella, nt:compapy moved the High\n\nCourt by a writ petition. A single Jr; dge made an interim , oJder permitting the appeliant-company. -to inspect the consignmet nd if any of the cassettes were 1 found to have infiinged. the appellarH's copyhght, 1hey were to be kept apart\n\nuntil further oders of the Registrar. The . Registrar ·.was directed to deal with\n\nthe application of the appe]lantcompany. in ACCOrdnce.with)a:.... The s:onsi'gnee preferred an appeal against this odef of ftbe single Judge .. A' Division)3ench of •. the High Court allowed the appeal and dismissed the, writ petition of the appellant cpmpimy.\n\nThe Division Bench heid, that there was no i¢prtation whenthe goods entered. India tJn route to Nepal. - 'The Divisic;>D Bench was of the view; th&t the , word 'import' did not merely tneart bringing thd, goods into India, but com- .. prehended something more,' that 'is, \"incorportiog and. mixing, or 'mixing up of. the goods imported with the rilass of the property in tb~· local area\". The . company obtained special leave' to appeal. The questions which arose were : .\n\n_(i) whther international law . is, of, its own force, drawn ifito 'the law .of the land without the aid of a municipal-statute, '(ii) whether, so drawn, it oerrid~ municipal Jaw in case of conflict~ (iii). whether there is any weli estabiished rule' · of :internat'ioiral law on the question of the right of-land-locked stat01 to inno ·\n\n'~t . passage f the goods across. 'til~;'.oil or another state; and' (iv). ;, bat js\n\nthe meaning of the,\\\\ ord 'ipoll' usco_ in s53 of the Copyright Act.\n\n'lo..o~~. ' • • • :-~ ' • i ~\n\n. ..··,\n\n.. I., Allowing. the ap{>eal,\n\n. I\n\nHELD: ...\n\n- . . ;:: On qutstions (i); & (ii)\"!\n\n~ .. . . . . . ..,...,...,,.:-;.;;: :rhere'can be np question that rlations must march with c (~ational - :\n\nmrnunity an'd the municipal law must respect ruloa of .. international law oven ac •.. nations respect international pinion .. The mity of' nations requires that rules of international law may be accommodated in , the mumcipal law even without expt~ legislative ·.sanction provided tl)ey d~ no_t run into copfiict with Acts of Parliament. But when they do run into such conffict~ the sovereignty and the . integrit-Y. of the republic 11nd the Sl!peacy -ftho c<institut~ legislatures in\n\n., F\n\n. I ~.\n\n6&6 SUPRI!MB COUltT REPORTS [ 1984) 2 tc.-.\n\nmaking the lawS:=Y oot , be subjected to etern;1l rules except to the 1 ·. Jeeitimltely accepted by the consituted legislatures themselves. The d lttt . . th .. th hI f ' OClnllCof incof110r&t; on also rccoen•ses e post !too at t e rues o tntero:luonal ..\n\nincorpora~ into nation:ll law and considered to be part of th~ rutionallllrt unltss thty art in conflict witlt on A.C'I of Por/iomttrl .• Comity of cations or \"· rounicipal law l!IUSt prevail in case or conflict.\n\nNation~! courts canr.ot sa no. • • • • 1 r · '\n\nY ''\" if Parliament bas satd no to a pnnctp c o tnlemauonal law. National conn, will endorse international taw but nt if it conflicts will national 1~. l'atioll.ll courts being organ.~ of the national state rnd not ons of intenutioll>) I•• must rforcc apply national law if international law. conflicts with it. But lite: courts are under an oblia; atlon within leeitimatc limits. to so interpret the llllmicipal statute as to avoid; confron!:-..tion with the cqmity of nations or lhc: ,..0 established principle• of iuternation:11 law. But if conflict is inevilable. the ltttu must yield. [67l EH) ·\n\n• Ptr Lora Da\"''Utt AIR {n Tr.nduxt Traditt¥ Corpt. v. Ctl!tral BaM, [1977) I All I!.R. 881; Wm Rand C'tntrnl Gold !1/iJt{ng Co . ._, The b(, [19051 21CB J9/; L/JIIttrpacht in /ntutionaf /..JIW (CetU:-; al Works); uuham CJ\n\n111 PoUtks.v. Th• Comme;,•'talth 70 Comrnonw03ltjl l; w ReporLS 60; Trrxrmr>- upon, Mascow . v. M!1. Tarapo\" 4c Compur1y a11d A11r, (1970) 3 SCR. S3ctfcc rod to.\n\nOn fUtJIIotl (Iii).\n\nAs .the leJoin& authomies on intccnation:.l JAw c.; prci!Cd di, clg<!DI vit•l on the quest ton cif the tr.>rwt ri~:hts of land-locked counlric:l. tbo rC$ult, has bel:ll that~ lan.!-lockcd.countrie. have (o , c]y oh bilateral, rcaoin.1l or multi-lattW •&roententa for tbc rctXliUIU\"on or tbc:ir rtgh!:i •. The very e.U>tcnce of innUitl<rilblc biateral tre.ties. Yobilc 00 tho ooc band it raises a pruruptioq or the ·ilt~ of a custoMAry rit of tnnsit, on tbc otbor it indicates the dependon~ of ri&hl on aaroement. 1bc most recent I96S ConvrJ)UtJD on Tran.iit Ttsde . 0\n\n' • d ' ~....... . . . bile provt.l- n -\"\"\"\"\"\"' Statco, to .. -b•ch both Nepal and India arc !lgnato~1, ~'< oct•..!\n\n10~ for fr~e.Jom of traJWt for the pa•, suec of &?<JtiS between t_ho (an~ (, S state and tho sea, a.:ro.t the terti tory of a transit state c.mphasae the . •areement bc.twccn the land-locked country and the tr.IDsit c:<Juntry. The b•~.t T r nJ l\"e1- 111 re&ty o Trade anJ Tn::aty of Transit entered Into bo:tween lmha • 1~ ord 1 d •uartotco •r 0 upan traJc between the two countries in rn~~:ticc mean 1 • tp.!it Nepal to Permit froo lnd unlumpcrcd flow of gooJs .ed bY tolcp:ll fro)llt todi' alld 1 auaranec or froedorn of transit) for goods originatina from ou~·~ 1'rtdf aero~ thcl territory or India to reach Nepal. But tbc Comcntion on. Tr:uutl .;~'let or Ut!d-lotL-d <' ·- lt:a\\'0 V . \"\" \"tltet and the Treaties tJ.:t\"een the two tuuntn.-• . d ~.r, f . ,. ~~'\"'\"' C<>ufttry r• to j-~ -ary rtrictions ror tho pufl)OM of protcctJOI\n\n, -·-.\n\n... -1,\n\n... ..\n\nGllAMO~HONE co. v. JI.B : PANDEY. 667\n\n. \\. iterary or artistic' property and preventing false marks, fats~. indications: of origin'- .\n\n_or other methods of unfair competiti'on in order to :, further other gel_lera:t conven- ·\n\ntions . . It is clear that for this purpose, it is not necessary that t, he land-lockd country should . ~- a party .to the general conver; ions --along with 'the trait country. The interpretation placed . by John H.B. 'Fried in the Indian Joumal of international law that ihe provisions .-of the 1965Conventibn)ermit the •. States of transit to enfoce, say a Copyright or trade'.'mark convention even if, for xample, neither the country of origin no; of destination is '~)arty to it appears to be (correct .\n\n' ., . . . . . , . . _interpretation. [67S B-H)\n\n...\n\nAn artitic, . literary or musical worlcj is the brain-chilq' .of its athor, Uie.\n\nfn~< of his labour, ?.nd so, considered to bC' his prot)erty. So highly is\"it prEled by .\n\no ' ' ' o • ' I { all civilised nation; that it is thought, worthy 'of protection by national laws and international Conventions relating to Copyright. The International <:; onvention .for . 'the protection of literary or artistic works first signed afBenic on: 9t~ ~Septem:ber, . . . . -- • .. ' t 1886 and finally revised at Paris in -1971 provided for protection to the authors of . literary and artistic works. The Universal Copyright Convention first signed at\n\nGenea on 6th Septcmber 1952 and revised in Paris iiiH7.1 requires th~ eontracting st; Hes to provi4c for .the adequate and cff(l\\:tive Protection of the rights of· authors and other oopyright Proprietors in leterary, scientific and artistic 'works\n\nincluding writings., musical, dramatic a!ld cinematograph works arid_paintinss Clll raving and.sulpture. ['84 G:H] . /.. . .\n\nI • 4:-On IJIIestn N•. (iv) ·\n\n4 . . r\n\n. \" . . •. . . ; . . . ' ' . . ' , · the word 'import' is not defined iii. the' Copyright Act'thoughit is defined\n\n.··: ':\n\n' . . .\n\nin the. Customs Ac( But the same \\Vordmay . mean .different things in different .. enactments and in different conteX\\S: Jt may eyen mean different things at different •· . places m the_samcstatute. It'ati depends on the sense of the provision'•where it occurs. \\ {? Reference to dictionaries is hudly of any avail particularly in the case of words of .ordillilry1parJance with a variety of well-know meanings. Such.word. take colQUr .\n\n\"V r .\n\n. ~,.\n\n. from the context. Appealto the Latin root won't help. The ppealJLmust .be io lie\n\n• \" • • • r .. sensor the statute. [~89 fl ,. ·\n\n- ~\n\n, Thesubmission tbatwhere!fga'ods are~ ( brougbt into the. coutry not for ._colllillerce; but for onward transmission to another country, there can; in law, be .no importation, is not acceptable. In the first.i>_lace, the language of s .. 53 'does not justifyreading the.words 'imported for commerce' for ttic words •imported; Nr ia\n\nthere any reason to assume that such was the ob.iect of tthe legislature: While-inter-. .!'\n\npre~~ tbc ords ' import' in he Copyright Act, oe must take [note that while fbe, A .PeStive requiremeilt a( the Copyright Converitions:is to pu)icct cop)ligl.t, .negatively .. . . .. . . '\n\n. G . : ..\n\n:E ·.\n\n\\ F\n\nr ..\n\n.. ·(' ...\n\nSUPREME COURT RBPORT~\n\n[1984] 2 S.C.R.\n\nalso, the :rlhsit Tr~le 'Cnention and te bilateal Treaty make exceptis enabl- 'ing tho tranait atate to tak~ mea5ue to pr.otect Cyrigbt. If this much is bornein mind, it becoma clear that that thy word ·import'in s. -53 of th~ Copyright Act\n\ncannot, bear the llatroW interpritatio'n llOUght to be p!ace<J upon it to limit it to import for commerce. It ml!Ut interpreted irf a senes which-will fit the Copyright Act into the setting of the Intcrn; ttional Con'(e,!]tions. [690 B-E]\n\n'. • • • • • •• < • '.\n\nThe word •import' in sce&. 51 and(.53 of the Copyright Act mea)'ls br.g ing into India.from ouMidt India', that it is not limited to importation for com-· tllefCe only: but includes importation for transitacros the eountry. This interpretation, far from beillli inconsistent with any principle of _InternationPI Law, i, s entitely in accord with International Conventions and the Treati~ between India and Nepal.[,91 H, 692A),\n\nTb.c' Hiah Court 'thOught that goods may be said to be Imported i_nt0 • the country o?ly if there is an ineorPoration. or mixing up of tht good~ imported with the mas~ of. the ProPerty in the local area. ln othe~ words the ll!gh Court\n\nreli~ on the Oriaillt\\1 Package n.octrine' as enunciated by Chief Justice Marshall in Browll ~; St~1e o.( Maryland 6 L, Ed. 78. Reliance was placed by the , High\n\nCourt upon the decision of this Court in the Central. india Spinni11g and Weaving\n\n&;. Mam(facturinz Co. -J, td.\n\nThe :Empr; I!!S Mills, Nagpur v.\n\nTHe Municlpol C<Jmmitte,, Wardha [1958] SCR 1.102~ That was a C6Se which arose under .the C.P. and B~:rar MunicipaHtie!!. Act and the question was whether the Pc!wcr to\n\nimpoe '\"a terminal tax. goods .or animals importid into or exported from the limit• of a 'munlcipaljty'; included -tho right to levy tax on goods .which 'were\". n•ither, loaded or unloaded 'at Wardha but were mereiy carried .across throunh toe .\n\nunicipal area'. We are afraid the case is really not of any guidance to us. sin'ce ·.\n\n~ .. ' . . 0 in the context of a 'termin!ll t&x:' the , word,<~ 'imported and-exported' could be construed in no other manner than was done by, the Court. We must hower\n\n._ say that the 'origi'tlal PaCkge doctrine' on !Vhieh reliance was placed wa! exprcs- ;\n\nly. disapproved tirat by tbi Federal. Court in the Province of Madra! v. Boddu\n\nPaida1111a : [1942] FCR 90 and again by the Suprcme.Couit m Stat~ of Bombay _v-~ 1\n\nP.N. Ba!Mlra, [1951] SCR 6112 .. [693 G-H, 691 A-Bl\n\nAQ 'order made under s. 53 of the Copyright 'Act is quasi-judicia[ .. The Registrar is not boun4 to make an order under s: 53 of the Copyright Act so soon as an appJfcatr0 n ia presimted to him bY the owner of the Copyright. Ho has\n\nnarally to consider the context of the n1ischief sought to be prevented. He must consider whether the _cepios would infringe tho Copyright if the copies were made ia India. He must. consider whether the app_licant owns the copyright _or the . duly authorised Agent of the Copyright. He must hear those claiming to be ·\n\naffected if an ordor .]s made atnd - conider any contention that may be put forward'\n\naa 'an excuie for the lmport. He maY cooider any oth.er rdevant circumstance. Since all legitimate defence's are upen and the~ enquiry is quasi-judici.al, :no one can s&riottsly 80J!tplain. [692'1'!-01\n\n.. --~-\n\n>-. .rC ...\n\n' I\n\nllf • ' • • • • •• 'GRAMOPHONil co. v. B. it P.4.NDEY. ( Chinnappa' ReddY, J.) 66~ . . . . . - - ' . . . . . -{, . . \\ . . CI; viL~APPELLATB JmusorcriON: Civil Appeal Nos. 3216·3218 of A 198,3.'\n\n.. Appeals by peci3:l ea~ from the Judgment ·md Ordet date.d the lOth February, 1983 of the Calcutta, High Court in €)ri-ginal rder ...•. B\n\nbs. 374-376 .of 19S2:\n\nSoli J. SorabJee, Harish N. Salve, Sudip; o.Sarkr & D.N. Gupta, _.;..r- . for the Appel, Ir~.t. · ·\n\n. '\" •\n\nfsnti Bhtuhan, S.K. Roy Chodhur!Y and\"il.S. Parihar for Respondent No. ) in CA._ 32i6 of ~983.. •. '\n\n. \" - . , B. Gupta, 's.K. Roy Chowdhary and H.S. Pdrihar for R.ep9n.· dent No; 1. -in cA. 3217·18 -of 1983. ' . . /' I\n\n. . .P.A. Francis, :i.N. PoiJar for te Respnde:k\n\n, f .\n\nI(, Prasaran,; Attorney General, Gop'a/ Subrarnaniaf'IJ nd e. v ..\n\nJ..i;;::__J Subba J?.ao in response to notice. . .· 4\n\n. • . . . ' t- .. \"\n\n_ 'G.S. Sanghi,. Shankar Mitra and P. Sinha for Intervener-:-\n\n' '\n\n. -\"!\n\nOceank Shippig Agency'(P.) Lt, d.. . /\n\n.... F\n\n/ ·. -\n\n\"\"· •. \"' The 1u9.gment 'or the Cou; t was, delivered by '\n\n. . .. .\n\n. ' ..\n\n~ '\n\nCHINNAPPA Reooy, 1. Nepal is our neighbor. Unfortunately •. ·Nepal is land-locked. Nepal's only access: to the ea is 'across ndia. So, as one good neighbour to another with a view to 'malntain, develop and strengthe~- the frendly relatins ;_between • our two· countries, , by . . treaty and by Internaional Convention,' we. allow a right of iruicent passage , in ordr to facilitate Npal'~. intcrn.ational tr;_e.de. One of the . . . . - questions before us iii teextent of this right :Does the right 'covr the\n\n, .\n\n670 tfPRiiMll COUU RBPORT~ [19~4} :G s.C.R.\n\n'ta:nsit of oods which may _not be imported into 'India? May good~\n\nwhichmay not be brought-intoJndia be taken across Indian territory? . What does \"import'' mean, more particu~rly what does \"import\"\n\nmean in Sec. 53 of the Copyright Ad? Can an unauthorised reprccl.uc•\n\ntion of a lit::rary, dramatic, musical or artistic work or n record eJ)1 bodying an nauthorised recording of a record (which, for short, dopt ing trade parlance, we may call' a pirated work), whcse irr.pcrtafion into India may be prohibited, but .whose importation into Nepal :is not prohibited, be taken across India~ territory to Nepal? These are some o( the questions which arise fM comideration in this appeal. . . ,.. .\n\n. / . •.. . ' .. •· .\n\nThe questions. have arisen this way: The appellant, the Gramo- . ' ' . . phone Company of.. India Limited, is (j. wcll-knowri manufactrer of musical records and cassetts. By agrecmell.t with the -performing artistes to whom royalitics are paid, the appellant company 'is the pwner of _the 'Cqpy right in. such recordings. The appellant received\n\nnformation from the Custom. Authnritie.s at Calcuttath at a consign- .. t ' . . ~-\"\" ment bf prerecorded cassettes sent by Universal Ovrseas Private Ltd. SingaP,.ore to M/s. Sungawa Enterorises, Kathmandu, ~Nepa~, had. arrived at'Calcutta Port by ship and was awaitingct.espatch to Nepal.\n\nThe appellat Iea.Jnt that a substantial number of~assettes wre 'pira-j ted works-', this fact having come to light through the bjoken condition of the consignment which' was lying in the Calcutta docks. Basing upon the information receiv.ed, the appellant sought the intervention of theRegistra: of Coy.rights for action undr Sec. 53 o, f the Cpyright __;.;.., Act, 1957. Tl11S ptoVJSlon enables .the Regtstrar1 after makmg such . enquiries as he deems fit, to order t'hat copies made m1t of India of a work which if made in India would in.fringe copy right, shall not .be imported. The provision also enables the Registrar to enteli any 'shipr., docJ< or.pren?.iseswhere 'such copies may be found. and to examine suc~1, oopies. All copies in respect of which an order is made prohibiting I, their import arc deemed to be goods the import of which. is prohibited\n\nor restricted uner Sec. 11 o.f the Customs Act, 1962. n, e prcvis.icn~ . : . of the Custom Act, are to have.effcct in respect of these copies. 'All\n\ncopies confiscated under the provisi<>ES of the said Act are not to vest in the Government, but to be delie'r<'d to the owner of the copy right in the work. As the Registrar was net taking exyrditious action on the . . application of the appellant and as it was apprehenr.ed th~.t the pirated cassettes woul<!. be releaseJ. fer tr~.nq:Crtaticn t~ Nep, pl, the appellant filed a writ app1ication in the Calcutta High Court seeki'ng a writ in 'the nature :of andamus to compel e Rrgi&tar:::r to p..ss rn. appropriate crder under Sec. 53 of the Copyrit Act 1wd to prevent releae\n\n'·\n\n.,.-\n\n\"'\n\n' ~\n\n', \\ ·, ' . '. . .\n\nGRAMOPHONil CO. V. B.B. _PAND!JY ,(Chinnappa ReddyJ.). ~71\n\nof t1.e c:1ssettes fr0m the custody of the customs authorities. . . . . .\n\nI , .\n\nThe learned single judge. of the Calcutt, a High Court, on the request of the appellant, issued a Rule Nis~ and made ai1 interim order permitt- 1ing the appeUant to inspect the consignmept of casscttei>\"and if any\"of\n\nthe cassettes' we_re thought tb infringe the appellants copyr'igb( they . wereto be kept apart:ntil further orders oft}lc Regstrar. After causing the necessary'inspectionto bemade, the Registrar was directed to deal 'with the application under Sec. 53 of the Copyright Act in accordance\n\n.~~ -· with lawafter heating interest_ed p:Uties. The :Registrar was di, rected ·. to deal with the :'1-Pplicationwithin eight weks from tlie date o'f the ---¥ ...... High Curt; s br9-ec: In the _event of any of th~ cassettes held back by the appellant being found not to infinge any provision of the Copyright Act,, he appellant was to pay damages as assessed by. the GOurt. '.\n\nAgainst the learp.ed s1ng1c Judge's order, the. consignee preferm1 a_n I appeal und'er daus'e. 15 of the Letter!' Patent. A Diision Bnch of. the C:tlcuttaJiigh Court held that the word 'import' did not merely mean.\n\nbringing he' g')ods intq' India, .but~mprehendea something ffioe, that is; \"in'; orporting and mixing, or mixing up of the goods imported with the' m1SS of the property in the local area\". /The learned judges t]:lought·, . it wo:u!d b':l wrong to say that there .Was importation 'into India, the v moentthe goods crossed the lniJ.ian customs barrieL Keeping in view ·\n\n. the . t; eaties with. Nepa11 . th~ Divisin. Bench took the view-that\n\n~· .,... . there was no importation when -the go_ocl.s entered India en _ .. , route to-Nepal: The appeal was, thetefore;. a!Jowed and the . writ ; petition filed by the. present appellant was dismissed . .:.And so, the\n\n--writ petitionr , in the High Court has appealed to us ' Ulder' 136 of the\n\n Con5titution.\n\nFirst, we shaltl'!am{ne if.thereis-any_mtida.te ofinternati~al\n\n: <\n\nI~ w or if the ruk's of international law afford us any guidance and if F such mandate or guidance is preceptive under indian law. Two questions arise: first, whethcrinternationallaw 1s, of, its, own (oice, drawn . ito the la'w of, th~ land without the aid of a muniipal statute and, . second, whethe.r ,'so dra \\v, n, it overrides' municipal Ia win case of onfiict.\n\nlt'has been said in England that there are two schools of thought,. one . school o'f thought propounding the doctrine of--incorporation 1,\\nd the\n\nG.· Other, the doctrine cf transformation.(] J AccordiriS to the one rules of inten1ational law are icorpm-1-ted into the' law of fue land. auto.-.\n\nticnJly and .conside'red -to be part of the law of the land unless in ·. ' . ' . .. . . . . ' ' . . .\n\n----TO- •••• • • . (1) Per Lord . Danning MR i11 Trtrtdltxt 1)ading Corpn, v: Central' Bank •\n\n• [1-977(1) All ~.R. 881] .\n\n. C\n\n. I\n\nSUPREMI COURT REPORTS . [1984] 2 s; c.R.\n\n~- . conflict with an Act of Parliamnt. According to the other, rules of International law are not :part .of the law of the land, unless already so by an Act ofParlia!lJ.ent, judicial decision or long established custom.\n\nAccording to the one whenever the rules.of international law changed,\n\ntey would result in a change ofihe law of the land ·.along ith them, 'without the aid of an At:t of Parliament'. According to the other, no • su; h change would occur unless those principles are 'accepted and adopted by the dmestic law'. Lord Danning who had once accepted the transformation doctrine without qucs_ti'on, late~ veered round to express a preference for the doctrine of incorporation nnd_ explained how courts were justified in applying -modern rules of international law when old rules of international law changed. rn fact, the' doctrine of incorporation, it app'ears, was accepted in England long before . Lord Danning did s<-1. Lord .Darwing himsef referred to some old cases. Apart from those, we may refer to West Rand Central GfJld\n\nMining Co. v. The King<11 where the court said:\n\n. :\"It is quite rue that whatever has received the common cons\"<.nt of civilized nr.tions must have received the assent of . our countr~~~ and that to which we have assented alo.ng wth other .11ations in gene,.a'l may proper]~;. be C'tllcd international Ia w, and as such wm be acknowledged and applied by our municipal . tribunals-when legitimate .occasion arises for those tribunals to decide questions to which doctrines of international law may. be ·\n\n relevant\". · 1' ~-\n\nLauterpacht in International Law (Generl Works) refers to the position in Grmany, France, Belgium and Switzerland and says . it is the same. He quotes what a German Court said to met anargum.ent that the role of customary international law conflicted wi1hArt.24 of the German Code f Civil Procedure. The court had said, \"The legislature of the German ReiCh did not and could not intend any\n\niolatioli of generally recognisc:-d niles ofi nternational law, when enacting Art. 24 of the German Code of Civil Procedure\". Lauterpacht . refers to another German case -.where the argument that 'there ought ' , not to be a. direct recourse to the law of. nations, except in so far as\n\nthere has been formed a German customary law' was rejected with the statement \"The contention of the Creditor that international law is applicable nlY in so far as jt has be.en adopted by German Customary Iaw, lacks foundation in law. Such a legal maxim would, more-\n\n(2) [1905 8 KB. 391\n\n- \\\n\n' .. -:.- .....\n\n: ... - • + •• - • : ,.. i- • . \\\n\n·.- .-.\n\nl.' , ..\n\n. . \\ . . . GRAMOPHONE Co.v. B.B. PANDEY (ChinnappaReddy, J.) 613 '\n\n- over, if generally applied,· lead to th~ untenable .re'ult that.in the'in: . ....; tercourse of nations' with one. another; there would obtain not a uni- \\ form system__:_internationii la~-bu't a series of more r less diverse municipal laws\";\"\" Lauterpacht sum.ariss the\n\n1position, this way!..:_ ' . .\n\n. . \"While it is clear that interational law may and d'oes ac't dlrectly)within the St.ate, it is equally clear that as a rulethat . .,:...... ) . . direct operation qf inter'aiinal Jaw is within the State subjeci\n\nto the qverridirig authorityof municipal law. cours. must pply .. __x-... statutes even if they conflic't witli international law. The supre- ' . mileY>: of interriatio'naliaw, lasts, pro foro infeni?,. only so loilg . as the State does not expressly and' uriequivcally. derogate from\n\n it. When it thus prescribe~ a_ departure from iqternationallaw, . . C~ventiomtl or .cntomary, ; j~ges ae Confronted , with-~· con-\n\n. :thct of international law and municipal law and; being <;>rgans\n\nappointed by the State~ thy are compelled to apply the later\" ..\n\n. '\n\n\\ l . . . There can be no qestion that. ations ·ust a-rh . with; the\n\n- international cominnity nd the Municipal law mus't respect rules of ' Intenational law even as nations respect intern~ tiona! opiiuon. Tl; te; . comity o( Natins requires that Rles or:'Ititerriational law 'may be\n\n- ::. ·\" i-:\n\n. A\n\n. '- 'ti B .\n\n.. \" t\". accommodated in 'te Muicipal Law. eve_n without.express tegislatve\n\n: : action provided thy do no't run into' ctifiiet with Acts of Parliament .. _ , -..1Pt when 'they do run into such qnflict, the sovereignty and the inte- ' _._ r\n\n.__ --trity of he Republic and thesupr€l:macy of the. constitut¢d lt; gislatures\n\nin making the' laws. may 'not be subjected1t6 exter!J.alrules except to the\n\nextent legitimately accepted by the constituted .legislatures themselves .. '\n\nThe doctrine of incorporation also recognises the position that the .. _,. rules of internationallaw re incorporated into natiQnal Jaw and con~ .\n\nF . sidered to be part ofthe .national law, unless . theyar~ in covflictwith ; --' ... an At of Pqliamnt; _Comity , ofNat.ions pr no, MunicipaLLaw must . . . , . preva1I in case t)f conflict. National Courts cannot say yes if Parlia- . ·\n\nment has said no to a principle of internatio.nallaw. National <.:; ourts ·\n\nwill endorse internationaflaw but not if it conflicts with national law~ .\n\nNaio11al courts beig organs of. the ationl. State 'and_nqt ogans\n\nG ·. of mternationallaw must perforce apply .national law if.internawnal 'Ia.. law confiicts~'with iL But the Corts ate under an obligation within 'legitimate limits, to so interpret' the Municipal ' Statute 'as to' avoi4o\n\nconfrontation with the comity of Nations or the weil established prin- ' cipll!s of Internatiohal Ia w. But. if conflict is inevitable; thelatter IPU&t\n\nyi~Id. .. .\n\nJ. . • . .\n\n._' ,' ·-.. ' ...\n\n. •·\n\n.,.\n\n~-..\n\n. -.fl '\n\n_..\n\n674 SUPJlEMI COU!tT ~RI3P01l\"J;'S\n\n( . [1984] 2 s.c.R.\n\n~-.\n\nTl1e proposition has ben well sta:ted by Latham CJ in Politics r.\n\nThe Cominonwealt!z111 : ~\n\n\"Every statute is to be interpreted imd applied, as far' 'as its language admits, as not to' -be inconsistent with the comity of nations or with the established rules. of international Jaw .... : .... ·\n\nIt mus! be her4 that lcgislatin othqrwlse within the power of ' the Commonwealth Parliament does not -become invalid because _..,_. tit conflicts with a rule of international law, thdgh every effort\n\n. should be made to construe Commonwealth. statute~ so as avoid breaches of international law and -of inteinational comity.· . . . The question. therefore, is not a question of the power of the Commonwealth Parliament to legislate in t>nach of international law, but is a question whether in fact it h:>s done w\".\n\n. I • I I\n\nThe Supreme Court of fndia has sid practicaHy the same thing tFf ' t2) in Hnetorotxport, Mascowv. M/s Taraprrre & Company and Anr.\n\n\"Now; q.s stated in Halsboury's La.ws of England, Vol .. 36,\n\npage 414, there is a presumption that Parliament does not .assert j • or assume jurisdiction which goes beyond the limits esablishcd by the .¥ommon consent of nations <Jnd statutes are to be _inter:-j., pteted provided, that their language permits. so as not to ~_,__ . inconsistent with th6 .comity of nations cr with the establishd\n\nprinciples -of internaticnal law .. But this principle applies only where there is an ambiguity 'tn~ must .give way before a clearly ·.expressed intenti0n. Jf statutory enactments are ckc.r _in mean-\n\n~-· . ing, they must be constrnrd according to their meaning _'even\n\ntliough they are contrary .to the comity ()f nations or international\n\nlaw''.\n\n. .. ; The observations show that' the co11rt was only concerned with . : • f fj 'a principle of i-nterpretation, but, by, impliCation, it may be poss.ible\n\nto say that the court preferred the doctrine of incorporation; otherwise ·, A_ the:--question of interpretation WO\\lld not truly asise. Wlu!t has been ' . '( '\n\n(1) 70 Commonwealth Law Reports 60.\n\n(2) [1970] 3 SCli ?3. ' (.\n\n. i\n\n, :-t.. sai_d i 11 th~ rractoroexport case is entirely consistent :with what we hac.\n\n• 1 satd earher./ · . · · · - . \\ . . . •\n\n rs th.'!re . .any weH estabhshed principle of international law on the Jque_stio)l of the. right f land--locked states to innocentr p..ssage of :\n\n'pods acmss the soil ; of aJlOthe~ State?. Tt appears that \"the leading ·.~ authorities on international law have expressed divergent. :views on the· .\n\nJ- -..... ;.,... qu'!Stion of. th~ transit rights/ of !and~---locked countries, While one gro, up'of writers,_ such as, SibeJ:t, Scel!e and othet'i? have held the view..- . ··..tl:r; f1 ths~ co\\.t.ntri.es i11ve my inherent righi of transit across Jieighbvu.r- _ -, Jg couatries; other equally emitl<;:nt -authorities, s'uch as. Me Nair\n\nA I\n\n,, .\n\n. a11:d Hyde have held tl1e. view tat these .rights are not principles reo-\n\n-C,\n\n. f -. g'lisd by. intrnational 'law, but arrangements made by sovereign -\n\nStat~~\" .. nJ Tile ro:su1t of the lck ofunanimity has been thaphe .land;--· .-,. , lockd contrie~ have to rely on bilateraL regional or multi.....J.[ateral ... -~ . . ' agr 5m~.ltS for the r.cagnition <?f .their. rights. The' very: existence . of innmerable bilateral treaties, while on the one. Iiand it raises a / \"'\n\n• • j • • • •\n\npr.sLi.mptiotl of the existenc~ of a. customary right of transit, c~ the~ r D . othr it!indicak~ the dpend~nce of the right on agreement. The discol; tentin-g situatio11 led to attempts by nations to codify the .rules reh\\t- ing to• tral).sit trade.' Th.e earliest attempt was the Conventioh qn th}\n\nFreedom of Transit known generally s the .Brcelona Ccmventioh. .. _.,.,.. .\n\nThe .second attemptwas the Conven, tion on tl1c High Sease, I 9:58: The' JUostrecep.t in the 1965 C6NVENTION.ON TRANSlT TRADE OF £ANn-:.-LOCKED STATES, As this ist11e latest ConveJ!ticn on the. ·. subJect and as both f1idia and: Nepal have signed -the Cqnvc, ntion, it may be useful to refer to it in som, e <, ietai'l. The ConventioJl was the\n\nr~5ult of a Resolution Qf the United Nations General Assembly 'which, . \"recoinisiug the need of land-lo£ked countries for'a:dequate transit -\n\n.t . ..,. fayilities in promoting internationa]_trade\", ipvitcd \"the Governments\n\n F :of Member States togive t; ullrecognition to the needs of lund--locked . '' M ember'-States it~ the matter of transit trade. :.uid therefore; to aecorcl.\n\nthem adequte facilities in terms of'interuational hw .and practice in this t-'.':ga.rd, bearing in. mind the fut'Ui.-e• requirements resulting' from . the economic -deelop; neut or'.tlu~ laud-locked countries\". Ariticle. 1 • ·\n\n(a) of the Convention dfins te term '!ndlock.ed State~' as meatig 'auy Contracting state wJ:llch has , no sea-cast. The term. \"traf!ic . -~_ .. _ _i_n_T_r_a_n;...s-it_\"_i_s_d_e_fi_ri_ed_\\_l_ke this: the passage of goods inludirig \\mac • compariied b:'!l!'i'•Jl\" -across the territory of a' Contractihg Stat< bet~''\" ,\n\n (I) SeeR. Makil Transit' Riahts of Landlocked tountries :. Journal of WorJd ' Trade Law .. Vol. o4 .Pa~:e ?4.\n\n' .\n\n. . .\n\ni . .\n\n. ' -.\n\n' 676 SUPREME COURT REPORTS. t .\n\n[1984] 2 S.C; R.\n\nf land be ked State and the sea when the pass.age is a portion o.f a . J,· complete journey which begitls or terminates Within the territory of\n\ntt land-locked. State and which includes sea 'transport directly ' preceding or follow_ing such passage. The transhipment, warehouing, breaking b1,1lk, and change in the mode of transport of such goods as w.e\\l as tb.e assembly, disassembly or reassembly of machinery r..nd bulky goods shall not rnder the passage of goods outside the definition .\n\nl of ':traffice in transit\" provided that. any such operation is undertaken ' sofe1y for the convenience of transportation. Nothing in this paragraph- >~-·-.. ' )hall b~ construed as imposing at! obligation on any Contracting State'. .\n\nto est3.blish or permit the establishment o$ peirnanent facilities._, on-~~ territory for such assembly, disassembly or reassembly\"; The term ''transit State\" is ddined as meaning 'any Contracting State with or' without a sea-coast, situated between a land-locked State and the\n\nsea, through whose territory \"traffic in transit\". passes'. 'Artic1~ 2 ptescribes tb.at'freedorri of Vransit shall be granted under the terms of ..;.,... .. this Convention for traffic .in transit and means -of trahsport ..\n\nTraffic in transit is to .be facilitated on routes in use mutually . acceptable for transit I to the Contracting States concerned.\n\nd:;:::rimin1tio~ is to b~ exrcised based on the 'Place of origin\n\ndparture, entry, exit or destinatiOn orany <; ircumstances relating to the owership of the goods or' the ownership, place of registration or fiag of yssel~, lnd vhicles or other nieans of transport used. Art. 3 ~- \" provides for exempton of Traffic in Transit from customs duties or . import or exprt taxes or any speciai dues' in respect or' transit, within'\n\nthe transit Stte .. Art. 4 refers to means of transport and tariffs. AP;. sJ refers to methods and dorumentaion in regard to customs. trano; port, ect. Art. 6 refers to storage ?f goodS in transit. Art. 7 refers to dlays or difficulties in 'traffic ih trl:'..nsit. Art. 8 refers to free zones.or other '\n\n:~ customs facilities. Art. 9 refers t~ provision of greater facilities. All' ¥\"' _\n\nthat we need mention about Articles 4 to 9 is that details have neces-\n\n~ sarily to be worked out by mutual agreement. Art. 10 refers to relation to most favourecl.:__nation clause. Art. 11 refers f9 'exceptionns to Convention' or grounds cf pubtic health, securt,:, and protection. of intellectual propeH v: It is perhaps usefa( to extract the whole of Art 11.\n\n• j • '\n\n\"Exceptions to Convention on grounds of pub.lic health, secW'ity, an& protection of intellectual property\n\nJ. No.- -Contacting State shall be bund by this' Convention to afford transit to persons whose admission into its terrlto:ty i11 forbiddea, . '\n\n' .\n\n~ l\n\n-~ • 0\n\n. '\n\n' . . ..\n\n. '\n\n' ¥. - • '' H • • i ... .. ' .\n\n, .. . ,.\n\n• . . ., ...\n\n. .. \\ . . . l • . . ' . GRAMOPHONS.CO. V. B.B: -PANDEY (Chimuzppa Reddy, 1.) ·. '6~1\n\n• • • ~- ••• .: - # ' or for good~ of a kind of , whiti the importatio, ri is prohibite~ either ... on grounds of public morals, publi'c health, or security or as a precution agairi.st.disass or animlS r. plan.ts :or against pest~. - .•\n\n• l . /\n\n. 2 .. Each Contracting State .s hal.l b~ entitlect -to take .. reasoqale , . · ... B precautions and measures to ensure that persons and goods,· parttcu Jarly goods which are the subjec't of a in.onopo]y; ·are really intransit, . and that the means of transpor't aie. really used for .the. passage of such- . goods, as 'wll as to prtect the' safety of the .route.s ' and means of com-·. . -~\n\n ... ;:\n\nI' .. . ; ..\n\n- munication. · · · .. .\n\n• .- l , '. -l .. • ·=· .·.c .\n\n ( .\n\n. ' ..\n\n\\ .\n\n. / . . .\n\nI ' . •\n\n. 3 .. Nothing _iti this Convention shall affect the. measures which . a Gontracting state ntaY be called upon to take in pti.rsuance or'provi-.\n\nsiori.s in a , get:leral intern.ational convention, hether f . a word-wide\n\nor regiomil character .. to which. it is a party, whether such convention .. . was already concluded .on .the a.ate of this Convention or is conclu~.e~. .\n\nlater, when such provisions relate: ' . '. . ...... .\n\n.··.\n\n(a) J to expot or import' or ransit .of particulAr kinds of articles\n\n. such 'as. na.rcotlcs, or' ot\\le~ dngerous. d.ii; gs,, or a'rins~ . ·?r~ ..\n\n'E .\n\n. .· , ) . . , ' ! • \\ ·, . . / . .\n\n._.U__.\n\n(b) . to.· protection 'of {ndiJstria/, lirel'ary or artisti~ pt:operty, oi\n\nprotectio~ .of trade names; an'd i'ndications of . source or appellations of origri,._and .the suppression of rlnfair competi-\n\n....\n\nti~ . .. . .. . . . . !\n\n. I . . . .. o - • • •\n\n4. Nothing in this Convention shall prevent any- ContractinJ; 'l . state from taking ~JlY action necessary for the protedlon of its essential\n\n. . . security interests';: Art. '12 refers .t9 exceptions in case of . emergeny. ·\n\n' Art. 13 refers to application ofthe. Cori.ventin in_time ofwar.'Art. 14 ..\n\n{,~G refers to obligations under the Convention and rits. and dties of . United Nations Member.s .. Art. is, i'efers, to:reciprocity. Art. 16 refer's . . . to settlement of disputes. Art . .17 .refers to signature. Art. 18. refers to ... . \"' .::ratification . . Art. 19 refers. to accession.. A~!· _20 _refers .to cntr; y in to . · ,,\n\n (force. Art. ~~ refers to revision. Art. 22 rtfers to .notifications by the .\n\n H\n\n.Secrctary.:._oceral. And Art. -23 referi to a\\ltltentic. texts. .. · ' . ,, . .. ·~~· ·, ;....\n\n' .\n\n' .l' . . ·~ '),, . \\ .\n\n, .\" .\n\n.I . . . ...\n\nI .\n\nI E\n\n\" G\n\nL • ' I I lis thus seen that the Convention while' proviJ.inr; for freedom of transit for the pasa9e of goods between a landlocked State and . the sea, across tile territory of a transit .State emphasizes the need fer .. agreemnt betwell. the land-locked country and the transit country . and, more important for our present purposes, ; t -spe, cificcscertain exceptions. It is indeed remarkable that the Convention places traffic\n\n(illicit) in incLli.trial, literary or artistic property on the, same footing\n\nas traffic in narcotics, - d:1.ngen.us dmgs and afms. This .. opinicn of the . :Int':':rn'l.tin.al C9mmunity as revealed by the convention must tie borne\n\nIn my mind in our~ further consideration of the question. It \\rna} be 1 ·.\n\nI ' •. • interesting to notice her~ wb?..t John H.E: Pried, who. respresented the Government of Nepal as ne of the members of the delei.ation at the U.N. Conference which produced the Convention, has to sal about these exceptions. Ip an article which \"he wrote in the Indian Toumal\n\nof lntetnationallaw; l)c st1:d,: . .\n\n~ \"The test of a trcPi.ty are its exceptions. The proof of a · treaty puctding.is, when it cannot be eaten: Itis the old problem offi.njing a balance btwecn demands for saving clauses, and the o.rposite ~[aim that the very value of a treaty depends on its . reliability. For land locked States, conditions unrler whih their outlet t<;> the outsi9, e world may be curtailed can of course be\n\n.\\-- 1\n\ncruciaL - -~·- •\n\nThe Con.venton . declares exceptions permissible for five rt; asons\n\nJ ·\n\n(1) crtain wdl_:_specified reasons of public policy; (2) because of . overriding intrnational oblig3.tions; (3) emergency in the country of . transit; (4) in case of war: (5) protectionofitsessential security interests. . .. \\ . . / . . , .. r\n\n- . r . . ·. . . \\ ' '\n\n- A few words about each, in view of. theire extraordinary importance.\n\n1. Exceptions for reasons of public policy. The State of transit may:-this . is permi, ss'ive; not . obligatory_:_proliibit transit of certain goods fqr the reason thaftheir import into its wn territry is prchitite< .. , namely (Art 11: Pll!\"a I): · ·..., c.. ..\n\nH .. ~\n\n{a) grount.~ of public morals_:_ e.&., indecent literature; ,,,\n\n, ..\n\n/ . •/ . ; , . .\n\nGRAMOPHONE CO. v. n.b. PANDEY (C/timw; pa Reddy, J.) 679\n\n~ .. '.\n\n(b)· on grounds of pblic v;~lth or public •, securi{, y; (t.g., con-\n\n' . . / ' 1 taminated foon ?f improperlv_packed exploives); ·\n\n.. '\n\n(c) as precaution against ariima 1_ diseases plant diseases or pests._\n\n. ·• . ' . ..\n\nI Tills clause (dubbed at the Ccn.fe_rence as the \"dirty' pictur~; s and rotten fish -clase\") w:ill not :hampr international trade if properly\n\n... ~-. applied. ·\n\n:~ 2. The_ same can ptoar~. be sid of the ''measiues\\.Vhich a\n\nContracting State .may be called u'po11 to take. (\"poritetre mena a\n\nprendre~· in the .qually authentic _'.French ve_rsion which is scveTtl\n\nnic{es t@ss per_missiv<!) in obedience to certain international treaties' to which it is a -party, namely, treaty provisions. relating to\n\n: . . , ' . .\n\n(a) \"export, imjJOrt or (i) transit of particular kjnd~ of articles. such as narcotics. or other dangero1Js drugs, or arm1i\"- (As to arms .this would therefor~ o1ily be~011?-e operative if· , a wor1dwid~ or ngional -treaty prohibiting or_ restric; ting international arms trad~ existed).. I ' ' r ' \"'- • •.\n\n(b)\n\n.L. . . -\n\n\"protectin 9! industrial, literary 9r artistic property, or protection of trade names\", and. the like ~-\n\n...\n\n___ ; J.~\n\n' ·.\n\n.\\.\n\n.These provisions are ~; tewirthy because they permit ih'e ' Stat, es of transit t? enforce:. say a coyy-right or trade\"mark COil~.\n\nvention even f. for example, 'tieither the country of origin nqr of\n\nistnation itS party to it ......... :: ....... :· ...... : ...... , .. , .... : ........... .\n\nFar as tl1ese provision~ go,'.transit traffic must not be hampered for any oter reason o(public po1icy of _the State of transit. Ifthat Stat~ forbids importation of cer'tain luxury goons for :fi.nan- . . I .. cial reasons; or of certain textiles to protect it~ own spinning im!ustry, that is, economic reasons, or of shorhave radios for, political reasons..::_all such goods must still 'be prmitted to pass. through its territory.\n\nI .\n\n3 .. Qualified. Emer&eq ... .-........... .' ....... .. : ................ : ....... : >, ' • •\n\nA ' --·\n\n.'C\n\nD.\n\n'\n\n' r I.\n\n680 SUpREME. COURT ltBPORTS. [1984] 2 s.C:k.\n\n4 .. War.: ......................... ...... : ..... :.: .............................. .\n\n). .Protection of essential se~Jrity interests ....... : .. , ...•.. : ·\n\nWe may now take a look at the treaties with our neighbour Nepal and the P.rotoco1s. First,. the 'Treaty of Trade' which was contracted \"in ()fder to epand trade between their respective territories and encoUrage collaboratio1 in economic devl.opment\". Art. 2 1stipulates that the .contracting parties shall endeavour-to grant maximum facilit'ies and to undertake an necessary measures for the free and unha~- -.--\n\npered fl..ow of gopds, nee(ied by one country from the other, to and - from their respective territories. Art. J enjoins the contracting parties :to. accord unconditionally to eac'h other treatment no less • favourable . than that accorded to any third country with fespect t.o (a) customs duties and charges of any kind impo'scd on,.or in connection with im- . _porta.tion and exportation and-(b) import regulations including quantita1ive restricti9ns.· Art. 4 provides that the cntracting parties should, on a reciprocal basis,. exempt from basic customs 'duty as well as from .quantit.'ltive restrictions t'he import of such primary products 'as may be mutually agreed upon, from each other. Art. 8 casts. a 'duty\n\non the ntracting parties to cooperate effectively with ea.ch other t9 p.reve'nt !nfringement and circumvention of the laws, rul, p and regulations of either country in regard to the matters relating to . foreign yxchange and foreign trade. Art. 9 specially pr9vides that \"Q.Otwithstanding \"tile earlier provisions of the treaty either Contracting Pary 1ruiy maintain or introduce such restrictions as are necessary for the purpose of ' ·\n\nF ·•\n\nG ·,\n\n(a) prOtecting pulic morals,\n\n' .\n\n'-.J\n\n(b) Protectin& hlllll3.n, animal and plant life,\n\n... ' (c) Safeprdhl.g national treasures,\n\n(d) safeguarding the implementation of law~ reiating to the , iaport nd export of jOld and silver bullion, .· and , '\n\n.\\--\n\n. ...J\n\n. 7' __\n\n·, \",\\ .... ' ··:.r.·\n\n.. -\n\n'' . ----...\n\n' -\n\n:::\\ ~· .. .... , ,~\n\n'. ' ,,\n\n: .. :- ... ~:.;_;.\n\n• : > '•' ~- ,• • : . ..;;- -~ ' ¥_a.1 • \\ ...... .- • + / •\n\n'- ' > ~. '\n\n. - ... \" <' ' ' ,\n\nI I ~, ! . ' .:\n\n' \"\n\n(e) '' safeguarding such othecititere~; ts as may be mutlly agreed\n\n . upon. ., i\n\n• Article (to)whiCh may be extracted in full is as follows: \"Nothing in this Treaty shall prevent either COntractin~ Party from taking any ·\" .measures which may be necessary.for the protection of its essential\n\nscurity i'ntrdts or i~ pursuance. of general international convention~;\n\n• whetr alfeady in ex:itence or cnclude4 hereafter, to which it is a . party relating tO. transit, xport or import of particular kinds' of articles· , . s'uch as opiu:n or other dangerous drugs or in. pursuance of-general\n\nconventions inter.de1'to prevent ilifringement of industrial, litefa, ry or artistic.property or.relathig.to false marks, falseindicaticn1ofori, in- ' or other method!) of urifair conipetitionn. ' ' .\n\n• 4 • • •\n\n' ' ' ., ' ,' It ppean to· us. that th~ TreatY. of Trade. oncernd itself with trade between II}dia andNepal and not with trade between Nepal arid other cottntries. The provisions retating to iplport, export, transit and , the fre 'and' unhampered .fiow of goods refer to the import and the .\n\neport from one country to anothe~ i.e . . from India to .Nepal and from ' Nepal. to. India and to .the trn.Si_t nd the rree .and unhampered flow 'of . goods in the course of trade between the / two countries .. :Even so, . . express teservatin is maCf.e to enable each ofthe . countries . .to impose ./ restrictions for certain purposes. and to take lluch measures as imiy be . ' nccessacy for th~ .protection .of essential security 'interests and effectua- >'ting international conventions rlating to opium and other dangerous .- .; drugs and also to effectuate \"general. crmventions intended . t~ pi:vent ·\n\ninfringemeilt of ina!Jstrial, literary. or. drtistiC proptrty or relating to false marks, false indications or 'origin or 'other method's or unfair.\n\ncompetition\". {Art. l 0) <\n\n' ' .\n\n.. . . . . TheTrety of Tranit'is.moe relea-.t. it, .sc11.eae, .. and 'sequence .\n\nand even'the language indicate that it.is based .en the 1965 CONVEN.\n\nTION ON TRANSit.TRADE OF t.AND-:-LOCKED COUNTRiES.\n\nTh~Prearnble t<? the treaty mentions that a_ treaty hu. bee~ ndded. •recognising that Nepal as a la.nd\"'c-lockod country needs access to and . .from -the: Sea tO promote its intei'IU.tiOnal trade, and ~Ogci8itlg 1 the I, need •to facilitate the traffice 'in tri.usit through. tl!eir territoriea'.\n\nArt: 3 defines 'Triffic i~ Tran; it' and is as follows: , ..\n\n.C ' '. ·.\n\n'E.·\n\n.···\n\n.G\n\n. / ~. .\n\nI . ''The tenn 'Traffic in. Transit' means the passa~- of ;9ods Including. unaccompanied. baggage .a'cross'the.· territory of a . Contr.actin& ... lrl , .. ,'I.Prty when the passa&e ia a protion'_of a coinplet~ jouraey ?.hca lfepll ·. '\n\n. .\n\n' ·. \\\n\n. '\n\n.... 682\n\n. 'SUPREMB COURT REPORTS [1984] 2 s.c.R .\n\nor terminates within' the tcrritor1 of the other Contracting Party. The transhipment, warehousing. breaking bulk ad change in the mode of transport of such goods as well as the assembly or reassembly of machinery and .onlky glclds slull ngt render the passage of goods cutsid.e the it1,'!fi.nition of \"traffic in transit\"· provided any such operation is\n\nu'ndertaken olely for_., the convenience .. of transportation. Nothing .in .. the Article shall be construed as imposing an obligation on eithe.r Contrac_ting Pn:ty to e; stablish or. permit 'the establishment of • permanent facilities on its territory for such assembly, dis-assembly, or re- , assembly\"; -\n\n~ .r . . . •\n\n- Art.l requires the Contracting Parties to accord '7raffic in Transit' freedom of transit across their respective territories through routes mutually agreed upon makig no destination 'based on flag of vesels the places of origin: departure entry, exi( _desti'nation, ownership o(\n\ngoods:or vesels.. . . .\n\nAi:t. 4 exempts Traffic in Trasit from .customs duties and trails-. it duties or other charges except reasonabie charges for transporta~ ·\n\ntion and such other charges as are. commensurate -with the .costs of services rendcrc& in respect of such' transit. . ·\n\n. - ·:Art. 5 requires eah of th~ Contracting Parties to provide, for the convenience of traffic in transit,. warehouses or sheds, for the 'storage: of traffic in trnsit awahing customs .clearance before onward transmission.\n\n( .\n\nI .\n\nArt. 6 stipulates that Traffic in Transit shall • be subject to the\n\n.procedur~ laid down in the Protocol, Articles 8 and 9 correspond to the provisions of Articles 11; 12and 13 'of the 1965 CONV~NTION ON TRANSIT TRADE OF LAND-LOCKED STATES and are\n\nsimilar to Article 9 nd 5 to 10 of the Treaty of Trade and reserve .the right of each of the. contracting p;.trties to 'impose restrictions for certain. purposes and 'take measures in connection with certain interests. In particular Art. 9 mentions that nothing. in the treaty shall\n\npreveiJ, t either ontractihg Party from taking any meas.ure which may be ncessary in _.pursuance of general conventions intended to prevent infringement ofindustrial, literary or artistic property' or rlat\n\ning to false mark_§, false indications of oriin or other. mthods of A\n\n\\,•\n\n' ....\n\n' .\n\n' )\n\nI. --\"'-----\n\n1 . If\n\n:..._.\n\n' ' ' ' - ' ........ ' . ' ' ' ', GRAMOPHONE co.- v. B.B. PANDEY (Chinnppa fteddy,1), 683 '' ' ' . \\\n\n' ' . unfair competition.\n\n. A . •.' 'I\n\nThe protocl arinexeq to the Treaty of Transit contains a detailed procedure fo'r the tanSit Of gOOdS aCfQSS the territory 'I - ' ' ' ' ' ,, . ' ' of India en-route from , the Pcirt of CalcJitta. to their Nepalese / destination.· . The .Protocol c, oritains detailed . provisions t~ .'\n\nB : ensure the goods reaching Nepal and to: prevent tl1e contingency. of the goods escaping into the Iildian market whiie Oll the way to Nepal. /\n\n' '' ' •' ' ~'-· ' r .,.\n\nWhile the Treaty of Trade generally garantees to 'each of the ' Contracting Pa.rtis the free and . unhampered flo~ of goods needed\n\n. by one-country from tl1e other, the Tre:a ty of Transit generally guaran- . . tees to each 'of the Coiitracting Parties freedom o'ftransi.t across the\n\nterritcry of the other Contrating Party in respect of 'goods which\n\nhave 'to pass through the territory of sucl1 other Contracting party to.\n\n. rea, ch the first Contracting- Party .from otside tl1e -territory of the second Contracting Party.\n\nI~ practice the two treaties.really mean a guarantee o Nepal to permit free and unhaippered flovt of good~ needed by Nepal froriJ India and a guarantee of freedom of tninsif .. for goods originating from outside India acro, ss the territory of India to reach epal. :. In the matter of payment of customs duties the ·\n\nr D\n\n. Treaty of Trade provides for the most favourable treatment while the\n\n Treaty of Transit grants ecmption from such pay.; nent: Both treaties\n\n. , E contain reservatio!l~- ·.there is a reservation enabling. the imposi, tin ·\n\nof such restictions as are~ necessary for the purpose of protecting public , morals, human, animal, -md ' plant life, safeguarding'. national treasures,. the implementation ' of l<~ ws . relating to the impcirt and export of gold arid silver bullion and the.safeguarding of other' mutually agreed interest~. 'there is an express reservation for the 'protection of .essential sec.urity interests. There is also provision for ne, cesary mcasui-s in pursuan.ce 'Of general international conventions elti1}g to transit, export oi: import of articles such as opium\n\nor. other dangerous drugS.\n\nThere. is further _ prvision for taking necessary mea'sures in' pursuance of general conventions .intended 'to prevent ipfringment o.f industrial, literary and rtitic pfope:r:tY or · relating to false marks, f<llse indicatio\"ns of origin or other metods of unfair co-mPetition. So, the two treaties _...generally :assure to Nepal the free and unhampere<:L flow from India 1and . freed01_n of transit .... acros~ India, , to goods or of goods :which we may. say _in the broad\n\n. .'way are not res extra commercium. In particular \"the treaties expressly contain resrvati(?ns enabling each of the contracting parties to\n\n'-..._\n\n~ t • i . ~\n\n, . '\n\n684 , ' ~UPREME COURT ltEPORn\n\n[1984] 2 S; C.R. • . . . A- ' take measures in pursuance of general convei1tions for the protection\n\nof industrial, literary and artistic property.\n\nSo we have it that Art. 11 of the 1965 CONVENTION ON TRANSIT .TRADE. OF LAND-LOCKED STATES, Art. 10 of the Treaty ; f Trade and Art. 9 of the' T(eaty .of Transit -contain exceptions to protect ''industrial, literary or artistic property\" and to prcv1nt \"false marks, false indications.-of origiH or other methods of unfair con1petition\", pursuant to generat conventions .. Neither the ·\n\nInternational C?nvez1tion of 1965-.nor the Treaties between the two . nation~ prohibit th~ imposing 'of restrictions for this purpose. On the .. other'h\"lnd, tb.ey contain reservations to the contrary. So great is the\n\nconcern of the Inrernational Corqmunity for industrial, literary or artistic property that the Convention on Tra.nsit. Trade of Landlockd .Countries views traffic in this kind of property with the same gravity as it views traffic in narcotics, dangerous drugs and arms._\n\nSo, the Convention on Transit Trade of Land-locked .states and the Treaties between the two countries, leave either country free to impose necessry restrictions for th(J_ purpose of protecting industrial,\n\nlitrary or-artistic proprty and preventing false marks, f~Ise indicatioJ'ts of origin or other methods of unfair competitions in order -f.O furtt1er other general converitions.. It is clear that for this purnose, it is \"n8t necessary that the land-:locked \"conntry should be a party to the general Convention along with the transit country. The inter\n\npretation placed by John H.E. Frd that .the provisions of the 1965\n\nConvntion.permit the States of transit to enforce, sa/ a Copyright_\n\nor. tra<, ie mark convention even if, for example, neither \"the country . of •origin . nor of destination is. part1 to it appears to us to be a\n\ncorrct interpretation.\n\n'-·.\n\nThe next step for us to consider is whether there is any generl\n\nCnvention Copyright. An artisti~,. , literary or musical work is th'! brain-child of its author, the fruit of his labour, and, so, considered\n\nt~ be his property. So highly is it prized by a\\1 civilised. nations that it is thought worthy of protetion by national laws and _international\n\nC)nventions relating to Copyright. The Internationaf Convention for the 'protection of literary or artistic works first signed at Berne on 9th . September, 1886, was revised at. Berlin in 1908, at Rome in 1928, at Brussels in 1948, at Stockholm in 1967 and fi:Q.ally at J?;::ris- . in 1971. Art. 1 of the Convention, as revised, constitutes the couritr; es . . , r \\.· to which the Convention applie~ into a Union for the protection of . j\n\n...,. '\n\n... - • • - ., •\n\n\"\"\" I'\"•' .... \"' -·, r. ~\n\n~~-.\n\n· ~· '. '.\n\n1 .\n\n. ..\n\n. '. GRAMOPHONE CO. v, B. B. PAt;_DEY (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) GaS;, ! .\n\nthe'rights ofnthrs.iu theirlitcrary' and artisticJwork.s>_ Th~ expression\n\n'litera~ and. artistic orks'., is' defined to include every production in the literary, scientific and artistic c;!.main whatever ay be the ino4e : or formation of. its expression. His P, Tovideclthat thc.work shall enjoy ... .\n\n. .... ',\n\n-' 'pr9tection in all countris of the Unioi1. Variq.us d<; taikd pr, ovisions~\n\nare rilade in the Convention for the protection of the wori.s. Art. 9 pro: . vides that\" authors or literary and artistic 'vorks protected by theconven~\n\n. tion shali enjoy the exclusive right o.f authorising the 'reproduction of these . .... -.... , . . . . . ' . works i~· any manner or form. It is also expressly stipulated that any\"' . : sound or visual recording. shall be c'onsidcred .... as a 'reproduction for _....-l\\lfhe purposes of the Convention: We arc not really conceined with\n\n. the several details of the Convention. B].lt'we may refer t~ 'Art. 16 whiCh\n\n provides: ·\n\n''1.\n\nJnfr{ngig CO.J?ies o/ a wor.k• shall be liable to: seizltre in . any CO!Irltry of the Union where the work enjoy 'iegalprotectioi£; . . ' ., . ' .\n\n2. The provisions of the prceding. ; aragraph~ -sha'll ,. also apply to repi'od$1ction.S comitg from a country 1vhere the work is not protecte~ . or.has ce:tsed to e-profected. . ..... . . .\n\n~ . ot . ,. .. . . • '\n\n 3.\n\nTh~· seizure shall take place in accordance wth the Legisia-·.\n\nE --'--#on of each contry ' ': India we may mention .is a parfy to the-Befne\n\n.~ ·\n\n Convention. ·\n\nThe Universal Copyr.ight c6nvntion whi.ch was first sigt{ed In ' . . . . il . . ,, . •. Gneva on September 6,'1952 was revised in Paris in 1971. Each Con-\n\n~ tratirig State is, called upon to undertake 'to pr; vide for theaduate\n\nand eff\":ctive protection 'of the 'right of authors arid , other, copy-right\n\n'poperietors in literary, scientific and artistic w<;>rks including writings,\n\nmusical, dramatic and' cinematograph '¥,0TkS nd paintings, engraving\n\n~ and sculpture', The ights_are to include the exclusive 'right to autho~ rise reprod.uction' by l\\n, y means: publc P.erformance and broadcasting.· 1 ·, Bach 'Contracting State is required to adopt such measures as are necessary to risure ihe application of the Convention. The .. Convention.: is not in-any way to affect the provisiotl. of the Berp.e Convention for the' protection of literary 'or aitistic works or membership in the Union. 2reated by that Convention. The Universal Copyright\n\nConvention is. not apJ?li, cable to the. relationships among countriet ef\n\n- ~- \"\"\n\n' ' ...\n\nI '\n\n- ~-:-\n\n.....\n\n.K.·\n\n. '\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS '.\n\n\nhaving as their country of origin, within the meaning of the Berne Convention, a country of the Berne Union. India is a sighat01y to the Univesal Copyright convent'ion also. ..\n\n. • The time i~ now ripe for us to refer to our own Copyright Act .of 1957. Section 2(c), (h), (o). (p), (f). d (w) define 'artistic work', 'dramatic' work',' 'literary work', 'musical work', 'cinema, to-' . graph film' .and 'record' respectively .. Sec. 2(y) 'defines '•work\" as\n\n':,...\n\nmqming. any of th~ following. works,. nam:el~, ~·\n\n(i) a literary, dramatic, mmical or artistic works;\n\n(ii) a cinematograph film'; ·\n\n. . /.\n\n(iii) a record. ..\n\n. ,\n\n. 'Record' is defiried by sc. 2(w) to mefjn 'any disc. tap~, perforated roll or other evice. in which sounds are embodied so as tn be capable of being reproduced therefrom, other than a soun(.t tr:1•; k associated with the cln<:!matogruph fiilm. 'Recording' is dcfinc(l J by Sec. 2(x) to. mdm :the aggregate of thy sounds_embo.d.ied i'n a:·:(:. c;'lpable of being repr0duced by means of a 'record\" .. ~Infrir.ging · G;)fJY: in relation to a rcord is defined 'to rhean; by Sec. 2(m)(iii), ., '';'tny such . record embodying tM same .recording. lf such r.:':cord is made or imported in contravention of the provisions of the' Act''. Sec. 13(1) states . .th.B.t copyright shall subsist through out India in (a) original, literary, draatic, mnsical and artistic. works;\n\n(b) cinematograph films; and (c) records. Sec. 14 explains the eaning of 'Copyright' in relation to vartous 'works'. In the . case of., a rec_ord, copyright -is said to mean \"the exclusive righ~, by virtue of, and subjectto the provisions of, this Act to do or authorise the doing of any '0{ the . fonowin& acts by uW!in~ t11e\n\nrecord, namely : . · . 1 . ·\n\n~. ..... '\n\n' , (i) to make any other record embodying the _same recording;\n\n. i\n\n...\n\n. >\n\n'' '.\n\n. GRAMOPHONE CO. v. B. B . . Pi\\NDEY. (Chinnappa Reddy; J.) 087. ¥. 0\n\n.. (ii) to cause the recording embodying m the record to be\n\n A\n\neard in public;\n\n(iii)' to communicate the rcording embodiep. in the reco'rd.\n\nby .t:adio diffusion\" (Sec. 14(1)(d). \\ . • ,,\n\n, • • . . Sections l7 to 2l cical with ·_ownership of Copyright anrl\n\n.- •:\"' tile rights of the own::r', t, Sections 22 to 29-.with •Term of Co11y- ; right', Sections 30 to 32 with •Licences',. Sections 33 .to 36 , ith . ~~-Performing Rights . Scities': Se'ciions .37 to 39 with. Rights of Broadc'asting Authorities, Sections 40 to 43 with International Co'py-\n\nC · right and Sections 44 . to. so'..- with Registration . of Co.pvright.\n\nSoetions Sl to 53 dal with infringe met of copyright .\n\n. Sec. 51 sttteswhen copyright .in . a work shall be deemed - • to b; infringed., In prticu1ar Clause (b) states that Copyright D shall be deemed to be infringed 'when auy person- •, • ,\n\n. :.:. (i) . makes for sale or hire, or sells or 'lets for , hir~,. or by · · way of trttde diplays or offers for sale or hire, or ' .,_\n\n-! . ..l.... (ii) ditributes : either for the purpose of trade or tb suh au extent as to affect'prejudici!lilY the owner of.the copyriht, or '\n\n.. .\n\n-~ i,\n\n\" ( •\n\n,;, \"' . . . .\n\n(iii) by way'of trade exhibits i~ public, or.-~\n\n-· . ' s •\n\n~- ,. .(iv) imports (except for the priv'ate and .domestic\" use of tb.!_, J.tnporter) into India, .\n\n.\\ any infringing copie, s ~( the work'. .,..\n\n 'Thee is. a.u ctxplaatio~ to which it is not necessary to referfor. the purposes' of this case, ·. • · \" \" . ' - .\n\n. J\n\n,-\n\n- I . .\n\n' 'H\n\n. \"'.\n\n.. ·\n\n'. .\n\nSUPA'EM!. COURT Rr.PORTS'\n\nA . Sec .. 52 . enumerateste acts which shall not constitute an\n\nB • . -·\n\ninfringment of copyright; Tt is-unnecessary to refer to 'the varios\n\nacts enumerated in Sec. 52, it is enough to state that bringing, 'into India ::tn infringing wor'k for . the purpose of transi't t.o Nepalor any other '-.Ountry is not one of the e-xcepted acts.\n\n'Sec. s3 which is of direct relevance it deals with impoi' tation of infringing copies' -needs to be fully extractd'. It -says, : . . \"\n\n. . \"53. {l) The Registrar of Copyrights, _on application by th<:-~ owner of the copyright in any .work Cf\" by this duly authorised agent . an~ on payment of the pre, scribed. fee, n\\ay, after making such in •.\n\n_quiry as h~ deems fit, order that copies made cut of India of tbe work which if mnde in Tnrlia would infringe copyright shall not be\n\n-;. ·.\n\n( \" •· . imported. -. . ; -..,...~\n\n. ' (2) Subject to any rule$ m3.de under this Act, the Registrar ' of Copyrights or a'ny person authorised by him in this behalf may enter any shi'p, dock or premises where any such copies as are referred to in sub-sectiori (l) may be found m1d 'may. examine such copies ..\n\n. . ', \\\n\n(3) All copies to which any rder made under sub-section(])_)._ . ·, applies shall be deeiAed to be goods 0f which the import has been prohibited or. restric.td under Sec. 11 of _the Custo; ns Act, 1962, and all the revisions of that Act shall have effect ac9ordingly; .\n\n. ·,\n\nProvided .that all such copie~ confiscated uner. the'provi; sions of the said Act shall not vest in th.e Government but shall be - delivered o the. owner of the .. copyright in_ the work. . ·. . ....\n\n. This provision empowers the Registrar Of Copyrights to make_ .' an order that copies made out of.India of any work which if made in -India. would , infringe Copyright, shall not be \"impo-rted: This \"' the Regi_strar may do on the application of the owner of . the Copy-\n\n_right in 'that work or by his duly authorised -agent on payment of the pr-sribed fee and after making such enquiry, as h~ deems fit .\n\n. ..\n\n-< .\\\n\nGRAMOPHONE co. v. B.B. PANDEY. (ChinnappaReddy, J.) 689 . . . . . , .\n\nI '\n\nThe effect of sbh\n\n1an order by the Registrar is to deem all cop.ics to which the order applies to he goods of& which the import has been prohibited or. restricted under sec.· 11 of the Custom~ Act, I962,.and . to attract all the prvisions !of the Customs , Act on that basis, inCluding the liability .to be c~fiscated, with the slight /modification that .copies confiscated tinder th~ provisions of that Ac{ shall' not vest in\n\n~ the /Government, but sha!I be delivered'to the 'owner of the (::opy- . ·/right. . •\n\n .' . , , .. Thequestion is what_dpes the word, 'ilJ1po.rt' mea~ in Sec. 53 . . ~?f the Copyright Act ? The word is not -defined in the Copyright . Act though it is defined in the Custom:s Act. . But the' sam~\n\n.:\\rord may niean different things i:o.' d ifferet enactn1ents arid in diffe-· . rent contexts. It may even mean differenl things~ at different places in the same statute .. It all depends. on the snse of the .provision ..\n\nif-. ..,. wher: it occurs. Reference to. dic.tionaries. is hardly of any avi1,\n\n. .;\n\n. particularly. in the case of words of ordinary parlance with a varjety . . of wellknowr meanings.- Sucir words take colour from the ontext .. . Appeal to-the Latinroot won't. help. The'--::.appeal mut\"be to th.e sense of the statute.\n\nHidayatullah J in Burmah Shall etc v ..\n\nCmmercial Tax Officerf [1961] 1 SCR 902 has illustrated how the contextuai mea.tiings of the very 'words •import' and ·~pot'. may . vary. ,, • \\\n\n' \" -:. .\n\nWe may look at Sec. 53, rather than elsewhere, to discover file meaning'of. the word . '•import\". We find that the meaning is . . . \\, . tated in, that pn;>Visic)n itself. If we ak what is not to be imported, . . we .find the answer is copies made out of India which if made in India would 'infringe copyright. So it follows ·hat 'impor~' in the provision means bringing int<;> India frO'l'l'i. 0ut of India. That,. we. see in precisely ho~ import is defined uner the Cust~!n~, Act. , Se~. f(23). of the Customs Act, 1962, defines the . 'Y?rd in this\n\nnanner ; ·\n\n'. ( :1 \"Iinport, 'with its gr&mmatical 'variation and ognate expres. ..... sio~ means bringing int~\"lddia\" from a place outside India. But we\n\n• do not propose to have recourse to ·.custos Act to interpret ex-. ' . pressions in thd Copyright A, ct even if it is permissible io do so .\n\nbecause Sec. 53 o{the Copyright Act is made; i<? run wih Sec,.'ll of. the Customs 'Act. / -\n\n\\ I .\n\n' - '\n\n•, .\n\nfi\n\n690 SUPREIYfE COURT REPORTS (\n\n[1984) 2 S.C.R\n\nTt was submitted by. the learn~ counsel for the. respondent~ that where goods are brought into. the country not for commerce, put for onward transmission to, another country; there can, in law,-\n\nbe n0 importation. If was said that the. object of the Copyright A.ct was. _to prcent_ uputhorised. reproductin of the work_ or te . unautho'nsed explOltahon of the reproduction of a work 111 Indta . a.nd this object would not be frustrated if infringing copies of a work were allowed. ransit across the country. If goods are brought in, only to go out, there is no . import, it was said. It is diflicult to agree with this submission, thoughtit did find favour with the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court,, in the judgment under~ appeal.. In the first place, the' language of Sec, 53 does not justify. reading t)1ewords' 'imported for commerce' for the words \\ 'imparted'. Nor is t!lere any reason to assui11:: that such vias .the ohject of the legislature. We , have , already mentioned the importance attached by International opinion, as man_ifested by the various International Conventions and Treaties, tQ the protection of .'Copyright and the gravity with which traffic in i'ndustdal, literary or artistic propery is viewed, treating such trffic on par with traffic in narcotics, dangero\\1s drugs and . arms .. In interpreting the word 'itnport' i1i the Copyright Act,· we must take\n\nnote that whik the .Positive requirement of the Copyright Conventions is to protect opyright, negativel:y also, the Transit Trad_e Convention and the biia, teral Treaty maKe exceptions enabling the Transit State\n\nto 1t1k~ m:asu;:e to protect Copyright. If this much is horne in\n\n., ~-\n\nmind, _it becomes clear that the word '; imporr i~ Sc. 53 of the)__ , Copynght Act cannot bear the narrow mterpretatwn .. sought to be-\n\n~ placed upon it to limit it to ini.port for commerce, It must be interpreted in a sense which- >vill fit the Copyright Act into the setting of the International.Conveutions,\n\n- The Calcutta :{light Opurt .thought that goods .may b~ said t6 be imported into the country only if there is an incorporation or. mixing up of the goods imported wHh themass of the property ht the local area. In other words the High Court ealisd on tge original package 4octrine' as. enunciated by the Amer.ican Court.·- Reliance• was placed by the High Court upon: .the decisi0n of this court in the Cenlrallndla Spipning and: Weaving & Manufacturing Co. Ltd; 1\n\nJ.\n\nThe. Empress Mills, Nagpur v. The Municipal Committee, Wardha [1958] SCR 11 02). That was a case which ar0se under the C!P. and B, erar Municipalities Act and the question was. whether tffe ppwer to impose ''a terminal-tax ori., goods or m1imals. imported into. ' . .\n\n< '\n\n. \\\n\n.-.\n\nG~AMOPHONE co. v. B.B. PANiiEY (Chinnappa RddJi., j) . . ' , . 691 ....\n\no'i exported fr;)in. the limit's of a municipality\" h1cluded' the right to levy tax o;, goods which •wer.e neither' loaded or unloaded. ai ·\n\nI ' .\\vardha but Wi3.iC merely Carried aCrOSS through the llUilicip~J area' .\n\n. I\n\n.·This court sai(t that it did not. The word 'import', it was thought'\n\nmeant not mrely the bringing int(; 1Jt caniprised something inorc,'\n\nthat is 'i!1corpo.rating and mixing up oftlie goods with the mass of\n\nthe property in the. loca I area', thus accpting the enunciation of\n\n- U the 'Orighat'Package ~:D-octrinf 1Jy Chief Justice .Marshp/l in Brown ' 'c ·· . v.\n\nState of Maryland 6 LEd-. 78. Another reason 'given by the ' learned Judges ' to arrive at t, he conclusion that they .did, was that . the very levy was a 'terminal tax' a:ud,. therefore, the )\\'Ords 'iport\n\n' and export', in Ute giyen context, had :something. to do with the idea of a terminus and not an intermediate Stage-of a jaurnay. We are . ... i' • . ' - ...,__ afraid the case is really not' of any guidanc'e to us since in thecon- ·,..' / text of a 'te.ninal tax' th~ 'Yords 'imported and. exported; could be construed in no other manner than was done by the Court. We must howver say that'the.original package doctrine' as enunciated b'y . ciief Justice Marshall on whtch reliance was plced wa~ expres-·\n\n.sly. disapproved first BY the FederalCourt intheProvine of Madras\n\nv. Bddu Paidanna, [1942] FCR 90 .and again by the upreme\n\nCour~ in State of Bombfy v. F'.N. Balsara, [1951] SCR 682.·\n\nApp~Yently, these decisions .were not broughJto the noticeof he court which decided the case. of Central l1idia Spinning and , Weaving and\n\nMamifactuing Co. Ltd. The Empress Mills 'N.apur Muf!icipal Com- , mittee, Wardha: So _we drive no help from this case.\n\nA~ we said,\n\n, E.· .... ..... :. we prefer tointerpret the words.'import' as it is found in the Copy-.· ~, :right Act rather than research. for its meaning by. referring to other · . ' than research statutes where it has been used. : ' ' ·. • .. ... .,.,.~ ../ • . ' i \" . The learned consel for the appellant invited our attention to. _ I . \"'. -, t • Radhakishan v.\n\n\n. ,/\"\n\n v .. Syli'anid :and Laxmrm, 77 Born. Ll:t 380, Bernado v. Collector oF Customs A. I.~. 1960 kerala L7:J, to urge that importation . was complete so. soon as the Customs barrier was crossed. ·.They are\n\ncases under the customs Act and it is need.Je'ss for US to seek aid from there when there is enough direct light under the Copyright\n\nAct and the \\iarious ; conventions and treaties which have with the . subject ''Copyright' from different angles. ·~ e do not al~~ .. desire to' . ' .crow our judgmnt with reference .tc) the history of' the Copyright\n\nand tle. Custom~ legislations~ jn the United Kingdom:' atld India as we do not think It nec'essar~ to do so in this case.\\,· ···· .. ·. , . . . \\ we have, therefore, no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that tlie~ word .. 'import' in 'Sees. 51 and 53 of the Copyright Act\n\n') ..\n\nF . ..\n\n. '\n\n• .• u.\n\n.• .!\n\n': •\n\n• 1'\\ . - 't, -fi\n\nA . ..\n\n''\n\n! '\n\nl '692\n\nSUPREMI! COURT REPORTS [19841 2 s.c.R._\n\n' . nieans 'bringing into, India from outside lndia', that it is nqt limited, . to. importation for c9mmerce oti)Y but ioclues importation for transit. aross ·.the country. Our interpretation, far from being intonsi_stent with\\ any principle of International law, is entirely in ac'cord with Internationa I • Conventions and , the Treaties between India and Nepat': A;1d; that we think is as it should be. ·-\n\n) ' ·, ' '' We have said that a~ order under Sec. 53 may be made by\n\n.) r'\n\n the R, f)gistrar 9f Copyrights on the application of the owner of the . :- _, Copyright, but after making such: enquiry as the Rgistrar deems, . ·• -~ fit. On the order being made the offending copies are deemed to be goods whose import has been prohibited or restricted under Sec. 11-~ -' of the Customs Act. Thereupon the relevant. provisions of the Customs Act are to apply, with {he difference that confiscated opies\n\nshall not vest itl the. Government, but shall be. delivered to the owner of the (;-opyright.u One fundamental difference between the nature .of n . Notification nder Sec. 11 of the Customs Act and an _. order made under .Sec. 53 of the , Copyright Act is that the former is\n\n quasi-legislative ·]n char:acter, while the lattet is quasi-Ndidal' . jn 'character: The quasi-judicial nature of the order made under ;-\n\nSec. 53 is further emphasised by the fact that an .appeal is provided . to the Copyright Boar~ against the order. of the Registrar under Sec. 72 of the- Cqpyrigtit Act. We mention the character of the order\n\n' ' ' ' / undP.r Sec. 53 to indicate that the effect of an order under Sec. 53 of the Copyright Act is not as portentous as a notification under Sec .. 1.1 of the Customs Act. The Registrar is nor' bound to make )' an order under Sec. 53 df tJ:te Copyright Act so soon as an applica _ - tion is presented to him by the owner of the Copyrighc. He has\n\nnatwlly . to consider the . dntext of. the' mischief sought to be\n\nprev~ted. He must consider whether the copies would. infringe the · Copyright if the copies wrre 'illade in India. He must con:ider. whether the , applicant owns the Copyright or ls the duly authorised agent of the .Copyright. He must. hear thse tlaiming to be affected if an order is made and consider any contention that may be put . , forward as an excuse for the impo, rt. fle may consider ny-other rdevant circumtane. Since all legitimate defences are open and . • the enquiry _is qu\"si-judicial, n'o one canserious]y complain.~.,\n\nIn the re!?lt; the judgment of the Division Bench is set aside and tha_t of the learned single judge .restored. There is no. .order as to costs. woe are grateful to the learned Attorney , General, who appeared at our instance, for the assistance given by hhn.\n\n-' '\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\nlr .... 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'Fried in the Indian Joumal of international law that ihe provisions .-of the 1965Conventibn)ermit the •. 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Ba!Mlra, [1951] SCR 6112 .. [693 G-H, 691 A-Bl", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12882, "end_char": 12933, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Couit m Stat~ of Bombay _v-~ 1\n\nP.N. Ba!Mlra, [1951] SCR 6112 .. [693 G-H, 691 A-Bl\n\nAQ 'order made under s. 53 of the Copyright 'Act is quasi-judicia[ .. 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Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14385, "end_char": 14393, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B. Gupta, 's."}}, {"text": "K. Roy Chowdhary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14398, "end_char": 14414, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Roy Chowdhary and H.S. Pdrihar for R.ep9n.·"}}, {"text": "H.S. Pdrihar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14419, "end_char": 14431, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Roy Chowdhary and H.S. Pdrihar for R.ep9n.·"}}, {"text": ".P.A. Francis", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14499, "end_char": 14512, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".P.A. Francis, :i.N. PoiJar for te Respnde:k\n\n, f ."}}, {"text": "G.S. Sanghi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14699, "end_char": 14710, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "t- .. \"\n\n_ 'G.S. Sanghi,."}}, {"text": "Shankar Mitra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14713, "end_char": 14726, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shankar Mitra and P. 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Lt, d.. . /"}}, {"text": "Sec. 53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15679, "end_char": 15686, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Nepal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16011, "end_char": 16016, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Can an unauthorised reprccl.uc•\n\ntion of a lit::rary, dramatic, musical or artistic work or n record eJ)1 bodying an nauthorised recording of a record (which, for short, dopt ing trade parlance, we may call' a pirated work), whcse irr.pcrtafion into India may be prohibited, but .whose importation into Nepal :is not prohibited, be taken across India~ territory to Nepal?"}}, {"text": "Calcuttath", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16580, "end_char": 16590, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Authnritie.s at Calcuttath at a consign- .. t ' . ."}}, {"text": "Universal Ovrseas Private Ltd. 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PANDEY (ChinnappaReddy, J.) 613 '\nover, if generally applied,· lead to th~ untenable .re'ult that.in the'in: . ....;", "canonical_name": "Chinnappa' ReddY"}}, {"text": "Latham", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27189, "end_char": 27195, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tl1e proposition has ben well sta:ted by Latham CJ in Politics r.\n\nThe Cominonwealt!z111 : ~\n\n\"Every statute is to be interpreted imd applied, as far' 'as its language admits, as not to' -be inconsistent with the comity of nations or with the established rules."}}, {"text": "Commonwealth Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 27840, "end_char": 27863, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "therefore, is not a question of the power of the Commonwealth Parliament to legislate in t>nach of international law, but is a question whether in fact it h:>s done w\"."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court of fndia", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 27976, "end_char": 27998, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I • I I\n\nThe Supreme Court of fndia has sid practicaHy the same thing tFf ' t2) in Hnetorotxport, Mascowv."}}, {"text": "Art. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33990, "end_char": 33996, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34167, "end_char": 34173, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34299, "end_char": 34305, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34345, "end_char": 34351, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34412, "end_char": 34418, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34475, "end_char": 34481, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Articles 4 to 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34564, "end_char": 34579, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34656, "end_char": 34663, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34719, "end_char": 34726, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34891, "end_char": 34897, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chimuzppa Reddy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 35313, "end_char": 35328, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. B.B: -PANDEY (Chimuzppa Reddy, 1.) ·. '"}}, {"text": "Art. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37232, "end_char": 37239, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37296, "end_char": 37303, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37442, "end_char": 37449, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37523, "end_char": 37530, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37571, "end_char": 37578, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37682, "end_char": 37689, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "John H.E: Pried", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 38678, "end_char": 38693, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I ' •. • interesting to notice her~ wb?..t John H.E: Pried, who.", "canonical_name": "John H.E: Pried"}}, {"text": "Government of Nepal", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 38717, "end_char": 38736, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "respresented the Government of Nepal as ne of the members of the delei.ation at the U.N. Conference which produced the Convention, has to sal about these exceptions."}}, {"text": "Art 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40017, "end_char": 40023, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42744, "end_char": 42750, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43362, "end_char": 43368, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43602, "end_char": 43608, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43865, "end_char": 43871, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "SUPREMB COURT REPORTS [1984] 2 s.c.R", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 47332, "end_char": 47368, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREMB COURT REPORTS [1984] 2 s.c."}}, {"text": "Art. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48624, "end_char": 48630, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48853, "end_char": 48859, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Articles 8 and 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48960, "end_char": 48976, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Articles 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49009, "end_char": 49020, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49114, "end_char": 49123, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49336, "end_char": 49342, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52834, "end_char": 52841, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52907, "end_char": 52914, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52943, "end_char": 52949, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "John H.E. Frd", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 54272, "end_char": 54285, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The inter\n\npretation placed by John H.E. Frd that .the provisions of the 1965\n\nConvntion.permit the States of transit to enforce, sa/ a Copyright_\n\nor.", "canonical_name": "John H.E: Pried"}}, {"text": "Berne", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 55047, "end_char": 55052, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Internationaf Convention for the 'protection of literary or artistic works first signed at Berne on 9th ."}}, {"text": "Art. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55208, "end_char": 55214, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55971, "end_char": 55977, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56465, "end_char": 56472, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Copyright Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 58367, "end_char": 58380, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 2(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58391, "end_char": 58403, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 2(y)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58565, "end_char": 58574, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 2(x)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59047, "end_char": 59056, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 2(m)(iii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59244, "end_char": 59258, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 13(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59403, "end_char": 59413, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59581, "end_char": 59588, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 14(1)(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60234, "end_char": 60247, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 22 to 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60368, "end_char": 60385, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 30 to 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60418, "end_char": 60435, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60454, "end_char": 60465, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 40 to 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60577, "end_char": 60594, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 44", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60636, "end_char": 60647, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 51", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60755, "end_char": 60762, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61818, "end_char": 61825, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62001, "end_char": 62003, "source": "regex", 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"metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Hidayatullah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 65058, "end_char": 65070, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hidayatullah J in Burmah Shall etc v ..\n\nCmmercial Tax Officerf [1961] 1 SCR 902 has illustrated how the contextuai mea.tiings of the very 'words •import' and ·~pot'."}}, {"text": "[1961] 1 SCR 902", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 65122, "end_char": 65138, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sec. 53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65271, "end_char": 65278, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Customs Act, 1962", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 65760, "end_char": 65777, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sec. 53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66115, "end_char": 66122, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Customs Act, 1962", "statute": "the Customs Act, 1962"}}, {"text": 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{"document_id": "1984_2_67_175_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "-....\n\n67 A\n\n. BANDHUA MUKTI MORCHA • v.\n\nUNION OF INDIA & OTHERS\n\nDecember.16, 1983 B\n\nConstiflltio11 of India.-Article 32 (1)-Mode of intirpreting Article 3Z.....- \"Appropriate proceedings\", 1neaning of-Letter addressed by a party on behalf of pers_ons belonging to socially and, economically weaker iRections co1n'p/aining violation ... • of their rights under variots social welfare legislations-Whether can be t'reated as a\n\nwrit petition._Maintiltability of-Public Interest Litigation-Nature and scope of.\n\n. C •\n\nConstitution of India, Article 32 (2)-Appointmeftt of com1nissions _by ihe Supretn'! Court to enqui; e into the complaint made iii the writ petition anti rrlying upon the commisioners' re/, ort-Propiety of-Adver:; arial Procedure-How far binding on the Co.urt-Supreme Court Rules, 1966, O, xxxv, XLVI and XLVll, Rule 6-\n\nCode of Civil Procedure,.O, XXVI.\n\n Mines Act, 1952-Sections 2 (j), (jj), (kk), .i (I) (b) proviso 18 Chapters V, VI &. Vil-Meaning of the word ''mine\"--Whether stone quarries are 1n; ties-Whether workers of the stone quarries and crushers entitled to the benefits accruing under\" the Act-Responsibility of the mine lessees, 1nine owners, Ceniral Governmint and the State Governments for ensuring the benefits accruing under the Act, explained-Mines Rules 1955, Rules 30-32-r'uniab Minor Minera~ Concession Rules, 1964.\n\nInter-State Migrat Work1nen (Regulation of .Employment and Conditions of Service) Act. 1979-ss.2 (/) (e), (b), (g), 4,§_)2 and Chapter V-InterState Migrant Workmen (Regulation of Employment aird Conditions of SerJ1ice) Central Rules, : 1980-Rules 23, 25-45-Definition of inter-state 1nigrant workinen-Rights and benefits of inter-state mlgrant workmen explalned~Thekedars or Jan1adars recruitlng workers for mine lessees/owners from outside the State are \"contractOrs\"-Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, J.970-:-ss. 2 (/)(a), (b), (c) (g), 16 to 21.\n\n. .\n\nBonded IAbour Sys(em (Abolition) Act, 1976-ss.2 (f), (g), 4, 5, 10-15-Existene,!! of Forced Labour-Whether bonded.labour-Burden o} prooJ lies upon the employer that the labourer is not a bonded labourer-Court will be justified in pressuming thilt the labourer ls a bonded labourer unless the pfesumption is rebutted by . producing satisfactory mairial.\n\nMinbnum Wciges Act, Worktnen's C0mpensation 1Act, 1983, Paynient of Wages Act, E1npl0Yees State Insurance Act, Emplqyees Provident Fund and MisCel/aneous Provisions Act, Maternity Benefits Act, 1957-Benefits accruing under these Acts- Whether available to mine workers. -\n\nThe petitioner, an organisation dedicated to the cause of release of bonded . labourers in the country, addressed a Ieiter to Hon'ble Bbagwati, J. alleging : (1) H that there \\Vere a large number of labourers from different parts ofthC: Country who wC:re work.1ng in some of the stone quarries situate in district Faridabad, State of . ' . '\n\n• , 68\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [!982] 2 S.c.R.\n\nHaryana under\n\n0 inhuman and intolerable cohditions; (2) that a large number of them were bonded labollrcrs; (3) that the provisions of the Constitution and various social Weffare laws passed for the benefit of the aid workmen ere not be:- ing implemented in regard to these IabOurers .. Th~ petitioner also mentioned in the letter the names of the stone. quarries and particulars of labourers who were work~ ing a_s bonded labourers and prayed that a w.t; it be issued for Proper implementation of the yarious provisiOni .of . the.., soda! welfare legislations, s:4ch as,· Mins Act, 1952 Inter-State ~11grant Workmen (Regulation of Employment and Con.:. ditiofls of Service) Act, 1979, Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act,\n\n1970, Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976, Minimum Wages.Act, Workmen's Compensation Act, Payment of Wages Act, Employees State Insurance Act, Ma.tern'ity enefits Act et~. applicable t~ these'Iabourrs Wo.rking in the said , sto-ne quarries with a view to endiIJ,$ the misery, suffering, and helplessness of \"these victims of te inost inhllinan exploitation.\" ·\n\nThe Coui't treated the letter as a writ petition and appointed a commissi;>n to inqui.re into the allegations made by the petitioner. The conunission while cori- , firming the allegatic;>ns of the petitioner, pointed out i~ its ref)ort that-(i) the v,.hole\n\natmosphere in the alleged stone quarries was fuil of dust and it was difficult for any one tci breathe; ai) some of.the workmen were riOt allowed to leave the stone quarries and were providing forced lab6ur; {ii) there was no facility of providing pure water to•drink and the labourers wefe compelled to' drink dirty water from a nul/ah; (i11) the labourers were not having proper shelter but were living in jhuggies With stones piled one upon the other as walls and straw caverning the top which Was too low to stanP, and which did not afford any proteCtion ag<iinst sun and rain;\n\n(v) some of ihe labourers were suffering from chronic diseases; (vi) no compensa- tion was being paid tO labourerswhq were injured due iO accidents arising in the Course of cmploymeiit; (vii) there were no f<icilities for medical treatment or\n\nchooling. At the direction of the Court, a socio-legal investigation Was a.lso carried out and it suggested measures for improving the conditions of the rnne workers;\n\nThe respondnts Cotitep.ded: (1) Article 32 of the Constitution is not attracted to the instant case as no fundcimental right of the .petitio\"ner or of the workrr1en referred to in the petition is iiifringed ; (2) A letter addressed bY a party to this\n\nCollrt cannot be treated as a writ petition;· (3) In a prdceeding under Art. 32,_ this . Court is not empoered to appoint any commission or an investigating body to enquire into the allegations made Jn the writ petition; (4} Reports made.by such commissions are based only on ex-parte statements which have not been tested by 'cross-examination and theiefore they. have no 'evidentiary value; and (5) there\n\nmight be forced labourers in the stone quarries and stone crushers.in the S_tate of Haryana but tlieY were not bonded. labourers within the meaning of that ex.pres- , sion as Used in the Ponded Laour System (Abolition) Act, 1976. '\n\nRejeCtini all the contentions aD.d allowing 'the writ petition on merits,· tbe Court ·\n\n'r-·\n\n- '\n\nHELD : The State GoVernment's objection as to the maintainability of .)..--· the writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution by the petitioners is repre: hen'sible.\n\nIf any citizeri brings before the Court a coniptaiqt that a large nuni.ber of peasants or .workers are boqded serfs or are bing subjected to exploitation by a few mine lessees or contractors or emplo.yers.?r are beng enied htJ.o_benefit~ of.\n\n;.<\n\nBAND HUA MUKTI MORCHA 'v. UN~ON 69\n\nsocial welfare laws, the State Government, Which is, under our constitutional sche!Jle, charged with the µiission of bringing about a new socio-ecomonic order \\vhere there will be social alld economic justice for.every One equality of status and opportuniiy for all, would \\-velcome an inquiry by-\"the .court, so that if it is found\n\n- that there are ill fact bonded labourers or even if the workers are-not bof_1ded in the strict sense of the. term as defined in the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act 1976 but they are made to proVide forced labour or are consigned to aJife of utter deprivatioD. and degradation~ such a situation can be set right by the State\n\nGovcrnmnt. Even if the State Goveriunent\"iS on its own inquiry satisfied ihilt the workmri are not bOnded and are notcompelled to provide forced Jabour and are Jivjng and wOrking in decent conditions with all the basic neceSsities of iife ' provided to them, the State Government should not baulk an inquiry bY the court when a complaint is brought by a citizen, but it should be anxiolls to satisfy the court and through tlie court, the pOOple of the coUntr.Y, that it is discharging its constitutional obligation fairly and adequately and the workriten are being nsured_ social and eeonomic justice .. [IQ2A-D].\n\n2 .. Moreover, When a complaint is made on behalf of workmen that they are held in bondage and are working and living in miserable cOndltions Without any proper or adequate. shelter over their heads, without any protection ainst\n\nsun and rain, without two squaremeals per da:Y arid withonly dirty water from a nullah tO drink, it is diffic.ult how such a_ complaint can be thrown out on the ground that it is not violative of the fundamental right of the workmen. It is the fundamental right of every one in this.country, assure4. under the interpfetation given to Article 21 by this Court in Francis Mullen's Case, to Jive with 'human dignity, free from exploitatiori. This right to live with human _dignitY enshrined in Article 21 derives its life breath from: the Directive Principles of State Poiicy and -particullrly clauses (e) and (f) of Article 39 and Articles 41 and 42 and at the least, therefore, , it mttst include protection Of the health. and strength of workers, men and women, and of.the tender age of children against abuse, opportunities 3nd\"faci~ lities for children to develop in a healthy manner and in cond!tionS of freedom and dignity, educational facilities, just and humane conditions of work and maternity relief. These are the ffiinimum.requirements which fllUSt exist in order to ertable a person to live with human dignity .and no State-neither thC Central Government nor ariy State Govefiiqient-has the right ta , take any aCtion which will deprive a person of the enjoymentof thesebasic essentials. Since th, e Directive Principles of State Policy contained .in clauses (e) and (f) of Article 39, Article 41 arid- 42 arC\n\n-\"\" not enforceable in a court of law, it may not be possible to compel the State through the jLidicial_ process to make provision by statutory nactment 'or executive fiat fOr ensuring these basic essentials which go to make up a Jife of human dignity but\"where legislation is alteady enaGted by the State providing these ba-3ic require~\n\nments to the wOrkinen ·.and thus invsting their\" right to Jive with basic human dignity, with concrete reality and content,· the. State can certainly be obligated to ensure observance of such legislation for inactiOn op. the partof the State fn securing implementation of such leg!slation would amount to denial of the right to live\n\n'--+,\n\nwith human.dignity nshrined inArticie 21, more so in the context of Article 256_ which provides 1hat the exceutive power of every State shall be so exercised as to ensure compliance with the laws made by Parliament and any existing laws which apply in that State. [103B-H-104A] ·\n\n3. The State is Under a: cOnstituti.onaI obligation to see that there is no violation of the fundamental right of any person, particularly when lie clongs, to the\n\nE •\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1984] 2 S.C.R\n\n. wa~r secti?ns of the conunity and ls unable to wage a legal battlC against a strong and powerful opponent who is exploiting him.\n\nThe Central Government is therefore bound to ensU.re obserVancC of various social welfare and,13.bour laws enacted by Parliament for the purpose of securing tO the workmen a life of basic\n\numan dignity in compliance wifh the_ Directive Principles of Stte Policy. It niust also follow as a necessary corollary that the State of Haryana in which the stone quarries arc vested by reason of Haryana Minerals (Vesting of Rights) Act . 1973 and which is therefore the owner.of the mines cannot while giving its mines for stone quarrying operations, permit wqrkni.en to be denied the benefit of various social welfare and labour laws enacted with. a view to enabling them to live a life of humln dinity. The State of Haryana n1ust therefore ensure that the minele'ssees or contractors, to whom it is giving its mines for stone quarrying operations, observe various social welfare and labour laws enacted for the benefit of the workmen.\n\nTJ:iis is a constitlltional obligaton which can be enforced against the Central Government and the State of Haryana by a writ petition under Article ' 32 of the Constitution. [1.04 AD]\n\n4. While interpreting Article 32, it must be borne in mind that our approach •\n\n1nut-be guided nOt by any verbal or formalistic canons ef construction but by the paramount object and purpose-for 'vhich this Ariicie has been .enacted 3.s a Fund.a mental Right in the Constitution and its interpretation 'must receive illu.mination from the tiinity of provisions-which permeate and energise the entire Constitution\n\namely, the Preamble, the Fundamenta! Rights and the Directive PrinciPles of ·, State Policy. ClauSe (I) of rticle.32 confers the righ~ to inove the_ Supreme c:otirt. for enforcement of any of the fundamental rights;=> but it does not say as to who , shall have this right to move the Supreme Court -nor d0eS it say by what proceeding~ the Supreme Court may be so movd. There. is no limitation in the words\n\nof Clause. (J) of Article 32-that the fundamental right which is sought to be enforced bY n1oving the Supreme Court should be o.ne belonging to the person who n1oves the Suprerne Court nor does it say that the Supreme Court shoU:ld be moved only by-a particular kind of proceeding.· It is clear on the plain language of clause' (l)' of Article 32 that wheriever there is ii violation of a fundamental right, any .One can move the Supreme Court for enforcement Of , such fundamental right.\"\n\nOf course, the collrt would nbt, in exercise of its discfetion, intervene at the in stance of a meddlesome interloper or buSy body and would ordinarily insist that only a person whose fundain\"ental fight is violative should\n\n0be allowed_ to activise the court, but. there is no fetter upon the power of the court to entertain a proceeding initiated by ally person other than .the one whose fundamental right is violated, though the court would not ordinarily entertain such a proceeding, since the person whose fuiidamental right.is violated. can always approach the court-and if he docs not wisli to seek judical redress by moving the court, why should some one else be'.allowed to do so on his behalf~ This reasoning however breaks down in the case of~ person orciass of persons , vhose fundamental right is violated but who cannot have resort to \"the court on acCount of their poverty or disability:or socially or economically disadvantaged position and in such a case, therefore, the court can and rriust allow any membf:r of the public ating bona fide to esPouse thC cause of such person or class of persons.\n\nThis does not violate, in the slightest measµro the Iallguage of the constitutional provision enacted in clause (1) of Article\n\n32. [106 BH-107AJ • • ff s:~ Clause (1) of Articie. 32 s_ays that the Suprf.me Cotirt can_ be moved for cnforcenlent of a fundan1ental right by any 'appfopriate' proceeding. There\n\nY II\n\n.....\n\nI ,.\n\n. .\n\nIll\n\n.....\n\nBANDHUA MUKTI MORCHA V. UNION 71\n\nis no liinitation in regard to the_kind o_f proceeding envisaged in clause (1) of Article 32 except that the proceeding must be \"appropriate\" and this requirement of appr.opriateness must be judged in the light of the purpose for which the proceeding is to be taken, namely, enforcement of a fundamental right. The Constitution makers deliberately did not Jay down any pariicular forn1 of proceeding for enforcement or a fundamental right nor di&, they stipulate that suCh proceeding should confonn to anY rigid pattern or straight jacket fonnula as, for example, in Erigland, becau5e theY knew that in a country like India where there is so much of poverty, ignorance, illiteracy, deprivation and xploitation, any insistence on a rigid for mula of proceeding for enfotcement of a fundamental right would become elf~ defeating because it would place enforcement of fundamental r, ights beyond the reach of the comiµo\"n man and~ the entire remedy for enforcetnent of fundamental rig_hts which the Constitution makers regarded as so precious and invaluable that they elevatCd it to the status of a fundii.mentaI right, would become a mere rope of sand so far aS; the large masses of the people in this country are concerned.\n\nThe\n\nConstittion makers therefore advisedly provided in clause (1) of Article .32 that the Supreme Court may be moved by any 'appropriate' proceeding, 'appropriate' not in terms of any particular form but •appropriate' with reference to the purpose of the p'oceeding. [107 A-F] ·\n\n' . ' . ~\n\nTherefore where a member of the public acting bona fide mOves the Court for.enforcement of a fi.!-ndamenta1 right on beha_lf of, a person or lass of persons who on-account of poverty or disability or socially of economicallY disadvantaged D position canriot approach the court for relief, such member of the public may mOve the collrt even by just writing a letter,' because it woi.Ild not be right or fair to expect a person' acting pro bono Publico to incur expenses out of his own pocket for going to a lawyer aii.d prepar.ing a regular writ petitiofi for being filed in court for enforcement of the fundamental right of the poor and deprived sections of the community and in such a case, a letter addressed by him can legitimately be regarded as an.\"\n\n\"appropriate\" proceeding. [107 F-H] E'\n\n. 6.\n\nPublic Interest litigation is not in the nature of adversary litigation.but it is a challenge and an opportunity to the goYernment and its officers to make basic human rights meanirigful to the deprived and vulnerable sections of the comn1unity and to assure them 'social and economic justice whici:) i~ the signature tune of our Constitution. When the Court 'entertains public interest litigation, it does no.t do so in a cavilling spirit or in a confrontational mood or with a yiew to tilting at . executive authority or seeking to unsurp it, but its attempt is only to ensure obser-\n\nVance ar social and economic rescue progfamrhes, legislative as wen as eXecutive, framed for the benefit of the have-nots and the handicapped and to protect them against v; iolation of their basic hunian ;-ights, which is also thti eonstitutional obli\n\ngation of the executive. The Court is thus merely assisting in the realisation of the constitutional. objectives. [102 D-E, G-H, 103 A-Bl\n\nClause (2) of Article 32 conferring power on the Supreme Court \"to issue directions, or orders, or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari\" which ever may e appropriate, for enforcement of any of the fundamerital rights, is in the widest terms.. It is not con, fined to issuing the high prerogative writs of habeas corpus, mandamust prohibition, certiorari, and quo warranto, which are hedged in by strict conditions - differing froin one writ to another. But it is i'.nuCh wider and includes within its\n\ntrix, Power to issue any directions, orders or WtitS Which may be appropriate ' .\n\nSuPREME COURT RE}?ORTS\n\n(1984] 2 S.C.R.\n\nfot enforctment of the fudamental right in question and this is m3.de aniply clear by the inclusive clause which refers to in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, qua warranto and certiorari. Therefore even if the Conditions' for issue of any of these high prerogative writs are not fulfilled,\" the Supreme court\n\nwou.ld have power to issue any directjon, order or it including a Writ in the nature of any high Prerogative .writ.· This provision conferring on the .SuPreme .court power to enforce the fundamental rights in the widest poss1ble terms shows the anxiety of the constitution makers not to a1Iow anY proceduraJ. technicalities to stand in the way Or enforcement of fundamental rights. Th6 Constitution makers 'clearly intended .that .ihe Supreme Court should have the an1plest power to issue whatever direction, order or writ may be 'appropriate. in a given case for enforcement of a fundamental right: That is why the Constittioll is silent as to what procedurC sh<i.11 be followed by the Supreme Court in exercising the power to issue such direction or Order or writ as in Article 32 and advisedly so, beca.Sue the constitution makers never_ intended to fetter the discretion of the Supreme Court to evo!ve a procedure appropriate in the circumstances of a given case• for the purpose of enabliiig it to exercise its .power of enforcing a fundamental right. Neither claug; e (2) of Article 32 nor any other provision of\"the Constitution requires that any particular procedure shall be followed by the Supreme Court in exercising its power to issue an approrpriate direction, order or writ. The pprpose for which the power to issue \"an appropriate direction, order or -writ isconferred on the Supreme 'Court is to secure enfotcement of a fundtimeri.tal .fight.and obviously therefore, \\vhatever\n\npr0cedure is necessary for fu1filment of that purpose must be permissible .to the Supreme Court. [108 B-H, 109 A-BJ , ·\n\n8,. It is notvat ail obtigatOrJ. that an <idversarial prot:edurc. where each party producJs his own evidence tested by cross-examination by the other side .and the judge sits like an umpire and decides the case only on the basis of such m8.terial as\n\nmay be produced before him by both parties, must be .followed ih a proceeding under Article 32 for enforcement of a fundamental right.\n\nIn _fact, there is no such constitUtional compulSion enacted in clause ·(2} of Article 32 or ifn any other part of the Constitution. There is D.othing sacrosanct abOui the adversarial , procedure with evidence led by either party and tested by cr_ossxmainatfon by the other party and the judge playing ; i. positi.ve role has become a part of our legal system beCause it is embodied in the Code of Civil pro_Cedure and the. Indian Evidence ACt. But these statutes obviously have no application where, a new jurisdiction is created in the Supreme Court for enforcement of a fWldamental right. Therefore it Is rtot justified to impose anj\" restriction on the power of the Supreme Cour::t' adopt such procedure as it thinks fit in _exercise. of Its new jurisdication, by lngrafting adve.rsarial procedure on it, when the constitution makers have deliberately chosen not tO insist, on any such requirement and instead left it open to the SuprCme C9urt to foliow such procedure as it thinks appropriate for the purpose of securing the end for which the\" power is conferred namely, enforcement of a funruin1eiita-1\n\nright. [109 B-0) . . .\n\n9. The strict adherence to the adversarial procedure can som~ times lead to injustice. Particularly when the parti~ are nOt evenly balanced Jn social or econo mic strength. Where one of the parties to a litigation belongs to a poor and depriVed section of thecOminnity.and do~ not possiss adeqate social and material resour ces, he is bound to be at a disadvantage as against a strong and powerful opponent uri, der the adversary,.system of justice, becasue of his.difficulty iii.getting competent legal representation and more than an)'thing else, his inability to produce relevant\n\n\\.'\".\n\n\"-''\n\n\" ! ..\n\n). '\n\n---·\n\nBANVHUA MUKTI MORCHA V. UNION. 73\n\nevidence before ihe court.\n\nThrefwe, when ihe. por come before the court'. particularJy for. enforcement of.their fun, daffiental .. rjghts, it is ecesry to dpart fom\n\n.... the adversarial procedure and to evoivea ne\":. pro_cedurc wh_1chw1ll_make It posSible\n\nfor tbe poor and the weak to bring the necessary Illt.erial before the court for te\n\npurpose of securing enforcen1ent of their fundamental_ rights. If the adver.san~~ procedUre is truly followed in their case, they would never be able to enforce their fundamental rights and the\" result ould be nothing but a mockry of the _-Constitution. Therefore the Courts should a:balldon the laissez faire approach in the judicial process particularly where it.involves a question of enforcement of funa\n\ninental rights and forge new tools, devise new methods and adopt new strategi~\n\n... for the purpose of making fundamental rits meaningful for the large maes of people. And this is clearly pcnnissibli: on the language of clause (2) of Article 32 because the Constitution makers while. enacting that clause haye deliberately and advisedIY not used 'and words restricting th.e .power of the court to adopt any procedure which it considers appropriate in the circumstances of a given case for enforcing a fundamental right. [1_10 BFl '\n\n10. .it is. obvious that the .Poor and. the disadvantaged cannot possibly: produce relevant materia-1 before the Court in support Of their caso and equally where . . an action is brought on their behair by a citizenacting pr(J bono pub/ico. it would be almost impossible for him to gather the relevant !9.aterial and place it before the Court. lo such a case the Supreme Court would he faiiing in discharge of its con- 'tional duties of enfofcing a fundamental right if it refuses to intervene because th\"e\n\nstitupetitioner belonging to the underprivileged segment of society or a Public spirited citizen espousing his cause is unable to produce the relevant material before the court.\n\nIf the Supreml; l Court \\vere to agopt a passive approach arid decline to 'intervene in such a case because relevani material has not been produced before it by the party Seeking its intervention, the fundamental tights would remain merely a teasing i11usion so far as the poor and disadvantad sections of the community are concerned. Therefore the SuPren1e Court has evolved the practice of appointing conunissions for the purpose of gthering facts and data in regard to a Complaint' of breach of a fundamental right made on behalf.of the weaker sections of the society. The Report\" of 'the commisSioner would furnish prima facie evidence of the facts and data gathered by the commissioner and that is why the Supreme Court is careful to appoint a responsible person as commissioner to make an inquiry or investigation into the fats r~Jating to the complairit. Even in the past the Supreme Court has appoii:ted sometimes a district magistrate, sometimes a district Jue; some- . times a professOr of law,· sometimes a jciumalist, sometimes an officer of the court and soinetims an advocate practising in the court, for the purpose' of carrying out an enquiry of investigation and inaking report to the court because the commissioner appointe'd .by the Court .must be a-responsible person who enjoys the confiden~ of the court and who is expected to carry o-Ut his assignment objectivey and impartially without\" any predilection or .prejudice. Once the report of the conimissioner is fived, copies of ii-would be supplied to the parties so that either party, if it wants to 'dispute anyof the facts or date statedjn the Report, rnaY do so by filing au affidavit nd the court then eonsider the report of the co.mmissioner and thC affidavits which rilay have been filed and proceed to adjudicate upon the issue \"arising in the wdt\" petition. It would. be entirely foi the Court io consider what wtiight to attach to the f<icts and data stated in the report of the commissioner and to what extent to act'upon such.facts and data. But it wOuld not be correct to say that the report of the commissioner hasno evidentiary value at al1, since the Statements\n\nWPREME COURT REPORTS. [1984] 2 s.c.R.\n\nm<lde :in it are not_ tested b~ cross-examinaioQJ., To accept this co'ntentio'n would be to introduce the adversarial_ procedure-in a pr.occeding where in the given situation, it is totally inapposite. [111 B-H, 112, A-BJ\n\n1.1. If is 'true that Order XL Vi of the Supreme Court Rules 1966 makes the provisions of Order xxvr of the Code of Civil Procedure, except rules 13, 14, 19, io, 21 and 22 applicable to the Supreme Court and lays down the procedure for an application, for issue of a Comm_ission, but Order XXVI is not exhaustive and does\n\nIlt\" dtract from the-inherent power of th(l Supreme Court to appoint a conurllsion, if the. appointment of such Comthission is found necessary for the purpose of secur- .ing enforcement fa funda1nental tight inexercise of its constitutional jurisdiction under Article 32. Order XLYI Of_ the Supreme Court Rules 1966 cannot in any way n1ilitate against the power of the Supreme Court under Article 32 and in fact rule 6 of Order XLVII of the Supreme Court Rules 1966 provides that noth.ing in these Rules \"shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent Powers of the couft to niakC such orders as may be nssry for the cndS of justice. [l 12 C-F]\n\nIn the instant case, thf:refore, the Court did not act'beyond its power in appointing the commissions for the purpose of making n inquiry into the conditions of_ workmen employed i°' the st<iJ.e quarries. The petitioner in the writ petition specifically alleged violation of the fundamental rights of the workmen employed in the stone quarries under Articles 4.1 and 23 and ii was therefore necessary for the court to' appoint these comn1issioners for th, e purpose of in{iuiring i11to the facts related to this complaint. The Reports of the Commissions were clearly docwnents . hri.ving cvidentiary value .ind. they fui-nished prima facie evidence 'of the facis and data stated in those Reports. Of course, it is f0r the' court to consider what \".'eight it Should attach to the facts and data contained in these Reports , in the light of the various ri.ffidavits filed in the proceedings.[l, l.2 F-H, 113 A-BJ.\n\n• . 12.· The position pointed out as the power of_ the Supreme Couft to appoint\n\ncon1misionerS in the exercise of its jurisdictiOn under Article 32 1nust\"apply equ3.lly in relation to the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Courts under Article 226 for th~ tatter Jurisdiction is also a ne\\V constitutional ju(isdiction and it is conferred in the same wide ten, ns as the jurisdiction Under Article 32 and the san1e powers can and must therefore be exerCised by the High Court v.ihilc exercising jurisdic- 'tion under-Art.ide 226. In fact, ihe jurisdiction of th~ High Courts under Article 226 is much \\Vider, because the High.COurts are required to exercise this jurisdictiOn not only for enforcement of a fundamental right but also for enforcement of any legal righ_t and there are many rights conferred on the poor and .. the disadvantaged which are the creation of statute and they need to be enforced, as urgently and vigo_tousl!' as fundan1ental rights .. [I I 3 B-D] •\n\n3 : 1.\n\nThe Stne quarries in the instant case are \"mines\" within the meaning of the Section 2 (j) of the Milles Act, 1952 since they are excavations where operp.-\n\ntions for the purpose of searching for or obtaining stone by quarrying are eing carried on but they are not 'open Cas\"t working' since admittedly e~Civations , in the case of' these Stone quarries extend below superjacent.ground.\n\nSince the workings in these stone quarriciS extend below Superjacent ground t1-nd they are not 'open east \\Vorkings' and 'moreover explosives are admittedly used in connection with\n\n. >-,\n\n\\ ...\n\n' II\n\nBANDHUA MUKTI MORCHA V. UNION 75 • the excavation, the conditions set out in the. proviso to see. 3 (i) (i) are not, fulfilled and hence the exclusion of the provisioris of the Minrs Act 1952 (other than the excepted sections) is not attracted and 'all the provisions of the Mines Act 1952 apply to these stone quarries. The\" prOvJsions contailled in chapters V1 VI & VII of the Mines Act confer certain rights and benefits on thfl workIQen employed in the stone quarries and stone crushers and these rights <ind benefits intended to secure to the workman jus~ ar.d human conditions of .\\\\'ork ensuring a decent. standard of Iife with basic human dignity. Since th~ stone quarries are not being exploited by the State of Haryana though it is the o.wner of the st.one quanies, but are being given out on lease by auction, the rn, ine-lessees who are not only lessees but also occupiers of the stone quarries arc the owners of the stone quarries within the mean.:. ing of that expression as used in section 2 (1) 3.nd so also are the owners of stone crushers ill relation to their establishment. The mine-lessees and owners of. stone crushers are, therefore, liable under section 18 of the Mines Act, 1952 to carry out their operations in accordance with the provisions of the Mines Act, 1952 and the Mines Rules, 1955 and other Rules and Regulations made under that Act and to ensure that the rights and benefits conferred by these provisions are actually and . concretelY made available to the workmen. The Central Government is entrusted under the Mines Act 1952 with the rsponsibilit).' of securiilg compliance with the provisions of that Act and of the Mines Rules 1953 a.nd other Rules and Regulations made under that Act and it is the primary obligation of thci Central Government to ensure that .these provisions (\\re complied with bY the mine-lessees and stone crusher owners.\n\nThe State of Haryana is.also under an obligation to take all necessary steps for the purpose of secµring compliance with these provisions by the mine-ICssee~ and owners of stone crushers. The Staie of Haryana is .therefore, in-any event, bound to take action to enforce the provisions.of the Mines Act 1952 and the Mines , g\\lles 1955 and otherRules and RegulatiOns made under that Act for the berrefit of the workmen. [113 G-H, 114 A, li5 A1 E: G, li6 B-F, 117 GD]\n\n13. The Inter-state Migrant Workmen (Regulatio-n of Employment and, . conditions of Service) Act, by sub-seCtion (4) of section (1) applies to every establishn1ent in which five or more inter-St; ite M-igrant workmen are employed or wereemployed on any day of the preceding twelve n1onths .and so also it appiies\n\no every contractoi who employs or employed five or mre inter~State migrant \\Vorkmeil on any day of t_he preceding twelve m<:>ntJ:is.\n\nSection (2) sub-section (1) Clause (b) of the Act defines contractor, in relation to an establishment, to me?.n \"a person \\vho undertakes (whether as an independent contractor, agent, employee or otherwise) to' produce a given res Ult for the establishment, other than a mere supply of goods and articles of n1anufacture to such establishment, b)• the employment of workmen or to supply workmen to the establishment, and includes a subcontractor, khatedar, sardar, agent or any other person, by whatever name called, who recruits or employs workman.\" Clause (e} of s.Ub-section (1) of section (2) defines. \"interstate Migrant Workmen\" to .mean \"any person who is recruited by or through a contractor in one State. under an a, greement or other arragement for employment in an establishment in anoiher State, whe'the1 with or without the knowledge of the principal employer in relation to Such establisbment.\" The expression \"priipal en1ployer\" is defined by claUse (g) of sub-tion (1) of section 2 tO inean \"in relation to a mine, the owner or agent of the mine and where a person has been named as the nianager of the mine, .the person so named.\" Obviously, therefore, the mine-lessees and owners of stone crushers in the .present case would be principal en1ployers within the meaning of that expression as used in the Inter-\n\n76 SUPREME COUllT REPORTS . . [1984] 2 s.c.R.\n\nState WorknlCn Act. Section 16 Jays a duty on every contractor employing inter State migrant work1nen i_n connection with the work of an csta blishment to prov id~ various other facilities particulars of. which are to be found in Rules 36 to 45 of\n\nhe Inter-State Migrant Workmen Rules. (These facilities include me'dical facilities, protective clothing, di-inking water, latrines;_ urinaIS and •washing facilities, rest rooms, cateens, crccbe and residential accomn1odation) .. The obligation to provide these f<icilities is in reltion to the-inter-State migrantwOrkmen employed in an estab1ishn1ent to which the Act applies. Rut this liability is not confined only to the contracti;>r1 , because Section 18 provides in so many terms that if any anowancc required tb be paid under-section 14 or 15 to an inter., State migrant workmari is not paid by the contractor or if any facility specified in Section 16 is not provided for the benefit of such workman, such allowance shall be paid or as the casf'. may be, . the fa.cility\"s'1.a11 be provided by the principal employer within such tin1e as ma.Y be prescribed by the Rules and all the allowances paid by the priricipal employer or all the expenses incurred by him in thiS connection may be recovered by him from the\n\nconractor either by deductiori froln the iamount payable to the contiactor or as a ·.debt payable by the contractor. [117 F-H, U9 E-A-120 A]\n\n14. Th\"ethekcd'ir or jamadar who is engaged by. the 1nine lessees or the stone-. crusher own'ers to recruit workrrien or e1nplOy them on behalf of the mine lessees or stone crush:r o\"Yners Would clearly be a 'contractor' within the meaning of that term as'defined in Section 2 sub-section (1) clause (b) and the \\YOrkmen recruited by or thtough hin1 from other States for crnployni.ent in the stone quarries and stone crushers in the State of Haryana w0:uld Undoubtedly -be interState migrant work meri.\n\nEven when the thekedar or jamadnr recruits or employs workmen for the\n\nsL:>n~ qL11rries and ston~ 'crUshrs by sen:lii1g word\" through the \"old hands\", the workmen so rhCruited or \"entployed would, h~ interState migl:at workmen, becausO the \"old. hands\" wo.uld be really acting as agents of the thekedar or janiadar fo'r the purpose 'of recruiting or employirig workmen crushers in the Sfiite of Haryana. (121-E]\n\nl5. In addition tO the rights and beefits conferred upon hiin Under the Inter-State Migrant W0rkmen Act _and the\" iriter-State Migrant \\Vorkmen Rules~ an intcrState migrant -workman is also, by reasori of Section 21, entitled to the benefit of the Provisions contained in the workmen's Cotnpen, sation Act 1923, The Payment of Wages Act 1936, The EmploYees' State Insurance Act 1948, . The Employees'. Provident Fu rids afld Misc. Provisions Apt, 1952, and_ the Maternity Benefit Act 1961. ('122 B-C] •\n\nThe obligation to give effect to. the provisipns cOntaind in .these various laws is not only that of the jamadar or thekedar and the minelessees and stone crushers owners (provided of course there are 5 or more intC'rState Migrant Workmen em.ployed ln the establishment) but; also: that of the. Central Govenunent because tpe. Central Government being 'the \"ppropriate Government\" within the meaui~ of Sectio.n 2(l)(a) is under an obligation to take necessary steps for the purpose of securing compliance with these , provisions by the thekedar or jamadar and mine-lessees and owners of stori.e .crushers. The State of Haryana is also bound to ensure that these provisions are observed by the thekedar or jamadar and. minelessees and owners of .stoi1e crushers. [122D:.F] ~\n\nH 16.' If the Jan1adar or thekadar in a Stone quarry or stone ci; usheris a •con trac.tor• within te meaning of the definition of the tem1 in the Inter~State Migrant\n\n., • •\n\n: ~.\n\n~ '\n\n. BANDHUA MUKTI MORCHA v. UNION 77\n\nWOrkmen Act, he wollld a fortiorari be contractor' also for the purpose of Conti-act Labour Act and any workmen hired in or in cohncc.tio{i with the work of stone quarfy or stone crusher by or through thejarn.adar or thekedar \\vou1d be work- . men entitled to the-benefit of the provisions of the Contract labour Act.- . Where . therefore the tl; tekedar for Jan1adar is a Contractor, 3.nd the workmen are. employed as 'coritract labour'within the rtlealling of these expressions as used in the Contr'act Labour Act the Contractor is well as the principal employer would be liable io omply with the Provisions of the Cotract Labor Act and the Contract Labour Rules nd to. provide to the contract labour rights and benefits collferred by these Provisions. The Central Government being the ''appropriate government'' witliin the meaning Of section 2 subsection.(l) clause (a) would be responsible for ensuring compliance \\ith the provisions of the Contract Labour A.ct and the Contract Labour\n\nRules by the mine-lessees and Stone crus.hers 0¥.'ners apd the thekedar :or jamadar.\n\nSo also, for reasons discussed while dealing with the applicability of the Mines Act 1952 and the Inter State Migrant.'Norkmen Act, the State of Haryana Woqld be under an obligation to enfore the provisions of the Contract Labour Act and the Contract Labour Rules for the h:nefit.of the workm, en. [123 E-F, H .• 124 ACJ\n\n17. There can be no doubt and indeed this was not .disputed On behii.lf of the respondents, tat the Miniffium Wag, es Act\"1948 is applicable.to workmen employed irl the stone quarries and stone crushers. Therefore whatever be the mode of payment fclloWed by the mine lesSees and stone crusher owners, the V.'orkmen must . get nothing less than the minirrium .wage for .the joQ which is being carfied out by them and if they are required to carry out additionally any of the functions pertaining to another job or occllpation for which a separate minimum wage is prescribed, they must be paid a proportion.ate part of such minimum wage in addition . to the minimum wage payable to them for the work priffiarily carried out bY them. The system of payment which is-being followed in the stone quarries and stone cru~ shers, under which the expenses of the explosives and of drilling holes arc to be borne by the workmen out of their own Wages, should be changed and the explo- . sives required for carrYing out blasting should be supPlied by,_th~ mine lessees or the .jamadar or thekedar without any deductio.n being made out of the v.-ages of. the workmen and the Work of drilling holes and shot firing should be entrusted only\n\n.' to those who have received the reqisiie training un.der the\" Mines Vocational Training Rules 1966.\n\nSo far as the complaint of the petitionerthat the workmen employed in the stone quarries and stone cru.shcrs are not beir, g . paid the mfnlmum wage due and payable for the work caified out by them is concerned,· jt is a matter which would have to be i!J.vestigated and detem1i, ncd. Ll24 C, 125 A-E]\n\nThe Bonded Labour system is intendc'i:l to strike against the system of bonded labour which has been a shameful scar on the Jndian Soda! Scene for\n\n1decades and ,;,.hich has c6nti.nued to disfigre the life of ihe nation even after independence. The 'Act was brought into force thro.ugh out the length and breadth of the country with effect from 25th October 1975, which means that the Act has been in force now for .almost 8 years and if properly implemented, it sho.uld ha Ve by this time brought 8.bout cOmplete idehtification, freeing and rehabilitation of bonded labouf. Bllt as official, semi-official and non-offici?-1 reports show, we have yet to go a long way in wiping out this outrage against humrinity. [126 A-C]\n\n18. It i.S clear bonded 1aboUr 1s a form of .forced labour and Section 1~ of the Bonded Labour Systein (Abolition) Act 1976 recognises this self-evident l prc_>position by Jajringa duty on every District Magistrate and e-Very officer specified\n\nF .•\n\n78.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\" [1984] 2 s.c.R.\n\nby him to inquire whether any bonded Jabour SYS\\em or ay other form_ of fod labour is being enforced by or on behalf of any , person and, if so, to take such action as inay be necessary to eradicate the enforcement of such forced Jabour.\n\nThe thrust of the Act is against. the continua-rice of any fornl of forced 1abur. It is of course true that, strictly speaking, a borided labourer mens a labourer who incurs or .has or is presumed to have incurred a bonded debt and a bori.ded debt\n\nmans an advance obtained or presumed to have been obtained by a bonded labourer under or in pursuance 9f the 11oried labour system and it wold therefore appeaf that before a labourer can be regarded as a bonded labourer, he must not only be forced to provide 13.bour to the employer -but he must have also received an. advance or other economic consideration from. the employer unless he is made to provide forced labour in pursuance of any custoni or.social obligation 3r by reason of his birth i_n ny p1rticular caste or community. -J30 A~D] ·\n\n19.\n\nThe contention of the State of Haryana.that the burden of proof under the bonded labour System (Abolition)- Act, 1976 is upon the bonded labourers is misconceived. To insist that the bonded labourers n1ust first prove that they are. pzoviding forced lab_our in consideration of an adVance or othef .economic con~\n\nsidration rec:ived Dy thm and then only they woU.ld be eligible_ for the benefits provided urlder the Act, is nothing but asking tlicm to do a t'ask which is extremely diffi.:::Ult, if iiot imposible. _ The labourers w6'.ild have no evidence :it all .to prove so and since employment of bonded labour is a penal Offence underthe Act, the e:nployer \\Vould im:nediately without any hesitation disown ha-Ying given any advance or e:; onomic consideration to the bonded. labourers. The insistance of proof from two labo'urers by the State Government which is constitutiOllally mindated to bring :ibout Change in the life conditions of the poor aad downtrodden and to ensure social justice to. the1n is rePrehensiblC . (130 F-H, 131 AJ\n\n• It would be cruel to insist that a bonded labour in order to derive the benefits of this i; ocial welfare legislation, should have to go through a formal. process of t_rial with the normal procedure for recording of evidence. That. would be a totally futile process. because it is obvious that a bonded labourers can never stand \"up. to the regidity and formalism of the legal process due to his poverty, illiteracy atld social and economic backwardness and if such a procedure were required to be followed, the St.ate Government might as well obliterate this Act from the statute book. It is now statistically establ_ished that most of bonded labourers are members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes or other backward classes and ordinary course of human affairs would show, indeed judicial notice can be takeri of it, that there would be nO occasion for a labourer to be placed in a situation wher~ he is reqiiired to supply (arced labour for no wige or for nominal wage, unless he has received some advance of other economic consideration from the employer and under the consideration fron1 the employer and under the pretext of not. having returned such a1Vance or other economic consideration, he is required to render service to the employer br is .deprived of his freedcim of -employment or of the right to moVe freely whereever he wants. Therefore, whenever it is shown that a labourers is maae to provide forced labour, the Court would raise a, presumption that he is required to do so ln consideration of an advance o.r other economic consideration received bY him and he is therefore a bonded labourer. This presumptionmay ·\n\nb~ rebutted by the .employer and also by the State Government if it so chooses but unless and until satisfactory m:lterial is produced for reubuting this presump- .tion, the Cotirt must proceed on the basis that-the lab.curer is a bonded labourer entitled to .the benefif of the provisions of the Act. The Stte Government _cannot\n\n• .\\~\n\n' )'\n\n( -\n\n. '\n\n. \"\n\n---; ••\n\n. ' ... •\n\nBAND:~UA MUKTI MORCHA V. UNION 79\n\nbe permitted to repudiate its obligation to identify, release and rehabilitate the bonded labourers on the ple3. that though the concerned labollrers m:iy be providing forced labour, the State Government does not owe any obligation to them .. unl~Ss and until they , show in an appropriate legal proceeding .conducted\n\n'accordif\\g to the rules of adversary ystem of jllsti&,. that they are bonded labourers. [131 C-H, 132 A]\n\n20 .. Thugh section 13 provides for constitution of a Vigilance Committee in each f:>istrict and each sub.-division of a 'District, 'the Government-of Haryana, for some reason or the other,· did not constitute any Vigilance Conrmittee until\n\nts attention was drawn to this requirement of the law by this Court. It may be that according to the Go'vernment of Haryapa there .were not at any time any bonded labourers v., ithin. its territories, .but everl so Vigilance COmmittees are required by Sectipn. 13 to be constltuted because the function of the Vigilance Committee is to identify bonded labourers, if there are any, and tO free and rehabilitate them and it would.not be right for the State Goyernment not to constitute vigilance Comn1itteeS on the assumption.that there ate no bonded labourers at\n\n~11. In constituting Vigilance Committee in each District and .• sub-division, the Haryana Government would do well to include representatives of non-political social action group~ operating at the grass root level; for it is only through such social actioti groups and voluntary agencies that the problems of identification of bonded labour can be effectively 'solved. [128 E-H, 129 AB]\n\n_The magistq~.tes and jUdicial officers take. a very lenient view of _violations D o( labour laws enacted for the benefits of the workmen and Jet off the defaulting employers \\\\lith smaM fines. There have also. been occasions where the magistrate and judicial officers have scotched prosecutiOns and acquitted or discharged the defaulting employers on hypertechrlicalities. This happens largely because the magistrates and judicial officefs are not sufficiently sensitised to the importance of the-observance of labour laws .\\vith the result that the labour I<iws are\" allowed to be, ignored a'nd breached \\vith utter callousness and indifference nd the workn1en\n\n.E begin.to feel that the defaulting employers can, b)r vaying a fine which hardly touches \"their pocket, escape from the arm of law and \\he labour laws supposdely enacted fcir the'ir benefit are not meant to be observed but are 1nerely decorative appendages intended to assuage the conscience of the workmen. The Magistrates ahd Judicial .\n\nOfficers shou[d take a strict yiew of violation of labour,'Jaws and t~ impose ad.equate punishment on the erring en1ployers so that they may realise that it docs nt pay to commit a breach of such la\\vs arid to deny the benefit of such la\\VS to the F workmen. [145 A-DJ\n\n21. :rhe Court issued several directiQns to the entral Government and the State Government and the variouS authorities for implen1enting the provisions enacted in various social welfare lavs for the benefit of the' orkmen employed in the stone qurries and stone. crushers in the state of Haryana. So that the poor workmen' who lead a miserable exlsteiicc-maY one day be able to realise that freedom is not Only the monopoly .. _of a few but belongs tO them all and that they are also equally entitled along With others to pa.rt.icipate in the fruits Cif freedoiri and development. [1.32 D, 145 D-F]\n\nPER PATHAK, J CONCURRING\n\n(\"l) Public Interest Litigation in its present form constitutes a new chapter in olir judicial system. It has acquired a significant degree of importancein the\n\njurisprudncc practised by our cot1rts~.and has evoked a iively, if Somewhat Conc .\n\n80 •\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [19B4] 2 s .. C.R.\n\n. troversial, resPnse' in fogat circles, in the edia and among. the general public.\n\nIn our country, this new class of litigiition is justificed by its protagonists on the basis generally of vast areas in our population of illiteacy and. poverty, of sqcial and eoonomic backwardness, and of an insufficient awareness and appreciation •. of individual and collective rights. These handicaps have denied nlillions' of our collntrymen access to justice. Public intereSt litigation is aid to possess the potential or providing su'ch access in the nµlieu of a new ethoS; in which pa:rticipa ting sectors in the adininisttation of justice cOperate in the creation of a 'system which promises legeal relief without cu4bersme formaufy arid heavy expe1lditure.\n\nIn the resut, the-Jegal organisation has taken on a radically. new dimension, and correspondingly new per_spectives are opening up before judges and lawyers and\n\nState Law agencies in th_e tasks before tQ.em.\n\nA crusading z.ea.1 iS abro:ld, viewing the present as an opportunity to -waken the political and legalorder to the objectives of social justice projecte~ in our oristitutional. system.- New slogans -fill the air, and new phrases .µave entered the legal dictionary, and one hears of 'the \"justicing system\" being galvanised into supplying justice to the socio-cconomi~ disadvanta'ges. These urges are responsible for t!le \"birth of ne\\V judicial concepts and the expanding horizqn calpower. They c1aith to represent an increasing em phasis on social welfare and a progressive humanitarianism, To the mind trained in he certainty of the law, of defined P.rificiples.\" of binding. precedertt, andthe common IaW doctrine :or stare decisis, ihC. future is fraught with confusion and disorder in the legal world and severe strains in the constitutional system_. At\n\nthe lowest, thefe is an uneasy doubt about where we are going. If p-Ublic interest litigation is to command broad acceptance attention must be paid to certain . -releven~ considrations. The historY of human exPerience show~· that Whell a revolution in ideas. and ju action .enters the life of a nation, 'the nascent power so released possesses the potential of throwing. the prevailing social order into disarray. In.a changing society, wisdonl. dictates that reform sbOutd eme.rge in the existing polity as an ordered. change produce thrOugh its institution. , Moeover1 the pace of change needs to be handled'with care lest the institutions themselves be endangered. [152F-H; 153A~C; 153O;154 A-BJ\n\nI :2 Like the Warren Court's affifmative act~On programmes for the benefit of minorities: and other sociaUy or econ.omically disasivantaged~ interests through the avenues of Public Law, the courts in India, are beginning fo apply a similar conCept of constitutional duty. The doctrine Of snditig has been enlarged in India to provide, Where reasonably possible, access tojustice to large sectors of people for whom so far it had been a matter of despair. It is tiine indeed 'for 'the law to do so. In larg'.e ril.e<isure, the traditional conception of adjudication represented th~ socio-ei; Onomic Vision prevailing at the turn of. thC century. In India,\n\nas the consciousness of social justice-spread 'though our mUlti-Jayered social order, the constitutioll began to come under increasing pressure frOrri social action groups .. petitioning o~- behalf of the under privileged .and deprived sections of society for\n\nthe fulfilmet of .their aspirations. Despite -the varying fortunCs of the number of cases Or public interest litigation which have entefed the Sureme Court, '-Public InterCst, Litigation constitutes today_ a significant segment of -the court's , docket (154 D: )56 A-q\n\n2:1. The Provisions of Article 32 do.not specifica11y. indicate \\vho canmovC the Court. In the ab:; ence-of a C'.Jrifining provisiq~ in that respect, it is plaiiJ. that a petitioner m1y be anyone in wham the Law recognises a standing_ to maintain an action of such nature. (156 EJ '\n\n. :.\n\n BANDHUA. MUKTI MORCl; IA V. UNION 81\n\n 2:2. As regards-the form of proceeding and its character, Article 12 speako generally o(\n\n11appropriate proceedings.\" It should be a pr_oceeding which can appropriately lead to an adjudication of the claim made for the enforcement of a fundamental _right and can result in the grant of effective relief. Article 32 speaks Of ihe Court's power ''to issue direction or orders of writs'-', and the specific refCrenc:e to \"writs in the nature of. habeas: corpus, man'damUs. prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari\" is by way of illustration only. They do not exlmst the content of the Court's power under Article 32; [156 F-G]\n\n3 :1.\n\nA Practice has gown in the pubii.c of invoking the jurisdiCtion of this Court by a simple letter complaining of a legal injufy to the author or to some other person or group of persons, and the Court has treated such letter as a petition under Article 32 and entertained the proceeding \"without anything more. It is only comparatively recently that the Court has begun to call fOr the filing of a regular petition on the ltter. There is~ grave danger. in-here.nt in a practce where a mere letter is entertained as a petition from a person whose antecedents and status 'are unknown. or so Unce-rtain that no sei:ise of responsibility can, without • anything more,. be attributed to the communication. There is go, od reason for the insistence on a document being set out in a form, or accompanied by evidence, indicating that the allegations made in it are made with a sense of responsibility by a person who has taken due care and caution to verify those a1legations before making them. A ptaiQt instituting a. sllit is required bY the Cocteof Civil Procedure to conclude with a clause verifying the pleadings contained in it: A petition or - application filed in court is required to be supported on , affidavit. TJ:ie.se safeguards are necessary because the document. a plaii1t Or petitiOn or application, commences a course of litigation invofVing the expenditure Of public time nd public money. besides in apprOpriate cases involving the issue of summons or notice to the defendant or respondent to appear and contest the proceeding. Men are busy conducting the aff<iirs of their daily lives, and nO orte occupied with the responsibilities and pressures of present day existence Welcomes b.eing summoned to a law court and involved in a litigation. A document making allegations without any proof whateVer of responsibility can conceivably constitute an abuse of the' process of Ia\\V.\n\nTherefore, iri special circumstances the document petitioning the coUrt for relief should be supported by satisfactory verification.\n\nThis requirement is all the grea.ter where petitions are received by the Court through the post. . It is never beyond the bound of posSibility that an unverified communi- 9ation received through the post by the court may in fact have been employed 1nala fide, as an instrument of coercion or blackmail or other oblique motiive against >a person named therein who holds a position of-honour and respect in society.\n\nThe Court must be ever vigilant against the abuse of its process. It cannot\" do th.at better in this matter than insisting at the earliest stage, and before issuing riotice to the respondent,· that an appropriate verification of the allegations be supplied. The equirement , i$- iinperative in private law litigation. Having rg3.rd\n\nto its nature and purpose, U is equally attracted to public interest litigation. While this Court has readily acted upon lc; tters and telegtams in the past, there is need to insist now on an appropriate 'verification of the petitioner other 9omunication.\n\nbfore act_ing on it. It will always be a matter for the court to decide, on wha; t peti-' . ti<;>n will it require verification and when will it waive the rule. [157 B-H; 158 A-C]\n\n3 :2. All communicatipns and petitions invoking the jurisdiction of the Court\n\nmut' be addressed to the entire Court, that is t6 say, the €hief Justice and his companion judes, No such communication or petition can properly be addresse~\n\n82 SUPREME COURT RBPoRTS [1984] 2 s.c.R.\n\nto a particular jdge. When the jurisdiction of the Court is invoked, it' i! the jurisdiction of the entire court. Which Judge or Judges will hear .the _Case 11 exclusively a matter concerning_ the interital regulation of the business o(the Court, interference with whi, eh by a litigant or member of the public constitutes the grossest jmpropriety. It iS Well established that when a division of the Court house and de'cides cases 'it is in law regarded as a he'\\fing and ~-decision by the Court itself.\n\nThe judgffient pronounced :ind the decree or order made are aCts of the Court, and -accordingly !hcY are -respected, obeyed -and enforced throughout the land._ It 'is only right and proper that this should be known clearly to the lay public ..\n\nCommunications and Petitions addressed tO a particular Judge are inlpoper and : violate the institutional personality of thC Court; They also embarrass the judge to whom they \"are personally a:ddr.!ssed. The fundamental Conception of the Court must be respected, that is a singfo indivisible institution, of united purpOse and existing solely for the high constitutional . functioris for which it has been. created. 'The conception ofthe Court as a Iooseaggregate of individual Juages, to one or more of whom judicial access may be particularly had, undermines its\n\nvery_existen~ arid endangers itsproper andeffective functioning. [158 E-H; 159 AJ\n\n4::.1. In 'public interest litigation, the role held by Ute Court is more assertive than in traditional actions, Viewed from the Warrei; i Court's experience the role\n\nf the Court is creative rather thari passive, and it assumes a more poSitive at.titude .\n\n..... in determining facts. Not infrequentlY public interest litigation affects ihC rights .\n\nof pefsOns not before the Court, and in shaping the relier the court must invari{l-bJy\n\ntilke into account its impaCt on those interests. Moreover, when 1ts jurisdiction .is invoked on behalf of a group, it is as. well to remember. that differences may exist\n\nin -eoritent and emphasis between the claims of different Sections of the grouP. For all these reasons the court must exercise the greatest caution and adopt procedures ensuring ufficient \"Il.otici:: to all interests likely tO be affected. MOreover; the . nature of the litigation sometimes invoJyes the Continued intervention Of the Collrt over a period of time, and the organising of the litigation to a satisfiictory conclusion calls for judicial ~:tatemanship, a c(ose tlndeistanding Of collstitutionaJ and legal values in the context or' contemporary social forCes, and a judicious mix: of restraint and .activism determined bY the dictati; s of existing reaJities. Importantly, at the same. time, the Court must never fo_rge~ that its jurist.!ictipn extends no farther _than thelegitimate limits of itS constit\\ltional powers, and avoid trespassing into political territory which under the Constitutior:i has been appropriated tb other organs of the State. [159 B; D-0]\n\n4~2., The Procedures acJopd by the Court in cases. of public interest\" litigation must of.-course be proced_ures designed and shaped by the Court with a view to resolving the problem presented before it on 'determining the nature and extent of relief <lccessible in the circumstances. Whatever the Procedure adopted by the cow\\ it must be procedure known to judicial tenets and charateristic of a judicial proceeding. There are methods a:nd avues of procuring material available to e.._xecutive and legislative agencies and often employed by them .for the efficient and effective discharge of the tasks before them. Not .all those methods and avenues are available to the Court. The Court must ever remind itse'If that One of the indicia identifyillg it as a Court is the nature and character of the procedure adOpted by it in determining a controVersy. It is 'in that sense limited fn the evolution of procures pursued by it in the process of an adjudication, and -in th~ grant and etecgtion of the relief. Legal juriSprudenoo has in its historical\n\n~ i .Jiii\n\n' -\n\nBANDHUA MUKTI MDRCHA, V. UNION 83 ,\n\ndevciopment identified rtain fundamental _principles which. form the essential, Constituents of judicial procedure. They are employed in every:judidal proceedin& and constitute th'e basic .infrastructure along whose chamaCts HOws the power or the Co.urt in the process of adjudication. it59 H; 160 A-DJ\n\n4:3. What should be. the conceivable fratne work of proure in public interest litigation does not admit of a clear cut aQSwer. It-is not poSsible to envisage a dCfinedfpattem of procedure applicii.ble to an cases. Of necessity the pattom whk:h the Court adopts will vary with the circuffistances of each case. But,\n\nif there iS a statute prescribing a judici:i1 procedure governing the particular case the Court must follow such procedure. It is not open to th.e Court to bypass } the statute iind evolve' a different\" procedure at variance with it. W, here, howevCr, the Procedure prescribed by statute is incomplete or insufficient; it will 'be open to the Court to supplement it by evolving iis own rules. Nonetheless, the sup-· plCmentary procedure must conform at all stages to the principles of natural justice. 'fhere can be no deviation from the principles of.natural jusiice and oiher, well accepted procedural nonns characteristic of a judicial proceeding. They constitute an entire Code of general principles of procedure, tried and pioven ii.nd hallowed by°the sanciity of common and c011sistent.acCeptance during long_years of the historlC(lJ develop.mt'nt of the law.\n\nThe general principles of law, to which i-eference is made here, command ihe confidence, not merely of thC , rUdge and the Iil.wyer and tlie' parties 'to the litigation, but supply that basic credible to the judicial proceeding which strengthens public faith in the Rule of Law~ Thy are rules rooted in reason and fairplay and. their goveman1...e guarantees a just ciispositipn of the case. The Court should be wary of suggestions favouring. nove1 procedures in cases where accepted procedural rules will suffice. 160 E~H; 161 AJ . . . . , s :I. Article 32 confers t_he widest amplitude of power of this Court in the matter of granting relief. ft has power to issue \"directions or orders. of writs''.. and .. tJlere is no specic indiCat1on, no express language, limiting orcircumscriing that power. Yet, the power is limited by.1he very nature, that its judicial Power.\n\nrt is powe_r which pertains to the judicial organ of 1be State, identified by the .very nature of the judicial institution .. There are certain fundamerital constitutional\n\nconcepts which, althoUB; h elemeptary, need to berecalled at times. The constitu-. tion envisages a broad division of the power of the State between the legislature, • the exCcutive and the judiciary. Alth0ugh the diviSion is not precisely demarcated, tP, ere is genera( acknowledgement of its limits. The limits can be gathered from the , Vritten text of the Constitution, from conventions and constitutional pfiictiee; and from an entire array of judicial decisions. The constitutional lawyer COncedes\n\na certain measure of overlapping in functional action among the .three organs-of .the State. But there is no warrant for a.Ssuming geometrical congruence. I, t is\n\nconun9n place that while the legislature enacts the law the eXecutive implements ·it and the Court interpretS it and, iii doing so~ adjudicates on the Validity of execqtive.\n\nacon and, under ovr Constitution, even ju.dges the validity of .the legislati9n itself;- And yet it is .We11 recognised ihat in a certain sphCre the JegisJature is pos~·\n\nsessed of judicial power, the. executive possesses a measure of both legislative an& judicial functions, and thy cOurt, in i~ duty. of interpreting.the law, accomplished jQ its perfected action a marginal degree of Jegislative, exercise. NOnetheless, a tine and delicate balance is envisaged under our Constitution between-these primary institutions of the State. In every case the Court should deteine the tre limits of its jurisdiction and, havjng d.one so. it should take care to remain wiihin the\n\nrestra.ints of its jurisdiction. [161 B-H; 162 A]\n\n84 SUPR!>Mi COURT REPOUS [1984] 2 s.c.R.\n\n5:2. This aspect of Collrt action assumes especial significance in public interest litigation. It bears .upon the legitimacy of the judicial irntitution, and that legitimacy is affected as much .by the solution presented by the Court in resolvina a controversy as by the manner in .which the solutibn is reached. 1n' an area of judicial functioning where jlldiial actiism finds room for play, where coM\"titutional adjudication 'can becoc an instrument of social policy forged by !he personal pohtical philoophy o{ tho Judie, !his ls an important comidoration 10 keep in mind. [162 BC]\n\n. 5 :3. Whore Ibo Court embarks upon affirmative action in tho at\":mpt fo remedy a consiitutional imbalance within the social order, few critics will ftc.d fault >11th it so Ions as it confines itself to the. soope of its legitimate authority. But there is always the possibility, In public interest.litigation, of succumbing to the temptation of crossing into te_rritofy which properly pertains to the Legislature or to the ExocYtive Government. For in mo!lt cases the jurisdiction of the Court is _Invoked when a default occurs, in executive administration, and sometimes where .a void _in community life remains unfilled by legislative action. Tho resulting public grieva'nce~ finds\" eXpression through social action groups, which consider. the Couri an appropriate forilm fo! feµioving the deficiencies. Indeed, the citizen -e:eems to find it more convenient to apply to the Court fof the vindicit.tion of con ...\n\nstitutional rights than appeal to the executive or legislative organs of the State ..\n\nIn the process of correcting executive error or' removing legislative omission the Court can so easily find itself involved in policy making pf a quality and to a degree characteristic, of political authority, and indeed run the risk of being mistaken for one.. An excessively political role identifiable with political govCrnance betrays the Court into functions alien to its fundarµental character, and tends to destrqy ., the delicate balance 'nvisaged in our constitutional system between its three basic institlltions. The Judge, conceived in the -true c1assical mould, is an impartial. arbiter, beyond and above Political bias and prejudice, functioning silently in ·&ccordan1re with the Constitution and his judicial conscience. Thus does h~ maintain tho legitimacy of the institution be selves and honour tho trust which his oftice _ bas reposed in him. (162 DHJ . ,_\n\nTho aftirmative schemes framed in public interest litigation by the C.Ourt sometimes' require detailed adJninistration under. constarit judicial supervision over proected periods. The lives of large sections of people some of whom have\n\nT had no voice in the decisions, are shaped and ordered by mand<itory Court action\n\nextending intq the f1,1ture. -Jn that context it is as wen to rerriember that public approval and public <:onsent assume material importance in fts successflll implementation. In contrast with policy making by legislation, where a large body bf legislators \"debate on a proposed legislative enactment, no such visual impact can be perceiv'ed when judicial decrees are forged and fashioned by a, few judi_cial personages in 'the confines of a Court. The mystique of the robe, at the stage of decision-making, 'is associated traditionally with cloistered secrecy and confidentiality and the end-result commonly issues as a final definitive act of the Court. It is a serious question whether in every case the siu; ne awesome respect and revercn~\n\n_will en4ure during different Stages .of affirmative action seeking o regulaie the lives of large numbers of people, some ?f whom never participated in the judicial process. [16~ A-DJ H s :4. Treating with public interest litigation requires more than legal ota:rship and a knowledge or' iet book law. It is -of the utmost importance in such\n\n.....\n\n..,,\n\n( -\n\n, .\n\n...\n\niiANDllUA MuKTI MORCHA V. UNION\n\ncases th.ltwhen formulating a scheme of action, the Court must have duo regard to -the particular circllmstances of the case, to surrounding realities including the pOtentiat for successful implementation, and the likelihood a!ld degree of response from the agencies on whom the implementation will depend. In mo§t cases of public interest litigatiOn. there wilf .be neither precedent nor settled praCtice to add weight and force to the validity of the Court's action. The example of similar cases in other countries can afford little su\"pport. The successful implementatjon of the orders of the Court will depend upon the particuiar social forces in tht? backdrop of loca1 history, the prevailirig economic 'pressures, the duration of thc!I stages involved in the implemeniation, the momentum of success from stage to stage, and the acceptabilitY of the Court's acon at all times by tfiose involVed in or affected by it. [163 E-Q] . o :5. An activist Court spearheading the movement for the development and oxtension of the citiz.en's constitutional rights, for the protection of individual\n\nliberty and for the strengthening of tho socio-economic fabric in compliance With dOclared constitutional objoctives, will need to move \\Vith a degree of judicial cir .. curnspection. In the centre of a social order changing with dynamic pace,' tho Court needs to balance the authority of tho past with the urges of lhe future. . In that task the court muit ever be conscious of the constitutional truism that it possesses the\"sanction of ncithetthe sword nor the pursue and that its strength lies bsically in public confidence anc.l_support, and that consequently the legitimacy of its acts and decisions must remain beyond alt dOubt. Therefore, whatever the case before it, whatever the context of facts ancl Jeagal rights, whatever the social and e-; onon1ic pressures of the times, whatever the personal philosophy of the.\n\nJudge, let it aot be forgotten that the essential identity of the institlltion, that it is a Court, must remain preserved sO that every action of the Court is infonnod by tho fund.a.mental norms of law, and by the principles embodied in tho Constitbtion and other sources of law. -1r its contribution to the Jurisprudent; ial ethos of society is to -advance our consUtutional objectives, it must function in accord\n\nwth only those principles which enter into the coffii>osition of judicial action and ' give to it_s essential quality. [163 H; 164 AD]\n\n.5 :6. There is a grea.t' merit in the Court proceeding .to decide an issue on the .basis of strict .legal principle and avoiding carefully the influence of purely emotional appeal. For that al One gi, ves thedecision Of the Court a direction which is certain, and unfaltering, and that especial permanance in legal jhrisprudence which makes it a base for the next step foard in the further progress of the law.\n\nIndoed, both certainty of substarice and oortainty of direction are indispenaable requireiµents in the development of the law, and invest it with the credibility\"whicft commands pubiic.confidenco In.its legitimacy. [165 AB]\n\nThis • warning is of especial significance. in these times, during a phase\n\n- of judicial history whel) a few social action groups tend to sl!ow evidence of pro- G suming that in CverY case the court must bend and mould its decision to popular notions of which way a case should be decided. [165 CJ ' '\n\nAs new area!· open before the Court with modem deyelopments in jurisw prudence,- in a World more seruitive to human rights as well as the imPact of t\"echnological progresl'!, the Co_urt will become increasingly consioUa of its expand.in.a: jurisdiCtion. That is. inevitable. But its res\"ponsibiJities are correspondinaJy .. llrO&t, aad perhaps never greater than now. [165 DJ H\n\n86 SUPREME COuRT REPORTS . [1984] 2 s.c.R.\n\nIt mrist 'be .remerµ'btrC<l that there is no higher\" Court tocorrect ove-r the Supreme Co_urt its errors, and at its Judge wear the mantle of infaUibility only . because their decisions are final. That the Judg!!S sit at the apex Of the judicial adininistration and their word,. by constitutional mandate, is the: law of tbO land can induce an unusual sense of power. It is a feeling Judges must guard against by constantly reminding themselves that every decision must be guided by reason Md by judicial principles. [165 E-F] ·\n\n6:1. Persons in this countr.Y obliged to serve as bonded labour are entitled to invoke Article 23 of te Constitution .. The provisions erribodied in' that clause form a vital eonstitue!'lt of tho Fundamental Rights set forth in.Part III of the Constitution, and their violation attracts pfoperly_ the scope of Article 32 of tbC .\n\nConstitution. [165 OJ\n\n6':2 .. It is true that-the reports of the court appointed Commissions haV'e not been tested by cross examiBation, but then the record does not show whether any atten1pt was IDade by-the respondents tO call them for cross examination. Further, whether the appointment of the commissioners fa11s within the terin of order' XLV! of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966 is of technical significance only because •'there was inherent power in the court, in the prticufaf circumstances of this.case fo tak~ that action; However, the court Would do well io issue. notice tO the res\n\npondiits, before appointing any Corn.rnisSioner, in those cases where. ihere is little appreheruion of tho disappearance of eviden~. [166 B-q . .\n\n6:3. . The present case is one of considerable iritportance to a section of Our people, who pressed by the twin misfortunes of poverty and-illiteracy. ate compelled to a condition of life hich long since should have passed into history. Tho con tifiued existence of such pockets of oppression and misery do no justice to the promises and assurances extended by our ConstitutiO!J to its cizens. [166 D~E] E PER AMARENDRA NATH SEN, J: (Concurrmg with Pathak, l.)\n\n• 1: l. Article 32 of the Constitution is clearly attracted to the facts of the case, as in the present case the violation of the fundamental right of liberty of e workmen who are said to be kept in wrongful and illegal detention, employed in forced labour, is alleged.\n\nForced labour is constitutionally forbidden by Article 23 of the Coostiiution. [168 D-E] ' ·\n\n1:2. An'y person who .is wrongfully and illega1ly employed as -a labourer in violation of the provisions of the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976 is jn essence dePrived of his liberty. A bonded ' labourer truly becomes a slave and thO freedoin of a bondd .lab9urer in the nlatter of his_ employment and mOvemont is !Jlore or less completely taken away and forced laboUr is thrust upon him. When any bonded labourer approached this Col, lrt the real grievance that he makes is-that he.should.be freed from this bodage and he prays for being set at libertY and liberty is no doubt a fundamental right guaranteed to every person\n\nUnder the cOnstitution. There canpoi be any\\manner of doubt that any person. who is wrongfully and illegally detained and is deprived of his libertY can pproach this Court under Article 32 of tlie Constitution for his freedom and wrongful and illegal detention, and for being set at' liberty. Whellever anY person is won8fully and. illegally deprived of his liberty, it is open to anybody who is interested in tho persop to Inove -this Co.urt unCler. Article -32 of the Coµstitution for his release. . It may not veri often be possible for the person who is deprived of his liberty to\n\nl ( ... .,,..\n\n--{\n\n\"' •. \\ -\n\n! .\n\n.-le\n\nBANDH\\JA MUKTI MORCHA V, UNION 87\n\napproach this Court, as by virtue of such illegal and wrongful Q.etention. he may not be free an~ ill a position to)llove the Supfeme.O?urt. [Hi_? E-H] .\n\n1 :3.\n\nThe Bonded labourers working in the f<ir away places are generally poc;>r an~ belong to the very weak_ section of the people. They are <j.lso not very literate and. they .1nay not be conscious of their own rights. Further, as they are kept in b.ondage their freedom is also restricted and they may not be in a position. to approach this Court. Thqugh no fundamental right of. the petitioner may be saidto be infringed, yet th,!} petitioner who co.mplains of the violation of the funda.- niental tight of the workmen who. ave been wrongfully and illegally denied their freedorµ and deprived of their constitutional right must be held to be entitled to approach this Court on behalf of the bonded labourers for 'removing thein from , illegal bondage and deprivation of liberty. [168 .B-C)\n\nS.P. Gupta v: Union of India & Another, (1981] Suppl. S.C.C, 81, referred to.\n\ni:I. Article 32 or for that matter any other article does nOt Jay down any procedure whfoh has to be followed to move this Court for relief against the vio.law tion of any fundamental riiht. Article 32 (1) only lays down that the right t~ n1ove this court by appropriate proceedings for enforcement of .fundamental rghts is guaranteed. The Constitution very appropriately leaveS the question as to what \\vill consµtute all approprfate prOceetng{or the purpose of enforcement of fundaw ment&l 5ights to be determined by th.e Court. This Court when sought to be mewed under Article 32 by any party for redressing his grievance against the violation of fundamental rights has to consider whether the procedufe foJloWed by e pii.rty is appropriate enough to entitle the couit to proceed to act on-the same. No doubt this Court has framed rules which ae contained in part IV, Order :XXXV of the Supreme Court Rules under the Caption \"application for enforcement of fundamental rights\" (''Article 32 of the Constitution\") Generally speaking, any party who seeks to move this Court under Article -32 of the Constitution should conform to the rules prescribed. The rules lay dOwn the procedure hi ch is normally to .be followed in the matter of any application under Article 32 of .the eonstitution. These rules are rule_s relating to the proct:dri.re to be adopted and the rules ar~ inten.ded to serve aS maids to the Deity of Justice.\n\nProcedural law which also forms a part of the law and has io .be observed, is, however, 'Subservient to substantive Jaw and the .law~ of procedure are preScribed for promoting nd furthering the ends of justice. There cannot be any doubt that this Court should usually follow the procedure laid do\\vn in O.XXXV of the Rules of .this Court and should normally iist on a petition properly verified by an affidavit to be _filed to enable_ the Court to take necessary action on the same. 'Though this Cou.rt should normally iilsist on the rules of procedure being followed, it cannot be Said, taking into consideration the nature of right coferred under Article 32 to move this Court by an appropriate proceeding and the Very wide powers cohferre4 on this Court fat granting relief in the case of violation of fundamental rights, tha't - this Court will haVe no jurisdiction to entertain any proceeding which. may not be in conforfnity with procedure prescribed by the Rules of this _Court. e .\n\nRules .undoubtedly lay down the procedure which .is normaJly to be followed for making an application under Article 32 ofthe Constitution. They,_ howeVer, do not and cannot have the effeCt of limiting the jurisdiction of this Court of enter- . taining a proceeding under' Article 32 of the Constitution, if made, only in the manner pr\"'cribcd by the rul ..\n\n~ [169 F-H; 170 A-DJ ' .\n\n\n[19~4] 2 S.C.R.\n\ni:2. For effectively safeguarding the fundamerit3.1 rights. guaranteed by the Constitution, the Court in appropriate cases in the interests of justice wiU certainly be competent to treat a P, roceeding, though_ not in conformity with the procedure prescribed by the Rules of this Court,- as an appropriate proceeding under Article 32 &( the Constitution and -to entertain the same. Fundamental rights guaranteed under the Coiistitution are indeed t6o sacred to be' ignored or trifled , vith merely on tl:ie ground of technicality or afly n.ile of procedure. The rules framed by this Court do not also lay .down th1;1.t this Court can be moved under Article 32 of the Constitution only in accordance with the procedure pres- . cribed by the Rules and not otherwise. A merC technicality in the matter of form • or procedure Which may not in any way affect\" the substance of. any proceeding should not stand in the way of the exercise of the 'very wide Jurisdiction and powers\n\nconfrred on this Court under Article 32 of the Constituticin for enforcement of fundamental iights guaranteed under the Constitution. Taking into considera ti on the substance of the matter-and the nature of allegations made, it will essentially be a matter foithe court 10 decide whether the procedure adopted can be considered to be an appropriate proceeding Within the ambit of Article 32 of the , Constitution. The Court if satisfied on the inaterials placed in the form of a letter or , other communication addressed to this Court, may take notice of the same in appropriate cases. Experience &hows that .in many cases it may not be possible for the party c9ncerned to file a regular writ petition in confonnity with procedure Ia:id down in the Rules -of this eourf. The Supreme Court for quite somt; years now has in rhany cases .propeeded to act on the basis of the letters addressed to it: A iong standing practice of the Court in ihe 1natter of procedure also acquired sanctity. Further in yarious cases the Court has refused to take any ntice of letters or other kind of communications addressed to Court and in many cases also the Court on being moved by a letter bas direCted a formal writ petition to be filed before it has decided to proceed further in the matter. [170 FH; 171 AD] . .\n\n2:3. It is bowel/er eminently desirable that normally the procedure prescribed in the rules of th.is Court should be followed while entertaining a petition under Article 32 of the Constitlition, though in exceptional cases and particulady in the matter of general public interest, this Court may, taking info con_sidetation the peculiar facts and ciumstances of case, proceed tO .exercise its jurisdiction Under Article 32 of the Constitution for enforcement of fundamental rights treating the letter or the comµiunication in any other form as an appropriate proceeding under Art. 32 of the Constitution. Further any party who addresses a letter oi' a6.y other communication to this cOurt seeking intervention of this Court on the basis of the said letter and communication should address this letter or Communication to this Cow1 and not to any individual Judge by name. Such communication should be addressed to -the Chief Justice 'of the Court and his companion Justices.\n\nA private. communication by a party to any Learned Judge ..\n\nOVer any matter is not propef and may create embarrassment for tho Court and the Judge concerned. 11710-H;172 A]\n\nIn the present case, the unfoftunate workers who are employed and bonded labourers at a distant place, could not pos.sibly in view Of their bondage, move this Court, following the procedure laid down-in the RulOI of this Court, The Petitioner which claims to be a social welfare Organization interested in . restorina liberty and dignity to these unfortunate bonded labourers should be considered competent to move this Cowt by a letter or 4il'e conununication addressed to\n\n. .\n\n..... (\n\n1 -\n\nBANDHUA MUKTI MORCHA \\'. UNION 89\n\nthis Court, to avoid trouble and expenses, as the petitioner is not moving this Court\n\n. A for any personal or private benefit. . ' ' ·\n\n. 3:1. Whenever, however, there is an_allegatioh of violation of fundamental rights, it becomes the responsibility and also the sacred 'duty of this Court to pro~ tect such fundamental rights guaianteed under the Constitution provided that this Court is satisfied that a case for interference by this Court\" appears prima facie to have been .made out. Very often the violation of .fundamental rights is not admitted or .accepted. On a proper consideration of the materials the Court has to come to a conclllsion whether there has been any violation of fundamental rights to enable the court to grant appropriate reliefs in the matter.\n\nIn various cases, because of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the Case the party approaching this Court.for enforcement of fundamental rights may not be in ii position to furnish all. relevant materials and necestary particulars. If, however, on a consideration of the materials placed, the Court is satisfied 'that' a propei.- probe into the matter is necessafy in the larger. interest of administration of justice and for enforcement of fundamental rights guaranteed, the Court, in vew of the Obligatiq, ns and duty cast upon it of preserving andprotec'ting fundamental rights, may require bettr aµd further materials to enable the Court to take appropriate action; and there cannot' b:e anything improper in the proper exercise of Court's jurisdiction under.\n\nArticle 32 of the Constitution to try to secure the necessary materials through appropriate agency. The conunission that the Court m3.Y appoint or the investi~\n\ngation that the court n1ay direct -is essentially for the 'Court's satisfaction as to the correctness or otherwise of (be allegation of violation of fundamental rights to\n\n~blc the Court to decide the Course to bC adopted .fol: doing proper justi~ to the parties in the matter of protection Of . their fund3.mental rights. It has to be . bome in mid that in this land of ours, there are persons without education, without means and without opportunities and they also are entitled to full protection of their rights or privileges which the Constitutions affords. Living in chilled penury without nssary resources and very often. not fully conscious of their rights guaranteed under the ConstitUtion, a very large section of the people comtnonly termecl. as the weaker section live in this land. When this Court is approached on behalf of this class of people .for enforcement of fundamental rights of which they have been denrived and which they are pqually entitled to enjoy, it becon1es the specl.al responsibility of the Court to sec that justice is not.denied to them a\"nd the disadvantageous position in which they are placed, do not stand in the way of their getting justice from this Court. [172 D-H; 173 AB]\n\n. 3 :3. ThC po, ver to appoint a commission or an investigatiqn body for making enquiries in terms of directions given by the Court must be considered to be implied and , irlherent in the power that the Court haS under Article 32 for enforcement, of the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution. This is a powei;- which is indeed \"incidental or anci11afy, to !he power which the Court is called upon to exeraise in a proceeding under' Ar.tiCle 32 of the Constitution.\n\nG It is entirely in the discretion of the Court, depending on the facts and circumstances of any case, to consider whether any such power regarding investigation has to be exercised or not. The Commission that the Court appoints or the investigation that the Court directs white dealing with. a proceeding under Article 32 of the\"\n\nConstitution is not a commission or enquiry under the Code of Civ'il Procedure.\n\nSuch power must necessarily be held. io be implied within the very wide Powers H conferred on this Court under Article 32 fr enforcement of fuiidamental rights.\n\n\n(1984] 2 S.C.R.\n\nA Fr proper Cxercise of its powers under Article 32 of the Constitution and for due\n\ndischarge of .the obligation and duty cast upon thi~ Court iii the matter of pro.· . tectibn nd enforcement of fundamental rights which the Constitution guarantees,\n\n. this .Court has an inherent power to act in such a manI1er as will enable this Court to discharge its duties and .obligations under Article 32 of the Constitution properly and effectively in the larger\" interest of administration of jU.sticc, and for proper protection of Constitution safeguards. [i73 C-G]\n\n4. The , litigation of ihis type particularly in relation to bonded Jaburers is really not in nature an adversary litigation and it becomes' the duty of the Stat'e and also of the appropriate \"authorities to offer its best cooperation to see that this cvifpractice which has been declared illegal is ended at_the earliest.- The existence .of bonded labour in the Court' is an unfortunate fact. Whenever there is an allegation of the existence of bonded labour_ in any particular_ State, the State instead of seeking to come Out with a case of denial of such existen~ on the basis of a feeling that the existenqe of bonde41abour in the State may cast a slur or stigma on its administratiVe machinery, should cause.cffective.enquiriesto be made into , the matter and if the matter is pending in this court, should coop_crate with this Court to seethat death-knell is sounded On this illegal system which constitutes ' a veritable social menace aD.d stands in the way of healthy development of the nation. [174 A-CJ\n\n. D\n\nPER CONTRA :.\n\n5. The grievance of denial Of Ot.h:er just rights to the workmen and the reliefs claimed for _givillg the. workmen the benefits to .which they _may be entitled under various Icgislatons enacted for their Welfare are more of less in the nature of con-. sequential reliefs incidental to the main relief of freedom from bonded and forced labour to whiCh the workriien are rejected. In the facts and circumstances Of the\n\nse, it appears that the prOvisions of inter-State Migrant WorkmcD. (Regulation of\n\nE Employment and Conditions of Service) Act, 1979 arc not applicable and therefore cdo not fall for any adjudication. [174 F-G]\n\n, ..\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ .Petition No. 2135 of 1982.\n\nUnder Article 32 of the Constitution.\n\nGovind Mukhoty,. S.K. Bhattacharya and N.R., Chaudhary for the Petitioner.\n\nM.N. Phadke, K.B. Rohtcigi and S.K. Dhingra for the Respondent Nos. 4,5,7, 8. & 9; ·\n\nK.B. Rhtagi and S.J. Dhingra for tl:le Respondent No. 13 ..\n\nS.K. Verma for the Respondent No'. 6.\n\nAbdul Khadar Sr . . Advocate and Miss. A. Su6hash11i for the respondent.\n\nl '\n\nBANDHUA MUKTI MORCHA 'V. UNIO'I (Bhagwati. n 91\n\nThe following Judgments were delivered-\n\nBHAGWAl'I, J. The petitioner is an organisation dedicated, to the cause of release of onded labou.rers in the country. The syst.em of bonded labour has been prevalent ill' .various parts of the country since long prior to the attainment of political freedom and it con\n\nstitutes an ugly and shameful feature of our national life. This system based on exploitation by a few socially and economically powerful wrsons trading on the misery and suffering of large numbers .. of men arid holding them iri bondage is a relic of a feudal hierarchical society which, hypocritically proclaims the divinity of men but treats . large masses of people belonging to the lower rungs of the social ladder or economically impoverished segments of society as dirt and . chattel. This system under which one person can be bonded 'to pro\n\n vide labour. to anothr fo.r years and years until an alleged debt'is supposed to. be wiped out which never seems to happen during the life time of the bonded labourer, is totally incompatible with the new . . egalitarian socio-economic order which we have promised to build and it is not only an affornt to basic human dignity but also con\" stitutes gross and revolting violatio~ of constitutional values. The appalling conditions in which bonded labourers live, not as humans but as serfs; recall to. the mind the following lines from\"Man with the Hoe\" which' ~!most seem to have been written with reference to this neglected and forlorn species of Indian humanity : .\n\n\"Bowed by. the weight or' centuries Ire leans\n\n.Upon his hoe and gazes on the ground . The emptiness of ages on his fac.e,\n\nAnd_on his back the burden of the world,\n\nThey are non-beings, .exiles of civilization, Jiving a life worst. than ihat of animals, for the animals are at least free to roam about as they like and they can plunder or grnb food whenever they are hungry but these out castes of society are held in bondage, robbed of their freedom and'they are consigned to an existence where they have to live either in hovels or under the open sky and be satisfied\n\nwith whatever 'little unwholesome food they can manage to get, in- . adequate. though. it be to fill their hungry stomachs. Not having any ·\n\n. choice, they are driven by poverty and hunger into a life of bondage a dark bottomless pit from which, in a cruel exploitative society, thdy cannot hope to be rescued. .\n\nThis pernicious practice of bonded labour existed in . maicy\n\n\n(1984J 2 S.C.R.\n\nStates and obviously with the ushering in of independence it could not be allowed to continue to blight the national life any longer and hence, when we framed our Constitution, we enacted Article 23 of , the Constitution which prohibits \"traffic in human beings and 'begar. and other similar forms of fcmied labour\" practised by any one. The system of bonded labour therefore stood prohibited by Article '23 and there could have been no more solemn and effective prohibition than the one enacted in the Constitution in Article 23. But, it appears that though the Consti\\ution was enacted as far back as 26th January, 1950 and many years passed since then, no serious.effort was made to give effect to Article 23 and to stamp out the shocking practice of ·· to bondild labour. It was only in 1976 that Parliament enacted the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976 providing for th.e aboli~ tion ofbonded labour S)\".Steni with a view to preventing the economic and physical exploitation 'of the weaker sections of the people.\n\nBut, unfortunately, as subsequent events have .shown and that is borne ont also by the Report made by the Centre for Rural Development Administration, I.ndian Institute of Public Administration to the Mini, stry of Labour Government of India on \"Rehabilitation of Bonded fabour in Monghyr Dfstrict, Jlihar\", the Report made by the Public Policy and Planning Division of the Indian Institute of Public Administration to the Ministry of Labour, Government of India on \"Evaluation Study of Bonded Labour Rehabilitation Scheme In Tehri Garhwal, U.P.\", the Report'ofLaxmi Dhar Misra, the Director-General (Labour Welfare) of the Government of India based on On the Spot Studies Regarding Identification, Release of Bonded_ Labourers and Rehabilitation of Freed Labourers in Uttar Pradesh,\n\nMadhya Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh; Karnataka, Orissa, Bihar, Rajasthan, tamilnadu and .Kerala and the Report of the National \" Seminar on \"Indentification and Rehabilitationof Bonded Labour\" l).eld from 7th to 9th February, 1983 that the pernidous practice of bonded labour has not yet been totally eradieated from the national scene and that 'it continus t6 disfigure the social and economic life of the country ai certain places.\n\nThere are still number of bonded labourers in various parts of the country and significantly, as pointed ot in the Report of the Natfoual Seminar on '.'ldentifi_catioµ and Rehabilitation of Bonded Labour\" a large number of them belong . to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes account for the next largest number while the few who are not from Scheduled Castes or Scheduled. Tribes are generally landles's agricultural labourers.\n\nIt is absolutely essential we would unhesitatingly declare that it is a constitutional imperative-that the bonded labourers must be identified and released from the shackles of bondage Sb that they can assimilate\n\n,4,- •\n\n\"\"'\n\n. BANDHUA MUKTI MORCHA v. UNlvN (Bhagwati, J.) 93\n\nthemselves in the main stream of civilised human society and realise 'the dignity, beauty and wor.th of human existence.\n\nThe process of identification and release of bonded labourers is a process of disco- .very and transformat.lon. of non-beings into human-beings and what it involves is eloquently described in the beautiful lines of Rabindra Nath Tagore in \"Kadi and Koma!\" .\n\nI 'Into the mouths of these . Dumb, pale and meal<; ,\n\nWe have to infuse the language o(the soul.\n\nInto the hearts of these Weary and worn, dry and forlorn We have to minstrel the language 'of humanity.'\n\nThis Process of discovery and transformation poses a serious problem since the social and economic milieu in which it has to be accomplished is dominated by elements hositle to it. But this problem has 'to be solved if we want to emancipate those who are living in bonda&e and serfdom and make them equal participants in the fruits of freedom and liberty.\n\nIt is aproblem which needs urgent attention of the Government'oflndia and the State Governments and when the Directive Principles of State Policy have obligated the Central.and the State Governments'to'take steps and adopt measures for the purp3se of ensuring social justice to .the have-notes and the handicapped, it is not right on the part of the.concerned governments to shut their eyes to the inhuman exploitation to which the bonded labourers are subjected. It is not uncommon to find that the administration in some States is not willing to admit the existence of bonded labour, even though it exists in their territory and there is incontrovertible evidence that it does so exist . We fail to see why the administration should .feel shy in admitting the existence of bonded labour, bequseit is not the existence of bonded labour that is a slur on the administration but its failure to take note of it and to take all eces sary steps for the purpose of putting an end to the bonded labour system by quickly identifying, reloasing and permanently rehabilitating bonded, labourers.\n\nWhat is needed is determination, dynamism and a sens; of social commitment of the part of the administration to free bonded labourers and rehabilitate them and wipe out this ugly inhuman practice which is a blot on our national life. . What happend recently in the Ranga Reddy District of Andrha Pradesh as a result , of the initiative taken by' this Court in Writ Petitions Nos. 1574 of 1982 and 54 of 1983 sbows clearly that if the political and administrative apparatus has a sense of commitment to the constitutional values\n\n\n[1984] 2 S.C.R.\n\nand is determined to take action for identifying, relasing and rebabi~ litating bonded labourers despite pres.sures and pulls from different quarters, much can be done for securing emancipation and rehabilitation of bonded labourers.' . The District .Administration of Ranga Reddy District could in less than six months release over 3000 bonded labourers from the 'clutches of contractors in stone quarries in Ranga Reddy District and send them back to their ho.mes. with tickets and pocket expenses. • It is therefore essent.ial thai whichever be the.\n\nState Government it should, where there is bonded labour, admit the existence of such bonded labour and make; all possible efforts .to eradicate it-. By doing so, it will not only be performing a humanitarian function but also discharging a constitutional obligation .and strengthening the foundations of participatory democracy in the country . ·\n\nWe also find that in some cases the State Governments in order to shi'rk their obligation, take shelter under the plea that there may be some forced labour in their State but that is not bonded labour.\" We shall have occasion to deal with this plea a little later 'when we refer to the definition of 'bonded labour' given in the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act; 1976 which it! first blush appears to be a narrow definition limited only to a situation where a debtor'is forced 10 provide labour to a creditor.\n\nThe state of Haryana has iil the present case tried to. quibble with this definition of 'bonded labour' and its .argument has been that these , labourers may be providing. forced\n\nlabur but they are not bonded labourers within the meaning of the Bonded Labour Systein (Abolition) Act, 1976 and they may therefore be freed by the Court if it so pleases but the State of Haryana cannot be compelled to .rehabilitate them.\n\nWe are cmi:strained to observe. that this agrument, quite apart from its .invalidity, ill-behoves a State Government which is committed to the cause of socialism.and claims to be striving to esure social justice to the vulnerable seciions of the community. But we. do not wish to anitcipate the discussion . in regard to this argument and at the present stage we content ourselves by mrely observing that it is unfortunate that any State Go.vernmerit shauld take up the plea that persons who are forced to proyided labour. miy .be forced. labourers but unless it is shown by them by proper evidence tested by CT<Jss-examination that they are forced to prqvide.\" . labour against a bonded debt, tbey cannot be said to be bondedlabourers and the State Government cannot beheld to be under any 'obliga~\n\nti01J.to rehabilitate them.\n\n' The ptitioner made a survey or'some of the stbne qarries in\n\n. .\n\n--~- ,\n\n\"\\ \"'\"\"\"\n\nBANDHUA MUJCTI MORCHA \\'. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) ' 95\n\nFAridabad district near the city bf Deijii and found that there were a large number of labourers from Maharashtra, . Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and Rajas.than who were working in these stone quarries nuder \"inhuman and intolerable conditions'\" and many of whom were b; inded labourers: The petitioner therefore addressed a letter to one of us Oil 25th February, 1982 pointing out that in the miries of Shri S.L. Sharma, Gnrukula Indra Prastha, Post Amar Nagar, Faridabad, District, a iarge number of labourers were languishing under abject conditions of bondage for last about. ten years, and the pe.titioner gave the names of 11 bonded laboqrers who were from village Asarha, Bariner distriCt of Rajasthan, 7 bonded labourers who were from village Bharol, district Jhansi of Madhya. Pradesh and 23 bonded labourers who were from village Barodia, Bhanger, Tehsil Khurai, district Sagar, M.P.\n\nThe petitioner pointed out that there were ')'et another 14 .bonded labourer.s fro in Lalitpur in U.P .\".\n\nThe petitioner also annexed to its letter, tatemen.ts in eriginal bearing .the thumb marks or .signatures as the case may be of these bonded lab; mrers referred to in the letter. 'rbe petitioner pointed out in. the letter that the labourers~ working in these stone quarries were living under the most inhuman conditions. and their pitiable lot.was described .by the. petitioner in the. f?llowing words:\n\n\"Besides these cases of bonded labour, there. are innumerable cases of fatal and serious injuries caused due to\n\nacidents while working in the mines, while dynamiting the tocks or while crushing the stones. The stone-dust pol)ution near the stone crushers. is s.o various that.many a valuable' lives are lost due to tuberoculosi~ while others are . reduced to mere.skeletons because ofT.B. and other diseases . . The ; vorkers are. not provided with any medical care, what to speak of compensating the poor worker for injury or for death. No cas, s a'.re registered against the mine 6wners or' the lessees for violation of safety rules unaer Mines Act.\n\nWe are enclosing herewith the statements of about 75 workers who have suffered or are suffering continuously due to non-implementation of the rules by the Central Government or by.Haryana Government or by the employers. . ·. . . '\n\nAlmost 99 % of the workers are' migrnt from drought prone areas of Rajasthan, Madhya.Pradesh; Andhra Pradesh, Orissa, Maharashtra and Bihar. But if there is any on.e\n\n• G\n\nplace where the Central legislation of Inter State -Migrant H W6rkmens Act 1979 is being most .flagrantly violated it is •\n\nSUPR~ME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1984] 2 S.C.R.\n\nhere in these mines, without any residential accommodation, with the name-not eve~ a thatched roof to fend against the icy 'Yinds and winter rain or against the scorching heat in mindsummer, with scanty clothing, with very impure and polluted drinking water accumulated during rainy season in the clitches, with absolutely no facilities for scliooling or· childcare, braving al! the hazards of nature and pollution \"and ill treatment, theS<I thusands of sons and daughters of . . .\n\nMother India pitomise: the \"Wretched of the Earth\".\n\n' On top of all these forms of exploitation is the totally illegal system of \"Thekedars\", middlemen who extract 30 %\n\nof the poor miner's .wages as their ill gotten commission (Rs. 20 out of Rs. 60, wages for per truck load of stone ballast).\n\nThe trucks are invariably oversign\"d in some cases thy doubt the prescribed size of 150 Sq. feet but payment remains the same .. The hills are dotted with liquor vends-legal and illegal.\n\nMurders ana molestation of women is very common.\"\n\nThe petitioner also set out the various provisions of the Con- . stitution and the statutes which were not being implemented or observed . in regard to the labourers working in ihese stone quarries. .The petitioner in the end prayed that a writ be issued for proper imple- . mentation of these provisions of the Constitution and statutes with a E view to ending the misery, suffering and helplessess of \"these vie-,\n\nti'!ls of most inhuman exploitation\". ·\n\nThe letter dated 25th February 1982 addressed by the petitioner was treated as a writ ptition and by an order dated 26th February 1982 this Court issued notice on the writ petition and appointed two advocates, nainely, M/s. Asliok Srivastava and Ashok Panda as commissioners to visit the stone qua:rries of Shri S.L. Sharma in Godhokhor (Anangpur) and Lakkarpur in Faridabad district and to interview each of the persons whose names were mentioned in the letter of the petitioner as also a\" cross section of the either workers with a view to finding out whether they are willingly working in these ' stone quarries and also to inquire about the conditions in which they are working. M/s. Ashok Srivastava and Ashok Panda were directed to.visit these stone quarries on 27th and 28th February 1982 'and to make a.report to this Court on or before 2nd March 1982.\n\nPursuant to. this order made by us, M/s. Ashok Srivastava and Ashok Panda visited. the stone quarries of S.L. Shrma in Godhokhor and Lakkarpur\n\n~'and carried out the assignment entrusted to them and submitted a \"'\n\n,\\-\n\nf ( ~\n\nBANDHUA MlJKTl MORCHA •· UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 97 • • report to this Court on 2nd March J 982.\n\nThe Report pointed oil! inter alia that i11 the stone quarries of S.L. Sharma at Godhakhpur, \"m1ny stone'. crushing machines were operating with the result that . th' whole atmosphere was full of dust and it was difficult even to.\n\nbreathe\".\n\nThe report then referred to the statements of various 'workers interviewed by Mis. Ashok Srivastava and Ashok Pan.da a11d according t~ 'the statements given by some of. them, namely, Lalu Ram, Dalla Ram, Thakur Lal, Budh Ram, Harda, Mahadev, Smt. Shibban, Hardev, Anam, Punnu, Ghanshyam, Randhir and Mute, they were not allowed to leave the stone quarries and were providing forced labour and they did not have even pure water to drink bu't wore compolled in most cases to drink dirty water frpm anal/ah and w're living in Jhuggics with stones piled one upon the other as walls and stra\\V covering at the top, which did' not afford any protection against sun and rain. and which were so low that a person could hardly stand insrde them.\n\nThe statements of these workers showed that a few of them , vere suffering from tuberculosis and even when injuries were caused due to accidents arising in the course of employment, no compensation was being i1aid to them and there were no facilities for medical treatment or schdoling for children.\n\nThe Report proceeded to state' that M/s. 'Ashok Srivastava and Ashok' Panda then Visited_ 1nine_ no. 8 in Godhokhor Bione quarries-and here they found that the. condition of the jhuggies was much worse ina<much as the jhuggies were made only of straw and most of the people living in jhuggies had no clothes lo wearand were shivering from cold and even the small children were moving about without any proj)oer clothing.\n\nM/s.• Ashok Srivastava and Ashok Panda found that none of the inmates of the jhuggies had any blanket or wollen clothes and they did not even have any mat on which they could sleep. The statem, nts of Phool Chand, Babu Lal, Bhoolu, Karaya, Ram Bahadur and Salt'u also showed that alhhese workers were bonded labourers who were not. allowed to. leave the stone quarries and one' of them, n, am, ly, Sallu was seriously injured on his leftJeg only a day before the visit of M/s. Ashok Sri\\>astava and Ashol': Panda but be did not\n\nhop_, to get ari'y co1nµensation \"because here ilo one gets any co.n1rn1sation for any injury''. Most of the workers interviewed 'by\n\nM/s. Ash0k Srivastava and Ashok Panda stated that they got very little by way of \\Vages fro1n ti1e mi.ne lessees or owners of\" stone crushers since they .had to purchase explosives with their own m011eys and they had to incur other epenses which, according to Dr. Patwardhan's repJrt to which we .shall refer :hereafter, inCluded 50 per cent of the expenses of drilling holes.· M/s .. Ashok Srivastava .and Ashok Panda also pointed out in the Report that the folJo, ving persons working\n\nSUPREME.COURT REPORTS [19S4] 2 S.c.R.\n\nin the Godhokhor tone quarries\" claimetl tat they were tcn<lcd . labourers :\n\n(!) Chand Bahadur. son of Hastbir (2) Lal Bahadur sen of Umbar .Bahadur (3) Chhotey Lal sol) of Jarau (4) Harak Bahadur ·.son of Jeet. Bahadur (5) Gopal Bahadur sort of Jliahu Sinh\n\n(6) Roop Singh son of Govinda (7) Medh Bahadur son of Aspteir\n\n(8) Jiddey Bahadur son of Nunbahadur (9) Phool. Baha<lur sen of\n\nRam Bahadur (10) Heera Bahadur son .of Balbahadur (JJ) Veer 'Bahadur son of Chhalvir. (12) Nain Singh son of Lal Baliadur (I 3) Lal Bahadur son of Gang Bahaciur (14). Ganesh son of Gang PahPdur . (15) Amber Bahadur son of Sadhu Ba.hadur (I 6) Hira ta! sen· of .: Atbahadur (17) l(amar Bahadur (18) agadh Bahadur sol) of Tep BQhadur (19) Gajender Bahadur son of Shyam ta! (20) Ganga Ram. son of Lal Bai1adur. (21) Nar .Bahadur .and (22) Sant. Bahadpr son of Bhag Bahadur .\n\n. So .far as the workers working h1 La'kkarptir .stone quarnrs were concerned, .. the report of M/s. Ashok Sriyastava and Ashck • Panda stated that out of about 250 persons living in st:raw j!rngrirc . .. 100. persons hailed from Bilaspur while 150 persons telongcd to\n\n.Allahbad and according to the rep.or!, 100. persons coming from . Bilas.pur stated that they were forcibly kept by the co11tractcr. a1'd\n\nthey were not allowed to move out ofthelr place and.tl1ey were bonded . labourers.\n\nM/s. Asliok Srivastava and Asho.k Panda described iii the Report the pitiable condition in which these workers were livinc in . . straw jhuggies withot any protection against sun 8_rd min arc!. \\~'ith\n\ndrinking water available only from the iiarsati nal!e/i. 'The Rrrc•rt\n\npointed out that while M/s. Ashk Sri_vastavri anci Asl1ok Pacda. were interiewing the .workers in the Lakkarpur stone quarry, ii started raining heavily and thereupon they t0ek shelter in me of tl•e\n\nj_hugges ''.but.inside the jhuggi .it'wns not _safC, as \\vater \\vns p0urlnr\n\ninside'.' amt they were compleiely drenched inside the jhugi. i k Report also stated that, according to.tJ1.ese workers. there wercno ; nodical facilities available and even where workers were inj1•rrd.\n\nthey did.not• get.any medical aid .. The Report ended hy cbmv; rf' . that the.so workmen \"presented a picture of hclplessnes>. poverty rrci\n\n?xtrcme exploitation at the hands of moneyed people\" and ihry \\\\(re\n\nfound \"leading a most.miserable life and perhapsheasts rnd ; n; n-c'c. could be leading niore comfortable life than these •iielplessiabourers\".\n\nH Thereafter, the writ petition came up for hc.aring on Sth March 1;'82 along with anot(ler wtit petition filed by the present pethiciner .\n\n! ' ··\n\n' .\n\n• ..\n\nIlANDJIUA MUKTI MORCHA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 99\n\nj for release of some other bonded. labourers and on this day the Court A m1-:le an order directing that the copies of the Repqtt of M/s. Ashok . Srinstava and Ashok Panda shouldbe supplied to all the mine- '\n\nlc>sees and stono crushers who are respondents t_o. th_e writ petitions . 'so that they mly have an opportunity to file their reply to the focts\n\nfound in the Report. The Court also appointed nr. Patw.ardha'n f .\n\nIndi•.tn _Institute of Technology to carry out a socioClegal lnvestiga-\n\n. B ti.on in the following terms : ·\n\n-1.·\n\n\"ft is neCe5'ary that a socio-legal investigation should be carried out for the purpose 9f determining what are the con- .. ditiohs prevailing in the various quar_ries in Faridabad District and. whether ther_e are any workmen in those qu.arries . againsi their will 'or without their conse1it and what are the -\n\n COi'!ditions i~ which they an living. and whether any of the provisions ofthe Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act and\n\nInter-State Migrant Workmen (Regulation of Employment&· Conditions ofScrvice) Act is being violated.\n\nWe may make it clear that when , e are directiiig a socio-legal investigation\n\n- of these matters it 'is . not in a Spirit to criticise the State . .\n\nG wernment or any of its officers but-with a view to find. ou_t the correctness of the state of affairs so that the State Govern- . moot.and its officers could take i1cccssary steps for remedying\n\n. tle situation if a state of affairs cxis'ts , v.hicli iS contrary .-tO\n\nth.e provi.sions Of law and. the basic hunH1n .nornis. The Court can take actioi1 only after the scio-legal investigation is carried out by some respon; iblc person and a copy , ofthe 'report of the socio-legal investigation is made available io the\n\np1rties.\n\nWe would, therefore, request Dr. Patwardhan of T.f .T. to be good enough to carry out a socio-legal investigation into the aforesaid matters in the quarfies in Faridabad :bistriCt a list of which will .be supplied by Mr: Muklrnty on behalf of the P'titi011crs to. Dr. Patwardhan within ten d\"ays from . today after giving a copy to Mr. K.d. Bhagat, learned C9ttn<el appearing for the State of Haryairn. Dr.Patwardhap i\" rquested- _to ca, rry out soci~-lcgal investigation with .a view to putting forward a scheme for improving the living - COndi-tions for t.he worke.rs worki1Jg in t.hc. stonc-ql1arries and after. the scheme is submitted to. us we propose to hear the\n\nprtics ,011 the scheme with a view to evolving a fial scheme with the assistance of the State of Haryana for the purpose of ccci1lon1ic regeneratiol}--.of tese workn1en. _\n\nThe Court permitted Dr. Patwardhan to tke th~ assistance of\n\nF •\n\n100'\n\nSUPRBME COURT.REPORTS [1984] 2 s.c, R. •\n\nany person other th.an the parties to the writ petition in order to help him in his task and at the suggestion of the Court, the State of Haryana agreed to deposit a sum of Rs. 1500 to meet the expenses of'Dr.\n\nPatwardhan in carrying out the socio-legal investigation. The Court also .recorded in its order .that when it was pointed out in the Report of M/s. Ashok Srivastava and Ashok Panda that the workers in the stone .quarries did not have any pure driJJking water but. were using dirty water from the nallah for drinking purposes, Mr. K.G. Bhagat learned Actditionar Solicitor General appearing on , behalf of the State of Haryana fairly stated that \"though it may not be strictly the obligation of the State Government, the State Gqvernment will take necessary measures fof providing. cfrinking facilities to the workmen in the stone quarries\" .. The Court also directed that • the. workmen whose names were setout in the writ petition. and in the . Report of M/s. Ashok Srivastava and Ashok Panda and particularly\n\nin regard to whom a. separate statement had been filed in Court on b; half of the petitioner, would be free to go wherever they liked and they should not be restrained from doing so by any 'one and \"i.f they go to their respective villages, the district magistrates having jnris-\n\n~· diction over those villages\" shall \"take steps or measures to the extent\n\np)ssible for rehabilitating them.\" .\n\nPursuant to this order made by the Court, the State of Haryana\n\ndpoited a sum of Rs. 1500 in Court to.meet the expenses of the so; io-legal investigation and Dr. Patwardhan embarked upon his task with tlie asistance of Mr. Krishan Mahajan, the.legal corres- . p'.>ndent of the Hindustan Times.\n\nIt took some time for Dr. Patwardh1n to complete his assignment and prepare his report but having . regard to the lmmensity of.the task, the.time within which Dr. Patw1rdhan finished the inquiry and submitted his report was remarkably sbrt. . We shall have occasion to refer to .this Report a little latter\n\nw'nn we deal with the arguments advanced .on behalf of the parties', bc1t we m1y point out at this stage that the report of Dr. Patwardhan is a comprehnsive, well documented socio-legal study of the conditions in which the workmen engaged in stone quarries and stone crushers live and work and it. has made various constructive suggestions. and recommendations fof'ihe purpqs{ of improving the living conditions of the<ie workmen.\n\nWe are indeed grateful td'Dr. Patw1rdhan for carrying out this massive assignment so efficiently an:i in.such a short time,-. Dr. Patwardhan has submitted a state- . m'nt of the expenses 'incurred by him .in carrying out this socio-legal investigation and this statement shows that .he has incurred a total . expense of Rs. 2078 which after withdrawal of the amount of Rs.\n\n\\ -\n\n' BANDHUA MfTKTI MORCHA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.)\n\nIOI\n\n1500 deposit; d by the State of Haryana, leaves a balance of Rs. 578 to 'be reimbursed to_ Dr. Patwardhan. We are of the view that Dr.\n\nPatwardhan should also be paid a small honorarium of Rs. 1000.\n\nWi would therefore direct the State of Haryana to deposit a sum of Rs.\n\n\\' 578 with the Registry of this Court within_ 4 weeks from today with . liberty to Dr. Patwardhan to withdraw the same.\n\nThough it was stated by Shri K.G. Bhagat on behalf of the State of Haryana that the State Government will take necessary\n\nmoasures for providing dr_inking facilities to the workmen •in the stone quarries referred to in the writ petition and in the report of M/s.\n\nAshok Srivastava and Ashok Panda, it appears that either no such\n\nmeasures were taken on behalf of the State Oovernment or even . if\n\n. C they wore taken, they were short lived.\n\nThe result was that the work- . men working in most of these stone quarries had to remain wit.hoot . • pure drinking water and they had to continue \"to quench their thirst by d, j; inking dirty and filthy water\". Whether it is the obligation of the State Government to provide pure drinking water and if so what measures should be directed to be taken by the State Government in D . that behalf are matters which. we shall presently consider.\n\nThese are matters of some importance because there can be no doubt \\hat · pure drinking water is absolutelyessential to the health and .wellbeing of the workmen and some authority has to be resp.onsible for. providing it. '\n\nBefore we proceed to consider the merits of the controversy between the parties in all its various aspects it will be convenient at this stage to. dispose of a few preliminary oli)ections urged on behalf of tile respondents. The learned Additional Solicitor General appearing on behalf of the State of Harynana as also Mr. Phadke on behalf of one of the mine lessees contended that even if what is allrned by the petitioner in his letter which has been treated as a writ petition, is true; it cannot support a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, becaus~ no fundamental right of the petitiouer or of the workmen on whose behalf the writ petition has been filed, can be said to have been infringed.\n\nThis contention is, in our opinion, futile and it is indeed surprising that the State Government should have raised. it in answer to the writ petition. We can appreciate tJ:te anxiety. of the mine lessees to resist the writ petition on any ground availa- ' ble to them, be it hyper-technical or even frivolous, bnt we find it imcomprehensible -that the State Government should urge such a ·\n\npreliminary objection .with a view to stifling at the thresh-hold an inquiry by the Court a,• .lo whethr the 'workmen are living in bondage\n\nSUpREME CoURT REPORTS (1984] 2 s.c.R.\n\n' . anct under inhuman conditions. We should have thoughtthat if any citizen b.rings bfore the Court.a complaint that a large number of 'peasants or workers are bonded se, rfs or are being subjected to .. ex:\n\nploitation by a few mine lessees 6r conli'ctors ·.or employers or are b'ing denied the benefits of social welfare laws, the.State Government,.\n\nwhic~ is, under. our conititutional scheme, charged with. the mission. of bringing abSut a new socio-economic order where there will be social and .econimb justice for every one and equality of status and opportunity for au, would wclconie an inquiry by the court, so that if it is. fow1d that there. are in fact bonded labourers or even if the .WJrkers.are not bonded in the strict' sense Of the term as defined in.the\n\nBonded. Lib:mr System (Abolition) Act 1976 but they are made to provide forced labciur pr are consigned to a life of utfer deprivation . and degradatiqn, such a situation can be set right by the State Govern- . ·\n\nmont. Even if the State Government is on its own inquiry satisfied • that th~ workm, n are not .bonded and arc not co'mpelled to provide •. forced .lab.our and are living and worhng ii; decent conditions with all tho b1sic necssities or life provided to them, 'the State Goveni\"ment should not b1u1k-an inquiry by the court when a complaint is brought\n\nb/ a citize~,:but it.should be anxious to ; atisfy the court and thr6ugh . th~. court. the p'ople, of the country, that it is discharging its constitutional oblig1tbn fairly and adequately and the. workmen are being ensured ooi.al and economic justice: We have on more occasions thln on' said tl11t , public interest litigation is not' in the nature of adversary litigation but it is a challenge and. an opportunity to the .. governm, nt and, its otli; ers to' nuke basic human rights meaningful to\n\ntbe. depfive.:I and vulnerable sections of the community and to. assure them s:icial and ecJrromic justice whih is the signature tune of our GJnstitution. The Government and its. officers must welqome public · interest litig1[ion, bocause it would provide. them an occasion to exa:nine w:nth'r the pJar and the down-trodden are gettillg their 'sJoial ani e; JrrJmic ~:1titlemlnts or whether they are continuing to\n\nro.n1in victlm; of deception and explitafion at !he hands of strong . and pJwerful sections \\)ftlie CJmmu1; ity and wliether social and economic justice has become a o:ieaning-fui reality for the1n ot it has remained\n\ntcirely teasing illusion and a>pro1niseof unreality, so that in case . the complaintin the public interest litigation is found to be true,: . they can in discharge or;' their' constitutional obligation root out exploitation and. injustice andensure to the weaker. sections their rights . and entitlcmets. When the Court entertains public. interest litiga- iion, it does not do so.in.a cavilling spirit or in a confrontational mood ·or with a -view to tilting.at executive authority or seeking to usurp it bui its attempt,. is only to ensure observance of .sociai and economic\n\n.. , j.\n\nc.J l\n\nBANDHUA MUKTI MORCHA v. UNION (Bhagwilti, J.) 103\n\nrescue programmes: legislatiye as wir as executive, fra1ild for the A i . benefit of ti)e have-nots and the handica1iped and to protect them against vio-Jation of their basic human rights, which is also the con- . stitutional obligation of the executive.\n\nThe Court is. thus• merely assisting in the realisation of the constitutio1ial obj_ecti\\•cs.\n\n.... \\\n\nMoreover, when a complaint i_s made on behalf of workmen that tlrey are held in bondage :and arc working and living in miserable conditions without any proper or adequate shelter over their heads, without any\" protection againsi sun and rain, without two . square meals per day.and with only dirty water 'from a nullah to. drink, it is difficult to appreciate how such a c01hplaini can be thrown out o~ the ground that it is not violative of the fundamental right of the workmen ..\n\nIt is the fundamental riglit of every one in this country, a_ssurcd under the interpretatioi1 givn to Aticlc 21 b, y thisCourt in Fraizcis Mullen's case, to live with human dignity, free froiu exr.loitation.\n\nThis right to live with human dignity enshrined in Arti!le 21 derives its life breath from _the Directive Prindplcs of State Policy and parti- cularly clauses (e}nd (f) of Article 39 and Artie-les41 and-42. and at the. least, th<; refore, it must include protection of the. health and sfre- _ngth of workers men and wornen, and of the tcriuer age of children\n\nagainst abus~, opportunities and facilities for child_ren to develop in a healthy man1\\er and in conditioi1s of freedom and dignity; educational facilities, just and humane conditions of w6rk and inaternity\n\n. relief.\n\nThese are the minimuln requirements which must exist_ in order to enable_ a person to live with human dignity and no State norther the Central Government nor any State Government-has the\n\nfight to take any action which will deprive a _person 0°f ihe enjoyment of these basic essentials: Since the Direcrive Principles of State . P0liey contained.in clauscs(e) and (f) of Article 39, Article 41 and 42 are not enforceable in a court of law, it may not be possible to > compel the State through the judicial process to make provision: by statutory enactment or executive fiat for ensuring these_ basic essen iials which go to make up a life of human dignity but .where legisla tion is alrea\\ly enacted by the Stte providing these basic requirements to the workmen and thus investing their right to\"1ive 'with basic human dignity, with concr-ete reality a11d content; the State can _certainly be obligated to ensure observance of such legislation' for inaction on' the part of the State in securing implementation of such legislation woulda1uunt. to denial of the right to live with human dignitY. enshrined in Article 21, more so in the_context of Article 256 which providGs that the. executive power of every State shall be so exercised as to ensure compliance ; yith the iaws made by. Parliament\n\n' .\n\n!04\n\nSUPREME COURT. REPORTS [1'984] 2 s.c.R.\n\nand any existing laws which. apply in that State, We have alrady po.inted out in Asiad Construction Worker<1l case that the State is under a constitutional obligation to see that there is no violation .. of the fundamecitaJ right of any. person, particularly when he belongs to the weaker sections of the; community and is unable .to wage a legal battle . against a strong and powerful opponent who is exploiting him.\n\nThe ·• Central Government. is' therefore bound to ensure observance of various social ,;, e!fare and Jabour laws enacted by Parliaent for the purpose of securing to the \\vorkmen a life of basic human dignity in compliance with the Directive Principles of State Policy. It must also follow. as a necessary coroilary that the State of Haryana in which the stone quarries are vested by reason cif Haryana Minerals (V'i.sting of Righ.ts) .Act 1973 and which is therefore the owner of the mines -cannot while giving its mines for stone quarrying operations, permit workmen to be denied the benefit of various social welfare and labour laws nacted with a view to enablihg them to live aJife of human digity. tthe State of Haryana must therefore .ensure that the mirre-less.f'.es or contractors, to who1n. it is giving .its mines for stone quarrying operations, observe various social welfare and labour laws enacted for the benefit of the workmen.\n\nThis is a constitutional Obligation which can be enforced against the Central Governinent and . the State of Haryai1a by a writ petition under Article 32 of the Con ·\n\nstitution.\n\nThe. next preliminary objection. urged by the learned Additional Solicitor General on behalf of the State ofHaryana and Mr. Phadke on behalf of one of the mine:Jessees was that the court had no poer Jo appoint either Mr. Ashok Srivastava and Mr. Ashok Panda or Mr. Patwardhan as commissioners and the Reports made by them had no evidentiary value since what was stated in .the Reports'was based only on ex-parte staterrients which had not been tested by ctoss-examination. The leari1ed Additional Solicitor General as also Mr. Phadke\n\n. relied on Order XLVI of the Supreme Court Rules 1966 which, as its heading shows, deals with commissions and contended that since the commissions issued by the court in the. present case did not fall within the terms of any of the provisfons of Order XLVI, they were outside the scope of the power of the court and the cour! was not entitled to place any reliance on their reports for the purpose of adjudicating the issues arising in the writ petition. This arguemnt, plausible though .it rnay seem at first sight, is in our opini911 not well founded and must be rejected. It .is based upon a total misconception of the\n\n(I) [1983] I S.C.R. 456.\n\n...\n\n...\n\n• •.\n\nBANDHU~ MUHi MORCHA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 105\n\ntrue nature of a proceeding under Article 32 of the Constitution.\n\nA ArtiCJe 32 is so frequently used by iawyers and judges for enforcement of fundamental rights without a1iy preliminary objection against its invocation being raised on behalf of the State, that we have rarely . any occasion to examine its language and consiucr how lar, e is the width and amplitude qf its dimens.ion and range.\n\nWe are rn much .accustomed to the.· concept~ of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence which .\n\nB require every legal. proceedin'g including a proceeding for a high prerogative writ to be cast in a rigid or definitive mould and insist on ob.seivance of certain ,,7en settled rules of procedure, that we irr.pli- Citly assume that the same sophisticated procedural rules must also govern a 'proceedillg under Article 32 and the S11prcJi1e Court camict permit itself to be freed from tl1e shackles of these rules even if that C. be necessary for enforce111ent of a fundamental right. It wa~ orr the basis of this impre, sion fostered by Jong association with the Anglo- Saxon system of administration of justice thaf for a number of y, ears this court had taken the view that it is only a person whose fundamental right is violated who can approach the Supreme Court for relie1 ui:der Article 32 or in other words, he mus, t have a. cause of actic1) fer D. euforcemellt of his fundamental right.\n\nIt was 01ily in the year 1981 in the Judges Appointment and Transfer Case~' that thfs Ccurt for lhe llrst tiine took, the view that v,1here a pe:rson .or class of :i:; erscns to whom legal injury is caused by reason of violation of a fundamental right is unable to approach the court for judicial redress on account of poverty or disability or socially or economically disadvantaged E position, any member. of the public acting bona fide can move the court for relief uder Article 32 and a fortiofari, also under Article 226, so that the fundamental rights may become meaningful not only for the rich and the well:to-do who have the means to approach the court but also for the large masses of pe°'le who are living a life of want and destitution and who are by reason of Jack of awareness, assertive- F . ness and resources unable to seek judicial redress.\n\nThis \"view whic.h we took in the Judges Appointment and Transfer Case is clearly within ti1e terms of Article 32 if only we look at the language of this . Article uninfluenced and uninhibited by any pre-conceptions and prejudices or any pre-conceived notions. Article 32 in so far it is material is iii the following -terms : G\n\n\"Art. 32 (!) : The right to move the Supreme Court by , , appropriate proceedings for4the effforcement of the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed.\n\n(!) [1982] (2).SCR 365.\n\n106 . .\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS ·\n\n[1984) 2 S.C.R .\n\n(2) : The Supreme Court shall have power to . issue directions or orders or .writs, .in- • clucling writ in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and cer!lornri, whichever may be appropriate, . for the enforcemel)t of any of the rights\n\nconferied by this Part. .\n\nWhile intcrpre, ting Article 32, it must. be borne in mind that our'approach must be guided. not by any v.crbal or formalistic.cations of coristrudion but by the. par.amount object and purpose for which . thi;; Article has been. enacted as a Funadmental Right in the Constitution and its interpretation must receive illtnnination f10m the trinity of provisions ivhich permeate and energise the entire Constitutioil namely, the Preamale, the Ftmclarnerital Rights and the Difectiw Prlndples of State Policy. .Clause (1) of Article 32 c6nfc1:s the right to move the Supreme Court for enforcement of any of the fundamental rights, but it does not 'say as to who shall luive this right to . move the Supreme court not does it say by what proceedings the Supreme Court may be so moved.\n\nThere is no li; nitation in the words. of Clause (1) of Article 32 that the fundamental right which is . sought to be enforced by. moving the Supreine Cou.rt should be one belongini to the person who' moves the Supreme Court JlOI .docs il say that the Supreme Court should. be mved only by a particular kind of pr0ceoding; It is clear on the plain langu'lge of clause (I) of Article 32 that whenever there is a violation of a fundamental right; any one can move the Sqpreme Court for enforcement ofsuch funda.mental right. Of course, the Court wo.uld not, in exercise of . its discretion, intervene at the instance of a meddlesome interloper\n\n. or busy body, and ould ordina?ily insist that only a person whose\n\nfundamental right is violated should be. allowed to activise the court, but there is no fetter upon the power of the <:ourt to entertain a pro: . ceeding initiated by any person other than the one whose fundamental right is violated, though the court would, not ordinaril} entertain such a proceoding, since the person whose fundamental righ(is violated can always apprdacJ:i the court and if lie. does not wish to seek judicial redress by moving the court, why should some one else be allowed to do so on his behalf.\n\nThis reasoning however breaks down. when we have the case of a\"person or class of persons whose [uridmental right is violated but who cannot hiwe resort.to the cqurt on account of their pJverty or disability o.r soci'ally or economically disadvantaged position ani in suoh a case, therefore, the courf.canand must allow any member of the public acting boqa fid0 to espouse the cause of such\n\n-/ -\n\nBANDHUA MUKTI MORCHA v. UNIGN (Bhagwati; J.) 107 . . person or class of persons and move .the court for j'udicial rnforccme!it A or the fundamental right of such person or class of persons.\n\nThis does nt violate, in the slightest m\\'asure, the language @f the con- • stitutional provision enacted in clause (J) of A1ticlc 32\"\n\nThe.n again clause(!) of Article 32 says that the Supreme Court . . . ' . can be moved for enforcement. of a fundamental right by any. 'a ppro-.\n\nB priate' proeeedlng. T!ierc is no limitation. in regard to the kind of proceeding envisaged in clause (l) of Article _32 except that.theproceedi.ng must be: \"appropriate\" and this requirement of appropriateness must be judged in the'light of the purpose for which the proceeding is to be taken, narnely, enforcement of a fondamentai right: . Tl1e\n\nCo11titutin makers .deliberately did not lay down ny particu]ar fo111i C of procec(iing for enforcement of a fu'ndamental right nor did they stipulate that such proceeding should conform. to any rigid pattem or straight jacket formula as, for example, in England,.· because they knew that in a country' like India where there is'so. much or p.Jverty, ignorance,. illiteracy, deprivati.on and exploitation, 'iny insistence on a rigid formulaof proceeding for enforcement of a fu1.id-\n\n . D a1mntal right would. become self-defeating .because it would. place enforcement of fundamental rights beyond the reach of the common\n\nimn and the enti're remedy for 'enforcement of fundainen'tal rights\n\n.- \\1('.lich th~ C Jtistitution' ma tiers regarded as so precious nd invaluable\n\ntint tiny elev1ted it to. the status of a fundamental right, would be- CJm' a 'll; re rope of snd so far as the large masses of the people in E this -c)untry ar0 ce>ilerned. The Constitution 1nakers therefore advis, dly provided in Clause (I) of Article 32-that the Supreme Court m1y b' in)v ;.j by a11y '.a;>prop'riatc' proceeding, .'appropriate' not .i1rterm1 of a11y piticular form but 'appropriate' with refrcnce to\n\nthe pucpJc o( the proceeding. That is the reason why it .was held by this Cnrt in the Judges Appoi1itment and Transfer Case (supra) F lint Wli)rC a m'mbor of the public acting bona_ fide moves Hie Court for enforcJ.mnt of a. funclamental right 011 behalf of a person or cla11 of pmoin who on acco.uu; of poverty or .disability cir s.ocially\n\nOf .eJ.JllJ n 1c1\\ly disidvantaged position cannot approach the Court far nlief, such member of the public may move the court even .by just wriiiag, a letter, because iwould not.be right or fair to expect a G . prson acting pro bona publico to incur expenses out of his own pocket\n\nfor going to.a. lawyer and preparing a regular writ petition for being filed in c6uit for cnfprcement. of the fundamentalright or'the poor and doprivod ; ectfons of the cominunify a11d in such a case, a Jetter addrossecd. by him can legitimately be regarded as ari \"appropriate''. ii proceeding. ·\n\nSUPREMI> COURT REPORTS [1984] 2 s.c.R • !Jut the question then arises as to what is the power which may be exernis.ed bi the Supreme Court when it is moved b\n\n0 y an \"appro_priate\" proceeding for enforcement of a fundamental right. The only provision made by the Constitution maker~ in this behallis to be found in clause (2) of Article 32.which confers power on the Supreme Court \"to issue directions or orders or writs including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto\" and cer- tlorari, which-ever may be apprapriate, for enforcement of any of the fundamental rights. lt will be seen that the power conferred by clause\n\n(2) of Article 32 is in the widest terms. . It is not confined to issuing the high prerogative writs of habeas 'corpus, mandamus, prohibition, certiorari and quo quarrnnto, which are hedged in by strict conditions differing from one writto another and which to quote the words. spoken by Lord Atkin 'in Bnited Australia Liniited v. Barciays Ban le\n\nLtd. (ll in another context often \"stand in the path of justiceClanking their mediavel cilains\".\n\nBut it is much wider and includes witilin it't; matrix, power to issue, any directions, orders or .writs which may be appropriate for enforcement of the iuO:damental right in questin and this is made ampiy clear by tlie inclusive clause whicil refers to ;,, the 1iature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quowarranto ; ind certiorari.\n\nIt is not only the iligh prerogative writs of 111andan1us, habeas corpus, prohibition, quo \\Varranto and. certiorari .which can bei ssuo:l by the Supreme Court but also writs in the nature cif .\n\nthes~ higil pnrJg1tive writs and tl1erefore even if the cpnditions for issue of any of tl1oie high prerogative writs are not fulfilled; the\n\nSuprem~ Court WJU\\d n_o( be constrained to fold its hands in despair and plead its inability to help the citizen who has come before it for\n\njudieial redrss, bitt would have po.wer to issue any directio1i, order .or \\Vrit including a. \\Vrit in. the nature of any high prerOgatlve writ.\n\nThis provision conforring on the Supreme Court power t~ enforce the fonaamental rights. in tile widest possible terms shows the anJ<icty of the Constitution makers not to allow any prncedural techn!colities to. stand in the way of enforcement of fu.ndametal rights. The Constitution mlkers clearly intende.d that the Supreme Court should have the atnplest power to issue whatever direction, order or writ nny be appropriate in a given case for enforcement of a fundameutal\n\nright. But what procedure shall be followed by the Supoome Court ; n exercising. tile power .tq issue such direction,. order or writ ? That is a 1u1tt~r on 1vi1ich the Constitution is silent and advisedly So, becau;~ the Con•titt1tion makers never intended to fetter tile discretio.n of . the Suprome Court to evolve a procedure appropriate in the circums-\n\n• (l) [1941] AC l\n\nf--\n\n....\n\nr_\n\n-, .....\n\nBHANDHlJA MUKTI MORC!IA V. UNION (Bhagwati, /) 109 • tances of a given case for the purpose of enabling it to exercise its power f enforcing a fundamental right.\n\nNeither clause (2) of Article 32 nor any otiler provision of the Constitution requires that any particular procedure shall be followed by the Supreme Court in exercising its powe, I to issue an, appropirate direction; order or writ.\n\nThe purpose for which the power to issue an ppropriate direction, order or writ is conferred on the Supreme co.urt is to secure enforcement of a fundamental right and obviously therefore, whatever procedure' is necessary for fulfilment. of tb, e purpose must be permissible to the Supreme Court. n is not at all obligatory that arr adversarial procedur, where each party produces his own evidence tested by cross examipation by the other side and the judge sits like an umpire and decides the case only on the basis of such m.aterial as may be produced before him by both parties, must lie followed in a proceeding under Article 32 for enforcement of a fundamenlal right. . Jn fact, there is no such constitutional. compulsion enacted in clause (2) of ArtiCle '.l2 or. in any other part of tbe Constituion. It is only because we have been following the adversarial procedure for over a century owing to the introduction of the Anglo-Saxon system of jurisprudence under the British Rule that it has bccom! a part of our conscious as . well as sub-conscious thinking that every judiGial 'proceeding must. be 'casf in the mould of adversarial procedure and that justice cannot be dqne unless the 'adversarial procedure is adopted. But it may be . noted .that there is riothing sacrosanct about the adversarial procedure and in fact it is not followed in many other countries where the civil system of law prevails.· The adversarial procedure with evidence led either party and tested by-cross-examinaticiri by the other. party and the judge playing a passive role has become a part ofour legal system because it isembodied in. the Code of Civil Procedure and the Indian Evidence Act. But these statutes ob.iously have no application where a •new juriSdicdon is created in the Suprcn1c Court for enforce1ncnf of a fundamental right. We do not think we would be justified in imposing any restriction on the power of the Supreme Court to adopt such procedure as it thinks fit in exercise of its new jurisdiction, by engrafting adversarial procedure on it. when the constitution makers\n\nhaVe delibe, rately cho?en not to insist on any such requirement and instead, left it opei~ to tl)e SuP, reme Court to foliow.such proceoureas it thinks appropriate for the purpose of securfng the end for which the power is conferred, namely, enforcement of a fundamental right.\n\nThe adversarial proceQ_ure l)aS, in fact, come in for a lot of criticism\n\n!Ven in the coU:ntry of its ofigin, and there is an increasing tendency even in that country to depart from its strict. norms. Lord' De Jin speaking of the.nglish judiial syS\"te.m sai~ ''If our n1thcds \\\\Ere\n\n, . . 110\n\n.SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984] 2 s.c.R ·\n\nas antiq.uated as our legal methods, we hould be a bakrupl country\". , And Foster Q:C . .Observed : . \"I t!Jink tl1e whole EngJ.ish system is non-sense. I would go to the root of it-·the civil case between two private parties. is a mimic battle ........ conducted according to rules of ev.idcnce.\" .There's a consicferable body of juristic opinion in our country als0 which believes that strict adherence to the adversarial procedure can some times lead tq injustice, . particularly where the parties are not evenly balanced i.n social or economic st1ength. Where one of the parties to a litigation belongs to a poor and de?rived section of the community and does not possess adequate social and material. resources, he is bound to be at a disadvantage as against a strong and p0werful opponent ui1de.r the adversary system of jusiice, because . o[ his diflb1lty ih getting competent legal representation and more that; anything else, his inability to produce relevant evidence before the court. ·Therefore, when the poor come before the coil;!, particularly for cnforcem, nt of their fondamntal rights, it is nescessary to de.part from'thi adversari'al procedure and to evolve a n'ew procedure which,\n\nwi!I rmkc it pJsible for the poor and the weak to bring the necessary 1111tcrial before the court for the 'purpose of securing enforce111e11t of . . . . ·. th>'r funclamcntal rights. It must be remembered that the problems of th~ pJor. whic'.1 are now coming before the court.are qualitatively different from thJse which hnvo hither to occupied the attei1tion of\n\ntho C'}urt and_they needa different kind of lawyering skill and a ' difforent kind of judicial approach.\n\nIf we blindly folio~ the ad versaria l prJcedure in their case; they would never be able to. enforce their\n\nfu,1da1nenta,! rights and the result would be nothing but a mockery of the Constitution. We have therefore to abandon the laissez faire .approach in .the jH<l°iciai procss particularly where it .involves\n\na q'uestion of enforcement' of fundamental rights and forge new tcols, devise new methods and adopt new strategies for the purpose of making , fnndarmntal rights meanirtgful for the lar.geJmsses of people. Ali'd this is clearly permissible on the language of claus.e (2) -of Aricle 32 . bcatise the .Constitution 1nakers 'while enaCtingthat .claue have dC-\n\n librateljr' and advisedly not 11sed any words restricting ihe power of the court to adopt any procedure which it considers appropriate in\n\nth~ circilmstanccs of a given case for_ enforcing a fundaental right.\n\nIt is true. that the 'adoption of this 1\\oi{-traditionql approach is not 'likely to find easy. acceptance from the generality of lawyers because their n.; inds it re. conditioned by constant association with the existing system of'administration f justice which has become ingrained in them as a result of long years of familiarity and experience nd become part of their mental make up and habit and they would therefore aliv1ys hlve an unconseiqus N\"dilection . for the prevailing .. systeni\n\n. ' .\n\n+-'.\n\n'...\n\nT ' • ;\n\nI ,.\n\n), '\n\nBANDHUA MUKTl MORCHA v. UNION (Bhagwati,.J.) Ii I\n\nof administration o(iustice. ·. But if we want. the fundamental rights A to become a living .reality and the Supreme Court to become it real, sentinel on the quiviVe, we must free. outselves from the shackles of outdated and outmoded assumptions and bring to bear on the subject fresh outlook and original unconventional thirtking. ·\n\nNow it is obviou; that the poor and the disadvantaged cannot B possibly produce relevant material before the court in support of their 'case and equally where an action is brought on their behalf by a' citizen . acting pro bon~ publico, it would be alcimost impossible for him to gather the relevant materia.1 and place it before the court.\n\nWhat is the Supreme Court to do in such a case ? Would the SupremeCourt not be failing. iri discharge of its constitutional duty of enforcing a . c fundamental right •if it refuses to intervene becasue the petiti0i1cr b;!Onging to .the underprivileged segment of s6Ciety o} a publiC spirited\n\ndtiin espousing his cause is. unable to 'produce the relevant material\n\nb)fore the. court. If the Supreme Court were to adopt a pas.iive approach and decline to intervene in .s.uch a case becaues relevant 1mterial has not been produced before ft by the party seeking its Ii intervention, the fundamental rights would remain merely a teasing: illu ; ion so f'.tr as the poor and disadvantaged sectfons of the community are cJ'lcerned. It is for this reason that the Supreme Court has evolv-· ed the practice of appointing commissionsfor the puqiose of gathering\n\nfacts and data in regard to a complaint of breach of fundamental right made on behalf of the weaker sections of the society. The Report\n\n. E ' of the coinmissioner \\vould fur1ish primil iaie evidene-.of the facts and data gathered by the commissioner and .that i's why the Supreme Court is camful to appoint a responsible. person as commissioner to make an inquiry or investigation into the facts rela.ting to the cort1plaint• It is interesting to note that in the pa1tthe Supreme Court has appoiMted sometimes .a district magistrate, sometimes a district F Ji1dge, soinetimes a professor of law, sometimes a jounalist,'scmetimes an officer of the court and sometimes an advocate practising in t!1c court, for the ptirp.ose of carrying out an inquiry qr investigation and m1king report. to the court because t)1e commi.ssioner appointed by t:ie C.ourt must be a responsible person who enjoys the confidence of tho court and who is ·.expected. to carry out his assignment objecti- G v0Jy and impartially. without any predilection or prejudice. .Once the r, eport of the Commissioner is received, copies.of .jt would be sup- . 'plied to the parties so that either party; if it wan.ts to dispute any cf ihe facts or data stated in the Report, may do so by filing an ,, ffidavit and the court then consider the report of the commissioner. and the .\n\nH affi1avits which ll!aY have been filed and pro_ceed (o adjiidiciate upon ·\n\n• I\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984) 2 s.c, R.\n\nthe isuerising in the w1it petition. It would be entirely for the Court to consider whatweight to attach to the facts and data stated in the report of.the commissioner and to what extent to act upon such facts and data. But it would not be correct to say _that the report of the commissio.ner has Jio evidentiary Vaine at all, since the statements made in it are no't tested by cross-examination. To accept thiS contention would be to introduce the adversarial procedure in a proceed- ing where in the given situation, it is totally inapposite. The learned A1ditional Solicitor General and Mr: Phadke relied on Order XXVl of the Code of Civil Procedure and Order XLVI of the Supreme Court Rules ! 966 for the purpose ofeontending that a commission can be appointed by the Supt; eme Court only .ro'r .the purpose of exa- 1nining witnesses, niaking legal-investigations and exan1iningaecounts and the _Supre1m Court has no power to appoint t\\ commission for miking an lnqtiiry: or in'1'esti'gatio1~ into facts relating to a Coin- platnt of violation of a fundamental t'ight in a proceeding under Article 32..\n\nNJw it is true that Order XLV I of the. Supreme Court R\"1JC5 1956 m:1kes the proyisions of Order XXVI of the Code of Civil Prciodure, except rules 13, 14, 19, 20, 21 and 22 applicable to .the\n\n:Spre:m Court and lays down the procedure for an application fol\n\ni\"m of a com:nissiou, but O_rder XXVI is not exhaustive and does nJt detract from the inherent power of the Supreme Court to appoint a cJm nission .. if theapp:Jinmtent of such co1nn1ission is found neccsnry for th' purpose of securing enforcement of a fundan1ental right in exrcis~ of its c9·11stitutional jut:isdiction under Article . .32. Order: XLVI of .the Suprem' Court Rules 1966 cannot in m1y way miliiatc ag iinst the power of the Supreme Court under Article32 and in fact rulo 6 rif Order XLVII of the Supreme Court Rules 1966 provides t!11t n ithing in tlnso Rules \"sha\\J be deemed to limit or otherwise a!foot th' in1Drent powers of the court to make such orders ts may .\n\nb~ n~::es>; ary for the ends of justice.\" We canot therefore accept th' coatention or the learned Addi. Solicitor General and Mr. Phadke that th' court acted beyond its power in appointing M/s. Ashok , Sriva-; tava a11d Ashok Pandci as Co1nmissiOnerS in the fist istBncc\n\nand Dr. Pat\\vardhan as co111n1issioner ata subsequent stage {or the ·· purp:Jse of making: an itiquiry into the conditions C!f \\vorkn1en en1pl6yod in the stone quarries. The petitioner in the \"'rit petitio1i speci- . froally alleged violation of' the fundamenial rights of the workmen\n\nemployed in the stone quarries under Articles 21 aTid 23 and it was therefore nec0ssary for the court to appoint these c\"oiinnissioners for the pc1rpose of inquiring int~ the facts related io this omplaint.\n\nThe. Report of M/s .. Ashok srivastava and Ashok Panda as also the Report of Dr. Patwardhan were clearly documents having evidenf-·\n\nx. '.\n\n' .j.\n\n\\ -\n\n. BANDHUA MUK1' MORCHA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 113.\n\ntiary value.and they furnishedprimafacie evidence of the facts and\n\nA.. data stated i.n those Reports. Of course, as we have stated above, it will be for us to consider what weight w~ should attach to the facts and data contained in these Report; i.n the light of the various af!idavi.ts filedin the _proceedings.\n\n. . . - . . . . .\n\nWe may point out that what we have. said abc ve in regard 1o\n\nB · the exercise of jurisdiction by the. Supreme Court under Articl.e 32 must apply equally , in relation to the .exercise of jurisdkticn by )lie.\n\nHigh. Courts under Article 226, for the latter jurisdicticn js a'[o a new constitutlonal jurisdiction and it is conferred in the san:c wide terms as .the jurisdi'ction under Article ~2 and the same powers can and must therefore be. exercised b) the .High Co];!rts while ex.ercising C . jurisdiction under Article 226. In. fact, the jurisdiction of the High ·\n\nCourts under Article 226 is much wider, because the. High Courts are required to exercise this jurisdiction not only for enforcement of a fundamental right but also for enforcement of any legal right and there are man-yrights conferred on the poor and the disadva.ntagcd \"· which are the creation of statute and they need. tp _be. enforced .as .• D urgently and vigorously its fundamental r1ghts,. ·.\n\nthving disposed of these preliminary bjections, we shall now . proceed to consider the writ petition on merits. But,. before ive\n\nforn to \"examine. the facts of this case, we may'first cnsider which . are tile laws gover.ning the living a.nil working conditions of workmen' ·, employed in the stone quarries--:~The first statute to which' we. must refer ill' this connectilfi1 is the Mines Act, 1952. This Act extends to tM whole of India an, d therefore applies a fo•tiorari in the State . of B:aryana. Section 2(j) nes \"mine\" to mean ·ny excavaticin\n\nwhere any operation for the. purpose of searching for of obtaining mi1wrals has been. or is being carried on and includes. in clause (iv)\n\n\"all open cast working\". The word \"minerals\" has been. given a very broad meaning under section 2(jj) a; d it rr.eans ·\"ail substances which cart be obtained from the earth. by mining, digging, drilling, dredging, hydraulicing. quarrying or by any other. operation\" .. Section 2(kk) gives the definition of \"opn cast workfog\" an4 according to this ddiaition, it means \"a quar; y, that is to say, anexcavation where any opertatfon for the purpose of searching for or obtaining minerals ''has been or is.being carried <in.'not being .. a shaft or an excavation which extends below superjacent ground\". There can be no doubt. that according to. these definitions, the' stone quarries with whih we are concer_ned in this writ petition, constitute \"mines\" within the meanijlg of the d; finition of that te.rm in 'section 2(j). since Jhey qre\n\n....\n\n• D\n\n114 SUPREME €0tJRT REPORT9'\n\n(1984] 2 S.C.R. • ·\n\nexcavations where operations for the purp'ose of searching for or obtaining stone by quarrying are being carried on but they are not\" 'open cast working' since admittedly excavations in the case of these stone quarries extend below superjace11t ground, But the question still remains whether the provisions or' the Mines Act 1952 apply : to these stone quarries even if they are \"mines\"., Section '3(1) (b) . enacts that the provision~ of the Mines Act, 1952 except those contained in sections 7, 8, 9, 44, 45 and 46 shall not apply to any mine engaged in the extraction 'i11ter alia of kankar, 'murruni,' Jaterite. - boulders, gravel, shingle, building stone, road nietal and earth and therefore, if this statutory. provision stood alone without any qualifi' cation, it would appear that barring the excepted sections, the provisions of Mines Act 1952 would not apply to these stone. quarries.\n\nBut there is a proviso to section 3(1)(b) which is very material and it runs as follows :\n\n\"3(1) The provisipns of this Act, except those contained in sections 7, 8, 9, 44, 45 and 46, shall not apP.IY to'-'-\n\n(b) any mine engaged in the exiraction of kank.ar, murrum, Iaterite, boulder, gravel, shingle, ordinary sand (excluding moulding sand, glss sand and other mineral sands), ordinary clay (excluding kaolin, china clay, white clay or fire clay), building.sto.ne, road metal earth, fullors earth and. lime stone : '\n\nProvided -that-\n\n(i) the workings do not extnd below superjacent ground; or\n\n. . . ..\n\n(ii) where' it is an open cast working- ·\n\n(a) the depth q( , the excavation measured from its\n\nhighefit to its !west point nowhere exceeds six\n\nmetfes; • . . (b) the number of persons employed on any one day does not exceed fifty; ad\n\n(c) explosives are not used in connection with ihe. ·\n\nexcavation.\"\n\nSince . the workings in these stone quarries cxter.d belc w superjacent ground and they are not 'open cast workings' and more- , over explosives are admittedly sed in connection with t~ excavation,_\n\n..-\n\nBANDHUA MUKTI l>!ORCHA ~· UNION (Bhagwati, .!;) 115\n\nthe conditions set out in the proviso are not fulfilled and henc;'e the A. exclusion of the provisions of the Mines Act 1952 (other than the excepted sections) is not attracted and all the provisions o(the Mines Act' 1952 apply tothese stone quarries. It may also be noted that the definition of 'mine' in section 2(j) includes in Clause (x) any premises or part thereof in or adjacent and belonging to a mine on : which any process ancilliary to the getting, dressing or .preparation B for sale of minerals ........... , ... is being carried on.''. Now obviously stone crushing is a process apcilliary to the getting, dressing . or preparation for ale of stone quarried from. the stone quarries and therefore if th.e stone crushing activity is caj'Iied o~ in premises in or adjacent to a stone quarry and it belongs to the same owner as the sfone quarry,. it would be. subject to the discipline of the\n\n. C provisions of the Mines. Act 1952 nd ail wqrkmen employed in connection with such stone crushers would be entitled to the benefit of the provisions of that Act. It will, thus, be seen that all the provisions of the Mines Act, 1952 are. applicable to the \\vorkmen employed in the stone quarries as also to the workmen employed in connection: with stone crushers, where. the stone crusher is si.tuate in or adjoining D to a stone quarry and belongs to the same owner as the stone quany.\n\nNow the provisions of the Mines Act, 1952 which are material are those set out in Chapters V; VI and VII, Chapter V deaiing wit.h. provisions as to halth and safety, Chapter.VI, with.hours and li1'nitation of employment and Chapter VII, wfrh leave with wages. The provisions contained in these three Chapters confer certain rights E' and benefits on the workmen employed in the stone quarries and stone crushers and these rights and benefits are in)ended to secure .• to the workmen just and humane conditiqns of work ensuring a d<cen.t standard of life with basic human dignity. We shall have' cccasicn to eonsider some of these rights .and benefiis. when we deal with the SJ?ecific complaints made on behalf of. the petitioner, bnt we may F poillt out at this stage that the most important rights and benefits conferred onthe workmen are those relating to tmir heaHh and safety. which include provisions as to drinking water, conservancy and injuries arising out of accidents, in regard to which detailed requirements are laid down in Chapters V, VI and lX. of the Mine..s Rules,\n\n1955. We may: also. point out. that the obligation of complying with G these provisions of the Mines Act, 195~ and.the Mines Rules, 1955 rests on the owner, agent and manager of every stone quarry a.nd stone crusher~ because section 18 declares that the owner, agent and manager of every ine shall be responsible that all operatio'ns carried on in connection threwith are cond'ucted in accordance with\n\nH the provision~ of the Act and 'of the' regulations. rules and by•laws . ·•\n\n, . •\n\n.116 •\n\n. SUPREME COURT REP0R1'S\n\n[1984) 2 S.C:R; ·\n\nnd of any orders made imder the Act. The 'owner' is defined in sedtion 2(1) of t!ic Mines Act~ 1952 to mean \"any pemn \\\\EC is the immediate proprietor or lessee or occupier of the n:inc or any rart\n\ntheof. '..:;· .... but' does -not incldc a erson who . me'iely :eceives a royalty, tent or fine from the mme or is merely the proprietor cf the.mine, subjct to any iease, gran(or licence fc'r _the working.thereof.\" Sil,;;, 'the stone quarries in the present case are not l:eing exploited by the State of Harvana though :it iS the owner of the stone quarries, . but are baing give~ out ni1 lease by auctio~.- the mine-lemes \"to\n\nare. not only lessees but also occupiers of the sfone quarr:es are tbc .owners of ihe stone•quarries within the meaning of that .expressicn as used in section 2(1) and so also arc' the owners of stcr.c ctusl:os . - . 4 - .· -.. in relation lo their establishment. The mine-lessees and owners . ot' stone crushers are, therefore .. Jiable under section I§ of the Mines Aot, 1952 to carry .out their operations in accordance with the pro.-\n\n.. visions of the Mines Act, 1952 and the Mines Rules, 1955 and,9ther\n\nRules and Regulations made \\lnder. that Act and to ensure that the rights and benefits confrrecl by ti1ese proyisions are actually and . 'c .. :inoretdy made available to the workmen. The Central Government. is entrusted under .t:1e Mines Act 195.2 with the responsibility of 1eour.ing compliance with the proidsious of that.Act and of the Mines\n\nR'ulci 1955 and other Rules and Regulations made .under that Act and .it is the primary obligation of the Central Government to ensure that thCS\\1 provisions are c()mp!ied 1;'.ith by the mine-lessees and stone\n\n-crtlshr .O\\vners.\n\nThe State of. !-f-aryana is also, fer rei!cns wliiCh w~ .h1ve already disCussed, under an obli_g-aticn to take all ncces5ary steps for. the purpJsc of securing co1npliance '\\'.Hh these prcviicns by .. the mine-lessees arid owners of stone crushers. The State of:\n\nHa, rya!1a has in fact aQlric; le.d tlie P-unjrb Minor Miner_al Conccss, i9n Rules !9M in their application to the State of Haryana by issuing the Punjab Minor Mineral Concession (Haryana First Amendment) Rules.1982 ori 6th December 1982 and substituted a new clause 16 in Form F .. ?- nw cla\"hse 13 in Form Land a nc\\v ylause 1Q in For; n1 N ·\n\nproviding that the lessee/lessees or .the cohtractor/contract.ors, s . tho case may be, . . . .\n\n\"shan abid.e by the, provision's ofMiries ACt, 1952 Inter • State Migian.t Workmen (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Se(vice) Ac( J979 ai1d the rules and regulatiom framed th6reundcr .and also the. provisions. of other fabour ' Jaws both Central and State as are applicable to the work;,, e11\n\ne;1gag¢d in tbe mineS; and quarrit-.s: relating to the pto:isions of dr_inking \\vatr, rest _sheltqrS, dwlling houses, la.trnes1 .·\n\n--~ ,\n\nBANirHUA MUKTI MORCHA v. UNION (Bhagwat!; f) !17. ·• ' a11d. first aid end. meelical facilities in particular. and other. ·., safety .and welfare provisions in general, to\"the s&tisfaction : • of the competent authorities under the aforesaid Acts, rules and regulations and also to the satisf; ction of-the District . . . . . .\n\nMigistrate concerrn; d .. In the case of non-compliance. of any Of the provisions of the enactments as _aforesaid, the St.ate Government. or any officer authorised by it in thi_s\n\nbehalf. may terminate the .contract by giving one monws. nJtice with forfeiture of security depo_sited or _in the alten1ative the State L_abo.ur Department may remedy the breach/ ·. breaches by providing. the welfare and ·.safety measures as provided in_ the aforosaid enactments at the expense and cost of the contractor/contractors. The amount thu.s .spent . . . . - shall be recovered from the cont; actor/contractors by the Industries .. Department and reimbursed to Labour Depart- 1nent.'' , '\\\n\nThe State of Haryana is therefore, in any event, bound to take action to enforce the provisions of the \"Mines Act J952 and the Mines Rules 1955 \"and other \"Rules and Regulations made .under that Act. for the :benefit of the workmen: · • We may then turn to the provisions of Inter-State Migrant . Warkmn (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service)·\n\nAct, 197~ (hereinafter referred lo as the Inter-State Migrnnt Workmen . A't) .. ' This Act was brought into force in the State of Haryana with\n\noffe;; t frnnr 2nd OctQber 19.80 and the authorities under ihis Act were\n\nnotifjod oil 21st July 1982. We may, therefore, proteed on .the basis that the provisions of this Act becairie enforceable, if not from 2nd Ootobor 1980 at least from 21st July 19.82.\n\nNow this Act by sub- ?' . section (4) df Section (I) applies to every establishment in which\n\n: five or more .inter-State migrant )VOrkmen are employd or were\n\neniploy, od. on any day of the preceding twelve months .and so also . . it applies to every. coritraCtor who employs or employed five or more\n\n. inter-State migrant workmen on any' day of. ihe preceding twdve\n\nmonths. Section (Z) subsection (I) Clause (b) of the Act .defin<s contractor, in ; elation to an establishment, to mean •a pencn who undertakes (whether as.an independent ccintrcicr, agent, mp1c}'c or otherwise) to produce a given result for the establishment, .ether than a mere. supply \"of good~ and ariicles of manufactnre to such 'establishment, .by the employment of workme.n or to supply workmen\n\nto the establishment, and includes a sub-contractor, khatedar, sardsr, agent or any , other person, by whatever nam.e called, who recruits\n\nA •\n\n. ,.\n\n.G'\n\n• A\n\nB;.\n\n\" ' ll8\n\nSUPREME COURT REP<{RTS [1984] 2.s.c.a.\n\nor employs -workmen.'' c; Jause (e) of sub-section' (I) of Section (2) defines \"inter-State migrant workmen\" to means \"any person who is recruited'by or through a contractor in one State under an agreell\\ent or other arrangement for employment in an establishment in another State, whether with or without the knowledge of the principal employer in relation to' .such establishment.\" The expression \"principalemployer\" is defined by clause (g) of sub-section (I) of Section 2 to mean \"in relation .to a mine, the owner or agent of the fuine and - ' ' where a person has been named as the manager of th.e mine, the \" . rerson so named.\" Obviously, therefore,. t):ie mine-lessees and . owners .of stone crushers in the present case would be principal employers within the meaning of that expression as used in the lnter- State Migrant Workmen Act. Section 4 provides for registration of every principal employer of an establishment to 'which the Act applies and Section 6 enacts that no principal employer of an establishment to which this Act applies, shall employ inter-State migrant workmen in the. establishment unless a certificate of registration in . respect of such establishment is issued under the Act in force. Similarly, Section .8 sub-section (1) provides that with.effect from such date as the appropriate Government may be Notification in the Official Gazette appoint no contractor to. wl.tom the Act applies shall recruit any person in a State for the purpose of eftiploying hi1il in any establishment situated in another State, exept unper and in accordance. with a licence issued in that behalf by the licensing officer appointed b/the Central Government who has jurisdietion in relation. to the area wherein the recruitment is made, nor shall be employ as workmen for the execution of any' work in any establishment in . any State, persons from another State excent under and in accordance with a licence issued in that behalf by the licensing officer appointed by\n\n/ I\n\nthe appropriate Government having jurisdiction in relation to the )( area wherein the_ establishment is situated. Sub-section (2) of Section 8 declares. that a licence under sub-section (1) may contain such\" conditions including, in particular, the terms an~ conditions of the agreement or other arrangelljent under which the workmen will be recruited, the remuneration payable, hours of work, fixation of wages and other 'esseritial amenities in respect of the inter-State migrant workmen, as the appropriate Government may deem fit to impose in accordance with the Rules, if any, made under-Section 35. Section\n\n12 imposes certain duties and obUgations on contractors which include inter cilia the duty to issue to every inter-State migrant wor!<man a . pass-book containing various particulars regarding recruitment and employment of the worKrn.an as also to pay to the workman the return fare from the place ofemployment to the place ofresidencc\n\n....\n\n' BANDHUA MUKTI MORCHA v. u.Nl0N (Bhagwati, J,) 119 ' . in the home State when he ceases to be employed, .Rule 23 of the Inter-State .Migrant Workn:en (Regulation -0f Employment and Conditions of Service) Central Rule$ 1980 (hereinafter referred to as inter-State Migrant Workmen Rules) sets out certain additional . ' particulars which must be inchided in the .pass•book to be issued tb every inter-State migrant workmen. Section 13 then proceeds to lay down the wage rates, holidays, hours of work and other conditions of service of an i9ter-State .migrant workman and provides inter alia that in no case shall a inter-State migrant workman be paid less than the wges fixed under the Minimum Wages Act 1948, and the wages shall be paid to.an.inter-State migrant workman in cash. The deiai!ed particulars in regard to wages payable to an inter-State migtnt workman are laid down in Rules 25 to 35 of the Inter-State Migrant Workmen Riiles. The!) follows Section 14 which provides that there shall be paid by the contractor to every inter-State' migrant workman at the time of recruitment, a displacement allowance and ' the amount of displacement allowance shair not be refundable but shall be in addition to the wages or other amounts payable to 'bim.\n\nThere is also a provision made in Section 15 for payment to an interstate migrant workman of a journey allowance of a sum not .less\n\ntha~ the fare from the.place of residence. in his State to the place of work in the other State, both for outward and return ]ourneys and this Section also enacts that the workman shall be entitled to. payruent of wages during the period of such journeys as if he was bn duty . . Section 16 lays a duty on .. every contractor employing inter-State migrant workmen in connection with the work of an establishment t; provide various other.facilities particulars of which are to be found . in Rules 36. to 45 ef the Inter-State Migrant Workmen Rules. These facilities inc)ude p:iedical facilities, protective clothing, drinking \\vater, latrines, urinals and washing facilities, rest rooms, canteens,· creche and residential accommodation. The obligation to provide these facilities. is in relation to the . inter-State Migrant Wo.rkmen. employed in -an establishment to which the Act applies. But this liability is not confined. only to the co11tractor, because Section 18 provides in .so many terms that .if any allowance required to be paid\n\nunder-ection 14 or I 5 to an. inter-State migrant .W 0rkman is not . paid by lihe contractor or if any facility specified jn section 16 is not .\n\npro.vided for the benefit of such workman, such allowance shall be paid or as the case may .be, the facility shall be provided by the principal employer within such time as may be prescribed by the Rules and .all the allowances paid by the principal employer or all the expenses incurred )Jy him in this connection may be recovered l; iy him from tM contractor either by deduction from. tJie amount payable .to the\n\n• _,\n\n.120\n\n\ncemtractor or as debt payable by the contractor.. Section :Zs & 2~. make .it an offence for any o.ne. to contravene. any of th.e provisions of .the Inter-State Migrant Workmen. Act or Inter-State Migrant Workmen Rules and Section JO gives over-ridiHg effect to the pr(i. visions of the Inter, State Migrant Workmen Act over any other law or any agreement or contract. of service or any standing orders. These are broadly the relevant provisions of the Inter-State Migrant Workmen Act and the Inter-State' Migrant Workmen Rules which may call for consideration. ·\n\nBut the question arises whether the Inter-State.- Migrant Workmen Act applies to the workmen employed in the stone quarries . . - . . and the stone crushers. Now it was not disputed on behalf of the State of.Haryana and indeed It was clear from the Report of Dr.\n\nPatwardhan that inost of the workmen.employed in the stone quarries and stone crusheril come from Uttat Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Tamilnadu and Andhra Pradesh and there are only .a few' workmen from Haryana. It ls only if 5 or more out. of these workmen .coming from States either than Haryana ate inter-State .· inigrant workmen within the meaning -of that expression as defined in Section. 2 sub-section (1) clause (e) of the Inter-State Mig'rant Workmen Act that the establishment in which .they are employed · . would be covered by the lnter-State Migrant Workmen Act.\n\nIt would. therefore have. to be determined in .case of each stone quarry fod each stone crusher whether there are 5 or.more inter-State migrant\n\nworkmen employed iu the establishment ana if there are, the provisions of the Inter-State Migrant Workmen Act and the Intet-State Migrant Workmen Rules would become applicable to ch establishment.\n\nThe U; ion. of India in a submission filed on its behalf by Miss Subhashini has taken up the stand that the wor)cmen en';.ployed in the stone . quarries and stone crushers .. a.re coming to joip. the service: in th; e\n\nstone quarries. of their own volition and they are noi recruited by any agent for _being migrated from any State\" and. \"as such they do. not come under the definition of the term\" inter-State migrant workman. We would av: ordinarily been incliiied to accept this statinerit ·\n\nmade on behalf of the Union of India; but we find that, according to the Report.of Dr. Patwardhan, the modus operandi that i~ followed for the purpose of rcruitment of workmen is \"that the stone crusher owners or th.e lessees holders ask the thekedar or jamadar of the mine tb fetch people from various States to w()rk in the mines\" and some times \"the janiadar or thekedar COlljlIBUnicates. the nee.d fo~ workers.to old hands at the quai:ricsso that they could bring in pe.ople • on their return froin their villages or their respective States\". Now\n\n.·~-\n\n-,.~\n\n' ...\n\n-J. '\n\n. BANDHUA. MUKTI MORCHA v. UNiON (Bhagwati, J.) 121\n\nif what h.as been reported by Dr .. Patwar<lhan is true, ithere can be nu doubt that the workmen employed in the stone quarries and. stone \" . crushers. would be inter-State migrant workmen. The thekedar or\n\njamadar. who .is engaged by the mine lessees or the stone-crusher owners to recruit workmen or employ them on behal( of the inine lessees or stone crusher owners would. clearly be a 'contractor' within the meaning.of that (erm as defined .in Section 2 sub-section (1) Clause\n\n(b) and the workmen recruited. by or through him from .other States for employment in the stone quarries and stone crushers 'iii the State of Haryana would undoubtedly be inter-State migrant workmep.\n\nEven when the thekedar or jal)ladar 'recruits or employs workmen for the stone quarries and stone . crushers by sefiding word through the \"old hands\", the workmen so recruid 'or employed would be inter-State migrant workmen, because the \"old hands\", w.ould be really acting as agents of the thekedar or jamadar for the purpose of..recruiting or employing workmen. The Inter-State Migrant\n\nWrkmen Act being a piece of social welfare legislation intended . to effectuate the Directive Principles of State Policy and ensure decent living and working conditions for the workmen .when they come from other States and are in a. totally strange environlnent. whee by. reason of .theii: poverty, ignorance. and. illiteracy, they would be totally unorganised and helpless and would become easy victims .. of illlploitation, it must be given a broad and expansive interpretatiop so as to preverit the mischief.and adhnce they remedy.and therefore, even when the workmen are recruited cir .employed by the jamadat or thekedar by operatig through the \"old hands';, they inu; t be regarded as inter-State _migrant workmen entitled to the benefit of the provisions of the Inter-State Migrant Workmen 'Act and the IIiter-State Migrant Workmen RuleS'. The Report of Di. Patwardhan also poipts out one other aspect of the matter : according to him,_. there is 'invariably \"an unc; lerstanding between the Jamadar or.thekedai and the owners of stone crushers holding leases of stone 'quarries as to the.rate of output of stone. to be fed through the crushers\" and thus the 'jamadar or thekedar is clearly a \"contractor' of the stone crusher owners and the woren recruited or employed by him on behalf of the owners of stone ctushel's are inter, Statewigrant workmen. We entireJY agree with this view put fowa:rd. by .Dr. Patwardhan. in his Report arid we hav~ no doubt. that if there iS any areement 'or understanding between the jamadar or thekedar on the one hand . . .. and the owners of tone crushers on•the other, that the Jamadar or ' thekedar will ensure a certain rate. of output of stone to be fed to the\n\nstone crushers, the jamadar or thekedar would be a 'contractor' and . the .. workmen recruited or einploye.d by him on behalf of the stone .\n\nA •\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1984] 2 s.c.R.\n\ncrnsher owners would be\"inter-State migrant workmen. But whether inany particular stone quarry or stone crush.er the workmen employed are inter-State .migrant workmen on the application of ., this test laid down by us and if so, hciw many of them are such inter-State migrant workmen, is a matter which would have to be investigated and deter- . mined and that is what must be .done if we areto make the provisicns of the Inter-State Migrant Workmen Act and the Inter-State Migrant Workmen Rules meaningfui for these workmen who are. recruited from other States and who come to the stone quarries ad stcr.e crushers in the State of Haryana. We may point out that in additicn to the rights and benefits confer; ed upon him under the Inter-S.tatc\n\nMigrant Workmen\" Act and tl1e Inter-State Migrant Workmen Rules, an 'inter-Siate migrant ',\\lorkman .is. also, by r.eason of Section 21, entitled to, the benefit of the provisions contained in the Wcrkman's . Compensation Act 1923. The Payment of Wages Act 1936,. The Employees' State Insurance Act 1948,. The Employees' Provillcnt .. Funds and Misc. Provisions Act, 1952, a11d the Maternity Benefit Act 1961. The obligation to give effect to the provisions contained in these varfous laws is .not only that of the jamadar or thekedar and the mine-lessees and stone crusher owners (provided of course there are 5 or more inter-State migrant workmen employei! in the establishment) but also that of the Central Government because the C'i1tral JJoveniment being the appropriate Government\" :within the meaning of Section 2(1)(a) is under an obligation to take necessary steps for •the purpose o( securing compliance with these provisions by the thekedar or jamadar and mine-lessees and owners of stone crushers.\n\nThe State of Haryana is also for reasons already discussed above bound to ensure that' thes_e provisions are-observed by 'the thekedar' ' or' jamadar dnd. mil)e-lessees and owners of stone crushers.\n\nWe, then turri to consider the provisio'ns of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act 1970 (hereinafter referred t_o as the ' ' Contract Labour Act). This Act applies to every establishment in which' 20 or more workme1; are .employed or were employed on any day , of the. preceding twelve months as contract labour and to every contractor who employs or who employed on. any day of the . preceding twdve months 20 or more workmen. The expression \"apprqpriate gqvernment\" is defined in Section 2 sub-section (I) clanse (a) and so far as the stone quarries and stone crushers are con'cerne!. the Central Government is the 'appropriate 'Government'.\n\nSection 2 s.ub-section (I) clause (b) states that a workman shall be deemed to be employed as \"contract labour\" in or in connection with the work of an establishment when he is 'hired in or in connection\n\nI --1\n\nDANDHUA MUKTI MORCHA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) . 123\n\nwith such work by or through a contractor and \"contractor\".· is defined in clause (c) of that sub-section to mean, in relation to an establishment, \"a person who undertakes to produce a given result for the establishment, other than a mere supply of goods or articles of manufacture to such. establishment, through contract labour or who supplies contract labour for any 'work of the establishment and includes a sub-contractor\". The expression \"principal employer''. is defined in clause (g) of subsectiori (i) of section 2 and for the purpose of a mine, it means the owner or agent of the mine and therefore, so far as the stone quarries 'and stone crushers ate concerned, the m; ne lessees and owners of stone crushers would be the principal employrs. Then there are provisions in the Contract Labour Act for registration of establisbmen! by every principal employer and for licencing of every contractor to whom the ; Act applies: 1lut more importantly, Sections 16 to 19 imposea duty on every contractor to~ provide canteens, rest rooms, nrst aid facilities and other facilities and Section 20 enacts that if any amenity required to be provided under section 16, 17, 18 or 19 for the benefit of the contract la hour e10ployed in an establishment is not provided . by the contractor, such amen; ty shall be urovided by _the principal em- . player and all expenses incurred by the principal employer in providing such amenity may be recovered by the principal employer from.the co.ntractor. Every contractor is made responsible under-section 21 for payment of wages to each worker employed_ by him as . contract • lbour .and such wages are to be disbursed in the presence of a representative duly authorised by the principal employer. Now if the jamadar or thekedar in a stone quarry or stone crustier is a . 'contractor' within the meaning Of the definition of that term in the • Inter-State Migrant Workmen Act, be would a fortiorarl a 'contractor' also for the purpose of Contract Labour Act and any • workmen hired in or in connection with the work of a' stone quarry or stone crusher by or through the jamadar or thekedar would be . workmn entitled to the benefit of the provisions of the . Contract •Labour Act. There are. elaborate Rules made under the Contract Labour Act called the cantract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Central Rules -1971 (hereinafter referred to as the Contract Labour Rules) and these Rules not only dal with the procedure for appliea- tion and grant of registration to a principal employer and licence _to a. cOl)tractor, but also particularise the deiails of the various welfare . and other facil:t; es direcied to be provided to the contract labour by Section 16, 1 ?, 18 and. 19 of the Contract Labour Act. Where therefore the thekedar or jamadar is a 'contractor' and the workmen are employed as 'contract lilbour' within the meaning of these expres-\n\n•F.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984] 2 s.c.R.\n\n sio1is as used in the Contract Labour Ad, the contractor as well as the principal .employer wold be liable to comply. with the provisions . of contract Cabour .Act and the Contract Labour Rules and to pro.vide to the contract Jabour rights and benefits conforred by these provisions. The Central Government beiqg the \"appropriate gove rnment\" within the.meaning of Setiori 12 suiHeciion (I) clause (a) would. be responsible for ensuring compliance with the provisions of the Contract Labour Act and .. the.Contract Labourilules by 1he . mine-lessees and stone crusher owners and the . thekedar or jamadar.\n\nSo also, for reasoiis which we have alredy discussed while dalig with th~ applicability of the Mines Act i952 .and, the Inter-State Migrani Workmen Act, the State of Haryana would be .under. an . obligation to enfor90 the provisions of the Coµtract Labour Act and the-Contract Lab0ur Rules for the benefit of the-workmen .\n\n. Turning to. the provisions of the Minim1fm .Wages Act 1948; there can lit.no doubt a'!ld indeed this was not disputed on beh~Jf of ihc respondnts, that the Mimmum Wags Act 1948 is applicable to workmetl employed in the stone q11arries and stone cru.shers. The minimum wage fixed for iniriers by the Notification of the 'Central . Govermneritdafod 2nd Dec; mber 1981 is fu.. 9.7·5.per day for those;.\n\nworking abbve the grnund and Rs. J 1 .. 25 per day for thbse wc; rking below the ground. Moreover the Notification prescribes a separate minimum wage for the occ11pation 'of a shot firer, stone breaker,. stone carrier; 1nud ren1over and water carriei. ThCn~ is \"a mjni'rrlu, m' • wage, prescribed iri the Notificationfor each of these _occupations.: • The question is whether -the workmen employed in the stone quarries and stone crushers are paid minimum wage for lhe work done by _them .. The_ Report of Dr. Patwardhan alleges that the mode, of\n\n.payment. to the workmen employed .in .stone quarrying operations is such that rafter deduction of the amounts spent on , explosivesand drilling of hoies, which amount has to be borne by the workmen • out. of the.ii' wa.ges, what is left to the workmen is iess than.the minimum wage. It is also stated_ in. the Repo\"rt of Dr. Patwardhan tht the workmen employed in he stone .qu&rries not only quarry the stone . . but also carry out the work of a shot firer' and a stone breaker, though . .. . .. ' ' - the work of. a shot firer. cannot be done by them without proper : training as provide.d in the Mines Vocational Training Rules. 1966. and for this work of a shot firer and a stne hreaker carti<d cut by ·. theni, they do not-get the minimum wage stipulated for the ctcupaticn of a 'shot firer o~. it. stone braker and moreover since they ar~ piece:\n\nrated workers, .their output fallsbecause of the other jobs they . are required to carry out with 'th\" result that they are deprived of the\n\n' .\n\n.~.\n\n...\n\n-J -\n\nBANDHUA MUKTI MORCHA v. UNI~ (Bhagwati, J.) 125\n\nminimum wage which they should otherwise receive, We are not . in a position at the preent stage to give \"° definite fihiling tht what\n\n.is statedin the. Report of Dr. Patwardhan is true, but there can.be no. doubt that whatever be the mode of pa)'inent followed by the mine lessees and stone crµsher owners, the workmen must get nothing less than the minimum. wage for the job which is being carried out by them and if they are required to cariY out additionally any of the functions pertaining to another job or occupation for which a soparate minimum wage is prescribed, they rriust be paid a proper'. tionatc part of such minimum wage in addition to the minimum wage p1yable to them for the work primarily carried out by them. We wou!d also suggest that the system of payment which is being followed in the stone quarries and stone crushers, under which •the expenses -of the explosives and of drilling h.oles are: to be borne by the workmen\n\n011t of their <>wn wages, should be changed and the explosives required for carrying out b!nsting should be suppiied by the mine lessees or .\n\nthe jmadar or thekedar without any deduction being made out of. the. wages of the workmen and the work of -Ori11ing holes. and shot firing should be entrusted only to those who have received the requisite training ·.under the Mines Vocational Training .Rnles 1966. We . would direc.t the Central Government and the Staie of Haryana to take. necessary steps in this behalf. so rar as the complaint of the petitioner thqt the' workmen employed in the •tone quarries and ·. sthe crushers' are not boing paid the min1mum was due and payable , for .the work carried out 'by them is concerned, it is a matter .which would have to be investigated and' determined in the light of the law: laid down by us. •\n\nLastly, we must conside~ the provision~ of the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) !ACt 1976. We. have already pointed out , that many ofthe States are not prepared to adinit the existence of'b0nded labour in theif territories and the State of Haryana is no xception.\n\nBut in order to determine whether there is any bonded labour in the stone quarries and >tone crushers in the Faridabad area of the State of l!aryana, it is _necessary to examine some of the relevant provisions of the Bonded Labour System (Abolition)· Act 1976: This Act was enacted with a view to giving effect to Article 23 of the Constitution which. prohibits traffic fu .h.man 'beings and begar and other similar forms of forced 1aboui: We bave had ecasion to. consid_er the true scope and dimension of this. Article of the Constituiion in, Ptople's • 'Union.for Democratic Rights v, [, Inion~( india11 l commonly known as\n\n(I) [198JJ 1 s, c:R. 456.\n\n126 SUPREMllliCOURT REPORTS [1984] 2 s.C.R.\n\nthe Asiad workers' case and it is not necessary for us to say anything more about it in the present judgment .. Sufl\\ce it to. state that this Act is intended to strike against the system of bonded labour which has. been a shameful sdllr on the Indian social sceue for decades and which has continued to disfigure the life of the nation even after independence. The 'Act was brought into force through out the length and breadth of the country with effect• from 25th Qctober 197 5, which means that the. Act has been in force now for alfilost 8 years and if properly implemented, it should have by this time brought about complete identification, freeing and rehabilitation of bonded Jabour. But as official, semi-official and non, official reports show, we hve yet to go a long way in wiping out this outtage · against humat.ity. Clause (d) of Section 2 defines '°bonded debt\" to mea.n an advance obtained or presumed to have been obtained, by .a bonded labourer, under or in pur_suance of, the bonded Jabour .system. The expression 'bended labourer' is .defined in clause (t)\n\nto mean \"a labourer who. incurs, Gr has, or is presumed to have incurred a bonded 'debt\", Clause (g) defines \"bonded labour system\"\n\n D to mean\n\n,!;\n\n\"the system of forced, or partly foreed, labour under which a debtor enters, or has, or is presumed to have, entered, into an agreement with the creditor to the effect that,- ·\n\n(i) in consideration of an advance optained by him or, by any of his lineal ascendants or descendants (whether or not .such advance is evidenced by any document) and . in.\n\nconsideratn of the interest, if any, due on such advance, or\n\n(ii) in pursuance of any customary or social obligatin; ar . . .\n\n(iii) for .any economic consideration received by him or by any of his lineal ascend.ants or descendants, or he would- ·\n\n(1) render, by .himself or throughany member of his family, or any person dependent ori him, labour or service to the creditor, or for the benefit of: the creditor. for a specified period or for an unspecified period, either . without ·-, vages or for nominal 'wages, or ·\n\n(2) forfeit the freedom of emplo /inent or other means of H. . , livel; hood for a specified period or for an un-specified period,\n\n?'·\n\nBANDHUA. MUKTI MORCHA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.). 127.\n\n(3) forfeit the right to move freely throughout the territory of India; or\n\n(4) fo1feit the right-to appropriate. or sell at market value -any. of his property or product of his labour. or the labour cf a member of hi> family or an; y persoi1 dependent on him.\"\n\nThe expression \"nominal wages\" is. defined in clause (i) of Section 2 to mean, in relation to an, labour, a wage which is less t]lan-·-\n\n(a) the minimum wages fixed by the. Government, in-relation to the same or similar labour, under ariy law for the time being in force, and\n\n(b) where no such wage has been fixed in relation to any form of labour, the .wages that are normally paid, for the same or similar labour, to the labo.urers working.in the same locality.\"\n\nSection 4 is the material section which provides for abolition of bo.nded labour system and it rims as follows :\n\n\"4(1) On the commencement of this Act, the bonded labour system shall stand abolished and every bonded labourer.. shall, on such commencement, stand1 freed and discharged\n\n- • E frnm any obligation to render. any bonded labour.\n\n{2) after the.commencement of this Act, no personshall-\n\n(a) make any advance nncter, or in pursuance of; t.he bonded labour system, or F\n\n(b) .compel any person to render any bonded labour or othen fonii of forced labour. .\n\nSection 5 invalidates any custom or 'tradition or any contract agreement or other instrument by virtue of which any person or any member of the family or dependent of such .person is required to do. any work or render any service as a bonded labourer. Section 6 provides inter a/ia that on. the commencement of the Act, every obligation of a bonded labourer to. repay any bonded debt or such part of any bonded debt as remains unsatisfied immediately before s\\Jch commencemerit, shall be deemed to have been extingui£hed.\n\n.128\n\nS0PRE~1E COURT REPORTS [I 984] 2 s.qc\n\n.There ate certain other consequential provisions m Section 7 to 9\n\nb:ut it is not necessary to refer to them.\n\nSections IO to 12 impose a duty on.every District Magistrate and every officer to \\vhom .power may be delegated by him, to inquire whether, after the commencement of the Act, any bonded Jabour system .or any other form or forced 'Jabour is., being enforced by or on behalf 9f, any person resident wit.hin the I.ocal limits of bis jurisdiction and if, as. a result of such inquir)', .any person is found to be enforcing tbe bonded labour system ot any other syst0m cf forced labour, he is required forthwith to take tho necessary action to eradicate the enforcement of such forced labour. 'Section 15 provides for Constifution of a Vigilance Committee in each District and each sub-division of a District and sets out what shallbo the composition of each Vigilance Commiitee. The functions Of the. Vigilance (; ommitiee are set out'in Sectio~ 14 ard among other things, that Section proviaes that. the Vigilance Comm ttee shall' be responsible biter a/ia to advise .tho District Mgistrate as to the offorts\n\nmade and action taken, to ensure that' the provisions of the Act or any Rule. made thereunder are properly impleiucnted, to provi.de for the economic and. soda! rehilbUitation of the freed bonded labourers'. . ·.and to keep an eye onthe number of offences of 'which cognizance has been \\aken unde~ the Act. Then comes Section 15 which Jays down that whenever any debt is clajnied by any Jab9urer or a Vigilance Committee to be a bonded debt, .the burden of proof that such debt • • i~ not a bonded debt shall lie on the 1; reditor. These are some of . the material provisions of the B.onded Labonr System (Abolition) Act-1976 wbich need to l{e considered.\n\nIt is a .matter of.regret i)lat though Section 13 proides for . ·.constitution of a Vigilance Committee in each. District and each subd!vision of' a District; the Goveminent of Haryana, for some reason\n\nor .the othe, r, did not constitute any Vigilance Committee until 'its attention was drawn to this requirement of the law by. this Court.\n\nIt may be that according. to the Government of Har}ana there were not at any timeany bonded labourers.within its territories, but even .. so Vigilance Committees are required by Section 13 to be constituted because the function of theVigilarice Committee is to identify bonded , labourers, if there arc any, and 'to free , and rehabilitate them and it would not be right for the State 'Government riot to constitute Vigilrtce Committees on .the assumption that there .are rio bonded Jaboure1s at all. But ·;.,~ .are glad to find that the Government of Il:aryana has now costituted a Vigilance Committee in each District. It does not appear froin the record whether a_ Vigilance. Committee: has been consthuted also in each sub-division of a District bu.t we\n\n' .. ;\n\n/. -\n\nBANDHUA MUKTI MORCHA v. UNION (Bhagwati,· J.) 129\n\nhave no doubt that the Government pf Hacyana will without any delay and at any rate within six' weeks from tcday constitue a Vigilance Committe.e in each sub-division and thus comply with the requirement of Section 13 of the Act. We may point out that in constituting Vigilance Commitiee in each District and sub-division, the Haryana Government would do well to include representatives of non-political social action groups operting at the grass root level, for it is only through such social action groups and voluntary agencies that the problem of identification of bonded labour can be effectively solved.\n\nIt was contended by the learned Additional Solicitor General on behalf of the State of Haryana that in the stone quarries and stone crushers. there might be forced labourers but they were not bonded labourers within the meaning of that expression as used in. the Act, since a labourer would be. a. bonded labourer only if be bas er is .:presumed to have inc'urred a bonded debt and there was nothipg\n\nin the presont, cose to show that the workmen employed in the sione quarries and stone crushers had incurred or could be presumed to have incurred any bonded debt. It was not enough, contended thelearned Additionalff Solicitor General, for the petitioner merely to .show that the workme~ were providillg forced labour in. that they were not allowed .to leave the premises of the establishment, but it was further necessary to show that they were woking under the bonded, .labour system. The learned Additional' Solicitor General ' also subm; t!ed that. in any event, even if the workmen filed affidavits ..\n\nto the effect that they had taj<en advances fro~ tbekedar or jamadar and or mine lesset:s and/or stone crusher owners and they were not allowe(to. leave the 'premises of the establishment. until the advances were paid of, that would not be noilgb evidence for the Court to . hold that they were bonded labourers, because the mine\"lessee.s and\n\nstone crusher owners had no opportunity to cross-examine the workmen making such affidavits. This contention was seriously pressed by the learned Additional Solicitor General on behalf of the. State of Haryana, but as we shall presently show, there is no substance in this contention. We may point out that in the course of the arguments we did suggest .to the learned Additional Solicitor General that even i( the workmen were not bonded labourers jn .the strict sense of the term but were merely forced to provide labour, should the State Government not accept liability for freeing and rehabilita; ting them, particularly in view of the Directive _Prif\\ciples of State Policy. The State of Haryana was however not prepared to c0me forward with any proposal.in this behalf.\n\nc • •\n\n• •\n\n' !30\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984] 2 s.c.R.\n\nNow it is clear that bonded labour is a form of forced Jabour and Section 12 of the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act 1976 recognises this self-evident proposition by laying a duty on every District Magistrate and every officer specified by him to inquire\n\nwhether any bonded Jaoour system or.any other form of forced labour is being enforced by or on behalf of any person and, if so, to take such action as may be necessary to eradicate the enforcement of such forced labour. The thrust of the Act is against the continuance of any foriu of forced Jabour. 'It is of course true that, strictly speak- ing, a bonded labourer means a labourer who incurs or has or 1s presumed io have incurred a bonded debt and a bonded debt means an advance obtained or presumed to have been obtained by a bonded labourer under or in pursuance of the bonded labour system and it . would therefore appear that before a labourer can be regarded as a bonded labourer, he must not .only be forced to provide Jabour to the employer but he. must have also received an advance or other economic consideration from the employer unless he is made to provide forced Jabour in pursuance of any custom or social obligation or by reason of his birth in any particular caste or community.\n\nIt was on the basis of this definitional requirement that the learned Additional Solicitor General on behalf of the State of Haryana p~ forward the argument that even if the . workmen employed in the stone quarries and stone .crushrs were being compelled to provide .forced labour,. they were not bonded laboure1s, since it as not shown by them or by the petitioner that they were doing so in consideration of an advance or other economic consideration received from the mine-lessees 'and owners of stone crushers.. Now if this contetion of the learned Additional Solicitor General were well-founded, it Would become almost impossible to enforce the provisions of the Bonded Lbour System (Abolition) Act 1976 because in every case where bonded labourers. are sought to be identified for the purpose of release and rehi!bilitation under the provisions of the. Act, the ' State A.uthorities as alS() the employer would be entitled to insist\n\nthat the bonded labourers must first prove that they .are providing forced labour .in consideration of an advance or other. economjc consideration received by them and then only they would be eligible, of the benefits provided under the Act and this would make it extremely dffiicult, 'if not impossible, for th~ labourers to establish that they are bonded labourers because they would have no evidence at all to prove that any advance or economic consideration was provided 'to them by the employer and since ployment of bonded labouren\n\nis a penal offence under the Act the employer would immediately, without any hesitation, disown having given any advance .or economic\n\n!. -\n\nk BANDHUA l&UUI MORCHA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 131 . . consideration to the bonded labourers. It is indeed difficult to 1111derstand how the State Government which is constitutionally mandated to bring about change in the life conditions of the poor 11nd the down-trodden and to ensure social justice to them, could possibly take up the stand' that the labourers m:ust prove that they are made to provide forced labour in consideration of an advance. or <:>ther economic consideration received from the employer and are t\\ierefore bonded lab9urers. It is indeed a matter of. regret that the State Government should have insisted on a formal, rigid and legalistic approach in the matter of a statute wich is one of the most important measures for ensuring human dignity to these unfortunate specimens of humanity who are exiles bf civilization and who are leading a life of abject misery and destitution. . It would be cruel to insist that a bonded labourer in order to derive the benefits of this social welfare legislation, should have to go through a formal process of trial with the normal procedure for recording of evidence.\n\nThat would be a totally futile process because it is obvious that a bonded lal:iourer can never stand up to the rigidity and formalism of the legal process due to his poverty,.illiteracy and social and economic backwardness and .if such a procedure were required to be folldwed, the State Government might as well obliterate this Act from the statute book. It is now statistically established that most •f bonded labourers are members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes or other backward classes and ordinary course. of hunian affairs would show, indeed judicial notice can be taken of it, that there would be no occasion for a labourer to be placed in a situation where he is required to supply forced la.hour for no wage or for.nomi- nal. wage, unless he has received some advance or othe~. economic , consideration from the employer and under the pretext of not having returned such advance or.other economic consideration, he is required to render service to the employer or is deprived of his freedom of employment or of the right to move fteely wherever he wants. Therefore, whenever it is shown that a labourer is. made to provide forced labour, the Court would raise a presumption that he is required to do so in consideration of an advance or other economic considera' tion received by him and he is therefore a _bonded labourer. This presumption may be rebutted .bY .the employer and also by the\n\nState Government if it so chooses but unless and until satisfactory material i11 produced for rebutting this presumption, the Court must proceed on the basis that the labourer is a bonded labourer entitled to the benefit of ihe provisions of the Act. The State Government. cannot be permitted to repudiate its .obligation to identify, release and rehabilitate the bonded labourers on the plea that though the\n\n• SUPREME COURT REPORTS . (1984] 2 s.c.R.\n\nconcerned labourers may be poviding forced labour, the State Government does not owe any obligatiqn to them unless and until they ·\n\nshow in an appropriate legal proceeding conducted according to the rules of adversary system .of justice, that they are bonded labourers.\n\nThe first question that arises in regard to the implementation of the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act 1976, is thatof identification of bonded labour. One major handicap which impedes the identification of bonded labour is the reluctance of the administration to admit the existence of bonded labour. even where it is prevalent.\n\nIt is therefore. necessary to impress upon the administration that it does not help to ostrich-like bury its head in the sand and ignore the prevalence of bonded labour, for it is not the existence of bonded\n\n. labour that is a slur on the administration but its failure 'to eradicate it and moreover not taking the necessary steps for the purpose of wiping out this biot on the fair name of the State is a breach of its constitutional obligation. We would therefore direct the Government of Haryana and also suggest to the other State Qovernments,.tQ take st.eps to sensitise the officers .concerned with the implementation of the Act to this acute human problems and its. socio-economic parameters. Moreover it may be noted that the District . Magistrates have a central role to play under. the provisions of the Act and. the State Governments would therefore do weli to instruct the District Magistra.tes to tae up the work of identification of bonded labour • as one of their top priority task~. There are certain areas of concentration of bonded labour which can be easily identified on the basis _of various studies and reports made bi governmental authorities, .social action groups and social scientists from time to time. These areas of concentration of bonded labour are mostly to be found in\n\nstonequarries, brick kilns and amongst agricultural landless labourers and such areas must be mapped out by each State Government and task forces should be assigned.for identification and release of bonded labour: Labour camp.s should be held periodicall~ in these areas with a view to educating the labourers and for this purpose, the assistance of the National 'Labour Institute may be taken, because the National Labour Institute has the requisite expertise and experience of holding such amps and it should be associated with. the organisation and conduct of such camps and in each such camp, individuals with organisational capability or potential shculd 1:e identified and given training in the work of identification and relea'e 'of bonded Jabour. More importantly non-political serial acticn groups and voluntary agencies and. particularly those with a record of honost and cJmp, tent service for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled . . . '\n\n'BANDHUA MUKTI MORCHA v . . UNION (Bhagwati, J,) 133\n\nTribes, agricultural labourers and other unorganised workmen shouid be involved in the .task of.identification and release of bonded labourers, for it is primarily through such soda! action groups and voluntary agencies alone that it will be possible to eradicate the toaded la tour system, because social action groups and voluntary agencies comprising inen and women dedi£ated to the cause o.f emancipation of bonded labour will be able to penetrate through the secrecy under which very often bonded labourers are required tp work and discover\n\nthe. existe.nce of bonded labour and help to identify and release bonded labourers. We would therefore direct the Vigilance Committees\n\n'. as also the District Magistrates to take the assistance of non-political social.action groups and voluntary agencies for the purpose of ensuring implementation of the provisions of the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act 1976. '\n\nTh.e other question arising' ou~ of the.· implementation of th~ Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act 1976 is that of rehabilitation\n\nof tlie released bonded labourers. and that is also a question of the greatest importance, because if the bonded labourers who are identi-\n\n• 1 D fied and freed, arc not rehabilitated, their condition would be much . worse .than what it was before during the period of their serfdom and they would .become more exposed to exploitation and slide back once again into serf<lon even in the absence of any coercion. The\n\nbonded labourer who is released wonld prefer slavery to hunger, a world of 'bondage and (illusory) security' as against a world'. of freedom and starvation. The State Governments must therefore concentrate on rehabilitation ofbonded lribour and evolve effective programmes fot. this purpose. Indeed they are under ari obligation to do so under the provisions of the Bonded Labour System (Aboii- tion) Act 1976. It may be pointed out that the oncept ofrehabilitation has the following four main features as admirably set out in the letter dated 2nd September 1982 addressed by the Secretary.\n\nMinistry of Lab?ur, Government of India to the various States Governments:\n\n(i) Psychological rehabilitation must go side by side with\n\nphysical and economic rehabilitation; G\n\n(ii) The physical and economic rehabilitatim:i has 15 major\n\ncomponent~ .namely \\lllotment of house-sites and agricultural land, Jarid development, provision of'Jow cost dwelling units, agriculture, provision of credit, horticulture, ariimal , husbandry, training for acquiripg\n\ni34\n\nSUP\\UlMB COURT RBPOR.TS\n\n(1984) 2 S.C.R..\n\n new skills and developing existing skills, promoting traditional arts and crafts, provision of wage einpioyment and . enforcement of minimum wages, collection and processing of minor foret produce, health, medical care and sanifation, supply of essential commodities, education of children of bonded labourers and protection civil rights;\n\n(iii) There is scope for brillging about an integration among the various central and centrally sponsored schemes and the on-going schemes of the 1!tate Governments for a more qualitative rehabilitation. The essence of such integration is to avoid duplication i.e. pooling resources from different sources for the same purpose.\n\nIt should be ensured that while funds aye not drawn from different sources for the same purpose drawn from different sectors for different components of the rehabilitation scheme are integrated. skillfully'. and ,\n\n. .\n\n(iv) While 'drawing up any scheme/programme of rehabilifation of freed bonded labour, the latter must necessarily be given the choice between the various alternatives for their rehabilitation and such programme should be finally selected for execution as .would need the total requirements of the families of freed bonded labourers . to enable them to cross the poverty line on the one hand and to prevent them from sliding back to debt bondage on the other.\n\nWe would therefore direct the Government of ..Haryana to draw up a scheme. on programme for \"a better and .more meaningful rehabilitat'on of the freed bonded labourers\" in the light of. tho above guidelines set out b¥ the Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Labour in his letter dated 2nd September 1982. The other State Governments are not parties before us and hence we cannot giv~ any direction to them, but we hope and trust that they will also take suitable steps for the purpose of securing identification, reiease and rehabilitation of bonded labourers on the lines indicated by u.s in this Judgment. • H We are not at all satisfied that the stand taken on bhalf of\n\nth~. State of Haryana.that there is no bonded labour at. all in the stono\n\n.,.\n\nBANDHUA MUKTI MORCHA v. UNION (Bharvati, J.).\n\nJ.35\n\ni q11rries and stane crushers is correct. The Report of Mfs Ashok\n\nSrivastava and Ashok Panda shows that, according to the statements given by some of the workers, they were not allowe<l to leave the\" stone quarries and were providing forced labour and this Report also stated that severlil persons working in the Ghodholwr and Lakarpur stone quarries were forcibly kept by the contractors and they wre not allowed to move out of their places and were bonded labourers. The petitioner also filed the affidavits of a large number\n\ny<. of workers on 24th August 1982, each of them stating that he is under heavy. debt of the thekedar who does not allow him to leave ..\n\n ~ the premises without settling the account. We cannpt ignore this material which has been placed before us and unquestioningly accept the statement made on behalf .of the State of Haryana that there is no bonded labour in the stone quarries and stone crushers. But. at the same time, we do not think that it would be right for us on\n\n,.. the basis of this material to come to a definite finding that these workers whoie names. are give~ in the Report of Mfs Ashok Srivastava and Ashok Panda or who have filed affidavits are providing forced labour or are bonded labourers. It is necessary to direct a further inquiry for the purpose of ascertaining whether any of.the labourers working in the stonequarries and stone crushers in Faridabad Distriet are bonded labourers fa the. light of the law laid down by us in this j judgment. We would . therefore direct Sb:1i Laxmi Dhar Misra,, Joint Secretary in the. Ministry. of Labour, Government of India, who has considerable experience of the work of identification, release t and . rehabilitation of bonded labourers, to visit the stone quarries\n\nT and stone crushers in Faridabad District and ascertain by enquiring from the labourers in each stone quarry or stone crusher whether any of them are being forced to provide labour ; md are .bonded laboureres. While making this inquiry, Shri Laxmi Dhar Misra Y will take care to see that wl1en he interviews the labourers either individually or collectively, neither the mine-lessees or owners of stone crushers nor the thekedar 'of jamadar nor any one else is present.\n\nShri Laxmi Dhar Misra will prepare in respect of each stone quarry or stone crusher a statement showing the names and particulars of\n\nthoe who, according to the inquiry made by him, are bonded labou-·\n\nrers a1!d he will also ascertaiii from them whether they want to continue to work in. the stone quarry or tone crusher or they want to\n\n-<. go back to their homes and if they want to go back, the District Magistrate of Faridabad will on. receipt of the statement from Shri Laxmi Dhar Misra, make necessary arrangements for releasing them and provide for .their trarlsportation back to their hromes and for thio purpose the State Government shall make the requisite funds\n\n• •\n\n. A.\n\n.ff\n\n. \" 136\n\nSUPREME,, COURT REPORTS\n\n(1984] 2 S.C.R.\n\n. available to the. District Magistrate. Shri Laxmi Dhar Misra .will also enquire from the mine-lessees and owners of stne crushers as also from the thekedar or jamadar whether there are any advances made by them to the labourers working in the stone quarry or. stone crusher anci if so, whether there is any docnmen- _iary evidence in support of the same and he will also ascertain what, according to the mine-lessees and owners of tone crushers oi the jamadar or thekedar, are the amounts of loans still remaining outstanding against such labourers. Shri Laxmi Dhar Misra will submit his report to this Court on or before 28th February t984.\n\nWe may make it clear that the object and purpose of this inquiry by Shri Laxmi Dhar Misra is not to fasten any liability on the minelessees and owners, of stone crushers and the iamadar or thekedar on the basis of the Report of Sbri Laxmi Dhar Misra but to secure the release !Ind repatriation •Of those labourers Who claim to be bonded labourers and who want to leave the employment and go some where else. We niay point out , that the problem of bonded labo11rers is a difficult problem because unless, on being freed from bondage, they are provided proper and adequate rehabilitation, it would not help 'to merely seure their release. Rather in: such cases it would be more in their interest to ensure proper working conditions . with 'run ejoyment of the benefits of social welfare and labom' 1aws\n\nso that they can live a healthy decent life. Bnt of course\n\n0 this would . only be the next best substitute for rel.,.; se and rehabilitation which\n\nmust· receive the highest priority. •\n\n So fa.r a's implementation of the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act 1948.is concerned \"\".e would direct the Central yovernment and State of Haryana fo take necessary steps for the purpose of ensuring that minimum wages are paid to the workmen employed in the stone quarries and stone crushers in accordance with the principles laid down by us in this judgment. It may not be a matter of any consequence, as to which mode of payment is followci, whether the workmen are paid on truck basis 9r on any other basis, but what is essential is and that is what the Minimum Wages Act 1948 requires that the workmen must _not receive any wage less than the minimum wage: Even if payment of wages is made to the workmen on truck basis; a formula would have to be evolved by the Central Gowtnment and the State of Haryana t0 ensure that the WQrkmen 'receive no less than the minimum: wage and to facilitatC:this fqrrnula. if would have to be provided that the expenses on explosives and drilling holes shall be borne by the mine-lessees and or the :iamadar or thekedar and the work of drillini: holes and shot firing shall be entrusted only ,\n\n' . l ., -\n\n\"\"\" -\n\n-'r .\n\nBANDHuA MUKTl-MORCl!A v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 137\n\n. to those who have received reqisite training uder the Milles Vocational Training Rules 1966. We would direct the Central Govern-\n\n.'\n\n. ment and the State of Haryana to take the necessary steps in this behalf so that within. the shortest poS6ible time adas far .as possible within six weeks from_ today the workqien start actually receiving in their hands a wage not less than the minimum wage. If payment of wages is continued to be maile on truck basis, it is necessary that the appropriate offieer of the Central Enfo; cement Machinery must . determine the measurement of each truck as to how many cubic feet of stone it can contain and print or inscribe such measurement on the truck, so that appropriate and adequate wage is received by the workmen for the work <)one by them and they are not cheated out of their legitimate wage. We would also direct the-. inspecting officers of Central Enforcement Machinery to carty .out surprise checks for the' purpose of ensuring that the trucks are not loaded beyond their - true measurement capacity. Such .surprise checks _shall be carried out by the inspecting officers of the central Enforcement Machinery ' at least once in a week and jf it is found that the trucks are loaded in excess of their true measurement capacity and the wor.kmen are thereby deprived of their .legitimate wages, the 'inspecting officers carrying ont snch checks will immediately bring this fact to the notice of the appropriate authorities for initiation of necessary. actio11 against the defaulting mine owners and/or thekedar or jamadar. We would also direct the Central Government and (he State of Haryana _to ensure that payment of wage is made directly to the workmen by the mine-lessees and stone-crusher owners or at any rate in the presence of a representative of the mine-lessees and stone crushers owners\n\nand the.inspecting officers bf the Centra.l Government 'as also of the State of Haryana shall carry out periodic checks in order' to ensure that payment of the sppulated wage is made to the workmen. Shri Laxmi Dhar Misra will also, while holding an. inquiry _pursuant to this . order, ascertain, by carrying out sample check, whether the workmen employed in any particular stone quarry or stone crusher are actually .in receipt of wage not less than the Illinimum wage and. whether the directions given by us in this order are being implemented. by the authorities. _ '.· - .\n\nG There are also two other matters in respect of which it is necessary for us to give directions. The first is that, apart from poverty and. helplessness, on~ additional reason why the work111en , employed in stone quarries and stone crushers are deprived of the rights and benefiis conferred upon them unde~ various social welfare.\n\nH laws enacted for their benefit and are subjected to .deception and\n\n\n(1984) 2 S.C.R.\n\nexploitation, m that they are totally ignorant of their rights and entitlements. It is this ignorance ', Vhich _is to some extent responsible for the total denial of the rights and benefits conferred upon them .. It is therefore necessary to educate the workmen employed iri stone quarries and stone crushers so that. they become a ware as to what are the rights and benefits to w, hich they are entitled under the various social welfare laws. The knowledge of thir rights and entitlements will give them the strength to fight against their employers for securing their legitimate dues and it will go a long way towards reducing, if not eliminating, their exploitation. We have fortunately in.our country the Central Board of Workers Education which is entrusted with the function of educating workers in their rights and entitlements and we would therefore direct the Central Board of Workers Education to organise periodic camps near the sites of stone quarries and stone crushers in Faridabad District for the purpose of creating awareness amongst the workmen about the rights and benefits conferred upon them by social welfare laws. This educational campaign shall be taken up by the Central Board of Workers Education as early as possible and the progress made shall be reported to this Court by the Central Board of Workers Education from time to time, at least once in three months. ·\n\nThe other matter in regard to which. we find it necessary to . give directions relates to the tremendous pollution oi' air . by dust\n\nE .. thrown out as a result of operation of the stone. crushers. When the stone crushers are being operated, they coniinually throw out largequantities of dust which not only pollute the 11ir, but also. affect the visibility ahd constitute a serious health hazard to the workmen.\n\nThe entire air in the area where stone crushers are being operated is heavily laden with dust and it is this air which the-workmen breathe F dy in and day out and it is µo wonder that many of them contract tuberculosis. We. would. therefore direct. the central Government and the State of Haryana to immediately take steps for the purpose of ensuring that the stone. crushers 'owners do not continue to foul' the air and they adopt.either of two devices, namely, keeping a drum of water above the stone crushing machine with arrangement for G : continues spraying of water upon it or installation of dust sucking\n\nmachine. This direction shall be carried out by the Central Government and the State of Haryana in respect of each stone crusher in thir Faridabad .District and a compliance report shall be made to this Col!rt on or before 28th February, 1984. -. _\n\nSo far as the provisions of the Contract Labour Act and the.\n\nJ '\n\nBANDHUA MUKTI MORCHA v. UNION (Bhagwafi, J..) 139\n\n-f foter-State Migrant Workmen Act are concerned, we have already discussed those provisions and pointed out in what circumstances those provisions would be applicable in. relation to workmen employed in the stone quarries an.d stone crushers. It is not possible for us on the material on record .to come to a definite finding whether the provisions of the Contract Labour Act and the Inter-State Migrant\n\nWokmen Act are applicable in the case 9f any particular stone quarry or stone crusher, because it would be a matter for investigation and ·) determination, particularly since it has been disputed by the Central Government that there are any inter-St>lte migrant workmen at all . .t in. any. of the stone quarries or stone crushers. We would therefore direct Shri Laxmi Dhar Misra to conduct an inquiry in each of the stone quarries and stone crushers in Faridabad District for the purpose of ascertaining whether there are any contract labrers or . inter-State migrant workmen in any of tlj, ese stone quarries or slone -'-· crushers, in the light of 'the interpretation laid down by us in this ' judgment, and, if so, what is the number of such contract labourers or inter, State migrant workmen in each stone quarry or stone crusher.\n\nIf Shri Laxmi Dhar Misra finds as a result of his inquiry that 'the Contract Labour Act and/or the Inter-State.· Migrant Workmen Act . is applicable, he will make a report. to that effect to the Court ou or before 15th February 1984. We may make it clear that this. inquiry\n\n~ by Shri Laxmi Dhar Misra is not directed for the purpose of fastehing\n\nany liability on the mine-lessees and stone crusher owners or the . iamadars and thekedars propriO vigore on the basis of such report, '\\ but merely for the purpose of considering whether a prima facie case\n\nT eX1sts on the basis of which action can be initiated by the Central\n\nGoverrunent; in which the mine-lessees and stone crusher .owners and/or the jamdars or thekedars would have. an opportunity of :.· contesting the allegation thl\\t the Contract Labour Act. and/or the Inter-State Migrant Workmen Act applies to their' stone l\\jUarry or stone crusher and defending such action.\n\nWe may. now take up a few specific complaints urged on behalf of the workmen. The first complaint relates. to the failure to provide pure drinking water to the workmen in most of the stone quarries\n\nand stone crushers. The Report of M/s Ashok Sr'vastava and Ashk G ., Panda as also the Report made by Dr. Patwardhan shows that pure\n\n drinking water is not made available to the workmen. rn Lakarpur mines the workmen are obliged to take water !'from a shallow rivulet covered with thick algae\" and that too, \"after a walk over a dangerously , steep incline''. The same situation also prevails in the mine H in the Gurukul area as also in the Anangpur mines and in these mines\n\n140 SUPREME COURT REPOR:rs [l 9'84 J 2 s.c.R.\n\n\"quite -0ften the upstream and the further down-streani of the rivulet get blocked due to mining of stone and the water becomes stagnnt\" and the workmen have .no other option but to use this water fo.r drink , king p11rposes. It is true that in the low.er reaches of Lakarpur near the road there is a tubewell from which the workmen get water but that is only when they are permitted to do so by the persons operting. it. The Report of Dr. Patwardhan also points out that it is the children or women of the workmen who are usually engaged in the . work of transporting wate.r from distant places like the . tubewell but they are not paid anything for this work which is being done by them. Ne'ther any m'ne-lessee or stone crusher owner nor any jamadar or thekedar regards it as his duty to make prov; sion for drink- ihg water for the workmen nor does any officer of the Central Government or of the State Government bother to enforce the provisions of law in regard to snpply of drinking water: It is clear that, quite apart from the provisions of the Contract Labour Act and the Interstate Migrant Workmen Act, there is a specific prescription in section 19 of the Mines Act 1952 and Rules 30 to 32 of the Mines Rules l955 D that the mine-lessees and stone crusher owners shall make effective\n\narrangement~ fot providing and maintaining at , suitable points conveniently situated a sufficient supply of cool and wholesome drinking wa, ter for all workmen employed in the .stone quarries. and stone\n\ncrushers. The quality of drinkin_g wate~ to be provided by them\n\nhas to be on a scale of at least. 2.1itres for every person employed at any one time and such drinking water has to be readily ayailable at conveniently accessible points during the whole of the working time. Rule 31 requires that if drinking water is not provided from taps connected with constant 'water supply system, it should .be kept cool in suitable vessels sheltered from weather and such vessels must be emptied, cleaned and refilled every day a; i.d steps have tobe taken to preserve the water, the storage vessels and the vessels used for drinking water in clean and hygienic condition.· The inspectors may also by order in writing require the mine-lessees and stone crusher owners to submit with the least possible delay a certificate from a competent health officer or analyst as to the fitness of the water for human consumption. This obligation has to be carried out by the mine-lessees and stone crushr owners and it is the responsibility of the Central Government as also of the State of Haryana to ensure that this o]:>ligation is immediately carfied out by the mine-lessees and stbne crusher owners. We would therefore direct the Central Government and the State of Haryana to ensure immediately that the mine-lessees and stone crusher owners start supplying pure drink- . ing water to the workmen on a seale of at least 2 .litres for every\n\n.,. .\n\nI I\n\n.·~\n\nBANDHUA _MUKTI MORCHA v. UNION (Bhcgwati, J.) 14! • • workman by keeping suitable vessels in a shaded place at conveniently access; ble points and appointing some one, preferably, amongst the women and/or children of the workmen to look after these vessels. The Central Government and. the State. of Haryana will also take steps for ensuring that the vessels in which drinking water is kept by the mine-Jes.sees and stone crusher owners are kept in clea and hygienic condition and are emptied, cleaned and refilled every day anc! they shall also ensure that minimum wage is paid to the women and/or children who look after the, vessels. The Chief Labour Commissioner, th.e Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner, the Assistant L1baur Commissioner arid the Labour Enforcement Officers of the Government of India as also the appropriate inspecting officers of the Government of Haryana shall supervise strict!} the enforcement of this obligation and initiate necessary actiori if there is any default.\n\nThe Central Government ' as also. the '.State of Haryana will also immediataly direct the mie-lessees and stone-crusher owners to start' obtaining drinking Water from any nnpolluted source .or sources . ofsupp:y and to transport it by tankers to the works site with sufficient frequency so as to be a\\Jle to keep the vessels filled up for supply of clean drinking water to the workmen. The Chief Administrator, Faridabad Comnlex is directed to set\" up the points from where the mine-lessees and st0ne crusher owners can, if necessary, cbtain supply . of potable watc.r for being catiied by tanker_s. These directions given by s shall be promptly , and immed!ately carried out by the appropr:ate authorWes and Shri Laxmi Dhar Misra will, while conducting his inquiry, also ascertain whether ihese directicns have teen carried . out and pure drinking water has been made available to the workmen in accordance with these directions and submit a report in that behalf . to the Court on or before 28th February 1984. ·\n\nThe second complaint related to the failure to provide conservan-; y faciFties to the workmen in the stone quarries and stone crushern: Section 20 of the Mines Act 1'952 requires that there shall\n\nbe provided separately for males and females a sufficient number of latrines and urinals of prescribed types so situated -, is to be convenient and accessible to. persons employed in the stone quarries and stone crushers and all such latrines ar.d urinals shall be adequatel)I lighted, ventilated and at all times maintain<d in a ckan and sanitary ·condition. What should be the number of. latrine~ and . urinals. to be povided in each stone quarry or stone crusher and .\n\nwhat should. be the standard of construction .to be ccmplkd with iii erecting the la!rines are provided in Rules 33 to 35 of the Mines\n\nRules 1955 and Rule 36 provides that a sufficient. number of water\n\nB '\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS • • . taps conveniently accessible shall be. provided in or near such latrines ' +\n\nand if piped water supply is not available; then a sufficient quantity\n\n• of water shall be hept stored in suitable receptacles near such latrines The Report of Dr. l>atwardhan sli.ows that there is not a trace of 1uch conservancy facilities in any of the stone quarries and the • 'vat open mountain dug-up without a thought as to environment is used by men and women and children as one huge open latrine\" where the ' ' only privacy is that provided by the \"curtain drawn by the turned. down eyes of women and the turned away eyes of men';, This statement made in the Reportof Dr. P; itwardhan has nbt been denied.\n\n.... in ar, iy of the affidavits in reply filed on behalfof the respondents.\n\nWe would therefore direct the Central Government as also the State Government td. ensure that conservancy facilities in the shape of latrines and. urinals in accordance with the provisions contained in Section 20 of the Mines Act 1950 and Rules 33 to 36 of the Mines Rules\n\nr-~\n\n1955 are provided immediately. by mine lessees and owners of stone crushers. This direction shall be carried out at the earliest without. ). any delay and Shri.Laxmi Dhar Misra will, while making his inquiry, ascertain whether the mine-lessees and owners of stone crushers in each of the stone quarrie, s and stone crush<rs visit<d by him have complied with this direction and a Report in that behalf shall be submitted by Shri Laxm; Dhar Misra on or before 28.th February, 1984. .\n\nThere was also' one other complaint mode on behalf of the\n\n. ·workmen and that related to the absence of any medical or first aid ..,.\n\nfacilities. The Report of J)r. Patwardhan shows that no such facili- 7 . ties are provided to the workmen employed in the sfone quarries and 1. \"\" stone crushers and this finding was not sqiously disputed en behalf of the respondents. It is indeed regrettable that despite 1here being a mandatory provision for medical and first Aid facilities in Secticn 21 -:t of the Min.es Act 1952 and Rules 40 to 45A of the Mines Rules 1955, no medical or. first aid. facilities . seem to. be provided in the stone quarries and stone crushers. We would therefore direct the Centra I Government as also the State Government to take steps t.o immediately ensure that proper and .adequate medical ayd first aid facilities as required by Section 21 of the Mines Act 1952 and Rules 40 to 45A of the Mines Rules 1955. are provided by the minelessees and owners of o6tone quarries to the workmen. Rule 45 provides that every shot 'f firer and blaster in a mine shall hold first aid qualification specified in Rule 41 and shall carry, while on duty, a first aid outfit consisting of one large sterilized dressing and an amul of tincture of iodine or other suitable antiseptic. But we find that this requireme.nt is also\n\nBAND!fUA MUKTI MORCHA v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) . . 143\n\nnot observed bythc mine-Jcssees and stone crusher owners and t4e workmen are\" required to carry on blasting with explosives withont any first aid qualification or first aid outfit. We would therefore direct the Central Government as also the State of Haryana to ensure that every workman who is required to carry out blasting with explo- sives should not only be trained under the Mines Vocational Training Rules 1966 bur should also hold first aid qualification and he. should carry a first aid outfit, while on duty, as tequired by Rule 45 ... The Central Government and the State Government wil1 also take steps to secure that proper and adequate medical treatment is provided by the mine-lessees and owners of stone crushers to. the :workmen en\"iployed by them as also to the members of their families and such medical assistance should be made vailable to the111 without , any cost of tanspoi'tat_ion. or otherwise a.nd the cost of medicines prescribed by the doctors must be reimbursed to them. Where the workmen or the members of their families meet with any' serious accident involving fracture or possibility of' disability or suffer from any serious illness,· the mine-lessees and owners of stone crushers should be required by the Central Government as also the State\n\nGovernment to make arrangements for hospitalisation cf such W()rkmen or members of their families.at the\"cost of the mine-lessees and/ or owners of stone crushers. We would also direct the Central Government and the Siate of Haryana to ensure that the provisions of the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961, the Maternity ilenifit (Mines and Circus) Rules 1963 and the Mines Creche Rules, 1966, where applicable in any particular stone quarries or stone crushers, are given effect to by the mine-lessees and owners of stone crushers.\n\nThese directions given by us shall also be carr'ed out at the earliest without any undue delay and Shri Laxmi. Dhar Misra, while conducting his inquiry, will ascertin whether these directions have been complied with and the necessary medical and first aid facilities including hosnitalisation have been provided to the workmen and the meinbes of iheir families.\n\nWe may point out that the above directions in regard to provision of health and welfare facilities have been given by us . onlf with reference to the provisions of the Mines Act 1952 and the Mines Rules . 1955 which are admittedly applicble in the case of stone quarries and stone crushers. We have not given any directions for enforcement. of the provisions of the Contract Labour Act and the Inter-State Migrant Workmen Act because it has yet to be determined whether these two statutes are app!icable in any particular stcne quarry or stone crusher. It.is also. necessary to point out that whenever any\n\n• A .\n\n144.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984] 2 s.c.R.\n\nworkman .suffers any injury or contraets any disease .in the course of employment, he is entitled to compensation under the Workmens' Compensation Act 1923, but unfortunately he is very often not in a position to approach the appropriate court or autho.rity for enforcing his claim to compensation and even if he files such a claim, it takes a long time before such claim is disposed of by the court or auth<irity.\n\nWe would therefore direct that as soon as any workman employed . iii a stone quarry or stone crusher receives injury or contracts disease\n\nin the course of his employment, the concerned mine-lessee or stone crnsher owner shall immediately report this fact to the Chief Inspector or Inspecting Officers of the Central Government and/or. the State Government and such Inspecting Officers shall immediately provide. legal assi.stance to the worman with a view to enabling him, to file\n\na claim for compensation before the appropriate court or authority and they shall .also ensure that such claim is pursued vigorously and the amount of compensation awarded to the workman is secured to him. We would like to impress upon the Cotirt'or Athority before which a claim for compensation is filed by or on bebaif oflhe workman to dispose of such claim without any undue delay, since delay i~ the awarding of compensation to the workman would only and to his misery and helplessness and would be nothing sort of gross denial of justice to him. The Inspecting Officers of the C.entral Government as also of the State Government will visit each stone quarry or stone crusher at least once in a fortnight and ascertain whether there. is any 'workman who is injured or who is suffering from .any disease or illness, and if so, they will immediately take the necessary steps . for the purpose Of providing medical and legal assistance and if they fail to do so, the Central Government and the State Government,\n\nas the. case may be, shall take necessary action against the defaulting .Inspecting :officer or Officers. ·\n\nWe have given these directions to the Central Government and th~ State of Haryana and we expect the Central Goyernment and the State of Haryana' to strictly comply with the.se directions . .. We need not state that if any of these directions is not properly carried out by the Central Government or the St.a.le of Haryana, we shall take a very serious view of the matter, because we firmly believe that it is no use having social weifare 1~'ws on the statute book if they are not going to be implemented.' We must not be content with the law in books but we must have law in action. If we want our democracy to be a participatory democracy, it is necessary that law must not only speak justice but mu.st also deliver justice.\n\nBefore parting with this case, we may point out, and this bas •\n\nt' .\n\nBANDHUA MUKTI MORCH A v'. UNION (Bhagwati' J.). 145 .\n\n. ,.\n\ncom~ to our notice not only through the Report of Dr. Patwardhan btit also otherwise, thtt! the magistrates and judicial officers take a very lenient view of violations of Jabour'laws enacted f01; the benefits of the workmen and Jet ff the defaulting. employers with small fines ..\n\nThere have ; lso boen occasions. where (he n1agistrate and judicial .officers have scotched prosecutions aild acquitted or discharged the defaultin.g employers on hypertechriica\\ities. This happens largely because the magistrates and judicial officers are not 'sufficiently sensitised to 'the importance of. observance of Jabour. Jaws with the result that the labour. laws are allowed to be ignored and breached. with utter callousness and indifference and theworkmen begin toJel that the defaulting employers can, by paying a fine which hardly touches their pocket, escape from the.arm of law and the labour laws sup'posedly enacted for their benefit are not meant 'to be observed bu!are merely decorative appendages intended .to assuage the co11scie.nce f the workmen. we would therefore, strongly impress upon the magistrates and judicial officers to take a strict view of viol.ation df Jabour laws and to. impose abcquate punishment on the erring employers so that they 1nay re.alise that it does not pay. to. commit a breach of' such laws and to deny the benefit of such laws to tlie workmen.\n\nC.·\n\n.We .accordingly. allow thiS writ petition and issue the above directions to the Central Govornment and the state of Haryana.and :: the. v.arious authorities mentioned in the preceding paragraphs of' E this judgment so. that these poor unfortunate workmen. who lead a miserable existencµ in' snialr hovels, exposed to .. the vagaries of \\Veathef, drinking foul water, breathing' heavily dusl-laden polluted air and breaking and blasting stone all ihcir life. may one day be able fo realise that freedom is nt only the monopoly of a few bt belongs to them all and that they are. a.lso equally .entitlca along with \\).thers F t? participate in the fruits of freedom and development. These directions_ 1Tiay. be .sum1narise~ as follows . . \"'\n\n(I) The Govern.men! of Haryana will, without any delay and\n\nat any rate , withihn six weeks from today, constitute Vigilance Committee in each sub-division of a district in compliance. with. the reuqirements of section 13 of the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act. 1976 keeping. iri v}ew the guidelines given by us in this judgtnfnt. ·\n\n(2) The Government of Haryana wili instruct the district magistrates to take up the work of identification .o( bonded\n\n• 146\n\nSUPREME COURT REPbRTS-\n\n[1984] 2 S.C.R .\n\nlabour as one of their top priority tasks and to map out areas of concentration of bonded labour which_ are mostly to be found in stone .quarries ad brick kilns and assign task forces for identification and •relea; e of bonded labour and periodically hold labour camps in the_se areas -with a view to educating the labourers inter alia with the assistance of fhe National Labour Institute.\n\n(3) The State Government as also the Vigilanoe Committees and the district magistrates will take the assistance of nonpolitical social action groups and voluntary agenc_ies for ... the purpose of ensuring implementation of the provisions of the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976. }- '\n\n(4) The Governmel of Haryana ;,, ill draw up within a period of three months from today a scheme cir programme-for rchallilitation of the freed bonded labourers in the light of the guidelines set out by the Secretary to. the Government of India; \"Ministry of Labour in his letter dated 2nd September 1982 and implement'such scheme or programme to the extent found necessary. •\n\n(5) The Central Government and the Government of Hpiyana\n\nwill take all necessary steps for the purpose of' ensuring 'that -minilt\\Um wages are paid to the workmen employfd , l.._ .in the stOiie quarries and stone crushers in accordance\n\nwith the principles-- laid down in this jdgment and this direction shall be carried out within the shortest possible . j time so that.within six weeks from today, the workmen ..i start actually receiving i_n their hands a wage not less than the minimumwage.\n\n(6) If payment 'or wages is made on truck basis, the Central Government will direct the appropriate officer of the Central j:lnforcement Machinery or any other appropriate • authority or officer to 'determine the measurement of each truck as to how many cubic ft._ of_ stone it can contain ai{c] print or inscribe such mrasuren1ent on 1he trui;,::k so that appropriate and adequate wage is received by the workmen for the work done by them and they arc not cheated out of (hejr legitimate wage.\n\n(7) The Central Governinent will direct the inspecting officers\n\n'\" •\n\n-j -f '\n\n...\n\n.· (8)\n\nBANDHUA MUKTI MORCHA \"' l'NlON (Bhag1rati, ].)_\n\n; J.47\n\n of the Central Enforcernen! Macl1inery or any o!her apprcpriate inspecting officers to carry out surpfise checks at least once in a week for the purpose of. ensuring that, '(he trucks are not loaded bcyonfl their true measurement\n\ncapacity. and \\f it is found that the trucks are leaded in . excess of the true n1easuren1Cnt apacity, .the inspcctirg officers carrying out such checks will immediately bring this t'act to the notice of the appropriate authorities and necessary action shall 'b~ initialed against the dcfaullirg mine owners at1d/or thekedars or jrin1adars.\n\n,;· .\n\n The Centi-al Government and. the Government of Haryana ; viii ensure that pay~1eP.t of '}'fges is ade diictly to the \\Vorkmen by the n1inc lessee$ and st_0ne cruher .oviners or at any rate in the presence of a rc.presentative of the tnine 1essescs or. stne crush-er owners and . the-. inspecting officers of the Central Government as also of ihe Government of Haryana shall carry out pericdic checks in crdcr to ensure that the payment of the , stipulated wage is inade to the workn1en.\n\n(9) The Cenlrnl Board of Workers Education wili organise\n\npricdic can1ps nca1' the sites. of cne qUariics rind stcnc crushers 'in Faridabad' district for the purpose of educatirg the \\Vorkn1en in the rights and benefits conferred upon thern by social welfare and labour laws and .!he progress\n\nmade shall be reported to this Cotirt by the Central Board of Workers EducatiOn at lcnt once in thtec n1cnths .\n\n(10). The Central Government ard the Government of Haryana \\vill im1nediat.ely take stps for the purpcse of ensuring that the stone cruShcr O\\vners d9 not coiitinue to foul . the air and they adopt either of two . devices, namely,,\n\nkeeping a drum of \\Yater abllve the stone crushing n1achiJ?.e with. arrangement for co11tinuous spraying cf water upon it or installation of dust suking n1achine and a con1pliance report in regard to this -(, irection shall be made to .this Court on or before 281'11 February, 1984. ·\n\n( 11) The Central Governn1cnt and the Governn1cnt of Haryana ,\n\n\\ill imm, ediately ensur~ t~1t the\n\n1 n1ine lessees and stoe cruShcr owi1ers start .supplyi-ng pu-re drinkin-g water to the Wurkmen on a scale Of at least 2 litres for every wcrk- -·\n\nA ..\n\nE\n\n(12)\n\nSUPREME COURT REP0RTS .\n\n\n. man 'by keeping sitable. vessels in a shadd place at conveniently accessible points and such vessels shall be kept in clean a.nd hygieniC condition and shali be emptied, deaned. and reflJled every day and the appropriate auth.o~ rities of the Centrl Government' and' (he Government of Haryana will supervise strictly the enforcement of. this direction and initiate necessary action if there is any default. ..\n\nThe Central Governmertt.•and the Government of Haryan~ will ensure that minimi1m wage is paid to the wmen and/or\n\nchildrn who look after the vessels in whicb pure drinking\n\n~ . . ' ' water ts kept for the workmen. . .\n\n(13) The Central Government and the Government of Haryana will immediately direct the mine. lessees and stone crusher owners 10 start obtaining drinking water from any iippolluted surce or sources of supply and to transport it by tankers to the work site with sufficient' frequency so as to be able to keep the vessels filled up for s'upply of clean 'drinking water to the workmen and the Chief Administrator; Faridabad Complex. will set up tlie points from' .where the min'e lessees and stone crusher owners can, if . necessary, obtain supply of potable water for being carried\n\nby tankers.\n\n04) The Central Government and the State Government will ensure that conservancy facilities in the shape of latrines and urinal, s in accordance with the provision~ .contained in ection.20 of the M; nes Act, 1950 and Rules 33 to 36 of the Mines Rules 1955 are provided at-the latest by 15th February 1984., ·\n\n. (15) The Central Government and the State Government w, ill\n\ntake steps to immediately ensure that appropriate and adequaie medical and.first aid' facilities as required by section 21 <if the Miries Act 1952 and Rules 40 to 45A of the Mines R\\lles 1955 are provided to the workmen not later than 31st January 1984.\n\n..• [16) The. Central Government and 'the Government of Haryana will ensure th11t every workmen who is required to carry 1, rnt blasting with explosives isnot only trained under the\n\n( ......\n\n. ..,.\n\n' .\n\n\" . . .\n\n\\- .... .\n\n-· • . •\n\n.. .\n\nBANDHUA MUKTI MORCHA v. UNIOW(Bhagwati, J.) . 149\n\nMines Vocational Training Rules 1966' but. also holds first aid qualification and carries' a first aid outfit while on dty as required by Rule 45 of the Mines Ru)es 1955. . •,\n\n(i '() The Central Government and the State Government will\n\nimmediately take steps to ensure that properand. adequate . medical treatment. is pro, ided 'by the mine lessees and owners of stone er.ushers to the ·orken employed by .them\n\n(18)\n\n...\n\n(19)\n\n(20)\n\nas also to the membe.rs of their families free of cost and such medical assistance s)lall be made available to them without any .cost of transpotation or otherwise a'nd the . ·.doctor's fees as' also the cost of medicines \"prescribed by the doctors inducting. hospitalisation charges, if any;. shall ll, lso be reimbursed. to them.\n\nThe Central Government and. the State Government wili ensure that the provisins o.f the Maternity :Benefit Act 1961, the Maternity. Benefit (Mines and Circus) Rules 1963 and the Mines Creche Rules 1966 where applicable :iii anY particular stone .. qu~1Ty qr stone crush.er. are given effect to by .the mine le.ssees aiid_ stone _crusher owners ..\n\nAs son as any workman .emp!Qyed in a stone quarry or\n\nstoe crusher receives injury or\" contracts disease in. the course of his employment, the concerned mine lessee or stone crusher owner shall immediately .·, report this fact to the Chief Inspector or Inspecting Ot)J.cers of the Central . . Governmt;11t and/or the State Government and such Inspec-. ·\n\n. ting Officers shall immediately provide\". legal assistance ·\n\nto the workman with a view to enabling him to file a claim for compensation before the appropriate court or authority and they shall also ensure that s.uch claim is pursued . vigorously and the amount of compensation awarded to. the workman is secured to .him. . .\n\nThe Inspecting Officers. of the Central Government as also of the State Government will visit each stone quarry or stone crusher at least once in, .a fortnight and ascertain whether there is any workman ·.who is injured or who i! suffering from any disease 6r illness, and if so, they will immediately take the necessary steps for the -pqrpose of providing medical and legal assistance ..\n\nA •\n\n. SUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1984) 2S.C.R\n\n.(21) _ lf the Central -Government and the Go_vernment of Haryana fail to ensure performance of any of. the obligations. set out in clauses 11, 13, 14 and 15 by the m?ne lessees and stone crusher owners within the period specified in those respective clauses, such obligation or obligations to the\n\n~tent to which they are not performed shall be. carried out by the Central Governmet and the Government of Haryana. . ' . . · ' · • We. also appoint\" Shri. Laxmi Dhar Misra, Joint Secretary w1 the Ministry of Labour, Government of India as a. (,; ommission\"er for the _purpose f carrying out the following assignment .\n\n(a) He will visit the stone ql\\arries and stone crushers in. Faridabad district and ascertain by enquiring from the labourers in each stone quarry Or stone crusher. in the lnanner set Out by us whether any of them are being forced to provide laoour and are bonded Jabourers and he will prepare in respect of each stone quarry or stone crusher a statement showing the names and particulars of those who, according fo the inquiry made by him, are bonded labourers and he will also ascertain from them whether they want to continue . to wo; k in the stone quarry or storre crusher or they want to _go away and if he 'finds that they want to go away, he will furnish particulars in regard to them to. the District Magistrate, Fari_dabad and . the District Magistrate will, on receipt of the particulars from Shri Laxmi Dhar. Misra, make necessary arrangements for releasing them and provide for their , transpora ti on back. t? their homes and\n\nfor this' purpose' the State Government will make the requisite funds available to the Dist1'ict Magistrate ..\n\n. (b) He wilf also enquire from\" the mine lessees. and owners of stone er.ushers as also from the thekedars and jamadars\n\nwhether there are any advances made by them to the labourers working in the' stone. quarries or' stone crushers and if so, whether there is any documentary evidence in support of the same anq he will also ascertain what, according to th.e mine lessees and owners of stone crushers .or the Jamadar or Thekedar, are the amounts of loans still: remaining outstanding against such labourers.\n\n(c) He will also -ascertain by carrying ut sample check whether the worlcmen employed_ in any particular stone qu_arry\n\n..\\c,\n\n(d)\n\n, (c)\n\n(f) •\n\n(g)\n\n(h)\n\nBANDHUA MUKTI MORCHA V, UNION (Bhagwati, J,) 151\n\nor stone crusher are actually in receipt of wage not less than the minin\\um wage and whether the directions given in tl_iis order in. regard to computation and payment of minimum wage are being implemented by the authorities,\n\nHe will conduct. an inquiry in each of the stone quarries and stonecr.ushers in faridabad District for th_c purpose of ascertaining whether there are any contract labourers or inter-State migrant workmen in any of these stone. quarries or stone c; ushers and i( he finds as a result of his inquiry that the Contract Labour Act and/or the Jnter- Staie. Migrant .Workmen Act is applicable, he will make a repcirt to that effect to the Court.\n\nHe will ascertain whether lhe direcUons given by us in !his judgme;1t rgajding effective arrangement for supply of pure drinking water have been carried out by the mine , lessees and stone crusher owners and pure .drinking water has been made available to the workmen in accordance with those, directions.\n\nHe will also ascertain whether the m'ne lessees and owners of stone crushers in each of the stone quarries and stone crushers visited by , him have.complied with the directions given by. us in. this Judgn1Cnt regarding provision of con-· servancy facilities .\n\n. He will. also ascertain whetl)er the directio1is given by us in this judgment in regard to provision of first aid facilities and proper and adequate medical treatment including hospitalisation to the workmen and the members of their families are bein& carried out by the mine lessees and stone crusher ownocs and' the necessary first aid facilities and . proper and adequate medical services including hospitalisation are provided to the workmen and the members of their families.\n\nHe will also enquire whether the various other directions given by us in this judgment have been and are being carried out by the mine lessees and stoe crusher owners.\n\nShri Laxmi Dhar Misra will carry out this assignment entrusted H • to him and niakc his report to the Court on or before 28th Fbruary\n\n' .\n\n. A\n\n. ,\n\n• ..\n\n152 SUPREME COURT REPORiS (1984] 2 s.c.R.\n\n1984.\n\nIt w, ill be open to Shri Laxmi Dhar Misra to take.the assis-.. lance of such other. person or persons as .he thinks fit including officers . or employtes in the Ministry of Labour r in the Mini; try of Mines, who may be made available by. the higher authorities. If Shri Laxrrii Dhar Misra finds it necessary,· he may request the Court to extend the time for submitting his report by addfessing a letter to the Registry . of the Court.' The State of Ilaryana will deposit a sum of Rs. 5000\n\nwithin two weeks from. today for the purpose 'of meetipg the costs and out. o( p9cket expenses ofShri Laxmi Dhar Misra .. .\n\nWe have no doubt that if these directions given by us are honestly and s.incerely' carried out, it wi)r be. possible to 'improve the life conuitions of these workmen and ensure social ustice t~ them so that\n\nthey may be able to brcathe.:th.e fresh air of sociaI and economic freedom. The Central Goveniment and the St.ate of:Haryana w; ll pay to the petitioner's advocate a sum of Rs .. 5000 by way of i::osts.\n\nWe are grateful to Mr.. Govind Mukhoty. for renderin'g valuable assistanc; e to -us jn this case.\n\nPATBAK, J. I have. read the judgmei1ts prepared by my brothers Bhagwati and A.N. Sen, and while I agree with. the directions proposed by my brother Bhagwati I think it proper, bec::ause of the importance of the questions which arise in such matters, to set forth . . . •\n\nPublic interest litigation in its present fer; constitutes a new chapter in our judicial system.\n\nIt has acquired a significant degree of ilnportanc; e in the jurisprudence practised by our courts and has evoked a lively, if somewhat o.ntroversial, response 'in. legal circles, , in the media and among the general 'public.\n\nJn tlie United States, . it is the name \"giyen to efforts to provjde legal representation .to ' .groups and interests that have been.unrepresented or tinder-represented •.. in the legal proces; .. These include not only \\he poor a.nd the dis- . advantaged but>. ordinary citizens who, because' they cannot afford .\n\nlawyers to represent them, have Jacked access to courts, admini.stra'tive agencies and other legal forums in which basic policy decisions affec ting tJ; leir itterests are inad~\"~{l) __ ]n our owfl.c.ount:ry, this rtew C]?SS of litigation is justified by its protagonists on the basis generally of .vast areas in our population .. of illiteracy and poverty, of social arid\n\neconomic. backwardness, and of an insufficieni awareness andapprecia ,.\n\nMitcbell\"RogoVin: Pub1iC Interest i.aw~ ·. .\n\nThe Next_ Horizon, Anierican r- Ass(;>ci?tion )ournal. )§77 p. 334: •\n\n. .·\\-\n\n.,__._.\n\nI ....\n\n.;.. ,\n\n( -j\n\n- '\n\n--* ... '\n\n...\n\nBANDHUA MIJKTI MORCH,;. l'. UNION (Pathak, 1,) 153 . . - tion of individual and collective rights.\n\nThee . handkaps l1avc denied millions of our countrymen access to justice. Public interest litigation is said to possess the potential of providing such access in the n1ilieu . of a new ethos, in which participating sectors in the administration of justice l'O-operate in th.e creation of a system. which promises legal relief without cumberspmc formality nd havy expenditure. In the result, the legal organisation has taken on a radically new dimension and correspondingly new'. perspectives are opening up before judges' and.lawyers .and State Law agencies in the tasks before them. ,·• A crusding zeal is abroad; viewing the. present as an opportunity . to awaken the political and legal order to the objectives' of social justice projected in our constitutional system. New slogans fill the. air, and, new phrases have entered the legal dictionary, and we hear of the \"justicing system\" being galvanised into supplying'justcie . to the .sodo-economic disadvantaged. These urges re responsible for the birth of new judicial concepts and the expaning ho1izon of juridical power. They claim to :represent an increasing emphasis on social welfare and a, progressive humanitarian.ism, \" ·\n\n' .\n\n011 the othet side, tbe attempts of the judge and the lawyer are 'watched with sceptical concern by th0se who see .interference . by the courts .in public interest litigation as a series of quixotic forays in a world of unyieldibg and harsh reality, whose suceess in the face' of. opposition bolstered by the inertia and aP.athy of C:enturies is bourid to be limited .in impact ~d , brief in. duration. They .see judicial endeavour frustrated by the immobility of public concern and a traditio.nal resistance to change, and believethat the temporary success gained is.doomedfo 'waste away as a mere ripple in the vastness of a . giant . slow-moving society. Even the optimistic sense danger to the credibility and legitimacy f the eidsting judicial system, a feeling' contributed no doubt by the apprehension that the region into which the judiciary has ventured appears barren; uncharted and unpredic- \\able, with few guiding posts and direction finding principles, ancl they fear that a traditonally proen legeal structure may yield te> the anarchy of purely.emotional impulse, To Jhe mind trained in the · certainW of t, be law, of defined principles, of binding precedent, , and the common law doctrine of Stare decisis. the future is fraught with confusion and disord.er in the \"legal world and severe strains in the constitutional system.·- Atthe lowest, there is an uneas:; doubt about where we are going. ·\n\n. ·~ .\n\nF ..\n\n, Amidst' this welter of agitated controversy, I tj1in)<'it appropriate H • ts, yt .down a fe~ considerations which seem to me relevant if public\n\nF ,\n\n•• ••\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984] 2 s.c.R.'\n\ninterest litigation is to cmmand bwad acceptance. The history of human experience shows that when a revolution in ideas and in action enters the life of a nation, the nascent power so released possesses the potential nf throwing the preva%1g social order int-0 disarray.\n\nIn a. changing .society •. wisdom dictates that reform should emerge in the existing polity as an ordered change rroduced through its . institutio.ns. Moreover, the pace of change .needs to be handled with care lest the i~1stitutions themselves be. endangered.\n\nIn his Law in the Modern State, Leon Duguit observed : \"Any system of publ.ic law can be vital only so far as it is based on a given sanction. to the following ruies :· First, the holders of power cannot . do certain things; second, there are certain things they must do.''''' Traditional .. legal remedies have been preoccupied largely with the '.first rule.\n\nIt is recently that the second has begun. substantially to engage !>lie functional attention of the judicial , administration.\n\nIn the UQited States, the Warren Court achieved a remarkable degree . of success in decreeing affirmative ac\\ion programmes for the benefit of minorities and other socially or . economically disadvantaged interests through the avenues of public law .. In India, we are now\n\nbeginnfog to apply a similar concept of con.stitutional duty.\n\nU util the arrival of public interesf litigiion; civil litigation was patterned exclusively on the traditional model. The traditional conception of adjudication beiieves a suit to be a n1eans for settling disputes between private parties concerning their private rights. In .the usual form, the suit is an organised proceeding between two\n\nindividual corltestants. .It deals with a definite framework of facts requiring identification through porincip!es codified by statute and oit the basis of which the right-obligation relations between the parties .are determined, culminating in the grant or denial of relief by the Court. It 'is a proceeding confined to the parties, on whose volition depends the fact mateiialbrought o~ the record, witli the judge sitting , over the coritest as a mere passive neutral umpire.\n\nJudicial initiative has no significant role.\n\nThe rigid character of civil litigation conceived as a contests between two individual .parties representil)g .their personal interests has ben allowed to expand into a - representative. proceeding Where a person can, with the permission. of the Court, represent other; also having the same inierest although not named in the\n\n(!) .. p. 26 .\n\n• •\n\n), -\n\nBANDHUA MUKTI MORCHA v. UNION (Pathak, J.) 155\n\nsuit.\n\nAnd the disability, temporary or permanent, of a person whose legal right is violated, enables another to represent hi? interes.t in a judicial proceeding .. They are cases \\Vhere 11ext friei1d.s. are .permitted by the Court to act for minors and persons of unsound mind, where a person may petition .. for. the release\" .of an. illegally detained individual, and where a minority shareholder, complaining of an ultra vires tra:nsaction by the 111anagement of a company, cqnsue in the name of the company. Tntervenors are allowed to part1c1patc in a proceeding . involving the decision of legal question; affecting their interests.\n\nA rate payer of local authority has been held entitled to challenge its• illegal action.\n\nA person conferred by statute the right to participate in' the' decision-making process of a statutory authority is entitled to seek relief against such decision .. In S.P.\n\nGupta v. Union of India, ni this Court has laid down that it; jrisdiction ca\"n be invoked by a third party in the case of violation of the constitutional rights of another person or determinate class of persons who, by reason of poverty, helplessness, disability or social or.economic disadvantage is unable to move the Court personally for relief.\n\nThe Court observed further that wl1ete the public injury was suffered by an indeterminate clas; of persons from the breach of a public duty or from the violation of a CQnstitutional provision of the law, any member of the public havig sufficient interest can maintain an actioll for judicial redress for such • public injury. The principle was qualified by the reservation that such petitioner should act bona fide a'nd not .for personal gain or private profit, nor be moved by political or other oblique motivation.\n\nThe doctrine of standing has thus been enlarged in this country to provide, where reasonably possible, access. to justice to large sections of people for whom so far it had been a matter of despair. ' . .\n\n• It ii time indeed for the law to do so. In large measure: the traditional concepiion of adjudication represented the socio-economic vision prevailing at the turn of the century. The expansion of govermental activity into . the life of individuals through programmes of social welfare and. development had not yet been foreshadowed.\n\nAn environment permeated by the .. doctrine of laissez faire shaped the development of legal jurisprudence. But soon, progressive social ''and economic forces.began to grow stronger and influence the minds of people, and governments,· in response to the pressures of egalitarian and socialist-oriented urges, began to enter increasingly upon. socio-economic programmes. in which legislation and. the courts\n\n\n156 '\n\n\nconstituted the prin9ipal instrumnts of change. The movement\n\nacceleratd with the close .of the Second World War, and a character of human rights was written into the political consiilution~ adopted by most .nations emerging from colonial rule even as, on another plane, it altered our basic conception df international law. In India, as .the consciousness of social justice. spread though ou~ multi.-layered .social order, the courts began to co.me under increasing pressure . fro111 social action groups petitioning dn behalf of the underprivileged.\n\nand deprived sections of society for the fuffilment of their aspiTat.ions.\n\nIt is not necessary to detail the number of cases. of public interest . litigation which• have entered this Court It is sufficient to point , out ihat, despite the varying fortune of those .case.s, public interest litigation constitutes today a significant segment ofthe Cowl's docket. ·. ~· ' .\n\n.In the 'debate 'befor~ us, questions of substantial importance. Jiave been raised tiy learned counsel, questions which go to the pro:\n\n• ;:\n\ncedur.e adopted by the Court arid the: manner of the exercise of its .Y constitutional powers. \"\n\n' This 'petition invokes t.he jurisdiction of the Cort under Article . 32 ,, of the Constitution, which con.fers the guaranteed right to move this Gourt by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of funa,\n\nmerial.rights .. The right excrcisei is a right to.a.constitutional remedy and the jurisdiction invoked is a constitutional jurisdiction. Bearing this ii{ mind.' we mus~ also take into account that the provisions of Article 32 do not Jpecifically indicate who can move the .Court . . In the absence <if a confining provision in that respect. It is plain that a petitioner may be anyone in whom ihe law recognis.es a standing to maintain.an action of such nature.\n\nAs regards the. form of the proceeding and its charcter, Artide 32 speaks generally of'a \"appropriate proceedings\". It should be. a proceeding which can appropriately lead to an adjudication of the. claim made for the enforcement of a fundamental right and ca1i result i.n tlie grant of effectiv~ relief. Article 32 spea)<s of the Court's power ''to' iss.ue dircfi.ons ,(or orders. or' \\vrits\", and' the specific ..C'efere'nce\n\nto \"writs in the natµre of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari\"' is by way of illustration only .. They do !lot exhaust the content of the Court's power under Article 32. . . Entering notinto a more contro\\ersial area, it is. appropriate to. consider the nature of the procedure which the court may adopt under Article 32 of the Constitution. So far.as \"1e traditional private\n\n. ... , I . . . .\n\n. _ .. _\n\nBANDHUA MUKTI MORCHA v: UNfON (Paihak; J.) 157\n\n_ faw. is concerned,. the proced;1re follows. the acept!'d pattern and A traditional forms associated with it. There can be little dispute there: D.oes public intrest litigation call .for somewhat different considerations ? Before dealing with this aspect, however, it is neciissary to touth on two fundam.ental matters.\n\nFirst, as to the petition, A practie has grown in the .public B of iiivoking the jurisdiction of this Court by a simple letter complaining of a IegaL injury to the author or 'to some other person or group of persons, and the Court has treafed such letter as a petition\n\nunder Article 32 and ntertained the proceeding without anything more.· It is only comparatiy-ely recently. that the Court has begun • to call for the fl.ling of a regular petition on the letter. I see grave C danger inherent in a practice where a mere Jetter is-entertained as a petWon from a person. whose antecedents and status are unknown or so. ncertain that no sense of responsibility can, without anvthiag_ more; be_ attributed to the 'communication:, There is good reason for the insistence on a document being set out in a form, or accompanied by 6vidence, inflicating that the allegations made in. it 'are D . made with a'sense of , responsibility by a person who l1as taken'd.ue\n\ncare and caution to verify those .allegations before making them.\n\nA plaint instituting a suit is required by the Code_ of Civil Procedure to conclude .with a clause. verifying the. pleadings contained in it.\n\nA petition or application tiled in court is required to oe supported\n\non. affidavit. These safeguards are necessary becatise the document, E a plaint or petitio, n or application, commences a course of litigation . involving the expenditure of public time and public m'oney, besides in appropriate cases involving tlie issue of summons'or notice to the defendant or respondent to appear and contest the 'proceeding. Men -are busy conducting' the affairs of their daily lives, and no one occupied with the responsibilities nd. pressures o(prsent day existence we!- F comesbeing summoried to a law couri 'and involved in a Jigitation.\n\nA document . making allegations , without any proof whatever of responsibility cari conceivably constitute \"an abuse of the process of law. There is good reason, I think, for maintain_ing the rule that,~ except in special circumstances, the document petitioning the court for relief should be supported by satisfactory verifi.cation.\n\nThis G .requirement is all the greater .where petitions are received by the Court througl\\ the post. It is never beyond the bound of posibility that an unverified commu.nication received thro.ugh the post by the court may in fact have been employed mala fide, as an instument . of coercion or blackmail or other oblique motive against a person , . H\n\nilamed therein , who holds .a posWon of honour and respect in society.\n\n, '\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORJS [19R4] 2 s.c.R.'\n\nThe Court _inust be ever .vigil.ant ag.ainst the abuse of it~ process. ]t cUnn, ot do tht better \\n 'this matcr t1; an insisting at the earliest tage, and before issuing notice to , the respondent, that an appropriate verification of. the allegations be supplied. The requiren1ent is i1nperativc in private law litigation. Having reg_afd to_ its nature an .... d purpose, it is equally attracted ta public interest litigation. While this Court has readily acted upon lette\\S and telegrams in the: past,\n\nther~ is ne_cd to insist no\\V on an appropriateverificatinn of the petition or other comniunieation before acting on it As .r flf!Ve. observed earlier, there may be ex!eption:i\\ circumstances which may .justify a W<1iver of the rule.\n\nFor example, when the habeas corpus juri, diction of the Court is invoked.\n\nFor in all .cases of illegal detention. there is no doubt that the Court musl. act with speeo ai1d readiness.\n\nOr. when the a1ithorShip of the comrlluication is so inJpecable and unquestionable that the authority of its c011tcnts. may reasonably be accepted priina facie unil rebutted. lt \\viil always be.a _1}1atter for the Court to decide, on what p':tition will. it require verification and when will it \\Vaivc the ru1e.\n\n. Besidps this, there is another matter which, alth•ough on tlie surface'.appears to .tie of merely technical significance, inerits more\n\ntl1n passing attenti0n.\n\nI think the time has .come to state clearly that. all communications and po\\itions invoking_ the jurisdiction of the- Court ni.ust be addressed. to the entire Court, that js to ?ay, the .E Chief Justice and his con1panion Judges.\n\nNo such .con11nunication or petition can prop.eriy be addrcsSed to a particuJaT Judge.\n\nWhen the jurisdiction of 'the Court is invoked, it is the .jurisdiction of the ci1tire co•1rt.\n\nWhich Judge or Judges will hear the case is exclusively a in1ttr conc0rnin_g th~ internal -regulati:.Jn of the bu; iness of the Court. interference with w]1ich by a litigant or member of the public\n\nF . c0astitutes the grossest impropriety. Ii is well established that when a division of the Court hears and decides cases it is in law regarded as a hearing ru1d a deci:;; on by the 'Court itself. The judgment pronounced and the decree or ordc:r nlade are acts of the Court, and accordingly they are respected,. o!'i:yed and enforced thrcughout the Jan~ It is only right and prciper that this Should be kno\\VTI G clearly to the lay public .. Communications ai1d petitions addressed to a particular Judge are improper and violate the institutional personality of the Court. They also embarrass the judge to whom they are prsonally a<ldrssed.. The fundamental conception of the Court !11Ust b~ rspecteJ, that it is a single indivisible instituticn, Of unit<d\n\nH~ purpuse and cxiting solely for tl)c high col1stitutional functions fer • \\Vhich it !1a'l b.~8t1 Created .. The conception of ... the Cort as a J-oose\n\n,;\\\n\n-+ ( - '\n\n--~\n\n' . '\n\nIlANDHUA MUKTI 1'{0RCHA v. UNION (PDt!wk, J.) 159\n\naggregate of individual Judges,. to one or more of whom judicial access may be particularly had, undermines its very existence and. endangers its proper and effective functioning .\n\nI. shall now turn to the character and incidents of the procedure . open to t\\le Court iii public interest litigation and the nature of the\n\npower exercised by it during the proceeding. In public interest litigation, the .role held by the Court is more assertive than in tradi~ tional actions.\n\nDuring the .regime of the Warran Court in the United · States, it proceeded to the point. where a.ffirmative programmes wer• .envisaged, 'and .the relationship between right and reniedy' was freed from the rigid intimacy which constitutes a fundamental feature of private law liti.gation.\n\nWhile remedial prncedure. was fashioned according to the demands of the case and varied from stage to stage, in the shaping of relief the. court treated with the future and devised .a code of regulatory action. Viewed in that context, the role. of. the Court i_s creative rather .than passive and it asseums a more positive attitude in determining facts.. ·\n\n Not infrequently public interest litigatidn affect0 the rights of persons rrat before the court, and in shaping the relief the court must invariably take into.accouht its impact on those interests.\n\nMoreover,\" when its jurisdiction is invoked on behalf of a group, ii is as well to re1nember that differences n1ay exisf in Content and emphasis between the claims of different sectipns of the group. For all .these reasons the co11rt must exercise the greatest caution and adopt pro-· Cedures ensudng Sufficient notice_ to all inrerests likely to be a.ffected.\n\nMoreover, the nature or the litigation . sometimes involves , the continued, intervention of the court over a period of time, and the organising of the litigation to a .; atisfactory conclsion calls for judicial statesn1anship, ·.a close understanding of constitutiorial and legal values in .the context cf contempora'ry social forces, and a judi- J:ious mix of restraint. and p.ctivism determined by the dictates of existi1ig realities. •Importantly,. at the same .tini'e, the Court must never forget that its jurisdiction extends no fart]\\n than ¥1e legitimate limits of its constitutional powers; and avoid trespassing into political'-' • territory which under 'the CO'nstitution has been appropriated to other organs of the State. This last aspect of the matter calls for more detailed con.sideration, which will he ~!tempted later. •\n\nThe procedures adopted by the Court in cases of public interest ·\n\nlitigation must of course be procedures designed and shaped, by_ the\n\n H Cou, rt with a. view to resolving the problem presented before it and\n\n'. E\n\n\ndeterillining t!ie naiure and ext.cnt of rdief accessible in the circums- . tances. On the. cons;.derations to which I have adverted earli.er, the C.ourt enjoys a degree .of flexibility unknown to the frial of traditional private law' litigation. 'But I think it. necessary to .emphasise . that whatever the procedure adopted by the colirt it must be pro- .. cedure known to judicial tenets and characteristic of a judicial proceedirrg. There are .m.ethods and. avenues of procuring, material ·.a.vailabie to executive. arid legislative agencies, and often. empfoyed by tJiem for the efficient and effective disch.arge of the ta.sks before • them.· Not all those. methods-and avenues are available to the Court.\n\nThe Cotirt must ever remind itself that oi1e of the indicia: identifying it 'as. a Court. is. the nature and character of the procedure adopted by it fo determining a controversy. Xt is in that sense limited in the evolution of procedures pursued ])y it in. the pocess of an adjudication arid in the. grant. and execution of the relief. Legal jurisprudence\n\n.. has in its historical.development identified certairi..fundamental prin•\n\nciples which form the essential constituents of judicial procedure . • Thev are emploved in 'every judicial proceeding; and constitute the .. basic infrastructure along whose channels flows the power of the <;:ourt iri the process of adjudication.\n\n' What should be the conceivable framework of procedure in. public interest litigation? This questi.on does not admit of a clear cut answer. As I have obsernid earlier, it is not possible to envisage a de1i11ed pattern of procedure applicable to all cases .. or. necessity the pattern which the Court adbp1s will vry with the circumstances of.each case.\n\nBut it seems to me that one principle is clear. lfthere is a statute prescribing a judicial procedre'governing the part.icular; case the Court must follow such procedure. It is not open to the Court to bypass the statute arid evolve a different procedure at variance\n\nwith it Where, however, the proceoure J>fescribed by statute . is incomplete or insufficient, ii. will .be open to the Court to supplement it by evolving its own rules .. N; netheless, the supplementary pro- . cedure must. conform at all stages to the principles of natural justice.\n\nThee.can be no deviation from the pr; ricipks of naturaljustice and , .. >other well accepted procedural norms characteristic of a. judicial proceeding. Tiley onstitute an e.nti.re code of general principles\" of. ; procedure, tried and proven and halllowed by the sanctity of common : . . . ' . a.nd. consistent acceptance during long years of the historical develop• ment of the. Jaw.\n\nThe. general principles of law. to which reference is made .here, conitnand.lhe confidence, not merely ofthe Ju'dge. and. the lawyer and the parties to the litigation; but supply that basic credib; lity t@ the judicial p1oceeding wh; ch strengthens public faith\n\n., ..\n\n. ;\n\n\\ ..\n\n~·\n\nBl\\NDHUA Ml:JKTI MORCHA v. UNION (Pathak, J.) 161 •· in the Rule of Law. They are•iules rooted in reason and fairplay, arid their governance guarantees a just disposition of the case. The court . should be wary .of suggestions favouring novel procedures in cases where accepted procedural Jules will suffice.\n\nTurning now to the nature and extent of. the relief which can be contemphte<l in public inte'est.litigaticin, we enter into an area at once delicate and. sensitive and frangbt with grav~ implications.\n\nArticle 32 confers the widest amplitude of power on this Courf in the matter of granting relief. It has power to issue \"directions or orders or writs\". and ther is no spcific indication, no express language, limiting or circumscribing that power. YeV the power is limited by its very nature, that it is judicial power, It is power which pertains to the judicial'organ ofthe State, identified by the very nature of the judicial institution. There are certain fundamental constituli.onal concepts which, although elementary, need to be recalfed at\n\nL:11cs.\n\nT:;:-: Constitulion envisages a broa<l division of the power of foe 3atc ~tween 'the legislature, the. executive and the judiciary.\n\nAlthough the division .~ not-precisely demarcated. there is genernl ackno-..vicdgln.::rt of its limits. The lirnits ca:· L•' gatJ-i .·.c'. frr, m th.e .written text of Lhe ClnS 1 :t~1 tion, froril conv~::.·:.:, n::. ,,' tl _cn.., i.itutiun8] practice, a11d from a11 ellti1') array of i.:J'._i: .:·-~ d~' .. Jr(·< The coA-- . stitutional_ lawyr co-nr.\"c-j s a certai;1 incasUrC' ot oyer\\:tpping in functional action lmong the three o,-gans of ihc S ate. Eut there is no. warrant for assuming a geometrical cpngruence.\n\nIt is common pl; tce that while the kgislature enacts the law, the executi\\e ' implements it and the court interprets it and, in doing so, adjudicates on the validity ofeecutive action and, under ourConstitution, even judge's the validity of the legislation itself. And yet it is well recog- . , nised that in a certain sphere th'' legislature is possessed of.judicial power, the executive' possesses a measure of both , legislative an judicial functions, and the co, urt,. in its. duty of interpreting the law, accomplishes in itS perfected action a marginal degree of legislative\n\n\"xrcise. Nonetheless, a fine and delicte balance is envisaged under our Constitution betwe.en these primary institutions of. the State.\n\nIn similar Constitutions elsewhere the courts have been anxious to maintain and preserve . that balance. An example is provied by Marbury v. Madisanl\" I do not mean to say that the Court shouldhesitate or falter or withdraw from the exercise of its jurisdic\" tion. On the contracy, it must plainly do its duty under the Con- · stitution. But .r do say that in every case the Cour.t hould determine .\n\n( l l. 5 U.S. [l Cranchj 137 [1803].\n\n~SUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1~84).2. S.C.R. ·\n\nthe true limits of its jurisdiction and,'having done so, it should take care. to remain within the restn\\ints of its jurisdictio.n.\n\nThis aspect of- Coiirt action assumes especial significance in public interest litigation. It bears upon the legitimacy of the judicial •instituti9n, Md. that. legitimacy is affected as much by the solution presented by the Court in. resolving .a controversy as by the manner in which 'the so1ution is reached. In an area of judicial functioning where' judicial activism finds .room for play, where constitutional adjudication. can become. an instrument of social policy forged by the\n\nprsollal political philosophy of the jUdge, this is .an important CO!)- . siderati(ln to keep in mind. .\n\n. . . . . . . •Where the Court.embarks upon affirmative action in the attempi to. remedy a \"constitutional imbalance within the social 'order, few · critics will find fault with it so Jong as it confines itself to the scope of its legitimate authority. But there is always the possibility, .in public interest litigation, of succumbing tp . the temptation or crossing into terri, tofy . which . prope'rly pertailis to the Legislature or to the Executive Government: 'For in. most cases the jurisdicticin of th~ 'Court is. invoked when a default occurs in executive administration;. and sometimes where a void .in community life remains unfilled by . .legislative action: The resulting public. grievace finds expression E through social action groups, which consider the Court an appropriate \" forum for removing. the deficiencies. Indeed, the citizen. seems to . find it pre coniienient to apply to the Court for the. vindication\n\nof constitutional i; ghts than appeal .to the executive or legislative\n\norgans of the State. -\n\n In th~ process of correcting executive erro.r. or removing legisla, tive omission the. Court can so eaily find itself 'involved in pelic.y . 'making of fl quality and toa degree characteristic of political autho-.\"\n\n. rity and inded run the risk of being mistaken for one. . An excessively political role identifiable with political governance betrays the Court into functions alien to. its fundamental character, and tends to destroy the <!elicate balance envisaged in our constitutional system . between its three b.asic institutions. The Judge, conceived in the true classicai mould, is an impartial arbiter,' beyond and abow political bias and prejudice; functioning silent!) in accordance with 1he Constitution ancl his judicial concience .. Thus does he maintain the legitimacy of the institution he serves and hopour the trust which· his office has reposed in him .. t- . . ..\n\n.....\n\nBANDHUA MUKTI MORCHA v. UNION (Pathak, J.) 163 .\n\nThe affirmative schemes framed in public interst litigation by the. Court sometimes require detailed administration under con~ · stant judicial snpervisfon over protracted periods, Tue lives of large ·. sections of people, some of whom have had no voice in the deci'sion, areshaped. and 'ordered by mandatory Court action extendini: i11to the future.: In that context, it is as well to remember that public approval and public consent assue material importance. in its. successful 'implemenfution. Jn contrast' with polity making by Jegisla.ticin, where a large. body of legislators. debate ori a proposed legislative enactment, no such visual impact cai1 be perceived when judicial decrees .are forged and fashioned by a few judicial p_ersonages\n\nin the confines of a Court. The mystique of the robe, at the stage of decision-making, is associated.traditionally .with cloistered secrecy and confidentiality and the end-result commonly issue• as a fin&l definitive act of the Court.: It is a serious question whether in every . ·.case .the same awesone respect and reverence will endure durini different stages .of affirmati'l'e action seeking to regµJate the' Jiyi,. of · large numbers of people, .some of. whom never partieipated in tl!e judicial process . . . .\n\nThere is good reason to suppose that treating with public interest litigation requires morethan legal schola\"hip and. a~ la.towlcdie of textbook. Jaw. It is of the utmost importance in such cam that .; wheri formulating a scheme of.action, the Court must have due regard to the particular circumstan.ces of the case, to /surrounding realities including the potential for successful implementation, and the lilce- . lihood and degree of response from the agencies on whom the imple- ' mentation will depend. In 111os.t cases of public interst litigation;\n\nthere will be neither. precedent nor settled practice to &dd weight and force to' the vitality of the Court'; action. The example -of. similar cases in otl]er coun\\_ries can afford little support. The success- . •. ful implementation Of the orde.rs of the Court wiU depend upon the particular social forces in the backdrop of local history, t!:te prev11iling . economic pressures, the duration o( the stages involved in the implementation, the momentum of success from stage to stage, and acceptance of t_he Court's action .. at all times by those involved in or affected\n\nit. •\n\n. . . . . .\n\nAn activist Court,. spearheading the moement for the developni,-nt and exteqsion f the citizen's constil1ltional rights, for the pr-0tection' of individual -liberty and for the strengthening of th\" soci.oeconomic fabric in compliance with declared constitutional objectives, will need to move with a degree of judicial circumspection. In the . . .\n\n• •\n\n. '\n\n...\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS '[1984] 2 s.c.R.\n\ncentre of a social order changing with dynamic pace, the Coutt\n\nneeds to balance the authority of the pa•t with the urges of the future. As far back as 1939, Judge Learned Hand()' observed that a Judge\n\n\"must preserve his authority by cloakin.g himself in the majesty of an over-shadowing past; but he must discover some composition with the dominant n<; eds of his times\". In thaHask the Court must ever be conscious of the , constitutonal truism that it possesses the sanction of neither the swo.rd nor the purse and that its st; ength lies basically in public confidence and support, and that consequently the legitimacy of its acts and decisions must remain beyo1d all doubt. Therefore, whatever the case before it, whatever the context of facts and legal ights; whatever the social' and economic pressures of the times, whatever the personal philosophy of the Judge, let i.t not be forgotten that the essential identity of the institution, that it is a Ccurt, must remain preserved so that every action of the Court is informed . by the fundamental norms of Jaw, and by the principles embodied . ' - . . in the Constitution and other sources of law. If its contribution to the. jurisprudeniiai .ethos of society is to advance our constitutional objectiv.es, it must function in. accord with only those principles which. enter irito the composition of .judicial action and give to it its essential quality. In his perceptive Lectures entitled \"The Warren Court: Constitutional Decision as an Instrument of Reform\"''' Professor Archicald Cox .pointedly observes .: .\n\n\"Ability to rationalise a constitutional judgment in terms of principleneferable to accepted sources of Jaw is an essential, major element of constitutional a!ljudication. It is one of the ultimate sources of the power of the Courtincluding the power to gain aceeptance for the occasional great leaps forward which lack such justification., Constitutional government must operate by consent of the governed . . Court decrees: draw no authority from the parlicipat10n of the people.. Their power to command consent depends upon more than habit or .even the deserved prestige of the . . justices. It comes; to an important degree, from the continuing force of the rule of law-from the belief that the major influence in judicial decisions is not fiat but principles which bind thejudges as well as the litigants and which apply : consistently among all men today, and also yesterday . and\n\ntomorrow\".\n\nI H (O 52 Harvard Law Review 361 [1939].\n\n(2) Harvard University Press [1968], p. 21.\n\n,_,\n\n{ -\n\nBANDHUA MUKTI MORCH!\\ v, UNION (PRthak, J.) 165\n\nThere is great merit in the Court proceeding to decide an issue on the basis of strict legal principle and avoiding carefully the influence of purely emotional irppeal. For that alone gives the decision of the Court. a direction which is certain, and unfaltering, and that particular permanence in. legal jurisprudence which makes it a base for the next step forward in the further progress of the law.\n\nIndeed,. both certainty of substance and cetainty of direction are indispensable requirements in the development of the law, and invest it with the credibility which commands public confidence in it• legitimacy .. _\n\n. .\n\nThis wrning is of especial si gnifiance in these times, during a phase of judicial history when a fow social action groups tend to show evidence of presuming that in every cas'e the court must bend and mould its decision to popular notions of which way .t'.case should be decided.. ·\n\nI have endeavoured by th_ese observations to indicate some of the areas in which the Court should move with caution and circumspection when addressing.itself to public interest litigatiqn., As new areas-open before .the. Court with modern developments in jurisprudence, in a world more sensitive to human rights as well as the impact of technological progress; the Court will become increasingly conscious of its expanding jurisdiction. That. is inevitable. But its responsibilities are correspondingly gre_at, and perhaps never greater than now. And we must remember that tliere is no higher Court to correct our errors, and that we wear the mantle of infallibility only because \\- ciur decisions are final: That we sit at the apex of the judicial administration and our word, by constitutio1ml mandate, is thelaw of the land can induce an unusual sense of power. It is a feeling we must guard against by constantly reminding om'selves that every decision . r must be guided by re,'.'son and by judi.;:ial principles.\n\nMy brothers have dealt with the preliminary objections raised by the respondents to the maintainability of this proceeding. On the considerations to which I have adverted earlier J have no hesita- 'tion in agreeing with them ihat the preliminary objections must be rejected. I have 90 doubt in my mind that persons in this country. obliged. to serve as bonded Jabour are. entitlted to invoke Article 23 of the Constitution. The provisions embodied in .that.clause form a vital constituent of the Fundamental Rights set forth in Part III of the Constitution, and their violation attracts properly the scope of Article 32 of the Constitution. I also find difficulty in upholding th? objection by the respondents to the admissibility and relevance ,\n\nF •\n\nF •\n\n. . 166 .\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984] 2 s:c.R,\n\n.C, f the material consisting of'the repo; t of the two advocates and of\n\nDr. P.atwardhan appointed as Commissioners. H is tnie that the reports of the said:Co'mmissioners have not been tested by cross- .examination,' but then the .record docs not show whether any .attempt .. was made by . the respondents to call them for cross-examination ..\n\nThe further question whether the appointment of the Comm.issioners falls withi,;.the terms of Order XLVI of the Suprem~ Court Rules . 1966 is of technical significance only, \\)ecausc there was inherent power in the Court, i11 the particular circumstances of this case, to take that action. 1 have already set forth earlier my views.in rspect\n\nof the nature and forms of procedure open to . the Co ti rt in pulllic interest litigation and I need not elaborate them here. ( may add,\n\nhowevr, that.the Court would do well to issue notice to. the respondents, bofore appointing any Commissioner, .. iii tl)ose cases where there Is little upprehen:iion of the disappearane of evidence:\n\n. . . . ._ . . (ln the merits of.the case I find myself in agreement with my )Jrother Bhagwati, .both in regard to ·:the operation of the various\n\nstatuts as. well as the directions proposed by. him. The case. is one . . of considerable importance to a section of our people, .who .pressed by the twiit misfortunes of pov.erty and i1iileracy, are compelled to a condition of life which long since should have passed into history~ The continued . existence of such pockets. of oppression and misery do no justice to the promises and assurances extended by 'm, ir Con- \"' . . . . . .. . ' .. st1tut.Ion to 1ts citizens. . ·. , . . . . -\n\n. AMARENDRA NATH 'SEN, J .. The' relevant facts .have .been fully. i set out in the judgment of my learned brother Bhagwati; J. My learned : . brother has. also recorded in his judgment the. various contentions' which were urged before us in this writ petition. - \\ ' ' .\n\n'i A preliminary objection . was raised by Shri K. L. Bhagat, Additional Solicitor General of India and also by Shri Phadke, learned counsel appe.aring on behalf of the respondents, as to the ma.intainability of the present petition.\n\nTI1e objection to the maintainability of th~ present petition is taken mainly on the following three grounds:-,- .\n\nArt. 32 of the Constitution is.' not attracted to the instant case as no fundamental right of the, petitioners or of the workmen referred to in. the petition ate infringed.\n\nA letter addressed by a party to this Court cannot be treatrd as a writ petition and in th~ absence of any\n\n. '\n\n, .\n\n-~ ..\n\n' -~ -\n\nBANDHUA MUKTI MORCjlA v. UNIOl:I (A.N. Sen, J.) . 167\n\nverified petitiqn this Court cannot he moved to exercise its wrir jurisdiction. - In a proceeding under Art. 32 of the Constitution ihis Court is nt cmp; wered tc. appoint any commission or an investigating body to enquire into the allegations . . . made and make a report to· this. Court on te basis of the enquiry to ¢nable this Court to exercise its power and jurisdiction under Art. 32 of the Constitution,\n\nI Propose to consider the objection• in ihe order noted above.\n\nI shall first deal with the first objection, namely, that Art . .32 of the Constitu.tion is not attracted as. there is no violation of any fundamental right of the petitioner or ofthe >Vorkri1en referred to in the .petition.\n\nTl; e substance of the grievance of the petitioners in this petition is that the workmen referred to in the communication addressed to thls Court. are bonded labourers .. In 1976, the Parliament enacted\n\nD . the. Bonded Lab0ur System (Abolition) Act, 1976 and by virtue of the provisions of the said Act,. the bonded labour system has been declar.ed to be illegal inthis country. Any person who is wrongfully and illegal!i employed as a labourer in violation of the provisions of the Act, -is in essence deprived al. his liberty ... A bo\"nded labourer truly becomes a slave and the freedom of a bonded labourer in the E matter of his employment and movement is mre or Jess completely taken. away .and forced iabour is thrust° upon him. When any bonded labourer appraaches this Court, the real grievance that he makes is that he sould be freed from this bondage and he prays for be; ng set a~ liberty and liberty is no doubt a fundamental righ(gura1tteed\n\nto every person under the Constitution. There cannot be any-manner F of doubt that any person who is wrongfully ana illegally detained and is deprived of his liberty can approach this Co11rt under Art. 32 of the Constitution for his freedom from wrongfui and illegal detention,\n\nand for being sef at liberty. Jn my opinion, whenever any person is wrongfully and illegally depdved of his libertv, it is open to, anybody ·\n\nwho is interested in the person to move' this Court under Art. 32 of : G the Constitution for his release. It may not very often be possible for the person who is deprived of his liberty to approach. this Court, as by. virtue of such illegal and wrongful detentio~·; he may not be . free and in a position to' move this Court. The Petitlo.ner in the instant case claims to be an association interested in the welfare of \" H society and particularly of the weaker section. The Petiticner furtl1cr\n\n\n[1984] 2S.C.R.\n\nstates that the petifioner seeks to promote the welfare of the labourers and. for promoting the welfare of laboljr, the petitioner .seeks to niove this Court for relasing the bonded labourers from their. bondage and:for resloring to them their freedom and.othe.r legitimate 1ights.\n\nThe bonded labourers working in the far away places are generally po9r and belong to the very weak section of the people. They. are also ; JO! very .literate and they may not be conscious of their own rights. Further, as they are kept in bondage their freedom is: also restricted and they may ndt be in a position to approach this Court. Though no fundamental right of the petitioner may be said to be infringed, yet the petititner who complains of the violatio1i of the fundamental right of the workmen who have .been wrongfully and illegally denied their freedom .and deprived of their constitntional right must be. held to be. entitled to approach this Com:t on behalf of.the bonded labourers for removing them from illegal bondage and deprivation of liberty. The focus standi oLthe petitiouer to move this Court appear to be conclusively established by the decision of. this Court in the case of S.P. Guta v. Union of India. & Aiir.U 1 Farced labour is constitutionally forbidden by Art. 23 of the Constitution .• As in the present case the violation or the fundamental right of liberty of the workmen who\" arc.said to be k.ept in wrongful and illegal detention, employed in forced labour, is alleged, Art. 32 of the Constitu!icn . to my mind, is clearly attracted; The ftrst ground raised on behalf\n\nof the respondei:ts cannot, therefore, be sustained':\n\nBefore I proceed to deal with the second ground urged on behalf of the respol)dents, it will be convenient to set out the provisions. of Art .. 32 of the Constitution.\n\nArt. 32 'read as follows :-\n\n\"(!) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for. the enforcement of the ri_ghts conferred by trus Part is guaranteed.\n\n(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue. directions or orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, qup warrants and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate'; for the enforcement of any of' the rights conferred by this part. ·\n\n(3). Without prejudice to the powers co.nferred on the Supreme Court by clauses (I) and (2), Parliament may by law empower\n\n(1) [19811 Suppl. S.C.C. 87.\n\n. '\n\n~.·\n\n...\n\naANDHUA MUK.Ti MORCHA V. UNION (A.N. Sen, J.)\n\nJ69\n\nany other court to exercise within t!ie .local limits of its jurisdiction all or aµy of the powers exercisable by tlie Supreme Court under clause (2).\n\n( 4) The right guaranteed by this article sh.,!! not sus- . pended except as otherwise provided for by this Constitution.\"\n\nArt. 32(1) confers the right to move this Court by appropriate proceedings for enforcement of the fundamental rights. guaranteed under the Constitution.\n\nArt. 32(2) makes provision. for the powers of this. Court in the matter of granting relief in any proceeding in - this Court_ for enforcement of the fundamental. rights . guaranteed by the ConstitutiOn. )\\rt. 32(3) and 32(4) which I have also set out for the purpose of complete understanding of the provisions of Art. 32 for proper appreciation of its scope and effect; do not have any material bearing ori the question-involved in the prese_nt proceeding.\n\nThe seond grou.nd which raises the question whether tjie letter addressed by a party to this Court can be treated as a writ petition and in the absence of any verified_ petition this court can be moved to exercise its writ jurisdiction. is essentially an objection to the procedure to be adopted by. this Cou.rt in the matter of entertaining a proceeding under Art. 32 for enforcement of fundamental rights of\n\nthe parties. Art. 32(1) of the Constitutionwhich ha_s been earlier set out guarantees the right to move this Court by an appropriate .. proceeding for the enforcement Of the fundamental rights. A; t. 32(2) f:Onfers wide powers on this Court in the _matter. of granting relief against any violation ofthe fundamental rights. Art. 32 or for that matter any other article does not lay down any procedure which has to be followed to move this Court for relief against the violation of any fundamental right. Art. 32(1) only' lays down that _the right to move this Court by appropriate proceedings for enforcement of fundamental rights is guaranteed. _ The Constitution very appropriately leaves the question as to what will constitute an approprite .proceeding for the ppose of enforcement of fundamental rights' to be determined by the Court. Tgis Court, when sought to be_ moved under Art. 32 by any party for redressing his .grievance against the violation of fundamental rights has to consider whether the procedure followed by the party is appropriate enough to entitle _ the court to procee.d to act on the same. No doubt this Court.has framed rules which are .contained in part IV, Order XXXV of the Supreme Court Rules under the Caption. \"application for enforcement of fundamental\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1984] i S.C.R.\n\nrights (\"Art. 32 of the Constitution\"). Generally speaking, any party who seeks to move this Con.rt under Act. 32 of the Constitution: should conform \"to the rules prescribed .. The rules fay down the procedure which is normally to be fllowed in the matter of any application under Art. 32 of the Constitution. These rules are ruls relating to the procedure tci be adopted and the rules are intended · to serv.e as mafds to the. Deity of Justice. Pro.cedural Jaw which also . forms a part of the law and has t6 be. observed, is, however, subservient to substantive law and the Jaws of procedure are prescri'll!d for promoting and furthering the ends of justice. There cannot. be any :doubt that this. Court should usually follow .the procedure laid down in O.XXXV of the Rules of this Court and should .normally insist on a petitio'n properly verified by an affidavit to be filed te enable the Co.tut to take necessary action on the same. Though this Court should nrmally insist on the ruls of procedure being followed, it cannot be said, taking.into consideration the nature of right conferred under Art. 32 to move this Courthy an appropriate proeeeding and the very wide powers conferred on this Court for granting relief in the case of violation or' fundamental rights, that . this Co.urt will have no jurisdiction to entertain any proceeding which may not be in conformity wit]\\ procedure prescribed by the Rules of tilis COurt. The Rules undoubtedly lay down the procedure which is normally to be followed for. making an application 'under Art. 32 of the Constitution. They, however, do not and cannot have the effect of limiting the jurisdiction f this Court of entertaining a proceeC.!ing>under Art. 32 of t\\le Constitut)on, if made', only in the manner prescribed by the rules. For effectively safeguarding the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, the Court in appropriate cases in the. inte.rests of justice will certainly be- 'ompetent to. treat a proceeding, though not in conformity with the procedure prescribed by the Rules of this Court, as an appropriate proceeding under Art. 32 of the Constitution aud to entertain the same. Fundamental rights . •guaranteed under the'Constitutiqn are indeed too sacred to be ignored . or trifled with merely on the ground. of technicality or any rule of .. procedute. . It may further be notice'a that the rules framed by this Court do not also. fay down that this Court. can be moved under Art 32 .of t)le Constitution only in accordance with the. procedure prescribed by the .Rules. and not otherwise .. A mere technicality in. the matter of form Ol' procedure whic)l may not in any way affect the substance of any proceeing should .not. stand in the way of the exercise of the very wide jurisdiction and powers conferred on this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitutjqn for enforcement of fundamental rights guaranted under the Constjtution.\n\nTaking. into .\n\n'! ,.\n\n.• '\n\nBANDHUA , MUKTI MORCHA v. UNION (A.N. Sen, J.) !'71\n\nconsidera.tio;1 th~ substance f the matter and .the nature of allega- A tions ma:de, it .will essentialiy be a matter for the Court to decide whether the 'procedure adopted cnn be considertd to te ,; n anic- priate proceeding within the ambit' of Art. 32 of the Constitution.\n\nThe Court, if satisfied on the material; placed in the fem of a letter \" or other communication addressed to this court,· may take notice . of the same in a.ppropriate cases. Experience shows that in many B . - ' . \\ cases it may not be possible for the party conc., rned to file a regular writ petition in conformity with procedure laid .down in the Ruks\n\nof this Court. It further appears that this Court; for quite some years now ha.s 1n many cases proceeded to act on the basis of the letters adressed to it. A long standfog practice of the. Court in the matter ofprocedure also acquires sancti'ty~. It may also be pointed C out that in various cases the Court has refused to take any notice of letters or other kind of communications addressed to Court and in many cases also. the court on being moved by a letter hasdireeied a formal writ petition to be filed before it has. decided to prcceed . further in the matter. It is, however, eminently desirable, in my ·\n\nopinion, that nornially the. procedur~ prescribed in the ruies. of this D Court should he followed while entertaining a petiticn 'under Art. 32 . of the Constitution, though in exceptional cases and particularly in matter of general public interest, this Court may, taking into C0\\1sideration the peculiar .facts and circumstances of the case, proceed to exerci.se its jurisdiction under Art. 32 of the constitution for enforcement of. fundamental rights treating t)le letter or ,.the communication\n\n, E in any other form as an appropriate proceeding under Arte 32. of the Constitution, It is, however, eminently desir1ble mat any party who addresses a Jetter .or any other coinmunication to this Court seeking intervention of this Court on the basis of the said letter and. communication shOuld 'address this letter or communication to this . Court and nqt to any individual Judge by name. Such communica- F . tion should be addressed to, the Chief Justice. of the Court and .his companion Justices,· A private communication, by a party to any Learned Judge over any matter is not proper and niay create. embarrassment for the Court. and the Judge concerned.\n\nlti the present <:ase,.the unfortunate , workers who are emploccd ·\n\nG , as bonded labourers at a distant place, could not possibly in view of the.ir bondage, move this Court, following the procedure laid do\\vn in the Rules of this Court. The.· Petitioner which claiins to be a Social Welfare Organisation interested jn restoring. liberty and digni, ty to these unfortunate bondedlabourers should be considered competent H to move this Court by a letter or like communication addressed to\n\n\n[1984] 2 $.C.R.\n\nthis Court, to avoid trouble and expenses, as the petitioner. is not moving this Court for any personal or private benefit. . . .\n\nI shall now consider. the third and the last: objection which relates to the powers of this Court to direct an enquiry into the allegations made and to call for a report in a proceeding under Art. 32 of the Constitution to enable this Court to exercise its power andjurisdiction under Art. 32 'bf the Constitution.\n\nWe have earlier noted that the funpamental rights are guarnteed by the Constitution arid for the enforcement of the fundamental rights very -wide powers have been conferred on this Court Before this Court proceeds to exercise itsp owers under Art.. 32 of the Con- stitution for enforcing the fundamental rights guaranteed, this Court has to be satisfied that there has been a violati('ln of the fundamental rights. The fundamental rights may be alleged to have been violated\n\nunder various. circumstances. The facts and circumstances differ\n\nI'\" . from case to case.\n\nWh.enever, ho.wever, there is an allegation of violation of fundamental rights, it becomes the responsibility and also the sacred duty of this Court to protect such fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution provided 'that this Court is satisfie.d that a case for interference by this. Court appears prima facie to have been made out.. very often the violation. of fundamental rights is not admitted or accepted. On a proper consideration of the materials t.he Court has to come to a c0ncluson whether there has been any violation of fundamental rights to enable the Court to grant' appro' priate reliefs in the matter. rn various cases, because of the peculiar facts and circumstances. of the case the party approaching this Court for enforcement of fundamental rights may not be in \" position to furnish all relevant materials an<l necessary partiuclars. If,' however, on a consideration of the materials placed, the Court is satisfied that a prope_r probe into the qatter is necessary in .the larger interest of administration of'justice and for enforcement of fundmental rights guaranteed, the Court, in view of the obligations and duty cast upon it of preserving and protecting fundamental rights, may require better and further materials to enable the. Court to take appropriate action; and there cannot be anything improper in the proper exercise of Court's jurisdiction under Art. 32 of the .Constitution to try to secure the necessary materials through appropriate agency. The Com- . rnission that. the Court may appoint or the investigation that the court may .direct is essentially for the Court's satisfaction as to the correctness or otherwise of the allegation of violation of fundamental rights tci . enable the Court to decide the coiirse to. be adopted for\n\n'-!, Ill\n\n~ANDHUA MUKTI M, ORCHA v. UNION (A.N. Sen, J. 173\n\ndoing proper justice to the parties i.n the matter of protection of their A fundamental rights', We have to bear in mind that in this Jarid of outs,. there are persons without education, without means and without opportunities and they also are entitled to full protec.tion of their rights or privileges which the Constitution affords. Living .iP. chilled penury without necessary.resources and very often not fully conscious of their .rights guaranted under the , Constitution, a very large section\n\n. B of the people commonly termed as the weaker section iive iri this land.\n\nWhen this Court is approached on behalf of this cl.ass of people for enforcement of fundamental rights of which they have beeii deprived and which they are equally entitied to enjoy, it beco.mes the special responsibility of this Court to see that justice is not denied to them and the disadvantageous position in whiCh they' are placed, do not C stand in the way of theiigetting justice from this Court .. The power to appoint a commission or an.'investigating body for making enquiries in terms of directions given by the Court must be considered to be implied and inherent in the power that the Court has under Art. 32 for enforcement of the fundametal rights guaranteed under. the Constitution. This is .a power which is indeed incidental . or\n\n.. D ancillary to the power 'which the Court is called upon to exercise in . a proceeding under Art. 32 of the Constitution. It is entirely in the discretion of the Court, depending_ on the facts and circuinstpnces of any.case, to consider whether any such power regarding invest!gation has to be exercised or not. .. The Commission that the Court appoints or the investigation. that the Court .directs while deali.ng with a pro-\n\nE . . ceeding under Art. 32 of the Constitution is not a commission .or enquiry under the Code of Civil Procedure. Such power must necessarily be held to be implied within the very wide powers conferred on this Court under Art.. 32 fr enforcement of fundamental rights. I am, further of the opinion that for proper exercise of its powers under Art. 32 of the Constitution and for due discharge F of the obligation and duty. cast upon this Court in the matter of protection and enforcement of fundamental rights which the Constitution• guarantees, it must be held that this Ccurt has an inherent power to act in such a manner as will enable this Court to discharge its dutles and obligations under Art. 32 of the Constitution prorerly and effectively in the larger interest of administraticn of justice, G and for proper protection of ccinstitutionai safeguards. I am, therefore, of the opinion that this objection is. de, void of any .merit. ..\n\nI may incidentally observe that as.a result of such acticn on the part of' the Court aitention of the appropriate authorities concerned H has in a number of cases. been po, intedly drawn to the existence of\n\n' -\n\nSUPREME COUU REPORTS [l Q84J 2 S.C.R.\n\nbonded labourers in various parts of the country and to their misea- . rable plight and a iarge number of bonded labourers have been freed from their bondage. ··.To my mint!, the litigation. of tis type parti. cularly in. re)ation to bonded labourers is really not in nature in adver- sary litigation and it becomes thioduty of the State and also of the . appropriate authorities to offer its best co-operation to see thaHhi$ evil practice \"'.hich has been declaie, d illegal is ended at the earliest.\n\nThe existence of.bonded labour in the country is ap unfortunate fact.\n\nWhenever there is any allegation of the existence of bonded labour in any particular State, the.State instead.of seeking to come 'out with a case of denial of such existence o'n the basis of afeeling that the existence of bonde~ labour in 'the State may, cast a slur or stigma on its' administrative machinery,. should cause effective enquiries to bo mad'e into the matter and if the mtter is pending in this Court, should. co-operate with this Court to-see that death-knell is sounded on this illegal system which constitutes. a veritable, social menace and stands in the way of healthy development of the nation.\n\nFoneasons aforesaid, I do not find any merit in the preliminary objections, raised and I agree with my learned brother that the preliminary objections must be over-ruled. ·\n\nOn the merits of the case my learned broth.er Bhagwati, J.\n\nhs in.his judgment carefully and elaborately discussed all the aspects.\n\nApart from the principal grievance made-that the. workmen in the\n\n~· . . .. . ' . instant case are bonded labourers, various grievances on behalf of the wrkmen have.been voiced !lnd deni.aI to the workmen of various other just rights has been alleged. The grievance of denial of.other\n\n.· just rights to the. workmen and the reliefs claimed for giving the\n\nworkmen the benefits to which. they may be entitled 'under various legislat.ions enacted for their welfare are more or Jess in the nature of consequential reliefs incidental to the main relief of 'freedom from . bonded.and forced labour to which the workmen are subjected. 1\n\nmust frankly confess th3.t\"in the facts .and circumstances of this case I have some. doubts as to the applicability of the provisions of Inter . . ·- . ..\n\nState Migrant Workmen (Regulation of Employment. and Conditions of Sryice). Act, 1919 . . The vie, vs expressed by my learned broter Bhagwati, J. in his judgment, to my mind, do not amount to any adjudication on the question nf appl\\cabiliiy of the Inter Siate Migrant Workmen (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) . Act, 1979. The 'observati()n.s niade by my leared brother Bhagwati,· J. and the directions given by him on. the various aspects witlnegard to th> m:rits of th' case after carefully considering the provisions of . . - . '\n\n' '\n\nI ,.___ -\n\n' 'r\n\n) ..\n\n• .....\n\n' ,__., -\n\n' ..\n\n' .,\n\nBANDHUA MUKTI MORCHA v. UNION (A.N. Sen', J.) 175\n\nall the relevant labour legislations enacted tor the benefit of labourers and. for improvement .and betterment of their Jot, are for furthering the interests of the .workmen and for proper protection and \"preser'Va-. tion of their just rights and to enable the appropriate authorities to take. necessary action in tha matter. As I am 'in agreement wit.h the vie\\Ys expressed bv my learned Brother .Bhagwati, J. I do not propose . to deal with these aspects at any Jength and l ccntent myself ]Jy\n\nexpressing my agreement . wiih the judgment of my learned brother Bhagwati, J. on these matters. ·\n\nS. R.\n\nPttitions allowed and\n\n. preliminary grmmds\n\n. C . rejected.\n\n• •\n\n. .", "total_entities": 584, "entities": [{"text": "BANDHUA MUKTI MORCHA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15, "end_char": 35, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BANDH\\JA MUKTI MORCHA V", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 42, "end_char": 65, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 113, "end_char": 123, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 3Z", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 149, "end_char": 159, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 520, "end_char": 541, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 543, "end_char": 553, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court Rules, 1966", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 780, "end_char": 805, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 841, "end_char": 864, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Mines Act, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 877, "end_char": 892, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sections 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 893, "end_char": 903, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Mines Act, 1952", "statute": "Mines Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "Ceniral Governmint and the State Governments for ensuring the benefits accruing under the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1180, "end_char": 1273, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Mines Rules 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1285, "end_char": 1301, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Concession Rules, 1964", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1337, "end_char": 1359, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss.2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1454, "end_char": 1458, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Concession Rules, 1964", "statute": "Concession Rules, 1964"}}, {"text": "Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1831, "end_char": 1877, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "ss. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1887, "end_char": 1892, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Concession Rules, 1964", "statute": "Concession Rules, 1964"}}, {"text": "ss.2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1974, "end_char": 1978, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Concession Rules, 1964", "statute": "Concession Rules, 1964"}}, {"text": "Minbnum Wciges Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2285, "end_char": 2303, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Paynient of Wages Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2341, "end_char": 2362, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Yees State Insurance Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2370, "end_char": 2394, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Maternity Benefits Act, 1957", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2455, "end_char": 2483, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bbagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2692, "end_char": 2700, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "labourers in the country, addressed a Ieiter to Hon'ble Bbagwati, J. alleging : (1) H that there \\Vere a large number of labourers from different parts ofthC: Country who wC:re work.1ng in some of the stone quarries situate in district Faridabad, State of . ' . '", "canonical_name": "BHAGWAl'I"}}, {"text": "Faridabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2872, "end_char": 2881, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "labourers in the country, addressed a Ieiter to Hon'ble Bbagwati, J. alleging : (1) H that there \\Vere a large number of labourers from different parts ofthC: Country who wC:re work.1ng in some of the stone quarries situate in district Faridabad, State of . ' . '"}}, {"text": "Mins Act, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3522, "end_char": 3536, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3635, "end_char": 3681, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3690, "end_char": 3732, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Payment of Wages Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3781, "end_char": 3801, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Employees State Insurance Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3803, "end_char": 3832, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5338, "end_char": 5348, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5630, "end_char": 5637, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6399, "end_char": 6409, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "BAND HUA MUKTI MORCHA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6719, "end_char": 6740, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "<\n\nBAND HUA MUKTI MORCHA 'v. UN~ON 69\n\nsocial welfare laws, the State Government, Which is, under our constitutional sche!Jle, charged with the µiission of bringing about a new socio-ecomonic order \\vhere there will be social alld economic justice for.every One equality of status and opportuniiy for all, would \\-velcome an inquiry by-\"the .court, so that if it is found\nthat there are ill fact bonded labourers or even if the workers are-not bof_1ded in the strict sense of the.", "canonical_name": "BANDH\\JA MUKTI MORCHA V"}}, {"text": "Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7223, "end_char": 7259, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8601, "end_char": 8611, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Francis Mullen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8629, "end_char": 8643, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "under the interpfetation given to Article 21 by this Court in Francis Mullen's Case, to Jive with 'human dignity, free from exploitatiori.", "canonical_name": "Fraizcis Mullen"}}, {"text": "Jive", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8655, "end_char": 8659, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "under the interpfetation given to Article 21 by this Court in Francis Mullen's Case, to Jive with 'human dignity, free from exploitatiori."}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8758, "end_char": 8768, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8881, "end_char": 8891, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 41 and 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8896, "end_char": 8914, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9414, "end_char": 9432, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These are the ffiinimum.requirements which fllUSt exist in order to ertable a person to live with human dignity .and no State-neither thC Central Government nor ariy State Govefiiqient-has the right ta , take any aCtion which will deprive a person of the enjoymentof thesebasic essentials."}}, {"text": "Article 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9652, "end_char": 9662, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9664, "end_char": 9674, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 256", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10437, "end_char": 10448, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10573, "end_char": 10583, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the partof the State fn securing implementation of such leg!slation would amount to denial of the right to live\n\n'--+,\n\nwith human.dignity nshrined inArticie 21, more so in the context of Article 256_ which provides 1hat the exceutive power of every State shall be so exercised as to ensure compliance with the laws made by Parliament and any existing laws which apply in that State. ["}}, {"text": "State of Haryana", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11308, "end_char": 11324, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It niust also follow as a necessary corollary that the State of Haryana in which the stone quarries arc vested by reason of Haryana Minerals (Vesting of Rights) Act ."}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12128, "end_char": 12138, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12804, "end_char": 12817, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "for enforcement of any of the fundamental rights;=> but it does not say as to who , shall have this right to move the Supreme Court -nor d0eS it say by what proceeding~ the Supreme Court may be so movd."}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12945, "end_char": 12955, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13263, "end_char": 13273, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article\n\n32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14652, "end_char": 14663, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "BANDHUA MUKTI MORCHA V", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14878, "end_char": 14900, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(c) He will also -ascertain by carrying ut sample check whether the worlcmen employed in any particular stone quarry\n\n..\\c,\n\n(d)\n\n, (c)\n\n(f) •\n\n(g)\n\n(h)\n\nBANDHUA MUKTI MORCHA V, UNION (Bhagwati, J,) 151\n\nor stone crusher are actually in receipt of wage not less than the minin\\um wage and whether the directions given in tl_iis order in.", "canonical_name": "BANDH\\JA MUKTI MORCHA V"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14994, "end_char": 15004, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Erigland", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15479, "end_char": 15487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Constitution makers deliberately did not Jay down any pariicular forn1 of proceeding for enforcement or a fundamental right nor di&, they stipulate that suCh proceeding should confonn to anY rigid pattern or straight jacket fonnula as, for example, in Erigland, becau5e theY knew that in a country like India where there is so much of poverty, ignorance, illiteracy, deprivation and xploitation, any insistence on a rigid for mula of proceeding for enfotcement of a fundamental right would become elf~ defeating because it would place enforcement of fundamental r, ights beyond the reach of the comiµo\"n man and~ the entire remedy for enforcetnent of fundamental rig_hts which the Constitution makers regarded as so precious and invaluable that they elevatCd it to the status of a fundii.mentaI right, would become a mere rope of sand so far aS; the large masses of the people in this country are concerned."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15530, "end_char": 15535, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Constitution makers deliberately did not Jay down any pariicular forn1 of proceeding for enforcement or a fundamental right nor di&, they stipulate that suCh proceeding should confonn to anY rigid pattern or straight jacket fonnula as, for example, in Erigland, becau5e theY knew that in a country like India where there is so much of poverty, ignorance, illiteracy, deprivation and xploitation, any insistence on a rigid for mula of proceeding for enfotcement of a fundamental right would become elf~ defeating because it would place enforcement of fundamental r, ights beyond the reach of the comiµo\"n man and~ the entire remedy for enforcetnent of fundamental rig_hts which the Constitution makers regarded as so precious and invaluable that they elevatCd it to the status of a fundii.mentaI right, would become a mere rope of sand so far aS; the large masses of the people in this country are concerned."}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18223, "end_char": 18233, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Supreme court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 19218, "end_char": 19231, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therefore even if the Conditions' for issue of any of these high prerogative writs are not fulfilled,\" the Supreme court\n\nwou.ld have power to issue any directjon, order or it including a Writ in the nature of any high Prerogative .writ.·"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20005, "end_char": 20015, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20314, "end_char": 20324, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Supreme 'Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 20624, "end_char": 20638, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The pprpose for which the power to issue \"an appropriate direction, order or -writ isconferred on the Supreme 'Court is to secure enfotcement of a fundtimeri.tal .fight.and obviously therefore, \\vhatever\n\npr0cedure is necessary for fu1filment of that purpose must be permissible .to the Supreme Court. ["}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21183, "end_char": 21193, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21314, "end_char": 21324, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence ACt", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21659, "end_char": 21678, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Supreme Cour::t", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 21905, "end_char": 21920, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therefore it Is rtot justified to impose anj\" restriction on the power of the Supreme Cour::t' adopt such procedure as it thinks fit in exercise."}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24009, "end_char": 24019, "source": "regex", "metadata": 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Thugh section 13 provides for constitution of a Vigilance Committee in each f:>istrict and each sub.-division of a 'District, 'the Government-of Haryana, for some reason or the other,· did not constitute any Vigilance Conrmittee until\n\nts attention was drawn to this requirement of the law by this Court."}}, {"text": "Haryana Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 48395, "end_char": 48413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In constituting Vigilance Committee in each District and .• sub-division, the Haryana Government would do well to include representatives of non-political social action group~ operating at the grass root level; for it is only through such social actioti groups and voluntary agencies that the problems of identification of bonded labour can be effectively 'solved. 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Bhattacharya", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 92943, "end_char": 92960, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.K. Bhattacharya and N.R., Chaudhary for the Petitioner."}}, {"text": "N.R., Chaudhary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 92965, "end_char": 92980, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.K. Bhattacharya and N.R., Chaudhary for the Petitioner."}}, {"text": "M.N. Phadke", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 93002, "end_char": 93013, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M.N. Phadke, K.B. Rohtcigi and S.K. Dhingra for the Respondent Nos."}}, {"text": "K.B. Rohtcigi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 93015, "end_char": 93028, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M.N. Phadke, K.B. Rohtcigi and S.K. Dhingra for the Respondent Nos.", "canonical_name": "K.B. Rohtcigi"}}, {"text": "S.K. Dhingra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 93033, "end_char": 93045, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M.N. Phadke, K.B. Rohtcigi and S.K. Dhingra for the Respondent Nos.", "canonical_name": "S.K. Dhingra"}}, {"text": "K.B. Rhtagi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 93088, "end_char": 93099, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "9; ·\n\nK.B. Rhtagi and S.J. Dhingra for tl:le Respondent No.", "canonical_name": "K.B. Rohtcigi"}}, {"text": "S.J. Dhingra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 93104, "end_char": 93116, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "9; ·\n\nK.B. Rhtagi and S.J. Dhingra for tl:le Respondent No.", "canonical_name": "S.K. Dhingra"}}, {"text": "S.K. Verma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 93149, "end_char": 93159, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "13 ..\n\nS.K. Verma for the Respondent No'."}}, {"text": "Abdul Khadar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 93188, "end_char": 93200, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Abdul Khadar Sr . ."}}, {"text": "A. Su6hash11i", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 93227, "end_char": 93240, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Advocate and Miss. A. Su6hash11i for the respondent."}}, {"text": "BHAGWAl'I", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 93357, "end_char": 93366, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "n 91\n\nThe following Judgments were delivered-\n\nBHAGWAl'I, J. The petitioner is an organisation dedicated, to the cause of release of onded labou.rers in the country.", "canonical_name": "BHAGWAl'I"}}, {"text": "Article 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 96004, "end_char": 96014, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 96335, "end_char": 96345, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "26th January, 1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 96419, "end_char": 96437, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But, it appears that though the Consti\\ution was enacted as far back as 26th January, 1950 and many years passed since then, no serious.effort was made to give effect to Article 23 and to stamp out the shocking practice of ·· to bondild labour."}}, {"text": "Article 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 96517, "end_char": 96527, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 96640, "end_char": 96682, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Dhar Misra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 97412, "end_char": 97422, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But, unfortunately, as subsequent events have .shown and that is borne ont also by the Report made by the Centre for Rural Development Administration, I.ndian Institute of Public Administration to the Mini, stry of Labour Government of India on \"Rehabilitation of Bonded fabour in Monghyr Dfstrict, Jlihar\", the Report made by the Public Policy and Planning Division of the Indian Institute of Public Administration to the Ministry of Labour, Government of India on \"Evaluation Study of Bonded Labour Rehabilitation Scheme In Tehri Garhwal, U.P.\", the Report'ofLaxmi Dhar Misra, the Director-General (Labour Welfare) of the Government of India based on On the Spot Studies Regarding Identification, Release of Bonded_ Labourers and Rehabilitation of Freed Labourers in Uttar Pradesh,\n\nMadhya Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh; Karnataka, Orissa, Bihar, Rajasthan, tamilnadu and .Kerala and the Report of the National \" Seminar on \"Indentification and Rehabilitationof Bonded Labour\" l).eld from 7th to 9th February, 1983 that the pernidous practice of bonded labour has not yet been totally eradieated from the national scene and that 'it continus t6 disfigure the social and economic life of the country ai certain places."}}, {"text": "Rabindra Nath Tagore", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 99107, "end_char": 99127, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of non-beings into human-beings and what it involves is eloquently described in the beautiful lines of Rabindra Nath Tagore in \"Kadi and Koma!\" ."}}, {"text": "Ranga Reddy", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 101066, "end_char": 101077, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "What happend recently in the Ranga Reddy District of Andrha Pradesh as a result , of the initiative taken by' this Court in Writ Petitions Nos."}}, {"text": "Andrha Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 101090, "end_char": 101104, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "What happend recently in the Ranga Reddy District of Andrha Pradesh as a result , of the initiative taken by' this Court in Writ Petitions Nos."}}, {"text": "Ranga Reddy District", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 101617, "end_char": 101637, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The District .Administration of Ranga Reddy District could in less than six months release over 3000 bonded labourers from the 'clutches of contractors in stone quarries in Ranga Reddy District and send them back to their ho.mes."}}, {"text": "Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 102580, "end_char": 102616, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "state of Haryana", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 102770, "end_char": 102786, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The state of Haryana has iil the present case tried to."}}, {"text": "BANDHUA MUJCTI MORCHA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 104103, "end_char": 104124, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~- ,\n\n\"\\ \"'\"\"\"\n\nBANDHUA MUJCTI MORCHA \\'.", "canonical_name": "BANDH\\JA MUKTI MORCHA V"}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 104136, "end_char": 104144, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "UNION (Bhagwati, J.) ' 95\n\nFAridabad district near the city bf Deijii and found that there were a large number of labourers from Maharashtra, .", "canonical_name": "BHAGWAl'I"}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 104273, "end_char": 104287, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and Rajas.than who were working in these stone quarries nuder \"inhuman and intolerable conditions'\" and many of whom were b; inded labourers: The petitioner therefore addressed a letter to one of us Oil 25th February, 1982 pointing out that in the miries of Shri S.L. Sharma, Gnrukula Indra Prastha, Post Amar Nagar, Faridabad, District, a iarge number of labourers were languishing under abject conditions of bondage for last about."}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 104289, "end_char": 104302, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and Rajas.than who were working in these stone quarries nuder \"inhuman and intolerable conditions'\" and many of whom were b; inded labourers: The petitioner therefore addressed a letter to one of us Oil 25th February, 1982 pointing out that in the miries of Shri S.L. Sharma, Gnrukula Indra Prastha, Post Amar Nagar, Faridabad, District, a iarge number of labourers were languishing under abject conditions of bondage for last about."}}, {"text": "25th February, 1982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 104506, "end_char": 104525, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and Rajas.than who were working in these stone quarries nuder \"inhuman and intolerable conditions'\" and many of whom were b; inded labourers: The petitioner therefore addressed a letter to one of us Oil 25th February, 1982 pointing out that in the miries of Shri S.L. Sharma, Gnrukula Indra Prastha, Post Amar Nagar, Faridabad, District, a iarge number of labourers were languishing under abject conditions of bondage for last about."}}, {"text": "S.L. Sharma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 104566, "end_char": 104577, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and Rajas.than who were working in these stone quarries nuder \"inhuman and intolerable conditions'\" and many of whom were b; inded labourers: The petitioner therefore addressed a letter to one of us Oil 25th February, 1982 pointing out that in the miries of Shri S.L. Sharma, Gnrukula Indra Prastha, Post Amar Nagar, Faridabad, District, a iarge number of labourers were languishing under abject conditions of bondage for last about.", "canonical_name": "S.L. Sharma"}}, {"text": "Gnrukula Indra Prastha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 104579, "end_char": 104601, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and Rajas.than who were working in these stone quarries nuder \"inhuman and intolerable conditions'\" and many of whom were b; inded labourers: The petitioner therefore addressed a letter to one of us Oil 25th February, 1982 pointing out that in the miries of Shri S.L. Sharma, Gnrukula Indra Prastha, Post Amar Nagar, Faridabad, District, a iarge number of labourers were languishing under abject conditions of bondage for last about."}}, {"text": "Asarha", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 104828, "end_char": 104834, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ten years, and the pe.titioner gave the names of 11 bonded laboqrers who were from village Asarha, Bariner distriCt of Rajasthan, 7 bonded labourers who were from village Bharol, district Jhansi of Madhya."}}, {"text": "Bharol", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 104908, "end_char": 104914, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ten years, and the pe.titioner gave the names of 11 bonded laboqrers who were from village Asarha, Bariner distriCt of Rajasthan, 7 bonded labourers who were from village Bharol, district Jhansi of Madhya."}}, {"text": "Madhya. Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 104935, "end_char": 104950, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ten years, and the pe.titioner gave the names of 11 bonded laboqrers who were from village Asarha, Bariner distriCt of Rajasthan, 7 bonded labourers who were from village Bharol, district Jhansi of Madhya."}}, {"text": "Barodia", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 104997, "end_char": 105004, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pradesh and 23 bonded labourers who were from village Barodia, Bhanger, Tehsil Khurai, district Sagar, M.P.\n\nThe petitioner pointed out that there were ')'et another 14 .bonded labourer.s fro in Lalitpur in U.P .\"."}}, {"text": "Bhanger", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 105006, "end_char": 105013, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pradesh and 23 bonded labourers who were from village Barodia, Bhanger, Tehsil Khurai, district Sagar, M.P.\n\nThe petitioner pointed out that there were ')'et another 14 .bonded labourer.s fro in Lalitpur in U.P .\"."}}, {"text": "Khurai", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 105022, "end_char": 105028, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pradesh and 23 bonded labourers who were from village Barodia, Bhanger, Tehsil Khurai, district Sagar, M.P.\n\nThe petitioner pointed out that there were ')'et another 14 .bonded labourer.s fro in Lalitpur in U.P .\"."}}, {"text": "Sagar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 105039, "end_char": 105044, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pradesh and 23 bonded labourers who were from village Barodia, Bhanger, Tehsil Khurai, district Sagar, M.P.\n\nThe petitioner pointed out that there were ')'et another 14 .bonded labourer.s fro in Lalitpur in U.P .\"."}}, {"text": "Lalitpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 105138, "end_char": 105146, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pradesh and 23 bonded labourers who were from village Barodia, Bhanger, Tehsil Khurai, district Sagar, M.P.\n\nThe petitioner pointed out that there were ')'et another 14 .bonded labourer.s fro in Lalitpur in U.P .\"."}}, {"text": "U.P", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 105150, "end_char": 105153, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pradesh and 23 bonded labourers who were from village Barodia, Bhanger, Tehsil Khurai, district Sagar, M.P.\n\nThe petitioner pointed out that there were ')'et another 14 .bonded labourer.s fro in Lalitpur in U.P .\"."}}, {"text": "Mines Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 106205, "end_char": 106214, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Rajasthan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 106516, "end_char": 106525, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Almost 99 % of the workers are' migrnt from drought prone areas of Rajasthan, Madhya."}}, {"text": "Madhya.Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 106527, "end_char": 106541, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Almost 99 % of the workers are' migrnt from drought prone areas of Rajasthan, Madhya."}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 106543, "end_char": 106557, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pradesh; Andhra Pradesh, Orissa, Maharashtra and Bihar."}}, {"text": "Maharashtra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 106567, "end_char": 106578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pradesh; Andhra Pradesh, Orissa, Maharashtra and Bihar."}}, {"text": "Bihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 106583, "end_char": 106588, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pradesh; Andhra Pradesh, Orissa, Maharashtra and Bihar."}}, {"text": "26th February 1982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 108378, "end_char": 108396, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The letter dated 25th February 1982 addressed by the petitioner was treated as a writ ptition and by an order dated 26th February 1982 this Court issued notice on the writ petition and appointed two advocates, nainely, M/s. Asliok Srivastava and Ashok Panda as commissioners to visit the stone qua:rries of Shri S.L. Sharma in Godhokhor (Anangpur) and Lakkarpur in Faridabad district and to interview each of the persons whose names were mentioned in the letter of the petitioner as also a\" cross section of the either workers with a view to finding out whether they are willingly working in these ' stone quarries and also to inquire about the conditions in which they are working."}}, {"text": "Asliok Srivastava", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 108486, "end_char": 108503, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The letter dated 25th February 1982 addressed by the petitioner was treated as a writ ptition and by an order dated 26th February 1982 this Court issued notice on the writ petition and appointed two advocates, nainely, M/s. Asliok Srivastava and Ashok Panda as commissioners to visit the stone qua:rries of Shri S.L. Sharma in Godhokhor (Anangpur) and Lakkarpur in Faridabad district and to interview each of the persons whose names were mentioned in the letter of the petitioner as also a\" cross section of the either workers with a view to finding out whether they are willingly working in these ' stone quarries and also to inquire about the conditions in which they are working.", "canonical_name": "Asliok Srivastava"}}, {"text": "Ashok Panda", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 108508, "end_char": 108519, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The letter dated 25th February 1982 addressed by the petitioner was treated as a writ ptition and by an order dated 26th February 1982 this Court issued notice on the writ petition and appointed two advocates, nainely, M/s. Asliok Srivastava and Ashok Panda as commissioners to visit the stone qua:rries of Shri S.L. Sharma in Godhokhor (Anangpur) and Lakkarpur in Faridabad district and to interview each of the persons whose names were mentioned in the letter of the petitioner as also a\" cross section of the either workers with a view to finding out whether they are willingly working in these ' stone quarries and also to inquire about the conditions in which they are working.", "canonical_name": "Ashck • Panda"}}, {"text": "Godhokhor", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 108589, "end_char": 108598, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The letter dated 25th February 1982 addressed by the petitioner was treated as a writ ptition and by an order dated 26th February 1982 this Court issued notice on the writ petition and appointed two advocates, nainely, M/s. Asliok Srivastava and Ashok Panda as commissioners to visit the stone qua:rries of Shri S.L. Sharma in Godhokhor (Anangpur) and Lakkarpur in Faridabad district and to interview each of the persons whose names were mentioned in the letter of the petitioner as also a\" cross section of the either workers with a view to finding out whether they are willingly working in these ' stone quarries and also to inquire about the conditions in which they are working."}}, {"text": "Anangpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 108600, "end_char": 108608, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The letter dated 25th February 1982 addressed by the petitioner was treated as a writ ptition and by an order dated 26th February 1982 this Court issued notice on the writ petition and appointed two advocates, nainely, M/s. Asliok Srivastava and Ashok Panda as commissioners to visit the stone qua:rries of Shri S.L. Sharma in Godhokhor (Anangpur) and Lakkarpur in Faridabad district and to interview each of the persons whose names were mentioned in the letter of the petitioner as also a\" cross section of the either workers with a view to finding out whether they are willingly working in these ' stone quarries and also to inquire about the conditions in which they are working."}}, {"text": "Lakkarpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 108614, "end_char": 108623, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The letter dated 25th February 1982 addressed by the petitioner was treated as a writ ptition and by an order dated 26th February 1982 this Court issued notice on the writ petition and appointed two advocates, nainely, M/s. Asliok Srivastava and Ashok Panda as commissioners to visit the stone qua:rries of Shri S.L. Sharma in Godhokhor (Anangpur) and Lakkarpur in Faridabad district and to interview each of the persons whose names were mentioned in the letter of the petitioner as also a\" cross section of the either workers with a view to finding out whether they are willingly working in these ' stone quarries and also to inquire about the conditions in which they are working."}}, {"text": "Ashok Srivastava", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 108950, "end_char": 108966, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M/s. Ashok Srivastava and Ashok Panda were directed to.visit these stone quarries on 27th and 28th February 1982 'and to make a.report to this Court on or before 2nd March 1982.", "canonical_name": "Asliok Srivastava"}}, {"text": "S.L. Shrma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 109229, "end_char": 109239, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the stone quarries of S.L. Shrma in Godhokhor and Lakkarpur\n\n~'and carried out the assignment entrusted to them and submitted a \"'\n\n,\\-\n\nf ( ~\n\nBANDHUA MlJKTl MORCHA •· UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 97 • • report to this Court on 2nd March J 982.", "canonical_name": "S.L. Sharma"}}, {"text": "BANDHUA MlJKTl MORCHA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 109351, "end_char": 109372, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the stone quarries of S.L. Shrma in Godhokhor and Lakkarpur\n\n~'and carried out the assignment entrusted to them and submitted a \"'\n\n,\\-\n\nf ( ~\n\nBANDHUA MlJKTl MORCHA •· UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 97 • • report to this Court on 2nd March J 982.", "canonical_name": "BANDH\\JA MUKTI MORCHA V"}}, {"text": "2nd March J 982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 109428, "end_char": 109443, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the stone quarries of S.L. Shrma in Godhokhor and Lakkarpur\n\n~'and carried out the assignment entrusted to them and submitted a \"'\n\n,\\-\n\nf ( ~\n\nBANDHUA MlJKTl MORCHA •· UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 97 • • report to this Court on 2nd March J 982."}}, {"text": "Godhakhpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 109527, "end_char": 109537, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "inter alia that i11 the stone quarries of S.L. Sharma at Godhakhpur, \"m1ny stone'."}}, {"text": "Ashok Pan.da", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 109793, "end_char": 109805, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ashok Srivastava and Ashok Pan.da a11d according t~ 'the statements given by some of.", "canonical_name": "Ashck • Panda"}}, {"text": "Lalu Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 109872, "end_char": 109880, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "them, namely, Lalu Ram, Dalla Ram, Thakur Lal, Budh Ram, Harda, Mahadev, Smt."}}, {"text": "Dalla Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 109882, "end_char": 109891, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "them, namely, Lalu Ram, Dalla Ram, Thakur Lal, Budh Ram, Harda, Mahadev, Smt."}}, {"text": "Thakur Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 109893, "end_char": 109903, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "them, namely, Lalu Ram, Dalla Ram, Thakur Lal, Budh Ram, Harda, Mahadev, Smt."}}, {"text": "Budh Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 109905, "end_char": 109913, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "them, namely, Lalu Ram, Dalla Ram, Thakur Lal, Budh Ram, Harda, Mahadev, Smt."}}, {"text": "Harda", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 109915, "end_char": 109920, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "them, namely, Lalu Ram, Dalla Ram, Thakur Lal, Budh Ram, Harda, Mahadev, Smt."}}, {"text": "Mahadev", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 109922, "end_char": 109929, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "them, namely, Lalu Ram, Dalla Ram, Thakur Lal, Budh Ram, Harda, Mahadev, Smt."}}, {"text": "Shibban", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 109936, "end_char": 109943, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shibban, Hardev, Anam, Punnu, Ghanshyam, Randhir and Mute, they were not allowed to leave the stone quarries and were providing forced labour and they did not have even pure water to drink bu't wore compolled in most cases to drink dirty water frpm anal/ah and w're living in Jhuggics with stones piled one upon the other as walls and stra\\V covering at the top, which did' not afford any protection against sun and rain."}}, {"text": "Hardev", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 109945, "end_char": 109951, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shibban, Hardev, Anam, Punnu, Ghanshyam, Randhir and Mute, they were not allowed to leave the stone quarries and were providing forced labour and they did not have even pure water to drink bu't wore compolled in most cases to drink dirty water frpm anal/ah and w're living in Jhuggics with stones piled one upon the other as walls and stra\\V covering at the top, which did' not afford any protection against sun and rain."}}, {"text": "Anam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 109953, "end_char": 109957, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shibban, Hardev, Anam, Punnu, Ghanshyam, Randhir and Mute, they were not allowed to leave the stone quarries and were providing forced labour and they did not have even pure water to drink bu't wore compolled in most cases to drink dirty water frpm anal/ah and w're living in Jhuggics with stones piled one upon the other as walls and stra\\V covering at the top, which did' not afford any protection against sun and rain."}}, {"text": "Punnu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 109959, "end_char": 109964, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shibban, Hardev, Anam, Punnu, Ghanshyam, Randhir and Mute, they were not allowed to leave the stone quarries and were providing forced labour and they did not have even pure water to drink bu't wore compolled in most cases to drink dirty water frpm anal/ah and w're living in Jhuggics with stones piled one upon the other as walls and stra\\V covering at the top, which did' not afford any protection against sun and rain."}}, {"text": "Ghanshyam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 109966, "end_char": 109975, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shibban, Hardev, Anam, Punnu, Ghanshyam, Randhir and Mute, they were not allowed to leave the stone quarries and were providing forced labour and they did not have even pure water to drink bu't wore compolled in most cases to drink dirty water frpm anal/ah and w're living in Jhuggics with stones piled one upon the other as walls and stra\\V covering at the top, which did' not afford any protection against sun and rain."}}, {"text": "Randhir", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 109977, "end_char": 109984, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shibban, Hardev, Anam, Punnu, Ghanshyam, Randhir and Mute, they were not allowed to leave the stone quarries and were providing forced labour and they did not have even pure water to drink bu't wore compolled in most cases to drink dirty water frpm anal/ah and w're living in Jhuggics with stones piled one upon the other as walls and stra\\V covering at the top, which did' not afford any protection against sun and rain."}}, {"text": "Mute", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 109989, "end_char": 109993, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shibban, Hardev, Anam, Punnu, Ghanshyam, Randhir and Mute, they were not allowed to leave the stone quarries and were providing forced labour and they did not have even pure water to drink bu't wore compolled in most cases to drink dirty water frpm anal/ah and w're living in Jhuggics with stones piled one upon the other as walls and stra\\V covering at the top, which did' not afford any protection against sun and rain."}}, {"text": "Ashok' Panda", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 110791, "end_char": 110803, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Report proceeded to state' that M/s. 'Ashok Srivastava and Ashok' Panda then Visited 1nine no.", "canonical_name": "Ashck • Panda"}}, {"text": "Phool Chand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 111351, "end_char": 111362, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The statem, nts of Phool Chand, Babu Lal, Bhoolu, Karaya, Ram Bahadur and Salt'u also showed that alhhese workers were bonded labourers who were not."}}, {"text": "Babu Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 111364, "end_char": 111372, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The statem, nts of Phool Chand, Babu Lal, Bhoolu, Karaya, Ram Bahadur and Salt'u also showed that alhhese workers were bonded labourers who were not."}}, {"text": "Bhoolu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 111374, "end_char": 111380, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The statem, nts of Phool Chand, Babu Lal, Bhoolu, Karaya, Ram Bahadur and Salt'u also showed that alhhese workers were bonded labourers who were not."}}, {"text": "Karaya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 111382, "end_char": 111388, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The statem, nts of Phool Chand, Babu Lal, Bhoolu, Karaya, Ram Bahadur and Salt'u also showed that alhhese workers were bonded labourers who were not."}}, {"text": "Ram Bahadur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 111390, "end_char": 111401, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The statem, nts of Phool Chand, Babu Lal, Bhoolu, Karaya, Ram Bahadur and Salt'u also showed that alhhese workers were bonded labourers who were not."}}, {"text": "Salt'u", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 111406, "end_char": 111412, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The statem, nts of Phool Chand, Babu Lal, Bhoolu, Karaya, Ram Bahadur and Salt'u also showed that alhhese workers were bonded labourers who were not."}}, {"text": "Sallu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 111548, "end_char": 111553, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "leave the stone quarries and one' of them, n, am, ly, Sallu was seriously injured on his leftJeg only a day before the visit of M/s. Ashok Sri\\>astava and Ashol': Panda but be did not\n\nhop_, to get ari'y co1nµensation \"because here ilo one gets any co.n1rn1sation for any injury''."}}, {"text": "Ashok Sri\\>astava", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 111627, "end_char": 111644, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "leave the stone quarries and one' of them, n, am, ly, Sallu was seriously injured on his leftJeg only a day before the visit of M/s. Ashok Sri\\>astava and Ashol': Panda but be did not\n\nhop_, to get ari'y co1nµensation \"because here ilo one gets any co.n1rn1sation for any injury''.", "canonical_name": "Asliok Srivastava"}}, {"text": "Ashol", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 111649, "end_char": 111654, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "leave the stone quarries and one' of them, n, am, ly, Sallu was seriously injured on his leftJeg only a day before the visit of M/s. Ashok Sri\\>astava and Ashol': Panda but be did not\n\nhop_, to get ari'y co1nµensation \"because here ilo one gets any co.n1rn1sation for any injury''.", "canonical_name": "Ashol"}}, {"text": "Ash0k Srivastava", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 111818, "end_char": 111834, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Most of the workers interviewed 'by\n\nM/s. Ash0k Srivastava and Ashok Panda stated that they got very little by way of \\Vages fro1n ti1e mi.ne lessees or owners of\" stone crushers since they .had to purchase explosives with their own m011eys and they had to incur other epenses which, according to Dr. Patwardhan's repJrt to which we .shall refer :hereafter, inCluded 50 per cent of the expenses of drilling holes.·", "canonical_name": "Asliok Srivastava"}}, {"text": "Ashok Panda", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 111839, "end_char": 111850, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Most of the workers interviewed 'by\n\nM/s. Ash0k Srivastava and Ashok Panda stated that they got very little by way of \\Vages fro1n ti1e mi.ne lessees or owners of\" stone crushers since they .had to purchase explosives with their own m011eys and they had to incur other epenses which, according to Dr. Patwardhan's repJrt to which we .shall refer :hereafter, inCluded 50 per cent of the expenses of drilling holes.·", "canonical_name": "Ashck • Panda"}}, {"text": "Patwardhan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 112077, "end_char": 112087, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Most of the workers interviewed 'by\n\nM/s. Ash0k Srivastava and Ashok Panda stated that they got very little by way of \\Vages fro1n ti1e mi.ne lessees or owners of\" stone crushers since they .had to purchase explosives with their own m011eys and they had to incur other epenses which, according to Dr. Patwardhan's repJrt to which we .shall refer :hereafter, inCluded 50 per cent of the expenses of drilling holes.·", "canonical_name": "P.atwardhan"}}, {"text": "Lal Bahadur", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 112456, "end_char": 112467, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "son of Hastbir (2) Lal Bahadur sen of Umbar .Bahadur (3) Chhotey Lal sol) of Jarau (4) Harak Bahadur ·.son of Jeet.", "canonical_name": "Lal Bahadur"}}, {"text": "Chhotey Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 112494, "end_char": 112505, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "son of Hastbir (2) Lal Bahadur sen of Umbar .Bahadur (3) Chhotey Lal sol) of Jarau (4) Harak Bahadur ·.son of Jeet."}}, {"text": "Harak Bahadur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 112524, "end_char": 112537, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "son of Hastbir (2) Lal Bahadur sen of Umbar .Bahadur (3) Chhotey Lal sol) of Jarau (4) Harak Bahadur ·.son of Jeet."}}, {"text": "Gopal Bahadur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 112565, "end_char": 112578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bahadur (5) Gopal Bahadur sort of Jliahu Sinh\n\n(6) Roop Singh son of Govinda (7) Medh Bahadur son of Aspteir\n\n(8) Jiddey Bahadur son of Nunbahadur (9) Phool."}}, {"text": "Roop Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 112604, "end_char": 112614, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bahadur (5) Gopal Bahadur sort of Jliahu Sinh\n\n(6) Roop Singh son of Govinda (7) Medh Bahadur son of Aspteir\n\n(8) Jiddey Bahadur son of Nunbahadur (9) Phool."}}, {"text": "Medh Bahadur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 112634, "end_char": 112646, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bahadur (5) Gopal Bahadur sort of Jliahu Sinh\n\n(6) Roop Singh son of Govinda (7) Medh Bahadur son of Aspteir\n\n(8) Jiddey Bahadur son of Nunbahadur (9) Phool."}}, {"text": "Jiddey Bahadur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 112667, "end_char": 112681, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bahadur (5) Gopal Bahadur sort of Jliahu Sinh\n\n(6) Roop Singh son of Govinda (7) Medh Bahadur son of Aspteir\n\n(8) Jiddey Bahadur son of Nunbahadur (9) Phool."}}, {"text": "Phool. Baha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 112704, "end_char": 112715, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bahadur (5) Gopal Bahadur sort of Jliahu Sinh\n\n(6) Roop Singh son of Govinda (7) Medh Bahadur son of Aspteir\n\n(8) Jiddey Bahadur son of Nunbahadur (9) Phool."}}, {"text": "Heera Bahadur", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 112745, "end_char": 112758, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Baha<lur sen of\n\nRam Bahadur (10) Heera Bahadur son .of Balbahadur (JJ) Veer 'Bahadur son of Chhalvir. ("}}, {"text": "Veer 'Bahadur", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 112783, "end_char": 112796, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Baha<lur sen of\n\nRam Bahadur (10) Heera Bahadur son .of Balbahadur (JJ) Veer 'Bahadur son of Chhalvir. ("}}, {"text": "Nain Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 112819, "end_char": 112829, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "12) Nain Singh son of Lal Baliadur (I 3) Lal Bahadur son of Gang Bahaciur (14)."}}, {"text": "Lal Bahadur", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 112856, "end_char": 112867, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "12) Nain Singh son of Lal Baliadur (I 3) Lal Bahadur son of Gang Bahaciur (14).", "canonical_name": "Lal Bahadur"}}, {"text": "Ganesh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 112895, "end_char": 112901, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ganesh son of Gang PahPdur . ("}}, {"text": "Amber Bahadur", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 112929, "end_char": 112942, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "15) Amber Bahadur son of Sadhu Ba.hadur (I 6) Hira ta!"}}, {"text": "Hira", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 112971, "end_char": 112975, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "15) Amber Bahadur son of Sadhu Ba.hadur (I 6) Hira ta!"}}, {"text": "l(amar Bahadur", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 113006, "end_char": 113020, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Atbahadur (17) l(amar Bahadur (18) agadh Bahadur sol) of Tep BQhadur (19) Gajender Bahadur son of Shyam ta! ("}}, {"text": "agadh Bahadur", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 113026, "end_char": 113039, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Atbahadur (17) l(amar Bahadur (18) agadh Bahadur sol) of Tep BQhadur (19) Gajender Bahadur son of Shyam ta! ("}}, {"text": "Gajender Bahadur", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 113065, "end_char": 113081, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Atbahadur (17) l(amar Bahadur (18) agadh Bahadur sol) of Tep BQhadur (19) Gajender Bahadur son of Shyam ta! ("}}, {"text": "Ganga Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 113104, "end_char": 113113, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "20) Ganga Ram."}}, {"text": "Nar .Bahadur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 113141, "end_char": 113153, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "21) Nar .Bahadur .and (22) Sant."}}, {"text": "Sant. Bahadpr", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 113164, "end_char": 113177, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "21) Nar .Bahadur .and (22) Sant."}}, {"text": "Bhag Bahadur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 113185, "end_char": 113197, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bahadpr son of Bhag Bahadur ."}}, {"text": "Ashok Sriyastava", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 113302, "end_char": 113318, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So .far as the workers working h1 La'kkarptir .stone quarnrs were concerned, .. the report of M/s. Ashok Sriyastava and Ashck • Panda stated that out of about 250 persons living in st:raw j!rngrirc . ..", "canonical_name": "Asliok Srivastava"}}, {"text": "Ashck • Panda", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 113323, "end_char": 113336, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So .far as the workers working h1 La'kkarptir .stone quarnrs were concerned, .. the report of M/s. Ashok Sriyastava and Ashck • Panda stated that out of about 250 persons living in st:raw j!rngrirc . ..", "canonical_name": "Ashck • Panda"}}, {"text": "Bilaspur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 113431, "end_char": 113439, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "persons hailed from Bilaspur while 150 persons telongcd to\n\n.Allahbad and according to the rep.or!,"}}, {"text": "Asliok Srivastava", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 113699, "end_char": 113716, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M/s. Asliok Srivastava and Asho.k Panda described iii the Report the pitiable condition in which these workers were livinc in . .", "canonical_name": "Asliok Srivastava"}}, {"text": "Asho.k Panda", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 113721, "end_char": 113733, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M/s. Asliok Srivastava and Asho.k Panda described iii the Report the pitiable condition in which these workers were livinc in . .", "canonical_name": "Ashck • Panda"}}, {"text": "Ashk Sri_vastavri anci Asl1ok Pacda", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 113995, "end_char": 114030, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\\~'ith\n\ndrinking water available only from the iiarsati nal!e/i. 'The Rrrc•rt\n\npointed out that while M/s. Ashk Sri_vastavri anci Asl1ok Pacda."}}, {"text": "Ashok . Srinstava", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 115152, "end_char": 115169, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "labourers and on this day the Court A m1-:le an order directing that the copies of the Repqtt of M/s. Ashok .", "canonical_name": "Asliok Srivastava"}}, {"text": "Faridabad District", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 115726, "end_char": 115744, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\"ft is neCe5'ary that a socio-legal investigation should be carried out for the purpose 9f determining what are the con- .. ditiohs prevailing in the various quarries in Faridabad District and."}}, {"text": "Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 115947, "end_char": 115983, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Patwardhan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 116807, "end_char": 116817, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We would, therefore, request Dr. Patwardhan of T.f .T. to be good enough to carry out a socio-legal investigation into the aforesaid matters in the quarfies in Faridabad :bistriCt a list of which will .be supplied by Mr: Muklrnty on behalf of the P'titi011crs to.", "canonical_name": "P.atwardhan"}}, {"text": "Muklrnty", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 116995, "end_char": 117003, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We would, therefore, request Dr. Patwardhan of T.f .T. to be good enough to carry out a socio-legal investigation into the aforesaid matters in the quarfies in Faridabad :bistriCt a list of which will .be supplied by Mr: Muklrnty on behalf of the P'titi011crs to."}}, {"text": "K.d. Bhagat", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 117110, "end_char": 117121, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "today after giving a copy to Mr. K.d.", "canonical_name": "K. L. Bhagat"}}, {"text": "Patwardhap", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 117180, "end_char": 117190, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr.Patwardhap i\" rquested- _to ca, rry out soci~-lcgal investigation with .a view to putting forward a scheme for improving the living - COndi-tions for t.he worke.rs worki1Jg in t.hc.", "canonical_name": "P.atwardhan"}}, {"text": "K.G. Bhagat", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 118272, "end_char": 118283, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "were using dirty water from the nallah for drinking purposes, Mr. K.G. Bhagat learned Actditionar Solicitor General appearing on , behalf of the State of Haryana fairly stated that \"though it may not be strictly the obligation of the State Government, the State Gqvernment will take necessary measures fof providing.", "canonical_name": "K. L. Bhagat"}}, {"text": "Krishan Mahajan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 119373, "end_char": 119388, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1500 in Court to.meet the expenses of the so; io-legal investigation and Dr. Patwardhan embarked upon his task with tlie asistance of Mr. Krishan Mahajan, the.legal corres- ."}}, {"text": "Patwardh1n", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 119471, "end_char": 119481, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It took some time for Dr. Patwardh1n to complete his assignment and prepare his report but having .", "canonical_name": "P.atwardhan"}}, {"text": "Patw1rdhan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 119608, "end_char": 119618, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "regard to the lmmensity of.the task, the.time within which Dr. Patw1rdhan finished the inquiry and submitted his report was remarkably sbrt. .", "canonical_name": "P.atwardhan"}}, {"text": "State of Harynana", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 122417, "end_char": 122434, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Additional Solicitor General appearing on behalf of the State of Harynana as also Mr. Phadke on behalf of one of the mine lessees contended that even if what is allrned by the petitioner in his letter which has been treated as a writ petition, is true; it cannot support a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, becaus~ no fundamental right of the petitiouer or of the workmen on whose behalf the writ petition has been filed, can be said to have been infringed."}}, {"text": "Phadke", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 122447, "end_char": 122453, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Additional Solicitor General appearing on behalf of the State of Harynana as also Mr. Phadke on behalf of one of the mine lessees contended that even if what is allrned by the petitioner in his letter which has been treated as a writ petition, is true; it cannot support a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution, becaus~ no fundamental right of the petitiouer or of the workmen on whose behalf the writ petition has been filed, can be said to have been infringed."}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 122654, "end_char": 122664, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Fraizcis Mullen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 127500, "end_char": 127515, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "drink, it is difficult to appreciate how such a c01hplaini can be thrown out o~ the ground that it is not violative of the fundamental right of the workmen ..\n\nIt is the fundamental riglit of every one in this country, a_ssurcd under the interpretatioi1 givn to Aticlc 21 b, y thisCourt in Fraizcis Mullen's case, to live with human dignity, free froiu exr.loitation.", "canonical_name": "Fraizcis Mullen"}}, {"text": "Article 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 127751, "end_char": 127761, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 128529, "end_char": 128539, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 41 and 42", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 128541, "end_char": 128558, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 129266, "end_char": 129276, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 256", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 129304, "end_char": 129315, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT. REPORTS", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 129465, "end_char": 129487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "04\n\nSUPREME COURT."}}, {"text": "State of Haryai1a", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 130968, "end_char": 130985, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the State of Haryai1a by a writ petition under Article 32 of the Con ·\n\nstitution."}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 131011, "end_char": 131021, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Order XLVI of the Supreme Court Rules 1966", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 131595, "end_char": 131637, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 132332, "end_char": 132342, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Order XLVI of the Supreme Court Rules 1966", "statute": "Order XLVI of the Supreme Court Rules 1966"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 133090, "end_char": 133100, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 133109, "end_char": 133112, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 133565, "end_char": 133575, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 134150, "end_char": 134160, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 134190, "end_char": 134201, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 134638, "end_char": 134648, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 134796, "end_char": 134806, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 134866, "end_char": 134873, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 135410, "end_char": 135420, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 135911, "end_char": 135921, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 136227, "end_char": 136237, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 136546, "end_char": 136556, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 138152, "end_char": 138162, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 138877, "end_char": 138884, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to any rigid pattem or straight jacket formula as, for example, in England,.·"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 139641, "end_char": 139651, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 141068, "end_char": 141078, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 141403, "end_char": 141413, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Atkin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 141689, "end_char": 141694, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "spoken by Lord Atkin 'in Bnited Australia Liniited v. Barciays Ban le\n\nLtd. (ll in another context often \"stand in the path of justiceClanking their mediavel cilains\"."}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 143870, "end_char": 143880, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 144703, "end_char": 144713, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 145706, "end_char": 145733, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Indian Evidence Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 145742, "end_char": 145761, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "SupremeCourt not", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 150653, "end_char": 150669, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Would the SupremeCourt not be failing."}}, {"text": "s6C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 150857, "end_char": 150860, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Phadke relied on Order XXVl of the Code of Civil Procedure and Order XLVI of the Supreme Court Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 153512, "end_char": 153612, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 154012, "end_char": 154022, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Phadke relied on Order XXVl of the Code of Civil Procedure and Order XLVI of the Supreme Court Rules", "statute": "Phadke relied on Order XXVl of the Code of Civil Procedure and Order XLVI of the Supreme Court Rules"}}, {"text": "Order XXVI of the Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 154117, "end_char": 154139, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Court Rules 1966", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 154655, "end_char": 154671, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Order XLVII of the Supreme Court Rules 1966", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 154778, "end_char": 154821, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ashok", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 155164, "end_char": 155169, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Solicitor General and Mr. Phadke that th' court acted beyond its power in appointing M/s. Ashok , Sriva-; tava a11d Ashok Pandci as Co1nmissiOnerS in the fist istBncc\n\nand Dr. Pat\\vardhan as co111n1issioner ata subsequent stage {or the ·· purp:Jse of making: an itiquiry into the conditions C!f \\vorkn1en en1pl6yod in the stone quarries.", "canonical_name": "Ashol"}}, {"text": "Articles 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 155565, "end_char": 155576, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Order XLVII of the Supreme Court Rules 1966", "statute": "Order XLVII of the Supreme Court Rules 1966"}}, {"text": "Ashok srivastava", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 155758, "end_char": 155774, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Report of M/s .. Ashok srivastava and Ashok Panda as also the Report of Dr. Patwardhan were clearly documents having evidenf-·\n\nx. '.", "canonical_name": "Asliok Srivastava"}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 156504, "end_char": 156515, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 156790, "end_char": 156801, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 156858, "end_char": 156869, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Mines Act, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 157631, "end_char": 157646, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 2(j)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 157751, "end_char": 157763, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Mines Act, 1952", "statute": "the Mines Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "section 2(jj)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 158027, "end_char": 158040, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Mines Act, 1952", "statute": "the Mines Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "Section 2(kk)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 158208, "end_char": 158221, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Mines Act, 1952", "statute": "the Mines Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "section 2(j)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 158747, "end_char": 158759, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mines Act 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 159153, "end_char": 159167, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Mines Act, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 159281, "end_char": 159296, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "sections 7, 8, 9, 44, 45 and 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 159323, "end_char": 159354, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Mines Act, 1952", "statute": "the Mines Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "Mines Act 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 159676, "end_char": 159690, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 3(1)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 159760, "end_char": 159775, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Mines Act 1952", "statute": "Mines Act 1952"}}, {"text": "sections 7, 8, 9, 44, 45 and 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 159885, "end_char": 159916, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Mines Act 1952", "statute": "Mines Act 1952"}}, {"text": "BANDHUA MUKTI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 160852, "end_char": 160865, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the workings in these stone quarries cxter.d belc w superjacent ground and they are not 'open cast workings' and more- , over explosives are admittedly sed in connection with t~ excavation,_\n\n..-\n\nBANDHUA MUKTI l>!ORCHA ~· UNION (Bhagwati, .!;)", "canonical_name": "BANDH\\JA MUKTI MORCHA V"}}, {"text": "Mines Act 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 161015, "end_char": 161029, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Mines Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 161111, "end_char": 161120, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 2(j)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 161211, "end_char": 161223, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Mines Act 1952", "statute": "the Mines Act 1952"}}, {"text": "Mines Act, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 162028, "end_char": 162043, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Now the provisions of the Mines Act, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 162299, "end_char": 162340, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Mines Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 163477, "end_char": 163486, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Mines Rules, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 163501, "end_char": 163518, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 163607, "end_char": 163617, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Mines Rules, 1955", "statute": "the Mines Rules, 1955"}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 163880, "end_char": 163893, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COURT REP0R1'S\n\n[1984) 2 S.C:R; ·\n\nnd of any orders made imder the Act."}}, {"text": "Mines Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 164007, "end_char": 164016, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "State of Harvana", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 164417, "end_char": 164433, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sil,;;, 'the stone quarries in the present case are not l:eing exploited by the State of Harvana though :it iS the owner of the stone quarries, ."}}, {"text": "section 2(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 164701, "end_char": 164713, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mines Act, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 165007, "end_char": 165022, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Mines Rules, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 165031, "end_char": 165048, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Mines Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 165293, "end_char": 165302, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "State of. !-f-aryana", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 165642, "end_char": 165662, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of. !"}}, {"text": "State of Haryana", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 166017, "end_char": 166033, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "9M in their application to the State of Haryana by issuing the Punjab Minor Mineral Concession (Haryana First Amendment) Rules.1982 ori 6th December 1982 and substituted a new clause 16 in Form F .. ?-"}}, {"text": "clause 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 166162, "end_char": 166171, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mines Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 167902, "end_char": 167911, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Mines Rules 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 167925, "end_char": 167941, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "21st July 19.82", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 168542, "end_char": 168557, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We may, therefore, proteed on .the basis that the provisions of this Act becairie enforceable, if not from 2nd Ootobor 1980 at least from 21st July 19.82."}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 170014, "end_char": 170023, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State Migrant Workmen Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 170367, "end_char": 170392, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 170394, "end_char": 170403, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "State Migrant Workmen Act", "statute": "State Migrant Workmen Act"}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 170508, "end_char": 170517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "State Migrant Workmen Act", "statute": "State Migrant Workmen Act"}}, {"text": "Section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 171669, "end_char": 171678, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 172129, "end_char": 172139, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section\n\n12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 172141, "end_char": 172152, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State Migrant Workmen Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 172751, "end_char": 172778, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 172916, "end_char": 172926, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "State Migrant Workmen Rules", "statute": "State Migrant Workmen Rules"}}, {"text": "State migrant workman be paid less than the wges fixed under the Minimum Wages Act 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 173114, "end_char": 173201, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 173448, "end_char": 173458, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "State migrant workman be paid less than the wges fixed under the Minimum Wages Act 1948", "statute": "State migrant workman be paid less than the wges fixed under the Minimum Wages Act 1948"}}, {"text": "Section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 173782, "end_char": 173792, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "State migrant workman be paid less than the wges fixed under the Minimum Wages Act 1948", "statute": "State migrant workman be paid less than the wges fixed under the Minimum Wages Act 1948"}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 174161, "end_char": 174171, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "State migrant workman be paid less than the wges fixed under the Minimum Wages Act 1948", "statute": "State migrant workman be paid less than the wges fixed under the Minimum Wages Act 1948"}}, {"text": "Section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 174840, "end_char": 174850, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 175047, "end_char": 175057, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State Migrant Workmen Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 175790, "end_char": 175815, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "These are broadly the relevant provisions of the Inter-State Migrant Workmen Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 175900, "end_char": 175980, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Migrant Workmen Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 176002, "end_char": 176023, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Migrant Workmen Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 176111, "end_char": 176130, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Uttat Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 176423, "end_char": 176436, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Haryana and indeed It was clear from the Report of Dr.\n\nPatwardhan that inost of the workmen.employed in the stone quarries and stone crusheril come from Uttat Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Tamilnadu and Andhra Pradesh and there are only .a few' workmen from Haryana."}}, {"text": "Tamilnadu", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 176465, "end_char": 176474, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Haryana and indeed It was clear from the Report of Dr.\n\nPatwardhan that inost of the workmen.employed in the stone quarries and stone crusheril come from Uttat Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Tamilnadu and Andhra Pradesh and there are only .a few' workmen from Haryana."}}, {"text": "State Migrant Workmen Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 176881, "end_char": 176906, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "U; ion. of India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 177256, "end_char": 177272, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The U; ion."}}, {"text": "Subhashini", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 177317, "end_char": 177327, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of India in a submission filed on its behalf by Miss Subhashini has taken up the stand that the wor)cmen en';.ployed in the stone ."}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 177770, "end_char": 177784, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We would av: ordinarily been incliiied to accept this statinerit ·\n\nmade on behalf of the Union of India; but we find that, according to the Report.of Dr. Patwardhan, the modus operandi that i~ followed for the purpose of rcruitment of workmen is \"that the stone crusher owners or th.e lessees holders ask the thekedar or jamadar of the mine tb fetch people from various States to w()rk in the mines\" and some times \"the janiadar or thekedar COlljlIBUnicates."}}, {"text": "Patwar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 178415, "end_char": 178421, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MUKTI MORCHA v. UNiON (Bhagwati, J.) 121\n\nif what h.as been reported by Dr .. Patwar<lhan is true, ithere can be nu doubt that the workmen employed in the stone quarries and.", "canonical_name": "P.atwardhan"}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 178829, "end_char": 178838, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Di. Patwardhan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 180314, "end_char": 180328, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Report of Di."}}, {"text": "Inter-State Migrant Workmen Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 182123, "end_char": 182156, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 182218, "end_char": 182228, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Inter-State Migrant Workmen Rules", "statute": "Inter-State Migrant Workmen Rules"}}, {"text": "Compensation Act 1923", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 182302, "end_char": 182323, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Payment of Wages Act 1936", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 182329, "end_char": 182354, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "State Insurance Act 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 182372, "end_char": 182396, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Provisions Act, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 182444, "end_char": 182464, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Maternity Benefit Act 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 182475, "end_char": 182501, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 2(1)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 182904, "end_char": 182919, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Maternity Benefit Act 1961", "statute": "the Maternity Benefit Act 1961"}}, {"text": "Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 183354, "end_char": 183400, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Contract Labour Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 183443, "end_char": 183462, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 183800, "end_char": 183809, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Contract Labour Act", "statute": "Contract Labour Act"}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 183963, "end_char": 183972, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Contract Labour Act", "statute": "Contract Labour Act"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 184742, "end_char": 184751, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Then there are provisions in the Contract Labour Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 184982, "end_char": 185034, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sections 16 to 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 185185, "end_char": 185202, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Then there are provisions in the Contract Labour Act", "statute": "Then there are provisions in the Contract Labour Act"}}, {"text": "Section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 185315, "end_char": 185325, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Then there are provisions in the Contract Labour Act", "statute": "Then there are provisions in the Contract Labour Act"}}, {"text": "section 16, 17, 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 185383, "end_char": 185401, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Then there are provisions in the Contract Labour Act", "statute": "Then there are provisions in the Contract Labour Act"}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 185764, "end_char": 185774, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Then there are provisions in the Contract Labour Act", "statute": "Then there are provisions in the Contract Labour Act"}}, {"text": "Inter-State Migrant Workmen Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 186111, "end_char": 186142, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Contract Labour Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 186205, "end_char": 186224, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Rules made under the Contract Labour Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 186469, "end_char": 186509, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 16, 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 186919, "end_char": 186932, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Rules made under the Contract Labour Act", "statute": "Rules made under the Contract Labour Act"}}, {"text": "Mines Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 187868, "end_char": 187877, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Wages Act 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 188143, "end_char": 188157, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Mimmum Wags Act 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 188255, "end_char": 188275, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 192483, "end_char": 192493, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "25th Qctober 197 5", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 193330, "end_char": 193348, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The 'Act was brought into force through out the length and breadth of the country with effect• from 25th Qctober 197 5, which means that the."}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 193713, "end_char": 193722, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 195485, "end_char": 195494, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 195892, "end_char": 195901, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 196461, "end_char": 196470, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 196713, "end_char": 196722, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S0P", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 196990, "end_char": 196993, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 7 to 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 197081, "end_char": 197095, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 197730, "end_char": 197740, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 198466, "end_char": 198476, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 198844, "end_char": 198854, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of Har}ana", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 199180, "end_char": 199201, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to the Government of Har}ana there were not at any timeany bonded labourers.within its territories, but even .. so Vigilance Committees are required by Section 13 to be constituted because the function of theVigilarice Committee is to identify bonded , labourers, if there arc any, and 'to free , and rehabilitate them and it would not be right for the State 'Government riot to constitute Vigilrtce Committees on .the assumption that there .are rio bonded Jaboure1s at all."}}, {"text": "Section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 199325, "end_char": 199335, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of Il:aryana", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 199685, "end_char": 199708, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But ·;.,~ .are glad to find that the Government of Il:aryana has now costituted a Vigilance Committee in each District."}}, {"text": "Government pf Hacyana", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 199994, "end_char": 200015, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Committee: has been consthuted also in each sub-division of a District bu.t we\n\n' .. ;\n\n/. -\n\nBANDHUA MUKTI MORCHA v. UNION (Bhagwati,· J.) 129\n\nhave no doubt that the Government pf Hacyana will without any delay and at any rate within six' weeks from tcday constitue a Vigilance Committe.e in each sub-division and thus comply with the requirement of Section 13 of the Act."}}, {"text": "Section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 200178, "end_char": 200188, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 202836, "end_char": 202846, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 202854, "end_char": 202890, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 208990, "end_char": 209026, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Government of Haryana", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 209733, "end_char": 209754, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We would therefore direct the Government of Haryana and also suggest to the other State Qovernments,.tQ take st.eps to sensitise the officers .concerned with the implementation of the Act to this acute human problems and its."}}, {"text": "National 'Labour Institute", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 210913, "end_char": 210939, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These areas of concentration of bonded labour are mostly to be found in\n\nstonequarries, brick kilns and amongst agricultural landless labourers and such areas must be mapped out by each State Government and task forces should be assigned.for identification and release of bonded labour: Labour camp.s should be held periodicall~ in these areas with a view to educating the labourers and for this purpose, the assistance of the National 'Labour Institute may be taken, because the National Labour Institute has the requisite expertise and experience of holding such amps and it should be associated with."}}, {"text": "National Labour Institute", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 210966, "end_char": 210991, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These areas of concentration of bonded labour are mostly to be found in\n\nstonequarries, brick kilns and amongst agricultural landless labourers and such areas must be mapped out by each State Government and task forces should be assigned.for identification and release of bonded labour: Labour camp.s should be held periodicall~ in these areas with a view to educating the labourers and for this purpose, the assistance of the National 'Labour Institute may be taken, because the National Labour Institute has the requisite expertise and experience of holding such amps and it should be associated with."}}, {"text": "Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 212429, "end_char": 212465, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 212539, "end_char": 212575, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Government of ..Haryana", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 215501, "end_char": 215524, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We would therefore direct the Government of ..Haryana to draw up a scheme."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 215710, "end_char": 215729, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "tho above guidelines set out b¥ the Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Labour in his letter dated 2nd September 1982."}}, {"text": "2nd September 1982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 215770, "end_char": 215788, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "tho above guidelines set out b¥ the Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Labour in his letter dated 2nd September 1982."}}, {"text": "Ashok\n\nSrivastava", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 216352, "end_char": 216369, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Report of Mfs Ashok\n\nSrivastava and Ashok Panda shows that, according to the statements given by some of the workers, they were not allowe<l to leave the\" stone quarries and were providing forced labour and this Report also stated that severlil persons working in the Ghodholwr and Lakarpur stone quarries were forcibly kept by the contractors and they wre not allowed to move out of their places and were bonded labourers.", "canonical_name": "Asliok Srivastava"}}, {"text": "24th August 1982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 216840, "end_char": 216856, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of workers on 24th August 1982, each of them stating that he is under heavy."}}, {"text": "Faridabad Distriet", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 217691, "end_char": 217709, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is necessary to direct a further inquiry for the purpose of ascertaining whether any of.the labourers working in the stonequarries and stone crushers in Faridabad Distriet are bonded labourers fa the."}}, {"text": "Laxmi Dhar Misra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 217826, "end_char": 217842, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "therefore direct Sb:1i Laxmi Dhar Misra,, Joint Secretary in the.", "canonical_name": "Laxmi. Dhar Misra"}}, {"text": "Ministry. of Labour, Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 217869, "end_char": 217909, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ministry."}}, {"text": "District Magistrate of Faridabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 218925, "end_char": 218957, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "go back to their homes and if they want to go back, the District Magistrate of Faridabad will on."}}, {"text": "Laxmi Dhar Misra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 219002, "end_char": 219018, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "receipt of the statement from Shri Laxmi Dhar Misra, make necessary arrangements for releasing them and provide for .their trarlsportation back to their hromes and for thio purpose the State Government shall make the requisite funds\n\n• •\n\n.", "canonical_name": "Laxmi. Dhar Misra"}}, {"text": "Laxmi Dhar Misra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 219314, "end_char": 219330, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Laxmi Dhar Misra .will also enquire from the mine-lessees and owners of stne crushers as also from the thekedar or jamadar whether there are any advances made by them to the labourers working in the stone quarry or.", "canonical_name": "Laxmi. Dhar Misra"}}, {"text": "Minimum Wages Act 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 220957, "end_char": 220979, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Minimum Wages Act 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 221465, "end_char": 221487, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Milles Vocational Training Rules 1966", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 222173, "end_char": 222210, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Central Board of Workers Education", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 225670, "end_char": 225704, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have fortunately in.our country the Central Board of Workers Education which is entrusted with the function of educating workers in their rights and entitlements and we would therefore direct the Central Board of Workers Education to organise periodic camps near the sites of stone quarries and stone crushers in Faridabad District for the purpose of creating awareness amongst the workmen about the rights and benefits conferred upon them by social welfare laws."}}, {"text": "28th February, 1984", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 227606, "end_char": 227625, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This direction shall be carried out by the Central Government and the State of Haryana in respect of each stone crusher in thir Faridabad .District and a compliance report shall be made to this Col!rt on or before 28th February, 1984. -. _"}}, {"text": "So far as the provisions of the Contract Labour Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 227633, "end_char": 227684, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State Migrant Workmen Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 227760, "end_char": 227785, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Migrant Workmen Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 229107, "end_char": 229126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "15th February 1984", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 229208, "end_char": 229226, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to that effect to the Court ou or before 15th February 1984."}}, {"text": "Ashok Sr'vastava", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 230167, "end_char": 230183, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Report of M/s Ashok Sr'vastava and Ashk G .,", "canonical_name": "Asliok Srivastava"}}, {"text": "Ashk G .", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 230188, "end_char": 230196, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Report of M/s Ashok Sr'vastava and Ashk G .,"}}, {"text": "Gurukul", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 230544, "end_char": 230551, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The same situation also prevails in the mine H in the Gurukul area as also in the Anangpur mines and in these mines\n\n140 SUPREME COURT REPOR:rs [l 9'84 J 2 s.c."}}, {"text": "Lakarpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 230921, "end_char": 230929, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is true that in the low.er reaches of Lakarpur near the road there is a tubewell from which the workmen get water but that is only when they are permitted to do so by the persons operting."}}, {"text": "section 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 231804, "end_char": 231814, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mines Act 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 231822, "end_char": 231836, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Faridabad Comnlex", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 235005, "end_char": 235022, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Chief Administrator, Faridabad Comnlex is directed to set\" up the points from where the mine-lessees and st0ne crusher owners can, if necessary, cbtain supply ."}}, {"text": "28th February 1984", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 235587, "end_char": 235605, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to the Court on or before 28th February 1984. ·"}}, {"text": "Section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 235746, "end_char": 235756, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mines Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 235764, "end_char": 235773, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Rules 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 236416, "end_char": 236426, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "atwardhan", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 236762, "end_char": 236771, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "provided in or near such latrines ' +\n\nand if piped water supply is not available; then a sufficient quantity\n\n• of water shall be hept stored in suitable receptacles near such latrines The Report of Dr. l>atwardhan sli.ows that there is not a trace of 1uch conservancy facilities in any of the stone quarries and the • 'vat open mountain dug-up without a thought as to environment is used by men and women and children as one huge open latrine\" where the ' ' only privacy is that provided by the \"curtain drawn by the turned."}}, {"text": "Section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 237492, "end_char": 237502, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mines Act 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 237510, "end_char": 237524, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Laxm; Dhar Misra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 237997, "end_char": 238013, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Laxmi Dhar Misra will, while making his inquiry, ascertain whether the mine-lessees and owners of stone crushers in each of the stone quarrie, s and stone crush<rs visit<d by him have complied with this direction and a Report in that behalf shall be submitted by Shri Laxm; Dhar Misra on or before 28.th February, 1984. .", "canonical_name": "Laxmi. Dhar Misra"}}, {"text": "28.th February, 1984", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 238027, "end_char": 238047, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Laxmi Dhar Misra will, while making his inquiry, ascertain whether the mine-lessees and owners of stone crushers in each of the stone quarrie, s and stone crush<rs visit<d by him have complied with this direction and a Report in that behalf shall be submitted by Shri Laxm; Dhar Misra on or before 28.th February, 1984. ."}}, {"text": "J)r. Patwardhan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 238214, "end_char": 238229, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Report of J)r."}}, {"text": "Mines Rules 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 238600, "end_char": 238616, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Centra I Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 238750, "end_char": 238769, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We would therefore direct the Centra I Government as also the State Government to take steps t.o immediately ensure that proper and .adequate medical ayd first aid facilities as required by Section 21 of the Mines Act 1952 and Rules 40 to 45A of the Mines Rules 1955."}}, {"text": "Section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 238910, "end_char": 238920, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Mines Rules 1955", "statute": "the Mines Rules 1955"}}, {"text": "Mines Act 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 238928, "end_char": 238942, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Mines Rules 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 238970, "end_char": 238986, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Maternity Benefit Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 240994, "end_char": 241021, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Mines Creche Rules, 1966", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 241084, "end_char": 241108, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Laxmi. Dhar Misra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 241354, "end_char": 241371, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These directions given by us shall also be carr'ed out at the earliest without any undue delay and Shri Laxmi.", "canonical_name": "Laxmi. Dhar Misra"}}, {"text": "Mines Act 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 241781, "end_char": 241795, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Compensation Act 1923", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 242406, "end_char": 242427, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "C.entral Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 243754, "end_char": 243773, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Inspecting Officers of the C.entral Government as also of the State Government will visit each stone quarry or stone crusher at least once in a fortnight and ascertain whether there."}}, {"text": "Central Goyernment", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 244395, "end_char": 244413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have given these directions to the Central Government and th~ State of Haryana and we expect the Central Goyernment and the State of Haryana' to strictly comply with the.se directions . .."}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": 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purpose of ensuring implementation of the provisions of the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976. }- '"}}, {"text": "Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 248425, "end_char": 248467, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Governmel of Haryana", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 248483, "end_char": 248503, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(4) The Governmel of Haryana ;,, ill draw up within a period of three months from today a scheme cir programme-for rchallilitation of the freed bonded labourers in the light of the guidelines set out by the Secretary to.", "canonical_name": "Government of Haryana"}}, {"text": "Government of Hpiyana", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 248888, "end_char": 248909, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(5) The Central Government and the Government of Hpiyana\n\nwill take all necessary steps for the purpose of' ensuring 'that -minilt\\Um wages are paid to the workmen employfd , l.._ .in the stOiie quarries and stone crushers in accordance"}}, {"text": "Central Governinent", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 249854, "end_char": 249873, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(7) The Central Governinent will direct the inspecting officers\n\n'\" •\nj -f '\n\n...\n\n.· (", "canonical_name": "Central Governmertt.•and the"}}, {"text": "Centi-al Government", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 250582, "end_char": 250601, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Centi-al Government and.", "canonical_name": "Central Governmertt.•and the"}}, {"text": "Cenlrnl Board of Workers Education", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 251074, "end_char": 251108, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(9) The Cenlrnl Board of Workers Education wili organise\n\npricdic can1ps nca1' the sites."}}, {"text": "Central Board of Workers EducatiOn", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 251405, "end_char": 251439, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of cne qUariics rind stcnc crushers 'in Faridabad' district for the purpose of educatirg the \\Vorkn1en in the rights and benefits conferred upon thern by social welfare and labour laws and .!he progress\n\nmade shall be reported to this Cotirt by the Central Board of Workers EducatiOn at lcnt once in thtec n1cnths ."}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 251483, "end_char": 251501, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Central Government ard the Government of Haryana \\vill im1nediat.ely take stps for the purpcse of ensuring that the stone cruShcr O\\vners d9 not coiitinue to foul .", "canonical_name": "Central Governmertt.•and the"}}, {"text": "Central Governn1cnt and the Governn1cnt of Haryana", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 252002, "end_char": 252052, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "( 11) The Central Governn1cnt and the Governn1cnt of Haryana ,\n\n\\ill imm, ediately ensur~ t~1t the\n\n1 n1ine lessees and stoe cruShcr owi1ers start .supplyi-ng pu-re drinkin-g water to the Wurkmen on a scale Of at least 2 litres for every wcrk- -·\n\nA ..\n\nE\n\n(12)\n\nSUPREME COURT REP0RTS ."}}, {"text": "Central Governmertt.•and the", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 252698, "end_char": 252726, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Central Governmertt.•and the Government of Haryan~ will ensure that minimi1m wage is paid to the wmen and/or\n\nchildrn who look after the vessels in whicb pure drinking\n\n~ . . ' '", "canonical_name": "Central Governmertt.•and the"}}, {"text": "Mines Rules 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 253745, "end_char": 253761, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 253991, "end_char": 254001, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Mines Rules 1955", "statute": "the Mines Rules 1955"}}, {"text": "Miries Act 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 254010, "end_char": 254025, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Mines Vocational Training Rules 1966", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 254427, "end_char": 254463, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Benefit Act 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 255296, "end_char": 255312, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Mines Creche Rules 1966", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 255375, "end_char": 255398, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Central -Government and", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 256680, "end_char": 256703, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1984) 2S.C.R\n\n.(21)  lf the Central -Government and the Government of Haryana fail to ensure performance of any of."}}, {"text": "Ministry of Labour, Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 257161, "end_char": 257200, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Laxmi Dhar Misra, Joint Secretary w1 the Ministry of Labour, Government of India as a. (,; ommission\"er for the _purpose f carrying out the following assignment ."}}, {"text": "Laxmi Dhar. Misra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 258093, "end_char": 258110, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the District Magistrate will, on receipt of the particulars from Shri Laxmi Dhar.", "canonical_name": "Laxmi. Dhar Misra"}}, {"text": "faridabad District", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 259361, "end_char": 259379, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "an inquiry in each of the stone quarries and stonecr.ushers in faridabad District for th_c purpose of ascertaining whether there are any contract labourers or inter-State migrant workmen in any of these stone."}}, {"text": "Laxrrii Dhar Misra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 261421, "end_char": 261439, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If Shri Laxrrii Dhar Misra finds it necessary,· he may request the Court to extend the time for submitting his report by addfessing a letter to the Registry ."}}, {"text": "State of Ilaryana", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 261591, "end_char": 261608, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Ilaryana will deposit a sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "PATBAK", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 262277, "end_char": 262283, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PATBAK, J. I have.", "canonical_name": "PATHAK"}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 262340, "end_char": 262348, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "read the judgmei1ts prepared by my brothers Bhagwati and A.N. Sen, and while I agree with.", "canonical_name": "BHAGWAl'I"}}, {"text": "A.N. Sen", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 262353, "end_char": 262361, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "read the judgmei1ts prepared by my brothers Bhagwati and A.N. Sen, and while I agree with.", "canonical_name": "A.N. Sen"}}, {"text": "United States", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 262882, "end_char": 262895, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jn tlie United States, ."}}, {"text": "Next_ Horizon", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 263687, "end_char": 263700, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Next_ Horizon, Anierican r- Ass(;>ci?tion )ournal. )§"}}, {"text": "BANDHUA MIJKTI MORCH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 263814, "end_char": 263834, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "( -j\n'\n... '\n\n...\n\nBANDHUA MIJKTI MORCH,;.", "canonical_name": "BANDH\\JA MUKTI MORCHA V"}}, {"text": "Leon Duguit", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 267303, "end_char": 267314, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In his Law in the Modern State, Leon Duguit observed : \"Any system of publ.ic law can be vital only so far as it is based on a given sanction."}}, {"text": "UQited", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 267767, "end_char": 267773, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the UQited States, the Warren Court achieved a remarkable degree ."}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 273686, "end_char": 273696, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 274239, "end_char": 274249, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 274551, "end_char": 274561, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 274703, "end_char": 274713, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 275445, "end_char": 275455, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "IlANDHUA MUKTI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 280733, "end_char": 280747, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "IlANDHUA MUKTI 1'{0RCHA v. UNION (PDt!wk, J.) 159\n\naggregate of individual Judges,.", "canonical_name": "BANDH\\JA MUKTI MORCHA V"}}, {"text": "United · States", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 281307, "end_char": 281322, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During the .regime of the Warran Court in the United · States, it proceeded to the point."}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 287018, "end_char": 287028, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "S.C.R.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 289418, "end_char": 289424, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.C.R. ·\n\nthe true limits of its jurisdiction and,'having done so, it should take care."}}, {"text": "Archicald Cox", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 296472, "end_char": 296485, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In his perceptive Lectures entitled \"The Warren Court: Constitutional Decision as an Instrument of Reform\"''' Professor Archicald Cox .pointedly observes .: ."}}, {"text": "Article 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 299881, "end_char": 299891, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 300098, "end_char": 300108, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "P.atwardhan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 300375, "end_char": 300386, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984] 2 s:c.R,\n\n.C, f the material consisting of'the repo; t of the two advocates and of\n\nDr. P.atwardhan appointed as Commissioners.", "canonical_name": "P.atwardhan"}}, {"text": "Jrother Bhagwati", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 301403, "end_char": 301419, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ln the merits of.the case I find myself in agreement with my )Jrother Bhagwati, .both in regard to ·:the operation of the various\n\nstatuts as."}}, {"text": "AMARENDRA NATH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 301963, "end_char": 301977, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "AMARENDRA NATH 'SEN, J .. The' relevant facts .have .been fully."}}, {"text": "K. L. Bhagat", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 302282, "end_char": 302294, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was raised by Shri K. L. Bhagat, Additional Solicitor General of India and also by Shri Phadke, learned counsel appe.aring on behalf of the respondents, as to the ma.intainability of the present petition.", "canonical_name": "K. L. Bhagat"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 302585, "end_char": 302592, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 303051, "end_char": 303058, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 303329, "end_char": 303336, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 304801, "end_char": 304808, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 305084, "end_char": 305091, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 306810, "end_char": 306817, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 307029, "end_char": 307036, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 307352, "end_char": 307359, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "aANDHUA MUK.Ti MORCHA V. UNION", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 307973, "end_char": 308003, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~.·\n\n...\n\naANDHUA MUK.Ti MORCHA V. UNION (A.N. Sen, J.)\n\nJ69\n\nany other court to exercise within t!ie .local limits of its jurisdiction all or aµy of the powers exercisable by tlie Supreme Court under clause (2)."}}, {"text": "A.N. Sen", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 308005, "end_char": 308013, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~.·\n\n...\n\naANDHUA MUK.Ti MORCHA V. UNION (A.N. Sen, J.)\n\nJ69\n\nany other court to exercise within t!ie .local limits of its jurisdiction all or aµy of the powers exercisable by tlie Supreme Court under clause (2).", "canonical_name": "A.N. Sen"}}, {"text": "Art. 32(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 308301, "end_char": 308311, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 308455, "end_char": 308465, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 308769, "end_char": 308776, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 309275, "end_char": 309282, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 309338, "end_char": 309348, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 309649, "end_char": 309656, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 309829, "end_char": 309839, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 310208, "end_char": 310215, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Order XXXV of the Supreme Court Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 310510, "end_char": 310547, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 310660, "end_char": 310667, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Order XXXV of the Supreme Court Rules", "statute": "Order XXXV of the 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{"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 313109, "end_char": 313115, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 313462, "end_char": 313469, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 313892, "end_char": 313899, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 314358, "end_char": 314361, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 315029, "end_char": 315036, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 315281, "end_char": 315288, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 316885, "end_char": 316892, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 316978, "end_char": 316985, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 318971, "end_char": 318978, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 320615, "end_char": 320622, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 320846, "end_char": 320853, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 321201, "end_char": 321208, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 321267, "end_char": 321294, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 321525, "end_char": 321532, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 321878, "end_char": 321885, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "broter Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 324791, "end_char": 324806, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The vie, vs expressed by my learned broter Bhagwati, J. in his judgment, to my mind, do not amount to any adjudication on the question nf appl\\cabiliiy of the Inter Siate Migrant Workmen (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) ."}}, {"text": ".Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 325727, "end_char": 325736, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As I am 'in agreement wit.h the vie\\Ys expressed bv my learned Brother .Bhagwati, J. I do not propose .", "canonical_name": "BHAGWAl'I"}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_2_693_702_EN", "year": 1984, "text": ".. \\\n\n. H.D. VORA\n\n' ,1 STATE OF MAHARASflTRA & ORS.\n\nFebruaj'y 22,. 1984 . . .· ....\n\n( [ P.N': BHAGWATI AND SABYASACHI MmcHARJI, JJ.) ,\n\n!)--~..,;.- Coi1fifution'ojlndia 1950. Artic/eJl (2) &Seventh SChedtile, List Ill f, lltrY ~2.\n\nAcquisition and 'requisition of proPerty-Dijferences-Wh.fll a1e.\n\n. Power character ....\n\nof r\"equi.itioh!.___WJ,;,, e.l.:erf'i.\\'rlb!C'-Fo~· a' public purpose of trat1Jito1; y\n\n' ,__.._ iJ01nbaY land R_eq:tisition. Act 194? sect/on.6(_4)(a)-'-Requis_ition Of residntial /lat-Whether ~:ould conti.'1;1e'for a'I indefinite peririd.....:.-Tcnant payig rent (11rectfv ./o\n\nlandlord-Tenant whether hecoi11e4 direct tenant of. lan.d/ord-Whether feqtdsllion A._.;..order should set out explicitly lhe public-purpoSe . . \\' Prl:ictice and Procedure:. Writ Peition.::....Challenging Order of re-i}Uis1tio11 offiai after a lpse of thii-ty., yearS-Whether maintainable.·. . . , ' '-'\n\nThe appellant applied to.the Accomnlodation Depaitrnent of the Staie- Govern~ n1ent for allotment of a flai. -The Sta\"te Governmentt urned down. the request but. iequisitioned the flat bYa~ order dated 9th April: 195:1, under cluse (a) r ; ubsection ( 4) of section 6 of the Bombay Lnci Requisition. Act, 19~8: Thi~ ordef of requsi~ .tion: did not set out the pu'blic. purpose for which the flat was_ reQuiSitiont!d. The_\n\nA\"lsistant Controller ofAcconimodatiori by an Order dated 25th April, 1951 allotted . . . ' / ' . . the requisitiorid flat to the apPellant who e; ntered into Occupation and paid rent to the land!ady from time \"to tim~_ but as he w.?s irregular and- comfnitted1 s_evcral \\ defaults the Controller .of AccoinmodatiOTI sought. to terminate the atiotment. /\n\n. ·._: . , The 3rd repndent, on 3d!h May, }973 purchased .the: .buQding. in which the\n\n~-equ1sition'ed \"flat was situated, and reuested thC State' Govcr~M\\nt '16 de-:rcquisi- . ' ' . ' .. . . ' . . .! ' . ..\n\nA .\n\n' ' • c\n\n' '\n\nH . '\n\n, .\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1984) 2 S.C.R. ' • A ( tion .the ftat, as the aHotinent of tfie\" fiat in favour of the appellant could not be sid\n\nta bC for a• .PubliC purpose~ .. The State Govornn1enf did not pay any heed t~ this . request.\n\n-The 3rd respondent, thereupon filed a \\Vrit Petition in the Hjgh Court chaUengii:ig the validity of the order or .requisition, Contending that it. could not survfyf _for such a longperiOct 9.f time ahd that the Stilte Go~rnment Was lherefore1' bpund t.o de-requisition the flat. The High Court allowed the Writ Petition arid directed the State Goveh1mcnt and the Controller of Accon1modation to de-r0Qui1i- rion the flat, take steps. to evict the appellant, ilnd hand oYer vac:lnt pos!cssion.\n\nIn ap1eal this caurt, it was contended inter alia on behalf of the appe1lant-- ·, oonant. that even if the order of requisition was inYalid as having been made foi;:a purpose Other thf_ln a public purpose, the \"3rd.respondent was not cntillcd to challen1e the order of requisition after a lapse of ove~· 30 years and that the Wit Petition should. haVc been dismissed by the Hig~ Court.\n\nDistnissing the Appeal,\n\n- ... - . 1-.IELD ;, l. The order .Qf rt<l-uisitioti c?ven if it was valid when made, ceased to . '\n\nbe v<ilid and effective after expiration of a reasonable priod of ti1:11e What period of ...>\n\ntime must be _regarded as -reasonable for the continuahce of an order-of\n\ntiofl depends on the htcts alld circu1nstances ot each case. [700 H]\n\nroquisi-\n\nIn the inStant case, the or.der of requisition was made as far back as 9th April 1951 a-ndcvcn if it was made for ):iousing a homeless pefson,,· arid .. the appellant at that tin1e;.fc!I \\Vi thin that category, if cannot be alloVired to 'continue. for such an inordin:tcly long: pcrio.d as thirty years. [700 G] . .-- \"\"'\n\n' 2.\n\nRequisitioning 1nust be made for a public purpo11e • .11.nd 10 lona 'aa iktr• is a public purpose for hich an order of rcquisitiOn is made, it would b1 vaiid irresp.cciive of whether such public purpose is recited in the o; der of fequisition or not. But if the order is cha!lang\"d• the State Goyernment would. have to aati1fy the Court by placing the necessary.facts. sho\":ing tbti pubic P\\l}pose for which thr: erder of requiition. was 1nadc. [69'8 B, G]\n\n3. There is a basic and funda1ncntal distinction reco&nised by law betw_eea requisition and acquisition. The Constitution itself in Entry 42 of List III of S1voatR Schedule maltesa dis_tinction ehveen acquisition and requisitioning of ;, Property, The origirial rticle 31 clause (2) of tc Constitution also rccoa:nis~ this distincties.\n\n. .\n\n' .\n\nH.D. VORA v. MAHARASHTRA 695.\n\nbetween con1pulsory acquisition and requisition -of p_roperty. The_ two conct-pts,\n\n/ A.\n\no-e ofrcquisition and the other or\"acquisitidn arc tt)_tally 'Ji~1inct aild independent. 4'\n\nAquisiting 111eans the aCquiring of the Cntire title ofThcrXpropriatcd owner wliaf-\" ever the ..:Jature. and extent of that title m<ly b'c:, Thc entire bundle of riSliiS which .was vested in the original holder passes on acquisition to the acquircr leaving nothing\n\ntO the forn1er. The concept of acquisition aS an air of per'n1anenoe and finality in . ·•\n\nihat there .is a tran~, ference of the title of the original_.holder to the acqui-rig _autho-_ rity. But the conCept of requisitiOn involves n1crc!y _taking of '.'do1n:iin or control\n\n0 _ver propertY without acquiring rights of owncrslip\" and n1us.1.by itsscry na_turc\n\nbe of tempo'rary duration. [699 .F-H] .; 7\n\n4. If the Govern111ent wants to f.ak.I'; over the propcrt.J' fo'r an iJ::1dcfinite period of time, the Govcrnmen.t mUst acquire' tiJ.e,_proPcrly but 'it cannot use fhe pwer. -of\n\nrequiSition foi achiCvillg tha.t objCct.. The power.Of rquisiiio_n is cxcrciscble by tile Government onJy_ for a Public' purpose which is of~ a tntnsitory ~.character .. lf the' public purpose for \\Vhich the -preinises a re required is of a perennial or permancnt\n\ncharacte~.fron1 th~ very incepti.on, no order can. be pas.Sect r.cciuisition.ing the premises and in such a case the order of requisition, if passed. would a fraud upon the\n\n.statute. \\Vhat ever be'th.e Public pu\"rpose for which\"\"an order of reqllisition ffiade, it.\n\nD Is by its vefy nature 'temporary in ch<i racter.'an~·· it cannot ndure for _an .. ind..:finite period of time .. The period of tin1e .for Which an Order of requisition n1ay be conti- .nued ca'nnot be:an unreasonably long period Sch as thirty yars' a1id t must therefoJ~C\n\nbe held, that. the order of requisition, cVcn: \"if .la lid when 1nade, ceased to bC valid and effective. The Writ , Petition ch<ii!engin& the order of requisition after a. Iaps'e of over thirty years was therefore ri1aintainable. [700 C-F, 101 A]\n\n5. The a~·llant Was an alottee of the flat une_r t~1~ order of reuisiorl. and he was liable to pay con1pensation for the use and occL1pation of the fla't to the State Govetnment and the State-Governnient, \\Vas in -its turn liable to pay con1pensatioll for the requisitioning of thC flat._ Jf, instead of. the appellant payillg .. olnpensation tO the State Governent and, the Stat~ Goycrnn1cnt nuking payn1.cnt of an identical amount to. the _owner, the appeJlni paid directl.Y tO. the oWner with the -exprcs-s r imP.:liCd assnt of the State aovernmeni; the order of:reqisition could oi cease\n\nto _be valid and effective •. It did nOt rliattr whether the appellant .described the. amount pa.id by hi1n to the ownef as rent, because whatevet was.do11e by hin1 was uuder the ordC:r, of ret}Uisitjon and So Jong as the order Of requisition sto\"od,. hiS posessio~ of the flat Was attfibutable OnlY to the Order of .rcquiSitioi1 and.nO payment of an.amount' described as rent could possible alter the nature of hi~ occ\\lpatioll of the flat or make-in1 a tenant in respeC.t of th~.flt. 1701 F-H]\n\nState of.Bo111bay v. -Bhanji Munj1 & Anr.·(1955] case [1950] S.C.R. 869; referred to.\n\nS.C.R. -777; Chiranf; ttal's\n\n696 SUPREME (, QURT REPORTii\n\n(1984] . 2 S.C:..R. ....._\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE )uRISDICTION : Civil Appeal. No. 1212 of.1984. , '\n\n' Appeai by Special leave.lro~ the Judgment and order dated .th\\ 20th October, 1983 of the Bombay High Court in W0 Appeal . No. 779 of 1983. ·\n\nP.R. Mridu!, G. l'ishwanath & Par(iat Sinha, for the Appllan1.\n\nRam Jethma/ani & Soli J. Sorahjee, M.N. Shroff. Ta/egankar &: B. v. Desai, for the Respondents. ·\n\nThe Judgi11ent of the Court was delivered bv\n\nBHAGwATi, .J. Special Leave Granted.·\n\n/ This appeal by pecial leave raises a short.question of la;_; as to whether an order of requisition of premises can be continued for an indefinite period of tinte ot it must necessarily be f temporary duration. The facts giving rise to this. appeal are few' and may be b; iefly stated as follows : . . . . . . \\\n\n.One Rukmanibai was the owner of a building bearing .House 1 \\ No. '65, Police Station Road,. Ville Parle West, Bombay. The ground floor of this building comprised of a flat wliih was in the\n\n; . ' ' - . occupation of one N.C. Shah as a tenant and since N.C. Shah•was going. to vacate the flat, Rukmanibai gave intimatiqh of the proposed 'yacanc)' to the State Government and requested the State 'Government to allot the premises to the appellant who was., h'er nearest relative. The appellant also addressed' a letter dated 12th' March 1951 to the Chief.Officer of the Accommodation Department of the Government of Bombay requesting that 'he should be allotted the .fiat which was going to . be vacated by N.C. Shah. It appears however that the tequest of the appeallant was turned down by the , State Government and ultimately the fiat was requisitioned by an ' . . \\ ' . ' -... order dated 9th Apt.ii 1951 made by the State Government in exer- .\n\nT= ..\n\nI ..,\n\n. '\n\n:. ..\n\nJ ' ' '\n\n697 H.D: VORA V'. MAHARASHTRA (Bhagwati, J.)\n\n. . ' I ' . icise of the.powers co.nferred uder clause (a) or sub-section (4) of\n\nsection ().of the Bombay Land Requisition Act.·· 1948. This order i of reqisition did. not set out the public purpose for which the fiat . was .'.requisitioned.\" Now curiously enough, though it was decided by the State Government not io. ailot the fiat to the appellant and his application. for al!otment was spe.cifically rejected, the Assistant ; Contr01lerof Accommodation possed an order on 25th April 1951 . alloting the..._.req1lisit.ioned 'fiat to the appcllnt and pursuant to the\n\nord•'r of aJlotm0 nt, the appellat entred 'into occupation of the fiat.\n\nThe appellant thereafter\"' paid rent to Rukmanibai from time to . ____..--. time but the payinent \"of rent wes very irregular and .the appellat\n\n. committed sever~] defaults . in: payment of refit with the result that not Jess than seven orders had to be passed _by the Accommodation Department of \"the Government {)f Bombay ctifetting the appellant . ·.to vacate the.flat beca.use his chronic defaults. Uitimatcly, however, each time no . action for evidion was taken by .th_e .Controller of Acconlinod?tion. presumably bepuse the appeJtant must haye paid· up the rent. It is significant t6 note that in the year 1964 the . ·: .appel!ent: requested tlie Controller of-Accommodation to defequistion.\n\nthe fiat and f~ allow him to become direct tenant.of Rukmani Bai but .his applicati, on was rejected. by letter dated 25th Ma_rch 1964 . . The appeliant also thereafter i~ •. the year .J 979 applied to the.\n\nController of Accommodation f,)r sa.nction .. to erect a kitchen platform ii) the fiat put this appli\\:ation was turned down by a letter dated 20th March 1979. addressed by the Controller of Accommoda- . tion. The appe!Jant throughout. this period contiued to occupy the\n\nA...,/. - fiat as an allottec under the orde.r of requisition , and paid. rent to\n\nRuk]llanibai frpm time io. time, though i\"regulary. '\\\n\nThe building in .which the requisitioned fia!.ws ituate, was purchased by the 3rd fespondent froln Rnkmanibai on 30th May.\n\n1973. 'fhe 3rd-respondent, after purchase of the building,· reguested the State .Government to derec(Uisition the fiat - \"inas111uch as _;, the attotment of the. fiat in .. favour of the appellant -could not be for a public' purpose. .The \"S.ta te Government diif not pay any heel! to this request of the ,3rd respondent with the result, tha.t tbe .\n\n3rd re&pondent was constrained io 'file writ petition Np. 1210. of.\n\n1980 in the High Co11rt of Bombay challenging the validity qf the order of requisition ald co1tlellding that it cOld- Iloi \"surviv~ for such a. long period of time and .the State Government was\n\nthrefore bound. to derequis.ilion the fiat. ·\n\n, E\n\n. , . 698' SUPREME COURT RErOl\\TS\n\n. [1984] 2 S.C.R.\n\nOne of the grounds on' which the validity o(tpe order of requisition was challenged ws that the order of requisition. did not set out the public purpose for which it was made, This ground of chalien'ge was negatived .by the Hih Cort and, .in our opinion, rightly, because it is not necessary that the orcter of requisition must explicitly set out the public purpose for which it is made, The only requirement of the law is that the i;.equisitioning must . • be made• for a public purpose and: so long as there is a public purpose for which an order of requisition, is made, it would be _valid irrespective whether such public purpose is recited in the order of requisition or not It bas, ip fact, been Sp held by this Court in State ofBombay v. Bhanji Munji & A.nr. <1> where Bose, J. speaking on behalf, of the Court pbserveq : '\n\n/ , \"In our opinion, it is not necessary to set out the purpose of the requisition in the. order. The desirability' of such a course is obvious because when it is n.ot done, proof of \\he purpose must be given in other ways and' that exposes the authorities to the kind of charges we find here and to the danger that the courts will consider them well founded. But in. itself an omission to set out the purpose in the order is not fatal so long as the facts are established to the satisfaction Of the court in some other way.\" . - ,\n\n- . /--·\n\nThe order of requisition could n~ therefore be successfully . . J attacked on the ground that it did not set out the public purpose for which it was, made, But as pointed out by Bose, J. in the above dassagc quoted from this iddgment in Bhanji Munji's case (supra), the State Government would have to show ihat the order of requisition was made for a public purpose andAhe necessary facts showii1g. the public purpose for which the order of requisition was made would ' have to be established by the State Government to the satisfaction of the court. The High Court held ill' the present case that no material was placed' before it to. s.ho, w what was the public purpose for which the order of requisition was made and in fact, theQ' was no denial on the. part of the State Governme, nt or the appella'ht of the averment made on behalf of the 3rd. respondent that the appellant was neither a government servant nor a homeless.person. This view taken. by the High Court appears to be well-lounded and it is J\\Ot ..\n\n\nJ<• '.,\n\n··\"'\"\n\n. I\n\nH.p. VORA v, MAHARASHTRA (Bhagwati, J.)_ 699\n\n'possi~ to hold on the material placed_ before us that the order of\n\nrequisition was made for a public purpose.\n\nBut it was contended on behalf of the appellant that even ·• if the order of requisition was invalid as having lieen made for a purpose oti1or than a pitbliC pu.rpose, the 3rd responileni was not ' entitled to challenge the. same aftet-a lapse of over _30 years and the writ petitio•1 should therefore have been dismissed by the Higl1 Court.· Now if the only , ground. on which the order .of requisition was challenged. in the. writ petition was that it was not. made for a public purpose and was therefore void; perhaps it might have .been possible to successfully repel this ground of challenge by raising an olojection that the High Court Shouk\\. not have entertaiaed the writ petition Ghallenging the order of requisition \"aftet a lapse of over 30\n\nyears. But we find that there fa also another ground of challenge urged on .behalf of the 3rd respondent.and that is a' very formidable , ground to which there is no answer, The argument urged under' this ground of challenge wits that'-'tn order of ', requisition is by jts very nature temporary in character anq it 'cannot endure for 'an\n\nii1definite period Of tim'e. and the Orderof }eqisition in the .present case therefore ceased to b~ valid and .effective after the expiration of a reasonable per.ad of time and that it could not, under any_ circumstance~, conti11ue for a period of about 3u years and hencf it was liable to be quashed and set aside or in any event the State Govern- . \\ . ment was bound to revoke \"the .same and to_ dereqilisition the flat.\n\nThis Contention has, in our opinion, great fo_r,; e and must be sustained.\n\nThere is a -basic and fundamental distinction, recognised by .law.\n\nbetwen r,:; quis.ition and acquisitinn_. The Consqtution itself in Entry\n\n42 '.of List !fl of the Seventh Schedule makes a distinction between. acquisition and requisitioning of property. The original Article 31.\n\nF clause (2) cif the ., Constitution also recognised 'this distihction _between . Compuisory acquisition and. requisitioning of pri, peity. The two concfepts, one of requisition and the other of acquisition are totally :c', istiric\\ and independent. Acquisition.., means , the. acquiri1ig ' '· \" , . of the entire title of the expropri 1ated owner \\Vhatever u1? nature anct· .,. • extent of that title inay be .. The entire bundle' of rights which was G vested ii1 the original llolder passes on acquisition to the acquirer leaving nothing to the former. Vide : Observations of Mukherjee, J. in Chiranjitla/'s.case. The c01icept' of acquisition has an aif of permanence -and finality in thO:t there is tra; osference of the title. of ' tl1e original holder to. the acquiring authority. But the concept of\n\n H ;.requisition involves merely taki.n'g of '.'domain or control over pro-' \"\" '\\ , • \\. . ' .\n\n- .\n\nI •\n\n, 700 [1984j 2. S.C R ..\n\nSUPRE\\fF.\n\nCOURT ')lEPORTS . .\n\nperty with?ut acquiri'ng rights of o;,, nershii:>> and musi by its very. . nature be of temporary duration. lf requisitining of property could '\n\nicGitimately continue for an indefinite period of time, t!ie dis\\iricticn. between requisition an4 acquisition v,:ould tend .. to become blurred, because in that event for all practical purposes the right to pcssess'on and enjoyineIJ~ of the property ,\\vhich constittes a major constituent element of the right of ownership wonld be vested indefinitely without any limitaiion of time in the reuuisitioning authority and it would . be possible for the authority to sub.stantially take over 'the prope<rty\n\n'without acquiring it and . paidng fu.11.market value as comp\\nsaticn\n\nundr thand. Acquisition Act, 1894. We do not think that the\n\ngvernrneilt can undethe guise cf requisition continued for an\n\ninc\\efidc pericd of time,, in substance acquire the property; bec.ause that wo.uld be a fre.ud on the power conferred en the government.\n\nIf the governmei wants to take over the, pror>_ertv for an iudefini&\n\nperiod 0( time, the government must acquire the property but it can-· not, use the power of requisition for achieving that object. The power of requisition is exercisable by the i:overnrnent c)nl~ fer a public purpose which is of a transitory character. .. If the public pur- . p0sc for.which the premises are requ; rcd is of a perenn.il or.permanent character from.the very inception, no oraer can be passed requisitioning the premises and in such a case the order of requisition, if passed', would be a fraud upon the statute, 'ror the . government would be requisitioning the premises when , really speaking they want the pre-. . mises fdr acquisitjon, the object 0~ taking the. premises being net\n\ntransitory but permanent in cha.ractct. Where't]Je.purpose for .which the prerniscs are .required is of , such a chameter that. from the very inception it can rieve'r be .served by req-;, isitioning the premises , tut can be. achieved only by acquiring ti1e property which would be the case where. the purpose is o( a permanent character. or likely to SUQSist for an indefinite period Ol time, the government may acquire the premises . but it certainly cannot requisition the premises and continue the reqisit!oning. inde~P.it'cly. Here in the present .case the order of requisition -was made as far back as 9th April 1951' and even if it .was mai!e for housing a. homeless person and the appellant al .thaMirne fell within the category of homeless person, it 'cannot be allowed to continue for such an inordinately Jong period. as thirty vears,\"' We must therefore hold tliat the order of requisition even. if it wa-s valid when made, ceased to be valid and effective after the expiration 'of'a reasonable period of time. His not necessary for us to deciile what period of time rn; iy be regarded as reasonable for ; the contlnuanCe ef an ordc; r of rql:iSitit::1~ iri a giv, n c\n\n0 aSe, bccaue u'tim:Jely the answer to this question must depiend on the facts and\n\n~ ' ....\n\n. ' • ..\n\n. . . . ' \\ ..\n\nH.D. VORA V, MAHARASHTRA (Bhagivali; J.) 701\n\ncircumstances of each case but there can be no doubt that whatever be .. the public purpose fo~ which an order of •requisition is made,' theperiod of .time for which the order o( requisitioir 'may be con- Hnued' cannot be an unreasonably long period such as thirty years . . The High Court was, therefore, in .any view of the matter, right in holding '.that in the circumstances the order. of 'requisit'<>p could not . survive 'any longer an\" the State Governmeni. was' bound to revoke / the order of requisition and d.erequisition ihe flat and to take steps to evict the appellant from the flat and to hand <\\vervacarit possession of it to the. 3rd respondent. 1 '\n\n.) ----\n\n' I\n\nThe was ls;· cme .other conte.ntion' \\1rged on behalf of the' appellant in a desperate attempt to pr6tcct his possession of the flat arrd that contention was, cince he had'paid rent of th~ flat to Rukma . nibai and such rent was accepted by , her; he. ha\\l becoine a direct 'tenant .of Rukmanibai and the order of requisition had become totally irrelevat so far as .as his p:issession .of the flat i~ concerned. This contention'is,.in our opiion, wholly unfounded .. The appellant' , admittedly came into occupation of-the flat as 'an''1!Jottee under the order .of requisition passed by' the State Government and 'eyen if any rnt was paid by tho ilppellant to Rukmanibai and such rent was acce'pte~ by her, it did not,'have the effect of putting an end to \" the order of requisition .. The appejlant was an ~Uottee of tqe flat under the order of requisitio~ and he was liable to pay compensation ! for the use .and occupation of the flat to the State Gov.ernment and the\n\n-1'.~ -.State Qovernment was in its triml.iable. 'to 'pay compensation to.\n\n. ,\\\n\nRukmanibai for:the:requisitiqning of.the flat and i( therefore, instead. of the appellant paying compensation to the State Government :ind \\ the State Government rhakiiig payment.'of ap identical amount to '. - F Rukmanibai, the appellant paid directly to Rukmanibai with the . -express or in any event implied assent of the State .Governmeni, the ·.order of requisition.Tould not cease to be valid and effective. It did ' 'not mattr at all whether the .appellant described the am.cunt paid '\n\nby him to Rukmanibai as rent, because whatever was done by him : was under the order of requisition and so long as , the order of.\n\n requisitioii stood, his possession of the flafwas attribut.able only' to the order of requisition and no payment of an amount described as rent could possibly alter the nature of his occupation of the flat or . . make him a teriant of Rukmanibai in respect of the flat.·\n\n,. .\n\nI. . .. .\n\nWe are \\herefo, re of the view that the High Court ._wa,• right.\n\n. SIJPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1984] 2 S.C.R .\n\nin allowing the writ petition ard directing the State Government and the Cq.ntroller of Accommodati.on to derequisitio~ the flat and to take steps to evict the appellant and !, O. hand over vacant and peaceful possession of the flat to the 3rd respondent'. We accordingly dismiss the appeal, and confirm the order passed by the High CoHrt but (n j:.lie circumstances of the case, the appellant shall not be evicted from. the flat until 28th February, 1985, provided the appellant files\n\na~ undertaking in this Court within two'_weeks from today that he will vacate the flat and hand over its vacant possession to the 3rd\n\nrespodent on or before tl1at date .. There wilt be 'no order as to c<\"ts of the appeal.\n\nN.VK\n\n' '\n\nAppeal dismissed .\n\n\\ .. , .\n\n• ...\n\n,. .", "total_entities": 28, "entities": [{"text": "H.D. VORA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8, "end_char": 17, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "H.D. VORA V", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "1 STATE OF MAHARASflTRA & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22, "end_char": 51, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P.N': BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 91, "end_char": 105, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.N. BHAGWATI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1168, "end_char": 1177, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4364, "end_char": 4366, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s\n\n696", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7878, "end_char": 7884, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "P.R. Mridu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8151, "end_char": 8161, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.R. Mridu!,"}}, {"text": "G. l'ishwanath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8164, "end_char": 8178, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. l'ishwanath & Par(iat Sinha, for the Appllan1."}}, {"text": "Par(iat Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8181, "end_char": 8194, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G. l'ishwanath & Par(iat Sinha, for the Appllan1."}}, {"text": "Ram Jethma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8215, "end_char": 8225, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Jethma/ani & Soli J. Sorahjee, M.N. Shroff."}}, {"text": "Soli J. Sorahjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8232, "end_char": 8248, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Jethma/ani & Soli J. Sorahjee, M.N. Shroff."}}, {"text": "M.N. Shroff. Ta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8250, "end_char": 8265, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Jethma/ani & Soli J. Sorahjee, M.N. Shroff."}}, {"text": "B. v. Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8277, "end_char": 8288, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ta/egankar &: B. v. Desai, for the Respondents. ·"}}, {"text": "BHAGwATi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8360, "end_char": 8368, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgi11ent of the Court was delivered bv\n\nBHAGwATi, .J. Special Leave Granted.·", "canonical_name": "BHAGwATi"}}, {"text": "Rukmanibai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8718, "end_char": 8728, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".One Rukmanibai was the owner of a building bearing .House 1 \\ No. '", "canonical_name": "Rukmanibai"}}, {"text": "N.C. Shah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8935, "end_char": 8944, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "occupation of one N.C. Shah as a tenant and since N.C. Shah•was going.", "canonical_name": "N.C. Shah•was"}}, {"text": "N.C. Shah•was", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8967, "end_char": 8980, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "occupation of one N.C. Shah as a tenant and since N.C. Shah•was going.", "canonical_name": "N.C. Shah•was"}}, {"text": "12th' March 1951", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9238, "end_char": 9254, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant also addressed' a letter dated 12th' March 1951 to the Chief."}}, {"text": "VORA V'. MAHARASHTRA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9707, "end_char": 9727, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J ' ' '\n\n697 H.D: VORA V'."}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9729, "end_char": 9737, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MAHARASHTRA (Bhagwati, J.)\n\n. . '", "canonical_name": "BHAGwATi"}}, {"text": "Bose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13329, "end_char": 13333, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "<1> where Bose, J. speaking on behalf, of the Court pbserveq : '\n\n/ , \"In our opinion, it is not necessary to set out the purpose of the requisition in the."}}, {"text": "Bhanji Munji", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14165, "end_char": 14177, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J attacked on the ground that it did not set out the public purpose for which it was, made, But as pointed out by Bose, J. in the above dassagc quoted from this iddgment in Bhanji Munji's case (supra), the State Government would have to show ihat the order of requisition was made for a public purpose andAhe necessary facts showii1g. the public purpose for which the order of requisition was made would ' have to be established by the State Government to the satisfaction of the court."}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16885, "end_char": 16901, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16988, "end_char": 16998, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mukherjee", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17579, "end_char": 17588, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vide : Observations of Mukherjee, J. in Chiranjitla/'s.case."}}, {"text": "Acquisition Act, 1894", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18706, "end_char": 18727, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "H.D. VORA V", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21030, "end_char": 21041, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H.D. VORA V, MAHARASHTRA (Bhagivali; J.) 701\n\ncircumstances of each case but there can be no doubt that whatever be .. the public purpose fo~ which an order of •requisition is made,' theperiod of .time for which the order o( requisitioir 'may be con- Hnued' cannot be an unreasonably long period such as thirty years . .", "canonical_name": "H.D. VORA V"}}, {"text": "Rukma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21954, "end_char": 21959, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' I\n\nThe was ls;· cme .other conte.ntion' \\1rged on behalf of the' appellant in a desperate attempt to pr6tcct his possession of the flat arrd that contention was, cince he had'paid rent of th~ flat to Rukma .", "canonical_name": "Rukmanibai"}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_2_703_718_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "-·~· ,..... .\n\n...\n\n703 A\n\nDAYARt.\\1 ASANAND GURSAHANf ..\n\nSTATE.OF ~AHARASHTRA ~ND omERS _\n\nFebruary 22. 198-l\n\nHtm!xly Ju.!lclul S•r•ft;~ Rtrml;\"'\"\" Rults l9~6.Sub .clauu (6) of ddu._ (1) . •I s, lt ml~ (2) nf Rult S. sropt of-S1niur/1, v--F,,, tlu: p1.1rpoie1 of .Juit•rity In 1ht . 111lt of /Jhtrfri Jmtgs, Mhtllt>f th~ pr/ml durMx wlrL-h onC' lind M'OrA.tii ~Hur A.wS..\n\nfJnt JuJr~ .could. btrtr.k.tmd-RiJtfrl to bt po.11C'Cf as till J~~.pt!ct;,.\"C Judye an,: Enrilf,_\n\nINtft tath~ .sofrtf)\" nn,/ ol/olll; ances m 1ltt sdclit.m' grrulf-Sdt-'ltiun Grod,. l'lhtthr\n\n•· tttpnratt trodr, ·\n\nThe judidl .., .. ice or tho Sutte or hhar, htra consi>l3 or tWO brnn<:h<'- .. t~J<Iy, (i) the Junitlr Branch und (ii) the Scnl<>r nranch. Tbc Junior Dron<:h con 0\"' of th, followins. Oa\\< I Officers~(i) J~Jj\\es of le Small C>u..._, Courts at places I\n\nOter thn llumbay. (ij) Chil. Jude;<!! (Senior ni\\i; ion). (iit) Judge.• or the Sn>al •.\n\nC.u101 Coun• at llomb1y and Mclropohtnn M\"1i Jrat<'i ood (ov) Ctvol Judges puno- .: or 1)11'i\\ion) ~\"I Judicial M:Jg~<lrnlcs of the FiNI Ci:J.\". The Senivr lfranch consisl> .\n\n o_f(i) D<<trict JuJs~ (ii) the Principal Jud&c anJ\" Jud1:es ol lloml'lY City Civil Court, lu) the C.'hicr Judge aod the Addl. ChicrJ ud&e of th; Stroll Causes Court, llomblY . frvl_oh¢ Chief Pre; idncy Mngi>tr:tte and tho AdditiotJI Chief (>r.,.; i, incy Mgistratc. l . a ... b.y, and (v) the A\"i'tant Jud~··· The•• is no separate cadre of !ICI\":tton gmdc\n\nl)i<trict Judcs or or ln, pc:ctin\" Pitrict Jd~~< rcfan:d to in tho Rules whi<h are t • fr.mcj uder tho proviso' lo Article J09 or the Coo, tituuon. 'fllo IIC'IIIo of I\"Y of :; nt.trict Jud~ rriur IO July I I Q52 w ... R>. 900.50·1(l('~I600-50-I SOO •. !; , • \\ 1\n\ni r•\n\nOo the roconomend,; tion of the 1-lih Cuurl, the Sl3to Go, ernrocnl I''\"\"'' two 'tlolutions one on 21_10.1963 und anoth.er 0 ,1 July ~0. 1974 S~nclioning one post\n\n UIIfflhe former with cfTcct from J-7-6:! ond fi, e po; l> UllUf thO lalt<f Witl\"f clfcct from ht AU¥\\I<t 1?74 of Oi; trici Ju, l~'\"' in' tht S.; lcetiun G:de of Rs. I 800-100:\n\n2000. which i' , pccif~~.:ally stated to '\"'a l'l rt or the pay scale of~~· 900-1800 appli Cltble to the codre of District Judge• .. Conoequont upon the l't\\'ISIOn or P<lY ~~ ..\n\nr I j' \"\n\n,. I\n\n704 -' '\n\nSUP'REME COURT REPORTS [1984] 2 s.c.R.\n\nA .-.· of officers of the cadre of the.Ihdian Administrative Service the State Government\n\nodified the pay scae of the selection grade District Judges ith effect fro IT! jam,; ary, 1, 1973 by the resolution dated August 21, 1975 revising the Selection\"Grade Pay' scale to one of 2000-125-2250. By its eariicr Resolution dated 23-9\"1969, the Government also sai1ction_ed five temporary posts f District Judges in the am~ scale of.\n\nRs. ~00-fSOO.for inspection of suordinate Courts and tling the' problem of corruptton. 1he High Court had laid down certain guidelines for posting a District Judge as-an Inspecting District Juuge and they art< (i) that the '6istrict Judge sl1ould have put in. at least three yeats as District. Judge arid should have worked as such\n\niany of the districts, (ii)..thaJ hls administrative capacity should be rciativcl:r~ high and (iii) that he should have a reaonablength 'of service ahead of him as a District\n\n.....\n\n.r. -\n\nJudge till his retirmcnt. '\n\n-~ '' f . ,. s The appellant wa.s enrolled as an Advocate on December 1:4, 1951. 11_1 responsc to the Notification inviting _app1ication5 for the purpose of recruiting rnmber of the B:tr directly as District JtJdges under Rule 5(2) {I) (b) of the Rules, te appcll~.nt applied for one or'the posts and was .also successful in gf'tting sleted and appoined as an Assistant Judge. by notificatiqn issued ori 2-l-1967.~0n Februa1:y IQ, 1973, the appellant was appointed to officiate in the cadreof.District Judges and' later confirmed as a District Judge y; ith effect from Atigust, 1, 1975. The seniority of fhe\n\n.. ...,..\n\n' .. ,. ' appellant was fixed on the basis of his actual-appointment as District Judge in April\n\n1973. ' \\ ./\n\n. The appellant filed a. writ ptition un'der Article 226 of the constitution con ten- . ding': (i) that he.was enlitled to reckon for purposes of his seniority in the cadre of ).\n\n r .- District Judges the period during which he worked as an Assistant Judge in accor.: dance with the proviso to sub clasuse (b) of clause (i) of sub (ule (2) of Rule 5 of the\n\nBombay Judicial Recruitment' Rules, 1956, and (ii5 that he 'was entitled .to g<?t the salary and allowances in the Slection grade scale.or to be posted as an lnpecting judge. Both the contentions were negativ.ed by the Hi&.h Court and hence the app~l.\n\n~-·\n\nby special leave of the Court.\n\nX .. .\n\nI . '\n\n. .... ..\n\nAllo;, ing the appeal in .part, tho Court.\n\nHELD 1. Due to lacHes and absence of satisfactory explanatio1, l for the delay of nearly 11ine year~, the que.5tion of the correctness of tf1e seniority assigQ_ed\n\nto the petitionr appellant in the yer 1973 cannot be looked into. [708 Fl\n\nH ' 2.1. The appellant is entitled to the pay in the selection grade pay scale from ' the date on .which--the immediate Junior (seniority being coun_t¢ on the length of\n\n... . \\..\n\n--~' .( '\n\nD.A. GURSAHANI v. MAHARASHTRA 705\n\n. cotinuou~ officiation in tho cadre of Ditrict Judges) -commenced to draw. salary\n\nA '. _... • -, in the electiorq:rado ~>f 8cale, .'He \", is also, entitled to all other consquential relief\n\n flowig therefrom. [\"18 C-D] · . ~· ·,\n\n., _>.\n\n\\ . \\ • .. ..\n\n2.2.\n\nTh~ :two Rcolutl:ons of the . dovernmct sanctioning six posts of. selection grade District JudgcJ did .not indicate that there was any process of proniotion ! by election or othcnri!G rrori1 the ccire or 6itrict Judges to the-cadre of election i. grade District Judges involved wh11e sanctioning the selection grade pay. scale: There 1 . . . • • _f .. . .- • • . wa~ no que!lion of even crossing the efficiency bar. The said selection grade scale ·.\n\n'wa~ sanctioned only to. mi'tigate the barLiship caused by stagn~'tion at .the highest . . -eve! of the original py !cale i.e. Rs. l~Oo .. It was just a time-scale a, nd an'extensio, n ·\n\nor .. projection of the' pay-scale of Rs. 900~1800 applicable to the carc of District . Judes but. confine<f.t~ six persons in all. The sanctioning of selction grade_pay\n\n,-sea ie for Dis'trict'Judses has nothing to do with the creatin of the posts of Inspectii\n\nDitrict Judge:tcither. The true legal position is that the 'first six persons in tho senio rity., list of judges based on the '!eng'tll of continuous officiati'bn in the cadre f Dimict Judge~ cart only be recipionts of salary in the selection grade pay scale,'-·\n\nthee h£ing only six such selection grade stnctioned. [71 0 G-H, 711 A-B] \"\n\n2-:.J.\n\nWhee it is k~1d that the selection· grade District Judges.do no't constitute a separate cadro, tho High Court. cannot in exercise of its\" general . power~ of -e'. ·~·. control under Article 23~ of the Constitution withhold the increment, beyond Rs. 1800 in the selection lrade pay scale unless there is a.i-'ule or-n executive .instruction' . which authorisei it to <lo 'io.' The election grade post is not a post to wluch promo- /lion lias to be made nor is there any cffit; fency bar ule attached to it.rFrther it is ·or \\hown that tho Governor had issued any executive .instmctions, nabling the - . . \\ . ... ..... \\ High <::'ourt to withheld increments in he extondcd pay scale which is in tis case\n\ncalled ns-ac!yction grade pay . scalo. The pay scale to which a judicial officer isr: . entitled i~ il onditio.n of tervice whicJ{ean be fC8Ulated by a Statute or rules made- ... . under the proviw ·.o . Article 309 or by eltccutive instiuctions iswid unoer\n\n.>' Article 1.62 of the ~titutioA. It cannot come withi;1 the range of the expression 'control' .in Artilc 235 of th~ Constitution. It is only where there is such alw, rule: . . or .executive instruction, thO ig~ Curtmay ct uder Article 235 of the ConstitututioA t~ sanctioll it. or to refuse to sanction it. ·{717 C-FJ ·,\n\n' I.\n\nTn the P~\"ent CllSO the mete nomsnclture givento the extenc; icd. pay scale a~ the se.lection:.rado py- .Calc _dos nt lead. to te inference tat_ ther~- is ~~ element\n\nofselction mvolvcd 1u sanctJOmng 1t. fn the Circumstances 1t should be trooted .as jmt an extended pay .tale which, forms part of the pay scale of Rs. 900-1800 as clari~ tied inthetwo Govent orders.sanctining the selection grade posts. Thereful on the part of .the High Couz:t. !o Sanction, the selection grade pay , scale to the\n\n. I\n\n. i\n\nE'.\n\n' ,\\\n\n\"706\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS. [1984-) 2 s.c.R.' .... ..\n\nappellant wi1en it became due automaticaJiy on the ground that he was not four.d fit to be sanctioned. thi_lt scale of-pay is errorncous. [717 G-H 718 A] .\n\n' Sant Ram Sharma v. !itate of Rajasthan & Anr, [1968f 1 S.C.R. 111; Labt\n\nMohall Deb & others v. Umon of-lndw & Others AIR 1972. SC 951 B.S. Yadav &\n\nOthers etc. v; State ofHaryana & oteis etc. [1981] I S.C.R. 1,024 referred to.\n\n3:1. The High Court had not created a1y new cadre of Inspecting District \"Judges and that.it was only for the purpos'c of facilitating a 11rief and easx reference to Sii!Ch officers as were '!:loing inspection work under a scheme evolved by the High Court for .maintainipg the efficiency of the JudiCial Service that they were .bclg,.. referred .to in coinmon parlance as-Inspecting District' Judges. No rule WIJ.S(evolved by the High Court to the effect that either the senior most-Judges or those promoted .. - by selection to that cadre should be posted as .Inspecting District Judges. Taking . the these guideliqes together,' it is posible to post any J?istrict Judge who satisiles\n\nthe three conditions as an Inspecting District Judge even .though there may be.many District Judges who are senior to him and who also satisfy the abcve conditions.\n\nI . .\n\nSince admitted!,- the posts of Inspecting District Judges do not constitlltc a separate ·:cadre superior to the cadre of District Judges, n~ person posted as an Inspecting !District Judg<! can claim seniority over a District Judge who' is not holding such a post on that ground alone. [712 E-H] .. :\n\nI . . 3.2 .. The High Court in the Judgment under appeal has, committed nn error ~- in virtually treating the Inspecting District Judge as equivalant to -select: on gr!J.de.\n\nDistdctJudg<; s.\" The creation o.f the posts of five Inspecting Ditrict Judges' had nothing to o with the sanctioning of sclectio\\1 grade pay scale for Disnict Judges,)\n\nWliilethe selection grade pay scale was sanctioned for six posts of District Jlidges ~\n\nby the two Government Resolutions'clated, October 21, 1963 and July 20, 1974, the . 1 five posts of Inspecting District Judges were created by the Goverr.ment Resolution . . dated September 23, 1959; These five posts were not posts with the selection grade • pay scale which had lrea.dy been brought into force by the \"Government Resolution ><\n\n.. ,\n\nof October 21, 1963: It' could not also have .been the intention o, f the High Ccurt as well as of the Govrnmcnt at the time of the creation of these posts or lnspccting District Judges that the five senior-most District and sessions Judges in the State should instead of. disposing of important judici; l work be engaged in inspecting a . . v . minimum of 35 courts during a year, in writing reports and in carrying out other administrative work which would leave. very little time. to engage themselves in judicial work. hat is also clear from the'guidelines.laid down for the posting of an 'officer as an Inspecting Judge which could_ be esily satisfied by younger and active\n\nmembers working in the cadre of District Judges. [714 F, 715 H, 716 C-D,} f\n\nll 3.3. The High Court also o\"\\erlooked thanhe specific case of the High Court '' . } ' bd~ that no separate cadre oflnspe9ting District Judges had been created, there\n\n;<,-\n\n\" \\\n\n D.A. GURSAHANI V. MAHARASHTRA:..(Venkataramiah, J.) ·.··\n\n. .., . ould be n~ \"occasion o-, consider the case of. the aRpellant. r any other Distric-t\n\nJudge t'or such promotion. The selection grade District Judges arc only those who . . .\n\n~ ·\n\ndraw pay in pay scale of Rs; 1800-100-2000 for which rio prOfll:tion is contemplated- : and tht niere_postingas an InspeCting District Judge by itself does not make an\n\n. 'officer so postd superior to other District Judges. The true legal position-is that\n\nwhil~ the'first six prsons in fue seniority list of District J\\ldges based on be length of\n\nontiuous officiation in the cadre of District Judges can be recipients 'of salacy jrt the selection grade pay sc<lle, the posts of I_rispecting District Judges and of the . 3 Registra-r need not n(X:eSsarily be held by them, Therefore, the question wpether {he appeallant can be posted as an Inspecting District Judge is within the discrtion . -~:; Lthe High_. Court only. f.716 F-H, 7li f\\-B, HJ f _ .\n\n~. .-\n\n• -..J\n\nCrvrL APPELLATE JuRrsoicrroN: Civil Appeal No. 435 or 1_983 .\n\n. I • \\ . ' . I , . . .\n\nAppeal by Special leave from the Judgment and Order dateq\n\nthejOth July, l982; of the Bombay High Court in writ petition\n\nNo. 63of 1982. ·\n\n'( . . D'aya_ram Asanand. Gur!ahtmi: Appellant in prson.\n\n-. '' . -A. V. Sawant, .M. N. Shroff, S. M. Shah :and P. Sankara ' Narayana for the Respondent. ' ..\n\n. The Judgm~.iit of the Court' was Ef.eliverec.i by\n\n1 ... .\n\nVENKATARAMIAH, J, -The two questions urged in. tl1is appeal/ filed against the judgment of the High Court of Bombay are whether the appellant is entitled to .reckonJor pUrJlOSes f his seniority in the cadre of District Judges the period during which he had worked as an Assistant Judge in accorda-ucewith the proviso to ub-clause (b) o'f clause (ij of sub-Rule (2J:; C?r Rule 5 of the Bombay Judiqial Servi'ce\n\nRecruitmen! Rules, 1956 (hereinafter referred to, as 'the Rules') and whether the appellant is entitled to get the salary and allowances. in\n\nA :_.\n\n. D '( ·.\n\n' : ·\n\n.. ' . - ~:-. :·\n\n. - } (1984] 2 s.CJ.t.\n\nSUPREME COURT,, REPORTS\n\nthe selection grade scale or to be posted as an Inspecting Judge_ Both the contentions were negatived by the High couit in a writ petition filed underArticle 226 of the Cdnstitution. This appeal by ·\n\nspecial leave is preferred against the judgment of the High Court.\n\n- I\n\nThe appellant was enrolled as an advocate on December 14,. • 1951. In response to a notification inviting application• for the pur-. pose o, f recruiting members of the Bar directly aa District Judges under Rule 5 (2) (i) (b}ofthe Rules, the appellant made an application~. ' for considering his case also for recruitment as a D'istrict Jildge. 1\n\nPltimaly five persons . were selected and appointed as Assistant~ Judges by notification issued on January 2, 1967 , and the appellant was one of them.\n\nAll of them were first posted aa Assistant ]ud.gcs\n\n' . ~\n\nas per the. proviso to\" Rule :.S (2) (i) (q) of tpe Rulei. -On February \" · 19, 1973, the appellant' was appointed to-officiate in the cadre of . District Judges .. He was confirmed as a Distric.t }udge with ~'ffect from Augu§.t 1, 1975 as per notific; ation No. A 1274/7~ dated.Decc--m.ber 9,197.5. The seniority of the appelleant i~ the cadre f District Judges . was fixed on the basis of his actual appointment. u District Judge in April; 1973.\n\nTh~ first contention of te appellant is that on a true construction of Rule 5 (2) (i) (b) of the Rules, he should be deemed ,._ t: to liave enteed the cadre of District Judges when he was initially . recruited as a District _Judge and postedas an Amsi&tant 1udge under\n\nthe proviso to Rille 5 (2) (i) (b) of the Rules. This claim of th~) ' appellant has been. rejected by the High Court. We db not propose\n\n• • • • .... w • ' to constder this contentiOn on the ground of lachea as we do not find any satisfactory explanation for the delay of ne&rly nine years on the part of the , appellant in questioning the eorroctness of the / seniority assigned to. him in the yea~ -197~. ><. ....-\n\n.,.\n\n'• We shall, however, confine this appeal to tht second question\n\nnamly, whether the appellant is entitled to the salary and allowance~\n\n.said to be pay, able to, District J.dges in the se-lection graM. In order to decide the above question, it is necessary to deal with the consti- . tutionof'the , Judicial Service in the State of Maharashtra. The Judicial Service of . the State. of Maharashtra 'conists af two branchesnamely, (i) .the Junior Branch and (ii) the senior Branch, The Junior Branch consists of the following Class I Officcn-(i) Judges of the Small Causes Courts at 'places other than Bombay, (ii) Civil Judges (Senior Division), (iii) Judges of the Small Cau5U Court at Bombay\"\n\n.....\n\n. ,_-:.·\n\n'. '. ~--- ,._,\n\n,_ . .. :\n\nD; A. GUitS'AHAN; ~. MAHA~SHTR~ (Venkataramiah, J.) - 709 . . . .. .. . . . ' \\\n\na:nd Metropolitan Magistrates nd (iv) Clyil Judges (Juior Division)\n\nand-Judicial Magistrates ofthe First Class . .The SeniorBranch cop..: sists of(i) District Judges,: (ii) the Principal Judge and Judges of' the Bombay'City Ciil Court, (iii) the .Chief Judge and the Addl. C, hief Judge of the Small Causes Court; BombaY, (iv) the Chief-Iresidency . Magistrate and the Additional Chid Prcidency Magistra:tc,: Bombay ·\n\nand (v) the Assistant Judges.· The MetropolianMagi-strate, Juvenile Court; Bomba~ is also a ni.embe~ of the Maharashtra Judicial Service.\n\nRule '4 of the Rules. provides: for tle niethod. of appointmel!t to the post in the .Junior Branch including Metropolitan Magistrates: Juve-\n\n·;- -~·: :·· ·~ •• '. :i ' \" ;· \"\n\n. A' I •\n\nB '\\\n\n~· nile Court; Bombay, . Rule 5 of the Rules deals with the method of . . . recruitment t6 the Senior Branch. . · · .• I. , '•.' ,\n\n.....\n\n. ...,. ..\n\n\" I , ' ~:.-\n\n. '\n\n. 1\n\n- 1 ...._t... ··;\n\n. r\n\nSubruJe (l) of Rule 5 cif the Rulesrelates to the .recruitment r . to the cadre of District Judges and Jdge~ of the Bombay City Civilr Court. It reds : . . ·,,\n\n~. . i ,.''5, (2) D isrictJudges and Judges of .the Bomby Cit_y civil\n\nCourt. ..\n\n. . ti) Distfict Judges~-Appointments to the posts of District Judges shall be made-.by the .Govern?r- ' ' . ''' '\n\n(~) . in consultation with ,-the' High Court by p'romotion ·-from the members of, the Junior Branch .who have ordinarily . servd as Assistant Judges, and . :t> · . .\n\n. , ~--...... .. . \\ -.\n\n:(b) on the rec0mmendation of the High Court rrom em.:. bers of the Bar who. have practised ; s Advoctes or Pladers ' for not less tl1an 'seven yea'rs. in the' High Court, 0~ Courts\n\n :mbordinate thereto: . . '\n\n • I · .\n\nProvided . that persons. recruited at the age. of riot more\n\n. . .\n\nthan forty-five years, .fifty years in the case of a person belong- ·.'. ing to a community recognised as backward by Government H for. the purposes of recruitment shall first lle app.ointed to • . . '\n\n--: ~1r:·\",\n\n( ..\n\n. \"\n\n. , ' ..\n\n.. :~\n\n( .\n\n- B ...\n\n-:710\n\nSUPRHME COURT _REPORTS [19841 2 S.C.l{.\n\nork as. Assi; tal)t Judg~. for such period as may be decided\n\nby Governmet on the merits of his case on the reo; mmenda- tions Qf the High Court before he is appointed as a Distriet iudge: ~\n\n Provided further that ordinarily the. proportion of post10 :filled in by promotion, underc lause (a) and those by appointment from members of the Bar under clause (b) shall be 50: . .. 50.\"\n\n. it may be noted here that there is no separate cadre of s~]ec tlon!grade District Judges or of Inspectin~ Ditrict Judges referrt& to in the Rules which are framed under the proviso to Article 39~\n\nI . f \"' ' of'the. Constitution .. The scale of pay of District Judges priar t6\n\nJuly L 1962 was Rs. 900-50-1000-60-1600-50-1800.\n\n.· : On october 21. 1963 on the recnimendation of the Hip., Court, the State Government passed a resolution, the relevant part •f .whicli' reads as follows': . . \\ . . . . . .\n\n- - \"Resolution:' Govehlmnt is pleased to sanction one post of District Judge in the Selection Grade of R<J: 1800_:100-2000 in the cadre of District Judges with.\n\neffect' from the lst July, 1962. , As the Se/ectton Grade is the part of the j)y scaie of .Rs .. 900-50-1000-60-1600- .\n\nS0-1800, applicable to th._e cadre o/ District Judges, n officer drawing pay in this grade shall. also be entitled to the. special pay, if any, attached to the post held. by . bini, subject to the condition that pay plus special pay does not exceed Rs. 2000/-.\" (emp4asis added)\n\nThe resolution set out above only stated.that oneoistictJud:e . in the selection grap.e will draw salary in the. scale of Rs. 1800-109-\n\n2000 with effect from .July ]~ 1962. It also stated that. this scale\n\nas a part of the pay scale of R.s.\"900-50-I000-60-1600-50-1800 appli-\n\n. cable to\"tbe cadre of District Judges: .It did not indicate that there 'was. any process of promotion by selection or otherwise from the . cadre of District Judges to the cadre of selection grade District Jud&es\n\n' \" ·('' , ' . .,\n\n\"\"'-._ f . ' .\n\n.J.\n\n.~.\n\n.. .\n\n. J..\n\n.....\n\nI .\" ..\n\n. .\n\n....\n\n.. o.f.' GURSAHNI v, MAHARASHTRA (Venkataramiah, J.) · 711\n\n' -\n\n. I\n\n. involved; wh; Ic sanci~ning the slection grade pay scale.· There was A. . ~6 qu'!stio-~ of even rossing the efficiency b.ar. ·:It appearsthat. the.\n\nsaid select'ion grade scale wassanctioned Olily to mitigate the-~ hard~ .. shi pj :caused by stagnation at the. higest level or the original. J)ay scale i.e. at Rs. 1.800. It was just.a, time-scale and an extension or\n\nproj, ectii;>n of the pay Stale of Rs. 900-1800 applicable tQ the cadre of District Judges but c'onfined t6 one. person. The above resolu-.\n\n. B tion was fli>llowed py another resolution of the State: Government . _dated July 20, 1974, the material 'part of whi.ch read'as fo)Iows: .\n\n. . ' ''Resolution: Government is pleasedAo sanction five\n\n. additional posts of District- Judges in . the. sdectin .. grade 'of Rs,.'l800-I00-2000 in the --cadre of- District '\n\nJdges with effect from. the 1st Augu-t, 19l4.\n\n1 As the Sdedion Grade is the part of the pay scale oi Rs .. 900~~-\n\n50-1000~60-1600-50~1800,' . applicable to the cadre. of District Judges, an officer drawing par. in this .grde - ' shall also .Q~ entitled to the special pay, if any., attach-\n\n. ed to the post 'held by. Iiiin, subject to the condition,\n\nthat pay plus special pay does not exceed Rs .. 2000.\"\n\n(Emphasisadded) ' ..\n\n: '\n\n. , .\n\nE_~ \" This r-esolution was worded in the sine manner as the ealier · ~- .a, c but the number of selection grade psts wa~ _increased by five. ( Thus; there were. in all six posts. of selection •grade District Judges ·\n\nwho coul~ draw1sa!ary at the pay scale attach¢d to. i!· ·\n\n• ._ I\n\n- Cmsequent upon the revision of pay scales' of offlcrs of the cadre of. the Indian Administrative Service the State Goverrtme; nt\n\nmoified the pay scale of the selection. grad~ District Judges with. effect from January I. 1973 by the resol1:1tion dated August 2L -1975, the relevant part o{ whiCh reads hus: ·\n\n. .\n\n. ,\n\nI .\n\n. '•Reso)ution:. Government is pleased to direct that the revised 1:)election Grade I. A.· S .. pay sca1e of R:5. 2000-125/2-2250 should be made applicable to the 'Selection .drade District Judges with effect from 1i~\n\n1973. .\n\nF ...\n\n. -~ . \\,. ' SUPREME COURT REPORtrS.\n\n[1984]'2 S.C.R\n\nI .\n\n2. Gocrnment is also pleased to direct that District / Judges 'in the Selection Grade poss, should be allowed to draw special pay, if any, attached to the P, ost held . . by them, subject to the .condition that pay plus specia\\ pav does not exceed Rs. 2450/-.\" .\n\nI .. • f\n\n' :\n\nThere ~Tas:· however,· no other alt=ration in the conditions of .service relevan-t _to t_he subject of , selectloti grade District Judges.\n\nIn so far a~ the Ins pectin& District iudges are concerned, it is seen J:hat the specific cae of the High Court as st out in the\n\naffidavit of Shri Makarend Shanka~ Vaidya, Adq.itiorial Regltrar :\n\n(Inspection). High Court of .Bom\"ay •is that the High Court had\n\nnot created an~ new cadre_ of Insp'ecting Distriet, Judges and that it . was only for the purpose of failitating a brief and easy reference to such officers as. were doing irispction work under a scheme evolved by the High C0urt' fo'r maintaining the efficiency of the Juicial . service that they were being referrCd. to. in common parlance as\n\nInspecti.ng District Judges. No rule was evolved b, y the High. Court to the effect that either the senio'r most .Judges or those promoted by\n\nselection to that cadre should be posted as InspetingD istrict Judges. ' It is, h'owevcr, stated by the deponent of this affidavit that the Higl\\· J.\n\n,, Court had laid down certain guidelines for posting a District Judge -·\n\nas ari Inspecting. District Judg~ and they~ are '(i) that}he P istrict ·\n\nJudge should have put in at least three years as District Judge an(i . should have worked as such in an-y of. the districts, Qi) that his\n\nadminstrative capacity should be !:, elativet'y high. :and (iii) that he should have a reasonable length of service ahead o~ him as a Dist~ . ~; ict-Judge till his retirement. . Taking all these guidelines togct_lier; it . is possible to post any District Judge who satisfies the three conditions . as an Inspecting Distilct. Judge even though there may be many District Judges who are senior to him.and wh~ also satisfy the ·-above condit!ons. since admittedly the posts of Inspecting D istrict the Judegs do not constitute a separate cadre .superior to the cadre of District Judgse, no person posted as an Inspecting District , fudge can . ( ' claim seniority over a District Judge who is not holding such a post\n\non that ground alone. This is also manifest from the statement ia\n\nparag.aph s2 of the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the- High\n\nCort (respondent No. 2) which reads thus;\n\n...\n\nj I\n\nI ,• I\n\n-' / .\n\n)-.\n\n>I ...\n\n• •\n\n..#· '\n\n.....\n\n' '\n\n-..\n\n' 'I '\n\n. ,.\n\n. '\n\nD.A. OURSAHAN~'V. MAHARASHTRA u:~_nkataramiah, l.). 713\n\n<'I say tliat it is false to say, that the respondent No.\n\n.;'l\n\n2 has created an erroneous impresion in 'the cadres of th~. judiciary,, public ind litigants th_at Distrit Judges appointed under the scheme of _inspection . of courts are~ superior to. other District Judges .and -this has caused insecurity in-the minds of District .judges.\" . '\n\n· ' On the.abovequest1bn, the. High. Court ha~ observcd in its . judgment under appeal thu, s:' . . .. • \\ ..\n\n-·· .. ·,\n\n\\ _ • ''.GQvern.ment qf_ Mharashtra,. in Ja \\V and ]udiciary' Department' Resolution dated 23r4 September, 1969 and the earlier the Resolution da.ted,..2ist 'Octobi.!r, 1963 hnd sanctio-ned the poats (;>{_ District Judges in the Selection .Ofade. By. the same Resolution addi~ tional posts of Joint Judges were aiso sanctioned.· It appears from the affidavit filed by the iesp_ondenfs. that\n\nschee - fo~ conducting the ~rpri~; e inspeCtion of 'the courts in the State outside the Greater. Bombay was.\n\nintroduced. in the ytar 1969 with'Y the following objects_; <. . :\n\n\"1..\n\n Frevntion; d; tection ad motin~ otit the corru~~ tion from courts and their ::tdministrativt: offices.\n\n• .. . -.$ - .\n\n2. Enforcement of discipline and.punctuality among Judges and staff and generally ensuring that the . allocated work both jdicial zmd admillistrative is\n\ndficintly doneand delay in diposal is limintcd. ·\n\n' \".\n\n- . • ' ... • \\ ' + J\n\n3. Ensuring strict observan<le of. civil and criminal\n\nmanuals.·\n\n4: ~· checking of registrs. and accounts and ensuring . that they are properly and punctually maintained, and ' ·\n\n:t . ...:.· .,\n\n' \\_\n\n-- _..\n\n·,\n\n ''\"\n\n. D-..\n\nE I\n\n.--<---\n\n. H\n\n. ·._;\n\nI r\n\n. t n\n\nE . '\n\nSUPREME COURT:REPORTS [1984] 2 s, C.R.\n\n' t\n\n5. Ensuring the welfare of Judges and the stff-includ~\n\ning tile\" provision of sujtable healthy and sanitary COn_dftions in. COUrts, . adequate housing a~COlll • modation for theJudges and the staff,· and.' gene- . rally towards providing conditions of service within our limitations.\".· 1'_\n\n/ ..\n\nAs part of this scheme Judicial officers posted as District Judges at Pune,' Thane~ Aurangabad, Akola-'\n\nand Nagpur are entrusted with the work of 'surprise inspection of co_urts. Each of. thse DistriCt r Judges is expecte<l, . to . carry put surpri, se inspection work in 5 districts. He is expected io carry (j)Ut the surprise inspection of at least 35 courts in a~ year and' submit 'his inspection notes to the High Court. These-inspection notes are scrutinise_d by tije High Court and deci~ sions on these inspection notes are also taken by the High Court. Regular inspection work is carried out by the District Judge concerned. From the affidavit filed . b'y the' Additional Registrar (Inspcctioh) of the High Court, it is further clear that no new cadre or posts of Jnspecting District Judge are .created. Though in a ..\n\ncoll}mori -paralance they are called Inspecting District\n\nJudSes they are merely District. Judges doing the work of surprise Jnspectiori.\"\n\n......\n\n,.. ·.\n\nHaving held thus, the. High Court COnlDltted an. error. in virtually' treating the Inspecting District Judgs as equivalent to . selection grades District Judges by the following obsfrvations made\n\nby .it i~ paragraph I). of its judgment: ·\n\n\"As to how ' the District udges arc selected or doing this inspectiou work is also explained by the\n\n;~ , respondets. 'in 'tlieir ·affidavits. From the submission ·, made in the affidavits it is quite clear that guidelines have been laid down for selectipg the District. J'odes\n\nworking under thfl, scheme of Inspection of the Cov 'IS.\n\nWltile selecting a person guidelines kept in vhj,. . re • (i) that the District Judges should have put in at_least . ' . ·. , . \\ ..\n\n-\"'--.\n\n. '\n\n-,. ·, .\n\no.A.· rruRSAHANI v. MAHAR~SHTRA (Venkataramiah. ,) . 715\n\n~.,. ' . . . . . . .\n\n'--.\n\n- 3 years as D!stid lndge, and should have worked as -\n\nsuch in ay -of the districs, (2) that his _administrative _ Capacity should; be relatively tJ.igh and (3) that he ShQUid t' have reasonabl_y long service,; ahead as Judge till his retirement. - Jt is also clarified in the affidaVit _.thai'\n\nthese r guideline~· necessarily\" iply his competence in judicial worl,<: and also his general J?Crformance. The\n\nassessment of relatively high. admil}iStrative capacity ' in particular implies in the c011, text his_ aptitude for inspectior1 work, .his attitudes towards the bar, litigants, judicial officers. a11d. staff. WQrking. in the 'inspecting courts. It' is also submitted. thai while r assessing ' the eligibility of a person with. reference to these guidelines, the cases of judicial 'officers 1lave-been consJd:red all along in the orf.).er of sniority of the perso'n in che cadre of District Judges .. Since no separate\n\ncade is c_reatedof judicil officers who a:re asked to d~·\n\nthe work of inspection under the scheme, no separate rJlles are fraJned, but guidelines ar~ laid down by the-\n\nHigh Cour.t. . Similarly guidelines are -laid down for a warding the selection grad~ to the District Judge and\n\nnorm~Jiy all the :S nspecti; lg. District. Judges and the Registrar are placd in the. cadr~ of Selection . Grade ·. District Judges unless here are .co!Upelling reasons to the contrary.· It is .thenstated in the affidavit of the\n\nre.spodents that th~ petitionet's.case as-.considered on,. four occasions btween.1979 to :1981 fer being.assigned\n\nthis inspection work and for being placed -in the selection grade but he has not 'bee~ found suitabl~.\"\n\nThe. infirmities noticeable in the above pas_:iage 'are hese: The', .liligh-Couri has_ failed to notice that the creation of the posts Of five Inspecting District Judges hid nothig to .do with the sactiofi.ip.g 9( ·\n\nselection. grade pay scale for Disrict Judg(_!s.\n\nWhile. the selection grade pay scale was sanctiolled for six -posts of District Judges by\n\n- the., two Government Resolutions dated Octo!1er 21, 1963 and July\n\n20, 1974, the.five posts of JnspectingDistrict Judges -were_ created by the-G)vernment resolution gated September 23. I 969. the relevant - part of which rad 'thus.;, 4'\n\n\"Resolution: Government is pleased to direCt that ·\n\nF -_\n\n,\\ ,.\n\n....\n\n716.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS 1 I 984[ i S.C.R ..\n\n~ five temporary posts of District Judges iu the sca'Ie of Rs, 900-50-I\"!J00-60-1600-50-lSOO shou-ld be -created\n\nfor a period of upto the 28th February, 1970 for inspection of subordinate courts ana tackling the pro- . b1em of corr.uption.\"\n\n. .\n\nThese five posts were not posts with the selection gra-de pay scale whichhad_alrady been broughdnto force by the Government Resolution of October 21. i96l It could not also have been the intention of the High Court as wtll as f the Oovernment atthe time of the creation or these posts of Inspecting Ditrict Judges C -~ that the five senior most District and Sessions Judges in the State\n\nshould in/Head of disposing of imprtant judicial work. be engaged in inspecting a minimum of 35 .. court'. during a year, in writing \"reports and in carrying out other adry.inistrative work which would ·\n\nleave .very .little time to engage themslves in judicial work. That\n\nis also cler from the i:Uidlines laid down for the posting of an officers as an r nsped:ing iudg~ which could be easily satisfied by ' y,~:mnger and active membtrs working in the .cadre of DistriCt Judg(s. . ~\n\nThe High Court also overlooked that the sp!;:dfic cse of the fiigh Court, being that no separate cadre of Inspecting Distriqt\n\n.Judges had been created,. thre. could be. no occasion to consider the case of the appellant or any ther District Judg~ for such pro- _, motion. The observations that ''Since no separate cadre is created of. judicial officers who are asked to do the work of inspection under the scheme, n() separate rules re .framed but guidelines, are laid down, by the Hig!t Court. Similarly guidelines nrc 1i>id down for awarqing the selection grade to the District Judge and normally all the 5 Inspecting District Judges and the Registrar are placed in the\n\ncadre of selection grade District Judges unle'ss ther~ :1re cpmpelling reasons to the contrary\" in the above pass<tge a'Te again out cf place.\n\n\\he ahoye conclusion. would have _been possible only on prod' cf\n\nthe following facts iz. (I) that the se_lection grade 1D istrict Judg::s. and the Inspecting District Judges belong to the same cadre and (2) that ~'they belonged to a cadre higl)er than the cadre of District Judges or that there was a need for going through the process of\n\nslection to sanction s'7_]ecticin grade pay_ scale. We have already\n\nhwn that the selection grade District Judges are only those who draw P~Y in pay scale of Rs. 1800-100-2000 for which no promotion . . ..\n\n; , .\n\n.. J.\n\n..,.. .... .\n\n'A.\n\n. ...\n\n,- \"~ ' '-\n\n• ....\n\n.. ,.\n\n- \\ / ' •• _w./\"\"'\", ' ' -, D.A. GURSAHNI V. MAHARI\\~HTRA (Vtnkataramiah, J.)\n\n-. r ' ' 7 7 ''\" -·\\,.:- . 1 . ; -' .. ,, . is contemplated and that me~~ _p.ostirig. as an Jnsecting-District Judge\n\nA by itselfd:Jes not make an officer so postedsuperior to other District Judges. )'he true legal position isJhat while thefirst six' persons in (, the sei)ioritYlist of District Judges based on the length of continous . officiation' in the cadre of District Ju-dges can berecipients of salary in. theselection grade, pay cale, the -posts of \"inspecting District Judges and of the Registrar_need not necessarily be held by tb.em.\n\n ,' B\n\n- ~\n\n- - :/ \" ,. . - , . ' When it is .. held that the selection. grade District Judges 'do\n\n' - .--·\n\n, not constitute a separate cadre, the H\\gh Cour( cannot in . exercise \" ,_....----of its general powers i; lf control under Article 235 of the Constitu-\n\n\"' • ·\" tionwitl-iol_d the increment beyond Rs:J800 :in.the selection grade; pay scale unless there is a_ rule or an exeu!ive : instruction whiCh - authorises jt.to do so .. -As mentioned earlier, the selection grade l)ost. is not a post to which promotion has t~ be made 'nor is 'there ariy\n\nc ,._\n\n,). .\n\n-I • ,,\n\n' I\n\n-· 'I .\n\n. efficiecy bar rule attached to it.·.· FJJrthei it is not shown that the', ·\n\nGovernor had issued a:Oy exc'cutie instructions<as it had been done : .\n\n-. in- Saift Ram Sharmq, v. State of Rajasthan-& Anr.r~J and in Lalit_, . ' Moha~ Deb & 'ors. v .. Union ofindia'& Or~.r~J enablibg the High.\n\n Court to withhold increments in the extended pay seale which is in _this case called as selection grade pay scale. The pay scale to which .\n\na judicial officer is entitled is a condition. of service 'which . can be regulated by' a statute or. rules , made udder the proviso to Articl~ 309 or by executiveinstructions' issued unde_r. Article 162 of th~\n\nConstittion; It -cannOt com~ within the rang6 ofthe _ expressio'n\n\n-~-~ . 'control' in Article 23 5 .. of tl; le' Constitution. (See B.S. Yada\" & Drs.\n\ntc. v. State of Haryan~ & -Ors, dc, r3J) It is. only ,\\vhere there is . uch a law, ru:~ or executive iristruction, the High Cortmay act ·.under Article 235 of the Constitution to sanction it or to. nifusc to .sin.ction it We are of_ the view that in the -p-resent. case the mere. 'norilenclature given to the extended pay scale as the selec'tion gntde . pay scale does not lead to the inference -tha't 'there is an' element of.\n\nselection involved in sanctionig it.. In the circumstances itshould b(f treated a~ just an extepded pay scale whjchfo_rms part of ihe pay scale of s. 900-1800 as clarified in. two. .Government _orders sane..:.\n\n. '\n\n.D ..\n\n:~ -\n\nI tioning the selection grade posts.\n\nIn view of the foreging while the question whether the appellant -can be posted as a'n Inspecting District\n\nJlidg~'is withi~ the-discretion of the High Court, the refusal on the\n\n•';\n\nf I.\n\n\\ . '\n\n.. . .\n\n-(1)\n\n.. (2) -(3)\n\n[19681 1 s:c.R. 1 i1 :' ....\n\nA.I.R 1972 S.C. 995)\n\n[1981] 1 S.C.R: 1024\n\n' j\n\n•. \\ H -··\n\n..•. ./_\n\n.. - . ,\n\n. ···. ~ ' / .. --\n\n,...;·., .....\n\n.....\n\n4-: -....., -,\n\n' .\n\n' \"\n\n_> •\n\n718 surREME COURT RE~ORTS .. [1934] 2 s.c.R ..\n\nA p1rt of the High 9ourt _to sanction the selection grade pa'y scale to . the appllantwhen it become due automatically on, the ground that !t:\n\nhe was not found fit to be' sanction':d that scale of pay is erroneous. _In view of what has been stated above, )ve rieed not go in:to the . other points raise4 by the appellant regarding the above questibn.\n\n/ ..\n\nIn the reslt the judgment of the High Court is set asi<:J.e in so far as the question of santioning. of the selection grade pa/scale to the appellant is concerned.' It is hc;:reby declared_ that the appellant is entitled to the pay in the selection grade. 'pay scale from the date on which his immediate junior (seniority being counted on the . le-ngth of continuous officiation in the Cl\\dre of District Judges} commenced to dra\\v salary in the selection grade pay scale. He is a1o entitled to all qther consequentia 1 reliefs. :flowing there fro ITt; A writ shall issue 11 the above terms., , . ' . , . - The appeal is a:-cordingly -ul!owcd in part. , No costs., .;\n\nI -\n\nS.R.\n\n...\n\n. I\n\nAppeal partly allowed.\n\n .. ..........___\n\n. '\n\n, I '\n\n. _-L\n\n. \\\n\n• •\n\n> .• ....", "total_entities": 41, "entities": [{"text": "GURSAHANf ..\n\nSTATE.OF ~AHARASHTRA ~ND omERS _\n\nFebruary", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 45, "end_char": 101, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 229, "end_char": 231, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "23-9\"1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2651, "end_char": 2660, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By its eariicr Resolution dated 23-9\"1969, the Government also sai1ction_ed five temporary posts f District Judges in the am~ scale of."}}, {"text": "District JtJdges under Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3507, "end_char": 3534, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4084, "end_char": 4095, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "District JtJdges under Rule", "statute": "District JtJdges under Rule"}}, {"text": "Article 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6917, "end_char": 6927, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7643, "end_char": 7654, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7702, "end_char": 7711, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 235", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7927, "end_char": 7938, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "October 21, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10939, "end_char": 10955, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "dated September 23, 1959; These five posts were not posts with the selection grade • pay scale which had lrea.dy been brought into force by the \"Government Resolution ><\n\n.. ,\n\nof October 21, 1963: It' could not also have .been the intention o, f the High Ccurt as well as of the Govrnmcnt at the time of the creation of these posts or lnspccting District Judges that the five senior-most District and sessions Judges in the State should instead of."}}, {"text": "D.A. GURSAHANI V. MAHARASHTRA:", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11874, "end_char": 11904, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "bd~ that no separate cadre oflnspe9ting District Judges had been created, there\n\n;<,-\n\n\" \\\n\n D.A. GURSAHANI V. MAHARASHTRA:..(Venkataramiah, J.) ·.··", "canonical_name": "D.A. GURSAHANI V. MAHARASHTRA:"}}, {"text": "(Venkataramiah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11906, "end_char": 11920, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "bd~ that no separate cadre oflnspe9ting District Judges had been created, there\n\n;<,-\n\n\" \\\n\n D.A. GURSAHANI V. MAHARASHTRA:..(Venkataramiah, J.) ·.··", "canonical_name": "(Venkataramiah"}}, {"text": "D'aya_ram Asanand. Gur!ahtmi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13122, "end_char": 13150, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D'aya_ram Asanand."}}, {"text": "-A. V. Sawant", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13181, "end_char": 13194, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "-A. V. Sawant, .M. N. Shroff, S. M. Shah :and P. Sankara ' Narayana for the Respondent. ' .."}}, {"text": ".M. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13196, "end_char": 13209, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "-A. V. Sawant, .M. N. Shroff, S. M. Shah :and P. Sankara ' Narayana for the Respondent. ' .."}}, {"text": "S. M. Shah", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13211, "end_char": 13221, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "-A. V. Sawant, .M. N. Shroff, S. M. Shah :and P. Sankara ' Narayana for the Respondent. ' .."}}, {"text": "P. Sankara ' Narayana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13227, "end_char": 13248, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "-A. V. Sawant, .M. N. Shroff, S. M. Shah :and P. Sankara ' Narayana for the Respondent. ' .."}}, {"text": "VENKATARAMIAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13337, "end_char": 13350, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "VENKATARAMIAH, J, -The two questions urged in.", "canonical_name": "(Venkataramiah"}}, {"text": "High Court of Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13432, "end_char": 13452, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "tl1is appeal/ filed against the judgment of the High Court of Bombay are whether the appellant is entitled to .reckonJor pUrJlOSes f his seniority in the cadre of District Judges the period during which he had worked as an Assistant Judge in accorda-ucewith the proviso to ub-clause (b) o'f clause (ij of sub-Rule (2J:; C?r Rule 5 of the Bombay Judiqial Servi'ce\n\nRecruitmen!"}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14132, "end_char": 14143, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State. of Maharashtra", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16334, "end_char": 16355, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the State."}}, {"text": "A. GUitS'AHAN;", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16702, "end_char": 16716, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D; A. GUitS'AHAN; ~. MAHA~SHTR~ (Venkataramiah, J.) - 709 . . . .. .. . . . ' \\"}}, {"text": "Venkataramiah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16732, "end_char": 16745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D; A. GUitS'AHAN; ~. MAHA~SHTR~ (Venkataramiah, J.) - 709 . . . .. .. . . . ' \\", "canonical_name": "(Venkataramiah"}}, {"text": "Article 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19448, "end_char": 19458, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S0", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20053, "end_char": 20055, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gocrnment", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 23168, "end_char": 23177, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gocrnment is also pleased to direct that District / Judges 'in the Selection Grade poss, should be allowed to draw special pay, if any, attached to the P, ost held . ."}}, {"text": "Makarend Shanka~ Vaidya", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 23732, "end_char": 23755, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In so far a~ the Ins pectin& District iudges are concerned, it is seen J:hat the specific cae of the High Court as st out in the\n\naffidavit of Shri Makarend Shanka~ Vaidya, Adq.itiorial Regltrar :\n\n(Inspection)."}}, {"text": "s2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25567, "end_char": 25569, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "D.A. OURSAHAN~'V. MAHARASHTRA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25756, "end_char": 25785, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D.A. OURSAHAN~'V. MAHARASHTRA u:~_nkataramiah, l.).", "canonical_name": "D.A. GURSAHANI V. MAHARASHTRA:"}}, {"text": "Ensuring the welfare of Judges", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27535, "end_char": 27565, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ensuring the welfare of Judges and the stff-includ~\n\ning tile\" provision of sujtable healthy and sanitary COndftions in."}}, {"text": "Pune", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 27901, "end_char": 27905, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1'\n\n/ ..\n\nAs part of this scheme Judicial officers posted as District Judges at Pune,' Thane~ Aurangabad, Akola-'\n\nand Nagpur are entrusted with the work of 'surprise inspection of courts."}}, {"text": "D.A. GURSAHNI V. MAHARI\\~HTRA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 34597, "end_char": 34626, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\\ / ' •• _w./\"\"'\", ' ' -, D.A. GURSAHNI V. MAHARI\\~HTRA (Vtnkataramiah, J.)\n."}}, {"text": "Vtnkataramiah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 34628, "end_char": 34641, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\\ / ' •• _w./\"\"'\", ' ' -, D.A. GURSAHNI V. MAHARI\\~HTRA (Vtnkataramiah, J.)\n.", "canonical_name": "(Venkataramiah"}}, {"text": "Article 235", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35431, "end_char": 35442, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Union ofindia", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 36042, "end_char": 36055, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v .. 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{"document_id": "1984_2_719_740_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "~ .\n\n-i ,\n\n. ..,.\n\n719 A\n\nBAlASAHEB VISHNU CHAVAN\n\nSTATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS.\n\nFebruary 22, 1984\n\n[0. Ctt!NNAPPA REDDY, E.S. V ENKATARAMIAH AND R.B. MISRA, JJ..].\n\nBombay Judicial Senicc .Recmit111e11t Rules, 1956-Rufe 5(2)-l11terpretatio1I of.\n\nRule 5(2) of the Bombay Judicial Service Recruitment Rules; 1956 provided fo.r two methods of appointment to the posts of District .Judges (i) by promotion of' members of the Junior Branch who had .served as Assistant Judges and (ii) by direct recuitment from members of the Br. The proviso to Rule 5(2) (i) (b) provided tnat when a member of the Bar was recuited as a D istrict Judge, ad he was i.ess\n\nth ·n the iv; e prescr1bJJ, h::: should first be appointed to work as Assistant Judge for such penocl as might be decided by the G()vernment before h~ w?s appointed as a District Judge.\n\nThe appellants who were members of the Junior Branch of the Judicial Service of the Strite of Maharah_lra were appointed as Assistant Judges in 1971, in 1974 respondents Nos. 2 to 5, who were members of the Bar, were aP, pointed P.S A sistan t Judges a.nd theit names were shown below the appallants in the existing list of\n\nA~istant Judges. Tn February 1977 respondents, Nos. 2 to 5 were appointed to officiate as Di3tric.t Judges. The appellants filed petitions before the High Court claiming that they should be treated as having been promoted as District Judges aloof with respondents Nos. 2 to 5. The High Court dismissed 'the petitions. Hence\n\nthese appeals.\n\nDi m issing the' appeals,\n\nHELD : Under ruk S C)(i)(b) of the Bombay Judicial Service Recruitment Rules, 1956 even though a member of t_he Bar is recruited as a D istrict Judge he may H l e asked to srve as a n Assistant Judge for a specified period. Whel) he so func-\n\nSUPREME COL'RT REPORTS [1984] 2 s.c.\n\ntions he cannot be called as a member of the cadre of Assistant Judges_ subject to the rule of seniorit> applicable to the regular members of that cadre who were appointed by promotion from the Junior Branch. He: would only be a person who is\n\nrccrnited as a District JUbge but posted as an Assitant Judge to gain the requisite Judicidl exp.; rience of that post before being entrusted with the duties of a District\n\nJudge. Tndusion of the name of such a person in the list of Assistant Judges does not confer any right on such regular Assistant Judges appointed by pron1otion from !.he\n\nJunior Branch who are placed above him in the list to claim seniority over him.\n\n[723 G-H, 724 A-B]\n\n- In the instant c1sc since as betwen the appellants on the one hand and re~:.~ Nmictits Nos. 2 to 5 on the other then: bing no comparison, it cannot be said that ( there is any violation of Article 14 or Article 16 of the Constitution. lt appears that all this confusion has arisen on ;1u:ount of the practice of including the names of the direct recruits from the B.u to the cadre of District Judges while they are serving as Assistant Judges under the proviso to Rufo 5(2)(iJ(b) of the Rules in the :same list . alongwith Assistant Jmlgcs promoted from the Junior Branch. If a separate list of\n\nsuch pr;; ons was thr:, th:re would not have been any room for such confusion.\n\n!724 E-Fj\n\nClv1L APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 5999 & 6000 of 1983\n\nAp.i;.eals by Special leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 25th JL nc, 1978 of the Maharashtra High Court in Mis_c. Appln. \\ No. 763 oJ 1981 with Special Civil Application No, 1323 c'f J 978.. - \"'\n\nU. R. La/it. V. N. Ganpu/e and Mrs. V. D. Khan11a for the Appellants.\n\n. A.V. Sawa11t, .11!.N. Shroff: S.M. Shalt, P. Sankara Naraymw for the Respondents.\n\nS.B. Bhasme, Gopa!, .iJ. Sat/zc fl r Respondent NL1. 5.\n\nV.B. Saliarya and R.N. Poddar for Repondent (U 0.1.).\n\n'The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nH VENKATARAMIAH, J. The appellant in Civil App?<. I No. 5995 of 1983 is Shri B.V. Chavan and the appellant 111 Civil Appeal Nlt\n\n.,.\n\nf- p:\"' .\\ ,\n\nn.v. CHA VAN v. MAHARASHTRA (Venkataramiah, J.) 721\n\n6000 of 1983 is Shri A.A. Halbe.\n\nTi1e , appellants in these two appeals are inambers of the Judicial Service of the State of M1harashtra. They were originally ''PiJO; nted as Civil Judges (fonior Division) and Judicial M1gistrates First Class in the Junior Branch of the Maharashtra State Judicial Service. Both of them in course of time were promoted in the year 1971 as Assistant Judges in the Senior Branch of the Miharashtra State Judicial Service. When they were both working as Assistant Judges, applications were invited from members of the Bar for filling in five posts of officiating Assistant Judges in the Judicial Service of the State of Maharashtra although the applications could be invited for the purpose of recruitment to ·the cadre of District Judges. Respondents Nos. 2 to 5 Shri I.G. Shah, Shri B.S. Bhirud, Shri H.H. Kantharia and Shri A.D. Mane alongwith many others applied for the same, Ultimately respondents Nos. 2 to 5 were selected by the High Court and on the recommeadation of the High Court. the Governor appointed them. as Assistant Judges as _per Government notification dated December 27, 1974, the m1terial part of which read thus:\n\n\"Sachivalaya, Bombay-400032, 27th December, 1974.\n\nNo. DAJ .]071/687-H-f. The following persons are appointed as Assistant Judges on an officiating basis initially till they ure appointed as District Judges, with effect from the dates on. which they assume charge of their appointn1ents:\n\nI. Shri Ishwarchand Gulabchand Shah\n\n2. Shri Bhaskar Dattatraya Bhirud\n\n3. Shri Hai ivandh Hira I al Kantharia 4.\n\nShri Anant Dhyanu Mane\n\nBY order ard in the name of the Governor of Maharashtra.\n\nSd/-M.B. Deshmukh Deputy Secretary to Government\".\n\nRespondents Nos. 2 to 5 accordingly were posted as Assistant Judges in January, 1975. In the list of Assistant Judges which was in force then the appellants-were shown at serial Nos. 5 and 6 and respondents Nos. 2 to 5 were shown at serial Nos. 25 to 28.\n\nLater on by a notification dated February I, 1917, respondents Nos. 2 to 5 were promoted to officiate as District Judges alongwith one\n\nShri M.M. Sonak but by a notification dated February 5. 1977 which\n\n\\Vas issued as a corrig'.?ndun1 to the notification. dated _February 1, 1977, respondents No. 2 to 5 were shown as having been appointed to offioiate as District Judges. The appellants who were workini: as Assistant Judges from 1971 were not promoted alongwith respondents Nos. 2 to 5. The appellants who felt aggrieved by the appointment of respondents N'.)s. 2 to 5 filed a petition before the Hiih\n\nCourt of Bonibay claiming that they should be treated as haveing been promoted as District Judges on the same date on whichr espondent. No. 2 was appointed and placed above respondents Nos.\n\n2 to 5 in the seniority list on the ground that they were senior to respondents Nos. 2 to 5 in the cadre .of Assistant Judges. The petitions were d'smissed by the High Court by a common judgment.\n\nThe appellants. have filed these appeals by special leave against the judgment of the High Court.\n\nThe solution to the problem before us depends upon the true meaning of the relevant provision of the Bombay Judicial Service D Recruitment Rules, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules') which govern the recruitment to the differnt cadres in the Judicial Service of the State of Maharashtra.\n\n' Rule 3 of the Rules provides that the Judicial Service. in Maharashtra shall consist of two Branches-(a) the Junior Branch, and (b) the Senior Branch. The Junior Branch consists of the following class I Officers namely (I) Judges of the small Causes Courts at places other than Bombay; (2) Civil Judges '(Senior Division);\n\n(3) Judges of the small Causes Courts at Bombay and Metropolitan Magistrates; and (4) Civil Judges (Junior Division) and Judicial Magistrates of the First Class (5) Metropolitan Magistrates, Juvenile Court, Bombay. The Senior Branch of the Judicial Service consisti of District Judges, the Principal Judge and the Judges of the Bombay City Civil Court, the Chief Judge and the Additional Chief Jud:e of the Small Causes Court, Bombay, the Chief Presidency Magistrate, Bombay and the Assistant Judges. Rule 4 of the Rules deals with the method of recruitment to the Junior Branch with which we are not concerned. Rule 5 deals with the method of recruitment to the\n\nSenior Branch. Sub.rule (4) of Rules 5 of the Rules provides that appointments to the posts of Assistant Judges shall be made by the Governor in consultation with the High Court by promotion from the Civil Judges (Junior Division) or Civil Judges (Senior Division) . of not less than seven years standing. The appellants were promoted andap pointed as Assistant Judges under this sub-rule, Sub-rulo .\n\nB.V. CHAWAN V, MAHARASHTRA (Venkataramiah, J.) 723\n\n(2) of Ruic 5 which provides for the appointment of District Judges reads thus:\n\n\"5. (2) District Judges and Judges of the Bombay City Civil Court-\n\n(i) District Judges.-Appointmcnts to the posts of District Judges shall be made by the Governor-\n\n(a) in consultation with the High Court by pro- .motion from the members of the Junior Branch who have ordinarily served as Assistant Judges, and\n\n(b) on the recommendation of the High Court from members of the Bar who have practised as advocates or pleaders for not Jess than seven years in the High Court, or courts subordinate thereto:·\n\nProvided that a person recruited at the age of not more than forty-five years, fifty years in the case of a pers0n belonging to a community recognised as backward by Government for the purpoS<s of recruitnient, sl111l first be appointed to work as Assistant Judge for such period as may be decided by Government on the merits of his case on the recommendations of the High Court before he is ap .:ointed as a District :Judge:\n\nProvided further that ordinarily the proportion of post fiiled in by promotion, under clause (a) and those . by appoi[ltment from members of the Bar under clause\n\n(b) shall be 50 : ~O.\"\n\nRule 5(2) 'of the Rules provides for two methods of appointment to the posts of District Judges (i) by promotion of members of the Junior Branch who have served as Assistant Judges and (ii) by direi:t recruitment from members of the Bar. When an Assistant Judge is promoted as a District Judge, he becomes entitled to function as 1 District Judge from the date of such promotion. But the proviso to Rule 5 (2) (i) (b) provides that when a member of the Bar is recruited as a District Judge and he is Jes then forty-five years of age on the dated of such recruitment (he is Jess than fifty years in the case of a person belonging to a backward 9oinmunity)\n\nhe hall first be appointed to work as Assistant Judge for such period as may be decided by the Government on the merits of his cas on the recommendation of the High Court before he is appointed as a District Judge. That means that even though a members ef the Bar is recruited as a District Judge, he may be asked to\n\nserve as an Assistant Judge f, ir a sp, cined period if he is below the prescribed age as st ted above. When he so functions as the Assistant Judge he 'ou'd not be strictly in law a person appointed as an Assistant Judge for thero is no provision for direct recruitment to the cadre of A55istant Judges.\n\nHe would only be a person who is recruited as a District Judge but posted as an Assistant Judge to gain the requisite judicial experience in that post before being entrusted with the duties of a District Judge. He cannot, therefore, be called.as a momber of the cadre of A<sistant •Judge subject to the rule of seniority applicable to the regular members of that cadre who are appointed by promotion from the Junior Branch. Inclusion of the name of such a person .in the list of Assistant J udges does not confer any right on such regular Assistant Judges appoint<d by pro.motion from the Junior Branch who are placed above him in the said list to claim seniority over him. He has to be posted as District Judge on the expiry of the period during which he has to work as an Assistant Judge under the proviso to Rule 5 (2) (i) (b) _of the Rules.\n\nThe other Assistant Judges promoted froni the Junior Branch in the list can become District Jud:es only when they are appointed in their turn under Rule 5 (2) (i; (a).\n\nJn the instant case, respondents Nos. 2 to 5 were appointed as District Judges after their prescribed stint in the cadre of Assistant Judges was over in 1977 but the appellants could be promoted under Rule 5 (2) (i) (a) only subsequently.\n\nIn the circumstances since as between the appeUants on the one luind and respondents No. 2 to 5 on the other there being no comparison, it cannot be said that there is any violation of Article 14 or Article 16 of the Constitution. lt appears that all this confusion starting with the i; sue of the notification inviting applications for purposes of recruitment under Rules 5 (2) (i) (b) of the Rules as arisen on account of the practice of including the names of the direct recruits from the Bar to the cadre of District Judges while they are serving as Assistant Judges under the proviso to Rule 5 (2) (i) (b) of the Rules in the same list alongwith Assistant Judges promoted from the Junior Branch. If a separate list of such persons was there, there would not have been any room for such confusion.\n\nThe High Court was right in negativing the claim of the appellants i11 the circumstances of the case.\n\nNo othn ground is urged.\n\nIn the result these appeals fail and they are dismissed but without any order as to costs.\n\nH.S.K.\n\nAppeals dismissed.\n\n/\"~'-·\n\n_;...\n\n' :\n\nf f ' •", "total_entities": 41, "entities": [{"text": "A\n\nBAlASAHEB VISHNU CHAVAN", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 23, "end_char": 49, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BALASAHEB VISHNU CHAVAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 51, "end_char": 77, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "0. Ctt!NNAPPA REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 100, "end_char": 119, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R.B. MISRA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 145, "end_char": 160, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.B. MISRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Bombay Judicial Service Recruitment Rules, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1565, "end_char": 1612, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2691, "end_char": 2701, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2705, "end_char": 2715, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "B.u", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2866, "end_char": 2869, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lt appears that all this confusion has arisen on ;1u:ount of the practice of including the names of the direct recruits from the B.u to the cadre of District Judges while they are serving as Assistant Judges under the proviso to Rufo 5(2)(iJ(b) of the Rules in the :same list ."}}, {"text": "U. R. La", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3465, "end_char": 3473, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "763 oJ 1981 with Special Civil Application No, 1323 c'f J 978.. - \"'\n\nU. R. La/it."}}, {"text": "V. N. Ganpu", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3478, "end_char": 3489, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. N. Ganpu/e and Mrs. V. D. Khan11a for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "V. D. Khan11a", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3501, "end_char": 3514, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. N. Ganpu/e and Mrs. V. D. Khan11a for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "A.V. Sawa11", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3538, "end_char": 3549, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A.V. Sawa11t, .11!.N. Shroff: S.M. Shalt, P. Sankara Naraymw for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "S.M. Shalt", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3568, "end_char": 3578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A.V. Sawa11t, .11!.N. Shroff: S.M. Shalt, P. Sankara Naraymw for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "P. Sankara Naraymw", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3580, "end_char": 3598, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A.V. Sawa11t, .11!.N. Shroff: S.M. Shalt, P. Sankara Naraymw for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "S.B. Bhasme", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3621, "end_char": 3632, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.B. Bhasme, Gopa!,"}}, {"text": "V.B. Saliarya", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3678, "end_char": 3691, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V.B. Saliarya and R.N. Poddar for Repondent (U 0.1.)."}}, {"text": "R.N. Poddar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3696, "end_char": 3707, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V.B. Saliarya and R.N. Poddar for Repondent (U 0.1.)."}}, {"text": "H VENKATARAMIAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3778, "end_char": 3793, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nH VENKATARAMIAH, J. The appellant in Civil App?", "canonical_name": "H VENKATARAMIAH"}}, {"text": "B.V. Chavan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3855, "end_char": 3866, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5995 of 1983 is Shri B.V. Chavan and the appellant 111 Civil Appeal Nlt\n\n.,.", "canonical_name": "B.V. CHAWAN V"}}, {"text": "Venkataramiah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3955, "end_char": 3968, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CHA VAN v. MAHARASHTRA (Venkataramiah, J.) 721\n\n6000 of 1983 is Shri A.A. Halbe.", "canonical_name": "H VENKATARAMIAH"}}, {"text": "A.A. Halbe", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4000, "end_char": 4010, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CHA VAN v. MAHARASHTRA (Venkataramiah, J.) 721\n\n6000 of 1983 is Shri A.A. Halbe."}}, {"text": "I.G. Shah", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4779, "end_char": 4788, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 to 5 Shri I.G. Shah, Shri B.S. Bhirud, Shri H.H. Kantharia and Shri A.D. Mane alongwith many others applied for the same, Ultimately respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "B.S. Bhirud", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4795, "end_char": 4806, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 to 5 Shri I.G. Shah, Shri B.S. Bhirud, Shri H.H. Kantharia and Shri A.D. Mane alongwith many others applied for the same, Ultimately respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "H.H. Kantharia", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4813, "end_char": 4827, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 to 5 Shri I.G. Shah, Shri B.S. Bhirud, Shri H.H. Kantharia and Shri A.D. Mane alongwith many others applied for the same, Ultimately respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "A.D. Mane", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4837, "end_char": 4846, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 to 5 Shri I.G. Shah, Shri B.S. Bhirud, Shri H.H. Kantharia and Shri A.D. Mane alongwith many others applied for the same, Ultimately respondents Nos."}}, {"text": "Ishwarchand Gulabchand Shah", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5445, "end_char": 5472, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "which they assume charge of their appointn1ents:\n\nI. Shri Ishwarchand Gulabchand Shah\n\n2."}}, {"text": "Bhaskar Dattatraya Bhirud", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5482, "end_char": 5507, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Bhaskar Dattatraya Bhirud\n\n3."}}, {"text": "Hai ivandh Hira I al Kantharia", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5517, "end_char": 5547, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Hai ivandh Hira I al Kantharia 4."}}, {"text": "Anant Dhyanu Mane", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5557, "end_char": 5574, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Anant Dhyanu Mane\n\nBY order ard in the name of the Governor of Maharashtra."}}, {"text": "M.M. Sonak", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6083, "end_char": 6093, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 to 5 were promoted to officiate as District Judges alongwith one\n\nShri M.M. Sonak but by a notification dated February 5."}}, {"text": "s. 2 to 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6504, "end_char": 6513, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hiih\n\nCourt of Bonibay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6542, "end_char": 6564, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 to 5 filed a petition before the Hiih\n\nCourt of Bonibay claiming that they should be treated as haveing been promoted as District Judges on the same date on whichr espondent."}}, {"text": "Maharashtra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7394, "end_char": 7405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in Maharashtra shall consist of two Branches-(a) the Junior Branch, and (b) the Senior Branch."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7613, "end_char": 7619, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Junior Branch consists of the following class I Officers namely (I) Judges of the small Causes Courts at places other than Bombay; (2) Civil Judges '(Senior Division);\n\n(3) Judges of the small Causes Courts at Bombay and Metropolitan Magistrates; and (4) Civil Judges (Junior Division) and Judicial Magistrates of the First Class (5) Metropolitan Magistrates, Juvenile Court, Bombay."}}, {"text": "Metropolitan Magistrates, Juvenile Court, Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7824, "end_char": 7872, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Junior Branch consists of the following class I Officers namely (I) Judges of the small Causes Courts at places other than Bombay; (2) Civil Judges '(Senior Division);\n\n(3) Judges of the small Causes Courts at Bombay and Metropolitan Magistrates; and (4) Civil Judges (Junior Division) and Judicial Magistrates of the First Class (5) Metropolitan Magistrates, Juvenile Court, Bombay."}}, {"text": "Bombay City Civil Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7987, "end_char": 8010, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Senior Branch of the Judicial Service consisti of District Judges, the Principal Judge and the Judges of the Bombay City Civil Court, the Chief Judge and the Additional Chief Jud:e of the Small Causes Court, Bombay, the Chief Presidency Magistrate, Bombay and the Assistant Judges."}}, {"text": "Small Causes Court, Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8066, "end_char": 8092, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Senior Branch of the Judicial Service consisti of District Judges, the Principal Judge and the Judges of the Bombay City Civil Court, the Chief Judge and the Additional Chief Jud:e of the Small Causes Court, Bombay, the Chief Presidency Magistrate, Bombay and the Assistant Judges."}}, {"text": "Chief Presidency Magistrate, Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8098, "end_char": 8133, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Senior Branch of the Judicial Service consisti of District Judges, the Principal Judge and the Judges of the Bombay City Civil Court, the Chief Judge and the Additional Chief Jud:e of the Small Causes Court, Bombay, the Chief Presidency Magistrate, Bombay and the Assistant Judges."}}, {"text": "B.V. CHAWAN V", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8725, "end_char": 8738, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B.V. CHAWAN V, MAHARASHTRA (Venkataramiah, J.) 723\n\n(2) of Ruic 5 which provides for the appointment of District Judges reads thus:\n\n\"5. (", "canonical_name": "B.V. CHAWAN V"}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12698, "end_char": 12708, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "He has to be posted as District Judge on the expiry of the period during which he has to work as an Assistant Judge under the proviso to Rule", "statute": "He has to be posted as District Judge on the expiry of the period during which he has to work as an Assistant Judge under the proviso to Rule"}}, {"text": "Article 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12712, "end_char": 12722, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "He has to be posted as District Judge on the expiry of the period during which he has to work as an Assistant Judge under the proviso to Rule", "statute": "He has to be posted as District Judge on the expiry of the period during which he has to work as an Assistant Judge under the proviso to Rule"}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_2_741_749_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "SADHU SINGH RODA S/O BUTA SINGH ETC.\n\nSTATE OF PUNJAB\n\n. January 25, 1984\n\n[V.D. TULZAPURKAR, R.S. PATHAK AND SABYASACHI\n\nMUKHARJI JJ.]\n\nCode of Criminal Procedure 1973-Secs. 433 and 433A.\n\nPunjab Jail Manual-Para 516-B-Interpretatlon of-Para 516-B Is nat a statutory rule but contains executive instructions which can be amended by subsequent executive instructions issued by State Gcwernment.\n\nParagraph S 16-B of the Punjab Jail Manual provided Inter alla that after a person sentenced to 1:re imprisonment had undergone detention for the period specified in that paragraph together with remission earned, his case sbuld be submitted to the State Government for consideration of his pre-mature release. In 1971 the State Government issued instructions laying down certain minimum period of actual detention to be undergone by a person sentenced tO life imprisonment before his case for pre.mature release could be considered by the State Government.\n\nIn 1976 the State Government. issued further inHructions that cases of life convicts whose death sentence had heed commuted to life imprisonment should be considered' for premature release only after completion of 14 years of actual imprisonment.\n\nThe petitioners, who claimed to have satisfied t le requirements of para 516-B and thus become entitled to be cansidered for pre-mature release under that paragraph, alleged that following the 1971 and 1976 instructions the jail authorities were not submitting their cases to the State Government for consideration of their pre-mature release.\n\nThe petitioners contended that para 516-B was a statutory rule and the subsCquent executive instructions issued in 1971 and 1976 could not amend or alter the statutory rule thereby adversely affecting their rights under Para 516-B.\n\nDismissing the five petitions and a l1owing two petitions,\n\nHELD : A sentence of imprisonment for life is a sentence for the n maioder of the natural life of the convict and there is no question releasing such a convict earlier ill the absence of a formal order of commutation passed by the State Gove1nment either under sec. 55, IPC. or sec. 433 (b) . of Cr. P.C. 1973 and that even the Remission Rules, though statutory, cannot over-ride the statutory prOvisions contained in the Penal Code.\n\nAdmittedly, in the case of none of the petitioners before the Court bas any order of commutation been passed b:Y the State Government und;;:r either of tbe said provisioQs. [74, E-F]\n\n~UPREMB COURT REPORTS\n\n(1984) 2 s.c.&.\n\nPandit Klshori Lal, AIR 1945 PC. 64; Gopal Godse [1961] 3 SC.R. 440; Mam Ram, (1981] I S.C.R .. 1196 and Kartar Singh (1982] 3 S.C.R. l; referred to.\n\nPara 516-B of the manual itself contained executive instructions and had no force of a statutory rule.\n\nIf that be so it would always be open to the State Government from time to time to alter or amend or even withdraw such executiVe instructions by issuing fresh instructions.\n\nBut once fresh instructions for processing the cases for lifers for pre-mature release are issued these must be uniformly and invariably applied to all cases of lifers so as to avoid the Charge of discrimia:Hion under Art. 14 of the Constitution. [748E-F]\n\nIn Naranjan Singh's case (Which decision is subject matter of challenge in criminal appeal arising from leave being granted in SLP (Crl.) No. 499 of 1983) the fact that the State Government had issued the 1971 instruction which substituted Para 516-B of the manual was not properly placed before the High Court and in the absence of such proper material the High Court took the view that the convict's ca!>e for pre-mature release was required to be considered in the light of the provisions of Para 516-B.\n\nThe view of the High Court cannot obviously 1'o accepted. [7480-H]\n\nThe contention of tbe petitioners that the State had been erroneously making a distinction between cases of prisoners who had been sentenced to death but whose sentences, oo mercy petitions, had been commuted to Jife imprisonment and prisoners who had been straigbtawiiy sentenced to Jife imprisonment in the matter of consideration of their cases for pre-mature reiease, must fail in view of the admitted position that cases of prisoriers who have been sentenced to death but whose sentence en mercy petitions has been commuted to life-imprisonment {who constitute a distiOct class) will now be governed by the 197.6 Instructions.\n\nThe view of the High Court in the case of Mehar Singh v. State of P.unjab __ (not reported} that the.1976 instructions Wiil not be applicable to cases of prisoners convicted earlier to that date is not tenable.\n\nClearly existing cases of life 'convict's falling within that category .will be governed by those instructions. [749A-CJ\n\nORIGINAL JURISDiCTION: Writ Petition (Criminal) Nos. 64 to 70 of 1983.\n\nUnder article 32 of the Constitution of fndia\n\nMrs. Urmila Sirur, Sanjeev Puri and Amerdeep Jaiswal for the Petitioners.\n\nHarbai1s Singh and S.K. Bagga for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nTULZAPURKAR, J. In the context of the right of the 'lifers' H (prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment prior to 18th December,\n\nSADHU SINGH v. PUNJAB (Tu/zapurkar, J.) 743\n\n1978 being the date of coming into force of sec. 433A, Cr.P.C.) to have their cases considered for pre-mature release ander the Punjab Jail Manual two contentions were urged by counsel appearing for the lifers before us in the above matters.\n\nFirst, it was contended that such lifers were entitled to have their cases for pre-mature release considered by the concerned authorities on completion of ten years of sentence inclusive of remissions in the case of a female prisoner or a male prisoner of under 20 years of age at the date of the commission o'f the offence or completion of 14 years of sentence inclusive of .remissions in the case of adult prisoners under Para 516-B of the .Punjab Jail Manual but since November, 1971 the authorities concerned are not submitting their cases for such consideration until actual substantive imprisonment has been undergone for 6 years in case of female prisoners and prisoners below 20 years at the date of the commission of the 'Offence and 8! years in case Qf adult prisoners and in that behalf certain executive instructions issued by the Punjab Government on 6th August, 197 i are being relied upon but according to the counsel for the lifers such executive instructions issued in 1971 cannot affect the right conferred upon the lifers under Para 516-B which has the force ofa statutory rule and Statutory Rules canpoi be amended or altered by any executive instructions; hence the lifers concerned in these matters are entitled to have their cases considered for pre.mature release since they satisfy the requirements of Para 516-B of the Punjab Jail Manual.\n\nIn this behalf counsel relied upon the Punjab High Court's decision dated 9.l!.1982 in- Naranjan Singh's case (which decision is subject- ·. matter of challenge in Criminal Appeal arising from leave being granted in SLP (Cr!. No. 499/1983).\n\nIn othet words, cqunsel . canvassed for acceptance of the Punjab High Court's view in the aforesaid case by this Court.\n\nSecondly, counsel for the lifers urged that the Sta.le of Punjab has been erroneously making a distinction between cases of Prisoners who have bee~ sentenced to death but whose sentences, on mercy petitions, have been commuted to life imprisonment and prisoners who have been straightaway sentenced to life imprisonment in the matter of consideration of their cases for pre-mature release in that in the case of the former completion of 14 years of actual sentence is insisted upon while in the case of the latter only 8§: years of actual sentence is regarded as sufficient for such consideration, the case of Tapinder Singh s/o Manjit Singh, the petitioner in Writ Petition (Cr!.) No. 68 of 1983 being in point. According to counsel the State Government in this behalf has been relying upon certain\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(I 9 84) 2 S.C.11.\n\nexecutive instructions issued on 30th of January, 1976 but counsel pointed out that in the case of Mehar Singlz v. State~( Punjab(l) a Single Judge of the Punjab High Court held that those instructions will not be applicable to cases of prisoners convicted earlier to that date and Special Leave Petition (Cr!.) No. 2142 of 1982 preferred by the State of Punjab against that decision was dismissed by this Court on 18th of February, 1983 and, therefore, it is not open to the State Government to rely upon those executive instructions issued on 30th January, 1976 for making the distinction and postponing the consi- deration of the cases of prisoners falling within the former category until 14 years of actual imprisonment has been suffered by them.\n\nparagraph 516-B of the Punjab Jail Manual runs thus:\n\n516-B. (a) With tho exception of females and of males who were under 20 years of age at the time of commission of offence, the cases of ePery convicted prisoner sentenced to:-\n\n(i) Imprisonment for life.\n\n(ii) fo1prisonment/s for life and term/s of imprisonment.\n\n(iii) Cumulative Periods of Rigorous imprisonment aggregating of more than 14 years.\n\n(iv) a single sentence of more than 20 years. :-\n\n(a) who has undergone a period of detention in jail amounting together with remission earned to 14 years, shall be submitted through the Inspectors General of Prisons, Punjab for the orders of the State Government.\n\n(b) the case of a female prisoner and of a male prisoner under 20 years of age at the time of commission of offence, who is undergoing-\n\n(i) Imprisonment/s for life.\n\n(ii) Imprisonment/s for life and a term/s of im.prisonment.\n\n(1) Unreportod\n\n.,.\n\n-~ -\n\nSADHU SINGH v. PUNJAB {Tulzapurkar, J.)\n\n(iii) Cumulative periods of Rigorous imprisonment aggregating to more than 10 years. or;\n\n(iv) A single sentence .of more than 20 years shall be submitted through the Inspector General of Prisons, Punjab, for the orders of the Staie Government when the prisoner has undergone a period of detentiPn in jail amounting togetAer with remission earned to 10 years.\n\n14~\n\n(v) Notwithstanding anything contained above, a ·\n\nSuperintendent, Jail may, in his discretion, refer at any time, for the orders of the State Government through the Inspector-General of Prisoners, Punjab, the case of any prisoner sentenced to imprisonment for life whose sentence might in the Superintendent's opinion be suitably commuted into a term of imprisonment.\"\n\nIt appears that from -time to time the State Government had been examining the question of, and the procedure for, submission of Roles for pre-mature release of prisoners as contained in the aforesaid Para 516-B of the Manual and after considerable deliberation the State Government took a policy decision in 1971 and issued instructions (hereinafter called 'the 1971 Instructions') providing that a period of actual sentence of St years in the case of adult lifers and 6 years in the case of female prisoners and those below 20 years of age at thr time of the commission of the offence should be regarded as the qualifying period for consideration of their cases for pre-mature release and in .this behalf a Memorandum No. J3311- 6JJ-7 l/39656 dated 10th of November, 1971 containing the aforesaid instructions was issued by ihe State Government to the Inspector- General of Prisons, Punjab and it was clarified that all cases of prisoners should be sent for consideration of their pre-mature release in the light of said policy decision with effect from 2nd of November,\n\n1971. It further appears that the question of releasing pre-maturely life convicts whose death sentence has been commuted was again considered by the State Government and it took a policy decision in January, 1976 that cases of such life convicts should be considered for pre-mature release only after completion 14 years of actual imprisonment and in that behalf a Memorandum No. 403-611-76/ 3456 dated 30th January, 1976 containing the necessary instructions (hereinafter called 'the 1976 Instructions') was issued by the State Government to the Inspector-General of Prisons, Punjab with a\n\n746 StlPRBMB COURT REORTS\n\n(1984) 2 S.C.R.\n\nrequest to diiect the Superintendents of Jails to submit cases of such life convicts for pre-mature release accordingly. (Copies of the Memoranda dated 10th of November, 1971 and 30th January, 1976 have been annexed as Annexures B and C to the Affidavit of Shri C.L. Goel in support of the SLP No. 499/19.83. filed by the State of Punjab in Naranjan Singh's case. (Proceedings of SLP No. 499/83 were made available to us at the bearing.) It may be stated that ·. these 1971 Instructions and 1976 Instructions though not incorporated in the Punjab Jail Maunal as yet, are being followed and implemented and it appears that relying on these Instructions the Jail Authorities are not submitting cases of the concerned lifers to the State Government for pre-maturo release though they may have sufferred the qualifying punishment under para 516-B of the Manual.\n\nHence Counsel for the petitioners herein bas raised the two contentions mentioned above. In our view, for the reasons which we are indicating presently, there is no substance in either of these contentions.\n\nIt is well settled as result of the Privy Conncil decision in Pandit Kishorl Lat's (I) case and this Court's decisions in Gopal Godse's (2) case, Maru Ram's (3) case and Kartar Singh's (4) case that a sentence of imprisonment for life is a sentence for the remainder of the natural life of the convict and there is no question releasing such a convict earlier in the absence of a formal order of commuta- . tion passed_ by the State Government either under sec. 55, IPC. 'or sec. 433 (b) of Cr. P.C. 1973 and that even the Remission Rules, though statutory, cannot over-ride the statutory provisions contained in the Penal Code. In other words, unlik0 the cases of prisoners sentenced to terms of imprisonment, m the case of!ifers even the Remission Rules though statutory are of no avail in the absence of a formal order of commutation either under sec. 55, !PC. or sec. 433\n\n(h) of Cr. P.C. 1973.\n\nAdmittedly, in the case of none Of the petitioners before us has any order of commutation been passed by the State Government under either of the said provisions and the petitioners are merely relying upon para. 516-B of the Punjab Jail Manual for contending that they am entitled to have their case.s considered for pre-mature release since they have undergone the requisite period of punishment-I 4 years/ 10 years inclusive of remissions as per the provisions of the said para and the contention is\n\n(1) A.I.R. 1945 P.C. 64. (2)\n\n[1961) 3 S.C.R. 440.\n\n(3) [19s1J 1 s.c.R. 1196.\n\nH (4) [1982) 3 s.c.c. 1.\n\n,.\\,-.\n\n~·-\n\n' ... ,.._ -\n\n• >\n\nthat since Para 516-B has the force of statutory rule the subsequent executive instructions (the 1971 Instructions or the 1976 Instructions) issued by the State Government cannot adversely affect their said right in as much as the effect of a statutory rule cannot be whittled down by executive instructions. On the other hand counsel for the State contended that the provisions contained in Para 516-B were themselves executive instructions and not a statutory rule and as such these could - be amended or altered from time to time by fresh executive instructions issued. by the State Government and therefore the petitioners' cases were not submitted to the concerned authorities for consideration of their' pre-mature release because of the subsequent executive instructions issued. in 1971 and 1976. We find ample material on record which supports the contention of counsel for the State.\n\nJn the first place, it may be stated that the marginal note against Para 516-B of the Punjab Jail Manual (1975 edition) clearly shows that the provisions thereof are based on a Government of India Resolution No. 159-167 dated 6th September, 1905, copy whereof was produced before us and the contents of the Resolution clearly show that various questions such as the places where transported prisoners should be kept, the nature of their punfahmnt, remission of sentences, pre-mature releases, etc. had engaged the attention of Government of India and decisions were taken on those questions. In particulr the Resolution records that the majority of the authorities consulted were in favour of the proposal of the U.P. Government that when the te1m of imprisonment undergone together with any remission earned under the rules amounted to 14 years the question of remitting the remainder of the imprisonment should be raised and the Governor-General in Council was accordingly pleas((d to direct that such a rule \"shall be ordinarily adopted in. future, though he would not, however, lay down that such prisoners must always be released at the end of the 14 years and it would still be open to, and indeed encumbent on, the Local Government to take into consideration, when deciding on the remission to be granted, circumstances of each, case, the character of the convict, his conduct in prison and the probability of his reverting to criminal habits or instigating others to commit crimes\". What is more copies of the Resolution were forwarded to various State Government \"for information and guidance.\" Thi; clearly shows that . the contents of Goyernment's Resolution dat.ed 6th September, 1905, on which para 516-B of the Punjab Jail Manual is based, were in the nature of executive instructions by way of guidance and not any hard and fast rule,\n\n-~'\n\n748 SUPRl!Mll COURT REPORTS (1984] 2 s.c.R.\n\nmuch less a statutory rule. Secondly, this position has been sufficiently clarified at . two places in the Punjab Jail Manual (1975 edition) itself. In the preface to that edition it has been clearly stated that the Paragraphs of the Manual against which a black line (side-line) appears arc in substance, either quotations from the Law or from the Rules having the force of the law while the portions of the Manual without a black line (side-line) are executive instruction which have from time to time been issued by the Government of India, Local Government or the In.spector General with the sanction and approval from the Local Government. and para 516-B is not side-lined by any black line.\n\nAgain, Chapter XX which deals with remission system contains Para 631 to 650 which comprise what in terms are called 'remission rules' presumably having statutory force since these paras are all side-lined, but what is of importance is that at the foot of para 63 i there is a Note which is nothing but a reproduction of para 516-B and at the end of Remission Rules (foot of para 650) there is a Nota bene which says that the Note to para 631 should not be regarded as part of the Statutory Rules but the same has been inserted for convenience of reference and with the object of assisting officers to. interpret the rulei. It is thus clear that para 516-B of the Manual iteslf contained executive instructions and had no force of a statutory rule. If that be so it would always be open to tho State Government from time to time to alter or amend or even whithdraw such executive instructions by issuing fresh instruction. In other words any existing execntive instructions co .Id be substituted by issuing fresh executive intructions for proce\"ing the cases of lifers for prematnre release but once issued these must be uniformly and invariably applied to all cases of lifers so as to avoid the charge of discrimination under Art. 14.\n\nReliance by Counsel for the petitioners on the Punjab High Court's decision in Naran}an Singh's case would be of no avail, However, we would like to observe that in that case the fact that the State Government had issued the 1971 Instructions which substituted para 516-B of the Manual was not properly placed before it and in the absence of such proper material the High Court took the view that the convict's case for per-mature release was required to be considered in the light of the provisions of para 516-B. The view of the Punjab High Court cannot obviously be accepted. The first contention urged by counsel therefore has to be rejected.\n\n),,_\n\nThe second. conicntion also must fail in view of the admitted position that cases of prisoners who have been sentenced to death but whose sentence on mercy petitions has. been commuted to lifeimprisonment (who constitute a distinct class) will now be governed by the 1976 lnstructioris.·. Here also the view of the Punjab High Court in the case of Melw Singh (supra) that the 1976 Instructions issued on 30th of January, 1976 will not be applicable to cases of prisoners convicted earlier to that . date is not tenable. Clearly existing cases or life convicts falling within that category will be governed by those instructions. It is true that SLP (Crl) No .• 2142/1982 preferred by State of Punjrb against that decision was dismissed by this Court on 18th February,· 1983 but the dismissal order passed by this Court itself indicates that this Court did so not because it approved the view of the Punjab High Court but that it \"did not consider this to be a prop'r cases for mterference in view of the peculiar facts of this case\". This Court did not deme on the facts of that case to interfere with the direction. given that the case of the convict should be submitted for consideration or his premature release.\n\nHaving regard to the above discussion it is clear there 1s no .., entitlement on the part of the petitioners other than Jang Smgh and Mukhtiar Singh to have their cases considered for pre-mature release immediately in view of 1971/ 1976 Instruction. Theil Writ Petitions are therefore dismissed.\n\nSo far as Jang Sing, h s/ o Bagga Singh and Mukhtiar Singh s/ o Harnam Singh are concerned even the Counter Affidavit of Shri K.C. Mahajan shows that in accordance with the 1971 Instruction they have undergone more than Xt years of actual imprisonment and as such they have the entitlement.\n\nWe therefore iosue a writ of Mandamus thet their cases be submitted for consideration of pre- ! . mature release for(h with without any delay.\n\nH.S.K.\n\nTwo p_titions allowed and five\n\npetitions tt/.1missed", "total_entities": 64, "entities": [{"text": "SADHU SINGH RODA S/O BUTA SINGH ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 35, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SADHU SINGH RODA S/O BUTA SINGH ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF PUNJAB", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 38, "end_char": 53, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF PUNJAB", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 25, 1984", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 57, "end_char": 73, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "January 25, 1984\n\n[V.D. TULZAPURKAR, R.S. PATHAK AND SABYASACHI\n\nMUKHARJI JJ.]"}}, {"text": "V.D. TULZAPURKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 76, "end_char": 92, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.D. TULZAPURKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R.S. PATHAK", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 94, "end_char": 105, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. PATHAK", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 137, "end_char": 168, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "S 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 406, "end_char": 410, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Code of Criminal Procedure 1973", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure 1973"}}, {"text": "sec. 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2101, "end_char": 2108, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "IPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2110, "end_char": 2113, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "sec. 433", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2118, "end_char": 2126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Ovisions contained in the Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2236, "end_char": 2272, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Pandit Klshori Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2499, "end_char": 2517, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pandit Klshori Lal, AIR 1945 PC.", "canonical_name": "Pandit Klshori Lal"}}, {"text": "[1961] 3 SC.R. 440", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 2548, "end_char": 2566, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3147, "end_char": 3154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Ovisions contained in the Penal Code", "statute": "Ovisions contained in the Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Naranjan Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3189, "end_char": 3203, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "748E-F]\n\nIn Naranjan Singh's case (Which decision is subject matter of challenge in criminal appeal arising from leave being granted in SLP (Crl.)", "canonical_name": "Naranjan Singh"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4807, "end_char": 4817, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Urmila Sirur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4853, "end_char": 4865, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under article 32 of the Constitution of fndia\n\nMrs. Urmila Sirur, Sanjeev Puri and Amerdeep Jaiswal for the Petitioners."}}, {"text": "Sanjeev Puri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4867, "end_char": 4879, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under article 32 of the Constitution of fndia\n\nMrs. Urmila Sirur, Sanjeev Puri and Amerdeep Jaiswal for the Petitioners."}}, {"text": "Amerdeep Jaiswal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4884, "end_char": 4900, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under article 32 of the Constitution of fndia\n\nMrs. Urmila Sirur, Sanjeev Puri and Amerdeep Jaiswal for the Petitioners."}}, {"text": "Harbai1s Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4923, "end_char": 4937, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Harbai1s Singh and S.K. Bagga for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "S.K. Bagga", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4942, "end_char": 4952, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Harbai1s Singh and S.K. Bagga for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "TULZAPURKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5018, "end_char": 5029, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nTULZAPURKAR, J. In the context of the right of the 'lifers' H (prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment prior to 18th December,\n\nSADHU SINGH v. PUNJAB (Tu/zapurkar, J.) 743\n\n1978 being the date of coming into force of sec."}}, {"text": "sec. 433A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5236, "end_char": 5245, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cr.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5247, "end_char": 5253, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Punjab Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6278, "end_char": 6295, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "years in case Qf adult prisoners and in that behalf certain executive instructions issued by the Punjab Government on 6th August, 197 i are being relied upon but according to the counsel for the lifers such executive instructions issued in 1971 cannot affect the right conferred upon the lifers under Para 516-B which has the force ofa statutory rule and Statutory Rules canpoi be amended or altered by any executive instructions; hence the lifers concerned in these matters are entitled to have their cases considered for pre.mature release since they satisfy the requirements of Para 516-B of the Punjab Jail Manual."}}, {"text": "6th August, 197", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6299, "end_char": 6314, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "years in case Qf adult prisoners and in that behalf certain executive instructions issued by the Punjab Government on 6th August, 197 i are being relied upon but according to the counsel for the lifers such executive instructions issued in 1971 cannot affect the right conferred upon the lifers under Para 516-B which has the force ofa statutory rule and Statutory Rules canpoi be amended or altered by any executive instructions; hence the lifers concerned in these matters are entitled to have their cases considered for pre.mature release since they satisfy the requirements of Para 516-B of the Punjab Jail Manual."}}, {"text": "Punjab High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6840, "end_char": 6857, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In this behalf counsel relied upon the Punjab High Court's decision dated 9.l!.1982 in- Naranjan Singh's case (which decision is subject- ·."}}, {"text": "Tapinder Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7774, "end_char": 7788, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Secondly, counsel for the lifers urged that the Sta.le of Punjab has been erroneously making a distinction between cases of Prisoners who have bee~ sentenced to death but whose sentences, on mercy petitions, have been commuted to life imprisonment and prisoners who have been straightaway sentenced to life imprisonment in the matter of consideration of their cases for pre-mature release in that in the case of the former completion of 14 years of actual sentence is insisted upon while in the case of the latter only 8§: years of actual sentence is regarded as sufficient for such consideration, the case of Tapinder Singh s/o Manjit Singh, the petitioner in Writ Petition (Cr!.)"}}, {"text": "Manjit Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7793, "end_char": 7805, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Secondly, counsel for the lifers urged that the Sta.le of Punjab has been erroneously making a distinction between cases of Prisoners who have bee~ sentenced to death but whose sentences, on mercy petitions, have been commuted to life imprisonment and prisoners who have been straightaway sentenced to life imprisonment in the matter of consideration of their cases for pre-mature release in that in the case of the former completion of 14 years of actual sentence is insisted upon while in the case of the latter only 8§: years of actual sentence is regarded as sufficient for such consideration, the case of Tapinder Singh s/o Manjit Singh, the petitioner in Writ Petition (Cr!.)"}}, {"text": "State of Punjab", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8354, "end_char": 8369, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2142 of 1982 preferred by the State of Punjab against that decision was dismissed by this Court on 18th of February, 1983 and, therefore, it is not open to the State Government to rely upon those executive instructions issued on 30th January, 1976 for making the distinction and postponing the consi- deration of the cases of prisoners falling within the former category until 14 years of actual imprisonment has been suffered by them."}}, {"text": "18th of February, 1983", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8423, "end_char": 8445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2142 of 1982 preferred by the State of Punjab against that decision was dismissed by this Court on 18th of February, 1983 and, therefore, it is not open to the State Government to rely upon those executive instructions issued on 30th January, 1976 for making the distinction and postponing the consi- deration of the cases of prisoners falling within the former category until 14 years of actual imprisonment has been suffered by them."}}, {"text": "30th January, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8553, "end_char": 8571, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2142 of 1982 preferred by the State of Punjab against that decision was dismissed by this Court on 18th of February, 1983 and, therefore, it is not open to the State Government to rely upon those executive instructions issued on 30th January, 1976 for making the distinction and postponing the consi- deration of the cases of prisoners falling within the former category until 14 years of actual imprisonment has been suffered by them."}}, {"text": "Unreportod", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9663, "end_char": 9673, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(1) Unreportod\n\n.,."}}, {"text": "10th of November, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11215, "end_char": 11237, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J3311- 6JJ-7 l/39656 dated 10th of November, 1971 containing the aforesaid instructions was issued by ihe State Government to the Inspector- General of Prisons, Punjab and it was clarified that all cases of prisoners should be sent for consideration of their pre-mature release in the light of said policy decision with effect from 2nd of November,\n\n1971."}}, {"text": "Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11349, "end_char": 11355, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J3311- 6JJ-7 l/39656 dated 10th of November, 1971 containing the aforesaid instructions was issued by ihe State Government to the Inspector- General of Prisons, Punjab and it was clarified that all cases of prisoners should be sent for consideration of their pre-mature release in the light of said policy decision with effect from 2nd of November,\n\n1971."}}, {"text": "2nd of November,\n\n1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11520, "end_char": 11542, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J3311- 6JJ-7 l/39656 dated 10th of November, 1971 containing the aforesaid instructions was issued by ihe State Government to the Inspector- General of Prisons, Punjab and it was clarified that all cases of prisoners should be sent for consideration of their pre-mature release in the light of said policy decision with effect from 2nd of November,\n\n1971."}}, {"text": "C.L. Goel", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12437, "end_char": 12446, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Copies of the Memoranda dated 10th of November, 1971 and 30th January, 1976 have been annexed as Annexures B and C to the Affidavit of Shri C.L. Goel in support of the SLP No."}}, {"text": "Pandit Kishorl Lat", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13304, "end_char": 13322, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is well settled as result of the Privy Conncil decision in Pandit Kishorl Lat's (I) case and this Court's decisions in Gopal Godse's (2) case, Maru Ram's (3) case and Kartar Singh's (4) case that a sentence of imprisonment for life is a sentence for the remainder of the natural life of the convict and there is no question releasing such a convict earlier in the absence of a formal order of commuta- .", "canonical_name": "Pandit Klshori Lal"}}, {"text": "Gopal Godse", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13364, "end_char": 13375, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is well settled as result of the Privy Conncil decision in Pandit Kishorl Lat's (I) case and this Court's decisions in Gopal Godse's (2) case, Maru Ram's (3) case and Kartar Singh's (4) case that a sentence of imprisonment for life is a sentence for the remainder of the natural life of the convict and there is no question releasing such a convict earlier in the absence of a formal order of commuta- ."}}, {"text": "Maru Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13388, "end_char": 13396, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is well settled as result of the Privy Conncil decision in Pandit Kishorl Lat's (I) case and this Court's decisions in Gopal Godse's (2) case, Maru Ram's (3) case and Kartar Singh's (4) case that a sentence of imprisonment for life is a sentence for the remainder of the natural life of the convict and there is no question releasing such a convict earlier in the absence of a formal order of commuta- ."}}, {"text": "Kartar Singh's", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13412, "end_char": 13426, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is well settled as result of the Privy Conncil decision in Pandit Kishorl Lat's (I) case and this Court's decisions in Gopal Godse's (2) case, Maru Ram's (3) case and Kartar Singh's (4) case that a sentence of imprisonment for life is a sentence for the remainder of the natural life of the convict and there is no question releasing such a convict earlier in the absence of a formal order of commuta- ."}}, {"text": "sec. 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13699, "end_char": 13706, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "IPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13708, "end_char": 13711, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "sec. 433", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13717, "end_char": 13725, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13859, "end_char": 13869, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "sec. 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14092, "end_char": 14099, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "sec. 433", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14109, "end_char": 14117, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPC", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "[1961) 3 S.C.R. 440", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 14675, "end_char": 14694, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15853, "end_char": 15872, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jn the first place, it may be stated that the marginal note against Para 516-B of the Punjab Jail Manual (1975 edition) clearly shows that the provisions thereof are based on a Government of India Resolution No."}}, {"text": "6th September, 1905", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15902, "end_char": 15921, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "159-167 dated 6th September, 1905, copy whereof was produced before us and the contents of the Resolution clearly show that various questions such as the places where transported prisoners should be kept, the nature of their punfahmnt, remission of sentences, pre-mature releases, etc."}}, {"text": "U.P. Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16389, "end_char": 16404, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In particulr the Resolution records that the majority of the authorities consulted were in favour of the proposal of the U.P. Government that when the te1m of imprisonment undergone together with any remission earned under the rules amounted to 14 years the question of remitting the remainder of the imprisonment should be raised and the Governor-General in Council was accordingly pleas((d to direct that such a rule \"shall be ordinarily adopted in."}}, {"text": "Goyernment", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17322, "end_char": 17332, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the contents of Goyernment's Resolution dat.ed 6th September, 1905, on which para 516-B of the Punjab Jail Manual is based, were in the nature of executive instructions by way of guidance and not any hard and fast rule,\n~'\n\n748 SUPRl!Mll COURT REPORTS (1984] 2 s.c."}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19502, "end_char": 19509, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Naran}an Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19591, "end_char": 19605, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reliance by Counsel for the petitioners on the Punjab High Court's decision in Naran}an Singh's case would be of no avail, However, we would like to observe that in that case the fact that the State Government had issued the 1971 Instructions which substituted para 516-B of the Manual was not properly placed before it and in the absence of such proper material the High Court took the view that the convict's case for per-mature release was required to be considered in the light of the provisions of para 516-B. The view of the Punjab High Court cannot obviously be accepted.", "canonical_name": "Naranjan Singh"}}, {"text": "Melw Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20514, "end_char": 20524, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Here also the view of the Punjab High Court in the case of Melw Singh (supra) that the 1976 Instructions issued on 30th of January, 1976 will not be applicable to cases of prisoners convicted earlier to that ."}}, {"text": "30th of January, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20570, "end_char": 20591, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Here also the view of the Punjab High Court in the case of Melw Singh (supra) that the 1976 Instructions issued on 30th of January, 1976 will not be applicable to cases of prisoners convicted earlier to that ."}}, {"text": "State of Punjrb", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20850, "end_char": 20865, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is true that SLP (Crl) No .• 2142/1982 preferred by State of Punjrb against that decision was dismissed by this Court on 18th February,· 1983 but the dismissal order passed by this Court itself indicates that this Court did so not because it approved the view of the Punjab High Court but that it \"did not consider this to be a prop'r cases for mterference in view of the peculiar facts of this case\"."}}, {"text": "18th February,· 1983", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20919, "end_char": 20939, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is true that SLP (Crl) No .• 2142/1982 preferred by State of Punjrb against that decision was dismissed by this Court on 18th February,· 1983 but the dismissal order passed by this Court itself indicates that this Court did so not because it approved the view of the Punjab High Court but that it \"did not consider this to be a prop'r cases for mterference in view of the peculiar facts of this case\"."}}, {"text": "Jang Smgh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 21503, "end_char": 21512, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Having regard to the above discussion it is clear there 1s no .., entitlement on the part of the petitioners other than Jang Smgh and Mukhtiar Singh to have their cases considered for pre-mature release immediately in view of 1971/ 1976 Instruction.", "canonical_name": "Jang Smgh"}}, {"text": "Mukhtiar Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21517, "end_char": 21531, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Having regard to the above discussion it is clear there 1s no .., entitlement on the part of the petitioners other than Jang Smgh and Mukhtiar Singh to have their cases considered for pre-mature release immediately in view of 1971/ 1976 Instruction."}}, {"text": "Jang Sing", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 21690, "end_char": 21699, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So far as Jang Sing, h s/ o Bagga Singh and Mukhtiar Singh s/ o Harnam Singh are concerned even the Counter Affidavit of Shri K.C. Mahajan shows that in accordance with the 1971 Instruction they have undergone more than Xt years of actual imprisonment and as such they have the entitlement.", "canonical_name": "Jang Smgh"}}, {"text": "Bagga Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21708, "end_char": 21719, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So far as Jang Sing, h s/ o Bagga Singh and Mukhtiar Singh s/ o Harnam Singh are concerned even the Counter Affidavit of Shri K.C. Mahajan shows that in accordance with the 1971 Instruction they have undergone more than Xt years of actual imprisonment and as such they have the entitlement."}}, {"text": "Harnam Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21744, "end_char": 21756, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So far as Jang Sing, h s/ o Bagga Singh and Mukhtiar Singh s/ o Harnam Singh are concerned even the Counter Affidavit of Shri K.C. Mahajan shows that in accordance with the 1971 Instruction they have undergone more than Xt years of actual imprisonment and as such they have the entitlement."}}, {"text": "K.C. Mahajan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21806, "end_char": 21818, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So far as Jang Sing, h s/ o Bagga Singh and Mukhtiar Singh s/ o Harnam Singh are concerned even the Counter Affidavit of Shri K.C. Mahajan shows that in accordance with the 1971 Instruction they have undergone more than Xt years of actual imprisonment and as such they have the entitlement."}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_2_750_759_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "7SO\n\nA-1\n\nSHIVRAM ANAND SHIROOR\n\nRADHABAI SHANTRAM KOWSHIK AND\n\nANOTHER\n\nJanuary 31, 1984\n\n(0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, E.S. VENKATARAMIAH AND\n\nR. B. MISRA, JJ.]\n\nBon1bay Rents llotel and Lodging House Rates Acts 1947.\n\nSeel/on 13\n\nMember of Armed Forces-Flat i11herited while in service-On retirement fro1n service-Whether could eject tenant frorn flat on ground of bona fide require1nent.\n\nInterpretation of Statutes :\n\nfVords o.t statute-clear and unambiguous-No question of construction ar/Ses-Court to giPe effect to plain woids.\n\nWords and Phrases :\n\n'regain possession'-Afeaning of.\n\nThe appellant '?'as a member of the armed forces of the Union from August, 19.42 .until August 17, 1970 when he retired from the Anny. 1'1 1964, bu inherited a flat fron1 his brother.\n\nThe respondent wa~ already the tenant bf the flat.\n\nSoon after retirement, he filed a suit against the respondent for ejectn1ent oa the grounds of default, sub letting and bOna fide personal requirement.\n\nWhile the suit was pending, the Bombay Rents, HOtcl and Lodging House Retes Control Act, }94 7 was amended in 197 5 by the introductiori of section I 3 A-1.\n\nThe appellant, therefore filed a fresh suit for eviction under ection 13 A-1, and produced therequired certificate.\n\nThe Rent Controller a1:d the Appellate Authority concurrently found that the appellant bona fide required. the flat for his own occupation and decreed the suit.\n\nThe respondent-tenant moved the High Court under Article 227, and the High Court while not interfering with the concurrent finding of the subordinate tribunals that the appellant bona fide required the premises for\n\n.;,\n\nSHIVRAM V, R.S. X:OWSHiK 751\n\nhis own occupation, Set aside the decree for eviction on the ground that section 13 Al did not enable a men1ber or a retired member of the armed forces to seek the remedy provided by section 13 Al. _if the premises were already in the occupation of lhe tenant when be became the landlord while being a member of the arined forces.\n\nAllowing 'the appeal to this Court,\n\nHELD : J. (i) The Bombay Rent Hotel and Lodging House. Rates Control Act, 1947 is a welfare legislation designed to protect tenants from harassment and unreasonable eviction by Lai1dlords.\n\nIt should, therefore be interpreted in a broad and liberal spirit so as to further and not to constrain the object of the Act.\n\nThe exclusionary provisions in the Act should be construed strictly so as to give a wide amplitude to the principal object of the legislation and to prevent its evasiOn on deceptive grouads.\n\nBut this does not mean 'that the intention of the legis!ature, expressed with sufficient vocabular cfa.rity or gathered by reference to permissible sources, may be by-passed. to. accommodate individual verions of what may appear reasonable. ['T55B-D]\n\n(ii) Wher.e the words of a statute can arise no question .of construction. themselves. [755D]\n\nare clear and unambiguous, there Such words ordinarily speak fOr\n\n(iii) A court should give effect to plain words. not because .there is . any charm or magic iO the plainness of such words 'but because plain Words\n\nmay be expected to convey plainly the intention of the Legislature. [755E]\n\nSection 13 A-1 of the Act was introduced in 1915, relaxing the rigour of section 13 in favour of a landlord who is or w<iS a member of the arn1ed forces.\n\nThe provision provides that if the landlord produces a certificate in the manner prescribed it shall be taken as established, without further proof that he was then a member of ihc armed forces of the Union\n\nor that he was such member and now a.retired ex-serviceman and that he did not possess any other suitable resider:ce -in the local area where he or any member of his family can reside.\n\nAll that he had to fllfther prove was that he bOna fide required the premises for occupation by himsclf_or any mrnber of his family.\n\nThe certificate is conclusive proof that.he did not possess any s_uilable residence in thC local area, and not that be bo11a fide required the premises for occupation by himself or any member 'of his_ family.\n\nAs soon as be established that he bona fide required the premises foi occupation he was entitled to recover possession, aod did not have to further prove that greater hardship could be caused to him than to the tenant if a decree for possession is not granted._[7560-G]\n\n3 .. It is impossible on the plain language of section 13 A\"'l of the Act to read down the provision as enabling a member or aretired member of the armed forces to recover possession of tile premises only if he bad himself originally let out the premises when he was the member. of the armed forces and not if tho tenancy had commenced before he became the\n\nlandlord of the premises either by inheritence, partition, or any. other H\n\n752 SUPREMB COURT RllPORTS (1984] 2 s.c.R.\n\nmode of transfer of property.\n\nTo place such an interpretation would be to virtually rewrite the prOvision. [757E-F]\n\nThe words 'regain possession' in the Statement of Object's and Reasons, merely mean 'obtain possession', and do not indicate that the member of the Armed Forces must have let the tenant into possession.\n\n(758G] Mrs. Winifred Ro<s and Anr. v. Mrs. Ivy Fonseca and Ors., [1983] (2) S.C. SCALE 900 referred to,\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No .. 2906 of 1981.\n\nC Appeal hy Special leave from Judgment and Order dated the\n\n6th July, 1981 of the Bamby High Court m Writ Petition No. 227 of 1981.\n\nRaju Ramachandran and Mrs. Sadhana Ramachandran for the Appellant.\n\nS.B. Bhasme, K.\n\nRajendra Choudhary and K. Sivraj Choudhary for Respondent.\n\nM N Shroff for Respondent No. 2 (NOT PRESENT)\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHINNAPPA\n\nREDDY, J.\n\nThe appellant in this appeal by special leave under Art. 136 of the Constitution was a member of the Armed Forces of the Union from August. 19~2 until August 17, 1970 when he retired from the Army, In 1964, he became the owner of a flat in. a co-operative society in Tardco Bombay having inherited the same from his brother. The respondent was already the tenant of the premises when the appcllent inherited it as the owner. Soon after his retirement, the appellant filed a suit for ejectment against the respondent on the grouuds of default in payment of rent, bona fide personal requirement and unlawful snblctting. This was iu 1971.\n\nWhile the suit was still pending, the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Centro! Act, 1947 was amended in 1975 by the introduction of sec. 13 A-L This was a special provision aimed at enabling a member of the Armed Forces of the Union or a retired members of the said Armed Forces to recover possession of premises hona fide required by him for his occupation or the occupation of members of his family on the production of a certificate from the Head of the Service or the Commanding Officer. The certificate was to specify that the indivi\n\nSBIVRAM v. R.S. KOWSHIK (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 753\n\ndual concerned was presently a member of the armed forecs of the Union or that he was such a member and was now a retired cx-servicomm and th•t he did not possess any other suitable residence in the local area wherever he or any member of bis family could reside. It was further provided that the certificate was to be conclusive evidence of the facts stated therein An important distinctin between the general provision contained in Section 13 (I) (g) and the special provision Section 13 A-1 is that under the special provision a tenant is disabled from taking advantage of Section 13 (2) which provides that no decree for eviction shall be passed on the ground specified in Sec.ion J 3 (!) fg) if the court is satisfied that having regard to all the circumstances of the case, greater hardship would be caused by passing the decree than by refusing to pass it.\n\nThe appellant, therefore, preferred to file a fresh. suit. for eviction of the respondent under Secrion 13 A-: of ihe Bombay Rent Act rather than pursue the suit filed in 1971.\n\nHe filed a fresh suit under the new provision. He produced the certificate required to be produced under Section 13 A-1. The Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority concurrently found that the Appellant bona fide required the flat for his own occupation and decreed the suit.\n\nThe tenant moved the High Court of Bombay under Art. 227 of the Constitution. A J.earned single Judge of the High Court, while . not interferring with the concurrent finding of the subordinate tribunals that the landlord bona fide require the premises for his own occupation, nevertheless set aside the decree for eviction on the ground that Section 13 A-I did not enable a member or a retired member of the armed forces to seek the remedy provided by Section 13 A-1 of the Bombay Rent Act if the premises were already in the occupation of the tenant when he became the landlord has .appealed under Art. 136 of the Constitution.\n\nSection 13 A-1 of the Bombay Rent Act is as follows:\n\n\"13 A-1 Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act (a) a landlord, who is a member of the armed forces of the Union, or who was sueh member and is duly retired (which term shall include premature retirement) shal! be entitled to recover possession. of any premises, on the ground that the premises are bona fide required by him for occupation by himself or any member of his family (which term shall include a parents or other relation ordinarily residing with him and dependent on him); und the Court shall pass a decree for eviction on such ground\n\nif the landlord, at the hearing of the suit, produces a certificate signed by the Head of his Service or his Commanding Officer to the effect that-\n\n(i) he is presently a member of the armed forces of the Union or he was suh member and is now a retired ex-service1nan;\n\n(ii) he does not possess any other suitable re.sidence in the local area where he or the member of his family can reside;\n\n(b) where a member of the armed forces of the Union dies while in service or such member is duly retired as stated above and dies wtihin five years of his retirement, his widow, who is or becomes a landlord of any premi.ses, shall be entitled to recover possession of such premises, on the . ground that the premises are bona fide required by her for occupation by herself of any member of he1• faimily (which term shall include her or her husband's parent or other relation ordinarily residing with her) : and the Court shall pass a decree for eviction on such ground, if such widow, • at the. suit, produces a certificate signed by the Area or Sub-area Commander within whose jurisdiction the premises are situated to the effect that-\n\n(i) she is a widow of a deceased member of the armed forces as aforesaid;\n\n(ii) .she does not possess any other suitable residence in the local area where she or the members of her family can reside.\n\nEplanation !-For the purpose of clause (al of this section, the expression \"the Head of this Service\", in the case of officers retired 'from the Indian Army includes the Area Commander, 'in the case of officers retired from the Indian Navy includes the Flag Officer Commanding-ill-Chief, Western Naval Command, and in the case of officers retired from the Indian Air Force includes the Station Commander.\n\n,.._\n\n-.,\n\nSHIVRAM v. R.S. KOWSHIK (Chinnappa Reddy,!.) 755\n\nExplanation 2-For the purposes of this section, any certificate granted thereunder shall be conclusive evidence of the facts stated therein\".\n\nIt is true, as pointed out by the learned Single Judge, the Bombay Rent Act is a welfare legislation designed among other matters, to protect tenants from harassment and unreasonable eviction by Landlords and it should, therefore he interpreted in a broad and liberal spirit so as to further and not to constrain the object of the Act.\n\nWe also agree that the exclusionary provisions in the Act should be construed strictly so as to give a wide amplitude to the principal object of the legislation and to prevent its evasion on deceptive grounds.\n\nBut this does nof mean that the intention of. the legislature, expressed with sufficient vocabular clarity or gathered by , reference to permissible sources, may be by-passed to accommodate individual versions of what may appear reasonable. The ta1k of an interpreter is to asce_rtain intention. It is often said, where the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous, there can arise no question of construction. Such words ordinarily speak for themselves.\n\nSince the _words must have._ . spoken as clearly to legislators . as to judges, it may be safely\n\npresumed that the legislature intended what the words plainly say.\n\nThis is the true basis of the so called golden rule of Construction that -\"Where the language of an Act is clear and explicit, we must give effect to it, -for in that case the words of the Statute speak the intention ofthe legislature\". A court should giveeffect to plain words not because there is any charm or magic in the plainness of such, words but because plain words may be expected to convey plainly the intention of the legislature.\n\nBearing these general principles in mind, if we look at Section !3 A-1 against the background and in the light of the object and the remaining provisions of the Act, what do we find ? As we said earlier one of the principal objects of the Act is to protect the tenant against unreasonable eviction by a landlord. So, the Act stipulates the grounds on which a Landlord may seek eviction of a tenai1t. Section 13' ( 1) (g) in particular enables a . lan.dlord to recover possession of any premises if the Court is satisfied 'that the premises are reasonably and bona-fide required by the landlord for occupation by himself or by any person for whose benefit the premises are held.\n\nSo solicitous indeed is the legislature about protecting the tenant that Section 13 (2) contains a further stipulation that : ·\n\n\"No decree for eviction shall bo plSscd on the ground specified in clause (g) of subsection (I) if the Court is satis.\n\nfled that, having regard to all the circumstances of the case including the question whether other reasonable accommodation is available for the landlord or the tenant greater hardship would be caused by passing the decree than by refusing to pass it'', and \"Where the Court is satisfied that no hardship would be caused either to the tenant or to the landlord by passing the decree fo respect of a part of the premises, the Court shall pass the decree in respect of such part only\".\n\nNotwithstanding the expressed legislative bias in favour of the tenant, the legislature itself made a serious departure from the general rule so as to lean in favour of landlords who are or were members of the armed services, and who because of the exigencies of their service were not able to occupy their own premises during the course of their service.\n\nSection 13 A-1 was enacted, relaxing the rigour of Section 13 in favour of a landlord who is or was a member of the armed forces.\n\nIt is now provided that if he produces a certificate in the manner preseribed it shall be taken as established, without further proof that he is presently a member of the armed forces of the Union or that he was such member and is now a retired exserviceman and that he does not possess any other suitable residence in the local area where he or any member of his family can reside.\n\nAll that he had to further prove is that he bona fide required the premises for occupation by himself or any member of his family.\n\nThe cerificate is conclusive proof that he did not possess any suitable residence in the local area, but not that he bona fide requires the same for occupation by himself or any member of his family. 1here may be cases where he does not possess any other suitable residence in the local area and yet he does not bona fide require the premises for occupation by himself or any member of his family, being comfortably settled elsewhere with a no need or pressure to move. But so soon as he establishes that he bona fide requires the premises for occupation for his family, he is, entitled to recover possession and docs not have to further prove that greater hardship would be caused to him than to the tenant if a decree for possesion is not granted.\n\nIt is of course, implicit that the person producing the certificate is the landlord. It is further implicit that the person mentioned in the certificate as presently or previously a member of the armed forces was at a simultaneous point of time both landlord and member of the armed forces.\n\nThis has been laid down recently by this Court in Mrs.\n\nWinifred Ross .h Anr. v. Mrs. Ivy Fonseca\n\nSHIVRAM v. R.S. KOWSHjK (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 757\n\nand Others (1) where it was observed :\n\n\"Having regard to the object and purposes of the Act and in particular Section 13 A-i it is difficult to hold that Section 13 A-I can be availed of by an ex-member of the armed forces to recover from a tenant possession of a buiiding which he acquires after his retirement.\n\nSince a liberal interpretation -of Section 13 A I of the Act is likely to expose it to a successful challenge on .the basis of Art. 14 of the Constitution, it has to be read down as conferring benefit only on those members of the armed forces who were landlords of the premises in question while they were in service even though they may avail of it after their retirement. Such a construction would save it from the criticism that it is discriminatory and also would advance the object of enacting it, namely, that members of the armed forces should not while they are in service feel worried about the difficulties of a long ifrawn out litigation when they wish to get back the premises which they have leased out during their service\". ·\n\nBut we find it impossible on the plain language of Section 13 A-1 to further read down the provision as enabling a member or a retired member of the armed forces to recover possession of the premises only if he had himself oiginally let out the premises 'when he was a member of the arined forces and not if the tenancy had commenced before he became the landlord of the premises either by inheritance, partition, or any _oher mode of transfer of property. To place such an interpretation would be to virtually rewrite the provi sion. The language of Section 13 A-I which is sufficiently plain does not warrant or invite such an interpretation. Nor is there anything elsewhere in the Act which compels such a construction The statement of object and reasons was read to us. It says,\n\n\"Defence Services Personnel are liable to transfers and\n\nto be stationed in different parts of the country. They are G ofte_n posted at non-family stations. Some of these personel, who possess their own premises either in their homo towns or elsewhere have necessarily to hire them out to other persons temporarily while they are away on duty. It has been represented to the State Government by the military\n\n(I) (1983] 2 S. C. sCALB 900 H\n\nauthorities that on their retirement or transfer to nonfamily stations the serving and ex-service personnel find it extremely difficult to regain possession of their premises which they badly require for personal occupation permanently or for housing their families for the duration of their posting at non-family stations. In case of death of a service personnel while in service or death of ex-service personnel shortly after the retirement, the widoll' also finds it extremely difficult to regain pornession of their premises for her personal occupation or occupation of her family.\n\nThe case of Defence Services Personnel due to their special obligations and disabilities do need d!fferent treatment from that accorded to other landlords and in fact special provisions have been made for them 'in some of the States, whereby processes for each personnel to regain possession of their premises have been simplified and made more effective ..\n\nIt is considered necessary to make a special provision in the Bombay . Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 to enable a member or retired member of the armed forces of the Union or a widow of such a member who dies while in service, or who dies within five years of his retirement, to regain possession of their premises, when bona fide reqnired for occupation by them or members of their families and to provide that the Court shall be bound to pass a decrrce for eviction on such ground if such member or widow, as landlord, produces, at the hearing of the suit, the necessary certificate signed by the Head of bis Service or His Commanding Officer or the Area or Sub-Area Commander within whose Jurisdiction the premises aresituated.\n\nThe Bill is intended to achieve these objects\"\n\nIt was said that the use of the words 'regain possession' in the statement of Objects and Reasons indicated that the member of the armed forces must have himself given possession, that is, he must have himself let 'the tenant into possession. We cannot read so much into the Statement of Object and Reasons and into the Statute, via the Statement of Objects and Reasons, 1 he words 'regain possession' in the context, are merely meant to convey 'obtain possession'. To our mind, the intention of the leislature is\n\n\"' ..\n\n-.. '\n\nSHIVRAM v. R.s. KOWSH(K (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 759\n\nexpressed with sufficient clarity by the la_nguage of Section 13 A-1 A and there is nothing either in the Statute or in the Statute or in the Statement of Objects and Reasons to suggest that the intention of the legislature was other thanwhat we have said. We therefore,· allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and restore those of the Rent Controller and the appellate authority. The parties will bear their respective costs. The respondents are given time till 30th September, 1984 to vacate the premises subject to their B filing within four weeks from today an undertaking which shall be in the form usually adopted in the Court.\n\nN.V.K.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 53, "entities": [{"text": "1\n\nSHIVRAM ANAND SHIROOR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7, "end_char": 31, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SHIVRAM ANAND SHIROOR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RADHABAI SHANTRAM KOWSHIK AND\n\nANOTHER", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 33, "end_char": 71, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RADHABAI SHANTRAM KOWSHIK AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "0. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 92, "end_char": 110, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "E.S. 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X:OWSHiK 751\n\nhis own occupation, Set aside the decree for eviction on the ground that section 13 Al did not enable a men1ber or a retired member of the armed forces to seek the remedy provided by section 13 Al. _"}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1734, "end_char": 1744, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "HOtcl and Lodging House Retes Control Act", "statute": "HOtcl and Lodging House Retes Control Act"}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1844, "end_char": 1854, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "HOtcl and Lodging House Retes Control Act", "statute": "HOtcl and Lodging House Retes Control Act"}}, {"text": "Rates Control Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2085, "end_char": 2108, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3178, "end_char": 3188, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3251, "end_char": 3261, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4389, "end_char": 4399, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Raju Ramachandran", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5446, "end_char": 5463, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raju Ramachandran and Mrs. Sadhana Ramachandran for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Sadhana Ramachandran", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5473, "end_char": 5493, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raju Ramachandran and Mrs. Sadhana Ramachandran for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "S.B. Bhasme", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5514, "end_char": 5525, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.B. Bhasme, K.\n\nRajendra Choudhary and K. Sivraj Choudhary for Respondent."}}, {"text": "K.\n\nRajendra Choudhary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5527, "end_char": 5549, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.B. Bhasme, K.\n\nRajendra Choudhary and K. Sivraj Choudhary for Respondent."}}, {"text": "K. Sivraj Choudhary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5554, "end_char": 5573, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.B. Bhasme, K.\n\nRajendra Choudhary and K. Sivraj Choudhary for Respondent."}}, {"text": "M N Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5591, "end_char": 5601, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M N Shroff for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "CHINNAPPA\n\nREDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5682, "end_char": 5698, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 (NOT PRESENT)\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHINNAPPA\n\nREDDY, J.\n\nThe appellant in this appeal by special leave under Art.", "canonical_name": "CHINNAPPA\n\nREDDY"}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5756, "end_char": 5764, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Tardco Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5971, "end_char": 5984, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a co-operative society in Tardco Bombay having inherited the same from his brother."}}, {"text": "sec. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6484, "end_char": 6491, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chinnappa Reddy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6917, "end_char": 6932, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The certificate was to specify that the indivi\n\nSBIVRAM v. R.S. KOWSHIK (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 753\n\ndual concerned was presently a member of the armed forecs of the Union or that he was such a member and was now a retired cx-servicomm and th•t he did not possess any other suitable residence in the local area wherever he or any member of bis family could reside.", "canonical_name": "CHINNAPPA\n\nREDDY"}}, {"text": "dual", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6943, "end_char": 6947, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The certificate was to specify that the indivi\n\nSBIVRAM v. R.S. KOWSHIK (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 753\n\ndual concerned was presently a member of the armed forecs of the Union or that he was such a member and was now a retired cx-servicomm and th•t he did not possess any other suitable residence in the local area wherever he or any member of bis family could reside."}}, {"text": "Section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7377, "end_char": 7387, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7422, "end_char": 7432, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7519, "end_char": 7529, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Rent Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7926, "end_char": 7941, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8091, "end_char": 8101, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Rent Act", "statute": "Bombay Rent Act"}}, {"text": "High Court of Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8288, "end_char": 8308, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The tenant moved the High Court of Bombay under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8315, "end_char": 8323, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Rent Act", "statute": "Bombay Rent Act"}}, {"text": "Section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8609, "end_char": 8619, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Rent Act", "statute": "Bombay Rent Act"}}, {"text": "Section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8719, "end_char": 8729, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Rent Act", "statute": "Bombay Rent Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8866, "end_char": 8874, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Rent Act", "statute": "Bombay Rent Act"}}, {"text": "Section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8897, "end_char": 8907, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Rent Act", "statute": "Bombay Rent Act"}}, {"text": "Section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13465, "end_char": 13475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13817, "end_char": 13827, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14835, "end_char": 14845, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14886, "end_char": 14896, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16786, "end_char": 16796, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16830, "end_char": 16840, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17025, "end_char": 17035, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17117, "end_char": 17124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17783, "end_char": 17793, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18283, "end_char": 18293, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19965, "end_char": 19971, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case of Defence Services Personnel due to their special obligations and disabilities do need d!fferent treatment from that accorded to other landlords and in fact special provisions have been made for them 'in some of the States, whereby processes for each personnel to regain possession of their premises have been simplified and made more effective ..\n\nIt is considered necessary to make a special provision in the Bombay ."}}, {"text": "Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19981, "end_char": 20028, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21341, "end_char": 21351, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "30th September, 1984", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21770, "end_char": 21790, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondents are given time till 30th September, 1984 to vacate the premises subject to their B filing within four weeks from today an undertaking which shall be in the form usually adopted in the Court."}}, {"text": "N.V.K.", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21942, "end_char": 21948, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.V.K.\n\nAppeal allowed."}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_2_760_767_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "M.R. PARASHAR AND ORS.\n\nDR. FAROOQ ABDULLAH AND ORS.\n\nJanuary 31, 1984\n\n(Y.V. CaANDRACHUD, C.J. AND A.P. SEN, J.J\n\nContempt of Courts Act. 1971-Publicarion in a newspaper of a/leqation of Contempt of Court by Chief Minister-Requisite Proof not furnished-No record of speech produced- Whether could be committed for contempt.\n\nA news item appeared in the newspaper of which respondent No. 2 was its editor, that while addressing a rally of Judicial Employees' Welfare Association, the Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir denounced and D ridiculed the judiciary stating that \"Justice is being bought in judlci<ll Courts\" and that he would never honour the Coures stay arders because justice could be bought with money.\n\nThe news item also stated that the Chief Minister expressed bis regret to the Chief Justice and other Judges who were present at the meeting, explaining that the strong words used by him were the voice of his conscience and that he had the greatest regard for\n\nthe judiciary.\n\nThe petitioner filed the contempt petition against the Chief Minister.\n\nAlthough a show cause notice was issued under the Contempt of Courts Act 1971 to the Chief Minister (respondent) on March 18, 1983 no counter 0 affl.davit was filed till September 26, 1983.\n\nWhen the contempt petition was called out on that day his ndvocate accepted the notice on behalf of the respondent.\n\nEventually on November 21, 1983 the affidavit of the Chief Minister dated November 9, 1983 was taken on record.\n\nWhile the Chief Minister denied having made the statements attributed to him, the Editor asserted that the version published in the newspaper was true.\n\nG On the question whether the statements published in the newspaper amounted to contempt of court.\n\nDismissing the petition,\n\nHELD : What is involved in this case is criminal contempt and there~ fore it is necessary to apply the particul:ir standard of proof required to be established in a criminal case. Respondent, No. 1, on the material placed on H record; cannot be held t.o be guilty of the charge. (764F]\n\n( .\n\n.. --..\n\n1 ..\n\nM.R. PARASliAR v. FAROoQ ABDULLAH 761\n\nJo matters invOlving allegations Of criminal contempt., the Court has to act both as a prosecutor and as a Judge.\n\nIt does so to uphold the authority of law and not in defence of a particular Judge.\n\nSecondly, the right _of free speech is an important right of the citizen an~ bona fide criticism of any system or institution is aimed at inducing thC administrators of that system or institution to look inwards and in1prove its public image.\n\nCourts do not like to assume the posture that they are above criticism. At the same time though Jaw does not restrain the expression of disapproba tion against what is done in or by Courts of law, the liberty of free expression is not to be confounded with a licence to make unfounded allegations of corruption against the judiciary.\n\nThe abuse of the liberty of free speech and expression carries the case nearer the law of contempt.\n\nThose who criticise the judiciary must remember that they are attacking an institution which is indispensable for the survival Of the rule of law but which bas no means of defending itself.\n\nTherefore, Judges must receive the protection of law from unfounded attacks on their character.\n\n(765H; 766A, B-E; F-G]\n\nIf the Chief Minister said what was alleged in the news item he was in contempt; if he had not, the Editor had committed a contempt by publishing a false feport of a scurillous speech that was never made~ In the face of denial by one and an assertion by the other without more, it is difficult to deci<!e who is right.\n\nOn the one hand is the tendency to ridicule the system of justice and malign those: who administer it, on the othef is the propensity of the fourth estate fo~ some little sensatioll and its political involvment.\n\nWhen political considerations pollute the stream of life, sifting truth from falsehood becomes a formidable .and .forbidding task. In thfsc circumstances it is difficult to record a positive finding that the allegatation that the Chief Minister made the particular stat :men{ is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. [764D-F]\n\nAlthough the petition\\!rS had asserted that the Judges of the High Court were present at One of the functions and that they walked out of the meeting on hearing the abusive language used by the Chief Miaister 00 attempt was made to establish the truth of that assertion.\n\nA walkout by Judges of the High Court during the speech of the Chief Minister or soon thereafter would have lent considerable weight to the allegation that the statements made by the Chief Minister were open to grave objection.\n\n[764GH]\n\nWhen a Chief Minister makes a formal speech an official record of the speech, if it were a prepared. speech, or even if it were an extempore speech, should have been kept.\n\nNo one taped or took down the speeches ofa person as important as.the Chief Miaister.\n\nNo written record kept contern~\n\nporaneously or prepared soon after is cited to contradict the allegation G that the Chief Minister scandalised the Courts and assailed the character of Judges.\n\n[7658-D]\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Contempt Petition No. 8118 of 1983.\n\nUnder Art. 129 of the Constitution read with Section 15 of the Contempt of Court's Act, 1971.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1984} 2 S.C.R\n\nA Subhash Sharma, N. M. Popli and K. R. R. Pillai for the petitioner.\n\nS. N. Kacker and Altaf Ahmad for Respondent No. 1.\n\nM. C. Bhandare, E. c. Agarwa/a and Mrs. Indira Saivlmey B for Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\n• CHANDRACHUD, C.J. This is a petition asking that the respondents be committed for contempt for certain statements allegedly made by Respondent !, who is the Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir.\n\nRespondent 2 is the Editor of a newspaper called Daily Kashmir Times in which those statements were published, while Respondent 3 is its correspondent.\n\nIn the issue of the Daily Kashmir Times dated November 13, 1982, a news item appeared under the caption \"CM asks engineers to forcibly occupy club building\". According to the report, the Chief Minister, while addressing the annual general meeting of the Institute of Engineers, said that the engineers should occupy a certain building forcibly as it would not be possible for them to evict the Amar Singh Club through the norma\\ legal process and that he would provide the necessary police assistance for that purpose. The report says that the Chief Minisier advised the Institute of Engineers to move quickly in the matter before the management of the Club could obtain a stay order from the Court.\n\nAnother new.s item appeared m the same newspaper on November 23, 1982 under the caption \"Chief Minister says he will never accept courts' stay orders\". According to the report, the Chief Minister, while addressing a rally of Judicial Employees' Welfare Accociation, denounced and ridiculed the judiciary by saying that \"justice is being bought in the judicial courts\". Taking exception to the frequent stay orders issued by the Courts against the Government, the Chief Minister is alleged to have said : \"I will never honour these stay orders even if I am hanged\", that justice could be bought with money and that this task could be performed conveniently by any leading lawyer. The news item concludes by saying that later, the Chief Minister expressed his regret to the Chief Justice and other Judges of the High Court who were present at the meeting, explaining that the strong words nsed by him were the voice of his conscience hut, otherwise, he had the greatest regard\n\nI _;;.,_ -\n\ni '\n\nM.R. PARASHAR v. PAROOQ ABDULLAH (Chandrachud, C.J.) 163\n\nfor the judiciary, and that he ouly wanted quick justice for the people.\n\nOn March 18, 1983 a riotice was issued by this Court to the respondents asking them to show cause why action under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 should not be taken against them. Since one of the respondents is a Chief Minister, we assumed that there would be no difficulty in serving the notice upon him and he would file his reply promptly, in view of the seriousness of the ailegations made against him. But, until September 26, 1983 no counter-affidavit was filed in the matter. When the Contempt Petition was called out on that date, Mr .. Altaf Ahmed, accepted the notice on behalf of the Chief Minister. On that date, the Court directed the Chief Minister to file his counter-affidavit within four weeks. On October 21, 1983 the Registry submitted a report to the Court that Mr. Altaf Ahmed had not yet filed his appearance for the Chief Minister. On November 21, 1983 an affidavit dated November 9,· 1983 of the Chief Minister was taken on record. Since the Chief Minister denied by that affidevit that lie had made the kind of statements attributed to him, we issued a specific direction that Responden(2, the Editor of Daily Kashinir rimes, should appear in person before the Court on November 28, 1983. That was with a view to obtaining his explanation as to how the newsprper came to publish the various statements which the Chief Minister denied he had ever made.\n\nRespondent 2 appeared before. us on' November 28, !983 and stuck to the versioff published in the newspaper. In the light of that, we reverted to the counter-affidavit filed by the Chief Minister when we found that it did not traverse the allegations of the petitioners satisfactorily.\n\nWe therefore directed him to file a further affidavit dealing with the allegations against him clearly and specifi cally. In pursuance of that direction, Respondent I filed an affidavit dated December 14, 1983:\n\nBy his affidavit Uated January 9, 1984, Respondent 2 has adhered to. his original stand that the report which appeared in the Daily Kashmir Times was true and correct.\n\nAccording to him, the Chief Minister did make the various statements complained of and that bis denial is untrue. .\n\nIf we were satisfied that the Chief Minister had made the statements attributed to him, it would have been a serious matter.\n\nThen, we could not have dismissed the perora!Jon as an ill-tempered\n\n764 SUPPJ!Mll COURT RBl>OilTS [1984) 2 s.c.a.\n\noutburst of an uninformed person. Considering the high position which Chief Ministers occupy in the public life of our country, their words and deeds .have to be presumed to be intended. The defence\n\nthat what was said or done was not intended is not open to persons occupying high public offices. The formal expression of regard for the courts under the pressure of a contempt notice becomes a mere escape if speeches and writings betray defiance of judicial authority and constitute an exhortation to the public to disregard orders passed by courts. But, the Chief Minister denies to have made the utterances, as stoutly as the editor asserts that the reports of the speeches published in bis newspaper are true. There is word against word, and no preponderating circumstance which, objectively, compels the acceptance of the word of one in preference to the word of the other. We have two responsible persons before us who pursue honourable professions : one is the Chief Minister of a State and the other is the editor of a newspaper. Both cannot be true in their\n\ncontentions before us.\n\nOno of them bas clearly violated the law of contempt. If the Chief Minister .said what is alleged, be is in contempt. If he has not, the editor has committed contempt by publishing a false report of a scurrilous speech that was never made.\n\nIn face of denial by one and an assertion by the other without more, it is difficult to decide who is righ(. On one hand is the tendency to ridicule the system of justice and malign those who administer it.\n\nOn the other is the propensity of the fourth estate for some little .\n\nsensation and its political invJlvement. When political considerations pollute the stream of life, sifting truth from falsehood becomes a formidable and forbidding task In these circumstances, we are unable to record a positive finding that the allegation that the Chief Minister made the particular statements is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. What is involved in this petition is criminal contempt and, therefore, it is necessary to apply that particlar standard of proof.\n\nThere is one circumstance which puts us on our guard in acc!'pting the contempt petition. That circumstance is that though, during the course of arguments, it was stated at the Bar on behalf G of the petitioners that the learned Judges of the Jammu & Kashmir High Court were present at one of the functions and that they walked out of the meeting on hearing the 'abusive' language used by the Chief Minister, no attempt was made to establish the truth of that assertion. A walk-out by Judges of the High Court during the speech of the Chief Minister or soon after he ended it, would have lent considerable weight to the allegation that the statements made H by the Chief Minister were open to grave object ion.\n\n' ,.\n\nBut we record the finding of 'not guilty' with a caveat. It is not for us to advi•e a chosen representative of the people as to how he should conduct his public affairs and what precautions he sl)ould take in order to protect himself from similar allegations in future.\n\nBut, it causes us some surprise that there is on official record whatsoever of the speeches made by the Chief Minister at the two functions.\n\nHe was invited' at those functions .in his capacity as the Chief Minister. And, admittedly, he spoke at those functions.\n\nWith the little knowledge that we have of these matters, we suppose that when a Chief Minister makes a formal speech, an official record of the speech is generally available. If he speaks from a prepared text, that forms the record of what he spoke. But, whether he speaks from a text or speaks extempore, it is unlikely, in the times iu which we live, that a speech made by a Chief Minister on a formal occasion will not be taken down or tape-recorded. Tapes have become a part of our life, public and private, sometimes to the point of annoyance. In times when mechanical gadgets have become the order of the day and 'taping', aspccially, h_as become a common practice, it is surprising that no one taped or took down the speeches of a person as important as the Chief Minister. No written record, kept contemporaneously or prepared soon after, is cited to contradict the allegation that the Chief Minister scandalized the Courts and assailed.the characler of Judges. As we said, it is not for us to advise any one, least of all those who, in the discharge of their onerous responsibilities, liave their own select group of advisers.\n\nBut, we cannot restrain the observation that it is so much safer for persons who have to make frequent public appearances to have their utterances duly put on paper, before of soon after the event. For those who have nothing to conceal or fear, that is a prudent course of action. For the rest, a constant friction with the law of contempt is inevitable. The former will lay their cards on the table and be cleared .. The latter have to live in the hope that the rigorous standard of 'proof beyond a reasonable doubt' will act as their saviour. The latter course of conduct leaves much to be desired from the point of view of men of honour. Courts are not astute to resort to their power to punish any one for criminal contempt. But that reluctnance should not be overtaxed.\n\nThe reluctance of courts to resort to the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act springs from their r.egard for the rule of law .. The role of a p'osecutor is incompatible with the role of a judge. In matters involving allegations of criminal contempt of Court, these roles are combined and the Court has to act both as a\n\nSUPRIIME COURT REORTS [1984] 2 s.c.a.\n\nprosecutor and as a judge. True, that it acts in order to uphold the authority of law and not in defence of this or that particular judge.\n\nBut an order punishing a person for such contempt is likely to create the impression, more so in the mind of lay observers, that the judges have acted in defeuce of themselves. Courts do not like to create such an impression even unwittingly. Secondly, the right of free speech is an important right of the citizen, in the exercise of which he is .entitled to bring to the notice of the public at large the infirmities from which any institution snffers, including institutions which administer justice. Indeed, the right to offer healthy and constructive criticism which is fair iu spirit must be left unimpaired in the interest of public institutions themselves. Critics are instruments of reforms, not those actuated by malice but those who are iuspired by the spirit of public weal.\n\nBona fide criticism of any system or institution is aimed at inducing the administrators ofthat system or institution to look inwards and improve its public image.\n\nCourts do not like to assume the posture that they are above criticism and that their functioning needs no improvement. But it is necessary to make it clear that thongh law does not restrain the expression of disapprobation aga/nst what is done in or by courts of law, the .liberty of free expression is not to be confounded with a licence to make unfounded allegations of corruption against the judiciary. The abuse of the liberty of free speech and expression carries the case nearer the law of contempt.\n\nWe would also like to remind those who criticise the judiciary that it has no. forum from which to defend itself. The legislature can act in defence of itself from the floor of the House. It enjoys privileges which are beyond the reach of law. The executive is all powerful and has ample resourses and media at its command to explain its actions and, if need be, to counter-attack. Those who attack the judiciary must remember that they are attacking an institution which is indispensable for. the survival of the rule of law but which has no means of defending itself. In the very nature of things, it cannot engage itself in an open war, nor indulge in releasing contradictions. The sword of justice is in the hands of the Goddess of Justice, not in the hands of mortal judges. Therefore, Judges must receive the due protection of law from unfounded attacks on their character.\n\nThe Chief Minister has stated in his affidavit that be spoke extempore.\n\nWe arc ilot on that. In the first place, extempore speeehes confer 110 greater immunity 011 the speaker than the\n\nspeeches made from prepared texts.\n\nSecondly, extempore speeches are not to be made without the application of a careful mind. That is not the definition of an extempore speech. Thirdly, more the extempore, greater the need to keep a written record of the spoken word. In the written record lies the safety of the public speaker, though not, perhaps, the benefit of posterity.\n\nJn the result, we dismiss the contempt petition.\n\nP.B.H.\n\nPetition dismissed.", "total_entities": 35, "entities": [{"text": "M.R. PARASHAR AND ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 21, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M.R. PARASHAR AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "FAROOQ ABDULLAH AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 28, "end_char": 51, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "FAROOQ ABDULLAH AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 31, 1984", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 54, "end_char": 70, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "January 31, 1984\n\n(Y.V. CaANDRACHUD, C.J. AND A.P. SEN, J.J\n\nContempt of Courts Act."}}, {"text": "A.P. SEN, J.J", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 100, "end_char": 113, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Contempt of Courts Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 115, "end_char": 137, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Although a show cause notice was issued under the Contempt of Courts Act 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1067, "end_char": 1144, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "March 18, 1983", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1183, "end_char": 1197, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Although a show cause notice was issued under the Contempt of Courts Act 1971 to the Chief Minister (respondent) on March 18, 1983 no counter 0 affl.davit was filed till September 26, 1983."}}, {"text": "November 21, 1983", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1389, "end_char": 1406, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Eventually on November 21, 1983 the affidavit of the Chief Minister dated November 9, 1983 was taken on record."}}, {"text": "November 9, 1983", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1449, "end_char": 1465, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Eventually on November 21, 1983 the affidavit of the Chief Minister dated November 9, 1983 was taken on record."}}, {"text": "Art. 129", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5202, "end_char": 5210, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5241, "end_char": 5251, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "A Subhash Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5330, "end_char": 5346, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1984} 2 S.C.R\n\nA Subhash Sharma, N. M. Popli and K. R. R. Pillai for the petitioner."}}, {"text": "N. M. Popli", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5348, "end_char": 5359, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1984} 2 S.C.R\n\nA Subhash Sharma, N. M. Popli and K. R. R. Pillai for the petitioner."}}, {"text": "K. R. R. Pillai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5364, "end_char": 5379, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1984} 2 S.C.R\n\nA Subhash Sharma, N. M. Popli and K. R. R. Pillai for the petitioner."}}, {"text": "S. N. Kacker", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5401, "end_char": 5413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. N. Kacker and Altaf Ahmad for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "Altaf Ahmad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5418, "end_char": 5429, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. N. Kacker and Altaf Ahmad for Respondent No.", "canonical_name": "Altaf Ahmad"}}, {"text": "M. C. Bhandare", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5453, "end_char": 5467, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Bhandare, E. c. Agarwa/a and Mrs. Indira Saivlmey B for Respondent."}}, {"text": "E. c. Agarwa", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5469, "end_char": 5481, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Bhandare, E. c. Agarwa/a and Mrs. Indira Saivlmey B for Respondent."}}, {"text": "Indira Saivlmey", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5493, "end_char": 5508, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. C. Bhandare, E. c. Agarwa/a and Mrs. Indira Saivlmey B for Respondent."}}, {"text": "CHANDRACHUD", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5574, "end_char": 5585, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\n• CHANDRACHUD, C.J. This is a petition asking that the respondents be committed for contempt for certain statements allegedly made by Respondent !,"}}, {"text": "Daily Kashmir Times", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5942, "end_char": 5961, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the issue of the Daily Kashmir Times dated November 13, 1982, a news item appeared under the caption \"CM asks engineers to forcibly occupy club building\"."}}, {"text": "November 13, 1982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5968, "end_char": 5985, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the issue of the Daily Kashmir Times dated November 13, 1982, a news item appeared under the caption \"CM asks engineers to forcibly occupy club building\"."}}, {"text": "Amar Singh Club", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6316, "end_char": 6331, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to the report, the Chief Minister, while addressing the annual general meeting of the Institute of Engineers, said that the engineers should occupy a certain building forcibly as it would not be possible for them to evict the Amar Singh Club through the norma\\ legal process and that he would provide the necessary police assistance for that purpose."}}, {"text": "November 23, 1982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6675, "end_char": 6692, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Another new.s item appeared m the same newspaper on November 23, 1982 under the caption \"Chief Minister says he will never accept courts' stay orders\"."}}, {"text": "Judicial Employees' Welfare Accociation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6848, "end_char": 6887, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to the report, the Chief Minister, while addressing a rally of Judicial Employees' Welfare Accociation, denounced and ridiculed the judiciary by saying that \"justice is being bought in the judicial courts\"."}}, {"text": "Court to the respondents asking them to show cause why action under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7795, "end_char": 7895, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "September 26, 1983", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8169, "end_char": 8187, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But, until September 26, 1983 no counter-affidavit was filed in the matter."}}, {"text": "Altaf Ahmed", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8296, "end_char": 8307, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the Contempt Petition was called out on that date, Mr .. Altaf Ahmed, accepted the notice on behalf of the Chief Minister.", "canonical_name": "Altaf Ahmad"}}, {"text": "October 21, 1983", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8466, "end_char": 8482, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October 21, 1983 the Registry submitted a report to the Court that Mr. Altaf Ahmed had not yet filed his appearance for the Chief Minister."}}, {"text": "November 9,· 1983", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8646, "end_char": 8663, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 21, 1983 an affidavit dated November 9,· 1983 of the Chief Minister was taken on record."}}, {"text": "November 28, 1983", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8946, "end_char": 8963, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since the Chief Minister denied by that affidevit that lie had made the kind of statements attributed to him, we issued a specific direction that Responden(2, the Editor of Daily Kashinir rimes, should appear in person before the Court on November 28, 1983."}}, {"text": "November 28, !", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9166, "end_char": 9180, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "us on' November 28, !"}}, {"text": "December 14, 1983", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9608, "end_char": 9625, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In pursuance of that direction, Respondent I filed an affidavit dated December 14, 1983:\n\nBy his affidavit Uated January 9, 1984, Respondent 2 has adhered to."}}, {"text": "Jammu & Kashmir High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12491, "end_char": 12517, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That circumstance is that though, during the course of arguments, it was stated at the Bar on behalf G of the petitioners that the learned Judges of the Jammu & Kashmir High Court were present at one of the functions and that they walked out of the meeting on hearing the 'abusive' language used by the Chief Minister, no attempt was made to establish the truth of that assertion."}}, {"text": "Contempt of Courts Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15474, "end_char": 15496, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_2_768_791_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "KARNATAKA STATE ROAD TRANSPORT\n\nCORPORATION, BANGALORE\n\nB. A. JAYARAM AND OTHERS\n\nJanuary 31, 1984\n\n[D. P. MADON AND SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, JJ.J\n\nMotor Vehicles.Act. (Act IV of }939) Section 57(8) Interpretation of- Whether the section creates any /ega/ fiction-Grant of an applica_lion for varia tio1is in conditions of permit, whet lier results in grafit of a new permil-Exisiing inter-state permit holders exempted under the approved scheme of nationalisation -Grant of request for increase in number of trips or tiumber of vehicles is not inconsistent with the provisions of the scheme-Motor Vehicles Act S cc/ion 68FF read with section 57(8) explained.\n\nOn February 2, 1966, the Respondent No. 1, B. A, Jayaram had been granted by the Regional Transport Authority, Bangalore, a stage carriage permit .on the inter-state route Cuddapah in the State of Andhra Pradesh to Bangalore in the Karnataka State, which was duly countersigned by the State Transport Authority, Andhra Pradesh. On 10.1.1968, the Mysore (Karanataka) State granted its approval under section 68(0)(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act 1939, to a scp.eme, popularly known as the \"Kolar Pocket Scheme\", to nationa: lize passanger transport service between Ba\"ngaIOre and various places in the Kolar District, as also certain routes within the Kolar District, covering 87 inter-state routes referred to in its appendix. Under clause 4 of the \"Kolar Pocket Scheme\", the existing permit holders oil the inter-state routes, were permitted to continue to oper3.tf: such inter-state routes subject to the conditions that their permit shall be rendered ineffective for the overlapping portions of the notified routes.\n\nThe route between Bangalore and Royalpad in the State of Karnataka forme_d part of the route between Bangalore and Cuddapah and was covered by the Scheme, with the result that the First Respondent's permit foe the said portion of the Bangalore Cuddapah route becam_e ineffective and consequent tha_t tho vehicles operated by him could not either pick up or set down passen- . gers on the Bangalore-Royalpad portion of the Bangalore cuddapah route though they could traverse the said portion. On January 24, 197 31 the first respondent made an aplication to. the Second Resoondent the Karnataka State Transport Authority for varying the conditions of the stage carriage per- 1nit granted to him by increasing the number of trips on the Bangalore Cuddappah route from one trip per day to two trips -perday so as to eliminate one. overnight halt at either or the two termini. The said application having been rejected, the First Respondent filed a writ petition No. 3360/74 which was allowed and a mandamus issued to the Second Respondent to dispose of the applicalioo in accordance with law holding that tho said Scheme did not ope-\n\n,.,...._\n\n·~ ...\n\n-- '\n\nK.S.R.T. CORPN. v. B.A. 1AYARAM\n\nrate as a bar to increasing the number of trips on an existing inter-state route.\n\nThe Second Respondent accordingly invited representation in connection therewith. In the meantime, the ~AppelJant the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation, filed on November 27, 1974 a writ petition _No. 6399/74 to recall the order made in the said writ petition No. 3360/74 and to rehear it after impleading.the Appellant as a respondent thereto. The writ petition was dismissed holding that the appellant was not a necessary party to writ petition No. 3360/74. On December 23/24, 1974, the Second Respondent granted to lhe first respondent the additional trip applied for by him. Against the order of dismissal of the W.P. 6399/74, the Appellant filed, an appeal No. WA 949/1979 under seclion 4 of the Karnataka High Court Act, 1961 (Mysore Ac.t V of 1962).\n\nOn a reference by the Division Bench, the Full Bench by its Judgment delivered on September 19, 1979, opined that ''If the condition of a permit for operating a stage carriage over a rOute is allcred by increaing the maximum number of trips over that route sPecified earlier in the permit such variation of the condition of the permit does not amourit to grant of a ner permit.\"\n\nThe Third Respondent who had been granted three stage carriage permits on three different inter-state routes, namely, Bangalore to Cliddapah; Bangalore Kalabasti; and Bangalore to VeJJore applied on June 11, 1979 to the Second Respondent for varyjng the conditions of the said three permits by increasing the number of vehicles by an additional vehicle on each route and by increasing the number of trips from lwo to four on each route, that is for two round trips, which were granted. The Fourth respondent who did not file any objection to the applications oft he Third RespondCDt filed three writ petitions being writ petitions Nos. 16247-16249 of 1979 ill the High Court against the said orders of variations of the Third' Reapondent's permits. The Writ petitions having been dismissed he preferred three appeals being W.A. Nos. 1285-87/1979 and an application to implead himself as a respondent in WA No. 949/H filed by the appellant. though he had never objected to the grant of the variation to the First Respondent oarJier. The writ appeals wore disn1issed on 22 2.1980. His\n\napplication to implead him$elf as a respondent to the said Writ Appeal No\n\n9~9/74 was granted. The Fourth Respondent thereafte; filed three -speciai leave petitions Nos. 5141-43of1979 against the order dated 22.2.1980 dismissing his appeals. He_ bas also filed another special leave petition No. 4771/80 against the Judgment in W, A. No. 949/74 by virtue of his having been aliowed to be implead ed by the High Court of Karnataka as third responnent thereto though it was not all necessary Since in the writ appeal No. 949 of 1974 which was dismissed on 22.2.1980, the Karnataka High Court granted to the itppellant a certificate of fitness to appeal to the Supreme Court.\n\nDsmissing tha appeal1 the Court\n\nHELD: 1: J.\n\nSection 57(8) ol the Motor-Vehicles Act, 1939 does not G create a legal fiction and grant of an application for variations in the conditicins of a perf:nit in respect of matter set out in section 57(8) docs not rasult in the grant of a new permit. Admittedly the language of sub-section (8) is not one which is normally used by legislatures in creating a legal fiction for sub.s. (8) does not state that an application of the nature referred in that sub-section is to be deemed to be an application for the grant of a ne\"'. permit. [787D-E]\n\nl : 2. Section sr is a procCdural section. Its various sub-sections form H\n\nan integral whole providing for the manner in which an application for variation of certain conditions of a permit is to be made, the mode of inviting objections thereto and the diSposal of such aPplications and objections. [787E-FJ\n\n1 : 3. Reading sub-section (8) in the context of sub-sections (3) to (7) and in juxtapo.ition with them, it iS clear that [the legislative intant in enacting thilt sub-section was tp prescribe the procedure to be followed when an applica tion for variation of the conditions of a permit referred to in that sub-section is made, this procedure being the same as is laid down in sub-sections (3) to (7) With respect to an applicaion for a new stage carriage permit or a new pUb1ic carrier's permit. It is for the purpose of providing that the fprocedure to be fo1lowed in the case of an application made under sub-sections (8) is PtO be the same as the procedure to be followed in the case of an app1ication for a new permit that sub -section (8) uses the words \"shaH be treated as an application for the grant of !Inew permit.' 1 By the use of these words what sub-section i(8) does is to incorporate in it the provisions. of sub-sections (3) to (9). This is a very different thing from enacting a legal fiction. [787B-D]\n\nEast Eng. Dwelllng Co. Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough c .. uncll, [1951] 2 All.\n\nE.R. p. 587, 589 H.L.; quoted with approval.\n\nState of Bombay v. Pandurang Vlnayak Chaphalkar and Others, [1953] S.C.R. p. 773, 778-9; M/s. Shivchand Amo/akchand v. Regional Transport Authority and Anr. [1984] l S.C.R.. 288=A.l.R.. 1984 S.C:. 9; followed.\n\nt : 4.\n\nAssuming that the application for variation of the conditions of a permit referred to in sub-section (8) of section 57 is to be deemed to be by a fiction of law to be an application for a new permit, the question to be considere4 is for what purpose is such an application to be deemed to be an application f0r grant of a new permit. Reading sub-sections (3) to (8) of section 57 as a whole, it is cleaithat the only purpose is to apply to such an application for variation the procedure prescribed by sub-sections (3} to (7) of section 57 and not for the purpose of providing 1hat when the application for variatiori is granted, the permtt so varied would be deemed to be a new permit~ If the permit so varied were to be deemed to be a new permit, the result would be anomalous. [789A-C] ·\n\nEx-parte Walton, In Re Levy L.R. [1881] 17 Ch. D. 743; 756 CA; Arthur Hi// v. East and West Dock Co. L.R. [1884] 9 A.C. 455, 456 ; The Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. The State of Bihar and Others, [1955] 2 S.C.R. 603, 647; The Commissloiter oj lncometax, Bombay City, Bombay v.\n\nAmarchand N.\n\nShroff, [1963] Supp. I S.C.R.. 699, 709; Maharani Mada/asa Devi v. M. Ramnarayan (P) Ltd. and Others, (1965] 3 S.C.R. 421, 424; Commissioner of lncometax, Gujarat v. Vadllal La//ubhai, [1973] I S.C.R.. 1058, 1064; referred to.\n\n2, In the case of an existing inter-state permit exempted under the said Scheme an increase in the number of trips or the number of vehicles allowed to be operated under such a permit would not be inconsistent with the provisions of the said Scheme. There is no inconsistency between an increaae in the number of vehicle$ or trips allowed under such a permit and the provisions of the said scheme. So far as the portions of the inter-stata route covered by the said ll cheme are concerned, the permits of the existius permit-holders hav 4,) bean\n\n' ..\n\n.. ' --\n\nK.S.R.T. CORPN. v. B.A .. JAYARAM (Madon, J.) 771\n\nrendered· ineffective. Further by the said Scheme as notified by a notification dated January 10, 1980, th~ existing permitholderS are not allowed to pick up or set down passengers on these portions of the notified routes.\n\nWhethe~ one vehicle or more traverse these portions or whether the same vehicle traverses such portion more than GDCc cannot in any manner affect the services operated by the Appellant ori such portions since no passengers are allowed to be picked up or set down on such portions.\n\nA11 that would happen is that these vehicles, in thecoure of their interstate operation, wo_uld traverse these portions of tl:ie notified routes without in any way operating as stage carriages for Such portion. [790C-Fl ·\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 891 of 1980.\n\nFrom the Judgement and Order dated the 22nd February, !980 of the Karnataka. High Court in Writ Appeal No. 949 of 1974.\n\nK. Parasaran, Soliciter General, Vineet Kumar, Naresh Kumar and Miss Deepika Saxina for the appellant.\n\nK.K. Venugopal, K.N. Bhat, M. Rangaswamy, MRV.Achar s. Ravindra Bhatt and Nanjappa Ganapathy for the respondents. '\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was , delivered by\n\nMADON, J. This Appeal has been filed by the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation pursuant to a certificate granted by the Karnataka High Court against its Judgment and Order in Writ Appeal No. 949 of 1974 on the following two questions of law:-\n\n\"I. Whether the conditions of a permit can be varied so as to increase the number of trips and/or. the number of vehicles allowed to be operated under that permit ?\n\n2. Whether the conditions of a permit held by an existing operator on au inter-tate route exempted under the Kolar Pocket Scheme, can be varied so as to allow an increase in the number of vehicles operating under that permit ?\n\nBefore embarking on a discussion of the above questions, it will be convenient to relate the facts which have given rise to this\n\nAppeal. On February 2, 1966, the First Respondent, B.A. Jayarm, H\n\n. 772\n\nSUPREME COURT RBPOFTS [1984] 2 s.c.a.\n\nhad been granted by the Regional Transport Authority, Bangalore, a stage carriage permit on the inter-State route Cuddapah in the State of Andhra Pradesh to Bangalore in the State of Karnataka for one trip only and a stage carriage permit no. 20/65-66 in respect of this route was issued to him on March 16, 1966. This permit was counter-signed by the State Transport Authority. Andhra Pradesh, on March 21, 1967. By Notification No. S.O. 111 dated January 10, 1968, published in the Mysore Government Gazette dated January 25, 1968, the Government of Mysore (now Karnataka) granted its approval under sub-section (2) of section 68-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939' (IV 1.939) (hereinafter referred to as \"the said Act\") to a scheme set out in the Schedule to the said Notification. The said Scheme covered 87 intra-State routes in the State of Karnataka set out in the Appendix to the said Scheme.\n\nThe effect of the said Scheme was to nationalize passenger transport service between Bangalore and various places in the Kolar District as also certain routes within the Kolar District. For this reason, the said Scheme was popularly known as the 'Kolar Pocket Scheme'.\n\nThe class of service covered by the said Scheme was \"Stage Carriages, Mofussil\". Clause 4 of the said Scheme inter alia provided as follows:\n\n\"Whether the services are to be operated by the State Transport Undertaking to the exclusion, complete or par tial, of other persons or otherwise : ------------------------·----\n\nThe State Transport Undertaking will operate services on all the routes; to the complete exc\\usion of other persons except that : (a) that existing permit holders on the interstate routes, may continue to operate such inte rState routes subject to the conditions that their permit shall be .rendered ineffective for the overlaping portions of the notified routes ... \"\n\nThe said Scheme was implemented with effect from January G 1, J 969, by issuing a stage carriage permit to the Appellant under sub-section (1) of section 68-F of the said Act.\n\nThe route between Bangalore and Royalpad in the State of Karnataka formed part of the route between Banglore and Cuddapah and was covered by the said Scheme. Accordingly, the First Res H pondent's permit for the said portion of the Bangalore Cuddapah\n\n. '\"'T\n\n• . :• K; S.RiT: CORPN.:v. B.A. JAYi.ilAM (Mada~, l.) ',,. 773.\n\nrout~ b'cicaine ine~:i~[ith'ihe reslllt, that the vhicles ·perated. by the , First Respondent coulil' not either 'pick up or ''set down passengers on the Bangaloie-Royalpad portion of: the , Bangalore- Criddapah route though 'they i\\:ould traverse the said portion; On ,: January 24, 1973, the First' Resli_ondentlmade an application to the\n\nKamataka State Road Transport Authority, the Second Respondent. before us, for varymg the conditions of the stage carnage permit granted to .him by increasing the number of trips on the Bangalore- Cuddapali route from bne , trip per day to two trips per day :. This . , • was apparently done .. to eliminate an overnight halt at .. either of the two termini. The said application was rejected. by the Second Respondent on April 22, 1974; as. not being maintainable in view ofthe said Scheme, without: publishing it for inviting , objections . thereto:\" The First Respoii.dent jhereupon 'ined; a writ 'petition in the.Karnataka High Court, being., WritPetidon No. 3360 of'i974, 'against the , said order. of the, Second Respondent. On September .. 25,'1974, .the said writ petition was, allowed and the court issued a'\n\nwrit of mandamus to , the : Second Respondent to •. dispose of ihe, First Respondent's said application in' accordance with '1aw, 'holding : \\, D' that the said Scheme did not operate as i a bar to 'iacreasing the number of trips on . an e1'isting inter-State route. In , pursuance of the said order of the 'High Court, the Sec\"ond Respondent published , the .First Respondent's said application inviting representations .jn\n\n. '\n\n. 'i\n\n.. connection therewith. In the meanwhile the Appellant flied on . 'November 27, 1974, a writ petition in.the Karnataka High .Conrt, .Ei ·· being Writ Petition No. 6399. of 1974; to recaa the order made in the said Writ Petition No. 3360 of 1974 and to rehear the said writ petition after impleading the Appellant as a respondent thereto.'.\n\nA.learned Single Judge of the said High Court dismissed. the Appel-;· !ant's said writ, petition 1on .. December , z, 1974, hold, ing. that the Appellant was not a necessary party to the said Writ .. Petition No .. . 3360 of 1974, . On Decembr .23/24, 1974,. the Second Rspondent ', ' .~, .... -~. {-,.·- - , .. -- granted to the .. First Respondent the additional trip applied .for by.,\n\n:J':.- \\.\n\n.. him.\" Against the order of th~ lerned . Single Judge dismissing its writ petition, the Appellntfiled a12 intra:Court appeal under. s'ection 4 of the Karnataka High .Court Act. 196L (Mysore Act Vof 1962), being Writ Appeal No.:'949 of 1979.\n\nTh~· Division Bench, IVhich ,<\n\nG!: !' )ea rd the said appeal,. referred 'the . following qdestiori to a larger\n\n'Bench for its opillion : · ; ' ...\n\n-,~\n\n. i ... f:t'\n\n~J:, ·- :~\\ , ,;,,,, '\"c < I f( '\n\n~ . '.'.If iii~ .condition of a permitfor/iqpefating a stge.: .,_; ,\n\nc_arrige:oveft>a'-__ rout~ is artee~, by_'1liricreasillg the' in:aiimU.ffi-:~\" •.-' . number oftrlps 'over th\\it 'route,'specified earifor 'in that .:fo ;~. . .:' _,. __ :·* -; - ., ,,, '~ ' ' '-f~1.· '~~~~ .:;:~ \"-~-- . ;~· \"'' : .. .-'.:~~/-~~~.\n\nA pcnnit, does such variation of the condition of the permit amount to grant of a new permit ?\"\n\nBy its Judgment delivered on September 19, 1979, the Full Bench answered the said question as follows :\n\n\"If the condition of a permit for oprating a stage carriage over a route is altered by increasing the maximum number of trips over that route specified earlier in the permit such variation of the condition of the permit does , not amount to grant of a new permit.\"\n\nWe will now relate the circumstances in which the Third Respondent, S. Joginder Singh, the soJe. proprietor of Janatha Travels, Bangalore, and the Fourth Respondent, D.P. Sharma, sole proprietor of Sharma Transport, Bangalore, made their entry on the stage of this litigation. The Third Respondent had been granted three stage carriage permits on three different inter-state routes, namely, Bangalore to Cuddapah, Banglore to Kalahasti and Bangalore to Vellore. After coming into force of the said Scheme, the Third Respondent made applications on June 11, 1979, to the second Respondent for verying the conditions of the said three permits by increasing the number of vehicles by an additional vehicle on each route and by increasing the number of trips from two to four on each route, that is, for two round tr:ps. These [applications were granted by the Second Respondent. The Fourth Respondent did not file any objections to the said applications for variation made by the Third Respondent, nor does it appear that he\n\nbar filed any objection to the said application for variation made by the First Respondent. The Fourth Respondent, however, filed three writ petitions, being W•it Petitions [Nos. 16247 to 16249 of 1979, in the Karnataka High Court against the orders of the Second Respondent granting variation of the Third Respondent's said permits. The said writ petitions were dismissed by a learned Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court and against these orders of dismiss~( the Fourth Respondent preferred three writ appeals, being Writ Appeals Nos. 1285 to 1287 of 1979. He also made an application to implead himself as a respondent in the said Appeal No. 949 of 1974 out of which the present appea.l before us arises.\n\nThe Fourth Respondend's said application was granted and he was impleaded as Fourth Respondent to the said Writ Appeal No .. 949 of 1974' The Third Respondent before us was the Third Respondent in the said Writ Appeal No. 949 of 1974.\n\nK.S.R.T. CORPN. v. B.A. JAYARAM (Madon, J.) 775\n\nBy Notification HD 45 TM! 76 dated January 10, 1980, the said Scheme was modified by substituting clause (d) thereof. The substituted clause (d) inter alia provided as follows :\n\n\"The State Transport Undertaking will operate the services on all routes. to the complete exclusion of other persons except the following :- :u\n\nx • x X' x x\n\n(c) The operation; of services by the permit holders who. have already been granted permits by_the Transport Authorities on the date of publication of the 'modified scheme on inter-Staie routes which are included in the inter-State agreement entered into by the Government of aµy other State provided that the operator Oil such '' route shall not be entitled to pick up and set down passengers in such portion of the Notified routes.\"\n\nI By its Judgment and Order dated February 22, 1980, a Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court dismissed the said writ appeals filed b~ the Fourth Respondent . The Division Bench held that in view of the opinion given by the Full Bench in the said Writ Appeal No. 949 of 1974 it was permissible under sub-section '(8) of section 57 of the said Act to vary the . conditions of a stage carriage permit in.respect. of a route so as to increase the number of trips on that route allowed under such permit ; that increase in the number of trips on a route can be. effected either by increasing the frequency of operation of the existing number of vehicles playing on that route without increasing the existing number of vehicles operating on that route .. or by increasing the number of , vehicles .operating on that route ; and that the Fourth Respondent was not an existing inter-State Permit holder nor had filed any objection before the Second Respondent to the applications for variation made by the Third Respondent and had, therefore, no locus. to file the said writ petitions.- By its Judgment and Order, made on the same day, the said Division Bench dismissed the Appellant's ·.said Writ Appeal No. 949 of 1974 with no order as to costs and granted ' to the Appellant a certificate of fitness to appeal to this Court on .the two questions• which we have set out earlier,; in pursuance of ..\n\nwhich the present Appeal has been filed. The Fourth Respondent has also filed in this Court a petition for special leave to appeal, being.\n\nSpecial Leave PetitimiNo. 4771 of.1980, agaillst. the said Judgment . and Order in: the said Writ Appeal No. 949 of 1974;. He has\"alse\n\n•' 1<;·\n\n. ~·\n\nff:\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1984) 2 S.C.ll.\n\nfiled three other petitions for special leave to appeal to this Court, being Special Leave Petitions Nos. 5141 to 5143 of l 9i0 against the common Judgment and Order of the said High Court in the said Writ Appeals Nos. 1285 to 1287 of 1979. These petitions have been ordered to be listed after the disposal of thL Appeal . and will accordingly be disposed of by separate orders.\n\nWe now turn to the rival contentions rahed before us at the hearing of this Appeal. On behalf of the Appellant, it was submitted that under sub-section (8) of section 57 an application to vary the conditions of a permit in respect of a matter spcc; fied in that sul>:section \"shall be treated as an application for the grant of a new permit.\" Sub-section (8), therefore, creates a legal fiction and a legal fiction must be taken to its logical conclusion.\n\nAn application to vary the conditions of a permit in respect of a matter apecified in sub-section (8) when granted would, therefore, result in the grant of a new permit. One of the matters specified in subsection (8) is a variation of the conditions of a stage carriage permit by increasing the number of trips above the specified maximum.\n\nIf such variation were permitted, by the result of the operat:on of the statutory fiction enacted in sub-section (8) of sec! ion 57 the permit so varied would in law be a new permit. Under section 68-FF of the said Act no permit can be granted except in accordance with the provisions of a scheme. The said Scheme prohib:ts of a new permit and, therefore; to vary the conditions of a stage carriage permit by increasing the number of trips or the number of vehicles would be tantamount to granting a new permit which would be contrary to the said Scheme and thus not prmissible under section 68-FF. According to the Appellant, tbe Judgment of the learned Single Judge in the said Writ Petition No. 3360 of 1974 filed by the First Respondent allowing the said Writ Petition No. 3360 of 1974 and setting aside the order of the Second Respondent rejecting as not maintainable the First Respondent's said application for varying the conditions of his inter-State carriage permit by increasing the number of trips by one and directing the Second Respondent by a writ of mandamus to dispose of the said application in accordance with law was erroneous as also the decision of the Full Bench in the said Civil Appeal No. 949 of 1974, holding that such variation did not amount to grant of a new permit. It was further submitted that increasing the number of vehicles on a route resulted in an increase in the number of trips and an application for varying the conditions of a permit by increasing the number of vehicles allowed to ply on the route in respect of which such permit was given was, therefore,\n\n~··\n\n' J\n\n• '\n\n\"'··\n\nK.S.R.T. CORPN. ' B.A,' JAYARAM (Madon, J.)\n\n' '\n\n;777\n\n'.equally an .aplication for the 'grant of a new permit ad such an ' /i/\n\napplication could not, therefore, b€ granted in respect fa portion 1 of a route covered by the said Scheme. ,, .V \"\"\n\n'! .t-\n\nOn the other.hand, it was submitted on behalf of !he contest- ' ing Respondents that Sub-section (8) of section si did not create a legal fiction and all that it did was to provide that the procedure for considering an application for varying the , conditions of a permit in respect of the matters specified in that sub-section was to be the same as the procedure for considering an application for granting a new permit. In the alternative, it was submitted that if sub-section (8) of section 57 created a legal fiction, it was only for the purpose of the procedure to he 'followed in processing an application for a variation in the conditions of a , permit in respect of a matter' specified in that sub-section and cannot he extended beyond that purpose so as to create another legal fict10n, namely, that a permit the conditions of which were so, allowed to be varied would be deemed to be a new permit. It was further 'submitted that the sa\"id Scheme, both prior to and after its modi- .fication, permitted the existing permit holders on inter-State' routes to continue to' operate on such routes subject to the condition th'at their permits be rendered ineffective for the overlapping'portions''of the notified routes only, with the result' that they could not pick up and . set down passengers on : such portions only. It was also submitted that increasing the number of hips or vehicles on such inier- State routes was not in any manner inconsistent with the provisions of the said Scheme, whether prior to or after its notification.·\n\n- . ~- '': \"'\" '-'..\n\n• ''\n\n.IE '.'\n\nOn the above rival.contentions, two main our consideration, namely, questions 'ar'ise for\n\n/•· . '\n\n(I) Whether sub-section (8) of section 57 creates a legal fiction by reason of which the grant of an application for variation in the conditions 'of a permit , in respect of, a matter set out in that sub-section 'results in th~ grant of a new permit? , , '\" • •\n\n(2) Whether an increase in the number of trips. or the num: ~G ber of vehicles above the maximum specified in an existing'.· , ' inter-State stage carriage permit would be inconsistant with the provisions of the said Scheme? ' - ' ·(',\n\n'i f In order. to determine these questions, it is' necessary to refer ' '' to. the releant provisions of the' said Act;· Chapter IV of the said ~H\n\n1't8\n\n. UPRBMB COURT RBPORTS\n\n(19S4) 2 S.C.R •\n\nAct,.which consists of sections 42 to 68, provides for control of transport vehicles. A \"transport vehicle\" is defined by clause (33) of section 2 as meaning \"a public service vehicle or a goods vehicle\".\n\nA \"public service vehicle\" is defined by clause (25) of section 2 as meaning \"any motor vehicle used or adapted to be used for the carriage of passengers for hire or reward, and includes a motor cab, contract carriage, and stage carriage\".\n\nThe expression \"stage carriage\" is ddjned by clause (29) of section 2 as follows :\n\n\"(29) \"stage carriage\" means a motor vehicle carrying or adapted to carry more than six persons excluding the driver which carries passengers for hire or reward at separate fares paid by or for individual passengers, either for the whole journey or for stages of the journey.\"\n\nAs the said Scheme and its modification relate only to stage carriages, we are not concerned in this Appeal with contract carriages or goods vehicles and it is unnecessary to look at the definitions of those expressions or the provisions of the said Chapter IV relating to these ypes of vehicles.\n\nUnder section 42 no owner of a transport vehicle can use or _permit the use of the vehicle in any public place (whether or not such vehicle is actual!y carrying any passenger or goods) save in accordance with the conditions of. a permit granted or .countersigned by a Regional or State Transport Authority or the Commission, that is, the Inter-State Transport Commission constituted under section 63-A, authorizing the use of the vehicle in that place in the manner in which the vehicle is being used.\n\nSection 43 confers power upon the State Government to control road transport by issuing directions to the State Transport Authority in the form of notifications in the Official Gazette . .Section 44. empowers the State Government by notification in the\n\nOfficial Gazette to constitute for the State a State Transport Authority to exercise and discharge the powers and functions specified in sub-\n\ncction (3) of section 44 and in like manner to constitute Regional Transport Authorities to exercise and discharge throughout specified areas the powers and functions conferred on Regional Transport Authorities by the said Chapter IV. The said Chapter IV .provides for grant of different permits, namely, stage carriage permits, contract crrriage permits, private carrier's permits, public carrier's pfrmit and temporary permits, as also for applications to\n\n-..--\n\n. '\n\nK.S.R.T. CORPN. v: B.A. JAYARAM'(Madon, J.) 779\n\n~ ' .. - .\n\n'A_,.{ . be made in respeCt of these classes of permits, the procedure to b~,\n\nfollowed in dealiug with such applications, for cancellation and suspension' of permits :and other cognate'matters:· Section 45.sets outthe general provisions .iwith respect to applications for permits • irrespective f the type of permits applied for and it. prescribes the auihority to whom an application for a permit i, s to be made ...\n\nUnder sub-sectiOn (3) of section 45 every applicant for the gran•, of,.\n\nB a new stage carriage permit or public carrier's . permit is re'quired to i deposit, by way of security, with his application an amount in such.·\n\nmanner and at such rate not exceeding Rs. 200 per motor vehicle,: as the State Government may, with reference to each class of vehicle, by notification in the Official Gazette, 1 specify. Under sub-section (4), of section 45 thesecurity so furnished is liable to be forfeited.in,. whole or in part by the transport authority if it is satisfied that the application was made for the purpoS'e' of preventing the issue of a .temporary permit under section 62. The whole or part of the security deposit as lias not been forfeited is to be refunded to .. the applicant, as soon as may be, after: the disposal of his application. Other sections in the said Chapter IV make special provisions with respect to applications for different types of permits. Section 46 deals with an application for a stage carriage. permit:· Such an application is to contain the particulars specified in 'clauses (a) to (f)'of the said section 46.\n\nThe particulars required to be specified by clauses (a) to (c) of the said . section 46 are material for our purpose and it will be, therefore, convenient to reproduce these clauses These clauses 'pr-0vide as follows : ·\n\n\"(a) the route or routes or the area or areas' to which\n\nthe application relates;\n\n(b) the number , of vehicles it is proposed to operate in relation to each route 'or area and the type and seating capacity of each such vehicle ; . . ... •:'\n\n(c) the minimum, and maximum .. 11uml)er of daily trips proposed to be .. provided in• rel; i.tion to each ronte or area. and the time table of the normal trips.\n\nExplanation-For the purposes \"or this section 57, \"trip\"'means a single journey from, one point to. another, and every ; return journey. shall be dccnied to be . a,, sq)aratetrip.\" ~\n\n. E'\n\n'180\n\nSUPREME COURT RBPO'RTS (1984] 2 s.c.R.\n\nA Section 47 prescribes the matters which a Regional Transport Authority is to have regard to in considering an application for a stage carriage permit. It also requires the Regional Transport Authority to take into consideration any representations made by persons already providing passenger transport facilities by any means along or near the route or area or by any association repre- B senting persons interested in the provision of road transport faci - litics recognized in this behalf by the State GoV0rnment' or by any local authority or police authority within whose jurisdiction any part of the proposed route or area lies. The said section also providcsfor reservation of certain percentage of stage carriage permits for the Scheduled Castes, and the Scheduled Tribes and C persons belonging to economicaily weaker sections of the community. Under section 48, subject to the provisions of section 47, a Regional Transport Authority may, on an applidation made to it under section 46, grant a stage carriage permit in accordance with the application or with such modifications as it deemed fit or refuse to grant such a permit. Sub-section (3) of section 48 provides for D conditions which may be attached to a stage carriage permit. Amongst the conditions which can be attached are conditions that the vehicle or vehicles be used only in a specified area or on a specified route or routes, the minimum and maximum number of daily trips to be provided in relation to any route or area generally or on specified days and occasions and a condition that within E municipal limits and such other areas and places as may be prescribed, passengers or goods shall not be taken up or set down except at specified points. Sections 49 to 51 deal with contract carriage permits, sections 52 and 53 with private carrier's permits and sections 54 to 56 with public carrier's permits. Section 57 is important since the answer to the first question which we have to determine F in this Appeal depends upon the true interpretation of sub-section\n\n(8) thereof and in order to understand the scope and effect of that sub-section, it is necessary to reproduce section 57. The said section 57 provides as follo.ws :\n\n\"27. Procedure in applying fot and granting permits- (!) An application for a contract carriage permit or a private carrier's permit may be made at any time.\n\n(2) An application. for a stage carriage permit or a public carrier's permit shall be made not less than six weeks before the date on which it is desired that the per- ·.nit shall take effect, or if the Regional Transport Autho-\n\n~ /.\n\nI ~. -~ K.s.R.T. CORP.N. voe:A..'JAYARAM (Madon, J.). . 781'\n\n' rity appoints dates on such dates. . •\n\nfor the receipt of such applications; .. '\n\n(3) . On receipt of an applicaticin for a stage,.carriage permit or a public carrier's permit, the Regional Transport Authority shall ri1ake the application available for inspection at, the office of the Authority and sho H publish the application or the substance thereof in the prescribed manner together 1iiith a notice 'of the date before which representations connection ther.ewith may be submitted and . the date, not bing less than thirty , days from such publication, on which, and thc,, time ,.and place at whic~,. the application and any representations received will be considered.:\n\nProvided that, if the grant of any permit in accordance with the application or with modifications would have the effect of increasing the manner of .vehicles operating in the region, or any area or on any route within the region, under the class of permits to which the application relates, beyond the limit fixed in that behalf under sub-sect{on (3) of section 47 or sub-section (Z) of section 55, as the case may be, tho Regional Transp6rt Authority may summarily refuse the application without following the procedure laid down in this sub-section.\n\n\"{ (4) N~ representation in' connection with an application referred to in sub-section (3) shall be cosidered by the Regional Transport Authority unless it is made in writ- . ing before the appointed date and. unless a copy thereof is furnished simultaneously to the applicant by the person . making such represeutation.\n\n(5) When any representation such as is r referred to in . sub-section (3) is made, the Regional Transport. Authoity shall .dispose of the application at a public hearing, at. which the applicant and the person making the representation shall have an opportunity of being heard eithr.in\n\nperson or by a duly authi:lrised representative. '· · ·\n\n'<6) '\"When any represeniation has been mde b/ the persons or auththorit.ies referred fo in section 50 to.the effect that the number of. cori'tract 'carriages for whlch permits have already ,, been , ilranted in anyregipn or any area ,\n\n...\n\n' '\n\n. ·1D\n\n--~·\n\n. .,_\\. -~_;:1\n\n•, E~'. \"\n\n. . F\n\n._.,\n\n' \\~.-; ·,.)::,\n\ni.-\n\nwithin a region is sufficient for or in excess of the needs of the region or of such area, whether such representation is made in connection with a particular application for the grant of a contract carriage permit or otherwise, the Regional Transport Authority may take any such steps as it considers appropriate for the hearing of the rcpresenta- 1ion in the presence of any persons likely to be affected thereby. '\n\n(7) When a Regional Transport Authority refuses an application for a permit of any kind, it shall give to the applicant in writing it.s reasons for the refusal.\n\n(8) An application to vary the conditions of any permit, other than a temporary permh, by the inclusion of a new route or routes or a new area or, in the case of a stage carriage permit, by increasing the number of trips above the specified maximum or by altering the route 'covered by it or in the case of a contract carriage permit\n\nor a public carrier's permit, by increasing the number of vihicles covered by the permit, shall be treated as an ' application for the grant of a new permit.\n\nProvided 1hat it shall not be necessary to treat an application made by the holder of a stage carriage permit who provides the only service on any route or in any area to increase the frequency of the service so provided, without any increase in the number of vehicles.\n\n(9) A Regional Transport Authority may,· before such date as may be specified by it in this behalf, replace any stage carriage permit or public carrier's permit or public carrier's permit granted by it before the said date by a fresh permit conforming to the provjsions of Section 48 or section 51 Qr section 56, as the case may be, and the fresh permit shall be valid for the same route or routes or . or the same aea for which the replaced permit was valid ;\n\nProvided that no condition other than the condition which was already attached to the replaced permit or which could have been attached thereto under the law in force when that permit was granted shall be attached to the fresh permit except with the consent in writing of the\n\n B holder of the permit.\n\n. r\n\n) -~\n\n\"' -~, :;' :;(J-,~~'*~\n\n'!·;,\n\nK.S.R.T. CORPN. ~. B.A:'JAYARAM (Madon, J.) -783 • , ((10) Notwithstanding anything contained.· insection 1)1 58, a permit issued under. the. provisions of sub-section .\n\n(~)shall be effective withiJJ; t , renewalfor the remainder of, ··• the. period during which the replaced permit . would have been so effective.\"\n\nWe will first conclude our survey of the relevant provisions of the said Act'before. proceeding to ascertain the correct interpretation to be placed upon subcsecticin (8) of. section 57. .Section '58\n\n1\\-· . . • • '' . • • I \"· • provides that a stage carnage .permit or a contract carnage permit; other than a temporary' permit issued . under section 62, shall be effective\" without renewal for such period, not less than three years and not more than five years, as the Regional Transport Authority may specify in the permit. A private carrier's permit or a pnbl, ic. carrier's permit otherthan a temporary permit is to be effective without renewal for a period ofJive years. Under sub-section {2) of 'section 58 an applications for renewal of a permit is to be made and disposed of as if it were an applicat on for a permit. Sub-\n\nection (2) also prescribes the time-limit within which applications for renewal are .to be made and it fmther provid.es that other condi-' tions being equal, an application for renewal shall be granted preference over lle:.v applications for permits.· Section 59 prescribes the general conditions to .. be attached ., to all permits.· Section 60 deals with cancellation and suspension of permits. It , ·.is unnecessary to refer to , the other 'provisions of the said Chap-. ter IV. '''\n\nChapter lV-A of the said Act provides for nationalization of\n\n.])\n\nroad transport service. 'Under section 68-B the provisions' of \"Chapter IVcA and the rules and orders made' thereunder are to have . , . effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith' contained in F . Chapter IV of the said Act or any other. law for the time being in .'force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any such law. '\n\nSection 68:C deals with the preparation ef a scheme by a State , Transport Undertaking for the purpose of providing an efficient, ,, adequate, economical and property, co-ordinated road transport_\n\nservice. Such a scheme is to be published in. the Official Gazette \" ; G and also in such other manner as the State Governmentmay direet.\n\n•\"'-' iSection 68-D, provides for filing of objections to a proposed. scheme.'\n\nUnder. Sub-section (2) of section 68-o,' after consid.ering the objec-' ., tions whfoh may have been made'to a poposed scheme and after giving an opportunity to the objector or his repesentatives and the .. frepresentatives.ofthe State Transport Undertaking. to be heard in' 'He\n\n1 ,'\n\n,.\",\n\nthe' matter, the State Government may approve or modify the scheme. The scheme as approved or modified is to be published in the Official Gazette and it is thereupon to become final and is to be called :the approved scheme and the area or route to which it relates is to be called the notified area or notified route. Section 68-F provides for cancellation or modification of approved schemes, Section 68F provides for issue ofa stage carriage permit or a public carrier's permit or a contract carriage permi_t in respect of a notified area or notified routes to the State Transport Undertaking.\n\nSection 68-FF provides as follows :\n\n\"68-'-FF-Restriction on_ grant of permits in respect of a notified area or notified route.-Where a scheme has been published under sub-section (3) of section 68-D in respect of any notified area or notified route, the State Transport Authority or the Regional Transport Authority,_ as the case may be, shall not grant any permit except in _accordance with the Provisions of the scheme.\" '\n\nThere is a proviso to the said section 68-FF with which we are not\n\nCon6erned.\n\nWe now turn to a consideration of the scope and effect of sub-section (8) of section 57. That sub-section does not apply io applications to vary any of the conditions of a permit but applies only to applications to vary certain conditions of a permit. These applications are :\n\n(1) an application to vary the conditions of any permit, other than a temporary permit, by the inclusion of a new F route or routes or. a new area ;\n\n.ff\n\n(2) an !application to vary the conditions of ra stage carriage permit by increasing the number of trips above the specified maximum ;\n\n(3) an application to ivary the conditions of a stage\n\ncarriage permit by altering the route covered by it ;\n\n(4) an application to vary the conditions of a contract carriage permit by increasing the number of vehicles cover\n\ned by the permit ; and\n\n(5) an application to vary the conditions of a public carrier's\n\n...\n\n- ' - ,.\n\n'\" ' 1,''':~~$t\n\nK.S.R.T. CORPN •.. v. B.A. JAYARAM (Madon, J.)\n\nt/ '\n\npermit by increasing the number of vehicles co\"'.ered by the permit. '\n\nIn aJI. these ftve, cases.'.ub, setlon (8) provides that the apph- ·\n\n, ~-· ·- - . - ' r cation \"shall be treated as an application for the' grant of a new permit\"-:· As. seen above, under .section 68-FF when a scheme has been approved and published under• sub-section (3) of section . 68-D in respect of any notified area or notified route, the State Transport Authority or the Regional Transport Authority, as the case may be, is prohibited from granting any permit except in' accordance with.the provisions of that scheme. The said Scheme ' \\ . confers a right upon the Appellant to operate the services on all, .routes mentioned in .the appendix to the .said Scheme to the com- .. . ., . ' plete exclusion of all other persons except existing permit holders . on inter-State routes with the condition that the permits of such existing permit .holders were to' be rendered ineffective for the over- . lapping portions of the notified routes and they would not be entitled to pick up or set down passengers on such 'portions of the notified routes. If the effect or'ub-'sectiori (8) of section 57 were as eon tended for by the Appellant,· that is, if the said sub•'secticin (8) were to create a legal fiction by which an application for variation . of the conditions ofa permit of the nature referred to in that sub- . section is to be deemed to be an application for the grant of a riew ·\n\npermit and such variation when granted would result in th~ ''gl'ant , of a new permit, then clearly by reason of the prohibition con- .tained in section 68-FF, the granting of snch application would be' . inconsistent with the provisions of the said Scheme and would not\n\nbe permissible in law. Considerable emphasis were placed, on. behalf of the. Appellant on the ords \"shall be. treted as' an appli- .catiori for the grant of a permit occurring in the said sub-section (8) ·, ' : and on the basis .of this phraseology, it was submitted that an appli- ·· ·\n\ncation' for variation .of a condition of a perniit referred to in subsection (8) of section 57 was by a fiction of; .law pnt on 'the sam~ footing as an application for t.he grant .of a new.· permit and. it,· therefore, followed as a corollary that such an application if granted., . would result in the grant of a new permit. ·\n\nI . , In a passage which has become it classic Lord Asquith in the House of Lords in the case of East E'nd.Dwe/lings Co.Lid. v Finsbury Borough Gouncil(') said : , \"'\n\n(I) J19Sl] 2All. B.R. 587, S99 H.L.\n\n' \"' ; f'~:: ~-~· '•.\n\n. , .. Ii\n\n' .-~\" \\ _\n\n'.~·\n\n,· ..\n\nG,· .,\n\n-~ ;'\n\n\"If you are bidden to treat an imaginary state of affairs as real, you must surely, unless prohibited from doing so, also imagine as real the consquence and incidents which, if the putative state of affairs ha_d in fact existed, must inevitably have flowed from or accompanied it ... The statute says ·\"that you 1nust imagine a c::rtain state of afl'airs ; it does not say that. having done. so, you must cause or permit your imagination to boggle when it comes to the inevitable corollaries of that state of affairs.\"\n\nThis passage has been referred to or quoted with approval in a nu:riber of dcc:, iom of this Court. One of the earliest of them was C the State of Bombay v. Pandul'ang Vinayak Ch-, phalkar and others.(')\n\nIt is unnecessary to refer to other cases of this Court in which this passage was. cited and approved. The question, however, is whether sub-section (8) of section 57 creates a legal fiction.\n\nAdmittedly, , the language of that sub-section is not one which is normally used by legislature in creating a legal fiction. Sub-section (8) does not state that an application of the nature refereed to in that subsection is to be deemed to be an applicat!oq for the grnnt of a new permit, which would have been the case were the intention of Parliament to create a legal fiction. The arguments on behalf of the Appellant are founded upon a basis which has no relation to the purpose underlying sub-section (8). Section 57 is a procedural section, Its various sub-sections form an integral whole providing for the manner in which an application for variation of certain conditions_ of a permit is to be made, the mode of inviting objections thereto and the disposal of snch applications and objections. Subsection (!) provides when an application for a contract carriage permit or a private carrier's permit can be made. Sub-section\n\n(2) provides when an application for a stage carriage permit or a public carriers permit shonld be made. Thus, these two subsections de01l with the time when applications for grant of certain classes of permits can be 1nade. Sub-sections (3) to (7) prescribe the procedure to be followed by the Regional Transport Authority. when it receives an application for a stage carriage permit or a public carrier's permit. Sub-section (8) deals with applications to vary certain conditions of pJrticular permits. Sub-section (9) confers power upon the Regional Transport Authority to replace a stage\n\nH . (tl I19S3J s.c.R. ~73, 11s-9,\n\n--·-\n\n'' 'K.S.R.T. CORPN: v.'B:A.'jAYARAM (Madon, J.) ·. . 787\n\n,, g, ifriage. permit, contract carriage perit or public crrier's prinit' A\\ grahted by it by a fresh permit and sub-section (IO) provides that such fresh permit shall be effective without renewal for the remainder, of the period during which the replaced permit would have been so ,. effective. Sub-section. (8) comes immediately after subsections (3) to (7) and when read in the context of these sub-sectiohs and in juxtaposition with them, it is clear that the legislative intmt in enacting that sub-section· \\vas to prescribe the procedure to be followed when an application for 'variation of. the conditions of a Y permit referred to in that sub-section is made, this procedure being the same as is laid down in sub sections (3) to (7) with respect to an application. for a new stage carriage permit or a new public carrier's permit. lt is for the.purpose of providing that the procedure to be followed in the case of an applieation made under sub-section (8) is to be the sanie as the procedure to be follo\\ved in the case of an application for a new permit that sub-section (8) uses the words \"shall be treated as an application for the grant' cif a' new permit.\" .By the use of these words what sub-section (8) does is to incorporate in it the provisions of sub-sections (3) to (7). This is a very different thing from enacting a legal fiction.\n\nWe find that in a recent case, namely, .Civil Appeal No. 3787 of 1983-Mis.Shiv. ·· chand Amolakchand v. Regional 'Transport Authority an.Ii anothe;('):..!...' su]):.scction (8) of section 57 has been. interpreted in the same way' as we have done. In that case too'therc was a modification' made. in an approved scheme whereby plying of stage carriages by 'private\n\n: E{' operators upon a portion of the notified route connecting a district headquarter and not more than 20 kms. in length was permitted.\n\nOn the said modification being made, the applicants whose permits ... ,. for a portion of the notified route, namely, from Shivpuri to Sautan; wana, had become ineffective on the coming into force of the approved scheme applied to the Regional Transport Authority for\n\nF') . the extension of the route specified in.their permit so as to include, ,\n\n''--1!\n\nthe route from Shivpuri to Santa;;,, ana. The Regional Transport\"· Autho; ityrejected the said application inter a/ia on the ground that no extension\"· of the wuie couid be granted without following 'the procedure laid down in' sub-section (3) of section 47 of the said Act. ;,\n\n-.--.,.\n\nIn the writ petition filed by the appllants'before the High Court . G f ' of Madhya'.Pradesh, the High Court took the same.view. This Court ·· · allowed the app, eal and set aside th~ Judgment and Order of the ;\n\n,' .-.\n\n-.;: ,~_: ·~ '.· i\n\n(I) [4984] I.S.C R: 288. ,.\n\n- i .:.t (\n\nHigh Court. In that case too, this Court had to consider the. effect of sub-section (8) of setion 57. The Court observed :\n\n\"The context in which sub-section (8) occurs and its juxtaposition with sub-section (3) to (7) in section 58 clearly indicate that what is sought to be made applicable to an , application referred to in sub-section (8) by treating it as an application for grant of a new permit, is the procedure set out in sub-sections (3) to (7) of section 58 and nothing more ... An application to vary the conditions of a permit as set out in sub-section (8) of sect'on 57 is undoubtedly to be treated as an application for grant of a new permit, bnt that is only for the purpose of applying the procedure set out in sub-sections (3) to (7) of. the said section. It is not an application for a new permit and if it is granted, the permit for the extended route does not become a new permit in the hands of the applicant. It is the same permit which now, after the granting of the application, covers the extended\n\nroute.\"\n\n.Ev ?n if sub-section (8) of section 57 can be viewed as creating a legal fiction. the question which would arise would be for what purpose such legal fiction was created.\n\nAs was observed by Lord James in Ex Parte Walton, In re Levy('> ; .. '\n\n\"When a statute enacts that something shall be deemed to have been done, which in fact and in truth was not done, the Court is entitled and bound to ascertain for what purposes and between what persons the statutory fiction is to be resorted to.\"\n\nThi> passage was quoted with approval by the House of Lords in Arthur Hill v. East and West India Dock Company('). This principle of statutory interpretation has been accepted by this Court.\n\nIn The Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. The State of Bihar and Ors(')\n\nit was held that \"a legal fiction is to be limited to the purpose for\n\nG,. which it was created and should not .be extended beyond that legitimate field.\" This was reiterated in The Commissioner of Income-\n\n(I) L.R. [1981] 17 Ch.D. 741, 756 C.A.\n\n(2) L.R. [198.4] 9 A.C. 4SS, 456.\n\n\nK, S.R.T. CORPN. v. B.A. JAYARAM (Madon, J.) 789\n\ntax, Bombay City, Bombay v. Amarchand N. Shroff('), Maharani Mandalsa Devi v. M. Ramnarain P. Ltd. and others(') and Commissioner of Income-tax, Gujarat v. Vadilal Lallubhai('). Assuming, therefore, that an application for variation of the conditions of a permit referred to in sub-section (8) ofsection 57 is to be deemed by a fiction of law to be an application for the grant of a ne\\v permit the question to which we must address ourselves is for what purpose is such an application for variation deemed to be an application for grant of a new permit.\n\nReaing sub sections (3) to (8) of section 57 as a whole, it is clear that the only purpose is to apply to such an application forvariation the procedure prescribed by sub-sections\n\n(3) to (7) of section 57 and not for the purpose of providing that when the application for variation is granted, the permit so varied would be deemed to be a new permit. If a permit so varied were to be deemed to be a Iiew permit, the result would be anomalous.\n\nAs we have seen, under sub-section (3) of section 45 every application for the grant of a new stage carriage permit or a public carrier's permit is to be accompained by a deposit by way of security of an amount not exceeding Rs. 200 per motor vehicle as the State Government may, with reference to each class of vehicle, by notifi - cation in the Official Gazette, specify. The object of providing for such. a deposit is made clear by sub-section (4) of section 45.\n\nThe object is that if the transport authority is satisfied that 8uch application was made for the purpose of preventing the issue of a temporary permit under section 62, then it can forfeit the whole. or part of the security deposit. This consideration does not and cannot be applied to an application for variation of the conditions of a permit referred to in sub-section (8) of section 57.\n\nFurther, under subsection (!) of section 58 a stage carriage permit or a contract carriage permit, other then a temporary permit, is to be effective without renewal for such period, not less than three years and not more than five years, as the Regional Transport Authority may specify in the permit. Under sub-section (2) of section 58, an application for renewal of a stage carriage permit or a public carrier's permit is to be made not less than 120 days before the date of its expiry and an application for renewal of a permit in any other case is to be made not less than 60 days before the date of its expiry.\n\nUnder subsection (3) a permit may be renewed on an application made and\n\n(I) (196'1 Supp.1 S.C.R. 699, 709.\n\n\n(3) [197J] I S.C.R. 1058, 1064,\n\ndispQsed of as if it were an application for a permit. If a permit in respect of which a condition referred to in rnb-section (8) of section 57 is allowed to be varied is to be deemed to be a new permit, it would automatically follow that such a permit would get extended for a further period even though no application for its renewal was made and that in granting such variation, the Regional Transport Authority would have to specify for what period, not less than three years, the permit so varied would be effective. Such\n\na result could not have been in the contemplation of Parliament and has not been provided for.\n\nEven though when the condition of a permit is allowed to be varied on an application made under sub-section (8) of section .'i7, the permit so varied is not a new permit, the question still remains whether: in the case of an existing inter-State permit exempted under the said Scheme an increase in the number of trips or the number of vehicles allowed to be operated under such a permit would not be inconsistent with the provisions of the said Scheme. We fail to see any inconsistency between an increase in the number of vehicles or trips allowed under such a permit and the provisions of the said Scheme. So far as the portions of the inter- State route covered by the said Schein• are concerned, the permits of the existing permit-holders have been rndered ineffective.\n\nFurther, by the said Scheme as modified, the existing permit-holders are not allowed to pick up or set down passengers on these portions of the notified routes.\n\nWhether one vehicle or more traverse these portions or whether the same vehicle traverses such portion more than once cannot any manner affect the services operated by the Appellant on such portions since no passengers are allowed to be picked up or set down or such pQrtions.\n\nAll that would happen is that these vehicles, in the course of their inter-State operation would traverse these portions of the notified routes without in any way operating as stage carriages for such portions.\n\nIt is, therefore, clear that the Second Respondent was in error in rejecting the, First Respondent's said application for variation G without following the procedure laid down in subsections (3) to (7) of section 57 merely on the ground that granting such application would be to grant a new permit and would be inconsistent with the provisions of the said Scheme. The learned Single Judge was, therefore, clearly right in allowing Writ Petition No. 3360 of 1964 filed by the First Respondent and in issuing a writ of mandamus against ff the Second Respondent directing him to dispose of the First Res-\n\n,,.\n\nK.S.R.T. CORPN. v. B.A. JAYARAM (Madon, J.) 791\n\npondent's said application according to law.\n\nWe are further of the opinion that the High Court was right in dismissing the said Writ Appeal No. 949 of 1974 filed by the Appellant.\n\nWe would like to observe that it is difficult to understand how a certificate was granted by the High Court with respect to the first question contained in it. The question as framed does not bring out the actual controversy between the parties. The controversy was not whether the conditions of a permit can be varied so as to increase the number of trips or the number of vehicles allowed to be operated under that permit as mentioned by the High Court in the certificate granted by it. The real'controversy was whether when the condition o'f a permit is varied so as to increase the number of trips or the number of vehicles allowed to be perated under that permit it would amount to the grant of a new permit, the grant of which would not be in accordance with the provisions of the said Scheme by reason of the provisions ofsection 68-FF.\n\nFor the reasons set out above, this Appeal fails and is dismissed. The Appellant will pay to Respondent Nos. I to 3 the costs of this Appeal. Respondent No. 4 will bear and pay his own costs of this Appeal.\n\nS.R.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 171, "entities": [{"text": "KARNATAKA STATE ROAD TRANSPORT\n\nCORPORATION, BANGALORE", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 54, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KARNATAKA STATE ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION, BANGALORE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "B. A. JAYARAM AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 56, "end_char": 80, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "B. A. JAYARAM AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "January 31, 1984", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 82, "end_char": 98, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "KARNATAKA STATE ROAD TRANSPORT\n\nCORPORATION, BANGALORE\n\nB. A. JAYARAM AND OTHERS\n\nJanuary 31, 1984\n\n[D. P. MADON AND SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, JJ.J\n\nMotor Vehicles."}}, {"text": "D. P. MADON", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 101, "end_char": 112, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.P. MADON", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Section 57(8)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 181, "end_char": 194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 588, "end_char": 606, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 57(8)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 631, "end_char": 644, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "February 2, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 660, "end_char": 676, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On February 2, 1966, the Respondent No."}}, {"text": "Regional Transport Authority, Bangalore", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 738, "end_char": 777, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1, B. A, Jayaram had been granted by the Regional Transport Authority, Bangalore, a stage carriage permit .on the inter-state route Cuddapah in the State of Andhra Pradesh to Bangalore in the Karnataka State, which was duly countersigned by the State Transport Authority, Andhra Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Cuddapah", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 829, "end_char": 837, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1, B. A, Jayaram had been granted by the Regional Transport Authority, Bangalore, a stage carriage permit .on the inter-state route Cuddapah in the State of Andhra Pradesh to Bangalore in the Karnataka State, which was duly countersigned by the State Transport Authority, Andhra Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 854, "end_char": 868, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1, B. A, Jayaram had been granted by the Regional Transport Authority, Bangalore, a stage carriage permit .on the inter-state route Cuddapah in the State of Andhra Pradesh to Bangalore in the Karnataka State, which was duly countersigned by the State Transport Authority, Andhra Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Bangalore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 872, "end_char": 881, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1, B. A, Jayaram had been granted by the Regional Transport Authority, Bangalore, a stage carriage permit .on the inter-state route Cuddapah in the State of Andhra Pradesh to Bangalore in the Karnataka State, which was duly countersigned by the State Transport Authority, Andhra Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Karnataka State", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 889, "end_char": 904, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1, B. A, Jayaram had been granted by the Regional Transport Authority, Bangalore, a stage carriage permit .on the inter-state route Cuddapah in the State of Andhra Pradesh to Bangalore in the Karnataka State, which was duly countersigned by the State Transport Authority, Andhra Pradesh."}}, {"text": "10.1.1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 988, "end_char": 997, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 10.1.1968, the Mysore (Karanataka) State granted its approval under section 68(0)(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act 1939, to a scp.eme, popularly known as the \"Kolar Pocket Scheme\", to nationa: lize passanger transport service between Ba\"ngaIOre and various places in the Kolar District, as also certain routes within the Kolar District, covering 87 inter-state routes referred to in its appendix."}}, {"text": "Mysore (Karanataka) State", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1003, "end_char": 1028, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 10.1.1968, the Mysore (Karanataka) State granted its approval under section 68(0)(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act 1939, to a scp.eme, popularly known as the \"Kolar Pocket Scheme\", to nationa: lize passanger transport service between Ba\"ngaIOre and various places in the Kolar District, as also certain routes within the Kolar District, covering 87 inter-state routes referred to in its appendix."}}, {"text": "section 68(0)(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1056, "end_char": 1072, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicle Act 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1080, "end_char": 1102, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Kolar District", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1254, "end_char": 1268, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 10.1.1968, the Mysore (Karanataka) State granted its approval under section 68(0)(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act 1939, to a scp.eme, popularly known as the \"Kolar Pocket Scheme\", to nationa: lize passanger transport service between Ba\"ngaIOre and various places in the Kolar District, as also certain routes within the Kolar District, covering 87 inter-state routes referred to in its appendix."}}, {"text": "clause 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1386, "end_char": 1394, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Motor Vehicle Act 1939", "statute": "the Motor Vehicle Act 1939"}}, {"text": "Royalpad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1705, "end_char": 1713, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The route between Bangalore and Royalpad in the State of Karnataka formed part of the route between Bangalore and Cuddapah and was covered by the Scheme, with the result that the First Respondent's permit foe the said portion of the Bangalore Cuddapah route became ineffective and consequent tha_t tho vehicles operated by him could not either pick up or set down passen- ."}}, {"text": "Karnataka", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1730, "end_char": 1739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The route between Bangalore and Royalpad in the State of Karnataka formed part of the route between Bangalore and Cuddapah and was covered by the Scheme, with the result that the First Respondent's permit foe the said portion of the Bangalore Cuddapah route became ineffective and consequent tha_t tho vehicles operated by him could not either pick up or set down passen- ."}}, {"text": "January 24, 197", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2168, "end_char": 2183, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On January 24, 197 31 the first respondent made an aplication to."}}, {"text": "Karnataka State Transport Authority", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2257, "end_char": 2292, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Second Resoondent the Karnataka State Transport Authority for varying the conditions of the stage carriage per- 1nit granted to him by increasing the number of trips on the Bangalore Cuddappah route from one trip per day to two trips -perday so as to eliminate one."}}, {"text": "Bangalore Cuddappah", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2408, "end_char": 2427, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Second Resoondent the Karnataka State Transport Authority for varying the conditions of the stage carriage per- 1nit granted to him by increasing the number of trips on the Bangalore Cuddappah route from one trip per day to two trips -perday so as to eliminate one."}}, {"text": "Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3063, "end_char": 3105, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the meantime, the ~AppelJant the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation, filed on November 27, 1974 a writ petition _No."}}, {"text": "December 23/24, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3417, "end_char": 3437, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On December 23/24, 1974, the Second Respondent granted to lhe first respondent the additional trip applied for by him."}}, {"text": "Karnataka High Court Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3655, "end_char": 3685, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "September 19, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3794, "end_char": 3812, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On a reference by the Division Bench, the Full Bench by its Judgment delivered on September 19, 1979, opined that ''If the condition of a permit for operating a stage carriage over a rOute is allcred by increaing the maximum number of trips over that route sPecified earlier in the permit such variation of the condition of the permit does not amourit to grant of a ner permit.\""}}, {"text": "Cliddapah", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4223, "end_char": 4232, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Third Respondent who had been granted three stage carriage permits on three different inter-state routes, namely, Bangalore to Cliddapah; Bangalore Kalabasti; and Bangalore to VeJJore applied on June 11, 1979 to the Second Respondent for varyjng the conditions of the said three permits by increasing the number of vehicles by an additional vehicle on each route and by increasing the number of trips from lwo to four on each route, that is for two round trips, which were granted."}}, {"text": "Bangalore Kalabasti", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4234, "end_char": 4253, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Third Respondent who had been granted three stage carriage permits on three different inter-state routes, namely, Bangalore to Cliddapah; Bangalore Kalabasti; and Bangalore to VeJJore applied on June 11, 1979 to the Second Respondent for varyjng the conditions of the said three permits by increasing the number of vehicles by an additional vehicle on each route and by increasing the number of trips from lwo to four on each route, that is for two round trips, which were granted."}}, {"text": "VeJJore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4272, "end_char": 4279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Third Respondent who had been granted three stage carriage permits on three different inter-state routes, namely, Bangalore to Cliddapah; Bangalore Kalabasti; and Bangalore to VeJJore applied on June 11, 1979 to the Second Respondent for varyjng the conditions of the said three permits by increasing the number of vehicles by an additional vehicle on each route and by increasing the number of trips from lwo to four on each route, that is for two round trips, which were granted."}}, {"text": "June 11, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4291, "end_char": 4304, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Third Respondent who had been granted three stage carriage permits on three different inter-state routes, namely, Bangalore to Cliddapah; Bangalore Kalabasti; and Bangalore to VeJJore applied on June 11, 1979 to the Second Respondent for varyjng the conditions of the said three permits by increasing the number of vehicles by an additional vehicle on each route and by increasing the number of trips from lwo to four on each route, that is for two round trips, which were granted."}}, {"text": "High Court of Karnataka", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5582, "end_char": 5605, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "949/74 by virtue of his having been aliowed to be implead ed by the High Court of Karnataka as third responnent thereto though it was not all necessary Since in the writ appeal No."}}, {"text": "22.2.1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5730, "end_char": 5739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "949 of 1974 which was dismissed on 22.2.1980, the Karnataka High Court granted to the itppellant a certificate of fitness to appeal to the Supreme Court."}}, {"text": "Karnataka High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5745, "end_char": 5765, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "949 of 1974 which was dismissed on 22.2.1980, the Karnataka High Court granted to the itppellant a certificate of fitness to appeal to the Supreme Court."}}, {"text": "Section 57(8)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5896, "end_char": 5909, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Motor-Vehicles Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5917, "end_char": 5941, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 57(8)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6084, "end_char": 6097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Motor-Vehicles Act, 1939", "statute": "the Motor-Vehicles Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "section 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8218, "end_char": 8228, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8479, "end_char": 8489, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8639, "end_char": 8649, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1955] 2 S.C.R. 603", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 9096, "end_char": 9115, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "(1965] 3 S.C.R. 421", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 9294, "end_char": 9313, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "K. Parasaran", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10945, "end_char": 10957, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Parasaran, Soliciter General, Vineet Kumar, Naresh Kumar and Miss Deepika Saxina for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Vineet Kumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10978, "end_char": 10990, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Parasaran, Soliciter General, Vineet Kumar, Naresh Kumar and Miss Deepika Saxina for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Naresh Kumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10992, "end_char": 11004, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Parasaran, Soliciter General, Vineet Kumar, Naresh Kumar and Miss Deepika Saxina for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Deepika Saxina", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11014, "end_char": 11028, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Parasaran, Soliciter General, Vineet Kumar, Naresh Kumar and Miss Deepika Saxina for the appellant."}}, {"text": "K.K. Venugopal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11049, "end_char": 11063, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K.K. Venugopal, K.N. Bhat, M. Rangaswamy, MRV.Achar s. Ravindra Bhatt and Nanjappa Ganapathy for the respondents. '"}}, {"text": "K.N. Bhat", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11065, "end_char": 11074, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K.K. Venugopal, K.N. Bhat, M. Rangaswamy, MRV.Achar s. Ravindra Bhatt and Nanjappa Ganapathy for the respondents. '"}}, {"text": "M. Rangaswamy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11076, "end_char": 11089, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K.K. Venugopal, K.N. Bhat, M. Rangaswamy, MRV.Achar s. Ravindra Bhatt and Nanjappa Ganapathy for the respondents. '"}}, {"text": "MRV.Achar s. Ravindra Bhatt", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11091, "end_char": 11118, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K.K. Venugopal, K.N. Bhat, M. Rangaswamy, MRV.Achar s. Ravindra Bhatt and Nanjappa Ganapathy for the respondents. '"}}, {"text": "Nanjappa Ganapathy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11123, "end_char": 11141, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K.K. Venugopal, K.N. Bhat, M. Rangaswamy, MRV.Achar s. Ravindra Bhatt and Nanjappa Ganapathy for the respondents. '"}}, {"text": "MADON", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11212, "end_char": 11217, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was , delivered by\n\nMADON, J. This Appeal has been filed by the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation pursuant to a certificate granted by the Karnataka High Court against its Judgment and Order in Writ Appeal No.", "canonical_name": "MADON"}}, {"text": "B.A. Jayarm", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12039, "end_char": 12050, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On February 2, 1966, the First Respondent, B.A. Jayarm, H\n\n.", "canonical_name": "B. A. JAYARAM AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT RBPOFTS [1984] 2 s.c.a", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12062, "end_char": 12098, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "772\n\nSUPREME COURT RBPOFTS [1984] 2 s.c.a."}}, {"text": "March 16, 1966", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12399, "end_char": 12413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "20/65-66 in respect of this route was issued to him on March 16, 1966."}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12480, "end_char": 12494, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Andhra Pradesh, on March 21, 1967."}}, {"text": "March 21, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12499, "end_char": 12513, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Andhra Pradesh, on March 21, 1967."}}, {"text": "January 10, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12550, "end_char": 12566, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.O. 111 dated January 10, 1968, published in the Mysore Government Gazette dated January 25, 1968, the Government of Mysore (now Karnataka) granted its approval under sub-section (2) of section 68-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939' (IV 1.939) (hereinafter referred to as \"the said Act\") to a scheme set out in the Schedule to the said Notification."}}, {"text": "January 25, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12617, "end_char": 12633, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.O. 111 dated January 10, 1968, published in the Mysore Government Gazette dated January 25, 1968, the Government of Mysore (now Karnataka) granted its approval under sub-section (2) of section 68-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939' (IV 1.939) (hereinafter referred to as \"the said Act\") to a scheme set out in the Schedule to the said Notification."}}, {"text": "Government of Mysore", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12639, "end_char": 12659, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.O. 111 dated January 10, 1968, published in the Mysore Government Gazette dated January 25, 1968, the Government of Mysore (now Karnataka) granted its approval under sub-section (2) of section 68-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939' (IV 1.939) (hereinafter referred to as \"the said Act\") to a scheme set out in the Schedule to the said Notification."}}, {"text": "section 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12722, "end_char": 12732, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12742, "end_char": 12766, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Clause 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13353, "end_char": 13361, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "statute": "the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939"}}, {"text": "January G 1, J 969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14012, "end_char": 14030, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Clause 4 of the said Scheme inter alia provided as follows:\n\n\"Whether the services are to be operated by the State Transport Undertaking to the exclusion, complete or par tial, of other persons or otherwise : ------------------------·----\n\nThe State Transport Undertaking will operate services on all the routes; to the complete exc\\usion of other persons except that : (a) that existing permit holders on the interstate routes, may continue to operate such inte rState routes subject to the conditions that their permit shall be .rendered ineffective for the overlaping portions of the notified routes ... \"\n\nThe said Scheme was implemented with effect from January G 1, J 969, by issuing a stage carriage permit to the Appellant under sub-section (1) of section 68-F of the said Act."}}, {"text": "section 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14109, "end_char": 14119, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Banglore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14240, "end_char": 14248, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The route between Bangalore and Royalpad in the State of Karnataka formed part of the route between Banglore and Cuddapah and was covered by the said Scheme."}}, {"text": "B.A. JAYi.ilAM (Mada~, l.) 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Sharma", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18206, "end_char": 18217, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "proprietor of Janatha Travels, Bangalore, and the Fourth Respondent, D.P. Sharma, sole proprietor of Sharma Transport, Bangalore, made their entry on the stage of this litigation."}}, {"text": "Sharma Transport, Bangalore", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18238, "end_char": 18265, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "proprietor of Janatha Travels, Bangalore, and the Fourth Respondent, D.P. 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'\n\n\"When a statute enacts that something shall be deemed to have been done, which in fact and in truth was not done, the Court is entitled and bound to ascertain for what purposes and between what persons the statutory fiction is to be resorted to.\""}}, {"text": "section 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55226, "end_char": 55236, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55520, "end_char": 55530, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55681, "end_char": 55691, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 45", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55973, "end_char": 55983, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 45", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56385, "end_char": 56395, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 62", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56556, "end_char": 56566, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56778, "end_char": 56788, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56824, "end_char": 56834, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 58", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57117, "end_char": 57127, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57684, "end_char": 57694, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 57", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59808, "end_char": 59818, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 68", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61272, "end_char": 61282, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_2_792_794_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "DIW AKAR SHRIVAST A VA AND ORS.\n\nSTATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND ORS.\n\nFebruary 2, 1984\n\n[0. CHINNAPPA RBDDY, E. s. VENKATARAMIAH AND\n\nR. B. MISRA, JJ.] ·\n\nCivil Procedure-Persons likely to be affeccttd must be impleaded as partit!s,\n\nNatural Justice-Applicabilily of,\n\nThe appellants questioned the relaxation granted to candidates belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in regard to the minimum qualifying C marks for admission into the medical coUeges without properly impleading the persons who were likely to be affected if the sumissions of the appe'llants were accepted.\n\nDismissing the appeals,\n\nHELD : Rules of natural justice apply as much to proceedings in courts of law as to proceedings before authorities elsewhere. It may be that where a general question is involved and a large number of rersons are concerned, the court may, in appropriate cases, permit a few of then1 to be sued in a represen tativecapicity or may consider them as sufficienily represented by a few who have been properly impleaded as parties. [793F-GJ\n\n'In the instant case no effort bas been made to implead any person likely to be affected as a party to the proceedings. The question of the legality or validity of the relaxation granted in their favour cannot possibly be decided in their absence. [7930 ; F] '\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICITION : Civil Appeal Nos. 6407 -6408 of 1983. ·\n\n' Appeals by Special leave from the Judgment and Order doted the 17th March, 1983 of the Madhya Pradesh High Caurt in Misc.\n\nPetition Nos. 1232 andll604 of 1982.\n\nWITH\n\nCivil Appeal Nos. 8201-04 of 1983.\n\nAppeals by Special leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 22nd August, 1983 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc, G Petitions Nos. 1876, 1908, 1909 and 1976 of 1983,\n\nD. SHRIVASTAVA v. M.P. STATE (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 793\n\nAND\n\nCivil Appeal No. 8200 of 1983.\n\nAppeal by Special leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 6th September, 1983 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc. Petition No. 2140 of 1983.\n\n,:, hiv Dayal, G. L. Sanghi, Mukul Mudgal and J. P. Sanghi for the Appellants.\n\nA. K. Sanghi_, S. R. Agawala and V. K Chitre for the Respondents.\n\nC. L. Sahu for the Intervener Madanlal.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCu1NNAPPA REDDY, J.\n\nThe appellants in the several appeals before us question th' relaxation granted to candidates belonging to the Scheduled Castes and t)le Scheduled Tribes in regard to the minimum qualifying marks for admission into the medical colleges of the State of Madhya Pradesh. We are afraid we have to throw out these appeals on the preliminary ground that the persons likely to be affected if we agree with the submissions made on behalf of the appellants, that is, the candidates belonging tot he Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes who have secured admission into the medical colleges as a result of the relaxation granted to them have not been brought before us by being properly impleaded as parties. We fail to see how the question of the legality or validity of the reb.xation granted in their favour can possibly be dedded in their absence. Rules of natural justice apply as much to proceedings in courts of law as to proceedings before authorities elsewhere. It may be that where a general question is involved and a large number of persons are .concerned, the court may, in appropr_iate cases, permit a few of them to be sued in a representative capacity , or may consider them as sufficiently represented by a few who have been properly impleaded as parties. That is not the situation here.\n\nNo effort has been made to implead any person likely to be affected as a party to the proceeding. All the appeals are liable to be dismissed on this short ground.\n\nThe learned counsel for the appellants urged that some seats reserved for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes which\n\nhave not been filled' on account of non-availability of candidates H\n\n. SUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1984] 2 '.C.R.\n\nhave to be transferred to the general category under the. rules and are, therefore, available for candidates coming under the general category. The counsel for the appellants suggests that the several appellants may be accommodated against these vacancies and directed to be admitted into one or other of the medical colleges.\n\nSo far as admission to medical colleges for the year 1982-83 is concerned, it is stated in the additional counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the first respondont that ail the seats including those transferred from the reserved category to the general cotegory have been filled and there are no more vacancies. It .is, therefore, un necessery to give any direction in Civil Appeal Nos. 6407 and 6408 . which relate to the year 1982-83. The other appeals relate to admissions during the year !983-84. In these cases, we have no definite information as to the number of vacncies available. Even if there are a large number of vacancies, we cannot give any direction to admit the appellants against those vacancies since we are not in a position to say that appellants are the best candidates from the general category. All that we can do is to say that if on account of non-availabity of candidates from the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, there are any vacancies which are required to be transferred to tho general category under the rules, such vacancies may be filled up from the general category on the basis of merit. We do not have any doubt that this will be done. Subject to this direction, the appeals are dismissed.\n\nH.S.K.\n\nAppeals disrnssed.\n\n, I", "total_entities": 15, "entities": [{"text": "DIW AKAR SHRIVAST A VA AND ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 30, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DIWAKAR SHRIVASTAVA AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 33, "end_char": 64, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 2, 1984", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 67, "end_char": 83, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "February 2, 1984\n\n[0."}}, {"text": "E. s. VENKATARAMIAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 106, "end_char": 125, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "E.S. VENKATARAMIAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. B. MISRA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 131, "end_char": 147, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.B. MISRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "hiv Dayal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2012, "end_char": 2021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ",:, hiv Dayal, G. L. Sanghi, Mukul Mudgal and J. P. Sanghi for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "G. L. Sanghi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2023, "end_char": 2035, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ",:, hiv Dayal, G. L. Sanghi, Mukul Mudgal and J. P. Sanghi for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "Mukul Mudgal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2037, "end_char": 2049, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ",:, hiv Dayal, G. L. Sanghi, Mukul Mudgal and J. P. Sanghi for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "J. P. Sanghi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2054, "end_char": 2066, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ",:, hiv Dayal, G. L. Sanghi, Mukul Mudgal and J. P. Sanghi for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "A. K. Sanghi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2088, "end_char": 2100, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sanghi_, S. R. Agawala and V. K Chitre for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "S. R. Agawala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2103, "end_char": 2116, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sanghi_, S. R. Agawala and V. K Chitre for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "V. K Chitre", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2121, "end_char": 2132, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sanghi_, S. R. Agawala and V. K Chitre for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "C. L. Sahu", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2155, "end_char": 2165, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. L. Sahu for the Intervener Madanlal."}}, {"text": "Cu1NNAPPA REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2240, "end_char": 2255, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCu1NNAPPA REDDY, J.\n\nThe appellants in the several appeals before us question th' relaxation granted to candidates belonging to the Scheduled Castes and t)le Scheduled Tribes in regard to the minimum qualifying marks for admission into the medical colleges of the State of Madhya Pradesh."}}, {"text": "State of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2504, "end_char": 2527, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCu1NNAPPA REDDY, J.\n\nThe appellants in the several appeals before us question th' relaxation granted to candidates belonging to the Scheduled Castes and t)le Scheduled Tribes in regard to the minimum qualifying marks for admission into the medical colleges of the State of Madhya Pradesh."}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_2_795_852_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "1 .\n\nLAKSHMI KANT PANDEY\n\nUNION OF )NDIA\n\nFebruary 6, 1984\n\n[P. N. BHAGWATI, R. s. PATHAK AND AMARENDRA NATH SBN, JJ.]\n\nAdoption of Children bY foreigners-Intra-national adoptions-Normative and Procedurai safeguards to be insisted 'upon so far as a foreigner wishing to take\n\na child in adoption, outlined-Constit,; t; on of India, 1950 Artie/es 15,24 and 39 C and Guardian and Wards Act (Act VIII of 1890), Section-~ 7 to.9 a1Jd ]].\n\nThe petitioner, an advocate of the Supreme Court addressed a letter in public interest to the Court, complaining of mat-practices indulged in by social organiSation and vnlunhiry agencies engaged in the work of offering Indian Children in adoption to foreign parents, the petitioner alleged that not only Indian Children of tender age are under the guise of adoption \"exposed to the Jong horrendous journey to distant foreign countries at great risk to their lives but in cases where they survive and where these children are not placed in the shelter and Relief Houses, they in course of time become beggars or prostitutes ' for want of .proper care from their alleged fo&ter parents.\" The ptiti.oner,\n\naccordingly, sought relief restraining Indian based private agencies ''from carrying put further activity of routing children for adopticn abroad\" and directing the Government of India, the Indian Council of Child Welfare and the Indian Council of Social Welfare to carry out their obligations in the matter of ador)tion of Indian Children by Foreign parents. Being a public interest litiga. tion, the letter wa.s treated as a writ petition.\n\nDisposing of the Writ Petition, after indicating the principles and norms to be observed in giving a Child in adoption to foreign p3.rets, the Court\n\nHELD : 1 : I. Every child has a right to love and be loved and to grow up in an atmosphere of love and affection and of moral and material security and this is possible cnly if the child is brought up in a family. The most congenial environment would, of cotlrse, be that of the family of his bio. logic2't parents. But if for any reason it is not possible for the biolog'cal parents or other near relative to look after the child or the child is abandoned and it is either not possible to trace the parenrs or the parents .are not willin_g to take care cif the child, the next best alternative would be tofind adoptive parents for the child so ihat the child can grow up unde'r the loving care and attentiob of the adopthe :)arents. The adootive parents would be the next best substitute fo~ the biological parents. [8J3EF] ' '\n\n1 : 2. When the parents of a child want to give it away in adoption or the child is abandOned and it is considered necessary in the inte:est of the 9hild\n\n796 StlPRl!MB COURT REPOFTS\n\n(1984) 2 S.C.R.\n\nto give it in adoption, every effort must be made first to find adoptive parents fOr it within the country, because such adoP ion would steer clear of any pro\n\nbJcms of assimilation of the child in the family of the adoptive parents which migi.1t arise on account of cultural, racial ur linguistic diftCrences in case of adoption of the child by foreign parents. If it is not possible to find suitable adoptive parents for the child within the country, it may become necessary to give the 'Child in adoption to foreign parents rather than allow the child to grow up in an orphanage or an institution where it will have no family life and no love and affeciion of parents and quite often, in the socioeconomic conditions prevailing in the country, it might have to lead the life of a destitute, half clad, half.hungry and sufferin5 from mal-nu1rition and illness. [ • '4B DJ\n\n2: I. The primary object of giving the child in adoption should be the welfare of the child. Great care has to be exercised in permit ting the child to be given in adoption to foreign parents, lest_ the chi l.d may be neglected or abandoned by tbe adoptive parenls in the foreign country or the adoptive parents may nt be able to provide to the child a life or moral or material securi1y or the child may be subjected to moral or sexual abuse or forced labour\n\nor e1; perimentation for meidcal or other research and n, ay be placed in a worse situation than that in his own country. [i:ll~G-H; 8l6A]\n\n2 : 2. Since there is no statutory enactment in our country providing for adoption of a_ child by foreign parents or laying down the procedure which must be followed in such a case, resort is had to the provbions of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 for tl1e purpo!'e of facilitating such adoption. [8 ~4G]\n\n2 : 3. The High Courts of Bombay, Delhi and Gujarat have laid down by Rules and Instructions certain procedure when a foreigner makes an application for adoption under the Guardian and Wards Act including issuing of a notice to the Indian Council of Social Welfare and other otllcially recognised social welfare agencies with a view to assist the ClJUrl in properly and carefully scrutinising the applications of the foreign parents for determining whether it will be in the interest of the child and promotive of its welfare, 1 o be adopred by ihe foreign parents making the application or in other words, whether such adoption will provide moral and material security to the child wi h an opportu~ nity to grow into the fu!I stature of its personality in an atmosphere of ll:ve and affection and warmth of a family he., rth and home. This procedure is eminently desirable and it can help considerably to reduce, if not e'iminate, the possibility of the child being adopted by unsuitable or undesirable parents or being placed in a family where it may be neglected, maltreated or exploited by the adoptive parents. [828B-E] ·\n\nRasik/al Chaganlal Mhta's case A.f.R. 1982 Gujarat 193, approved.\n\n3 : i. The requirements which hould be insisted upon so far ali a foreigner wishing to take a child in adoption and the procedure that should be followed for the purpose of ensuring that such inter-country adopt; on'l do not lead to abuse mal-treatment or exploitation of children and secure to them a healthy, decent family life are as under :\n\n(I) Every application from a foreigner desiring to adopt a child must.be\n\n• \\\n\n\" I\n\n1..K., PANDEY i>. UNiON 797\n\nsponsored bY. a social or childwelfare agency recognised or licensed by the governinent of the country in which the foreigner is resident. No application by a foreigner tor taking a child in adoplioil should be entertained dircc ly by any social or welfare ageilcy of India working in the area of inter country adoption or by any institution or centre or home to which children are com mitted by the juvenile court. This is essential primarily for three reasons. . . .\n\n[8JIG-H]\n\nFirstly. it will help to reduce, if not eliminate altogether, the possibility of profiteering and trafficking in children. because if a foreigner were allowed to contact directly agencies or individuals in India for the purpose of obtaining a child in adoption, he might, in his anxiety to sc;; cure a child for adoption, -be induced or persuaded to pay any unconscionable or unreasonable amount which might. be demanded by the agency o individual procuring the child. Secondly it would be almost importsi blc for the court to satisfy itself that the foreigner who wishes to take the child in adoption would be suitable as a parent for the child and whether he would be able to provide a stable and secure famiJy life to' the childand would be able ro hand!re transracial, trans.cultural and trans.national problems likely to arise from such adoption, because where the application for adopting a child _has not ben sponsored by a social or child welfa1c agency in the country\n\nof the foreigner, there would be no proper and salisfactory home study report on which the court can rely. Thirdly, in such a case, whre the application of a foreigner for taking a child in adoption is made directly without the inter vention of a social or child welfare agency, 'there would be no authority or agency in the country of, the foreigner wh9 could be made responsible fur super vising the progress of the child and ensuring that the child is adopted at the earliest in accordance with law and grows up in an atmosphere of warmth and affection with moral and material security assured to it. [832A-E]\n\nEvery application of a foreigner for taking a child in adoption must be accompanied by a borne study report and the ocial Or child welfare agency spOosor in such appJ.cation should also send along with it a recent photograph of the family, a marriage certificate of the foreir.ner and his or her spouse as also a declaration concerning their health together with a certificate regarding rheir medical fitness duly certified by a medical doctor, a declaration regarding their financial Slatus alongwith supporting documents including employer's certificate where applicable, incorlle-tax assessment orders, bank references and particulars concerning the properties owned by them, and also a declaratiorl stating that they are willing to be appoinied guardian of the child and an undei taking that they would adopt the child according to the law cf their country within a period of not more than two years from time of arrival of the child in their country and give intimation of such adoption to 1he court appointing them as guardian.as also to the social or child welfare agency in Jndia proces. sing tbeir case, and that they would maintain the child and provide it necessary education and up bringing according to their status and they would also send to the court as also to the social or child welfare agency in lndi'a reports relat ing to the progress of the child alongwith its recent photograph, the fn.quency of such progress reports being quarterly duriug the first two years and half yearly for the next three years. The application of the foreigner must also be accompanied by a Power of Attorney in favour of an Officer of the oci8I or child welfare agency in India which is requested to process the case and such\n\n798 SUPltEME COURT REPOltTS\n\n[1984) 2 S.C.R.\n\nPower of Attorniy should authorise the Attorney to handle the case on behalf of the . foreigner in ca.:; e the foreigner is not in a position to come to India.\n\nThe social or child welfare agency sponsoring the application of the foreigner 1nust also certify that the foreigner seeking to adopt a child is permitted to do so according to the law of his country. These certificates, declarations and documents must accompany the:' application of the foreigner for taking child in adoption, shouid be duly notarised by a Notary Public Whose signature should be duly attested either by an Officer of the Ministry of External Affairs or Justice or Social Welfare of the country of the foreigner or by an Officer of the Indian Embassy or High Commission or Consulate in that country: The social or child welfare agency sponsoring the applicatioh of the forcipner must also undertake while forwarding the application to the social or child welfare agency in India, that it will ensure adoption of the child by the foreigner according to the law of his country within a period not exceeding two years and as soon as the adoption is affected, it will send two certified} copies of ' 1he adoption order to the social or child welfare agency in India through which the application for guardianship is processc~. so that one c;; opy can be\n\nfiled in court and the 01her can remain with the social ol child welfare agency in India. The social or child welfare agency sponsoring the application must also agree to send to the concerned social or child welfare agency in India Progress reports in regard to the child, Quarterly during the first year and half yearly for the subsequent year nr years until the adotrtion is effected. and it must also undertake that iri case of disruption of the family of the foreigner before adoptiori can be effected, it wilt take care of the child and find a suitable alternative placement for it with the approval of the concerned social or child welfare agency in India and report such alternative placement to the .court handling the guardianship proceedings and such information shall be passed on both by the court as also by the concerned social or child welfare agency in India to the Secretary~ Ministry of Social Welfare, Government of India. [8l3C-H; 834A-E]\n\n3: 2. The Government of India shall Prepare a list of social or child welfare agencies licensed or recognised for inter-country adoption by lhe Government of each foreign country where children from India are taken iri adoption and this list shall be prepared after getting the necessary information from the government of each such foreign country and the Indian Diplomatic Mission in that foreign country. Such lists shall be supplied by the Governm; nt of India to the various High Courts in India as also to the social or child welfare agencies operating in India in the area of inter-country adoption under licence or recognition from the Government of IAdia. l8J4B F; [835 B]\n\n3 : 3. If the biological parents are known, they should be helped to\n\nundertand all the implications of adoption including the possibility of adoption by a foreigner and they should be told specifically that in case the child is adopted, it would not be posllible for them to have any further contact with the ct>ild The biological parents should not be sujccted to any dure\"ss io making a decision about \"relinquishment and cveo aftert hey have taken a deci~\n\nsion to relinQuish the child f0r giving in adoption, a further period of abo\"ut threemonths should be allowed to them to reconsider their decision.\n\nBut once the decision is taken and riot reconsidered within such further time as may be allowed to them, it must be regarded as irrevocable and the proc~ urc for\n\nL. IC PANDEY V. UNION 799\n\ngiving the child in adoption to a foreigner can then be initiated without any further reference to the bi_ologica\\ parents by fil(ng an application for appointment. of the foreigner as guardian of the child. Th:reafter there can be no question of once again consulting the biological parents whether they wish to give the cfiild in adoption or they want to take it back. But in order to eliminare any possibility of mischief and to rriake sure that the child bas in fact surrendered by its biological parents, i_t is necessary that the Institution or Centre or home for Child Care or social or Child Welfare Agency to which the chiJd is surrendered _by 1he biological parents, should take fiom the biological parents a document of surrender duly signed by the biological parents and attested by at least two responsible persons nnd such document of surrender should not only contain the names of the biological parents and their address but also information in regard to the birth of the child and its background, heaith and development. If the biological parents state a prefe- . rence for the religious upbringing of the child, their wish should as far as possible be respected. but ultimately the interest of the child alone should be the sole guiding factor and the biologic:il parents should be informed that the child n1ay be given in adoption even to a foreigner who professes a religion different from that of the biological parents. The biological parents ... should not be induced or encouraged oi\" even be permitted to take a decision in re_gard to giving of a child in adoption before the birth cf a ch.ild or within a period of three months fro1n the date of birth. This precaution is necessary because the biological parents must have reasonable time after 1he birth of the chi id to take a decision whether to rear up the child themselves or to relinquish it for adoption and mortover it n1ay be necessary to allow some time to the child to overcome any health problems experienced afcer: birth.\n\n[835-H; 8!6A-D; 836GH]\n\n3: 4. It should nc.t be open to any and every agency or individual to process an application from a foreigner for taking a child in adoption and such application .should be processed only through a social or child welfare agency licensed or recognised by the Government 6f India or the Government of the State in which it is operating. Since an application for appointment as guardian can be processed onJy by a recognised social or child welfare agency and noe e!Se, any unrecognised institution, centre or agency which has a chilJ under its care would have to approach a. recognised social or child welfare agency if it desires such child to be given in inter-countiy adoption, and in that event it must send without any undue delay the name and must send without any undue delay the name and particulars of such child to the recognised social or child welfare agency throu.gh which such child is proposed to be givn in inter-country adoption. The Indian Council of Social Welfare and the Indian Council for Child Welfare are clearly tWo social or Child welfare agencies operating at the national le\"vel and recognised by the Government of Jndia. But apart from these two recogoh, ed social or child welfare agencies functioning at the national level, there are other social 'or child welfare agencies engaged in child care and welfare and if they have good standing and reputa tion and are doing . commendable work in the are of child care and welfare they should also be recognised by the Government of India or the Governffient of the State for the purpose of intercountry adoptions. 'But before taking a decision to reconise any particular social or child weJfate agency for the purpose ofinter-couritry adoptions the Government of India or the GOvemment\n\nof a State would do well to examine whether the social Or child welfare agency\n\nsoo SUPREME COURT k.EPORTS [1984] 2 s.c.R.\n\nhas proper staff with professional social work experience, because otherwise it may not be possible for the social or child welfare agency to carry out satisfactorily the highly responsible task of ensuring proper placement of a child with a foreign adoptive family. The Government of India or th c Government of a State recognising any social or child welfare agency for inter-country adoptions rnust insist as a condition of recognition that the social or child welfare a.gency shall maintain proper accounts which shall be au.dited by a charte-red accountant at the end of every year and it shall not charge to the foreigner wishing to adopt a child any amount in excess of that actually incurred by way of legal or other ex:pensrs in connection with the application for appointment of guardian inclt!ding such reasonable remuneration or honorarium for the work done al)d trouble taken in processing, filing and pursuing the application as may be fi<ed by the Court .. [837B-H; 838A-D]\n\n3 :- 5. Every recognised social or child welfare agency must maintain _a register in which the names and particulars of all children proposed to be given in inter-country adoption through it must be entered and in regard . to each such child, the recognised social or child welfare agency must prepare a child study report through a professional social worker t_.:iving all reJevent information in regard to jhe child so as to help the foreigner to come to a decision whether or not to adopt the child and to understar d the child, if he decides to adopt it as also to assist the court Jn coming to a decision whether it will be for the welfare of the child tb be given in adoption to the foreigner wishing to adopt it. The child study report should contain as far as poss ble information in regard to the folJowing matters :--\n\n(l) Identifying information, supported where possible by documents.\n\n(2) Information about original parents, including their heaJth and details\n\nof the mother's pregnancy and birth.\n\n(3) Physical, intellectual and emotional development.\n\n(4) Health report prepared by a registered medical practitioner preferably by a paediatrician.\n\n(5) Recent photograph.\n\n(6) Present environment-category of care (Own home, foster home, institution etc,) relationships routines and habits.\n\n(7) Social worker's assessment and reasons for suggesting inter-country adoption. [838G-H; 839AE]\n\nG 3 : 6. The recognised social or child welfare agency must insist upon approval of a specific known child and once 1hat approval is obtained the recognise:i ocial or child welfare agency should immediately without any undue delay proceed to make an application for appointment of tlie foreigner as guardian of the chiJd. Such application would have to be made in the court within whose jurisdiction the child ordinarily resides and it must be accompanied by copies of the home study report, the child study report and H other certificates and documents forwarded by the social or child welfare agency\n\nL. K, PANDBY v. UNION 801\n\nsponsoring the application of the foreigner for taking lhe child in adoption.\n\nIt is also necesary that the recognised social or child welfare agency through which an application of a foreigner for taking a chi1d in adOption is routed must before offering a child in a'ctoption, m1ke sure that the child is free to be adopted. The recagnised social or child welfare agency must place sufficient material before .the court to 'satisfy it that the child is legally available for adoption. It is also necessary that the recognised social or child welfare agency must satisfy itself, firstly,~ tht there is no impediment in the way of the Child entering the country of the prospective adoptive parent; secondly. that the travel documents for the child can be obtained at the appropriate iime and lastly, that' the law of .the country of the prospective adoptive parent permits legal adoption of the child and that on such legal adoption being cOnciuded, the child would acquire the same legal status and rights of inberi tance as a natural born child and would be grarited citizenship ; n the country of adoption and it should file alongwitb the application for guardianship, a certificate reciting such satisfaction. [841CD; 842H; 843AD]\n\n3 : 7. In caaes where a child relinquished by its b1ological parents or an orphan or destitu.tc or abandoned child is brought by an agency or individual from one State to another, there should be no objection to a social or child welfare agency. taking the cbiJd to another State, even it the objl!ct be to give it in adoption, provided there aro sufficient safeguards .to ensure that such social o_r child welfare agency does not indulge in any malpracticc.\n\nThere should also be no difficulty to apply for guardianship of the child in the court of the latter State. because the child not having any permanent place of residence would then be ordi0ari1y resident in the place where it is in the care and custody of such aiency or individual.\n\n[8~3H; 844A-F]\n\nSection 11 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 provides for notice of the application to be issued to various persons incl.uding the parents of the child if they are residing in any State to which the Act extends. But, no notice under this section should be issued to the biological parents of the child, since it would create considerable amount of embarrassment and hardship if the biological parents were 1hen to come forward and oppose the application of the prospective adoptive parent for guardianship of the child. Moreover, the biological parents would then come to know who is the person taking the child in adoption and with this knowledge they would at any time be able to trace the whereabouts of the child and they may try to contact tl'le child resulting in emo1ional and psychological disturbance for the child which might affect his future happiness. for the same reasons, notice of the application for guardianship should also not be puplished in an); newspaper.· It. the court is satisfied, after giving notice of the application to the Indian Council of Child welfare or the Indian Council for Social Welfare or any of its branches for scrutiny of the application, that it will be for the welfare of.the child to be give io adoption to the foreigner making the application for guardianship, it will only then make an order appointing the foreigner as guardian of the child and permitting him to remove ihe child to his own Country with a vie~ to eventual adoption. The Court will introduce the following conditions in the order, namely : [846A:H; 848AB]\n\n(i) That be forei$DCf wllo is poointcd l?uardfan shal! make proper .H\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1984] 2 S; C.R.\n\nprovision by way of deposit or bond or otherwise to enable the child to be repatriated to lndia should it become necessary for any reason.\n\n[847C]\n\n(ii) That 1he foreigner who is appointed guardian shall submit to the court as ilso to the Social or Child Welfare Agency processing the application for guardi?nship, progress repOrts of the child along with a recent photograph quarterly during the first two years and half yea.rly for the aext throe years. [8470]\n\n(iii) The order appointing gu :rdian shall carry, atta<; hed to .it, a photograrh of the child duly counter-signed by av officer of the court.\n\n[847F] Where an order appointing guardian of a child is made by the court, immediate intimation of the same shall be given to the Ministry of Social Wei fare; Govcrnmeni of lndi~ as alsO to the Ministry of Social Welfare of the Governmen of the State in which the court is situate and copies of such order sha11 also be forwarded to the two resnective Ministries of Social Welfare. The Minis1rr of Social Welfare, Government of fr dia shall maintain a register containing names and other particulars of the children in respect of whom orders for appointment of guardian have been made as also names, addressea and other particulars of the prospective adoptive parents who have been appointed such guardians and . who have been permitted to take away the children for the pufpose of adoption. The Govt. of India will also sent to the Indian Embassy or High Commission in the country of \"he pirospective adoptive parents from time to time the names, addresses an~ other particulars of such . prospective adoptive parents together with particulars of the children taken by them and requesting the Embassy or High Commission to maintain and unobtrusive watch over the welfare and progress of such children in order to safe. guard against any possible mal-treatment exploitation or use for ulterior purposes and: to immediately report and instance of rnaJ.treatment, negligence or xploitation to the Government of India for suitable action.\n\n1 . . .\n\n[8470-H; 848A-C] 3 : s. The social or child welfare agency which is looking after the child selected by a prospective adoptive parent, may legitimately receive from such prospective adoptive parent maintenance expenses at a rate of not exceed ini; i: Rs 60 per day (this outer limit being subjective to revision by the Ministry of Social Welfare, Government of India from time to time) from the date of selection of the child by him until the date the child leaves for going to is new home as also medical rxoense1 including hospitalisation charges, any, actually incurred by such social or child welfare agency for the child.\n\nBut the claim for payment of .such maintenance charges and medical expnses shall be Submitted to the prospective adoptive parent. [842C-D]\n\n3 : 9. Jf a child is to be given in inter.country adoption, it would be desirable that it is given in such adoption as far as possible before it complete~ the age of 3 years.· The reason is that if a child is adopted before it attains the ag'! of understanding, it is always easier for it to get assimilated and inte grated in the new environment in which it may find itself on being adopted by a foreign parent. Children above the age of 3 years may also be given in inter-country adoption There can beno hard and fast rule in this connec .. tion. Even children between the ages of. 3 to 7 years may be able to assimilate\n\n~~mselves in tl:~.e new s1:1rroundings withot any difficult~. Even f?hildre~\n\n...\n\nL, K. PANDEY v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 803\n\nabove the age of seven years may be giveb in intercountry adoption but theit wishes may be ascertained if they are in a position to indicate any preference. '\n\n[845DG) 3: 10. The proceedings on the Application for guardianship should be . held by the Court in camera and they should be regarded as confidential and as soon as an order is made on the application for guardianship the entire proceedings including the papers and documents should be sealed. [84IC-D]\n\n3: ll. The. social or child welfare agency which is looki11g after the child selected by a pro!lpeCtive adoptive parent, may legitimately receive from such prospective adoptive parent mainteance expenses at a rate of not excecdind Rs. 60 per day (this outer limit b:!ing subject to revision by the Ministry of Social Welfare, Government of India. fro01 .. time to time) from the date of setection Of the child by him until the date the child leaves for going to its new horiie as also medical expenses including hospitalisation charges, if any, actually incurred by sui:h social or child welfare agency for the child. But the claim for payment of such maintenance charges and edical expenses shall be submitted to .the prospective adoptive parent through the recognised social or child welfare agency which bas processed the application for guardianshiP and payfnent _in respect of such claim shall not be,_p.:ceivcd direclly by the social or child welfare agenc.y making the claim but shall be paid only through the recognised social or child welfare agency. However, a foreigner may make voluntary donatiOn to any social or child welfare agency bui no su'ch dona tion from a prospective adoptive parents shall be received until after the child has reached the country of its prospective adoptive parent, [842CG] ·\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION 1982.\n\nWrit Petition (CRL) No. 1171 of\n\nUnder article 32 of the Constitution of India.\n\nPetitioner in person .\n\nFOR THE RESPONDENTS :\n\nMiss A. Subhashini for Union of India and Ministry of Social Welfare.\n\nMiss Kamini Jaiswal for, Indian Council of Social Welfare.\n\nJ.B. Dadachanji & Co. for Indian Council of Child Welfare and Swedish Embassy.\n\nDr. N. M. Ghatate for all God's Children Inc.\n\nArizone,\n\nU.S.A.\n\nP.H.' Parekh for Maharashtra State Women's Council of\n\nChild Welfare, Bombay and for Enfants de-L'espoir.\n\nHi.\n\n\n(1984] 2 S.C.R.\n\nP.K. Chakeravorty for Legal Aid Service, West Bengal.\n\nMrs. Manik Karanjawa/a for Indian Associations for Promotion of Adoption ..\n\nMrs Urmila Kapur for SOS Children's Village of India.\n\nKai/ash Vasdev for Missionary of Charity, Calcutta.\n\nBa/dev Raj Respondent in person.\n\nG.M. Coelho Bar at Law for Enfant's du Mande (France)\n\nMiss Rani Jethama/ani for Kuanyin Charitable Trust.\n\nB.M. Bageria for Terre Des Hommes (India) Society.\n\nSukumar Ghose for Mission of Hope (India) Society, Calcutta.\n\nS.K. Mehta . for Netherlands Inter Country Child Welfare Oraganisation.\n\nParijot Sinha for society for International Child Welfare.\n\nKai/ash Vasdev for Bhavishys.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBHAGWATI, J. This writ petition has been. initiated on the basis of a letter addressed by one Lax mi Kant Pandey, an advocate practising in this Court, complaining of mat-practices indulged in by social organisations and voluntary agencies engaged in the work of offering Indian children in adoption to foreign parents. The letter referred to a press report based. on \"empirical investigation carried out by the staff of a reputed foreign magazine\" called \"The Mail\" and alleged that not only Indian children of tender age are under the guise of adoption ''exposed to the long horrendous journey ' to distant foreign countries at great risk to their lives but in cases where they survive and where these children are not placed in the Shelter and Relief Homes, they in course of time become beggars or prostitutes for want of proper care from their alleged foreign foster parents.\" The petitioner accordingly sought relief restraining Indian based private agencies \"from carrying out further activity of routing children for adoption abroad\" and directing the Govern-\n\n;::\n\n1 -~\n\nL.K. PANDBY v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 805\n\nment oflndia, the Indian Council of Child Welfare and the Indian Council of Social _Welfare to carry. out their obligations in the matter of adoption of Indian children by foreign parents. This letter was treated as a writ petition and by an Order dated 1st September, 1982 the Court issued notice to the Union of India the Indian Council of Child Welfare and the Indian Council of Social Welfare to appear in answer to the writ petition and assist the Court in laying down principles and norms which should be followed in determin• ing whether a ehild should be allowed to be adopted by foreilin parents and if so, the procedure to be followed for that purpose,\n\nwith the object of ensuring the welfare of the child.\n\nThe Indian Council of Social Welfare was the first to file its written submissions in response to the notice issued by the Clouft\n\nand its written submission ij.led on 30th September, 1982 not only carried considerable useful material bearing on the question of adoption of Indian children by foreign parents but also contained. various suggestions and recommendations for consideration by the Court in formulating principles and norms for permitting such adoptions and laying down the procedure for that purpose. We shall have occasion to refer to this large material placed before us as also. to discuss the various suggestions. and recommendations made in the written submission by the Indian Council of Social Welfare when we take up for coesideration the various issues arising in the writ petition. Suffice it to state for the present that the written submission of the Indian Council of Social Welfare is a well thought out document dealing comprehensively with various aspects of the problem in its mani-fold dimensions. When the writ petition reached hearing before the Court on 12th October, 1982 the only writtn submission filed was that tlt_e Indian Council of Social Welfare and neither the Union of India nor the Indian Council of Child Welfare had made any response to the notice issued by the Court. But there was a telegram received from a Swedish Organisation called 'Barnen Framfoer Allt Adoptioner\" intimating to the Court that this Organisation desired to participate in the hearing of the writ petition and to present proper material before the Court. S .O.S, Children's Villages of India also appeared through their counsel Mrs. Urmila Kapoor and applied for being allowed to intervene at the hearing of the writ petition so that they could made their submissions on the question of adoption of Indian Children by foreign parents.\n\nSince S.O.S. Children's Villages of India is admittedly an organisation concerned with welfare of children, the Court, by an Order dated 12th October, 1982, allowed them tq intervene and to ma!<e\n\n' ·.~\n\nC.l\n\n. l H\n\n'.)\n\n~-'\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984) 2 S.C.ll.\n\ntheir submissions before the Court. The Court also by the same Order directed that the Registry may address a communication to Barnen Framfoer Allt Adoptioner informing them about the ad journed date of hearing of the writ petition and stating that if they'\n\nwished to present any material and make their submissions, they. could do so by filing an affidavit before the adjourned date of heariJ; g: The Court also directed the Union of ndia to furnish before the next hearing of the writ petition the names of \"any Indian lnsti~ tutions or Organisations other than the Indian Council or'Sociai Welfare and the Indian Council of Child Welfare, which are engaied or involved in offering Indian children for adoption by foreign parents\" and observed that if the Union of India does not have this information, they should gather the requisite information so far as it is possible for them to do so and to make it available to the Court.\n\nThe Court also issued a similar direction to the Indian Council oi'\n\nChild Welfare, Indian Council of Social Welfare and S.O.S.\n\nChildren's Villages of India. There was also a further direciion given in the same Order to the Union of India, the Indian Council of Child Welfare, the Indian Council of Social Welfare and the S.O.S. Children's Villages of India \"to supply to the C.ourt information in regard to the mmes and particulars of any foreign agencies which are engaged in the work of finding Indian children for adop0 tion for foreign parenis\". The writ petition was adjourned to 9th November, 1982 for enabling the parties to carry out these directions. ··\n\nIt appears that the Indian Council of Social Welfare thereafter in compliance with the directions given by the Court, filed copies of the Adoption of Children Bill, 1972 and the adoption of Children, Bill 1980. The adoption of Children Bill, 1972 was introduced in the Rajya Sabha sometime in 1972 but it was subsquently dropped; presumably because of the opposition of the Muslims stemning from the fact that it was intended to provide for a uniform law of adoption applicable to all communities including the Muslims. It is a little difficult to appreciate why the Muslims should have opposed this Bill which merely empowered a Muslim to adopt if he so wished; it had no compulsive force requiring a Muslim to act contrary to his religious tenets : it was merely an enabling legis lation and if a Muslim felt that it was contrary to his religion to adopt, he was free not to adopt. But in view of the rather strong sentiments expressed by the members of the Muslim Community and with a view not to offend their religfous susceptibilities, the Adoption of Children Bill, 1980 which was introduced in the Lok\n\n!' I\n\n.-.\n\nL.K. PANDEY v. ENION (Bhagwati, J.) 807\n\nSabha eight years later on 16th December, 1980, contained an ex A press provision that it shai( not be applicable to Muslims. Apart from this change in its coverage the Adoption of Children Bill, 1980 was substantially in the same terms as the Adoption of Children Bill, 1972. The Adoption of' Children Bill 1980 has unfortunatety notyet been enacted into law but it would be useful to notice some of the relevant provisions of this Bill in so far as they indicate what. •3' B principles and norms the Central Government regarded as neceSliary to be observed for securing the welfare of children sought to be given in adoption to foreign parents and what procedural safeguards the Central Governmentthought, were essential for securing this end. Clauses 23 <tn.d 24 of the Adoption of Children Bill, 1980 dealt with the problem of adoption of Indian children by parents\n\n'.)C domiciled. abroad and, in so far as material, they provided iis follows :\n\n\" \"23 (1) Except antler the authority of an order under section 24; it shall no_t be lawful for any person to take or send out of India a child who is a citizen of India to any (]) place outside India with a view to the adoption of the child by any person.\n\n(2) Any person who takes. or sends a child out .of India to any place outside India in contravention of sub- r section (l) or makes or takes part in any arrangements for\n\n'.IJ: transferring the care and custody of a child to any person for that purpose shall lie punishable with imprisonment for \" a term which may extend to six months or with fine, or ' with both. . 1\n\n(24) (I) If upon an application made by a person who is not domiciled in India, the district court is satisfied that the applicant intends to adopt a child.under the law of ... or within the country in which he is domiciled, and for that purpose desires to remove the child from India either immediately or after an interval, the court may make an order (in this section referred to as a provisional adoption order) authorising the applicant to remove the child for tl!e purpose aforesaid and giving to the applicant the care and custody of the child pending his adoption as aforesaid:\n\nProvided that '!0 application shall be entertained\n\n~08\n\nSUPRBMB COURT RBPORTS [1984] 2 s.c.a\n\nunless it is accompanied by a certificate by the Central Government to the effect that-\n\n(i) the applicant is in its opinion a fit person to adopt the child ;\n\n(ii) the welfare and interests of the child shali be safeguarded under the law of the country of domicile of the applicant;\n\n(iii) the appliaant has made proper provision by way of deposit or bond or otherwise in accordance with the rules made under this Act to enable . the child to be re- patriated to India, should it become necessary for any reason.\n\n(2) The provisions of this Act relating to an adoption order shall, as far as may be; apply in relation to a provisional adoption order made under this section.\n\nThe other caluses of the Adoption of Children Bill, 1980 were $Ought to be made applicable in relation to a provisional adoption order by reason of sub-clause (3) of clause 24. The net effect of this provision, if the Bill were enacted into law, would be that in :1 view of clause 17 no institution or organisation can make any arrangement for the adoption of an Indian child by foreign parents unless such institution or organisation is licensed as a social welfare Institution and under Clause 21, it would be unlawful to make or to give to any person any payment or reward for or in consideration of the grant by that person of any eonsent required in connection f with the adoption of a child or the transfer by that person of the care and custody of such child with a view to its adoption or the making by that person of any arrangements for such adoption.\n\nMoreover, in view of Clause 8, no provisional adoption order can be made in respect of an Indian child except with the consent of tile parent or guardian of such child and if such child is in the care G of an institution, except with the C0nsent of the institution given on its behalf by all the persons entrusted with or in charge of its management, but the District Court can dispense with such consent if it is satisfied that the person whose consent is to be dispensed with has abandoned, neglected or persistently ill-treated the child or has persistently failed without reasonable cause to discharge\n\n0his . ; !)bligation as parent or guardian or can not be found or is incapable B of giving consent or is withholdin~ consent unreuonably. When a\n\nl..11:. :PANDEY v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) ' 809\n\nprovisional adoption order is made by the District Court ou the application of a per son domiciled abroad, such persou would be entitled to obtain the care and custody of the child in respect of which the order is made and to remove such child for the purpose of adopting it under the law or within the. country in which he is domiciled .. These provisions in the Adoption of Children Bill, 1980 will have to be borne in mind when we formulate the guidelines which must be observed in permitting an Indian child to be given in\n\nadoption to foreign parents. Besides filing copies of the Adoption of Children Bill, 1972 and the Adoption of Children Bill, 1980 the Indian Council of Social Welfare also filed two lists, one list giving names and particulars of recognised agencies in foreign countries engaged in facilitating procurement of children from other countries for adoption in their own respective countries and the other list c6ntaining names and particulars of institutions arid organisations in India engaged in the work of offering and placing Indian children for adoption by foreign parents.\n\nThe Writ Petition thereafter came up for hearing on 9th D November, 1982 when several applications were made by various <I institutions and organisations for intervention at the hearing of the writ petition. Since the questions arising in the writ petitio'n were of national importance, the Court thought that it would be desirable to have assistance from whatever legitimate source it. might come and accordingly, by an order dated 9th November, 1982, the Court granted permission to eight specified institutions or organisations to file affidavits or statements placing relevant material before the Court in regard to the question of adoption of Indian children by foreign parents and directed that such affidavits or statements should be filed on or before 27th November, 1982. The Court also. issued\n\nnotice of the writ petition to the State of West Bengal directing it to file its affidavit or statement on or before the same date. The Court also directed the Superintendent of Tees Hazari courts to produce at the next hearing of the writ petition quarterly reports in regard to the orders made under the Guardian and Wards Act , 1890 . entrusting care and custody of Indian children to foreign parents during the period of five years immediately prior to 1st October,\n\n1982. Since the Union of India had not yet filed its affidavit or . statement setting out what was the attitude adopted by it in regard to this question, the Court directed the Union of India to file its affidavit or statement within the same time as the others.\n\nThe Court then adjourned the hearing of the writ petition to 1st December '1982 in order that the record may be completed by that time.\n\n{ ' • D\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984] 2 s.o.il.\n\nPursuant to these directions given by the Court, various affidavits and statements were filed on behalf of the Indian Council of Social Welfare, Enfants Du Monde, Missionaries of Charity, En fants De L's Espoir, Indian Association for promotion of Adoption Kuan-yin Charitable Trust, Terre Des Homes (India) Society; Maharashtra- State Women's Council, Legal Aid Services West Bengal, SOS Children's Villages of India, Bhavishya International Union. for Child Welfare and the Union of India. These affidayits and statements placed before the Court a wealth of material. bearing , upon the question of adoption of Indian children by foreign parents 1 and made valuable suggestions and recommendations for the consi- , deration of the Court. These affidavits and statements were supple-. mented by elaborate oral arguments which explored every facet of the question, involving not .only legal but also sociological considerations. We are indeed grateful to the various participants in_, this inquiry and to their counsel for the very able assistance rendered,, by them in helping us to formulate principles and norms which should be observed in giving Indian children in adoption to foreign parents and the procedure that should be followed for the purpose. of ensuring that such inter-country adoptions do not lead to abuse maltreatment or exploitation of children and secure to them a healthy, decent family life.\n\n'• ·, I\n\n• '!': It is obvious that in a civilized society the importance of child E welfare cannot be over-emphasized, because the welfare of the entire~ community, its growth and development, depend on the health and\" well-being of its children. Children are a \"supremely importani national asset\" and the future well being of the nation depends on how its children grow and develop. The great poet Milton , put it admirably when he said : \"Child _shows the man a~ F morning shows the .day\" and the Study . Team on Social Welfare said much to the same effect when it observed that \"the physical.· and mental health oflhe nation is determined largely by .. the manner in which it is shaped in the early stages\". The child iS a soul with a being, a nature and capacities of its own, who must lie ' helped to find them, to grow into their maturity, into fulness of' G physical and vital energy and the utmost breadth, depth and height of its emotional, intellectual and spiritual being; orherwise there cannot be a healthy growth of the nation. Now obviously children need special protection because of their tender age and physique mental immaturity and incapacity to look-after themselves. That is why therr is a growing realisation in every part of the globe that H children must be brought up in an atmosphere of love and affection\n\n_rm..\n\ni:;.K.· PANDEY v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 811\n\nand under the tender care and attention of parents so that they may be able to attain full emotional, intellectual and spiritual stability and maturity and ecquire self-confidence and self-respect and a balanced view of life with full appreciation and realisation of the role which they have to play in the nation buildit1g process without which the nation cannot develop and attain real prosperity because a large segment of the society would then be left out of the developmental process. In India this consciousness is reflected in the provisions enacted in tl1e Constitution. Clause (3) of Article 15 enables the State . to make special provisios inter alia for children and Article 24 provides that no child below the age of fourteen years shall be employed to work in any factory or mine or engaged in any other hazardous employment. Clauses (e) and (f) of Article 39 provide that the State shall direct its policy towards securing inter alia that the tender age of children is not abused, that citizens are not forced by economic necessity to enter avocations unsuited to their age and. strength and that children are given facility to develop in a healthy manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity and that childhood and youth are protected against exploitation and against tnoral and material abandonment. These constitutional provisions reflect the great anxiety of the constitution makers to protect. and safeguard the .interest. and welfare of children in the county.\n\nThe Government of India has also in pursuance of these constitutional provisions evolved a National Policy for the Welfare of Children. This Policy starts with a goal-oriented preambula!ory introduction : ·\n\n\"The nation's children are a supremely important asset. Their nurture and solicitude are our responsibility.' Children's programme should find a prominent part in our national plans for the development of human resources, so that our children grow up to become robust citizens, physically fit, mentally alert and morally healthy, endowed with the skills and motivations needed by society. Equal oppor- . tunities for development to all children during the period of growth should be our aim, for this would serve our larger purpose ofreducing inequality and ensuring social justice.\"\n\nThe National Policy sets out the measures which the Governmen.t of India proposes to adopt towards attainment of the objectives set out in the preamoulatory introduction and they include measures designed to protect children against neglect, cruelty and exploitation\n\n• r H\n\n812 SUPRBME COURT REPORtS (1984j 2 s.c.ll:\n\nA' and to strengthen family ties \"so that full potentialities of growth of children are realised within the normal family neighbourhood and community environment.\" The National Policy also lays down priority in programme formation and it gives fairly hlgh priority to maintenance, education and training of orphan and destitute children.\n\nThere is also provision made in the National Policy for const_itution B of a Natioual Children's Board and pursuant to this provision, the Government of India has Constituted the National Children's Board with the Prime Minister as the chair person. It is the function of the National Children's Board to provide a focus for planning and review and proper coordination of the multiplicity o{ services striving to meet the needs of children and to ensure at different levels C continuous planning, review and coordination of all the essential services. The National Policy also stresses the vital tole which the voluntary organisations have to play in the field of education, health recreation and social welfare srrvices for chlldren and declares that it shall be the endeavour of State to encourage and strengthen such voluntary organisations.\n\nD There bas been equally great concern for the welfare of children at the international level culminating in the Declaration of the Rights of the Child adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 20th November, 1959. The Declaration in its Preamble points out that \"the child, by reason of his physical and mental E immaturity, needs special safeguards and care, including appropriate. legal protection, before as well as after birth\", and that \"mankind.\n\nowes to the child the best it bas to give\" and proceeds to formulate several Principles of which the following are material for our present purpose:\n\nF \"PRINCIPLE 2 : The child shall enjoy special protection and shall be given opportunities and facilities by law and by. other means, to enable him to develop physically mental ly morally, spiritually and socially in a healthy and normal manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity. In the' enactment of laws for this purpose the best interests of the G child shall be the paramount consideration.\"\n\nPRINCIPLE 3 : The cliild shall be entitled from his birth to a name and a nationality.\n\nPRINCIPLE 6 : The Child, for the full and harmonious development of hls personality, needs love and under- .\n\n7 . '\n\nLit, p ANDBY v. UNION (iJhagwati, J.) ill~\n\nstanding. He shall, wherever possible, grow up in the care and under the responsibility of his parents, nd in any case ln an atmosphere of affection and of moral and material security; a child of tender years shall not, save in exceptional circumstances, be seperated from his mother. Society and the public authorities shall have t.he duty to extend particular care to children without a family and to those without adequate means of support. Payment of State and other assistance towards the maintenance of children of large families is desirable.\n\nPRINCIPLE 9 : The child shall be protected against all forms of_neglect, cruelty and exploitation. He shall not be. the subject of traffic, in any form.\n\nPRINCIPLE 10 : The child shall be protected from practices which may foster racial, religious and any other form of discrimination.\n\nHe shall be brought up. in a spirit of understanding, tolerance friendship among peoples, peace and universal brotherhood and in full consciousness that his energy and'talents should be devoted to the service of his fellow men.\"\n\nEvery child hos a right to love and be loved and to grow Up in an atmosphere of love and affection and of moral and material security and this is possible only if the child is brought up in a family. The mosl congenial environment would, of course, be that of the family of his biological parents. But if for any reason it is not possible for the biological parents or other near relative to look after . the child or the child is abandoned and it is either not possible to trace the parents or :the parents are not willing to take care of the child, the next best alternative would be to find adoptive parents for the child so that the child can grow up under the loving care and atten• tion of the adoptive parents. The adoptive parents would be the . next best substitute for the biological parents. The practice of: adoption has been prevalent in Hindu Society for centuries and it is recognised by Hindu Law, but in a large number of other countries it .is of comparatively recent origin while in the muslim countries it is totally unknown. Amongst Hindus, it is not merely ancient Hindu 4w which recognises the practice of adoption but it has also be.en legislatively recognised in the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956. The Adoption of Children Bill 1972 sought to provide for a uniform law of adoption applicable to all communities includ-\n\nA f __\n\nF '''\n\n: UPREME COURT REPORTS [1984] !2 s.c.il.\n\ning the muslims but, as pointed out above, it was dropped owing to the strong opposition of the muslim community. The Adoption of Children Bill, 1980 is now pending in Parliament and if enacted, it will provide a uniform law of adoption applicable to alt communities in India excluding the muslim community. Now when the parents . of a ?hild want to give it away in adoption or the child is abandoned and it is considered necessary in the interest of the child to give it in adoption, every effort must be made first to find adoptive parents for it within the country, because such adoption would steer clear of any problems of assimilation of the child in the family of the adoptive parents which might ari1e on .account of cultural, racial or linguistic differences in case of adoption of the child by foreign parents. If it is not possible to find suitable adoptive parents for the child within the country, it may become necessary to give the child in adoption to foreign parents rather than allow the child to grow up in an orphanage or an institution where it will have no family life and no love and affection of parents and quite often, in the socioeconomic conditions prevailing in the country, it might have to lead the life of a destitute, half clad, half hungry and suffering from mal-nutrition and illness. Paul Harrison a free-lance journalist working for several U.N. Agencies including the International Year of the Child Secretariat points out that most third world children suffer \"because of their colintry's Jack of resources fo' development as well as pronounced inequalitie' in the way available resources are distributed\" and they face a situation of absolute material deprivation. He proceeds to say that for quite a large. number of children in the rural areas, \"poverty and lack of education of their parents, combined with little or no access to essential services of health, sanitation and education, prevent the realisation of iheir full human potential making them more . likely to grow up uneducated, unskilled and unproductive\" and their life is blighted by malnutration, lack of health care and disease and illness caused by starvation, in1pure water alld poor sanitation.\n\nWhat Paul Harrison has said about children of the third world applies to children in India and if it is not possible to provide to them in India decent family life where they can grow up under the loving care and atten tion of parents and enjoy the basic necessities of life such as nutritive food, health care and education and lead a life of basic human digi:tity with stability and security, moral as well as material, there is no reason why such children should not be allowed to be given H • in adoption to foreign parents. Such adoption would be quite consistent with our National Policy on Children because it would\n\nL; it, PANDEd v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 815\n\nprovide an opportunity to children, otherwise destitute, neglected\n\nA >. or .abandoned, to lead a healthy decent life, without privation and suffering arising. from poverty, ignorance, mal-nutrition and lack of sanitation and free from neglect and exploitatio~, where they would be . able to realise \"full potential of growth\". But of course .. as we ... said above, every effort must be made first to see if the child can fl be rehabilitated by adoption within. the country and if that is not B possible, then only adoption by foreign parents, or as it is some ti.1ne called 'inter country adoption' should be acceptable. This ptinciple stems from the fact th.at inter country adoption may in-.i valve trans-racial, trans-cultural and trans-national aspects which. would not arise in case of adoption within the country and the fist - \".:\\ alternative should therefore always be to find adoptive parents for . C the child within the country. In fact, the Draft Guidelines of Procedures Concerning Inter-Country Adoption formulated at the International Council of Social Welfare . Regional Conference of Asia aud Western Pacific held in Bombay in 1981 and approved .at the Workshop on Inter Country Adoption held in Brighton, U.K. on 4th September, 1982, recognise the validity of this principle in clause 3.1 which provides: \"Before'any plans are considered for a child to be adopted by a foreigner, the appropriate authority or agency shall consider all alternatives for permanent family care within tbe child's own country\". Where, however, it is not possii l D\n\nble to find placem 'nt for the child in an adoptive family within the country, we do not see anything wrong if : a home is provided to E the child with an adoptive family in a foreign country. The Government of India also in the affidavit filed on its behalf by Miss B. Sennapati Programme Officer in . the Ministry of Social Welfare seems to approve of inter-country adoption for Indian children and 1\n\nthe proceedings of the Workshop on Inter Country Adoption held in Brighton, u.K. on 4th September, 1982 clearly show that the Joint . F Secretary, Ministry of Social Welfare who represented the. Govern-' nient_ of India at the Workshop \"affirmed support of the' Indian -\n\nGoverninent to the efforts of the international organisations in pro-· moting measures , to protect wajfare and interests of.children who\" are addpted aborad.\"\n\nBut while supporting inter-country adoption, it is necessary to bear in .mind that the primary object of giving the child in adoption\n\nbeing the welfare of the child, great care has to be exercised in permitting the child to be given in 'adoption to foreign parents, .Jest\" the child may be neglected or abandoned by the adoptive parents in\n\n: ,.\n\nIi'\n\nG.:\n\n816 SUPREMll COURT REPORTS [19&1] 1 s.c.I\\,\n\nthe foreign country or the adoptive parents may not be able to .pro vide to the child a life of moral or material security or the child may be subjected to moral or sexual abuse or forced labour or ex perimentation for medical or other research and may pe placed in a worse sitnation than that in his own country. The Economic and Social Council as also the Commission for Social Development have therefore tried to evolve social and legal prihci plcs foF the protection and welfare of children given in inter-country adoption, The Economic and Social Council by its Resolution 1925 LVIII requested the Secretary General of the United Nations to convene a group of Experts with relevant experts with relevant experience of family and child welfare with the following mandate :\n\n\"(a) To prepare a draft decleration of social and legal princip_les relating to adoption and foster placement of children nationally and internationally, and to review and appraise the recommendations and guidelines incorporated in the report of the Secretary General and the rele vant material submitted by Governments already available to the Secretary General and the regional commissions.\n\n(b) To draft guidelines for. the use of Governments in the implementation of the above principles, as well as suggestions for improving procedures within the context of their social development-including family and child wel fare-programmes.''\n\nPursuant to this mandate an expert Group meeting was convened in Geneva in December, 1978 and this Expert Group adopted a \"Draft declaration on social and legal principles relating to the protection and welfare of children with special reference of foster placemnt and adoption, nationally and internationally\". The Commission , for Social Development considered the draft Declilration at its 26th Session and expressed agreement with its contents and the Economic and Social Council approved the draft Declaration and request ed the General Assembly to consider it in a suitable manner.\n\nNone of the parties appearing could give us information whether any action has been taken by the. General Assembly. B'ut the draft Declaration is a very important document in as much it lays down certain social and legal principles which must be observed in case of inter-country adoption. Some of the relevant principles set out\n\n~··\n\nL, K, PANDBY r. UNION (Bhagwatl, J.) 817\n\nin thC' draft Declaration may be referred to with advantage : • \"Art. 2. It is recognised that the best child welfare is good family welfare.\n\n4. When biological family care is unavailable or in appropriate, substitute family care should be considered.\n\n7. Every child has a right to a family. Children who cannot remain in their biological family should be placed in foster family or adoption in preference to institutions, unless the child's particular needs can best be met in a specialized facility.\n\n8. Children for whom institutional care was formerly regarded as the only option should be placed with families, both foster and adoptive.\n\n12. The primary purpose of adoption is to provide a permanent family for a child who cannot be cared for by his/her biological family.\n\n14. In considering possible .adoption placements, those responsible for the child should select the most appropriate environment for the particular child concerned.\n\n15. Sufficient time and adequate counselling should be given to the biological parents to enable them to reach a decision on their child's future, recognizing that it is in the child's best in.terest to reach this decision as early as possible.\n\n16. Legislation and services should ensure that the child becomes an integral part of the adoptive family.\n\n17. The. need of adult adoptees to know about their background should be recognized.\n\n19.\n\nGovernments should determine the adequacy of their national services for children, and recognize those children whose needs are not being met by existing services.\n\nFor some of these children, inter-country adoption may be considered as a suitable means of providing them with a family.\n\n21, In each countrr. placements §hould bo macle a\n\nA /). ·\"\n\nD (j,\n\nF ·:;\n\n.• I '\n\nSUPRBMB COURT REPORTS\n\n(1984) 2 S.C.R.\n\nthrough authorized agencies competent to deal with intercountry adoption services and providing the same safe-·· .guards and standards as are applied in national adoptions.\n\n22. Proxy adoptions are not acceptable, in consideration of the child's legal and social safety.\n\n23. No adoption plan should be considered before it has been established that the child is legally free for adoption and the pertinent documents necessary to complete the adoption are available. All necessary consents must be in a form which is legally valid in both countries. It must be definitely established that the child will be able to imm'.- grate into the country of the prospective adopters and can subsequently obtain their nationality.\n\n24. In intercountry adoptions, legal validation of the adoptio11 should be assured in the countries involved.\n\n25. The child should at all times have a name, nationality and legal guarC!iati.\"\n\nThereafter at the Regional Conference of Asia and Western Pacific held by the International Council on Social Welfare in Bombay in i9ll, draft guidelines of procedure concerning inter-country adop- tion were formulated and, as pointed out above, they were approved at the Workshop held in Brighton, U.K. on 4th September, 1982.\n\nThese guidelmes were based on the Draft Declaration and they are extremely relevant as they reflect the almost unanimous thinking of participants from various countries who took part in the Regionat Conference in Bombay and in the Workshop in Brighton, U.K.\n\nThere are quite .a few of these guidelines which are important and which deserve serious consideration by us : ·\n\n\"1.4. In all inter-country adoption arrangements, the welfare of the child shall be prime consideration.\n\nG Biological Parents: :)\n\n2.2. When the biological parents are known they shall he offered social work services by professionally qualified workers (or experienced personnel who are supervised by such qualified workers) before and after the birth of the JI ohild. \"\n\n.,.\n\n.~\n\nL, K. PANDEY 4. UNION (Bhagwati, ii.) 819\n\n2.3. These services shall assist the parents to consider .all the alternatives for the child's future. Parents shall not be subject to any duress in making a decision about adoption. No commitment to an adoption plan shall be permitted before the birth of the child. After allowing parents a reasonable time to reconsider any decision to relinquish a child for adoption, the decision should become irrevocable.\n\n2.5. If the parents decide to relinquish the child for adoption, they shall be helped to understand all the implications, including the possibility of adoption by foreigners and of no further contact with the child.\n\n2.6. Parents should be encouraged, where possible, to provide information about the child's background and development, and their own health.\n\n2.8. It is the responsibility of the appropriate autho-\n\nB 6\n\nrity or agency to ensure that when the parents relinquish a D child for adoption all of the legal requirements are met. •1\n\n2.9. If the parents state a preference for the religious up-bringing of the child, these wishes shall be respected as far as possible, but the best interest of the child will be the paramount consideration.\n\n2.10. If the parents are not known, the appropriate authority or agency, in whose care the child has been placed, shall endeavour to trace the parents and ensure that the above services are provided, before taking any action in relation to adoption of the child.\n\nThe Child:\n\n3.1. Before any plans are considered for a child to be adopted by foreigners, the appropriate authority or agency shall consider all aHernatives for permanent family care\n\nwithin the child's own country.\n\n3.2. A child-study report shall be prepared by professional workers (or experienced personnel who are supervised by such qualified workers) of an appropriate authority '\n\nor agency, to provide information which will form a basis for the selection of prospe9tive adopters for the child, H\n\n' '\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984] 2 s.c.R.\n\nassist with the child's need to know about his original family at the appropriate time, and help the adoptive parents understand the child and have relevant information about him/her.\n\n33. As far as possible, the child-study report shall B include the following : ·\n\n' ., D\n\n3.3.1. Identifying information, supported where possible by documents.\n\n3.3.2. Information about original parents, including their health and details of the mother's pregnancy and the birth.\n\n3.3.3. Physical, intellectual and emotional development.\n\n3.3.4. Health report.\n\n3.3.5. Recent photograph.\n\n3.3.6. Present environment-category of care (Own home, foster home, institution, etc.) relationships, routines and habits.\n\n3,3.7. Social Worker's assessment and reasons for suggesting inter-country adoption.\n\n3.4. Brothers and sisters and other children who have been cared for as siblings should not be separated by adoption placement except for special reasons.\n\n3.5. When a decision about an adoption placement is finalised, adequate time and effort shall be given to preparation of the child in a manner appropriate to his/her age and level of development. Information about the child's new country and new home, and counselling shall be pro vided by a skilled worker.\n\n3.5. (a) Before any adoption placement is finalized the child concerned shall be consulted in a manner appropriate to his/her age and level of development.\n\n3.6. When older children are placed for adoption, . 1 the adoptive parents should be encouraged to come to the\n\n. H child's country of ori11in, to meet him/her there, lea~!)\n\n\\. , -·-\n\n.. l_\n\nL.K. P~NDBY v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 821\n\npersonally about his/her. first environment ; ind escort the child to its new home.\n\nAdoptive Parents :\n\n4.3. In addition to the usual capacity for adoptive, parenthood. applicants need to have the capacity to handle\n\nthe trans-racial, trans.-cultural and trans-national aspects of\n\n B inter-country adoptions.\n\n4.4, A family study re.oort shall be prepared by professional worker (oi experienced personnel who are supervised by such qualified workers) to indicate the basis on which the applicants were accepted as prospective adopters.\n\nIt should include an assessment of the parents' capacityto parent a particular type of child and provide relevant information for other authorities such as Courts.\n\n4.5.\n\nThe report on the family study, which must be made in the community where the applicants are residing, shall include details of the following :\n\n4.5.1.\n\nIdentifying information about_ parents and other members of the family, including any necessary documentation.\n\n4.5.2.\n\nEmotional and intellectual capacities of prospective adopters, and their motivation to adoption.\n\n4.5.3. Relationship (material, family, relatives, friends, community)\n\n4.5.4.\n\nHealth.\n\n4.5.5.\n\nAccommodation and financial position.\n\n4.5.6.\n\nEmployment and other interests.\n\n4 5.7.\n\nReligious affiliations and/or attitudes.\n\n4.5.8.\n\nCapacity for adoptive parenthood, and details of child preferred (age, sex, degree of disability).\n\n4.5.9. Support available from relatives. friends, com- . munity.\n\n4.5.10.\n\nSocial worker's assessment and details of adoption authority's approval.\n\n\n[\\984) 2 S, C, R:\n\n4,5.11. Recent photograph of family.\n\nAdoption A•thorities and Agencies :\n\n5.1. Inter-country adoption arrangements should be made only through Government adoption authorities (or agencies recognised by them) in both sending and receiving countries. They shall use experienced staff with professional social work education or experienced personnel supervised by such qualified workers.\n\n5.2. The appropriate authority or agency in the child's country should be informed of all proposed intercountry adoptions and have the opportunity to satisfy itself that all alternatives in the country have been considered, .and that inter-country adoption is the optimal choice of care for the child.\n\n5.3. Before any inter-country adoption plan is considered, the appropriate authority or agency in the child's country should be responsible for establishing that the child is legally free for adoption, and that the necessary documentation is legally valid in both countries.\n\n5.4. Approval of inter-country adoption applicants is a responsibility of the appropriate authorities or agencies in both sending and receiving countries. An application to adopt a child shall not be considered by a sending countrf unless it is forwarded through the appropriate authority or agency in the receiving._ country.\n\n5.5. The appropriate authority or agency in both countries shall monitor the reimbursement of co, ts involved in inter-country adoption to prevent profi_teering and traffic king in children.\n\n5.6. xx xx xx xx\n\n5.7. When a child goes to another country to be adopted, the appropriate authority or agency of the receiving country shall accept responsibility for supervision of the placement, and for the provision of progress reports for the adoption authority or agency in the sending country for the period agreed. upon,\n\n:--,-\n\n!h·\n\nL, K. fANDBY v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 823\n\n5.8. In cases where the adoption is not to be finalised in the sending country, the adoption authority in the receiving country shall ensure that an adoption order is sought as soon as possible but not later than 2 years after placement. It is the responsibility of the appropriate authority or agency in the receiving country to inform the appropriate autnority or agency in the sending country, of .the details of the adoption order when it is granted.\n\n5.8.1. In cases where the adoptioA is to be .finalised in tho sending country after placement, it is the responsibility of the appropriate authority or agency fo both the sending and receiving country to ensure that the adoption is finalised as soon as possible.\n\n5.9. If the placemenfiisdisnipted before the adoption is finalised, the adoption authority in the receiving country . shali be responsible for ensuring, with the agreement of 'the adoption authority in the sending country that a satisfaciory alternative placement is made with prospective adoptive parents who are approved by' the adoption authorities of both countries.\n\nAdoption Services ond Communities :\n\n6.1. Appropriate . authorities o; agencies in.receiving countries shall ensure that there is adequate feedback to the appropriate authorities or agencies in sending countries, both in relation to intercountry adoption generally and to individual children where required.\n\n6.2. xx xx xx xx\n\n6.3.\n\nThe appropriate authorities and agencies in both sending and receiving countries have a responsibility .for public education in relation to inter-country adoption, to ensure that when such adoption is appropriate for children, public attitudes support this. Where public attitude is known to be discriminatory or likely to be hostile on. grounds of race or colour, the. appropriate authority or , agency in the sending country should not consider placement of the child,\n\n\n[1984] 2 S.C, R.\n\nStatus of the Child ;\n\n7.L Family;\n\nIt is essential that in inter-country adoption child.is given the same legal status and rights of inheritence, as if she/he had been born to the adoptive parents in marriage.\n\n7.2. Name;\n\nWhen the legal adoption process is concluded the child shall have the equivalent of a birth registration certificate.\n\n7.3. Nationality;\n\nWhen the legal adoption is concluded, the child shall be granted app<opriate citizenship.\n\n74. xx xx xx xx\n\n7.5. Immigration;\n\nBefore an inter-country adoption placement with particular prospective adopters is proposed, the appropriate authority or agency in the child's country shall ensiare that there is no hindrance, to the child entering the prospective adopters' country, and that travel documents can be obtained at the appropriate time.\n\nWe shall examine these provisions of the Draft Declaration and the draft guidelines of procedure when we proceed to consider and lay down the principles and norms which should be followed in intercountry adoption.\n\nNow it would be convenient at this stage to set out the procedure which is at present being followed for giving a child in adop tion to foreign parents. Since there is no statutory enactment in our country providing for adoptivn of a child by foreign parents or laying down the procedure which must be followed in such a case, resort is bad to the provisions of the Guardians & Wards Act 1890 for the purpose of facilitating such adoption. This Act is an oldstatute enacted for the purpose of providing for appointment of guardian of the person or property of a minor. Section 4 subsection (5) clause (a) defines the \"court\" to mean the district court\n\n-,.·\n\nUc. PANDEY ' UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 825\n\nhaving jurisdiction to entertain an application under the Act for an A order appointing or declaring a person to be a guardian and the expression \"district court\" is defined in sub-section (4) of section 4 to have the same meaning as assigned to it in the Code of Civil Procedure and includes a High Court in the exercise. of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction. Section 7 sub-section (1) provides that where the court is satisfied that it is for the welfare of a minor that B an order should be made appointing a guardian of 'his person or property or both or declaring a person to be such a guardian, the court may make an order accordingly and, according to section 8, such an order shall not be made . except on the application of one of four categories of persons specified in clauses (a) to (d), one of them being \"the person desirous of being the guardian of the minor\" C and the other being \"any relative or friend of the minor\". Sub section (I) of section .9 declares that if the 'application' is with respect to the guardianship of the person of the minor-and that is the kind of application which is availed of for the purpose of intercountry adoption-it shall be made to the district court having jurisdiction in the place where the minor ordinarily resides. Then D follows section.11, subsection (I) which prescribes that if the court is satisfied that there is ground for proceeding on the aplication, it shall fix a date for the hearing thereof aud cause notice of the application and or the date fixed for the hearing to be served on the parents of the minor if they are residing in any State to which the Act extends, the person if any named in the petition as having E the custody or possession of the person of the minor, fhe person proposed in the application to be appointed guardian and any other person to whom, in the opinion of the court, special notice of the application should be given. Section 17 provides 'that 1n appointing guardian of a minor, the court shall be guided by what, consi.•- tently with the law to which the minor is subject, appears in the F circumstances to be for the welfare of the minor and in considering what will be for the welfare of the minor, the .court shall have regard to the age -sex, and religion of the minor, the character and .capacity o( the proposed guardian and his nearness of kin to the minor, the wishes, if any, of a deceased parent and any existing or previous relations of the proposed guardian with the minor or his G property. The last materi.al section is section 26 which provides that a guardian of the person of a minor appointed by the court shall not, without the leave of the court by which he was appointed, remove the ward' from the limits , of its jurisdiction, except for such purposes as may be prescribed and the leave to be granted by th'e\n\nA '\n\nD . ..\n\n826 SUPREME COURT REPoRTS .\n\n[1982) 2 S.C.R.\n\ncourt may be special or general. These are the relevant provisions of the Guardians and Wards Act 1890 which have a bearing on the procedure which is at present being followed for the purpose of carrying through intetcountry adoption. The foreign parent makes an application to the court for being appointed guardian of the person cif the child whom he wishes to take in adoption , and for leave of the court to take the child with him to his country on being appointed such guardian. The procedure to be followed by the court in disposing of such application is laid down by three High Courts in the country with a view to protecting the interest and safeguarding the welfare of the child, but so far .as the rest of the High Courts are concerned, they do not seem to have taken any steps so far in that direction. Since most of the applications by foreign parents wishing to take a child in adoption in the State of Maharashtra are made on the original side of the High Court of . . Bombay that .High Court has issued a notification dated !0th May 1972 incorporating Rule 361-.B in Chapter XX of the Rules of the High-Court of Bombay (Original Side) 1957 an this newly added Rule provides inter a/ia as follows :\n\nWhen a foreigner makes an application for being appointed as the guard1an of the person or property of a minor, the Prothonotary and Senior Master shall .address a letter to the Secretary of the Indian Council of Social Welfare, informing him of the presentation of the application and the date fixed for the hearing thereof-he shall also inform him that any representation which the Indian Council of Social Welfare may make in the matter would be considered by the Court before passing the order on the application. A copy of the applicat1011 shall be forwarded to the Secretary of the Indian Council of Social Welfare alon6with the Jetter of Prothonotary and Senior Master.\"\n\nThe High Court of Delhi. has also issued instructions on the same lines to the Courts subordinate to it and these instructions read as follows :\n\n-~-. -.,_.\n\n(i) A foreigner desirous' of-being appointed guardian or the person of a minor and praying for leave to remove the minor to a foreign country, shall make an application for the purpose in the prescribed form under the Guardians and Wards Act, attaching with it three copies of passport size\n\n-~'···\n\n~··.\n\nL.ic. PANDEY v. ENION (Bhagwati, J.) 827\n\nphotographs of the minor, duly attested by the person having custody of the minor at the time ; ·\n\n(ii) If the court is satisfied that there is no ground for proceedings on the application, it shall fix a day for the hearing there of and cause notice of the application and of the date fixed for the hearing on the person and in the manner mentioned in Section 11, Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 as also to the general public and the Secretary of the Indian Council of child Welfare and consider their representation ;\n\n(iii) Every person appointed guardian of the person of a minor shall execute a bond with or without .a surety or sureties as the court may think fit to direct and in such sum as the court may fix, having regard to the welfare of the minor and to ensure his production in the court if and when so required by the court ;\n\n(iv) On the court making an order for the appointment of a foreigner guardian of the person of an Indian minor, a copy of the minor's photograph shall be counter-signed by the Court and issued to the guardian or joint guardian, as the case may be, appointed by the court alongwitb the certificate or\n\nguardianship.\"\n\nThe High Court of Gujarat has not fra1ned any specific rule for this purpose like the High Courts of Bombay and Delhi but 'in a judgment delivered in 1 ~32 in the case of Rasiklal Chaganlal Mehta,(') the High Court of Gujarat bas maqe the following obser vations:\n\n\"In order that the Courts cari satisfactorily decide an intercou11try adoption case against the aforesaid back ground and in the light of the above referred gµidelincs, we consider it necossary to gi1'e certain direction>. In ali such cases, the Couri should issue notice to the Indian Council of Social Welfare (175, Dadabbai Naroji Road, Bombay\n\n(I) AIR 1982 Guj. 193.\n\nE .\n\nl l\n\n~ UPRBME COURT REPORTS (1984j 2 s.c.fl..\n\n400001) and seek its assistance. If the Indian Counc.l of Social Welfare so desires it should be made a party to the proceedings. If the Indian Councilof Social\n\nWlfare does not ap.pear, or if it is unable, for some reason, to render assistance, the Court should issue notice to an independent, reputed and publicly/o!ficially recognised social welfare agency working in. the field and in that area and request it to render assistance in the matter.\" The object of giving notice to the Indian .Council of Social\n\nWelfare or the Indian Council for Child Welfare or any other independent, reputed and publicly or officially recognised social welfare agency is obviously to ensure that the application of foreign\n\nparents for guardianship of the child with a view to its eventual adoption is properly and carefully scrutinised and evaluated by an expert body .having experience in the area of child welfare with a view to assisting the Court in coming to the conclusion whether it will be in the. interest of the child, promotive of its welfare, to be adopted by the foreign parents making the application or in other words, whether such adoption will provide moral and material security to the child with an oppor.tunity to grow into the full stature of its personality in an atmosphere of love and affection and warmth of a family hearth and home. This procedure which has been evolved by the High Courts of Bombay, Delhi and Gujarat is, in our opinion, eminently desirable and it can help . considerably to reduce, if not eliminate, the possibility of the child boing adopted by unsuitable or undesirable parents or being placed in a family where it may be neglected, maltreated or exploited by the adoptive parents. We would strongly commend. this procedure for acceptance by every court .in the country which has to deal with an application by a foreign parenf for appointment of himself as guardian of a child with a view to its eveutual adcption. We shall discuss this matter a little more in detail when we proceed to consider what p_rinciples and norms should be laid down for inter-country adoption, but, in the meanwhile, proceeding further with the narration of the procedure followed by the courts in Bombay, Delhi and Gujarat, we may point out that when notice is issued by the court, the Indian Council of Social Welfare or the Indian Council for Child Welfare or any other recognised social welfare agency to which notice is issued, prepares what may conveniently be described as a child study report and submits it to the Court for its consideration. What are the different aspects relating to the child in respect of which the child study report should give information is a matter which we shall presently discuss, but suffice it io state fo~ the time\n\nt..K. PANDEY v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 829\n\nbeing that the child study report should contain legal and social data in regard to the child as .also an assessment of its behavioural pattern and its , intellectual, emotional and physical development.\n\nThe Indian Council of Social Welfre has evolved a standardised form of the child study report and it has been annexed as Ex. 'C\" to the reply filed in answer . to the notice issued by the Court.\n\nOrdinarily an adoption proposal from a foreign parent is sponsored by a social or child welfare agency recognised or licensed . by the Government ohhe country in which the foreign parents resides and the application of the foreign parent for appointment as guardian of the child is accompanied by a home study report prepared by such social or child welfare agency.\n\nThe home study report contains an assessment of the fitness and suitability of the foreign parent for taking the child in adoption based on his antecedents, family background, financial condition, psychological and emotional adapta bility and the capacity to look after the child after adoption despite racial, national and cultural differences, The Indian Council of Social Welfare has set out in annexure 'B' to the reply filed by it, guidelines for the preparation of the home study report in regard to the foreign parent wishing to take a chiid in adoption, and it i obvious from these guidlines which we shall discuss a little later, that the home study report is intended to provide social and legal facts in regard to the foreign parent with a view to assisting the court in arriving at a proper determination of the question whether it will be in the interest oft.he child to be given in adoption to such foreign parent.\n\nThe court thus has in most cases where an application is made by a foreign parent for being appointed guardian of a child in the courts in Bombay, Delhi and Gujarat, the child study report as well as the home study report together with other relevant material in order to enable it to decide whether it will be for the welfare of the child to be allowed to be adopted by the foreign parents and if on a consideration of these reports and material, the court comes to the.conclusion that it will be for the welfare of the child, the court makes an order appointing the foreign parent as gurdian of the child with liberty to him to take the child to his own country with view to its eventual adoption. Since adoption in a foreign country is bound to take some time and till then the child would continue to be under the guardianship of the foreign parent by virtue of the order made by the court, the foreign -parent as guardian would continue to be accountable to the court for the welfare of the child' and the court therefore takes a bond from him with or without surety or sureties in such sum as may be thought .for ensuring its production if and . when required by the court.\n\nSUPRBMB COURT RBPORTS\n\n(1984] 2 S C.R.\n\n' The foreign parent then takes the child to his own country either personally or through an escort and the child is then adopted by the foreign parent according to the law of his country and on such adoption, the child acquires the same status as a natural born child with the same rights of inheritance and succession as also the same nationality as the foreign parent adopting it. This is-broadly the procedure which is followed in the courts in Bombay, Delhi and Gujarat and there can be no doubt that, by and large, this procedure tends to ensure the welfare of the child, but even so, there are several aspects of procedure and detail which need to be considered in order to make sure that the child is placed in the right family where it will be. able to grow into full maturity of its personality with moral and material . security and in an atmosphere of love and warmth and it would not be subjected to neglect, maltreatment or exploitation.\n\nNow one thing is certain that in the absence of a law providing for adoption of an Indian child by a foreign parent, the only way in which such adoption can be effectuated is by making it in accordance with the law of the country in which the foreign parent resides.\n\nBut in order to enable such adoption to be made in the country of the foreign parent, it would be necessary for the foreign parent to take the child to his own country where the procedure for making the adoption in accordance with the law of that: country can be followed.\n\nHowever, the child which is an Indian national cannot be allowed to be removed. out of India by the foreign parent unless the foreign parent is appointed guardian of the person of the child by the Court and is permitted by the Court to take the child to his\n\n' own country under the provisions of the Guardians and Wards Act\n\n1890. Today, therefore, as the law stands, the only way in which a foreign parents can take an Indian child in adoption is by making an application to the Court in .which the child ordinarily resides for being appointed guardian of the person of the child with leave to remoye the child out of India and take it to his own country for the purpose of adopting it in accordance with the law of his country.\n\nWe are definitely of the view that such inter-country adoption should be permitted after exhausting the possibility of adoption within the country by Indian parents. It has been the experience of a large . number of social welfare agencies working in the area of adoption that, by and large, Indian parents are not enthusiastic about taking a stranger child in adoption. and even if they decide to take such child in adoption, they prefer to adopt a boy rather than a girl and they are. wholly averse to adopting a handicapped child, with the result that the majority of abandoned, destitute or orphan girls and\n\n;-~\n\n_)--. \"\"\n\nL.K. PANDBY.d. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 831\n\n. handicapped children have very little possibility of finding adoptive parents within the country and their future lies only in adoption by foreign parents. But .at the same.time it is necessary to bear in mind that by reason of the unavailability of children in the developed countries for adoption, there is a . great demand for adoption of children from India and consequently there is increasing danger of ill-equipped and sometimes even undesirable organisations or individuals activising themselves in the field of inter-country adoption with a view to trafficking in children and sometimes it mav also happen that the immediate prospect of transporting the_ child from neglect and abandonment to material comfort and security by placing it with a foreigner may lead to other relevant factors such as the intangible needs of the child, its emotional and. psychological requirements and possible difficulty of its assimilation and integration in a foreign family with a different racial and cultural background, being under-emphasized, if not ignored._ It is therefore necessary to evolve normative and procedural safeguards for ensuring that the child goes into the right family which would provide it warmth and affection of family life and help it to grow and develop physically, emotionally, intellectually and spiritually.\n\nThese safeguards we now proceed to examine ..\n\nWe may make it clear. at the outset thatwe arc not concerned here with cases of adoption of children living with their biological parents,. for in such class of cases, the biological parents would be the best persons to decide whether to, give their child in adoption to foreign parents. It is only in those cases where.the children sought to be taken m adoption are destitute or abandoned and are Jiving in social or child welfare centres that it is necessary to consider what normative and pr.ocedural safeguards seould be forged for protecting their interest and promoting their welfare.\n\nLet us first consider what are the requirements which should be insisted upon so far ar a foreigner wishing to take a child in adoption is concerned. In the first place, every application from a foreigner desiring to adopt a chiid must be sponsored by a social or child welfare agency recognised or licensed by the government of the country in which the foreigner is resident.\n\nNo application by a foreigner for taking a child in adoption should be entertained directly by any social or welfare agency in India working in the area cf inter-country adoption or by any institution or centre or home to which children are committed by the juvenile.court. This is essential primarily for three reasons. ·\n\n832 SUPREME COURT llBi>ORtS\n\n[J984J~ S.C.R,\n\nFirstly, it will help to reduce, if not eliminate altogether the possibility of profiteering and trafficking in children, because if a foreigner were allowed to contact directly agencies or individuals in India for the purpose of obtaining a child in adoption, he might in his anxiety to secure a child for adoption, be induced or persuaded to pay any unconscionable or unreasonable amount which might be demanded by the agency or individual procuring the child.\n\nSecondly it would be almost impossible for the court to satisfy itself that the foreigner who wishes to take the child in adoption would be suitable as a parent for the child and whether he would be able to provide a stable and secure family life to the child and would be able to handle trans-racial, trans-cultural and trans-national problems likely to arise from 'such adoption, because, where the application for adopting a child has not been sponsored by a social or child welfare agency in the country of the foreigner, there would be no proper arid satisfactory home study rport on which the court can rely. Thirdly, in such a case, where the application of a foreigner for taking a child in adoption is made directly without the intervention of a social or child welfare agency, there would be no . authority or agency in the country of the foreigner who could be made responsible for supervising the progress of the child and ensuring that the child is adopted at the earlist in accordance with law and grnws up in an atmosphere of warmth and affection with moral and materia 1 security assured to it. The record shows that in every foreign country where children from India are taken in adoption, there are social and child welfare agencies licensed or recognised by the government and it would not therefore cause an'y difficulty hardship or inconvenience if it is insisted that every application from a foreigner for taking a child in adoption must be span- . sored by a social or child welfare agency licensed or recognised or recognised by the government of the country in which the foreigner resides. It is not necessary that there should be only one social or child welfare agency in the foreign country through which an application for adoption of a child may be routed ; there may be more than one such social or child welfare agencies, but every such social or child welfare agency must be licensed or recognised by the govern- ment of the foreign country and the cout should not make an order for appointment of a foreigner as guardian unless it is satisfied that the application of the foreigner for adopting a child has been sponsored by such social or child welfare agency. The social or child welfare agency which sponsors the application for taking a child in adoption must get a home study report prepared by a prpfessional\n\nL.K. PANDBd v. UNION (Bhagwatl, J.) 833\n\nworker indicating the basis on which the application cif the foreigner for adopting a child has been sponsored by it. The home study report should broadly include information in regard to the various matters set out in Annexure 'A' to this judgment though it need not strictly adhere to the requirements of that Annexure and it should also contain an assessment by the social or child welfare agency as to whether the foreigner wishing to take a child in adop~ tion is fit and suitable and has the capacity to parent a child coming from a different racial and cultural milieu and whether the child will be able to fit into the environment of the adoptive family and the community in which it lives. Every application of a foreigner for taking a child in adoption must be accompanied by a home study report and the social or child we1fare agency sponsoring such application should also 'send along with it a recent photograph of the family, a marriage certificate of the foreigner and his or her spouse as also a declaration concerning their health together with a certificate regarding their medical fitness duly certificate by a medical doctor, a declaration regarding their financial status alongwith _ supporting documents including employer's certificate where applicable, incometax assessment orders, bank references and particulars concerning . the properties owned by them, and also a declaration stating that they are willing to be appointed guardian of the child . and undertaking that they would 'adopt the child according to the law -of their country within a period of not more th'an two years from the time of arrival of the child in their country and give intimation of such adoption to the court appointing them as guardian as also to the social or child welfare agency in India processing their case, they would maintain the child and provide it necessary education and up-bringing according to their status and they would also send to the court as also to the social or child welfare agency in India reports relating to the progress ofthe child alongwith itnecent photograph, the frequency of such progress reports being quarterly during the first two years and half yearly for the next three years.\n\nThe application .of the foreigner must also be accompanied by a Power of Attorney in favour of an Officer of the social or child welfare agency in- India which is requested to process the case and such Power of Attorney should authorise the . Attorney to handle the case on behalf of the foreigner in case the foreigner is n:ot in a position to come to India. The social or child welfare agency sponsoring the application of the foreigner must also certify that the foreigner seeking to adopt ii child is permitted to do so according to the law of his country. These certificates, declarations a11d documents which must accompany the application of the foreig-\n\n834 SUPREMe couRt REPORTS\n\n(1984) 2 s.c.R.\n\nA ner for taking a child in adoption, should be duly, notarised by a Notary Public whose signature should be duly attested either by an Officer of the Ministry of External Affairs or Justice or Social Wei fare of the country of the foreigner or by an Officer of the Indian Embassy or High Commission or Consulate in that country. The social or child welfare agency sponsoring the application' of the B\n\n0foreigner must also undertake while forwarding the appllcation to the social or child welfare agency in lndia, that it will ensure adop tion of the child by the foreigner according to the law of his country within a period not exceeding two years and as soon as the adoption is effected, it will send two certified copies of the adoption order to the social or child welfare agency in India through which the appli C cation for guardianship is processed, so that one copy can be filed in court and the other can remain with the social or child welfare agency in India. The social or child welfare agency sponsoring the application must also agree to send to the concerned social or child welfare agency in India progress reports in regard to the child, quarterly during the first year and half yearly for the subsequent year D or years until the adoption is effected, and it must also undertake that m case of disruption of the family of the foreigner before adop ti on can be effected, it will take care of the child and find a suitable alternative placement for it with the approval of the 'concerned social or child welfare agency in India and report such alternative placement to the court handling the guardianship proceedings and E such information shall be passed on both by the court as also by the concerned social or child welfare agency in India to the Secretary, Ministry of Social Welfare, Government of India. The Government of India shall prepare a list of social or cluld welfare agencies licensed or recognised for inter-country adoption by the government of each foreign country\" where children from India arc taken in adop, F tion and this list shall be prepared after getting the necessary information from the government of each such foreign country and the Indian Diplomatic Mission in that foreigne country.\n\nWe may point out that the Swedish Embassy has in Annexure II to the affidavit filed on its behalf by Ulf Waltre, given names of seven Swedish organisatiqns or agencies which are authorised by the\n\nG National Board for Inter-Country Adoption functioning under the Swedish Ministry of Social Affairs to \"mediate\" applications for adoption by Swedish nationals and the Indian Council of Social Welfare hasalso in the reply filed by it in answer to the writ 'peti; tion given a list of government recognised organisatios or agencies dealing in inter-country adoption in foreign countries. It should not ft therefore be difficult for the Gevernment of India to prepare a list\n\nL.K. PANDEY v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 835 ' of social or child welfare agencies licensed or recognised for intercountry adoption by the Government in various foreign countries.\n\nWe direct the Government of India to prepare such list within six . months from today and copies of such list shall be supplied by the Government of India to. the various High Courts in India as also to the social or child welfare agencie> operating in India in the area of inter-country adoption under licence or recognition from the Government of India. We may of course make it clear that application of foreigners for appointment of themselves as guardians of children in India with a view to their: eventual adoption shall not be. held up until such list is prepared by the Government of India but they shall be processed and disposed of in the light of the principles and norms iaid down in this judgment.\n\nWe then proceed to consider the position in regard to, biological parents of the child proposed to be taken in adoption. What are 'the. safeguards which are required to be provided in so far as biological parents are concerned ? We may make it clear at the outset that when we . talk about biological parents, Vie mean botn parents .if they are together or the mother or the father if either is alone.\n\nNow it sould-be regarded as an elementary requirement that if the biological parents are known, they should be properly assisted in making a decision about relinquishing the child for adoption, by the Institution or centre or Home for Child Care or social or child welfare agency to which the child is being surrendered. Before a dec.ision . is taken by the biological parents to surrender the chikl for adoption, they should be helped to understand all the implications of adoptions including the possibility of adoption by a foreigner and they should be told specifically that in case the child is .adopted, it would not be possible for them to have any further contact with the child. The biological parents should not be subjected to any duress in making a decision about reli1>quishment and even after they have taken a decision to' relinquish ihe child. for giving in adoption~ a further period of about three months should be allowed to them to reconsider their decision. But once the decision is taken and not reconsidered within such further time as may beall owed to them, it must be regarded as irrevocable a11d the procedure for giving the child in adoption to a foreigner can then be initiated without any further reference to'the biological parents by filing .an application for appointment of the foreig!'er as guardian of the child.\n\nThereafter there can be no question of once again consulting the biological parents whether they wish to give the child in adoption\n\nIJT they want to take i\\ back.· It wou\\d be most unfair if after a\n\n\n. (1984) 2 S.C.R.\n\nchild is approved by a foreigner and expenses are incurred by him for the purpose of maintenance of the child and some times on medical assistance and even hospitalisation for the child, the biological parents were once again to be consulted for giving them a locus penitentia to reconsider their decision. B.ut in order to eliminate any possibility of mischief and to make sure that the child has in fact , heen surrendered by .its biological parents, it is necessary that the Institution or Centre or Home for Child Care or social or child welfare agency tO which the child is surrendered by the biological parents, should take from, the biological parents a document of surrender duly signed by the biological parents and attested by at least two responsible persons and such document of surrender should not only contain the names of the biological parents and their address but also information in regard to the birth of the child and its background, health and development. If the biological parents state a preference for the religious upbringing of the child, their wish should as far as possible be respected, but ultimately the interest of the child alone should be the sole guiding factor and the biological parents should be informed that the child may be given in 11dop- . tion even to a foreigner who profe1ses a religion different from that of the biological parents. This procedure can and must be followed where the biological parents are known al)d they relinquish the child for adoption to an Institution or Centre or Home for Child Care or hospital or social or child welfare agency.\n\nBut where the child is an orphan, destitute or abandoned child and its parents are not known, the Institution or Centre or Home for Child Care or hospital or social or child welfare agency in whose care the child has come, must try to trace the biological parents of the child and if the biological parents can be traced and it is found that they do not want to take back the child, then the .same procedure as outlined above should as far as possible be followed.\n\nBut if for any reason the biological parents cannot be traced, then there can be no question of taking their consent or consulting them. It 'may also be pointed out that the biological parents should not be imduced or encouraged or even be permitted to take a decision in regard to giving of a child in adoption before the birth of the child or within a period of three months from the date of birth. This p_recaution is necessary because the biological parents must have reasonable timeafter the birth of the child to take a decision whether to rear up the child themselves or to relinquish it for adoption and moreover it may be necessary to allow some time to the child to overcome any health problems experienced after birth.\n\n7 ._).·· -\n\nL.K. PANDEY v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.)\n\nWe may now turn to consider the safeguards which should be observed in so far as the child proposed to be taken in adoption is concerned. It was generally Mreed by all parties appearing before the Court, whether as interveners or otherwise, that it should not be open to any and every ageacy or individual to process an application from a foreigner for taking a child in adoption and such application . should be processed only through a social. or child welfare agency licensed or recognised by the Government of India or the Government of the State in which it .is operating, or to put it differently in the language used by the Indian Council of Social Welfare in the reply filed by it in answer to the writ petition, \"all private adoptions conducted by unauthorised individuals or agencies . should be stopped\". The Indian Council of Social Welfare and the Tndian Council for Child Welfare are clearly two social or child welfare agencies operating at the national level and recognised by the Government of India, as appears clearly from theJetter dated 23rd August, 1980 addressed by the Deputy Secretary to the Government of India to the Secretary, Government of Kerela, Law Department, Annexure 'F' to the submissions filed by the Indian Council for Child Welfare in response to the writ petition. But apart from these two recognised social or child welfare agencies functioning at the national level, there are other social or child welfare agencies engaged in child care and welfare and if , they have good standing and reputation and are doing commendable work in the area of child care and welfare, there is no reason why they should not be recognised by the Government of India or the Government of a State for the purpose of inter-country adoptions. We would direct the Government of India to consider and decide within a period of three months from today whether any 'of the institutions or agencies which have appeared as interveners in the present \\Hit petition are engaged in child care and welfare and if so, whether they deserve to be recognised for inter-country adoptions. Of course it would be open to the Government of India or the Government of a State suo m©tu or on an application made to it to recognise any other social or child welfare agency for the purpose of inter-country adoptions, provided such social or child welfare agency enjoys good reputation and is known fo~ its work in the field of child care and welfare.\n\nWe would suggest that before taking a decision to recognise any particular social or child welfare agency for the purpose of intercountry adoptions, the Government of India or the Government of a State would do well to examine whether the social or child welfare agency has proper staff with prfessional social work experience, pecause o\\l)erwise it may not be possible for the social or ch.ild wel-\n\n838 StIPREMB COURT REPORTS\n\n(1984] 2 S.C R.\n\nA fare agency to carry out satisfactorily the highly responsible task of .ensuring proper placement of a child with a foreign adoptive family.\n\nIt would also be dseirable not to recognise an organisation or agency whcih has been set up only for the purpose of placing children in adoption : it is only an organisation or agency which is engaged in the work of child care and welfare which should be regarded as B eligible for recognition, since iriter-country adoption must be looked upon not as an independent activity by itself, but as part of child welfare programme so that it may not tend to degenerate into tradmg. The Government of India or the Government of a State recognising any social or child welfare agency for inter-country adoptions must insist as 'a condition of recognition that the social or child C welfare agency shall maintain proper accounts which shall be audited by a chartered accountant at the end of every year and it shall not charge to the foreigner wishing to adopt a child any amount in excess of I.hat actually incurred by way of legal or other expenses in connection with the application for appointment of guardian including such reasonable remuneration or h9norarium for the work D done and trouble taken in processing, filing and pursuing the application as may be fixed by the Court.\n\nSituations may frequently arise where a child may be in the care of a child welfare institution or centre or social or child welfare agency which has not been recognised by the Government. Since an application for appointment as guardian can, according to the principles and norms laid down by us, be processed only by a recognised social or child welfare agency and none else, ariy unrecognised in-. stitution, centre or agency which has a child under its care would have to approach a recognised social •Of child welfare agency if it desires such child to be given in inter-country adoption, and in that event it mnst send witho.ut any undue delay the name and particulars of such child to the recognised social or child welfare agency through which such child is proposed to be given in inter-country adoption.\n\nEvery recognised social or. child welfare agency must maintain a register in which the names and particulars of all children proposed to be given in inter-country adoption through it must be entered and in regard to each such child, the recognised social or child welfare agency must prepare a child study report through a professional social worker giving all relevant information in regard to the child so as to help the foreigner to come to a decision whether or not to adopt the child and to understand the child, if he decides to adopt it as also to assist the court in coming to a decision whether it will be for the welfare of the child to be given in adoption to th~\n\n. ,/\n\n_), -.+ r\n\n...\n\nL.K. PANDEY v. UNION (BhagWati, J.)\n\nforeigner wishing to adopt it. The child study report should contain as far as possible information in regard to the following matters :\n\n\"(!) Identifying information, supported where possible by documents.\n\n(2) Information about original parents, including their health and details of the mother's pregnancy and birth.\n\n(3) Physical, intellectual and emotional development.\n\n(4) Health report prepared by a reg\\stered medical practitioner preferably by a paediatrician.\n\n(5) Recent photograph.\n\n ( 6) Present environment - category of care {Own home, foster home, institution etc.) relationships; routines and habits.\n\n(7) Social worker's assessment and reasons for suggest\n\ning inter country adoption;\"\n\nThe government of India should, with the assistance . Of the Government of the States, prepare a list of recognised social or child welfare agencies with their names, addresses and other particulars and send such list to the appropriate department of the Goverihhent of each foreign country where Ihdian children are ordinarily taken in adoption so that the social dr child welfare agencies licensed ot recognised by the Government of such foreign country for °inter country adoptions, would know which social or child welfare agency in India they should approach for processing an application of its national for taking an Indian child in adoption.\n\nSuch list shall also be sent by the Government of India to each High Court with a requ\\'st to forward it to the district courts within its jurisdiction so that the High Courts and the district courts in the country would know which are the recognised social or child welfare agencies entitled to process an applic'atioh for' appointment of a foreigner as guardian. Of course, it would be desirable if a Central Adoption Resource Agency is set up by the Government of India with regiO-· nal .branches at a few centres which are active in intercoiintty\n\n. c\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984] 2 s.c R.\n\nadoptions. Such Central Adoption Resource Agency can act as a clearing house of information in regard to children available for inter-country adoption and all applications by foreigners for taking Indian children in adoption can then be forwarded by the social or child welfare agency in the foreign country to such Central Adoption Resource Agency and the latter can in its turn forward them to one or the other of the recognised social or child welfare agencies in the country. Every social or child welfare agency taking children under its care can then be required to send to sucb Central Adoption Resource Agency the names and particulars of children under its care who are available for adoption and the names and. parti£ulars SJf such children can be entered in a register to be maintained by such Central Adoption Resource Agency. But until such Central Adoption Resource Agency is set up, an application of a foreigner for taking an Indian child in adoption must be routed through a recognised social ot child welfare agency. Now before any such application from a foreigner is considered, every effort must be made by the recognised social or child welfare agency to find placement for the child by adoption in an Indian family. Whenever any Indian family approaches a recognised social or child welfare agency for taking a child in adoption, all facilities must be provided by such social or child welfare agency to the Indian family to have .a look at the children available with it for adopt'on and if the Indian family wants to see the child study report in respect of any particular child, child study report must also be made available to the Indian family in order to enable the Indian family to decide whether they would take the child in adoption. It is only if no Indian family comes forward to take a child in adoption within a maximum period of two months that the child may be regarded as available for inter-country adoption, subject only to one exception, namely, that if the child is handicapped or is in bad state of health needing urgent medical attention, which is not possible for the social or child welfare agency looking after the child to provide, tbe recognised social or child welfare agency need not wait for a period of two months and it can and must take immediate step.s for the purpose of giving such child in inter-country adoption. The recognised social or child welfare agency should, on receiving an application of a foreigner for adoption through a licensed or recognised social or child welfare agency in a foreign country, consider which child would be suitable for being given in adoption to the foreigner and would fit into the environment of his family and community and send the photograph and child study report of such child to the forei!lner for the purpose of obtaining . hi~\n\nr-\n\n. _Jr'-\n\nt.k. PANDEY v. UNION (Bhagwati' j,) 84i\n\napproval to the adoption of such child. The practice of accepting a general approval .of the foreigner to adopt any child should not be allowed, because it is possible that if the foreigner has not seen the phAograph of the child and has not studied the child study report and a child is selected for. him by the recognised social or child welfare agency in India on the basis of his general approval, he may on the 2.rrival of the child in his country find that he does not like the child or that the child is not suitable in which event the interest of the child would be seriously prejudiced. The recognised social or child welfare agency must therefore insist upon approval of a specific known child and once that approval is obtained, the recognised social or child welfare agency should immediately without any undue delay proceed to make an application for appointment of the foreig ner as guardian of the chiid.\n\nSuch application would have to be made in the court within whose jurisdiction the child ordinarily resides and it must be accompanied by copies of the h!)me study report, the child study report and other certificates and documents forwarded by the social or child welfare agency sponsoring the application of.the foreigner for taking the child in adoption.\n\nBefore we proceed to consider what procedure should be followed by the court in dealing with an application for appointment of a foreigner as guardian of a child, we may deal with a point of\n\ndoubt which was raised before us, namely, whether the social or child welfare agency which is looking after the child should be entitled to receive from the foreigner wishing to take the child in adoption any amount in respect of maintenance of the child or its medical expenses.\n\nWe were told that .there are instances where large amounts are demanded by so called social or child welfare agencies or indi viduals in consideration of giving a child in adoption and often this is done under the label of maintenance charges and medical expenses supposed to have been incurred for the child. This is a pernicious practice which is really nothing short of trafficking in children and . it is absolutely necessary to put an end to it by introducing adequate safeguards. There can be no doubt that if an application Of a foreigner for taking a child in adoption is required to be routed . through a recognised social or child welfare agency and the necessary steps for the purpose of securing appointment of the foreigner as guardian of the child have also to be ttken on\\y through a reognised social or child welfare agency, the possibility of any so called social or child welfare agency .or individual trafficking in children by\n\ndemanding exhorbitant amounts from prospective adoptive parents under the guise of maintenance charges and medical expenses or\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1984] 2 s.c.tl..\n\notherwise, would be almost eliminated.\n\nBut, at the same time, it would not he fair to S)lggest that the social or child welfare agency which is looking after the child should not be entitled to receive any amount from the prospective adoptive parent, when maintenance and medical expenses in connec:ion with the child are actually incurred by such social or child welfare agency.\n\nMny of the social orchild welfare agencies running homes for children have little financial resources of their own and have to depend largely on volun tary donations and therefore if any maintenance or medical expenses are incurred by them on a child, there is no reason why they should not be entitled to receive reimbursement of such maintenance and m_edical expenses from the foreigner taking thechild in adoption.\n\nWe would therefore direct that the social or child welfare agency which is looking after the child selected by a prospective adoptive parent, _may legitimately receive from such prospective adoptive parent maintenance expenses at a rate not exceeding Rs. 60 per day (this outer limit being subject to revision by the Ministry of Social Welfare, Government of India from time to time) from the date of selection of the child by him until the date the child leaves for going to its new home as also medical expenses including hospitalisation charges, if any, actually incurred by such social or child welfare agency for the child.\n\nBut the claim for payment of such maintenance charges and medical cxponses shall be rnbrnitted to the prospective adoptive parent through the recognised social or child welfare agency which has processed the application for guardianship and payment in respect of such claim shall not be received directly by the social or child welfare agency making the claim but shall be paid only through the recognised social or child welfare 2gency.\n\nThis procedure will to a large extent elim;_nate trafficking in children for money or benefits in kind and we would therefor< direct that this procedure shall be followed in ihe future.\n\nBut while giving this direction, we may make it clear that what we have said should not be interpreted as in any way preventing a foreigner from making voluntary donation to any social or child welfare agency but no such donation from a prospective adoptive parent shall be received until after the child has reached the country of its prospective adoptive parent.\n\nIt is also necessary to point out that the recognised social or child welfare agency through which an application of a foreigner for taking a child in adoption is routed must, before offering a child in adoption, make sure_ that the child is free to be adopted. Where the H parents have relinquished the child for adoption and there_ is a docu-\n\n...\n\nl..IC. PANDEY v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.)\n\nment of surrender, the child must obviously be taken to be free for adoption.\n\nSo also where a child is an otphan or destitute or abandoned child and it has not been possible by the concerned social or child welfare agency to trace its parents or where the child is committed by a juvenile court to an institution, centre or home for committed childre~ and is .declared t_o.be a destitute by the juvenile court, it must be regarded as free for adoption. The recognised social or child welfare agency must place sufficient material . before the court to satisfy it that the child is legally available for\n\nrhe adoption. It is also necessary that the recognised welfare agency must satisfy itself, firstly, that there is no impediment in the way of the child entering the country of the prospective adoptive parent ; secondly, that the travel documents for the child can be obtained at the appropriate time and lastly, that the law of the country of the prospective adoptive parent permits legal adoption of the child and that no such legal 'adoption being concluded, the child would acquire the same legal status and rights d inheritance as a natural born child and would be granted citizenship in the country of adoption and it should file along with the application for guardianship, a certificate reciting such satisfaction.\n\nWe may also at this stage refer to one other question that was raised before us, namely, whether a child under the care of a social or child welfare agency or hospital or orphanage in one State can be brought to another State by a social or child welfare agency for t.hc purpose of being given in adoption and an application for appointment. of a guardian of such child can be made in the court of the latter State.\n\nThis question was debated 'before us in view of the judgment given by Justice Lentin of the Bombay High Court on 22nd July, 1982 in Miscellaneous Petition No. 178 o'f 19&2 and other allied petitions. We agree with Justice Lentin that the . practice of social or child welfare agencies or individuals going to different States for the purpose. of collecting children for being given in inter-country adoption is likely to lead to considerable abuse, because it is possible that such social or child welfare agencies or individuals may, by offering monetary inducement, persuade indigent parents to part with their children and then give the children to foreigners in adoption by demanding a higher price, which the foreigners in their anxiety to secure a child for adoption may be willing to pay. But we do not think that if a child is relinquished by its biological parents or is an orphan or destitute or abandoned child in its parent State, there should be any objection to a social or child welfare agency taking the child to another State, even if\n\n. SUPREME COURT REPoRts [1984] 2 s.c.tt .\n\nthe object be to give it in adoption, provided there are sufficient safeguards to ensure that such social or child welfare agency does not indulge many malpractice. Since we are directing that every application of a foreigner for taking a child in adoption shall be routed only through a recognised social or .child welfare agency and an application for appointment of the foreigner as guardian of the child shall be made to the court only through such recognised social or child welfare agency, there would hardly be any scope for a social or child welfare agency or individual who brings a child from another State for the purpose of being given in adoption to indulge in trafficking and such a possibility would be reduced to almost nil.\n\nMoreover before proposing a child for adoption, the recognised social or child welfare agency must satisfy itse If that the child has either been voluntarily relinquished by its biological parents without monetary inducement or is an orphan or destitute or abandoned child and for this purpose, the recognised social or child welfare agency may require the agency or individual who has the care and custody of the child to state on oath as to how he came by the child and may also, if it thinks fit, verify such statement, by directly enquiring from the biological parents or from the child care centre or hospital or orphanage from which the child is taken. Thi.s will considerably reduce the possibility of abuse while at the same time facilitating placement of children deprived of family love and care in smaller towns and rural areas.\n\nWe do noi see any reason why in cases of this kind where a child relinquished by its biological parents or an orphan or destitute or abandoned child is brought by an agency or individual from one State to another, it should not be possible to apply for guardian' ship of the child in the court of the latter State, because the. child not having any permanent place of residence, would then be ordinarily resident in the place where it is in the care and custody of such agency or .individual.\n\nBut, quite apart from such cases, we are of the view that in all cases where a child is proposed to be given in adoption, enquiries regarding biological parents, whether they are traceable or not and if traceable, whether they have voluntarily relinquished the child and if not, whether they wish to take the child back, should be completed before the child is offered for adoption and thereafter no attempt should be made to trace or contact the biological parents, This would obviate the possibility of an ugly and unpleasant situation of biological parents coming forward to claim the child after it has been given to a foreigner in adoption.\n\nIt is also necessary while considering placement of a child in adoption to bear in mind that brothers and sisters or children who have\n\n...\n\nt.k. PANDEY v. tJNION <iJhagwali, J.)\n\nbeen brought up as siblings should not be separated except for special reasons and as soon as a decision to give a child in adoption to a foreigner is finalised, the recognised social or child welfare agency must if the child has reached the age of understanding, take steps to ensure that the child is given proper orientation and is prepared for going to its new home in a new country so that the assimilation of the child to the new environment is facilitated.\n\nwe mdst emphasize strongly that the entire procedure which we have indicated above including preparation of child study report, making of necessary enquiries and taking of requisite steps leading upto the filing of an application for guardianship of the child proposed to be given in adoption, must be completed expeditiously so that the child does not have to remain in the care and custody of a social or child welfare agency without the warmth and affection of family life, longer than is absolutely necessary .\n\nWe may also point out that if a child is to be given in intercountry adoption, it would be desirable that it is given in such adoption as far as po; sible before it completes the age of 3 years.\n\nThe reason is that if a child is adopted before it attains the age of understanding, it is always easier for it to get assimilated and integrated in the new environment in which it may find itself on being adopted by a foreign parent. Comparatively it may be some what difficult for a grown up child to get acclamatized to new surroundings in a different land and some times a problem may also arise whether foreign adoptive parents would be able to win the love and affection of such grown up child. But we make it clear that we say this, we do not wish to suggest for a moment that children above the age of three years should not be given in inter-country adoption.\n\nThere can be no hard and fast rule in this connection. Even children between the ages of 3 and 7 years may be able to assimilate themselves in the new surroundings without any difficulty and there is no reason why they should be denied the benefit of.family warmth and affection in the home of foreign parents, merely because they are past the age of 3 years. We would suggest that even children above the age of 7 years may be given in inter-country adoption but we would recommend that in such cases, their wishes may be ascertained if they are in a position to indicate any preference. The statistics placed before us sh6w that even children past the age of 7 years have been happily integrated in the family of their foreign adoptive parents ..\n\nS46\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS i!984) 2 SC.R.\n\nLastly, we come to the procedure to be followed by the court when an adp!ication for guardianship of a child is made to it.\n\nSection ll of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 provides for notice of the application to be issued to various persons including the parents of the child if they.arc residing in any State to which the Act extends.\n\nBut. we are definitely of the view that no notice under this section should be issued to the biological parents of the child, since it .would create considerable amount of eml;)arrassment and hard ship if the biological parents were then to come forward and oppose the application of the prospective adoptive parent for guardianship of the child. Moreover, the biological parents would then come to know who is the person taking the child in adoption and with this knowledge they .would at any .time be able to trace the whereabouts of the child and they may try to contact the child resulting in emotional and psychological disturbance for the child which might affect his future happiness. The possibility also cannot be ruled'out that if the biological parents know who are the adoptive parents they may try to extort money from the adoptive parents. It is therefore absolutely essential that the biological parents should not have any opportunity of knowing who are the adoptive parents taking the child in adoption and therefore notice of the application for guardianship should not be given to the biological parents.\n\nWe whould direct that for the same reasons notice of the application for guardianship should also not be published in any newspaper.\n\nSec• tion 11. of the Act empowers the courno serve notice of the application for guardianship on any other person to whom, in the opinion of the court, special notice of the application should be given and in exercise of this power the court should, before entertaining an application for guardianship, give notice to the Indian Council of Child Welfare or the Indian Council for Social Welfare or any of its branches for scrutiny of the application with a view to ensuring that it will be for the welfare of the child to be given in adoption to the foreigner making the application for guardianship.\n\nThe Indian Council of Social Welfare or the Indian Council of Child Welfare to which ntice is issued by the court would have to scrutinise the application for guardianship made on behalf of the foreigner wishing to take the child in adoption and after examining the home ; tudy report, the child study report as also documents and certificates forwarded by the sponsoring social or child welfare agency and making necessary enquiries, it must make its representation to the court so that the C01lft may be able to satisfy itself whether t.he principles and norms as also the procedure laid down by us in this judgment have been observed and followed, whether the foreigner\n\n{ ..\n\nt.k. PANDEY v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.)\n\nwill be a suitable adoptive parent for the child and the child will he able to integrate and assimilate itself in the family and community. of the foreigner and will be able to get warmth \"nd affection of family life as also moral and material stability and security and wh<ther it will be in the.interest of the child\n\n0to be taken in adoption by the foreigner. If the court i.s satisfied, then and then only it will make an order appointing the foreigner as guardian of .the child and permitting him to remove the child to his own country with a view to eventual adoption. The court will also introduce a condition in. the order that the foreigner who is appointed guardian shall make proper provision by way of deposit or bond or otherwise to enable the child to be repatriated to India should it become necessary for and reason. We may point out 1hat such a provision . is to be found in clause 24 of the Adoption of Children Bill No. 208 of 1980 and in fact the practice of taking a bond from the foreigner who is appointed guardian of the child is being foloweld by the courts in Delhi as a result of practice instructions issued by the High Court of Delhi. The order will also include a condition that the foreigner who is appointed guardian shall submit to the Court as also to the Social or Child Welfare Agency processing the application for guardianship, progress reports of the child along with a recent photograph quarterly during the first two years and half yearly for the next three years. The court may also while making the order permit the social or chi.Id welfare agency which has taken care of the child pending its selection for adoption to receive such amount as the Court thinks fit from the foreigner who is appointed guardian of such child.\n\nThe order appointing guardian shall carry, attached to it, a photograph of the child duly counter-signed by an officer of the court. This entire procedure shall be completed by the court cxpediticusly and as far as possible within a period of. two months fro.m the date of filing of the application for guardianship of the child. The proceedings on the application for guardianship should be held by the Court in camera and they should be regarded as confidential and as soon as an order is made on the\"appl; cation for guardianship the entire proceedings including the papers and documents should be sealed. When an order appointing guardian of a child is made by the court, immediate intimation of the same shall be given to the Ministry of Social Welfare, Government of India as also to the Ministry of Social Welfare of the Government of the State in which the court is situate and copies of such order shall also be forwarded to the two respective ministries of Social Welfare.\n\nThe Ministry of Social Welfare, Government of India shall maintain a register containing names and other particulars of the children in\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORRS il984j 2 s.c.1.t\n\nrespect of whom orders for appointment of guardian have been made as also names, addresses and other particulars of the prospective adoptive parents who have been appointed such guardians and who have been permitted to take away the children for the purpose of •doption. The Government of India will also send to the Indian Embassy or High Commission in the country of the prospective adoptive parents from time to time the names, addresses and other particulars of such prospective adoptive parents together with particulal'S of the children taken by them and requesting the Embassy or High Commission to maintain an unobtrusive watch over the welfare and progress of such children in order to safeguard against any possible mal-treatment, exploitation or use for ulterior purposes and to immediately report any instance of mal-treatment, negligence or exploitation to the Government of India for suitable action.\n\nWe may add even at the cost of repeatition that the biological parents of a child taken in adoption should not under any circumstances be able to know who are the adoptive parents of the child nor should they have any access to the home study report or the child study report or the other papers and proceedings in the application for guardianship of the child. The foreign parents who have taken a child in adoption would normally have the child study report with them before they select the child for adoption and in case they do not have the child study report, the same should be supplied to them by the rec0gnised social or child welfare agency processing the application for guardianship and from the child study report, they would be able to gather information as to who are the biological parents of the child, if the biological parents are known. There can be no objection in furnishing to the foreign adoptive parents particulars in regard to the biological parents of the child taken in adoption, but it should be made clear that it would be entirly at the discretion of the foreign adoptive parents whether and if so when, to inform the child about its biological parents. Once a child is taken in adoption by a foreigner and the child grows up in the surroundings of the country of adoption and becomes a part of the society of that country, it may not be desirable to give information to the child abcut its biological parents whilst it is young, as that might have the effect of exciting his curiosity to meet its biological parents resulting in unsettling effect on its mind. But if after attaining the age of maturity, the child w, ants to know about its biological parents, there may not be any serious objection to the giving of such information to the child because after the child attains maturity, it is not likely to be easily affected by such information and in such a\n\n--\\__\n\nL.K. PANDEY v. UNION <Bhagwati, J.)\n\ncase,. the foreign adoptive parents may, in exercise of their discre\n\ntion, furnish such information to the child if they so think fit.\n\nThe•e are the principles and norms which must be observed and the procedure which must be followed in giving a child in adoption to foreign parents. If these principles and norms are observed and this procedure is followed, we have no doubt that the abuses to which inter-country adoptions, if allowed without any safeguards, may lend themselves would be considerably reduced, if not eliminated and the welfare of the child would be protected and it would be able to find a new home where it can grow in an atmosphere of warmth and affection of family life with full opportunities for physical intellectual and spiritual development. We may point out that the adoption of children by foreign parents need not wait until social or child welfare agencies are recognised by the Government as directed in this order, but pending recognition of social or child welfare agencies for the purpose ' of inter-country adoptions, which interregnum, we hope; will not last for a period of more than two months, any social or child welfare agency. having the care and custody of a child may b.e permitted to process an application of a foreigner, but barring this departure the rest of the procedure laid down by us shall be followed wholly and the principles and norms enunciated by us in this Judgment shall be observed in giving a child in inter-country adoption.\n\nThe writ pettition shall stand disposed of in these terms.\n\nCopies of this 'order shall be sent immediately to the Ministry of Social Welfare of the Government of India and the Ministry of Social Welfare of each of the State Governments as also to all the High Courts in the country and to the Indian Council of Social Welfare and the Indian Council of Child Welfare. We would direct F that copies of this Order shall also be supplied to the Embassies and Diplomatic Missions of Norway, Sweden, France, Federal Republic of Germany and the United States of America and the High Commissions of Canada and Australia for their informations si, nce the statistics show that these are the countries where Indian children are taken in adoption.\n\nS.R.\n\nSUPRBMB COURT REPORTS\n\nANNEXURE-'A'\n\n1. Source of Referral.\n\n~· Nuber of single and joint interviews.\n\n3. Personality of husband and wife.\n\n[1984} 2 S.C.R.\n\n4. Health details such as clinical tests, heart condition, past illnesses etc. (medical certificates required, sterility certificate required, if applicable), I\n\n5. Social status and family background.\n\n6. Nature and Adjustment with occupation. ·\n\n7. Relationship with community.\n\n8. Description of home.\n\n9. Accommodation for the child.\n\nJO. Sch<>oling facilities.'\n\n11. Amenities in the home.\n\n12. Standard of living as it appears in the home.\n\n13. Type of neighbourhood.\n\n14. Current relationship between husband and wife.\n\n15. (a) Current relationship between parents and children (if any children).\n\n(b) Development of already adopted children (if any) and their acceptance of the child to be adopted.\n\n16. Current relatinship between the couple and the members of each other's families,\n\n. (\n\nL.K. PANDEY v. UNION <Bhagwati, J.)\n\n17, If the wife is working; will she be able to give up the job?\n\n18. If she. cannot leave the job, what arrangements will she make to look after the child ?\n\n19. Is adoption considered because of sterility of one of the\n\nmaritial partners ?\n\n20. If not, can they eventually have children of their own ?\n\n21. If a child is born to them, how will they treat the adopted child?\n\n22. If the couple already has children how wiJI these children react to an adopted child ?\n\n23. Important social and psychological experiences which\n\n. have had a bearing on their desire. to adopt a child.\n\n24. Reasons for wanting to adopt an Indian child .\n\n25. Attitude of grand-parents'. and relatives towards the\n\nadoption.\n\n26. Attitude of relatives, friends, community and neighbour- E hood towards adoption of an Indian child.\n\n27. Anticipated plans for the adopted child.\n\n28. Can the child be adqpted according to the adoptio~ law in the adoptive parents country? Have they obtained the necessary permission to adopt ? (Statement of permission required.)\n\n29. Do the adoptive parents know any one who adopted a\n\nchild from their own country or ariother country ? Who\n\nare they ? From where did they fail. to get a child from G that source ?\n\n30. Did the couple apply for a child from any other source ?\n\nIf yes, which source ?\n\n 31. What type of child is the couple interested in ? (sex, age, and for what reasons.) ff\n\n. 852\n\n\n[!984] 2 S.C R •\n\n32. Worker's recommendation concerning the family and the ).\n\ntype of child whkh would best fit into this home. \"\"'+.\n\n33. Name and address of the agency conducting the home B study. Name of social worker, qualification of social worker.\n\n34. Name of agency responsible for post placement,. super- • c vision and follow up.\n\nY--\" ;;", "total_entities": 154, "entities": [{"text": "LAKSHMI KANT PANDEY", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5, "end_char": 24, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "LAKSHMI KANT PANDEY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "UNION OF )NDIA\n", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 26, "end_char": 41, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. N. BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 61, "end_char": 75, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.N. BHAGWATI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. s. PATHAK", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 77, "end_char": 89, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. PATHAK", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Guardian and Wards Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 365, "end_char": 387, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 470, "end_char": 483, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner, an advocate of the Supreme Court addressed a letter in public interest to the Court, complaining of mat-practices indulged in by social organiSation and vnlunhiry agencies engaged in the work of offering Indian Children in adoption to foreign parents, the petitioner alleged that not only Indian Children of tender age are under the guise of adoption \"exposed to the Jong horrendous journey to distant foreign countries at great risk to their lives but in cases where they survive and where these children are not placed in the shelter and Relief Houses, they in course of time become beggars or prostitutes ' for want of .proper care from their alleged fo&ter parents.\""}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1304, "end_char": 1323, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The ptiti.oner,\n\naccordingly, sought relief restraining Indian based private agencies ''from carrying put further activity of routing children for adopticn abroad\" and directing the Government of India, the Indian Council of Child Welfare and the Indian Council of Social Welfare to carry out their obligations in the matter of ador)tion of Indian Children by Foreign parents."}}, {"text": "Indian Council of Child Welfare", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1329, "end_char": 1360, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The ptiti.oner,\n\naccordingly, sought relief restraining Indian based private agencies ''from carrying put further activity of routing children for adopticn abroad\" and directing the Government of India, the Indian Council of Child Welfare and the Indian Council of Social Welfare to carry out their obligations in the matter of ador)tion of Indian Children by Foreign parents."}}, {"text": "Indian Council of Social Welfare", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1369, "end_char": 1401, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The ptiti.oner,\n\naccordingly, sought relief restraining Indian based private agencies ''from carrying put further activity of routing children for adopticn abroad\" and directing the Government of India, the Indian Council of Child Welfare and the Indian Council of Social Welfare to carry out their obligations in the matter of ador)tion of Indian Children by Foreign parents."}}, {"text": "Guardians and Wards Act, 1890", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4459, "end_char": 4488, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "High Courts of Bombay, Delhi and Gujarat", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4558, "end_char": 4598, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Courts of Bombay, Delhi and Gujarat have laid down by Rules and Instructions certain procedure when a foreigner makes an application for adoption under the Guardian and Wards Act including issuing of a notice to the Indian Council of Social Welfare and other otllcially recognised social welfare agencies with a view to assist the ClJUrl in properly and carefully scrutinising the applications of the foreign parents for determining whether it will be in the interest of the child and promotive of its welfare, 1 o be adopred by ihe foreign parents making the application or in other words, whether such adoption will provide moral and material security to the child wi h an opportu~ nity to grow into the fu!I stature of its personality in an atmosphere of ll:ve and affection and warmth of a family he.,"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6469, "end_char": 6474, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "No application by a foreigner tor taking a child in adoplioil should be entertained dircc ly by any social or welfare ageilcy of India working in the area of inter country adoption or by any institution or centre or home to which children are com mitted by the juvenile court."}}, {"text": "Ministry of External Affairs or Justice or Social Welfare", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10647, "end_char": 10704, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These certificates, declarations and documents must accompany the:' application of the foreigner for taking child in adoption, shouid be duly notarised by a Notary Public Whose signature should be duly attested either by an Officer of the Ministry of External Affairs or Justice or Social Welfare of the country of the foreigner or by an Officer of the Indian Embassy or High Commission or Consulate in that country: The social or child welfare agency sponsoring the applicatioh of the forcipner must also undertake while forwarding the application to the social or child welfare agency in India, that it will ensure adoption of the child by the foreigner according to the law of his country within a period not exceeding two years and as soon as the adoption is affected, it will send two certified} copies of ' 1he adoption order to the social or child welfare agency in India through which the application for guardianship is processc~. so that one c;; opy can be\n\nfiled in court and the 01her can remain with the social ol child welfare agency in India."}}, {"text": "Ministry of Social Welfare, Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12270, "end_char": 12317, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and it must also undertake that iri case of disruption of the family of the foreigner before adoptiori can be effected, it wilt take care of the child and find a suitable alternative placement for it with the approval of the concerned social or child welfare agency in India and report such alternative placement to the .court handling the guardianship proceedings and such information shall be passed on both by the court as also by the concerned social or child welfare agency in India to the Secretary~ Ministry of Social Welfare, Government of India. ["}}, {"text": "Government of IAdia", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12981, "end_char": 13000, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Such lists shall be supplied by the Governm; nt of India to the various High Courts in India as also to the social or child welfare agencies operating in India in the area of inter-country adoption under licence or recognition from the Government of IAdia."}}, {"text": "Government of the State", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16142, "end_char": 16165, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It should nc.t be open to any and every agency or individual to process an application from a foreigner for taking a child in adoption and such application .should be processed only through a social or child welfare agency licensed or recognised by the Government 6f India or the Government of the State in which it is operating."}}, {"text": "Indian Council for Child Welfare", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16847, "end_char": 16879, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Indian Council of Social Welfare and the Indian Council for Child Welfare are clearly tWo social or Child welfare agencies operating at the national le\"vel and recognised by the Government of Jndia."}}, {"text": "Government of Jndia", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16984, "end_char": 17003, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Indian Council of Social Welfare and the Indian Council for Child Welfare are clearly tWo social or Child welfare agencies operating at the national le\"vel and recognised by the Government of Jndia."}}, {"text": "Section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22763, "end_char": 22773, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Guardians and Wards Act, 1890", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22781, "end_char": 22810, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Indian Council of Child welfare", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 23819, "end_char": 23850, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the court is satisfied, after giving notice of the application to the Indian Council of Child welfare or the Indian Council for Social Welfare or any of its branches for scrutiny of the application, that it will be for the welfare of.the child to be give io adoption to the foreigner making the application for guardianship, it will only then make an order appointing the foreigner as guardian of the child and permitting him to remove ihe child to his own Country with a vie~ to eventual adoption."}}, {"text": "Indian Council for Social Welfare", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 23858, "end_char": 23891, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the court is satisfied, after giving notice of the application to the Indian Council of Child welfare or the Indian Council for Social Welfare or any of its branches for scrutiny of the application, that it will be for the welfare of.the child to be give io adoption to the foreigner making the application for guardianship, it will only then make an order appointing the foreigner as guardian of the child and permitting him to remove ihe child to his own Country with a vie~ to eventual adoption."}}, {"text": "Ministry of Social Wei", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 25188, "end_char": 25210, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[847F] Where an order appointing guardian of a child is made by the court, immediate intimation of the same shall be given to the Ministry of Social Wei fare; Govcrnmeni of lndi~ as alsO to the Ministry of Social Welfare of the Governmen of the State in which the court is situate and copies of such order sha11 also be forwarded to the two resnective Ministries of Social Welfare."}}, {"text": "Ministry of Social Welfare", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 25252, "end_char": 25278, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[847F] Where an order appointing guardian of a child is made by the court, immediate intimation of the same shall be given to the Ministry of Social Wei fare; Govcrnmeni of lndi~ as alsO to the Ministry of Social Welfare of the Governmen of the State in which the court is situate and copies of such order sha11 also be forwarded to the two resnective Ministries of Social Welfare."}}, {"text": "Govt. of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 25854, "end_char": 25868, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Govt."}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27920, "end_char": 27922, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29871, "end_char": 29881, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29889, "end_char": 29910, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "A. Subhashini", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 29965, "end_char": 29978, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "FOR THE RESPONDENTS :\n\nMiss A. Subhashini for Union of India and Ministry of Social Welfare."}}, {"text": "Kamini Jaiswal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 30036, "end_char": 30050, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Miss Kamini Jaiswal for, Indian Council of Social Welfare."}}, {"text": "J.B. Dadachanji & Co.", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 30091, "end_char": 30112, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J.B. Dadachanji & Co. for Indian Council of Child Welfare and Swedish Embassy."}}, {"text": "N. M. Ghatate", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 30175, "end_char": 30188, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. N. M. Ghatate for all God's Children Inc.\n\nArizone,\n\nU.S.A.\n\nP.H.' Parekh for Maharashtra State Women's Council of\n\nChild Welfare, Bombay and for Enfants de-L'espoir."}}, {"text": "P.H.' Parekh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 30236, "end_char": 30248, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. N. M. Ghatate for all God's Children Inc.\n\nArizone,\n\nU.S.A.\n\nP.H.' Parekh for Maharashtra State Women's Council of\n\nChild Welfare, Bombay and for Enfants de-L'espoir."}}, {"text": "P.K. Chakeravorty", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 30366, "end_char": 30383, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(1984] 2 S.C.R.\n\nP.K. Chakeravorty for Legal Aid Service, West Bengal."}}, {"text": "Manik Karanjawa", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 30426, "end_char": 30441, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mrs. Manik Karanjawa/a for Indian Associations for Promotion of Adoption ..\n\nMrs Urmila Kapur for SOS Children's Village of India."}}, {"text": "Urmila Kapur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 30502, "end_char": 30514, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mrs. Manik Karanjawa/a for Indian Associations for Promotion of Adoption ..\n\nMrs Urmila Kapur for SOS Children's Village of India.", "canonical_name": "Urmila Kapoor"}}, {"text": "Kai/ash Vasdev", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 30553, "end_char": 30567, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kai/ash Vasdev for Missionary of Charity, Calcutta."}}, {"text": "G.M. Coelho", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 30640, "end_char": 30651, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G.M. Coelho Bar at Law for Enfant's du Mande (France)\n\nMiss Rani Jethama/ani for Kuanyin Charitable Trust."}}, {"text": "Rani Jethama", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 30700, "end_char": 30712, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G.M. Coelho Bar at Law for Enfant's du Mande (France)\n\nMiss Rani Jethama/ani for Kuanyin Charitable Trust."}}, {"text": "B.M. Bageria", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 30748, "end_char": 30760, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B.M. Bageria for Terre Des Hommes (India) Society."}}, {"text": "Sukumar Ghose", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 30800, "end_char": 30813, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sukumar Ghose for Mission of Hope (India) Society, Calcutta."}}, {"text": "S.K. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 30862, "end_char": 30872, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.K. Mehta ."}}, {"text": "Parijot Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 30935, "end_char": 30948, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Parijot Sinha for society for International Child Welfare."}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 31070, "end_char": 31078, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBHAGWATI, J. This writ petition has been.", "canonical_name": "BHAGWATI"}}, {"text": "Lax mi Kant Pandey", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31164, "end_char": 31182, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "initiated on the basis of a letter addressed by one Lax mi Kant Pandey, an advocate practising in this Court, complaining of mat-practices indulged in by social organisations and voluntary agencies engaged in the work of offering Indian children in adoption to foreign parents."}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 32496, "end_char": 32510, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This letter was treated as a writ petition and by an Order dated 1st September, 1982 the Court issued notice to the Union of India the Indian Council of Child Welfare and the Indian Council of Social Welfare to appear in answer to the writ petition and assist the Court in laying down principles and norms which should be followed in determin• ing whether a ehild should be allowed to be adopted by foreilin parents and if so, the procedure to be followed for that purpose,\n\nwith the object of ensuring the welfare of the child."}}, {"text": "Indian Council of Social Welfare", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 32914, "end_char": 32946, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Indian Council of Social Welfare was the first to file its written submissions in response to the notice issued by the Clouft\n\nand its written submission ij.led on 30th September, 1982 not only carried considerable useful material bearing on the question of adoption of Indian children by foreign parents but also contained.", "canonical_name": "Indian Council of Social Welfare"}}, {"text": "30th September, 1982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 33078, "end_char": 33098, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Indian Council of Social Welfare was the first to file its written submissions in response to the notice issued by the Clouft\n\nand its written submission ij.led on 30th September, 1982 not only carried considerable useful material bearing on the question of adoption of Indian children by foreign parents but also contained."}}, {"text": "12th October, 1982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 33998, "end_char": 34016, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the writ petition reached hearing before the Court on 12th October, 1982 the only writtn submission filed was that tlt_e Indian Council of Social Welfare and neither the Union of India nor the Indian Council of Child Welfare had made any response to the notice issued by the Court."}}, {"text": "Barnen Framfoer Allt Adoptioner", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 34296, "end_char": 34327, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But there was a telegram received from a Swedish Organisation called 'Barnen Framfoer Allt Adoptioner\" intimating to the Court that this Organisation desired to participate in the hearing of the writ petition and to present proper material before the Court."}}, {"text": "Children's Villages of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 34492, "end_char": 34520, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S .O.S, Children's Villages of India also appeared through their counsel Mrs. Urmila Kapoor and applied for being allowed to intervene at the hearing of the writ petition so that they could made their submissions on the question of adoption of Indian Children by foreign parents."}}, {"text": "Urmila Kapoor", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 34562, "end_char": 34575, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S .O.S, Children's Villages of India also appeared through their counsel Mrs. Urmila Kapoor and applied for being allowed to intervene at the hearing of the writ petition so that they could made their submissions on the question of adoption of Indian Children by foreign parents.", "canonical_name": "Urmila Kapoor"}}, {"text": "S.O.S. Children's Villages of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 34771, "end_char": 34806, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since S.O.S. Children's Villages of India is admittedly an organisation concerned with welfare of children, the Court, by an Order dated 12th October, 1982, allowed them tq intervene and to ma!<e\n\n' ·.~\n\nC.l\n\n."}}, {"text": "Barnen Framfoer Allt Adoptioner", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 35158, "end_char": 35189, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Court also by the same Order directed that the Registry may address a communication to Barnen Framfoer Allt Adoptioner informing them about the ad journed date of hearing of the writ petition and stating that if they'\n\nwished to present any material and make their submissions, they."}}, {"text": "Indian Council oi'\n\nChild Welfare", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 36014, "end_char": 36047, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Court also issued a similar direction to the Indian Council oi'\n\nChild Welfare, Indian Council of Social Welfare and S.O.S.\n\nChildren's Villages of India."}}, {"text": "16th December, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 37820, "end_char": 37839, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L.K. PANDEY v. ENION (Bhagwati, J.) 807\n\nSabha eight years later on 16th December, 1980, contained an ex A press provision that it shai( not be applicable to Muslims."}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 38295, "end_char": 38313, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "•3' B principles and norms the Central Government regarded as neceSliary to be observed for securing the welfare of children sought to be given in adoption to foreign parents and what procedural safeguards the Central Governmentthought, were essential for securing this end."}}, {"text": "Central Governmentthought", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 38474, "end_char": 38499, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "•3' B principles and norms the Central Government regarded as neceSliary to be observed for securing the welfare of children sought to be given in adoption to foreign parents and what procedural safeguards the Central Governmentthought, were essential for securing this end."}}, {"text": "section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38800, "end_char": 38810, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40898, "end_char": 40907, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41006, "end_char": 41015, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41221, "end_char": 41230, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41616, "end_char": 41624, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 42374, "end_char": 42382, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PANDEY v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) ' 809\n\nprovisional adoption order is made by the District Court ou the application of a per son domiciled abroad, such persou would be entitled to obtain the care and custody of the child in respect of which the order is made and to remove such child for the purpose of adopting it under the law or within the.", "canonical_name": "BHAGWATI"}}, {"text": "9th D November, 1982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 43552, "end_char": 43572, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Writ Petition thereafter came up for hearing on 9th D November, 1982 when several applications were made by various <I institutions and organisations for intervention at the hearing of the writ petition."}}, {"text": "9th November, 1982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 43933, "end_char": 43951, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "might come and accordingly, by an order dated 9th November, 1982, the Court granted permission to eight specified institutions or organisations to file affidavits or statements placing relevant material before the Court in regard to the question of adoption of Indian children by foreign parents and directed that such affidavits or statements should be filed on or before 27th November, 1982."}}, {"text": "27th November, 1982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 44260, "end_char": 44279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "might come and accordingly, by an order dated 9th November, 1982, the Court granted permission to eight specified institutions or organisations to file affidavits or statements placing relevant material before the Court in regard to the question of adoption of Indian children by foreign parents and directed that such affidavits or statements should be filed on or before 27th November, 1982."}}, {"text": "State of West Bengal", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 44340, "end_char": 44360, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "issued\n\nnotice of the writ petition to the State of West Bengal directing it to file its affidavit or statement on or before the same date."}}, {"text": "1st October,\n\n1982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 44762, "end_char": 44780, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "entrusting care and custody of Indian children to foreign parents during the period of five years immediately prior to 1st October,\n\n1982."}}, {"text": "SOS Children's Villages of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 45611, "end_char": 45643, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pursuant to these directions given by the Court, various affidavits and statements were filed on behalf of the Indian Council of Social Welfare, Enfants Du Monde, Missionaries of Charity, En fants De L's Espoir, Indian Association for promotion of Adoption Kuan-yin Charitable Trust, Terre Des Homes (India) Society; Maharashtra- State Women's Council, Legal Aid Services West Bengal, SOS Children's Villages of India, Bhavishya International Union."}}, {"text": "Bhavishya International Union", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 45645, "end_char": 45674, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pursuant to these directions given by the Court, various affidavits and statements were filed on behalf of the Indian Council of Social Welfare, Enfants Du Monde, Missionaries of Charity, En fants De L's Espoir, Indian Association for promotion of Adoption Kuan-yin Charitable Trust, Terre Des Homes (India) Society; Maharashtra- State Women's Council, Legal Aid Services West Bengal, SOS Children's Villages of India, Bhavishya International Union."}}, {"text": "Milton", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 47041, "end_char": 47047, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The great poet Milton , put it admirably when he said : \"Child _shows the man a~ F morning shows the .day\" and the Study ."}}, {"text": "Article 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48621, "end_char": 48631, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48706, "end_char": 48716, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48890, "end_char": 48900, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "National Children's Board", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 51144, "end_char": 51169, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is also provision made in the National Policy for const_itution B of a Natioual Children's Board and pursuant to this provision, the Government of India has Constituted the National Children's Board with the Prime Minister as the chair person."}}, {"text": "United Nations", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 52002, "end_char": 52016, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D There bas been equally great concern for the welfare of children at the international level culminating in the Declaration of the Rights of the Child adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 20th November, 1959."}}, {"text": "20th November, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 52020, "end_char": 52039, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D There bas been equally great concern for the welfare of children at the international level culminating in the Declaration of the Rights of the Child adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 20th November, 1959."}}, {"text": "iJhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 53062, "end_char": 53071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lit, p ANDBY v. UNION (iJhagwati, J.) ill~\n\nstanding.", "canonical_name": "iJhagwati"}}, {"text": "Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 55343, "end_char": 55383, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "UPREME COURT REPORTS [1984]", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 55524, "end_char": 55551, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Adoption of Children Bill 1972 sought to provide for a uniform law of adoption applicable to all communities includ-\n\nA f \n\nF '''\n\n: UPREME COURT REPORTS [1984] !"}}, {"text": "Paul Harrison", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 56884, "end_char": 56897, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Paul Harrison a free-lance journalist working for several U.N. Agencies including the International Year of the Child Secretariat points out that most third world children suffer \"because of their colintry's Jack of resources fo' development as well as pronounced inequalitie' in the way available resources are distributed\" and they face a situation of absolute material deprivation."}}, {"text": "U.N.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 56942, "end_char": 56946, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Paul Harrison a free-lance journalist working for several U.N. Agencies including the International Year of the Child Secretariat points out that most third world children suffer \"because of their colintry's Jack of resources fo' development as well as pronounced inequalitie' in the way available resources are distributed\" and they face a situation of absolute material deprivation."}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 59575, "end_char": 59581, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Regional Conference of Asia aud Western Pacific held in Bombay in 1981 and approved .at the Workshop on Inter Country Adoption held in Brighton, U.K. on 4th September, 1982, recognise the validity of this principle in clause 3.1 which provides: \"Before'any plans are considered for a child to be adopted by a foreigner, the appropriate authority or agency shall consider all alternatives for permanent family care within tbe child's own country\"."}}, {"text": "Brighton", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 59654, "end_char": 59662, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Regional Conference of Asia aud Western Pacific held in Bombay in 1981 and approved .at the Workshop on Inter Country Adoption held in Brighton, U.K. on 4th September, 1982, recognise the validity of this principle in clause 3.1 which provides: \"Before'any plans are considered for a child to be adopted by a foreigner, the appropriate authority or agency shall consider all alternatives for permanent family care within tbe child's own country\"."}}, {"text": "U.K.", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 59664, "end_char": 59668, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Regional Conference of Asia aud Western Pacific held in Bombay in 1981 and approved .at the Workshop on Inter Country Adoption held in Brighton, U.K. on 4th September, 1982, recognise the validity of this principle in clause 3.1 which provides: \"Before'any plans are considered for a child to be adopted by a foreigner, the appropriate authority or agency shall consider all alternatives for permanent family care within tbe child's own country\"."}}, {"text": "4th September, 1982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 59672, "end_char": 59691, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Regional Conference of Asia aud Western Pacific held in Bombay in 1981 and approved .at the Workshop on Inter Country Adoption held in Brighton, U.K. on 4th September, 1982, recognise the validity of this principle in clause 3.1 which provides: \"Before'any plans are considered for a child to be adopted by a foreigner, the appropriate authority or agency shall consider all alternatives for permanent family care within tbe child's own country\"."}}, {"text": "clause 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59737, "end_char": 59745, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "B. Sennapati", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 60271, "end_char": 60283, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government of India also in the affidavit filed on its behalf by Miss B. Sennapati Programme Officer in ."}}, {"text": "u.", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 60484, "end_char": 60486, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Ministry of Social Welfare seems to approve of inter-country adoption for Indian children and 1\n\nthe proceedings of the Workshop on Inter Country Adoption held in Brighton, u.K. on 4th September, 1982 clearly show that the Joint ."}}, {"text": "K.", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 60486, "end_char": 60488, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Ministry of Social Welfare seems to approve of inter-country adoption for Indian children and 1\n\nthe proceedings of the Workshop on Inter Country Adoption held in Brighton, u.K. on 4th September, 1982 clearly show that the Joint ."}}, {"text": "Economic and Social Council", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 61562, "end_char": 61589, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Economic and Social Council as also the Commission for Social Development have therefore tried to evolve social and legal prihci plcs foF the protection and welfare of children given in inter-country adoption, The Economic and Social Council by its Resolution 1925 LVIII requested the Secretary General of the United Nations to convene a group of Experts with relevant experts with relevant experience of family and child welfare with the following mandate :\n\n\"(a) To prepare a draft decleration of social and legal princip_les relating to adoption and foster placement of children nationally and internationally, and to review and appraise the recommendations and guidelines incorporated in the report of the Secretary General and the rele vant material submitted by Governments already available to the Secretary General and the regional commissions."}}, {"text": "Geneva", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 62726, "end_char": 62732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pursuant to this mandate an expert Group meeting was convened in Geneva in December, 1978 and this Expert Group adopted a \"Draft declaration on social and legal principles relating to the protection and welfare of children with special reference of foster placemnt and adoption, nationally and internationally\"."}}, {"text": "Art. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63693, "end_char": 63699, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "International Council on Social Welfare in Bombay", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 66424, "end_char": 66473, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter at the Regional Conference of Asia and Western Pacific held by the International Council on Social Welfare in Bombay in i9ll, draft guidelines of procedure concerning inter-country adop- tion were formulated and, as pointed out above, they were approved at the Workshop held in Brighton, U.K. on 4th September, 1982."}}, {"text": "Nationality", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 76811, "end_char": 76822, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nationality;\n\nWhen the legal adoption is concluded, the child shall be granted app<opriate citizenship."}}, {"text": "Wards Act 1890", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 77864, "end_char": 77878, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 78055, "end_char": 78064, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Wards Act 1890", "statute": "Wards Act 1890"}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 78380, "end_char": 78389, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Wards Act 1890", "statute": "Wards Act 1890"}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 78436, "end_char": 78463, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 78552, "end_char": 78561, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Wards Act 1890", "statute": "Wards Act 1890"}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 78850, "end_char": 78859, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Wards Act 1890", "statute": "Wards Act 1890"}}, {"text": "Section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 80104, "end_char": 80114, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 80721, "end_char": 80731, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "These are the relevant provisions of the Guardians and Wards Act 1890", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 81111, "end_char": 81180, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Maharashtra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 81996, "end_char": 82007, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since most of the applications by foreign parents wishing to take a child in adoption in the State of Maharashtra are made on the original side of the High Court of . ."}}, {"text": "High Court of . . Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 82045, "end_char": 82069, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since most of the applications by foreign parents wishing to take a child in adoption in the State of Maharashtra are made on the original side of the High Court of . ."}}, {"text": "Chapter XX of the Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 82162, "end_char": 82185, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "High-Court of Bombay (Original Side) 1957", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 82193, "end_char": 82234, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "0th May 1972 incorporating Rule 361-.B in Chapter XX of the Rules of the High-Court of Bombay (Original Side) 1957 an this newly added Rule provides inter a/ia as follows :\n\nWhen a foreigner makes an application for being appointed as the guard1an of the person or property of a minor, the Prothonotary and Senior Master shall .address a letter to the Secretary of the Indian Council of Social Welfare, informing him of the presentation of the application and the date fixed for the hearing thereof-he shall also inform him that any representation which the Indian Council of Social Welfare may make in the matter would be considered by the Court before passing the order on the application."}}, {"text": "High Court of Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 82977, "end_char": 82996, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court of Delhi."}}, {"text": "Guardians and Wards Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 83349, "end_char": 83372, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 83832, "end_char": 83842, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Guardians and Wards Act, 1890", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 83844, "end_char": 83873, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Indian Council of child Welfare", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 83929, "end_char": 83960, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PANDEY v. ENION (Bhagwati, J.) 827\n\nphotographs of the minor, duly attested by the person having custody of the minor at the time ; ·\n\n(ii) If the court is satisfied that there is no ground for proceedings on the application, it shall fix a day for the hearing there of and cause notice of the application and of the date fixed for the hearing on the person and in the manner mentioned in Section 11, Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 as also to the general public and the Secretary of the Indian Council of child Welfare and consider their representation ;\n\n(iii) Every person appointed guardian of the person of a minor shall execute a bond with or without .a surety or sureties as the court may think fit to direct and in such sum as the court may fix, having regard to the welfare of the minor and to ensure his production in the court if and when so required by the court ;\n\n(iv) On the court making an order for the appointment of a foreigner guardian of the person of an Indian minor, a copy of the minor's photograph shall be counter-signed by the Court and issued to the guardian or joint guardian, as the case may be, appointed by the court alongwitb the certificate or\n\nguardianship.\""}}, {"text": "High Court of Gujarat", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 84640, "end_char": 84661, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court of Gujarat has not fra1ned any specific rule for this purpose like the High Courts of Bombay and Delhi but 'in a judgment delivered in 1 ~32 in the case of Rasiklal Chaganlal Mehta,(') the High Court of Gujarat bas maqe the following obser vations:\n\n\"In order that the Courts cari satisfactorily decide an intercou11try adoption case against the aforesaid back ground and in the light of the above referred gµidelincs, we consider it necossary to gi1'e certain direction>."}}, {"text": "High Courts of Bombay and Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 84722, "end_char": 84753, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court of Gujarat has not fra1ned any specific rule for this purpose like the High Courts of Bombay and Delhi but 'in a judgment delivered in 1 ~32 in the case of Rasiklal Chaganlal Mehta,(') the High Court of Gujarat bas maqe the following obser vations:\n\n\"In order that the Courts cari satisfactorily decide an intercou11try adoption case against the aforesaid back ground and in the light of the above referred gµidelincs, we consider it necossary to gi1'e certain direction>."}}, {"text": "Rasiklal Chaganlal Mehta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 84807, "end_char": 84831, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court of Gujarat has not fra1ned any specific rule for this purpose like the High Courts of Bombay and Delhi but 'in a judgment delivered in 1 ~32 in the case of Rasiklal Chaganlal Mehta,(') the High Court of Gujarat bas maqe the following obser vations:\n\n\"In order that the Courts cari satisfactorily decide an intercou11try adoption case against the aforesaid back ground and in the light of the above referred gµidelincs, we consider it necossary to gi1'e certain direction>."}}, {"text": "Couri", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 85147, "end_char": 85152, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In ali such cases, the Couri should issue notice to the Indian Council of Social Welfare (175, Dadabbai Naroji Road, Bombay\n\n(I) AIR 1982 Guj."}}, {"text": "Indian Counc.l of Social Welfare", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 85365, "end_char": 85397, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If the Indian Counc.l of Social Welfare so desires it should be made a party to the proceedings.", "canonical_name": "Indian Council of Social Welfare"}}, {"text": "Indian Councilof Social\n\nWlfare", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 85462, "end_char": 85493, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If the Indian Councilof Social\n\nWlfare does not ap.pear, or if it is unable, for some reason, to render assistance, the Court should issue notice to an independent, reputed and publicly/o!ficially recognised social welfare agency working in."}}, {"text": "Indian Council for Child Welfare", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 85853, "end_char": 85885, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The object of giving notice to the Indian .Council of Social\n\nWelfare or the Indian Council for Child Welfare or any other independent, reputed and publicly or officially recognised social welfare agency is obviously to ensure that the application of foreign\n\nparents for guardianship of the child with a view to its eventual adoption is properly and carefully scrutinised and evaluated by an expert body .having experience in the area of child welfare with a view to assisting the Court in coming to the conclusion whether it will be in the.", "canonical_name": "Indian Council of Social Welfare"}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 87544, "end_char": 87549, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We shall discuss this matter a little more in detail when we proceed to consider what p_rinciples and norms should be laid down for inter-country adoption, but, in the meanwhile, proceeding further with the narration of the procedure followed by the courts in Bombay, Delhi and Gujarat, we may point out that when notice is issued by the court, the Indian Council of Social Welfare or the Indian Council for Child Welfare or any other recognised social welfare agency to which notice is issued, prepares what may conveniently be described as a child study report and submits it to the Court for its consideration."}}, {"text": "Gujarat", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 87554, "end_char": 87561, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We shall discuss this matter a little more in detail when we proceed to consider what p_rinciples and norms should be laid down for inter-country adoption, but, in the meanwhile, proceeding further with the narration of the procedure followed by the courts in Bombay, Delhi and Gujarat, we may point out that when notice is issued by the court, the Indian Council of Social Welfare or the Indian Council for Child Welfare or any other recognised social welfare agency to which notice is issued, prepares what may conveniently be described as a child study report and submits it to the Court for its consideration."}}, {"text": "Indian Council of Social Welfre", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 88345, "end_char": 88376, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Indian Council of Social Welfre has evolved a standardised form of the child study report and it has been annexed as Ex. '", "canonical_name": "Indian Council of Social Welfare"}}, {"text": "SUPRBMB COURT", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 91015, "end_char": 91028, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPRBMB COURT RBPORTS\n\n(1984] 2 S C.R.\n\n' The foreign parent then takes the child to his own country either personally or through an escort and the child is then adopted by the foreign parent according to the law of his country and on such adoption, the child acquires the same status as a natural born child with the same rights of inheritance and succession as also the same nationality as the foreign parent adopting it."}}, {"text": "Guardians and Wards Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 92851, "end_char": 92874, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Swedish Embassy", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 104714, "end_char": 104729, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We may point out that the Swedish Embassy has in Annexure II to the affidavit filed on its behalf by Ulf Waltre, given names of seven Swedish organisatiqns or agencies which are authorised by the\n\nG National Board for Inter-Country Adoption functioning under the Swedish Ministry of Social Affairs to \"mediate\" applications for adoption by Swedish nationals and the Indian Council of Social Welfare hasalso in the reply filed by it in answer to the writ 'peti; tion given a list of government recognised organisatios or agencies dealing in inter-country adoption in foreign countries."}}, {"text": "Ulf Waltre", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 104789, "end_char": 104799, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We may point out that the Swedish Embassy has in Annexure II to the affidavit filed on its behalf by Ulf Waltre, given names of seven Swedish organisatiqns or agencies which are authorised by the\n\nG National Board for Inter-Country Adoption functioning under the Swedish Ministry of Social Affairs to \"mediate\" applications for adoption by Swedish nationals and the Indian Council of Social Welfare hasalso in the reply filed by it in answer to the writ 'peti; tion given a list of government recognised organisatios or agencies dealing in inter-country adoption in foreign countries."}}, {"text": "Gevernment of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 105321, "end_char": 105340, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It should not ft therefore be difficult for the Gevernment of India to prepare a list\n\nL.K. PANDEY v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 835 ' of social or child welfare agencies licensed or recognised for intercountry adoption by the Government in various foreign countries."}}, {"text": "Tndian Council for Child Welfare", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 111935, "end_char": 111967, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Indian Council of Social Welfare and the Tndian Council for Child Welfare are clearly two social or child welfare agencies operating at the national level and recognised by the Government of India, as appears clearly from theJetter dated 23rd August, 1980 addressed by the Deputy Secretary to the Government of India to the Secretary, Government of Kerela, Law Department, Annexure 'F' to the submissions filed by the Indian Council for Child Welfare in response to the writ petition."}}, {"text": "23rd August, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 112132, "end_char": 112149, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Indian Council of Social Welfare and the Tndian Council for Child Welfare are clearly two social or child welfare agencies operating at the national level and recognised by the Government of India, as appears clearly from theJetter dated 23rd August, 1980 addressed by the Deputy Secretary to the Government of India to the Secretary, Government of Kerela, Law Department, Annexure 'F' to the submissions filed by the Indian Council for Child Welfare in response to the writ petition."}}, {"text": "Government of Kerela", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 112229, "end_char": 112249, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Indian Council of Social Welfare and the Tndian Council for Child Welfare are clearly two social or child welfare agencies operating at the national level and recognised by the Government of India, as appears clearly from theJetter dated 23rd August, 1980 addressed by the Deputy Secretary to the Government of India to the Secretary, Government of Kerela, Law Department, Annexure 'F' to the submissions filed by the Indian Council for Child Welfare in response to the writ petition."}}, {"text": "Government of a State", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 112771, "end_char": 112792, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But apart from these two recognised social or child welfare agencies functioning at the national level, there are other social or child welfare agencies engaged in child care and welfare and if , they have good standing and reputation and are doing commendable work in the area of child care and welfare, there is no reason why they should not be recognised by the Government of India or the Government of a State for the purpose of inter-country adoptions."}}, {"text": "government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 117554, "end_char": 117573, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(7) Social worker's assessment and reasons for suggest\n\ning inter country adoption;\"\n\nThe government of India should, with the assistance ."}}, {"text": "Government of the States", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 117611, "end_char": 117635, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Of the Government of the States, prepare a list of recognised social or child welfare agencies with their names, addresses and other particulars and send such list to the appropriate department of the Goverihhent of each foreign country where Ihdian children are ordinarily taken in adoption so that the social dr child welfare agencies licensed ot recognised by the Government of such foreign country for °inter country adoptions, would know which social or child welfare agency in India they should approach for processing an application of its national for taking an Indian child in adoption."}}, {"text": "Central Adoption Resource Agency", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 118604, "end_char": 118636, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Of course, it would be desirable if a Central Adoption Resource Agency is set up by the Government of India with regiO-· nal .branches at a few centres which are active in intercoiintty\n\n."}}, {"text": "Central Adoption Resource Agency", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 118813, "end_char": 118845, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Such Central Adoption Resource Agency can act as a clearing house of information in regard to children available for inter-country adoption and all applications by foreigners for taking Indian children in adoption can then be forwarded by the social or child welfare agency in the foreign country to such Central Adoption Resource Agency and the latter can in its turn forward them to one or the other of the recognised social or child welfare agencies in the country."}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1984] 2 s.c.tl", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 124512, "end_char": 124549, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "through a recognised social or child welfare agency and the necessary steps for the purpose of securing appointment of the foreigner as guardian of the child have also to be ttken on\\y through a reognised social or child welfare agency, the possibility of any so called social or child welfare agency .or individual trafficking in children by\n\ndemanding exhorbitant amounts from prospective adoptive parents under the guise of maintenance charges and medical expenses or\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1984] 2 s.c.tl..\n\notherwise, would be almost eliminated."}}, {"text": "Lentin", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 129189, "end_char": 129195, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This question was debated 'before us in view of the judgment given by Justice Lentin of the Bombay High Court on 22nd July, 1982 in Miscellaneous Petition No."}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 129203, "end_char": 129220, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This question was debated 'before us in view of the judgment given by Justice Lentin of the Bombay High Court on 22nd July, 1982 in Miscellaneous Petition No."}}, {"text": "22nd July, 1982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 129224, "end_char": 129239, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This question was debated 'before us in view of the judgment given by Justice Lentin of the Bombay High Court on 22nd July, 1982 in Miscellaneous Petition No."}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPoRts [1984] 2 s.c.tt", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 130166, "end_char": 130203, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COURT REPoRts [1984] 2 s.c.tt ."}}, {"text": "iJhagwali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 133095, "end_char": 133104, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PANDEY v. tJNION <iJhagwali, J.)\n\nbeen brought up as siblings should not be separated except for special reasons and as soon as a decision to give a child in adoption to a foreigner is finalised, the recognised social or child welfare agency must if the child has reached the age of understanding, take steps to ensure that the child is given proper orientation and is prepared for going to its new home in a new country so that the assimilation of the child to the new environment is facilitated.", "canonical_name": "iJhagwati"}}, {"text": "S46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 135708, "end_char": 135711, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section ll of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 135876, "end_char": 135923, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "clause 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 139561, "end_char": 139570, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ministry of Social Welfare of the Government of the State", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 141231, "end_char": 141288, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When an order appointing guardian of a child is made by the court, immediate intimation of the same shall be given to the Ministry of Social Welfare, Government of India as also to the Ministry of Social Welfare of the Government of the State in which the court is situate and copies of such order shall also be forwarded to the two respective ministries of Social Welfare."}}, {"text": "Ministry of Social Welfare of the Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 146059, "end_char": 146112, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Copies of this 'order shall be sent immediately to the Ministry of Social Welfare of the Government of India and the Ministry of Social Welfare of each of the State Governments as also to all the High Courts in the country and to the Indian Council of Social Welfare and the Indian Council of Child Welfare."}}, {"text": "Norway", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 146423, "end_char": 146429, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We would direct F that copies of this Order shall also be supplied to the Embassies and Diplomatic Missions of Norway, Sweden, France, Federal Republic of Germany and the United States of America and the High Commissions of Canada and Australia for their informations si, nce the statistics show that these are the countries where Indian children are taken in adoption."}}, {"text": "Sweden", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 146431, "end_char": 146437, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We would direct F that copies of this Order shall also be supplied to the Embassies and Diplomatic Missions of Norway, Sweden, France, Federal Republic of Germany and the United States of America and the High Commissions of Canada and Australia for their informations si, nce the statistics show that these are the countries where Indian children are taken in adoption."}}, {"text": "France", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 146439, "end_char": 146445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We would direct F that copies of this Order shall also be supplied to the Embassies and Diplomatic Missions of Norway, Sweden, France, Federal Republic of Germany and the United States of America and the High Commissions of Canada and Australia for their informations si, nce the statistics show that these are the countries where Indian children are taken in adoption."}}, {"text": "Federal Republic of Germany", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 146447, "end_char": 146474, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We would direct F that copies of this Order shall also be supplied to the Embassies and Diplomatic Missions of Norway, Sweden, France, Federal Republic of Germany and the United States of America and the High Commissions of Canada and Australia for their informations si, nce the statistics show that these are the countries where Indian children are taken in adoption."}}, {"text": "United States of America", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 146483, "end_char": 146507, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We would direct F that copies of this Order shall also be supplied to the Embassies and Diplomatic Missions of Norway, Sweden, France, Federal Republic of Germany and the United States of America and the High Commissions of Canada and Australia for their informations si, nce the statistics show that these are the countries where Indian children are taken in adoption."}}, {"text": "High Commissions of Canada and Australia", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 146516, "end_char": 146556, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We would direct F that copies of this Order shall also be supplied to the Embassies and Diplomatic Missions of Norway, Sweden, France, Federal Republic of Germany and the United States of America and the High Commissions of Canada and Australia for their informations si, nce the statistics show that these are the countries where Indian children are taken in adoption."}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_2_853_857_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "SHIV DAYAL SHRIVASTAVA\n\nUNION OF INDIA\n\nFebruary 7, 1984\n\n[S. MURTAZA FAz, L ALI, A. VARADARAJAN AND\n\nRANOANATH MISRA, JJ.]\n\nHigh Court Judges (Conditions of Service) Act, J9S4-S•. 5 (3) and 9 (I) read with Rule 20B of All India Services (Leave) Rules J9SS-Interpretatlon of.\n\nFor calculating cash 'equivalent of leave salary admissible to a Judge under Rule 208, Ss. 5 (3) and 9 (1) of the Act would not apply.\n\nIn Union of lndid v. Gurnam Singh [1982] 3 S.C.R. 7c0, this. Court decided that under the High Court Judges (Conditions of Service) Act, 1954 Judges were entitled to cash equivalent of leave salary in respect of the period or earned leave at their credit on the date of retirement' as provided under rule ZOB of the AlJ India Service (Leave) Rules, 1955. The two question which arose for consideration in this pe!ilion under Art. 32 filed by a retired Chief Justice of Madhya Pradesh High Court were (I) whether in view oftbe provisions of s. 5(3) of tho Act, the limit has to be confined to five months equal to 150 days and not 180 days as in Rule 20B ; and (2) whether for calculating the equivalent of leave salary admissible to a Judge the provisions of s. 9 (I) of the Act would apply? . .\n\nAllowing the petition and answering the questioris in he negative.\n\nHBLD : Tho ratio of Gurnam Slngh's case has not been disputed.\n\nIt would necessarily mean acceptance of the position that the Act did not make provision for payment of the retirement beriefit contemplated under rule 20B ; otherwise rule 20B could not have been applied. For calculating the benefits under rule 20B, s. S (3) of the A<\"t is not not relevant and in case in the leave account maintained nder s. 4 of the Act leave is due1 the benefit under rule 20B has to be worked out subject to the upper limit of 180 days, equal to six months [857 B-C]\n\n Once it is held that the benefit under rule 20B is not controtied by Chapter II of the Act, the, manner of calculatipn indicated in s. 9 (I) of the Act would also not apply. [857 ll]\n\nTho pric!ples governing the cash equivalent of leave would apply not\n\nony to the petitioner but also to Judges who have already retired or who may retue hereafter, from the date from which this -facility was made aVaitable to the members of the Central Services holding therank of Secretary to the\n\nGovornmnt of India or its equivalent. [857 E-G)\n\n, c\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984] 2 s.c.R.\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition No. 8991 of 1983.\n\n(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.)\n\nPetitioner in person alongwith Mukul mudgal\n\nK. Parasraµ, Attorney General, K.G. Bhagat Addi. Solicitor General, R.N. Poddar for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment Of the Court was delivered by\n\nRANGANATH MISRA, J.\n\nShri Shiv Dayal Shrivastava, the petitioner before us in this application under Article 32 of the Constitution praying for a writ of mandamus to the Union of India, retired as Chief Justice of the Madhya Pradesh High Court with effect from February 28, 1978.\n\nAt the time of retirement he was drawing salary of Rs. 4,000 per month as provided under Constitution. This Court in the case of Union of India v. Gurnam Singh('> decided that under the High Court Judges (Conditions of Service)\n\n' Act; 1954 ('Act' for short), Judges were entitled to cash equivalent of leave salary in respect of the period of earned leave at their credit on the date of retirement as provided in Rule 20B of the All India Services (Leave) Rules, 1955 ('Leave Rules' for short). The Accountant General of Madhya Pradesh authorised-the petitioner to draw cash equivalent of leave salary amounting to Rs. 15,240 by his communication dated July 17, 1982. The peti_tioner informed the Accountant General that he was drawing the amount as indicated in the communication without prejudice to his . right to claim ]ls: 24,000 to which sum under the law he was entitled.\n\nOn July 19, 1982, the petitioner was authorised to draw a further sum of Rs. 750 thus in all Rs. 15;990 only. On February 2, 1983, the Union of India in the Ministry of Law, Justice & Company Affairs indicated to the several authorities including the Registrars of all the High Courts that while in view of the decision of this Court referred to above, the Central Government were advised that Judges of the High Courts were entitled to payment of cash equivalent of leave salary in respect of the period of earned leave at their credit,\n\nthe expression 'earned leave' does not occur in the Act. On the analogy of the Leave Rules the cash equivalent of leave salary to be paid would be the cash equivalent of the unutilised leave due on\n\na · Ol [19821 3 s.e-R. 'oo,\n\n~-·-\n\nfull allowances as defined in ss. 3 and 9 (I) of the Act. In making calculations of the cash equivalent of the leave salary the ceiling of five months mentioned in s. 5. (3) of the Act would be applicable.\n\nRelving on the aforesaid letter of the Central Government, the Accountant General of Madhya Pradesh on March 25, 1983, mtimated the. petitioner that he \\Vas entitled to payment of cash equivalent of unutilised earned leave subject to the celling of five months; leave and, therefore, he had been paid an excess sum of Rs:' 2,220\n\nw!iich should be refunded. That has led the petitioner to move this Court.\n\nRule nisi was issued to the Union of India and this Court\n\ndirected separate notice to the Attorney-General. A return .bas\n\nC been made to the rule by the Union of India. No dispute has been raiseg to payability of the cash equivalent on the basis of Rule 20B of the Leave Rules. Reliance has been placed.on the provisions of the Act to justify the circular letter of February 18, 1983. Learned Attorney-Gerieral has been heard and he has furnished written submissions also.\n\nThe decision of this Court in Gurnam Singh's case has been\n\n-~ accepted by the Union of India and steps have been taken to implement the same. In that case this Court held :\n\n\" ... it must be regarded as a provision absorbed by rule 2 of the High Court Judges Rules, 1956, into !lie statutory structure defining the conditions of service of a Judge of a High Court. We may observe that even as a right to receive pension, although accruing on retirement, js a condition of service, so also the right to the payment of the cash equivalent of leave salary for the period of unutilised leave accruing on the date of retirement must be considered as a condttion of service\" ..\n\nTwo questions require decision, viz., (I) whether in view of\n\nthe provisions of s. 5 (3) of the Act, the limit has to be confined to.\n\nG five months equal to 150 days and not 180 days as in Rule 20B; ahd\n\n(2) whether for calculating the equivalent of leave salary admissible to a Judge the provision.s of s. 9 (I) of the Act would apply?\n\nWe may now refer to rule 20B of the Leave Rules as also to the two provisions of the Act : ff\n\nSUPREME COURT REPOFTS\n\n(1984] 2 S.C.R\n\n\"20B-Payment of cash equivalent of leave salary-The Government shall suo motu sanction to a member of the service who retires from the service under subrule (1) of rule 16 of the All India Services (DeathcumRetirement Benefits) Rules, 1958, having attained the age of 58 years on or after the 30th September, 1977 the cash equivalent of leave salary in respect of the period of earned leave at his credit on the date ef his retirement subject to a maximum of 180 days.\"\n\nSection 5 (3) of the Act reads :\n\nC \"5 (3). Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) of s. SA, the maximum period of leave which may be granted at one time shall be, in the case of leave'on fulllallowances, five months and in the case of leave with allowances of any kind, sixteen nionths.\"\n\nD Section 9 (1) provides :\n\n\"9 (1). The monthly rate of leave allowances payable to a Judge while on leave on full allowances shall be for the first forty five days of such leave, a rate equal to the monthly rate of his salary, and thereafter two thousand two hundred and twenty rupees.\n\nProvided that where leave on full allowances is granted to a Judge on medical certificate the monthly rate of leave allowances shall, for the first one hundred and twenty days, of such leave, be a rate equal to the monthly rate of his salary.\"\n\nChapter II of the Act deals with leave. Section 3 pro_vides the kinds of leave admissible to a Judge. . Section 4 makes provision for a leave account to be maintained. Section 5 deals with aggregate amount of leave which may be granted; Section SA makes provision for commutation of leave on half allowances into leave on full allowances while sections 6, 7 and 8 deal with grant of leave of specific kinds. . These provisions in the Act deal with leave which has to be asked for and taken during the tenure of working as a Judge. Leave necassarily implies authorised absence from duty or employment (see Webster's Third New International Dictionary).\n\nRule 20B makes provision for payment of <; ash equiva1ent of leave\n\ndue under the appropriate provisions but subject to a maximum of 180 days. We have already indicated that the ratio of Gurnam Singh's case has not been disputed. It would necessarily mean acceptance of the position that the Act did not make provision for payment of the retirement benefit contemplated. under rule 20B;\n\notherwise rule 20B could not have been applied. The scheme in rule 20B is that the payment would be made suo motu and without any application for it.\n\nLeave referred to under the AC! is one which has to be asked for and is i.ntended to meet a different situation.\n\nFor calculating the benefits under rule 20B, s. 5 (3) of the Act is not relevant and in case. in the leave account maintained under s. 4 of Act leave is due, the benefit under rule 20B has to be worked out subject to the upper limit of 180 days, equal to six months.. lfhe claim made by the petitioner that he was entitled to the benefit of six months is, therefore, justified subject, of course, to admissibility of leave to the extent of 180 days in the leave account. No dispute was raised before us that as a fact petitioner had to his credit more than 180 days of leave.\n\nOnce we hold that the benefit under rule 20B is not controlled by Chapter II of the Act, the manner of calculation indicated in s. 9 (1) of the Act would also apply. The petitioner would thus become entitled to cash equivalent of six months' salary which would work out at Rs. 24,000. As he has been paid a sum of Rs. 15,990 he is entitled to Rs. 8,010. A .writ in the nature. of mandamus be issued to the Union of India to pay him the said amount within one month from today.\n\nParties are left to bear their own costs before us.\n\nWe would like to add that it is manifest that in view of the enunciation of law by us in th's judgment, the principles governing the cash equivalent of leave would apply not only to the petitioner but also to Judg\"s who have already retired or who may 'retire hereafter, from the date from which this facility was made available to the members of the Central Services holding the rank of Secretary to the Government of India or its .equivalent.\n\nH.S.K.\n\nPetition allowed.", "total_entities": 53, "entities": [{"text": "SHIV DAYAL SHRIVASTAVA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 22, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SHIV DAYAL SHRIVASTAVA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "UNION OF INDIA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24, "end_char": 38, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 7, 1984", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 40, "end_char": 56, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SHIV DAYAL SHRIVASTAVA\n\nUNION OF INDIA\n\nFebruary 7, 1984\n\n[S. MURTAZA FAz, L ALI, A. VARADARAJAN AND\n\nRANOANATH MISRA, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "L ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 75, "end_char": 80, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. VARADARAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 82, "end_char": 96, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A. VARADARAJAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RANOANATH MISRA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 102, "end_char": 122, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RANOANATH MISRA, JJ.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "High Court Judges (Conditions of Service) Act, J9S4-S•. 5 (3) and 9 (I) read with Rule 20B", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 125, "end_char": 215, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "High Court Judges (Conditions of Service) Act, J9S4-S•. 5 (3) and 9 (I) read with Rule 20B of All India Services (Leave) Rules J9SS-Interpretatlon of."}}, {"text": "Ss. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 364, "end_char": 369, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1982] 3 S.C.R. 7", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 447, "end_char": 464, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "High Court Judges (Conditions of Service) Act, 1954", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 503, "end_char": 554, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Court decided that under the High Court Judges (Conditions of Service) Act, 1954 Judges were entitled to cash equivalent of leave salary in respect of the period or earned leave at their credit on the date of retirement' as provided under rule ZOB of the AlJ India Service (Leave) Rules, 1955."}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 838, "end_char": 845, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 882, "end_char": 907, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "32 filed by a retired Chief Justice of Madhya Pradesh High Court were (I) whether in view oftbe provisions of s. 5(3) of tho Act, the limit has to be confined to five months equal to 150 days and not 180 days as in Rule 20B ; and (2) whether for calculating the equivalent of leave salary admissible to a Judge the provisions of s. 9 (I) of the Act would apply? . ."}}, {"text": "s. 5(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 953, "end_char": 960, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1172, "end_char": 1176, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gurnam Slngh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1298, "end_char": 1310, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "HBLD : Tho ratio of Gurnam Slngh's case has not been disputed.", "canonical_name": "Gurnam Slngh"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1683, "end_char": 1687, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chapter II of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1902, "end_char": 1923, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1965, "end_char": 1969, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter II of the Act", "statute": "Chapter II of the Act"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2473, "end_char": 2483, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter II of the Act", "statute": "Chapter II of the Act"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2491, "end_char": 2512, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Mukul mudgal\n\nK. Parasraµ", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2547, "end_char": 2572, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Petitioner in person alongwith Mukul mudgal\n\nK. Parasraµ, Attorney General, K.G. Bhagat Addi."}}, {"text": "K.G. Bhagat Addi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2592, "end_char": 2608, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Petitioner in person alongwith Mukul mudgal\n\nK. Parasraµ, Attorney General, K.G. Bhagat Addi."}}, {"text": "R.N. Poddar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2629, "end_char": 2640, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Solicitor General, R.N. Poddar for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "RANGANATH MISRA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2706, "end_char": 2721, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment Of the Court was delivered by\n\nRANGANATH MISRA, J.\n\nShri Shiv Dayal Shrivastava, the petitioner before us in this application under Article 32 of the Constitution praying for a writ of mandamus to the Union of India, retired as Chief Justice of the Madhya Pradesh High Court with effect from February 28, 1978.", "canonical_name": "RANOANATH MISRA, JJ."}}, {"text": "Shiv Dayal Shrivastava", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2732, "end_char": 2754, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment Of the Court was delivered by\n\nRANGANATH MISRA, J.\n\nShri Shiv Dayal Shrivastava, the petitioner before us in this application under Article 32 of the Constitution praying for a writ of mandamus to the Union of India, retired as Chief Justice of the Madhya Pradesh High Court with effect from February 28, 1978.", "canonical_name": "SHIV DAYAL SHRIVASTAVA"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2807, "end_char": 2817, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "High Court Judges (Conditions of Service)\n\n' Act; 1954", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3173, "end_char": 3227, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Court in the case of Union of India v. Gurnam Singh('> decided that under the High Court Judges (Conditions of Service)\n\n' Act; 1954 ('Act' for short), Judges were entitled to cash equivalent of leave salary in respect of the period of earned leave at their credit on the date of retirement as provided in Rule 20B of the All India Services (Leave) Rules, 1955 ('Leave Rules' for short)."}}, {"text": "July 19, 1982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3871, "end_char": 3884, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 19, 1982, the petitioner was authorised to draw a further sum of Rs."}}, {"text": "February 2, 1983", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3981, "end_char": 3997, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On February 2, 1983, the Union of India in the Ministry of Law, Justice & Company Affairs indicated to the several authorities including the Registrars of all the High Courts that while in view of the decision of this Court referred to above, the Central Government were advised that Judges of the High Courts were entitled to payment of cash equivalent of leave salary in respect of the period of earned leave at their credit,\n\nthe expression 'earned leave' does not occur in the Act."}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4003, "end_char": 4017, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On February 2, 1983, the Union of India in the Ministry of Law, Justice & Company Affairs indicated to the several authorities including the Registrars of all the High Courts that while in view of the decision of this Court referred to above, the Central Government were advised that Judges of the High Courts were entitled to payment of cash equivalent of leave salary in respect of the period of earned leave at their credit,\n\nthe expression 'earned leave' does not occur in the Act."}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4225, "end_char": 4243, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On February 2, 1983, the Union of India in the Ministry of Law, Justice & Company Affairs indicated to the several authorities including the Registrars of all the High Courts that while in view of the decision of this Court referred to above, the Central Government were advised that Judges of the High Courts were entitled to payment of cash equivalent of leave salary in respect of the period of earned leave at their credit,\n\nthe expression 'earned leave' does not occur in the Act."}}, {"text": "On the analogy of the Leave Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4464, "end_char": 4497, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 3 and 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4671, "end_char": 4682, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "On the analogy of the Leave Rules", "statute": "On the analogy of the Leave Rules"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4805, "end_char": 4809, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "On the analogy of the Leave Rules", "statute": "On the analogy of the Leave Rules"}}, {"text": "March 25, 1983", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4951, "end_char": 4965, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Relving on the aforesaid letter of the Central Government, the Accountant General of Madhya Pradesh on March 25, 1983, mtimated the."}}, {"text": "February 18, 1983", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5622, "end_char": 5639, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Reliance has been placed.on the provisions of the Act to justify the circular letter of February 18, 1983."}}, {"text": "Gerieral", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 5658, "end_char": 5666, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Learned Attorney-Gerieral has been heard and he has furnished written submissions also."}}, {"text": "Gurnam Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5760, "end_char": 5772, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decision of this Court in Gurnam Singh's case has been\n~ accepted by the Union of India and steps have been taken to implement the same.", "canonical_name": "Gurnam Slngh"}}, {"text": "High Court Judges Rules, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5972, "end_char": 6001, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6484, "end_char": 6488, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the High Court Judges Rules, 1956", "statute": "the High Court Judges Rules, 1956"}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6709, "end_char": 6713, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the High Court Judges Rules, 1956", "statute": "the High Court Judges Rules, 1956"}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7348, "end_char": 7357, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7646, "end_char": 7655, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chapter II of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8177, "end_char": 8198, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8217, "end_char": 8226, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter II of the Act", "statute": "Chapter II of the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8281, "end_char": 8290, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter II of the Act", "statute": "Chapter II of the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8345, "end_char": 8354, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter II of the Act", "statute": "Chapter II of the Act"}}, {"text": "sections 6, 7 and 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8521, "end_char": 8540, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter II of the Act", "statute": "Chapter II of the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9528, "end_char": 9532, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9615, "end_char": 9619, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chapter II of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10126, "end_char": 10147, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10188, "end_char": 10192, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter II of the Act", "statute": "Chapter II of the Act"}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10996, "end_char": 11015, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We would like to add that it is manifest that in view of the enunciation of law by us in th's judgment, the principles governing the cash equivalent of leave would apply not only to the petitioner but also to Judg\"s who have already retired or who may 'retire hereafter, from the date from which this facility was made available to the members of the Central Services holding the rank of Secretary to the Government of India or its .equivalent."}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_2_858_882_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "KHAZAN CHAND ETC.\n\nSTATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR AND OTHERS\n\n[P. N: BHAGWATi AND D. P. MADON, JJ.]\n\n' Constitution of India 1950, Articles )4 and 265.\n\nJainmu and Kashmir General Sales Tax Act 1962 Sectlon 8 (1), (2) and (J)-Wherher valid and constitutional.\n\nTaxing Power of State-What is-Cotnprehends power to provide for\" collectiati of tax and prescribe methods for recovery.\n\n' Jammu and Kashmir General Sales Tax Act 1962-Section 8 Sales Tax' -Payment of-After prescribed perlod-Cha,.ging of interest on sales tax- Whether valid and legal.\n\nSection 8 (2)-tax paid beyond prescribed period-Interest charged at ; I graduated scale-Permissibility of-.Whether vfolatire of Article 14.\n\nSection 8 (.3)-Goods sold on credit basis-Liability to payment of sal<'S E tax by dealer-Whether arises.\n\nThe :; ippeltants and the petitioners were assessees registered as dealers under the Jammu and Kashmir General Sales Tax Act, 1962.\n\nThey filed their quarterly rCturos within the time prescribed by the Act but without paying the tax due according to suh returns.\n\nSome or them also filed revised fturns thereafter.\n\nThe 1ax d1Je was paid by the asscssees after several months and in some cases by instahnents.\n\nIn a few cases. 1hc full amount of tax was not paid even by the date l he assessment orders came to be made.\n\nIn the case of most of the Assessees the Assessing Authority levied penalty under sub-section ( 2) of section 8 of the Act before making any asessment. lo other cases, orders requiring interest to be paid were made along with the assessment orders.\n\nThe assessees who Were appellants in this_ Court, bad filed writ Petitions in the High Court challenging the validity of section 8 of the Act under which interest was sought to be recovered aS also the demand for payment of interest.\n\nThe High Court dismissed the Writ Petitions.\n\nIn the Appeals and Writ Petitions to this Court the assessees were :\n\n(a) dealers who bad filed their rel urns but had not deposited the full amount of tax due according to such returns, and the Assessing\n\n'~ , I\n\n~ '\n\nKHAZAN CHAND v. J, & K. STATE 859\n\nAuthority, having accepted the returns, had issu.ed a composite notice of demand calling up them to pay the amount of tax along wiih interest due on it,\n\n(b) dealers who had filed their returns but had paid the tax due according -to such returns after the expiry of the prescribed time and in whose cases the Assessing Authori! y had accepted the returns and had isSued a notice of demand asking them to pay interest on the amount of tax fof the period for which such payment was delayed, and '\n\n(c) dealers who had filed their returns but had not paid the amount of ta:ill due according to such returns by the prescribed time but bad paid it later and notices were issued against them calliOg upon them to pay interest for the p'C:riod of default before making aay order of assessme.nt.\n\nIt was contended on their behalf that;\n\n(1) The charging of interest from the assessees was violative of Article 265 of the Constitution as there was no legislative power in the State Legislature to make a law providing for payment of interest if the amount .of tax was not paid by the prescribed\n\ntime, and, for this reason, the provisions of section 8 or the Act in so far as they provide for payment of such interest are beyond .the legislative competence of the State Legislature and, therefore\n\n(2)\n\n(3)\n\n(4)\n\n(5)\n\nunconstitutional. '\n\nSub-section (2) of section 8 of the Act was void as infringing Article 14 of the Constitution becaUse its provisions are discriminatory, arbitrary and unreasonable •\n\nThe Assessees carried on business on credit basis and as by the dates when they filed their quarterly retuins their customers had not pa id to them the price of goods sold to them, the Assessees were not bound to pay tax .along with their returns but were bound_ to pay tax in respect of these transactions of sales only when the amount of sale price was received by them from their customers.\n\nIn some cases, the amount of interest claimed frQm the Assessees exceeded the amount of tax paid by them and, therefore, the demand for such excess amount of interest was bad in Jaw.\n\nThe Assessees were not liable to pay interest on the amount of tax not paid in time without a notice of demand for payment of tax being first issued.\n\n(6) Interest was levied by the Assessing Authority for the entire 11\n\nMo [1984] 2 s.c.R.\n\nperiod of default at the maximum rate prescribed by sub-section\n\n(2) of section 8 which was contrary to the provisions of that subsection.\n\nHELD: The constitutionality of sub.section (1), (2) and (3) of section 8 of the Jammu and Kashmir General Sales Tax.Act 1962 upheld.\n\nThe State however restrained from recovering' from the Assessees. interest on the amount of quarterly tax paid after the expiry of the date prescribed for payment by sub.section (3) of section 8 of the Act at a rate other than the rate of one per cent per month for the. first three months of default and at the rate of two per cent per month for the next three months of default and at the rate of three per cent for the period of def au It exceeding six months. [881 G-H; 8821\\]\n\n1. Ci) The Constitution af India, does not apply in its entirety to the State of Jammu and Kashmir because that State holds a special position in the Constitutional set up of the country~ Article 3 70 makes special .Provisions with respect to the State of Jammu and Kashmir.\n\nUnder sub-clause\n\n(c) of clause (I) of Article 370 the provisions of Articles I and 370 apply in relation to the State of Jammu and Kashmir and under sub-clause (d) of clause (I) of Article 370 such of the other provisions of the Constitution apply in relation to that State subject to such exceptio11; s and modifications as the President may specify by an order issued with the concurrence of the Government of the State.\n\nIn exercise of the power conferred by clause (1) of Article 370 the President of India, with the concurrence of the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, has made the Constitution (App 1ication to Jammu and Kashmir) Order, 1954 (C. 0. 48) which was amended from time to time.\n\nThe proviitions of the Constitution of India as in force on June 20. 1964. and as amended by the Constitution Amendment Acts set out in clause (2) of that Order apply in relation to the -State of Jammu and Kashmir subject to the exceptions and modific.itions set out in the said clause.\n\nBy sub-clause (6) (a) of clause (1) of the said Presidential Order, Clause (I) of Article 246 of the Constitution of India was made applicable to the State of Jammu and Kashmir with certain modifications, while clause\n\n(3) of Article 246 was not made applicable to the State.\n\nSub.clause (22) of clause 2 of the said Presidential Order applies List I in the Seventh Sche-. dole to the State of Jammu and Kashmir with the omissions a\"nd modifications mentioned in the said sub-clause.\n\nEntries 92 and 92A of List I apply to the State of Jammu and Kashmir in an unmodified form.\n\nBy the same sub-clause, List II ill the Seventh Schedule, natllely, the State List, does not apply to the State of Jammu and Kas.hmir. [870G-H; 871AB]\n\n(ii) Thus under section S of the Constitution of Jammu aod Kashmir the e1:ecutivc and legislative poer of the State extends to al1 maters with respect to which Parliament bas power_ to make laws for the State under the provisions of the Constitution of India under the Constitutional provisions applicable to the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the power of the State Legislature to enact a law relating to taxes on intra-State sale or purchase of goods is thC same as that of the Legislatures of other States in. India.\n\nBy sub-clause (7) of clause 2 of the said Order, Article 265 is made applicable to tho State of Jammu and Kashmir.\n\nSection 114 of the Constitution of\n\n---~\n\n, J\n\n} \\\n\n...\n\nKHAZAN CilAND v. 1. & IC, STATB 861\n\nJammu and Kashmir is in terms identical with Article 265 of the Constitution of India which provides. that ''No tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of law.\" [871BD)\n\n(iii) The power to make a law with r.espect to tax comprehends with in it the power to levy that tax and to determine the persons who are liable to pay such tax, the rates at which such tax is to be paid and the event which will attract liability in respect of such tax.\n\nThis is done by the charging sections of the particu.Jar tax law.\n\nThe taxing power of the state will also comprehend within it the power to provide for quantification of the Jiability of persons made liable to pay the tax.\n\nThis is done by the provisions relating to assessment.\n\nThe taxing power will also comprehend within it the power to provide for col1ection of tax including prescribing the methods of recovery of the amount of tax due if the person liable to pay the tax does not voluntarily pay it.\n\nThe power to make a law with respect to a tax includes not only what bas been set out above but also a power to make provisions in the relevant statute with r<'spect to all matters ancillary and incidental 'to the levy, assessment, collection and recovery of tax. Callee\n\nion of tax by the State may be either after be \"liability is quantified by assessment or may be prior to actual assessment by requiring the assessee to pay before any assessment -is made the amount of taX admitted to be dtie and payable by him. [872B-E]\n\nWhitney v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue, L.R. 1926 A.C. 37, 51 H. L. 10 T. C. 79, 110; Chalturam and others v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bihar (1947) F.C.R. 116, 126; (1947) 15 I.T.R 302, 308; Messrs Chatturam Hori/ram Lrd. v. Commissioner of Income TaX, Bthar and Orlssa, [1955] 2 s.c.R. 280, 297·8; (1955) 27 l.T.R. 708, 715·6 referred to.\n\n(iv) One of the methods of collection of revenue adopted by the Act, is to require that tax due according to the quarterly returns should. be paid before filing such returns and it was within the legislative competence of the Legislature of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to provide for recovery of the amount of tax due under quarterly returns if default is made in paying such amount by tho prescribed time. [872H; 873A)\n\n(v) Payment of interest in case of default in payment of tax is a means of compelling an assessee to pay the tax due by theprescribed date.\n\nIt is a mode of recovery of taK and well within the legislative power of the State. [873C]\n\n2. (i) Inter~State trade and commerce is a matter which affects all the States in _India and thus the whole country.\n\nIt is for this reason that in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution the subject of taxes on the sale Or purchase of goods taking place in the course ol inter-State trade or commerce bas been put in List I and made a Unioasubject.\n\nTaxes on the sale or purchase of goods taking place within the State affect only those who carry on the business of buying and selling goods within the State and, therefore, this subject haS been pu_t in List II of Seventh Schedule, namely tho State List. [874C-D]\n\n. E\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1984) 2 S.C.R.\n\n(ii) Sales tax is the biggest source of revenue for a State and it is for the State to decide how and in what manner it will raise this revenue and to determine which particular transactions of sale or purchase of goods taking place within that Sta-te should be taxed and at what rates. and which particular transactions of sale or purchase of goods should be eiempted from. tax or taxed at a lower rate having regarj to the subject-n1:i.tter of sale, as for instance, Where particular goods constitute necessities for the poorer c!,1sses of people orwhere the goods in question are of .such a nature as are required to be exempled from.tax or taxed at a lowerrate_in order to encourage a local industry.\n\nConsideration of these matters must, therefore, differ from State to State.\n\nSimilarly it is for the each State to detern1inc the methods -it will adopt to collect its revenue from this source and to decide which rr1ctbods would be most efficacious for this purpose. If the provisions of tbc legislation of every State on a particular topic are to be identic,!l in every respect, there is no purpose in including that topic in the S'tate List and it may as well be included in the Union List.\n\nMerely because the provisions of :, State Jaw differ from the provisions of other State laws on the safi.1e subject cannot n1ake such provisions discriminatory. [874DG]\n\n(iii) Jnterest is payable under subsection LZ) of section 8 on the amount of lax paid artcr the expiry of the prescribed date of p Yment.\n\nThe rate of two per cent per month and particul?rly the rate of three per cent per 1nonth can be said to be on the high side, but this would not reader the provisions of that sub-section void or unconstitutional.\n\nProviding for payment of interest in case of delaed payment of tax is a method usually adopted in fiscal legislation to ensure that the amount of tax which is due is paid by the prescribed time and provisions in that behalf form part of the recovery machinery provided in a taxing statute.\n\nIt is for the State to provide by what means payment of tax is to be enforced and a person who . does not pay the amount of tax lawfully and admittedly due by him can hardly complain of the measures adopted by the State to compel him to pay such amount. [875AC]\n\n(iv) Under the Act, the same rates of interest apply both to the dealer who has made default in payment of tax due by him and to the State Government in case )f default made by it in making payment of the amount of tax or penalty which has become refundable as a result of an appellate or rovisional :order.\n\nThe graduated rate of interest provided by sub-section (2) of section 8 cannot, therefore, be characterised as arbitrary or unreasonable.\n\n[875F-G]\n\n3. (i) Under the Act, the liability to pay sales tax is cast upon the dealer.\n\nThis is made clear by sections 4,6, and clauses (G), (L) (1), (L) (II}, and (n) of section 2.\n\nIt -is imn1aterial whether the price of goods has been paid to the dealer or is payable to him.\n\nThe fact that a dealer has sold goods on credit is, therefore, wholly immaterial.\n\nTbis liability is irrespective of tho fact whether the dealer has ffi[lde profit or loss in bis business and Whether he has received the sale price or not. [876H; 877A-B]\n\n(ii) Section 64A of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 does not deal with the liability of the seller to pay sales tax to the Goveroment. [878E]\n\nKHAZAN CHAND v. 1. & K. STATB 863\n\nIn tho instant caseJ the Assessees were bound to pay .the tax . due according to 1 he quarterly returns filed by them before filing such returns and the fact that their customers bad not paid to them the sale price did not exempt them from their statutory liability. [8780)\n\nThe recovery prov_isions of the Act are meant for speedy a_nd prompt collection of revenue.\n\nThese provisions are not meant for the benefit of defaulting tax-paye1 sand Sltb defaulters cannot claim that the amoual of interest payable by them on delayed tax payment should be scaled down as if they were .entitled to claim relief under a debtrelief law.\n\n[879B-C]\n\nUnder subsection 8 (1) the tax assessed o.r any other amount demanded iS to be paid within the time specified in the notice ofdemarld.\n\nUnder sub-seceion ( 3), the quarterly tax is to be paid betore ftirnishing -the quarterly return but not later than the date prescribed under sub-section (2) of section 7.\n\nAccordingly, the requirement of sub-section (2) of section 8 that int.!f6St will be chargeable from the date specified for paym_ent in the notice of demand cannot be applied to the payment of quarterly tax and necessary alterations as required by sub-section (8) o section 8 will, therefore have to be made in the provisions of sub--section (2) in their application to a default made in _Qayment of quarterly tax and .sub-section (2) must be read as providing.that interest under sub-section (2) will become payable fronl the date prescribed by sub-section (3) of section s'ror payment of quarterly tax. [880B-F)\n\nMessrs Royal Boot House etc. v. State of Jammu and -Kashmir and others. C.M.P. Nos. 32413 and 32.414 of 1983 decided on January 6, 1984\n\nby P. N. Bhagvati, A; g. C. J. and Venkataramiah and Varadarajaa; JJ.\n\nE referred to.\n\nSub-section (2) of.section 8 of the Act provides for different rates of interest depending upon the length of the period of default. [881D)\n\nIn the instant oases, int eresLon the amount of. quarterly tax not paid , in time has been imposed at a uniform rate for the full period of default and not according to the scale of rates prescribed by sub-section (2) of section 8.\n\n[88 IB]\n\nORiGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition Nos: 12695, 13478-82, 13352 of 1983, 99·100, 133-34, 231, 234-36 of 1984. ·\n\n[Under article 32 of the Constitution of India]\n\nCivil Appeals Nos. 322·351 of 1984\n\nAppeals by Special leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 24th June, 1983, 19th August, 1983, !st September, 1983, & 29th December, 1983 of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court in Writ\n\nPetition Nos. 430 & 886/82, 364/81, 478/81, 132/82, 338/80; 525/80, 485/80, 67/83, 404/82, 681/82, 679/81, 688/82, 472/81, 678/82,\n\nS64 StJPRBMB CoURT REORTS\n\n(1984) 2 S.C.R.\n\n230/81, 229/83,. 476/81, 228/83, 471/80, 287/83, 682/82, 344/82 621/82, 302/80, 624/80, 46/83, 912/83, 558/82 and 623/83.\n\nK. K. Venugopal and Anll Dev Singh Salish Vig, S. P. Sharma, L. K. Gupta, Vimal Dave, R. C. Kaushik and Subhash Sharma for the Petitioners/ Appellants.\n\nAltaf Ahmed for the Respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nMADON, J. This group of Writ Petitions and Appeals by Special Leave challenges the constitutional validity of sub-sections (!), (2) and (3) of section 8 of the Jammu and Kashmir General Sales Tax Act, 1962 (J & K Act XX of !962) and seeks to quash the orders directing the Petitioners and Appellants before us (hereinafter for the sake of brevity referred to as \"the Assessees\") to pay interest on the amount of tax due according to the quarterly returns filed by them but not paid within the prescribed time.\n\nAll the Assessees are registered as dealers under the Jammu and Kashmir General Sales Tax Act, 1962 (hereinafter referred to as \"The Act\"). Sub-section (1) of section 7 of the Act requirse every. dealer liable to pay tax under the Act to furnish in the prescribed form a return of his turnover for a year within 120 days from the expiry of that year. Sub-section (2) of section 7 provides as follows :\n\n\"Without prejudice to the provisions of sub.section (1), every dealer shall also furnish in the prescribed form quarterly returns for each quarter of the year within thirty days from the expiry of that quarter. Every such return shall be accompanied by a Treasury Receipt or any other proof of having paid the tax due on that return.\"\n\nThus, the tax due according to a quarterly return is to be paid by the dealer before filing suoh return and proof of payment of the tax so due is to accompany such return. Sub-sections (I), (2), (3),\n\n(7) and (8) of section ~. omitting what is not relevant for our purpose, provide as follows:\n\n\"(!) The tax assessed, or any other amount demanded, under this Act shall be paid in such manner and within\n\nll.-..\n\n. '\n\n.<c\n\nKHAZAN CHAND f, 1. & K. STATE (Madon, J.) 865\n\nsuch time not being less than fifteen days from the date of the notice of demand. as may be specified in the notice. Jn default of such payment the whole of the amount then remaining due shall become recoverable in accordanc with sections 16 and 16A.\n\nx x x x x x\n\n(2) If the tax or any o_ther amount due under this Act is not paid by the dealer or any other person, by whom it is payable, within the period specified in demand notice, the dealer or such other person shall be liable to pay interest on the tax or other amount from the date it was pay- . able to the date of actual payment at.the following rates-\n\n(a) Ifthedefault is for a period of not exceeding three months at 1 % per month;\n\n(b) If the default is for a period exceeding three months but less than six months at 2 per month;\n\n(c) If the default is for a period exceeding six months at 3% per month:\n\nProvided that where, as a result of :an order under Sections I 1, 12, 24 or an order of the Conrt, the amount of tax or other sum on which interest was payable under this sub-section has been reduced, the interest shall be reduced accordingly and excess interest paid, if any, shall be refunded.\n\nExplanation-Interest shall be charged. for full month and not for a part of the month.\n\n(3) Quarterly tax shall be paid before furnishing a quarterly return but not later than the date prescribed under\n\nsub-section (2) of Section 7.\n\nG x x x x x\n\n (7) Where a dealer fnrnishes a revised return under sub-section (4) of Section 7 and the tax payable is more than the tax paid on the basis of original retJrn, he shall pay the extra tax payable before furnishing the revised return: H\n\nSUPREME COURT REP OR TS\n\n(1984] 2 S.C.R.\n\nProvided that if the tax already paid is in excess of the tax payable, such excess am )Unt shall be treated to have been paid towards the tax payable for the quarter next following the date of fuanishing such revised return.\n\nB (8)-Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act,\n\nif a dealer fails to pay the tax payable under this Section, the provisions of sub-section (2) of this Section, Section\n\n16 and Section 16-A shall apply mutatis mutandis to the recovery thereof.\n\nExplanation (!)-Quarterly Tax means the tax . payable on the basis of a quarterly return required to be furnished by subsection (2) of Section 7.\n\nExplanation (2)-lnterest under sub section (2) of this Section on the extra tax payable on the basis of revised return shall be payable from the date next following the date on which the tax was payable on the basis of original returri.\"\n\nThe Assessees filed their quarterly returns within the time prescrsbed by the Act but without payfog the tax due according to such returns. Some of them also filed revised returns ther_eafter.\n\nThe tax due was p1id by the Assessees after several months and in some cases by instalments. In a few cases, the full amount of tax was not paid even by the date the assessment order in their cases came to be made. In the case of most of the Assessees, the Assessing Authority levied penalty under sub-section _(2) of section 8 of the Act before making, any assessment. In other cases, orders requiring interest to be paid were made along with the assessment orders.\n\nIt may be mentioned that in cases where the assessment orders were made, the returns filed by the Assessees were accepted as correct.\n\nThose A1sessees who are Appellants. before us filed writ petitions in the Jammu and Kashmir High Court challenging the validity of section 8 of the Act under which interest was sought to be recovered from them as also the demand fdr payment of interest. These writ petitions were hea1d along with other writ petitions in which other questions arose. The High Court dismissed all these writ petitions but made no order as to tho costs thereof.\n\nThe petitioners before the High Court fell into four categories, fl namely-\n\n( -· --\n\n~··\n\nKHAZAN CHAND v. J. & K; STATE (Madon, J.)\n\n(1) Dealers who had neither fried their returns ncr deposi\n\nted the tax due from them and the Assessing Authority had determined the amount of tax payable by them and issued a composite no.lice of demand calling upon them to deposit the amount of tax along with interest due on it.·\n\n(2) Dealers who had filed their returns but had not deposited the full amount of tax due according to such returns and the Assessing Authority, having accepted the returns, had issued a composite notice of demand calling upon them to pay the amount of tax along with interest due on it.\n\n(3) Dealers who had filed their returns but had paid the tax due according to such returns after the expiry of the prescribed time and in whose cases the Asessing Authority had accepted\" the returns and had issued a notice 'or demand asking them to pay interest on the amount of tax for the period for which such payment was delayed.\n\n(4) Dealers who had filed their returns and had paid the tax due according to such returns by the preacribed. time but the Assessing Authority had not accepted the returns and had .enhanced the amount of tax payable by these dealers and had issued a composite notice of demand calling upon them to pay the amount of tax so enhanced along with interest on it.\n\nWe are concerned in these Petit10ns and Appeals only with dealers who fall tinder categories (2) and ( l) above as also with those dealers who had filed their returns but had not paid the. !!mount of tax due according to such returns by the prescribed time but had paid it later and notices were issued against them calling upon them to pay interest for the period of default before making any order of assessment, We are not concerned in these Petitions and Appeals with those dealers who fall under categories (I) and (4) above.\n\nAt the hearing. of these Petitions and Appeals, no arguments whatever were advanced before us in support of the contention that subsec, tion (l) of section 8 was unconstitutional and the challen!le\n\nSUPRBMB COURT REPORTS (1984] 2 s.c.R.\n\nto that sub-section must, therefore, fail.\n\nThe only contentions which were urged at the hearing were as follows:\n\n(I) The charging of interest to the Asssssees is violative of Article 265 of the Constitution of India as there was no legislative power in the State Legislature to make a law providing for payment of interest if the amount of tax was not paid by the prescribed time and, for this reason, the provisions of section 8 of the Act in so far as they provide for payment of such interest are beyond the legislative competence of the State Legislature and, therefore, unconstitutional.\n\n(2) Sub-section (2) of section 8 of the Act is void as infringing Article 14 of the Constitution bcause its provi sions are discriminatory, arbitrary and unreasonable\n\n(3) The Assessees carried on business on credit basis and as by the dates when they filed their qnarterly returns their customers had not paid. to them the price of goods sold to them, the Assessees were not bound to pay tax .along with their returns but were bonnd to pay tax in respect of those transactions of sale only when the amount of sale price was received by them from their customers.\n\n(4) Jn some cases, the amount of interest claimed from the Assessees exceeded the amount of tax paid by them and, therefore, the demand for sueh excess amount of interest was bad in law.\n\n(5) The Assessees were not liable to pay any interest on\n\n the amount of tax not paid in time without a notice of • demand for payment of such amount of tax having been first issued to them.\n\n(6) Interest was levied by the Assessing Authority for the entire period of default at the maximum rate prescribed by sub-section (2) of section 8 which was contrary to the provisions of that sub-section.\n\nWe will first examine the correctness of the contention that the impugned provisions of section 8 of the Act are violative of Article p 265 of the Constitutio'l of India. Article 265 of the Cof\\stitutjon\n\nKHAZAN CHAND v. }, & K. STATE (Madon, J.) 369\n\nprovides that \"No tax shall be levied or collected 'except by autho. rity of law.\" Thus, Article 265 postulates that before any tax can be. levied and collected there must be a valid law enacted by an approp.riate legislature imposing such tax and providing for its collection. The submission on behalf of the Assessees was that under the Constitution the Legislature of the State of Jammu and Kashmir has no legislative power to provide for payment of interest in case of late payment of tax. It was not the contention of the Assessees, as indeed it could not be, that the Legislature of the State of Jammu and Kashmir had no legislative power to enact a law levying a tax on the sale or purchase of good1 taking place\n\nwithin the State and making provisions for the collection of such tax, because the constitutional position in this behalf is clear and indisputabfo. Under claus' (I) of Article 246 of the Constitution of India, Parliament has exclusive power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List I in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution referred to as the \"Union List\" and under clause\n\n(3) of the same Article the Legislature of any State has exclusive power to make laws for such Slate or any part thereof with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution referred to as the \"State List\". Taxes on the sale or purchase of newspapers and on a1verti rements published therein fall under Entry .92 of the Union List and taxes on the sale or purchase of goods, other than newspapers, where such sale or purchase takes place in the course of inter-State trade or commerce fall under Entry 92A of the Union List, while taxes on the sale or purchase of goods, other than newspapers, subject to the provisions of Entry 92A of List I, fall under Entry 54 of the State List. Thus, so far as sales tax is concerned, the Constitution bifurcates the legislative field of taxation between the Union and the States. As a result of this bifurcation, the subject of taxes on intraState sale or purchase of goods (other than newspapers) falls exclusively within the State power of taxation. The Constitution of India, however, dbes not apply in its entirety to the State of Jammu and Kashmir because that State holds a special position i11 the constitutional set up of our country. Article 370 of the Constitution of India makes special provisions with respeci to the State of Jammu and T<ashmir.\n\nUnder sub-clause (c) of clause (I) of Article 370 the provisions of Articles I and 370 apply in relation to the State of Jammu and Kashmir and under subclause (d) of clause (I) of Article 370 such of the other provisions of the Constitution apply in relation to that State subject to such exceptions and modifications as the President may specify by an order iss11ed with the concurrence of the Govern-\n\n870 SUPllEME COUil T REPORTS\n\n\\ J 984] 2 S.C.R.\n\nment of that State.· Thus, by reason of the application of Article 1 t() the State of Jammu and Kashmir by sub-clause (c) of clause (I) Qf Article 370 the State of Jammu and Kashmir is one of the States which. form the Union of India and by virtue .of sub-clause (d) of clause (I) of that Article so far as the provisions of the Constitution, other thanthose of Articles I and 370, are concerned, the President of India' has the power, with the concurrrnce of the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, to issue an order specifying which of them. shall apply to that State and whether such provisions shall apply in their entirety or subject to such exceptions and modifications as may be specified in that order.\n\nArticle 370 also envisages the convening of a Constituent Assembly for that State and the framing of a separate Constitution for it. In exercise <if the power\n\ncorifered by clause (I) of Article 370 the President of India, with the concurrence of the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir', has made the Constitution (Application to Jammu. and Kashmir) Order, 1954 (C. 0. 48). This order deals with the entire constitutional position of the State of Jammu and Kashmir within the framework of the Constitution of India, except only the internal Constitution of the State Government to be framed by the Constituent Assembly of that State. The Constituent Assembly of the State of Jammu and Kashmir framed its own Constitution repealing and replacing its earlier Constitution. This new Constitution, called the •; constitution of Jammu and Kashmir\", was adopted and enacted by the Constituent Assembly of that State on November 17, 1965.\n\nBy the Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order, 1954 CC. 0. 48), as amended from time to time, the provisions of the Constitution of India as in force on June 20, 1954, and as amended by the Constitution Amendment Acts set out in clause (2) of that Order apply in relation to the State of Jammu and Kashmir' subject to the exceptions and modifications set out in the said clause.\n\nBy sub-clause (6) (a) of clause (2) of the said Presidential Order, clause (1) of Article 246 of the Constitution of India is made applicable to the State of Jammu and Kashmir with certain modifications with which we are not concerned, while clause (3J of Article 246 is not made applicable to that State. Sub-clause (22J of clause 2 of the sa; d Presidential Order applies Lisi I in the Seventh Schedule to the State of Jammu and Kashmir with the omissions and modifications mentioned in the said sub-clause.\n\nThese omissions. and modifications are, however, irrelevant for our purpose inasmuch as Entries 95 and 92A of List I apply to tbe State of Jammu and\n\n....\n\nKHAZAN CHAND v. ], & K. STATE (Madon, J.) 871\n\nKashmir in an unmodified form. By the same sub-clause, .List II in the Seventh Schedule, namely, the State List, does not apply to the State of Jammu and K.ashmir: Section 5 of the Constitution of Jammu anc!· Kashmir, however, provides as follows:· l .\n\n\"5, Extent of executive and legisiative. power of the State.-The executive and legislative power of the State extends to all matters except those with respect to which Parliament has power to make laws for the State under the provisions of the Constitution of India.\"\n\nThus, under the constitutional provisions applicable to the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the 'power of the State Legislature to enact a law relating to taxes on intra-State sale or purchase of goods is the . same as that of the Legislatures of other States in India. By subclausc (7) of clause 2 of the _said Order, Article 265 is made applicable to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Furthe1, section 114 of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir is in terms identical with Article 165 of the Constitution of India and equally provides that \"No tax shall b_e levied o:- collected except by authority of law.\"\n\nThe question which-we, therefore, have to consider is \"Whe ther in the exercise of its power to make a Ia.w with respect to taxes on the sale or purchase of goods taking place within the State, the Legislature of that State has the legislative competenee to provide for payment of interest on the amonnt of tax due according to the return filed by an assessee. but not paid within the prescribed time?\"\n\nAs was pointed out by Lord Dunedin in Whitney v. Commissioner of Inland Revenue(1); a passage cited with approval by the Fede ral Court in Chatturam and others v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bihar,(2) and by this Court in Messrs Chatturam Hori/ram Ltd. v.\n\nCommissioner of Income Tax, Bihar and Orissa<' J:\n\n\"Now, there are three stages in the imposition of a tax: there is the declaration of liability, that is the part o( the statute which determines what persons in respect of what property are liable. Next, there is the assessment.\n\n(I) L. R. (t926] A. C. 37, 51.H. L; 10 T. C. 79, 110. (2) [1947] F.'c. R. 116; 126; (1947) IS I. T. R. 302, 308.\n\n(3) [1955)2 S. C.R. 290,-297·8; (1955) 27 I; T. R. 7081 715·6.\n\nSUPRBMB COURT REPORTS\n\n(1984) 2 .S.C.R.\n\nLiability does not depend on assessment.\n\nThat, ex hypothesi, has already been fixed. But assessment particularises the exact snm which a person liable has to pay. Lastly, come the methods of recovery, if the person 1axed does not voluntarily pay.\"\n\nIt would follow from the above decisions that the power to make a law with respect to a tax comprehends within it the power to levy thlt tax and to determine the persons who are liable to pay such tax, the rates at which such tax is to be paid and the even __,.....__ which will attract liability in respect of such tax. This is done by r the charging sections of the particular tax law.\n\nThe taxing power. r of the State will also comprehend within it the power to provide for quantification of the liability of persons made liable to pay the tax. This is done by the provisioas relating to assessment. The taxing power will also comprehend within it the power to provide for collection of tax including prescribing the methods of recovery of the amount of tax due if the person liable to pay the tax does not. voluntarily pay it. The power to make a law with respect to a tax includes not only what has been set out above but also a power to make provisions in the relevant st1tute with respect to all matters ancillary and incidental to the levy, assessment; collection and reco very of tax. 'Collection of tax by the State may be either after the liability is quantified. by assessment or may be prior to '4ctual assessment by requiring the assessee to pay before any assessment is made the amount of tax admitted to be due and payable by him. This is done 'by making proviaions such as those for advance payment of tax and for self-assessment contained in the Income Tax Act, 1961.\n\nThis is also what sub-section (3) of section 8 of the Act does by requiring that the quarterly tax payable .on the basis of a quarterly return. required to. be furnished by sub-section (2) of section 7 _shall be paid before furnishing such return. This is a mode of collction of revenue in advance before quantification of the actual tax liability and the Legislature would be well within its right and would be competent to provide for recovery of such amount if it is not paid by the prescribed time. The Act, as its long title shows is \"An Act to provide for the levy of a general tax on the sale or purchase of goods in the State and for other matters connected therewith\" and one of the methods of collection of revenue adopted by it is to require that tax due according to the quarterly returns should be .\n\npaid before filing such returns and it was within the legislative competence of the Legislature of the State of Jam mu and Kashmir to provide for recovery of the amount of tax dµe under quarterly\n\n~·-\n\nKllAZAN CHAND v. 1. & K. STATE (Madon, J.) 873\n\nreturn• if default is made in paying such amount by the prescribed time. This has been done by the State. Legislature by enacting subsection (8) of section 8 under which the provisions of sub-section\n\n(2) of section 8 and of sections 16 and 16-A are made applicabie mutatis mutandis to the recovery of tax payable by a dealer if he fails to pay it.\n\nSub-section (2) of section 8 provides for payment of interest, section 16 provides for recovery of tax as arrears of land revenue, and section 16-A provides for issue of a garnishee notice to a person from whom money is due, or may become due, to the ~·~- assessee or to a person who holds, or may subsequently hold, money ...._ 'for or on account of the assessee to pay to the Assessing Authority\n\n. .\n\nas much of the money as is sufficient to pay the amount due by the assessee by way of tax.\n\nThu•, payment of interest in case of default in payment of tax is a means of compelling an assessee to pay the tax due by the prescribed date. It is a mode of recovery of tax and well within the legislative power of the State. ·\n\nThe challenge to sub-section (2) of section 8 on the ground that the provisions of that sub-section infringe Article 14 of the Constitution is a twofold one, namely:\n\n(I) tha, t the said sub-section is discriminatory, and\n\n(2) that it is arbitrary and unreasonable.\n\nSub-clause ( 4) of clause 2 of the Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order, 1954, makes Article 14 of the Constitution oflndia applicable to the State of Jammu and Kashmir.\n\nWith respect to the charge of discrimination, it was submitted that such high rates of interest for nori'payment of ta)\\ are not to be found in the. sales tax law of any other State and, therefore, by enacting . , the said sub section (2) of section 8 and providing for payment of interest at the rate of two por cent per month when the period of default exceeded three months.but did not exceed six months and for interest at the rate of three per cent per month if the default was for a period exceeding six months, dealers in the State of Jammu and Kashmir were hostilely discriminated against as compared with dealers in other .States.\n\nThis argument wholly overlooks the very basis of the scheme of distribution of legislative power contained in our Constitution. Our Constitution is federal in its structute and a salient feature of a federal polity is distribution of legislative and administrative powers between the federated unit and the federating units, that is, between the federal government\n\n874 sVPRllMB COURT REPORTS tl984] :l. s.c.R.\n\nand the State governments. Thus, matters in respect of which our Constitution-makers felt that there should be uniformity of law throughout the country have been placed by them in the Union List (List I in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution) conferring exclusive power upon Parliament to make laws with respect thereto, while matters which they foll were of local concern and may require laws to be made having regard to the particular needs and peculiar problems of each State have been assigned to the State Legislatures by placing them in List II of the Seventh Schedule, that is, the State List. Inter-State trade and commerce is a matter which affects all the States in India and thus the whole country.\n\nIt is for this reason that in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution the subject of taxes on the sale or purchase of goods taking place in the course of inter- State trade or comme.rcc bas been put in List I and made a Union subject. Taxes on the sale or purchase of goods taking place within the State affect only those who carry on the business of buying and selling goods within the State and, therefore, this subject has been put in List II of the Seventh Schedule, namely, the State Lbt. Sales tax .is the biggest source of revenue for a State and it is for the State to decide how and in what manner it will raise this revenue and to determine which particular transactions of sale or purchase of goods taking place within that State should be taxed , and at what rates, and which. particular transactions of sale or purchase of goods should be exempted from tax or taxed at a lower rate having regard to the subject-matter of sale, as for instance, where particular goods constitute necessities for the poorer classes of people or where the goods in question are of such a nature as are required to be exempted from tax or: taxed at a lower rate in order to encourage a local industry.\n\nConsideration of these matters must, from the nature of thmgs, differ from State to State.\n\nSimilariy, it is for each State to determine the methods it will adopt to collect its revenue from this source and to decide which methods would be most . efficacious for this purpose. The provisions of the sales tax Jaw of each State must, therefore,· necessarily differ in various respects from the provisions of sales tax laws of otner States. If the provisions of the legislation of every State on a particular topic are to be identical in every respect, there is no purpose in including that topic in the State List and it may as wrll be included in the Union List. Merely because the provisions of a State law differ from the provisions of other State laws on the same subject caionot make such provisions discriminatory.\n\nH The second part of the challenge under Article 14 was with\n\n!(HAZAN CHAND v. 1. & x:. STATE (Madon, J.)\n\nrespect to the rates at which interest is payable under sub-section (2) of section 8 on the amount of tax paid after the expiry of the prescribed date of payment It is true that the rate of two per cent per month and plfticuforly the rate of three per cent per month can be said to be on the high side, but we fail to see how this would render th'e provisions of that sub-section void or unconstitutional.\n\nProviding for payment of interest in case of delayed payment of tax is a method usually adopted in fiscal legislation to ensure that the amount of ta< which is due is paid by the prescribed time and provisions in that behalf form part of the recovery machinery provided in a taxing statute. It is for the State to provide by what means payment of tax is to be enforced and a person who noes not pay the amount of tax lawfully and admittedly due by him can hardly complain of the measures adopted.by the State to compel him to pay such amount. It neither lies in the defaulter's mouth to protest against the rate of interest charged to him nor is it open to him to dictate to the State the methods which it should adopt for recovering the amount of tax due by him.\n\nIn this connectic>n, it is pertinent to note that under section IOB of the Act, where as a result of an order mad' in appeal or revision, a refund has become due to t_he dealer or any other person on account of tax or penalty found to have been paid in excess, the State Government is requited to pay to such dealer or person simple interest at the rate of 12-pet, cent per annum on the amount of such refund from the date such . payment was made upto the date on which such refund was granted , and in case of delay in refunding the excess amount; interest at the rate of 24 percent per _annum if the refund is granted beyond a period of three months out before the expiry of six mdhths from the date of the appellate or revisional order and at the rate of 36 per cent per annum if it is granted thereafter. Thus,'.under the Act, the same rates of interest apply both to the dealer whd has made default in payment of tax due by him and to the State Government in case of default made by it in making payment of the amount of tax or penalty which has become refundable as a result df an appel' late or revisional order. The graduated rates of interest provided_\n\nby sub-section (2) of section 8 cannot, therefore; be characterized as arbitrary or unreasonable. ·\n\nThe rcmairiing contentions are directed not against the cons titutionality of the impugned statutory provisions but against the.; legality of the impugned orders. The first of these contentions is that the assessees, having sold goods on credit basis, are not liableto pay the quarterly tax until they have received from their CJ!StO-\n\nIJ-\n\n876 sUPRBMI! COURT REPORts\n\n!1984) 2 S.C.R.\n\nmers the price of goods sold to them. This contention is founded upon an assumption that the liability to pay the tax under the Act is contigent upon receipt of the sale price-an assumption not warranted by the provisions of the Act. Under the Act, the liability to pay sales tax is cast upon a dealer. This is made clear by section 4 of the Act which is headed \"Liability to tax under this Act.\" The relevant provisions of sub-section (I) of section 4 .are as follows:\n\n\"Subject to the provJSJons of this Act, every dealer,· except the one dealing exclusively in gods declared tax free under Section 5, shall pay for each year tax on his taxable\" turnover at a rate not exceeding twenty-fiye per cent of such turnover as may be determined by the Government and notified by the Government in the Government Gazette and such tax shall be charged on the sale of goods once only.\n\nx x x x x ,,\n\nUnder section 6, a dealer who has become liable to pay under section 4 is prohibited from carrying on business as a dealer until he has been registered in accordance with the provisions of the Act.\n\nClause (g) of section 2 inter alia defines a 'dealer' as meaning \"any person who carries on (whether regularly or otherwise) the business of selling, purchasing or distributing goods, directly or indirectly, for cash or for deferred payment, or for commission, remuneration, or other valuable consideration\" .. Clause (L) (1) defines the expression \"sale\" with all its grammatical variations and cogna, e expressions a.s meaning \"any transfer of proporty in goods, otherwise than by mortgage, hypothecation, charge or pledge, by any person for cash or deferred payment or for any other valuable consideration ... \".\n\nClause (L) (II) defines \"sale price\" as meaning inter a/ia \"the amount of >aluable consideration paid or payable to a dealer for any sale made including any sum paid or payable for anything done by the dealer in respect of the goods at the time of or before delivery thereof other than the actual cost of outward freight or delivery or the cost of installation when such cost is separately charged.\" Under clause '(n) of section 2, \"turnover\" includes the aggregate of the amounts of sale and purchase and parts of sale and purchase made by any dealer whether as principal, agent or in any other capacity.\n\nIt is clear from the above statutory provisions that the liability to pa1 sales tax is that of the dealer and not of the peraon who purchases goods from him and for the purposes of sales tax, it is\n\nKHAZAN CHAND v. 1. & K. STATE (Madon, J.) 871\n\nimmaterial whether the prico of goods has been paid to the. dealer or is payable to him The fact that a dealer has sold goods on credit is, therefore, wholly immaterial. The Act imposes the liability to pay sales tax on dealers. This liability is irrespective of the fact whether he has made profit or loss in' his business and whether he has received the sale price or not.\n\nWhen the liability to pay sales tax is cast by the statute on the dealer, he may pass on to his customer the amount of tax payable by him but he can only do so as a term of the contract of sale. Unless and until the purchaser agrees to pay to his vendor the amount of sales tax payable by the\n\n-....__~. venrlor, he is not bound to pay it to the vendor.\n\nWhere, however, the purchaser agrees to pay such amount, it forms part of the sale price on which sales tax would be payaple to the State. Under the sales tax laws of some States, a dealer is permitted to recover or collect from the purchaser the amount of sales tax payable by him.\n\nEven then the dealer can recover or collect such amount only if the purchaser agrees to pay it. In such cases, under those sales tax laws the amount so recovered or collected is nol treated, either in whole or in part, as part of the sale price and not taxed, provided the amount not taxed 1s paid over to the State or tax on the full amount, that is, including the amount of tax so recovered or collected, is required to be paid along with the quarterly or monthly return, as the case may be, and then at the time of assessment refund of the whole or oart of the tax on the amount so collected is given to the dealer.\n\nIn this connectien, a reference was made to section 64-A of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930, (sustituted for the original section 64-A by the Sale of Goods (Amendnient) Act, 1963, under which unless a. different intention appears from the terms of the contract, in the\n\nevent of any duty of customs or excise on goods or any tax on the sale F or purc4ase of goods being imosed, increased, decreased or remitted in respect of any goods after the making of any contract for the sale or purchase of such goo'ds, without stipulation as to the payment of such duty or tax where duty or tax was not chargeable at the time or the making of the contract, or for the sale or purchase of such goods duty paid or tax paid where duty or tax was chargeable at that time, if such imposition .or increase so takes effect that the duty or. tax or G increased duty or tax, as the case may be, or any part of such duty or tax is paid or is payable, the seller may add so much to the contract price as will be equivalant to the amouut paid or payable in respect of such duty or tax or increase of duty or tax, and is to be entitled to be paid and to sue for and recover such addition, and if\n\n878 SUPREME COURT REl'ORTS\n\n[1984} 2 S.C.R\n\nsuch decrease or remission so takes effect that the decreased duty or tax only, or no duty or tax, as the case may be, is paid or is payable, the buyer may deduct so much from the contract price as will be , equivalent to the decrease of duty or tax or remitted duty or tax, and is not to be liable to pay or be sued for in respect of such deduction.\n\nWe do not find Section 64-A of the Sale of Goods Act tu have any relevance to the point before us. That section is subject to a different intention appearing from the terms of the contract and gives a right to the seller to odd the amount of customs or excise duty or sales tax or purchase tax to the price of goods where such duty or tax is imp.osed for the first time after the contract of sale is made, where the contract does not contain any stipulation as to payment of duty or tax, or in case the goods are sold duty paid or tax paid, where ihe rate of snch duty or tax is increased, to add the extra duty or tax to the contract price. Tho! section also gives a corresponding right to the buyer to deduct so much from the contract price as will be equivalent to the decrease of duty or tax or remitted duty .or tax where any decrease or remittance in duty or tax takes place after the making of the contract of sale. Section 64-A thus provides for the rights and liabilities inter se of a seller and buyer of goods, where any customs or excise duty or any sales tax or purchase tax is imposed or its rate increased or decreased, or such duty or tax remitted in whole or in part after the making of the contract of sale.\n\nThis section does not deal with the l; ab!ity of the seller to pay , sales tax to the Government.\n\nUnder section 8-B of the Act, where a registered dealer realizes , any amount by way of tax from the purchaser, he is required to deposit it in the Government Treasury or in the office of the Deputy ·\n\nSales Tax Comissioner within one month of its realization.\n\nWhere a dealer so deposits the te\\x, he would get credit for it against the amount of tax payable by him, but from this it, does not follow that where he has not been able to recover the amount of tax or sale price from his customers, he is not bound to comply with the statutory requirements of sub-section (3) of section 8 under which he has , to pay tax according to the quarterly return furnished by him before the date prescribed for filing such return. The Assessees were, there. fore, bond to pay the tax due according to the quarterly returns filed by them before filing such returns and the fact that their custo . mers had not paid.to them the sale price did not exempt them from their statutory liability in this behalf.\n\nThe next contention, namely, that the. Assessing Authority was\n\nKHAZAN CHAND v. J. & K. STATE (Madon, J.)\n\nnot entitled to impose interest, the amount of which exceedc~ the amount of tax in respect of which default had been made in paying it by the prescribod date, is equally without any substance. No reason was advanced in support of this contention and we .fail to see on what prmciple the Hindu Law rule of damdupat can be made applicable to a sales tax legislation. The recovery provisions of the Act are meant for speedy and prompt collection of revenue. These provisions are not meant for the benefit of defaul, ting tax-payers and such defaulters cannot claim that the amount of interest payable by them on delayed tax payment should be scaled down as if they were entitled to claim relief under a debt relief law.\n\nIn taking up such a contention, the concerned Assessees have overlooked the fact that the amount of interest payable by them would not have exceeded the amount of tax not paid by them by the prescribed date had they paid the tax due earlier as also the fact that they would not have been liable to pay any amount at all by way of intere.st had they paid the tax due oy the prescribed dte. ·\n\nWe now turn to tho contention that the Assesses were not liable to pay interest unless a notice of demand was .first issued to them calling upon them to pay the. amount of quarterly tax due from them. In support of this submission reliance placed upon subsections(!) and (2) of section 8 of the Act. In our opinion, reliance placed upon those sub-sections is misconceived for in doing sot.he Assessees have overlooked the other relevant provisions of section 8.\n\nSub-setion (I) of section 8 requires that the tax assessed, or any other amount demand, under the Act is. to be paid in such manner and within such time, not being less than fifteen days from the date of the notice of demand, as may be specified in the notice and it is.· when default is made in making such payment that the who!\" of the amount then remaining due becomes recoverable in accordance with sections 16 and 16-A of the Act. Sub-section (2) of section 8 lays down that if the tax or any other amount due under the Act j, not . paid within the period specified in the notice of demand, the defaulter will become liable to pay interest on the tax or other amount from the date it was payable to the date of actual payment at the rates mentioned in the said sub-section. Under sub-section\n\n(3) of section 8, quarterly tax is to be paid before furnishing the quarterly return but not later than the date prescribed under sub- . section (2) of section 7. As we have seen, under sub-section (2) of section 7 quarterly returns are to be fun1ished within thirty day; from the expiry of the quarter and such return is to be accompanied by a: Treasury Receipt or any other proof of payment of tax due\n\n880 SUPRBMB COURT RliPORts\n\n[1984) 2 S.C.R.\n\naccording to that return. This requirement implies that the tax due according to a quarterly return has to be paid before the filing of that return by the prescribed date therefor. Under sub-section <8) of section 8, if a dealer fails to pay the tax payable under that section, the provision• of sub-section (2) of section 8 and of sections 16 and 16-A are to apply mutatis mutandis to the recovery thereof. Thus, provisions of sub-section (2J of section 8 apply when quarterly tax is not paid before furnishing a quarterly retern under sub-section (3) of section 8 but by the express terms of sub-section {8) of section 8, the provisions of sub-section (2) of that section will apply to the recovery of quarterly tax not in their entirety but \"mutatis mutiwdis\". Under sub-section 0) the tax assessed or any other amount demanded is to be paid within the time specified in the notice of demand. Under sub-section (3 ), the quarterly tax is to be paid before furnishing the quarterly return but not later than the date prescribed under sub-section (2) of section 7. Thus, by sub-section\n\n(3) the time for payment of quarterly tax is not made dependent upon the issuance of a notice of demand and the date for payment to be specified in it but it is statutarily fixed and, as under sub-section (8) of section 8 the proviaions of sub-section (2) are to apply muratis mutandis to the recovery of quarterly tax, necessary cbanges must be made in the provisions of sub-section (2) in their application to the recovery of quarterly tax payable under snb-section (3). Accordingly, the requirement of sub-section (2) that interest will be chargeble from the date specified for payment in the notice of demand cannot be applied to the payment of quarterly tax and . necessary alterations as required by sub-section (8) will, therefore, have to be made in the provisions of sub-section (2) in their application to a default made in payment of quarterly tax 'and sub-section (2) must be read as providing that interest under sub-section (2) will become payable from the date prescribed by sub-section (3) of section 8 for payment of quarterly tax. There is thus no substance in this contention. We may also mention that in the case of certain other orders made under the Act demanding interest on default being made in payment of quarterly tax, the challenge thereto on the ground that no interest can be charged unless a notice has been issued demanding payment of quarterly tax was negatived by this Court in Messrs Royal Booi House etc. v. State of Jammu and Kashmir and others.(1)\n\n(1) C- M. P. Nos. 32413 and 32414 of 1983 decided oo January 6 1983, by P. N. Bbagwati, Ac. C. J., a Venkataramiah arid\n\n. H Varadarajan,' JJ.\n\nKI!AZAN CHAND v. J. & K. STATE (Madon, J.) 881\n\nWe now turn to the last contention raised before us, namely, that the Assessing Authority was not entitled to charge interest at the maximum rate but could only charge interest at the graduated rate specified.in sub-section (2) of section 8.\n\nIt appears that in most, if not in all, orders which .have been impugned in these Petitions .and Appeals, interest on the amount of quarterly tax not paid in time has been imposed at a uniform rate for the full period of default and not according to the scale of rates prescribed by sub-section (2) of section 8. Thus, where the default was for a period exceeding three months but not exceeding six months, interest bas been levied for the full period of default at the rate of two per cent per month and where the ddault was for a period exceeding six months, interest at the rate of three per cent per month has been levied for the entire period of default. Jn our opinion, this is not warranted by the terms of sub-section, (2) of section 8 of the Act. Sub-section (2) provides for different rates of interest depending upon the length of the period of default. If the default was for a period not exceeding three months, then the interest could only be charged at the rate of one per cent per month and where the default was for a period exceeding three months but not exceeding six months, then the interest which could be charged can only be one per cent month for the first three months of default and two per cent per month for the remaining period In the same way, if the default was for a period exceeding six months, interest could be chaged only at the rate of one per cent per month for the firs.! three months of default, at the rate of two per cent per month for the next three months of default and at the rate of three per cent per month for the remaining period of default. The grievance made by the A ssessees is justified and their challenge to the impugned orders on. this ground must, therefore, succeed.\n\n . In the result, though we uphold the constitutionality of subsecttons (!), (2) and (3) of section 8 of the Jammn and Kashmir General Sales Tax Act, I 962, we make the rule issued in each of the G Wdt Petitions before us absolute only to the extent that we restrain. the Stale and Jammu and Kashmir from recovering from the Assessees who are Petitioners before us interest on the amount of quarterly tax paid after the expiry of the date prescribed for payment thereof by sub-section (3) of section 8 of the Act at a rate other than the rate of one per cent per month for the first three months of <lefa11lt and at the rate of two per cent per mont)l for the next tllree lJ\n\n882 SUPREME COURT RllPORTS [1984) 2 s.c.R.\n\nmonths of default and at the rate of three per cent per month for the period of default exceeding six months. We also allow the Appeals filed by the Assessees who are Appellants before us to the same limited extent by setting aside the .order of dismissal of their writ petitions passed by the Jammu and Kashmir High Court and making the rule issued in each of those writ petitions absolute only to the limited exter.t specified above.\n\nOn an application made to us in that behalf, we grant to the Petitfoners and Appellants before us three months' time from today to make payment of the amount of interest due and payable by them according to this Judgment and the State of Jammu and Kashmir will not until the expiry of the said period of three months take any steps to recover such amount of interest from any of the Petitioners and Appellants.\n\nAs the Petitioners and Appellants before us have partly succeeded in the Writ Petitions and Appeals filed by them, we make no order as to the costs of these Writ Petitions and Appeals.\n\nN.V.K Appeals & Petitions partly allowed. -", "total_entities": 203, "entities": [{"text": "KHAZAN CHAND ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 16, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KHAZAN CHAND ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19, "end_char": 56, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P. 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"source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30253, "end_char": 30262, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 370", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30333, "end_char": 30344, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 370", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30916, "end_char": 30927, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 370", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31103, "end_char": 31114, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31419, "end_char": 31440, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Constituent Assembly of the State of Jammu and Kashmir", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 31564, "end_char": 31618, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Constituent Assembly of the State of Jammu and Kashmir framed its own Constitution repealing and replacing its earlier Constitution."}}, {"text": "November 17, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31839, "end_char": 31856, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This new Constitution, called the •; constitution of Jammu and Kashmir\", was adopted and enacted by the Constituent Assembly of that State on November 17, 1965."}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31990, "end_char": 32011, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "June 20, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 32027, "end_char": 32040, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "48), as amended from time to time, the provisions of the Constitution of India as in force on June 20, 1954, and as amended by the Constitution Amendment Acts set out in clause (2) of that Order apply in relation to the State of Jammu and Kashmir' subject to the exceptions and modifications set out in the said clause."}}, {"text": "Article 246", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32336, "end_char": 32347, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32355, "end_char": 32376, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 246", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32510, "end_char": 32521, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "clause 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32579, "end_char": 32587, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32642, "end_char": 32658, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "K. STATE (Madon, J.) 871", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32942, "end_char": 32966, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and modifications are, however, irrelevant for our purpose inasmuch as Entries 95 and 92A of List I apply to tbe State of Jammu and\n\n....\n\nKHAZAN CHAND v. ], & K. STATE (Madon, J.) 871\n\nKashmir in an unmodified form."}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33039, "end_char": 33055, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of Jammu and K.ashmir", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 33103, "end_char": 33130, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By the same sub-clause, .List II in the Seventh Schedule, namely, the State List, does not apply to the State of Jammu and K.ashmir: Section 5 of the Constitution of Jammu anc!·"}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33132, "end_char": 33141, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33466, "end_char": 33487, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "clause 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33777, "end_char": 33785, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 265", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33806, "end_char": 33817, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33881, "end_char": 33892, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 165", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33961, "end_char": 33972, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33980, "end_char": 34001, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Dunedin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 34528, "end_char": 34535, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As was pointed out by Lord Dunedin in Whitney v. Commissioner of Inland Revenue(1); a passage cited with approval by the Fede ral Court in Chatturam and others v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bihar,(2) and by this Court in Messrs Chatturam Hori/ram Ltd. v.\n\nCommissioner of Income Tax, Bihar and Orissa<' J:\n\n\"Now, there are three stages in the imposition of a tax: there is the declaration of liability, that is the part o( the statute which determines what persons in respect of what property are liable."}}, {"text": "SUPRBMB COURT", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 35217, "end_char": 35230, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPRBMB COURT REPORTS\n\n(1984) 2 .S.C.R.\n\nLiability does not depend on assessment."}}, {"text": "Income Tax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36973, "end_char": 36993, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37033, "end_char": 37042, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income Tax Act, 1961", "statute": "the Income Tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37188, "end_char": 37197, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income Tax Act, 1961", "statute": "the Income Tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38208, "end_char": 38217, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38268, "end_char": 38277, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 16 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38285, "end_char": 38303, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38429, "end_char": 38438, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38473, "end_char": 38483, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38545, "end_char": 38555, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39172, "end_char": 39181, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39245, "end_char": 39255, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "clause 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39422, "end_char": 39430, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39505, "end_char": 39515, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39833, "end_char": 39842, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40854, "end_char": 40870, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41207, "end_char": 41223, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41394, "end_char": 41410, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41814, "end_char": 41830, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43418, "end_char": 43428, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43559, "end_char": 43568, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45841, "end_char": 45850, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46631, "end_char": 46640, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46749, "end_char": 46758, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46899, "end_char": 46908, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47204, "end_char": 47213, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47259, "end_char": 47268, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47411, "end_char": 47420, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48435, "end_char": 48444, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50546, "end_char": 50556, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sale of Goods Act, 1930", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 50566, "end_char": 50589, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50620, "end_char": 50630, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Sale of Goods Act, 1930", "statute": "the Sale of Goods Act, 1930"}}, {"text": "Section 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52083, "end_char": 52093, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sale of Goods Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 52103, "end_char": 52120, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52991, "end_char": 53001, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53400, "end_char": 53409, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53971, "end_char": 53980, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55884, "end_char": 55893, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56057, "end_char": 56066, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56087, "end_char": 56096, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 16 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56472, "end_char": 56490, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56524, "end_char": 56533, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56874, "end_char": 56883, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57019, "end_char": 57028, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57072, "end_char": 57081, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "SUPRBMB COURT RliPORts\n\n[1984) 2 S.C.R.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 57276, "end_char": 57315, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As we have seen, under sub-section (2) of section 7 quarterly returns are to be fun1ished within thirty day; from the expiry of the quarter and such return is to be accompanied by a: Treasury Receipt or any other proof of payment of tax due\n\n880 SUPRBMB COURT RliPORts\n\n[1984) 2 S.C.R.\n\naccording to that return."}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57523, "end_char": 57532, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57632, "end_char": 57641, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 16 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57649, "end_char": 57667, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57764, "end_char": 57773, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57873, "end_char": 57882, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57930, "end_char": 57939, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 0", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58091, "end_char": 58100, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58372, "end_char": 58381, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58617, "end_char": 58626, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59414, "end_char": 59423, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "P. N. Bbagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 59964, "end_char": 59978, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "32413 and 32414 of 1983 decided oo January 6 1983, by P. N. Bbagwati, Ac.", "canonical_name": "P. N: BHAGWATi"}}, {"text": "H Varadarajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 60015, "end_char": 60028, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H Varadarajan,' JJ."}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60315, "end_char": 60324, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60629, "end_char": 60638, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61061, "end_char": 61070, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62147, "end_char": 62156, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62547, "end_char": 62556, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_2_883_893_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "PREM CHAND JAIN & ANR.\n\nR. K. CHHABRA\n\nFebruary I 3, 1984\n\n{S. MJJRTAZA FAZAL ALI, A. V ARADARAJAN AND\n\nRANGANATH MISRA, JJ.j\n\nUnfrersity Grants Commission Act, 1956 (Act III of 1956) Sections 2 (f). 22 and.-23, Scope of-Right to confer degree and Right to have the word \"University\" associated to the name of an institution--Whether the wOrds ,.\"established\" or \"incorporated\" in section 2 (h}. 22 and 23 also included a univ, rsity regiStered C 1D1der the Companios Act of 1913?\n\nSectiOn 2 (f) of the University Commission Act; 1956 defines \"a University\" to ffiean : \"a University established or incorporated by or under a Central Aet, a Provincial A.ct,. or a State Act, and inc1udeS any such institution, as may in consultation with the University concerned, be recognised by the Commission in accordance with the regulations made in this behalf under this .Act''.\n\nSection 22 which empower the right to confer degrees and Section 23 which imposes the prohibition for use of the word \"University\" also ptovides that way.\n\nPenalties for contrave:riing the provi\".' sions of sections 22 and 23 are provided under section 24 o.f the Act but the proviso to section 23 exempts any institution having a suffix \"University\"· before the commencement of the University Grants Commission Act, _ for a period of two years only to enable it to take appropriate steps under the University Grants Con1mission Act. ·\n\nCommercial University which was registered. under the companies Act of 1913 and before the coming into force of the University Commission Grants Act, 1956 and was doing useful service to the students\n\ncommunity did not take any -steps as required under the new Act even p after the lapse of the two years, and therefore, the appellant came to be prosecuted for the offences under sections 22 and 23.\n\nThe appellants having lost their case including in the High Court have come up- in appeal by way of. special leave.\n\nAllowing the appeil iti. part and setting asde the convictions and\n\nsntence of fine? the Coqrt\n\nG ·\n\n884 SuPllmlE'coURT REPORTS\n\n(1985) 2 S.C.R.\n\nHELD I : I The University Grants Commission Act, 1956 did nOt intend to admit a commpany incorporated under the Companies Act into the definition of a ''University,' under section 2 (f), or for - the purposes of Section 23. Several institutions stayaing themelves as cuniversities' had started awarding degrees and. diplomas which had no basis and could not be accepted.\n\nKeeping in view the mischief which wa~ sought to be eradicated and the _consideration which weighed with Parliament to introduce the prohibition in the Act, the Act recognises only those institutions established or incorpoq1.ted under special statutes of sovereign leg; slatures. (890D-E)\n\n1:2 The definition of university and' the provisions in S.23 of the Act refer to Acts of the Cenlral, Provincial or the State legislatures by which one or more universities are established or incorporated and not to institutions incorporated under a general statute providing for incorporation.\n\nThe words \"established\" or \"incorporated'' referred to Act under which universities are established or incorporated. Several universities in this country have been either established or incorporated under special statutes, such as the Delhi University Act, the Banaras Hindu , University Act, the Allahabad University Act etc.\n\nIn these cases, there is\n\n~ special Act e; ther of the Central or the _Provincial or the State legislatures e_stablishing and incorporating the particular universitiCs. There is a)so another pattern-where urider one compondious Act several universities efe either-established or incorporated-for instance, the Madhya Pradesh Universities Act 1913. [889a-E; P]\n\n1 :3 Commercial University Ltd. when incorporated under the Companies Act, therefore, did not satisfy the definition as also the provisions of section 23 of Act consequently the prosecution under section 23 was valid. [889H]\n\nAttorney General v. H.R.H. Augushtis [1957] I All\n\nE.R. 49\n\n(HL); Bhagwan Prasad v. Secretary of State; AIR 1940 P.C. 8_2, quoted with approval.\n\n2:1 The-definition of University given in section 2 (f) or the prohibition in section 23 of the Act are not ultra vires the Parliament on the ground that such provisionS are beyond its legislative competence. [ 8 91 F]\n\n2:2 'Education including universities' was a State subject until by the 42nd Amendment of the Constitution in 1976, that entry was omitted from the State lis~ and, was taken into entry 25 of the Concurrent Ii st.\n\nThe University Grants Commissions Act essentially intended to make provisions for the coordination and determination of standards in univer sitics and that, is squarely covered under entry 66 of list I.\n\nWhile legislatin1 for a purpose germane to the subject covered by that entry and establishing a University Grants Commission, Parliament consicred .it necessary, as a regulatory measure, to prohibit unauthorised conferment of degrees and diplomas as also use of the word 'university' by institution which had not been either established or incorporated by special Icgisla,-\n\nPREM CHA)ID JAi)! V. ll.IC. CHIUJIRA\n\nation.\n\nIn doing s.o the Parliament did uot entrench upon lc&islativc power reserved for the State legislature. [890EG)\n\n2:3.\n\nThe legal position is well-settled that the en_tries incorporated in the lists.covered by Schedule VII are not powers of legislation but 'fields' of legislation.\n\nSuch entries are mere legislative heads and are of an enabling character.\n\nThe language of the entries s.hould be siven the widest scope or amplitude.\n\nBach general word has been asked to be extended to all ancillary or subsidiary matters which can fairly and reasonably be comprehended.\n\nAn entry confers powers Upon the legislature to legislate for matters ancillary or incidental, including provision for avoiding the law.\n\nAs long as the legislation is within the permissible field in pith and substance, objection would not be.entertained merely on the ground that while enacting legislation, provision has been made for a matter which though germane for the purpose for which competent legislation is made it covers an aspect beyond it.\n\nIf an enactment subs. tantially falls within the powers expressly conferred by the Constitution upon the legislature enacting it, itcannot be held to be invalid merely because it incidentally encroaches on matters assigned to another legislature. [891AB]\n\nHarakchand v. Union of India, [1970] 1 S.C.R. 479 at p. 489; Stall of Bihar v. Kameswar, [1952] S.C.R. 889; Navlnchandra v. C.I.T. [1955] 2 S.C.R. 829 at p. 836 ; State of Madras v. Cannon Dunkerley, [1959] S.C.R. 379 at p. 391 ; The Check Post Officer & Others v. K.P. Abdulla Bros, [1971] 2 S.C.R. 817 ; State of Karnataka v. Ranganatha, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 641 at p. 661 ; KSE Board v. Indian Aluminium, [1976] 1.S.C.R. 552 ; Subramanyam Cttiar v.\n\nMuthuswami, [1945] F.C.R. 179 ; Praful/a Kumar Mukherjee & Other• v. Bank of Commerce, [1947] F.C.R. 28; Ganga Sagar Co. v. U.P .. State, [1960] S.C.R. 769 at p. 782.\n\nThe observations in Azeez Pasha & Anr v. Union of India (1968) I.S.C.R. 833 were with reference to the rights of the minority community to establish a university in exercise of its right guaranteed under Art.\n\n30 of the Constitution.\n\nAdmittedly. CUL is not an institution belonging to any minority community.\n\nIt will not be appropriate either to allow aruguments based on what has been observed with reference to an institution belonging to the minority community or to examine the vires of the Act with reference to what dOes not arise for consideration in the appeals. [892A-B)\n\nThough the proviso to s. 2 3 had specifid a period of two years within which the word 'university' had to be omitted by the institution not entitled to its use yet there is scope for the submission that being incorporated under a Central Act, the people connected with CUL worked under the bona fide . impression that sue~ incorporation satisfied the requirements of the Act.\n\nIn such circumstances, the conviction of the appellant must be set aside. (8920-E)\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal Nos. 2S3-254 of 1972. ·\n\nfrom the Jud$ment and Order dated the 6th day of January,\n\n•ID\n\n1972 or the Delhi High Court in Criminal Appeal Nos. 103 & 104 of 71.\n\nShanti Bhushan, R.K. Garg, Shiv Dayal and S. K. Bagga for the Appellants.\n\nHharbans Lal, R. N. Poddar, Ms. Halda Khatun and C. V. S, ubba Rao for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nRANGANATH MISRA, J. Both these appeals are by Special leave and challenge is to the conviction and sentence of fine imposed under Section 24 of the University Grants Gommission Act, 1956 (III of 1956) ('Act' for short) by the learned Additional Sessions Judge and upheld by the Delhi High Court in appeal.\n\nCommercial University Limited (CUL for short) was incor-\n\n< porated under the Companies Act, 1913 (VII of 1913) with objects, inter alia, to promote commercial education, encourage and impart commercial education by opening institutes, colleges and schools . and provide, prescribe. and maintain various standards of studies and examinations in the study of. commercial subjects and 'to ascer:\n\nlain by means of examinations and/or otherwise the persons who acquire the prescribetl standards and to confer on such persons any academic diplomas, degrees, etc. It has a Board of Governors and the Registrar of the University is one of the Ex-Officio Governors.\n\nThis institution claims to have expanded its activities and regular convocations have been held for awarding degrees and diplomas.\n\nThe Act came into force in 1 956 and for the first time provided restrictions under ss. 22 and 23 of the Act to the following effect :\n\n\"S.22. the right io confer degrees-\n\n(!) The right of conferring or granting degrees shall be exercised only by a University established or incorporated by or under a Central Act, a Provincial Act or a State Act or an institution deemed to be a University under section 3 or an institution specially empowered by an Act of Parliament to confer or grant degrees.\n\n(2) Save as provided in sub-section (I) no person or authority shall confer, or grant, or hold himself or itself out as entitled to confer or grant, any degree.\n\n. . r\n\nPREM CHAND JAIN v. R. K. CHHABRA (Ranganath Misr11, J.) gg7\n\n(3) For the purpose of this section, \"degree means any such degree as may, with the previous approval of the Central Government, be specified in this behalf by the Commission by notification in the official gazeUe.\"\n\n\"S.53. No institution, whether a corporate body or not, other than a University established or incorporated by or under a Central Act, a Provincial Act or a State Act shall be entitled to have the word 'University' associated with its name in any manner whatsoever :\n\nProvided.that nothing in this section shall, for a period C of two years from the commencement of this Act, apply to an institution which, immediately before such commencement, had the word 'University' associated with its name.\"\n\nPenalties for contravening the proyisions of ss.22 and 23 were provided in s. 24 and whoever contravened those provisions became punishable with fine which would extend to rupees one thousand and if the person contravening was an association or other body of individuals, every member of such association or other body, who knowingly or willingly authorised or permitted the contravention was punishable with fine which would also extend to one thousand rupees. .,, The appellants came to be prosecuted for the offence under s. 24 of the Act as CUL continued to bear the description of University even after the period indicated in the proviso to s. 23 of the Act was over.\n\nBefore coming into force of the Act, there was no legislation in India which prohibited any individual or body from establishing a university and such university was free to confer degrees and diplomas. Section 22 prohibited privately established universities from conferring degrees and restricted such conferment to universities established by Acts passed by State legislatures or Parliament or institutions which were deemed to .be universities in the manner provided by the Act. Similarly, before the Act came into force there was no law which restricted the use of the wod 'University' and all institutions were free to associate this word with their names if they liked.\n\nSection 23, however, imposed the . restriction in absolute term and the proviso allowed a period of two years within which adjustments to the new situation brought about by law had to be made,\n\nOriginally there were five accused persons.\n\nOne of them died and in respect of another the prosecution was withdrawn as he resigned from CUL. .The prosecution continued against the remain •. ing three-Shri P.C. Jain and Smt. Sushi[a Sohni who are appel !ants in Criminal Appeal No. 253 of 1972 and Shri L.N. Mehra who is appellant in the connected criminal appeal.\n\nMr. Shanti Bhushan appearing for the appellants anvanced four contentions :-(I) CUL had been incorporated under the Companies Act of 1913 and is deemed to be a company under s. 3 ,~~~- . of the Companies Act, 1956, the prosecution was misconceived as the prohibition in s. 23 was not attracted. (II) The restriction imposed under s. 23 of the Actwas ultra vires because entry 11 which read as \"Education including universities\" was in list.II of Schedule VII of the Constitution and was a State subject but the Act in question was passed by Parliament. The long title of the Act reads as \"an Act to make provision for the coordination and determination of standards in universities and for that purpose, to establish a University Grants Commission\" and is covered by entry 66 oflist I of the Seventh Schedule. The restriction provided py s. 23 as such does not appear to be a matter squarely within the 'ambit of the entry and therefore such a provision is ultra vires the Constitution. (III) This Court observed in S. Azeez Basha & Anr. v . . Union of India(') as per Wanchoo, C. J. :\n\n\" ...... we should like to say that the words 'educational institutions' are of very wide import and would include a university also, This was not disputed on behalf of the union of India and therefore it may be accepted that a religious minority had the right to establish a university under Art. 30 (I). The position with respect to the establishment of Universities before the Constitution came into force in 1950 was this. There was no law in India which prohibited any private individual or body to establish a university ......... Thus, in law in India there was no prohibition against establishment of universities by private indivi duals or bodies and if any university was so established it . must of necessity be granting degrees before it could be called a university. But though such a univetsity might be granting degrees it did not follow that the Government of the country was bound to recognise those degrees ............. \"\n\n(!) (1968) I S. C. R. 833.\n\nPREM CHAND JAIN v. R .IC. CHHABRA (Ranganath Misra, J.) 889\n\nIt was urged by Mr. Shanti Bhushan that since Art. 30 guaranteed the right to establish a university to the minotity communities, the restrictions imposed by the Act would not be operative and to that extent the provision would be ultra vires the Constitution; (IV) All the three accused appellauts had severed their connection with CUL-Smt. Sohni resigned in Angus!, 1962; Shri Mehra in December, 1965; and Shri Jain in 1970. On the same analogy which led to withdrawal of the prosecution against Shri Anand Singh, the present prosecution should not have been pursued against the appellants.\n\nThe word 'university' has been defined in s. 2 (f) of the Act to mean: \"a University established or incorporated by or under a Central Act, a Provincial Act or a State Act, and includes any such institution as may, in consultation with the University concerned, be recognised by the commission in accordance with the regulations made in this behalf under this Act\". Section 23 of the Act imposing the prohibtion for use of the word 'University' also provides that way. Undoubtedly under the Companies Act when a company is duly registered, it gets incorporated and such incorporation brings into existence an independent legal entity different from the share-holders constituting it. Yet we are not prepared to agree with Mr. Shanti Bhushan that the Act intended to admit a company incorporated under the Companies Act into the definition or for the purpose of s. 23. The word \"established\" or \"incorporated\" referred to Acts under which universities are es.tablished or incorporated Several universities in this country have been either established or incorporated under special statutes, such as the Delhi University Act, the Banaras Hindu University Act, the Allahabad University Act etc. In these cases, there is a special Act either of the Ce11tral or the Provincial or the State legislatures establishing and incorporating the particular universities. There is also another pattern-where under one compendious Act several universities are either established or incorporateds-for instance, the Madhya Pradesh Universities Act, 1973. The definition of university and provisions in s. 23 of the Act refer to Acts of the Central, Provincial or the State legislatures by which one or more universities are established or incorporated and not to institutions incorporated under a general statue providing for incorporation.\n\nWe do not accept 'the contention of Mr. Shanti Bhushant that CUL when incorporated under the Companies Act satisfied the definition\n\nas also the provisions of s. 23 of Act and, therefore, there could\n\nbe no prosecution. We agree with the observation of Lord Somervell to the effect :\n\n\"The mischief against which the statute is directed and, perhaps though to an undefined extent, the surrounding circumstances can be considered\",\n\n\"In ascertaining the true legislative intention. (A. G. v.\n\nH. R. H. Augustus('). Lord Porter also spoke to the same effcet while speaking for the Board in the following words :\n\n\"A right construction of the Act can only be attained if its whole scope and object together with an analysis of its working and the circumstances in which it is enacted are taken into consideration.\"\n\nBhagawan Prasad v. Secretary of State('). SeYeral institutions styling themselves as 'universities' had started awarding degrees and diplomas which had no basis and could not be accepted. Keeping in view the mischief which was sought to be eradicated and the consideration which weighed with Parliament to introduce the prohibition in the Act, it must be held that the Act recognises only those institutions established or incorporated under special statutes of sovereign legislatures.\n\n'Education including universities' was a State subject until by the 42nd Amendment of the Constitution in 1976, that entry was omitted from the State list and, was taken into entry 25 of the_ concurrent \"list.\n\nBut as already pointed out the Act essentially intended to make provisions for the coordination and determination of standards in universities and that, as already indicated, is squarely covered under entry 66 of list I. While legislating for a purpose germane to the subject covered by that entry and establishing a University Grants Commis.sion, Parliament considered it necessary, as a regulatory measure, to prohibit un-· authorised conferment of degrees and diplomas as also use of the . word 'university' by institution which had not been either. established or incorporated by special legislation.\n\nWe are not inclined to agree with the submission advanced on behalf of the appellants that in doing so Parliament entrenched upon legislative power reserved for . the State legislature. fhe legal position is well-\n\n(1)\n\n(1057) 1 A. E. R. 49 (H.L.)\n\n(2) A. I. R. 1949 P. C. 82.\n\nPREM CHAND JAIN v. R. K. CHHABRA (Ranganath Misra, J.) 891\n\nsettled that the entries incorporated in the lists covered by Sche dule VII are not powers of legislation but 'fields' of legislation.\n\nHarakchand v.\n\nUnion of India(1). In State of Bihar :v.\n\nKameswar(') this Court has indicated that such entries are mere legislative heads and are of an enabling character. This Court, has clearly ruled that the language of the entries should be given the widest scope or 'amplitude.. Navinchandra v.\n\nC.T.T. (3) Each general word has been asked to be extended to all ancillary or subsidiary matters which can fairly and reasonably be comprehended. See State of Madras v.\n\nGannon Dunkerley('). It has also been held by this Court in The Check Post Officer and Others. v.\n\nK.P. Abdulla Bros (5) that an entry confers power upon the legislature to legislate for matters ancillary or incidental, including provision for avoiding .the law.\n\nAs long as the legisla tion is within the permissible field in pith and substance, objection would not be entertained merely on the ground that while enacting legislation, provision has been made for a matter which though germane for the purpose for. which competent legisl.ation is made it covers an aspect beyond it. In a seiies of decisions this Court has opined that if an enactment substantially falls wiihin the powers expressly conferred by the Constituiion upon the legislature enacting it, it cannot be heid to be invalid merely because it incidentally encroaches on matters assigned to another legis lature. See State of Karnataka v.\n\nRanganatha (6);' KSE Board\n\nv. India Aluminium (7); Subramanyam Chettiar v. Mutuswami ('); Prafulla Kumar Mukherjee & Othere v.\n\nBank of Commerce('); Ganga Sugar Co. v. UP. State (10).\n\nWe, therefore, do not accept the submission that the definition of university \"given in.s. 2 (f) or the prohibition in s. 23 of the Act are ultra vires the Parliament on the ground that such provisions are beyond its legislative competence.\n\n(1) ·(1970] 1 S. C.R. 479 at p. 489. (2)\n\n(195.2] S. C. R. 889.\n\n(3) (1955] 2 S. C. R. 129 at p. 836. (4) (1959] S. C, R. 379 at p. 391. (5)\n\n(1971] 2 S. C.R. 817. (6) (1978] IS. C.R. 641 at p. 661.\n\n(7) (1976] ! S. C. R. 552.\n\n(8) (1945) F. C.R. 179.\n\n(9) [1947] F. C.R. 28.\n\n(10) (1960] S. C.R. 569 at p. V82.\n\n. ~,.\n\nIn the decision of this Court in the case of. Azee• Basha, the observations relied upon were with reference to the rights of the minority community to establish a university in exercise of its right giiaranteed under Art. 30 of the Constitution. Admittedly, CUL is not an institution belonging to any minority community.\n\nWe do not think it is appropriate to allow arguments to be canvassed in this case on the basis of what had been observed with reference to an institution belonging to the minority commu- ' uity. Nor is it appropriate that the vires of the Act should be examined with reference io what does not arise for consideration in the appeals before us.\n\nThere is no dispute that prosecution against Shri Anand Singh was withdrawn as he had resigned from CUL after the case was launched. The claim of Mr. Shanti Bhushan that the three accused persons have resigned between 1962 to 1970 as already indicated has not been disputed.\n\nThough the proviso to s. 23 had specified a period of two years within which the word 'university' had to be omitted by the institution not entitled to its use, yet there is scope for the submission of Mr. Shanti Bhushan that being incorporated under a Central Act, the people connected with CUL worked under the bona fide impression that such incorporation satisfied the requirements of the Act.\n\nIn such circumstances, we think it appropriate to accept the submission advanced on behalf of the appellants to a limited extent and allow the appeals and set aside the conviction of the appellants under s. 24 of the Act. They are acquitted of the offence and fines if already realised be refunded.\n\nBefore we part with the matter, we think it appropriate to deal with another aspect. Under s. 3 of the Act provision has been made that the Central Government may on .the advice of the Commission declare by notification in the official gazette any institution for higher education other than a university to be deemed to be a uuiversity for the purposes of the Act and when such declaration is made, all the provisions of the Act would apply to such an institution as if it were a university within the definition of the term in s. 2 (f). CUL may make an application to the Central Government for such recognition and on the advice of the University Grants Commission, the Central Government should dispose of the same in accordance with law.\n\nWe have been told that the institution has been working very satisfactorily\n\nand has, to its credit, a long history of service in the field of\n\nPREM CHAND iAIN v. i!.. K. CHHABRA (Ranganath Missra, i.) 893\n\neducation.\n\nWe are hopeful that taking all aspects into considra tion botJj the Commission as also the Central Government would consider the request of the institution to be recognised under s. 3 of the Act. If it is so recognised the institution would be able to confer degrees as provided in s. 22 of the Act.\n\nIt is for the Central Government next to consider whether an institution covered by s. 3 of the Act would not satisfy the provision of s. 23 of the Act and if in the opinion of the Central Government such an institution is not covered, whether an appropriate amendment to s .. 23 should not be made so as to exclude recognised institutions under s. 3 of the Act from the field of prohibition covered by s. 23 of the Act. CUL should make the application within one month from now and the Central Government should examine the matter appwpriately and pass proper orders or directions within six months thereafter.\n\nAt any rate the institution should have reasonable time-until end of 1984-to take such.appropriate steps as it may be advised, to avoid fnrther Prosecution under the Act.\n\nS.R.\n\nAppeal partly allowed.", "total_entities": 128, "entities": [{"text": "PREM CHAND JAIN & ANR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 21, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PREM CHAND JAIN & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. K. CHHABRA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24, "end_char": 37, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R. K. CHHABRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February I 3, 1984", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 39, "end_char": 57, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. K. CHHABRA\n\nFebruary I 3, 1984\n\n{S. MJJRTAZA FAZAL ALI, A. V ARADARAJAN AND\n\nRANGANATH MISRA, JJ.j\n\nUnfrersity Grants Commission Act, 1956 (Act III of 1956) Sections 2 (f)."}}, {"text": "S. MJJRTAZA FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 60, "end_char": 81, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RANGANATH MISRA, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 104, "end_char": 123, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RANGANATH MISRA, JJ", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Unfrersity Grants Commission Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 127, "end_char": 165, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sections 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 184, "end_char": 194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Unfrersity Grants Commission Act, 1956", "statute": "Unfrersity Grants Commission Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 381, "end_char": 390, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Unfrersity Grants Commission Act, 1956", "statute": "Unfrersity Grants Commission Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 871, "end_char": 881, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Unfrersity Grants Commission Act, 1956", "statute": "Unfrersity Grants Commission Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 928, "end_char": 938, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Unfrersity Grants Commission Act, 1956", "statute": "Unfrersity Grants Commission Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "sections 22 and 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1078, "end_char": 1096, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Unfrersity Grants Commission Act, 1956", "statute": "Unfrersity Grants Commission Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1116, "end_char": 1126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Unfrersity Grants Commission Act, 1956", "statute": "Unfrersity Grants Commission Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1158, "end_char": 1168, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Unfrersity Grants Commission Act, 1956", "statute": "Unfrersity Grants Commission Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "University Grants Commission Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1254, "end_char": 1286, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1462, "end_char": 1475, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "University Commission Grants Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1524, "end_char": 1562, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sections 22 and 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1788, "end_char": 1806, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the University Commission Grants Act, 1956", "statute": "the University Commission Grants Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "University Grants Commission Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2087, "end_char": 2125, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Ot intend to admit a commpany incorporated under the Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2131, "end_char": 2197, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2244, "end_char": 2253, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Ot intend to admit a commpany incorporated under the Companies Act", "statute": "Ot intend to admit a commpany incorporated under the Companies Act"}}, {"text": "Section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2284, "end_char": 2294, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Ot intend to admit a commpany incorporated under the Companies Act", "statute": "Ot intend to admit a commpany incorporated under the Companies Act"}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2549, "end_char": 2559, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Keeping in view the mischief which wa~ sought to be eradicated and the _consideration which weighed with Parliament to introduce the prohibition in the Act, the Act recognises only those institutions established or incorpoq1.ted under special statutes of sovereign leg; slatures. ("}}, {"text": "S.23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2790, "end_char": 2794, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Ot intend to admit a commpany incorporated under the Companies Act", "statute": "Ot intend to admit a commpany incorporated under the Companies Act"}}, {"text": "Delhi University Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3265, "end_char": 3285, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh Universities Act 1913", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3668, "end_char": 3704, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Commercial University Ltd.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3724, "end_char": 3750, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "889a-E; P]\n\n1 :3 Commercial University Ltd. when incorporated under the Companies Act, therefore, did not satisfy the definition as also the provisions of section 23 of Act consequently the prosecution under section 23 was valid. [", "canonical_name": "Commercial University Limited"}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3779, "end_char": 3792, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3862, "end_char": 3872, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Madhya Pradesh Universities Act 1913", "statute": "the Madhya Pradesh Universities Act 1913"}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3915, "end_char": 3925, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Madhya Pradesh Universities Act 1913", "statute": "the Madhya Pradesh Universities Act 1913"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4133, "end_char": 4142, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Madhya Pradesh Universities Act 1913", "statute": "the Madhya Pradesh Universities Act 1913"}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4169, "end_char": 4179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Madhya Pradesh Universities Act 1913", "statute": "the Madhya Pradesh Universities Act 1913"}}, {"text": "Schedule VII", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5359, "end_char": 5371, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1970] 1 S.C.R. 479", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 6462, "end_char": 6481, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1955] 2 S.C.R. 829", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 6563, "end_char": 6582, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1971] 2 S.C.R. 817", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 6716, "end_char": 6735, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1978] 1 S.C.R. 641", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 6772, "end_char": 6791, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1945] F.C.R. 179", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 6892, "end_char": 6909, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1947] F.C.R. 28", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 6967, "end_char": 6983, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art.\n\n30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7252, "end_char": 7260, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "CUL", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7295, "end_char": 7298, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CUL is not an institution belonging to any minority community."}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7653, "end_char": 7657, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shanti Bhushan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8302, "end_char": 8316, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shanti Bhushan, R.K. Garg, Shiv Dayal and S. K. Bagga for the Appellants.", "canonical_name": "Shanti Bhushan"}}, {"text": "R.K. Garg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8318, "end_char": 8327, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shanti Bhushan, R.K. Garg, Shiv Dayal and S. K. Bagga for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "Shiv Dayal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8329, "end_char": 8339, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shanti Bhushan, R.K. Garg, Shiv Dayal and S. K. Bagga for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "S. K. Bagga", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8344, "end_char": 8355, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shanti Bhushan, R.K. Garg, Shiv Dayal and S. K. Bagga for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "Hharbans Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8377, "end_char": 8389, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hharbans Lal, R. N. Poddar, Ms. Halda Khatun and C. V. S, ubba Rao for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "R. N. Poddar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8391, "end_char": 8403, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hharbans Lal, R. N. Poddar, Ms. Halda Khatun and C. V. S, ubba Rao for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "Halda Khatun", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8409, "end_char": 8421, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hharbans Lal, R. N. Poddar, Ms. Halda Khatun and C. V. S, ubba Rao for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "C. V. S", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8426, "end_char": 8433, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hharbans Lal, R. N. Poddar, Ms. Halda Khatun and C. V. S, ubba Rao for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "ubba Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8435, "end_char": 8443, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hharbans Lal, R. N. Poddar, Ms. Halda Khatun and C. V. S, ubba Rao for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "Section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8639, "end_char": 8649, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "University Grants Gommission Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8657, "end_char": 8695, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Delhi High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8787, "end_char": 8803, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nRANGANATH MISRA, J. Both these appeals are by Special leave and challenge is to the conviction and sentence of fine imposed under Section 24 of the University Grants Gommission Act, 1956 (III of 1956) ('Act' for short) by the learned Additional Sessions Judge and upheld by the Delhi High Court in appeal."}}, {"text": "Commercial University Limited", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8816, "end_char": 8845, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Commercial University Limited (CUL for short) was incor-\n\n< porated under the Companies Act, 1913 (VII of 1913) with objects, inter alia, to promote commercial education, encourage and impart commercial education by opening institutes, colleges and schools .", "canonical_name": "Commercial University Limited"}}, {"text": "Companies Act, 1913", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8894, "end_char": 8913, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 22 and 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9692, "end_char": 9705, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Companies Act, 1913", "statute": "the Companies Act, 1913"}}, {"text": "S.22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9745, "end_char": 9749, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Companies Act, 1913", "statute": "the Companies Act, 1913"}}, {"text": "Provincial Act or a State Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9926, "end_char": 9955, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10006, "end_char": 10015, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Provincial Act or a State Act", "statute": "Provincial Act or a State Act"}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10446, "end_char": 10464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "r\n\nPREM CHAND JAIN v. R. K. CHHABRA (Ranganath Misr11, J.) gg7\n\n(3) For the purpose of this section, \"degree means any such degree as may, with the previous approval of the Central Government, be specified in this behalf by the Commission by notification in the official gazeUe.\""}}, {"text": "S.53", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10555, "end_char": 10559, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Provincial Act or a State Act", "statute": "Provincial Act or a State Act"}}, {"text": "University established or incorporated by or under a Central Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10623, "end_char": 10687, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Provincial Act or a State Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10691, "end_char": 10720, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss.22 and 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11098, "end_char": 11110, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Provincial Act or a State Act", "statute": "Provincial Act or a State Act"}}, {"text": "s. 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11128, "end_char": 11133, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Provincial Act or a State Act", "statute": "Provincial Act or a State Act"}}, {"text": "s. 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11578, "end_char": 11583, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Provincial Act or a State Act", "statute": "Provincial Act or a State Act"}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11700, "end_char": 11705, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Provincial Act or a State Act", "statute": "Provincial Act or a State Act"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11793, "end_char": 11798, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before coming into force of the Act, there was no legislation in India which prohibited any individual or body from establishing a university and such university was free to confer degrees and diplomas."}}, {"text": "Section 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11931, "end_char": 11941, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12406, "end_char": 12416, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "CUL", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12738, "end_char": 12741, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One of them died and in respect of another the prosecution was withdrawn as he resigned from CUL."}}, {"text": "P.C. Jain", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12807, "end_char": 12816, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".The prosecution continued against the remain •. ing three-Shri P.C. Jain and Smt."}}, {"text": "Sushi[a Sohni", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12826, "end_char": 12839, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sushi[a Sohni who are appel !"}}, {"text": "L.N. Mehra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12904, "end_char": 12914, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "253 of 1972 and Shri L.N. Mehra who is appellant in the connected criminal appeal."}}, {"text": "Shanti Bhushan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12971, "end_char": 12985, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Shanti Bhushan appearing for the appellants anvanced four contentions :-(I) CUL had been incorporated under the Companies Act of 1913 and is deemed to be a company under s. 3 ,~~~- .", "canonical_name": "Shanti Bhushan"}}, {"text": "CUL had been incorporated under the Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13047, "end_char": 13096, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13141, "end_char": 13145, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "CUL had been incorporated under the Companies Act", "statute": "CUL had been incorporated under the Companies Act"}}, {"text": "Companies Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13161, "end_char": 13180, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13237, "end_char": 13242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Companies Act, 1956", "statute": "the Companies Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13297, "end_char": 13302, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Companies Act, 1956", "statute": "the Companies Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "II of Schedule VII of the Constitution and was a State subject but the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13407, "end_char": 13481, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13759, "end_char": 13775, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "II of Schedule VII of the Constitution and was a State subject but the Act", "statute": "II of Schedule VII of the Constitution and was a State subject but the Act"}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13805, "end_char": 13810, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "II of Schedule VII of the Constitution and was a State subject but the Act", "statute": "II of Schedule VII of the Constitution and was a State subject but the Act"}}, {"text": "Wanchoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14036, "end_char": 14043, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Union of India(') as per Wanchoo, C. J. :\n\n\" ...... we should like to say that the words 'educational institutions' are of very wide import and would include a university also, This was not disputed on behalf of the union of India and therefore it may be accepted that a religious minority had the right to establish a university under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14347, "end_char": 14354, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "II of Schedule VII of the Constitution and was a State subject but the Act", "statute": "II of Schedule VII of the Constitution and was a State subject but the Act"}}, {"text": "Government of the country", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14916, "end_char": 14941, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But though such a univetsity might be granting degrees it did not follow that the Government of the country was bound to recognise those degrees ............. \"\n\n(!) ("}}, {"text": "Ranganath Misra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15059, "end_char": 15074, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CHHABRA (Ranganath Misra, J.) 889\n\nIt was urged by Mr. Shanti Bhushan that since Art.", "canonical_name": "RANGANATH MISRA, JJ"}}, {"text": "Art. 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15131, "end_char": 15138, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sohni", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15427, "end_char": 15432, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sohni resigned in Angus!,"}}, {"text": "Mehra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15464, "end_char": 15469, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1962; Shri Mehra in December, 1965; and Shri Jain in 1970."}}, {"text": "Jain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15498, "end_char": 15502, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1962; Shri Mehra in December, 1965; and Shri Jain in 1970."}}, {"text": "Anand Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15588, "end_char": 15599, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the same analogy which led to withdrawal of the prosecution against Shri Anand Singh, the present prosecution should not have been pursued against the appellants."}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15721, "end_char": 15725, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "University established or incorporated by or under a Central Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15753, "end_char": 15817, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Provincial Act or a State Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15821, "end_char": 15850, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16045, "end_char": 16055, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Provincial Act or a State Act", "statute": "Provincial Act or a State Act"}}, {"text": "Undoubtedly under the Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16148, "end_char": 16183, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Shanti Bhushan that the Act intended to admit a company incorporated under the Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16405, "end_char": 16497, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16540, "end_char": 16545, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Shanti Bhushan that the Act intended to admit a company incorporated under the Companies Act", "statute": "Shanti Bhushan that the Act intended to admit a company incorporated under the Companies Act"}}, {"text": "Delhi University Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16781, "end_char": 16801, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Banaras Hindu University Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16807, "end_char": 16835, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh Universities Act, 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17178, "end_char": 17215, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17264, "end_char": 17269, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Madhya Pradesh Universities Act, 1973", "statute": "the Madhya Pradesh Universities Act, 1973"}}, {"text": "Shanti Bhushant that CUL when incorporated under the Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17544, "end_char": 17610, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17663, "end_char": 17668, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Shanti Bhushant that CUL when incorporated under the Companies Act", "statute": "Shanti Bhushant that CUL when incorporated under the Companies Act"}}, {"text": "Somervell", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17762, "end_char": 17771, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We agree with the observation of Lord Somervell to the effect :\n\n\"The mischief against which the statute is directed and, perhaps though to an undefined extent, the surrounding circumstances can be considered\",\n\n\"In ascertaining the true legislative intention. ("}}, {"text": "Porter", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18023, "end_char": 18029, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Porter also spoke to the same effcet while speaking for the Board in the following words :\n\n\"A right construction of the Act can only be attained if its whole scope and object together with an analysis of its working and the circumstances in which it is enacted are taken into consideration.\""}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21751, "end_char": 21755, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21782, "end_char": 21787, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "(1970] 1 S. C.R. 479", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 21910, "end_char": 21930, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "(1955] 2 S. C. R. 129", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 21974, "end_char": 21995, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "(1971] 2 S. C.R. 817", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 22047, "end_char": 22067, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "(1945) F. C.R. 179", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 22137, "end_char": 22155, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1947] F. C.R. 28", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 22162, "end_char": 22179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Azee• Basha", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22271, "end_char": 22282, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Azee• Basha, the observations relied upon were with reference to the rights of the minority community to establish a university in exercise of its right giiaranteed under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22442, "end_char": 22449, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23190, "end_char": 23195, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shanti Bhushan that being incorporated under a Central Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23374, "end_char": 23432, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23770, "end_char": 23775, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Shanti Bhushan that being incorporated under a Central Act", "statute": "Shanti Bhushan that being incorporated under a Central Act"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23957, "end_char": 23961, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Shanti Bhushan that being incorporated under a Central Act", "statute": "Shanti Bhushan that being incorporated under a Central Act"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24395, "end_char": 24399, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Shanti Bhushan that being incorporated under a Central Act", "statute": "Shanti Bhushan that being incorporated under a Central Act"}}, {"text": "University Grants Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 24505, "end_char": 24533, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CUL may make an application to the Central Government for such recognition and on the advice of the University Grants Commission, the Central Government should dispose of the same in accordance with law."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25008, "end_char": 25012, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25111, "end_char": 25116, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25214, "end_char": 25218, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25265, "end_char": 25270, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25476, "end_char": 25480, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25533, "end_char": 25538, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_2_894_899_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "E ,\n\nA. MADAN MOHAN\n\nv ..\n\nKALA VAKUNTA CHANDRASEKHARA\n\nFebruary 14, 1984\n\n(S. MURT AZA FAZAL ALI, A. VARADARAJAN AND\n\nRANGANATH MISRA, JJ.]\n\nRepresentation of the Peo_ple At, 1951;\n\nSections 81, 82 and 86-Schedu/es and'annexure~; to election petition 1101 served on the opposite party-Fai/ure-Wheiher renders the petition liable to be rejected in llmine.\n\nThe respondent fi)ed an election petition in the High Court allegin& that th~ returned candidate (petitioner herein) had committed corrupt prac tices which rendered his election void. The returned candidate made an application stating that the respondent had committed breach of the manda tor.y provisions of section 81 (3) in that with the copy of the election petition served on him, copies of documents and schedules which formed an integral part of the election petition, had not been enclosed and that for this reason the election petition was liable to be dismissed in liminc unJer section 86.\n\nThe High Court dismissed his application. In the special leave petition the returned candidate has urged the same argument advanced by him before the High Court.\n\nDismissing the pciition,\n\nHELD : There is no requirement of law that the documents or schedules to the election petition should also be served on the candidate because if they were filed in Court il is always open; to the returned candidate to inspect them and find out the allegations made in the petition. Documents or sche dules donot forn1 an integral part of the election petition. [897E-F]\n\nIn the instant case all that was necessa.ry to be done by the election petitioner had been done. The election petition was accompanied by as many copies as there were responden:s. It was duly verified and copies thereof were accompanied by necessary schedµlcs containing the details of corrupt practices and the schedules were also signed by the pet!tioner. [897£..F]\n\nSahodrabai Rat v. Ram Singh Aharwar, [1968. 3 SCR and M. V. Hamle,\n\n[1983) 2 sec 473, held inapplicable.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Special Leave Petition\n\n(Civil) No. 11868 of 1983.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated the 16th July, 1983 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Application No. 53 of 83.\n\nSo/i J. . Sorabjce, V.R. Reddy; K. Rajendra Chowdhary and K. Shivraj Chowdhary for the Petitioner.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAzAL ALI, J: .This petition for special leav~ is directed against an interlocutory Order dated July 16, 1983 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court rejecting the application of the petitioner for dismissing the election petition of the respondent in limine under s. 86 of the Repsesentaiion of the People Act (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'.)\n\nThe petition arises out. of an election to the Siddipets Assembly Constituency in Andhra Pradesh which took place on January 5, 1983. The petitioner was declared elected to the said Assembly. The respondent filed an election petition in the High Court alleging certain corrupt practices.\n\nThe short point for consideration before us is as to\" whether or not the election petition was liable to be dismissed in /imine under s. 86 of the Act as the copies of the documents and sche dules, which formed an integral part of the election petition, were not supplied to the petitioner which amounted to a clear breach of the mandatory provisions contained in s. 81 (3) of the Act.\n\n The High Court after hearing both the parties dismissed the application of the petitioner for throwing out the election petition of the respondent in /imine We have heard counsel for the parties at. length and it seems to us that the matter is no longer res integra and is covered by a decision of this Court is Sahodrabai Rai v.\n\nRam Singh Aharwar (') to which we shall refer hereafter. --------\n\n(!) (1968) 3 s.c.R. 13.\n\nSUPREME COURT R!PORTS it984) 2. S.C.R.\n\nOn the findings of the High Court three facts are clearly proved:\n\n(a) that when the election petition was filed, it was accompanied by as many copies as were.the respondents,\n\n(b) that the election petition was duly verified and the copies. thereof were accompanied by the necessary schedules containing the details of corrupt practices, and\n\n(c) that the schedules or the annexures to the petition were also .signed by the election petitioner (respondent).\n\nThe only complaint of the petitioner was that the copy of the election petition served on him was not accompanied by copies of the schedules and hence the1e was a clear breach of the provisions of s. 81 (3) of the Act. Section 81(3) may be extracted thus :\n\n\"81. Presentation of petitions-\n\n(3) Every election petition shall be accompanied by as many copies thereof as there are respondents mentioned in the petition, and every such copy shall be attested b ,., the petitioner under his own signature to be a true copy of the petition.\"\n\nAn. analysis of the above reveals-\n\n(a) that the petition should be accompanied by as many F copies as there are respondents, ·\n\n(b) that every such copy should be attested by the petitioner under his own signature to be a true copy of the petition.\n\nIt is not disputed in this case that both these conditions were fully satisfied.\n\nSection 83 of the Act contains four requirements, viz.,\n\n(a) that the election petition shall contain a concise statement of the material facts relied upon by the petitioner,\n\n{b) that the petitioner , should set forth the full particulars\n\nof the corrupt practices alleged,\n\nA. M. MOHAN v. ltALAVAIWNTA (Faza/ Ali, J.) 897\n\n(c) that the petition should be sigEed by the petitioner and verified in the manner laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure and where a corrupt practice is alleged the petition should also be accompanied by an affidavit in the prescribed form, giving the particulars of the corrupt practice, and\n\n(d) any schedule or annexure to the petition should also be signed and verified by the petitioner.\n\nThese conditions have also been fulfilled in the present case.\n\nThe counsel for the petitioner vehemently contended that as the schedules and other documents formed .an integral part _of the petition, the same should have been served on the petitioner (respondent in the. High Court) before it could be said that the pr_ovisions of ss. 81 and 82 of the Act had been complied with.\n\nIt was further argued that in the absence of such a compliance, the petition was liable to be rejectd in limine under s. 86 of the Act.\n\nWe are, however, unable to ai:; ree with this contention which does not at all flow from the plain and simple requirements of ss. 81 and 82. As indicated above, all that was necessary was done in this case and there was no requirement that the documents or the schedules .should also have been served on the petitioner because if they were flied in the Court it was always open to the petitioner to inspect them and find out the allegations made in the petition.\n\nWe are unable to hold that the documents or the schedules formed an integral part of the petition.\n\nAn identical question came up for consideration before this Court in Sahodrabai's case (supra) where while repelling a similar argument the following observations were made :\n\n\"The only proviion to which our attention has been drawn is sub-s. (3) of s. 81 and sub-s. (2) of s. 83. The first provides that every election petition shall be accompained by as many copies thereof as there are respondents mentioned in the petition and that every such copy _shall be an authenticated true copy. The words used here are only \"the election petition.\" There is no mention of any document acc_ompanying the election petition ......... Assistance is however taken from the provisions of sub-s. (2) of s. 83 which provides that any schedule or any annexure to the\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1984] 2 S.C.R.\n\npetition shall also be signed by the petitioner and verified in the same manner as the petition. It is contended that , since the pamphlet was an annexure to the petition it was not only necessary to sign and verify it, but that it should have been treated as a part of the election petition itself and a copy served upon the respondents. In this way, noncompliance with the provisions of s. 86 (I) is. made out. In our opinion, this is too strict a reading of the provisions.\n\nWe have already pointed out that s. 8 I (3) speaks only of the election petition ............ Even if this be not the case, we are quite clear that sub-s. (2) of s. 83 has reference not to a document which is proauced as evidence of the averments of the election petition but to avcrments of the election petition which are put, not in the election petition but in the accompanying schedules or annexures.\n\nBut what we have said here does not apply to documents which are merely evidence in the case but which for reasons of clarity and to lend force to the petition are not kept back but produced or filed .)Vith the election petitions.\n\nThey are in no sense an integal part of the averments of the. petition but are only .evidence of those averments and in proof thereof. The pamphlet therefore must be treated as a ·, document and not as a part of the election petition in so -far as averments are concerned ........ .It would lie stretching the words of sub-s. (2) of s. 83 too far to think that every document produced as evidence in the election petition becomes a part of the election petition proper.\"\n\nIt is a well settled principle of interpretation of statute that wherever a statute contains stringent provisions they must be literally and strictly construed so as to promote the object of the Act.\n\nAs extracted above, this Court clearly held that if the arguments of the appellant (in that case) were to be accepted, it would be stretching and straining the language of ss. 81 and 82 and we are in complete agreement with the view taken by this Court which has\n\ndedded the issue once for all.\n\nThe learned counsel relied on a latter decision of this Court iii the case of M. Karunanidhi v. H. V. Hande(1) where a Divison\n\n(1) [1983) 2 s.c.c. 473,\n\n. ' J\n\n\"\" .\n\nBench while considering a similar question made the following observations :\n\n\"The Preliminary issue and the appeal turn on a short point of construction. The question that arises is whether the words \"copies thereof\" in sub-section (3) of Section 81 comprehend the ' election petition proper or do they also include a schedule or annexure in terms of sub-section (2) of Section 83 or merely a document only in proof of the allegations in paragraph 18 (b) must. turn on a construction of sub-section (3) of Section 81 read with sub-section, (2) of Section 83. It now appears to be well set.tied by Sahodrabai' s case, (1968 (3) SCR 13) that s111;::secti_on (2) of section 83 applies only to a schedule or annexure which is an integral part of the election petition and Iiot to a document which is produced as evidence of the averments of the election petition..'' . . ,\n\nThis decision in no way departs from the ratio laid down in Sahodrabai's case (supra). The aforesaid case however, rested on the ground that the document (pamphlet) was expressly referred to in the election petition and thus became an integral part of the same and ought to have been served on the respondent. It is, therefore, manifest that the facts of the case cited above ae clearly distinguishable from the facts of the present case. Furthermore, the decision in M. Karunanidhi's case (supra) has noticed the previous decision and has fully endorsed. the same.\n\nFor these reasons, therefore, we are clearly of the opinion that the view taken by the High Court was correct and no interference is called for with the judgment of the High Court. As the matter was clearly concluded by authorities of this Court we did not think it necessary to grant special leave and hearing the parties at length we disposed of and dismiss the petition in tetms of the aforesaid observations. ·\n\nP.B.R.\n\nPetition dismissed.", "total_entities": 43, "entities": [{"text": "A. MADAN MOHAN", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5, "end_char": 19, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A. MADAN MOHAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "KALA VAKUNTA CHANDRASEKHARA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27, "end_char": 54, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KALAVAKUNTA CHANDRASEKHARA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 14, 1984", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 56, "end_char": 73, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "E ,\n\nA. MADAN MOHAN\n\nv ..\n\nKALA VAKUNTA CHANDRASEKHARA\n\nFebruary 14, 1984\n\n(S. MURT AZA FAZAL ALI, A. VARADARAJAN AND\n\nRANGANATH MISRA, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "S. MURT AZA FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 76, "end_char": 97, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. VARADARAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 99, "end_char": 113, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A. VARADARAJAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RANGANATH MISRA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 119, "end_char": 139, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RANGANATH MISRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Sections 81, 82 and 86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 183, "end_char": 205, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 666, "end_char": 676, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 945, "end_char": 955, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec 473", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1964, "end_char": 1971, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "J. . Sorabjce", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2198, "end_char": 2211, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So/i J. ."}}, {"text": "V.R. Reddy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2213, "end_char": 2223, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sorabjce, V.R. Reddy; K. Rajendra Chowdhary and K. Shivraj Chowdhary for the Petitioner."}}, {"text": "K. Rajendra Chowdhary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2225, "end_char": 2246, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sorabjce, V.R. Reddy; K. Rajendra Chowdhary and K. Shivraj Chowdhary for the Petitioner."}}, {"text": "K. Shivraj Chowdhary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2251, "end_char": 2271, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sorabjce, V.R. Reddy; K. Rajendra Chowdhary and K. Shivraj Chowdhary for the Petitioner."}}, {"text": "FAzAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2337, "end_char": 2346, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAzAL ALI, J: .This petition for special leav~ is directed against an interlocutory Order dated July 16, 1983 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court rejecting the application of the petitioner for dismissing the election petition of the respondent in limine under s. 86 of the Repsesentaiion of the People Act (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'.)"}}, {"text": "s. 86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2595, "end_char": 2600, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2764, "end_char": 2778, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of an election to the Siddipets Assembly Constituency in Andhra Pradesh which took place on January 5, 1983."}}, {"text": "s. 86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3105, "end_char": 3110, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3335, "end_char": 3340, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3782, "end_char": 3795, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COURT R!PORTS it984) 2."}}, {"text": "s. 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4479, "end_char": 4484, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 81(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4501, "end_char": 4514, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5153, "end_char": 5163, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5575, "end_char": 5602, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "ss. 81 and 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6208, "end_char": 6221, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6376, "end_char": 6381, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 81 and 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6521, "end_char": 6534, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sahodrabai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7028, "end_char": 7038, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An identical question came up for consideration before this Court in Sahodrabai's case (supra) where while repelling a similar argument the following observations were made :\n\n\"The only proviion to which our attention has been drawn is sub-s. (3) of s. 81 and sub-s. (2) of s. 83."}}, {"text": "s. 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7209, "end_char": 7214, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7233, "end_char": 7238, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7650, "end_char": 7655, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8142, "end_char": 8147, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8264, "end_char": 8268, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8393, "end_char": 8398, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9203, "end_char": 9208, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 81 and 82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9715, "end_char": 9728, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10246, "end_char": 10256, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10377, "end_char": 10387, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10513, "end_char": 10523, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10554, "end_char": 10564, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10647, "end_char": 10651, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 83", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10670, "end_char": 10680, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "M. Karunanidhi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11345, "end_char": 11359, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Furthermore, the decision in M. Karunanidhi's case (supra) has noticed the previous decision and has fully endorsed."}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_2_900_913_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "SMT. KAUSHALYA DEVI BOGRA AND OTHERS ETC.\n\nTHE LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER, AURANGABAD\n\nANDANR.\n\nFebruary 15, 1984\n\n[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, A. VARADARAJAN AND\n\nRANGANATH MISRA JJ.]\n\nConstltioa of Iudia 1950, Artie/• UI.\n\nSupr1me Court in appeal telling asld• jKdgl11'at of High Court-High Court directed to dispos1_ of cas• afresh-High Court wh1th1r entit/1d to resurrect th11ariilr Judlfl11'DI.\n\nLand AcquisitioR A.ct, 1894, Section 23-Lar11 tract of land acquired valuation of such lmtd--Transactions in respect of small properti'es do not offer proper guide-li1H1. • A large tract of land located with in the Municipal Limits was notified for acquisition under a.3 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act prevailing in the State of Hyderabad, corresponding to section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act. 1894 for a public purpose. Appeals were filed by two groups of people whose lands were acquired under a common notification-, and they were disposed of by the High Court by applying a common basis.\n\nDissatisfied with the compensation awarded, the first eroup of claimants and the State preferred appeals.\n\nA Division Bench of the High Codrt after dividing the land into zones for the purpose of fixation of compensation determined the compensation. Beine dissatisfied with the results, the claimants preferred appeals to this Court.\n\nIn the appeals, it was urged on behalf of the claimants that the decision of the Civil Judge in the second groups had not becoffie final and that an en~ hanced compensation was granted by the Civil Judge in that matter, and sought to introduce additional evidence, This Court set aside the judgments of the High Court, sent the cases bac'; tr> the Hi&h Court and directed the Hi&h Court to dispose them.\n\nIn the connected appeal (second group), the claimant being dissatisfied with the compensation awarded both by the Land A\"'!uisition . Collector aqd\n\n' I .\n\nKAUSHALYA DEVI V. LAND ACQN. OFFICER 901\n\nthe Civil Judge preferred an .appeal to the High Court, and a Division Beneh A which reassessed the evidence, held that as no acceptable material was on record to justify_any enhancement of compenation, that award of :the Land Acquisition Officer should be sustained, The appellant challenged this order of the High Court, in his appeal to this Court.\n\nWhen the appeals after remand (first group) came before the same Division Beneh, the High Court finding that no further evidence was forth ... ' coming either on behalf of the appellants or the State, held that the ear1ier Judgment of the High Court shotild be treafed as the substantive judgment declared it to be placed on tbe record as the judgment of the High Court after remand by the Supreme Court,. and thereby confirmed the aluation and cornpensatio~ awarded by the earHer Division Bench.\n\nAllowing the appeals by both the groups to this Court;\n\nHELD : 1 (i) The High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in dealing with the first appeals. This Court. in ex-ercise of its appellate powers vested in it u:Odcr Article 136 of the Constitution had set aside the Bench decision of the High Court delivered iP 1971 and that judgment for all inteDts _ and pur poses had become nonexistetit. Thepresent Division Bench of. the High Court was not entitled, by any process known to law, to resurrect that judgment into life. [909B-C]\n\n(ii) The dfrection of the appell<\"te court is binding on all courts subordinate thereto.\n\nThe provisions of Article 141 of the Constitution, require all Courts in India to be bound to follow the decisions of this Court. Judicial discipline requires and decorum known to law warrants. that appellate direc\n\ntions should be taken as binding and followed. [909D-E] E\n\nBroom v. Cassell & Co., [1972] 1 All. E.R 801 :.referred to.\n\nIn the instant case, a jqdgnient which has already been sCt aside has been brought on record and has been described as the judgment iri the first appeals. That judgment is a nullity. The Division\". Bench of the High Court a11owed itself to be s\"!'ayed awa:Yand landed up ina sitution which was wholly unwarranted. Some of its observations were uncalled for and greater restraint was expected, It was open to the High Court .to require the parties to move this Court for modification of the direction. If necessary, a reference could have been made to the Registry of this Court, so that this Court cotild have even taken suo motu action. If additional evidence w!s not forth coming, the Division Bench could have appJied its mind afresh to the materials already on record, and the appeals should have been disposed of by an independent judgment and not by restoring to life a judgment which had, in exercise. of appellate powers of this Court, been. rendered lifeless. [910GH; DFJ\n\n2. When large tracts of 13.nd are acquired, the transaction in respet of srna11 properties do not offer a proper guideline. Therefore, the valuation intransactions in regard to smaUer property is not taken asa real basis for determin ing the Compensaticn fot larger _tracts of Property. For determining the market value of a large property on the basis of a sale transaction for smaller property a dedction should be s; iven. A reduction of 25% was jndicated in one case:\n\nD . '\n\nwhile certain other cases indicated that the reduction should be to the extent of 1/3. [912F-H; 913A]\n\nPrithvi Raj Taneja v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Others, [1972] 2 S.C.R 633; Padma Uppal Etc. v. State of Punjab and Others, [1977] 1 S.C.R. 329; Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore v. T. Adinarayan Setty, [ 19S9] Suppl.\n\nI S.C.R. 404; referred to. •\n\nIn the instant case, the lands have been acquired in a toY.rn, which was in a developed part of the State, and was a constituted municipality. Not far away from it are places of tourist importance. A fort and a place of historical importance are in the vicinity of the town. There is. evidence that the Jands acquired are located close to these spots, and that these areas were developed and semi-developed portion of the 'town. The town had become the regional be. ad-quarters of a Zon~ of the State and had been industrially developing.\n\n~ .' , : I I The lands in qµestion had potential value which had to be kept in view in the matter of fixing the compensation under the iand Acquisition Act.\n\nTaking an overall picture of the matter) ccmpensation is fhted at' the rateof Rs. J.SO per spuare yard or Rs. 7260/- per acre for all the lands acquired by te notification in question. Over and above this amount, the appellants shall be entitled to statutory solatium of 15 % as also interest at the rate of 6 % per annum on additional compensation from the date of di. spossession till payment thereof.\n\nThe Collector to wOrk out.t:he compensation within two months. If the amount of com.pensation deter:mind is not paid within three months thereafter interest at 12 % per annum on. the additional compensation shall be payable till payment\n\nis made. [912C-D; 913D-E] .\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 2458- 7461 of 1981.\n\nAppeals by Special leave from the Judgment and Order dated . . the 16th October, 1979 of the Bombay High Court in 1st.\n\nAppeal Nos. 773/67, and 537/68, F.A. No. 774/67 and Cross Appeal No. 702/68.\n\nWITH\n\nCivil Appeal No. 2462 of 1981.\n\nAppeal by Special leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 15th October, 1979 of the Bombay High Court in Civil Appeal H No. 628 of 1972.\n\nShanti Bhushan, C.S. Vaidyanat'1, P. Chowdhary, M. Mudgal,\n\n,,.\n\nKAUSHALYA.DEVI v. LAND ACQN. OFFICER (Ranganatb Misra, J.) 983\n\nMs. Gurdip Kaur and Prasant Bhushan for the Appellants.\n\nO.P. Rana and M.N.\n\nShroff for the Re1pondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nRANGANATH MISRA, J. All these appeals are by special leave and seek to challenge two _separte judgments of the Bombay High Court. A large tract of land located within the municipal limits of Aurangabad within the State of Maharashtra wa11 notified for acquisition under section 3 (I) of the Land Acquisition Act prevailing in the State of Hyderabad ·(corresponding to s. 4 of the.\n\nLand Acquisition Act, Act I of 1894), by notification dated November 28, 1957, for the. purpose of locating a Medical College 11.nd an attached hospital. These lands can be conveniently referred to as Navkhanda and Ahmadibag properties. Four of these-appeals are by one group being Kausalya Devi Bogra and others and the other is by Syed Yusufuddin Syed Ziauddin.\n\nSince their lands were acquired under a common notification and as would be indicated later, the appeals were disposed of by the High Court by applying a common basis and these appeals at the request of the counsel have been heard together, they are being disposed of by a common judgment. The total acquisi_tion was of about 150 acres of land.\n\nOut of it, the first group owi; ied about 74 acres while the claim of Yusufuddin related to about 15 acres of land.\n\nIn so far as the lands of Kausalya _ Devi's group are concerned, the Land Acquisition Officer determined compensaion at 4 paise per square yard for the Navkhanda land in--the two blocks besides statutory solatium of 15%. At the•_instance of the clai. mants reference was made to the Civil Judge who raised the compensation o 15 paise per square yard as against the claim laid at the rate of Rs. 2.50 per square yard. So far as •Ahmadibag lands are concerned, the Land Acquisition Officer -awarded compensation at the rate of 3 paise per square yard and on a reference to the Court, the learned Civil Judge raised the compensation to 12 paise per square yard besides the statutory solatium of 15% while the claimants had asked for compensation at the rate of Rs. 1.50 per square yard. In both the cases the claimants as also !he State preferred appeals-the State challenging the 'enhancement and the claimants asking for more.\n\nA Diviiou\n\n...\n\n., .E\n\nBench of the Bombay High Court by judgment dated April 27, 1971, divided the Ahmadibag lands into three zones for the purpose of fixation of compensation; the firs.t portion was on the east, the portion which abutted the road near the main gate up to an indicated depth was treated as the second block and the patch of land which was to the north of the second portion was treated as the third block. The High Court fixed compensation at 12 paise per square yard for the middle portion and at 9 paise per square yard for the rest of .the land. So far as Navkhanda lands were concerned; the same was also divided into three zones and depending upon the location of these three blocks, compensation was fixed at 16 paise per square yard of the land in the zone abu'ttingthe road; 10 paise per square yard for the second zone and at 8 paise per square yard for the remaining lands forming the third zone. Being dissatisfied with the results obtained in the first.appeals before the High Court, the claimants came before this Court by certificate under Article 133 of the Constitution on the basis of valuation involved. Attempt was made to introduce additional evidence w.hich mainly consisted of material to show that. higher. compensation had been given for similarly situated , properties.\n\nBy Judgment dated March 23, 1979, in Civil Appeal Nos. 1035 & 1038 of 1972, this Court directed :\n\n\"We, therefore, allow the appeals, set aside the judgment of the High Court and send the cases back to the High Court to be restored and direct the High Court to take the appeals on its file and dispose them of according to law in the light of the directions given above.\" ·\n\nOne. of .the consi.deration for remand was reference to . two judgments of the Civil Judge where, .in respect of lands covered by the same Notification, compensation had been worked out at Rs. 4.50 per square yard. One of these judgments was the.case of Yusufuddin.\n\nAs.the ju.dgment of this Court would. show, it had been represented by the claimants before this Court that the decision .. of the Civil Judge in Yurnfuddin's case had not been challenged in appeal and had become final.\n\nThat was, however, not a fact and First Appeal No. 628/72 had been taken to the High Court by the State.\n\nIn Yusufuddin's case, as already indicated, the property acquired was around 15 acres. These lands were covered by two sector; 10 'acres and 16 gunthas appertained to Sej Nos. 3, 4 arn; l\n\n....\n\nic:AUSHALYA DEVI v. LAND ACQN. OFFICER (Ranganath Misra, J.) 905\n\n5 while 5 acres 32 gunthas related to Saj No. 167, and all these lands were situated close to the road leading from Aurangabad City to Panchakki. The Land Acquisition Officer had given an award of Rs. 5454.71 inclusive of solatium of 15% for the first sector and a sum of Rs. 4614.11 inclusive of the solatium in respect of 5 acres 32 gunthas in Sej 167. The appellant was aggrieved by the Award and laid claim of Rs. 40,360 in respect of first block and Rs. 2,26,512 in respect of the other. On the basis of the evidence placed on record, the learned Civil Judge came to hold that market value of the property on the date of the preliminary notification was Rs. 4.50 per square yard but as the claimants had claimed a lesser amount, he confined the compensation to the amount claimed and fixed the compensation accordingly. The decision of the Civil Judge was challenged in appeal as already indicated. The High Court re-assessed the evidence and came to hold that no acceptable material was on record to justify any enhancement of compensation and the Award of the Land Acquisition Offiicer should be sustained. Accordingly, the decision of the Civil Jndge was vacated and if out of the enhanced compensation any amount had been paid, refnnd thereof was directed.\n\nThis first appeal of the State against Ynsufuddin was disposed of by a Division Bench consisting of Deshmukh, C.J. and Deshpande, J. on October 15, 1979. Before the same Division Bench the other batch of first appeals remanded pursuant to the direction of this Court came up for hearing ou the next day, viz., October 16, 1976. The High Court referred to these first appeals as once upon disposed of by a Division Bench of the Court and stated :\n\n\"Being dissatisfied with this common judgment disposing of the four appeals, the claimants carried the matter to the Supreme Court on leave from this Court. According to the provisions of the law then existing, the leave granted was as a matter of course as the claim involved in each of the appeals was much more than Rs. 20,000 at all stages of the litigation. After obtaining a certificate of fitness for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court on I 7th December 1971 from this Court, the petition of appeal was filed in the Supreme Court on 15th February 1972. Certain statements were made in this petition of appeal with an allegation that steps were being taken .to produce additional\n\nSUPRBME COURT REPORTS [19841 i s.c.lt.\n\nevidence by a separate application as per rules. Accordingly, a separate application for production of additional evidence was made on 27th February 1972. Presuma.bly\n\na copy of the appeal memo, as also a copy of this appliication was served upon the State Government of Maharashtra, who were the respondents, and we further presume that those copies were made available to the learned counsel who were engaged by the State to defend the said appeals. We are told that before the matter comes up for hearing, there is an intervening stage when a statement of case is required to be filed before the final hearing. The learned counsel is not aware whether in these appeals any such statement of case was filed by the parties. After a lapse of aboUtseven years these appeals were called out for hearing before the Supreme Court on 23rd March, 1979.\n\nBy a speaking order, the Supreme Court set aside the Judgment of this Court and remanded the original four appeals for being Jurther heard and disposed of on merits.\n\nIt is only in this manner that we are hearing today the .said four appeals over again.\n\nFor reasons which we will detail hereafter, we have not heard the parties on merits at all. It is true that the Supreme Court has set aside the judgment of this Court and remanded the appeals for further hearing and disposal according to law. That is what precisely we are doing but for reasons which we will record hereunder why we have not heard the parties on merits.\n\nOn considering in detail the long and able judgment delivered by the two judges of this Court and afcer reading\n\nthe Supreme Court order and noting the factual position, there is not much force in hearing the appeal afresh and further there is no necessity for the application of mind. by another two judges of this Court to the same evidence which is on record. The factual position that has come to our notice reveals a state of affairs which cannot be described as very commendable so far as the handling of the Government litigation is concerned ......... What surprises us is that when copies of original appeal, petition as well as civil application . for additional evidence are served upon the Government no attempt is made to file a reply that these judgments need not 9c admitted as additional evidence as the High Court is\n\n. ·~\n\n\\ l\n\nKAUSHALYA DEVI v. LRND ACQN. OFFICER' (Riillgailath Misra, J.) \"9'61\n\nalready seized of the judgments in appeals which are admit ted and they have not become final as alleged by the appellants in their memo of appeal to the Supreme Court. Even after seven years when the matter was called out for .final hearing before the Supreme Court, we are surprised to find from the Supreme Court's order that the Govermnent repre, sentative before the Supreme Court was on the defensive all the while and merely wanted to state that he shonld be heard further in the matter of additional evidence. We do not know whether any attempt was made to seek instructions from the State Government or in spite of query being made the informatiOn was wanting from this end. Whatever the reason may be for the Government's failure to provide instructions to the counsel appearing for the State in the Supreme.\n\nCourt or whatever may be the reason for the failure of the Government counsel in Delhi to seek information either of them is not a very commendable state of affairs.\n\nThe Supreme Court. should have been told at once that those judgments were subjected to appeals and the appeals are pending and almost ready for hearing. We are sure the Supreme Court would have adjourned the hearing unti!'ihe decision by the High Court in First Appeal Nos. 628 of 1972 and 179 and 180 of 1972. That undoubtedly would have been the proper course for the Government to adopt and we have no doubt that the Supreme Court would have valued that suggestion.\"\n\nThen followed a long paragraph censuring the conduct of'\n\nC I\n\ncounsel for the claimants which closed with the following observa F tion:\n\n• \"The Supreme Court took cognizace of all this and thinking that that Court cannot go into such questions in detail as it may invoive taking of evidence, the Supreme Court passed the order and that is how this group of appeals has come back to us for further hearing.\" ·\n\nA set of first appeals one of which related to Yusiifuddin's matter being of the year 1972 first came up for hearing before the High Court. In course of hearing thereof, when the judgment of\n\nthe Division Bench of 1971 in the case of Kausalya Devi's group\n\nH • was produced, it was pointed out that this Court had already vacated the judgment of the Division Bench and .the matter h'ad\n\nbeen remanded. The Division Bench hearing tl1e appeals after remand, therefore, directed as stated in its order :\n\n'.'We, therefore, said that the office may find out as to which are the group of appeals which were rema:nded and issue notice fixing 8th October, 1979 as the date of hearing along with those group of appeals. That is how they came to be shown on our Board from that day onwards continuously until they reached the final hearing.\n\nHowever, the very next day'after 18th September 1979, Mr. Savant came to tell us that he would not be in a position to apply for additional evidence, as the very judgments of the Civil Judge in respect of which certain representations were made before the Supreme Court are those which are the subject-matters of First Appeals Nos. 179 and 180 of 1972 as also first appeal no. 628 of 1972. Since we had already adjourned the matter, we decided to hear these appeals first and take up these remanded appeals.\"\n\nThe Division Bench continued to State :\n\n\"The first factual position which we note here is that neither the appellant has pressed for additional evidence nor the State could lend additional evidence, though the wording of the Supreme Court order says that both the parties will be at liberty to apply for additional evidence.\n\nNone of the parties has any additional evidence to offer.\n\nIn fact, in our humble view, remand seems to be a direct result of a rash statement; not being deniec; I even at final hearing stage. If this is the position in so far as the appeal in the matter was concerned where two other judges of this Court who were seized of the matter had given full hearing to the parties at an earlier stage we told Mr. Andhyarujina, Advocate, that there was no necessity for any further hearing in the matter and that we are not inclined to do so. Since there is no change in the record anc:I no additional evidence is offered and the High Court judgment was pronounced on the evidence already recorded, we see no reason to differ in any way with the well considered earlier judgment of this Court. We, therefore, declare that a copy of that judgment, which will be our substantive judgment, be placed\n\nKAUSHALYA DEVI v. LA' D ACQN. OFFICER (Ranganath Misra, J.) 909\n\non record as the judgment of this Court afier remand by the Supreme Court.\n\nWe thus not only confirm the valuation and compensation awarded by the earlier Bench of this Court hut also confirm their order .as to costs.\" .\n\nHaving read the judgment cif the High Court and considering the manner in which the. first appeals have been . disposed of, we have no doubts in our mind that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in dealing with the first appeals. This Court in exercise of appellate powers vested it under Article 136 of the Consititution had set aside the Bench decision of the High. Court delivered in 1971 and that judgment for all intents and pnrposes had become non-existent. The. present Division Bench of the High Court was not entitled, y any process known to law, to resurrect that judgment into life.\n\nThe direction of the appellate court is certainly binding on the courts subordinate thereto. That apart, in view of the provisions of Article 141 of the Constitution, all courts in India are bound. to follow the decisions of this Court. Judicial discipline requires and decorum known to law warrants that appellate directions should be taken as binding and followed. It is appropriate to usefully recall certain observations of the House of Lords in Broom v. Cassell & Co.(1) Therein Lord Hailsham, L. C. observed :\n\n''The fact is, and I hope it will never be necessary to say so again, that in the hierarchical system of courts which exist in this country, it is necessary for each lower tier, including the Court of Appeal, to accept loyally the decisions of the higher tier.\"\n\nLord Reid added :\n\n\"It seems to me obvious that the Court ofAppeal failed to understand Lord .Delvin's speech but whether they did or G not, I would have accepted them to know that they had no power to give any such direction and to realise the impossible position in which they were seeking to put those judges in advising or .directing them to disregard a decision of this\n\nHouse.\"\n\n(1) [1972] I All E. R. 801.\n\n'stlPREMB COuRT REPOR1'S (1984} 2 s:c.R.\n\nA Lord Diplock observed at p. 874 of the Reports :\n\n0 D\n\n\"It is inevitable in a hierarchical system of courts that there are decisions of the Supreme appellate tribunal which do not attract the unanimous approval of all members of the judiciary.\n\nWhen I sat in the Court of Appeal, I sometimes thought the House of Lords was wrong in over ruling me.\n\nEven since that time there have been occasions, of which the instant appeal is one, when alone or in company.\n\nI have dissented from a decision of the majority of this House. But the judicial system orily works if someone is allowed to have the last word and if that last word, once spoken, is loyally accepted.\"\n\nWe refuse to accept the submission of Mr, Shanti Bhushan for the appellants that the High Court intended to disobey the direction given in the appellate order of remand. Nevertheless, the Division Bench of the High Court allowed itself to be swayed away and landed up in a situation which was wholly unwarranted. Some• of the , observations which we have extracted. were uncalled for and greater restraint was expected. It was open to the High Court to require the parties to move this Court for modification of the direction. If necessary, a reference could have been made to the Registry of this Court so that this Court could have even taken suo motu action. Finally, if additional evidence was not forth coming, the Division Bench could have applied its mind afresh to the materials already on record and the appeals should have been disposed of by an independent judgment and not by rcstori ng to life judgment which had, in exercise of appellate powers of this Court, been rendered lifeless.\n\nWe hope and believe that such an unfortunate situation will never recur and, therefore, we propose to say no more on this aspect of the matter.\n\nAs already indicated, the order of remand has not been opera~ tive on account of the High not giving effect to it. On the other hand, a judgment which haJ already been set aside has been brought on record and has been described as the judgment in the first appeals. In our opinion, that judgment is a nullity. The two options available before the Court, therefore, are, a further remand to the High Court asking for a fresh disposal of the appeals or to dispose of the appeals in exercise of appellate powers by recording findings. Acquisition in this case is of the year 1957. Twentyseven\n\nKAlisliALYA DEVI v. LAND ACQN. OFFICER (Ranganath Misra, J.) 911\n\nyears have already passed. A remand at this stage would indeed' be not in the interest of the parties nor in public interest.\n\nWe have, therefore, decided to look into the materials ourselves and dispose of these appeals finally.\n\nAurangabad was in a developed part of the Nizam's State of Hyderabad and .was a constituted municipality. Hyderabad had become a part of India by 1948.\n\nBy the State Re-organisation Act of 1956, Aurangabad and certain other tracts of Hyderabad became parts of the then State of Bombay. Aurangabad was cif historical importance.\n\nNot far away from it are the famous caves of Ajanta and Ellora. Aurangabad, therefore, had been of tourist importance from before. A fort and a palace of historical importance are in the vicinity of this town.\n\nThere is evidence that the lands acquired in the instant appeals are located close to these spots. There is also evidence that these areas were developed and semi-developed portions of the town.\n\nThe learned Civil Judge Clid take into account certain documents for fixing up the valuation of the property on the date of the notification. In Yusufuddin's case a sale deed of October 18, 1957, was relied upon where ihe valuation was about Rs. 4.50 per square yard. This sale deed was of the year of the notification though the transaction happened to be a few months after the date. The learned Civil Judge had found that the property was located not away from the acquired land.\n\nExhibit 36 was also the c:ertified copy of a sale deed of 1957 but since it bad a construction on the property and the separate valuation thereof could not be known in the absence of any substantive, no reliance had actually been placed on this transaction. Exhibit 37 was a transaction of 1953 and the rate adopted there was about Rs. 5 per square yard. A party to the transaction was examined as a witness.\n\nAs noticed by the learned Civil Judge, the property was located at a distance of about there furlongs from the acquired land. The learned Civil Judge stationed at l\\uran'gabad was\n\n.. certainly in a better position to take judicial notice of the location of important landmarks within Aurangabad than the learned Judges of the Bombay High Court or even the Judges of this.\n\nCourt sitting at a long distance from the place wh¢re the lands . are situated. Exhibit 42 is a. saledeed of 1960 and keeping in view the extent of lands sold and the consideration per square yard, the rate worked out at Rs. 2.25. The purchaser had:been examined as a witness and the land'has been found to -be abOut\n\nhalf a furlong away from the acquired land. The learned Civil Judge also relied upon a letter of the Collector of Aurangabad addressed to the Deputy Director of Excise Department wherein it was indicated that the price ofland in the area was about Rs. 5 per square yard and that was stated with reference to some land near the Railway Station. The acquired land is admittedly not far away from the Railway Station.\n\nThe learned Civil Judge did in fact state in his order that the lands of Yusufuddin were situated by the side of the road leading from Panchakki to Bhadkal gate.\n\nThe historical monument of Panchakki has been stated to be located by the side of the acquired land. A State Hotel has come up not far away from the land. The Court took judicial notice of the fact that Aurangabad city had developed rapidly following police action which brought about accession of the Nizam's State to India. Aurangabad had become the regional headquarters of a zone of the State.\n\nThe city had been industrially developing. Therefore, the lands in question had potential value which had to be kept in view in the matter of fixing the compensation under the Land Acquisition Act.\n\nAdmittedly, the lands of Yusufuddin and the lands belonging to Kausalya Devi group are in one adjacent tract. Therefore, it would not be improper to assume, particularly in the absence E of any contrary evidence from the side of the State that there was no great disparity in the quality of lands and that all these lands were substantially of similar type.\n\nTwo principles relating to the matter of fi•ation of compensation relevant for the present purpose may be kept in view.\n\nWhen large tracts are acquired, the transaction in respect of small properties do not offer a prope~ guideline. Therefore, the valuation in transactions in regard to smaller property is not taken as a real basis for determining the compensation for larger tracts of property (see Prithvi Raj Taneja v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors(1). ; Padma Uppal etc. v. State of Punjab & Ors(').\n\nIn certain .other cases this Court indicated that for determining the market value of a large property on the basis of a sale transaction for smaller. property a deduction should be given~ In Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore v. T. Adinarayan Setty, (') a reduction of 25 % --------· --·\n\n(1)\n\n[1972) 2 S.C.R. 633. (2)\n\n\n(3) [1959) Suppl. 1 s.c.R. 404.\n\nKAUSHALYA DEVI v. LAND ACQN. OFFICER (Ranganath Misra, J.) 913\n\nwas indicated while there are certain other cases where the view is that the reduction should be to the extent of 1/3.\n\nAgain, in the very scheme for fixation of compensation provided by the Land Acquisition Act there is bound to be some amount of arbitrariness.\n\nThe acquistion is deemed to be a statutory purchase and on the basis-Of. evidence the law requires an assumed consideration to be determined.\n\nKeeping in view the fact that acquisition is of compulsory nature, a solatium of 15 % on the valuation is provided.\n\nBearing these considerations in view and taking into account the fact that the lands in question were located in a developed part of Aurangabad and had considerable potential value, we proceed to fix the market value of the property.\n\nOne acre of land is equal to 4840 square yadrs.\n\nThe learned Civil Judge had maintained a distinction between the two classes oflands.\n\nWe take note of that fact also in the matter of determing the compensation. We, however, do not propose to indicate separate valuations for thet wo classes of lands. Taking an overall picture of the ma!ter, we direct\n\ncompensation to be fixed at the rate of Rs. 1.50 per square yard or Rs. 7260 per acre for all the lands of the present appellants acquired by the notification in question.\n\nOver and above this amount, the appellants shall be entitled to statutory solatium of 15 % as also interest at the rate of 6 % per annum on the additional compensation from the date of dispossession till payment thereof.\n\nWe direct the Collector to work out the compensation on the basis indicated above within two months from today. If Ute amount so determined is not paid within three monts thereafter, the interest on the additional compensatfoµ shall be at the rate of 12 % par annum till payment is made.\n\nOrJintily, thi appJl!ants should have been entitled to costs.\n\nKeeping in view the history of the litigation and manner in which the Kausalya Dovi group of appellants had conducted themselve• on the earlier occasion before this .court, we do not award costs to them.\n\nIn Civil Appoal No. 2462/81 appellant Syed Yusufuddin Syed Ziauddin will be c 1titled to .his costs in this Court and hearing fee of Rs. 1,000.\n\nJ'!.V.K.\n\nAppeals a/lo>eeq.", "total_entities": 70, "entities": [{"text": "KAUSHALYA DEVI BOGRA AND OTHERS ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5, "end_char": 40, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KAUSHALYA DEVI BOGRA AND OTHERS ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER, AURANGABAD\n\nANDANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 43, "end_char": 91, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER, AURANGABAD AND ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 15, 1984", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 94, "end_char": 111, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "February 15, 1984\n\n[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, A. VARADARAJAN AND\n\nRANGANATH MISRA JJ.]"}}, {"text": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 114, "end_char": 134, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. VARADARAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 136, "end_char": 150, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A. VARADARAJAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RANGANATH MISRA JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 156, "end_char": 175, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RANGANATH MISRA JJ.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 422, "end_char": 432, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hyderabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 723, "end_char": 732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A large tract of land located with in the Municipal Limits was notified for acquisition under a.3 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act prevailing in the State of Hyderabad, corresponding to section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act."}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 751, "end_char": 760, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2670, "end_char": 2683, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the appeals after remand (first group) came before the same Division Beneh, the High Court finding that no further evidence was forth ... ' coming either on behalf of the appellants or the State, held that the ear1ier Judgment of the High Court shotild be treafed as the substantive judgment declared it to be placed on tbe record as the judgment of the High Court after remand by the Supreme Court,."}}, {"text": "Article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2992, "end_char": 3003, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3416, "end_char": 3427, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3471, "end_char": 3476, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The provisions of Article 141 of the Constitution, require all Courts in India to be bound to follow the decisions of this Court."}}, {"text": "[1972] 2 S.C.R 633", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5358, "end_char": 5376, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1977] 1 S.C.R. 329", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5426, "end_char": 5445, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7094, "end_char": 7111, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the 16th October, 1979 of the Bombay High Court in 1st."}}, {"text": "Shanti Bhushan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7379, "end_char": 7393, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shanti Bhushan, C.S. Vaidyanat'1, P. Chowdhary, M. Mudgal,\n\n,,.", "canonical_name": "Shanti Bhushan"}}, {"text": "P. Chowdhary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7413, "end_char": 7425, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shanti Bhushan, C.S. Vaidyanat'1, P. Chowdhary, M. Mudgal,\n\n,,."}}, {"text": "M. Mudgal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7427, "end_char": 7436, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shanti Bhushan, C.S. Vaidyanat'1, P. Chowdhary, M. Mudgal,\n\n,,."}}, {"text": "Gurdip Kaur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7512, "end_char": 7523, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "OFFICER (Ranganatb Misra, J.) 983\n\nMs. Gurdip Kaur and Prasant Bhushan for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "Prasant Bhushan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7528, "end_char": 7543, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "OFFICER (Ranganatb Misra, J.) 983\n\nMs. Gurdip Kaur and Prasant Bhushan for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "O.P. Rana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7565, "end_char": 7574, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "O.P. Rana and M.N.\n\nShroff for the Re1pondents."}}, {"text": "M.N.\n\nShroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7579, "end_char": 7591, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "O.P. Rana and M.N.\n\nShroff for the Re1pondents."}}, {"text": "Aurangabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7849, "end_char": 7859, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A large tract of land located within the municipal limits of Aurangabad within the State of Maharashtra wa11 notified for acquisition under section 3 (I) of the Land Acquisition Act prevailing in the State of Hyderabad ·(corresponding to s. 4 of the."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7928, "end_char": 7937, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8026, "end_char": 8030, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Land Acquisition Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8040, "end_char": 8060, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "November 28, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8100, "end_char": 8117, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Land Acquisition Act, Act I of 1894), by notification dated November 28, 1957, for the."}}, {"text": "Kausalya Devi Bogra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8322, "end_char": 8341, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Four of these-appeals are by one group being Kausalya Devi Bogra and others and the other is by Syed Yusufuddin Syed Ziauddin.", "canonical_name": "KAUSHALYA DEVI BOGRA AND OTHERS ETC"}}, {"text": "Syed Yusufuddin Syed Ziauddin", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8373, "end_char": 8402, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Four of these-appeals are by one group being Kausalya Devi Bogra and others and the other is by Syed Yusufuddin Syed Ziauddin.", "canonical_name": "Syed Yusufuddin Syed Ziauddin"}}, {"text": "Yusufuddin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8821, "end_char": 8831, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Out of it, the first group owi; ied about 74 acres while the claim of Yusufuddin related to about 15 acres of land."}}, {"text": "Article 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10867, "end_char": 10878, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "March 23, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11127, "end_char": 11141, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By Judgment dated March 23, 1979, in Civil Appeal Nos."}}, {"text": "Yurnfuddin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11897, "end_char": 11907, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "show, it had been represented by the claimants before this Court that the decision .. of the Civil Judge in Yurnfuddin's case had not been challenged in appeal and had become final.", "canonical_name": "Yurnfuddin"}}, {"text": "Ranganath Misra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12313, "end_char": 12328, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "OFFICER (Ranganath Misra, J.) 905\n\n5 while 5 acres 32 gunthas related to Saj No.", "canonical_name": "RANGANATH MISRA JJ."}}, {"text": "Aurangabad City", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12455, "end_char": 12470, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "167, and all these lands were situated close to the road leading from Aurangabad City to Panchakki."}}, {"text": "Panchakki", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12474, "end_char": 12483, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "167, and all these lands were situated close to the road leading from Aurangabad City to Panchakki."}}, {"text": "Ynsufuddin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13645, "end_char": 13655, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This first appeal of the State against Ynsufuddin was disposed of by a Division Bench consisting of Deshmukh, C.J. and Deshpande, J. on October 15, 1979.", "canonical_name": "Yurnfuddin"}}, {"text": "Deshmukh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13706, "end_char": 13714, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This first appeal of the State against Ynsufuddin was disposed of by a Division Bench consisting of Deshmukh, C.J. and Deshpande, J. on October 15, 1979."}}, {"text": "Deshpande", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13725, "end_char": 13734, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This first appeal of the State against Ynsufuddin was disposed of by a Division Bench consisting of Deshmukh, C.J. and Deshpande, J. on October 15, 1979."}}, {"text": "October 15, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13742, "end_char": 13758, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This first appeal of the State against Ynsufuddin was disposed of by a Division Bench consisting of Deshmukh, C.J. and Deshpande, J. on October 15, 1979."}}, {"text": "October 16, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13916, "end_char": 13932, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "October 16, 1976."}}, {"text": "27th February 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14917, "end_char": 14935, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly, a separate application for production of additional evidence was made on 27th February 1972."}}, {"text": "Government of Maharashtra", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15039, "end_char": 15064, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Presuma.bly\n\na copy of the appeal memo, as also a copy of this appliication was served upon the State Government of Maharashtra, who were the respondents, and we further presume that those copies were made available to the learned counsel who were engaged by the State to defend the said appeals."}}, {"text": "23rd March, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15611, "end_char": 15627, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After a lapse of aboUtseven years these appeals were called out for hearing before the Supreme Court on 23rd March, 1979."}}, {"text": "Riillgailath Misra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17142, "end_char": 17160, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "OFFICER' (Riillgailath Misra, J.) \"9'61\n\nalready seized of the judgments in appeals which are admit ted and they have not become final as alleged by the appellants in their memo of appeal to the Supreme Court."}}, {"text": "Supreme.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 17983, "end_char": 17991, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Whatever the reason may be for the Government's failure to provide instructions to the counsel appearing for the State in the Supreme."}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 18074, "end_char": 18079, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Court or whatever may be the reason for the failure of the Government counsel in Delhi to seek information either of them is not a very commendable state of affairs."}}, {"text": "Yusiifuddin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19090, "end_char": 19101, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A set of first appeals one of which related to Yusiifuddin's matter being of the year 1972 first came up for hearing before the High Court."}}, {"text": "Kausalya Devi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 19277, "end_char": 19290, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In course of hearing thereof, when the judgment of\n\nthe Division Bench of 1971 in the case of Kausalya Devi's group\n\nH • was produced, it was pointed out that this Court had already vacated the judgment of the Division Bench and .the matter h'ad\n\nbeen remanded.", "canonical_name": "KAUSHALYA DEVI BOGRA AND OTHERS ETC"}}, {"text": "18th September 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19909, "end_char": 19928, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "However, the very next day'after 18th September 1979, Mr. Savant came to tell us that he would not be in a position to apply for additional evidence, as the very judgments of the Civil Judge in respect of which certain representations were made before the Supreme Court are those which are the subject-matters of First Appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "Savant", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19934, "end_char": 19940, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "However, the very next day'after 18th September 1979, Mr. Savant came to tell us that he would not be in a position to apply for additional evidence, as the very judgments of the Civil Judge in respect of which certain representations were made before the Supreme Court are those which are the subject-matters of First Appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "Andhyarujina", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21119, "end_char": 21131, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If this is the position in so far as the appeal in the matter was concerned where two other judges of this Court who were seized of the matter had given full hearing to the parties at an earlier stage we told Mr. Andhyarujina, Advocate, that there was no necessity for any further hearing in the matter and that we are not inclined to do so."}}, {"text": "Article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22184, "end_char": 22195, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22624, "end_char": 22635, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hailsham", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22979, "end_char": 22987, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is appropriate to usefully recall certain observations of the House of Lords in Broom v. Cassell & Co.(1) Therein Lord Hailsham, L. C. observed :\n\n''The fact is, and I hope it will never be necessary to say so again, that in the hierarchical system of courts which exist in this country, it is necessary for each lower tier, including the Court of Appeal, to accept loyally the decisions of the higher tier.\""}}, {"text": "Reid", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23275, "end_char": 23279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Reid added :\n\n\"It seems to me obvious that the Court ofAppeal failed to understand Lord .Delvin's speech but whether they did or G not, I would have accepted them to know that they had no power to give any such direction and to realise the impossible position in which they were seeking to put those judges in advising or .directing them to disregard a decision of this\n\nHouse.\""}}, {"text": ".Delvin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23363, "end_char": 23370, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Reid added :\n\n\"It seems to me obvious that the Court ofAppeal failed to understand Lord .Delvin's speech but whether they did or G not, I would have accepted them to know that they had no power to give any such direction and to realise the impossible position in which they were seeking to put those judges in advising or .directing them to disregard a decision of this\n\nHouse.\""}}, {"text": "Diplock", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23733, "end_char": 23740, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'stlPREMB COuRT REPOR1'S (1984} 2 s:c.R.\n\nA Lord Diplock observed at p. 874 of the Reports :\n\n0 D\n\n\"It is inevitable in a hierarchical system of courts that there are decisions of the Supreme appellate tribunal which do not attract the unanimous approval of all members of the judiciary."}}, {"text": "Supreme appellate tribunal", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 23868, "end_char": 23894, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'stlPREMB COuRT REPOR1'S (1984} 2 s:c.R.\n\nA Lord Diplock observed at p. 874 of the Reports :\n\n0 D\n\n\"It is inevitable in a hierarchical system of courts that there are decisions of the Supreme appellate tribunal which do not attract the unanimous approval of all members of the judiciary."}}, {"text": "Shanti Bhushan", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 24433, "end_char": 24447, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We refuse to accept the submission of Mr, Shanti Bhushan for the appellants that the High Court intended to disobey the direction given in the appellate order of remand.", "canonical_name": "Shanti Bhushan"}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 26701, "end_char": 26707, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By the State Re-organisation Act of 1956, Aurangabad and certain other tracts of Hyderabad became parts of the then State of Bombay."}}, {"text": "Ajanta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 26797, "end_char": 26803, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Not far away from it are the famous caves of Ajanta and Ellora."}}, {"text": "Ellora", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 26808, "end_char": 26814, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Not far away from it are the famous caves of Ajanta and Ellora."}}, {"text": "October 18, 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 27337, "end_char": 27353, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Yusufuddin's case a sale deed of October 18, 1957, was relied upon where ihe valuation was about Rs."}}, {"text": "Aurangabad city", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 29527, "end_char": 29542, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Court took judicial notice of the fact that Aurangabad city had developed rapidly following police action which brought about accession of the Nizam's State to India."}}, {"text": "Kausalya Devi group", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 29985, "end_char": 30004, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Admittedly, the lands of Yusufuddin and the lands belonging to Kausalya Devi group are in one adjacent tract."}}, {"text": "[1972) 2 S.C.R. 633", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 31093, "end_char": 31112, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Kausalya Dovi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 33147, "end_char": 33160, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Keeping in view the history of the litigation and manner in which the Kausalya Dovi group of appellants had conducted themselve• on the earlier occasion before this .court, we do not award costs to them.", "canonical_name": "KAUSHALYA DEVI BOGRA AND OTHERS ETC"}}, {"text": "Syed Yusufuddin Syed Ziauddin", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 33320, "end_char": 33349, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2462/81 appellant Syed Yusufuddin Syed Ziauddin will be c 1titled to .his costs in this Court and hearing fee of Rs.", "canonical_name": "Syed Yusufuddin Syed Ziauddin"}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_2_914_954_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "A.R. ANTULAY\n\nRAMDAS SRINIWAS NAY AK AND ANOTHER\n\nFebruary 16, 1984\n\n[D. A. DESAI, R. S. PATHAK, 0. CH!NNAPPA REDDY, A. P. SBN\n\nAND V. BALAKRISHNA ERADI, JJ.)\n\nInterpretation of Sttttutes-Construction of Penal Laws-Rules for.\n\nCriminal Procedure Code, 1973 (Act II of 1974) Sections 4, 6, 190, 200, 202, 238 to 250-Specfal Judge, taking cognizance of offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (Act 2 of 1947) on a private complaint fn respect of the said offences committed by Public ServantS, legality of-Criminal Law Amendment Act (XLVJ of 1952) section 6 to 8, Scope of-Court of Special Judge Is a Court of.Original Criminal Jurisdiction and shall have llll powers except those specifically excluded.\n\nLegislation by In corporatiort, doctrine applied.\n\nRespondent Nayat filed a pdvate complaint aeainst the appellant, alleging thit the appellant ha!, asa p•blic servant aommitted certain oft'ences under ss. 5, 5A and 7A of the Prevention of Corruption Act (Act II of 1947), and section 161-165 of the Indian Penal Code before the learned Special Judge, Sbri P. S. Bhutta.\n\nThe Special Judge toot cognizance of the said offences and adjourned the case to October 12, 1982 on which date, the appellants' counsel moved an app1icatioD questioning the jurisdiction of the court OD two specific counts : (i) that the Court of special Judge act up under s. 6 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 ('1952 Act' for short) cannot take coa:nizance of any of the offences enumerated ins, G' (1)\n\n(a) & (b) upon a private compl.aint of facts constituting the offenpe and\n\n(ii) that where there are m-ore special Judges than o'ne for any area, in the absence of a specification by the State Government in this behalf, spccif)'iQg the local area over which each special Judge would have jurisdiction, the speci_al Judge (Mr. Bhutta) had DD jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offences and try the case.\n\nThe learned special Judge rejected both tho con\n\n1 tentions.\n\nThe appellant filed Criminal Revision Application No. SlO of 1982 in the Bombay High Court.\n\nOn a reference made by the learned Single Judge, this roviaion apPlication was board by a Division Bench of the High' Court.\n\nTho learned Judges by two separate but concurring judgments held that 1pccial Judge is competent and is entitled to take cognizance of offences set out in s. 6 (1) (a) & (b) upon a private complaint of facts constituting the offence and consequently rejected the first contention.\n\nIn reaching this conclusion the learned Judges held that a prior investigation under s. SA of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 194 7 ('I 947 Act' for shon) by a police officer of tle designated ran~ is n.ot a c;:ondition precedent to\n\nA. R. ANTULAY v. R. S. NAYAK 915\n\nthe special Judge takiag cognizance of te offences under s. 8 (ll of 1952\n\nAct, and taking notice of the Notification dated January 15, 1983 issued by the Maharashtra State under sub's. (2) of s. 7 of 1952 Act, specifying Shri R B. Sule, Special Jtidge for Ort?atcr Bomaby for trying the Special Case No. 24 of 1982 rejected the second contention and therefore, the re .. vision petition as wel_I: Hence this appeal by special leave.\n\nDismissing the appeal, the Court_,\n\nHELD : I. It is a well established cannon of construction that the court should read the section as it is and cannot rewrite it to suit its convenience; nor does any cannon of construction permit the court to read the section in such manner as to render it to some extent otiose. [936DB]\n\n2:1. 'A private complaint filed in respect of the offences committe~ by public 1ervaots as. enunierated io_s. 6 (1) and_(b)_of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952 can be entertained by, the special Judge and taken c<igaizaace of.\n\nThe same is perfectly legal. [9368)\n\nState of Tamil Nadu v. V. Krlshnaswaml Naidu & Anr. [1979] 3 SC.R. 928; Parasnath Pande & Anr. v. State, A.I.R. 1962 Bom. 205; Jagdish Prasad Verma 11. The State, A.J.R. \"i966 PatD!I 15; referred to •.\n\n2'.2. It is a well recognised prineiple of criminal .jurisprudence that anyone can set or put the cril}1inal Jaw into motion eacept wherC the statute enacting or creating an offence indicates to the contrary.\n\nThe Scheme of the Code of Criminal Procedure enviasges two parallel and independent agencies for taking criminal offences to Court.\n\nEven for the most serious offence of murder, it was not isputed that a private complaint can, not only be filed but can be entertained and proceeded with according to law. Locus Standi of the complaint is a concept foreign to criminal jurisprudence save and except that where the statute Creating an offence provides for the eligibility of the complaint, by necessary implication .the general principle gets eJicluded by such statutory provision. [9230-F]\n\nWhile s. 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure permjts anyone to approach the Magistrate with complaint, it does not prescribe any qualification the camplaint is required to fulfil to be eligible to file a complaint.\n\nBut where an eligibility criterion for a complaint is contemplated specific provisions have been made such as to be found in ss. 195 & J99 of the Cr. P. C.\n\nThese specific provisions clear'Jy indicate that in the absence of a11y such.statutorY provisions, a locus standi of a complaint is a concept foreign tO criminal jurisprudence.\n\nIn other words the principle that anyone can set or put the criminal law in motion remains intact unless contraindicated by a statutory provi•ion. [923G-H; 924A]\n\nThis general .principle of nearly uµiversal application is founded on a\n\npolicy that an offence i.e. an act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force (Sees. 2 (n) Cr. P. C.) is not niei:ely an offence c;; c>mmitted iq relati9n to the perso~ wo s'1ffers harm bq~ i~ also an oence . ff\n\n• 916 .S8PllBME COURT RIU'ORTS (1984] 2 s.c.a.\n\nagainst society.\n\nThe society for its ortrly and peaceful deelopment is interested in the punishment of the offender.\n\nTherefore, prosecution for serious offencCs is undertaken in the name of the state representing. the people which would exclude any element of private vendatta 'or vengeance.\n\nIf such is the public policy underlying penal statutes, who brings an act or omimission made punishable by law to the notice of the authority competent to deal wit.hit, is immaterial and irrelevant unless the statute indicates to the contrary.\n\nPunishment of the offender in the interest of the society being one of the objects behind penal statutes enacted for larger good of the society, right to iniliate proceedings cannot be whittled down, circumscribed or fettere.d by putting it into a straight jacket formula of locus standi unknown to criminal jurisprudence, save and except specific statutory exception.\n\nTo hold that such an exception exists that a private complaint for offences of corruption committed bY public servant is not maintainableJ the court would require an unambiguous statutory provision and a teogled web of argument for-drawing a far fetched implicationJ cannot be a substitute for an express statutory provision. [924AB]\n\nIt is no answer to this fairly wellestablisbed legal position that for the last 32 years no case has come to the notice of the court in which cognizance was taken by a special Judge in a private complaint for offences punish able under the 1947 Act.\n\nIf ometbing that did not happen in the past is to be the sole reliable guide soas to deny any such thing happening in the future, law would be rendered static and slowly whither away, [925C]\n\nThe Scheme underlying Code of -0-imioal Procedure clearly reveals that anyone who wants to give information of an offence may either approach the Magistrate or the officer in charge of a Polie St\"ation.\n\nIf the offence complained of is a non-cognizable one, the Police Officer. <:an either direct the complaint to approach the Magistrate or he may obtain permiSsioo of the Magistrate and investigate the offence.\n\nSimilarly any one can approach\" the Magistrate with a complaint and. even if the offence disclosed is a serious one, the Magist.rate is competent to ta:ke cognizance of the offence and initiate proceedings.\n\nIt is open to the Magistrate but not obligiltory uPon him to direct investigation by police.\n\nThus two agencies have been set up for taking offences to court. One would therefore, require a cogent and expHcit provision to hold thats. SA displaces this scheme.\n\n[925DF)\n\n:.r.:3. Section 8(1) of the 195, z Act which confers power on the special Judge to take cognizance of' offences set out in s. 6(1) (a) (b) does not\n\ndirectly or indirectly, expressly or by necessary implication indicate that the only method of t<iking cognizance is the police report under s. 173(2> of the Code of Criminal Procedure submitted by a police officer of the designated rank or permissible rank as set out in s. SA of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. [9320-H]\n\n2:4. In. the absence of a specific provision made in the statute indicating that offences will have to be investigatedJ inquired intoJ tried and otherwise dealt with according to that statute, the same will have to be investigated, inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with according to the Code Qf Criroi11al Procedure.\n\nIn other words, Code of Criminal Proce1.fure\n\n. v\n\n' '\n\nA.R. ANTULAY v. R.S. NAYAKi 917\n\nis the parent statute which provides for investigation:. inquiring_ into and trial of cases by criminal courts of various designations. [93SA-B]\n\n2:5. If Cour-t of-special Judge is.a criminal court, which atleast was not di!:puted, and jurisdiction is conferred''upon the presiding officer Of the Court of special Judge to take cognizance of offences simultaneously excJu. ding one out of the four recognis\"d modes of taking cogoizance 1 namely, upon commitment of by a Ma8istrate as set out ins. 193, the only other 1' method by which the Court of special Judge can take cognizance of an offence-for the trial of which it was set up, is any one of the remaining three other methods known to law by which a criminal court would take ---~- cognizance of- _an offe_nce not as an idle formality but with a view '°' to initiating proceedings and ultimately to try the accused.\n\nIf the language einployed in S. 8(1) is read in this light and in the background that a special Judge may take cognizance of offence without the accused being committed to him for trial 1 it necessarily implies that the Court of special Judge is armed with power to take _Cognizance without commitment\n\n~ by the Magistrate.\n\nThus the special Judge can take cognizance of offences enumerated ins. 6(1) (a) and (b) Upon a complaint or uPon a police report Or upon bis coming to know in some mariner of the offence having been cornmitted.\n\nThe provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code have to .be applied to the Court of special Judge in such manner and to such extent as to retain the separate identity of the Court of special Judge and not that be must either fulfil a , role of a Magistrate or~ Session Court.\n\nSection 8(1) of 1952 Act says that the special Judge shall take cognizance ··•( of an offence and shall not take it on commitment of the accused.\n\nThe Legislature provided for both the pQsitive and the negative.\n\nIt posi , tively conferred power Oil special Judge to take Cgaizance Of offences and it negatively removed any concept of comtnitment.\n\nIt is not possible thereforeJ to read s. 8(1) that cognizance can ooly be taken upoo a police report 'C and any other.view wiU render the safeguard under s~ SA illusory.\n\n[93SDF; 9368; C; E)\n\n2:6. Section SA is a safeguard against investigatlonJ by police officers lower in rank than designated officcrJ of offences against pnb1ic servants.\n\nThis has no he3.ring either directly or indirectly with the mode and method of taking cognizance or trial by the special Judge.\n\nTherefore, an investigation under.s. SA is not a condition precedent before _cognizance can be taken of offerices triable by a special Judge, who acquires p0wer under s. 8(1) to take Qognizance of offences enumerated in s. 6(1) (a) and (b) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1 with this limitation alone that it shall not be upon commitment to him by the Magistrate. [94lA-B]\n\n2:7;. Once s. SA is out of the way 10 the matter of taking cognizance of offences committed by public servants .bY a special Judge, the Power of the special Judge to take cognizance of such offences conferred by s. 8( 1) \"ith only one limitation; in any one of the known methods of taking cogai .. zance of offences by courts of original jurisdiction remains undeoted.\n\nOne such statutorily recognised well.known method of taking cognizance of offences by a coQrt competent to tak; e cognizance is upon receiving a comp ..\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1984) t2 S.C.R.\n\nlaint of facts which constitutes the offence.\n\nAnd s. 8(1) says that the special Judges has the power to take cognizance of offences enumerated in s. 6(1) (a) & (bl and the only mode of taking cognizance e•cluded by the provision is upon commitment.\n\nIt therefore, follows that the special Judge can take cognizante of offences committed by public servants upon receiviag a complaint of facts constituting such offences. [941FH]\n\nThere is no \\\\'arrant for an approach that on receipt of the complaint, the special Judge must direct an investigation under s. SA. [942<;:]\n\nH. N. Rishbud & lnder Singh v. State of Delhi,\n\n[1955] S.C.R. 1150; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Mubarak Ali; [1959] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 201; State of Uttar Pradesh v. Bhagwant Kishore Joshi; [1964] 3 S.C.R. 71; s. N. Bose\n\n\n2:8. In order to give full effect fo s. 8(1), the only thing to do is to read special Judge ins. 238 to 250 wherever the expression !Magistrate' occurs.\n\nThis is what is called legislation by incorporation.\n\nSimilarly, where the question of taking cognizance arises, it is futile to go in search of the fact whether fOr purposes of s. 190 which conferred power on the Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence, special Judge is a .t\\-fagistrate1\n\nWhat is to be done is that one has to read the expression special in place of Magistrate, and the whole thing beco:i1s crystal clear. [94SBF]\n\n2:9. The Legislature wherever it found the grey area clarified: it by making specific provision such as the one in subs. CJ) of s .8 and to leave no one in doubt further provided in aub-s. (3) that all the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure shall so far as they are not incoasistent with the Act apply to the proceedings before a speci.il Judge.\n\nAt the tim.e when the 1952 Act was enacted what was in operation was the code of Criminal Procedure, 1898.\n\nIt did not envisage any Court of a special Judge and the Legislature never wanted to draw up an exhaustive Code of Procedure for this new criminal court which was being set up.\n\nTherefore, it conferred power (taking cognizance of offences), prescribed procedure (trial of warrant cases by a Magistrate), indicated authorit). to tender pardon (s.338) and then after declaring its status as comp.arable to a Court of Sessions proceeded to prescribe that all provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure will apply in so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the 1952 Act.\n\nThe net outcome of this position is that a new court of original jurisdictioD was set up and whenever a question arose as to what are its powers in respect of specific questions brought before it as court of original criminal Jurisdiction, it bad to refer to the Code of Criminal Procedure undaunted by any designation clap.trap.\n\nWhen taking cognizance, a Court of special Judge enjoyed the powers under s. 190.\n\nWhen trying cases, it is obligatory to follow the procedure for trial of warrant cases, by a Magistrate though as and by way of status it was equated with a Court of Sessions. [94SFH; 946A-D]\n\n\n• r\n\nI·\n\nA.R. ANTULAY V. R.S. NA.YAK' 919\n\n2:10.\n\nThe deeming fiction enacted in s.8 (3) is confined to the limits of its requirement in that the person conducting a prosecution before a special Judge is to be deemed to be a public prosecutor.\n\nOn the contrary, conscious of the position that a private complaint may be filed before a special Judge who may take cognizance of, the offences on such a complaint, the Legislature wanted to clothe the person in charge of the prosecution before a special Judge with the status of a public prosecutor for the purposes of the Code of Criminal Procedure. [949A-C)\n\nShwe Pru v. The King; A. I. R. 1941 Rangoon 209; Amlesh Chandra & Ors. v. The state, A.l.R. 1952 Cal. 481; Raj Kishore Rabidas v. The State: A.J.R. 1969 Cal 321; Re. Bhupalll Mal/iah and Ors. A.J.R. 1959 A.l.R.\n\nA.P. 477; Medichetty Ramakbtiah and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh; A.J.R. 1955 A.P. 659; referred to.\n\n2 :t ~.\n\nIt is not a condition precedent to the iS!!iUe of process that the court of necessity must bold the inquiry as envisaged by s.202 or direct investifiation as therein contemplated.\n\nThe po'Wer to take cognizance without holding inquiry or directing investigation is implicit in s.202 or the Code.\n\nTherefore the matter is -left to the judicial discretion or the Court whether on examining the complainant and the witnesses if any as .contemplated by s.200 to issue process or to postpone the issue of process.\n\nThis discre.tion which the court enjoys cannot be circumscribed or denied .by making it mandatory upon the court either to bold tho inquiry or direct investigation. Such an approach would be contrary to the statutory provision.\n\nTherefore, there is no merit in the contention that by entertaining a private complaint, the purpose of speedy trial would be thwarted or that a pre-process safeguard would be denied. Further when cognizance is taken on a private complaint or to be precise otherwise than on a police report, the special Judge has to try the case according to the procedure prescribed for trial of warrant cases instituted otherwise than on police report by a Magistr1te (ss. 252 to 258 of 1898 Code of Criminal Procedure).\n\nThis procedure provides more adequate safeguard than the investigation by police officer of designated rank and therefore, search for fresh or. additional safeguard is irrelevant. [951A-F; H)\n\n2:12.\n\nPrior to 1955, the procedure .for trial of warrant cases instituted on a police rt)port and otherwise than on police report was the same and the Act of 1952 set up the court of special JudgC to try cases under the 1947 Act and the trial was to be held according to the procedure prescribed for trial of a warrant case.\n\nIt necessarily fo1lows that between 195'.? to 1955, the Court of sPecial Judge would have followed the same procedure for trial of a case instituted upon a police report or otherwise than on a police report. lf.in 19SS. the Legislature prescribed two d\"ifferent procedures and left the one for trial of warrant cases instituted otherwise than on police report intact and the position remained unaltered even after the introduction of s.7A, it is nor suggestive of such a grave consequence that a private complaint is not maintainable.[953A-C]\n\n3:1. The entire argument inviting the court to specificaliy decide\n\nI!.\n\nwhether a court of a special-Judge for a cCrtain purpose is a court o Magis- JJ\n\n.; ; .. ~\n\nSUPREMB COURT REPORTS [1984] 2 sc.R.\n\ntrate or a court of Sessions revolves round a mistaken belief that a special Judge has to be one or the other, and must fit in the slot of a Magistrate or a Court of Sessions.\n\nSuch an approach would strangulate the functioning of the court and must be eschewed.\n\nShorn of all embellishment, th(! Court of a special Judge is a Court of original criminal jurisdiction.\n\nAs a court of original criminal jurisdiction in order to make it functionally o.riented some powers were conferred by the statute setting up the court.\n\nExcept' those specifically conferred and specifically denied, H has to fuoctioil as a court of original criminal jurisdiction not being hide bound by the tfrmioological status description of Magistrate or a Court of :Sessions.\n\nUnder the . Code it will enjoy all powers which a court of original criminal jurisiction enjoys sav<; and except the ones specifically denied. [946C-E]\n\n3:2. The Court of a special Judge, once created by an indep'endent statute, has been broitght as a court of original criminal jurisdiction' under the High Court because s. 9 confers on the High Court all the power's con ferred by Chapter XXXI and XXXIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure,\n\n1898 on a High Court as if the court of Special Judge were a Court of Sessions trying cases without a jury within the local limit of the jurisdiction of the High Court.\n\nTherefore is no , gainsaying the fact that a new crminal coor' with a name, designation and qu8.Jificatioa of the officer eligible to preside over it with powers specified and the particular procedure wti.ich \\t must follow has been set up under the 1951 Act.\n\nThe Court has to be treated as a court of original criminal jurisdiction and shall have all the powers as any court of original criminal jurisdictiOn bas under the Code of Criminal Procedure except those specifically excluded. [9460-H; 947A-B)\n\nt!ll.IMINAL APPELLATE Jua1srncnoN : Ck\"n. \\L APPEAL No.\n\nZ47 OF 1983\n\n'From the judgment and order date.: 7. 3. 83 of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Revision Application No. 510 of 1982.:\n\nDr. L, M. Singhvi, Dalveer Bhandari, A. M. Singhvl, S. S.\n\nParkar, H. Bhardwaj, U. N. Bhandari, H. M. Singh, Ranbir Singh, S. G.Hasnain, Shamrao Samant, and HA Sekhar, for the appellimt.\n\nRam Jethmalani, PR Vakil, Ms. Rani Jethmalani, Mukesh Jethmalani, OP Malviya, Shailendra Bhardwaj, Harish Jagtlani for the respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the court was delivered by\n\nDESAI, J. This appeal by special leave is directed against the decision of a Division Bench of Bombay High Court in Criminal Revision Application No. 510 of 1982, which was preferred by the appellant against the rejection of his application by the learned H spe_cial Judge as per his order dated October 20, 1982.\n\nA.a. AN'.rULAY .. a.s. NAYAE (Dtsal. J.)\n\nThe various stages through which Special Case No. 24 of 1982 progressed upto and inclusive of October 18, 1982 have been set out in our Judgment rendered today in cognate Criminal Appeal No. 356 of 1983 and they need not be recapitulated here.\n\nAfter the learned special Judge Shri P. S. Bhutta took cognizance of th~ offences upon a complaint of Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak, the first respondent (Original complainant), the case was adjourned to October 18, 1982 for recording the evidence of the complainant. On that day, learned counsel appearing for the appellant in the trial court moved an application questioning the jurisdiction of the court on two specific counts; (i) that the Court of special Judge set up under Sec. 6 .of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 ('1952 Act' for short) cannot take ognizance of any of the offences enumerated in: Sec .. 6 (I) (a) and (b) upon a private complaint of facts constituting the offence and (ii) that where there are more special Judges than one for any area, in the absence of a specification by the State Government in this behalf, specifying the local area over which each special Judge would have jurisdiction, the special Judge (Mr. Bhutta) had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offences and try the case. The learned special Judge rejected both the contentions. The appellant filed Criminal Revision Application No. 510 of 1982 in the Bombay High Court. , On a reference made by the learned Single Judge, this revision application was heard by a Division Bench of the High Court. The. learned Judges by two separate but concurring judgments held that special Judge is competent and is entitled to take cognizance of offences set out in Sec. 6 (1) (a) and (b) upon a private complaint of facts constituting the offence and consequently rejected the first contention. In reaching this conclusion the learned Judges held that a prior investigation under Sec. 5 A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 ('1947 Act' for sMrt) by a police officer of the designated rank is not a condition precedent to the special Judge taking cognizance of the offences under Sec. 8 (I) of. 1952 Act.\n\nThe learned Judges also held that by the time the matter was heard by them, the Government of Maharashtra had issued. a notification dated January 15, 1983, under sub-s. (2) of Sec. 7 of 1952 Act specifying Shri R. B. Sule, special Judge fm Greater Born• bay for trying Special Case No. 24 of 1982, After taking note of this notification and the statement of Shri P. R. Vakil, learned. counsel for the respondent, the second contention of the learned counsel for the appellant was also rejected. ' The learned Judges accordingly rejected the revision petition. Hence this appeal by special leave.\n\n!122 SPRBME COURT RBPO!tTS [1984} 2 s.c.R.\n\nOn behalf of the appellant, the pivotal point canvassed was that a private complaint cannot be entertained by the special Judge in respect of all or any of the offences enumerated in Sec. 6 (1) (a) and (b) of the 1952 Act.· In support of this submission, it was very vehemently urged that the provision contained in Sec. 5 A of the 19.52 Act has been repeatedly held to be mandatory in character and if its non-compliance is brought to the notice of the superior court at a stage anterior to the conclusion of the trial, the proceeding would be vitiated. It was urged that Sec. SA incorporates a safe gnard against frivolous, speculative and tendentious prosecutions and therefore, it must not only held to be mandatory but it must be so interpreted as to make an investigation under Sec. 5A a condition precedent to the taking of the cognizance of an offence or offences committed by a public servant by the special Judge. A number of subsidiary points were submitted in support of this principal contention which need not be enumerated, but would be dealt with in the course of the judgment.\n\nOn behalf of the respondent.complainant it was urged that it is one of the fundamental postulates of the administration of criminal justice that anyone can set the criminal law into motion unless the statute enacting the offence makes a special provision to the contrary both with regard to the locus standi of the complainant, the manner and method of investigation and the person competent to investigate the offence, and the court competent to take cognizance. It was submitted that in Sec. 8 (1) which specifically confers power on the special Judge to take cognizance of an offence without commitment of the case to it there is nothing which would preclude a complainant from filing a private complaint or which would deny .jurisdiction to the special Judge to take cognizance of the offences on such a private complaint. It was submitted that even if Sec. 5A is treated as mandatory and incorporates a safeguard, it is a safeguard against investigation of offences committed by a public servant by police officers of lower rank and nothing more. It was lastly urged that on a comprehensive view of the provisions of 1952 Act,' it does not transpire that any of its provisions and more specifically Sec.\n\nSA denies the power to the special Judge to take cognizance of offences enumerated in Sec. 6 (I) (a) and (b) upon a private complaint. It was also contended that before taking such a drastic view of blocking the access to justice by holding that a private complaint cannot be entertained , by the special Judge, the court must insist on specific and positive provision of such incontrovertible character as to supplant the scheme of Code of Criminal Procedure which permits two\n\n; -\"'-7\n\nA.ll. ANTULAY v. R.S. NAYABi (Desai, J.)\n\nparallel and independent agencies to take criminal offences .to conrt.\n\nAn incidental submission was that the Legislature clearly expresses itself when it requires a certain qualification for filing the complaint, an<l to specify a certain court competent to take cognizance and the method and manner of taking cognizance of those specified offences.\n\nTo substantiate this submission our attention was drawn to a number of statutes which we will presently mention. ·\n\nThe contention put in the forefront was that Sec. SA upon its true interpretation and keeping in view that it enacts a mandatory safeguard in favour of public servants, investigation therein contemplated is a condition precedent to taking cogni1ance of offences enumerated in Sec. 6 (1) (a) and (b) and as a corollary a private complaint would not lie and cannot be entertained by a apecial Judge under Sec.' 8 (1) of 1952 Act. The contention may be examined on principle and precedent. ·\n\nIt is a well recognised principle of criminal jurisprudence that anyone can set or put the criminal law into motion except where the statute enacting or creating an offence indicates to the contrary. 1he scheme of the Code of Criminal Procedure envisages two parallel and independent agencies for taking criminal offences to court. Even for the most serious offence of murder, it was not disputed that a private complaint can, not only be filed but can be entertained and proceeded with according to law.\n\nLocus standi of the complainant is a concept foreign to criminal jurisprudence save and except that where the statute creating an offence provides for the eligibility of the complainant, by necessary implFcation the general principle gets excluded by such statutory provision. Numerous statutory provisions, can be referred to in support of this legal position such as (i) Sec. 187 A of Sea Customs Act, 1878 (ii) Sec. 97 of Gold Control Act, 1968 (iii) Sec. 6 of Import and Export Control Act, 1947 (iv) Sec. 271 and Sec. 279 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (v) Sec. 61 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, (vi) Sec. 621 of the Companies Act, 1956 and (vii) Sec .. 77 of the Electricity Supply Act.\n\nThis list is only illustrative and not exhaustive. While Sec. 190 of the . Code of Criminal Procedure permits anyone to approach the Magistrate with a complaint, it does not prescribe any qualification the complainant is required to fulfil to be eligible to file a complaint. But where an eligibility criterion for a complainant is contemplated specific provisions have been made such as to be found in\n\nS\"cs. 195 to 199 of the Cr. P. c: These specific provisions clearly indicate that in the absence of any such statutory provision, a focus\n\n924 SUP!t.EMB COURT REPORTS\n\n(11184) 2 s.c.R.\n\nsiandl of a complainant is a concept foreign to criminal jurisprudence.\n\nIn other words, the principle that anyone can set or put the criminal law in motion remains intact unless contra-indicated by a statutory provision. This general principle of nearly universal application is founded on a policy that an offence i. e. an act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force (See Sec. 2 (n), Cr. P. C.) is not merely an offence committed in relation to the person who suffers harm but is also an offence against society. The society for its orderly and peaceful development is interested in the punishment of the offender. Therefore, prosecution for serious offences is undertaken. in the name of the State representing the people which would exclude any element of private vendatta or vengeance. If such is the public policy underlying penal statutes who tirings an act or omission made punishable by law to the notice of the authority competent to deal with it, is immaterial and irrelevant unless the statute indicates to the contrary. Punishment of the offender in the interest of the society being one of the objects behind penal statutes enacted for larger good of the society, right to initiate proceedings cannot be whittled down, circumscribed or fettered by putting it into a straight jacket formula of locus standi unknown to criminal jurisprudence, save and except specific statutory exception.\n\nTo hold that such an exception exists. that a private complaint for offences of corruption committed by public servant is not maintainable, the court would require an unambiguous statutory provision and a tangled web of argument for drawing a far fetched implication, cannot be a substitute for an express statutory provision. In tho matter of initiation of proceeding before a special Judge under Sec. 8 (1), the Legislature while conferring power to take cognizance had three opportunities to unambiguously state its m.ind whether the cognizance can be taken on a private complaint or not. The first one was an opportunity to provide in Se.c. 8 ( l) itself by merely stating that the special Judge may take cognizance of an offence on a police report submitted to it by an investigating officer conducting investigation as contemplated by Sec. SA.\n\nWhile providing for investigation by designated police officers of superior rank, the Legislature did not fetter the power of special Judge to take cognizance in a manner otherwise thari on police report. The second opportunity was when by .Sec. 8 (3) a status of a deemed public prosecutor was conferred on a private complainant if he chooses to conduct the prosecution. The Legislature being aware of a provision like the one contained in Sec. 225 of the Cr. P. C., could have as well provided that in every trial before a special Judge the pro_ secution shall be conducted by a Public. Prosecutor, though that\n\n....\n\n....\n\nA.R. ANTULAY v. R.S. NAYAE (Desai, J.) 925\n\nitself would not have heen decisive of the matter. And the third oyportunity was when the Legislature while prescribing the procedure prescribed for warrant cases to be followed by special Judge did not exclude by a specific provision that the only procedure which the special Judge can follow is the one prescribed for trial of warrant cases on a police report. The disinclination of the Legislature to so provide points to the c.ontrary end no canon of construction permits the court to go in search of a hidden or implied limitation on the power of the special Judge to take cognizance unfettered by such _ requirement of its being done on a police report alone. In our . opinion, it is no answer to this fairly well-established legal position that for the last 32 years no case has come to the notice of the court in which cognizance was taken by a special Judge in a private complaint for offences punishable under the 1947 Act. If something that did not happen in the past is to be the sole reliable guide so as to deny any such thing happening in the future, law wou.ld be rendered &tatic and slowly whither away.\n\nThe scheme underlying Code of Criminal Procedure clearly reveals that anyone who wants to give information of an offence may either approach the Magistrate or the officer in charge of a Police Station. If the offence complained of is a non-cognizable one, the Police Officer can either direct the complainant to approach the Magistrate or he may obtain permission of the Magistrate and investigate the offence. Similarly anyone can approach the Magistrate with a complaint and even if the offence disclosed is a serious one, the Magistrate is competent to take cognizance of the offence and initiate proceedings. It is open to the Magistrate but not obligatory upon him to direct investigation by police. Thus two agencies have been set up for taking offences to court. One would 'therefore, require a cogent and explicit provision to hold that Sec ..\n\n5A displaces this scheme.\n\nThe Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (' 1947 Act' for short) was put on the statute book in the year 1947. Sec. 5A did not form part of the statute in 1947 .. Sec. 5A was first introduced in the Act in the year 1952. Prior thereto, Sec. 3 of the 1947 Act which made the offences under Secs. 161 and 165 JPC cognizable had a proviso engrafted to it which precluded investigation of the offences under the Prevention of Corruption Aci by a police officer below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police except without the order of a Magistrate of the first class. There was ah identical provision in sub-s. ( 4) of Sec. 5 for investigatioa of\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1984} 2 s.c.R.\n\nthe offence of criminal misconduct. Sec. 5 A makes a provision for investigation by police officers of higher rank. Sec. SA starts with a non-obstante clau.se that : 'Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, no police officer below the rank ...... ' Assuming that Sec. SA did not make it obligatory to conduct investigation by police officer of a certain rank, what would have been the position i.n law.\n\nChapter XII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, . 1973 bears '- the heading 'Information to the police and their powers to investigate.' Sec. 154 provides for information to police in cognizable cases. It casts a duty on the officer in charge of a police station to reduce to writing every information relating to commission of a cognizable offence given to him and the same will be read over to the informant and the same shall be signed by the informant and a copy thereof shall be given to him. If information given to an officer in charge of a Police Station disclosed a non-cognizable offence, he has to enter the substance of the information in a book to be l<ept by such officer in such form as the State Government may prescribe in this behalf and to refer the informant to the Magistrate (Sec. 155 <I).\n\nSub-s. (2) puts an embargo on the power of the police officer in charge of the police station to investigate a noncognizable offence without the order of a Magistrate having power to try the case or commit the case for trial. Sec. !56 sets out the powers of the officer in charge of police station to investigate cognizable cases. Sub-s. (2) o(Sec. 156 may be noticed. It says that 'no proceeding of a police officer in any such case shall at any stage be called in question on the ground that the case was one which such officer was not empowered under the section to investigate.' Sub-s.\n\n(3) confers power on the Magistrate empowered under Sec. 190 to take cognizance of an offence, to order an investigation as set out in sub-ss. (l) and (2) of Sec. 156. Sec. 167 enables the Magistrate to remand the accused to police custody in the circumstances therein mentioned. Sec. 17 3 provides tb.at 'every investigation under Chapter XII sh.all be completed without unnecessary delay and as soon as it is completed, the officer in charge of the police station shall forward to a Magistrate empowered to.take cognizance of the offence on a police report, a report in the form prescribed by the State Government, setting out various things enumerated in the section. Sub.-s. (8) of Sec. 173 provides that despite submission of the report on completion of the investigation, further investigation can be conducted in respect of the same offence and further evidence so collected has to be forwarded to the same Magsitrate. The report\n\nI T\n\nA.R. ANTULAY v. R.S. NAYAK <Desai, J.) 927\n\nof this further investigation shall by and large conform with the requirements of .subss. (2) to (6).\n\nFasciculus of sections in Chapter XIV prescribed conditions requisite for initiation of proceedings.\n\nSec. 190. provides that subject to the provisions of the Chapter, any Magistrate of the first class, and any Magistrate of the second class specially mpowercd in this behalf under sub-sec. (2), may take cognizance of any offence-( a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence; (b) upon a police report of snch facts; and (c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge, that such offence has been committed. Sec. 191 obliges the Magistrate when he takes cognizance of an offence under clause (c) of sub-sec. U) of Sec. 190, to inform the accused when he appears before him, that he is entitled to have the case inquired into or tried by another Magistrate,\n\nSec. J 93 provides that 'except as otherwise expressly provided in 'the Code or by any other law for the time being in force, no court of Session shall take cognizance of any offence as a court of original jurisdiction unless the case has b.een committed to it by a Magistrate under the Code.'\n\nCognizable offence has been defined in Sec. 2 (c) of the Cr. p. C. to mean 'an offence for which, and \"cognizable case\" means a case in which, a police officer may, in accordance with the First Schedule or under any law for the time being in force, arrest without warrant.' Complaint is defined in Sec. 2 (d) to mean 'any allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking action under the Code, that some person, whether known or unknown, has committed an offence, but does not include a police report.' The.re is an explanation appended to the section which bas some relevance. 'A report made by a police officer in a. case which disclosed, after investigation, the commission of a noncognizable offence shall be deemed to be a complaint; and the police officer by whom such report is made shall be deemed to be the complainant.' Sec. 2 (e) defines 'non-cognizable offence' to mean 'an offence for which' and ''non-cognizable\" case means a case in which, .a police officer, has no authority to arrest without warrant.' Police report is defined in Sec. 2 (r) to mean 'a report' forwarded by a police officer to a Magistrate under sub-see. (2) of Sec. J 73.' 'Officer in charge of a police station' has been defined in Sec. 2 ( o) to include any police officer present at the station house who is next in rank to such officer and is above the rank of constable or when the State Government so directs, any other police officer so pesent.'\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1984.J 2 s.c.a.\n\nIn other words, a Head-constable of Police that is one step higher from a constable can be in charge of a police station.\n\nIt may now be mentioned that offences under Secs. 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, l 65A IPC and Sec. 5 (2) of the 1947 Act are cognizable offences. If they are cognizable offences, anyone can go to a police station under Sec. 154 !PC, give information of the offence and an officer of. the level of a Head-constable of Police can start investigation to the chagrin and annoyance of a public servant who may be a highly placed officer. It must also be recalled that prior to 1947, off once under Sec. 161 IPC was a non-cognizable offence meaning thereby that a Magistrate under Sec. 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure would take cognizance upon a private complaint and initiate a proceeding. By Sec. 3 of the 1947 Act, offences under Sec. 16 l and 165 were made cognizable. Legislature being aware that once these two offences are made cognizable, a police officer of the rank of Head-constable would be entitled to initiate investigation against the public servant who may as we!! be highly placed officer in police, revenue, taxation or other departments. In\n\norde~ to guard against this invidious situation, while making offences under Secs. 161 and 165 cognizable by Sec. 3, as it stood in 1947, care was taken to introduce a proviso to Sec. 3 which reads as under:\n\n\"Provided that a police officer below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of police shall not investigate any such offences without the order of a Magistrate of the First Class or make any arrest therefor without a warrant.\"\n\nWhile investigating a cognizable offence, the investigating officer who is an officer in charge of a police station has a right to arrest the accused without a warrant. On these offences being made cognizable, in order to protect public servant from being arrested by a petty police officer as well to avoid investigation of an offence of corruption being conducted by police officers below the specified rank the proviso was enacted thereby depriving low level police officers from exercising this drastic power. However, Legislature was aware that an officer of a rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police may not always be available and to guard against offences going undetected, a further power. was conferred that although ordinarily the offence by public servant undr the aforementioned sections shall not be investigated by an officer below the rank of\n\n~/ -l\n\nA.R. ANTULAY v: R.S. NAYAK (Desai, J.) 929\n\nDeputy Superintendent of Police, the Magistrate of the first class can grant permission to an officer of the lower rank to investigate the offence in teeth of the statute. Therefore, two safeguards were sought to be incorporated in the predecessor provision of the present Sec. 5A, being the proviso to Sec. 3, namely, these offences having . become cognizable shall not be investigated by an officer of a rank below that of a Deputy Superintendent of Police but it if.becomes so necessary, it shall not be done without the, order of a Magistrate. of the first class. Left to police, investigation by the designated officer of superior rank guaranteed a protection against frivolous investigation. In larger public mterest non-availability of such higher officers was catered to by conferring power on the Magistrate of the first class to grant pe.rmission to an officer of the rank lower than the designated officer to investigate such offences. Two conclusions emerge from this situation, that investigation by a police officer of the higher rank on his own may tend to curb frivolous or speculative prosecution but even if an officer of a rank lower than the designated officer is to undertake the investigation for the reasons which he must convince the Magistrate of the first class, the Legislature considered cour.ts' intervention as adequate safeguard against investigation by police officer of a lower rank. It may be mentioned that Sec 5A was first introduced by the Prevention of Corruption (Second Amendment) Act, 1952 but was substituted by the present Sec 5A by Act 40 Of 1964 which was enacted to give effect to the recommendations of the Santhanam Committee. Sec. SA specifies the officers of superior rank in police force on whom the power to investigate offences under Secs. 161, 165, 165A !PC.and Sec. 5 of the 1947 Act is conferred. Simultaneously power was conferred on the Presidency Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class, as the case may be, to permit an officer inferior in rank to the designated officer to undertake investigation and to make an arrest without a warrant. The Legislative intention 1s further manifested by the proviso to Sec.. SA which enables the State Government to authorise police officer not below the rank of an Inspector of Police by general or special order to investigate the aforementioned offences . without the order of the Presidency Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class, and may make an arrest withont a warrant.\n\nAgain while specifying officers of higher rank in clauses (a) to (d) of Sec. 5A (1) who would, by virtne of office, be entitled to investigate the aformentioned offences as cognizable offences and could also make arrest without warrant power was conferred on the Presidency Magistrate or the Magistrate of the first class to remove this nmbrella of protection by giving an authority to investi(late such offence~\n\n\n[1984) 2 S.C.R.\n\nto a police officer of rank lower than the officers of designated rank, and the proviso makes a further dent in the safeguard in that the\n\nState Government by general or special order can brir.g down the designated rank to the level of lnspec.tor of Pol.ice to investigate these offences.\n\nThe whole gamut of argument is that Sec.\n\nSA of 1947 Act incorporates such a safeguard in favour of the accused that upon its true interpretation it is not open to the special Judge to take cognizance of an offence except upon a police report that may be submitted by officers of the designated ran~ or officers authorised by the Presidency Magistrate or the Magistrate of the first class or the Inspector of Police authorised by the State Gqvernment by a general or special order, and therefore a fortiori, it must exclude cognizance being taken by the special Judge upon a private complaint because that would completely render illusory the tafeguard prescribed in Sec. SA. H was said that where a person is threatened with the deprivation of his liberty and the procedure prescribed inco.rporates statutory safeguards, the court should be very slow to dilute or do away with the safeguards or render the same ineffective. It was said that if the courts were to hold that a private complaint can be entertained by the special Judge and the latter is under no obligation to direct investigation of the same by an officer of the designated rank, the safeguard incorporated in Sec. SA becomes illusory and that is imJ!ermissible.\n\nBefore we proceed further, it is now necessary to take notice of salient provisions of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 19S2.\n\nThe Act was enacted as its long title shows to amend the Indian Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 and to\n\nprvide for a more speedy trial of certain offences. Sec. IA is the dictionary clause. Sec. 2, 3, 4 and 5 have been repealed by various amendments. Then comes Sec. 6. It reads as under:\n\n\"6. (!) The State Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, appoint as many special Judges as may be necessary for such area o~ areas as may be specified in the notification to try the following offences, namely:-\n\n(a) an offence punishable under Sec. 161, Sec. 162, Sec. 163, Sec. 164, Sec. i6S or Sec. 165-A of the Indian Penal Code or Sec. 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947.\n\n. ~·\n\n.... ,\n\nA.R. ANTULAY v. R.S. NAYAK (Desai, J.)\n\n(b) any conspiracy to commit or any attempt to commit or any abetment of any of the offences specified in Cl. (a).\n\n(2) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as special Judge under this Act unless he is, or has been, a Sessions Judge or an Additional Sessions Judge or an Assistant Sessions Judge under the Code of Criminal Procedure,\n\n1898.\"\n\nSec. 7 confers exclusive jurisdiction on the special Judge appointed under Sec. 6 to try the cases set out in Sec. 6 (1) (a) and 6 (I) (b). Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 7 provides that \"Every offence specified in sub-section (1) of Sec. 6 shall be tried by the special Judge for the area within which it was committed, or where there are more special Judges than one for such area, by such one of them as may be specified in this behalf by the State Government.\" Sub- .sec. (3) enlarges the jurisdiction of the special Judge not only to try offences set out in Sec. 6 (1) (a) and (b) but also to try offences other than those mentioned therein with which the accused may, under the Code of Criminal Procedure, be charged at the same trial. Three things emerge from Sec. 7. The special Judge has exclusive jurisdiction to try offences enumerated in Sec. 6 (1) (a) and (b). Where thel'e are more than one special Judge for the same area, the State Government is under an obligation to specify the local jurisdiction of each special Judge, it may be case-wise, it may be area-wise. Sub-sec. (3) enlarges the jurisdiction to try other offences which have been committed in the course of the same transaction and for which the accused could be charged at the same trial. Then comes Sec. 8. It reads as under:\n\n\"8 (1): A special Judge may take cognizance of offences without the accused being committed to him for trial, and in trying the accused persons, shall follow the procedure prescribed by the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, for the trial of warrant cases by Magistrates.\n\n(2) A special Judge may, with a view to obtaining the evidence of any person supposed to have been directly or indirectly concerned in, or privy to, an offence, tender a pardon to such person on condition of his making a full and. true disclosure of the whole circumstances within his knowledge relating to the offence and to every other person concerned, whether as principal or abettor, in the commisll32\n\n\n(1984] 2 S.C.R.\n\nsion thereof; and any pardon so tendered shall, for the purposes of Secs. 339 and 339A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, be deemed to have been tendered under\n\nSec. 338 ofthat Code.\n\n(2) Save as provided in sub-section (lj or sub-section (2), the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, shall, so far as they are not consistent with this Act, apply to the proceedings before a special Judge; and for the purposes of the said provisions, the Court of the special Judges shall be deemed to be a Court of Session trying cases without a jury or without the aid of assessors and the person conducting a prosecution before a special Judge shall be deemed to be a public prosecutor.\n\n(3A) In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the provisions contained in sub-section (3), the D provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 shall, so far as may be, apply to the proceedings before a special Judge, and for the purposes of the said provisions, a special Judge shall be deemed to be a Magistrate.\n\n(4) A special Judge may pass upon any person convi- E cted by him any sentence authorised by law for the punishment of the offence pf which such person is convicted.\"\n\nIt may be mentioned that Sec. 8 does not apply to the State of West Bengal. This has some relevance to the understanding of some of the decisions bearing on the subject arising from the State of West Bengal. Sec. 9 provides for the subordination of the special Judge to the High Court of the State in the matter of appeal, revision and other incidental powers which the Higlf Court exercises over subordinate courts.\n\nSec. 10 provided for transfer of certain cases, which were pending at the commencement of the 1952 Act.\n\n'Before we undertake a detailed examination of the submission that Sec. 5 A incorporates a condition precedent to the taking of the cognizance of an offence by a special Judge, it is necessary to state with clarity and precision that Sec. 8 (1) which confers power on the special Judge to take cognizance of offences set out in Sec. 6 (I) (a) and (b) does not directly or indirectly, expressly or by necessary implication indicate that the only method of taking cognizance is tile police report under Sec. 173 (2) of th, e Code of Crimi-\n\n---~\n\nA.R. ANTULAY v. R.S. NAYAK (Desai, J.) 933\n\nnal Procedure submitted by a police officer Qf the designated rank or permissible rank as set out in Secs. 5A. It merely says' A special Judge may take cognizance of offences without the accused being committed to him for trial, and in trying the accused person, shall follow the procedure prescribed by the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 for the trial of warrant cases by Magistrates.' The Code of Criminal Procedure has prescribed four known methods of taking cognizance of offences by the courts competent to try the same.\n\nThe court Jias to take cognizance of the offence before initiation of --be proceeding can be contemplated. The court called upon to\n\nfake cognizance of the offence must apply its mind to the (acts placed before it either upon a police report or upon a complaint or in some other manner the court came to know about it and in the case of Court of Sessions upon commitment of the case by the Magistrate.\n\nSec. 6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides for setting up of criminal courts under the High Court in every State. They are (i) Courts of Session: (ii) Judicial Magistrates of the first class and; in any metropolitan area, Metropolitan Magistrate, (iii) Judicial Magistrates of the second class, and (iv) Executive Magistrates.\n\nThese are to be the criminal courts in every State. The Code made detailed provision for .powers of police officers entitled to investigate offences, procedure of investigation, powers of various courts to take cogiiizance of offences which that particular court is entitld fo try under the Code. Sec. 190 Cr. P. C. confers power on the Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence in one of the manners therein prescribed. The expression 'Magistrate' in Sec. 190 is a 1:ompendious terni which includes Judicial Magistrate of the first class, Metropolitan Magistrate, Judicial Magistrate of the second class and Executive Magistrate, All the three are comprehended in Sec. 190. But then there is another court of original jurisdiction, namely, Court of Session also being set up under Sec. 6. Can Court of Session take cognizance directly upon a complaint filed before it ?\n\nThe answer is obviously in the negative Sec. 193 provides that except as _otherwise expressly provided by the Code or by any other law for the time being in force, no Court of Session shall take cognizance of any offence as a Court of original jurisdiction unless the case has been committed to it by a Magistrate.\n\nIn other words, Court of Session can take cognizance of an offence only upon an order of commitment made by the Magistrate and in no other manner. This necessitated conferring power on the Magistrate to commit cases to the Court of Session. Code of Criminal Procedure\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [I 984J 2 s.c.R\n\nmakes ample provisions specifying offences which are triable by Magistrate of the firsf class and Metropolitan Magistrate, those triable by a Judicial Magistrate of the sec0nd class and those excln sively triable by the Court of Session. Column 6 in the First\n\nSchedule ann.excd to the Code of Criminal. Procedure specifies which court can try a particular offence under the Indian Penal Code.\n\nAccordingly, provision was made in Sec. 209 for commit ment by the Magistrate of a case brought to him either upon a private complaint or upon a police report provided that the offence is exclusively triable by the Court of Session. If the Magistrate ~.-c-- took cogniiance of an offence upon a complaint, which appears to --· be exclusively triable by Court of Session he has to proceed according to Sections 202 (2), 208 and 209. Chapter XVIII incorporates provisions prescribing procedure for the trial before a Court of\n\nSession. Sec. 226 says that .the case comes to the Court in pursu ance of a commitment of the case under Sec. 209. Sec. 209 caters to a situation where the case was instituted before the Magistrate on a police report or otherwise. In both the. cases, if it appears to him that the offence which is alleged against the accused is exclusively triable by the Court of Session, there. is no option but to commit the case to the Cpurt of Session. The Court of Session thus takes cognizance of the offence upon commitment by the Magistrate. And any other mode of taking cognizance is specifically barred under\n\nSec. 193.\n\nSec. 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides as under : . .\n\n\"4 (!)-All offences under the Indian Penal Code shall• be investigated, inquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions hereinafter contained.\n\n(2) All offences under any other law shall be investi gated, inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with accor ding to the same provisions, but subject to any enactment for the time being in force regulating the manner or place of investigating, inquiring into, trying or otherwise dealing with snch offences.\"\n\nSec. 4 (I) provides for investigation, inquiry or trial for every offence under the Indian Penal Code according to the provisions of the Code.\n\nSec. 4 (2) provides for offences under other law which may be inve; tigated, inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with H according to the provisions of the Code of Criminal Proc<; dure but\n\nA.R. ANTULAY v. R.s. NAYAK (I)esai, J.) 935\n\nsubject to any enactment for the time being in force regulating the fmanner or place of investigation, inquiring into, trying or otherwise dealing with such offences.\n\nJn the absence of a specific provision made in the statute indicating that offen'ces will have to be investigated, inquired into, tncd and otherwise dealt with according to that statute, the same will , have to be investigated, inquired into, , tried and otherwise dealt with according to the Code of Criminal Procedure. In other words, Code of Criminal Procedure is the parent statute which provides for investigation, inquiring into and\n\n~-trial of cases by criminal courts of various designations. -\n\nNow the Code of Criminal Procedure prescribed only four methods of taking cognizance of an offence whether it be a Magistrate or a Sessions Court is for the time being immeterial. The Code prescribes four Jllethods for taking cognizance upon a com- plaint, or upon a report of the police officer or where the Magistrate himself comes to know of the commiss.ion of offence through some other source and in the case of Sessions Court, upon a commitment by the Magistrate. There is no other known or recognised mode of taking cognizance of an offence by a criminal court. Now if Court of. special Judge is a criminal court, which atleast was not disputed,\n\n_... and jurisdiction is_con ferred upon the presiding officer of the Court of special Judge to take cognizance of offences simultaneously excluding one of the four recognised modes of taking cogniz.ance, namely, upon commitment by a Magistrate as set out in Sec, 193, the only other method by which 'the Court of special Judge can take cognizance of an offence for the trial of which it was set up, is any one of the remaining three other methods known to law by which a criminal court would take cognizance of an offence, not as an idle\n\n1 formality but with a view to initiating proceedings and ultimately to \"r.· _' try the accused. If the language employed in Sec. 8 (1) is read in\n\n_ this light and in this background that a special Judge may take\n\ncognizanc-e of offence without the accused being committed to him for trial, ft necessirily implies that the Court of special Judge is a.rmed with power to take cognizance of offences but that it is denied the power to take cognizance on commitment by the Magistrate.\n\nThis exch1des the mode of taking cognizance under Sec. 193. Then\n\nG , .Ji, remains only Sec .. 190 which provides various methods of taking cognizance of offences by courts- It is idle to say that Sec. 190 is confined to Magistrate and special Judge is not a Magistrate. We shall deal with the position of a' special Judge a little later. The fact however remains that the Court of the special 'Judge as the expression , is used in sub-sec. (3) of Sec. ,8 is a:priminal:court and in view_'of , ff\n\nSUPRBMB COURT REPORTS (1984] 2 s.c.R ·\n\nSec. 9 it is under the appellate and administrative control of the High Court. It must take cognizance of offences with. a view to trying the same but it shall not take it on commitment of the accused to the court. As a necessary corollary, it must appear that the special Judge can take cognizance of offences enumerated in Sec. 6 (l)(a) and (b) upon a complaint or upon a police report or upon his coming to know in some manner of the offence having been committed. With regard to the last of the modes of taking cognizance, it was urged that there is inh_erent evidence to show that Sec. 190\n\n+ '\n\n..,\n\n(l)(c) cannot be availed off by special Judge because Sec. 191 is not __ _ available to him so as to transfer the case. A little while'later, we___ shall point out that the provisions of the Court of special Judge in - snch manner and to such extent as to retain the separate identity of the Court of special Judge and not that he must either fulfil a role of a Magistrate or a Session Court.\n\nIt is a well-established canon of construction that the court should read the section as it is and cannot rewrite it to suit its convenience; nor does any canon of construction permit the court to read the secticn in such manner as to render it to some extent -:' otiosB. Sec. 8 (I) says that the special Judge shall take cognizance of an offence and shall not take it on commitment of the accused.\n\nThe Legislature provided for both the positive and the negative. It positively conferred power on special Judge to take cognizance of offences and it negatively removed any concept of commitment. It is not possible therefore, to read Sec. 8 (I) as eanvassed on behalf of the appellant that cognizance can only be taken upon a police report and any other view will render the safeguard under Sec. SA illusory.\n\nIt appears well-established that an investigation contemplated by sec. SA must ordinarily be undertaken by the police officers of\n\n- 'r'. the designated rank and except with the permission of the Magistrate bars investigation by police officers of lower rank, It may be that in a given case permission granted by the Magistrate for invtstigation . by a police officer of a rank lowerthan the designated rank may be judicially reviewable. If in cases where any illegality or irregularity in the process of investigation under Sec. SA has been brought to the notice of the court at an early stage, a direction has been given for a fresh investigation by a police officer of the designated rank.\n\nBut this is subject to a well-recognised legal position that the court would not attach any importance to any illegality in the matter of investigation if it is relied upon at the conclusion of a trial in the 11bsence of prejudice pleadecl and proved. The questiop. is whether\n\nA.R. ANTULAY v. a.s. NAYAK (Desai, J.) 931\n\nthese aspects are sufficient to provide an exception to the wellrecognised general principle apart from the specific power conferred under Sec. 8(ll of the 19S2 Act on the special Judge to take cognizance of the offences, the only exception being not upon a commitment to him that anyone can set the criminal law into niotion ?\n\nLet us therefore, turn to some of the decisions to which our attention was drawn to substantiate the submission that Sec. 5A ~-incorporates a safeguard in favour of the accused. In fact, it is really not necessary to analyse these decisions in detail to arrive at the ratio of each of them because it is not controve.rted that Sec. SA does incorporate a safeguard but the parameters of the safeguard arc against inve.stigation by police officers of fairly lower rank once the offences enumerated in Sec. 6 (I) (a) and (b) were made cognizable. The limit of tho safeguard is that ordinarily investigation of such offences shall be undertaken only by officers of the designated rank save and except with the permission of the Magistrate or as per the first proviso to Sec. SA. The submission is that upon its true evaluation, the safeguard clearly points in the direction of a prior investigation before cognizance of the offences can be taken by the special Judge and any other view would dilute the safeguard or render it ilh1sory. It was also submitted that if defective investigation can vitiate the proceedings a fortiori the total absence of and investigation whatsoever as contemplated by Sec. SA, which would be the position if a private complaint can be directly entertained by the special Judge, would of necessity vitiate the proceeding.\n\nThe sheet anchor of the supmission was the decision of this Court in M.N. Rishbud & Inder Singh v. The State of Delhi.(') in that case the question posed was was whether the provision Sec. SA of the 1947 Act requiring that the investigation into the offences specified therein shall not be conducted by any police officer of a rank lower than a Deputy Superintendent of Police without the specific order of a Magistrate, is directory or mandatory ? The Court rendered the opinion that Sec. SA is mandatory and not directory, and that an investigation conducted in violation thereo( bears the stamp of illegality. Thus so far as investigation of a case is concerned, this Court has recorded a definite opinion that investigation by a police officer in contravention of the provision contained in Sec. SA hears the stamp .of illegal1ty. What is the effect of this\n\n(I) [19;5] s.c.R. 1150.\n\n938 SUPllEMB COURT !1EPORTS It 984) 2 s.c.R.\n\nmegality on the outcome of aconcluded trial does not arise for our consideration but there are certain observations which were relied upon to urge that a prior investigation under Sec. SA being held to be mandatory and . as a special Judge can take cognizance of an\n\noffence upon a police report submitted at the end of a valid and legal investigation in consonance with Sec. SA, by necessary implication,· taking cognizance of an offence by a special Judge under Sec. 8(1) of 1952 Act upon a private complaint is excluded.\n\nWe must frankly say that we find nothing in this judgment even remotely to bear out the submission. Sec. SA is a safeguard against~----\n\ninvestigation by police officers lower in rank than designated officers.\n\nIn this connection at page 1159, the Court has observed as under:\n\n\"The underlying policy in making these offences by\n\n· public servants non-cognizable appears to be that public servants who have to discharge their functions-often enough in difficult circumstances-should not be exposed to the harassment of investigation against them on information levelled, possibly, by persons affected by their official acts, unless a Magistrate is satisfied that an investigation is called for, and on such satisfaction authorises the same.\n\nThis is meant to ensure the diligent discharge of their official functions by public servants, without fear or favour.\n\nWhen, therefore, the Legislature thought fit to remove the protection from the public servants, in so far as it relates to the investigation of the offences of corruption comprised in the Act, by making then cognizable it was considered necessary to provide a substituted safeguard from undue harassment by requiring that the investigation is to be conducted normally by a police officer of a designated higher rank.''\n\nThis observation will leave no room for doubt that the safeguard incorporated in Sec. SA is one against investigation by police oflj.cer of a rank lower than the designated rank and that the Magistrate con permit investigation by police officer of lower rank.\n\nIt was however, urged that the three vital stages relevant to initiation of proceedings in respect of offences enumerated in Sec. 6( I) (a) and (b) have been clearly delineated in this judgment when at page\n\nj !62 it is observed; 'trial follows cognizance and cognizance is preceded by investigation.' This is the basic scheme of the Code in respect of cognizable offences but that too where in respect of a\n\nconizable offence, the informant appproaches an officer in charge\n\nA it, ANTULAY v. a.$. NAYAF; c (Desai, J.) 939\n\nof a police station. When in the case of a cognizable offence, a police officer on receipt of information of an offence proceeds under Chapter XU, he starts with investigation and then submits .his report, called the police report, upon which cognizance is taken, and then follows the trial. And these three stages in that chronology are set out with regard to an investigation by an officer in charge of a police station or a police officer entitled to investigate any particular offence. This sentence cannot be read in isolation or torn out of the context to lend support to the submission that'in no case cognizance can be taken without prior investigation under Sec. SA.\n\nTn fact the Cotut proceeded to make it abundantly clear that 'a defect or illegality in investigation however serious, has no direct bearing on tlie competence or the procedure relating to cognizance or trial.' The Court examined the scheme of Secs. 190, 193 nd 195 to 199 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and observed : that 'the language of Sec. 190 is in marked contrast with that of the other sections of the group under the same heading i.e. Sections 193 and 195 to 199. These latter sections regulate the competence of the Court and bar its jurisdiction in certain cases excepting in compliance therewith, Section 190 does not.' The Court concluded by observing 'that whre the cognizance of the case has in fact been taken and the case bas proceeded to termination, the invalidity of the precedent investigation does not vitiate the result, unless miscarriage of justice has been caused thereby.' Having minutely read this judgment on which firm reliance was placed on behalf of the' appellant, we find nothing in it to come to the conclusion that an investigation under Sec. SA is a condition precedent before cognizance can be taken of offences triable by special Judge. Reliance next was placed upon the decision of this Court in The State f Madhya Pradesh v. Mubarak Ali.(') This Court held that Sec 5A was inserted in the 1952. Act to protect the public servants against harassment and victimization. If it was in the interest of the .public that corruption should be eradicated, it. was equally in the interest of the public that honest public servants should be able to discharge their duties free from false, frivolous and malicious accusations. To achieve this object,\n\nSections 5A and 6 introduced the following two safeguards; (1) no police officer below the rank of a designated police officer, shall investigate any offence punishable under Sec. 161, Sec. 165 or Sec. 165 A of the Indian Penal Code or nuder sub-Sec. (2) of Sec. 5A of . the 1947 Act without the order of a Presidency Magistrate and (2) no court shall take cogl\\izance of offences hereinabove enumerated\n\n(!). [1959] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 201,\n\n940 SUPRJlMll COURT REPORTS [1984] 2 s.c.R.\n\nexcept with the previous sanction, of the appropriate Government.\n\nThe Court held that these statutory safeguards must be complied with, for they were conceived in pulic inierest and were provided as a guarantee against frivolous and vexatious prosecutions. The Court further observed that the Legislature was prepared to believe an officer of an assured status implicity, and it prescribed an additional guarantee that in the case of police officers below the rank, the previous order of a Presidency Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class as the case may be. Comes thereafter a pertinent observation 'that the Magistrate's status gives assurance to the bonafides of the investigation. 'This would rather show that Legislature while on the one hand conferred power on the police officers of the designated rank to take upon themselves the investigation of offences committed by public servants, it considered intervention of the Magistrate as the real safeguard when investigation was permitted by officers lower in rank then the designated officers. In other words, the Court was a safeguard and it ought to be so because the judicially trained mind is any day a better safeguard then any police officer or any rank. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Bhagwant Kishore Joshi(') the obsevation of the Court in Mubarak Ali's case was affirmed. Jn S.N. Bose v.\n\nState of Bihar,(2) this Court held that the order of the Magistrate giving permission to the Inspector of Police to investigate the case did not give any reasons and there was thus a violation of Sec. SA.\n\nYet this illegality committed in the course of an investigation does not affect the competence and jurisdiction of the court for trial and where cognizance of the case has in fact been taken and the case has proceeded to termination the invalidity of the preceding investigation does not vitiate the result unless the miscarriage of justice has been caused thereby, and in reaching this conclus10n reliance was placed on the case of M.N. Rishbud In P. Sirajuddin etc. v. State of Madras. etc.(3) it was held that 'the Code of Criminal Procedure is an enactment designed inter a/ia to ensure a fair investigation of the allegations against a person charged with criminal misconduct. This is undeniable but has hardly any relevance. Some guidance is given to the enquiry officer and the means to be adopted in investigation of offences. This has no bearing on the issue under discussion. Refe. rence was also made to Union of India v. Mahesh Chandra Sharma(4) which does not advance the case at all. Having carefully examined\n\n(I) [1964] 3 SCR 71.\n\n\n(3) [1970] 3 S, C.R. 931.\n\n(4) AIR 1957 Madhya Bharat 43.\n\n,..\n\n' l\n\nA.R. ANTUtAY v. R.S. NAYAK (lJesai, J.\\ 941\n\nthese judgments in the light of the submissions made, the only con'\n\nclusion that unquestionably emerges is that Sec. SA is a safeguard against investigation of offences committed by public servants, by . petty or lower rank police officer. It has nothing to do directly or indirectly with the mode and method of taking cognizance of offences by the court of special Judge. It also follows as a necessary corollary that provision of Sec. SA is not a condition precedent to initiation of proceedings before the special Judge who acquires power under Sec. 8(1) to take cognizance of offences enumerated in\n\nSec. 6(1) (a) and (b), with this limitation alone that is shall not be upon commitmment to him by the Magistrate.\n\nOnce the contention on behalf of the appellant that investigation under Sec. SA is a condition precedent to the initiation of proceedings before a special Jndge and therefore cognizance of an offence cannot be taken except upon a police report, does not commend to us and has no foundation in law, it is unnecessary to refer to the long line of decisions commencing from Tay/or v Taylor, (1) Nazir Ahamad v. King Emperor (') and ending with Chettiam Veettil Ahmad and Anr. v. Taluk Land Board and Ors., (3) laying down hitherto uncontroverted legal principle that where a statute requires to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all Other methods of perfor- mance are necessrily forbidden.\n\nOnce Sec. SA is out of the way in the matter of taking cognizance of offences committed by public servants by a special Judge, the power of the special Judge to take cognizance of such offences conferred by Sec. 80) with only one limitation, in any one of the known methods of taking cognizance of offences by courts of original jurisdiction remains undented. One such statutorily recognised well-known method of taking cognizance of offences by a court competent to take cognizance is upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitutes the offence. And Sec. S(D says that the special Judge has the power to take cognizance of offences enume- . rated i_n Sec. 6dJ(a) and (b) and the only mode of taking cognizance excluded by the provision is upon commitment. It therefore, follows that the special Judge can take cognizance of offences committed by\n\n(!) [1875-76] ! Ch. Division 426.\n\n(2) AIR 1936 Privy Council 253.\n\n\n. lff\n\n942 SUPREME COURT REi>ORTs i1984) 2 s.c.it\n\npublic servants upou receiving a complaiut of facts constituting such offences.\n\nIt was, h )Wever, submitted that even if it be hel4 that the special Judge i: entitled to entertain a private complaint, no further . steps can be ta) en by him without directing an investigation under\n\nSec. 5A so ih~ t the safeguard of Sec. 5A is not whittled down.\n\nThis is the self 'ame argument under.a different apparel. Accepting such a submiss on would tantamount to saying that on receipt of tlie complaint tbe special Judge must direct an investigation under Sec. 5A. There s no warraut for such an approach. Astounding\"' it appeared to 1 s, in all solemnity it was submitted that investigation of an off en ; e by a superior police officer affords a more solid safeguard comp ired to a court. Myopic as this is, it would topsy turvy the funda nental belief that to a .person accused of an offence there is no bette1 safeguard than a court. And this is constitutionally epitomised in At. 22 that upon arrest by police, t\\e arrested person must be produc< d before the nearest Magistrate within twenty-four hours of the arr :st. Further, numerous provisions of the Code of Criminal proced m such as Sec. 161; Sec . .!64, and Sec. 25 of the Indian Evidence Act would show the Legislature's hesitation in placing confiden\"e on police officers away from court's gaze. And the very fact tha; power is conferred on a Presidency Magistrate or .\n\nMagistrate of the first class to permit police officers of lower rank to investigate th 1se offences would speak for the mind of the Legislature that the court is a IJlOre reliable safeguard than even superior police of.leers.\n\nIt was urged that there is inherent evidence in other provisions of the 1952 Act aild the Code of Criminal Procedure which would buttress the submi; sion that the special Judge cannot take, cogniz.ance upon a private co nplaint. Even if Sec. 8(1) confers specilic powers of taking cogniza1 ce of offences without the necessity of the accused being committed •'or trial and prescribes the procedure for trial of warrant cases by Hagi;, tntes to be adopted by a special Judge, it is necessary to deter nine with accuracy whether a special Judge is a Magistrate or a Sc :sions Judge. After referring to Sec. 8(3) which provides that st ve as provided in sub-sec. (1) or sub-sec. (2), the pro vi si ms of the Code of Criminal procedure, 1898 shall so far as they are not inconsistent with the 1952 Act apply to the proceedings before a special Judge; and for the purposes of th' said provisions, the Court of a special Judge shall be deemed to be a Court of Sessions trying cases without\n\nI !'-:\n\nA.a. A.NTULAY v. R.S. NAYAK (Desai, J.) 94~\n\na jury or without the aid of assessors and the person conducting a prosecution before a special Judge shall be deemed to bea public prosecutor; it was urged that for the purpose of procedure to be fo!lowea by a special Judge in the trial of the case before'1lim, he is a Magistrate as provided in Sec. 8(1) but not a Sessions Judge because no Sessions Court can take cognizance of offences without commitment while a special Judge has to take cognizance of offences without accused being committed to him for trial yet the provisions of sub-Secs. (2) and {3) leave no one in doubt that for all other purpose.s he is to be treated as a Sessions Judge or a Court of Sessions. Proceeding along it was urged that if a special Judge has all the trappings of the Court of Sessions, he cannot take cognizanc_e as provided by Sec. 190, Cr. P. C. because it confers power on Magistrate to take cognizance of any offence in_any one of the three modes therein prescribed. Therefore, it was submitted that a private complaint cannot be entertained.\n\nFor more than one reason it is not possible to accept this\n\nD submission. If Sec. 190 -cannot be availed, we fail to see how a special Judge would be entitled to take cognizance on a police report. If Sec. 190 is not attracted all the three modalities of taking cognizance of offences would not be available. One cannot pick and choose as it suits one's convenience. Either all the three. modalitie_s are available or none. And Sec. 80) which confers power E of taking cognizance does not show any preference. On this short ground, the submission must be rejected.\n\nIt is, however, necessary to decide with precision and accuracy the position of a special Judge and the Court over which he presides styled as the Court of a-special Judge because unending confusions F have arisen by either assimilating him with a Magistrate or with a Sessions Court. The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 was .enacted for more effective prevention of bribery and corruption.\n\nYears rolled by and experience gathered showed that unless a special forum for the trial of such offences as enumerated in the 1947 Act . is created, the object underlying the 1947 Act would remain a G distant dream. i his led to 'the enactment of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952. The Statement of Objects and Reasons accompanying the Bill refers to the recommendations of the Committee chaired by Dr. Bakshi Tek Chand appointed to review the working of the Special Police Establishment and tO make recommendations for improvement of laws relating to bribery and corruption.\n\nTo take the cases of corruption out of the maze of cases handled H\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1984j Z R.C.R.\n\nby Magistrates, it was decided to set up special courts. Sec. 6 conferred power on the State Government to appoint as many special Judges as may be necessary with power to try the offences set out in clauses (a) and (b).\n\nNow if at this stage a reference is made to Sec. 6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which provides for constittion. of criminal courts, it would become clear that a new court with a new designation was being set up and that it has to. be under the administrative and judicial superintendence of the High Court.\n\nAs already pointed out, there were four types of criminal courts functioning under the High Court. To this list was added the court of a special Judge. Now when a new eourt whieh is indisputably a criminal eourt because it was not even whispered that the Court of special Judge is not a criminal court, is set up, to make it effective and functionally oriented, it becomes necessary to prescribe its powers, procedure, status and all ancillary provisions . .i\\Vhile setting up a court of a special Judge keeping i.n view the fact that the high dignitaries in public life are likely to be tried by such a court, the qualification prescribed was that the person to be appointed as special Judge has to be either a Sessions Judge, Additional Sessions Judge or Assistant Sessions Judge. These three dignitaries are above the level of a Magistrate. After prescribing the qualification, the Legislature proceeded to confer power upon a special Judge to take cognizance of offences for the trial of which a special court with exclusive jurisdiction was being set up. If a special Judge has to take cognizance of offences, ipso facto the procedure fot: trial of such offences has to be prescribed.\n\nNow the Code prescribes different prooedures for trial of cases by different courts. Procedure for trial of a cases by different courts. Procedure for trial of a case before a Court of Sessions is set out in Chaprer XVIII; trial of warrant cases by Magistrates is set out in Chapter XIX and the provisions therein included catered to both the types .of cases coming before the Magistrate, namely, upon police report or otherwise than on a police report. Chapter XX prescribes the procedure for trial of summons cases by Magistrates and Chapter XXI prescribes the procedure for summary trial. Now that a new criminal court was being set up, the Legislature took the first step of providing its comparative position in the hierarchy of court; under Sec. 6 Cr. P.C. by bringing it on level more or less comparable to the Court of ·\n\nSessions, but in order to avoid any confusion arising out of comparison by level, it was made explicit in Sec. 8 (l) itself that it is not a C\"urt of Sessions because it can take cognizance of offences without commitment as contemplated by Sec. 193 Cr. P. C.\n\nUndoubtedly in Sec. 8 (3) it was clearly laid down that subject to the provi-\n\n.,..\n\nA.R. ANTULAY v. R.S. NAYAR: (Desai, J.) 945\n\nsions of sub-Sec. (1) and (2) of Sec. 8, the Court of special Judge shall be deemed to be a Court of Sessions trying cases without a jury or without \"the aid of assessors.\n\nIn contra-distinction to the Sessions Court this new court was to be a court of original jurisdiction. The Legislature then proceeded to specify which out of the various procenures set out in the Code, this new court shall follow for trial of offences before it. Sec. 1 (I) specifically says that a special Judge in trial of offences before him shall follow the procedure prescribed in the Code of Criminal Procedure for trial of warrant cases by Magistrates. The provisions for trial of warrant cases by the Magistrate are to be found in Chapter XXI of !898 Code. A glance through the provisions will .show that the provisions therein included catered to both the situations namely, trial of a case initiated upon police eport (Sec. 251A) and tnal of cases instituted otherwise than on police report (Sec. 252 to 257). If a special Judge is _en-joined with a duty to try cases according to the procedure prescribed in foregoing provisions he will have to first decide whether the case was instituted upon a police report or otherwise than on police report and follow the procedure in the relevant group of sections. Each of the Secs. 251A to 257 of 1898 Code which are in pari materia with Secs. 238 to 250 of 1973 Code refers to what the Magistrate should do. Does the special Judge in Secs. 238 to 250 wherever the expression 'Magistrate' occurs.\n\nThis is what is called legislation by incorporation.\n\nSimilarly, whete the question of taking cognizance arises, it is futile to go in search of the fact whether for purposes of Secs. 190 which conferred power on the Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence, special Judge is a MagiStrate? What is to be done is that one has to read the expression 'spec'al Judge' in place of' Magistrate, and the whole thing becomes crystal clear. The Legislature-wherever it found the grey area clarified ii by making specific provision such as the one in sub-s (2) of Sec. 8 and to leave no one in doubt further provided in subs. (3) that al! the provisions of the Code of .Crimin'al Pro cedure shall so far as they are not inco.nsistent with the Act apply to the proceedings before a special Judge.\n\nAt the time when the 1952 Act was enacted what was in operation was the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. It did not envisvge any Court of a special Judge and the Legislature never. wanted to draw up an exhaustive Code of Procedure for this new criminal court which was being set up. Therefore, it conferred power (taking cognizance of offences), prescribed procedure (trial of warrant cases by a Magi, trate), indicated authority to tender pardon (Sec 338) and then after declaring . ts status as C•):n, nribl' to a Coct of Sllsions proceeded to pres-\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984] 2 s.c.n\n\ncribe that all provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure will apply in so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the 1952 Act.\n\nThe net outcome of this position is that a new court of original jurisdiction was set up and whenever a question arose as to what are its power> in respect of specitlc questions broughrbefore it as court of original criminal jurisdiction, it had to refer to the Code of Criminal Procedur;: undaunted by any designation claptrap. When takiug cognizance, a Court of special Judge enjoyed the powers under Sec. 190.\n\nWhen trying cases, it is obligatory to follow the procedure for trial of warrant cases by a Magistrate though as , and by way of status it was equated with a Court of Sessions .. The entire argument inviting us to specifically decide whether a court of a special Judge for a certain purpose is a Court of Magistrate or a Court of Sessions revolves round a mistaken belief that a special Judge has to be one or the other, and must fit in in the slot of a Magistrate or a Court of Sessions.\n\nSuch an approach would strengulate the functioning of the court and must be eschewed.\n\nShorn of all embellishment .• the court or a special Judge is a court of original criminal jurisdiction. As a court of original criminal jurisdiction in. order to make it functionally oriented some powers were conferred by the statute setting up the court. Except those specifically conferred and specifically denied, it has to function as a court of original criminal jurisdiction not being hide bound by the terminological status description of Magistrate or a Court of Session.s.\n\nUnder the Code it will anjoy all powers which a court of original criminal jurisdiction enjoys save and except the ones specifically denied:\n\nSec 9 of the 1952 Act would equally be helpful in this behalf.\n\nOnce court of a special Judge is a court of original criminal jurisdiction, it became necessary to provide whether it is subordinate tothe High Court, whether appeal and revision against its jndgments and orders would lie to the High Court and whether the High Court would have goneral superintendence over a Court of special Judge as it'has over all criminal courts as enumerated in Sec. 6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The court of a special Judge, once created by an independent statute, has been brought as a court of original criminal jurisdiction under the High Court because Sec. 9 confers on the High Court all the powers conferred by Chapters XXXI and XXX III of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 on a High Court as if the court of special Judge were a court of Sessions trying cases without a jury within the local limits of the jurisdiction Qf the Hi(lh Court. Therefore, thero is no gainsayinJ! the fact that\n\nA.R. ANTULAY v. R.s. NAYAK (Desai, J.) 947\n\na new criminal court with a name, designation and qualification of the officer eligible to preside over it with powers specified and the particular procedure which it must follow has been set up under the 1952 Act. . The court has to be treated as~ court of original criminal jurisdiction and shall have all the powers.as any court of original. criminal jurisdiction has under the Co.de of Criminal Procedure, except those specifically excluded.\n\nOnce the position. and power of the Court of a special Judge in the hierarchy of criminal courts under the High Court is clearly and unambiguously established, 1t is unnecessary to roam into an enquiry examining large number of decisions laying down in the context of each case that the dourt of a special Judge is a Court of Sessions and the contrary view taken in some other decisions.\n\nReference to those judgments would be merely adding to the length of this judgment without achieving any useful purpose.\n\nIt was submitted that there is further internal evidence pointing in the direction that a private complaint cannot be entertained by a special Judge.\n\nSec. 225 in Chapter XVIII containing provisions prescribing procedure of trial before a Court of Sessions provides that 'in every trial before a Court of Sessions' the prosecution shall be conducted by a Public Prosecutor.' Last part of Sec. 8 O) of the 1952 Act pr_ovides that' ...... the pen on conducting a prosecution before a special Judge_ shall be deemed to be a public prosecutor.' It was urged that public prosecutions are ordinarily launched in the name of t_he State because in matters of serious offences the society is interested in punishing the anti-social elements who may be a menace to society and that such prosecution is not for satisfying private lust or sense of vengennce. Proceeding 'along, it was stated that the scheme of Criminal Procedure Code clearly shows that serious offences are exclusively triable by a Court of Sessions and. that even if a commitment to the Court of Sessions is made upon an inquiry held by a Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence on a private complaint, once the case is committed to a Court of Sessions, the role of the private complainant becomes insignificant. 1 be State takes over the prosecution and the public prosecutor shall necessarily be in charge -of the prosecuton.\n\nAnd it was pointed out that public prosecutor is appointed by the Central or the State Government. It was urged that appointment ofa public prosecutor under Sec. 24 of the Cede of Criminal Procedure is a solemn duty to be performed by the Central or the State.Government, as the . ·\n\neie 1niy be, and that too after coqsultation wi.th the High Court.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984;] 2 s.c.R.,\n\nAnd it is such public prosecutor who . shall alone be entitled to conduct the trial before Court of Sessions. In order to acquaint us with the role, the dignity and the rcsponsibjlity of a public prosecutor, atten<ion was drawn to Shive Pru v. The King, li Amleslz Ceandra & Ors. v. The State, (1 ) Raj Kislzore Rabidas v. The State.(2) In Re Bhupafli Mall1ah and Ors (3) and Medichetty Ramalcistiah and Ors. v. The State o/Andlua Pradesh I') These decisions purport to indicate the objectivity imd. the fairness with which a public prosecutor in charge of the case shall conduct the prosecution and it is no part of his duty to attempt to obtain a conviction at all costs.\n\nHis duty is to fairly analyse the evidence for and against the accused and that he should not withheld any evidence which has a bearing on the issues before the court. In other words, he must be fair and objective in his approach to the case animated by a desire to vindicate justice and no more. It was urged that if this be the wellrecognised role of a public prosecutor, bow horrendous it would appear if a private complainant motivated by a deire to wreck vengeance against the accusod is to be deemed to be a public prosecutor. It was said that such a private complainant cannot be elevated to the status of a public prosecutor but the deeming fiction enacted in latter part of Sec. 8 (3) would clothe him with such a status of a public prosecutor which he was hardly qualified to enjoy.\n\nAs a second string to the bow, it was said that Sec. 321 of the Code of Criminal Procedure generally confers power on a public prosecutor to withdraw the prosecution subject to limitations therein prescribed. The submission is that if a private complainant who chooses to conduct his case and thereby enjoys the status of a deemed public prosecutor he would be able to poute the fountain of justice by initiating some frivolous prosecution and then withdraw it if his palms are greased. It was also said that the accused may put up a bogus complainant and make a pretence of trial and escape a serious prosecution upon high level investigation.\n\nThese are wild imaginings, irrelevant for the purpose of construction of a provision in a statute. Further this submission overlooks the vital role that the court has to play before any prosecution can be withdrawn at the -instance of a public prosecutor. That a public prosecutor may abuse his office is not determinative as to who shoule be a public\n\n(l) AIR 1941 Rangoon 209 ..\n\n(2) AIR !952 Cal. 481.\n\n(3) AIR 1969 Cal. 321.\n\n(4) AIR 1959 A.P. 477. ff\n\n(5) AIR 1959 A.P. 659.\n\nA.R. ANTULAY v. R.s. NAYAK <Desai, J.) 949\n\nprosecutor. The deeming fiction enabled in Sec. 8 (3) is' confined\n\nt<.> the limits of its requirement in that the person coridri.cting a:· prosecution before a special Judge is to be deemed to be a public prosecutor. Jn fact, this fiction created by Sec. 8 (3) would rather negative the argument of the appellant that a private complaint is not maintainable, inasmuch as the Legisslature could have inserted a provision analogous 10 Sec. 225 that a prosecution before a'sj>ecial Judge shall be conducted by a public prosecutor.\n\nOn the contrary,\n\n··--~-conscious of the position that a private complaint may be filed before\n\n\"I. 11 special Judge who may take cognizance of the offences on such a\n\ncomplaint,• the Legislature wanted to clothe the person in charge of the prosecution before a special Judge with the status of a pubiic prosecuror for the purposes of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\n\nThis is an additional reason why the contention of the appellant that a private complaint is not maintainable cannot be entertained.\n\nIt was then submitted that if the object underlying 1952 Act was . to provide for a more speedy trial of offences of corruption by a public servant; this laudable object would be .. thwarted if it is ever held that a private complaint can be entertained by a special Judge.\n\nDeveloping the argument it was pointed out that assuming that a private complaint is maintainable before taking 'cognizance, a special Judge will have to examine the complainant and all the witnesses present as enjoined by Sec. 200. The Judge thereafter ordinariiy will have to postpone issue of process against the accused, and either inquire into the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by a police officer and incases under the 1947 Act by poiice officers of designated rank for the purpose of deciding wlieiher or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding. (Sec. 202(1)). If the Judge proceeds to bold the inquiry himself, he is obliged to take evidence on oath but it was said that if the Court of special Judge is a Court of Sessions, the case would be governed by proviso to . sub-s. (2) of Sec. 202, Cr P.C. and that .therefore, he will have to call upon the complainant to produce all his witnesses and examine them on oath. This would certainly thwart a speedy trial was the apprehension disclosed and therefore, it was said that there is internal contra-indication that a private complaint is not maintainable. We find no merit in the submissions. As has been distinctly made clear. that a Court of' special Judge is a court cif odginal criminal jurisdition and that it can take cognizance of an offence in the manner herein before indicated, it may be that in order to test whether the complaint disclosed; a serious offence or that thete is all)' frivolit~ mvolved in it~ the Jude may insist U:p'on h'oldinan\n\n\n[1984) 2 S.C.R.\n\ninquiry by postponing the issue of process. When a private complaint is filed, the court has to examine the complainant on oath save in the cases set out i11-the proviso to Sec. 200 Cr.P.C.\n\nAfter examining the complainant on oath and examining the witnesses present, if any, meaning thereby that the witnesses not present need not be examined, it would open to the court to judicially determine whether a case is made out for issuing process.\n\nWhen it is said that court issues process, it means the court has taken cognizance of the offence and has decided to initiate the _ --- ~\n\nproeeeing and as a visible manifestation of taking cognizance,.,,...- ' />'\n\nproces~ is issued which means that the accused is called upon to lappear before the court. This may either take the from of a \" summons or a warrant, as the case may be. It may be that after examining the complainant and his witnesses, the court in order to doubly assure itself may postpone the issue of process, and call upon the complainant to keep his witnesses present. The other option open to the court is to direct investi3ation to be made by a police officer. And if the offence is one covered by the 1947 Act, the investigation, if directed, sbsll be according to the provision containeb in Sec. SA But it mnst be made distinctly clear that it is neilhei' obligatory to bold the inquiry befor_e issuing process to direct the investigation of the offence by police. The matter is in the judicial discretion of the court and is judicially reviewable depending upon the material disclosed by the complainant in his statment\n\nunder oath under Sec. 200, called in the parlance of criminal courts verification of the complaint-and evidence of witnesses if any. It was however, urged that if Sec, SA can be dispensed with by holding that a private complaint is maintainable, the court atleast should ensure pre-process safeguard by insisting upon the examination of all witnesses that the complainant seeks to examine and this will be counter-productive as far as the object of a speedy trial is concerned. Viewed from eithe~ angle, there is no merit in this submission. Primarily, examination of witnesses even at a preprocess stage by special Judge is not no the footing that case is exclusively triable by a Court of Sessions as contemplated by Sec. 202(2) proviso. There is no commitment and therefore, Sec. 202(2) proviso is not attracted. Similarly, till the process is issued, the accused does not come into the picture. He may physically attend but is not entitled to take part in the proceeding. (See Srnt. Nagawwa\n\nv. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konja/gi and Ors. (1)) Upon a complaint being received and the court records the verificat'ion, it is open to\n\n(1) (1976) 3 SCC736.\n\nA.R. ANTULAY v. R.S. NAYAK (Desai, J.)\n\nthe court to appJy its mind to the facts disclosed and to judicial\\y determine whether process should or should not be issued. It is not a condition precedent to the issue of process that the court of necessity must hold the inquiry as envisaged by Sec. 202 or direct investigation as therein contemplated. The power to take cognizance without holdi1ig inquiry or directing investigation is implicit in Sec. 202 when it says that the Magistrate may if he thinks fit, postpone the issue of process against the accused and either inqure into the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by a policeo ·~ officer ............ , for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding.' Therefore, the matter is left to .the ' judicial discretion of the court whether on examining the complainant and the witnesses if any as contemplated by Sec. 200 to issue process or to postpone the issue of process. This discretion which the court enjoys cannot be circumscribed or denied by making it mandatory upon the court either to hold the inquiry or direct investigation. Such an approach would be contrary to the statutory provision. Therefore, there is no merit in the contention that by entertaining a private complaint, the purpose of speedy trial would be towarted or that a pre-process safeguard would be denied.\n\nFurther when cognizance is taken on a private complaint or to be precise otherwise than on a police report, the special Judge has to try the case according to the procedure prescribed for trial of warrant cases instituted otherwise than on police report by a Magistrate (Sec. 252 to 258 of 1898 Code of Criminal Procedure).\n\nSec. 252 requires that when accused is brought before a court, the court shall proceed to hear the complainant and take all such evidence as may be produced in support of the prosecution. Accused bas a right to cross examine complainant and bis witnesses. If upon considering the evidence so produced, the court finds that no case against the accused has been made out which, if nndebutted, would warrant his conviction, the court shall , discharge the. accused (Sec. 253 ibid). If, on the other hand, the court is of the opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, which the court is competent to try, a charge shall be framed in writing against the accused (Sec. 254 ibid). After the accused pleads not guilty to the charge, all prosection witnesses examined before the charge shall be re.called for further cross examination. Prosecution may examine adgitional witnesses whom the accused would be entitled to cross examine. Thereafter the accused may enter on his defence and may examine witness in defence. This\n\nprocedure provides more adequate safeguard than the investigation H\n\n(1984] 2 S.C.R.\n\nby polie officer of designated rank and therefore, search for fresh\n\nc; ir additional safeguard is irrelevant.\n\nIt was however urged that while making the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 applicable to an Proceeding in relationto an offence punishable under Secs. 161, 165 and 165 IPC and under Sec. 5 of the 1947 Act, modification was considered necessary in subs. (8) of Sec. 251A which prescribed procedure for tljal of warrant cases instituted upori a police report while no corresponding amendment was made in any of the provisions con- tained in the same Chapter which prescribed procedure for warrant'~- cases instituted otherwise than on police report and that this wold • ,. show that a private complainant which will be required to be tried accarJiing to the procedure prescribed for trial of warrant cases instituted otherwise than on a police report was not within the contemplation of the Legislature. The modification made in subs.\n\n(8) of Sec. 251A is marginal and minimal. It is to the effect that ip.stead of the words 'the accused shall then be called upon' the words 'the accused shall then be required to give in in writing at once or within such-time as the Magistrate may allow, a list of persons (if any) whom he proposes to examined as. his witnesses and all the documents (if any) on which he proposes to rely, and he shall then be called upon to enter his defence' shall be substituted.\n\nIt was urged that no corresponding amendment was made in Sec. 256 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 189 l and that this glaring omission would clea, r!y indicate that the prosedure prescribed for\n\ntri~I of warrant cases otherwise than on police report was not within the contemplation for the trial of offences under the 1947 Act.\n\nSec. 251A eame to be introduced in the Code of Criminal Procedare,\n\n!89S in 1955. Prior thereto there was uniform orocedure for trial of wami.nt cases by Magistrnte irrespective of whether the case was instituted on a police report or otherwise than on a police report.\n\nBy the Amending Act, 1955, two different procedures came to be prescribed for trial of warrant cases (i) under Sec. 251A in respect of cases instituted on a .police report and (ii) Sec. 252 to 258 in cases instituted other.wise than on a police report. This distinction with some modification has been retained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The Legislature made certain modification.s in the\n\npocedure applicable to warrant cases instituted otherwise than .on police report, bnt left the other provisions applicable to trial .of warrant cases .instituted .otherwise that on police report intact. J'he Legislature .in its wisdom .may have considered it necessary to .ma!<e changes .in one procedure and not in the other. It should , not -.b.e_\n\nforgotten that prior to 1955, the procedure for trial of warrant cases\n\nistituted on a police report and otherwise than oil police report was\n\nthe same and the Act of 1952 set up the Court of special Judge to try cases under the 1947 Act and the trial was to be held according to the procedure prescribed for trial of warrant case. It necessarily' follows that between 1952 to 1955, the Court of special Judge would have followed the sa, ne pro.cedure for trial of a case instituted upon a police report or otherwise than on a police_ report. If in 1955, the Legislature prescribed two different procedures an4 left the one . . . for trial of warrant cases in.stituted otherwise than on p0Iice report ~--.:._-intact and the position:. remained unaltered even after the intro- duction of Sec. 7 A. it js not sggestiv e of such a grave.consequence that a private complaint is n_ot maintainable.\n\nTherefore, this additional limb docs not advance the case any further.\n\n- --::-\n\nThe learned Judges composing the Division Bench of the High Court by their separate judgments negatived the contention of the appeIJant holding that for the purpose of taking cognizance of an offence under the 1947 Act, special Judge was a Magistrate andcan take cognizance as provided by Sec. 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In reaching this conclusion, the learned Judges were largely inffueced by the decision in Stale of Vamil Nadu v. V.Krishnnaswami Naidu & Anr., (1) in which this Court held that the special Judge functioning under Sec. 8 (l) is a Magistrate for the purposes of Sec. 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. They also relied upon the decision in Parasnath Pande and Anr. v. State(2) wherein a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court held that a report submitted upon an investigat10n, which is found to be defective, can be treated as a private complaint of the police officer submitting the report and if cognizance i~ taken OJ} sl!-ch complaint, it would not be invalid. It was said that thes~ decisions run counter to some decisions of this Court. It is not nece&sary to examine this aspect becaus~ as pointed out by us, a court of special Judge is a court of original criminal jurisdiction and it is not necessary to treat him either a Magistrate - or a Court of Sessions save and ex.cept in respect of specific provision wherein it is so provided. There is the third decision in this context, which 1TIBY be briefly referred to here.\n\nIn Jagdish Prasad Verma v. The State, l8) a Division Bench of the\n\ni..\n\n(1) (1979) 3 SCR 928 \\,£i) AIR 1962 Bom. 205\n\n~AIR 1966 Patna fS\n\nH .\n\n954.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (!984j 2 s.c.il.\n\nPatna High Court\" held that the special Judge can take cognizance upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute the offence or\n\neven upon information received from any person other than a police officeror upon his own knowledge of suspicion that the offence has been committed. This was treated as so obvious by the court that there is no discussion in support of the conclusion.\n\nHowevr, we are satisfied that thes.e decisions lay down the correct law on the point of maintainability of private complaint.\n\nHaving examined the matter from all the different angles, we are satisfied that the conclusion reached both by the learned special --- Judge and Division Bench of the Bombay High Court th:it a private complaint filed by the complainant was clearly maintainable and that the cognizance was properly taken, is correct. Accordingly, this appeal fails and is dismissed.\n\nS.R.\n\nAppeal dismissed.", "total_entities": 359, "entities": [{"text": "A.R. ANTULAY", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 12, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.R. 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S. Bhutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1053, "end_char": 1085, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5, 5A and 7A of the Prevention of Corruption Act (Act II of 1947), and section 161-165 of the Indian Penal Code before the learned Special Judge, Sbri P. S. 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"end_char": 91326, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 91769, "end_char": 91775, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 91783, "end_char": 91809, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sec. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 91972, "end_char": 91978, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 92066, "end_char": 92098, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sec. 225", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 93468, "end_char": 93476, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 93705, "end_char": 93711, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", 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108250, "end_char": 108275, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sec. 251A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 108361, "end_char": 108370, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "By the Amending Act, 1955", "statute": "By the Amending Act, 1955"}}, {"text": "Sec. 252 to 258", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 108431, "end_char": 108446, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "By the Amending Act, 1955", "statute": "By the Amending Act, 1955"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 108568, "end_char": 108600, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sec. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 109792, "end_char": 109798, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 190", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 110269, "end_char": 110277, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 110285, "end_char": 110311, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sec. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 110526, "end_char": 110532, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 167", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 110573, "end_char": 110581, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 110589, "end_char": 110615, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "(1979) 3 SCR 928", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 111525, "end_char": 111541, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 111638, "end_char": 111654, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Patna High Court\" held that the special Judge can take cognizance upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute the offence or\n\neven upon information received from any person other than a police officeror upon his own knowledge of suspicion that the offence has been committed."}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_3_100_117_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "1!)0\n\n.BHAGWAN DAS SITA RAM\n\n-,_v.\n\n.,.-. - . o COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX\n\n. I March15, 1984\n\nt. . . [V.:0. TuLZAPURKAR AND SABYASACHl MUKHARJI, JJ.)\n\n- }\n\n~)- IncOme-taX Act, '1922..:._s. 22 and s. 23 read with second provi'so to s~S. :c: ·\n\n(6) cf S. 34....--/nterpretation of-When assessnient can be made after a period of four years from asstssmen.t >; ear-Assessment proceedings commenc~ by.filing of. voluntary return-.On expiry -'of four years proceedings are suspended but proceedingsan4 {e, turrts do not become invalid. Bar of limitation lifts in case of direction TribizQ/~When Ond on whom Tribunal can issue direction. ,._ •.\n\nWords and Phrases-\"anyperson\" in econd proviso to sub-s. (3) ofs. 34- D Scope of must be a Person wl:zo would be liable lo be assessed for whole or part of income that went into assessment of the year under appeal.\n\nA bigger Hindu undivided family (HUF) had flied income-tax returns for the assessment years 1946-47 to 1949-50. When the assessment was being done the bigger (HtTF) made a claim under s. 25A of the Income Tax Act, 1922, that the said HUF. was paititioned on 19.5.1945. While this claim was pending, the appe11ant along with a smailer HUF (hereinafter re; ferred to as the assessee) which had come into being on pa.rtition of the bigger HUF, filed voluntary returns on 18.\\l.1950for the assessment years 1946-47 to 1949-50unders. 22(1) of the Act. The bigger HUF's claim partition, Which was rejected by the Income Tax Officer arid the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, was accepted by the Appellate Triunal ori 31,8.1954. While disposing of the. appeals of the bigger HUF against the assessment orders, the Tribunal gave a direction on 28.10.1954 that asscssriullts be made on the bigger HUF after accepting partition. 'After thC claim of partition was accepted the Income-tax Officer sent notices to the assesseei fOr initiating proceedings against him under s. 34(1) (b).- Jn response to the notices the assi!.see filed fresh returns on 12.4.1955- Rejecting the contention of the assessee that the time for making assessment under s. 34 had expiied, the Income-tax Officer completed asseSsmentsunder s. 2~(3) read with s. 34 on\n\n~ .8.9.1955. The assessee's appeal was rejected by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Appellate Tribunal. The assessee filed a writ petition in the High Court_ which was allowed and the assessment orders were quashed on 30.3.1960. The High Court observed that as voluntary returns filed by the assessee were pending no proceeding could be taken undr s. 34. Thereafter the Revenue attempted to assess the assessee on the basis of voluntary returns originaJly filed on 18.11.1950 by relying upon the order of the Tribunal dated 23.10.1954 in the bigger HUF's case and invoking second proviso to s. 34(3). The assessee filed a writ petition and that was dismissed. The Income-tax Officer completed assess\n\nmt undeu, ~3) 9!' p, 19\\it In appeal the Appellate ista)lt <;:omllli''\n\n• •\n\n. -\n\n• • • BHAGWAN DAS v. c.fr. (S. Mukhrji, j.) ioi\n\nsioner held that no valid assessment could be made on 31..S:.1962 and this viey.:· w:is confirmd by the Appellate Tribunal. A ref.:rence was made to the High Court all the questioll whether on the facts and -cfrculnstanCes of the case, valid · assesrnent'.could be made\" on 31.5.1962 for the assfi'isment ye3.rs 1948-49 and,-. 1949 50 on the basis of voluntary return.s of income filed under s. 22(1) of the Act. The assessee contended that-since 3. return exhausted itself fter expiry of four years from the end of the asseSsment year to \\\\hich it reIJ.ted, no assessmCnt could made an th~ ba~ of voluntary return, , it,\"could be done under s. 34 only if :2nd prOviso to sub-s. (3) of s. 34 applied. By majority a full Bench of the High Court answered the question in the affirmativ.! in favour of the reve .. nue. Hence. these appeals. -The two questioi:is which arose\" Were! (I) whether the assessment could be made under s. '23(3) on the basis of voluntary returns filed or actioil should have been taken under!. 34 with the help of the seCond proviso - to Sub-s~ (3) of s. 34; and (2) whether ihe Tribunal cOuld give a finding or\n\ndirctioi:i in respect of the asessee.. ' ·\n\n. -Dismissing tt:e_ appeals;\n\nHEW:··\n\n.f!n QuestoitNo. (I)\n\n- The High Court was right . in taking the vie~ hat assesments could be m<idi! on the basis of voIU\"iitary returns alrCady filed by_ the asse.ssee.\n\nSub--s~ (3) of S. 34 provides a p-eriod Or limitation O:f four years for a~Sessment.under s. 23 . of the Act.' If the assessment proceedings _ cpmmenCe .b-y filing or' \"\"votuntarY returns, as Indeed _these do, on the expiry :of the periOd of four years from the · Cod of the Year in Which ihe income, \"profits or giins Were first assess.able, such proceedings are susPended .Jr inierrupte+f. But neither the Proceedings nor the returns_ beCome-. invalid. Since the order Was _passed bY the Tribunal giVing direction, the. bar of limitatiori provided by s. 34(3) was lifted and the assess--·\n\nments could be made without any_ bar of limitation. [106 G-H, 107 'A] . . . ' . i\n\n-- Commissionf!r of Income-tax Bombay City II v. Ranchhoddass Karsondtls, 36 .. J.T.R. 569,· Estat'e Of the iate A.M.K.Af. Karuppan Chettiar v.· Co\"1missioner of\n\nIncome-ta~,\"Marlras, 72 1.T.R. 403 ; and, Commissioner_-· of Income-tax Madras\n\nv. M.K.K.R. Muthukaruppan Chettiar, 18 I.T.R~ 69, refe_rred t~\n\nOn Question.No. (1)_:\n\n. ' . . c\n\n' /__ - - . ,:.·...;, The High Cotirt rightly answered thC question in favour of 'he revenue on G the view that the Tribunal was competent to give the direction in respec(ofthe· present assessee. [108 E-G I\n\nSecond proviso. to s. 34(3) 3.uthories dirctionS _to be given by the T ribunat iO respect of the assessee of any person beyOnd follr years 3sprovided iri. s. 34(3) _of the Act: As explained in Income-tax. Officer v. Murlidhar Bhagwandas, ,\"a\"itj person\" in respect of whom such direction could be given must_ be one who 'wOutd be liable, to be assessed, for the' whole or a \\?art of the-income tat went into the assessment of the yea~ under api)eat o_r reVision. , The court must tum -\n\n.....\n\n. .\n\nio2, fopame coliar aeP~Ris tI9s4j 3 s.c.i\n\nto s. 31 of the Act to ascertain who is that person otver than the appealing assessee wbo might be affected by the orders passed by the appellate authority, .Modification or setting \"aside of assessment made on a firm, joint Hindu-family, association of persons for a particular year may affect the assessinent for the said year on a' partner ot partner&. of, the firm, member of members of such Hilldu undivided family or the individual, as the case might be. These instances_ are\n\nonly illustrative and not exhaustive. The expression ''any .person\" in 'its widest amplitude might take in any person connected or not with the assessee, whose .\n\nioce:me fat any yar bad escaped assessment; but \"this Constru9tio, n cannOt be accepted, for the said expression was necessarily circumscribed by the scope Qf the subject-matter of the appeal or revision, as the case might be. $0 therefore the.person mu•i be one who would be liable lo 'be aJSeJsed for the whole .or any , part-of the ittcOme that wentnto a$sess1nent of the year under apfleal or revbion\n\n(llmphasjs supplied). Therefore, \"any person\" in sub-section ~(3) of s. 34 must be confined to person intimately connected in the aforesaid sense with the assessments of the yearS under appeal. ]701 C-S, 108 A-FJ\n\nIncome-tax Officer, A-Ward, Sitapur v. Mur/idhar BhagWan Das, 52 I.T.R. 335; Rajinder Nath v. Comminioner of lncome-1ax, Delhi, 120 I.T.R. 14 ; • Commissioner of Income--tax, <; entral, Calcutta v. National Taj Traders. 121 I.T.R. 535; and Commissioner of Income-tax, A.Jl(Jhra Pradesh v. Vadde Pullaiah & Co., 89 J.T.R. 240, referred IO. ,\n\n 'The f11cL• in the instant case show that income can belong either to the biwr Hindu undivided family or to the smaller Hindu undivided family, the present assessee alongwith another smaller H.U.F. Snd to no one else~ There~. !bro a finding that it belongs or it does not belong to the bigger Hindu undivided famiiy which bad disrupted on partition would determine the issue whether it .\n\ncold bO taxed fa the hands Of the present assessee. Judged in the light of the test laid down in Murlidhar BhagwOn Das casearid as pointed Out i~ R.ajinder Nath's case, it appears that the present usessee can be said to be a person who would be liable to be assessed for the whole or part of the income that went to the assessment of the bigger Hindu undivided family io years under appeal and U a Person intimately connected with the as, sessments of the bigger Hindu µn divlde<I ramily; The income in this case cannot be the income of both bigger Hindu Undivided family and the present assessce, it must be either of these two.\n\nTbererore. the directions given in the appeals filed by the bigger Hindu undivide°d family would be applicable to the present as......,. (111 A-DJ\n\nComml!siontr\" Df l11ome--tax, Gujarat v. Shanti/al Punjabhai, 57 I.T.R. 58. fl di<tinguisbed.\n\nCoinmf3Sldnsr oi lnMme-tax, Punjab, Jammu & Kashmir and HJmac/r4/ Prai., h-v. S. Rtzghubf• Singh Trust, 123 I.T.R: 438 referred to.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 1168-6~ . (NT) of 1973.\n\n Appeal by Special leave from the Judgment and Order dated\n\n., -\n\n. ..,.,\n\n• J.\n\nBHAGWAN DAS v. c.I.T. (S. llfukharji, J.) i03\n\nthe 3rd January, 1973 of the Allahabad High Court in I. T: Ref. No. 450 of 1969.\n\nS.C. Manchanda and M. J.P. Ma/ho.tra for the Appellant . •\n\nS.T. Desai, B.B. Ahuja and Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondent .\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J. These appeals by certificat~ granted by the High Court of Allahabad under Section 66A(2) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922, arise out of judgment delivered and order passed on 3rd 1ltnuary, 1973 by the High Court of Allahabad in Income-tax Reference No. 450 of 1965. The following question of law had been referred to the High Court for consideration under Section 66(1) of the Income-Tax Act, 1922 by the Appellate Tribunal, Allahabad Belich, Allahabad: ·\n\ni. \"Whether, on the facts and in fhe circumstances of the case, valid assessments could be made on 31st May, 1962, for the assessment years 1948-49 and 1949·50 on the basis of voluntary returns. of income filed under Section ~2(1) of the Indian Income-Tax Act, 1922 on 18.11'1950?\n\n• The matter came up before a Division Bench of the High Court and a~ there was a previous bench decision of tliat Court in the case of Sool Chand Ram Sewak v. Commissioner of Income-tax, U.P.1 which supported the revenue's case and as the division bench before whom this case came was unable to accept that view, Jhe division ,; bench referred the case to a larger. B.ench. This reference thereafter .\n\n~· came before a Full Bench41:onsisting of'Gulati, H. N. Seth &.C.S.P.\n\n1 '\n\nSingh, JJ. Gulati'and C. S. P. Singh, JJ. answered the question in. the affirmative in fa.vour of the revenue and against the assessee: , Seth J. however, was in favour of assessee. I.n view of. the majority .fue .question was answered in favour of the revenue and in affirmative.\n\n(!) 73 I. T. R. 466. .::\n\ncl.\n\nsuPRBMB 'cotiirr REPolltS\n\n. [19S4J 3 S.C.R;\n\nBefore we deal'with the questiOn ii) controversy, it will be necessary to note some of the relevant facts. There were originally four appeals for the assessment years 1946-47, 1947-48, 1948-49 and 1949-50. As the appeals for the assessment years 1946-47 and 1947-48 were withdrawn by the revenue, we are ow concerned with appeals for the assessment years 1948•49 and 1949-50. .\n\nThe present assessee is a branch of a bigger Hindu undivided\n\n' •\n\nfamily known as•Nathu Ram Jawahar Lal, Jhansi. .,. -\n\nThe bigger Hindu undivided family of M/s Nathu Ram\n\nJwahar Lal was partitioned on 19th May, 1945, and the present assessee along with anoter smaller H.U.F. came into . existence and the said bigger H.U.F. had ma~~ claim in respect otlthe partition under Section 25A of. he Indin lncome-Tax Act,\n\n1922. While this claim was pending t!le present assessee filed volu.ntary returns under Section 22(1) of the Act'.for thi issessment years\n\n194'6~47 to 1949-50 on 10th November, 1950. The said claim of partition by the bigger H.U.F. was rejected by the Income-tax Officer and also by the ppeilate Assistant Commissioner. The said H. U. F. thereafter, filed appeals to the Appellate Tribunal in respect of the order under claim of partition under Section 25A of 1922 Act which by its order dated 31st August, 1954 accepted tbe claim under Section 25A of 1922 Act, and the Tribunal passed . orders on that basis in the appeals relating to the assessment orders in respect of. the bigger H.U.F. on 28th October, 1954.\n\nThe. Income-tax Officer, thereafter, .initiated proceedings under\n\nSetion 34 ofthe Incme, tax Act of 1922 for assessing the small.er H'indu undivided family, the preseµt assessee in view of the fact.that tlie claim for disruption of the bigger H. U. F. had been accepted. by te. Tribunal. The ]Jresent assessee filed fresb rturns of income ori 1_2.4.1955 in response to notices under Sectiou 34 of 1922 Act ..\n\nTh_e-reums originally filed were under Sectin 22( I) and were fild on 18th November, 1950, The. assessee's objection regarding the validity of the assessments being made under Sei:tion 34 on merits as well as on the point that time for .making the assessment under Section 34 had already exP.ired, were rejected by the Income-tu\n\nOfficer. He, therefore, completed the. assessments on . 8.9.1955 under Section 23(3) read with Se.ction 34 of the Income-tax Act,\n\n1922. The assessee could not get any decision in his favour either fro in the Appellate Assistant Commissioner or from the .Tribunal and being aggrieved by these orders, filed a Writ Petition; to the High. Court of Allahabad challenging the vlidity of the Appellate\n\n. )\n\n. ,...\n\n.J.\n\nDHAGWAN DAS v. C.I.T. (S, Mukharji, J.) iM\n\norders. ]he assessee was successful in the Writ and, therefor_e, the appellate orders were quashed by the. High Court. The. revenue\n\nhaing failed in its attempt to complete the assessee's assessments under Section 34, made another attempt to assess the assessee on the basis of the voluntary returns originally filed by the assessee on 18.11.1950 by relying upon the order of the Tribunal dated 28.10.1954 and invoking.the provisions of 2nd proviso to Section 311(3).\n\nThe said assessments which were completed on 31st May,· 1962 were the subject matters of appeals before the Tribunal.\n\nTl\\j! point before the Tribunar was whether valid assessments could be made for the assessment years under consideration on 31st May, 1962 on the basis l>f the returns filed under Section. ~2(1) of the Act of 1922 on 18th November, 1950. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner by his order held that no valid assessments could bf made ori'3Yst May, 1962. ') ' .,\n\n'11 It appears that on 28th October, 1950, relating to the assessment years 1946-47 to 1949-50 in case of bigger Hi!Jd1! undivided family, M/s Nathu Ram Jawaharlal, Jhansi, order was passed by th~, Tribunal in the appeal relating to the assessments pending before it.\n\nIt\" should be noted that originally on the basis that the bigger H.U.F. had not been disrupted assessments for these years bad been made and appeals relating to those assessments were pending before tlie\"'rribunaL The Tribunal disposed of these appeals by the order dated 28th October, 1954 and the Tribunal in the said order had observed, inter alia, as follows;\n\n\"The assessments for . those years were (have) necessarily to be set aside with the direction that fresh assessments should be made, one for the period 19.5.1945 upto which the Hindu undivided family was in existencil and the . others on the component Hindu undiviiled families, namely M/s Jawaharlal Mani Ram and Bhagwan Das Sita Ram.\"\n\nThe Tribunal in the instant appeal out of which the reference was mde to .the High_ Couq and out of which these appeals arise, after d1scussmg the relevant facts and the provisions of law confirmed the' order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and dismissed the appeals. As mentioned hereinbefore after the Tribunal had directed\n\nth~- assessm_ets shoul~ be made on the cowponent units of the bigger Hmdu, und!Vlded famdy, afte:_partition was accepted, namely, tpe as$essee and Jawabarlal Mam Ram, the Income-tax Officer instea4\n\n: ;~ c\n\n\\<_it D\n\n'; f: p\n\n.. -_,\n\nj II\n\n.B.\n\n106 suPilEME couh REPORTS (!984] 3 s.c.lt\n\nof proceding on the hasis of the voluntary returns already filed by the assessee proceeded to take action under Section 34(1) (bfof the Act of 1922 and completed the assessments for all the four years on Septemper 8,1955. The assessee appealed against these assessments to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax, but before the appeals were taken up for hearing, the assessee moved th~ High Court of Allahabad under Article 226 of the Constitntion. On March 30, 1960, the High Court quashed the assessment orders on the ground that as volnutary returns filed. by . the assessee were pending, no proceeding could be taken under Section 34 of tJle Act,\n\n1922. Theraefter the Income-tax Officer initiated proceedings on the basis of the voluntary returns. The assessee again filed a writ petition. praying for quashing the proceedings on the ground that revenue fould not proceed against it on the basis of the voluntary re.turns. This petition was rejected by the High Court and thereafter the Income-tax Officer proceededlto complete the assessments under\n\n. Section 23(3) and passed assessment orders on 31st May, 1962; in respect of the four years.\n\nThe first question, is, whether the assessment could be made Under S.ection 23(3) on the basis of voluntary returns filed or action should have been taken under .Section 34 with the help of the second proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 34. it is well-settled that when a return of income is filed by the assessee voluntarily under Section 22(1) of the Act, 1922, assessment proceedings commence against him and Section 34 does not come into play at all so long as tlie: assessment proceedings remain pending. Bnt it was contended that a return exhausted itself after the expiry of four years from the end of the assessment year to which it related. After the expiry of that period, no assessment was possible on the basis of the voluntary return. In such a case assessment was possible under •Section 34, if the case was covered by the second proviso to Section 34(3).\n\nThe High Court was of the opinion that sub-section (3) of Section 34 provides a period of limitation of four years fot assessment under Section 23 of the Act, l 9Z2. If the assessment proceedings commence by filing of voluntary return, as indeed these do, on the expiry of the period of four years from the eud of the year in which the income, profits or gain~ were first assessable, such proceedings are suspended or interrupted. But neither.the proceedings nor the returns become invalid. The High Court referred to the provisions of Section 34(3) and was of'the view that since the order was passed by the Tribunal giving direction,' the bar or limitation was lifted and\n\n....\n\n~.·\n\nBHAGWAN DAS v. c.J.T. (S. Mukharji, i.)\n\nA. the assessments could be made without any bar or limitation. Refe- . rence was made to the decision of this Court in the case of Commissioner of Income-tax Bombay. City l/ v. Ranchhoddass Karsondas,, and in the case of Estate of the late A.M.K.M. Karuppan Chettiar v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras' and Commissioner of Income-tax Madras v. M.K. K.R. Muthukaruppan Cheuiar3. 8\n\nThe High Court, on the basis of these decisions, was cif the ) view that assessments could be made on the basis of voluntary retl!rns already filed by the assessee. We are of the opinion that the High Court was right.\n\n• The next question is whether it was open to the Tribunal to give a finding or direction in respect of the present assessee. Reliance was.placed on the decision of this Court in Income-tax Officer, A~\n\nWard, Sitapur v. Murlidhar Bhagwan Das.• There, this tourt after referring to the expression \"any pt; rson\" in the 2nd proviso of sub section (3) of Section 34 of 1922 Act observed at page 346 of the\n\nrort as follows.\n\n\"The expression \"any person\" in. its widest connotatfon .may take in any person, whether connected r not with the assessee, wh.ose income for any year has escaped assessment; but this construction cannot be accepted, for the said expression is necessarily circumscribed by the . scope of the subject-matter of the appeal or revision, as the case may .be.\n\nThat is to say, that person must be one who would be liable to be assessed for the whole or a part of the income that went into the assessment of the year under appeal or revision. If so construed, we must turn to sect.ion 31 .to ascertain who is that person other than the appealing assessee who can be liable to be assessed for the income of the said assessment year. A combined reading of section 30(1) and Section 31(3) of the Act indicates the cases where persons other than the appealing assessees might be affected by orders passed by the .Appellate CommiSsioner. Modification or setting aside of assessment made on a firm, joint Hindu family, association\n\n(I) 361.lf.R. $69.\n\n(2) ?2 t.T.R. 403.\n\n(3) 78 I.T.R. 69.\n\n(4) 52 l.T.R. 335.\n\nl B\n\n< D\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS tJ 984] 3 s.c.lt.\n\nof persons, for a particular year may affect the assessment for the said year on a partner or partners of the firm, member or members of the Hindu undivided family or the. individual, as the case may be. In such cases though the latter are not co-nomine' parties to the appeal, their assessments depend upon the assessments on the former. The said instances are only illustrative. It is not necessary to pursue the matter further. We would, therefore, hold that the expression \"any person\" in the setting in which it appears must be confined to a person intimately connected in the aforesaid sense with the assessments of the year under appeal.\" . . • The High Conrt was of the view that \"any person\" would include the person who would be liable to be assessed for the whole or a part of the income that went into the assessment of the year . under appeal or revision. In that view of the matter, the majority judgment of the High Court ort this aspect was in' favour of the revenue. Then on the question whether the direction for the assess: ment could. be given in respect of any other year, other than the year in which the partition took place, it was contended that direction could be given only for the assessment year 1946-47. Majority judgment of the High Court found no force in. that contention. As this question arose directly for the assessment years 1948-49 and 1949-50 in respct of which the appeals came before the Tribunal in which the directions ba:d been given, the High Court was of the view that it was necessary for the Tribunal to give a finding with regard to the partition of the family and the ownership of the income in both the appeals. The Tribunal was thus competent to give the . . . direction. In that view ofthe matter, the two learnedjudges of the Allahabad High Court were of the opinion that assessments were valid and answered the question in favour of the revenue. Referring to the said decision which has been mentioned in the majority judg ment, Seth J. however was of the!view that the direction given by the Tribunal in this case did not authorise the assessment on the smaller Hindu undivided family. Seth J. was further of the view that such direction could only have been given in the year in which disruption of the bigger H.U.F. took place. In that view of the matter, Seth J. expressed Clissent as mentioned her.einbefore. We are of the opinion that the majority of the learned judg; es of the High Court Were right. Second proviso to Section 34(3) of the fllC!ian- Income-tax Act, 1922 authorised directions to be given by the Tribunal in respect of the assessee or any person beyond four yars as provided in Section 34(3) of 1922 Act.\n\nBHAGWAN DAS~. C.I.T. (S. Mukharji, J.)\n\n' ' 109\n\nAs noted before the expression \"any person\" in respect of whom such direction could be given was explained by this Court in Income-tax Officer, A Ward Sitapur v.\n\nMurlidhar Bhagwandas (supra). As mentioned iii the passage quoted above . from lhe said decision, if so construed then the Court must turn to Section 31 of 1922 Act to a certain who is that person other thap the appealing assessees might be affected by the orders passed by the appellate authority. Modification o'r setting aside of assessment made on a firm, joint Hindu family, association of persons, for a particular year may affect the assessment for the said year on a partner or partners of the firm, member or members of such Hindu undivided family or the individual, as the case might be. It was therefore argued that it was only those types of assessees mentioned by this Court in the passage noted above were the 'persons' who could be \"any person\" other than the appealing assessee who can be said to be liable to .be assessed and in respect of whom direction might be given, otherwise such directions or provision for such direcMons if the provision is so re.ad would be ultra vires article 14 of the Constitution. We must make it clear that this Court had itself made it clear categorically in the passage quoted above that the instances given in the above passage were only illustrative passage nieaningthereby that.the instances were not exhaustive. This Court made it clear that the expression .<•any per son\" in its widest amplitude might take in any person connected or not with the assessee, whose incom\" for any year had escaped assessment; but this construction could not be accepted, for the said expres sion was necessarily circumscribed by the scope of the subject-matter. of the appeal or revision, as the. case might be. So therefore the person\n\n' ' must be one who would be liable to be assessed for the whole or any part of the income that went into assessment of the year under appeal or revision (Emphasis supplied). Therefore, this Court observed that\n\nany person\" in sub-section (3) of Section 34 must be confined to a person intimately connected in the aforesaid sense with the assessments of the years under appeal.\n\nReference may be made to the decision of this Court in the case of Rajinder Nath v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Delhi, 1 where the I.T.O. treated two buildings as belongillg to a firm comprised of a father and his two major sons as partners and in the assessments on the firm for the assessment years 1955-56 and 1956·57 and he estimated the cost of construction of the buildings at a higher fire t)lan that\n\n11) Ito .IT.R. P 14\n\nc !',\n\nD •\n\nB •\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1984] 3 S.C.R,\n\ndisclosed and brought to tax the exess as income in the hands of the firm. On appeal, the A.A. C. found that the money advanced . for the construction of the buildings had beep debited in equal shares to the father and two major sons and a minor son and held that the firm was not the owner of the properties and defocted the addition .. The A.A.C. also observed that the I.T.O. was free to take action to assess the excess in the hands of the co-owners. The I.T.O. thereupon' issued notices under Section 147(a) of the I.'r. Act, 1961 and reopened .the assessments of tlte individual assessees (the co-owners) and included. therein the proportionate shares of the additions on account of the estima!ed excess of the cost of construction. On appeal, the A.A.C. held that Section 147(a) couid not apply but upheld the assessments under Section 153(3) (ii) of 1961 Act.. On further appeal, the Tribunal held that Section 153(3) (ii) could not apply because there was neither a finding .nor a direction in the earlier order of the A.A.C: and further that A.A.C. could 'not convert the assessments made under Section l 47(a) intb those under Section 153(3) (ii). On a reference of the questfons, (I) whether the A.A.C. was justified in )loldirig that the provisions of Section 147(a) were not applicable, and -(ii) whether the provisions of Section 153 (3) (ii) were not applicable, the High Court-held that the proyisions of Section 153(3) were J applicable observing that the A.A.C's finding that the properties did\n\nnot belong to the firm and, therefore, the excess amount of the cost of construction could not be rekarded as the income of the firm was a finding which was necessary for the disposal of the firm's appeal and as a corollary it was held that the buildings belonged to 1he coowners and this necessitated the \"direction\" to the I.T.O. that. he was free to assess the excess in the hands of the co-owners. Dealing with this contention, Pathak J. who delivered he judgment of this Court observed at page 20 of the report:\n\n\"The expression \"another person\" in the Expln. would include persons intimately conne.cted with the person in whose case the order is made in the sense explained by this Court in Murlidhar Bhagwan Da.i (1964) 52 ITR 335 (SC). It is one thing for the partners or'a firm to berequired'toexplain the socnrce of a receipt by tlie firm, it is quite another for them in their jndividual status to be aske.d to explain the source of amounts received by them as separate individuals.\n\nOn such opportunity bing provided it would have been open to the assessees to show that the excess alleged over the disclosed cost of construction did not constitute any taxable income, The fi, ndin~ contemplated in Bxpln, 3, it will ~\n\n. )\"\n\nllHAGWA~ v. C.I.T. (S. Mukharji, J.) Ill\n\nnoted, is a finding that the amount represents the income of another person.\"\n\nIn the iastant case b\n\n0efore 'us, applying the test observed in that case tliis was a case where the facts showed. that income can belong either to the bigger Hindu u11divided family or to the smaller Hindu undivided family, the present assessee along with another smaller H.lJ.F. 'and to 'no one else. Therefore a finding that it belongs odt does not belong to the bigger Hindu u.ndivided family which had disrupted on partition would determine the issue whether it could be . taxed in the hands of the present assessee. Judged in the light of the test laid down in Murlidhar BhagwaT1 Das (supra) and as pointed outin Rajinder Nath's case, it appears to us that the preent assessee can be said to be a person who would be liable to beassessed for the whole or part of the income that went to the.a.ssessment of the bigger , Hindu undivided family in years under appeal and is a person intimately connected with the assessments of the bigger Hfodu undivided family. The income in this case cannot be the income of both bigger H.indu undivided family and the present assessee, it must be either or these two. We are, therefore, of the opinion that direc. tions given in the appeals filed by the bigger Hindu undivided family yould b, e applicable to the present asacssee.\n\nOn behalf of the assessee it was contended that only the categories of persons referred to in Sections 30(1) and 30(3) of 1922 Act would be governed by the said expression \"any person\"\n\nSub-section (3) of Section 3, I, inter alia, authorises the AJ?pellate Assistant Commissioner in case Of an order cancelling registration of a firm under sub-section (42) of Section 23 or refusing to register a firm under sub-section (4) of Section 23 or Section 26A or to make fresh assessment or to confirm such order, or cancel it and direct the Income-tax Officer to register the firm or to make a fresh assessment, as the case may be, or in the case of an order under subsection (2) .of Section 25 or sub-section (I) of Section 23A or sub-section (2) of Section 26 or Section 48, 49 or 49F, confirm cancel or vary such order. It also authorises in case of an order un~\n\nder sub-section (I) of Section 25A to ccinfirm such order or cancel if and either direct the Income-tax Officer to make further inquiry and pass a fresh' order 'or to make an assessment in 'the manner • laid down in sub-section (2) of section 25A. , The other cases were cases.of orders under Section 28 or sub-section (6) of Section 44E or sqb-se9tion (5) of e9fo'n 44F or qb-section (I) of Section 461\n\nc;:,\n\n... ,.-; .\n\n112 SUPREME COURT J!.EPOlns\n\n[1984] 3 S.C.R.\n\nor in case of an appeal against a computation of loss under Section 24, confirm or vary such computation, or in case of an appeal under sub-section (IA) of Section 30 decide. that the person is or is not liable to make the deduction and in \\he latter case direct the refund of the Sl)m paid under sub-section (6)-0f Settion 18.\n\n. , While on these provisions it is material to refer to sub-section (4), of Section 33 whiGh authorises the Tribunal afrer giving both parties an opportunity of being heard to pass such orders thereon as it thinks fit and to communicate any such orders to the assessee and to the Commissioher.\n\nThe c:ontention on behelf of the assessee is that though the.\n\nAppellate Tribunal has wide powers as indicated in sub-section (4) of Section 33 but the amplitude of that power is curtailed by other provisions. It was contended that read with sub-section (3} ofSectio.n 34; as assessment order could not be passed after the expiry of four years from the end of the year in which the income, profits or gains were first assessable and is view of the fact that here in the instant c.ase voluntary reiurns for the years under question had been filed by. the assessee within time, after four years no direction could be giyei; i\n\nby the Tribunal. It was, seco!ldly, contended that the present smal, !er Hindu undivided family was not intimately connected (with .the assessment of the bigger Hindu undivided family as contemplated by the observations of this Court in Income-tax Officer v. Murlidhar Bhagwan Das (supra), this direction.was of , no use and the assessment made on the basis of this direction cannot be availed of. ·\n\n• We are unable to accept this oontention. Firstly ii must be observed that the Tribunal passed the orders and gave its dreiction ii respect of the years concerned. These years were the subject matters of appeal before the Tribunal in the case of bigger H.U.F. It wa~ contended that ihese direction were given subsequent to the order under Section 25A and could not affect position thereafter. We are unable to accept this position also. As mentioned hereinbefore, the order under Section 25A was passed in August, 1954. The bigger' Hindu undivided family had applied for order under Section 25A regarding the disruption a( the Hindu undivided family, the Income: tax Officer rejected that prayer. The assessee appealed therefrom. In Aug\\ist, 1954, this order was set aside by .the Tribunal and it wa8 'held that the bigger Hindu undivided family had been disruptec). Iii- . •\n\nasmnch as the income liable to be assessed. on the smaller Hindu un- ' . !livided family wo11ld 11rise only on the disrurtion of the lar$er Biridq •\n\nBHAGWAN DAS v. c.1.T. (s: Mnkharji, J.). 113\n\nundivided family; this direction was proper. The order under Section 25A declares the status of the family and the smaller Hindu undivided family became liable to be assessed as a result of disruption of the bigger Hindu undivided family. The assessment orders h.owever wer~ passed based on the previous order under Section\n\n25A but these orders were passed for all these follr years anq the assessments under appeal for all these four years were pending. before the Tribunal in disposing of which the Tribunal gave the direction to make the assessments on the smaller Hindu undivided family.\n\nTherefore no question arises as to whether for subsequent periods i:lirec(ions could have been given. This is a direction clearly within the contemplation of sub-section (3) of Section 34. Secondly, we are of the opinion that the smaller Hindu undivided family is one of the . persons which was clearly contemplated by sub-section (3) of Section 34 in the facts and circumstances of this case. The. assessabili\\y o& income and the quantum of the same of the present assessee was linked up with the assessability of the bigger Hindu. undivded family if the bigger Hindu undivided family was liable to be' assessed if there was no disruption then there was no income of the smaller Hindu undivided family. The income in the hands of smaller Hindu undivided family could then not have been liable tobe asssesssd, I on the other hand it was the other way that there was a valid parti- . lion, the \\)igger Hindu undivided\" family no longer existe.d and the smaller Hindu undivided family would . be liable . to be assessed.\n\nFrom that point of view it clearly . comes within the ratio of the observation of this 'Conrt in Jncomi!-tax Officer v.\n\nMurlidhar Bhagwan Das (supra). Further more looked at from another point of view, though the Karta represented the bigger Hindu undivided family, all the member's of the bigger Hindu undivided family, including those who were members of the smaller Hindu undivided family were parties though .not oe nomine for all practical purposes, because they were liable as mambers of the family for the amount assessed. In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion that this direction was quite valid and would be applicable.\n\nThe obsevations of this Court in the case of Comissioner of Income-tax Central; Calcutta v.\n\nNational Taj Traders' are 'in consonance .with the conlusions reached by us. Tulzapurkar, J. expla:ined in the said decision the._ situations in which directions could be given.under Section 33B of the Income-tax Act, 1922 where\n\n)21 I.T.R. 53$.\n\nB '\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS \"'\n\n[1984] 3 S.C.R,\n\n there was no express provision like sub-section (3) of Section 34.\n\nIn our opinion in the facts of this cas~, the present assessee can be said to be•\"any person\" as indicated in Mur/idhar Bhagwr.n Das ·(supra) in Section 34(3) of 1922 Act\n\nThe view taken by _us is also in consonance with the observation of this Courts inthe case of Co!Jlmissioner of Income-tax, Andhra Pradesh v. Vadde Pul/aiah & Co.'\n\nRefernce was also made to a Bench decision of the Bombay . High Court in the case of Mathuradas B. Mohta v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Poona;' and a decision of this Court in the case of Commissioner of Income-tax, U.P. v.\n\nMohd: Shakoor Mohi Bashir.• But in view of the facts and circumstances of the instant case before us, it is not necessary to deal with the said decisions.\n\nOn behalf.of the assessee, reliance was placed on a decision of the Division Bench of Gujarat\" High Cort in the case of Commissioner of Intome-tax, Gujarat v. Shanti/al Punjabhai.4 There an individual Shantilal was a member of the Hindu undivided family and also a partner of a firm. The Income-tax Officer found that the assessee was the nominee of the Hindu undivided family in the said firm, and, therefore, included the share of of profits the assessee in the said firm, in the total income of the Hindu. undivided family .\n\n• The decision proceeded on the _basis that the Income-tax Act did - not contemplate two different assessees in the same assessment year for tbe same taxable income. In that ase the assessee was also an assessec in his own right. In that case theCourt had observed at .page 80 of the report that there were two separate and distinct assessment proceedings, one in respect of the assessee in his status as an individual and the other in respect of the Hindu undivided family. The assessment proceedings in respect of the assessee, Shantilal, were in respect of his income arising from his self-acquired and separate . property. The ssessment proceedings against the Hindu undivided family, were proceedings against the entire entity'. and. though the assessee, Shantilal, was a member of the family, the assessment was on the income derived by the Hindu undivided family from the property or business 'of the said Hindu undivided family. In tht\n\n(1) 89 I.T.R. 240\n\n(2) . 56 l.T , R. 269\n\n(3) 89 I.T.R. 57\n\n(4) sn.T.R. SB\n\n)I ,\n\n• J\n\nBHAGWAN DAS v. c.I.T. (S. Mukharji, J.) 115\n\nassessment; the income accruing and arising from the separate pro- ' perty of.the assessee, Shantilal could not be assessed, as the business carried on by the asseseee, Shanti!al, was not the bussiness of the Hindu undivided family. The Income-tax Officer held that Shantilal was the nominee of the Hindu undivided family, meaning thereby-'\n\nthat the business belonged to tbe Hindu undivided family and it was . that conclusion of the Income-tax Officer which was reversed by the . . .\n\nTribunal. The Tribunal holding that the revenue had failed to prove that the assessee, Shantital was the nominee of the family, in other words, that the income arising from the firm's business was. the income of the Hindu undivided family. The direction given by the Tribunal was on the question which was between the revenue and the Hindu undivided family and the only finding that could be given by the Tribunal was between the two parties, namely, the Hindu undivided family and the revenue and not between the revenue and the as- • sessee. Shantilal, who was not an assessee nor a party to those asseSS' ment proceedings. Therefore, if any action had to be taken in con- . . sequence of the finding or the direction given by the Tribunal, that action could be taken not against the assessee, Shantilal, but against the Hindu undivided famliy. As would be apparent, the facts of tht case were entirely different. ' Here in the instant case the proceeding against the assessee in the present case could be taken only if there was disruption of the Hindu undivided family. Therefore in the assessment of Hindu undivided family viz. if the bigger Hindu undivided family was considered to be an existing entity then in such a case the asssessment against the present assessee could not be sustained. If on the other hand the assessment on the bigger H. U.F. could not be sustained because there was disruption of the family as contended for. by the bigger Hinud undivided family then only the present assessee could be assessed. In that view of the matter, we are of opinion that the present assessee can be said to be. a person other then the appealing assessee would be affected by the order concernd and would come within the nieaning of \"any person\" as explained by this Court in the case of Income-tax.Officer v. Mur/idar Bhagwan Das (supra).\n\nl)ecision of this Court in the case of Comissioner of Income-tax, .\n\nPunjab, Jammu & Kashmir and Himachal Pradesh v. S. Raghubir . Singh Trust' was relied on behalf of the assessee. There the res-\n\n(1} 123 I.T.R. p. 438\n\n116 SlJ?REME COURTS REPORfS\n\n\npondent trust created by R. filed its return of income for the as; ess ment year 195'4·55. Holdiiig that the trust was invalid, the Jncometax Officer assessed the income of the trust in the hands of R. R. carried the matter in appeal and other proceedings and ultimately tl1e High C.ourt held that the trust was yalid and the income was the income of the trust and not Of R. The I.T.O. issued a notice on\n\n19th September, 1961, under Section 34(1)1b) oftbe Indian J.T. Act, i922, to reopen the assessment of the trust. The trust claimed that the notice. was barred by limitation. The Tribunal accepted the claim and held that trust was a stranger to the pr6ceedings for the\n\nssessment of Rand the second proviso' to Section 34(3) did not\n\nsave the reassessment proceedings initiated against the.trust from the b.ar of limitation and. the High Court, on a reference, agreed with<the Tribuna1. On appeal to this Court it was held, affirming the decision of the High Court, that even .though the finding of the High Court that the income belonged to the trust and not tp R was a finding necessary for disposing of the reference in favour of R and it was a \"finding\", bnt the trust was a stranger to the assessment proceedings of R. and not \"any Jlerson\" within the meaning of the second proviso to Section 34(3) and, therefore, the second proviso to Section 34(3) was not attracfed and the reassessment proceedings against the trust were barred by time. That decision must be understood in the facts of that case. The settler ahd the trust cannot be said so intimately connected as to corn, e within the ratio of Murli dhar Bhagwan Das's case. The Court found that assessee ttust could not be said to be intimately connectedwith the assessment of Raghubir Singh. As a result of the trust deed failing, there may be numerous situations viz., there might be resulting trust or it might be that the trust property would go to other beneficiaries. It is not necessary for us to explore or explain those possibilities. Biit in the facts of this case; we are of the opinion that whether the income •of the smaller Hindu undivided family, namely the present assessee is liable to be taxed is so intimately or inextricably linked up with the question of assessability of bigger Hindu undivided family, which again is dependent upon the question whether there was disruption of bigger Hindu undivided family and that being the very subject matter' of appeals in the four years in which this direction had been given, we are of the opinion that' _directions given in this case are °, yalid and would save the assessments against the assessee for the two years in question.\n\nIn the aforesaid view of the matter, we Me of th~ 9pinion that\n\n\" ,.\n\ni17 iluA.owAN DAS v. c.i.r. (S. Mukharji, i.)\n\nthe majority of the learned judges of the High Court were right in their conclusions and the question was correctly answered by the majority of the learned judges of the High Court. The ltppeals therefore fail and are dismissed with costs.\n\nH.S.K. Appeals dismiss ed.", "total_entities": 159, "entities": [{"text": "BHAGWAN DAS SITA RAM", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7, "end_char": 27, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BHAGWAN DAS SITA RAM", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "o COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 46, "end_char": 74, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V.:0. TuLZAPURKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 103, "end_char": 120, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.D. TULZAPURKAR*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "IncOme-taX Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 161, "end_char": 175, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 197, "end_char": 202, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 251, "end_char": 256, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1040, "end_char": 1046, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income Tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1054, "end_char": 1074, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "19.5.1945", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1114, "end_char": 1123, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was paititioned on 19.5.1945."}}, {"text": "18.\\l.1950for", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1324, "end_char": 1337, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While this claim was pending, the appe11ant along with a smailer HUF (hereinafter re; ferred to as the assessee) which had come into being on pa.rtition of the bigger HUF, filed voluntary returns on 18.\\l.1950for the assessment years 1946-47 to 1949-50unders."}}, {"text": "31,8.1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1567, "end_char": 1576, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The bigger HUF's claim partition, Which was rejected by the Income Tax Officer arid the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, was accepted by the Appellate Triunal ori 31,8.1954."}}, {"text": "28.10.1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1692, "end_char": 1702, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "appeals of the bigger HUF against the assessment orders, the Tribunal gave a direction on 28.10.1954 that asscssriullts be made on the bigger HUF after accepting partition. '"}}, {"text": "s. 34(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1916, "end_char": 1924, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income Tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Income Tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "12.4.1955-", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1995, "end_char": 2005, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After thC claim of partition was accepted the Income-tax Officer sent notices to the assesseei fOr initiating proceedings against him under s. 34(1) (b).- Jn response to the notices the assi!.see filed fresh returns on 12.4.1955- Rejecting the contention of the assessee that the time for making assessment under s. 34 had expiied, the Income-tax Officer completed asseSsmentsunder s. 2~(3) read with s. 34 on\n\n~ .8.9.1955."}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2089, "end_char": 2094, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2158, "end_char": 2162, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2177, "end_char": 2182, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": ".8.9.1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2189, "end_char": 2198, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After thC claim of partition was accepted the Income-tax Officer sent notices to the assesseei fOr initiating proceedings against him under s. 34(1) (b).- Jn response to the notices the assi!.see filed fresh returns on 12.4.1955- Rejecting the contention of the assessee that the time for making assessment under s. 34 had expiied, the Income-tax Officer completed asseSsmentsunder s. 2~(3) read with s. 34 on\n\n~ .8.9.1955."}}, {"text": "30.3.1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2417, "end_char": 2426, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The assessee filed a writ petition in the High Court_ which was allowed and the assessment orders were quashed on 30.3.1960."}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2547, "end_char": 2552, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2790, "end_char": 2798, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 22(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3423, "end_char": 3431, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3673, "end_char": 3678, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3717, "end_char": 3722, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4106, "end_char": 4111, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4435, "end_char": 4440, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4510, "end_char": 4515, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4973, "end_char": 4981, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "M.K.K.R. Muthukaruppan Chettiar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5341, "end_char": 5372, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Karuppan Chettiar v.· Co\"1missioner of\n\nIncome-ta~,\"Marlras, 72 1.T.R. 403 ; and, Commissioner_-· of Income-tax Madras\n\nv. M.K.K.R. Muthukaruppan Chettiar, 18 I.T.R~ 69, refe_rred t~\n\nOn Question."}}, {"text": "s. 34(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5663, "end_char": 5671, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5799, "end_char": 5807, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6189, "end_char": 6194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7307, "end_char": 7312, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Commissioner of Income--tax, <; entral, Calcutta v. National Taj Traders. 121 I.T.R. 535", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7598, "end_char": 7686, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "701 C-S, 108 A-FJ\n\nIncome-tax Officer, A-Ward, Sitapur v. Mur/idhar BhagWan Das, 52 I.T.R. 335; Rajinder Nath v. Comminioner of lncome-1ax, Delhi, 120 I.T.R. 14 ; • Commissioner of Income--tax, <; entral, Calcutta v. National Taj Traders."}}, {"text": "Murlidhar BhagwOn Das", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8281, "end_char": 8302, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Judged in the light of the test laid down in Murlidhar BhagwOn Das casearid as pointed Out i~ R.ajinder Nath's case, it appears that the present usessee can be said to be a person who would be liable to be assessed for the whole or part of the income that went to the assessment of the bigger Hindu undivided family io years under appeal and U a Person intimately connected with the as, sessments of the bigger Hindu µn divlde<I ramily; The income in this case cannot be the income of both bigger Hindu Undivided family and the present assessce, it must be either of these two.", "canonical_name": "Murlidhar BhagwaT1 Das"}}, {"text": "R.ajinder Nath", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8330, "end_char": 8344, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Judged in the light of the test laid down in Murlidhar BhagwOn Das casearid as pointed Out i~ R.ajinder Nath's case, it appears that the present usessee can be said to be a person who would be liable to be assessed for the whole or part of the income that went to the assessment of the bigger Hindu undivided family io years under appeal and U a Person intimately connected with the as, sessments of the bigger Hindu µn divlde<I ramily; The income in this case cannot be the income of both bigger Hindu Undivided family and the present assessce, it must be either of these two.", "canonical_name": "R.ajinder Nath"}}, {"text": "S. Rtzghubf• Singh Trust", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9136, "end_char": 9160, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "h-v. S. Rtzghubf• Singh Trust, 123 I.T.R: 438 referred to."}}, {"text": "S.C. Manchanda", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9474, "end_char": 9488, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.C. Manchanda and M. J.P. Ma/ho.tra for the Appellant . •"}}, {"text": "M. J.P. Ma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9493, "end_char": 9503, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.C. Manchanda and M. J.P. Ma/ho.tra for the Appellant . •"}}, {"text": "S.T. Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9534, "end_char": 9544, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.T. Desai, B.B. Ahuja and Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondent ."}}, {"text": "B.B. Ahuja", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9546, "end_char": 9556, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.T. Desai, B.B. Ahuja and Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondent ."}}, {"text": "A. Subhashini", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9566, "end_char": 9579, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.T. Desai, B.B. Ahuja and Miss A. Subhashini for the Respondent ."}}, {"text": "SABYASACHI MUKHARJI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9646, "end_char": 9665, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J. These appeals by certificat~ granted by the High Court of Allahabad under Section 66A(2) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922, arise out of judgment delivered and order passed on 3rd 1ltnuary, 1973 by the High Court of Allahabad in Income-tax Reference No.", "canonical_name": "SABYASACHI MUKHARJI"}}, {"text": "High Court of Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9714, "end_char": 9737, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSABYASACHI MUKHARJI, J. These appeals by certificat~ granted by the High Court of Allahabad under Section 66A(2) of the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922, arise out of judgment delivered and order passed on 3rd 1ltnuary, 1973 by the High Court of Allahabad in Income-tax Reference No."}}, {"text": "Section 66A(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9744, "end_char": 9758, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Income Tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9766, "end_char": 9793, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 66(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10028, "end_char": 10041, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Indian Income Tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Income-Tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10049, "end_char": 10069, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "31st May, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10228, "end_char": 10242, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The following question of law had been referred to the High Court for consideration under Section 66(1) of the Income-Tax Act, 1922 by the Appellate Tribunal, Allahabad Belich, Allahabad: ·\n\ni. \"Whether, on the facts and in fhe circumstances of the case, valid assessments could be made on 31st May, 1962, for the assessment years 1948-49 and 1949·50 on the basis of voluntary returns."}}, {"text": "Indian Income-Tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10367, "end_char": 10394, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "18.11'1950", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10398, "end_char": 10408, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of income filed under Section ~2(1) of the Indian Income-Tax Act, 1922 on 18.11'1950?"}}, {"text": "of'Gulati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10855, "end_char": 10864, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~· came before a Full Bench41:onsisting of'Gulati, H. N. Seth &.C.S.P.\n\n1 '\n\nSingh, JJ."}}, {"text": "H. N. Seth", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10866, "end_char": 10876, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~· came before a Full Bench41:onsisting of'Gulati, H. N. Seth &.C.S.P.\n\n1 '\n\nSingh, JJ."}}, {"text": "Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10892, "end_char": 10897, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~· came before a Full Bench41:onsisting of'Gulati, H. N. Seth &.C.S.P.\n\n1 '\n\nSingh, JJ."}}, {"text": "C. S. P. Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10914, "end_char": 10928, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gulati'and C. S. P. Singh, JJ."}}, {"text": "Seth", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11030, "end_char": 11034, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the affirmative in fa.vour of the revenue and against the assessee: , Seth J. however, was in favour of assessee."}}, {"text": "Section 25A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12005, "end_char": 12016, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indin lncome-Tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12024, "end_char": 12044, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 22(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12135, "end_char": 12148, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indin lncome-Tax Act,\n\n1922", "statute": "Indin lncome-Tax Act,\n\n1922"}}, {"text": "Section 25A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12493, "end_char": 12504, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indin lncome-Tax Act,\n\n1922", "statute": "Indin lncome-Tax Act,\n\n1922"}}, {"text": "Section 25A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12585, "end_char": 12596, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indin lncome-Tax Act,\n\n1922", "statute": "Indin lncome-Tax Act,\n\n1922"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Officer", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12768, "end_char": 12786, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Income-tax Officer, thereafter, .initiated proceedings under\n\nSetion 34 ofthe Incme, tax Act of 1922 for assessing the small.er H'indu undivided family, the preseµt assessee in view of the fact.that tlie claim for disruption of the bigger H. U. F. had been accepted."}}, {"text": "Section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13439, "end_char": 13449, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "8.9.1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13560, "end_char": 13568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8.9.1955 under Section 23(3) read with Se.ction 34 of the Income-tax Act,\n\n1922."}}, {"text": "Section 23(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13575, "end_char": 13588, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13618, "end_char": 13632, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "High. Court of Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13835, "end_char": 13859, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The assessee could not get any decision in his favour either fro in the Appellate Assistant Commissioner or from the .Tribunal and being aggrieved by these orders, filed a Writ Petition; to the High."}}, {"text": "Section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14170, "end_char": 14180, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income-tax Act,\n\n1922", "statute": "the Income-tax Act,\n\n1922"}}, {"text": "Section 311(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14416, "end_char": 14430, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income-tax Act,\n\n1922", "statute": "the Income-tax Act,\n\n1922"}}, {"text": "Nathu Ram Jawaharlal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15057, "end_char": 15077, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "undivided family, M/s Nathu Ram Jawaharlal, Jhansi, order was passed by th~, Tribunal in the appeal relating to the assessments pending before it."}}, {"text": "28th October, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15455, "end_char": 15473, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It\" should be noted that originally on the basis that the bigger H.U.F. had not been disrupted assessments for these years bad been made and appeals relating to those assessments were pending before tlie\"'rribunaL The Tribunal disposed of these appeals by the order dated 28th October, 1954 and the Tribunal in the said order had observed, inter alia, as follows;\n\n\"The assessments for ."}}, {"text": "Jawaharlal Mani Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15838, "end_char": 15857, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "others on the component Hindu undiviiled families, namely M/s Jawaharlal Mani Ram and Bhagwan Das Sita Ram.\"", "canonical_name": "Jawaharlal Mani Ram"}}, {"text": "Bhagwan Das Sita Ram", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15862, "end_char": 15882, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "others on the component Hindu undiviiled families, namely M/s Jawaharlal Mani Ram and Bhagwan Das Sita Ram.\"", "canonical_name": "BHAGWAN DAS SITA RAM"}}, {"text": "Jawabarlal Mam Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16368, "end_char": 16386, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As mentioned hereinbefore after the Tribunal had directed\n\nth~- assessmets shoul~ be made on the cowponent units of the bigger Hmdu, und!Vlded famdy, afte:partition was accepted, namely, tpe as$essee and Jawabarlal Mam Ram, the Income-tax Officer instea4\n\n: ;~ c\n\n\\<_it D\n\n'; f: p\n\n.. -_,\n\nj II\n\n.B.\n\n106 suPilEME couh REPORTS (!", "canonical_name": "Jawaharlal Mani Ram"}}, {"text": "Section 34(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16620, "end_char": 16633, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16936, "end_char": 16947, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "March 30, 1960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16972, "end_char": 16986, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 30, 1960, the High Court quashed the assessment orders on the ground that as volnutary returns filed."}}, {"text": "Section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17147, "end_char": 17157, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jle Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17162, "end_char": 17169, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 23(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17578, "end_char": 17591, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Jle Act,\n\n1922", "statute": "Jle Act,\n\n1922"}}, {"text": "Section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17833, "end_char": 17843, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Jle Act,\n\n1922", "statute": "Jle Act,\n\n1922"}}, {"text": "Section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17902, "end_char": 17912, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Jle Act,\n\n1922", "statute": "Jle Act,\n\n1922"}}, {"text": "Section 22(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18005, "end_char": 18018, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Jle Act,\n\n1922", "statute": "Jle Act,\n\n1922"}}, {"text": "Section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18085, "end_char": 18095, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Jle Act,\n\n1922", "statute": "Jle Act,\n\n1922"}}, {"text": "Section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18467, "end_char": 18477, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 34(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18528, "end_char": 18541, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18602, "end_char": 18612, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18680, "end_char": 18690, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 34(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19080, "end_char": 19093, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20227, "end_char": 20237, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 30(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21045, "end_char": 21058, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 31(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21063, "end_char": 21076, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 23228, "end_char": 23248, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that view ofthe matter, the two learnedjudges of the Allahabad High Court were of the opinion that assessments were valid and answered the question in favour of the revenue."}}, {"text": "Section 34(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23929, "end_char": 23942, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23960, "end_char": 23980, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 34(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24104, "end_char": 24117, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "BHAGWAN DAS~.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24132, "end_char": 24145, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BHAGWAN DAS~. C.I.T. (S. Mukharji, J.)\n\n' ' 109\n\nAs noted before the expression \"any person\" in respect of whom such direction could be given was explained by this Court in Income-tax Officer, A Ward Sitapur v.\n\nMurlidhar Bhagwandas (supra)."}}, {"text": "S. Mukharji", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24154, "end_char": 24165, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BHAGWAN DAS~. C.I.T. (S. Mukharji, J.)\n\n' ' 109\n\nAs noted before the expression \"any person\" in respect of whom such direction could be given was explained by this Court in Income-tax Officer, A Ward Sitapur v.\n\nMurlidhar Bhagwandas (supra)."}}, {"text": "Section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24486, "end_char": 24496, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25340, "end_char": 25350, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26263, "end_char": 26273, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "A.A.C.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 27225, "end_char": 27231, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "for the construction of the buildings had beep debited in equal shares to the father and two major sons and a minor son and held that the firm was not the owner of the properties and defocted the addition .. The A.A.C. also observed that the I.T.O. was free to take action to assess the excess in the hands of the co-owners."}}, {"text": "Section 147(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27381, "end_char": 27395, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "A.A.C", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 27637, "end_char": 27642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On appeal, the A.A.C. held that Section 147(a) couid not apply but upheld the assessments under Section 153(3) (ii) of 1961 Act.. On further appeal, the Tribunal held that Section 153(3) (ii) could not apply because there was neither a finding .nor a direction in the earlier order of the A.A.C: and further that A.A.C. could 'not convert the assessments made under Section l 47(a) intb those under Section 153(3) (ii)."}}, {"text": "Section 147(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27654, "end_char": 27668, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 153(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27718, "end_char": 27732, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 153(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27794, "end_char": 27808, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 153(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28021, "end_char": 28035, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 147(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28148, "end_char": 28162, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 153", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28220, "end_char": 28231, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 153(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28305, "end_char": 28319, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.T.O.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 28723, "end_char": 28729, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On a reference of the questfons, (I) whether the A.A.C. was justified in )loldirig that the provisions of Section 147(a) were not applicable, and -(ii) whether the provisions of Section 153 (3) (ii) were not applicable, the High Court-held that the proyisions of Section 153(3) were J applicable observing that the A.A.C's finding that the properties did\n\nnot belong to the firm and, therefore, the excess amount of the cost of construction could not be rekarded as the income of the firm was a finding which was necessary for the disposal of the firm's appeal and as a corollary it was held that the buildings belonged to 1he coowners and this necessitated the \"direction\" to the I.T.O. that."}}, {"text": "Pathak", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28830, "end_char": 28836, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dealing with this contention, Pathak J. who delivered he judgment of this Court observed at page 20 of the report:\n\n\"The expression \"another person\" in the Expln."}}, {"text": "Murlidhar BhagwaT1 Das", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30325, "end_char": 30347, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Judged in the light of the test laid down in Murlidhar BhagwaT1 Das (supra) and as pointed outin Rajinder Nath's case, it appears to us that the preent assessee can be said to be a person who would be liable to beassessed for the whole or part of the income that went to the.a.ssessment of the bigger , Hindu undivided family in years under appeal and is a person intimately connected with the assessments of the bigger Hfodu undivided family.", "canonical_name": "Murlidhar BhagwaT1 Das"}}, {"text": "Rajinder Nath", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30377, "end_char": 30390, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Judged in the light of the test laid down in Murlidhar BhagwaT1 Das (supra) and as pointed outin Rajinder Nath's case, it appears to us that the preent assessee can be said to be a person who would be liable to beassessed for the whole or part of the income that went to the.a.ssessment of the bigger , Hindu undivided family in years under appeal and is a person intimately connected with the assessments of the bigger Hfodu undivided family.", "canonical_name": "R.ajinder Nath"}}, {"text": "Sections 30(1) and 30(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31124, "end_char": 31148, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31235, "end_char": 31244, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31390, "end_char": 31400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31457, "end_char": 31467, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 26A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31471, "end_char": 31482, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31708, "end_char": 31718, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 23A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31741, "end_char": 31752, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31775, "end_char": 31785, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 48, 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31789, "end_char": 31803, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 25A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31914, "end_char": 31925, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 25A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32126, "end_char": 32137, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32184, "end_char": 32194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 44E", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32217, "end_char": 32228, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 461", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32283, "end_char": 32294, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 24", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32420, "end_char": 32430, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32516, "end_char": 32526, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32766, "end_char": 32776, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33118, "end_char": 33128, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 25A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34351, "end_char": 34362, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 25A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34492, "end_char": 34503, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 25A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34595, "end_char": 34606, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mnkharji", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 35065, "end_char": 35073, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "livided family wo11ld 11rise only on the disrurtion of the lar$er Biridq •\n\nBHAGWAN DAS v. c.1.T. (s: Mnkharji, J.)."}}, {"text": "Section 25A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35146, "end_char": 35157, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section\n\n25A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35401, "end_char": 35413, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35856, "end_char": 35866, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36017, "end_char": 36027, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Tulzapurkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 37512, "end_char": 37523, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tulzapurkar, J. expla:ined in the said decision the._"}}, {"text": "Section 33B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37618, "end_char": 37629, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act, 1922", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37637, "end_char": 37657, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37786, "end_char": 37796, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Section 34(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37944, "end_char": 37957, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Income-tax Act, 1922", "statute": "the Income-tax Act, 1922"}}, {"text": "Bombay . High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 38186, "end_char": 38205, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In our opinion in the facts of this cas~, the present assessee can be said to be•\"any person\" as indicated in Mur/idhar Bhagwr.n Das ·(supra) in Section 34(3) of 1922 Act\n\nThe view taken by _us is also in consonance with the observation of this Courts inthe case of Co!Jlmissioner of Income-tax, Andhra Pradesh v. Vadde Pul/aiah & Co.'\n\nRefernce was also made to a Bench decision of the Bombay ."}}, {"text": "Shantilal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 38718, "end_char": 38727, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On behalf.of the assessee, reliance was placed on a decision of the Division Bench of Gujarat\" High Cort in the case of Commissioner of Intome-tax, Gujarat v. Shanti/al Punjabhai.4 There an individual Shantilal was a member of the Hindu undivided family and also a partner of a firm.", "canonical_name": "Shantilal"}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 39094, "end_char": 39108, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Shantilal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 39576, "end_char": 39585, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The assessment proceedings in respect of the assessee, Shantilal, were in respect of his income arising from his self-acquired and separate .", "canonical_name": "Shantilal"}}, {"text": "Shantital", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 40697, "end_char": 40706, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Tribunal holding that the revenue had failed to prove that the assessee, Shantital was the nominee of the family, in other words, that the income arising from the firm's business was.", "canonical_name": "Shantilal"}}, {"text": "Shantilal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 41406, "end_char": 41415, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "sequence of the finding or the direction given by the Tribunal, that action could be taken not against the assessee, Shantilal, but against the Hindu undivided famliy."}}, {"text": "19th September, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 43115, "end_char": 43135, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Holdiiig that the trust was invalid, the Jncometax Officer assessed the income of the trust in the hands of R. R. carried the matter in appeal and other proceedings and ultimately tl1e High C.ourt held that the trust was yalid and the income was the income of the trust and not Of R. The I.T.O. issued a notice on\n\n19th September, 1961, under Section 34(1)1b) oftbe Indian J.T. Act, i922, to reopen the assessment of the trust."}}, {"text": "Section 34(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43143, "end_char": 43156, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 34(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43425, "end_char": 43438, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 34(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44004, "end_char": 44017, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 34(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44056, "end_char": 44069, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Murli dhar Bhagwan Das", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 44319, "end_char": 44341, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The settler ahd the trust cannot be said so intimately connected as to corn, e within the ratio of Murli dhar Bhagwan Das's case.", "canonical_name": "Murlidhar BhagwaT1 Das"}}, {"text": "Raghubir Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 44453, "end_char": 44467, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Court found that assessee ttust could not be said to be intimately connectedwith the assessment of Raghubir Singh."}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_3_10_21_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "1()\n\nR. PALANIMUtf{U\n\nRETURNING OFFICER\n\nFebruary 23, 1984\n\nSection JOO (l) (c)-ReserVed constituency-Canflidate giving false certifica1e as belonging to scheduled tribe-Election held void.\n\n• In his election petition the appellant: contended that th~ second respondent who in fict belonged to the Hindu Reddy community contested the election from the reserv.cd constituency falsely claiming that he belonged to the Scheduled Tribe Konda Reddy community and that by virtue of section JOO(!) (c) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 the election was void. It was also contended that at the t:me .of .the sc\"rutiny of the nominaHon papers the appellant had raised this objection but that the Returning Officer, without holding a proper enquiry, rejected the objection relying upon a Certificate of the\n\nTebsild>r that the second respondent belonged to the Scheduled Tribe Konda Reddy community. The high Court rejected the election petition and upheld the election.\n\n-Allowing the app.eal (by the Court)\n\nHELD : There is no dispute that the Konda Reddy community is a Scheduled Tribe community. On the evidence available on record it is impossible for any Court to reasonably conclude that the second respondent belonged to the Konda Reddy Scheduled Tribe community. In fact, he belonged to the Hindu Reddiar community, which is. not a Scheduled Tribe co.Jmun1ty. Therefore, his election from the reserved c9nstituency was void under section 100 (1) (c) of the Act. [19D-G)\n\n• per Varadarajan, J. Other Judges expressing no opinion.\n\nWith the laudable object of promoting the educational, economic and social advancement of the Backward Classes and Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes the Government had been awarding scholarships, hostel accommodation and other facilities, making reservation of seats in Professional Colfeges and institutions of higher learning and for oppointments -to Government and quasi ..\n\nOovefnment jobs. But not infrequently, fafse certificates are obtined by others to obtain these benefits thus depriving the persons for whose advantage these benefits are created. The false Claim in this case which es_caped the scrulinY of even the High cOurt had to be negatived only after considerable effort and expenditure on the part of those who wish to lay bare the facts. The same kind of scrutiny and contest could not be expetced from students and •\n\n• -,\n\n'Y .\n\nIt. 1.>Ai.ANiMttntu v. RE:t'URNING OFPICER,(Varat4-rqian, J.) 11\n\ncandidates belongl.ng to Backward Classes, .Scheduled Cestes and Scheduled Tribes -when these benefits are sought on false certificates. So long as the benefits are continued folthese classes, the Government mach~ry must.\n\n- exerci~ strict scrl?tiny. The Governme.ut must 'Stop any fraud which may be committed on it as well as these classes of.people by taking appropriate steps in regard to grant of certificates, while at ltie same time eosurig that rsons belonging to these ,1asm obtain the requisite certificates without difficulty from the authorities empowered to issue the same. [19H20AJ\n\nCIVIL APPELLATll JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 4027 of 1982. .\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated the 27th September, 1982 of the High Court of Judicature at Madras in Election Petition No. 4 of 1980. ·\n\nP. Chldmbaram, Parmeswaran, P. Manoharam and A.S.\n\nNambiar for the Appellant. n\"\n\n, A. V. Rangam an(t Ms; Sar/a Chandra for respondent No. L\n\n' S.N. Kacker, M.G. Ramachandran and K. Kam.madasam for the .respondents. , • The Judgment of the Co'urt was delivered by\n\nVARADARAJAN, J. This appeal by special leave is directed against th.e judgment of a learned Single Judge of Madras High Court dismissing Election Petition No .. 4 of 1980 with costs quantified at Rs. 1000. The. Election Petition was filed for declaring the election of the second respondent V. Arangarajan alias V. Rangarajan alias Perumal to the.'.I'amil Nadu Legislative Assembly from No. 157, , Uppiliapuram Scheduled Tribes reserved Assembly Constituency in Thuraiyur taluk, Tiruchirapali district, in the election held on . 28.S.1980 as void and further . declaring that ttie appellant R. Palanimuthn has been dnly elected from thai constituency. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties we allowed the appeal on 17.12.1983 totbe_extent of setting aside the election of ihe second ·\n\nrespondent for reasons to follow and directed the parties to bear the respective costs. Now we )lroceed to give our reasons. · ' .\n\n\"' II'he polling tOQk plac~ on 28.5.1980 and . the result was . announced after the counting was over on L6.1980. The second - .H\n\nSUPREMifcOli.Rt REPORTS tl984j 3 S.C.R.\n\nA . respondent belonging to the AIADMK\n\n0 secured 43,263 votes while the appellant belonging to the Congress (I) party, bis closest rival, secured 40,997 votes. The other candidates in the field, respondents 3 to 5 secured less than 1752 votes each and the second respondent\n\nwas declared Clected. ·\n\nthe constituency , has been declared by the notification dated 26.2.1969 issued by .the Election Commission oflndia under the provisions of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Order (Amendment) Act 108 of 1976 to he a Scheduled tribes constitnency.\n\nConsequently on \\y candidates belonging to the Scheduled Tribes as per the Constitution and the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Order 1950 as amended in 1976 could contest for election from this constituency h.aving regard to Article 173 of the Constitution and Section 5 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'.\n\nThe nominations of !ill the twelve candidates who filed their nominations before the last date fixed for the purpose were accepted by the first respondeni, Returning Officer as valid. Later, seven .of\n\nthpse candidates withdrew leaving only the appellant and respondeflts - 2 to 5 in the field.\n\nBy the Scheduled . Castes and Scheduled Tribes Order, 1950, Konda Reddies in Tamil Nadu except Kanyakumari district. and Shencottah taluk in Triunelveli district have been declared as belonging to the Scheduled Tribes. Later, by the Scheduled Castes and the\n\nScheduld Tribes (Amendment) .Act 108 of 1976 the exception made in respect of Kanyakumaii district and Shencottah taluk in Triunelveli district' has been removed with the result that Konda Reddies are thereafter shown to be existi.ng throughout Tamil Nadu.\n\nOnly Sclreduled Tribes candidates could contest from the constituency concerned' in view ot the provisions referred to above.\n\nThe appellant's contention is that the second respondent dos not belong to the. Konda Reddy Scheduled TriQe community as Claimed by him but is a Hindu Reddy and was therefore not qualified to be chosen to contest from the reserved .. constituency and consequetitly his election is void under Section 100 (I) (c) of the Act. The second\n\nrespondent opposed the election petition contending that he belongs to t.he Konda. Reddy Scheduled. Tri.be community and was therefore\n\n- cntitld' t\\) contest from the constituency and his election is valid~\n\n\\...\n\n. I!.. PALANiMUTIDJ v. RETURNING OFFICER (Varadarajan, J.) 13\n\nThe appellant filed objection to the acceptance of the second r.esportdent's nomination at 'the time of scrutiny of nominations by the first respondent, Returning Officer, contending that the second respondent does not. belng to the Konda Reddy community and was not a Scheduled 'fribe candidate. This objection was admittedly rejected by the first respondent who appears to have relied upon the Tehsildar's certificate: The appellant's contention is that the first respondent rejected his objection to the, acceptance of the omination of the sec11nd respondent relyirtg upon the certificate obtained by the second respoudent from the Tebsildar .to the effect that be belongs to the Konda Reddy Scheduled Tribe . community without holding a proper enquiry .and applying his own mind to the principles of law and the n:iatedal placed before him. ' •\n\nOn the pieadings the learned Single Judge who tried the election petition framed th~ following four material issues:\n\n!. Is the second respondent a person not belonging to the D Konda Reddy (ScheduledJTrihe) community?\n\n2. Was the acceptance of the nomination of the .second respondent improper?\n\n3. Is the election of the second respondent liable to be declared ·~ void under sections 100 (I) (c), 100 (!) (d) (i) and 100 (!)° (d)(iv) of the Representation of the Pe?ple Act, 1951? , ·\n\n4. Is the petitioner entitled to a further declaration under s.\n\n101 of the Act?\n\nOn consideration of the oral and documentary evidnce adduced before him by-the parties as also the evidence or three other. persons examined as CWS 1 to 3, the learned Single Judge held that the second respondent belongs to.the Konda Rddy Scheduled Tribe community• and 'he upheld the second respondent's election and dismissed the\n\nlection petition with costs as mentioned above. In coming to the conclusion that the second respondent belongs to the Konda Reddy Scheduled Tribe community the learned Single Judge. found that the .evidence of t, he second. respondent RW-1 and of his father RW-9 that the second respondent belongs to the Konda Reddy COQ\\munity is corroborated by the evidence of no.t only RWs-2, 3, 4 and 6 but also by tile evidence of RW-5 who belongs to the Naidu community l\\Dd knows the. 111emers of tqe scond respondent's . famHy . and br .\n\nI the evidence of RW-7 who belongs to the Oorali community- The learned Judge has made the following general observation regarding the witnesses exainin:ed on the second respondent's side: '\n\n\"Generaliy I find that all the witnesses who _come to depose on behalf of the second respondent were elderly persons and have impressed me very much as telling the truth.\n\nThey are also. independent witnesses and expected to know the community of th!\" second respondent in view of theit residence in the village and their long _acquaintance. The veracity of their statements hild not been shaken (in) the least in the cross-examination. I have n6 hesitation in accepting the evidence of these witnesses when they state that the second respondent belongs to Konda Reddy community which is a Scheduled Tribe.\"\n\nBefore us it was not disputed that the constituency concerne d has been reserved by law for Scheduled Tribes candidates and . therefore only Schednled Tribes candidates could. contest for election\n\nfrom that constituency. It was also not disputed that the appellant and respondents 2 to 5 contested as Scheduled Tribes candidates , and that the appellant belongs to the Scheduled Tribe community and the election of the second respondent would be void under s. 100 (1) (c) orthe Act and the appeal would have to be allowed if the second respondent does. not belmg' to the Konda Reddy Scheduled Tribe community. The only dispute before us is on th~ question whether the second respondent belongs to the Konda Reddy Scheduled Tribe community. The appellant's stand on this point is that the second respondent does not belong to the Konda Reddy community and is not a Scheduled Tribe candidate entitled to co!l'pete for election from the constituency concerned l; iut is a Hindu Reddy, while the stand of the second respondent is that he is a •'.Konda Reddy and belongs to the Scheduled Tribe community and was therefore entitled to compete. for election from the constituency and has been validly elected. There is uo dispute that Konda Reddy community is a Scheduled Tribe community. Arguments were advanced by Mr. P. Chidambram, learned counsel who appeared for the appellant and Mr. S.N. Kackar, learned Senior Counsel who appeared for the second respondent on this only question. The first respondent's counsel Mr. A .. V. Ra, ngam did riot advance any\n\nargument.\n\nlt is Se.en frolll the evi\\len9e of PW-12, t)le t)l¢n cliiefl3le9tora) . . . •\n\nIt. PALANiMUrHU v. ltBTUllNiNG OFPiCEit (Varadarajan, J.) 15\n\nOfficer, Tamil Nadu that the constituency concerned was a nonreserved or general constituency upto February 1979 and that it was converted into a Scheduled Tribes reserved constituency by the notification Ex. P-76 dated 26.2.1979 issued by the Election Commission oflndiaunder the.provisions of the Scheduled Castes and '. Scheduled Ttibes erder !Amendment) Act, 1976 which came into force on 19.9.1976. The appellant and respondents 2 to 5 contested in the election held in the constituency concerned on 28.5.1980 as\n\nScneduled Tribes candidates. The second respondeut R W-1 . had obtained the certificate Ex. R-1 dated 25.10.1977 from the Tahsildar Thtlraiyur soon after the inclusion of Konda Reddy coilfmunity in -the list of Scheduled Tribes by the said amendment of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Order) Act, 1976. Theparties relied\" upon oral and documntary evidence before the learned Single Judge of the High Court for proving their respective•contentions.\n\nBut before us much reliance was not placed on oral evidence and our attention was invited to certain relevant documents. The oral evidence adduced on the side of the appellant is to the effect that the sec_ond respondent belongs to the Hindu Reddiar community which is not included in the Scheduled Tribes while the oral evidence adduced on the side of the .second respondent is to the effect. 'that he belongs to the Konda Reddy community Which is a Scheduled Tribe community. . . .\n\nMr. Chidambram invited our attention to four sets of documents. Exhibits P-26, P-27, P-28, P-29, P-30, P-31 and P-32 are documents.relating to the second respondent's family and constitute one set. Exhibits R-2, R-3, P-23, P-24 and P-63 constitute the second\n\nsE.exht_. _Ebthibpit 9\n\ns P(-7), Pp1 1 2 0 , P(d)32a adndpP 5 - 9 58 con 1 ttittuteththe r thirthd sett. f t 1 s - a , • n - cQns 1 u e e 1our se .\n\nExhibits P-7, Pl2, P-32 and P-58 constitµte the third set. We sha11 consider these documents seJ'arately.\n\nEx. R-9 is t\\le sale deed d11ted 4.3.1899 executed by Veera Reddy in favour of Chellammal wife of the 6econd respondent's G grand flM'her Perumal Reddy. Ex. P-26 dated 8.10.1926 is the mot!· gage dr_ed executed by the second respondent's father Venkata Reddy and his parents Perumal R'eddy and Chellammal in favour of one Narayana Reddy. Ex, P-27 is an Order of 1965 sanctioning {in agricultural Joan of Rs. 2000/- to the second respondent's father .. Venkata Red\\ly. Ex. P-28 dated 7.10.1970 is the sale deed executed\n\n by the second respondent's father 'Venkata Reddy in favour of H\n\nferiasar aqd another. Ex. f~9 is an El\\etion Reister e)\\q\"a~\n\n' ,,, showing that Challammal, wife of Venkata Reddy\n\n0 is the decree holder-auctioIJ, purchaser in E.P. No: 270 of 19'H in 0. S. No. 1865 of 1970 on the file of 'the Additional District .Munsiff's Court\n\n' . ' Thuraiyur. Ex. P-30 dated 9.7.1973 is the sale deed executed by\n\nChellammal wife of Venkata Reddy in favour of one Veeiasaniy and others. Ex. P'31 dated 13.9.1976 is the sale deed executed in favour of the' second respondent described a'S the son of Venkata • Reddy by one Ramasamy Reddy and others. In all these documents the second respondent's family's commQnity is mentioned as Hindu\n\nReddy community.\n\nEx. •R-2 dated 15.4.1958 is the first page of the Secondary School Leaving Certificate relating to the second respo9dent who is stated therein to be a Hindu Reddiar by caste. Ex. R-3 is the . Secoddary SchoOI .Leaying Certificate of the second respondent's sister Leelavathi born on 15.12.1948. The second ' respondent; s. father has verified a]l the entries in columns 1 to 6 of Ex. R-3 to be\n\ncorrect and has undertaken not to demand any change in those entries 'in future-., Against column 2. (iii) relating to Leelavathi's\n\ncommnity, as to whether she belongs to Scheduld Caste or Scheduled Tribe or most Backward Class or is a C~>nvert to Chiistianjty from auy Scheduled Caste the sec_ond respondent's father )las an.s- . wered that query saying that she does not belong to any of those castes by an emphatic 'No'.~RW-1 has admitted that fa:. R-3 relates to his sister Leelavathi and contains his father's signature. He has, howev; r, stated that his]father is illiterate and bas put his signature in the original Ex. R-3 without knowing what it contains. Ex.· P-23 is an extract from the birth register rlating to a male child Veerama Reddy son of Venkata Reddy. and Chellammal born on . 29.12.1937. Ex. P:24 is another birth register extract relating to the birth of a'maTe child.Perumal, evidently the second respondent; on 6.6.1943 to the parents Venkata Reddy and ChellammaJ.. Ex; P-6~ is another birth register extract relating to the birth of a female child l>orn on 1.9.1949: Venkata Reddy himself had informed the authority concerned about the birth on the next day ilnd has signed the entry in token, thereof. In . all these 'documents also the second respondent and his father are mentioned as belonging to the Hindu Reddiar community. •\n\nEx. P-7 dated 11.6.1963 is the second respondent's application for admission into a Cooperative Traiqing Institut~. Ex. P-12 dated 12.6.1972 is the second respondent's applicaH, on for admissio.n of his daughter Geetha in a Panchayat Union Elementary School. Ex.' J>-32 is tM .certified \\lO)?Y of the plaintiµ Small Caqse $4it, :\\'lo. 16?\n\n...... c\n\n~-· -,~\"\n\n.l!.._PAI.ANIMU'IHU-V. RETURNi:NG OFFICER (Varadarajan, J.) 17\n\n.of 1980 instituted by the second respondent in the District Munsiffs' . Court, Thuraiyur. The second respondent has asserted in bis evidence that he signed that plaint prepared by the Advocate's clerk . wilho_ut going through its cointents. Ex. P-58 is the entry in the\n\nService Register relating to the second respondent under. his signa- 'ture dated 5.7 .1967 .. In' all these documents also the second respondent is dtscribed as a Hindu Reddiar,\n\nThe above documents show that the second respondent : and his 'father 1 Venkata Reddy and grandfather Perumal Reddy belong to the Hindu Re4diar community. The appellant . gave notice uftder Order 12 Rule 5 of the Code of Civil procedure\n\no the_ second respondent for admitting certain facts. One of the facls he was required to admit is that Hindu Reddiar community is not a Scheduled Tfibe community. The second respondent had ad- . mitted that the Hindu Recldiar comm'uity is not a Schduled Tribe community and stated that .he J:iad obtained the certificate dated 25.10.1977 from Tahsildar ofThuraiyur taluk to-the effect that he , longs to the Konda Reddy community, and .that he had applied , on an earlier date for the grant of that certificate in order to. enable him to aJ?ply for a job. Faced with the aforesaid documents which .clearly show that the second . .respondent and the. members.of his : family belong to the Hindu Raddiar conimunity whichis admittedly\n\n, not a-Scheduled Tribe_ c0mmunity the second respondent has sought- E . to get ov.er the difficulty by saying that Konda Reddy. communitY , is.asub-caste of the Hindu Reddiar community. This explanation, . cannot . be accepted having re11ard to the facts .and circumstances of . the case.\n\nThe last set of docuinents have been produced to show that the sec_ond -respondent had not flaimed to belong to the Konda Reddy Scheduled_ Tribe conlll)Unity though he would have done so if be belongs to that community in fact but has merely s.tated that he is the son ofVenkata Reddy. -Ex. f-9. (a} dated 12.3.1968 is the • second respondent's appliqation for appofotmnt as Supervisor in a; Land Mortg[; g~.Bankwhere b.e has described himself as the son of Venkata Reddy. Ex. P-10 (d).<lated 26.3.1918 is the second respon- . dent's application for appointment as a Trustee in Sri .Prasanna . Ven)catachalapathy temple and l)ther terqples at Thuraiyur where also , li, y has described himself 'as the son of Venkata.Reddy. Ex. P-59 ,:d11ted 8. l. l 9l'i5 is Jhe se, cond-respondent's application for appoint . , ment as a J_unfor Assistant ill: th, e 'thuraiyurural Cooperative Bank\n\n. where he .has, describd J:iirqsel(.as the son of Veqkala Reddy. Ex.\n\n_..p.lQ {d) tnay not.serve the_pu, l'pose for which t.his s.et of. documents al!a'l'e beep ; produed. in the; absence Of any meterial ori record to : ,! . - - '- ... - ... ' '. -· ' \" ; - '• .. ·, ·- _._ - - '\n\nA •\n\nSUPl\\EME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1984) 3 S.C.R.\n\nshow that the second respondent would have stood to benefit in the matter of appointment as a trustee of the temples if he had men- • tioned that he belongs to the Konda Reddy Scheduled Tribe community. It is common knowledge that in Tamil Nadu reservation for certain percentage of appointments in Government and quasi- Government services is based on the community to which applicants' belong. The reservation of certain percentage 'of the appointmentss to Backward Classes on the one hand and Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes together on. the other has been made depending upon the relative population of those communities in that State ..\n\nSch6larships and hostel-accommodation are. available in that State to the Backward Classes and Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes students subject to e!jgibility. These facts are well known in Tamil .Nadu. It is not prol:>able that the second respondent who had applied in 1965 and 1968 for. appointment as a Junior f..ssistatit in.\n\nThuraiyur Rural Cooperative Bank and as Supervisor in a Land Mortgage Bank was not awar.e that it would be advantageous for him to mention in those applications that he belonged to the Konda Reddy Scheduled Tribe community if in fact he had belonged to that community. We think tht he would riot have failed to mention in those applications that he belongs to the Konda Reddy Scheduled Tribe .community if in fact he had belonged to that community.\n\nWhile the first three of the four sets of documents mentioned above . probablise the fact that the second respondent belongs to the Hindu Reddiar community which admitteolly is not a Scheduled Tribe community, Ex. P-9 (a) andlP-59 in the last set of documents improbablise the second respondent's 'case that he beiongs to the Konda •Reddy Scheduled Tribe community. Ex. R-3 which is one of the documents in the first set is a very important document which conclusively esta)>lishes that the second respondent does riot belong to the Konda Reddy Scheduled Trib.e community, fodn that document . which had been . verified by thejsecond respondents's father to be true under his signature with an undertaking that he would not demand any change in any of the eniries in columns 1 to 6 the second respondent's father has sti+ted that. his daughter Lee!avathi to wh9m Ex. R-3 rlates does not belong.to the Scheduled Tribe or scheduled Caste or Most Backward Class and was not a Convert to Christianity from any Scheduled Cste. The s.econd respondent's father RW-9 has conveniently stated ii).. his evidel).ce 'that he does not know to read or write Tamil, Telugu or any oiher language, that he used .to previously sign in Tamiland that lfe has lost .hill eye-sight and COJild not see 'whether El\\&. ~4 l\\lld l, l-~ conta4l hi4\n\nR. PALANiMUT!IU v. RETURNiNG O'FFICER (Varadarajan, J.) 19\n\nsignature. It is not possible to rccept the evidence of RW-1 who has admitted that Ex. R-3 relates to his siater Leela:vathi and con. •\n\ntains his father' signature, as mentioned above, that his father RW9 is illiterate and he had signed Ex. R:3 witbout knowing what it con tained. R W-9 appears to be ignorant of the existence of the community know!) as Konda Reddy community, for he has stated in his evidence that _ther_e. is no community known as Konda Reddy communify though earlier he had stated in his evidence that he belongs to the Konda Reddy community. RW-1 has_ stated in his evidence that he came to know that he belongs to the Konda Reddy community only from the information given to him by his father RW-9. It is not the case of the second respon.dent that his father RW-9 himself came to know that he belongs to the Konda Reddy community only after the date on which he put his signature in the aforesaid imporiant document Ex. R-3 in which he has clearly. admitted that.his daughter .Leelavathi does not belong to. any Scheduled Tribe. Therefore, RW-9 who has Clearly admitted in Ex, R-3 that his daughter Leelavathi does not belong to the Scheduled Tribe community could not have informed the second respondent that they belonged to the Konda Reddy community. On the. evidence available on record in this case it is absolutely impossible for any court to reasonably conclude that the second respondent belongs to the 'Konda Reddy Scheduled Tribe community and not the Hindu Reddiar community. We may state here that Mr. S.N.\n\nKackar found it almost impossible to support the judgment of the learned Single Judge that the second respondent belongs to the Konda Reddy Scheduled Tribe community and that his nomination and subsequent election as a Member of the tamil Nadu Legislative .\n\nAssembly from the Scheduled Tribes .reserved 'Constituency concerned are valid. For these reasons we hold that the second respondent does not belong tp the Konda Reddy Scheduled Tribe commyunit but belongs to the Hindu Reddiar commuity which is not a Scheduled Tribe community and that his election from. the Scheduled Tribes reserved constituency concerned is void under\" s. 100 (l)(c) of the Act. We therefore allow the appeal and set aside the second respondent' selection with costs as sta, ted above.\n\nBefore I part with this appeal I would like to say what we feel that the Goyernment of Tamil Nadu should notice for taking such remedial action as it may deem necessary. Scholarships. are awarded, hostel accommodation and facilities are made available and reservation of seats in professional and other colleges and institutions of ]iigher learnin!l and for appointment to posts in\n\n. G . •\n\nc ..\n\n20 ..\n\ngovernment and quasi-government service have been made in Tamil Nadu for the backward lasses forming one group and Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. forming another group on the ratfo of their population with the laudable object of helping their educational, economic and ocial advancement. The second respondent who has now been found to be a Hindu Reddiar and not a Scheduled Tribe Konda Reddy, had admittedly obtained the Tahsildar; s certificate dated 25.10.1977 to the effect that he belongs to the Scheduled Tribe Konda Reddy community adqiittedly with the object of securing a job as a Scheduled Tribe candidate. If he had succeeded in getting any job in gvvernment servic~ or qu1sigovernment service on fhe basis of tliat certificate it is needless to say that he would have deprived some real Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. candidate getting the job on the bassis of the aforesaid reservation. The second respondent has used that certificate for obtaining nomination and electloa in a Scheduled Tribes Constituency of the Tamil Nad.u Legislative Assem':>ly even thvugh he ought to have known that other candidates in the keenly contested election might raise .objection to ; his false or wrong claim that .he .is . a_ Scheduled Tribe. candidate. The wrong claim which escaped the scrutiny of even the High Court had to be negatived only by this Court after the appellant had tken. a lot of pains and incurred considerable expenditure in filing the present appeal. This\n\namount of scrqtiny and contest could not.be expected from stuaents and candidates for; appointments who belong to Backward Classes scheduled Castes and. Scheduled Trib, s. If 11tempts are made by persons not belonging to any of these communities at securing the\n\nspeCial benefits to wh\\ch these Backward Classes, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes students and candidates are entitled under the rules in force in that State, an.d there is. no proper scrutiny of the claim of such persons that they belong to these classes the benefits which are intend\\'d by the Stte to go tq these classes will be taken away by those to whom they are not really intended. Therefore, so long as these benefits are continued for the aforesaid classes strict scrutiny has to be made by the State Government machib.ery and the fraud which may be committed. on the State and those ciasses of people for whom these benefits are really. intended by those for , whom these benefits are not meant by producing .false community certificates has to be'stopped by the government taking appropriate . steps. At the same time it must be nsured that it is not made difficult for persons really belonging to these class.es obtaining the .. necessary community cer\\ificates from those at1_14oriseq o issl\\e, th.~\n\n. '\n\nR. P;\\Lrn!M'UTHU v. irnTURNINQ, QFF!CER (F. ALI&. R. MISRA, jJ.) 21 ·\n\nsame.\n\nA copy of the judg1Jlent shall be forwarded to the Chief A Secretary to the Government of Tamil Nadu. ·\n\nFAZAL ALI & RANGANATH MISRA, JJ. We entirely agree with the reasons given by brother Varadarajan, J. for allowing the appeal.\n\nHowever, we refrain from. expressing any opinio11 on the observations made by our learned Brother in the last paragraph of the judgment, beginning with the words \"Before we . part with\" and ending with \"authorised to issue the same\".\n\nP.B.R.\n\nAppeal allowed .\n\n. '\n\n. '", "total_entities": 58, "entities": [{"text": "R. PALANIMUtf{U", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5, "end_char": 20, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1()\n\nR. PALANIMUtf{U\n\nRETURNING OFFICER\n\nFebruary 23, 1984\n\nSection JOO (l) (c)-ReserVed constituency-Canflidate giving false certifica1e as belonging to scheduled tribe-Election held void.", "canonical_name": "R. PALANIMUtf{U"}}, {"text": "February 23, 1984", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 41, "end_char": 58, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1()\n\nR. PALANIMUtf{U\n\nRETURNING OFFICER\n\nFebruary 23, 1984\n\nSection JOO (l) (c)-ReserVed constituency-Canflidate giving false certifica1e as belonging to scheduled tribe-Election held void."}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 502, "end_char": 540, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "the Returning Officer", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 695, "end_char": 716, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RETURNING OFFICER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "section 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1441, "end_char": 1452, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Representation of the People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "per Varadarajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1484, "end_char": 1499, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A. VARADARAJAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATll JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3059, "end_char": 3088, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "19H20AJ\n\nCIVIL APPELLATll JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3191, "end_char": 3225, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From the Judgment and Order dated the 27th September, 1982 of the High Court of Judicature at Madras in Election Petition No."}}, {"text": "P. Chldmbaram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3265, "end_char": 3278, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Chldmbaram, Parmeswaran, P. Manoharam and A.S.\n\nNambiar for the Appellant.", "canonical_name": "P. Chldmbaram"}}, {"text": "Parmeswaran", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3280, "end_char": 3291, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Chldmbaram, Parmeswaran, P. Manoharam and A.S.\n\nNambiar for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "P. Manoharam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3293, "end_char": 3305, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Chldmbaram, Parmeswaran, P. Manoharam and A.S.\n\nNambiar for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "A.S.\n\nNambiar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3310, "end_char": 3323, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Chldmbaram, Parmeswaran, P. Manoharam and A.S.\n\nNambiar for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "A. V. Rangam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3349, "end_char": 3361, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "n\"\n\n, A. V. Rangam an(t Ms; Sar/a Chandra for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Sar/a Chandra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3371, "end_char": 3384, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "n\"\n\n, A. V. Rangam an(t Ms; Sar/a Chandra for respondent No."}}, {"text": "S.N. Kacker", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3409, "end_char": 3420, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L\n\n' S.N. Kacker, M.G. Ramachandran and K. Kam.madasam for the .respondents. , •", "canonical_name": "S.N.\n\nKackar"}}, {"text": "M.G. Ramachandran", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3422, "end_char": 3439, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L\n\n' S.N. Kacker, M.G. Ramachandran and K. Kam.madasam for the .respondents. , •"}}, {"text": "K. Kam.madasam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3444, "end_char": 3458, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L\n\n' S.N. Kacker, M.G. Ramachandran and K. Kam.madasam for the .respondents. , •"}}, {"text": "VARADARAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3530, "end_char": 3541, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Co'urt was delivered by\n\nVARADARAJAN, J. This appeal by special leave is directed against th.e judgment of a learned Single Judge of Madras High Court dismissing Election Petition No .. 4 of 1980 with costs quantified at Rs."}}, {"text": "V. Arangarajan alias V. Rangarajan alias Perumal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3821, "end_char": 3869, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Election Petition was filed for declaring the election of the second respondent V. Arangarajan alias V. Rangarajan alias Perumal to the.'."}}, {"text": "S.1980", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4062, "end_char": 4068, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "R. Palanimuthn", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4121, "end_char": 4135, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "declaring that ttie appellant R. Palanimuthn has been dnly elected from thai constituency.", "canonical_name": "R. PALANIMUtf{U"}}, {"text": "AIADMK", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4664, "end_char": 4670, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "respondent belonging to the AIADMK\n\n0 secured 43,263 votes while the appellant belonging to the Congress (I) party, bis closest rival, secured 40,997 votes."}}, {"text": "Article 173", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5421, "end_char": 5432, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5457, "end_char": 5466, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5474, "end_char": 5512, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6785, "end_char": 6796, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7650, "end_char": 7655, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "D Konda Reddy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8133, "end_char": 8146, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Is the second respondent a person not belonging to the D Konda Reddy (ScheduledJTrihe) community?"}}, {"text": "sections 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8334, "end_char": 8346, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.\n\n101", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8506, "end_char": 8513, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10650, "end_char": 10656, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "P. Chidambram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11506, "end_char": 11519, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Arguments were advanced by Mr. P. Chidambram, learned counsel who appeared for the appellant and Mr. S.N. Kackar, learned Senior Counsel who appeared for the second respondent on this only question.", "canonical_name": "P. Chldmbaram"}}, {"text": "S.N. Kackar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11576, "end_char": 11587, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Arguments were advanced by Mr. P. Chidambram, learned counsel who appeared for the appellant and Mr. S.N. Kackar, learned Senior Counsel who appeared for the second respondent on this only question.", "canonical_name": "S.N.\n\nKackar"}}, {"text": "A .. V. Ra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11709, "end_char": 11719, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first respondent's counsel Mr. A .. V. Ra, ngam did riot advance any\n\nargument."}}, {"text": "25.10.1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12522, "end_char": 12532, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R-1 dated 25.10.1977 from the Tahsildar Thtlraiyur soon after the inclusion of Konda Reddy coilfmunity in -the list of Scheduled Tribes by the said amendment of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Order) Act, 1976."}}, {"text": "Chidambram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13369, "end_char": 13379, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Chidambram invited our attention to four sets of documents.", "canonical_name": "P. Chldmbaram"}}, {"text": "Venkata • Reddy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14990, "end_char": 15005, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P'31 dated 13.9.1976 is the sale deed executed in favour of the' second respondent described a'S the son of Venkata • Reddy by one Ramasamy Reddy and others.", "canonical_name": "Venkata • Reddy"}}, {"text": "Ramasamy Reddy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 15013, "end_char": 15027, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P'31 dated 13.9.1976 is the sale deed executed in favour of the' second respondent described a'S the son of Venkata • Reddy by one Ramasamy Reddy and others."}}, {"text": "Veerama Reddy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16280, "end_char": 16293, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P-23 is an extract from the birth register rlating to a male child Veerama Reddy son of Venkata Reddy."}}, {"text": "Venkata Reddy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16301, "end_char": 16314, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P-23 is an extract from the birth register rlating to a male child Veerama Reddy son of Venkata Reddy.", "canonical_name": "Venkata • Reddy"}}, {"text": "Chellammal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16320, "end_char": 16330, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and Chellammal born on .", "canonical_name": "Chellammal"}}, {"text": "Perumal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16434, "end_char": 16441, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Perumal, evidently the second respondent; on 6.6.1943 to the parents Venkata Reddy and ChellammaJ.. Ex; P-6~ is another birth register extract relating to the birth of a female child l>orn on 1.9.1949: Venkata Reddy himself had informed the authority concerned about the birth on the next day ilnd has signed the entry in token, thereof.", "canonical_name": "Perumal Reddy"}}, {"text": "ChellammaJ", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16521, "end_char": 16531, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Perumal, evidently the second respondent; on 6.6.1943 to the parents Venkata Reddy and ChellammaJ.. Ex; P-6~ is another birth register extract relating to the birth of a female child l>orn on 1.9.1949: Venkata Reddy himself had informed the authority concerned about the birth on the next day ilnd has signed the entry in token, thereof.", "canonical_name": "Chellammal"}}, {"text": "Geetha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17114, "end_char": 17120, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P-12 dated 12.6.1972 is the second respondent's applicaH, on for admissio.n of his daughter Geetha in a Panchayat Union Elementary School."}}, {"text": "Perumal Reddy", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17879, "end_char": 17892, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "his signa- 'ture dated 5.7 .1967 .. In' all these documents also the second respondent is dtscribed as a Hindu Reddiar,\n\nThe above documents show that the second respondent : and his 'father 1 Venkata Reddy and grandfather Perumal Reddy belong to the Hindu Re4diar community.", "canonical_name": "Perumal Reddy"}}, {"text": "Order 12 Rule 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17967, "end_char": 17982, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17986, "end_char": 18013, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Venkata.Reddy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 19749, "end_char": 19762, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ven)catachalapathy temple and l)ther terqples at Thuraiyur where also , li, y has described himself 'as the son of Venkata.", "canonical_name": "Venkata • Reddy"}}, {"text": "Veqkala Reddy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 19976, "end_char": 19989, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "where he .has, describd J:iirqsel(.as the son of Veqkala Reddy.", "canonical_name": "Venkata • Reddy"}}, {"text": "Tamil Nadu", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 20487, "end_char": 20497, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is common knowledge that in Tamil Nadu reservation for certain percentage of appointments in Government and quasi- Government services is based on the community to which applicants' belong."}}, {"text": "Thuraiyur Rural Cooperative Bank", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 21238, "end_char": 21270, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thuraiyur Rural Cooperative Bank and as Supervisor in a Land Mortgage Bank was not awar.e that it would be advantageous for him to mention in those applications that he belonged to the Konda Reddy Scheduled Tribe community if in fact he had belonged to that community."}}, {"text": ".Leelavathi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 24071, "end_char": 24082, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "admitted that.his daughter .Leelavathi does not belong to.", "canonical_name": ".Leelavathi"}}, {"text": "Leelavathi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 24194, "end_char": 24204, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therefore, RW-9 who has Clearly admitted in Ex, R-3 that his daughter Leelavathi does not belong to the Scheduled Tribe community could not have informed the second respondent that they belonged to the Konda Reddy community.", "canonical_name": ".Leelavathi"}}, {"text": "S.N.\n\nKackar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 24609, "end_char": 24621, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We may state here that Mr. S.N.\n\nKackar found it almost impossible to support the judgment of the learned Single Judge that the second respondent belongs to the Konda Reddy Scheduled Tribe community and that his nomination and subsequent election as a Member of the tamil Nadu Legislative .", "canonical_name": "S.N.\n\nKackar"}}, {"text": "s. 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25247, "end_char": 25253, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Goyernment of Tamil Nadu", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 25454, "end_char": 25478, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before I part with this appeal I would like to say what we feel that the Goyernment of Tamil Nadu should notice for taking such remedial action as it may deem necessary."}}, {"text": "FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28747, "end_char": 28756, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "FAZAL ALI & RANGANATH MISRA, JJ."}}, {"text": "RANGANATH MISRA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28759, "end_char": 28774, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RANGANATH MISRA", "offset_not_found": true}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_3_118_161_EN", "year": 1984, "text": ".ff\n\ni18\n\nTARAPORE.& COMPANY ·. . v,\n\nCOCHIN SHIPYARD LTD. COCHIN & ANR.\n\nMarch 6, 1984\n\n. [D.A. DBSAI AND 0. CHINNAPPA REDUY, JJ.J\n\nArbitration Act 1940 (Act X of 1940) section 16(/)(c), 30 and 33.\n\n. .\n\nArbitration-Works conlract~Construction of BNilding Dock and Repair Dock-Reference _of specific question 'of law to arbitrator-Arbitrator framing \"issue-Parties agreeing to issue being decided-=-Award 1f could be set aside on ground of error. of law on. face of award.\n\nInterpretation:.\n\nAgreement-Works contracr of large magnitude-Over-Simplification of clauses impermissib/e.-Agreement predicated upon and agreed fact silllation- Situation ceasing to exist-Agreement to that extent rendered irrelevant and otiose.\n\nWords & PhraseJ:\n\n.'Without prejudice'-Meaning of-' claim arising out of contract'-'Relating to the contract'-Meaning of___.;.C/auie 40 General Conditions of Contract.\n\nThe appelJant and the resi;>ondents entered into a contract for the construction of Building 1)ock; CJ a use 40 _of the General Conditions of Contract entered into between -the parties, provided that \"all questions and dispute\\ relating to the meaning of the Specifications Estimates Instructions, Designs,\n\nDrawing-----nd the quality of the workmenship or materials used in tlte work or its to any Other questions, claim, right, matter or thing whatsoever in any way <irising out_ of or relating to the\" contract or otherwise concerning the execution whether arising during the progress of the work or ofter completion- ---shall be-referred to the Sole Arbitrator etc~\" During the. implefilentation of the works contract, disputes arose between the partis-in respect of a laim for compensation on account of the increase in the cost of imported pile-diving equipment and teclmic31 know-how fees. Correspondence was exchanged 'bet ween the Appellant and Respondent No. 1 and the dispute was referred to the\n\nSole Arbitrator. The polnt referred were: (1) Whether the c1airn of compen sation for increase in the cqst of im-portcd pile driving equipinent and technical know-bow fees would fall within the purview of the first para of clause 40 of the General .Conditions of COntract ; and (2), if it does, the quantum of con1pensatin. if aQy~ to which the appeUallt would be entitled to. The arbitrator entered upon the reference and after hearing the parties. gave bis award. The\n\n-~ .\n\n. ,\n\nTARAPORE CO. JI. COCHIN SHIPYARD 119\n\narbitrator hel, d that the appellant was entitled to compensation for the increase in the cost of in1ported pile drawing equipment and technical know-how fees by a sum of Rs. 99 lakhs which amount shall be payable with interest@ 9'J/2% The award was typed orl stamp paper of the value of Rs. 150/-. The arbitratC!r\n\nforwarded the award to both the parties .\n\n. The appellant moved 3. petition under' sections 14 and 17 of the Arbitration Act, in the Court.Of the Sub.orCinate Judge for filing the award and for making it a rule of the Court, while the respondent moved a petition , under sections 30 and 33 for setting aside the award contending that: (-1) the aw\"ard was insufficiently stamped, and (2) the arbjtrator had exceeded his jurisdiction by miscon .. struing clause 40. The s'ubordinate Judge negatived both the coil.tentions. Jt. was held that the respondent having submitted the question ,.., hether the dispute raised by the appellant was covered by the arbitration clituse ; could not controvert the jurisdiction of the Arbitrator to decide the dispute ; and the awrd of the arbitrator was modified in the matter of interest frOm 9'1 /2 per \"cent as awarded by the ar'Qitrator to 6 per cent, and the award was made a fuie of the Court.\n\nThe respondent preferred an appeal to the Rish Court, and a Division Bench, agreed with the Subordinate Judge on the question of insufficiency of stamp. It however held that the question whether th~ dispute was arbitrable or not could not be finally decided ~Y the arbitrator because it was a matter relating to-his jurisdiction, and that the arbitrator cannot by an erroneous interpretation or construction of the clau:e confer jurisdiction on himself and that the court can go into the qµestion whether the matter in dispute between the parties was covered by the arbitration clause_. It finally held tha, t even though the arbitration clause was very wide, the dispute as to compensation for increase in the cost of impo_rted pile diiving equipment and technic3.I know-how fees could not be covered by the arbitration clause because under clause 26 every plant, machinery and equipment had to be provided by the contractor and any rise or escalation in the price Of suCh equip!nent or machinery, cannot be the subject matter of compensation. by the respondent. The apt)e_al wai therefore allowed, and,.the trial court's order, ma_kiog the award a rule of the court was set aside and\n\ndirted that the award be returned to the parties.\n\nIn. the appeal to this Court it was contended on beh'l)f of the appellant, that though Sec. 16( l)(e) of the Arbitrlllion Act may permit the court to remit or set aside-the award on the ground that there is an error of law , ap193.rent on the face of it, yet where a specific question of law has been referred to the arbitrator for deciion, the fact that the-deciion is 'ei-roneous does not make the award bad on its face so as tO permit its being set aside.. As a specific question of law touching upon the jurisdiction of the arbitrator was speficially referred to the arbitrator for his decision, the decision of the arbitrator is binding on the parties and the court cannot proceed to inquire whether upon a true construction of the arbitration clause, the dispute referred to the arbitrator for arbitration would be covered by the arbitration clause so as to clothe the arbitrator with the jurisdiction to arbitrate upon the dispute.\n\nOn behalf of the respondent, it was contended that the jurisdiction or the arbitrator cannot be left to the decision of the arbitrator so as to be binding on\n\nG •\n\niio\n\n, SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984] 3 s.c.R..\n\nthe parties and it is always for the court to decide whether the arbitrator had jurisdiction to decide the dispute, and that the arbitrator cannot by a miscon- , structioo of the, arbitration agreement clothe himsClf with or confer upon himself the jurisdiction to decide the dispute.\n\nAllowing the Appeal ; ..\n\nHELD : 1. A specific question of law touching the jurisidiction of the arbitratOr was specifically referred to the arbitrator and therefore the arbitrator's decision is binding on ~}le parties and the award cannot be s.et aside on the sole . ground that there was an error of law apparent on the face of the award. 1t is also established that the claim for compensation made by the contrctor which led to the dispute VflS covered by the arbitration clause. The quantum of com~ pensation awarded by the arbitrator .was never disputed nor questioned. [170EFl\n\n2. A question of law may fiure before an \"Brbitrator in two wiys. It may arise as an incidental point \"'.hile deciding the main disput~ referred to the ar\"itratOr or in a given case parties may refer a specific question of law to the arbitrator for his decision. [137GH]\n\nRussel : Law of Arbitration. Twentieth Edition p. 22 ,· Halsbury's Laws of England Vol. 2 Para 623 4th Edition referted to.\n\n3. Arbitration has been considered a civilised. way of resolving disputes avoiding court proceedings. There is no reason why the parties should be precluded from .referring a specific question of law to an ar bitratoi for his decision and agree to be bound by the same. This approach manifests faith of parties ill the capacity ofthe tribunal of their choice to decide even a pllre question of law. If they do so, with eyes wide open, and there is nothing to • preciude the parties from doing. sq. then there is no reason why the 'court s4ould iry to impose its view of law superseding the view of the Tribunal whose decision the parties agreed to. abide by. On-principle it appears distinctly clear that wben a specific question of la\"w is referred o an arbitrator for -bis decision including the one. touching upon the jurisdiction of the arbitrator. the decision of the arbitrator would be bindi'ng on both the pa'rties and it would not be open to any of the two pafties to wriggle out of it by contendiOg that the arbitrator cannot clutch at.or confer jurisdictiOn upon himself by mis-construing the arbi .. tration agree!llent. [I 38E' G J . ·\n\n4. If a question 'of law is specifically 1eferred and it becomesevident th; t the parties desired to have a decision on the f!'ecific question from the arbitrator rather than one from the cOurt, then the court will not i[herferf with the award of the arbitrator on the ground that there is an error or law apparent on the face of the award even if the view of law taken. by the arbitrator does not accord with the view of the court. [147F]\n\nKelantan Government v. Duff Development Co. Ltd. 1923 All E.R. 349: Re Kins and Duveen, [1913]-2 K.B. 32: F.R. Absa/om Ltd. v. Great Western (London)Garden Village Society Ltd., (1933] All E.R. 616; Durga Prasad Chamria\n\n. . --\\. ..\n\n\" )- I\n\nTARAPORB'co. v. COCHIN SHIPYAjtD 121\n\n. and Anr. v. Sewkishendas Bhattar and Ors: AIR 1949 Privy Council 334; Seth\n\nThawardasPherumalv. The Union of ludia; (1955] 2 S.C.R. 48; M/s. Alopi Parshad & Sons Ltd. v. Tbe Union of India, (1960] 2 S.C.R. 783; Champsey Bhara and Company v. Jivraj Balloo Spinning and Weaing Company Ltd. : Law Report 50 J.B. 324; Union ofJndia v. A.L. Rallia \"Ram., (1%4] 3 S.C.R. 164; Mis. Kapoor NiloJc.heri., Co-op. Dairy Farm Society Ltd. v. Union of lndia and Others., AIR 1973 S.C. 1338; N. Chellappafl v. Secretary, Kewla State Electricity Board & Anr., [1975] 2 S.C.R. 811; Produce Brok@rs Co. Ltd. v. Olympia Oil and Cake Co. ltd., (1914-15] All E.R. 133; Attorney General For Manitoba v: Kelly and Others .. (1922) Hll E.R. 68; Hirji Mulji v. CJieong Yue Steamship Co.Ltd., (1926] All E.R. 51; lfeyman & Anr. v. Dmwins Ltd., (1942] 1 All E.R._ 337; Jivarajbhai Ujamshi Sheth & Ors. v. Chiniamanrao Balaji & Anr., (1954] 5 S.C.R. 480; Dr. S.B. Dutt v. University of Delhi., [195,8] S.C.R. 1236; referred to.\n\n5. The expression 'Without prejudice' carries a technical meaning depending upon the context in which it is used.\n\nAn action taken without prejudice to one's right cannot\" necessarily mean that the entire action1 can be ignored, by the party taking the same. [148F-G]\n\nIn the instant case, i'n the context in which the expressioa iwithout prejudice9\n\nis used, it would only mean that the respondent reserved the right tO contend before the arbitrator that the dispute is not covered by ihe arbitration clause .. Jt does not appear that. what was a contention that no specific question\n\n\\\\;3-S specifically referred to the arbitrator, On a. proper reading of the corresporidence, and in the setting in which the term 'wiihout prejudice' is used; it only means that the respondent reseived to itself the right to contend before the arbitrator that a dispute raised or , the claim made by the contractor was not covered by the arbitration clause. N9 other me\" '1•.ng :can be assigned to it.·\n\n[1480-E]\n\n6. In works contract of such magnitude, and which have been undertaken by an Indian Contractor for the first time negotiations prior to the finalisation of the contact and the correspondence leading to the formation of cOntract supply the basis on which the contract was finally entered into. Undoubtedly, if in the final written contract, .thei:,.e is something contrary to the basic understanding _ during the formative stage of the contract, the written contract would prevail.\n\nBuf if the co\"ntract does not indicate to the contary and the assumptions appeared to be the found{ltion of the contract, that aspect cannot be overlooked while determining what were the obligations undertaken the formal contract. [151U-!52Bl\n\n7. Over-simplification of the clauses of the contract involving works of large magnitude is impermissible. kThe whole gamut of discussions, negotiations and correspondence must be taken into consideration to arrive at a true nicaning of what was agreed to between the parties. [156F]\n\nIn the instant case, there is no room for doubt that the parties agreed that the investment of the contractor under this head would be Rs. 2 crores and the tendered rates were predicated upon and co-related _to this understanding. [156G]\n\nIii\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984] 3 s.c.R..\n\nWhen ri agreemet is predicated. upon an agreed fact situatin, if the latter cea5es to exist the agreement to that extent becomes irrelevant of otiose. [1560]\n\n9. Phrases suGh as 'claim arising out of contract' ot. 'relating to the con- tract' or 'Concerniti:g the cotract' -on proper construction would mean that if whiieintertaining or rejecting the claim or ihe dispute in relation to claim ma:Y be entertained or rejected after reference 10 the contract, it is a claim arising out of contract. The language of clause 40 shows that. any claim arising out of the contract -iri relation to estimates made in the contract would be covered by the arbitration clause. If it becomes necessary to have recolirse to th6 contract to settle the dipllte One way or the other then certainly it can be said that it is a dispute arising out of the con\"act. [157F-G]\n\n-'> •\n\nIn the instant case, the .arbitration clause is so widely worded as disputes arising out of .the contract. or in relation tq the cont'ract or execution of the works that \"it would comprehend, within its cOmpass a claim for cOmpensation related to estimates and arising out of the cOntract: [157H] ·\"\"\"'(\n\n10 (i) A dispute, the determination of which turns on the true construction of the contract,.. wou!d also seem to. be a dispute under arisin~ out or.:or concerning the contract. The test is tf\\at if in setling a dispUt~, a reference to the contract is necessary, such a dispute would be covered by. the arbitration clause. [158D-E]\n\nA.M. Mair & Ca. v. Gordhandas Sqgarmu/l., [1950] S.C.R, 792; Ruby Gef!eral Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pearey' Lal Kumar And Another; [1952] S.C.R. 501; referred to.\n\nii. Where the parties .are at one in asserting that they entered into a bindin.s contract, but a difference has arisn between them whether there bas been a breach by one side or the other, or whether circumstances hnve arisen which have dischar.ged one ·or both parties from further petformance; such .differences should be \"regarded as differences which have arisen 'in.respect of' or\n\n'With regard to' of 'under' the contract, and an arbitration clause which uses these, or similar expressions should be contrue~ acc0rdingly. \"[1~9B-~]\n\n\nIn the instant case, from the pleadings, it clearly transpires that both the parties had recoutse to the contract. It is satisfactorily established that the. claim made by the contractor would be covered by the arbitration clause. [160B]\n\ntARA!'oRE Co. V•COCHIN SHIPYARD (Desai J.) 123\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 3023 of 1980.\n\n• .\n\nAppeal by Special leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 21st August, 1980 of the Kt; rala High Court in M.F.A. No. 409 ' of 1979.\n\n' ,\n\n' ./\n\n< F.S. Nariman, A.N. Haksar, T. Raghvan, R.F. Nariman, V.A. Bobde & K.R. Nambiar, foi\"the Appellant.\n\nG.B. Pai, P.K. Kumar, A.K. Sharma, As/wk Mathur and\n\nPaveen Kumar for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was .delivered by\n\nDESAI, J. In this appeal by. special I.eave a very interesting\n\n.,_ question ih the field oflaw of arbitration which 'honest man dread more, than the dreaded law suits' arises for our cnsideration.\n\nFirst respondent Cochin Shipyard Limited ('respondent' for short) invited tenders for construction of Building Dock at Cochin.\n\nAs there was only one tender that of Tarapore & . Company,· the appellant, the respondent called fresh tenders somewhere in July,\n\n1971. In December, 1971; the respondent invited tenders for construction of a Repair Dock also at Cochin. There were two. tenders for Building Dock; namely, one of the appellant and one by M/s National Building Construcfion Corpbration, a Government oflndia undertaking, the value of the tender Of the latter being double that of the appellant. For the construction of the Repair • Dock, the only tender was of the appellant. 1n view or th~ limited nuinber of tenders. received, the appellant was invited to negotiate the terms of tender. The v_alue of the works to be executed was over Rs. 24 crores. In view of the huge investment in the project, the tenders were examined by a committee called the Tender Committee conslituied in accordance with the approval of the Ministry of Shipping and Transport for examining and evaluating the tenders\n\nrceived for the Building Dock and the Repair Dock. The Tender Committee taking note of the poor response to the invitation to tender and costiy affair decided to accept the tender of the appellant inter alia for the reasons (i) that works of such complexity and magnitude have not bee.n undertaken before by any Indian contrac-; tor, (ii) that the plant and equipment required for the work are not available indigenously, (iii) that if the contractor is to procure the\n\n• F\n\nB ..\n\n~UPREME COURT REPORTS (19s4j 3 s.c.a.\n\nspecialised equipment rquired for this work, there is hardly any assurance that after these works are over, he would find any substantial use for the sai:ne, (iv) that excavation. and subsequent cons-·\n\ntructio~ involve de-watering which introduces considerable amount of uncertainty and tht during the discussions; the apprehension of the tenders of this kind was voiced and noticed by' the Committee, .and (v) that RCC Piling also requires .highly skilled and complex technical . operations and it involves .. a large eiement of risk and uncertainty in the work.\n\nBoth the tenders of the appellant were . accepted, and contracts were entered into between the parties.\" Both the parties while entering into contracts. were aware anc\\ conscious\n\n~ of the fact that equipment and technical know-how would. have to\n\nbe imported involving a huge outlay of foreign exchange. Appellantcontractor quoted rates . on t.wo aiternative basis depending-upon whether it had to import equipment and know-how at its cost invol- . ving Rs. 2 crores in foreign exchange or the equipment and knowhow wer.e tci be imported by the respondent at.its cost and made available for use of the appellant in which case the appellant would be liable t.o pay hire charges for the pile. driving plant at the rate of Rs. 23/- per metre of 600 mm dia. RCC cast-in-situ pipe' and Rs. 16/- per metre of 500 mm di:\\.\n\nRCC cast-in-situ pipe and at the. rate of 300 per .tonne, of steel sheet piies driven to be recovered ' from the running bills payable to the appellant.contractor. The -\n\nE ·. appellant was gjven to understand b:t a. note in the invitation to • tender that foreign exchange in yen credit to th;: tune of Rs. 38 lacs is earmarked for the purchase of construction equipment, accessories etc. from Japan for works of Building Dock, Repair Dock1 the three Quays etc. On January 24, 1973, work order for Building Dock\n\nand Repair Dock was .issued. by the respondent in favour of appel- . !ant and in this .work order as recommended by the Tender Committee, the respondent adopted the' alternative B as set out iri the ten-· der, namely, that the contractor was to procure the equipment and know-how at a cost of about Rs. 2 crores in foreign exchange. In order.to make this aspect specific, additional condition No. 31 was incorporated in the works order in order to provide for the expense to be illcurred and the amount of foreign exchange needed for im~ porting equipmept and technical kllow-how, relevant portion . of\n\n. '\n\n.wl!ich reads as under : '\n\n\"Requisite foreign exchange, for importing piling plant ·. · >>and machinery, spares, technicaf, know-how and> hiring of experts necessary for both the.Dock Works vide Work Order ·.\n\nNo. 130l9/l/71-W-II dated Janual'J 24, 1973 for Building.\n\n> -,..,\n\n...\n\n• f\n\nTARAPORECO. v. COCHIN SHIPYARD (Desai J.) 125\n\nDock etc. and Work Order No. 13012/15/71-W-II dated January. 24, 1973 for Repair Dock. etc., amounting to about Rs 2.00 crores in all wiUbe made availa\\>le to the contractor\n\nfom the 11th Yen Credit subject to his getting indigenous clearance and providing detailed justification. The details of such procurement shall befnrnished by the t:ontractor as soon as they are finalised.\"\n\n• •\n\nIn view of the huge investment, it was agre.ed that the respondent would make an.advance payment of75% of the value of old . machinery and 90% of the value of new machinery brought to site by the Contractor and in -0rder to secure this advance payment, equipment would be hypothecated by the Contractor (o the respon- dent and the advanoe payment were to carry interest at 9.1/2% p.a. on the outstanding balance of advance. The mode of recovery was also specified. The formal contract was signed on January 29, 1973 which included an arbitration clause to which we would turn a little later.\n\n It so happened that the required pile driving equipment including the technical know-how against 1 lth Japanese Yen credit were not available. The respondent also made inqulres in this behalf, but without 'success. Ultimately, International Foundation Group, Holland agreed to provide the rate of equipment conforming more or less to the same specification for which clearance.was sought and received. from the Government of India. After the respondent •\n\ncertified that the equipment and know-how ofiei:ed by International Foundation Group. Holland conform to the earlier cleara11ce and that the same equipment being not indigenously available or against 11th Japanese Yen Credit, the respondent requested the Government of India to give necessary clearance to the appellant to import the equipmeat. This approval was received on Septembet 1, 1973 and the foreign exchange to the extent or Rs 211.80 lakhs equal to 9,4%2.700. Dutch Florins was released in favour of the appellant.\n\nThe entire imported equipment was received in four consignments between March/July 1974. During the intervening period, there were variations in the rate of exchange and therefore the foreign exchange cost of equipment alone in terms of rupees worked ut at Rs. 177.50 lakhs and of the technical know-how fees payable in 11 instalments worked out at Rs. 105 lakhs. The custom duty went up by .Rs. 21 lakhs as a consequence of the increase in rupe_e value\n\n• 0f the imported equipment in terins of Dutch F1orlu, . . . ' . . . .\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n\nThe appellant made .a tentative claim in the amount of Rs. 61.27 lakhs from therespondent on account of increase in cost of pile driving equipment and technical know-how fees on the ground that the contracto{ was entitled to be compensated by the respondent foi,)he same. In. the letter dated May 28,1975, the appellant bas stated that the 'tendered rates were. based on certain total cost of machines which has since gone up considerably rendering the rates no longer workable. The l&l'Pellant' had .provided for a cost of I 50 lakhs of rupees for the equipment and ihe life of the equipment was !akin as 12,000 hours and its probable period of engagement on this job was taken as 8,000 hours. On this basis' two-thirds of the cost of the equipment will be written off by way of depreciation on this job.' It was also stated that there is an increase in the fees for the technical know-how.\n\nThe letter concluded by saying that the loss sustain.ed by the appellant upto May 15,1975 on account of variation in the rate of foreign exchange was Rs. 61,27,'3!7 and requested the'.respondent to compensate the loss aileast upto the tune of Rs. 45 lakhs which is approximately 75% of the loss suffered by the contractor in this behalf. The respondent 'responded to this letter as per its letter daied July 2,1975 saying that the letter dated July 14,1972 of the appellant which forms part of the contract documents clearly recites that the total foreign ex-· change required by the contractor for the equipment, spares, technical know-bow. and hiring of exprts, was expected to be about Rs. 2 crores and that the expenditure incurred by the contractor in this behalf. so far has been less than Rs. 2 crores and in the circum- .stancesit was found difficult to accept the position that the tender was based on the assumptions indicated in the letter under reply and that the rates for the pile driving should for the future he revised. there ensued further correspondence between the parties.\n\nUltimately, the appellant by its letter dated March 1, 1976 informed the respondent that its claim for compensation for increase in the . cost of imported pile driving eqµipment and technicai know-how fees has not been entertained for over a year. It was further stated that 'inasmuch as the dispute has thus arisen between us re&ardiflg the above claim, we are invoking the provisions for arbitration in our contracts and ret; erring this dispute to arbitration.' On March 17, 1976 Chief Engineer of the respondant replied saying that the matter as set out in the letter dated March 1,1976 invoking arbitration clause is receiving tlieir immediate attention and the appellant will hear shortly in this be))alf. On March 29,1976, the respondent wrote to the .appellant denying the claim for compensation of the\n\nappellant. Simultaneously the 'respondent framed three point8\n\n.~.\n\n' )\n\n. .\n\nTARAPORE co. v. COCHIN SHIPYARD (Desai J.) 127\n\ncovering the dispute so raised for reference to and decision by the arbitrator. The letter also sets out as required by Clause 40 a panel\n\nof three names from which anyone can be chosen by the.appellant as the sole arbitrator. The appellant by its letter dated April\n\n1~19_76 :Vhile refuting the contention of the respondent that the dispute would not be covered by Clause 40 i.e. arbitration clause in the contract, stated that the proper course would be to.refer the dispute that has arisen betwee.n the parties' to the decisfon of the a.rbitrator a11d not any particular issue or issues.\n\nUltimately froni amongst the three names indifated by the respondent the appellant selected .Shri C. Srinivasa Rao, Chief Bridge Engineer, Southern Railway, Madras to be the Sole Arbitrator to tlecide the dispute.\n\nOn receipt of this letter the respondent referred the dispute to Shri C. Srinivasa Rao as Sole Arbitrator. While referring the dispute to the sole arbitration of Shri C. Srinivasa Rao, the respondent retained the three points of reference set out in the letter dated March 29,1976 but added one more. The Arbitrator entered upon the reference on June 2,1976. On being called upon by the Arbitrator, the appellant filed its statement of claim on June 19,1976. The appellant claimed Rs. 2,03,47,.266 as per th., Schedule to the Statement of Claim on account of increase in the cost ofeq'uipment and technical know-how fees. The respondent filed its reply to the\n\nStatement of Claim on July 19,197,,\n\n' Thepoints/disputes referred by the parties to the sole arbitrator read as under ;\n\n\"!. Does the claim of Messrs. Tarapore & Co. on Cochin Shipyard Ltd., for compensation for increase in the cost of im, Ported pile driving equipment and technical knowhow fees referred to in clauses (2) and (3) hereunder fall within the purview of the first paragraph of Clause 40 of the General Conditions of Contract entered into between the two parties ?\n\n2. If the answer to (1) above is in the affirmtive, in terms of the provisions of the contract are Messrs .. Tarapore & Co. entitled to compensation for increase in the cost of im- . ported pile driving equipment and technical know-how fees to be paid to them by Cochin Shipyard Ltd.? If so, what s\n\nthe amo11nt ~\n\n'I>.\n\nSUPR~ME COURT REPORTS\n\n\n3. The dis1mte t.hat has arisen between Messrs. Tarapore & Co., and Cochin Shipyard Ltd.· regarding the claim of M/s. Tara pore & Co., for compensation for increase in the cost of the imported pile driving equipment and the technical know-how fees. • ,4. \"Costs'~\n\nParties appeared before the Arbitrator through their respective counsel. The Abitrator gave its Awatd on July 6,1977. On Point No. 1, the Arbitrator' held as under:\n\n• \"The claim of Messrs. Tarapore and Company on Cochin Shipyard Limited for compensat.ion for increase in the cost of imported pile driving equipment and technical know-how fees falls within the purview of the first paragraph of Clause 40 of the General Conditions of Contract entered into between the parties.\"\n\nOn Point No.· 2, the Arbitrator . held that the appellant. 'Messrs. Tarapore and Company are: entitled to compensation by the Cochin Shipyard Limited for the increase in the cpst of i111ported pile driving equipment and the.. technical know-how fees by a sum of Rs. 99·1akhs only which amount shall be payable with interest at 9.1/2% per 'annum from this date till date of payment or decree, whichever i~ earlier'. On Point No. 3, the decision recorded was 'that it jg covered by the decision on Points (1) and (2)'. On Point No. 4, on the question of costs, the Arbitrator having determined his fees and incidental expenses directed both the parties to bear the same eq:ually. '(he Award was typed on a stamp paper of the valµe of Rs .. 150/- at Madras. j3y his letterdated Nil July, 1977, the Sole Arbitrator foFWarded the award to both the parties.\"\n\nThe appellant moved a petition under Secs. 14 and 17 of the Arbitration Act in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Ernakulam for filing the award and for making it a .rule of the court. On October 7;1977 the respondent moved O.P. 81 of 1977 being a combined petition under Secs. 30 and 33 of the Arbitratioo Act before the Subordinate Judge, Ernakulam praying for setting aside the award. The prayer for setting aside the award was fonnded on two groui1\\ls; {l) that the award is insufficien!lY stamped and (2) that the\n\nfl, r1;>itrator has exceeded bis iuriuliction by misconstruin(l Clause 40\n\n'r-\n\n, . '\n\n. )-\n\nTARAPORE co. v. COCHIN SHIPYARD (Desai J.) 129 . .\n\nof the General Conditions of Contract (Arbitration clause for\n\nshort),\n\nThe learned Subordinate Judge noted the fact that the award was originaJly engrossed on a stamp paper of Rs. 150/- but before filing the award in the court on 'August 4, 1977, the Arbitrator on August f,1977 affixed additional stamp of Rs. 14,722.50 p. which would be the requisite stamp under Art. 12 read with Art. J 4 of the Kerala Stamp Act. .The learned Subordinate Judge accordingly negatived the contention of the .respondent that the award was insufficiently stamped. On the second point, the learned Jdge held that the respondent having subn:iitted the question whether the dis-' pute raised by the appellant was covered by the arbitration clause cannot be permitted to controvert lhe jurisdiction of the Arbitrator . to decide this dispute and accordingly, negatived the. contention of the respondent. The learned Judge after modifying the award of\n\nt, he Arbitrator in the matter of int, rest from 9.1/2% as awarded by\n\n• D the Arbitrator to 6% granted the application of the applicant and . made the award a rule of the cpurt.\n\nThe respondent preferred M.F.A. 409 of 1979 in, the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam. A Division .Bench of the High Court agreed with the learned Subordinate Judge on the question of insufficiency of stamp.· The Division Bench however, after exl?ressingits displeasure about not making a reasoned award by the Arbitrator proceeded to examine the C()ntent.ion whethei; the arbitration claUfe covers the dispnte. The court held that the question whether the dispute is arbitrable or not cannot be finally decided by the arbitrator because it is a matter relating to his .jurisdiction. It was further held that the arbltrawr cannot by an erroneous interpretation or construction of the clause confer jurisdiction on himself and the court c.an go into the question whether the matter in disp)lte between the parties is covered by the arbitration clause. The specific contention ort behalf of the appellant that once a specific question of law is referred to the arbitrator, the parties are bound by the de.cision of the arbitrator was negatived by the High Court and it was held that as the reiipondent has joined arbitration under protest, it was not estopped from contestinjl the question and the award is not binding Qn it if it can be shown that the arbitration agreement did not cov.er the dispute raised by the appellant. The court finally held that even though the arbitration clause was very wide, the dispute as to the compensation for increase in the cost of. imported pile driving equipment an<l technical kn_owhow fees woutd\n\nD •\n\n~\\!PREME COURT REPORTS ·\n\n[1984}3 S.C.R.\n\nnot be covered by the arbitration clau>e inter.alia on the ground that by Cl. 26 of the General Conditions of Contract every plant, .\n\nmachinery and equipment had to be provided by the contrator and any rise nr escalation in the price of su.ch equipment or machinery cannot be the subject matter of compensation by the respondent.\n\nAccordingly, the appeal of the respondent was allowed and the )ud$ment and order of the trial court making the award rule of the court was set aside. The court directed that the award be returned to the parties: Hence this appeal by the contractor by special Jeave.\n\nBefore we advert to the rival contentions, it would be advantageous to refer .to the arbitration clause being Clause 40 of the General Conditions of Tender subject to which the contract ; vas entered into, the relevant portion of which reads as Ul)der ;\n\n\"Clause 40.\n\nExcept where otherwise provided in the contract, all questions and disputes relating to the meaning of the Specifications, Instructions, designs Drawings hereinbefore mel)tioned and as .to the quality or workmanship or materials used on the work or as to any other questions, claim, right, matter or thing whatsoever in any way arising out of or relating to the Contract, Designs, Drawings, Speci, ficatioqs, Estimates, Instructions, Orders or these conditions or otherwise concerning the works or the execution or failure .· . . to execut.e the same,. whethe.r arising during the progress of the work Qr after completion or abandonment thereof shall, after. written notice by eitJ; ier party to the contract, to the either of them, be referred to the .Sole Arbitration of a person appointed by the Chief Project , Officer of the Cochin Shipyard Project or the Administrative Head of the Cochin Shipyard Project at.Jhe time of such appointment by whatever designation known, from a panel of names given in Annexure II.\"\n\nOver and above the extfacted portion, the clause provides for the manner and metho'd of appointing tlie sole arbitrator, the continuance ofthe work during progress of arbitration proceedings, the .time and place of holding the arbitration proceedings, the power to ·\n\nenlarge the period for making the award and finality to be attached to the award of the Arbitrator.\n\n\"'- .\n\n. '\n\n' ,\n\n, .\n\n. '\n\nTARAPORE co. v. COCHiN SHIPYARD (Desai J.) 131\n\nWhen the arbitration clause was invoked by the appellant, the respondfnt did contend that 'the dispute raised by the appellant was not covered 1!J the arbitration clause. After. specifying its demur, the respondent formulated the points in dispute on which the arbitration was invited to give his award. Undoubtedly, the respondent proceeded to formulate the points in dispute betwee.n the parties on which the Arbitrator was to be invited to give his award without prejudice to its right to contend that the dispute is \"not . covered by-the arbitration clause and that the appellant is .not entiled to any compensation in respect of the increase in the cost of imported pile driving equipment and technical know-how fees. What is the eifect of referring the specific question of law to arbitration without prejudice to one's right to co(itehd to the contrary will be presently examined. The fact remains that on the. dispute arising out of a claim for compensation on account of the increase in the cost of imported pile driving equipmet. and technical know-how fees, the respondent agreed to refer the dispute under two specific heads to the Arbitrator. The dispute so raised have already been extracted. Briefly stated they are : (1) whether the claim for compention would fall within the pµrview of the first para of the arbitration clause and (2) if it does the quantum of compensation, if any, to which the appellant would be entitled.\n\nAnalysin~ the dis, puies, let it be made distinctly c!eAr tht the appellant asserted that its claim for compensation would be governed by the arbitration clause and the same wa• specifically denied by the respondent saying that t\\Je claim would be beyond the pµrview of the arbitration claus;.· On these rival positions, the specific issue was framed whether the claim for compensation would fall within the purview of the first part of the arbitratoin clause. This:was the specific dispute referred to the arbitrator inviting him specifically to decide this dispute. If this issue specifically .raises a question as to jurisdiction of the arbitrator to arbitrate upon the dispute set out in Point No. 2, it appears to have 'been specifically referred t.o the Arbittator for his decision. Parties, therefore, agreed to submit the specific ques- • tion even with regard to the scope, ambit, width and the construction 'of the arbitration clause so as to define its parameters and contours with a view to ascertaining whether the claim advanced by the -appellant and disputed by the respondent would be covered by the . arbitration clause. Whether. upon its true construction.the arbitration clause would include within its compass the dispute thus raised between the parties was specifically put in issue because parties were at variane about i\\. 'Appellant asserted that its claim to compensation would form the subject matter] of arbitration under Clause 40\n\n• .\n\n\n(1984] 3 S.C.R.\n\nand the respondent contending to the contrary. While deciding this dispute, as to th~ scope, width and ambit of arbitration clause vis:a•vis the dispute raised, it is not necessary to decide whether the Claim was tenable justified or had any substance in it. 'fhat would fall within the second point of reference to the arbitra, tot which opens with a spific 'clause that it needs onJy to be de.cided if the answe.r to the first point of reference, namely jurisdiction of the arbitrator under Clause 40 is in the affirmative meaning thereby that the.dispute so,; aised and subisting between the Nrties-would be covered by the arbiration agreement. In other words, if the dispute is covered by)he arbitration agreement, the arbitrator was further required to decide whether there was any substanc;, in the claim made, and if he found some substance in the disputed claim, to ascertain what amount the appellant would be entitled to recover as and by way of compensation from the-respondent. The arbitrator was thus required and called up0n first to decide whether the dispute is arbitrable as falling witlfin the width and ambit •or the arbitration . agreement. If the answer is in the affirtnative, then alone the second, point need be examined. If the answer to the first point ofreference is in the negative in that if the arbitraior weie of the opinion that the dispnte is not arbitrable as it would not fa II within the sc't>pe, width afld ambit,· of• the arbitration agreement, it would not be necessary for him to determine wiether the l>ppellant was entitled to recover anything by way of compensation. This aspect is beg analysed in depth to point out that the parties specificall~ referred. . . the question of construction . of arbitration agreement, its idth, ambit and parameters vis-a-vis the dispute raised so as to decide whether the dispute wuld fall within the purview of the arbitration agreement, in. other wrds the jurisdiction of the arbitrator ..\n\nCorrespondence placed on record would unmistakably show. that a specific questionas to the jurisdiction of the arbitr.ator was specifically referred by the parties to the arbitrator. Appellant- . contractor by his letter dated March .J, 1976 to the Chief Engit1:eer\n\nof the respondent invited his attention to the claim for compeµsation for.increase in cost of pile driving equipment and technical know-how fees raised about a year.ago and further invited his attention to the Jetter dated 6th October, 197~ of the respondent infprming the appellant that the claim cannot' be entertained. The app2Jlant proceeded further to state as under: _ . '\n\n\"Inasmuch as a dispute has. thus arisen between us regarding the above claim, we are invokills die provisions for ·\n\n)'i. '• ·\"'\n\n•• >\n\nhRAPORE co. v. COCHIN SHIPYARD (Desai f) 133\n\narbitration in our contracts and referring this dispute to arbitration.\" ~\n\nThe respondent by bis letter dated March 17, 1976 informed the appellant that the matter.raised in the letter dated March 1,1976 in the matter of compensation is receiving their immediate attention and the appellant will shor\\ly hear f1om them in this connection.\n\nThereafter the respondent by his letter dated March 29,1976 informed the appellant as under; • \"We have dealt with the merits of your claims in the . previous correspo!ltlence on the' subject and we reitera!e that no amounts whatever are dve to you in respect of these claims. It is also our view that such claim does not fall within the purview-of Clause 40 of the General Conditions of Contract and hence does not qualify for arbitration.\n\nHowever, in view of your insistence and without\n\nD prejudice to our position, we propose that, the following be the issues to be referred to arbitration: '\n\n1. Does the claim of M/s Tarapore & Co., on Cochin Shipyard Ltd., for compensation for increase in the cost of imported pile driving equipment and technical know-how fees fall within the purview of the first para of CJause-40 of the General Conditions of Contract entered into between the two parties?\n\n' 2. If the answer to I is in the affirmative in terms of • the provisions. of the concerned contract, are Messrs.\n\nTarapore Co. entitled to compensation for .increase in the cost of imported rile driving equipment and technical knowhow fees to be paid to them py Cochin Shipyard, Ltd.? If so, what is the amount? ·\n\n3. \"Costs.\"\n\nThe respondent proceeded to notify the panel of names and invited the appellant to choose the arbitrator as agreed to between the parties and set out in clause 40. The appellant by his letter dated April 19,1976 whil~ reasserting that the claim made by it would be covered by Clause 40 further stated that the proper course would be to refer the dispute that has arisen between thep arties on\n\nB •\n\n• 134\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984i 3 s.c.R..\n\nthe matter of compensation to the decisio11 of the arbitrator and not any partfoular issue or issues. It was also sugg<; sted that framing of the issues will bethe funttio11 of the arbitrator after he enters upon the reference and after he has the pleadings of both the partie3 before him. The appellant also suggested what dispute should be . . . referred to the arbitrator and set it out as under:\n\n\"The decision of the dispute that has arisen between M/s Tarapore & Co., and the Cochin Shipyard Limited, regarding the claim of Mfs Tan.ore & Co., for compensation • for the increase in the cost of t\\Ie imported pile driving . equipment and of the technical know-how fees.\"\n\nThe appellant proceeded to ; uggest that Shri C. Srinivasa Rao from amongst the panel be appointed as the Sole Arbitrator .. The respondent by his letter dated April 27/28, 1976 annexing ihree earlier letters dated March I, 1976, March 29, 1976 and April 19, 1976 referred the four points herein before set out for the decision of the arbitrator. \\ ..\n\nThis correspondence would unmistakably show that while the appellant wanted a general reference about its claim, it was the respondent w_ho now contests that no specific question of law was . specifically referred to the . arbitrator for his decision was specific about the points to be referred for the decision of the Arbitrator. Te first , roint extracted hereinabove would clearly show that the specific question about the jurisdiction of the arbitrator to arbitrate , .\\ipon the dispute set out in points Nos. 2, 3 and 4 was specifically\n\nrefered to the arbitrator .. On the first point, the arbitrator_ had to decide whether the claim made by the appellant and disputdd by the respondent would be covered by Clause\"40 i.e. the.arbitration clause.\n\nIn other words, the specific question referred to the Arbitrator was about\" his jurisdiction. to arbitrate upon the disputes covered by points Nos. 2, 3-.nd 4, if and only\"if,_upon a true construction of the arbitration clause that is first paragraph of Clause 4_0, would cover the disputed claim for. compensation he can enter into the merits of the dispute and _decide it. It is upon the decision on point No. I that the arbitrator would have jurisdiction to decide the dispute involved in points Nos. 2, 3 and 4. The1 first point of reference is clearly a specific question of law touching upon the jurisdiction of the arbitrator and this was framed anp referred to by none other than, despite the initial objection of the petitioner, the respondent. Therefore, the respondent invited the arbitrator by the specific point of -\n\n• '\n\nJ ,\n\nTARAPORE co. v. COCHIN Sl{IPYARD (Desai, J.) 135\n\nreference which involves a •specific question of, law touching upon the jurisdiction of the arbitrator to decide the same. This becomes further clear from the. fact that both the learned counsel appearing before the arbitrator submitted agreed draft issues for the decision of the arbitrator. The first issue amongst the agreed draft issues reads as under:\n\n\"Does the claim of the claimant fall within the purview of the purview of the firs\\ para of Clause 40 of the General Conditions of Contract entered into between the two parties? .\n\nThis point was not to be incidentally decided while deciding the .dispute referred io the arbitrator his jurisdiction to entertain the dispute js questioned. In fact, hereby : the reference of the specific point of law touching upon the jurisdiction of the arbitrator the parties invited the arbitrator to decide this specific question. It was he who was asked by the submission or terms of reference to decide his jurisdiction first and then proceed to decide the dispute on merits. We referred to Issue No: 1 in the agreed draft issues only to l:iuttress the conclusion that it was at the. instance of the respendent that the arbitrator was called upon to decide the question of the scope, ambit and width of arbitration clause the decision on wh\\Ch would confer jurisdiction upon him to decide the dispute as to compensation. In this context it would be advantageous to refer to paragraphs 11 and 12 of the counter statement filed by the respondent before the arbitrator which reads as under:\n\n\"11. It is submitted that the claim in question relating to the increase in the cost of machinery and equip ment as also technical know-how fees payble by the contractors/claimants is fully outside the purview of the. contract. There is no liability on the part of the respondent• to procure the machinery and equipment or technical knowhow required by the contractor nor was there any liability to pay any part of the cost, whether it . be the original assumed cost or the increased cost. The claim thus is completely outside the purview of the contract and it is submitted, · therefore, that the same does not fall within the purview of the first para)lfaph of Clause 40 of the General Conditions of Contract and thus not arbitrable .\n\n12. It is submittedthat the question of arbitrability of the ·.dispute should be 'decided as a preliminary point before proceeding with the other issues.\"\n\nB .\n\nSUPREMB?COURT REPORTS (1984] 3 s.c.R..\n\nThe formulation of the specific question of law by the respon dent along with its suggestion to dec.ide it as a preliminary issue and .becoming a party to the agreed draft issue No .. I would conclusively establish. that the specific question of law touching upon the jurisdiction of the arbitrator was referred to the arbitrator for his\n\ndeision. Therefore, the conclusion is lnescapable that a specific question of law touching upon the jurisdiction of the arbitrator which is indisputably a question construction of Cl. 40 and therefore a question 6f law was specifically referred by the parties to the arbitrator for his decision and\n\n0 by the terms of Clause 40 agred to ' abide by his decision as final andibinding.\n\nMr. F.S. Nariman, learned counsel for theappellant urged \"that Sec. 16(1) (c) may permit the court to remit or set aside the award on the ground that there is an error of law apparent on the face of it, yet where a specific question of law has been referred to the arbitrator for decision, the fact that the decision is erroneous does not make the award bad on its face so as to permit its being set\"aside.\n\nExpanding the submission, it was urged that a decisibn on a question of law by an arbitrator may be given in two different and distinct situations; firstly where while deciding a dispute referred to him incidentally. a question of law may arise which an arbitrator )llay decide in order to dispose of the refefence and if in such a situation any error of law appearson the face of the award, the curt can interfere with the award. But.there is an altogether an independent and a distinct situation in which a question of law might arise such . as where the parties to the dispute may frame the specific question of iaw and refer it to the Arbitrator for his decision. In the later situation, it was urged that the decision of the Arbitrator even if\n\nerrneous would not permit the court to interfere with the award.\n\nProceeding along it was urged that in thi.s case. a specific question of Jaw touching upon the jurisdiction of the arbitrator was specifically referred to the Arbitrator for his decision and therefore, the decision of the Arbitrator is binding on the parties and the court cannot proceed to inquire whether upon a true construction of the arbitra tion clause. the dispute referred .to the Arbitrator for arbitration would be covered by the\" arbitration clause so as to clothe the arbitrator with the jurisdiction to arbitrate upon.the ; disl'ute.\n\nMr. Pai, lear11ed counsel for the respondenfcountered by saying that jurisdiction oNhe arbitrator cannot be left to the decision of tbe \"arbitrator so s to be binding on the parties and it is always for the court to decide whether the arbitrator has jurisdiction to decid.e\n\n' '\n\n• .>\n\n.. l\n\nTARAl>OkE co. l' COCHIN SHIPYARD (Desai, J.) 1~1 . .\n\nthe dispute. Alternatively, it was submittec\\ .that the arbitrator cannot by a misconstruction of the arbitration agreement clothe , himself with or . confer upon himself the jurisdiction to decide the dispute. The court it was said has always retains to itself the jurisdiction to look at the arbitration agreement to determine its scope and ambit and if it. is found that the dispute referred to the, arbitrator does not fall within the arbitration agreement,. the court . must interfere on the ground that the award disclosed an error of law apparent on the face of it.\n\nThe contention may be examinecJ. both on principle.and on the\n\nprecedents.\n\nComplexity of rights and obligations in national and international trade and commerce would certainly generate disputes between tjl.e parties and treated as a normal incident of commercial life artd till commercial arbitration came to be s:cognised as a civilised way of resolving such disputes, prolix and time-consuming litigation was the only method of resolving such disputes. As an alternative , to court proceedings, arl;>itration as a method ofresolving <\\isputes by domestic tribunal constituted by the choice of parties became acceptable. The basic difference between -the court proceedings and the arbitration is the choice of the tribunal. Ordinarily, all matters in which relief can be claimed from the court may become subject matter of arbitration. Now if in a iaw court incidental questions of law arise in the course of proceeding, the court has an obligation to decide those questions of law. But when it came to a tribunal not endowed, with the judicial power of the State but by conferment by the. parties to the dispute or• which acquir.es jurisd\n\n0 iction by a submission of the parties to the dispute to invite the decision by the forum of their choice and to be bound by it a que.stion arose whether a pure question of law if at afl can be referred to an arbitrator for his decision and even if he_ decides, can the decisiop be questioned on the ground that there is an error apparent on the face of the award in deciding the questipn. Now as stated a short while ago, a question of law may figure before an arbivator in two ways. It may arise as an incidental point while deciding the main dispute referred to the abitrator or in a given case parties may refer a specific question of law to the arbitrator for his decision. There is no more gainsaying the fact l!.at a pnre .question of law may and can be referred t'o an arbitrator for his decision. Russel on the Law of Arbitration Twentieth Edition at page 22 states as under .\n\nis\n\nSUPJ(EME COURT REPORTS\n\n. (1984) 3 S.C.R.\n\n\"A pure 'question of law may be referred to an arbitrator; and where such a question is specifically referred his award win not be set asjde merely upon the ground that his decision is wrong.\"\n\nIn Halsbury's Laws bf England Vol. 2 Para 623 4th Edition the statemept of law reads as under:\n\n\"If 'a specific question of law 'is submitted to the arbitrator for his decision and he decide it, the fact that the decision is erroneous does not make tlie award bad on its face c so as to .. permit its being 'set aside; and w.here the question referred for arbitration is a question of construction, which is, gencraUy , speaking, a _question of law, the arbitrator's decision cannot be set aside only because the court would itself have come to a different conclusion.\"\n\n• With the ever widenings expansion of international trade and commerce, complex question of private International Law, effect of local laws on contracts between parties belonging to different.nations are certainly bound to crop up. l\\rbitration has been considered a civilised way of resolving such dispute~ avoiding court proceedings'.\n\nThere is no reason why the parties should be precluded from referring a specific question of law to an arbitrator for his decision and agree to be bound by the same. This approach manifests faith of parties in the capacity of the tribunal of their choice to decide even pure a question of law. If they do so, with eyes wide open, nd there is nothing to preclude the 'parties from doing so, then there is no reason\n\nwhy the court should try to impose its view of law superseding the\n\n' . . -viey; of the Tribun; tl whose decision the parties agreed to abide by.\n\nTherefore, on principle it appears distinctly clear that when a specific question oflaw is referred io an arbitrator for his decision including the one touching upon the jurisdiction of the arbitrator, th~ decision' o\\'the arbitrator would be binding on both the parties and it would not be open to any of the two parties to. wriggle out of it by conten ding that the arbitrator cannDt clutch at or confer jurisdiction upon. himself by rllis-construing the arbitration agreement. ·\n\nThis conclusion is borne out by a long' line of decisions both, Indian and foreign to which we would now turn. . .\n\nThe earliest case to which we would reff is the decision of the\n\n....(_ ...\n\n... -,,1\n\n. ,\n\nTARAPO; E co. v. COCHIN SHIPYARD (Desai,};) 1~9 • House of Lords in KeTanten Government v. Duff Development Co.\n\nLtd.' in which Lord Trevethin in his speech said as uuder:\n\n\"lf your Lordships should be of opinion that the award is bad in law upon its face, it should be set aside, for ihis is not in my view, a submission to arbitration of such a nature that, although the law is bad upon the face of the awan; j, the decision cannot be questioned. That happens only wheri the ·. submission is of a sp1cific question of law and is such that it can be fairly construed to show that' the parties intended to give up their rights td reort to the King's courts and in Jieu thereof to submit that question to the decision of a tribunal . of their own.\"\n\nSame distinction was also brought out\"y Lord Parmoor when he said that 'the principle applicable where a specific question of law has been-submitted to the decision of arbitration is well expressed by Channell, J., in Re King and Duveen,2 in which it was said that where aspecific question of 'law is referred to an arbitrator for nis decision, the award cannot be set asid.e. on the ground of an error apparent. on the face of the award because the question ?f Jaw was wrongly decided.' At .a later stage, it was observed that if the court, before which it is sougqt to impeach the award, comes to the conclusion that the alleged error in law even if it can be maintained, arises in the decision of a question ot .law directly submitted to the, •arbitrator for his decision, t.hen '.he principle stated by-Channel, J., in Re. King and Duven apphes, 1s attracted and the parties having chosen their tribunal, and not having applied successfully to the court under; either s. 4 ors. 19 of the Arbitration Act, 1889, are not in a position to .question the award or to maintain a claim to set it aside.' This decision is an authority of the propositidn tha.t where' . a question of construction is the very point referred fo~ arbitration; then the decis.ion of the arbitrator upon thai point cannot be set aside by the court only because the court would itself have cometo a different conclusion. ·\n\nIn F, R. Absalom ltd. v. Great Western (London) Garden Village Society Ltd.' the contention was that the award was bad by reason of an error in law appearing on the face of it. 'l; he submission was\n\n(!) [1923) All E.R. 349\n\n. (2) [1913) 2 K.B. 32\n\n(3) [1933] AU E.R. 616\n\n• 140 - . St!PRBMB Coukt REPORtS (1984] 3 s.c.k . • not before the court and a reference to the pleadings had to be made. for the purpose of ascertaining whether any specific question of law • was in dispute, and Wa3 referred io the arbitrator for his decision.\n\nThe pleadings disclosed that the whole dispute between parties was as to the am.ount due to the contractor in respect of the value of the work done and of the materials on the site urio and including a certain pate. In tlie background of this fact, Lord Warrington in his speech said that no specific question of construction arose.\n\nIn order to. decide whether.the ii.ward was bad It\\! reason of an error of Jaw on the face of it, Lord Russel in his peech pointed out at page 621 that it is essential to keep the case where disputes are referred Jo an arbitrator 1n the decision of , which a question of law. becomes material distinct from the case in which a pecific question oflaw has been referred to him /or decision.' Thereafter he proceeded to state: .\n\n\"The authorities make a clear distinction between\n\nthese two cases and as they appear to me, . they decide that\n\nin the former case the court can interfere. if and when any error of law appears on the' face of the award; but that in the\n\nlattr case no such interference is._ possible upon the ground that it so appears that the decision upon the question of law is an erroneous one.\n\nIn reaching this conclusion;' the decision in Ke I an tan Govern ment v. Duff Development Co. Ltd. was affirmed. On the facts, ff it was found that no specific question of law as referred to tlie arbitrator for his decision.\n\nIn /Jurga Prasad Chamria _and Anr. v. Sewkishendas Bhattar !ind Ors'; the award was sought to be set aside inter alia on the ground that t!11l award was bad on account of an error of law. appar, ent on the face' of it. The errors 'of law relied upon were; (a) the arbitrator J:iad • admitted as evidence the family settlement and the partnership arrangement of 1916, neither of which, though each' related (it was said) to immoveable property, had been registered as required by the Indiaµ Registration Act, and (b) the arbitrator. • ought to have held that Anardeyi's suit was in any event barred by limitation. The Privy Council first noticed the issues settled by fanckridge. J.; amongstthem were the two following:\n\n(I) A.I.R, 1949 (P.C.) 334\n\n• >\n\nTARAPORE co.iv. COCHIN SHIPYARD (Desai, J.) 141\n\n\"l(b) Is' the agreement dated 16th November, 1916, relating to the alleged family settlement valid or admissible in evidence? .\n\n(9) Is the plaintiff's ·claim or any portion thereof barred Jjy limitation?,, After tnese issues had been settled, the parties agteed to refer to arbitration \"the outstanding matters in the suit.\" In a motion for setting aside the award jt was urged that there was an error of law apparent on the face of the award both with regard as to the admissibility of the alleged faily settlement and about the suit of Anardeyi being barred by limitation. Rejecting the motion, the Privy 'council observed as under,\n\n• ·\"However, tl:iat may be, their Lordships are satisfied that the two points oflaw as to which it is said the arbitrators error vitiates the award were specfically referred to him to\n\ndecid~ and if this' is so, it would be <:ontrary to well-established principles such as are laid down in re King and Duveen D and F.R. Absa/om Ltd. v. Great West (London) Garden Village Society Ltd., for a Court of law to interfere with the award even if tlie Court itself would have taken a different view of eitherofihe points of iaw had they been before it.\"\n\nTurning to the decisions of our Court, reference may first be made to Seth Thaward1~ Pherumal v. The Union of India'. Jn that case, the question was_ whether the award was -bad on account of error of law apparent on the face of it, as provided in Sec. 16(!) (c) . of the Arbitration Act.\n\nExamining this contention, this Court observed as under: ·\n\n\"This covers cases in which in errOi of law appears on , the face of the award. But in determinin!!'what such an error is, a distinction must'be drawn between cases in which a question of law is specifically referred and those in which a decision . . on a question oflaw is incidentally material (however necessary) in order to decide the question actually referred. If a question of law is'specifcally referred and it is evident that•' the parties desire to have a decision from the arbitrator about that rathei'then one from the Courts, then the Courts will not , interfere, though even there, there is authority for the view that the courts will interfere if it is apparent that the arbitrator\n\n\nG' :1\n\nff.\n\n\n[1984) 3 S.C.R.\n\nhas. acted illegally in reaching his decision, tht is to say, if he has decided on foadmissible evidence or on principles of construction that the law does 1,1ot contenance o, r something of that nature. See the speech of Viscount Cave in Ke/antan Government v. Duff Development Co. at page 409. But that is not a matter which arises in this case.\n\nThe law about this is, in our opinion the same in England as here and the pril)ciples that govern this class of case have been reviewe.d at length and set out with clarity by . the House of Lords in F.R. Absalom Ltd. v. Great Western (London) Garden Village Society and in Ke/antan Government v'. Duff Deefopment Co. In Duiga Prasad v. Sewkiii.· hendas the Privy Council applied the, law expounded in Absa/om's case tci India; see also Chainpsey Bhara & Co. v.\n\nJivraj Ba/loo Spinning and.Weaving Co. and Saleh Mahomed\n\nUmer Dossa/ v. Nathooma/ Kessamal. The wider language used by Lord Macnaghten in Ghu/am Jiliini v. M uhmmad .Hassan<b.aci reference to the revisionail powers of the. High Court under the Civil Procedure Code and must be. confined to the facts of that case where the question of !aw involved there, namely, limitation, was spec!ficaUy referred.\n\nAn arbitrator is not a conciliator and cannot ignore the law or mi; apply it in.order to do what he thinks is just and reasonable.\n\nHe is a tribunal selcted by the parties to decide their disputes according to law and so is b01md to follow, and apply the Jaw, and ifhe does not he can be set right by the Courts provided his er•or appears on.the fact of' the .• award. The single exception to this is when the. parties choose specifically to refer a question of law l\\S a seperate and distinct matter.\"\n\n• p - .\n\nThe Court fl)rther proceeded to examine whether in the facts . 'Of that . case, the arbitrator was speci'fically asked to construe\n\nclause 6 of the contr>ll:t or any part of the\"contract or whether any question of law was specifically referred. The Court emphasised . the word 'specifically' by pointing out tha_t, parties who made a reference to arbitration have the right fo insist that the Tribunal of their choice shall decide their dispute according to Jaw, so before the 'right., i:an be denied to them in any particufar matt_er, the court must be very sure that both sides wanted the decision of the arbitrator on a point of Jaw rather than that of the Courts 'and that they wanted his decision on that point to be final. . The Conrt then proceeded to examine the various clauses of the contract and held tllat tl1is is not the kind of specific reference on a point of law that\n\nt ' . ;\n\nTARAPORE.CO. v. COClflN SlflPYARD (Desai, J.) • 143\n\n_ the law of aritration requires. The C_ourt held that when a. question of law is the point at issue, unless both sides specifically agree . to refer it and agree \"to be bound by the arbitrator's decision, the jurisdiction of the Courts to set an arbitration right when the error is apparent on the face of the award is not _ousted. The mere faCt , that both parties submit incidental arguments about a point of law -\n\n in the course of the proceedings is no~ enough. This decision is an authority for the proposition that where the parties specifically agree . to refer a specific question of law for the decision of the arbitratot, and agree to be bound by it, the _Cciurt cannot set aside the award on the ground of an error oflaw apparent on the face of it even though the decision of the arbitrator may not acsord with the law as understood by the C\"ourt. If on the other hand, the question of law is incidentally decided by the arbitrator, it is not enough to oust the jurisdiction of the Court to set aside the award on the ground that there is an error apparent on the face of the award. ·\n\nIn M/s Alopi Par shad & Sons .Ltd. v. The Union 'of India'\n\nthe Court reiterated the observation in Seth Thawardas's case and 'D observed that if a specific question is submitted to the arbitrato~- and he answers it, the. fact that the answer involves an erronous decision in point of law, does-not make the award bad on its_ face so as io permit of its being set aside. _In the facts of the case, this Court agreeing with the High Court held that ther'e is no foundation-for the view that a specific reference, submitting a question of law for the adjudication of the arbitrators, was made. It may be st3cted in passing that a brief reference to the claim put forward before the arbitator on behalf of.the appellants in th.at case, set out . at page 798 of the report, would clearly, show that no specific question -of law was referred by the parties for .the decision of the arbitrator. Mr. Pai learned counsel for the respondent pointed out that the Court has also observed following the deCision, of the Privy , Council in Chatnpsey Bhara and Company v. Jiv.aj Bal/60 Spinning and Weaving Company Ltd'., that 'theextent of the jurisdiction of the court to set aside an award on the grouµd of an error in making the award is well-defined. The award of an arbitrator may be set, . aside on the ground of an etror on the face thereof only when in the award 011in any document incorporated with it, as for instance, a note appended by the . arbitrators, stating the reasons for_ his decision, there is found some legal proposition which is the basis of the award and which is erroneous. This observation does not help\n\n(I) J[1960]'2 S.C.R. 793 __\n\n(2) Law Report$Q l-A 324\n\n.. • 144\n\n\n(19&4) 3 S.C.R • • in deciding the point under discussion and just after this statement, there follows the obsevation about the effect of referring a specfficquestion of Jaw for the decision of the airbitrator and the jurisdiction-of the Cort to set aside 'the award on the grol!nd 'that !herds an error of law apparent on the face of it. ' .. .In Union of Indiav: A.L. Ra//ia Ram1 this Court after referring to the decision in Champs.y '/Jhara and Coinpany reaffirmed that, the rule in that decision does not apply where questions of law are-specifically referred to the arbitrator for hii decision; the award of the arbitrator on those questions is binding upon the parties, for by referring specific questions tlw parties desire to -have a decision from the arbitrator on tho§e questipns raiher than frqm the Court and the Court will not, unless it is satisfied that the arbitr.ator had proceeded illegally interfere with the decision. After referring . to the decl- . sion hereinabove examined by' us, the Court came to the conclusion that no specific question of Jaw wer.e referred to the arbitrator's the decision whereof is binding upon the parties. .\n\nIn M/s Kapoor Nilokheri Co-op. Dairy Farm Society Ltd. v. • • Union of India and Others• the Court agreed with the submission .on behalf of the respondent Government of India that the appellants having specifically stated that their clais are bsed on the agreement and on '.nothing else and all that the arbitrator bad to decide . was as to the effect of the agreement, the arbitrator bad really to decide a question . of law, i.e. of interpreting the document, the agreement dated May 6, 1953 and therefore the decision is not open to Challenge. In fact, this decision is hardly of any assistance and we leave it' at that.\n\nIn N' Chellappan v. Secretary, Kera/a State Electricity Board & Anr•. by a consent order, the umpire was _appointed as the sole arbitrator, and the respondent-Board without a demur participated in the proceedings before the umpire and took the chance of an award in its favour, this Court said hat it cannot turn round and say that the umpire. bad no inherent jurisdicti6n and therefore its participation in the proceedings before the, um.pi re is of no avail. This decision is not of much assistance on the point!undet discussion. Mr. Pai\n\non the other band urged that the jl/risdiction of the afbitator could not be determined by him nor can he arrogate jurisdiction to himself\n\n(I) (1964] 3 S.C.R. 164\n\n(2) A.LR. 1973 S.C. 1338\n\n(3) (1975) 2 S.C, R:1*!1\n\n-,,,_\n\n• I\n\n~ -\n\n. >,.\n\n• TARAPORB co. v. COCHIN sHiPYARD (Desai, J.) 145, , by mis-construction of the contract and thereby clutch at jurisdiction and in such a situation, the court always retains to itself to set at naught.the award on the ground of an error of law apparent on the face of the award. 111 terms, he stated that the issue about the jurisdiction of the arbitrator has never been parted with by . the Court-Generally speakings, common law courts were very reluctant . to part with its jurisdiction to' set at naught an award on the ground\n\nthat-the_ arbitrator had no jurisdiction to entertain and. decide the dispute. The Court went so far as to say that the arbitrator cannot confer jurisdiction upon himseif by deciding in its own favour some preliminary points upon which its jurisdiction rests. In fact, that is a non-issuse. It cannot be dispute.d that even the question of jurisdiction of an arbitrator can be the aubject matter of a specific reference.\n\nIf.the parties agree to refer the specific question w)lether th~ dispute raiseq is covered by the arbitration agreement, it becomes a specific question of law even if it involves the jurisdjction of the arbitraor _and if it is so, a. decision of.the arbitrato_r on specific question referred to him for decision even if it appears to be erroneous . to the Court is binding on the.parties.· The decisions relied upon by Mr. Pai do not derogate from this legal position... We may briefly\n\nrfer to those decision\n\nIn Produce Brokers Co. Ltd~ v. Olympia Oil aniJCake Co. Ltd.,1\n\nit was held that \"if the question which the arbitrator takes upon himself to decide is not in fact within the' submission the awa_rd is a nullity. The arl/itrtor annot make his award binding by. holding contrary to the true fac.ts when the question which he !lffects to\n\ndetermine is within the submiision.\" Let us emphasise the ratio of the decision that the arbitrator takes upon himself to decide a question not within the submission. This would mean that the question of law was not specifically referred to thy arbitrator for his decision but it was incidentally raised. In fact, nowhere .it was contended that ariY specific question of law was referred to the arbitrator and if so what would be its effect on the binding character of the d.ecision was. ever raised in that case. In that cllse after an\n\nanswer was returned to the Special Case submitted for the opinion of the court, the Committee of Appeal unreservedly accepted the said answers upon the construction of the contract as a matter of\n\nlawapart from the custom of.the trade, but proceeded further to hold that there was a long established and well-recognised custom of the trade .in cases of re-sales that buyers under the forrn of contract\n\n(I) [1914-!Sl AU ~R 133\n\n\n[1984] 3 S.C.R, • in question impliedly' agreed with their sellers tlrat they would accept the original Shipper's appropriation if passed on without delay. On a motion by the buyers to have the award. set aside, of which notice was glven, the Divisional Court held that the arbitrators had no . . jurisdiction to find conclusively the existence of a trade custom, and the Court of Appeal on the authority of prr.cedents bui against their own opinion, affirmed the decision. The appellant-seller's company appealed to the House of Lords. , Lotd Loreburn in his speech -\n\nobserved that 'these men of business made contracts and therein agreed to arbitrate upbn all disputes arising out of 'their contracts.\n\nYet there Iiave already been seven distinct stages of argument and decision, four of them in courts of law, upon a dispute arising on those contracts, and the end is not .yet. I do not know how many more stages there will be. Pa1ties have a right to prefer .what some may consider the imperfect though expeditious wisdom of arbitrators to the slower and more .costly justice of His Majesty's courts. It is to be regretted when they have to encounter the inconveniences of both methods with the advantage 01. neither.\" Approaching the matter from this angle, the appealwa:s allowed and the decision of. the 9ommittee of Appeal, taking note of the custom of th~ trade, allowed the award to stand. This decision can in no way help the respondent.\n\nIn Attorney Oeneral For Manitoba v. Kelly and Others1 it was observed that \"Whenever therels. a difference of opinion between the parties as to the. authorify cqnferred oh an umpire or arbitrator under an agreed submission the decision rests ultimately with the court and not with the umpire or arbitrator.\" This is predicated upon a proposition that common ll!w courts were reluctant to part with their jurisdiction to set, atnaught an award if th~ arbitrator confers jurisdiction upon himself by deciding in his own favour some preliminary point 'Upon which his jurisdiction rests.\n\nMr. Pai also referred to the decisions of.the Privy Council in Champsey Bhara & Co, and Hirji Mu/ji v. Cheong Yue Steamship Co.\n\nLtd.• Both these decisions. are of no assistance on the question about the reference of a specific question of law touching upon the jurisdiction of the arbitrator fr his deeision and its effect. Jn fact. the decision in Champsey Bhara' s case clearly turns upon as to what constitutes an error of Jaw apparent on the face of the award . •\n\n(1) [1922] All. E.R. 69\n\n(2) [1926] All. ER SJ\n\n~··\n\n. 4'.,\n\n' '\n\n. ' i\n\n• • >\n\n--~\n\nTARAPORE co. y. COCHIN SHIPYARD (Desai, J.) 141\n\nThe next case referred to was Heyman & Anrs. v. Darwins Ltd.1 It reasserts that as a rule the arbitrator cannot clothe himself with jurisdiction. ~-\n\nTurning to the decisions of this Court, .reference was first made to Jivarajbhai Ujamshi Sheth & Ors. v. Chintamanrao Balaji & Anr.• Shah, J. speaking for himself and Jilstice Sarkar at page 499 observed . that 'this is not a case in which the arbitrator Jias committed a mere error of fact or law in -reaching his conclusio11 on the disputed question >Submitted for his adjudication. It is a case of assumption of jurisdiction not poss_essed by him, and that renders the award1 tci the extent to which it is beyond the arbitrator's jurisdiction, invalid\".\n\nIt may be pointed out that these observations are in the context of\n\ntlie facts of that case and there was no contention before the cou.rt that any specific qu, estion of law touching upon the jurisdiction of the arbitrator was referred to-for his:decision by the parties.\n\nThe last decision in this context referred to was Dr. S:B. Dutt\n\nv. University q{ Delhi.8 In that case the .arbitrator gave by his award a direction to enforce the contract of personal service. This _ wautated as an error of law apparent on the face of the award and\n\nthe award was set aside. Again it may be pointed out that tpe\n\nreference to the the point set out in the .letter of reference extracted at page 1240 clearly spells out that no specific question oflaw touching upon the jurisdiction of the arbitrator was referred to the arbitrator for his decision.\n\n' On a conspectus of these decisions, it clearly transpires that if a question of law is specificially referred .and it becomes evident that the parties desired to have a decision on the specific question from _ th_e arbitrator about 'that rathr than one from court, then the court will noi interfere with the award of the arbitrator on the ground that th'ere is an error of law apparent on the face of the award even if the view of taw taken by the. arbitrator does not.accord with the view of the court. This view of law taken in England was stated by this Court to be the same in this country and since the decision in Seth Thawardas's case which follows earlier decisions in England and India, it has not been departed from.\n\nTh_e view canvassed for by Mr. Pai that common law courts were very reluctant to part with\n\nits jurisdiction has hardly any relevance where a specific qu, estion of\n\n(I) [1942! (I) All E.R. 337.\n\n(Q) [1964] S SCR 480.\n\n(3) (195?1 SCR 1236'\n\n• 148\n\n. SUPREME COURT REP OR TS [1984) 3 s.C.R.\n\n. law including the one touching the jurisdiction of the arbitrator is\n\nreferred to the arbitrator for his decision. Even if the decision of the arbitrator doi'l not ac.cord with the view of the court, the award . cannot be set aside on the sole ground that there is an error of law apparent on the face of it.\n\nBefore we conclude on this 'pojnt we must take note 6f a contention of Mr. Pa.i that the respondent cannot be 'estopped from contending that the arbitrator had no jurisdiction lo entertain the dispute as the respondnt agreed to the submission without prejudice to its rights to contend t, o _the contrary .. It is undoubtedly true that 'in the letter dated March 29,1976.by which the respondent agreed to refer the dispute to the arbitrator. it was in ternis stated that the reference is being made without prejudice to the positi.on of the resppndent as adopted in the ltter meaning thereby without prejudice to its rights to contend that the claim of the appellant is not covered by the arbitration clause. In the context in which the expression 'without prejudice' is us.ed, it would only mean that the respondent\n\nreserved the right to contend before the arbitratpr that the dispute is not covered by the arbitration clause. It does not appear that what was reserved as a contention that, no specific question of law was specifically referred to the arbitrator. It is difficult to spell out , such a contention from the letter. And the respondent did raise the contention before the arbitrator .that he had no jurisdiction to entertain the dispute as it would not be covered by the arbitration clause. Apatt from the technical meaning which the expression 'without prejudice' carries depending upon the context in which it is used, in the. present case on a l?roper reading of the _correspondence .and-in the setting in which the term is used, it only means that the re.spondent reservedto itself the right to contend before the arQ, jtartor that a dispute raised or the claim made by the 'contractor was not . covered by the arbitration clause. No other meaning can be as'signed to it. An action taken wihout prejudice to one's right cannot • necess.arily mean that the entire action can be ignored by the party taking the same. In this case, the respondent referred the specific . question of )aw to the qrbitrator. This WflS according to .the respondent without ptejudice to its right to. contend that the c.Jaim or the dispute. is not covered by the arbitration clause. The contention was to be before the arbitrator. If the respondent warited to sscrt that it had reserved t9 itself the right 'to con!e.nd that no specific question of law was referred to the arbitrator, in .the first instance, it should not have made the reference in the terms in which it is made but should have agreed to the proposal of tile appellant\n\nI • >\n\ntARAPORE co. v. COCHIN SHIPYARD (Desai, J,) 149\n\nto make a general reference. If the appellant insisted on the reference of a spcifi:c .question which error High Court appears to have committed, it could have declined to make .the reference <Of a specilkquestion of iaw touching his jurisdiction and should have taken recourse to the. court by making an appi'ication under Sec . 33 of the Arbitration Act to have the. effect of the arbitration agreement determined by the court. Not only the re'spondent did not have recourse to an application under Sec .. 33 of the Arbitration Act, but ofits own it referred a specific question of Jaw to the arbitrator for his decision, participated. in the arbitration proceeding ini(ed, the arbitrator to decide the spedfic question and fook a chance of a decision. It cannot therefore, now be permitted to turn round. and contend to the contrary on the nebulous plea that it had referred the, claim/dispute to the sole arbitrator without prejudice to its right . to contend to the contrary. Therefore, there is no merit in the contention of Mr. Pai. •\n\n, In this case, as earlie~ pointed out a _specific question as to whether the claim of compe!lsation made by the appellant-contractor and demurred arid disputed by the respondent wQuld be covered within the scope, ambit and width of the arbitratioi. clause, wa~ specifically referred by the parties for the decision of\\the arbitrator.\n\nTherefore, it is a case where a specific question 'of law touching upon , Jhe jurisdiction of the arbitrator was referred for the decision of the arbitartor by the parties.' Even if the view taken by the arbitrator may qot accord with the view of the.court about the scope, ambit and wi<!!h of the arbitration clause, the award cannot be set aside\n\non the ground that there is an efror of law apparent on the face of the award. The view taken by the High Court is palpably untenable a.nd has to be reversed. On this short paint, the appeal can be all6wed ... However, it was strenuously urged by both the sides that the dispute arising out of the claim for compensation made by. the appellant on account of the increase in the cost of the piie driving equipment and technical know-how fees would or would not, be covered by the first Pilragraph of Clause 40, we would briefly examine the same to point out that it would be covered.\n\nIn order to ascertain whether 'the claim for compensation for incr_ease iu the price of pile driving equipment and technical knowh9w fees would be covered by the arbitration clause, it is necessary briefly to refer .to the negotiations and discussions leading to the formation of the contract for construction of the Repair Dock and the Building Dock. The value of the works to be executed was\n\n150 SUPREME'couRT REPo~'rs [1984j s.C.R .\n\n. A over Rs 24 crores. In respect of the construction of Repair Oock,\n\nthere was only the tender of .the appellant land. in respect of the Building Dock,. there were two tenders:· one of the appellant and another by M/s National mji!ding Construction Corporation, the tendered valueo of the latter being double . that of. the former.\n\nIndisputably, tqe respondent had a very limited or realistically no .• B choice. In such a situation the Tender Committee took notice of the fact of the. pol:lr response to the invitation to tender. The\n\nCommittee took notice of such salient features of the work being the complexity and magnitude of the works to be undei'taken by any Indian Contra9tor and the non-availability of plant and equipment C required for the works and, more especially that if the contractor ·\n\nwas to procure the specialised equipment required for the works, there was hardly any assurance that after the works were over, the machinery would be so much depreciated to have a11y substantial •use or utility to the contractor. Iri the 'invitation to te.nder, it was indicated that requisite foreign exchange for importing pile driving equipment and machinery, spares and technical know-how amounting to about Rs 2 crores in all would be made available to the contractor from the 11th Yen Credit from Japan, subject to his getting indi: genous cloorance and providingd.etailed justdication. Annexure IV to the General Conditions of Contract clearly. specifies that the tendereis while quoting shall give separately the full details' of the E equipment for which they would be requiting foreign exchange\n\n assistance. And they shall also idicate the financial implication if any, . for providing not providing the foreign exchange assistance indicated for th~ various equipments. Two things emerge from recital of the facts' herein enumerate<; l i'n the course of formation of. tbe contract: (1) that the pile driving equipment will have to be F imported from outside India and technical know-how fees will. have to be paid both in foreign currency and (2) this would necessitate investment of about Rs 2 crores by the contractor. The_ contractor in his letter dated July 14,1972 specifically invited the rospondent to confirm the modifications in the terms of contract as set out therein.\n\nG Jn paragraph 31 (E) (!), the contractor states that all foreign exchangefor the equipment, spares, technical know-how and hiring of experts shall be provided to the contractor and that the total foreign exchange on all these accounts will be about Rs 2 crores. A sort of an assurance was thus extended to the contractor thatthe same wquld .be made available to him from the 11th Yen credit from H Japan. This is.not disputed. It is also an admitted position that , the neeessary equipment, machinery, spares and technical know-how were not available from Japan and the availability of the I Ith\n\n.. '\n\n' .\n\nl •\n\n!AkAl>oRilcp. ~. cocit1N sarPYARD (Desai, J.) 151\n\nYen credit from Japan lost all significance. Further the respondent A by its letter dated January 24, 1973 to the appellant while accepting the tender of the appellant.on behalf of Cochin Shipyard Limited specifically stated as under:\n\n''You shall provide at your cost all construction' plant and machinery (including that requiring import) for all items of work including RCC piling and Steel Sheel Piling Works.\n\n1 Departmental machinery likely to be made. available for issue to the Contractor shall be as -in Annexure IV of the General Conditions of Tender.\n\nYou shall furnish an inventory. of all plant and machinery propos.ed to be used. on the works including items of imported machinery with probable date of their availability at site for use or! the work. This should match with the Detailed Working Programme indicated as above.\"\n\nAt this stage a reference to the.addition~! Terms and Condi- Q tions/Modifications to the General Conditions and Specifications of\n\nt~~ Departmental Tender Documents, \\(ould be advantageous. It _reads as under: • ·\n\n\"All Piling Equipment shall . be procured by the Contractor ........................ .... 1 •........... ; ......................... . ............. Selection of equipment will be done by the Contractor\n\ni11 consultation . with the Cochin Shipyard authorities. No hire charges for the equipment procured by the. Contractor is payble to the Shipyard .................................................. .. ................ Requisite foreign exchange, for importing piling plant and machinery, spares, technicai know'-how and hiring of experts necessary for both the Dock Works, videWork Order ........ for Repair Dock etc., amounting to about Rs 2.00 crores in.all will be m1de available to the Contractor from the ! Ith Yen credit subject to his getting indigeous clearance and proyiding detailed.justification\" .\n\nIt is thus unquestionably established that the appellant whose tender was accepted after negotiations and scrutiny by the Tender Commitee was expected to invest Rs 2 crores in importmg pile driving equipme)Jt and technical know-how fees. The tender was accepted and a formal contract was entered into on his basis. 1n\"\n\nworks contract of such magnitude, the value whereof was over Rs. 24 crores, and which was being undertaken by an Indian contractor for\n\nff\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1~84] 3 s.c.R.. j\n\nthe first time negotiations prior to the finalisation of the contract and tlie correspondence leading to the formation of contract supply the basis on which contract was finally entered into. Undoubtedly, . if in th'e final written contract, there . is something contrry to the basic understanding during the formative stage of the contract, the written oiltract would. prevail. But if the contract does not indicate 1\n\nto the contray and the assumptions appeared to be the foundation of the contract obviously that aspect cannot be overlooked while determining what were the obligation undertken under th, formal contract. It may be recalled that the two alternative rates were . quoted.by the_ contractor: (i) the respondent were to Import the. pile· driving equipment and technical _know-how for its optration, the same would be leased to the contractor at negotiated fates or (ii) the contractor were to impor.t the same the rates be paid to the contractor. The second alternative was accepted by the parties on the f1mdamental assumption that the investment in this behalf. would be Rs 2 crores. This is the agreed position on which contract was . entered into. To continue the narrative, it may be pointed out that this fundamental foundation of the contract not left to guess work, but is specifically referred to in the.notice inviting tender and in Ille specification$ and modifcations as addenda to the General Comlitions of Contract. It was clearly understood between .the parties that the contractor has to invest roughly Rs. 2 crares in foreign, ' exchange for iporting pile driving equipment and technical knowhow fees without which this work could never have been .undertaken and without which it wonld not have been entrusted . to the contractor. The contractor when be quote his terms must obvimrsly ·. have made appropriate calculations, one of which in this case appears to. be that it will have to invest Rs. 2 crores in foreign exchange and this fact flies in the face that aftrer the work ws over the imlJor\"ted machinery would depreciate to this extenfthat it would h.ave hrdly any use of utility to the contractor s noticed by the Tender Committee. The rates quoted by the contractor were obviously interrelated to the basic assumption. The fact that such was also also the understanding of the respondent may now be pointed out.\n\nThe respondent by its letter dated July 31, 1973 to Industrial Adviser (HME), Directorate General of Technical Development requested him .to issue necessary clearance to the appellant fot import of the equipment set out in the Annexure to the letter on the ground that the appellant tried its level best to get the equipment from the Japaneses sources, butthey could not get positive resitive . ' . '\n\n' .\n\n• j\n\n\"'\\\n\nTARAPORE co. v. cocillN SHIPYARD (Desai, J.) 153\n\nresponse for such equipments. They had also tried their best to get\n\n.sitable offers from U. K., U. S. A., USSR, Canada, West Germany and Holland. It l\"as also pointed aut that the respondent itself also made independent enqujries in Japan for getting suitable offers for tl1e above equipment without success. Thus it . becomes clear' that to the knowledge of the respondent, the 11th Yen Credit became irrelevapt. The Government of India by its letter dated September 1,1973 to the respondent conv(>yed its approval to the release of; the foreign exchange in favour of the appellant to the extent of Rs 2 ILSO lakhs (Rupees two crores eleven lakhs and eighty thousand only) equivalent to DFL 9, 442, 7.00 at the specified exchange rate. Therafer the appellant by its letter. dated May 28,1975 amongst others requested tjie responde.nt to take note of the fact that the tendered tales were based ou certain total cost of machfoes which Iias since gone up considerably rendering the rates' no longer . \" workable; The contractor proceeded to point out the utter irrelevancy of the rates in view of the higher outlay of imported. machinery and technical know-how. It pointed out the loss sustained by the contractor and requested fqr compensatfon in this behalf.\n\nThis was followed by the letter dated Jnly I, 1975 by the contractor io the respondeht, emphasising thefact that ihe tendered rates had become - unwofkable and unrealistic owing to the increse in the cost of equipment. know-how etc. as a result of the increase in the foreign\n\nexchange rate of Dutch Guilders as related to the Rupee. In response to the last letter the respondent replied by. its, letter dated July 2, 1975, relevant portion of which may be extracted:\n\n\"In this connection, a kind reference is invited to your letter dated the 14lh July, 1972 (which forms a part of the contract documents) wherein you had indicated that the rota/ foreign exchang~. required by you for the equipment; spares, 'technical know-how and hiring of experts, was expected to be about Rs 2 crores. From the d.ata enclosed with your . letter under reply, it is seen that the foreign exchange.expenditure incurred by you SO far in connection With this Contract had been less than Rs 2 crores. In the circumstances; it is difficult to accent the position that your tender was based on assumptions indicated by you and that the rates for pile driving should now be revised.:'\n\nThis letter furnishes proof, if one was needed that parties were ad idem that the investment for imported pile driving equipment and foreign exchange know-how would be about Rs 2 crores. The\n\nSUPR~ME COURT REPORTS [19&4i 3 s.c.k. •\n\nrespondent does not .contest the claim for ompensation under this head as is npw sought to. be done on the ground that as the contractor had to provide imported pile drivjng equipment and technical know-how, the respondent is not entitled to compensation even _if the initial estimate has been found to - be unrealistic .. On the contrary the claim for compensation 1s disputed and controverted on the'gr0und that the foreign exchange expenditure incµrred by the' contractor so far in connection with imported pile driving equipment and technical know-how has been less than Rs 2 crores. From this correspondence, it. wolud emerge that both the parties were agreed that the.contractor wonld have to invest Rs 2 crores in foreign exchange for importing pile driving equipment and technical know-how wh.ich could only be used after approval of the same by. the respondent. The appellant by its letter August 9; 1975 contended. that\n\nescalation of expenditure under this head is taken care of in the contract .and more speCifically in clauses 13 and 6 o( the works\n\norder: W'e would have occasion t~ refer to these clauses. a little latet.\n\nThe respondent by its letter dated August 29, 1975 reasserted its\n\nposition that the foreign exchange element of the expenditure incurred by the contractor works-out to Rs 1.96 crores, which is foss than the figure of Rs. 2 crore.s that was expected to be invested in foreign exc4ange-which was to be provided by the contracto.r, .\n\nThe respondent.also referred to th~ assessmnt of e.<penditure made by the contractor as per its letter dated July 14,1972. This has already been referred to by us. The respondeni further asserted that the estimate so ma'!te till that date has not been exceeded and tJ1eiefore, any argument based on fluctuation in the exchaqge rate is not valid or tenable. It may be repeated that the refusal to entertain the claim for compensation was predicated upon. the. estimates having not exceeded the basic. minimum of Rs. 2 crores by the contractor on which rates were worked out and agreed, and not that such claim cannot be entertained under the contract. By its Jetter dated September 18;1975, the contractor reiterated it~· position; In its letter dated October 6, 1975, the respondent when it was faced with the situation that the expenditure incurred under this head in foreign ex- change had risen to Rs 214.33 lacs i. e. it had exceeded the expected investment of Rs. 2 croresunder this head, took !I summerasult ; rnd stated that therespondent had at no stage stated that the contractor was 'not entitled to'any claim because the amount of foreign exchange has not yet exceeded Rs 200 Iak!).s'. One has merely to call attention to the two letters dated July '2, 1975 and August 29 1975 to reach the conclusion that tJie respondent has gone back upon its original vositio11 and having found that the expenditure under this head has\n\n- j\n\n-1.\n\n'rARAPORB co. Y. COCHIN SHIPYARD (Desai, J.) BS •\n\ntgone up beyond the estimated expenditure made a volte face, the two positions. so adopted being entirely inconsistent with' each other Tl; tereafter, the matter was referred to arbitration. .\n\nFrom the commencement i.e. from tl\\e stage of inviting tenders and through the negotiations and the finalisation of the contract, at every stage, the respondent assured that foreign exchange would be made available from 11th Yen Credir.\n\nAs the equipm3nt was not available from Jap11'n, the availabilty of Yen Credit becqme otios\" .from the contractor's point of view. At the instanc, e of and with the active participation of the respondent, the contractor made enquiries in various countries and ultimately procured the necessary equipment and technical know--how which was approved by the respondent and imported the same. In the time lag, the price as well as the foreign exchange rates in relation to rupee underwent an upward change, with the result. that the contractor had to invest, as made out by it and not seriously controverted before the arbitrator in all Rs. 275.40 lakhs for imported pile driving equipment and spares and Rs. 18,64, 337.61 on technical services-cum-know-how fees and a further sum for higher custom duty. Details of the claim have been set out in Annexures 1 and 2 reSf>ectivel~ to the statement of claim submitted by 'the appellant to the arbitrator. The respondent in its counterstatement did not controvert the details of the claim and the expenditurejnvolved under the two heads-_ The whole of the counter claim' was concerned with the denial of its liability io compensate the contractvr coupled with the contention that the claim would not be covered by the arbitration agreement and therefore,· ihe arbltator ,\n\nhad no jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate the claim. ·· It may also be mentioned that at, no time since the award, the res;))n1n t ever disputed or questioned the amount awarded \"by the arbitrator.· It is thus satisfactorily established that the contractor had to invest something far in excess of Rs. 2 crores which it was expected to invest. ih foreig~ exchange for imported pile drivijig equipment and techmcal know-ho_w fes. The whole contract was concluded on this understanding. Being aware of the fluctuating position in this b_ehalf, the contractor l:ad tendered two alternative rates for comple\n\nhon of the, work as pomted earlir ; one based on equipment being\n\nimorted by the respondent and leased to the appellalJt and alterna~1ely rats on the basis that the contractor would import pile dnvmg equrp, ment and technical know-how. In respect of the second alternative, which was ultillllitely agreed to between the parties 1 was clearly and unmistakably understood between. the partiest hl .. • •\n\n:.Cl.\n\nSuPREME COURT REPORTS [! 984] 3 s.c.k\n\nthe contractor would have to invest Rs. 2 crores and the rates were co-related to this investment with the knowledge of the fact that when work was completed, the equipment would' depreciate to the tnne of 75% of its capability and WQnld be hardly of an¥ use to the contractor. The estimated expenditure having far exceeded, a claim for compensation would certainly be tefiable .at the instance of the contractor. . .\n\nThe High Court quoted clauses 16, 26 hnd 31 in its judament • 0 but did nof dilate upon the provisions of the clauses so a:; to corelate them with Its decisiatl. Clause 16 envisaged a situation where .. since the formation of the 'contract any fresh law is enacted which has the bearing on the price of materials incorporated in the works and/or wages oflabour, the terms of contract shall accordingly be varied. Clause 26 provided for supply of materials, plants, tools, appliances etc. by the contractor. Clause 2 provides for the liability of the contractor to supply construction, plant 'and machinery .. including the items .to be imported and a further obligation. is cast on the contractor to Juruish inventory of the same.\n\nClause 3·1 amongst others, provided that the pile driving equipment shall be procured by the contractor, and the selection of equipment shall be done by the contractor, in consultation with the respondent. These clauses were presumably referred to in the context of. an arguwent that the pnce escalationdause does not cover the claim for compensation for dditional expenditure on imported plant and machinery and technic)ll know-how because the contract substantially provides for the s.ameto bl supplied by the contractor.' In our opinion, this over-simplification of the clauses of the contract involving works pf such magnitude is impermissible. The whole gamut of discussions, negotiations and'correspondence must be taken into consideration to arrive at a true meaning of what was agreed to between the parties. And in this case there is no room for doubt that the parties agreed, that the investment of the. contractor under this head would be Rs,. 2 crores and the tendered rate& were predicated upon and co-related_ to t)lis undt!standing. When an . ag, eement is predicated upon ati agreed fact situation, if the latter ceases to exist the agreement to that extent becomes irrelevant or otiose. The rat.es j'layable to J, he contractor were r.elated to the investment of Rs 2 crores under this head by the contractor. Once the rates bec!lme irrelevant on account of circumstances beyond the control of the contractor, it was open to, the. contractor to make a claim for compensation.\n\nTherefore, it appears satisfactorily est4blished that-the claim arose . while iWplementing t.he contract and in_ relation to the contract.\n\n~ . 1. . '\n\n•, x . '\n\nTAR.I.PORE co. v. cocl!iN sHiPYARD (Desai, J.) 157 • The next question is whetherlhis claim made by the contractor and disputed by the respondent wpuld be ccivered by the arbitratfon clause. The arbitration clause has already been extracted. Even the High Court admits th<1t clause 40 is very widely worded. It inter alia provides that.all questions and disputes relating to the meaning of the Specifications Estimates, InstructiOns, Designs. Drawings bereinbefore mentioned and as to the quality of the Workmanship or matelials. used on the work or as to the any other questions claim, right, matter or thing whatsoever .in any. way arising out of or relating to the contract---:--..._-:-_ or otherwise concerning the . works or the execution---'---whether arising during the progress of the work or after completion----'--;---shall be referred to the Sole Arbitrator etc.\" The scope; width and the ambit of the Arbitration clause is of widest amplitude and any claim arising out of or relating to the contract or otherwise concerning the works or the execution thereof would be covered by the arbitration clause.\n\nThe material portion of clause 40 which would assist us in deciding the questions is .'claim' right matter or thing whatsoever in any way arising out of or relating to the contract~---------·-- . estimates or otherwise concerning the works or-the execution. etc.\" Briefly stated any claim arising out of or relating to the contract, estimates or otherwise concerning the works or the execution thereof would be covered by the arbitration clause. The question to be, posed is .\"does the claim made by the contractor arise outof or relates to the contract, estimates, or is otherwise <:oncerning works for execution thereof? Phrases such as 'claim arising out of contract' or \"relating to the contract' , or 'concerning te contract' on proper constrnction • would mean that if while entertaining or rejecting the claim or the dispute in relation to C:1; tim may be entertained or rejected after . ,, reference to the contract, it is a claim arising out of contract. Again\n\nthe language of cl. 40. shows that any claim arising out of the contract in relation to estimate made in the contract would be covered by the arbitration clause. If it becomes necessary to have recourse to the contract .to settle the dispute one way or the bther than certainly it can be -said that it is a dispute arising out of the contract.\n\nAnd in this case the arbitration clause so widely worded as disputes arising out of the contract or in relation !o the contract or execution of the.works would comprehend.\n\nWithin its compass a claim for compensation related to estimates .and arising out ofthe'contract.\n\nThe test is whether it is necessary to have recourse to the contract to settle.the dispu.te that'has arise.n.'\n\nVJ (See Russel onJ\\rbitration 20th ed. pag< 85/\n\n158 SUPREME COURT RllPORTS\n\n[1~84] 3 S.C~R.\n\nWe may now tum to some. decision to which our attention was drawn. The first case we would like to.refer to is A. M. Mair & Co. v.\n\nGordhanda.•s Sagarmull.' The Court was concerned with the arbitra tio.n clause drawn up as ; \"all matters, question, disptes, differences •\n\nand/or claims, arising out of and/or concerning, and/or in connection and/or in consequence of, or relating fo, the contract etc.\"\n\nThe question arose whether the due dateuJJder the contract was extended within the time, earlier reserved. The arbiirator held that the due date of the contract has been extend.ed by a mutual agree ment and the respondents were held liable to pay a sum of .Rs. 4,116 together with .interest at the rates specified in the award. It was contended that the, dispute is not covered by the arbitration clause.\n\nThis Court whilli holding that the dispute is covered by the arbi.trar tion clause observed that looking to the rival contentions, such a dispute, the determination of which turns on the true coristr-uction of the contract, would also seem to be a dispute. under or arising out of or concerning the contract.\n\nThe test formulated .was that if in . settling a dispute, a reference to the contract is necessary, such a\n\ndispute would be cove.red by the arbitration clause: •\n\nIn Ruby General lns.urance Co. Ltd v. Pearey Lal Kumar AIJa .Another, this Court was concerned with the clause in a. policy of insurance .which provided that differences .arising out of the policy .11hall be referred to the decision of the arbitrator. In construing this clause, this Court observed as under:.\n\n\"The test is whether recourse to the contract by wh.ich the parties are bound is necessary for the purpose of determining the matter .in dispute between them .. If such F recourse to the contract is necessary, then the matter must come within the scope of the arbitrtor's jurisdiction.\"\n\nIn Union af India v. Salween Timber Cou; truction (lndia) & Ors.• this Court observed that the test for determining the question is whether recpurse to the contract by .which both the parties are bound is necessary for the purpose of determining whether the claim of the respondent.firm is justified or'otherwise. If it is necessary to . take recourse to the terms of the contract for the purpose of deciding the matter in dispute, it must be held that the matter is within\n\nff (1) [i950]S.C.R. 792.\n\n(2} ]19521 S.C.R. 501. .\n\n(3) [1%9] 2 S.C.\\l. µ4,\n\nTAll.APORB CO. v. COCHIN SHIPYARD (Desai, J.) 159\n\nthe scope of the arbitratron clause and the aiitrators have jurisdiction A to decide the same. In so stating the proportion of [aw, reliance was placed on Heyman & Anr. v. Danvins Ltd.'. in which it was held that 'where the parties are atone in asserting that they entered into . • a' binding contract, but a difference l!as arisen between them whether there has been a breach by one side or the other, or whether circum- B stances have arisen which have discharged one or both parties froln further performance, such differences should be regarded as differences which have arisen in resp\\'Ct of or 'with .regard to, or 'under' the contract, .and an arbitration clause whicl\\ uses these, or. similar expressions should be construed accordingly. The Court affirme.a,. the decision in Ruby General lnsurance Co. Ltd. case. c\n\nIn Astro Vencedor Compania Naviera S. A. of Panama v. Mabanaft G. M. B. H. The J)iamianos' a question arose whether a claim in tort would be covered by the arbitration clause? It was admitted that \"1'e claim for wrongful arres\\ is a claim in tort. And D it was contended that a claim in to1 t cannot come within the arbitration clause. The Court of Appeal speaking through Lord Denning held that the claim in tort would be co\".ered by the arbitration clause, if the claim or the issue has a sufficiently close connection with the claim under the contract.\n\nIn Gunter ilenck v. Andre & ClE. S. A.' the Court (Queen's 'BenchDivisb n (Commerci'al Court) help thit the words 'arising out\n\nof clearly extend the mooning than would otherwise be applied to the clause were it limited: to 'all disputes arising under the onfract. F\n\nIn the facts before .us, th~ respond en~ n para t of its counter• slatement filed before 'the arbitrator spec1f1ca!ly referred to clause. 16 of the General Conditions of Contract and to the AaditiOnal Terms and Conditions Modifications forming part of 'the contract G document. In paragarph II, it was stated that th~ claim of the appellant was completely outside the purview of the contract and the same\n\ndoes not fall within the purview of the first paragraph of Clause 40\n\nO> [19421 A.c. 3S6 @ 366.\n\n(2) (19711 2 Q.B, 588.\n\n(3) (1970) I Lloyd's Law Reports 235, ..\n\n' A\n\n.. : .. L ·-\n\nSUPREME CO:URT REPORTS\n\n(1984) 3 S.C.l\\o\n\n. it was further stated in paragraph 13 that contract provides for escalation in certain respects and that is the only escalation which is admissible in terms of. the contract d the claim made by the appellant does not come within the escalation clanse nor in the agreed. formula relating to such escalatjon. The contratcor relied\n\n- upon Clause 13 of the Additional Terms and Coditions Modfications ' . . which form part of the contract document to sustain its claim. From the pleadings, it clarly transpires that both the parties had recourse to the contract which is admittedly entered into in support. of. the\n\n. C rival contentions and , therefore, the , claim made by the appellant\n\n. would be covered by the arbitration clause, which is of the widest .amplitud.e, It is thus satisfactorily esfablished that the claim made by tlie contractor would be covered by the arbitration clause.\n\nMr. Nariman also wanted us to examine whether ihe claill) made by the arbitrator would •. be admissible on the principle of quantu#i meriut. lt is not necessary to exmine this aspect at all° in the view which we are taking.\n\nHe also wanted us to adopt an approach that the effort of the court must be to uphold the award and not to reject it. We, consider it llnnecessary to dilate upon it .\n\nThe discussion leads to the .ine.scapable conclusion that a specific question.if law touching the jurisdiction of the arbitrator was specifically referred to the arbitrator and therefore the arbitrator decision is binding on the parties and the award cannot be st aside . on the sole ground that there was an erro~ Qf law apparent on . the face of the award. It is also established that the claim for compensation made by the arbitrator which led to the dispute was covered by the arbitration clause. The quantum of compensation awarded by the arbitrator was never disputed nor qU:estioned. Therefore, the High Court was clearly in error reversing the decision of the trial 901,1rt.\n\n,. .. ;\n\n~ ~.\n\n• . _\\\n\nTARAPORE CO. v. COCHIN SHIPYARD (Dei, J.) 161\n\nAccordingly this appeal succeeds and is allowed and the Judgment of the High Court is set aside and the Judgment atid order of the Subordinate Judge, Ernakulam dated March 30, 1979 is restored with costs throughout-\n\nN.V.K. 'Appeal gllowed . •\n\n- ;\n\n' j", "total_entities": 143, "entities": [{"text": "i18\n\nTARAPORE.& COMPANY", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5, "end_char": 28, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "TARAPORE & COMPANY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "COCHIN SHIPYARD LTD. COCHIN & ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 38, "end_char": 71, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "COCHIN SHIPYARD LTD. 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V•COCHIN SHIPYARD (Desai J.) 123\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "F.S. Nariman", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 15203, "end_char": 15215, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' ,\n\n' ./\n\n< F.S. Nariman, A.N. Haksar, T. Raghvan, R.F. Nariman, V.A. Bobde & K.R. Nambiar, foi\"the Appellant.", "canonical_name": "F.S. Nariman"}}, {"text": "A.N. Haksar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 15217, "end_char": 15228, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' ,\n\n' ./\n\n< F.S. Nariman, A.N. Haksar, T. Raghvan, R.F. Nariman, V.A. Bobde & K.R. Nambiar, foi\"the Appellant."}}, {"text": "T. Raghvan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 15230, "end_char": 15240, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' ,\n\n' ./\n\n< F.S. Nariman, A.N. Haksar, T. Raghvan, R.F. Nariman, V.A. Bobde & K.R. Nambiar, foi\"the Appellant."}}, {"text": "R.F. 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Sharma, As/wk Mathur and\n\nPaveen Kumar for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "P.K. Kumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 15313, "end_char": 15323, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G.B. Pai, P.K. Kumar, A.K. Sharma, As/wk Mathur and\n\nPaveen Kumar for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "A.K. Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 15325, "end_char": 15336, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G.B. Pai, P.K. Kumar, A.K. Sharma, As/wk Mathur and\n\nPaveen Kumar for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "Paveen Kumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 15356, "end_char": 15368, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G.B. Pai, P.K. Kumar, A.K. Sharma, As/wk Mathur and\n\nPaveen Kumar for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15435, "end_char": 15440, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was .delivered by\n\nDESAI, J. In this appeal by.", "canonical_name": "DESAI"}}, {"text": "Cochin Shipyard Limited", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15651, "end_char": 15674, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "First respondent Cochin Shipyard Limited ('respondent' for short) invited tenders for construction of Building Dock at Cochin."}}, {"text": "Tarapore & . Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15799, "end_char": 15819, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As there was only one tender that of Tarapore & ."}}, {"text": "National Building Construcfion Corpbration", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16086, "end_char": 16128, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "tenders for Building Dock; namely, one of the appellant and one by M/s National Building Construcfion Corpbration, a Government oflndia undertaking, the value of the tender Of the latter being double that of the appellant."}}, {"text": "Ministry of Shipping and Transport", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16662, "end_char": 16696, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In view of the huge investment in the project, the tenders were examined by a committee called the Tender Committee conslituied in accordance with the approval of the Ministry of Shipping and Transport for examining and evaluating the tenders\n\nrceived for the Building Dock and the Repair Dock."}}, {"text": "Japan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 19038, "end_char": 19043, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "from Japan for works of Building Dock, Repair Dock1 the three Quays etc."}}, {"text": "January 24, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19109, "end_char": 19125, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On January 24, 1973, work order for Building Dock\n\nand Repair Dock was .issued."}}, {"text": "January 29, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20989, "end_char": 21005, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The formal contract was signed on January 29, 1973 which included an arbitration clause to which we would turn a little later."}}, {"text": "International Foundation Group, Holland", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 21311, "end_char": 21350, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ultimately, International Foundation Group, Holland agreed to provide the rate of equipment conforming more or less to the same specification for which clearance.was sought and received."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 21495, "end_char": 21514, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "from the Government of India."}}, {"text": "International Foundation Group. Holland", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 21594, "end_char": 21633, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the respondent •\n\ncertified that the equipment and know-how ofiei:ed by International Foundation Group."}}, {"text": "Septembet 1, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21915, "end_char": 21932, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This approval was received on Septembet 1, 1973 and the foreign exchange to the extent or Rs 211.80 lakhs equal to 9,4%2.700."}}, {"text": "2,1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23919, "end_char": 23925, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent 'responded to this letter as per its letter daied July 2,1975 saying that the letter dated July 14,1972 of the appellant which forms part of the contract documents clearly recites that the total foreign ex-· change required by the contractor for the equipment, spares, technical know-bow."}}, {"text": "July 14,1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23955, "end_char": 23967, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent 'responded to this letter as per its letter daied July 2,1975 saying that the letter dated July 14,1972 of the appellant which forms part of the contract documents clearly recites that the total foreign ex-· change required by the contractor for the equipment, spares, technical know-bow."}}, {"text": "March 1, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24652, "end_char": 24665, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ultimately, the appellant by its letter dated March 1, 1976 informed the respondent that its claim for compensation for increase in the ."}}, {"text": "Clause 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25664, "end_char": 25673, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25910, "end_char": 25919, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "C. Srinivasa Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 26234, "end_char": 26250, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ultimately froni amongst the three names indifated by the respondent the appellant selected .Shri C. Srinivasa Rao, Chief Bridge Engineer, Southern Railway, Madras to be the Sole Arbitrator to tlecide the dispute.", "canonical_name": "C. Srinivasa Rao"}}, {"text": "July 19,197", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 27034, "end_char": 27045, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent filed its reply to the\n\nStatement of Claim on July 19,197,,\n\n' Thepoints/disputes referred by the parties to the sole arbitrator read as under ;\n\n\"!."}}, {"text": "Tarapore & Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 27164, "end_char": 27178, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Does the claim of Messrs. Tarapore & Co. on Cochin Shipyard Ltd., for compensation for increase in the cost of im, Ported pile driving equipment and technical knowhow fees referred to in clauses (2) and (3) hereunder fall within the purview of the first paragraph of Clause 40 of the General Conditions of Contract entered into between the two parties ?"}}, {"text": "Clause 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27405, "end_char": 27414, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cochin Shipyard Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 27756, "end_char": 27776, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ported pile driving equipment and technical know-how fees to be paid to them by Cochin Shipyard Ltd.?"}}, {"text": "Tarapore and Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 28293, "end_char": 28313, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1, the Arbitrator' held as under:\n\n• \"The claim of Messrs. Tarapore and Company on Cochin Shipyard Limited for compensat.ion for increase in the cost of imported pile driving equipment and technical know-how fees falls within the purview of the first paragraph of Clause 40 of the General Conditions of Contract entered into between the parties.\""}}, {"text": "Cochin Shipyard Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 28317, "end_char": 28340, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1, the Arbitrator' held as under:\n\n• \"The claim of Messrs. Tarapore and Company on Cochin Shipyard Limited for compensat.ion for increase in the cost of imported pile driving equipment and technical know-how fees falls within the purview of the first paragraph of Clause 40 of the General Conditions of Contract entered into between the parties.\""}}, {"text": "Clause 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28498, "end_char": 28507, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 29329, "end_char": 29335, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "he Award was typed on a stamp paper of the valµe of Rs .. 150/- at Madras."}}, {"text": "Clause 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30021, "end_char": 30030, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30468, "end_char": 30475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 31266, "end_char": 31299, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent preferred M.F.A. 409 of 1979 in, the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam."}}, {"text": "Cl. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32870, "end_char": 32876, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33505, "end_char": 33514, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33651, "end_char": 33660, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cochin Shipyard Project", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 34493, "end_char": 34516, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "written notice by eitJ; ier party to the contract, to the either of them, be referred to the .Sole Arbitration of a person appointed by the Chief Project , Officer of the Cochin Shipyard Project or the Administrative Head of the Cochin Shipyard Project at."}}, {"text": "Clause 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38020, "end_char": 38029, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38547, "end_char": 38556, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "6th October, 197~", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 40514, "end_char": 40531, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "contractor by his letter dated March .J, 1976 to the Chief Engit1:eer\n\nof the respondent invited his attention to the claim for compeµsation for.increase in cost of pile driving equipment and technical know-how fees raised about a year.ago and further invited his attention to the Jetter dated 6th October, 197~ of the respondent infprming the appellant that the claim cannot' be entertained."}}, {"text": "Clause 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41543, "end_char": 41552, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Tarapore Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 42212, "end_char": 42224, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the concerned contract, are Messrs.\n\nTarapore Co. entitled to compensation for .increase in the cost of imported rile driving equipment and technical knowhow fees to be paid to them py Cochin Shipyard, Ltd.?"}}, {"text": "Cochin Shipyard, Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 42360, "end_char": 42381, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the concerned contract, are Messrs.\n\nTarapore Co. entitled to compensation for .increase in the cost of imported rile driving equipment and technical knowhow fees to be paid to them py Cochin Shipyard, Ltd.?"}}, {"text": "clause 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42579, "end_char": 42588, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42702, "end_char": 42711, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mfs Tan.ore & Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 43402, "end_char": 43419, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "referred to the arbitrator and set it out as under:\n\n\"The decision of the dispute that has arisen between M/s Tarapore & Co., and the Cochin Shipyard Limited, regarding the claim of Mfs Tan.ore & Co., for compensation • for the increase in the cost of t\\Ie imported pile driving ."}}, {"text": "C. Srinivasa Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 43595, "end_char": 43611, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant proceeded to ; uggest that Shri C. Srinivasa Rao from amongst the panel be appointed as the Sole Arbitrator .. The respondent by his letter dated April 27/28, 1976 annexing ihree earlier letters dated March I, 1976, March 29, 1976 and April 19, 1976 referred the four points herein before set out for the decision of the arbitrator. \\ ..", "canonical_name": "C. Srinivasa Rao"}}, {"text": "Clause 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44910, "end_char": 44918, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Desai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 45531, "end_char": 45536, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therefore, the respondent invited the arbitrator by the specific point of -\n\n• '\n\nJ ,\n\nTARAPORE co. v. COCHIN Sl{IPYARD (Desai, J.) 135\n\nreference which involves a •specific question of, law touching upon the jurisdiction of the arbitrator to decide the same.", "canonical_name": "DESAI"}}, {"text": "Clause 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45997, "end_char": 46006, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47746, "end_char": 47755, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cl. 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48541, "end_char": 48547, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48679, "end_char": 48688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "F.S. Nariman", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 48749, "end_char": 48761, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. F.S. Nariman, learned counsel for theappellant urged \"that Sec.", "canonical_name": "F.S. Nariman"}}, {"text": "Sec. 16(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48808, "end_char": 48818, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Pai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 50521, "end_char": 50524, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Pai, lear11ed counsel for the respondenfcountered by saying that jurisdiction oNhe arbitrator cannot be left to the decision of tbe \"arbitrator so s to be binding on the parties and it is always for the court to decide whether the arbitrator has jurisdiction to decid.e\n\n' '\n\n• .", "canonical_name": "Pa.i"}}, {"text": "Trevethin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 56006, "end_char": 56015, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "TARAPO; E co. v. COCHIN SHIPYARD (Desai,};) 1~9 • House of Lords in KeTanten Government v. Duff Development Co.\n\nLtd.' in which Lord Trevethin in his speech said as uuder:\n\n\"lf your Lordships should be of opinion that the award is bad in law upon its face, it should be set aside, for ihis is not in my view, a submission to arbitration of such a nature that, although the law is bad upon the face of the awan; j, the decision cannot be questioned."}}, {"text": "Parmoor", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 56667, "end_char": 56674, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Same distinction was also brought out\"y Lord Parmoor when he said that 'the principle applicable where a specific question of law has been-submitted to the decision of arbitration is well expressed by Channell, J., in Re King and Duveen,2 in which it was said that where aspecific question of 'law is referred to an arbitrator for nis decision, the award cannot be set asid.e."}}, {"text": "Channell", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 56823, "end_char": 56831, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Same distinction was also brought out\"y Lord Parmoor when he said that 'the principle applicable where a specific question of law has been-submitted to the decision of arbitration is well expressed by Channell, J., in Re King and Duveen,2 in which it was said that where aspecific question of 'law is referred to an arbitrator for nis decision, the award cannot be set asid.e.", "canonical_name": "Channell"}}, {"text": "King", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 56843, "end_char": 56847, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Same distinction was also brought out\"y Lord Parmoor when he said that 'the principle applicable where a specific question of law has been-submitted to the decision of arbitration is well expressed by Channell, J., in Re King and Duveen,2 in which it was said that where aspecific question of 'law is referred to an arbitrator for nis decision, the award cannot be set asid.e."}}, {"text": "Channel", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 57429, "end_char": 57436, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At .a later stage, it was observed that if the court, before which it is sougqt to impeach the award, comes to the conclusion that the alleged error in law even if it can be maintained, arises in the decision of a question ot .law directly submitted to the, •arbitrator for his decision, t.hen '.he principle stated by-Channel, J., in Re.", "canonical_name": "Channell"}}, {"text": "Duven", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 57458, "end_char": 57463, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "King and Duven apphes, 1s attracted and the parties having chosen their tribunal, and not having applied successfully to the court under; either s. 4 ors."}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57594, "end_char": 57598, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Arbitration Act, 1889", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 57614, "end_char": 57635, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Warrington", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 58809, "end_char": 58819, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In tlie background of this fact, Lord Warrington in his speech said that no specific question of construction arose."}}, {"text": "Registration Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 60416, "end_char": 60432, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Anardeyi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 60484, "end_char": 60492, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ought to have held that Anardeyi's suit was in any event barred by limitation."}}, {"text": "fanckridge", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 60593, "end_char": 60603, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Privy Council first noticed the issues settled by fanckridge."}}, {"text": "TARAPORE", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 60679, "end_char": 60687, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J.; amongstthem were the two following:\n\n(I) A.I.R, 1949 (P.C.) 334\n\n• >\n\nTARAPORE co.iv."}}, {"text": "Sec. 16(!)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62160, "end_char": 62170, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Viscount Cave", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 63213, "end_char": 63226, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "See the speech of Viscount Cave in Ke/antan Government v. Duff Development Co. at page 409."}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 63390, "end_char": 63397, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The law about this is, in our opinion the same in England as here and the pril)ciples that govern this class of case have been reviewe.d at length and set out with clarity by ."}}, {"text": "Absa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 63741, "end_char": 63745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "hendas the Privy Council applied the, law expounded in Absa/om's case tci India; see also Chainpsey Bhara & Co. v.\n\nJivraj Ba/loo Spinning and."}}, {"text": "om", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 63746, "end_char": 63748, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "hendas the Privy Council applied the, law expounded in Absa/om's case tci India; see also Chainpsey Bhara & Co. v.\n\nJivraj Ba/loo Spinning and."}}, {"text": "Macnaghten", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 63927, "end_char": 63937, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The wider language used by Lord Macnaghten in Ghu/am Jiliini v. M uhmmad .Hassan<b.aci reference to the revisionail powers of the."}}, {"text": "High Court under the Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 64026, "end_char": 64067, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "clause 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64850, "end_char": 64858, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "High Court under the Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "High Court under the Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Seth Thawardas", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 66865, "end_char": 66879, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. The Union 'of India'\n\nthe Court reiterated the observation in Seth Thawardas's case and 'D observed that if a specific question is submitted to the arbitrato~- and he answers it, the."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 69765, "end_char": 69784, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dairy Farm Society Ltd. v. • • Union of India and Others• the Court agreed with the submission .on behalf of the respondent Government of India that the appellants having specifically stated that their clais are bsed on the agreement and on '.nothing else and all that the arbitrator bad to decide ."}}, {"text": "May 6, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 70092, "end_char": 70103, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of law, i.e. of interpreting the document, the agreement dated May 6, 1953 and therefore the decision is not open to Challenge."}}, {"text": "(1964] 3 S.C.R. 164", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 70920, "end_char": 70939, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Lotd Loreburn", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 74322, "end_char": 74335, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lotd Loreburn in his speech -\n\nobserved that 'these men of business made contracts and therein agreed to arbitrate upbn all disputes arising out of 'their contracts."}}, {"text": "Champsey Bhara", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 76169, "end_char": 76183, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the decision in Champsey Bhara' s case clearly turns upon as to what constitutes an error of Jaw apparent on the face of the award . •"}}, {"text": "Jilstice Sarkar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 76740, "end_char": 76755, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. Chintamanrao Balaji & Anr.• Shah, J. speaking for himself and Jilstice Sarkar at page 499 observed ."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 78663, "end_char": 78668, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This view of law taken in England was stated by this Court to be the same in this country and since the decision in Seth Thawardas's case which follows earlier decisions in England and India, it has not been departed from."}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REP OR TS [1984) 3 s.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 78952, "end_char": 78987, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COURT REP OR TS [1984) 3 s.C.R.\n\n."}}, {"text": "Pa.i", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 79380, "end_char": 79384, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before we conclude on this 'pojnt we must take note 6f a contention of Mr. Pa.i that the respondent cannot be 'estopped from contending that the arbitrator had no jurisdiction lo entertain the dispute as the respondnt agreed to the submission without prejudice to its rights to contend t, o _the contrary .. It is undoubtedly true that 'in the letter dated March 29,1976.by which the respondent agreed to refer the dispute to the arbitrator.", "canonical_name": "Pa.i"}}, {"text": "Clause 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 84121, "end_char": 84130, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "National mji!ding Construction Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 84864, "end_char": 84906, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "there were two tenders:· one of the appellant and another by M/s National mji!ding Construction Corporation, the tendered valueo of the latter being double ."}}, {"text": "Cochin Shipyard authorities", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 88901, "end_char": 88928, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "with the Cochin Shipyard authorities."}}, {"text": "July 31, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 92374, "end_char": 92387, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent by its letter dated July 31, 1973 to Industrial Adviser (HME), Directorate General of Technical Development requested him .to issue necessary clearance to the appellant fot import of the equipment set out in the Annexure to the letter on the ground that the appellant tried its level best to get the equipment from the Japaneses sources, butthey could not get positive resitive . ' . '"}}, {"text": "U. K.", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 92896, "end_char": 92901, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They had also tried their best to get\n\n.sitable offers from U. K., U. S. A., USSR, Canada, West Germany and Holland."}}, {"text": "U. S. A.", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 92903, "end_char": 92911, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They had also tried their best to get\n\n.sitable offers from U. K., U. S. A., USSR, Canada, West Germany and Holland."}}, {"text": "USSR", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 92913, "end_char": 92917, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They had also tried their best to get\n\n.sitable offers from U. K., U. S. A., USSR, Canada, West Germany and Holland."}}, {"text": "Canada", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 92919, "end_char": 92925, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They had also tried their best to get\n\n.sitable offers from U. K., U. S. A., USSR, Canada, West Germany and Holland."}}, {"text": "West Germany", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 92927, "end_char": 92939, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They had also tried their best to get\n\n.sitable offers from U. K., U. S. A., USSR, Canada, West Germany and Holland."}}, {"text": "Holland", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 92944, "end_char": 92951, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They had also tried their best to get\n\n.sitable offers from U. K., U. S. A., USSR, Canada, West Germany and Holland."}}, {"text": "July 2, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 94478, "end_char": 94490, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "its, letter dated July 2, 1975, relevant portion of which may be extracted:\n\n\"In this connection, a kind reference is invited to your letter dated the 14lh July, 1972 (which forms a part of the contract documents) wherein you had indicated that the rota/ foreign exchang~. required by you for the equipment; spares, 'technical know-how and hiring of experts, was expected to be about Rs 2 crores."}}, {"text": "14lh July, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 94611, "end_char": 94626, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "its, letter dated July 2, 1975, relevant portion of which may be extracted:\n\n\"In this connection, a kind reference is invited to your letter dated the 14lh July, 1972 (which forms a part of the contract documents) wherein you had indicated that the rota/ foreign exchang~. required by you for the equipment; spares, 'technical know-how and hiring of experts, was expected to be about Rs 2 crores."}}, {"text": "September 18;1975,", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 97607, "end_char": 97625, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By its Jetter dated September 18;1975, the contractor reiterated it~· position; In its letter dated October 6, 1975, the respondent when it was faced with the situation that the expenditure incurred under this head in foreign ex- change had risen to Rs 214.33 lacs i. e. it had exceeded the expected investment of Rs."}}, {"text": "October 6, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 97687, "end_char": 97702, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By its Jetter dated September 18;1975, the contractor reiterated it~· position; In its letter dated October 6, 1975, the respondent when it was faced with the situation that the expenditure incurred under this head in foreign ex- change had risen to Rs 214.33 lacs i. e. it had exceeded the expected investment of Rs."}}, {"text": "Clause 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 101818, "end_char": 101827, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 102069, "end_char": 102078, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 102163, "end_char": 102171, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 102388, "end_char": 102396, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 104319, "end_char": 104328, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 105184, "end_char": 105193, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 106147, "end_char": 106153, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ruby General lnsurance Co. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 110225, "end_char": 110256, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the decision in Ruby General lnsurance Co. Ltd. case."}}, {"text": "Denning", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 110644, "end_char": 110651, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Court of Appeal speaking through Lord Denning held that the claim in tort would be co\".ered by the arbitration clause, if the claim or the issue has a sufficiently close connection with the claim under the contract."}}, {"text": "clause. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 111221, "end_char": 111231, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 40", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 111556, "end_char": 111565, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 112060, "end_char": 112069, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Nariman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 112618, "end_char": 112625, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Nariman also wanted us to examine whether ihe claill) made by the arbitrator would •. be admissible on the principle of quantui meriut."}}, {"text": "Ernakulam", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 113911, "end_char": 113920, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. COCHIN SHIPYARD (Dei, J.) 161\n\nAccordingly this appeal succeeds and is allowed and the Judgment of the High Court is set aside and the Judgment atid order of the Subordinate Judge, Ernakulam dated March 30, 1979 is restored with costs throughout-\n\nN.V.K. 'Appeal gllowed . •"}}, {"text": "March 30, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 113927, "end_char": 113941, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. COCHIN SHIPYARD (Dei, J.) 161\n\nAccordingly this appeal succeeds and is allowed and the Judgment of the High Court is set aside and the Judgment atid order of the Subordinate Judge, Ernakulam dated March 30, 1979 is restored with costs throughout-\n\nN.V.K. 'Appeal gllowed . •"}}, {"text": "N.V.K.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 113978, "end_char": 113984, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. COCHIN SHIPYARD (Dei, J.) 161\n\nAccordingly this appeal succeeds and is allowed and the Judgment of the High Court is set aside and the Judgment atid order of the Subordinate Judge, Ernakulam dated March 30, 1979 is restored with costs throughout-\n\nN.V.K. 'Appeal gllowed . •"}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_3_162_168_EN", "year": 1984, "text": ",. 162\n\nA. YOUNUS KUNJU\n\nR.S. UNNI & OTHERS B March 8, 1984\n\n[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND RANGANATH MISRA, JJ.]\n\nElection Law-Representation of People Act, 1951 Section 123(4)-Al!egation c of Corrupt Practice and irregularities in the matter ofcounting of ballot papecs- Standard of proof of the charge of corrupt practiCe is the' sarlle in efectioh case, as_in a criminal case.\n\nIn tbe election held on 19.5.1982 for the election of a member of the Kerala Legi$lative Assembly \"from constit.uency No .. 125 lEravipuram in the Quilon District of that State, there were eight candidates in all but the main contest was between the appellant and the respondent. No. 1.\n\nThe appellant polled 37,073 while the respondent polled 37,862. There was therefore an ecess of 789 votes.\n\nAs per the result. declared .on 20.5.1982, the respondent wa• declared elected.\n\nThe appellanftherefore, filed an election petition in the Kerala. High Court alleging commission of corrupt practices wi_thin the meaning of J; Ub-sectiOns 2, 4, and- 7 of Section 123 of th~ Act and Several irregularities in . the course of counting leading to wrong conclusion regarding the result. In paragraphs 4 to 8 of the election petition it had been alleged that e1ecti0n agent Azeez published a statement dated 13.5.1982 in thdorm of a hand-bill kiag faI1e but serious allegations gainst the appellant touching his personal character and conduct.\n\nIt was alleged that the appellant h3.d caused the murder of one Omana, a _18.dy worker supporting Respondent -No. 1 because she refused to work for the\n\nappellant. The oral evidence to this Cffect byPWs 7, 8, 11 and 12 who-wefe the workers of tbe appellants aiid the plea for nonsummoning the.printer with the documents printed by him were not believe~ by the Election Judge. The. election petitiotvhaving been dismissed, .. the petitioner has come in appeal.\n\nDismissin& the appeal_. the Court\n\nHELD : 1 : 1. The High Court rightly negatived the challenge to the G election of respondent No. 1 o~ gronds of corrupt pratice. [168E]\n\n• 1 : 2. There is a -total consensus of judicial opinion that a chl:trge of currupt practice under the RepresentatiOJJ of People Act, 195f has to be proved beYond reason8.b1e doubt and the standard of prOof is the same as in a criminal case .. When the High Court applied the right standard in the. matter Of . . .,#Jr, \"f, .....\n\n• H\n\napprecition of the material pla:ced before it and has come to hold that the . allegatiorls of corrupt practice within the meaning of ection 123(4) of the Act bas not been proved, tbe Supreme Court would not re-appreciate the evidence. ' .\n\n(167FH, 168AJ\n\n• J\n\nA. Y. KUNJU v. R.s. UNNi (Ranganath Misra, J. ) 163\n\nMahant Shreenath v. Chaudhry Ranbir Singh [1970] 3 S.C.C. 647; Bqddepal/i A Rajtl{{opa/a Raa t. N.G. Ranga, A.I.R. 1971 SC 267; applied .\n\n• I : 3. Want of proper steps at the right time and negligence or. wilful default at 1he trial to Cause the summons and prodllctiOn of a document must only lead the Court todraw an acfvcrse inferance regarding non production of the relevaot material. [165G-H]\n\n1 : 4. Any report of a police officer which indicates that the information was gathered from the gossips in the locality jg not admissible and it is hearsay of a type to which no. credence could attach. [166A-B] ·\n\nl : 5. When an election was fought on party basis and there was sharp division of the electorate on the basis of political parties, workers at the election C with party alignment would Ilecesarily be political supporter of the tespective\n\ncanOidates and when called as witnesses thy would support their stand.\n\nInstances are not uncommon where such witnesses support_ their respective can-. didates and their cas~ even though the same may be far from truth. In such circun1stanceson the oral. testimony of PWs 7, 8, 11 and 12 who are admittedly workers of the appellant the change of publication of objectionable materials can not be said to have been established. [t61iB-D] D\n\nCNIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5992 of 1983\n\nAppeal from the J11dgment and order dated the 7th December, 1982 of the Kerala High Cowt in Election Petition No. 8 of 1982\n\nE ·\n\nM.M. Abdul Khader and E.M.S. Anam for the Appellant.\n\nf. Govinden Nair and N. Sudhakaran for the Respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nRANGANATH MISRA, J. This appeal under Section ll6A of the Representation of People Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') is directed against the decision of the Kerala High Court dismissing the election petition of the appellant whereby he challenged the election of respondent No .. 1 as a member of the Kerala Legislative Assembly from Constituel)cy No. 125 Eravipuram in the ..\n\nQuilon district of that State. Election was held on 19.5.l\\2 and the result was declared on the following day. There were eight candidates in all but the main contest was between the appellant and the respondent No. 1. The appellant polled 37, 073 while respondent No. 1polled37, 862.\n\nTherewas, therefore, an excess of 789 votes.\n\nAll the remaining candidates together polled abo11t 2,000 votes.\n\n$UPREME COURT REPORTS [1984] 3 s.c.R:\n\nChallenge to the election was laid on two g!'.ounds:- namely, commission of corrupt prctices within .the eaning of sub-sections 2, 4 and 7 of Section 123 of the Act and several irregularities in th~ course of counting leading to wrong conclusion regarding the result.\n\nThe returned candidate .joined issue and denied these allegations.\n\nThe learned Election Judge in the High Court came to hold that the appellant had failed to bring home the charges of corrupt practices ..\n\nHe also did .not accept the plea of irregularities in counting ofbal!otpapers. A request made to him for recount was rejected and on these conclusions he held that the election petition was liable to be dismissed.\n\nAppellant's counsel conceded tha't the allegations of corrupt practices covered by sub-section 2 of Section l 23 of the Act would not be pressed.\n\nHe also fairly accepted the position that the evidence relating. to obtaining or procuring of assistance for the furtherance of the prospects of respondent No. l's election from government ' . ervants was inadequate as found by the High Court. Two grounds were, therefore, pressed in support. of the appeal, na'mely, the allegations of corrupt practice within the Section 123(4) of the Act and the allegations of irregularities in the matter of counting of_ ballot-papers.\n\nSection 123(4) provides:\n\n\"123. The following shall}be deemed to: be corrupt o practices for the purposes of this Act:-\n\n(4) The publication by a candidate. or his agent or by any 0th.er pers.on (with the consent of a candidate or his election. agen.t), of any statement of fact which is false, and . ' which he either believes to be false or does not believe to be true, in relation to the personal character or conduct of any candidate; or in relation to the candidature, or witbdrawal, of any candidate, being a statement reasonably calculated to prejudice the prospects of that candidates e.lection.\"\n\n• Admittedly Azeez was the election agent of respondent No: I.\n\nIn paragraphs 4 to 8 of the election petition, it bad been allged that election agent Azeez published a statement dated 13.5.82 in tlie form of a hand-bill making false but serious allegations against the appellant touching his personal character and conduct. It was alleged that the appellant had ca11se<J t4e murder of one OII\\ana1 a\n\n). .. \"· KUNJlJv. iu. UNNI (Ranganath Misra, J.) 165\n\nlady worker supporting the respondent No.I because she refused to sllpport his campaign. A meeting was held on 14.5.82 at a place known Tatamala Junction to condemn and Condole the said death.\n\nIf'was respresented that the death was \"Caused on the ground that the said helpless lady was not prepared to work for him. Azeez along'wit)l other election workers carried wide scale propaganda with loud-speakers. At the said meeting there were many speakers including Azeez and the respondent No. I who spoke in the same strain as the contetl'ts of the hand-bill. This was done ·with a view to affecting the prospects of tile appellant's election. Similar\n\npropaganda was said to have been made by them urnil canvassing stopped. The respondent No.I denied these allegations in the written statement. According to the appellant the corrupt ptactices within the meaning of Section 123(4) of the Act related to distribution of the hand-.bill in question, naely, at two places being Mayyanana and Thrikkovil Battom areas and the speeches were made at the public meeting held at Tatamala Junctiqn.\n\nExhibit P-1 is a copy of the hand-bill. No steps were taken to summon the original documynts\"from the press where the hand-bill is said to have been got printed by Azeez, though the name of the press was borne on the hand-bill. Soon after the hand-bill came to be circulated a denial was published by the press to the effect that no such bill was printed and/or publishd by the press. Admittedly the relevant materials if called from. the press would have been the best evidence to provide the link. between the publicafion of tl; ie objectio' nable material and the 'election agent of the respondent No.I.-\n\nWhen. we made a qury from !counsel for the appellant as to why such steps were not tken and the primary evidence was kept away from the Court, learned counsel.indicated to us that. the press bad come out with a denial'closely following the circulation and it was not likely that the press would have caused production of the doca ment. Since the name of the press was given in the document and appellant proceeded on the footing that the document was printed in the said press, if the press did not comply with the summons, . production could have been enforced by law. Want of proper steps at the right time and negligence or wilful default at the trial cannot be answered in the manner appellant's counsel has contended before us .and w.e must draw adverse inference against the appellant for non-production of the re.levant material. Reliance was also placed on a report by P.W.4, a police officer where there was mention of such propganda being carried on with reference t0 the death of the\n\n• C.\n\n166 SUPJlEMB, co\\JRt REPORTS [l 984) 3 s.c.iv\n\n~ lady. The report did not indicate the source but only statel:l tht ; the police officer collected the information from the gossips in. the ! locality. Such a report as righly held by the High Court was not I\n\nll admissible , and it was hearsay of a type to which no credence could attach. Though counsel was very vehement to press this document , into service he was not in a position to cite any legal basis for doing / so. Apart from these two documents' which we hold had ben\n\n•' rightly ruled out, the other evidence is oral in character and P.Ws. '. 1, 8, II and J2 are the witnesses who have. been spoken about it.·\n\nAdmittedly all these witnesses were the workers of the appellant.\n\nThere is over-whelming m.aterial n the record, and even counsel fairly admitte.d, that .the election was fought on party basis and there was sharp division of the electorate on the basis of political parties.\n\nThat being the position, 'workers at the election with party alignment would necessarily be political supporters of the respective candidates and when •called as Witnesses they would '.support their stand.\n\nInstances are not uncommon where such witnesses support their respective candid.ates and their cases even though the same be far from truth. In such circumstances we do not think on the oral. testimony of. these fo'ur witnesses the, charge of publication of ' objectionable materials can be said to have been established.\n\n~ . . .\n\nAdmittedly the meeting at Tatamala Junction was held on the 14.5 .. 82 towards the evening. It is the case of the appellant that at this meeting the respondent No. 1, his election agent Azeez and several other supporters spoke.\n\nEach one of them referred tothe. appellant as the person respohsible for the murder of tpe lady.\n\nThere is no dispute before us that the picture drawn up as the appellant as the murder• of the lady' would very .much tarnish hjs image, personality and ccter and woul.d have ad'1ersely affected the. prospects of his winning the election is, widely circulated in the constituency before pollin.s. Three witnessas have been examined being P.Ws.2, 6 and 9 in respect of the Tatamala meeting. P.W. 2 was the Circle Inspector of Police of the area and stated that he had attended the meeting. Though the 'meeting started at 7 p.m. he went to the meeting place at about 9 p.m. and remained there for about an hour.\n\nThus at about 10 p.m. he left the place but the. meeting was still continuing. 'He referred to the speech by Azeez but did nol indicate as to what exactly he spoke. In cross-examination he admitted that though he maifllined a diary, the details Of the meeting were not . . available and he did not report about the meeting to his superior officers, This evidence does not lend any support to the case sought to be made out by the appellant. P.W. 6 was aprinter and publisher of\n\nA. Y .• kUNJlJ v. R.s. UNNI (Ranganath Misra, /.) 167\n\nthe newspaper by name Pauramitram. His evidence is that he was also working as reporter of the paper and.had gone to the meeting in such capacity. pn the basis of his jottings he gave a news item which was published in the paper marked Exhibit P-3. He claims to have left the meeting place at.9.30 p.m. but th~ meeting was still continuing. The news item as. rep.orted.does indicate what Azeez spoke. The -, vitness also deposed on oath about the speech of Azeez. The High court refused to .place any reliance on this witness mainly on account of the fact that this paper was not an established newspaper of the area and did not have regular pubJi; • . cation. On the basis of the evidence of R. W. 1 the information officer at the state headquarter.s, the High Court came to doubt the .. bona-fide of f.W.6 as also his paper. We have also perused tI:ie evidence of P.W.6 and R.W.l and the observations of the High Court in regard to this aspect.\n\nWe are inclined to agree with the High Court that the evidence of the witness is not impressive and we hold the same was rightly rejecte<l by the High Court which had occasion to see him. The only other witness who has been examined in regard to the meeting.is P.W.9. a person who claims to be independent and\\unc.onnected with the lis. P.W.9 on his.own showing had gone to . see his father suffering from a heart, attack. 'He came from a place' about 20 kilometres away. According to him he left father's place by around 10.30 p.m. If that be so and he was covering a distance of about 20 kilometres, he would not have .reached the meeting place before 11.p.m. when the meeting is said to have concluded. His evidence that he stayed at the meeting place to listen to the speeches for quite sometime has therefore, to'be ruled out as inconsistent with the .other evidence. His evidence too has been rightly rejected by te High Court.\n\nThere is total consensus of judicial opinion that ·. a charge of corrupt practice under the Act has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt and standard of proof is the same as in a criminal case. See\n\nMahant Sliree Nath v. Chaudhry 'Ranbir Singh.1 This proposition has even not been disputed by counsel for the .appellant. We, th.erefore, do not propose to refer to the catena of de.cisions affirming the aforesaid view. The High Court applied the right standard in the matter of appreciation of the material placed before it and has come to hold that the allegations of corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123(4) of the Act has not been proved. In suh a situa-\n\n(l) [1970] 3 s.c.c. 647\n\n16S SUI'll.EMll COuilT 11.EPollTS [!~84] 3 s.c.k '\n\n A fion as pointe~] out by thislCourt1 in Jthe case of Boddepalli\n\nD . .\n\n. J?.ajagopa/a RM v. N.G. Ranga,1 this Court would not reappreciate . the evidence. Shah, J. as he then was observed tus:. . ·\n\n\"The finding of the learned Trial Judge is based upon appreciation of evidence of the witneses in the light of'probabilities. A charge of corrupt practice under the Representation of the People Act must be established by clear _and\n\ncogenevidence. When the Court of First Instance on a consideration of . the evidence of the witnesses has refused to place any reliance upon their testimony the burden lying upon tha party setting up a plea of corrupt practice becoes no lighter in appeal. T)le charge cannot be held, established merely upon suspicion, or preponderance of probabilities.\n\nUnless the appellant establishes that the appreciatfon of evidence was vitiated by gross misreading or misconception of the evidence or because of failure toconsider important pieces of evidence which had a bearing on the charge or because of seriousirregularities in procedure which amount to a denial. of a. fair trial the appellate court. will not proceed to reappreciate the evidence on which the findings are recorded by the Court of First Instance on the credibility of witnesses.\" ·\n\nWe are in complete.agreement with these observations. Our conclusion, therefore,· is that the High Court rihtly negatived the challenge to the election of responent No. l on grounds of corrupt practices. /If,• . . .\n\nThe only other c-0ntention canvassed at the h<aring is about the irreguJarities in the counting. The total rejected. ballot-papers were within the range of SQO while the difference between the appellant and the . respondent No. l was .about 800. The details necessary for obtaining a recouI>t Weijj, not pleaded in the election petition nor was any cogent material placed before the Court which could bring the matter within the rule indicated by this Court t.o justify :a direction for recount .. That !plea, in our opinion, has\n\nrightly been negatived by the High Court. The appeal fails and is dismissed. Parties shall beat their own costs in this Court.\n\n~ Appeal dismissed.\n\n(I) AIR [1971) S.C. 267", "total_entities": 33, "entities": [{"text": "162\n\nA. YOUNUS KUNJU", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3, "end_char": 23, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A. YOUNUS KUNJU", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R.S. UNNI & OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 25, "end_char": 43, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. UNNI & OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 8, 1984", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 46, "end_char": 59, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "162\n\nA. YOUNUS KUNJU\n\nR.S. UNNI & OTHERS B March 8, 1984\n\n[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND RANGANATH MISRA, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 62, "end_char": 82, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RANGANATH MISRA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 87, "end_char": 107, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RANGANATH MISRA, JJ.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Election Law-Representation of People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 110, "end_char": 157, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 123(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 158, "end_char": 172, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Election Law-Representation of People Act, 1951", "statute": "Election Law-Representation of People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Kerala. High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 912, "end_char": 930, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellanftherefore, filed an election petition in the Kerala."}}, {"text": "Section 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1026, "end_char": 1037, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Election Law-Representation of People Act, 1951", "statute": "Election Law-Representation of People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Azeez", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 1240, "end_char": 1245, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In paragraphs 4 to 8 of the election petition it had been alleged that e1ecti0n agent Azeez published a statement dated 13.5.1982 in thdorm of a hand-bill kiag faI1e but serious allegations gainst the appellant touching his personal character and conduct."}}, {"text": "Omana", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 1475, "end_char": 1480, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was alleged that the appellant h3.d caused the murder of one Omana, a _18.dy worker supporting Respondent -No."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2563, "end_char": 2576, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "allegatiorls of corrupt practice within the meaning of ection 123(4) of the Act bas not been proved, tbe Supreme Court would not re-appreciate the evidence. ' ."}}, {"text": "Ranganath Misra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2666, "end_char": 2681, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "UNNi (Ranganath Misra, J. ) 163\n\nMahant Shreenath v. Chaudhry Ranbir Singh [1970] 3 S.C.C. 647; Bqddepal/i A Rajtl{{opa/a Raa t. N.G. Ranga, A.I.R. 1971 SC 267; applied .", "canonical_name": "RANGANATH MISRA, JJ."}}, {"text": "M.M. Abdul Khader", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4176, "end_char": 4193, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8 of 1982\n\nE ·\n\nM.M. Abdul Khader and E.M.S. Anam for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "E.M.S. Anam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4198, "end_char": 4209, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8 of 1982\n\nE ·\n\nM.M. Abdul Khader and E.M.S. Anam for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Govinden Nair", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4233, "end_char": 4246, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "f. Govinden Nair and N. Sudhakaran for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "N. Sudhakaran", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4251, "end_char": 4264, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "f. Govinden Nair and N. Sudhakaran for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "Representation of People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4389, "end_char": 4423, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "$UPREME COURT REPORTS [1984]", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5122, "end_char": 5150, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "$UPREME COURT REPORTS [1984] 3 s.c."}}, {"text": "sections 2, 4 and 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5280, "end_char": 5299, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Representation of People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "Section 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5303, "end_char": 5314, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Representation of People Act, 1951", "statute": "the Representation of People Act, 1951"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5939, "end_char": 5948, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 123(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6363, "end_char": 6377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 123(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6473, "end_char": 6487, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Azeez", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7092, "end_char": 7097, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• Admittedly Azeez was the election agent of respondent No: I.\n\nIn paragraphs 4 to 8 of the election petition, it bad been allged that election agent Azeez published a statement dated 13.5.82 in tlie form of a hand-bill making false but serious allegations against the appellant touching his personal character and conduct.", "canonical_name": "Azeez"}}, {"text": "13.5.82", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7263, "end_char": 7270, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• Admittedly Azeez was the election agent of respondent No: I.\n\nIn paragraphs 4 to 8 of the election petition, it bad been allged that election agent Azeez published a statement dated 13.5.82 in tlie form of a hand-bill making false but serious allegations against the appellant touching his personal character and conduct."}}, {"text": "14.5.82", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7645, "end_char": 7652, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A meeting was held on 14.5.82 at a place known Tatamala Junction to condemn and Condole the said death."}}, {"text": "Section 123(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8400, "end_char": 8414, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Pauramitram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13216, "end_char": 13227, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "UNNI (Ranganath Misra, /.) 167\n\nthe newspaper by name Pauramitram."}}, {"text": "Section 123(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15685, "end_char": 15699, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Boddepalli", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15881, "end_char": 15891, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~84] 3 s.c.k '\n\n A fion as pointe~] out by thislCourt1 in Jthe case of Boddepalli\n\nD . ."}}, {"text": "Shah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15984, "end_char": 15988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shah, J. as he then was observed tus:. . ·"}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16193, "end_char": 16225, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_3_169_179_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "VED PRAKASH GUPTA\n\nD.ELTON CABLE INDIA (P) LTD. l.t\n\nMarch 8, 1984.\n\n}).A. DESAI 0. CHJNNAPPA REDDY & A. VARADARAJAN JJ.)\n\n Industrial Disputes .Act. 1947 S. 2(s)-Definition of Workman-Scope of- Covers.an employee whose substanriQl duty is of a securit)I inspector _at the gate of\n\nfactO'.Y premises.\n\nIndustrial Disputes Act, 1947-S. 2(ra)\"-Dejinition of unfair labour practice- Scope of-Dimissal on flimsy gr/Jund-Wh; ther amounts to vict!mjzation or unfair labour pr:actlce by management.\n\nNatural Justice-Principle ... of-Enquiry officer nat summoning necessary D witnesses-Whether findings of enquiry ojfiCer pen>erse.\n\nThe appellant, an.e1nployee_ of the respondent, was charg-:d for abusins,, some feHOw worker oi officer of the management within the premises of the_\n\nfactory of the respondent. In dome,.stic enquiry the Enquiry Officer found the appellant guilty of the charge. The .mt\\nag\"ement dismissed the appellant. On a reference being made under s. tO(i)(c) of the Industrial Disputes Act. 1947 the Labour Cout held on preliminary issue that the reference was bad in law bccauSC>the appellant was not a workman under s. 2(s) of the Act. The Labour Court's findirigs w.:re challengCd by the appellant in a writ petition which was dismissed by the High. Court in limine On a special leave petition being fi.Jed by the appellarit from which this appeal arises, this Court dfrected the Labour Court to try the other issues before it on the basis that the appellant was a\n\nworkman. The Labour Court held that the finding of the Inquiry Officer was ... perverse; the punishment of dismissal was dispr0porti6nate to the gravity of the charge and the appllanl was entitled to reinstatement with full back wages and continuity of service. The management filed a writ petition in the High Co'urt challenging the findings of the Labour Court. This writ petition was transferred to this Court.\n\nAllowing the appeal and dismissing the.writ petition,\n\nHELD : A perusal of the evidenee shows that the substantial part of the work of the appellant consisted of looking after the security oflhe factory and its property by deputing t.he watchmen working under him to \\\\'Ork at the factory\n\ngte or sending them to watch-towers or around the factory or to accoin.pany v.lSitors tb the factory and making entries in the visitors' register as regards the visitors and in the concerned registers as' Te&ards materjaJ entering or, going out of the premises oftlte factory. The apellant could never appoint or dismiss any workman or orer any enqu~? against any workm; in. In these circumstance'\n\n,-.\n\n. .,\n\nit is hetd that the substantial duty of the' appellant was only thatof a Security Inspector at the &ate of the factory premises and that it was nelther-managerial nor supervisory in nature in the sense in. which those terms are understood in industriaJ law. Theref.ore he clearly falls within the definition of workman Under s. 2(s) of the Act and the reference of the dispute under s. IO(i)(c) of the Ac.tis valid in, aw. [17'IBC, E-G]\n\nIt is seen from the judgment of the Labour Court that though \\be appellant had produced before the Enquiry Officer 5 sheetS of.papers with the signatures of about 100 workmen of the factory in support 'of the statement that the appellant had not abused anyone in the factory dufing the course 'of his servjce and the manage'ment had produced Exts. M-6, a list of 90 peisons before the Enquiry Officer, he h'!d not called any of those persons .to ascertain thetruth regarding the allegCd abuse by the appellant. It is also seen from the judgment of the Labour Court that.the appe'llant was hot giVen a list of the management's witnesses before the commen9ement of the domestic enquiry. In these cir<:um stances, the conclusion of the Labour Court that the Enquiry Officer had not acte4 properly in the proceedings and that he had not given full Opportunity to the appellant as required by law does not call for any interference: [178CE]\n\nThe punishment ..awarded to the appellant is shockingly disproportionate \"regard b, eing l; ad to the charge framed against him. No resporisible eployer\n\nwould ever impose in like circumstances the .punishn1ent of dismissal to the employee, and victimizatio~ or unfair labour practice.could well be inferred irom •the conduct of 'the management in aWarding the extreme punishn1ent of dis- . missal for.a flimsy charge of abuse of some worker or officer of the management by the appellant within the premises of thefactory. [l78G-H, 179A]\n\nTherefore termination of the apiJellant's sf;:rvice is invalid and unsustainable 'in law. [179A]\n\nL/yods Bank Ltd. v. Panna lat Gupta & Others(l961) LLJ.18 and Construction and Engineering Company Ltd. v. Their Wor.kmen (1965) LLJ. 462, .\n\nrefrred to~\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1673 ~~. . ..\n\nApJ?eal by Special leave from the Ju<lgment and Order dated the !Ith hnuary, 1982 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 26 of 1982).\n\nG o. P. Malhotra, and N, S. Das Bahl and Pawan K. Bahl for\n\nthe Appellant.\n\nShanti Bhushan and V.P. Chaudhary for.the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Coutt was delivered by\n\nV ARADARAJAN, J. This civil appeal by special leave is direced itgainst the judgment delivered by the Division Bench of the Punjab\n\nV.'f>. GUPTA v .. DELTON CABLE (Vardarajan, J.) j 7J\n\n& Haryana High Curt on 11.1.1982 dismissing in limine Writ\n\nPetition No. 26of1982 which had been filed by the appellant Ved Prakash Gupta. The appellant was an employee of the first respondent M/s; Delton Cable India (Pl Ltd. Faridabad, Haryana. He was given a charge-sheet by the management on 5.8.1979 and dismissed from service on 13.9.1979 after having been found guilty of the charge in the domestic enqiry conducted by the Enquiry Officer who has been examined as one of the witnesses on the side of the mana-· ' gement before the Labour Court at a later stage. There was reference of tHe dispute arising out of the dismissal of _the appellant to the Labour .Court, Faridabad in Reference No. 143 of 1980 under\n\ns.10 (i) (c) of the Irldustrial Disputes Act, hereinafter referred to as the 'Act.' The Labour Court framed the following issues. ·\n\n(i), Whether the claimant Shrl Ved Prakash Guljta was in the position of a workman under the Industrial Disputes Act?\n\nIf so, to what effect?\n\n(ii) Whether tlie reference is bad in law in view of the objections raised in the written statement? If. so, to what effect?\n\n(iii) Whether proper and 'valid . domes-tic enquiry has been E , conducted? If so, to what effect?\n\n(iv) Whether the termination of the service of the workman is proper, justified and in order? If not, to what relief is he entitled? • Issues l and 2 were tried as preliminary issues by the Labour Court. The Labour Court held on issue no. l that the appellant Is not a workman within the 'maning of the definition of workman contained in s. 2(s) of the Act. Consequently, it was held that the reference is bad in law in the light of the bjections raised by the ll'.!anagement in the written statement. The Labour Court held that there was no need to consider. the other two issues and passed an award against the appellant. It was against that a, ward that the appel)ant filed the writ petition which was dismissed by the Division Bench of the High Court in limine on 11.1.1982. This Court granted special leave 'to appeal against the judgment of the High Court and later directed the Labour Court to try the other issues on the basis that the appellant is a workman as per the f\\ct. The Labour Court accordingly tried the other two issues and held that though the domestic enquiry\n\nstlP_l_\\BME Collilt REPORTS [1984] 3 s.c.it\n\nwas fair and proper the finding of the euquity officer was perverse.\n\nThe Labur Court has observed: •\n\n\"The Enquh;.y Officer should have given findings according to the evidence before him intbe enquiry proceeding. J; Ie bas neglected M4 and M-6 while giving the findings in the enquiry. -He also failed to summon the necessray witnesses\n\nan,4 tejected the request of the workman for challenging those witnesses.''\n\nThe Labour Court found that the punishment of dismissal awarded to the appellant was disproportionate to the gravity of the charge framed against him and that be is entitled to reinstatement with full baci\\: wges and continuity of service.\n\nI t- ,\n\nThe management filed Writ P.tition No .. 4567 of 1982 in the' High Court against the order of the Labour Court holding that the finding of the Enquiry Officer was perverse and that the appellant\n\n. Y is entitled t0 reiastatement With full back wages and continuity of service. The writ petition has been itbdrawri to this Court by order dated 9.7.1983 to be beard along with the civil appeal. This .. is how the. civil appeal and writ petition have come up before us . .\n\nE .\n\nArguments were advanced before us by Mr. 0. P. Malhotra\n\nr -\n\nappearing for the appellant and Mr. V. P. Choudhary appearing for management on two points viz:(!) whether tbe appellant wa~ • .:/ a workmen at the relevant time and (2) whether his dismissal is valid in law\n\nThe charge framed against the appellht was a~ follows:\n\n\"You were on duty on 31.7. 1979 and 1.8..1979 from 8 a.m .. to 4 p.m. It was reported against you as under:\n\nOn 31. 7 .1979 a person from M/s. Gurnmukh Dass (building material supplier) came to lMI department with two copies of challan No. )05 dated 15.7.1979 f9r obtaining the signature of the person mncerned in ·;1oke1i of having received 2000 bricks. The copies ofthe chanan were having the gate entry. Shri Durg Singh on instructions of Mr. S.K.\n\nBagga, junior Engineer, went to the gate for confirming whether the bricks have been received in the factory premises. us per the challan. It was found that the gate entry for the . . ., .\n\n.L.\n\n. -\" ' t\n\nV.P. GUPTA v. DELTON CABLE (Varadarajan, J.) 173\n\nsupply of 2000 bricks as per the challan aforesaid had been A cancelled in the gate register. You, however, tookthe challan (both copies) from Shri Durg Singh and cancelled the gate\n\nentry from the challan and returned goth the copies to the perso°' of M/s; Gnrumukh Dass.\n\nThat on 1.8.1979 as pe. the instructions of IM! department one Mr. Hira Laf, the worker ofIMI department was sent to the gate office in connection with a challan of a water pump. As the worker i.e. said Mr. Hirn Lal did not come back to IMI department for quite some time Mr. S.K. Bagga, •Junior Engineer of IM! department persona!Ly went to the . gate office. He (S.K. Bagga) apprised Mr. Deep Chand\n\nSenior Security Officer of the irresponsibl~ manner in which yon delivered the chalian to the persop of M/s. Gurumukh Dass instead of to IM! department. When Mr. Deep Chand further verified this fact from you you showed ignorance and\n\n- demanded t0 know the name of the person who had said so.\n\nWhen informed that it was Durg Singh you without any rhyme and reason or provocation abused Shri Durg Singh in a filthy manner saying (translated in English as I fuck the mother of Dnrg Singh ; bring him). You were advised that being a responsible employee and that too belonging' to the security departmnt you should not abuse any employee but you continued in hot temper and demanded Mr. Durg Singh to be called in the gate office.\n\nWhen Shri Durg Singh was brought and in your presence he once again confirmed and . reiterated.that yon had given the chal!an to the person of M/s.\n\nGurumukh Das yon lost all your senses and started abusing Shri S.K. Bagga left and right in a filthy, derogatory and abusive manner. You said (translated in English as-you should try liard to. your gandh; y, ou cannot do anything worng to me. Yon may go to Ram Kumar or yon may go to Vijay Ku; mar): The above conduct of yours is gross misconduct as you have lost the basic. courtesy which yon were supposed to extend to the employees as a responsible member of the security staff. The charges if proved will result in total loss of confidence in you.\"\n\nJhe two questions arising for our consideration in the civil appeal and writ petition are :\n\n(i) whether the appellant was a workman within the meanin$\n\n<;>f s. 2. (s)'Of the Act ?; an~\n\n' G\n\n174 SUPREME co.URT REPORTS\n\n(1984] 3 S.C.R.\n\n(ii) whether. the termination of the appellant's service is\n\nproper?\n\n On the first question there is evidence of only the appellant .examined as WW-I on his side and of the Personnel Manager examined as MW-! 0n the side of the management. The evidence WW-I shows that he was originally recruited as a clerk on a .salary of Rs. 160/- per mense.m. It was admitted by MW-I t!iat at the time of the termiqation of his service WW-I was dtawing total emoluments of Rs. 581/- per mensem as Chargeman security equivll- . lent to a security Inspector as stated in the appellant's claim statement. He was working under the Security Officer and varions other heads of departments of the management.\n\nHe has deposed thtt he used to perform the duty of a Chowkidar whenever one left.the place temporarily for taking tea etc.\n\nHe has also deposed that he used to accompany accounts branch people as a gaurd ', Vhenever they carried money. He. has statd. that he was ordered to fill up leave application forms of other workmen and counter-sign them before they were approved by the Security Officer. It has ben elicited from him that he has filled up duty registers of workmen and thai some small store items like torch-cells were issued from the\n\nstore~ under his signatures. It is seen from his evidence that such store items could be got from the stores under tohe signatures of . . ' even watchmen. On the other hand, MW-I has stated in his evidence that Exts .. M-1 to M-7 are copies of leave applications of workmen containing the apellant's signatures and .that Exts. M-50\n\nanct' M-Sl bearing the appellant's signatures are identity cards .issued by the management to workmen. He has. stated that the Security Inspector is provided with a. chair and a table and three telephones- . one of them an intercom, one connected with the fact.ory and the ·\n\nthird connected with the exchange of the telephone department and that the appellant was an officer of the first rank in the respondent's factory. There is no doubt whatsoever that MW<-1 is exaggerating the position which the appellant was holding in, t!ie respondent's factory.\n\nHe has admitted that the telephone is piovided in.the Security Inspector's rooni at the gate of the factory premises only to pass on immediate information to other places from the gate of the factory: The telephon, s provided in the Securify Inspector's room at the gate of the factory premises are not intended for the Security• Inspector to carry on any managerial function. MW-I has admitted , jn his evidence that the, Security Inspector ould not appointor dismiss or even take any disCiplinary action against any workman of the\n\netj:ilishmen\\. He has stated that the Security Inspector has control\n\n' >\n\nV.P. GUPTA v. DELTON CABLE (Varadarajan, J.) 175\n\nover 5 watchmerl, drivers, Rickhaw-pullars and sweepers-16 persons. in all and is ip. overall charge of the factory during the first and third shifts which cover the period from 12 mid-night to 8 a.m. while. the important second shift is from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. According to the evidence of MW-1 the security Inspector allots duties to persons working under him by way of retaining them at the factory's gate r sending them to watch-towers or for moving around the factory or . accompanying visitors to the factory.\n\nHe could order his subordinates to come for overtime duty, sanction , leave for them and recommend for advances and for their promotion. He could issue identity cards like Exts. M-50 and M-51 to workmen and draw small items of stores and issue them to the security staff. He has admitted that the Security Inspector has writing work for only 10 to 30 minutes in the second shift and almost no writing work at all in the first and third shifts and that the writing work consists of entering the names of visitors in the .visitors' register and making entries in respect of in-coming and out-goi!'g materiais in the concerned registers.\n\nS. 2(s) of the'.Act describes a workman and reads :\n\n\"workman' means any person (including apprentice) employed in any industry to do any manual, unskilled, skilled, . technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employiner\\( be express or implied and for the purpose of any proceeding under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connec- _ tion with, or as a consequence of, that dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment ha;\" led to that dispute, but does not include any such .person-\n\n(i) who is subject to the Air Force Act, 1950 (45 of. 1950), or the Army Act, 1950 (46 of 1950), or the Navy Act, 1957 (62 of 1957) ; or\n\n(ii) who is employed in the police service or as an officer or other employee of a prison I or\n\n(iii) who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity ; or\n\n_(iv) who, being employed in a supervisory capacity, . draws wages exceeding one thousand six hundred rupees per mensem or exercises, either by the nature of dutis atta\"ched to the office .or by reason of the powers:vested in him, func tions mainly 'of a managerial nature.\" '\n\nThe respondent-management can at best contend that the appellant would fall under s. 2(s) (iii). That has been its attempt before the Labour Court and also in this Court. The management's endeavour is to show that the appellant who admittedtly was drawing total emoluments of.only Rs. ~81/· per mensem at the relevant time was employed in a managerial or administrative capacity and was therefore not a workman who could raise a dispute under the Act.\n\nThis Court has stated in Llyods Bank Ltd. v. Panna .Lal Gupta & Others 1 that though it would be legitimate to say that the work done in the audit department is 'important for the proper and efficient functioning of the bank it would be idle to elevate that work to the status o\\ offiers who supervise the work of everybody concerned with the bank's establishment. It would be useful to remember in this connection what this Court had stated in Hind Construction and\n\nElfgineering Company Ltd. v .. T}leir work'!'en.• It is this :\n\n \"The tribunal's Power has been stated in this Court in a large number of cases and it has been ruled that the tribunal can only interfere if the conduct of the employer shows lack of bona !ides or victimization of employee or employees or unfair labour practice. The tribunal may in a strong case interfere with a basic error on a point of fact or a perverse finding but it cannot substitute its own appraisal of the evidence for that of the officer conducting .the domestic enquiry though it may interfere where the principles of natural justice or fair play have not been followed or where the enquiry is so perverted in its procedure as to amount to no enquiry at all......... The tribunal is not required to consider the propriety or adequacy of the punishment or ' whether it is excessive or too severe .. Bnt 'where the punish\n\nment is shockingly disproportionate regard being had to the\n\n(!) [1961] L.L.J. 18\n\n\\2) [1965] L.L.J. 46?\n\n. ' ?\n\nv.P. GUPTA v. DELTON CABLE (T'.aradarajan, J.)\n\nparticular conduct and the past record or is such as no reasonable employer would ever impose in like circumstances, the tribunal may treat the imposition qf uch punishment as hself showing victimization or unfair labour practice.\"\n\nA perusal of.the evidence of WW-1 and MW-1 •regarding the nature of the duties performed by the. appellant shows that the substantial part of the work of the appellant consisted of looking after the sec1Jrity of the factory and its property by deputing the watchmen working upder him to work at the factory gate or sending them to watch-towers or around the factory or to accompany . visitors to the factory and mal[ing .entries in the visitors' .register as regards the visitors and in the concerned registers as regards . ' . . materials entering or going out of the premises of the factory. It must be noted that MW-1 has admitted in his evidence that there is nothing in writting to show what duties are to be carried out by the appellant. Placed in such a situation the appellant might have been doing other items of work such as signing identity cards of workmen, issuing some small items of stores like torch-cells etc. to bis subordinate watchmen, which can be got from the stQieS even under . the signatures of watchman and filling up applicatio1;1 forms of other\n\nworkmen and counier-signing them or recommending advances and loans or for promotion of his subordinates. It must also be remembered that the evidence of both WW-I and MW-I shows that the appellant could never appoint or dismiss any workman or order . . any enquiry against any workman. In these circnmstances weold\n\nthat-the sulistantial duty of the appellant was only that of a Security Inspector at the gate of the factory premises and that it was neither. managerial nor supervisory in nature in the sense in which those terms are understood in industrial law. In the light of the evidence and the legal position referred to above we are of the opinion that. the finding of the Labour Courfthat the appellant is not a workman within the meaning ofs. 2(s) of the Act is perverse and could not be supported.\n\nOn the evidence available on record we bold that the appellant clearly falls within the definition of a workman ins. 2(s) of . the Act and that the reference of the dispute under s.10 (i) (c) of the Act is valid in law.\n\n The finding of the Labour Court that the enquiry was fair and prqper in the light 'Of its own finding that the enquiry :\"fficer failed to summon the necessary witnesses and rejected the request of the _.appellant for challenging the witnesses could not be stated to be correct.\n\nOn the merits some witnesses were examined on the side pf the management before the Labour Court and they are S.K.\n\n•• c\n\n•• c\n\nBagga, MW-2, Hira Lal, MW-3, Deep Chand, MW-4 and Laxmi *-;.-\n\nChand, MW-5 an Accountant ofM/s. Gurumukh Dass, MW-2 has '--.. deposed about the appell; mt abusing Durg Singh who according tq the appellant was the Secretary of a Labour Uniou while the appellant and others were trying to canvass membership for a rival trade union.\n\nMWs-3 and 4 are stated to have corroliorated the evidence.of MW-2.\n\nMW-5 is the only independent witness examined on the side of the management. It is seen from the judgment of the Labour Court relating to the merits of the case that MW-5 who has deposed aout . the challans Exts. M-7 and M-8 having been returned to the persori who accompanied him from the maintenance,. department had not supported. the management that. the appellant abused Durg Singh or any other person within the premises of the factory. It is aiso seen from the judgment of the Labour Court that though the appellant had produced before the Enquiry Of11cer 5 sheets of papers with the signatures of about 100 workmen of the factory in support of the statement that the appellant had not abused anyone in the factory during the course of his service and th.e management had produced Exts. M-6, a list of90 persons before the Enquiry Officer, he had not called any of '.. - . those persons to ascertain the truth regarding the alleged abuse of Durg Singh and S.K. Bagga by the appellant. I.tis also seen from the judgment of the Labour Court that the appellant was not given a list of the management's witnesses before the commencement of the domestic enquiry. In these circumstances, we are of the op; nion that thl!! conclusion of the Labour Court that the Enquiry Officer had not\" acted properly in ihe proceedh1gs arid that he had not given full . ' . opportunity to the appellant as required by law does not call for any interference. The charge levelled against the appellant is not a serious one and it is not known how the charge even if proved would result in any much less total loss of confidence of the management in the appellant as the management would have it in the charge. It was argued In the Labour Court that there was no previous adverse remark against the appellant. There is nothing record to show that any previous adverse remark against the appellant had b.een taken into consideration by the management for a warding the extreme penalty of dism.issal from service to the appellant even if he had In fact abused in filthy language Durg Singh and s.K. Bagga.\n\nWe are therefore of the opinion that the punishmerit]awarded to the appellant. is shockingly disproportionate regard being had to the charge framed against him.· We are also of the opinion that no responsible employer would ever\"impose in'like circumstances the punishment of dismis~.1 to the. employee and that victimization or unfair labour practice could well be .inferred from the conduct of the 111a11asement in,\n\n-~'\n\n• V.P. GUPTA v. DELTON CABLE (Varadarajan, /.) 1 :9\n\nawarding the extreme punishmeni of dimissal for a flimsy charge of abuse of some worker or officer of the management by the-appellant wtthin the, premises of the factory. We therefore hold that the termination of the appellant's ervice is invaliili and unsustainable in law, and that he is entitled to reinstatement with full back wages and other benefits including continuity of service. The appeal is allowed accordingly with costs qu; mtified at Rs. 1,000. The writ petition is dismissed without costs.\n\nH.S.K.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\n. ' •", "total_entities": 54, "entities": [{"text": "VED PRAKASH GUPTA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 17, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VED PRAKASH GUPTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "D.ELTON CABLE INDIA (P) LTD", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19, "end_char": 46, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DELTON CABLE INDIA (P) LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. DESAI 0. CHJNNAPPA REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 72, "end_char": 99, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. VARADARAJAN JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 102, "end_char": 120, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A. VARADARAJAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. 2(s)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 155, "end_char": 162, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 302, "end_char": 331, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "S. 2(ra)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 332, "end_char": 340, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 981, "end_char": 1004, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 2(s)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1133, "end_char": 1140, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 2(s)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2924, "end_char": 2931, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. Das Bahl", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5014, "end_char": 5025, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G o. P. Malhotra, and N, S. Das Bahl and Pawan K. Bahl for\n\nthe Appellant."}}, {"text": "Pawan K. Bahl", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5030, "end_char": 5043, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G o. P. Malhotra, and N, S. Das Bahl and Pawan K. Bahl for\n\nthe Appellant."}}, {"text": "Shanti Bhushan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5065, "end_char": 5079, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shanti Bhushan and V.P. Chaudhary for.the Respondent."}}, {"text": "V.P. Chaudhary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5084, "end_char": 5098, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shanti Bhushan and V.P. Chaudhary for.the Respondent."}}, {"text": "V ARADARAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5164, "end_char": 5176, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Coutt was delivered by\n\nV ARADARAJAN, J. This civil appeal by special leave is direced itgainst the judgment delivered by the Division Bench of the Punjab\n\nV.'f>.", "canonical_name": "V ARADARAJAN"}}, {"text": "Vardarajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5328, "end_char": 5338, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "GUPTA v .. DELTON CABLE (Vardarajan, J.) j 7J\n\n& Haryana High Curt on 11.1.1982 dismissing in limine Writ\n\nPetition No.", "canonical_name": "V ARADARAJAN"}}, {"text": "Ved Prakash Gupta", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5470, "end_char": 5487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "26of1982 which had been filed by the appellant Ved Prakash Gupta.", "canonical_name": "VED PRAKASH GUPTA"}}, {"text": "s.10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6068, "end_char": 6072, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6294, "end_char": 6317, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 2(s)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6908, "end_char": 6915, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Whether the claimant Shrl Ved Prakash Guljta was in the position of a workman under the Industrial Disputes Act", "statute": "Whether the claimant Shrl Ved Prakash Guljta was in the position of a workman under the Industrial Disputes Act"}}, {"text": "11.1.1982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7338, "end_char": 7347, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was against that a, ward that the appel)ant filed the writ petition which was dismissed by the Division Bench of the High Court in limine on 11.1.1982."}}, {"text": "0. P. Malhotra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8881, "end_char": 8895, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Arguments were advanced before us by Mr. 0."}}, {"text": "V. P. Choudhary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8938, "end_char": 8953, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Malhotra\n\nr -\n\nappearing for the appellant and Mr. V. P. Choudhary appearing for management on two points viz:(!)"}}, {"text": "31. 7 .1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9279, "end_char": 9290, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1979 and 1.8..1979 from 8 a.m .. to 4 p.m. It was reported against you as under:\n\nOn 31."}}, {"text": "Gurnmukh Dass", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9310, "end_char": 9323, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "7 .1979 a person from M/s. Gurnmukh Dass (building material supplier) came to lMI department with two copies of challan No. )"}}, {"text": "Durg Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9579, "end_char": 9589, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Durg Singh on instructions of Mr. S.K.\n\nBagga, junior Engineer, went to the gate for confirming whether the bricks have been received in the factory premises.", "canonical_name": "Durg Singh"}}, {"text": "S.K.\n\nBagga", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9613, "end_char": 9624, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Durg Singh on instructions of Mr. S.K.\n\nBagga, junior Engineer, went to the gate for confirming whether the bricks have been received in the factory premises.", "canonical_name": "S.K.\n\nBagga"}}, {"text": "Varadarajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9852, "end_char": 9863, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "t\n\nV.P. GUPTA v. DELTON CABLE (Varadarajan, J.) 173\n\nsupply of 2000 bricks as per the challan aforesaid had been A cancelled in the gate register.", "canonical_name": "V ARADARAJAN"}}, {"text": "Gnrumukh Dass", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10132, "end_char": 10145, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "You, however, tookthe challan (both copies) from Shri Durg Singh and cancelled the gate\n\nentry from the challan and returned goth the copies to the perso°' of M/s; Gnrumukh Dass.", "canonical_name": "Gnrumukh Dass"}}, {"text": "1.8.1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10156, "end_char": 10164, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That on 1.8.1979 as pe."}}, {"text": "Hira Laf", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10215, "end_char": 10223, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "department one Mr. Hira Laf, the worker ofIMI department was sent to the gate office in connection with a challan of a water pump."}}, {"text": "Hirn Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10355, "end_char": 10363, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the worker i.e. said Mr. Hirn Lal did not come back to IMI department for quite some time Mr. S.K. Bagga, •Junior Engineer of IM!"}}, {"text": "S.K. Bagga", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10424, "end_char": 10434, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the worker i.e. said Mr. Hirn Lal did not come back to IMI department for quite some time Mr. S.K. Bagga, •Junior Engineer of IM!", "canonical_name": "S.K.\n\nBagga"}}, {"text": "Deep Chand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10538, "end_char": 10548, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He (S.K. Bagga) apprised Mr. Deep Chand\n\nSenior Security Officer of the irresponsibl~ manner in which yon delivered the chalian to the persop of M/s. Gurumukh Dass instead of to IM!"}}, {"text": "Gurumukh Dass", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10659, "end_char": 10672, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He (S.K. Bagga) apprised Mr. Deep Chand\n\nSenior Security Officer of the irresponsibl~ manner in which yon delivered the chalian to the persop of M/s. Gurumukh Dass instead of to IM!", "canonical_name": "Gnrumukh Dass"}}, {"text": "Dnrg Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11026, "end_char": 11036, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When informed that it was Durg Singh you without any rhyme and reason or provocation abused Shri Durg Singh in a filthy manner saying (translated in English as I fuck the mother of Dnrg Singh ; bring him).", "canonical_name": "Durg Singh"}}, {"text": "Gurumukh Das", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11429, "end_char": 11441, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "reiterated.that yon had given the chal!an to the person of M/s.\n\nGurumukh Das yon lost all your senses and started abusing Shri S.K. Bagga left and right in a filthy, derogatory and abusive manner.", "canonical_name": "Gnrumukh Dass"}}, {"text": "Ram Kumar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11686, "end_char": 11695, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Yon may go to Ram Kumar or yon may go to Vijay Ku; mar): The above conduct of yours is gross misconduct as you have lost the basic."}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12141, "end_char": 12145, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 2(s)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16153, "end_char": 16160, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Air Force Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16815, "end_char": 16834, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Army Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16857, "end_char": 16871, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Navy Act, 1957", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16893, "end_char": 16907, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 2(s)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17461, "end_char": 17468, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Navy Act, 1957", "statute": "the Navy Act, 1957"}}, {"text": "T'.aradarajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19340, "end_char": 19353, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.P. GUPTA v. DELTON CABLE (T'.aradarajan, J.)\n\nparticular conduct and the past record or is such as no reasonable employer would ever impose in like circumstances, the tribunal may treat the imposition qf uch punishment as hself showing victimization or unfair labour practice.\""}}, {"text": "sec1J", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19792, "end_char": 19797, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21657, "end_char": 21661, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bagga", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 22107, "end_char": 22112, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the merits some witnesses were examined on the side pf the management before the Labour Court and they are S.K.\n\n•• c\n\n•• c\n\nBagga, MW-2, Hira Lal, MW-3, Deep Chand, MW-4 and Laxmi *-;.-\n\nChand, MW-5 an Accountant ofM/s. Gurumukh Dass, MW-2 has '--.. deposed about the appell; mt abusing Durg Singh who according tq the appellant was the Secretary of a Labour Uniou while the appellant and others were trying to canvass membership for a rival trade union."}}, {"text": "Hira Lal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 22120, "end_char": 22128, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the merits some witnesses were examined on the side pf the management before the Labour Court and they are S.K.\n\n•• c\n\n•• c\n\nBagga, MW-2, Hira Lal, MW-3, Deep Chand, MW-4 and Laxmi *-;.-\n\nChand, MW-5 an Accountant ofM/s. Gurumukh Dass, MW-2 has '--.. deposed about the appell; mt abusing Durg Singh who according tq the appellant was the Secretary of a Labour Uniou while the appellant and others were trying to canvass membership for a rival trade union."}}, {"text": "Deep Chand", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 22136, "end_char": 22146, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the merits some witnesses were examined on the side pf the management before the Labour Court and they are S.K.\n\n•• c\n\n•• c\n\nBagga, MW-2, Hira Lal, MW-3, Deep Chand, MW-4 and Laxmi *-;.-\n\nChand, MW-5 an Accountant ofM/s. Gurumukh Dass, MW-2 has '--.. deposed about the appell; mt abusing Durg Singh who according tq the appellant was the Secretary of a Labour Uniou while the appellant and others were trying to canvass membership for a rival trade union."}}, {"text": "Laxmi", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 22157, "end_char": 22162, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the merits some witnesses were examined on the side pf the management before the Labour Court and they are S.K.\n\n•• c\n\n•• c\n\nBagga, MW-2, Hira Lal, MW-3, Deep Chand, MW-4 and Laxmi *-;.-\n\nChand, MW-5 an Accountant ofM/s. Gurumukh Dass, MW-2 has '--.. deposed about the appell; mt abusing Durg Singh who according tq the appellant was the Secretary of a Labour Uniou while the appellant and others were trying to canvass membership for a rival trade union."}}, {"text": "Gurumukh Dass", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 22203, "end_char": 22216, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the merits some witnesses were examined on the side pf the management before the Labour Court and they are S.K.\n\n•• c\n\n•• c\n\nBagga, MW-2, Hira Lal, MW-3, Deep Chand, MW-4 and Laxmi *-;.-\n\nChand, MW-5 an Accountant ofM/s. Gurumukh Dass, MW-2 has '--.. deposed about the appell; mt abusing Durg Singh who according tq the appellant was the Secretary of a Labour Uniou while the appellant and others were trying to canvass membership for a rival trade union."}}, {"text": "K. Bagga", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24584, "end_char": 24592, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is nothing record to show that any previous adverse remark against the appellant had b.een taken into consideration by the management for a warding the extreme penalty of dism.issal from service to the appellant even if he had In fact abused in filthy language Durg Singh and s.K. Bagga."}}, {"text": "H.S.K.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 25579, "end_char": 25585, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H.S.K.\n\nAppeal allowed."}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_3_180_189_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "I .\n\n• 180\n\nSHRI VALLABH GLASS_ WORKS LTD. & OTHERS\n\n• . , v • • •\n\nUNION OF INDIA & OTHERS B\n\nMarch 14, 1984\n\n[B.S. VBNKATARAMIAH AND.R.B. MISRA J1.) r,\n\nConstitution of India 1950, Article 2261ndian Contract Act 1872, Sectio~ 7.}: C Limitation Act 19o3, Section J7(J)(c) & Article 113_.\n\nntral Ecise & Salt Act 1944, FirSt Schedule, Item 23A(I) and Item 68.\n\nExcise duty-Claim for refund of excess duty paid-Jurisdiction of the High Court to order refund in a petition under Article 226. y\n\nAppellant No. 1 was a compaQ.y engaged in the business of manufacturing different types of glass, viz., figured glass, wired glass, coloured figuft:d glass, rolled glas; and coolex wired glass. 1he Central Excise Department had levied and collected excise duty on the said go'Ods on the basis that they ., belonged to the category of 'sheet glass' and were therefore subject to pa:Ytnent of excise duty under Item 23A(I) of the First Schedule to the Central Excise and Salt\n\n- Act, -)944. On February 20, 1976, tjle appellauts. applied for the refund of excess duty paid by them from.October I, !%3 upto the date of the application .\n\nOn the ground that the items of glass in cjuestion could not be described as 'sheet glass' mentioned in Item 23A and that since they did not faJl undei any ()f the Items I to 67 in the First Schedule of the Act they could only be ubjected\n\nto levy of e:xcise dutY uDder the resid.uary provision, Iten:i 68. The Assitant Collector of dntral Excise rejected the claim_ for rfund and the appellants there-upon filed a Wrii petition in the High Court on September 28, 1976, but \"the same was withdrawn as a Departmental Appeal filed by the appellants was pending with the Collector. The said Departmental Appeal was however later dismissed and this order was confirmed in the appeUants' revision petition to the -Government.\n\nThe appellants thereupon filed a Writ Petition in the High Court and assailed ihe order. The High cOurt revered the decision of the departinental authorities and held that the items of glass manufactured by the appeUants did not fall within IDe scope of tariff Item 23A(I) of the First Schedule but that they, \"ame within tariff Item 68 thereof, liable to duty accordingly, and directed refund of excess duty paid after February 20, 1976, on which date the dispute was raised. The claim. for fefund of excess duty paid durin8 th~ period prior to February 20, 1976 was, however, rejeCted.\n\nIn the appeal to this Court on the question : (I) whether the appellauts\n\nre etitled to Claim refund of excess excise duty paid prior to Febrwary201 '\n\nV ALLABH GLASS WORKS v. UNION 181\n\n1976 and whether they are entitled to claim refund of such duty paid between October l; 1%3 and February 20, 1976 or during any shorter period, and (2) whether the appellants are entitled to claim such refund ii; i respect of all the\n\ngood~\n\nAllowing the appeal in part .\n\n• HELD : 1, (i) The excess amount paid by the appellants would have become refundable b~ virtue of.section 72 of t'he Indian Contract Act if the appellants had filed a suit within the period. of limitation. Section 17(1)(c) df\n\nthe Limitation Act, 1963 provides that where in the case of any suit or appli~ cation for-which a per\\od of limitation is prescri)Jed under that Act~ the suit or application is for relief fro.m the consequences of a mistake, the period Of /\n\nlimitation shalt not begin to run until the plaintiff or appliCant had discovered it.or could ha¥e with reasonable diligence discovered it. [186F-G]\n\n(ii) Under Article 113 of \\]:le Limitation Act, 1963 a &uit for recovery of excess duty had to be filed within three years from the date of payment to the Department. [187B]\n\n(iii) The J-Iigh Courts have p6wer, for the purpose of enforcement of fundamental Tights and statutory rights-to make consequential Orders. for 'repayment of money realised by .Government without the authority of law under Article 226 of the Constitution. This. is an alternative remedy provided by the Constitution in additiOn to, but not in supersession Of the ordinary remfdy by way cir suit in the absence of any provision which would bar such a suit expressly or by necessary 'Implication. While there are different periods of limitation prescribedfor the institution of different kinds .Qf suits by the Limitation Act, 1-963, there is no such period prescribed by law in respect of petitions filed lJnder Article 226 of the Constitution. Whether relief should be_ granted to a petitioner under Artide 226 where the cauSe of action had arisen in the remote past is a matter of sound judicial discretion .governed by the doctrine of !aches. Where . a petitioner wko could have availed of the alternative remedy by way of suit approaches the High .Court under Article 226. it is appropriate ordinarily to construe that any unexplained delay .in fiing of the wri't petition after the expiry of the period of limitation pres<;:ribed for filing a suit as unieasonable. This rule, however, cannot be a rigid formula. I;:ach case has to be judged on its own facts and circumstances touching the conduct of the parties, the change in , situation, the prejudice which is likely to be caused to the opposite party or to the general public. [187D-H]\n\nIn the instant case, the appellant had made excess payment on being assessed by the Department and such payment cannot be treated as voluntary payment preclµding them from rcoVering the amounts. The appellants should in the facts and Circumstances of this case be deemed to have discovered the mistake on the date of making eh payment of excise duty in excess of the proper duty payable\" under law. All sQch excess payments made on or after .September 28, 1973 which would fall within the period of.three years prior to the date on whic• the first writ petition was filed should.have been orred to be refunded under Article 226. But the High Court declined to do so. Though\n\n182 SUl'RJ!ME COUR't REPORTS [19841 3 s.c.I\\\n\nthe appellant should not be granted apy relief in respect of pay1nent made t ween October I; 1963 and September 27, 1973 which would fall beyond the three years from the date of the first writ petition, it .iSnot proper and just tO negative the claim in respect of excess payments made after Septer; nber 28, 1973.\n\n[}87H-188D]\n\n_Sales Tax Officer, Banaras & Ors. v. Kanhaiya Lal Mukundlal Saraf, [-1959] S.C.R. 1350, referred to.\n\n2. In respect of wired glass; a dispute h:s arisen between the Department and the appel1ants earlier anc}. in that ce while the Department claimed that wired lass was subject to payment of duty under tariff Item . 23A(4) the appel- ' !ants.pleaded that wired glasJ was liable to duty under tariff Item 23A(I). The\n\nGovement of. India ultimately aCcepted the cse of the appellants, and .duty was paid on that basis till February 20, 1976. While the eaflier order may not be a legal bar to the .Contention raised by the appellants. on February 20, 1976 'that wired glass was not taxable under tariff Item 23A(l) but under tariff Item 68 after that date, it is certainly a circllmstance which disentitles' the. appellants 'to daim refund, of excess duiy pald by them in a petition under Article 226. 'The claim for refU; nd of excess dutY paid on wired glass during the period prior to February 20, 1976 is therefore liable to rejected.\n\n[1850-186C]\n\nCIVIL APPELATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3338 of 1979\n\nFrom the Judgment and 'Order dated 22 and 23-11'78 .of E Gujarat High Court in Sp!. Civil Application No. 577 of 1978.\n\nAnil B. Divan, Ravinder Narain and Ms. Rainu Walia for the.appellants.\n\nM. M. Abdul Khader, G. S. Narayan and A. Subhashini for f the respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMIAH, J. This appeal by spee.ial leave is filed against the judgment and order dated November' 22/23, 1978 of the High Court of Gujarat in Special Civil Application No. 577 of 1978 filed under Article 226 of the Constitution.- •.\n\nAppellant No. I° is a company which is ei1gaged in the business of manufacturing diffrent type& of glass viz. figured glass wired glass, coloured figured glass, rolled glass and coolex wired . glass at Vallabh Vidyanagar in the State of Gujarat j-om the year\n\n1963. Appellant No.2 is the Managing Director of appellant No. L The Central Excise Dep:rrtmen t had levied .and collected excise duty\n\n,.. .\n\n' . on the said goods on the basis that they belongedto the.cataegory of sheet glass and wer.e therefore subject to payment of excise duty . ' under Item 23A (I) of the First Schedule to the Central Excises i\"td Salt Act, 1944 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). On February 20, 1976, the appellants applied for. the refund of excess duty paid by them from October 1, 1963 pto the date of the applicatioti on the ground that the item of glass in question were distinct .com mercial goo'ds known in the market as figured glass, wired glass, coloured figured glass, rolled glass,!coolex figured glass and coolex\n\n.- wired glass and could not' be desc'ibed in common parlance as 'sheet . glass' mentioned in Item 23A and that since they did not fall under . any of the Items l to 67 in the First Schedule to the Act' they could . only be subjected to levy of excise duty under the residuary provi sion Item 68 in that Schedule after it was inserted in it. •\n\n...,,, Item 23A of the First Schedule to the Act at all material times\n\n... !\n\nread as.~\n\n\"23A. Glass and glassware-\n\n(1) Sheet.glass and plate glass \"'\n\n(2) Laboratory glassware\n\n(3) Glass shells, glass globes and chimneys ,. for lamps and hinterns\n\n. (4) Other glassware including tableware\n\nThirty per cent ad valorem . '\n\nTen per cent ad valorem\n\nFifteen per cnt ad valorem\n\nThirty per cent ad valo\n\nrem.\"\n\nThe relevant part of tariff.Item 68 which was introducedjfrom March .1. J975 read as:\n\na \"68.All other goods not ·\n\nelsewhere spceified, manufactured jn a factory but excluding\n\n(a)· alcohol, all sorts, includin& a!cYcholic liquors for human consumption.\n\nOne per cent ad valorem\n\nI 84\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(b) opium, Indian hemp\n\n and other narcotic drugs and narcotics; and\n\n.. (c) dutiable goods as defined in sections 2(c) of the Medicinal and Toilet Preparations (Ex- 1 cise Duties) Act, 1955.\"\n\n(19$4) 3 S.C.ll.\n\n, ' J\n\nAfter holding an enquiry and hearing th'\\: appellants, the Assitimt Collector of Central Excise, Anand rejected the claim for refund by his order dated September 20, 1976 because he was of the view that the Items of goods in respect of which dispute had been . raised fell within the purview of tariff Item 23A (1). Against the said order of the Assistant Collector the appellants' filed a writ petition in Special Civil Application No. 1365 of 1976. on the file of the\n\nHih Court on September 28, 1976, The said petition was admitted but. when it was taken up for final hearing it l'l'1S contended on behalf of the :bepartment that since . the. appellants had also filed\n\nn appeal against the very same order before the Collector of Centra 1 Excise they could not pursue the remedy under Article' 226 of the Constitution as it stood then. In view of the above contention the writ petition was withdrawn without prejudice to the remedy by way of appeal. The appeal was thereafter disposed of by the Collector on July 27, 1977 affirming the .order of the Assistant. Collector.\n\nA revision petition filed by the appellants against the . order of the Collector was dismissed by the Government of India by its order dated February 2, 1978. The said order in revision was challenged before the High Court by the appellants under Article 226 cif the Constitution. The High Court by its judgment under appeal 'reversed the decision of the departmantal authorities which had; been affirmed by the Central Government and held that the items of glass ma•- factured by the appellants namely, figured glass, wired glass, coloured figured glass, rolled glass and coolex wired glass did not fall within the scope of tariff Item 23A(l) of the First Sr:hedule to the Act as it stood at the material time but' they came within _tariff Item 68 and were liable to bear duty ttcr:ordingly. The High Court was, however, of the view that the appellants were only entitled to refund of excess duty _paid by them after February 20,\n\n> . j\n\n1976 on which date they raised the dispute. Accoi:dingly the High Court issued a writ quashing the decision of the Department in so far as the classification of the goods was concerned and declaring that they were subject to payment of duty under tariff Item 68 of the First Schedule. to the Act aud not under tariff Item 23A(l) thereof. The Department was further directed to review the rlevant assessments accordingly for the period subsequent to February 20,\n\n1976 and to refund any excess duty that might after such review be found to be refundable to the appellants. The claim of the appellants for refund of excess duty . paid during the period prior to February 20, 1976 was, however, rejected. The appellants have filed this appeal by special leave only as regards the rejetion by the' High Court pf their prayer for refund of excess duty paid by them prior to February 20, 1976.\n\nThe Departn1ent has not filed any appeal against the judgment of the High Court. Hence the decision that the goods were taxable\n\nunder tariff Item 68 and not under tariff Item 23A(l) of the First D Schedule to the Act has become final. Item 23A(l) is also stated to have been since amended suitably so as to bring the items of glass in dispute within its scope.\n\nThe question which arise for consideration in this appeal are therefore (1) whether the appellants are entitled toclaim refund of • excess excise duty which bad been paid by them prior of February 20, 1979 and if so, whether they are entitled to claim refund of .snch duty paid betweeji <;>ctober 1, 1963 and February 20,1976 or during any shorter period and (2) whether the appellants are entitied to claim such refund in respect of all the goods in question.\n\nSince it is convenient to dispose of the second qu<stion at this . stage,· we shall. take it . up first: A few more fr cts which are relevant to this issue have to be stated here. As mentioned earlier the goods in respect of which dispute had been raised by the appellants in their applitation dated February 20, 1976 were figured glass, wired glass, cqloured figured glass, roiled glass and coolex 'wired glass. But it is seen that in respect of wired glass, a dispute ha.d arisen between the Department and the appellants earlier and in that case while the Department claimed that wired glass was subject to payment of duty under tariff Item 23A(4) the appellants pleaded that wired glass was liable to duty under tariff Item 23A(l).\n\nThe Gove111ment of India ultimately by its order' dated August 24, 1971 lin Order No. 26J of 1971 of the Government of India oil\n\nSUPREME CO Ult t REPORts (19s4i 3 s.c.ll..\n\nCentral Excise Revsion Application) accepted the case of the appellants that wired glass was subject to duty under tariff Item 23A (I) and the appellants paid duty on that basis till Febuary 20, 1976.\n\nThese facts distinguish the case in respect of wired glass. from the case in respect of the other gooqs. While the said earlier order may not be. a legal bar tq tpe contention raised by the appellants on February 20, 1976 that wired glass was not taxable under tariff Item 23A(l) but under tariff Item 6S after that date, i't is certainly 'll circumstan.ce which disentitles the appellants to claim• refund of excess duty paid by them in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution on a ground contrary to their earlier stand. The claim for refund of xcess duty paid on wired glass during the period prior.to February 20, 1976 i~ liable to be rejected. The appeal of the appellants to that extent should, therefore, fail. . .\n\nIn regard to the relief of refund of excess duty paid in respect of the other. goods, the case stands on an entirely different footing.\n\nThis is a ca.se where t.he Department had ass.essed the duty payable by the. appellants under a wrong. provision. The appellants were obliged to pay the duty so assessed. They did not, no doubt, qlies tion the assessments by taking a specific stand as t\\ley had done earlier in the case of wired glass. The appellants, however, question ed the validity ofthe levy only on February 20, 1976 on the ground that tariff Item 23A (1) of the First Schedule to the Act under which the duty had been levied was not applicable to the goods.\n\nWhile • the Departmnt refused to accept the said plea, the High Court has upheld h. In view of the decision of the High Covrt, the fact that the appellant had paid duty in excess of what they were bound in law to pay should be now taken as having been established. It is not disputed that if the appellants had file, d a suit within the period of limitation the excess amount would have become refundable by virtue of section 72 of the Indian Contract Act. Section 17(1JtcJ of the Limitation Act, !9'63 provides that where in the case of any suit or application for which a period of limitation. is prescribed under that Act, the suit or application is for relieff.rom the consequence of a mistake, the period of limitation shall.not begin to run until the plaintiff or applioont had discovered it or could have with reason able diligence discovered it.\n\nIn the instant case the date on which\n\n-~ the mistake was discovered by the appellants or the date on .which the appellants could with reasonabe diligence have discovered it is not clear from the record before us. No efforts also was made in the course of the arguments urged on behalf of the appellants to establish it. We have, therefore, tci assume that on the date\n\n. .\n\n• • j\n\n. \\iAI; LABH GLASS WORKS v. UNION (Venkataramiah, J.) 181\n\neach payment of excise duty made by the appellants in excess .of the proper dut:y payable by them, the appellants could have discovered with due diligence that the duty claimed from them was excessive.\n\nUnder Article 113 of the Limitation .:\\, ct, 19p3. which is applicable to this case, a suit for recovery of such excess duty had to be filed within three years from the date of payment to the Department. But the appellants instead of filing a s\\lit, first filed •a writ petition in Special Civil Application No. 1365 of 1976 on September 28; 1976\n\nand that petition had to. be withdrawn in view of clause (3) of . Article 226 of the Constitution as it stood then. because the alter- . native remedy by way of an appeal was available. The appellants couid, therefore, file the writ petition out of which the appeal arises only after the disposal of the revision petition by the Government of India as mentioned earlier. It is not disputed that the High Courts have power, for the purpose of enforcement of fundamental rights and statutory rights~ to make consequential orders for repayment of money realised by the Government without the authority of law under Article 226 of the Constitution. This is an alteniative r.emedy provided by •.he Constitution in addition to but not in supersession of the otdinary remedy by way of suit in the absence of any provision which would bar such a suit. either expressly or by necessary implication. While there are different periods of limitation P.rescribed for the institution of different kinds of suits by the Limitation Act, 1963, there is no such period .Prescribed by law in respect of petitions .filed\n\nun<Jer Article 226 of the Constitution.\n\nWl'!.ether relief should be granted to a . petitioner. under Article 226 of the Constitution where the cause' of action had arisen in the remote past is a matter of sound judicial, di.scretion governed by the dpctrine of !aches.\n\nWhere a petitioner who could have availed pf the alternative remedy by way of suit approaches the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, it is appropriate ordinarily to construe that any nnexplained delay in the filing of the writ petition after the expiryof the period of limitatipn prescribed for filing a suit as unreasonable.\n\nThis rule, however, cannot be a rigid formula. There may be cases where even a delay of a shorter period may be considerd to be sufficient to refuse relief in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. There may also be cases where there may be circumstances which may persuade the court to grant reliet even though the petition may have been filed beyondthe period of limitation prescribed for a suit. Each case has to judged on its own facts and circumstance touhing the conduct or the parties, the change in situation, (he prejudice which is likely to be caused to the opposite party or to the general public etc. In the instant case, the appellants\n\n• c\n\nG'\n\nE .\n\n• •\n\n188 SuPRBME COURT REPORTS tl984] 3 s.c.i;\n\nhad iit facf approached .the High f:ourt on September 28, 1976 itself by filing Special Civil Application No. 1365 of 1976 for directing repayment of the excess duty paid by them. But no relief could be granted in that petition in view of the provisions of Article 226 of . the Constitution as.it stood then and the petition had to be withdrawn.\n\nHence qren granting that on the date of making each payment 6f excise duty in excess of the proper duty payable under law, the appellants should be deeihed to have discovered the mistake, all such excess payments made on and after September 28, 1973 whih. would fall within the period of three years prior to the date on which Special Civil Application No. 1365 of 1.976 was*filed should have been ordered to be refunded under Article 226 of the°Constiiu tion.\n\nBut the High Court declined to do so on grounds of estoppel and acquiesence. While we do agree that the appellants should not be granted any relief in respect of payment made between October 1, 1963 and Septembr 27, 1973 which would fall beyond three years from the date of the first writ petition filed in this case we do not find it proper and just to negative the claim of the appellants in respeccof excess paymen!S 1llade after September 28, 1973. In the instant case the appellants had ma\"de excess payments on being assessed by the Department and such payments cannoJ be treated as voluntary payments precluding them from recovering them. (See Sales Tax. Officer, Banaras & Ors. v. Kanhaiya Lal Mukudlal Saraf).1 We do not also find that the conduct of t!fe appellants is of such a nature as wuld disentitle them to claim refund of excess payments made in respect of goods other than wfred glass.\n\nWe, therefore, modify the judgment and order passed by the High Court by quashing -tit~ assessments of excise duty made in respect of the goods in question other than wired glass viz. figured glitss, coloured figured glass, rolled glass and coolex wired glass for •the period between September 28, 1973 and February 20, 1976 also and directing the assessing anthority to make a fresh assessment in accordance with law in the light of the decision of the High Court.\n\nThe respond.ents are further directed to refund after such fresh determination any excess duty that may .be found to have been paid by the appellants. The fresh assessments shall be completed\n\n(!) (1959] S. C. R. 1350. •\n\n-< .\n\n. '\n\nwithin four monhts fro II\\ today. The appeal is, however, dismissed in so far it relates ro the claim for refund of excess duty paid in respect of wired glass during that period.\n\nThe appeal is accordingly allowed in part. No costs .\n\n• •\n\nN.V.K.\n\nAppeal_partly allowed.", "total_entities": 74, "entities": [{"text": "VALLABH GLASS_ WORKS LTD. & OTHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 17, "end_char": 51, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VALLABH GLASS WORKS LTD. & OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 68, "end_char": 91, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R.B. MISRA J", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 135, "end_char": 147, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.B. 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Divan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7520, "end_char": 7533, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Anil B. Divan, Ravinder Narain and Ms. Rainu Walia for the.appellants."}}, {"text": "Ravinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7535, "end_char": 7550, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Anil B. Divan, Ravinder Narain and Ms. Rainu Walia for the.appellants."}}, {"text": "Rainu Walia", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7559, "end_char": 7570, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Anil B. Divan, Ravinder Narain and Ms. Rainu Walia for the.appellants."}}, {"text": "M. M. Abdul Khader", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7592, "end_char": 7610, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. M. Abdul Khader, G. S. Narayan and A. Subhashini for f the respondents."}}, {"text": "G. S. Narayan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7612, "end_char": 7625, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. M. Abdul Khader, G. S. Narayan and A. Subhashini for f the respondents."}}, {"text": "A. Subhashini", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7630, "end_char": 7643, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. M. Abdul Khader, G. S. Narayan and A. Subhashini for f the respondents."}}, {"text": "VENKATARAMIAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7712, "end_char": 7725, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMIAH, J. This appeal by spee.ial leave is filed against the judgment and order dated November' 22/23, 1978 of the High Court of Gujarat in Special Civil Application No."}}, {"text": "High Court of Gujarat", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7835, "end_char": 7856, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMIAH, J. This appeal by spee.ial leave is filed against the judgment and order dated November' 22/23, 1978 of the High Court of Gujarat in Special Civil Application No."}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7914, "end_char": 7925, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Vallabh Vidyanagar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8154, "end_char": 8172, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "glass at Vallabh Vidyanagar in the State of Gujarat j-om the year\n\n1963."}}, {"text": "Gujarat", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8189, "end_char": 8196, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "glass at Vallabh Vidyanagar in the State of Gujarat j-om the year\n\n1963."}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8524, "end_char": 8538, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Salt Act, 1944", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8567, "end_char": 8581, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9146, "end_char": 9160, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Salt Act, 1944", "statute": "Salt Act, 1944"}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9338, "end_char": 9352, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Salt Act, 1944", "statute": "Salt Act, 1944"}}, {"text": "sections 2(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10142, "end_char": 10155, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "July 27, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11267, "end_char": 11280, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeal was thereafter disposed of by the Collector on July 27, 1977 affirming the .order of the Assistant."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11434, "end_char": 11453, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "order of the Collector was dismissed by the Government of India by its order dated February 2, 1978."}}, {"text": "February 2, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11473, "end_char": 11489, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "order of the Collector was dismissed by the Government of India by its order dated February 2, 1978."}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11579, "end_char": 11590, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12540, "end_char": 12554, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "February 20, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13711, "end_char": 13728, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question which arise for consideration in this appeal are therefore (1) whether the appellants are entitled toclaim refund of • excess excise duty which bad been paid by them prior of February 20, 1979 and if so, whether they are entitled to claim refund of .snch duty paid betweeji <;>ctober 1, 1963 and February 20,1976 or during any shorter period and (2) whether the appellants are entitied to claim such refund in respect of all the goods in question."}}, {"text": "Gove111ment of India", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 14726, "end_char": 14746, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Gove111ment of India ultimately by its order' dated August 24, 1971 lin Order No."}}, {"text": "Febuary 20, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15079, "end_char": 15095, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "26J of 1971 of the Government of India oil\n\nSUPREME CO Ult t REPORts (19s4i 3 s.c.ll..\n\nCentral Excise Revsion Application) accepted the case of the appellants that wired glass was subject to duty under tariff Item 23A (I) and the appellants paid duty on that basis till Febuary 20, 1976."}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15553, "end_char": 15564, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16403, "end_char": 16417, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 72", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16918, "end_char": 16928, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Contract Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16936, "end_char": 16955, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16981, "end_char": 16995, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Article 113", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18005, "end_char": 18016, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "September 28; 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18327, "end_char": 18345, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1365 of 1976 on September 28; 1976\n\nand that petition had to."}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18413, "end_char": 18424, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18959, "end_char": 18970, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Limitation Act, 1963", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19352, "end_char": 19372, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19456, "end_char": 19467, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Limitation Act, 1963", "statute": "the Limitation Act, 1963"}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19551, "end_char": 19562, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Limitation Act, 1963", "statute": "the Limitation Act, 1963"}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19835, "end_char": 19846, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Limitation Act, 1963", "statute": "the Limitation Act, 1963"}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20238, "end_char": 20249, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Limitation Act, 1963", "statute": "the Limitation Act, 1963"}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21042, "end_char": 21053, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "September 28, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21363, "end_char": 21381, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hence qren granting that on the date of making each payment 6f excise duty in excess of the proper duty payable under law, the appellants should be deeihed to have discovered the mistake, all such excess payments made on and after September 28, 1973 whih."}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21559, "end_char": 21570, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "October 1, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21777, "end_char": 21792, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While we do agree that the appellants should not be granted any relief in respect of payment made between October 1, 1963 and Septembr 27, 1973 which would fall beyond three years from the date of the first writ petition filed in this case we do not find it proper and just to negative the claim of the appellants in respeccof excess paymen!S 1llade after September 28, 1973."}}, {"text": "Septembr 27, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21797, "end_char": 21814, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "While we do agree that the appellants should not be granted any relief in respect of payment made between October 1, 1963 and Septembr 27, 1973 which would fall beyond three years from the date of the first writ petition filed in this case we do not find it proper and just to negative the claim of the appellants in respeccof excess paymen!S 1llade after September 28, 1973."}}, {"text": "S 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22012, "end_char": 22015, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "September 28, 1973 and", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22783, "end_char": 22805, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "figured glitss, coloured figured glass, rolled glass and coolex wired glass for •the period between September 28, 1973 and February 20, 1976 also and directing the assessing anthority to make a fresh assessment in accordance with law in the light of the decision of the High Court."}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_3_190_215_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "CHINGLEPUT BOTTLERS\n\nMAJESTIC BOTTLING COMPANY B\n\nMarch 15, 1984\n\n[A, P. SEN ANn•A. VARADARMAN, JJ.]\n\nConstitution of lndia-4rt. 226-High Court's Jurisdiction .to issue writ of c mandamus in cases where duty sought tq be enforced is-of discretz'onary nature.\n\nNatufal Justice-Applicaiion of rules of natural justice to case$ which relate not to rights but to mere privile'Ces of licences.\n\nTamil Nada Arrai:k (Manuff(lcture) Rules, 1981-R. 7-Commissioner has no legal duty tO grant /icence-ApprovQl of State_ Government is a pre-requisite for grant of licence-High Court cannot com]lf!l grn/ of licence by Commissioner by issuing writ of mandamus. . .\n\nOn the surrender oft.he licence for the manufacture and supply of bottled arrack for the Chingleput District for the financial year 1982·83 by the then existing licensee, the C.Ommissioner of ProJ:iibition and Excise called for fresh appliJ; atiOns from intending persons for the grant of licence 'under the Tamil Nadu Arrack (Manufacture) Rules, 1981 framed under the Tamil Nadu Prohibition Act, 1937. Two firms, namely, Majestic. Bottling Company and ChingleputBottlers, filed there applications and an enquiry with regard to them was held by the .. Assistant Commissioner. The Comniissioner considered the report of enquiry, gave a separate oral hearing to the two applicants and passed an order rejecting both the applications. As regard_s Majestic Bottling Company the Commissioner held that they did not satisfy the requirements of rr. 5(a) and S(e). In the case of Chingleput Bottlers,. he held that they did not satisfy the . requirements of rr. S(a), S(c) and S(e). While recording the finding in respcc(\n\nof CbingJCpU.t Bottlers, the CommissiOner. rCiied on a: report of the Collector and other material gathered by him during the. course of the enquiry, which included a representation. froq-i Majestic Bottling ComPany against the application of Chingleput Bottlers. Both the applicants filed petitipns under Article 226 of the\n\nConstituton questioning the orders passed. by the Commissioner.\n\nA Single judge Of the High O?urt .issued a writ of certiorari quashing the order of the Commissioner insofar as he rejected the application of Majestic Botfling Company an4 also issued ;{w.rit of miindamµs ordaining the' Commis~ sioner tO grant the licen~ to Majestic Bottling Company. As regards ChingJeput Bottiers, the Single Judge rejeced their Contention that tpe Commissioner had acted in breach of rules of natural justice by his failure -to furnish them the report .of the Collector and Observed that nothing preluded them from seeking\n\nven1sl of. the records or from ~king a demand for a copy of th~ sam~.\n\nt •\n\ny •\n\n. '\n\nCHINGLEPUT BOTTLERS v. MAJESTIC BOTTLiNG 191\n\noth the' applicants preferred appeals to t11e D_ivision Bench. The State Government which Was in pOssession of material adverse to the two partners of ' Majestic Bott.ling Compriny did iiot initially file a eparate counter affidavit but only di~ so at the conciusion of the hearing. The Division Bench ruled that the order passed by the Commissioner must be adjud'ged by the reasons stated by him and those reasons cannot be supp1emented by fresh reasons provided by the State Government in its belated affidavit and upheld the judgment of the Single\n\nJudge.\n\nThe State Government and piingleput. Traders filed appeals against the\n\njridgmnt of the Division Bench.\n\nIt was contended on behalf of the. State Government that the grant of licence under r: 7 was.subject to the prior approval of the State Government, that if the High Courtwas satisfied that the impugned order of the Commis sioner. was liable to be quashed on the grouncf: that there was an error apparent on the face of the record, the proper course for it to adopt was to issue a writ of mandamus to the Commissioner t\"ff re-determine the question of gra11t Or such\n\npriviICge and . that. the High Court had nO power to fssue a writ of mandamus directing the Commissioner .to grant the Jicence in favour of lvlajestic Bottling Company:\n\nIt was cpntended on behalf of Ching1eput Bottlers that the Commissioner had acted in breach of rules of na:turaI jusliee in not furnishing them a copy of the report submitted by the Collector and _other material gathered by hi~ during the course of the enquiry.\n\nAllowing the appeal of th'e State Government and disniissing the appeal Of Chingleput Bottlers. .1 .\n\nHELD : 1. No mandamus wil1 lie where the duty sought to be enforced is of a discretionary nature nor wi_ll a rnandamus issue to compel th! performance by a public body or authority of an act contrary to law. [!98H-!99A]\n\n(a) In the instant case the Commissioner was under no legal duty to graht a licence to Majestic Bottling Company ti11 he received the prior. approval of the State Government under r. 7. Even assuming that the Commissioner recommended the grant of a lience to them under f 7, the State Government were .under no compulsion to grant such prior approval.\n\nTh~ grant or refusal of such licence was etirely in.the discretion of the State Government. The High Court had no jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus to the_ Commissioner to grant a\n\nlcence to Majestic Bottling Company contrary to the provisions of r. 7.\n\n(199A-C] •\n\nde Smith : Judicial Review of Administrative Actin, 4th Ed. pp. 341 and 5~ ;•H.W.R. Wade: Administrative Law, 5th ed. p. 638; referred to.\n\n(b? Absence of a specific plea in the natµre of demurrer wold not.invest H the H1h. Court with jurisdction_ to issue a writ of mandamlJ, J ordaining the\n\nomm1&S1oner to ant a hcene uner ;. 7 without the prior •rproval of the\n\nG '\n\nState Government wic~ is a condition pre-.reqUisite for the grant of such pivi, Iege. The Hjgh Court was unduly technical in applying the rul6s of pleading and shortcircuited the whole procedure upon a wrongful assumption of itS own\n\npower~. The view taken ?Y it is manifestly erronCous; otherwise, the statutory requirements of such prior approval of the S.tate Government under r. 7 would be rendered wholly otiose. [20!CE]\n\nK.N. Guruswamy v. State of Mysore, [1955] 1 S C.R. 305; and P: Bhooma Reddy v. Staie of Mysore, [1969] 3 S.C:R. 14; distinguished . .\n\n(c) It is not possible to accept the contention that no useful purose would have been serVed by the High Court remitting the matter for the reconsideration of the Commissioner sinte it hacJ already found that all the reasons that could .be given for upholding the validity of the commissioner's order were bad and unsustainable. This was not a case where it could be said tbt there was nothing for the. State Government to consider while examining the question whether it should accord or.\" refuse prior approval to the. grant of licence to\n\nMajestic.Brittling Com.pany under r. 7. One .of the .relevant factors that the State Government had to t;:ike into consideration was whethe; the partners of that Company were persons who would abide by the provisions of the Act and the rules. 'I:he facts d, isclosed 'in the counter affidavit of the State Government lay a-serious charge against the partners of that Company and it \\vas permissible for \"the .State Government to take those facts as justification for refusal to. grant prior 'approval under r. 7. [202C,'203A-B, E-F]\n\n( d) The proper course forthe High Court to adopt was to issue a writ of mandamu1 directing the Commissioner to redeterffiine the Question after following the procedure of r. 7 and in case he ca&te to a decision .to grant the\n\ntince in favour of Majestic Bottling Company, to refer the matter to the State Oovemment for its prior approval. [206A-B]\n\nMis Hochtief Gammon v. Stateof-Orissa, [1976] l S.C.R. 667; Pad/ieldv.\n\nMinister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Fodd, L.R. [1968] A.C. 997: referred to.\n\n• Gujarat State Financial Corpn. v. M/s. Lotus Hotels Pvt. Ltd., [1983] 3 s.c.c. 379; distingl\\ished.\n\nState of Tamil Nadu v. C. Vadiappan, [1982] 2 Mad. L.J. 30; and K.\n\nRamaswamy v. Government of Tamif. Nadu (Writ App.eat No. 368of1981); overruled.\n\n2. It iS a fundamental rule of law that no decision •ust be taken . which Will affect the rights of any perSonwithout first giving him an.opportuD.ity of putting forward. his case. Strict adherence to the rules of naturai justice is\n\nrequiedwhere a public authority or body has to deal with rights. The audi alteram .partem rule may -not apply to cases which relate not to rights or legal expectation but to mere privilege or licence. An authority or body need not observe the ruleS of natural justice where its, decision, although fin<il~ relates not to a 'right' but to a 'privilege' or 'licence'. All that is emphasised in s:uctj . ' ' .\n\n! •\n\n• >\n\nCWINGLEPUT BOTTLERS v. MAJESTic BOTTLiNG 193 ..\n\nCases is that the applicatibns for grant of privilege or licence must be considered fairly.\n\nThere are no inflexible rules of natural justice of universal application.\n\nEach case depends on its own Circumstances. Rules of natU.ral justice vary with the varying constitutions of statutory bodies and the rules prescribed by the legislature under whih they have to act. [209C-D-G, 213D-E-G]\n\n'The right to know the case to be met docis not necessarily involve any right to know the source of adverse information or to confront the informants, for, in some cases it. wou Id be quite proper for the authority to emJ?IoY confidential sources. [210B-C]\n\nRidge v. Baldwin: L.R: [1964] A.C. 40 ; R. v. GaminK Board for Great . .\n\nBritain, [1970] 2 All E.R. 528; R. Surinder Singh Kanda v. Govanment of the\n\nFederation of Malaya, L-R. [1962] A.C. 322; Breen v. Amalgamated, Engineerinr C Union, [1971] 2 Q.B. 175; Mac lnne. v. Onslow Fane & Anr., [1978] 3 All E.R. 211; l{ishanChand Arora v .. Commissioner of Police, [1961] 3 S.C.R. 135; and Nakkuda ,\\/Iv. M.F. De S. Jayaratne, L.R. [1951] A.C. 66. referred to.\n\n3. In tbe itnt case there is nothing in the language of r. 7 to sUggest that in rCfusig to grant the privilege, the Corpmissioner is obliged to act\n\njudiciallY' The order refusing a licence undet r. 7 is purely. an administrative or executive order f!.nd is not Open to appeal or revision. There is no /is between , the Commissioner and the person who is refused such Privilege. ThC power of ·\n\nrefusal of licence unlike the power to grant is not subject to any pte-condition.\n\nThe grant-Of a liquor licence under r. 7 'does bt involve any right or expectation , , but it is 3. matter of privilege. The Commissioner was under _no obligation either fo disclose the sources of information or the gist of the information that he had. All that was required was that he should act fairly and deal \\Vith the applications. without any bias, _and not in an arbitrary or capricious manner.\n\nThe Commissioner was entitled to ct on the report of the Collector and also on other material gatheed by him during the course of the enquify.\n\nIt~Cannot be , said that\" the Commissioner in dealing with the app1icil.tions did not act fairly in -not furnishing a copy of the report of the Collector or in taking a rePresentation from Majesti~ Bottling Company. There is also no suggestion of any ma/ajides on the part of the Commissioner or. the State Government.\n\n[213G-H,'214A-B, C-E, G-H]\n\n_J.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 1 1970-, ·; 11972of1983\n\nAppeals by Special leave from the judgment and Order dated G\n\n> I\n\nthe 27th July, 1983 of the Madras High Court in W. A. Nt>s. 523, 531 & 528 of 1983.\n\nK. K. Venugopa/ and C. S. Vaidyanathan for the Appellants in CA-Nos. 1 1970-7118\\.\n\nSahnti Bhushan, A. T. M. Sampath and Mr. K. Subramaniam for the Respondents in CA. Nos. 11970-71/83.\n\n-A -\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS • , ll 9841 3 S.C.R. • A. K. Sen an-d A. V. Rangam for the Appellant in CA. No. 11972of1983.\n\n Soli J. Sorabjee A. T.\n\nM. Sampath and K. Subramantam • for the Respondent in CA. 11972/83.\n\nihe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSEN, J. These appeals by special leave directed against a judgment of a Division. Bench of the Madras High Court dated July 7, i983 upholding the judgment and order ()f a learned Single Judge dated.June 13, 1983 relate to the grant of a licence for the manufacturing and supplying of bottled arrack to the wohlesale and. retail licensees for the Chingleput district under r. 7 of the Tamil Nadu Arrack(Manufacture) Rules, 1981 ('Rules', for short) framed under the Tamil Nadn Prohibition Act, 1937 ('Act' for short). These appeals raise separate' anq distinct questions and must therefore receive separate consideration.\n\nPut very shortly, the essential facts are these. On May 28, 1982 one 0. H. Kumar carrying oniJusiness 11nder the name and style of .Messrs Three Star Bottling Company surrendered his Iicene for the mamifacture arid supply of bottled arrack for. the Chingleput district for the financial year 1982-83. The Commissioner of Prohibition & Excise, Madras called for applications from intending persons for the grant of the licence. fn response to the notice 'issued by the Commissioner under r.3(2) of the Rules, 'there were two applications filed under r.5 in Form 1, namely, by J. Balaji. managing partner of Messrs Majestic Bottling Company on June 9, 1982 anct\"by V. Ramabadran, maiiaging partner of . Messrs Chingleput Bottlers on June 14, 1982.~The Commissioner issued a questionnaire and directed the Collector, Chingleput to have an . inquiry held as regards the suitability of the applicants for the grant of a licence.\n\nPnrsuant thereto, the Collector had an inquiry held by the Assistant Commissioner (Excise) which lasted for four days i.e. from June 21 to June 24, 1982. Atter.the preliminary inquiry and field inspection m!de by the Assistant Commissioner (Excise), the Collector forwarded his 'report dated July 2, 1982 to the Commissioner who fixed July 5, 1982 for oral hearing of the parties.\n\nH On July 5, 1982, the Commissioner &eparately heard both J.\n\nBalaji and . V. Ramabadran. At the hearing, the Commissioner rec<;>rded the statements of both J. Balaji and v. Ramaba.dra11 .in\n\n!' •\n\nI t\n\nCHINGLEPUT BOTTLERS v. MAJESTIC BOTTLING (Sen, J.) 195\n\nsupport of their respective claims. On July 31,1982 the Commissio ner passed an order rejceting both the applications. As regards Messrs Majestic. Bottling Company, the Commissioner held. that their application was in order but that they did not satisfy the requirements of r. 5 (a) and (e) of the Rules. As to their suitability under r. 5 (a), he found that though the partnership had been formed prior to the date of the application i.e. on June 9, 1982 the firm actually got registered subsequent thereto on June 23, 1982 and therefore there was no valid partnership in. existence on June 14, 1982 i. e,. on the date of the filing of the application. As regards r. S(e), be held that there was no water facility .in the lands owned by the partnership firm. ·\n\nAs regafds Messrs Chingleput Bottlers, the Commissioner. held that the application made by them was not in order because it was not accompanied by a solvency certificate and that there was no potable water available at the proposed site. He further held that there was only one and a half feet water in the well at the site and it was of poor quality. He also came to the conclusion that the appHcation had not been made bona fide on behalf of the partnership firm but as benami for others. The. Commisioner accordingly held that Messrs Chingleput Bottlers did not fulfil the requriements of r.• S(a), (c) and'(e) of the Rules.\n\nThe finding of the Commissioner that Messrs Chingleput Bottlers were mere benamidars of 0. H. Kumar, the previous licensee, was based on the report of the Collector and the other material gathered by him during the course ef the inquiry.\n\nBoth Messrs Majestic Bottling Company and Messrs Chingle put Bottlers filed separate petitions under Art. 226 of the Constitu- • tion before the High Court questioning the validity of the order passed by the (;:ommissioner. By his judgment dated June 13, 1983 a learned Single Judge held that the Commissioner was not justified in rejecting the application of Messrs Majestic Bottling Company on a.wrongful assumption that they did not satisfy the requirement of r. S(a) and (e) of the Rules. He held that the order was vitiated by an error apparent on the face of the record inasmuch as J. Balaji, managing partner of Messrs Majestic Bottling Company had produced record with regard to the availability ofwater.\n\nThe learned Single Judge however set aside the finding of the Commissioner that th.~ appliation made by Messrs Chingleput\n\n• H\n\n• ff\n\nBottlers was not in order because it was not accompanied by a solvency certificate holding that non-production of a solvency certificate wonld not entail a dismissal ol the application on that Jlround alone, as also the finding with regard to non-availabiiity of water . at the proposed site since. the blending unit of essrs Three Star .\n\nBottling Company was already functioning there. The learned Single\n\nJudge rejected the contention of Messrs Chinglepnt Bottlers that the Commissioner had acted in_breach of the rules of natural justice by his failure to furnish the report of the Collectot obs<ll'Ving that noth.ing precluded them . from seeking perusal' of' the records; nor did they make a demand for it.\n\nBy his judgment, the learned Single Judge by the issue Qf a writ of certiorari quashed the impugned ordr of the Commissioner\n\n- insofar as he rejected the application made by .Messrs Majestic Bottling Company on the ground that there was an error apparent on the face of the record but instead of remitting the matter back to the Commissioner to re-consider the question of grant of such privilege, issued a writ of mandamus ordaining the Commissioner to grant the licence to Messrs Majestic Bottling Company. He further uplteld the order of the Commissioner rejecting the application of Messrs Chinglpet Bottlers for the grant of privilege on the ground that they were mere benamidars of the. previous licensee. AMrieved by the judgment of the learned Single Judge, both the State Govern- ' ment and Messrs Chingleput Bottlers preferred appeals under cf. 15 of the Letters Patent. Upholding the judgment of the learned Single • Jndge the learned Judge of \\he Division Bench held ihat learned Single Judge was justifiep not only in quashing the same but in' issuing a writ of mandamus directing the Commissioner to grant the licence in favour of Messrs Majestic Bottling Company without the prior. approval the State Government under r. 7 of the Rules.\n\n' .\n\nBefore proceeding further, we would like to mtntiOn that the State Government did not file a separate counter. There was a counter-affidavit filed by R. Lakshmanan, Joint Commissioner (IV), ..\n\nDepartment of Prohibition & Excise, Madras on behalf of both the_ State Government as well as the Commissioner of Prohibition & Excise seeking to support the impugned order passed by the Commis sioner. In addition to the grounds mentioned by the Commissioner'\"\n\n' ' for the refusal of the applications for grant of privilege, there was an additional ground taken in paragraph 11 and it was alleged that J. Balaji, managing partner of Messrs Majestic Bottling Company . and his other partner Smt. Shanthi, who incidentally is also bis\n\n' ,>\n\nbi1NGLBPUf BOTTLERS v. MAJESTIC BOfrLING (Sen,!.) 197\n\nmother were the two erstwhile directors of Messrs Dhana\\akshmi Chemial Industries Private Limited, Ranipet up)o Novemb.er 26, 1980 and there was pr/ma facie evidence tltat the company had misused tbe large quantity of rectified spirit by diverting alcohol from industries to arrack production and therefore they were persons not likely to abide by the provisions of the Act and the Rules farmed thereunder within the meaning of r.S(b); and this would have been a relevant point to be taken into consideration by the State Government in the matter of grant or refuMl of prior approval. under r. 7(1). It was alleged that these two persons were directors during the afore said period of misuse.\n\nAt the ccnclusion of the hearing of the appeals before the High Court,. the State Government filed a supplementary affidavit , of S. Ranganathan, Deputy Secretary to the State Government of Tamil Nadu, Department of Prohibition & Excise furnishing further and better particulars . of the alleged misuse of rectified spirit by Messrs Dhanalakshmi Chemical Industries Private Limited which .had put the. State. Government to a loss of revenue to the tune of Rs. 2 crores. It was averred that inviostigtion into the case was almost complete and a posecution was about to be launched' against the Company and its directors, includiPg J. Balaji and Smt. Shanthi, the two partners of Messrs M, ajestic Bottling Company. Inasmuch as no such abjection was taken before the learned Single Judge, the learned Judges felt that it was not necessary for them to deal with the facts brought out in t)le two counter-affidavits .. It appears that the learned Advocate-General also did not press the ground at the hearing of the appeals. The learned Judges held that the validity of the impugned order passed by the Commissioner must be adjudged by the reasons stated by him and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons by the State Government in the shape of affidavit or. otherwise. ,,\n\nTher• are really two questions that fall for determination.\n\nThe first is as to the jurisdiction of the High Court to iss\\le a writ of mandamus. It is said that the grant of licence under r.7 is subject , to th~ prior approval of the late Government and is in thi discretion of the State Government. .The High Court is not the granting authority and therefore had no power to issue a writ of mandamus directing the Commissioner to grant a licence to Messrs Majestic Bottling Company. The second question is whether the Commissioner acted in breach of the rules natural justice in not furnishing\n\n; .\n\nto Messrs Chingleput Bottlers a copy, of the report submitted by the Collector and qther ma}erial gathered by him during the course of the inquiry tending to show th.at they were benamidars of one . o.H. Kumar, the previous licensee. It is said that Messrs MaJestic\n\nBottling Company had at the separate hearing before the Commis- .... sioner submitted a brief styled as a representation containing several documents inoppsition to the.application made by'Messrs Chingleput Bottlers on the ground that their application was benanii without furnishing a :copy of the same to them and this must have influenced the mind of the Commissioner. Even if the Commissioner was not acting in a judicial o'r quasi judicial capacity, he was required to act fairly ... The rU!es of natural justice therefore required . that Messrs Chiugleput Bottlers should not be deprived of this business without knowing the case they had to meet. Both the questions that arise will have to be dealt with separately.\n\nThe first issue, as 'already indicated, raises a question of prime importance and of some difficulty. It would therefore be convenient, in the first instance, to deal with the appeal preferred by the State Government.· It is urged that the High Court had no jurisdiction to issue a •writ of mandamus ordaining the Commissioner to grant a lrcence to Messrs Chinglepl\\t Bottlers under r.7 of the Rules without the prior. approval of the State Government. It s said. that although a writ of mandamus .may be a necessary adjunct to a writ of certiorari, the proper course for the High Court to have adopted was, if it was satisfied that the impugned ordr of the Commissioner was liable to be quashed insofar as he rejected the application made by Messrs Majestic Bottling Company on the ground that there was an error apparent on the face of the record, to have issued a writ of mandamus Commissioner to redetermine the question as to the grant of such privilege. Reliance is placed on de Smith's Judicial Review of Administrative Yi.ction, 4th edn. at pp.341 and 5.f4. The.· • contention must,. in our opinion. prevail. e\n\nIii order that a writ of mandamus may issue to compel the Commtsioner to grant the licence, jt must be shown thai.under the Act and the Rules framed thereunder there was a legal duty\n\nimposed on the. Commissioner to issue a licence under r. 7 of the Rules without the prior approvarof the St.ate Government and that Messrs Majestic Bottling Company had a corresponding legal right for its enforcement. No . mandamus will lie where the duty sought to be enforced is of a dicretionary nature nor will a mandamus\n\nCltINGLEPUT BOTTLElls v. MAJESTIC BOTTLING (Se71, J.) 199 • issue to compel the performance by such public body or authority of an act contrary to law. The Commissioner of Prohibition & Excise was ifnder no legal duty to grant a licence to Messrs Majestic . .\n\nBottling Company till he received the prior approval of the State Government under r.7. Even assuming that the Commissioner reommended the grant of a licence rt> them ; under r.7, the State Government were under no compulsion to grant such prior approval.\n\nThe grant or refusal of such licence was entirely in the discretion of the State Government. The High Court had no jurisdiction tll issue a writ of Mandamus to the Commissioner t<l grant a licence to Messrs Majestic Bottljng Company contrar' to the provisions of r.7 of the Rules.\n\n• The learned Judges observed that in normal cicumstances they would h(lve upheld the objection of the learned Advocate-\n\nGeneral as to the jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a writ of mandamus, but in view of the fact that the State Government had chosen not to file a separate return. taking a specific plea that in the event of a writ of certiorari being granted, the Court shou\"id not issue a writ of mandamus for the grant of licence since the grant or refusal of licence was subject to the prior approval of the State Government under r.7 of the Rules. The learned Judges accordingly held that the learned Single Judge was justified in issuing a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the Commissioner to issue a licence in favour pf Ms:ssrs Majestic Bottliug Company in view of the fact that there were . only two applicants in the field and the • application of Messrs Chingleput Bottlers having bn rejected, the State Government had no other option but to make .the grant in favour of Messrs Majestic Bottling Company. Further, the learned Judges observed that to sustain the objection would be tantamount to allowing the State Government to sit in appeal over the jdgment of the High Court. In substance, the learned Tudges were of the . view that filure of the State Government to take a specific. plea as to jurisdiction precluded them from raising a question' as 'to the jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a writ of mandamus.\n\nWe are afraid, we cannot accept this line of reasoning.\n\nIt is true that\" sometimes it is pfudent to couple a writ of certiorari with a writ of mandamus to control the exercise of discretionary power. The following illuminating passages from de\n\nSmith's Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 4th edn. at pp.341 ; and 544 pithily sum up the function of a writ of mandamus •\n\nB •\n\nn ..\n\n. SUPREME COURT REPORTS . . . . - ·. ~\n\n[1984] 3 S.C.R . • \"It is now open to a court when granting certiorari to\n\n. remit the matter to the authority with a direction to recon' ' sider and to decide in a.ccordance with the findiugs of the court. Apart from this, the role of the courts is limited to ensuring that direction has been exercised f according to Jaw.\n\nIf, therefore, a party agg.rieved by the exercise of discretionary power seeks an order of mandamus to compel the .authority to determine the matter on the basis legally relevant considerations, the proper form of the mandamus will be one to hear 4 . and determine according. to Jaw ;· though by holding inad- missible the considerations on which the original decision was based the court may 'indirectly indicate the. particular manner in which the discretion ought ti!! be exercised. In practice the frontier beween . control of legality and control of the actual exercise of discretion remains indeterminate, for the courts are sometimes observed to cross the boundaries that they have set .to. their own jurisdiction.\"\n\n** *\" •• •• •• \"The dnty to observe these basic principles of legality in exercising a discretion is unlike the \"duty\" to apply the law correctly to. findings of fact, prima facie enforceable by mandamus. Hence where an authority has misconceived or misapplied its discretionary powers by exercising them for an improper purpose, or capriciously, or on the _basis of irrelevant considerations or without regard to relevant c.onsideratipns, i.t will be deemed to hav.e failed to exercise its di; cretion or . jurisdiction .at all or to have failed to hear and determine according to law, al!d mandamus may issue to compel it to act in accordance with the law.\"\n\nPrfessor H.W.R .. Wade in his Administrative Law, 5th edn. at p.638 also defines the purpose of a writ of mandamus in these words:\n\n\"Mandamus is often used as an adjunct to certiorari.\n\nIf a tribunal or authority acts in a matter where it ha.s no power to act at all, .certiorari will quash the decision aud prohibition will prevent further unlawful proceedings. If there is power to act, but the power )s abµsed (as by hreach of natural justice or error on the face of the record), certiorari will quasli and mandamus may '. issue simultaneously to require a proper rehearing.\n\nAn example is Board of Educa ' ' . lion v. Rice ll911] AC 179 cited elsewhere ; the Board's\n\n• CliiNGLEPUT BOTTLERS v. MAJESTIC BOTTLING (Sen, i.) 20i\n\ndecision was ultra vtres since they had addressed their minds to the wrong question ; consequently it was quashed by certiorari and the Board were commanded by mandamus to determine the matter according to law, i.e. within the limits indicated by the House of Lords.\"\n\nIn our judgment, the High Coµrt exceeded its jurisdiction in issuing a writ of mandamus directing the Commission•:r to grant a licence to Messrs Majestic Bottling Company without the prio\"r approval of the State Government as enjoined by r.7 of the Rules ..\n\nThe High Court was unduly technical in applying the rules of plead• ings.\n\nAbsence of a specific plea in nature of demurrer would not invest the High Court with jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus ordaining the Commissioner to grant a licen<e' to Messcrs Majestic . . Bottl'tng Company under .r.7 of the Rules without the prior approval\n\nof the State Government which was a condition pre-requisite for the grant of such privilege. It is regrettable that the High Court should have short-circuited the whole procedure upon a wrongful assumption of its own powers. The view taken by the High Court is manifestly erroneous. Otherwise, the statutory . requirement of such prior approval of the State Government under r.7 would be rendered wholly otiose.\n\nWe should not be understood as laying down an inflexible rule that the High Courts cannot, untler any circumstances, regulate or control the manner of grant of a liquor licence by the issue of a writ of mandamus. It would all depend upon the fktts and circum- , stances as to whether the Hlgh Court should issue a wfit of mandamus .or not. The grant of a liquor licence is a matter of privilege. II) the very nature of things, the grant of refusal of Jicence is in the discretion of the State Government. Normally, where the statute vests a discretionary power llj)On an administrative authority, the Court would not interfere with the exercise of such .discretion unless it is mane with oblique motives or extraneous purposes or'upon extraneous considerations. The present case does notfall within the , rule laid down in K. N. Guruswamy v. The State of MyNre & Ors.1 and P. Bhooma Reddy v. State of Mysore & Ors' The decisions in Guruswamy's and Bhooma Reddy's cases are•both in consonance with the well-settled principle that. the High Court can always issue a\n\n(l) [1955] 1 SCR 305\n\n(2) [1969] 3 SCR 14\n\n.Ci\n\nG •\n\nwrit of madam us under Art. 226 of the Constitution against a public authority to compel the performance of a public duty where such authority acts in violation of the law. . . .\n\nIt is urged on behalf of Messrs Majestic Bottling Company placing reliance on the decision of the House of Lords in Padfield\n\nv. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries & Food1 and that of this Court in Messrs Hochtief Gammon v. State of Orissa &ldrs.2 following the same that, no doubt where the reasons given are bad and the authority had not taken into consideration the relevant matters or real grounds on which the order co.uld have been passed, the Court. can direct the authority to reconsider the matter in the light of such relevant mters. ufit was urged that no useful purpose would\n\nb~ served in remitting lbe matter to the authority for reconsideration where all the reasons that can be given for upholding the validity of the order have beenfound by the Court to be bad and unsustainable. The .submission is that in such a case the Courts will not direct the authority to refonsider the matter for, then there is nothing to . reconsider but the Court will direct the authority to carry out what it has by the impugned order refused to do. In Hochtief Gammon's -case, this Court deduced the following principles from the decision of House of Lords in Padfield';; case:\n\n\"The l!xecutive have to reach their decisions by taking into account relevant .considerations. They should not refuse to consider felevant matter no.r should they take into account wholly irrelevant or extraneous consideration. They should not misdirect themselves on a point of law. Only sµch a decision will be lawfuf. The Courts have power to see that the Executive acts lawfully. It is no answer to the exercise of that power to say that. the Executive acted bona fide nor that they have bestowed painstaking consideration. They cannot avoid . scrutiny by courts by failing to give reasons. If they give reasons and they are not good reasons, the court can direct them to reconsider the matter in the light of relevant. matters though the propriety, adequacy or satisfactory character of these reasons may not be open to judicial scrutiny. Even if the Executive .considers it inexpedient to exercise their powers fhey should state their reasons and there must be;/ material to show that they have considered all the relevant facts.\n\n(I) LR [1968] AC 997\n\n) (1976] I SCR 667\n\n.)J\n\n• CH!NGLEPUT BOTTLERS v. MAJESTIC BOTTLING ~Sen, J.) 2b3\n\nThis was not a case where it coul'tl be said that there was noth ing for the State Government to consider as to whether should accord or refuse prior approval to the gran~ of a licence to Messrs Majestic Bottling Company under r. 7 of the Rules. The Commissioner by the impugned order rejected the applications for grant .of a licence made by both Messrs Chingleput Bottlersfnd Messrs Majes tic Bottling Company and therefore the. stage was not reached. The stage for the State Government to reconsider the matter of grant of privilege under r. 7 would , only arie when;. the commissioner makes a recommendation for the grant of a licence. to Messrs Majestic Bottling Company. At that stage, the State Government would have to consider whether they should accord prior approval for the grant 'of such privilege to Messrs Majestic Bottjjpg Company having regard to the matters specified in r. 5 of the Rules and the condilions set out in r. 6(c), .in view of the further facts brought out in the supplementary counter affidavit of Deputy Secretary to the State Government, Department of Prohibition•& Excise in support of the objection raised in para 11 of the counter-affidavit. One of the relevant factors that the State Government must, as they should, take into consideration is , the suitability of Messrs Majestic Bottling Company for the graqt of licehce as required under r. S(a) and !he other is whether J. Balaji, the managing partner and Smt. Shanthi the other partner, were per sons who would abide by tlie provisisjons of the Act and the Rules made thereunder as enjoined by).. S(b). The facts lay a serious charge that Balaji, managing partner of Messrs Majestic Bottling Company and his other partner Smt. Shanthi were directors of Messrs Dhanalakshmi Chemical Industries Private Limited, Ranipet upto November 26, 1980 and that there was prima facie evidence showing that the company had misused the rectified spirit issued to it causing a loss of revenue to the State Government to the tune elf Rupees two crores or thereabout. It would be permissible for the\n\nState Government to take these facts as justification for refusal to grant prior approval under r. 7 of the Rules. .\n\nIn Foming to the conclusion they did~ the learned Judges have drawn sustenance from the decision of this Court in Gujarat State Financial Corporation v. Messrs Lotus Hotels Private Limitedl and of the High Court in the State of Tamil Nadu & Anr. v. C. Vadiappan' in support of the view that the High Court had jurisdiction .to issue a writ of mandamus directing the State of Tamil Nadu and\n\n(!) (1983] 3 s.c.c. 379\n\n(2) (1982] 2 Mad. L.J. 30\n\n• 2o4 stJPRBMll COURT REPORTS t19s4J 3 s.c.ft:.\n\n the Commissfoner of Prohibitit'm & Excise to grant the privilege for the manufacture and supply of bottled arrack to Messrs Majestic .\n\nBottling Company for tbe Chingleput district under r. 7 of the Rules .. The decision in Gu}wat Stat~ Financial Corporation's case .\n\n(supra) is clearly distinguishable and is not an authority for any such . proposition. No;; uch questiou arose in that case at al1. There, the Court was dealing with a contract entered into by the Gujaat State . Financial Corporation with Messrs Lotus Hotels Private Limited for\n\nthe purpose of setting up a 4-star hotel. The Company approached the Corporation for a loan.of rupees 30 !akhs and the Corporation sanctioned a loan of Rs. 29.93 lakhs on certain terms and conditions wl'tich the Company accepted. The Corporation however finally resolved not to disburse the lon to the Company whereupon the Company moved Gujarat High Court by a petition under Act. 226 for the issue of a writ of mandamus to direct the Corporation to disburse the loan. A learned Single Judge of the High Court issued the writ as prayed for and it was confirme<\\ by• a Division Bench. ·.\n\nOn appeal by the Corporation, this writ Court held that the High Court was justified.in issuing the writ of .mandamus. The decision in G, ujarµt State FinancialCorporation's case, (supra) turned on .the doctrine of promissory estoppel and it does not justify the conclusion reached by the learned ludges in the present case for the issue of a writ of mandamus. It is needless to stress that if the require- . . . ment of law was that the advance of loan to be sanctioned by the Gujarat State Financial Corporation was to be subject to the prfor. approval of the Reserve Bank of India, the decision of the Court would have been otherwise.\n\nIt is difficult to subscribe to the doctrine evolved by the High Court in Vadiappan's case, (supra) that 'the Commissioner is the 'sole. arbiter' under r. 7 of the Rules. It relied upon the earlier deci&ion of the High Court in K. Ramaswamy v. Government of Tam ii Nadu & Ors' laying down that .the proviso to r. 6 of the Tamil Nadu Arrack (Supply by Wholesale) Rules, 1981 had to be understood strictly ill a negative sen~. According to the High Court, at best it confers.on the Government a power to .vefo. By itself, the High Court observed, 'it does not make the Government a final arbiter between the competing claims. The High Court further observed in Ramliswamy' s case, supra, that 'the weighing of the pros and cons and the consideration of the merits and demerits of the rival clai-\n\n\\ (I,) Writ >.ppeal No. 368of1981.\n\n. ' -, f\n\nCHiNGLEPUT BOTTLERS v. MAJESTIC BOTTLING (Sen, J.) 205\n\nments remained, from first to last with the Commissioner as his sole responsibility, and that the requirement of the Government's proper approval under the proviso to r. 6 of the' Tamil Nadu Arrack (Supply by Wholesale) Rules \"1981 was no doubt a necessary part of the validity of every licence, but 'the enabling power cannot he employed as a machinery for a review in every case but only as a check upon a possible abuse of its power by the Commissioner'.\n\nThat approach of the High Court seems to run counter to the scheme of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. The grant of a liquor licence under r; 7 is a matter of privilege of the State Government.\n\nThe Commissioner merely exercises the delegated powers of the State Government. The ultimate responsibility for the grant of such privilege is with the State Government under r. 7 of the Rules .\n\n. Nor can we subscribe to the contention that the Commissioner bad to act under the directions and control of the State Government under sub-s. (2) of s. 2SA of the act while exercising his powers delegated under sub-s (I) of s. l 7C read with s. 25A (I) in the matter or grant of a liquor licence under r. 7 of the Rules. It would not justify the High Court to issue a writ of mandamus to the Commissioner to grant a licence to Messrs Majestic Bottling Com- . pany under r. 7 of the Rules without the prior approval of the State , .\n\nGovernment. Obviously, the State Government and the Commissioner canot act de hors the scheme of tl)e Act and the Rules framed thereunder. Furter, the contention that the State Government had already made up their mind against the grant of such previlege to Messrs Majestic Bottling Company . and that there was no occasion for the High Court to send back the cae to -the Commissioner as it would have amonnted to the State Governn1ent being asked to sit in appeal over the judgment of the High Court, cannot be accepted. We regret to say,· the High Court has tried to circumveni the whole procedure by issuing a writ of mandamus directing the Commissioner to grant a licence under r. 7 without the prior appro\\lal of the State Government. As already stated, the grant of a licence un.der r. 7 of the Rules is a privilege. There are no charges of ma/a fides on the part of the State Government. There is no suggestion that the State Government had already made up their mind. This is also not a case where the rules of necessity require recourse \"to a writ of mandamus to command the issue of a licence without con forming to the procedure prescribed under r. 7.\n\n II>\n\nIn the premises, it was not a . proper exercise of jurisdiction for the High Court to have 'iss\\led a writ . of mandamus under Art, 226 ·\n\nff;\n\n,,.\n\nof the Constitution ordaining the Commissioner to grant a licence to\n\nMessr~ Majestic Bottling Company under r.7 of the )lules 'without . the pr10r approval of the State Government. In our opinion, the proper course for the High Court to adopt was to issue a writ of mandamus directing the Commissioner to redetermine the question after following the procedure of r. 7 and in case he came to a decision to grant the licence in favour of Messrs Majestic Bottling Company, to refer the matter to the State Government for its prior approval. Otherwise r.7 of the Rules would be rendered. completely otiose . .\n\nTurningto the appeai preferred by M/s Chingleput Bottlers, le'arned counsel for them has mainly advanced a three-fold sub mission: (1) The Commissioner had acted in flagrant violation of the rules.<)[ natural justice in not furnishing to Messrs Chingleput Bottlers a copy of the report of the Collector and other extraneous material comprising of a representation received from Messrs Majestic Bottling Company along with various other documents.\n\nNor had. he disclosed to them the substance of the report of the Collector or other information gathered by him irrespective of the source.\n\n(2) The impugned order passed by the Commissioner was vitiated by errors apparent on the face of the record. There was no factual basis for. the assumptidn that the three persons from whom Messrs Chingleput Bottlers had taken the lease of the land on which the blending unit is located. viz, K.J. Geo\"'5e, M/~. Visvam baran and E.K. Chandrasekaran, were real partners of Messrs Three.\n\nStar Bottling Company. There was also no warrant for the suspicion cast by the Collector in is report that Messrs Chingleput Bottlers were mere benamidars of otie . O.H. Kumar, proprietor of Messrs Three Star Bottling Company, the existing licensee, on the ground that they bad entered into an agreement to purchase the blending unit from him. The function of the Commissioner in making the grant of'privilege under r. 7 qf the Rules of being a quasi-judicial nature, the Commissioner could not act on unwarranted conjecture,; and mere surmises. (3) The 'commissioner had not acted fairly inasmuch as 'he adopted a double standard. For a secret inquiry was conducted against Messrs_Chingleput Bottlers for adjudging their, suitability for the grant of privilege while no. such inquiry was mqde against Messrs Majestic Bottling Company. The Commissioner had thus treated Messrtchingleput Bottlers and Messrs Majestic Bottling Company on an unequal footing and thus the procedure adopted was violative of Art. 14. The observation made by the Commissioner that the pepqsit of Rs. 10,01,00) made by Messr~ Chingleput Bottlers with.\n\n, J/\n\n...\n\nCIUNGLEPUT BOTTLEM v; MAJESTIC BOTTLING (Sen, J.) 207\n\nthe Indian Overseas Bank ha.d not come from bona fide sources and that obviously there was some secret understanding between O.H . . Kumar and Me; srs Chingleput Bttlers was not based on any material at all. The Commissioner knew that O.H. J(umar, the previous licensee, was not in a position to advance rupees 10 lakhs and odd to Messrs Ching!eput Bottlers. Again, no such inquiry was made as to the financial capacity of Messrs Majestic Bottling Company. Further, the Commissioner had wrongly assumed that\n\nMers Chingleput Bottlers and given theiraddress as 'Ramabadran, c/o essrs Three Star lk>ttling Company, lyanchery' when no such address was ever furnished and therefore the impugned order is vitiated by an error apparent on the face of the record.\n\nIn support of the contention that the Commissioner acted i11 violation of the' rules of natural justice, the learned counsel contends that Messrs Chingleput Bottlirs had a right to be heard. It is urged that there was clear breach of the principle of audi alteran partem . inasmuch as neither a copy of the report of the Collector was furnished to Messrs Chingleput Bottlers nor a copy of >the representation submitted by Messrs Miijestic Bottling Company against the grant of licence to them. The argument is that a hearing where a party does not know the case he has to meet is no hearing at all, while the learned counsel concedes that the right to know the case to be met does not necessarily involve any right to know the sources of adverse inference or to confront informants,' for in many cases it will be quite proper for the authority to employ confidential sources, the rules of natural justice require that the information itself should be disclosed so that there is a fair opportunity of\n\nmeeting the case.\n\nIn the file relating to Messrs Majestic Bottling Company there is a representation filed by J. Balaji, managing partner of Messrs Majestic Bottling Company, consisting of 131 pages and was apparently handed over by J .. Balaji at the time of heafing, before the Commissioner on July 5, 1982. The rresentation dated July 5, 198? is in the forrn of a petition in continuation qf the application for grant made on June 9, 198,2. Regarding Messrs Chingleput Bottlers, certain objections are raised to the grant of licence. The objections are formulated in a document marked Annexure 'A'. It is alleged that the existing licensee 0.H. Kumar is running the show under the name and style of Messrs Three Star Bottling Company which is\n\nuder the control of three person§. namely, K.J, George, M:S.\n\nV1svaml,>aran and E.K. Chanctrasekara, n. It recites th11t now finq-\n\nB .. ,\n\n.. ' '\n\n' 208\n\nWPREME COURT REPORTS _{1984} 3 s.c.R.\n\ning that O.H. Kumar could not get the present licence, they have sef up Ramabadran who has himself shown his address as care of : Messrs Three Star Bottling Company. This .itself clearly shows that the. applicant. Ramabadran is a benamidar of Messrs Three Star Bottling Company. In support of the assertion that Ramabadran is a benamidar of 0.H. Kumar, there is a copy of the judgment of the High Court of Madras in Writ Petition No. 1239 of 1961 filed along with other papers .. In the file relati, ng to ssrs Chingleput Bottlers there is a two-page note which formulates . . certain objections to the grant of privilege to Messrs Chirfllleput Bot(lers. It was obviously handed over by J. Balaji, managing partner of Messrs Majestic Bottling Company to the Assistant Commissionef\"(Excise) during his inspection of the blendipg unit or before the C9llector before the submission of his report.\n\n' ' We do not think that the Comissioner was under an obliga-·; lion to furnish Messrs Chingleput Bottlers with a copy of.the report submitted by the.Collector or of the representation made by Messrs Majestic Bottling Company. Thf~ equally applies to the two-page note appearing in.the file of Messrs Chingleput Bottlers. It was. quite pro- . per.for the Commissioner to make secret and discreet inquiries from confidential sources. There was no duty cast on him to disclose to Messrs Chingleput Bottlers the sources of adverse information or to give. them an oppt>rtuniiy to confront the informants.\n\nRules of fairplay only enjoin that Messrs Chinglepnt Bottlers should kiiow the case against thFm. This apparently they did from the questionnaire issued by the Commissioner and the questions put by the Commissioner on July 5, 1982 on the basis of the information gathered by him.\n\nThe Commissioner has relied upon the report of the Collector and the conclusions reached by the Collector are based on the statement of Ramabadran recorded by the Assistant Commissionr (Excise).\n\nFurther, at the heating on July 5, I 982, the Commissioner recorded the statementoof Ramabadran, managing partner of Messrs Chingleput Bottlers. There 'was no occasion for the Commissioner to have recorded the statement of Rartiabadran over again unless this was to give him an opportunity to exp)ain \\be substance of the report of the Collector or other information gat\\\\ered by hi.m irrespective of the source.\n\nThe learned Judg_es . repelled. the contention of Messrs Chingleput Bottlers, that the Comissioner acted in breach of therules 9f natural justice by his failure to furnish theD! with a copy of th~\n\n' ..\n\nCllINGLEPUT BOTTLERS v. M~JESTIC BOTTLING (Sen, J.) 209\n\nrepoi; t of Collector on the ground that there is no fund<1mental right in a citizen to carry on any trade ln liquor. According to them, the Commissioner under the Rules performs an admi11istrative function and having regard to the reuirements of r .5 of the Rules, and in view of the fact that Messrs Chingleput Bottlers had neither a legal right nor a legal expectation that they would be granted the privilage all that was required was that the Commissioner should act fairly in dealwg with the application and not in a capricious or arbitrary manner. _On the material on record, the learned Judges held that they w•re satisfied that the Commissioner acted fairly and reasonably and not arbitrarily or capriciously in coming to the conclusioo that Messrs Chinglepnt Bottlers had not made the application on their own behalf, but betiami for others and in rejecting their application for the privilege for setting up a blending uit for arrack.\n\nIncidentally, they pointed out that Messrs Chingleput Bottlers did not specifically make a grievance of the fact in the writ petition that principles of natural justice had not been complied with. It is a. fundamental rule of law that no decision mnst be taken whiCh. will affect the rights of any persQn without first giving h_im an opportunity of putting forward his case.\n\nThere has ever since the -judgment of Lord Reid in Ridge v.\n\nBa(dwin, supra, been considerable fluctuation of judicial opinion in 'England as tD the degree of strictness with which the rules ofnatural justice should be extended, ad there is growing awareness of the problems created by the extended application of principles 9f natural justice, or the duty to act fairly, which tends tQ sacrifice the administrative efficiency and despatch, or frµstrates the object of the bw in question. Since this Court had held that Lord Reid's judgmc:it in Ridge v. Baldwin would be of assistance in deciding questi@ns relating to natural justice, there is always \"the duty to act judicially''. whenever the rules of natural justice are applicable. There is therefore the insistence upon the requirement of a \"fair hearing\". . .\n\nIn the light of the settled principles, we have to see whether the G Commissioner. acted in breach of the rules of natural justice or fairplay in passing the jmpugned order:\n\nThere is authority for the proposition that an authority or body need' not observe the rules of natural justice where its decision, although final, relates not to a 'right' but to a 'privilege or ficeµce'.\n\nJn a: nunibr of recent decisions, the Conrts have, while extending\n\nthe protection of natural justice in the former 'Category of claims, denie\\I such proiection to the latter ca!egory. All that is emphasize(! in such cases is that the applications must be considered fairly.\n\nIn R. v. Gaming Board for Great Britain.e:Xparte Bneailn & Khaida1 the\n\nCourt of Appeal held that in refusing a certificate for reasons concerning the character and suitability of the applicants, the Board must act fairly and obey th~ broad principles .of natural justice, In fact, it was held that they had done so _since they had given the applicants full opportunity to know and contest the case again!t them, ven though they had not revealed the sources of their infor- • tfiatiim or given their reas, ons. It follows that the right to know the case to be met does not necessarily involve any right to know the source of adverse information or to confront the informants, for id. some cases it would be quite proper for the authority to employ confidential sources.\n\nThe Master of' Rolls referred to the contention advanced by counsel appearing for the applicants. that they ougbt not to be deprived of the chance to get licence for the gaming business without knowing the case they had to meet. The counsel criticized especially the way in which the Board proposed to kee,. that confidential information and relied on.some words of his in R. Surinder Singh Kanda v. Government .~! the ~Federation of Malaya• where he had said:\n\n'Thatthe Judge or whoever lras to adjudicate must not hear evidence or receive representation from one side behind the pack of the.other.\" ·\n\nLord' Denning rejected the contention by observing that 'the CO\\Jnsel had put hjs case too high'. The ]earned Master of Rolls then observed.: ·\n\n. . \"It is an error to regard Crockfor!l's. as having any right of which they are being deprive(!. They have not bad in the past, and they have not now, any right to play these games of chance-roulette, cheminde-fer, baccarai and the like for their own profit. What they are really seeking is a privilege:almost, I might say, a franchise'to carry on gaming\n\nH (!). [1970)\" 2 All B.R. 528\n\n(2). LR [1962) AC 3~.\n\n• f • .•\n\n-r.\n\nCHINGLEPUT. BOTTLERS v. MAJESTIC BOTTLING (Sen, J.) 211\n\nfor profit, a thing never hitherto allowed in this country. It A\n\nis for them to show that they are fit to be trusted with it.\"\n\nIu Breen v. Amalgamated Engineering Union.' Lord Denning said :\n\n\"If a man seeks a privilege to.which he has no particular claim-such as an appointment to some post or other- ' . then lie can be turned away without a word.\" •\n\nThe Master of Rolls went on to say that nonetheless statutory and in some cases domestic bodies must act\n\n0fairly and this may involve a. hearing. althoug_h it is not clear from the judgment whether the duty applies where .an initial application is being considered. or only where an existing privilege is being terminated.\n\nIn Mcinnes .v.Ons/ow Fane & Anr., Megarry, V.Cc has drawn a distinction between initial applications for grant of licence and the revocation, suspension or refusat to renew licences already granted.\n\nThe learned Vice-Chancellor says:that there i~ a substantial distinction between 'application cases' and 'forfeiture cases'. He observes. that while an apJ, llicanf for _grant of licence has neither a right to such a grant nor a reasonable expectation that su.ch grant would be •. made in his favour, but cancellation or forfeiture of an existing licence orrefusa!' to renew a licences, involves. a right to a hearing as the applicant has what may be called 'reasonable expectation'; Megarry, V.C. dealt with the question whether the grant or refusal of licence by the Boara of Control is sbject to any requirement of natural justice or fairness which would be enforced by the Courts.\n\nIn dealing with the nature of the right to claim a licence, he said that it was nothing but a privilege. The three distinct categories can \"- best be discerned in his own words : ;.\n\n\"\"· I\n\n\"First, there are what may be called the forfeiture cases.\n\nIn these, there is a decision which takes away some existing right or position, as where a member of an organization is expelled or a licence is revoked. Second, at the other extreme there are what may be called the application cases. There are cases where the decision merely refuses to grant the applicant the right or position that he seeks, such as membership\n\n(!). [1971] 2 QB 175 (2). (1978) 3 J\\ll. BR 211\n\nof the organization, or a licence to do certain acts. Third \"there is an interme<; liate category, which may be called th:\n\nexpectation, cases, which differ from the application cases only in thar the applicant has spme legitimate expectation from what has already happened that his application will be granted. This head includes cases where an existing licence holder applies for a renewal of his licence, or a person already eleceted or appointed to some position seeks confirmation from some confirming autf10rity.\n\nThe learned Vice-Chancellor went on to say that there was a substantial distinction betwi:en forfeiture cases and application cases: In forfeiture cases, there is a threat to take sometl)ing away for some reason. In such cases, the right to an unbiased tribunal, th.e right to notice of the charges arid the right to be heard in answer to the charges which were:the three features of natural justice are plainly apt. In application cases, on the other hand, nothing is being taken away, and i.n all normal circumstances there are no charges', and so no requirement of an opportunity of being heard in answer to the charges. Indeed, there is the.far wider and less defined questions of the general suitability of the applicant for membership or a licence. The distinction is well recognized, for in general it is clear that tho Courts will require natilral justice to be observed for expulsion from a social club, but not on an application for admi!!llion to' it. The intermediate category i.e. of tqe expectation cases, may at least in sonze respects be regarded s being more akin to forfeiture cases than application cases ; for although in form there is no forfeitnre bu' merely an attempt at acqnisition that fails, the legitimate expeCtation of a renewal of the licence or conformation of the' membership is one which raises tbe question of what it is that has happened to make the applicant unsuitable for {he membership or licence for which he was previously thought suitable,\n\nIil such cases, Megarry, V.C. felt that. much help cannot be had from discussirig whether 'natural justice' or 'fairness' was the more appropriate term'. He.observes that if one expects that naturnl justice is a flexible term which imposes different requirements in different cases; it is capable of.applying appropriately to the whole range of situations indicated by the terms such as 'judicial,' 'qnasi judicial' and 'administrative'. The content of the 'duty to act f\\\\irly'\n\n1lid. not impose on :he Board to give either oral hearing to the .\n\nj ,\n\n' -\n\n. '\n\nCltlNGLEPUT BOTTLERS v. MAJESTIC BOTTLING (Sen, J.) 213\n\n. ' applicant or to disclose the case against him nor was it under any obligation to give r_easons for a decision: The learned Judge then went on to say that there was no obligation for the Board to give the applicant even the gist of the reasons while they refused his applicatibu, or proposed to d_o so, and added:\n\nThe concepts of natural justice and the duty to be fair must not be allowed to discredit themselves while making unreasonable requirements and imposing undue bµrdens.\"\n\n1n such cases, the right to hearing has been denied on the ground .\n\nthat the claim or interest or legitimate' expectation is a more 'privilege c or 'licence' .. This is in consonance with the decision of a Constitu- . lion Bench of this Court in Kishan Chand Arora v. Commissioner of\n\n. Police, Calcutta' following the judgmet of the Privy Council in Nakkuda Ali v. M.F.De S. Jayaratne's' case.\n\n\" It is beyond the scope of the .present judgment to enter into a discussion on the apparent conftict between the decision of the Privy Council in Nakkuda Ali's case and the observations of Lord Reid in Baldwin's case. It would appear that the long line of cases beginning. with 82/dwin's cse and ending with D'arcy Ryan'J case are cases dealing with interference with property rights, deprivation of member>hip of professional or other non-statutory bodies, dismissal from office, imposition of penalties and deprivation of advantages etc.\n\nBoth the Privy Council as well as this Court have required strict\n\napherenc~ to the rules of natural justice wfiere a public authority or body has_ to deal with rights. But the principle that there was a duty to observe the audi alteram partem rule may not apply to cases whi_ch relate not to rights or legal expectations but to. mere pivilege\n\nor licence. •\n\nIt is now well-settled that, while considering the question of breach of the principles of natural justice, the Court should not proceed as if there are intlexible rules of natural justice of universal application. Each case depends on lits own circumstances. Rnles of natural justice vary with the varying constitutions nf statutory bodies and the rules 'prescribed by the legislature under which they\n\nhave to act.\n\n' H I\n\n(I). [19611 3 SCR _135.\n\n(2). LR [1951) AC 66.\n\n214 SUPREME cotlRT REPORTS [1984} 3 ~.:;.i>: •\n\nThere is nothin$ in the language of r. 7 of the Rules to suggest that in refusing to grant the privilege, the Commissioner is obliged to act 'judicially'. The order refusing a licence under r. 7 is purely an administrative or executive order and is not open to appeal or revision. There is no /is between the Commissioner and the person who is refused such privilege. The power of refusal of licence unlike the power to grant is riot subject t.o any pre-condition.\n\nIt mus; follo)l' that the grant Of a liquor. icence under r. 7 of the Rules does no{ involve any right or expectation but it is a'inatter ot privilege. The Commissioner was therefore under no. obligation either to disclose the sources of information or the gist of the information that he had. All that was required was that he should act fairly, and deal with the applications without any bias, and not in an arbitrary or capricious manner. - . ..\n\nThere is no suggestion of any 1iiala fide!; on the part of the Commissioner or the State Government. The Commissioner heard both the parties after he had an inquiry made through the Collector . to adjudge their suitability for the grant of the licence. The Commissioner had issued a questionnaire and had the material collected by the Collector. The Commissioner was entitled to act on the report of the Collector:and also on other material gathered\n\nf •\n\nby him during the course of the:inquiry .. There is no requirement under the Act for a confronted hearing like the hearing.contemplated . -\\ between rival claimants for the grant of a stage carriage permit under . the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 into' their respective merits and demerits. The Commissioner separately heard both the parties and had their statements recorcied with respect to all the relevant aspects.\n\nIt canntlt be said that the Commissioner in dealing with the applications did not act fairly in 'not furnishing a copy of the report of the Collector or in taking a representation from Messrs Majestic Bottling Company.\n\nThe Jiigh Court could not have in proceedings under Art. 126 of the Constitution interfered with the impugned order of the . Commissioner merely because on a reappraisal of the evidence it might have come to a contrary conclusion. There was. no errclr of jurisdiction on the part of the Commissioner nor was the impugned order vitiaJed by any error apparent on the face of the record. The finding reached by the Commissioner that the application made by' Messrs Chingleput Bottlirs was not, made bona fide on their own\n\n: •.\n\nC!!IN.GLEPUT norrLEks v. MAJEsnc lior:rtna (Sen, J.) 215\n\naccQunt but as benami for others is a :finding based on appreciation of evidence .. The Con:imissioner was entitled to rely upon the facts found by the Collector. It may be pointed out that the Collector's report is entirely based on tl)e statement of V. Ramabadran, managing partner of Messrs Chingleput Bottlers. The High c;, ourt was therefore justified in dismissing the appeal preferred by Messrs Chingleput Bottlers. ' • In the result, the appeal preferred by the State povemment must succeed and is allowed .. The judgment. and brder passed by the High Court fot the issue of a writ of mandamus directing the Commissioner of Prohibition & Excise, .Madras is set aside and the case' is remanded to the Commissioner for a decision afresh according to law. For th.e reasons stated, the appeal filed by Messrs Chingleput Bottlers must fail and is 'dismissed.\n\nS.R.\n\nThere shall be no order as to costs.\n\n' .\n\nC.As .. 11970-71 /83 dismissed and C.A. / 1'172/83 allowed", "total_entities": 123, "entities": [{"text": "CHINGLEPUT BOTTLERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 19, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "CHINGLEPUT BOTTLERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 15, 1984", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 50, "end_char": 64, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CHINGLEPUT BOTTLERS\n\nMAJESTIC BOTTLING COMPANY B\n\nMarch 15, 1984\n\n[A, P. SEN ANn•A. VARADARMAN, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "P. SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 70, "end_char": 76, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Tamil Nadu Prohibition Act, 1937", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1022, "end_char": 1054, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Majestic. Bottling Company", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1075, "end_char": 1101, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Majestic. Bottling Company", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Majestic Bottling Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1397, "end_char": 1422, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As regard_s Majestic Bottling Company the Commissioner held that they did not satisfy the requirements of rr."}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1974, "end_char": 1985, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Tamil Nadu Prohibition Act, 1937", "statute": "the Tamil Nadu Prohibition Act, 1937"}}, {"text": "Majestic Botfling Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2202, "end_char": 2227, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A Single judge Of the High O?urt .issued a writ of certiorari quashing the order of the Commissioner insofar as he rejected the application of Majestic Botfling Company an4 also issued ;{w.rit of miindamµs ordaining the' Commis~ sioner tO grant the licen~ to Majestic Bottling Company."}}, {"text": "ChingJeput Bottiers", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2356, "end_char": 2375, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As regards ChingJeput Bottiers, the Single Judge rejeced their Contention that tpe Commissioner had acted in breach of rules of natural justice by his failure -to furnish them the report .of the Collector and Observed that nothing preluded them from seeking\n\nven1sl of.", "canonical_name": "CHINGLEPUT BOTTLERS"}}, {"text": "CHINGLEPUT BOTTLERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2690, "end_char": 2709, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CHINGLEPUT BOTTLERS v. MAJESTIC BOTTLiNG 191\n\noth the' applicants preferred appeals to t11e D_ivision Bench.", "canonical_name": "CHINGLEPUT BOTTLERS"}}, {"text": "MAJESTIC BOTTLiNG", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2713, "end_char": 2730, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CHINGLEPUT BOTTLERS v. MAJESTIC BOTTLiNG 191\n\noth the' applicants preferred appeals to t11e D_ivision Bench.", "canonical_name": "Majestic. Bottling Company"}}, {"text": "Ching1eput Bottlers", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4068, "end_char": 4087, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the High Court had nO power to fssue a writ of mandamus directing the Commissioner .to grant the Jicence in favour of lvlajestic Bottling Company:\n\nIt was cpntended on behalf of Ching1eput Bottlers that the Commissioner had acted in breach of rules of na:turaI jusliee in not furnishing them a copy of the report submitted by the Collector and _other material gathered by hi~ during the course of the enquiry.", "canonical_name": "CHINGLEPUT BOTTLERS"}}, {"text": "Chingleput Bottlers", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4376, "end_char": 4395, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Allowing the appeal of th'e State Government and disniissing the appeal Of Chingleput Bottlers.", "canonical_name": "CHINGLEPUT BOTTLERS"}}, {"text": "de Smith", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5250, "end_char": 5258, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(199A-C] •\n\nde Smith : Judicial Review of Administrative Actin, 4th Ed."}}, {"text": "Judicial Review of Administrative Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5261, "end_char": 5298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5549, "end_char": 5551, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Judicial Review of Administrative Act", "statute": "Judicial Review of Administrative Act"}}, {"text": "[1955] 1 S C.R. 305", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 6083, "end_char": 6102, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1961] 3 S.C.R. 135", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 9724, "end_char": 9743, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Nakkuda", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9749, "end_char": 9756, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1978] 3 All E.R. 211; l{ishanChand Arora v .. Commissioner of Police, [1961] 3 S.C.R. 135; and Nakkuda ,\\/Iv.", "canonical_name": "Nakkuda Ali"}}, {"text": "Majesti~ Bottling Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11036, "end_char": 11061, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It~Cannot be , said that\" the Commissioner in dealing with the app1icil.tions did not act fairly in -not furnishing a copy of the report of the Collector or in taking a rePresentation from Majesti~ Bottling Company."}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11200, "end_char": 11228, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[213G-H,'214A-B, C-E, G-H]\n\n_J.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos."}}, {"text": "s. 523, 531 & 528", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11399, "end_char": 11416, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "K. K. Venugopa/", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11427, "end_char": 11442, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. K. Venugopa/ and C. S. Vaidyanathan for the Appellants in CA-Nos."}}, {"text": "C. S. Vaidyanathan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11447, "end_char": 11465, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. K. Venugopa/ and C. S. Vaidyanathan for the Appellants in CA-Nos."}}, {"text": "Sahnti Bhushan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11511, "end_char": 11525, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 1970-7118\\.\n\nSahnti Bhushan, A. T. M. Sampath and Mr. K. Subramaniam for the Respondents in CA."}}, {"text": "A. T. M. Sampath", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11527, "end_char": 11543, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 1970-7118\\.\n\nSahnti Bhushan, A. T. M. Sampath and Mr. K. Subramaniam for the Respondents in CA."}}, {"text": "K. Subramaniam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11552, "end_char": 11566, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 1970-7118\\.\n\nSahnti Bhushan, A. T. M. Sampath and Mr. K. Subramaniam for the Respondents in CA.", "canonical_name": "K. Subramaniam"}}, {"text": "A. K. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11664, "end_char": 11673, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A -\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS • , ll 9841 3 S.C.R. • A. K. Sen an-d A. V. Rangam for the Appellant in CA."}}, {"text": "A. V. Rangam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11679, "end_char": 11691, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A -\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS • , ll 9841 3 S.C.R. • A. K. Sen an-d A. V. Rangam for the Appellant in CA."}}, {"text": "Soli J. Sorabjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11736, "end_char": 11752, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Soli J. Sorabjee A. T.\n\nM. Sampath and K. Subramantam • for the Respondent in CA."}}, {"text": "K. Subramantam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11775, "end_char": 11789, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Soli J. Sorabjee A. T.\n\nM. Sampath and K. Subramantam • for the Respondent in CA.", "canonical_name": "K. Subramaniam"}}, {"text": "SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11873, "end_char": 11876, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ihe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nSEN, J. These appeals by special leave directed against a judgment of a Division."}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11968, "end_char": 11985, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bench of the Madras High Court dated July 7, i983 upholding the judgment and order ()f a learned Single Judge dated."}}, {"text": "Tamil Nadn Prohibition Act, 1937", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12338, "end_char": 12370, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "May 28, 1982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12547, "end_char": 12559, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 28, 1982 one 0."}}, {"text": "H. Kumar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12567, "end_char": 12575, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. Kumar carrying oniJusiness 11nder the name and style of .Messrs Three Star Bottling Company surrendered his Iicene for the mamifacture arid supply of bottled arrack for."}}, {"text": "Three Star Bottling Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12634, "end_char": 12661, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. Kumar carrying oniJusiness 11nder the name and style of .Messrs Three Star Bottling Company surrendered his Iicene for the mamifacture arid supply of bottled arrack for."}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12838, "end_char": 12844, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Commissioner of Prohibition & Excise, Madras called for applications from intending persons for the grant of the licence."}}, {"text": "J. Balaji", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13070, "end_char": 13079, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "fn response to the notice 'issued by the Commissioner under r.3(2) of the Rules, 'there were two applications filed under r.5 in Form 1, namely, by J. Balaji.", "canonical_name": "J .. Balaji"}}, {"text": "June 9, 1982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13137, "end_char": 13149, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "managing partner of Messrs Majestic Bottling Company on June 9, 1982 anct\"by V. Ramabadran, maiiaging partner of ."}}, {"text": "V. Ramabadran", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13158, "end_char": 13171, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "managing partner of Messrs Majestic Bottling Company on June 9, 1982 anct\"by V. Ramabadran, maiiaging partner of .", "canonical_name": "V. Ramabadran"}}, {"text": "Chingleput Bottlers", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13203, "end_char": 13222, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Messrs Chingleput Bottlers on June 14, 1982.~The Commissioner issued a questionnaire and directed the Collector, Chingleput to have an ."}}, {"text": "June 14, 1982.~The", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13226, "end_char": 13244, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Messrs Chingleput Bottlers on June 14, 1982.~The Commissioner issued a questionnaire and directed the Collector, Chingleput to have an ."}}, {"text": "J.\n\nBalaji", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13860, "end_char": 13870, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H On July 5, 1982, the Commissioner &eparately heard both J.\n\nBalaji and .", "canonical_name": "J .. Balaji"}}, {"text": "V. Ramabadran", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13877, "end_char": 13890, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. Ramabadran.", "canonical_name": "V. Ramabadran"}}, {"text": "June 23, 1982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14572, "end_char": 14585, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As to their suitability under r. 5 (a), he found that though the partnership had been formed prior to the date of the application i.e. on June 9, 1982 the firm actually got registered subsequent thereto on June 23, 1982 and therefore there was no valid partnership in."}}, {"text": "June 14, 1982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14648, "end_char": 14661, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "existence on June 14, 1982 i. e,."}}, {"text": "Majestic Bottling Company", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15704, "end_char": 15729, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Both Messrs Majestic Bottling Company and Messrs Chingle put Bottlers filed separate petitions under Art.", "canonical_name": "Majestic. Bottling Company"}}, {"text": "Chingle", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15741, "end_char": 15748, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Both Messrs Majestic Bottling Company and Messrs Chingle put Bottlers filed separate petitions under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15793, "end_char": 15801, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "June 13, 1983", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15938, "end_char": 15951, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By his judgment dated June 13, 1983 a learned Single Judge held that the Commissioner was not justified in rejecting the application of Messrs Majestic Bottling Company on a.wrongful assumption that they did not satisfy the requirement of r. S(a) and (e) of the Rules."}}, {"text": "Messrs Majestic Bottling Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16052, "end_char": 16084, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By his judgment dated June 13, 1983 a learned Single Judge held that the Commissioner was not justified in rejecting the application of Messrs Majestic Bottling Company on a.wrongful assumption that they did not satisfy the requirement of r. S(a) and (e) of the Rules."}}, {"text": "Chinglepnt Bottlers", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16988, "end_char": 17007, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Single\n\nJudge rejected the contention of Messrs Chinglepnt Bottlers that the Commissioner had acted in_breach of the rules of natural justice by his failure to furnish the report of the Collectot obs<ll'Ving that noth.ing precluded them ."}}, {"text": "Chinglpet Bottlers", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17849, "end_char": 17867, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He further uplteld the order of the Commissioner rejecting the application of Messrs Chinglpet Bottlers for the grant of privilege on the ground that they were mere benamidars of the."}}, {"text": "R. Lakshmanan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18663, "end_char": 18676, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was a counter-affidavit filed by R. Lakshmanan, Joint Commissioner (IV), ..\n\nDepartment of Prohibition & Excise, Madras on behalf of both the_ State Government as well as the Commissioner of Prohibition & Excise seeking to support the impugned order passed by the Commis sioner."}}, {"text": "Shanthi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19203, "end_char": 19210, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shanthi, who incidentally is also bis\n\n' ,>\n\nbi1NGLBPUf BOTTLERS v. MAJESTIC BOfrLING (Sen,!.)"}}, {"text": "S. Ranganathan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20127, "end_char": 20141, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the State Government filed a supplementary affidavit , of S. Ranganathan, Deputy Secretary to the State Government of Tamil Nadu, Department of Prohibition & Excise furnishing further and better particulars ."}}, {"text": "Dhanalakshmi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20330, "end_char": 20342, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the alleged misuse of rectified spirit by Messrs Dhanalakshmi Chemical Industries Private Limited which .had put the."}}, {"text": "MaJestic\n\nBottling Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 22126, "end_char": 22152, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is said that Messrs MaJestic\n\nBottling Company had at the separate hearing before the Commis- .... sioner submitted a brief styled as a representation containing several documents inoppsition to the.application made by'Messrs Chingleput Bottlers on the ground that their application was benanii without furnishing a :copy of the same to them and this must have influenced the mind of the Commissioner."}}, {"text": "Chiugleput Bottlers", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 22687, "end_char": 22706, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that Messrs Chiugleput Bottlers should not be deprived of this business without knowing the case they had to meet."}}, {"text": "Commissioner of Prohibition & Excise", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24647, "end_char": 24683, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Commissioner of Prohibition & Excise was ifnder no legal duty to grant a licence to Messrs Majestic . ."}}, {"text": "Majestic Bottliug Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 26046, "end_char": 26071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Judges accordingly held that the learned Single Judge was justified in issuing a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the Commissioner to issue a licence in favour pf Ms:ssrs Majestic Bottliug Company in view of the fact that there were ."}}, {"text": "Judicial Review of Administrative Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26997, "end_char": 27034, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Guruswamy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31726, "end_char": 31735, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The present case does notfall within the , rule laid down in K. N. Guruswamy v. The State of MyNre & Ors.1 and P. Bhooma Reddy v. State of Mysore & Ors' The decisions in Guruswamy's and Bhooma Reddy's cases are•both in consonance with the well-settled principle that."}}, {"text": "Bhooma Reddy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31773, "end_char": 31785, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The present case does notfall within the , rule laid down in K. N. Guruswamy v. The State of MyNre & Ors.1 and P. Bhooma Reddy v. State of Mysore & Ors' The decisions in Guruswamy's and Bhooma Reddy's cases are•both in consonance with the well-settled principle that."}}, {"text": "[1955] 1 SCR 305", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 31966, "end_char": 31982, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1969] 3 SCR 14", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 31988, "end_char": 32003, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": ".Ci", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 32005, "end_char": 32008, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the High Court can always issue a\n\n(l) [1955] 1 SCR 305\n\n(2) [1969] 3 SCR 14\n\n.Ci\n\nG •\n\nwrit of madam us under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32038, "end_char": 32046, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hochtief Gammon", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33245, "end_char": 33260, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Hochtief Gammon's -case, this Court deduced the following principles from the decision of House of Lords in Padfield';; case:\n\n\"The l!xecutive have to reach their decisions by taking into account relevant .considerations."}}, {"text": "Padfield", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33353, "end_char": 33361, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Hochtief Gammon's -case, this Court deduced the following principles from the decision of House of Lords in Padfield';; case:\n\n\"The l!xecutive have to reach their decisions by taking into account relevant .considerations."}}, {"text": "Chingleput Bottlersfnd Messrs Majes tic Bottling Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 34869, "end_char": 34925, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Commissioner by the impugned order rejected the applications for grant .of a licence made by both Messrs Chingleput Bottlersfnd Messrs Majes tic Bottling Company and therefore the."}}, {"text": "Majestic Bottjjpg Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 35335, "end_char": 35360, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At that stage, the State Government would have to consider whether they should accord prior approval for the grant 'of such privilege to Messrs Majestic Bottjjpg Company having regard to the matters specified in r. 5 of the Rules and the condilions set out in r. 6(c), .in view of the further facts brought out in the supplementary counter affidavit of Deputy Secretary to the State Government, Department of Prohibition•& Excise in support of the objection raised in para 11 of the counter-affidavit."}}, {"text": "Balaji", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 36146, "end_char": 36152, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts lay a serious charge that Balaji, managing partner of Messrs Majestic Bottling Company and his other partner Smt."}}, {"text": "Dhanalakshmi Chemical Industries Private Limited, Ranipet", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 36267, "end_char": 36324, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shanthi were directors of Messrs Dhanalakshmi Chemical Industries Private Limited, Ranipet upto November 26, 1980 and that there was prima facie evidence showing that the company had misused the rectified spirit issued to it causing a loss of revenue to the State Government to the tune elf Rupees two crores or thereabout."}}, {"text": "November 26, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 36330, "end_char": 36347, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shanthi were directors of Messrs Dhanalakshmi Chemical Industries Private Limited, Ranipet upto November 26, 1980 and that there was prima facie evidence showing that the company had misused the rectified spirit issued to it causing a loss of revenue to the State Government to the tune elf Rupees two crores or thereabout."}}, {"text": "Gu}wat Stat~ Financial Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 37426, "end_char": 37460, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bottling Company for tbe Chingleput district under r. 7 of the Rules .. The decision in Gu}wat Stat~ Financial Corporation's case ."}}, {"text": "Gujaat State . Financial Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 37668, "end_char": 37704, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There, the Court was dealing with a contract entered into by the Gujaat State ."}}, {"text": "Lotus Hotels Private Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 37717, "end_char": 37745, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Financial Corporation with Messrs Lotus Hotels Private Limited for\n\nthe purpose of setting up a 4-star hotel."}}, {"text": "Gujarat High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 38089, "end_char": 38107, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Corporation however finally resolved not to disburse the lon to the Company whereupon the Company moved Gujarat High Court by a petition under Act."}}, {"text": "Reserve Bank of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 38902, "end_char": 38923, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "approval of the Reserve Bank of India, the decision of the Court would have been otherwise."}}, {"text": "Vadiappan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 39053, "end_char": 39062, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is difficult to subscribe to the doctrine evolved by the High Court in Vadiappan's case, (supra) that 'the Commissioner is the 'sole."}}, {"text": "Ramliswamy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 39638, "end_char": 39648, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court further observed in Ramliswamy' s case, supra, that 'the weighing of the pros and cons and the consideration of the merits and demerits of the rival clai-\n\n\\ (I,) Writ >.ppeal No."}}, {"text": "s. 2S", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40885, "end_char": 40890, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 25A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40978, "end_char": 40984, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Messrs Majestic Bottling Com-", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 41163, "end_char": 41192, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It would not justify the High Court to issue a writ of mandamus to the Commissioner to grant a licence to Messrs Majestic Bottling Com- ."}}, {"text": "Visvam baran", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 44096, "end_char": 44108, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "viz, K.J. Geo\"'5e, M/~. Visvam baran and E.K. Chandrasekaran, were real partners of Messrs Three."}}, {"text": "E.K. Chandrasekaran", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 44113, "end_char": 44132, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "viz, K.J. Geo\"'5e, M/~. Visvam baran and E.K. Chandrasekaran, were real partners of Messrs Three.", "canonical_name": "E.K. Chandrasekaran"}}, {"text": "O.H. Kumar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 44336, "end_char": 44346, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "O.H. Kumar, proprietor of Messrs Three Star Bottling Company, the existing licensee, on the ground that they bad entered into an agreement to purchase the blending unit from him.", "canonical_name": "O.H . . Kumar"}}, {"text": "Messrs_Chingleput Bottlers", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 44846, "end_char": 44872, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For a secret inquiry was conducted against Messrs_Chingleput Bottlers for adjudging their, suitability for the grant of privilege while no."}}, {"text": "Messrtchingleput Bottlers", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 45041, "end_char": 45066, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Commissioner had thus treated Messrtchingleput Bottlers and Messrs Majestic Bottling Company on an unequal footing and thus the procedure adopted was violative of Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45174, "end_char": 45181, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Overseas Bank", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 45370, "end_char": 45390, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ", J/\n\n...\n\nCIUNGLEPUT BOTTLEM v; MAJESTIC BOTTLING (Sen, J.) 207\n\nthe Indian Overseas Bank ha.d not come from bona fide sources and that obviously there was some secret understanding between O.H . ."}}, {"text": "O.H . . Kumar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 45491, "end_char": 45504, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ", J/\n\n...\n\nCIUNGLEPUT BOTTLEM v; MAJESTIC BOTTLING (Sen, J.) 207\n\nthe Indian Overseas Bank ha.d not come from bona fide sources and that obviously there was some secret understanding between O.H . .", "canonical_name": "O.H . . Kumar"}}, {"text": "Chingleput Bttlers", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 45517, "end_char": 45535, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kumar and Me; srs Chingleput Bttlers was not based on any material at all."}}, {"text": "O.H. J(umar,", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 45601, "end_char": 45613, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Commissioner knew that O.H. J(umar, the previous licensee, was not in a position to advance rupees 10 lakhs and odd to Messrs Ching!eput Bottlers.", "canonical_name": "O.H . . Kumar"}}, {"text": "Ching!eput Bottlers", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 45704, "end_char": 45723, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Commissioner knew that O.H. J(umar, the previous licensee, was not in a position to advance rupees 10 lakhs and odd to Messrs Ching!eput Bottlers."}}, {"text": "Mers Chingleput Bottlers", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 45875, "end_char": 45899, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Further, the Commissioner had wrongly assumed that\n\nMers Chingleput Bottlers and given theiraddress as 'Ramabadran, c/o essrs Three Star lk>ttling Company, lyanchery' when no such address was ever furnished and therefore the impugned order is vitiated by an error apparent on the face of the record."}}, {"text": "Chingleput Bottlirs", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 46270, "end_char": 46289, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In support of the contention that the Commissioner acted i11 violation of the' rules of natural justice, the learned counsel contends that Messrs Chingleput Bottlirs had a right to be heard."}}, {"text": "Miijestic Bottling Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 46553, "end_char": 46579, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "inasmuch as neither a copy of the report of the Collector was furnished to Messrs Chingleput Bottlers nor a copy of >the representation submitted by Messrs Miijestic Bottling Company against the grant of licence to them."}}, {"text": "J .. Balaji", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 47359, "end_char": 47370, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the file relating to Messrs Majestic Bottling Company there is a representation filed by J. Balaji, managing partner of Messrs Majestic Bottling Company, consisting of 131 pages and was apparently handed over by J .. Balaji at the time of heafing, before the Commissioner on July 5, 1982.", "canonical_name": "J .. Balaji"}}, {"text": "July 5, 1982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 47422, "end_char": 47434, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the file relating to Messrs Majestic Bottling Company there is a representation filed by J. Balaji, managing partner of Messrs Majestic Bottling Company, consisting of 131 pages and was apparently handed over by J .. Balaji at the time of heafing, before the Commissioner on July 5, 1982."}}, {"text": "July 5, 198", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 47459, "end_char": 47470, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The rresentation dated July 5, 198?"}}, {"text": "June 9, 198,2", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 47555, "end_char": 47568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "is in the forrn of a petition in continuation qf the application for grant made on June 9, 198,2."}}, {"text": "K.J", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 47916, "end_char": 47919, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is alleged that the existing licensee 0.H. Kumar is running the show under the name and style of Messrs Three Star Bottling Company which is\n\nuder the control of three person§. namely, K.J, George, M:S.\n\nV1svaml,>aran and E.K. Chanctrasekara, n. It recites th11t now finq-\n\nB .. ,\n\n.. ' '\n\n' 208\n\nWPREME COURT REPORTS _{1984} 3 s.c."}}, {"text": "George", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 47921, "end_char": 47927, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is alleged that the existing licensee 0.H. Kumar is running the show under the name and style of Messrs Three Star Bottling Company which is\n\nuder the control of three person§. namely, K.J, George, M:S.\n\nV1svaml,>aran and E.K. Chanctrasekara, n. It recites th11t now finq-\n\nB .. ,\n\n.. ' '\n\n' 208\n\nWPREME COURT REPORTS _{1984} 3 s.c."}}, {"text": "V1svaml,>aran", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 47935, "end_char": 47948, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is alleged that the existing licensee 0.H. Kumar is running the show under the name and style of Messrs Three Star Bottling Company which is\n\nuder the control of three person§. namely, K.J, George, M:S.\n\nV1svaml,>aran and E.K. Chanctrasekara, n. It recites th11t now finq-\n\nB .. ,\n\n.. ' '\n\n' 208\n\nWPREME COURT REPORTS _{1984} 3 s.c."}}, {"text": "E.K. Chanctrasekara", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 47953, "end_char": 47972, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is alleged that the existing licensee 0.H. Kumar is running the show under the name and style of Messrs Three Star Bottling Company which is\n\nuder the control of three person§. namely, K.J, George, M:S.\n\nV1svaml,>aran and E.K. Chanctrasekara, n. It recites th11t now finq-\n\nB .. ,\n\n.. ' '\n\n' 208\n\nWPREME COURT REPORTS _{1984} 3 s.c.", "canonical_name": "E.K. Chandrasekaran"}}, {"text": "Ramabadran", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 48139, "end_char": 48149, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.\n\ning that O.H. Kumar could not get the present licence, they have sef up Ramabadran who has himself shown his address as care of : Messrs Three Star Bottling Company.", "canonical_name": "V. Ramabadran"}}, {"text": "Ramabadran", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 48281, "end_char": 48291, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ramabadran is a benamidar of Messrs Three Star Bottling Company.", "canonical_name": "V. Ramabadran"}}, {"text": "0.H. Kumar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 48408, "end_char": 48418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In support of the assertion that Ramabadran is a benamidar of 0.H. Kumar, there is a copy of the judgment of the High Court of Madras in Writ Petition No.", "canonical_name": "O.H . . Kumar"}}, {"text": "High Court of Madras", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 48459, "end_char": 48479, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In support of the assertion that Ramabadran is a benamidar of 0.H. Kumar, there is a copy of the judgment of the High Court of Madras in Writ Petition No."}}, {"text": "July 5, I 982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 50068, "end_char": 50081, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Further, at the heating on July 5, I 982, the Commissioner recorded the statementoof Ramabadran, managing partner of Messrs Chingleput Bottlers."}}, {"text": "Rartiabadran", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 50264, "end_char": 50276, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There 'was no occasion for the Commissioner to have recorded the statement of Rartiabadran over again unless this was to give him an opportunity to exp)ain \\be substance of the report of the Collector or other information gat\\\\ered by hi.m irrespective of the source."}}, {"text": "Reid", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 52082, "end_char": 52086, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There has ever since the -judgment of Lord Reid in Ridge v.\n\nBa(dwin, supra, been considerable fluctuation of judicial opinion in 'England as tD the degree of strictness with which the rules ofnatural justice should be extended, ad there is growing awareness of the problems created by the extended application of principles 9f natural justice, or the duty to act fairly, which tends tQ sacrifice the administrative efficiency and despatch, or frµstrates the object of the bw in question."}}, {"text": "Denning", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 54896, "end_char": 54903, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord' Denning rejected the contention by observing that 'the CO\\Jnsel had put hjs case too high'."}}, {"text": "Megarry", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 56234, "end_char": 56241, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Megarry, V.Cc has drawn a distinction between initial applications for grant of licence and the revocation, suspension or refusat to renew licences already granted."}}, {"text": "Kishan Chand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 61108, "end_char": 61120, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lion Bench of this Court in Kishan Chand Arora v. Commissioner of\n\n."}}, {"text": "Nakkuda Ali", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 61405, "end_char": 61416, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\" It is beyond the scope of the .present judgment to enter into a discussion on the apparent conftict between the decision of the Privy Council in Nakkuda Ali's case and the observations of Lord Reid in Baldwin's case.", "canonical_name": "Nakkuda Ali"}}, {"text": "Baldwin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 61461, "end_char": 61468, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\" It is beyond the scope of the .present judgment to enter into a discussion on the apparent conftict between the decision of the Privy Council in Nakkuda Ali's case and the observations of Lord Reid in Baldwin's case."}}, {"text": "D'arcy Ryan'J", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 61567, "end_char": 61580, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "with 82/dwin's cse and ending with D'arcy Ryan'J case are cases dealing with interference with property rights, deprivation of member>hip of professional or other non-statutory bodies, dismissal from office, imposition of penalties and deprivation of advantages etc."}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 64271, "end_char": 64295, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Art. 126", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64741, "end_char": 64749, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "statute": "the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939"}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_3_1_9_EN", "year": 1984, "text": ". • '\":\\ 1 A\n\nUNION OF INPIA & O'fHERS\n\nHAJI MASTAN MIRZA B\n\n-y\n\nFebruary 23, 1984\n\n(S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, A. VARADARAJAN AND\n\nRANGAJ; IATH MISRA, JJJ c\n\n. Smutgler; and Foreign ExchanKe Manipulators (Forefeiture of Prop, rty) -dct, 1976, Setions 2, 6 and 7 read with Section 3(1) of Conservation of Foreign\n\nand Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1973 Scope of-Whether an appeal preferred and Pending under the Provision of SAFEMA, a bar for the maintain ., ability ofa writ petition unaer Article ~26 4 the Constiiution chaUenglng. the detention under COFEPOSA and for an Incidental prayer quashing the notice • D issued under SAFEMA P Non Supply of copies of mat, rlal documents based on which a deentlon order ; is pa!sed vitiates the detentfon and the explanation for non sripply cannot be ~Ub$f/tute for the copies of the docuinent. ' •\n\nHaji Mastan Mir .. war detained under Section 3(1) (c) of the Main.\n\ntenanc~ of Inteinal Security Act, by order dated 17·9-1974. There was a formal release of the respondent from, deten lion under the MISA on 19!2·1974, hut 'E ., he was-immediately detained under, Section 3(1) of COFEPOSA by an order 'dited 19-12-1974 passed by the Minister of Finance of the Government of ludia on the basis of the ma teriais placed before him ... by bis Joint Secretary.\n\nThe grounds of detention. were served on the respondent on 23-12·1974. A deCJaration under Section 5(1) of COFEPOSA was served on him on 19-1-1976. 'Emersency. wa~ procJalrned throughout the country ~Y the President on F --~\"{'<: 25-6'1975 and it continued to be in force until 21-3-1977o The respondent • was released on 23-3-1977 •\n\nFounded on the detention of the respondent under the order dated ..., 19-12-1974, aftc, r issuing a show cause notice u/s 6(1) of SAFBMA' to the respondent and his relatives and alleged associates, an order u/s 7 ofSAFBMA was, passed f!Jrfeiting the properties of the refoondent and his rc1atives~ G Appeals preferred by all but one are , pending be ore the Appellate Tribunal . comtituted under that Act. The Misce!Jiineo,1.is Petition. No. 548/7-7 filed by these affected parties challenging the viresof certain previsions of COFEPOSA and SAFEMA in the Bombay fliah Court are still pending.\n\nA crjmial Application No. 780/1977 was filed by the respondent' under H\n\n-~ Article 226 of the Constitution and under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal\n\nProedvre in t!>e jlombay Hi$h Court in April 1981, chal!en$iD$ the validity . .\n\n• •\n\n• •\n\n. . of the impugned Order of detention dated 19·12~1974 and the dec1aratidn dated 18-1-1975 under COFEPOSA for holding that the action taken under\n\nSAFE~IA is unsustainable. The High Court of Bombay, aCcepted the plea that non sllpply of copiC:s of the material dccuments affected the making of effectivC representation and thus held that thC act!on taken under Sections 6(1) and 7 of SAFBMA was invalid. The J-Iig; h Court restrained -the _appellants from taking any actidn under SAFEMA based on the said order dated\n\n19-12-1974. Hence the ppeal by special leave;\n\nDisiSsing the appeal, the_ Court\n\nHELD :-1.2: The respondent's petiiion under Art. 226 of the Constitu .. tion and S. 48.i of the Code of Criminal Procedure_ is m.lintainable. [6D]\n\nC 1.2_, The pendncy of the appeal filed under the provisions of SAFEMA .\n\nagainst the ofder for forfeiture of the respondent's properties made under the provisions of that Act is not a bar to the presnt proc<!ding. [6A]\n\nt.3 : The fact that the respondent did not challenge his det_ention. under COFEPOSA before his release cannot operate as estoppel against his right, or moving the court for having the order Or detention quashed when that order was sought to be used as a basis for taking action against him under ss. 6 and 7 of SAFEMA. The respondent was in detention under MiSA frotll 17-9-1974 to 19-12-1974 and thereafter under COFEPOSA until 23-3-1977.\n\nDurini thC period of. his detention under. COFEPOSA from 19.;.1z..1974 to 23-3-19n proclamation of emer8:ency in the country was in force from 25-6-1975•\n\nto --.21-3-1977. ·: Theiefore, \"for a major part or the respondeht's detention under COFEPOSA he could not move -any court of taW for redresS agaizist his detention anci be was released on 23-3-1977 soon after the emergency was' lifted on 21-3-1977. [6C; BJ\n\n2.f: A re.ading of Seio~ 6(1) Of SAFEMA would show that actiori under Sections 6 and 7 can be taken against only persons to whom that Act applies, that is as specified in section 2(1).\n\nSub-sectiOn 2 of secti6n 2 says that the Act applies to every person. ill Jespect of whom an order for detention has been made under COFEPOSA provided that such order of detention has. not been set aside by a court of GOmpetent jufisdiction. In the present.case action bas been taken against the respondent under Sections 6(1J n_d _ 7 read Only\n\nwith Section 2(2) of the Act._ Therefore, a valid order ot detention under COFEPOSA 'is a conditiol) precedent to proceedings being aken ·under Sections. 6 and 7 of SAFEMA. If the impugned order of detention dated ,19-.12-1974 is set aside for any reason~ the proceedings taken under _Sections (i\n\nand 7 of SAFEMA cannot stand. [7G-H; SA]\n\n2.2: Th~ failure to sUi)ply copies of documents referied to and relied upon in the grounds of detention under COFEPOSA vitiates. the detention -itself. as the detenu could -not make any effective representation in tho . -absence of those doclljllents. [SE] ·\n\nGurdip Singh v. Union of India & Others, [l9S!] I.S.C.C. 419, referred to. - 2.3' The explanation. offere<, I throu¥h the co11nter-affidavit by the\n\n{ ..\n\n• •\n\nUNiON v. HAii MASTAN MIIUA (Varadafajan, J.) 3\n\ndetaining Authority for the non supply of the copies of ._the material documents cannot be a substitute for the copies of the documents. without which the detenu coufd not have made any effective representation .against his dete11tion. [SD]\n\n3. In the present case also copies of do.cuments which were indisputably material documents and were referred to in the gounds of detntion were admittedly not supplied to th; respondent. Therefore, the detention of the . respondent was bad in law and the ordtr, of detention could not .. be sustained Consequently, action taken under Sections 6 and 7 of SAFEMA is baseles~· and unsustainable in law. [SH ;'9A-B]\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE 1URISDICTION;: Criminal Appeal.No. 3~\n\nof 1982.\n\nAppeal by Special leave from. the 1udgment and Order dated the 20th/24th/25th November, 1981 of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Application No. 780 of 1981.\n\nK. G. Bhagat, Addi. Sol. General, N. C., Tal11kdar and D Miss A. Subhashinl for, the Appellants. ··\n\nRam Jethamalani, M. G. Karma!, Madhu Patel, Shri Narain Mathur, K. V. Desai and M/38 Rani Jethamalanl for the Respondent.\n\nlbe Judgment of the Court was deli\"vered by\n\nVARADARAJAN, ]. This appeal by.special leave is directed against the judgment of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Application No. 780of1981 filed by the respondent Haji Mastan Mirza, allowing the criminal appeal and deelaring that the order of detention dated 19.12.11174 passed by the Minister of Finance, Government of India under s. 3(1) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuing Activities Act, 1973, (COFEPOSA) is illegal, nhll and void ab initio and inoperative, and quashing that order as well as the declaration under s. 5(1) of the COFEPO§A made on 18.1.1975 and also consequently quashing the notice. under s. 6(1) and theorder made under s. 7 of the Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, (SAFEMA) 1976 and restraining the appellant from taking any action whatsover on the basis of the order of detention dated 19.12.1974.and the declaration dated 18.1.1975 were quashed by the learned Judges of the High Court is that the respondent w.as not served with copies of documents referred to and relied npoo in\n\nthe i:rounds of detention' served on the respondent on 19.12. 1974 .\n\n. '\n\nAn order dated 17.9.1974 was passed for detention of the respondent under s. 3(1)(c) of the Maintenance of Internal S\"ecuri!y Act (MISA) and the grounds of detention were served on him oh 23.9 . .1974 after he surrendered on 18.9.1974.· There was a formal release of the respondent from detention under the M!SA on 19.12.1974, and he \\vas immediately detained' under , s. 3(1) of the COFEPOSA by th, e aforesaid order dated 19.12°.1974 passed by the Minis.ter of Finance of the Government of India on the basis of the materials placed before him by his Joint Secretary.\n\nThe grounds of detention were served on the respondent on 23.12.1974. declaration under s. 5(1) of COFEPOSA was served oa the respondent on 19.1.1,75. Emergency was proclaimed through- , out the country by the President on 25.6.1975 and.it continued to be in force until 21.3.1977. The respondent was released on 23.3. 19°77.\n\nA show cause notice under s. 6(1) of SAFEMA was issued to the respondent and bis relatives and alleged associates founded on the respondent's detention under the aforesaid order dated 19.12.1974 made under s. 3(1) of COFEPOSA. Pursuant to that notice an order under s. 7 of SAFEMA was passed forfeiting the properties of the respondent and bis relatives. The respondent and all the other aggrieved persons except one filed appeals against that order before the Appellat~ Tribunal constituted under the provisions of that .. A.ct. '(hose appeals are said to be still pending, The persons who filed those. appeals have filed Miscellaneous. Petition No. 548 of 1977 on or about 25.4.1977 in the Bombay High Court, challepging the vires of certain provisions of\n\nCOFEPOSA and SAFEMA. That petition is pending even now.\n\nThe respondent filed the criminal application No. 780 of\n\n19~1 nder Art. 226 of the Constitution and s. 482 of thel Code o'f Criminal Procedure in the Bqmbay High Court in April 1981, challenging the validity of the impugned order of detention dated 19.12.1974 and the declaration dated 1,8.1.1975, passed and made under s. 3(1) and &. 5(1) of COFEPOSA for showing that the action taken under s. 6(1) and s. 7 of ~AFEMA is unsustainable.\n\n• The learned counsel for the respondent conceded before us that the respondent is not challenging the vires of any of the provisions of COFEPQSA and' Si\\FEMI\\ in the present appeal .\n\niJNio'N v. ii:Ail MASTAN' MIRJA (Varadarajan, i.)\n\nThe said petition nnder. Art. 226 of the Constitu.tion and .s. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure challenging the validity of the\n\norder of detention and deelaration passed under COFEPOSA and the notiCe and order issnecj under s. 6(1) and 7 of SAFEMA was . heard by Gadgil and Kotwal, JJ constituting t.he Division llench of the Bombay High Court. Koiwal, J consi, dered all the grounds urged before him and accepted most of them including two grounds viz. non-applicatien of mind of the Detaining Authority to the material placed before him before he passed the impugned order of detention dated 19.12.1974 and the failure of the appel- lant to supply copies of th_e documents clearly and unmistakably. relied upon. for arriving at the subjective satisfaction that the respondent's detention under .COFEPOSA is necessar~ and referred .to in the grounds of detention served upon him for holding lhat the order of detention passed under s. 3(1). and declaration made \"under s. 5(1) of COFEPOSA is void ab inititl and that the '- . ' ' action taken under s, 6(1) and s. 7 of SAFEMA pursuant to that order of dete11tion is liable to be struck down while holding that the petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution and s .. 482 of the Code of Criminal .Procedure is maintainable. and that the effect of, . the ordr of detention dated 19.12.1974 could not said to be no longer.in force after the respondent had been. released from detention on 23.3.1977 inasmuch as action under s. 6(1) and s. 7 of SAFEMA has been taken only pursuant to that order of deten tion.\n\nGadgil; J while disagreeing with Kotwal, J on the question of teapplicati9n of the mind of the Detaining Authority to the • materials placed before him bfore he passed the impugned order of detention clearly agreed with Kotwal, J•that the responde11t was not supplied with the. copies of the documents relied upon in tire grounds of detention supplied to him and consequently Gadgil, J also held that the respondent is entitled to the relief claimed by him .before the High Court. Thus both the learned Judges agreed ·• in holding that the impugned order of detention dated 19.12. 1974 .. and the\" declaration dated 18.]. 1975- NSSed ahd made under\n\nss. 3(1) and 5(1) respectively of COFEPOSA and the notice and order for forfeiture of the respond$ln!'s propertips issued and made under s. 6(1) and s. 7. respecti'.'.ely of SAFEMA are Invalid and restrained the appellants from taking any action under SAFEMA based on the said order of detention dated 19.12.1974.\n\nJ);\n\nSUPREME COUJ!.T RBMRfS. [f984) 3 s.c.R..\n\nThe pendency of the appeal filed under the provisions of SAFEMA against tbe order for forfeiture of the respondent's propertil)S made under the provisions of that Act is not a bar to the . present proceeding.\n\nThe respondent was in detention under\n\nMISA from 17.9.1974 to 19.12.1974 and thereafter' under COFEPOSA until 23.3.1977. During the period of his detention . under COFEPOSA froJD 19.12:1974 to_.?3.3.1977 proclamation\n\nofemergency in the country was in force from 25.6.1975 to 21.3.1977.\n\nTherefore, 'for a major part 9f the period of the respondent's detention under COFEPOSA he could not move • any court of law for .redress against his detention and he was released on 23.3.1977 soon after the emergency was lifted on 21.3.1977.\n\nIn these . circumstances the fact that the respondent did not cqall.enge his detention under COFEPOSA before his release cannot operate as estoppel against his right of moving the court for having the order of detention quashed when that order was scught to be used as a basis for taking action against him nnder ss. 6 and 7 of SAFEMA. We therefore hold.that the res pondent's petition under, Art. 226 of the Constitution ands. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is maiqtainable, We may state that this question of maintainability. of the respondent's petition was not disputed by the lear.ned counsel for the appellant before us.\n\nS. 6(1) of SAFEMA providing for the issue of notice before proceedings ean be taken for forefeiture of properties of the persons governd by the provisions of that Act reads thus : ·\n\n\"If, having regard to the value of the properties held by any person to whom this Act applies, either by hiniself or through any other person. on his behalf, . his known . sources of income, earnings or assets, and any other information or material available to it as.a result of action taken under section 18 or otherwise, the competent authority has reason to believe (the.reasons for such belief to be recorded in writing) that all or any of such properties are illegally acquired properties, it may serve a notice upon such person (hc; reinafter referred to as the person affected) calling upon him, within such time as may. be specified in the notice, which shall not be ordinarily less than thirty days, to indi- . cate the sources of his \"income, earnings or assets;_out of\n\nwhich or by means of w'.1ich he has acquired such property,\n\n'-\\\n\nUNION v. HAJI MA~TAN MIRZ~ (VaraJirajan, J.) 7\n\ntlie evidence on which he relied. an<l other relevant inforllla tion and particulars, . and to show cause why all or any of such properties, as the case may be, should not be de.clared to be illegally acquired properties and forefeited to the Central Government under this Act,'.'\n\ns. 7 the. Act which empowers the competent authority to the Centr, al Governmentany property held by the competent authority to have been illegally acquired reads thus :\n\n\"7(1) The competent authority may, after considering the explanation, if any, to the show-cauie notice issued under section 6, and the materials available before it and after Jlivlng to the person afected and in a case where the person affected holds any property specified in the notice through any other person, to such bther person also a reasonable opportunity of being heard, by order, record a finding whether ail or any of the properties in question are illegally acquired properties. ·\n\n(2) Where the. competent authority is satisfied that some of the properties refetred to in the show-ca11se notice are illegally acquired propertiesbut is not able to identify specifically such properties, then, it shall be lawful for tl)e competent authority to specify the.properties which, fo the best of its judgment, are illegally acquired properties and record a finding accord, ingly under sub-section (1).\n\n(3) Where the competent authority records a finding under this section to the effect that any property is illegally •acquired property, it shall declare that such property shall; subject to the provisions of this Act, stand forfeited to the Central Government free froll\\oall encumbrances.\" ·\n\nA reading of s. 6(1) of SAFEMA would show that action ULder ss. 6 and 7 can he taken against only persons to whom that Act applies. S. 2(1) of that Act specifies the persons to whom the Act arplies. Sub-section 2 of s. 2 says that the Act applies to every person in respect of whom at order for detention has been. made under COFEPOSA provided that such order of detention has not been set aside by a court of competentjnrisdiction. In the present case action has been taken against the rpondent under ss. 6(1) and 7 read only with s. 2(2) of the A9t. Therefore, a valid order f detention under CO FEPOSA is a com)ition precedent to proceedings being taken under ss. 6 md. 7 of\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (19841 3 s.c.it\n\nA SAFEMA. If the impugned order of detentidn dated 19.12.1974\n\n-is set aside for any reason, the proceedings taken under ss. 6 and 7 of SAFEMA cannot stand. Therefore, we have to consider whether the impugned order of detention dated 19.12.1974 under\n\nCOFEPOSA is void and has to be quashed;:\n\nIt is seen from para 17 of the judgment of Kotwal, J that it was not disputed before the learned Judges of the High Court that no copy of any of the .dbcuments was ever supplied to the respondent. That fact was admitted in unmistakable terms not only in• the counter-affidavit. filed on behalf of the respondents before the High Court QUI also in the course of the arguments of th.eir learned counsel. Kotwal, J has held that the duments referred to in the grounds and re'lied upon -for the purpose of the respondent's detention are such that without copies thereof belngsupplied to the respondent he could not liave been in at position to .make any effective representation against his detention.\n\nThere was no dispute before the le.arned Judges of the High Com that the documents referred to. in the grounds of detention and relied upon for the purpose of detention are material documents and that the respondent could not ave made any effective repre-. sentation without cppies of those documents. The respondents\n\nbefore the High C9urt however sought by their counter-affidavit to justify the non-supply of the copies of the documents. The explanation for the non-supply of the documents cannot be a substitute for the copies of the documents without which the respondent could not have made any effective representation against his detention. This Court has repeatedly held in. several decisions that the failure to supply copies of documents referred to ana relied upon in the grounds of detention for the purpose of detention under COFEPOSA vitiates the detention itself. In Gurdip Sinzh v. Union. of India and Others(') the person detained under s. 3(1) of COFEPOSA applied for the supply of copies of the documents forming the material on whicn.ihe order of detention had been made but they \\Vere refused _to be supplied to him. Nor were the grounds supplied to the ctetenu accompa oied by the copies of documents forming the basis thereof. It was held in that decision to which bne of us is a party that the detention was bad ln law.\n\nIn the present case also copies of documents which were indisputably material documents and were referred . to in the\n\n(I) [1981] 1 S.C.C 419 ..\n\ntiNION f, HAil MAStAN MIRZA (Varadarajan, J.) 9\n\n. ' . grounds of deiention and relied upon for the purpose of detention were admittedly not supplied to the respondent. Therefore, the detention of the respondent was bad .in law and the order of detention could not be .sustained and js liable .to be quashed ..\n\nConsequently. action ta!<en under ss. 6 & 7 of SAFEMA is baseless • and unsustainable in law. The conclusion reached by the learned Judges of the High Court based on that ground is correct.- The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed.\n\nS.R.\n\n( ' ...\n\nAppeal di:; pzissed", "total_entities": 107, "entities": [{"text": "A\n\nUNION OF INPIA & O'fHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11, "end_char": 38, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "HAJI MASTAN MIRZA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 40, "end_char": 57, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HAJI MASTAN MIRZA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 85, "end_char": 105, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. VARADARAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 107, "end_char": 121, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A. VARADARAJAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "IATH MISRA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 135, "end_char": 145, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RANGANATH MISRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Section 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 268, "end_char": 280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 309, "end_char": 357, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Haji Mastan Mir", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 849, "end_char": 864, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Haji Mastan Mir .. war detained under Section 3(1) (c) of the Main.", "canonical_name": "HAJI MASTAN MIRZA"}}, {"text": "Section 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 887, "end_char": 899, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Conservation of Foreign\n\nand Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1973", "statute": "Conservation of Foreign\n\nand Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1973"}}, {"text": "Inteinal Security Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 929, "end_char": 950, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "17·9-1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 967, "end_char": 976, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "tenanc~ of Inteinal Security Act, by order dated 17·9-1974."}}, {"text": "19!2·1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1058, "end_char": 1067, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was a formal release of the respondent from, deten lion under the MISA on 19!2·1974, hut 'E .,"}}, {"text": "Section 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1114, "end_char": 1126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Inteinal Security Act", "statute": "Inteinal Security Act"}}, {"text": "Section 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1399, "end_char": 1411, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Inteinal Security Act", "statute": "Inteinal Security Act"}}, {"text": "s 6(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1763, "end_char": 1769, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Inteinal Security Act", "statute": "Inteinal Security Act"}}, {"text": "s 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1852, "end_char": 1855, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Inteinal Security Act", "statute": "Inteinal Security Act"}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2313, "end_char": 2324, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 482", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2355, "end_char": 2366, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court of Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2661, "end_char": 2681, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court of Bombay, aCcepted the plea that non sllpply of copiC:s of the material dccuments affected the making of effectivC representation and thus held that thC act!on taken under Sections 6(1) and 7 of SAFBMA was invalid."}}, {"text": "Sections 6(1) and 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2845, "end_char": 2864, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "19-12-1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3002, "end_char": 3012, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The J-Iig; h Court restrained -the _appellants from taking any actidn under SAFEMA based on the said order dated\n\n19-12-1974."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3127, "end_char": 3135, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3164, "end_char": 3169, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 6 and 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3748, "end_char": 3759, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "23-3-1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4237, "end_char": 4246, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Theiefore, \"for a major part or the respondeht's detention under COFEPOSA he could not move -any court of taW for redresS agaizist his detention anci be was released on 23-3-1977 soon after the emergency was' lifted on 21-3-1977. ["}}, {"text": "21-3-1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4287, "end_char": 4296, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Theiefore, \"for a major part or the respondeht's detention under COFEPOSA he could not move -any court of taW for redresS agaizist his detention anci be was released on 23-3-1977 soon after the emergency was' lifted on 21-3-1977. ["}}, {"text": "Sections 6 and 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4377, "end_char": 4393, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4478, "end_char": 4490, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 6(1J n_d _ 7 read Only\n\nwith Section 2(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4806, "end_char": 4856, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": ",19-.12-1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5053, "end_char": 5065, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If the impugned order of detention dated ,19-.12-1974 is set aside for any reason~ the proceedings taken under Sections (i\n\nand 7 of SAFEMA cannot stand. ["}}, {"text": "Varadafajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5627, "end_char": 5638, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "offere<, I throu¥h the co11nter-affidavit by the\n\n{ ..\n\n• •\n\nUNiON v. HAii MASTAN MIIUA (Varadafajan, J.) 3\n\ndetaining Authority for the non supply of the copies of ._the material documents cannot be a substitute for the copies of the documents.", "canonical_name": "Varadafajan"}}, {"text": "Sections 6 and 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6223, "end_char": 6239, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "K. G. Bhagat", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6530, "end_char": 6542, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. G. Bhagat, Addi."}}, {"text": "D Miss A. Subhashinl", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6585, "end_char": 6605, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "General, N. C., Tal11kdar and D Miss A. Subhashinl for, the Appellants. ··"}}, {"text": "Ram Jethamalani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6631, "end_char": 6646, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Jethamalani, M. G. Karma!,", "canonical_name": "Rani Jethamalanl"}}, {"text": "M. G. Karma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6648, "end_char": 6659, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Jethamalani, M. G. Karma!,"}}, {"text": "Madhu Patel", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6662, "end_char": 6673, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Madhu Patel, Shri Narain Mathur, K. V. Desai and M/38 Rani Jethamalanl for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "Narain Mathur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6680, "end_char": 6693, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Madhu Patel, Shri Narain Mathur, K. V. Desai and M/38 Rani Jethamalanl for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "K. V. Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6695, "end_char": 6706, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Madhu Patel, Shri Narain Mathur, K. V. Desai and M/38 Rani Jethamalanl for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "Rani Jethamalanl", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6716, "end_char": 6732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Madhu Patel, Shri Narain Mathur, K. V. Desai and M/38 Rani Jethamalanl for the Respondent.", "canonical_name": "Rani Jethamalanl"}}, {"text": "VARADARAJAN", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6799, "end_char": 6810, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lbe Judgment of the Court was deli\"vered by\n\nVARADARAJAN, ].", "canonical_name": "Varadafajan"}}, {"text": "Haji Mastan Mirza", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6964, "end_char": 6981, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "780of1981 filed by the respondent Haji Mastan Mirza, allowing the criminal appeal and deelaring that the order of detention dated 19.12.11174 passed by the Minister of Finance, Government of India under s. 3(1) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuing Activities Act, 1973, (COFEPOSA) is illegal, nhll and void ab initio and inoperative, and quashing that order as well as the declaration under s. 5(1) of the COFEPO§A made on 18.1.1975 and also consequently quashing the notice.", "canonical_name": "HAJI MASTAN MIRZA"}}, {"text": "s. 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7133, "end_char": 7140, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuing Activities Act, 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7148, "end_char": 7226, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7349, "end_char": 7356, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuing Activities Act, 1973", "statute": "the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuing Activities Act, 1973"}}, {"text": "s. 6(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7440, "end_char": 7447, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuing Activities Act, 1973", "statute": "the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuing Activities Act, 1973"}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7472, "end_char": 7476, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuing Activities Act, 1973", "statute": "the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuing Activities Act, 1973"}}, {"text": "Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7484, "end_char": 7556, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 3(1)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8025, "end_char": 8035, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuing Activities Act, 1973", "statute": "the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuing Activities Act, 1973"}}, {"text": "19.12", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8266, "end_char": 8271, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was a formal release of the respondent from detention under the M!SA on 19.12.1974, and he \\vas immediately detained' under , s. 3(1) of the COFEPOSA by th, e aforesaid order dated 19.12°.1974 passed by the Minis.ter of Finance of the Government of India on the basis of the materials placed before him by his Joint Secretary."}}, {"text": ".1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8271, "end_char": 8276, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was a formal release of the respondent from detention under the M!SA on 19.12.1974, and he \\vas immediately detained' under , s. 3(1) of the COFEPOSA by th, e aforesaid order dated 19.12°.1974 passed by the Minis.ter of Finance of the Government of India on the basis of the materials placed before him by his Joint Secretary."}}, {"text": "s. 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8320, "end_char": 8327, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "23.12.1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8580, "end_char": 8590, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The grounds of detention were served on the respondent on 23.12.1974."}}, {"text": "s. 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8610, "end_char": 8617, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "19.1.1,75", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8662, "end_char": 8671, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "declaration under s. 5(1) of COFEPOSA was served oa the respondent on 19.1.1,75."}}, {"text": "25.6.1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8745, "end_char": 8754, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Emergency was proclaimed through- , out the country by the President on 25.6.1975 and.it continued to be in force until 21.3.1977."}}, {"text": "21.3.1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8793, "end_char": 8802, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Emergency was proclaimed through- , out the country by the President on 25.6.1975 and.it continued to be in force until 21.3.1977."}}, {"text": "23.3. 19", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8835, "end_char": 8843, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent was released on 23.3."}}, {"text": "s. 6(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8875, "end_char": 8882, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "19.12.1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9033, "end_char": 9043, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A show cause notice under s. 6(1) of SAFEMA was issued to the respondent and bis relatives and alleged associates founded on the respondent's detention under the aforesaid order dated 19.12.1974 made under s. 3(1) of COFEPOSA."}}, {"text": "s. 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9055, "end_char": 9062, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9115, "end_char": 9119, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9733, "end_char": 9741, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 482", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9766, "end_char": 9772, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9986, "end_char": 9993, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10058, "end_char": 10065, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10070, "end_char": 10074, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "iJNio'N", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10289, "end_char": 10296, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "iJNio'N v. ii:Ail MASTAN' MIRJA (Varadarajan, i.)\n\nThe said petition nnder."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10365, "end_char": 10373, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 482", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10400, "end_char": 10406, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10414, "end_char": 10440, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 6(1) and 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10570, "end_char": 10583, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Gadgil", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10609, "end_char": 10615, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "heard by Gadgil and Kotwal, JJ constituting t.he Division llench of the Bombay High Court."}}, {"text": "Kotwal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10620, "end_char": 10626, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "heard by Gadgil and Kotwal, JJ constituting t.he Division llench of the Bombay High Court.", "canonical_name": "Kotwal"}}, {"text": "Koiwal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10691, "end_char": 10697, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Koiwal, J consi, dered all the grounds urged before him and accepted most of them including two grounds viz.", "canonical_name": "Kotwal"}}, {"text": "s. 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11279, "end_char": 11286, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11316, "end_char": 11323, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11408, "end_char": 11412, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11526, "end_char": 11534, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "23.3.1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11783, "end_char": 11792, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "released from detention on 23.3.1977 inasmuch as action under s. 6(1) and s. 7 of SAFEMA has been taken only pursuant to that order of deten tion."}}, {"text": "s. 6(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11818, "end_char": 11825, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11830, "end_char": 11834, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 3(1) and 5(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12554, "end_char": 12571, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12691, "end_char": 12698, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12703, "end_char": 12707, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 6 and 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13971, "end_char": 13982, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14051, "end_char": 14059, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14097, "end_char": 14123, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "S. 6(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14293, "end_char": 14300, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 18", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14775, "end_char": 14785, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "VaraJirajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15352, "end_char": 15363, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "cate the sources of his \"income, earnings or assets;_out of\n\nwhich or by means of w'.1ich he has acquired such property,\n\n'-\\\n\nUNION v. HAJI MA~TAN MIRZ~ (VaraJirajan, J.) 7\n\ntlie evidence on which he relied.", "canonical_name": "Varadafajan"}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15615, "end_char": 15633, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and to show cause why all or any of such properties, as the case may be, should not be de.clared to be illegally acquired properties and forefeited to the Central Government under this Act,'.'"}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15654, "end_char": 15658, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15941, "end_char": 15950, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 6(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17041, "end_char": 17048, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 6 and 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17088, "end_char": 17099, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 2(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17160, "end_char": 17167, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17231, "end_char": 17240, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17244, "end_char": 17248, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 6(1) and 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17530, "end_char": 17544, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17560, "end_char": 17567, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17691, "end_char": 17696, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 6 and 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17867, "end_char": 17878, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19694, "end_char": 19701, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "HAil MAStAN MIRZA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20241, "end_char": 20258, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to in the\n\n(I) [1981] 1 S.C.C 419 ..\n\ntiNION f, HAil MAStAN MIRZA (Varadarajan, J.) 9\n\n. ' .", "canonical_name": "HAJI MASTAN MIRZA"}}, {"text": "Varadarajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20260, "end_char": 20271, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to in the\n\n(I) [1981] 1 S.C.C 419 ..\n\ntiNION f, HAil MAStAN MIRZA (Varadarajan, J.) 9\n\n. ' .", "canonical_name": "Varadafajan"}}, {"text": "ss. 6 & 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20577, "end_char": 20586, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_3_216_222_EN", "year": 1984, "text": ". .\n\n216 •\n\nJAGDISH PRASAD\n\nSMT. ANGOORI DEVI\n\n• March 15, 1984\n\n[D.A. DESAI AND RANGANATH MISRA, JJ.]\n\nCons1itution of lndia-l{rts. 226 & 227-Wrlt of certiorari-Scope a/- Whether High Court can correct an error oi faCt.\n\nU.P; Act No.13of1972-s.12(J)(b) and 12(2) read withs. 25-1nterpretation of-Allegation of sub-tenancy-How and by whofn shoUJd be pYored.\n\nPf0vincia.' Small Gause Courts Act, 1887_:_._s~ 25-Revisional furisdiction-\n\nD Scope of\n\nThe respondent-landlord filed a suit for ev1ctlon of the appel!ant-:-tenant in a town in U.P. ob theground that the tenant had created a sub-tenancy of the . premises in favour _oT a trading company. The landlord filed a photo- . graph Showing tbe so'n of the proprietor of the trading company standing in the shop. Adopting the appro8.ch that if any person othef than a tenant was found sitting iri the shop, the tenant hd. to. lead evidence to Show that a 'sitting person was not a sub-tenant, the small cause court Judge assun1ed that there was a sub-tenancy; held against the tenant and ordered his eviction.. Allowing the revision petition filed by the tenant the Additiona 1 :District Judge held .that it was for the landlord to lead good and positive evidence to prove that the business in fact at the shop was being carried by the trading company and .not by the tenant himself.\n\nThe Additional District JiJdge looked into the evidence and held against the °landlord. In an application under Art. 227 the High Court held that under s. 25 of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 read with sec. J2(l)(b) and s. 12(2) of the aforesaid Act a tenant would be deemed to hav~ sublet the\n\naccommodation if he had allowed. it to be occupied by any person wbo was not a member of his family. The High c:Ourt further held ttlat the Additional District .Judge exceeded his juridiction under s. 25 of the Provincial Small\n\nCause Courts Act, 1887 in setting aside the findings of the trial court on a mere\n\nreap:t)raisal of the evidence on record. Hence this appeal. .\n\n. Allowing the appeal, •\n\nHELD : As long as C}>ntrol OVet the premises is kept ; by the tenant and\n\n. the business run in the premises is of the tenant, subletting flowing fromthe\n\n---\"I. .\"'\" presenco of .a person othcf than the tenant in the shop cannot be as'3umed. The -· i.\n\nHJJ!i!i Ii U.P. Act No. 13of1972 does not require the Court to assume a sub-tenancy merely from the fact of presence of an outsider. [2200]\n\nIn th~ instant case the. allegation that th~ premises ha-j been sub-let to a trading company had tO be proved-as a fact by the landford and mei.\"ely on the basis of the phcltograph showing the presence of the son of the proprietor of the trading copany withinthe room, sub-letting could Opt be ptesume; d. The approach of the trial Judge was totally vitiated. [120 D-E]\n\nThe revisional juriSdiction under s. 25 of. th~ Provincial Small Cause Courts B Act is not as wide as the appe1late jurisdiction under s. 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure; yet in a case of this type this Court does not think fault could he .\n\nfound with the revisional court for. pointing out the legal error committed by the • trial court in its approach to -this material aspect. The legal p<Jsition having been totally misconceived by the trial court and there being an assumption of the position which the landlord was required to prove by evidence, the revisional authority was entitled to point out the legal error and rectify the defect.\n\n[221B-D]\n\nThe jurisdiction to.issue a writ o~ certiorari is a supervisory one and in exercising it, the court is not entitled to act as a court of appea]. That necessarily means that the findings Of fact arrived at by the inferior court or tribunal are binding. -An error of law apparent on the face of the record could b.e'corrected\n\nb)1\" a writ of certiorari~ but not an error of fact, however, grave it may appear to be. [22lF-G]\n\nSyed Yakaab v. K.S: Radhakrishnan & Ors., [l964] 5 S.C.R. 64, referred to.\n\nIn the in.Stant cas~ the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering\"' with the order of the Additional District Judge. [22lG]\n\n• C1VIL -APPELLATB JURISbICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2147 of 1980.\n\nAppeal by Special leave from the Judgment and Order dated\n\n' the 19th August, 1980, of the Allahabad High Court in C.M.W.P.\n\nNo. 7578 of 1979 . . ' .\n\nPramod Swarup for the Appellant.\n\nM.K. Garg a.nd V.K. !ai11 for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Conrt was delivered by\n\nRMNGA.NATH MisRA, J. Ihe tenant of one room which. is a part of a premises located within the township of i\\, ligrah in the State of Uttar Pradesh is in appeal before this Court after obtaining special leave under Article .136 of the Constitution. The respondent\n\n. o\n\nlandlord asked for his e\\>iction on the gronnd of' the tenant having created a sub-tenancy. of theprmis'es sometime in Octbber, 1976, in favour of M/s. Pavan Trading Company, a soap manufacturing concern. The tenant denied the allegation of sub-letting. The main issue raised in the proceeding was whether the tenant had sub-lef the accommodation as alleged by the landlord. The SCC Judge started dealing with this issue by saying : ' \"Under Sectfons 12, 15 and 20 of the Act ir-tenant has i allowed a non-family member to occupy the accommodation, he should be deemed to have sub-let the.accommodation. If it is found that Pavan Tratling Co. or if any of his prtner is carrying on business in the accommodation, the tenant in fact shall\n\nbe d.eemed to have sublet the accommodation. In Deihl Rent Control Journal 1971 page 492 (Abdul Aziz :v. Yaqub Khan) it was held by the Court that if ahy person other than a tenant . is found sitting in the shop, the tenant has' to lead evidence to Show that a sitting pei;:; on is not the sub-tenant. Thus the burden is on the defendant to explain the circumstances. nnder which partner of the Pavan Trading Co. is sitting in the accommodation. 21/C-1 a photograph bas been proved.\n\nEven .the defendant has admitted this photograph during his cross-examination: the person standing in. the shop has been identified by the parties to be the son of the proprietor of\n\nPavan Trading Co ...... ,\" ·\n\n• •\n\n' He looked for evidence from the tenant against sob-letting by assuming from the presence of the son offae proprietor of Pavan Trading !=ompany that there was a sub-tenancy; held against the\n\nteant and directed his evictfon from the \"premises. The Additional District Judge before whom th~ tenant's revision petition came for' disposal took note of the erroneous approach of the trial court and came to hold : •\n\n• \"In the present case, it has not at all. been admitted by the defendant-that Pavan Trading Company or any member of the said company has been carrying on business in the shop alongwfth him or by himself. The mere presence of a: member of Pavan Trading Company in the shop at a certain time will . not be suffici.ent to say all that the business is being carried. on by Pavan Trading Company in the shop. In these circumstances, it waSfor the plaintiff.to lead good and positive evidence to prove that the business in fact at tat $hop\n\n.lo\n\n• 4 .iAGDIS!lPRASAD v. ANGQORI DEVI (Ranganath Misra, i.) 2l9 ..\n\nwas being carried on by the Pavan Trading Company and not by the defendant himself.\"\n\nHe looked into the evidence and came to hold :\n\n\"The evidence of the plaintiff was not at all sufficient to shift the burden of proof to the defendent and on cbnsideration of the evidence of the p)aintiff it is not at all possi.ble to say that the plaintiff has been able to prove the fact of\n\nPavan Trading Company carrying on the business at the shop which may amount to sub-letting of the shop by the .defendant.\"\n\n_The appellaie authority, therefore,· allowed the revision and reversed th~ order of eviction and directed dismissal of the petition of the landlord. The landlord filed an application under Article 227 of ihe Constitution. Referring to the .contention of the landlord, the High Court observed.:\n\n\"Learned counsel for the petitioner subm, itted that the learned Ad_ditional District Judge clearly misconceived his jurisqiction under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Court Act. It. is urged that it was not permissible for the learned Judge to re-appraise the evidence on record on the. issue purely on fact.\n\nThe learned counsel contended that whether. it was defendant who was dojng businsss in the shop in dispute of M/s. Pavan Trading Company is undoubtedly a pure issue of fact, the findings on wHich could not be disturbed in revision under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Court Act\", and held :\n\n\"The Simple question for determination before both the courts below was whether defendant had sub-let the shop in dispute to M/s. Pavan Trading Company. This question depended on the facts of the present case .wholly on the answer to the. question whether it was the defendant or the proprietor of the said company who was doing business in the disputed shop. This . question was deterri:liued by the trial. court on the b_asis !Jf direct oral and documen'taty evidence adduced by the plaintiff to the effect that in point of fact it was the proprietor of M/s. Pavan Trading company who was doing business in the shop in question instead of the defen-\n\n'. ' Tl\n\n- E\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [19.84J3 s.c.ti.. ·\n\ndant. This finding is not based on any notion of brden of proof. .It was a pure and simple finding arrjved at on the analysis of the c\\lience on. record without reference to th~ question of burden of proof.\n\nOn the answer to this question depends entirely the fate of the case in as much as under Section 25 of the U.P. Act No. XIII bf 1972 read with\n\nSction 12(\\)(b) and Section 12(2} of the aforesaid Act, a tell3nt would be deemed to have sub-let the accommodation; if he.has allowed it to be occupied by any persan who is not' a member of his family.\n\nWhethe'r the tenant has allowed the shop to be occupiedby someone not a member of his family' -is indisputably a pure question of fact.\n\n. That being so, th.e learned District Judge exceeded his jurisdiction under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Court Act ih setting !lside the finding of the trial court on a mere re-appraisal of the evidence on record. The finding of the trial court was not vitiated by any .error of law. The impugned order .is tlius ex-facic illegal.\"\n\nHaving' heard counsel for, the parties we are of the view t)lat the lligh Court was clearly wrong in reversing the decision of the AdditionaJ .District Judge. The application for eviction was based cin the allegation of sub-tenancy. The allegation that the premisses had been sub-Jet to Pavan Trading Co'mpany had to be proved as a fact by the landlord and merely on the basis of photograph showing the pr; sence of the son of the proprietor of Pavan Trading Company within.the room, snb-letting could nofbe presum- ed. We must indicate that the approach of the trial Judge was totally vitiated .. Merely from the presence 0f a person other than the tenant in the shop sub-letting cannot be presumed. There may be several situations in which a person other than the tenant may be found sitting in the shop ; for instance, he may be a customer waiting to be attendant; a distributer who may have come to deliver his goods at the.shop forsale; a creditor coming for collection of the dues ; a friend visiting for some social purpose or the like. As long as control over the premises is kept by the tenant and the business run in the premises is of the tenant, sub-letting flowing from the presence of a person other than the t<; nant in the shop cannot be ' assumed.· The Act .does not require ihe Court to assume a sub- H teancy merely from the fact of presence of an. outsider. Obviously the law has intended and we must assume that the rule in the 4bdul.\n\n) ,\n\nAziz's case (referred to by the trial court) proceed on.the footing that the person was sitting in the shop in exercise of his own right and not in a situation as indicated by us. The trial court unwarrantedly drew the presumption and looked at the evidence of the tenant to find out whether th.e vcsumpti•.m had been rebutted.\n\nThere is no warrant in law for such a situation. The Additional District Judg~ rightly took exception to this approach to the matter by the trial court and since the evidence of the pllntiff had not been scrutinised under th~ errcineol:s impression of the legal position, the same was looked into to find out. whether the claim f the subtenancy had been established. This was not an attempr to re-assess evidence but to take into consideration the evidence which had not been looked into by the tril court. The revisional jurisdiction under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Court Act is not as wide as the appellate jurisdiction under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure ; yet in a ase of this type we do not think fault couldbe found with the revisional court for poirttin$ out fhe legal error committed by the trial court in its approach to this material aspect. The legel position having been tota\\ly'misconceived by the trial court and there being an assumption of the position which the landlord was required to prove by evidecc, the r'evisional authority was entitled to point out the legal error and)ectify the defect. This ·\n\nis all that had been done by the Additional District Judge.\n\nIn the case of Syed Yakoo!J v. K.S. Radliakrishna & Ors'., a Constitution Bench of this Court indicated the scope of. interference in a certiorari proceeding by saying. that a writ of certiorari is issued for correcting the errors of jurisdiction committed by the courts or tribunals in cases where they exceed their jurisdiction or fail to • exercise it or exercise i't. illegally ot improperly. i.e. wliere an order is passed without hearing the party sought to be affected by it. or . , where the procedure adopted is opposed to . p:inciples of natural justice. •A caution was indicated by saying that the-jurisdiction to\n\nisse a writ o.f certiorari is a supervisory one and in exercising it, the court is not entitled. to act as a court of appeal. .1'hat necessarily means that the .findings of fact arrived at by the inferior court or' tribunal are binding. An erro; of law apparent .on the face of the record could be corrected by a 'writ of certiorari, bu! not an error of fact, however, grave it may appear to be.\n\nThe rule in Yakoob's case when applied to the pre.sent facts would lead to the conclusion\n\n(I) [1964] 5 S.C.R. 64.\n\n• D\n\nthat the High G:>urt exceeded its jurisdictioµ in interfering with the order of the Additit>nal District Judge.\n\nWe are, therefore, inclined to agree with the appellant's contention that the. High Court wrongly interfered with the decision of t]le Additional District Judge that the landlord failed to establish sub-tenancy. The circum stances in which the son of the pr9prietor of Pavan Trading Company was in the shop hav~ bee~ clearly explained and we are inclin'ed to agree that there is no tnaterial on the record to doubt the explanation plactd by way of evidence in the proceeding.\n\nThe apJ\"al is accordingly , allowed and t!1e order of the High Court is vacated and that of the Additional District Jildge is restor ed. The net effect is. the application for eviction of the appellant. tenant is dismissed with costs throughout. Hearing fee in this Court is assessed at Rs. l, OOQ .\n\nH.S.K. ..\n\nAppeal allowed .\n\n.1.\n\nr ' ·•", "total_entities": 34, "entities": [{"text": "JAGDISH PRASAD", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12, "end_char": 26, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "JAGDISH PRASAD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ANGOORI DEVI", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 33, "end_char": 45, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "ANGOORI DEVI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "D.A. DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 66, "end_char": 76, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.A. 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Garg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4339, "end_char": 4348, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M.K. Garg a.nd V.K. !"}}, {"text": "RMNGA.NATH MisRA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4430, "end_char": 4446, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Conrt was delivered by\n\nRMNGA.NATH MisRA, J. Ihe tenant of one room which."}}, {"text": "Pavan Trading Company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4851, "end_char": 4872, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of theprmis'es sometime in Octbber, 1976, in favour of M/s. Pavan Trading Company, a soap manufacturing concern."}}, {"text": "SCC", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5078, "end_char": 5081, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The SCC Judge started dealing with this issue by saying : ' \"Under Sectfons 12, 15 and 20 of the Act ir-tenant has i allowed a non-family member to occupy the accommodation, he should be deemed to have sub-let the.accommodation."}}, {"text": "Pavan Tratling Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5323, "end_char": 5341, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If it is found that Pavan Tratling Co. or if any of his prtner is carrying on business in the accommodation, the tenant in fact shall\n\nbe d.eemed to have sublet the accommodation."}}, {"text": "Pavan Trading Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5833, "end_char": 5850, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "nnder which partner of the Pavan Trading Co. is sitting in the accommodation."}}, {"text": "Article 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7856, "end_char": 7867, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8098, "end_char": 8108, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8519, "end_char": 8529, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Pavan Trading company", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9145, "end_char": 9166, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jf direct oral and documen'taty evidence adduced by the plaintiff to the effect that in point of fact it was the proprietor of M/s. 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'"}}, {"text": "Section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9591, "end_char": 9601, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Pavan Trading Co'mpany", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10620, "end_char": 10642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The allegation that the premisses had been sub-Jet to Pavan Trading Co'mpany had to be proved as a fact by the landlord and merely on the basis of photograph showing the pr; sence of the son of the proprietor of Pavan Trading Company within.the room, snb-letting could nofbe presum- ed."}}, {"text": "Aziz", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11795, "end_char": 11799, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ") ,\n\nAziz's case (referred to by the trial court) proceed on.the footing that the person was sitting in the shop in exercise of his own right and not in a situation as indicated by us."}}, {"text": "Section 25", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12665, "end_char": 12675, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 96", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12767, "end_char": 12777, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12781, "end_char": 12808, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Yakoob", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14368, "end_char": 14374, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The rule in Yakoob's case when applied to the pre.sent facts would lead to the conclusion\n\n(I) [1964] 5 S.C.R. 64."}}, {"text": "[1964] 5 S.C.R. 64", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 14451, "end_char": 14469, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_3_223_228_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "JITENDRA SINGH RATHOR\n\nSHRI BAIDY ANA TH A YURVED BHAWAN LTD. & ANR.\n\nMarch 15, 1984\n\n(D.A. DESAI AND RANGANATH MISRA, JJ.]\n\nlabour law Service~ of Employee-Termination on charge -of misconduct- Industrial Tribunal finding charge of misconduct proved-Reinstatement with half of back wages ordered-Employer apprOaching High Court-High Court vacating order of .reinstatement and qualltifying compensation at RS. • 15000-.Interference by High Court whether valid aud legal. •\n\nConstitution of India 1950, Art 227\n\nJuri., diction of High Coul't to interfere with the award of an Inddstrial TrilYunal D -When arises. •\n\nIndustrial Disputes Act 1947, Section I IA.\n\nEmployee's\" services terminated on account of misconduct-Jurisdiction of IndUst; ial Tribunal to grant relief-Explained.\n\nThe appellant was employed as a Librarian under the 1st respondent. His services were terminated for misconduct. He laid a Complaint before the Indus trial -Tribunal under section 33A of the Industrial.Dispures Act, 19.47. The Tribunal came to the conclusion that though the charge ot misconducteagainst the appellant was establishCd, the punishment of termination of service was not warranted, ordered reihstatement with half of his back wages and other benefits from the date of termination .\n\n.,4 The respond<nt-employer applied to the High Court under Article 227 to i quash the direction of reinstatemellt contending that as the Tribunal had found misconduct on the part of the Workman, it was obligatory for the Tribunal to\n\nimpose some punishment which it had failed to do. It was fQrther contended\n\n. G that as there was las), of confidence, reinstatement was not appropriate. The High Court held that with-holding of.50 per cent of the back wages was a condition ofteinstatement and wa~. not by way of pµnishment, held that reinstatement was no_t called for, vac.ated-the Oroe~ of reinstatement, direCted payment of compensation to the respondent workman in lieu of reinstatement and quanti- /!\\ . fied the compensation at Rs. 15,000.\n\nAllowing.th• appeal.\n\n. HELD :. I. The order of the High Court is set aside and.the award of the Industrial Tribunal is restored. The High Court had no justification to interfere with lhe direction regarding reinsiaten1eut to S'tvk:~ and in pr0cceding tosubsti~ • .. • tute the directiqn by quantifying conipensation at Rs. 15000 it acted without any legitimate basis. [228D, 22711, 228A]\n\n2. Section llA of the InduStrial Disputes-Act, 1947 vests wide discretion in the Tribunal, and in a given case oµ. the facts established 'th~ Tribunal cari Vacate -the order of dislnissal or .discharge and . give suitable directiOns.\n\nIt is a well-settled principle of law --that when an order of tetmination of service is found to be bad and reinstatement is directed, the wronged workman is ordin'arily entitled to full back wages Unless for any particular reason the whole or a part.of it is asked to be withheld .. The Tribunal while directing reinstatement and keeping the delinquency in view could withhold payment of a part or the whole of the back wages.· [226G, 227AJ ' . '\n\n3. The High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution does not enjoy the wide discretion vested in the Tribuna1 under-, section llA, though as a superior court, it' is vested With the right Of superintendence. The High Court ~Sin disputably entitled to scru!inize the orders of the subordinate tribunals within the well itcepted limitations and it could in an approprial.e c_ase quash the award of the Tribunal and thereupon remit the matter tQ it for' fresh dispOsal in accordance with law and directions, if ahy. The High Court is not_ entitled to exercise the powers of the Tribunal clod substitute an award in.p}ace of the one made by the Tribunal as in the case of an appeal where it lies to it. [227D] ·\n\nE • CtVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION ... Civil. Appeal No. 108\n\nof 1984.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 4.3.83 of the Patna High Court in C.W.J.C. No. 3490 of 1979.\n\nM.K. Ramamurthi and A.S/iaran for the Appellant.\n\nS. N. Singh for the Respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by ) '°' -RANGANATll MISRA, J. The workman is .in ppeal after obtaining leave uuder Article 136 of the Constitution from this Court. The appellant was working as librarian under the respondent employer.. His services were terminate!\\ on May 24, 1977, on pay_. 'ment of a month's 'salary. The appellant laid a complaint before\n\nthe Industrial Tribunal under section 33A of the Industrial Disputes Act,. 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and. the Tribunal yall\\e to find on hearing parties that though the charge of misconduc\n\n.. ) .\n\n0, I\n\n1. s. RATHOR v. BAiDYANATH AYURVED (Ranganath Misra, J.) 225\n\nwithin the meaning of clause 16(iii) (a) of the Standing Orders had been established, punishment of termination of service was not\n\nwarranted. Accordingly, reinstatement was ordered.· The direction of the Tribunal ran thus:\n\n; \"Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and evidence on record I direct the opposite party (employer) to reinstate the.complainant (appellant) with half of his back wages and other benefits from the date of termination of his service (24.5.1977) within one [month from the date of pronouncement of this award.\" •\n\nThe employer applied to the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution to quash the direction of reinstatement and in support of the stand it was contended that as the Tribunal had found misconduct on the part of.the workman, it was obligatory for the Tribunal to impose some punishment which it had failed to do. The employer also took the position that there was loss of confidence and reinstatement was not appropriate. Th.e appellant maintained that though under the law he was entitled to full Back wa11es upon reinstatement, the Tribunal had directed witpholding a moiety of it in view of its finding that misconduct had been established. •The High Court came to hold that withholding of 50 per cent of the back. wages was a condition of reinstatement and was not by way of punishment. The High Court observed:\n\n\"The two poyiers under section I IA ate alternative; the first is to direct reinstateme11t of the workman on such terms and conditions as it thinks fit and the second is to give 'some other relief to the worklllan in eluding the award of any lesser punishment in lieu of reinstatement as the circumstances of the case may require. Under the second alternative, the Tribunal may instead of directing reinstatement give the relief of compensation to the workman or award a lesser punishment. ... It was for the Tribunal, therefore, to decide as to which of the two alternatives it should a'dopt. But the Tribunal is always bound to exercise its discretion judicially and decide to adopt either the first course to direct reinstatement on such terms and conditions as it thinks fit or the second course to award a lesser punishment in lieu of reinstatement as the circtmstances of the case may require. The order of re.instatem• with half back wages is an order pf the firs\\ 9ategory and nQt of the second category. The\n\nF.\n\n, payment of only half of the back \"'ages is a cc 'dition of the reinstatement and not a punishment for the mi; conduct of the ·\n\nworkan. '~ .': · · ·\n\n.. • The High. Court then came to the conclusion tha~ the cider of. reinstatement was not called for ad proceeded to indicate: ' ,. • • • • r•\n\n\"The question now is shold the award be set aside and the case be remitted back to the Tribunal for a fresh deter- millation of.the inatter in acco.fdance with law of Should , the . proceeding be concluded by making a reasonable modification .\n\nin the award of the Tribunal?\" · ' ·· · .\n\n. ,, The High Curt thereafter vacated th.; order of reinstatement holding that ends of justice would be served by directing payment of . compe_nsation tothe rcspondentwi:irkman in lieu of reinstatement·\n\nand quantified th~ compensation at Rs .. 15,000. Thismodification. by the. High Court . is assailed in appeal at :it-he instance of the workman. · ·\n\n. . . - Section llA of the Act provides : ·\n\n\"Where an industrial dispute relating to the disharge or dismissal of a workman has ·.been referred 'to a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal. for adjudication and, in the course of the adjudication proceedings, the Lab.our Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be, is satisfied ·\n\nthat the order of. discharge or dismissal was not justified, it may, .by its award,' set aside the order of discharge or dismissal and direct reinstatement of the workman on such terms and ccinditions, if any;•as it thinks fit, or give such other relief io. . the workman including the award of any lesser punishment iri'\n\nlieu of discharge or dismissal as the circumstances of the case may require.\" '\n\n. . Wide discretion i• vested in the Tribunal undef this povision and in a given case on the facts established the Tribunal can vacate. the order of dismissal or discharge and give suitable directions.. It is a well-settled principle of law that when an order of termination . of service is. found . to. be bad 'and. reinstatement is directed, th e wronged workman is ordinarily entitled to full. back wages unless . for any particular reason the whole or Oa. part of it is asked. to he\n\n' .\n\n. .\n\n1.§. itA'tHOR v. BAIDYANATH AYURVIID (Ranganath Misra, J.) 227 )\n\n< •\n\nwithheld. The Tribunal while directing reinstatement and keeping the delinquency in view could withhold payment of a part or the whole of the back wages. In our opinion, the High Court was right in taking the view that when payment of back wages either in full or part is withheld it amounts to a penalty. Withholding of back wages to the_ extent of half in the facts of the case was, therefore, by way of penalty referable to proved misconduct and that situation could not have been answered by the High Court by saying that the relief\n\nof reinstatement was being granted on terms of wi.thholding of half of the back wages and; therefore, did not constitute penalty.\n\nUnder Section llA of the Act, advisedly wide discretion has been vested in the Tribunal in the matter of awar_ding relief according to the circumstances of the case'. The_ High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution does not enjoy such power though as a superior ''\\.-< court, it is vested with the right of superintendence. The High Court is indisputably entitled to scrutinii; C the orders of the subordinate tribunals within the well accepted limitations and, therefore, it could in an appropriate case quash the award of the tribunal and thereupon remit the matter to it for fresh disposal in accordance with law and directions, if any. The High C Ui t is not 'entitled to exercise the powers of the Tribunal and substitute a; i award in place oi the one made by the Tribunal as in the case of an appeal where it\n\n. -._ lies to it. In this case, the Tribunal had directed reinstatement, the\n\nr High Court. vacated the direction of reinstatement and computed compensation of Rs. 15,000 in lieu of restoration of ser, ce. We are not impressed by the reasoning of the High Court that reinstate-• • ment was not justified when the tribunal in exercise of its wide discretion given under the law found that such relief would meet the\n\nends of justice. The Tribunal had not recorded a finding that there was loss of confidence of the employer. The job of a libraian does > not involve the necessity. of enjoyment of any special confidence of ,; the employer. At any rate, the High Court too did not record a finding to that effect. Again, there is QO indication in the judgment of the High Court as to how many years of service the appellant had put in and how many years of service were still left under the Standing Orders. The. salary and other service benefits which th~ appellant was receiving also did not enter into the consid_eration of the High Court while '<omputing the compensation. We are, there- -, . / fore, of the view thaf the High Court had no justification to interfere with e direction regardi!lg reinstatement to service and in procee-\n\nD •\n\nSUPR.~MB COURT REPORTS\n\n{1984] 3 S.C.R.\n\nding to substitute the direction by quantifying compensation of Rs. 15,000 it acted without any legitimate basis.\n\nMr. Prasad for the respondent no. 1 invited our attention to the fact that the High Court was cognizant of the necessity of a remand\n\n. but taking into consideration the delay involved and the fact that a remand was unnecessary in view of ihe nature of theorder it was going to . make took upon itself to give a final decision. We reiterate that ordinarily it is not for the High Court in exercise of the jurisdiction of superintendence to substitute one finding for another and similarly one punishment for another. We may not be understood to. have denied that power to the High Court in every type of cases.\n\nIt is sufficient for our present purpose to hol.d that on the'.facts made •out, the approach of the High Court was totally uncalled for and the manner in which the compensation was assessed by vacating the_order ofreinstatement is erroneous both on facts and in law.\n\nThe appeal, therefore, is :!!lowed and the order of t)le High .Court is set aside and the award of the Industrial Tribunal is restored.\n\nThe appellant became entitled to reinstatement within a month from November 24, 19]9, when the award was made. He would, therefore, be entitled to full wages and other service benefits from December 24, 1979, taking the month's allowance given in the awardinto account .. He would also be entitled to the half of the -back • wages in terms of the award from May t4, 1977 till December 23,\n\n1979. We direct the Tribunal to compute the amount so due as back wages and the appellant is entitled to 12 per cent interest on the siim from January 1, 1980, till payment. The appeal is allowed with costs. Hearing fee assessed at Rs. 2000.\n\nN.V.K.\n\nAppeal allowed . •\n\n• . .\n\n' ,", "total_entities": 24, "entities": [{"text": "JITENDRA SINGH RATHOR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 21, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "JITENDRA SINGH RATHOR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BAIDY ANA TH A YURVED BHAWAN LTD.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 28, "end_char": 61, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BAIDYANATH AYURVED BHAWAN LTD. & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "D.A. DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 87, "end_char": 97, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.A. DESAI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RANGANATH MISRA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 102, "end_char": 122, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RANGANATH MISRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 474, "end_char": 495, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 502, "end_char": 509, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 615, "end_char": 643, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 33A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 954, "end_char": 965, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Act 1947", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Act 1947"}}, {"text": "Article 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1338, "end_char": 1349, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Act 1947", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Act 1947"}}, {"text": "Article 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3125, "end_char": 3136, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3932, "end_char": 3948, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From the Judgment and Order dated 4.3.83 of the Patna High Court in C.W.J.C. No."}}, {"text": "M.K. Ramamurthi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3980, "end_char": 3995, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M.K. Ramamurthi and A.S/iaran for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "S. N. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4030, "end_char": 4041, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. N. Singh for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "-RANGANATll MISRA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4113, "end_char": 4130, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ) '°' -RANGANATll MISRA, J. The workman is .in ppeal after obtaining leave uuder Article 136 of the Constitution from this Court."}}, {"text": "Article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4188, "end_char": 4199, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "section 33A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4461, "end_char": 4472, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4480, "end_char": 4503, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "clause 16(iii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4737, "end_char": 4751, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5314, "end_char": 5325, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10235, "end_char": 10246, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12272, "end_char": 12278, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Prasad for the respondent no."}}, {"text": "December 23,\n\n1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13661, "end_char": 13679, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He would, therefore, be entitled to full wages and other service benefits from December 24, 1979, taking the month's allowance given in the awardinto account .. He would also be entitled to the half of the -back • wages in terms of the award from May t4, 1977 till December 23,\n\n1979."}}, {"text": "January 1, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13818, "end_char": 13833, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We direct the Tribunal to compute the amount so due as back wages and the appellant is entitled to 12 per cent interest on the siim from January 1, 1980, till payment."}}, {"text": "N.V.K.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13918, "end_char": 13924, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.V.K.\n\nAppeal allowed . •"}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_3_229_243_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "• • 229\n\nGHANSHYAM OASS ANO OTHERS\n\nv. •\n\nDOMlNION <:1F INDIA AND OTHERS\n\nMarch 20, 1984 -\n\n[D.A. l>ESAI, A.P. SEN AND V. BALAKRISHNA ERADI,'.JJ.] ,\n\nContract with Government and claims arisillg therefrom-Contractor issues notice to Gove, rnment under section 80 C.P.C. (before the amendment in 1976) hut dles before the instit!on of the suit-The legal representatives of the contractor institutes the suit on the basis of the notice issued by the contractor-Whether a fresh notice under section 80, C.P.C. is necessary and for want of such_ a fresh\n\nnotice the suit itself ii not maintainable-Code of Civil Procedure (Act Vof 1908) section 80 (as is stood before the Amendment Act of 1976), Scope of.\n\nThe plaintiff's father Seth Lachhman Dass Gupta entered into a contract with the Governor General-in-Council for the suppJy of CharcoaJ tO the Military Supply Depot, Agra and received payments for the same at the contractual rate froln time to time. Tfi.e contract contained an escalation clause viz. cl. 8 to the *' effect 1hat in case the Price of charcoal was increased bY more than 10% of the stipulated rate during the subsistence of the contract', the contractor would be entitled to the price at the higher rate. During the periOd of..pie contract, the rate of charcoal went up continuously. The military aul!'\"orities paid at the enq, anced rate for the part of supplies w.hi!C for the rest they refused to pay more than the contractual rate. He accordingly set.ied a notice to the Government under s. 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 J!laking a claim for payment of a sum of Rs. 20, 119.so p. in terms of clause 8 of the contract beint1 the dill'erence between the enhanted rate and the contractual rate for the supplies paid 'for.\n\nBut before.he could bring tl).e si.Iit against tbe Government,\" he died. Thereupon_, the respondents brought a suit as his legal heirs and successo1s.claiming the amount. , the defendants contested the claim inter alia on 'the ground that the notice given by Seth Lachhman Dass could not eoure for the benefit of the plain tiff's nd. therefore the suit was bad for want of notice under s. 80 of the Code.\n\nThe Court of first inftance held that no further notice under s. 80 was necessary as the notice served by the plaintiff's father Seth Lachhman Dass must enure to their benefit.\n\nOn appeal, the High Court reversed his decision on the point and held that the notice given by the plaintiff's father was insufficient and wns not a valid notice under s. 80 of the Code insofar as the plaintiff'• were concerned. Against the judgment, the plaintiff's preferred an appeal by special leave.\n\nAllowing the appoal, th• Court\n\n~30 •\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984} 3 s. C.R. ·,,(\n\nHELD : 1. The question as· to ... whether a, notice under s. 80 is valid or not is a question of judicial construction. S. 8Q of the Code is but a part of the Procedure Code passed to pro't'ide the regulation and machinery, by -means of wblbh the. courts may do justice between the parties. It is therefore merely a part of the adjective law and deals. with procidure alone and must be interpreted in a manner so as_ o subserve and advag.ce the cause of justice rather than to defCat it. As far as possible, no Proceedings in a court of law should be aUowed to -be defeated on mere technicalities. This is the principle oil -which OQ.rs laws of procedure are based. [238A, 239GH, 240A-CJ\n\n2. The whole object of serving a notice. under s. 80 is to give the Government Sufficient warning of the case which is going to be instited against it' and that the GOvemment, if it so wished ca.n settle the claim without litigation or afford restitution without recourse to a court of law. Though the terms of s. 80 . have to. be strictly complied with, thai does not mean that the notice should be scrutinised in a pedantic manner di.vorced from COlJlmon sense. The point to be con1idere'd is whether the notice gives suffiCient information as to the nature Or the claim such as would enable the recipient to avert the litigation. If the notice substantially fulfills its work of intimating the parties concerned generally of the y.., nature of the suit intended to be filed, it would be sufficient compliance of the . section. While interpreting ttie pfe .. amended Section the courts must have due regatd to the change in. law brought about by subs. (3) of s. 80, which shows legislative acceptance of the rule of substantial compliance instead of strict compliarice. [240DE, 242C.E]\n\nSangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah relied on •.. •\n\n3. In the present case the requirement of s. 80 that there inust be identity I between tuse of RC?tion and the ielief claimed in the notice as well as in the ~·- plaint, is fulfilled.\n\nA• resards the requirement of identity of the person who issues the notice with the ycrson who brings the suit, in this case the notice contained the name of the original claimant i.e. the father of the plaintiffs. The notice reached the concerned department of the Government where the Govern .. ment bad opportunity to examine the nature of the claim and decide whethi:r it should accept or contest the claim. The conce_rnCd Government authorities served a J:eply on the plaintiff'; father that his claim was not acceptable. There ... after he died and his right to file the suit for enforcement of the claim having devolved upon his heirs i.e. the plaintiff's, the plaintiffs filed the suit for enforce.. .{_~ ment of the same claim: In the circumstances, . if s. 80 is held to ha\"Ve '\"\" not been compliCd With, as done by the Hiah Court, great injustice would _be done to the plaintiffs in the matter of filiD.g suits to the Government inasmuch as in case-of insistence on fresh notice, the period of limitation to file the suit would expire in the meantime. Such a situation is not intended b; t the Code.\n\nThus the requirement of s. 80 was clearly fulfilled in this case but the High Court having allowed the technical plea of the defendants, the plaintiffs have been deprived of their legitimate claim for at least 35 years.\n\n[238DH, 239A-C, 240GH],..- -'-\n\nff S.N. Dutt v. Union of India, (1962] 1 $.C.R. 560; Mahadev Dattatraya Rajshri v. Secretary of State for India, [1930] 32 Botn. L.R. 604; and. Bachchu Singh v. Secretary of State for India in Cuoncll; [1902) 25 I.L.R. 1.87, overruled.\n\nclii-NsmAM v. ooMINroN oF rnn1A.(Sen, J.)\n\n, . . • ; I'\n\nRaglzuth Dass V. Unio,;-of India, (1969} I S.c.R: 450; Union of Iridia v.\n\nJee'wan -Rilm A.I.R. i958. S._C. 905; State Of Madras v. C.P. Agencies~ A.I.R. \"\n\n1960. S.C. 1309 and Amar Nath , Gogra v. Union.of India, [19~4] I S.C.R. 651, -affirmed.\n\nBh{igchand rac'adusa v. Secretary of State for.India in CounCi/, '[19211 I.A: 338; / T./-. tr,-C\"J~\" hettiar v. Governmeitt of the. Provif:ce of Jfadras [1947] ·- I.A. 7f: and Govern;,, en1 of the Provice of Bombay v. Pestonji Ardeshir Wadia - (1949] 76 I.A. 57; referred to. ' · ·\n\nC1ViL. APPELLATE JUR!SDICTrON: Civil' Apperu No. 82 of 1971.\n\n From Judgment and Decree dated 26.2.65 of Allahabad High. · c .\n\nCourt in first appeal Nn. 457 of 1952. ' . .\n\nJ.P. Goyal and S.K. Jain for the appellants.·\n\nV.C. Mahajan and A. Subhashini for the espondents.\n\nD The Judgement of the Court was , delivered by ·\n\n. ' SEN, J. This appeal on certificate brought from .the judgment and decree of the Allahabad High Court datedFebruary 26, 1965 reversing the judgment .and decree of the Civil Judge, Agra dated August 25,. 1952 and dismissing the plaintiff~' suit for recovery of E Rs. 26,000 raises , a question of some importance upon s.80' of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. . , · ·\n\nThe facts giving rise.to this appeal may be shortly tated. On .. , November 12, 1949, the plaintiffs Ghanshyam Dass .and his two ' . • minor. brothers Shree Ram and Mohan Lal brougat the suit out' of which this ppeal arises; in the. Court of the .Civil Judge, Agra for. recovery of a sum of Rs. 26,000 against the Dominion of India . . through the Defence Secretary, New Delhi. . It was' pleaded that ·. .\n\ntheir late father Seth Lachman Dass Gupta entered into a contract • with the• Governor General-in-Council for the supply of charcoal , to the Military Supply Depot at Agra during the period from' April I, 1943. to March 31, 1944. In pursuance thereof, lie made .. necessary supplies and• received payments for the same at the con-· .\n\ntractual rates from time to time. •It was pleade<I that the contract - . contained an escalation clause viz: clause 8, to the effect that in case ·\n\nthe price of charcoal increased by more than iO% of the tipulated rate during the subsistence or'the contract, the contractor would be . entitled to the price at the higher rate,' It was alleged that from\n\nJ.,\n\n. c\n\nsUPRllME COURT REPORTS [1984] 3 s.a.il.\n\nlhe date of-the Contract, the rate of charcoal went up continuously to 44.8% in July, August and September 1943, 93.1% in October, November and December 1943 and 82.7% in January, February and March 1944. Accordingly Seth Lachman Dass made a demand for payment of price at the increased rate. The military authorities paid at the enhanced rate for par~ of the supplies while for the - rest they refused to pay at more than the contractual rate. Seth Lachman Dass served a notice Ex. A-8 on tb, e Dominion of Jfdia through the Defence Secretary under s.80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. It appears tliat before his death,' on or about September 15, 1948 he received a letter from the military.authorties rejecting his claim fo.r payments at the enhanced rate but before he could institute any suit he died on October 28, 1949. - .'ifhereafter, on November 12, 1949 the plaintiffs who are his three sons, brought the suit as his legal heirs and successors claiming the amount. The defendants contested the claim inter a/ia on the ground that the notice Ex. A-8 given by Seth Lachman Dass could nofenure for the benefit of the plaintiffs and therefore the suit was bad for want of a notice \"under s.80 of the Code. The learned Civil Judge, however, held that no further notice under s.80 was necessary as the notice Ex. A-8 served by the plaintiffs father Seth Lachman Dass must enure for their benefit.\n\nHe found that the plaintiffs were entitled in terms of clause 8 of the contract to receive a sum of Rs. 20,?lO.SOp. being the difference between the enhanced rate and the contractual rate for the supplies paid for and accordingly decreed the plaintiffs' claim to that extent. But on appeal the High Court, his defision on the pointlwas reversed upon the .view that the notice Ex. A~8 .given by the plaintiffs' father was insufficient and was not a valid notice under s.80 of the Code of Civil Procedure insofar as the plaintiffs were concerned.\n\nThe short question involved in this appeal is whether the notice Bx. A-8 given by the iplaintiffs' father Seth Lach man Dass Gupta before his death under s.80 of the Code of Civil Procedure,\n\n1908 would enure for the benefit of'the plaintiffs.\n\nSection 80 of. the Code as it stood on the gate of the institu tion or 'the suit, insofar as material, is reproduced below :\n\n\"80~ l'{ptice: No suit shall be instituted against (the Government) or against a public officer in respect of any act purporting to . be done such public officer in his official\n\n' .\n\n. .\n\n' )\n\nl •\n\ni f I f I ...---.,:: ,--. / I\n\nGHA.NSflYAM v. DOMINION OF INDIA, (Sen, J.) 233\n\ncapacity, until the expiration of two months next after notice A in writing has been delivered to, or left at the office of-\n\n(a). in the case of suit against the Central Government ............ a Secretary to that Government ;\n\n••• • •• • •• • ••\n\nand, in the case of a public officer, delivered to him or left at his office, stating the cause of action, the name, description and place of residence of the plailltiff and the relief which he\n\nclaims ; and the plaint shall contain a statement that such C notice has been so delivered or left.\"\n\nIn the celebrated case of Bhagchand Dagadusa & .Ors. v.\n\nSecretary of $tate for India in Council & Ors1., the Judicial Committee of. the Privy Council held that this section is express, explicit an mandatory and it admits of no implications or exceptions.\n\nThe words of Viscount Sumner delivering the judgment of the Privy Council have become classical :\n\n''Section 80 is express, explicit and mandatory, and it admits of. implications or exceptions. A suit in which' (inter alia) an injunction is prayed still \"a suit'' within the words of the section, and to read any qualification into it is an encroachment on the function of legislation. Considering how . long these and similar words have been read throughout most of the Courts in India in their literal sense, it is reasonable to suppose that the section has not been found to work injustice. but, if this is not so, it is a matter to be rectified by an amending Act.':\n\nThe Privy Council rejected the contention put forward before them that the section deals with mere procedure and held that the requirements of s.80 are to be strictly complied with and are applicable to all forms of action and all kinds of relief. It further held . that s.80 imposes a statutory and unqualified obligation upon the Court and in .the absence of compliance with s.80, the suit was not maintainable, either as to the declaration sought or injunction prayed for.\n\n(I) (1927] 54 I.A. 338.\n\nif:. E\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984] 3. s.c.il..\n\nEarljer, in-ome cases, a liberal construction was put upon the section and it was held that a notice is sufficient ifit substantially fulfils its objection in informing the parties concerned of the nature of the suit to be filed, and that a notice is not invalid merely because it .is given by two out offhree plaintiffs. But since the Privy Council judgment in Bhagchand's case, supra, strict compliance with the . terms of s.80 has been enforced a.nd a notice given by one. of two plaintiffs has been held to be insufficient.\n\nAgain, in a case where the plaintiffs' father gave notice. and then plaintiffs filed a. suit after the father's death, the notice given byihe father in respect of the same cause of action was held insfficient :Mahadev Dattatraya Rajarshi v.\n\nSecretary of Swe for India1 following Buchan Sigh v. Secretary of State.•\n\nIt is plain from the terms of s.81) that the notice inust fulfil the req]Ji.rements set out therein., It is essential th.at the notice must state the names, descriptions and places of residence of all the plaintiffs. A notice must be such as. to enable the addresse or the recipient to indentify the claimant.\n\nIn Val/ayan Chettiar& Ors. v.\n\nThe Government of the Province of Madras & Anr'. Lord Simo.nds delivering the jildgment of the Privy Council referred to the observa tions of Lord Sumner in Bhagchand's case that s.80 is explicit and. mandatory and admits of l\\O implications or exemptions, and .observed that :\n\n\"There should be identity of ihe person who issues the notice and who brings the suit. To hold otherwise would be to admit an implication' or exception for which there is no F justification.\"\n\nThere, the question was whether a suit brought by two plaintiffs was competent when notice .under s.8.0 was given by only one of them. Tile Privy Council. having regard to the mandatory requirements of .s.80 of the Code held that there was no valid notice and aotordingly upheld the judgment of the High Court dismissing the plaintiff's suit. So also in Governmeni of the Province Bombay\n\nv. Pestonji Ardeshir Wadia. & Ors.,• the Privy Council reiterated the same principles where no notice had been served under s.80 specify-\n\n(I) (1930) 32 Bom.L.R. 604.\n\n(2) !LR (1902) 25 All. J87.\n\n(3) [1947] 74 I.A. 223.\n\n(4) [1949] 76 I.A. S1 .\n\n• A.\n\n' l\n\n1-,\n\n.- .\n\n. .. .\n\n•.... GitANSNYM! v. DOMINION OF INriL\\ (Sen, J.) . 235\n\n: -- t • • - ' • i ing t11c n3mos and addresses of all the trustees and thertfore the p:cyisions of the section had not been complied with and it was\n\nac.; urdingly held that the suit was incompetent.... · . . : . . - . . . . . . . . . ' , . . . . ' As to the requirement tha.t the notice .must state the cause of . action and the reliefs,· Claimed, there is a large body of decisions laying .down• that a notice under the section should be heid to be . sufficient if it substantially fulfils its object in informing the partjes. concerned ofthe nature of the suit to be filed.\n\nIn consonance with this. view, this Court in Dhian Singh Sabha Singh & Anr, v.\" Union of . India,1 Union of India v. Jeewan .Ram', State. of Madras v. C.P. ·\n\nAgeni:ies' and Amar Nath v.\n\nUnio~ of India' has held that though the terms of the section have io be . sfrictly complied with, that does ., not mean that ihe D.otice shou.ld be scrlltinized ill 'a pedantic manner ,\n\noi in a manner divorced from common sense. On this principle, it has. been held. thafnotice. which states the cause of action and the relie.fs described in the annexed copy' of the ptaint (which forms part of the . notice) 'though defective _in form, complies substantially with the\n\nsection. The point to be CO!lsidered is whether the notic.e gives suffi- eient information as to the nature of the claim such as ould.enable\n\nthe recipient to avert the litigation. The relevant passage from the judgment in Dhain Singh Sabha. Singh' s case, supra, is set' out below:\n\n.. . \"We are constrained to observe that the approacb of . the. igh Court to this quetion \".\"a~ not .well founded. The\n\nPrivy Council no doubt -fa:.d down m Bhagchand Dagadusa v.\n\nSecretaty of State (1927) LR. 54 LA 338) that the terms of this section should be strictly complied with. That does not however mean that the terms of the notice should be scrutini- •\n\nzed in a pedantic manner or in a manner completely divorced from. common sense: As was stated by_ Pollock C.B .. in , -. Jones v. Nicholls (1844) 153 E.R. 149 \"We must import a . little common sense into notices of this 'kind.\" Beaumont . C.J: also obseed in Chandu Lal Vadilal v. Govrnment of Bombay, ILR (1943) Born. 128 \"One must construe sectio~ \"so with some regard to common . sense and to the object with which it appears to have been passed \"\n\n, (1) [1958] SCR 781.\n\n(2) AIR 1958 SC 905.\n\n(3) AIR 1960 SC 1309. (4) [1964] l SCR 657.\n\n-..\n\nSUPREME co\\JR r REPoR rs r1p84j 3 s.c.il.\n\nThe question as to whether notice under s.80 was invalid for want of identity .of, the plaihtiffs , Pirectly arose in the case of S.N.\n\nDatt v. {Inion of India'. There, a no)ice was served by the appellant who wa.s the sole proprietor of a business styled S.N. Dutt & Co., (iu the name of S:N. Dutt & Co.) and thereafter he filed a snit against the Union ofindia describing t11e. plaintiff as \"Surendra Nath Dutt sole proprietor of a business carried on under the name and style ofS.N. Ontt & Co.\". This Co1utupheld the decision ofthe Calcutta High Court dismis_sing the plaintiff's suit holding that the person who issued the notice was not the same as the person who filed the suit.\n\nThe contentiol\\ that the appellant was carrying on business nnder an assumed name arid therefore the notice was valid as S.N. Dutt & Co.\n\nas merely the name and style of the business which he was carrying on, was rejected. The Court held that since no snit could be filed by $.N. Dutt & Co. in that name as it was not a partnership firm, it could not give a valid and legal notice in that name, and a valid notice could only be given in the name of S.N. Dutt. The decision merely reiterates the t\\ile laid down by this Court in Bhagchand that \"section 80, according to its plain meaning, requires that there should be identity of the person who gives the notice with the person :-\\'ho brings the suit\". The Court distinguished the decisions in ' Dhian Singh Sobha Singh and C.P. Agencies on the ground that the Court was dealing with defect in describing the cause of action and the relief claimed and where it concerns the relief and the cause of action, it may be necessary to use common sense to find out whether s.80 of the Code has beeri complied with, and stated :\n\n. ' \"But where it is a question of the name of the plaintiff, there is in our opinion (little scope for the use of common sense,) for either the name of the person suing is there in the notice or if is not. No amount of common sense will put the name of the plaintiff there, if it is not there.\"\n\nIn the case of Raghunath Dass. v Union of India & Anr.• the same question arose but the Court struck a discordant note there.\n\nThere, the notice emanated from M/s Raghunath Dass Mulkhraj and in the body of the notice at several places the expression \"we\" was used. Further, the plaintiff had purported to sign for M/s Raghunath Dass.Mulkhraj but at the same time he signed the notice as proprietor of M/ s Raghunath Dass Mulkhraj. The Court held\n\n'(!) [1962) I SyR 5§0.\n\n<2> [19691 t s; c.R. 450\n\n- -<\n\n• GHANSHYAM v. DOMINION OF INDIA (Sen, J.) 237\n\nthat that was a clear indication of the fact that M/s Raghunath Dass Mulkhraj was a proprietary concern and the plaintiffs was its proprietor. In repelling the contention kthat there was no identity of the person who gave the notice with the person who filed the suit the Court observed :\n\n\"Whatever doubts that might, have been possibly created in the mind of the recipient of the notice, after going through the bocly of the notice as to the identity of the would be plaintiff, the same would have been resolved after going through the notice as a whole.\"\n\nThere, the plaintiff had averred in the plaint that he was carrying on his business under an assumed name and style of M/s ' Raghunath Dass Mulkhraj meaning thereby that the concern was a proprietary concern and that the name given to it was only a trade name.\n\nHe had also stated ip the plaint that he had given a notice under s.80 of the Civil Procedure Code.\n\nIn the written statement filed on behalf of the Dominion of India, the validity of the notice issued was not challenged. Regarding the hotice in question there was only an averinent in the written statement that suit was barred by s.80 of.the Code as no nolice under that section appears to have been served on the Administration. Ii:i repelling the contention that the suit was bad for want of notice under s.80 of the Code, the Court said:\n\n\"The object of the notice contemplated by that section is to give to the concerned Governments and public officers opportunity to reconsider the legal position and to make amends or settle the claim, if so advised without litigation.\n\nThe legislative intention behind that section in onr opinion is that public money and time should not be wasted on unnecessary litigation and the Government and the public officers should be given a reasonable opport!Pity to examine the claim made against them lest they should be drawn into avoidable litigations. The purpose of law is .advanceme.nt of justice. The provisions in s.80, Civil Procedure Code are not intended to be used as boo'\\Jytraps against ignorant and illiterate persons. In this case we are concerned with a narrow question. Has the person mentioned in the notice s \" plaintiff brought the present suit or is he someone else ? T1:is\n\nqustion has to be decided by reading the notice as a whole m\n\n11 reasonable mannef,\"\n\nG . ,.\n\n138 SUPREME COUltT REPORTS\n\n[1984] 3 S.C.R.\n\n ·, In the ultimate analysis, the question as to whether a ncJtlae undeu.80 of the Code is valid or not is a question of judicial con struction. The Privy Council and this Court have applied the rule of strict compliance in dealing with the. question of identity of the person who issues the notice with the person who brings the suit. This\n\n' . . , .\n\nCourt has 4:iowever adopted the rule of substantial compliance in ·· deali!Jg with the requirement that there must be identity between the cause of action and the reliefs claimed in the notice as well as in the plaint. As already stated, the Court has held that notice under this section should be held to be sufficient if it substantially fulfils its object of informing t.he parties concerned of the nature of the suit to be filed. . On this principle, it has been held that though the terms of the section have .to be strictly complied with, that does not mean that the notice should be scrutinized in a pedantic manner divorced. from common sense. The point to be considered is whether the notice gives sufficient information as to the natur.e of the claim such as would the recipient to avert the litigation.\n\nJn the present case, in the notice Ex. A8 the name, description and place of residence of the plaintiff Seth Lachman Dass, the father of the plaintiffs, was given but unfortunatory before filing the suit he died and thereafter within the period of limitation the suit was instituted by his sons on the basis of the said notice. The notice Ex. A-8 undoubtedly fulfils the requirement of s.80 insofar as the cause of action and the elief claimed are concerned as they are absolutely the same as set out in the plaint: As stated in• Dhian Singh Sabha Singh, the notice must substantially fulfil its work of intimating the parties conerned generally of the nature of the suit intended to be filed and if it does sq, it would be sufficient compliance of the section. as to the requirement that it should state the name, descriptibn and place of residence of the plaintiff, there must be identity of the person who issues the notice with the person who brings the suit\n\n_Now . so far as the name and description of the plaintiff are concerned, the notice gives the name as Seth Lachman Dass Gupta.\n\nThenotice Ex. A-8 duly, reached the cuncerned department and they dealt with the notice. It is not that the Government had no .. opportunity to examine the nature of the claim and decide whether its should accept or contest the. claim. The military authorities ·-served a reply on Seth Lachman Dass before his death that his claim , was not acceptable. There was no other alternative for Seth Lachman pass but to have brought a suit for the enfor~ment of his claim,\n\n•. (\n\nl '-\"\n\n...\n\nGHANSHYAM v. OOMINioN OF INDiA (Sen, J,) 239\n\n.) If he could not file a suit due to his death, his right to file the suit devolved upon his heirs i.e. the plaintiffs. If the view taken by the High Court is allowed o stand, great injustice would be done to the litigants in the matter of filing suits against the Government. If fresh notice is insisted upon in such cases, the period of limitation\n\nI . to file a suit may expire in the meantime. Such & situation is not\n\n•. intended by the Code.\n\n• 1 • The authorities relied upon by the High Court in nonsuiting the plaintiffs are of ancient vintage. In Mahadev Dattatraya Rajarshi's case, supra, the Bombay High Court relying upon the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Buchan Singh, held that the language .()f s.424 of the Code of 1882, the predecessor of s.80 of the present Code which was substantially in the same terms, was impera\" tive and absolutely debarred the Courts from entertaining a suit without complying. with the provisions of the section. In Buchan Sing h's\n\n~ '-< case, supra it was obser; ved by the Allahabad High Court at p.191:\n\n\"If we acceded to this contention, it appears to us that we should be adding words to s.424 which find no place in it.\n\nIt would be necessary to add after the words \"name and\n\nplace of abode of the intending plaintiff\" some such words as \"or of the party through whom such intending plaintiff claims.\"\n\n~ The Court of first instance here tried to distinguish the decision\n\n! ,1..\n\n' in Buchan Singh .on the ground that.the word \"intending\" appearing in s.424 of the 1882 Code had. been omitted from s.80 of the present\n\nCode, and therefore the word \"plaintiff\" should be construed in a generic sense. The High Court however following the decision of the Bombay High Court in Mahadev Dattaraya Rajarshi held that. the notice must contain the name of the actpal plaintiff who could bring \"\" the. suit_ adding that \"the notice must be given by .the person who becomes the piaintiff and by no other''. We are afraid, that is taking too technical a view of the matter:\n\nS.80 of the Code is but a part of the Procedure Code passed to provide the regulation and machinery, by means of which the Courts may do justice between the parties. It is therefore merely a part of\n\n)'\\ the adjective law and deals with procedure alone and must be inter- H preted in a , manner so as to subserve and advance the cause of justice rather th<in to defeat it. In San1vam Sinh v. Election Trih\"·\n\nI,:,\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS '\n\n(1984] 3 S.C.R.\n\nnal, Kotai'1 & Anr'., Vivian Bose, J. in tis illuminating language dealing with the Code ot' Civil Procedure said : •\n\n\"It is procedure, something designed to faciliate.justice and further its ends: not a penal enactment for punishment and penalties; not a thing designed. to trip people up. Too technical !l construction of sections that leaves no room for reasonable elasticity of interpretation should therefore be guarded against (provided always that justice is done to both sides) lest the very means designed for tire furtherance of justice be used to. frustrate it.\n\nOur laws of procedure are based on the principle that \"as far as possible, no proceeding in a court of law should be allowed to be defeated on mere technicalities\". Jlere, all the requirements of\n\ns.80 of the Code were fulfiled.\n\nBefore the suit was brought, the Dominion of India received a notice of claim f1:om Seth Lachman '' Dass. The wpole object of serving a notice under s.80 is to give the Government sufficient warning of the case which is going to be institued againsHt was that the Government, if it so wished, settle the' claim without litigation or afford restitution without recourse to a court of law. That requirement ofs.80 was clearly fulfilled in the facts and circumstances of the present case. . .\n\nIt is a matter 9f common experience that in a large majority of: cases the' Government or the public officer .concerned make no use of the opportunity afforded by the section. In most cases the notice given under s.80 remains unanswered till the expiration of ; two months provided by the section. It is also clear that in a large number of cases. as here, the Government or the public officer\n\nutilied the section merely to raise technical defences contending \"either that no notice had' been •given or that the notice actually given did not comply with the requirements of the &ection. It is unfortunate that the defendants came forward with a technical plea that the suit was not maintainable at the instance of the plaintiffs, the legal heirs of Seth Lachman Dasi! on the ground that no fresh notice had been given by them. This was obviously a technical plea\n\ncalculated to defeat the just claim. Unfortunately, the technical plea so raised prevailed with the High Court with the result that the plain- ' tiffs have been deprived of their legitimate dues for the last 35 years ..\n\n\\l)i[l955]J2]S.C.R.l l.\n\n.( f\n\n, '\n\nl >\n\nditANSHYA.M v, DOMINION OF INDIA (Sen, i.) 241\n\nThe Law Commission in the Fourteenth Report, volume 1 on the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 at p.475 made a recommendation that s.80. of the Code should be deleted. It was stated as follows :\n\n\"The evidence disclosed t!Jat in a large majority of cases, the Govrnm:ent or the public officer made no use of the opportunity afforded by the section. Jn most cases the notice given under section 80 remained unanswered till the 'expiry of the period of two months provided by th<;. section.\n\nIt was also clear that in a large number of cases, Governments and public officers utilized the section merely to raise technical defences contending either that no notice had been given or that the notice actually given did not comply with the requirements of the section. These technical defences appeared . to have succeeded in a number of cases defeating the just claims of the citizens.\" ·\n\nTile Law Commissio.n in the Twenty Seventh Report on the Code at pp;2l-22 reiterated its earlier recommendation for deletion.of s.80 and in the Fifty-Fourth Report at p.56 fully concurred with the recommendatiorrmade earlier. In conformity with the recommenda-. tion of the Law Commission, s.80 bas undergone substantial changes. By s.27 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 whieh was brought into effect from February 1, 1977, the existing s.80 qas been re-numbered as s,80(1) and sub-ss.(2) and (3) have been inserted. Sub-s.(2) as inserted has been designed to give . an nrgent and immediate rlief against the Government or the public officer with' the leave of the Court. But the Court shall not ' grant relief in the suit, whether interim or otherwise, except after giving to the Government or public officer, as the case may be, a reasonable opportunity of showing cause in respect of the relief prayed for in the suit .. Proviso to S\\lb:s(2) enjoins that the Court shall, if it is satisfied, after hearing the parties that no urgent or immediate relief need be granted in the suit, return the plaint for presentation to it after complying with the requireme.nts of sub-s.(1).\n\nSub-s.(3) as inserted by s.27 of the Code of . Civil Proceddre (Amendment) Act, 197b reads as follows :\n\n\"80(3). No suif instituted ag.;.nst the Government or against a public officer in respect of 11ny act purporting to be done by such public officer in his official capacity shall be . .\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1984) 3 S.C.lt\n\n dismissed merely by reason of, ny error or defect in the notice referred to in sub-section (I) if irt sch notice-\n\n(a) the name, description and the residence of the plaintiff had been so given as to enable the appropriate . authority or the public officer to identify the person erv\n\ning the notice and such notice had been delivered or left at the office of the appropriate authority specified in subsection (!), and\n\n(bJ the cause of action and the relief claimed by the plaintiff had been beeri substaniially indicated,\"\n\nBy subs.(3), Parliajllent has brought in the rule of substantial . cmpliance. The present suit would be directly covered by sub-s.(3) of s.80 so inti:oduced if the suit had been brought :after February 1,11977, Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, s.97 of the Amendment Act provides that the amendment shall not apply to pending suit and the suits pending on February I, .1977 liave to be dealt as if such •• amendment had not been made. Nevertheless the Courts must . have due regard to the change in law brought about .by sub-s.(3} of s.80 of the .Code introduced .by the Amendment Act w.e.f.\n\nFebruary l, 1977. Such a change has a legislative acceptance of the rule of substantial compliance laid down by this Court in Dhiati Singh Sobha Singh and. Raghunath Dass. As observed in Dhian Singh Sobha Singh's case\"supra, . .one must construe s.80 with some regard to common sense and to the object with which it appears to have. been enacted.- The decision in S.N. Dutt v. Union of India's 'case, supra, dues not accord with the view expressed by us and is therefore overruled.\n\nBefore parting with the case we consider it necessary to refer to one more aspect. It has frequently come to our notice that the strict construction placed by the Privy Council in Bhagchand' s case, supra, which was repeatedly reiterated in.subsequent cases, has !eel to a peculiar practice in some Courts. Where urgent relief is neceseary the practice adopted. is to file a suit without notice under s,80 and obfaih interim relief and ther.eafter to serve a notice, withdraw the suit and in.stitute a second suit after expiry of the period of th.e notice. We have to express our strong condemnation ofthishighly objectionable practice. We expect that the High Courts will .take necessary steps to put a stop to such practice.\n\n,) ..\n\n-.• ' .\n\n.-'\n\n.J •.\n\n<lHANSHYAM v. DOMINION OF INDIA,(Sen, J,)\n\nThe result tberefc>ris that the appeal su¢cds and is allowed.\n\nA The judgmtnt and decree passed by the Allahabad High Court\n\ndated February 26, 1965 are set aside and those of the lear9ed Civil Judge, Agra dated August 25,. 1252 are restored. with costs-through .out. The plaintiffs shall be erttitled to further in.teres\\ on the decretal amount at 6% per annum from August 25, 1952, the date of B the decree, pased by the Civil Judge~ Agra; till realization.\n\nS.R Apf¥al allowed.\n\nl\" i\n\n-£,'._/_ .;", "total_entities": 138, "entities": [{"text": "229\n\nGHANSHYAM OASS ANO OTHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4, "end_char": 34, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "GHANSHYAM DASS AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "DOMlNION <:1F INDIA AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 42, "end_char": 72, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DOMINION OF INDIA AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A.P. SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 106, "end_char": 114, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. BALAKRISHNA ERADI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 119, "end_char": 139, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. 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Goyal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7111, "end_char": 7121, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J.P. Goyal and S.K. Jain for the appellants.·"}}, {"text": "S.K. Jain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7126, "end_char": 7135, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J.P. Goyal and S.K. Jain for the appellants.·"}}, {"text": "V.C. Mahajan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7158, "end_char": 7170, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V.C. Mahajan and A. Subhashini for the espondents."}}, {"text": "A. Subhashini", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7175, "end_char": 7188, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V.C. Mahajan and A. Subhashini for the espondents."}}, {"text": "August 25,. 1952", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7455, "end_char": 7471, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SEN, J. This appeal on certificate brought from .the judgment and decree of the Allahabad High Court datedFebruary 26, 1965 reversing the judgment .and decree of the Civil Judge, Agra dated August 25,."}}, {"text": "s.80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7581, "end_char": 7585, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7594, "end_char": 7623, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "November 12, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7701, "end_char": 7718, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On .. , November 12, 1949, the plaintiffs Ghanshyam Dass .and his two ' . •"}}, {"text": "Ghanshyam Dass", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7735, "end_char": 7749, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On .. , November 12, 1949, the plaintiffs Ghanshyam Dass .and his two ' . •"}}, {"text": "Shree Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7785, "end_char": 7794, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "brothers Shree Ram and Mohan Lal brougat the suit out' of which this ppeal arises; in the."}}, {"text": "Mohan Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7799, "end_char": 7808, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "brothers Shree Ram and Mohan Lal brougat the suit out' of which this ppeal arises; in the."}}, {"text": "Dominion of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7948, "end_char": 7965, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "26,000 against the Dominion of India . ."}}, {"text": "New Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8001, "end_char": 8010, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "through the Defence Secretary, New Delhi. ."}}, {"text": "Seth Lachman Dass Gupta", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8059, "end_char": 8082, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "their late father Seth Lachman Dass Gupta entered into a contract • with the• Governor General-in-Council for the supply of charcoal , to the Military Supply Depot at Agra during the period from' April I, 1943.", "canonical_name": "Seth Lachhman Dass Gupta"}}, {"text": "Agra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8208, "end_char": 8212, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "their late father Seth Lachman Dass Gupta entered into a contract • with the• Governor General-in-Council for the supply of charcoal , to the Military Supply Depot at Agra during the period from' April I, 1943."}}, {"text": "March 31, 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8255, "end_char": 8269, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to March 31, 1944."}}, {"text": "clause 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8485, "end_char": 8493, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "statute": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908"}}, {"text": "Seth Lachman Dass", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8999, "end_char": 9016, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly Seth Lachman Dass made a demand for payment of price at the increased rate.", "canonical_name": "Seth Lachhman Dass Gupta"}}, {"text": "s.80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9332, "end_char": 9336, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9344, "end_char": 9373, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "September 15, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9423, "end_char": 9441, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears tliat before his death,' on or about September 15, 1948 he received a letter from the military.authorties rejecting his claim fo.r payments at the enhanced rate but before he could institute any suit he died on October 28, 1949. -"}}, {"text": "October 28, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9597, "end_char": 9613, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears tliat before his death,' on or about September 15, 1948 he received a letter from the military.authorties rejecting his claim fo.r payments at the enhanced rate but before he could institute any suit he died on October 28, 1949. -"}}, {"text": "s.80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9983, "end_char": 9987, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "statute": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908"}}, {"text": "s.80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10069, "end_char": 10073, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "statute": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908"}}, {"text": "clause 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10246, "end_char": 10254, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "statute": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908"}}, {"text": "s.80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10658, "end_char": 10662, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10666, "end_char": 10693, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Seth Lach man Dass Gupta", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10843, "end_char": 10867, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A-8 given by the iplaintiffs' father Seth Lach man Dass Gupta before his death under s.80 of the Code of Civil Procedure,\n\n1908 would enure for the benefit of'the plaintiffs.", "canonical_name": "Seth Lachhman Dass Gupta"}}, {"text": "s.80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10891, "end_char": 10895, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10903, "end_char": 10926, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10982, "end_char": 10992, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Civil Procedure,\n\n1908", "statute": "the Code of Civil Procedure,\n\n1908"}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11550, "end_char": 11568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in the case of suit against the Central Government ............ a Secretary to that Government ;\n\n••• • •• • •• • ••\n\nand, in the case of a public officer, delivered to him or left at his office, stating the cause of action, the name, description and place of residence of the plailltiff and the relief which he\n\nclaims ; and the plaint shall contain a statement that such C notice has been so delivered or left.\""}}, {"text": "Viscount Sumner", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12203, "end_char": 12218, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The words of Viscount Sumner delivering the judgment of the Privy Council have become classical :\n\n''Section 80 is express, explicit and mandatory, and it admits of."}}, {"text": "Section 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12291, "end_char": 12301, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12671, "end_char": 12676, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "long these and similar words have been read throughout most of the Courts in India in their literal sense, it is reasonable to suppose that the section has not been found to work injustice."}}, {"text": "s.80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13005, "end_char": 13009, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13133, "end_char": 13137, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13239, "end_char": 13243, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Earljer", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13414, "end_char": 13421, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "s.c.il..\n\nEarljer, in-ome cases, a liberal construction was put upon the section and it was held that a notice is sufficient ifit substantially fulfils its objection in informing the parties concerned of the nature of the suit to be filed, and that a notice is not invalid merely because it .is given by two out offhree plaintiffs."}}, {"text": "Bhagchand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13776, "end_char": 13785, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But since the Privy Council judgment in Bhagchand's case, supra, strict compliance with the ."}}, {"text": "s.80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13839, "end_char": 13843, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14290, "end_char": 14294, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sumner", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14749, "end_char": 14755, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Simo.nds delivering the jildgment of the Privy Council referred to the observa tions of Lord Sumner in Bhagchand's case that s.80 is explicit and."}}, {"text": "s.80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14781, "end_char": 14785, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15172, "end_char": 15175, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15277, "end_char": 15281, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15587, "end_char": 15591, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15704, "end_char": 15706, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Dhain Singh Sabha. Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17258, "end_char": 17282, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The relevant passage from the judgment in Dhain Singh Sabha.", "canonical_name": "Dhain Singh Sabha. 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Dutt & Co.) and thereafter he filed a snit against the Union ofindia describing t11e."}}, {"text": "Surendra Nath Dutt", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 18668, "end_char": 18686, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "plaintiff as \"Surendra Nath Dutt sole proprietor of a business carried on under the name and style ofS.N. Ontt & Co.\"."}}, {"text": "ofS.N. Ontt & Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18753, "end_char": 18770, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "plaintiff as \"Surendra Nath Dutt sole proprietor of a business carried on under the name and style ofS.N. Ontt & Co.\"."}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 18809, "end_char": 18828, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This Co1utupheld the decision ofthe Calcutta High Court dismis_sing the plaintiff's suit holding that the person who issued the notice was not the same as the person who filed the suit."}}, {"text": "S.N. Dutt & Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19081, "end_char": 19096, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The contentiol\\ that the appellant was carrying on business nnder an assumed name arid therefore the notice was valid as S.N. Dutt & Co.\n\nas merely the name and style of the business which he was carrying on, was rejected."}}, {"text": "$.N. Dutt & Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19235, "end_char": 19250, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Court held that since no snit could be filed by $.N. Dutt & Co. in that name as it was not a partnership firm, it could not give a valid and legal notice in that name, and a valid notice could only be given in the name of S.N. Dutt."}}, {"text": "S.N. Dutt", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19409, "end_char": 19418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Court held that since no snit could be filed by $.N. Dutt & Co. in that name as it was not a partnership firm, it could not give a valid and legal notice in that name, and a valid notice could only be given in the name of S.N. Dutt."}}, {"text": "section 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19504, "end_char": 19514, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Dhian Singh Sobha Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19706, "end_char": 19729, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Court distinguished the decisions in ' Dhian Singh Sobha Singh and C.P. Agencies on the ground that the Court was dealing with defect in describing the cause of action and the relief claimed and where it concerns the relief and the cause of action, it may be necessary to use common sense to find out whether s.80 of the Code has beeri complied with, and stated :\n\n. ' \"", "canonical_name": "Dhain Singh Sabha. Singh"}}, {"text": "s.80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19976, "end_char": 19980, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Raghunath Dass Mulkhraj", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20492, "end_char": 20515, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There, the notice emanated from M/s Raghunath Dass Mulkhraj and in the body of the notice at several places the expression \"we\" was used."}}, {"text": "Raghunath Dass.Mulkhraj", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20647, "end_char": 20670, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Further, the plaintiff had purported to sign for M/s Raghunath Dass."}}, {"text": "Raghunath Dass Mulkhraj", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20934, "end_char": 20957, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "<2> [19691 t s; c.R. 450\n-<\n\n• GHANSHYAM v. DOMINION OF INDIA (Sen, J.) 237\n\nthat that was a clear indication of the fact that M/s Raghunath Dass Mulkhraj was a proprietary concern and the plaintiffs was its proprietor.", "canonical_name": "Raghunath Dass Mulkhraj"}}, {"text": "s.80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21767, "end_char": 21771, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22033, "end_char": 22037, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22210, "end_char": 22214, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22861, "end_char": 22865, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22867, "end_char": 22887, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Seth Lachman Dass", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 24547, "end_char": 24564, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A8 the name, description and place of residence of the plaintiff Seth Lachman Dass, the father of the plaintiffs, was given but unfortunatory before filing the suit he died and thereafter within the period of limitation the suit was instituted by his sons on the basis of the said notice.", "canonical_name": "Seth Lachhman Dass Gupta"}}, {"text": "s.80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24829, "end_char": 24833, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Dhian Singh Sabha Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24973, "end_char": 24996, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A-8 undoubtedly fulfils the requirement of s.80 insofar as the cause of action and the elief claimed are concerned as they are absolutely the same as set out in the plaint: As stated in• Dhian Singh Sabha Singh, the notice must substantially fulfil its work of intimating the parties conerned generally of the nature of the suit intended to be filed and if it does sq, it would be sufficient compliance of the section.", "canonical_name": "Dhain Singh Sabha. Singh"}}, {"text": "Seth Lachman", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 25924, "end_char": 25936, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was no other alternative for Seth Lachman pass but to have brought a suit for the enfor~ment of his claim,\n\n•. (\n\nl '-\"\n\n...\n\nGHANSHYAM v. OOMINioN OF INDiA (Sen, J,) 239\n\n.)", "canonical_name": "Seth Lachhman Dass Gupta"}}, {"text": "Mahadev Dattatraya Rajarshi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26625, "end_char": 26652, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Mahadev Dattatraya Rajarshi's case, supra, the Bombay High Court relying upon the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Buchan Singh, held that the language .()f s.424 of the Code of 1882, the predecessor of s.80 of the present Code which was substantially in the same terms, was impera\" tive and absolutely debarred the Courts from entertaining a suit without complying.", "canonical_name": "Mahadev Dattatraya Rajarshi"}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 26672, "end_char": 26689, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Mahadev Dattatraya Rajarshi's case, supra, the Bombay High Court relying upon the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Buchan Singh, held that the language .()f s.424 of the Code of 1882, the predecessor of s.80 of the present Code which was substantially in the same terms, was impera\" tive and absolutely debarred the Courts from entertaining a suit without complying."}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 26723, "end_char": 26743, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Mahadev Dattatraya Rajarshi's case, supra, the Bombay High Court relying upon the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Buchan Singh, held that the language .()f s.424 of the Code of 1882, the predecessor of s.80 of the present Code which was substantially in the same terms, was impera\" tive and absolutely debarred the Courts from entertaining a suit without complying."}}, {"text": "Buchan Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26747, "end_char": 26759, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Mahadev Dattatraya Rajarshi's case, supra, the Bombay High Court relying upon the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Buchan Singh, held that the language .()f s.424 of the Code of 1882, the predecessor of s.80 of the present Code which was substantially in the same terms, was impera\" tive and absolutely debarred the Courts from entertaining a suit without complying.", "canonical_name": "Buchan Singh"}}, {"text": "s.424", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26789, "end_char": 26794, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26835, "end_char": 26839, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Buchan Sing", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27038, "end_char": 27049, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Buchan Sing h's\n\n~ '-< case, supra it was obser; ved by the Allahabad High Court at p.191:\n\n\"If we acceded to this contention, it appears to us that we should be adding words to s.424 which find no place in it.", "canonical_name": "Buchan Singh"}}, {"text": "s.424", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27216, "end_char": 27221, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.424", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27583, "end_char": 27588, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27629, "end_char": 27633, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mahadev Dattaraya Rajarshi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27805, "end_char": 27831, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court however following the decision of the Bombay High Court in Mahadev Dattaraya Rajarshi held that.", "canonical_name": "Mahadev Dattatraya Rajarshi"}}, {"text": "S.80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28095, "end_char": 28099, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Vivian Bose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28574, "end_char": 28585, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vivian Bose, J. in tis illuminating language dealing with the Code ot' Civil Procedure said : •\n\n\"It is procedure, something designed to faciliate.justice and further its ends: not a penal enactment for punishment and penalties; not a thing designed."}}, {"text": "s.80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29324, "end_char": 29328, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29506, "end_char": 29510, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30061, "end_char": 30065, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Seth Lachman Dasi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 30598, "end_char": 30615, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is unfortunate that the defendants came forward with a technical plea that the suit was not maintainable at the instance of the plaintiffs, the legal heirs of Seth Lachman Dasi!", "canonical_name": "Seth Lachhman Dass Gupta"}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31084, "end_char": 31113, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s.80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31150, "end_char": 31154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "statute": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908"}}, {"text": "section 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31405, "end_char": 31415, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "statute": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908"}}, {"text": "s.80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32033, "end_char": 32037, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908", "statute": "the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908"}}, {"text": "s.80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32195, "end_char": 32199, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32238, "end_char": 32242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32246, "end_char": 32273, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "February 1, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 32331, "end_char": 32347, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By s.27 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 whieh was brought into effect from February 1, 1977, the existing s.80 qas been re-numbered as s,80(1) and sub-ss.(2) and (3) have been inserted."}}, {"text": "s.80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32362, "end_char": 32366, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33130, "end_char": 33134, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Parliajllent", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33976, "end_char": 33988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and\n\n(bJ the cause of action and the relief claimed by the plaintiff had been beeri substaniially indicated,\"\n\nBy subs.(3), Parliajllent has brought in the rule of substantial ."}}, {"text": "s.80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34100, "end_char": 34104, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.97", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34208, "end_char": 34212, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34497, "end_char": 34501, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "February l, 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 34556, "end_char": 34572, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "February l, 1977."}}, {"text": "Dhiati Singh Sobha Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 34682, "end_char": 34706, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Such a change has a legislative acceptance of the rule of substantial compliance laid down by this Court in Dhiati Singh Sobha Singh and.", "canonical_name": "Dhain Singh Sabha. Singh"}}, {"text": "Raghunath Dass", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 34712, "end_char": 34726, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raghunath Dass.", "canonical_name": "Raghunath Dass Mulkhraj"}}, {"text": "s.80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34802, "end_char": 34806, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_3_22_30_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "RAJ.ENDRA SINGH & ORS. ETC.\n\nSMT. USHA RANI & ORS. ETC.\n\nFebruary 27, 1984\n\n[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, A •. VARADARAJAN AND\n\nRANGANATH MISRA, JJ,]\n\nRepresentaiion, ofthe People Act 1951, ections 81(3) and 86.\n\nE{ection Petition-Sen'ice of true o\"nd exact copy of election petition on respondents-Duty of election petitioner-Consequences of failure _of-Dismissal in limini of election petition .\n\n• Amendment of election petitioll-W!tether pern1issible. , .\n\nTlie respondent fi1e, d an Election Petition for setting asipc the election of the appellant. ta the State Legislative Assembly. The appellan_t filed a petition for rejection of the said Election Petition in lirnine under Sectio.n 86 of the Representcltion of the People Act1 1951 on the_ ground that the copy of tiie petition' served o~ him was neither attested to be a true copy nor a correct copy of the original petition, asconte\"n1plated by the provisions conla-ined in section . 81(3). The case of the respondent-election. peti_tidnerwas that two sets of copies were filed, one set being correct as require.d . by the Act and the other set inc01 • rect containini vital om.issions and mistakes, the appellant having got a correct copy as rquired by section 81(3) there was compliance with the requirement of . the sectjon.\n\nThe High Collrt held that as. the respondent had filed correct coPies, the proVisioris of section 81 (3) \\Vere not violated and it was for the appellant to have chosen the cofrect copy fron1 the two sets and invoked the doCtrine of benefit of-doubt \"in order to cure the non-compliance of the mandatory provisions of section 81(3), and rejected the applii; ation to dismiss the Election Petition.\n\nJn the connected appeals, the lsJ Reponderrt had filed separate Election Petitions fcir setting aside the election of the appellants to the .Rajya Sabha.\n\nWhen the said petitions came up before the High Court for hearing an applicatin was made by the respondent. for amendment of the Original petition by insertion of page 17 which was aliowed. The 'appellants filed .petitions before the Election judge for rejecting the Election Petitiori on th~ ground that no amendment could be allo; wed which \\\\'ould have. the effect of defeating or bypassing th'e provisions f section 81(3). of .the Act, and that the original petition served on the appellants did not contain page 17 and hence was not the cdrrect\n\nand exact copy of the election petition.\n\nThe High Court rejected the application to dismiss the Election Ptition. . . ' . ., Allowing the Appeals.\n\nAAJBNDM SiNGH v. OSHA R.\\Ni 23\n\nHELD; t. The mandate contained in section 81(3) is clear and specific and A' requires that every copy of the.election petition must be a true and exact copy of the petition. The consequences of this mandatory provison annotbe got over by praying for an amendment of te election petition beuse that ':ould defeat the very object and purpose of sect10n 81(3), [28 F, 29 BJ\n\nJn the instant cases,. the judgment of the High Court are set aside, and the election petitions dismissed , in Ii mine 1:1nder s_ection 8<? of the Act.\n\n(30 DJ\n\nSharif-ud-Din v, Abdul Gani Lone, [1980] 1 SCR1177; referred to,\n\n2, Section 81 (3) an~,86 of the A1>t do not conmplate the filing of incorrect coPies and if an election petitioner disregards the mandate contained in\n\nection 81(3).by filing incorrect copies, he takes the risk of the petition being C dismissed in limine under section-86. It is no part of the duty of the resp_ondent to wade thfough the entire record in o+der to fiod out which is the correct copy.\n\nIf out of the copies ftled, the respondent's copy fs fouJid to ba an incorrect one, it amounts to n6n-compliance of the provisions' of section 81(3) which is sufficiebt to entail a dismissal of the election petition at the behest of the respondent.\n\n[27B; CJ\n\n3. If an election petitioner files a number of copies, some of . which may be correct and some -may be incorrect, it is his duty to see that the copy\n\nrved On the respondent is a correct one.' [27 A}\n\nJ.)\n\nIn the instant e, it has D.ot been proved _by the responde_p.t that correct copies of.the Clection petition hadbeen filed or, that the appellant got the Cor.. . E rect copy and not the incorrect one, in the face of the clear and categorical assertion by him that he did not rceive the correct copy. [27 FJ\n\n4, The mandate contained in Section 81(3) cannot be equated withs, 537 of the Code of Criminal Ptocedure which _m_akes certain omissions a! a curable irregularify'. No. such concept can be imported into the election law because the object of the law is that the electoral process should not be set at naught and F an elected candidate should not be thrown out unless the grounds mentioned in the Act arc clearly and fully proved, [27 DJ' .\n\n5. Parliament ill its wisdom has not made any atte.mpt to interfere with the premptive and mandatory provisions of section 81 (3) resulting in the consequence of dismissa, l of the p_etitfon under section 86 despite the observa tions in Satya Narain. v. Dhija Ram & Ors. [1974] 3 SCR 20, [30 CJ\n\nCIVIL APPBl.L.\\TB JIJR!SDICTION Civil Appeal No. 3702 (NCB) of 1982. ,\n\nAppeal by Special leave frotn the judgment and Order dated the 2nd August, 1983 of the Allahabad High Court'in Election Peti\n\ntion No. 28 of 1980.\n\n~4.\n\nSUPREME COURT Rlil'ORts (I 984 J 3 s.c:R..\n\nWith\n\n. Civil Appeal No. 9 of )983\n\n. Appeal by Special leave. from the Judgment and Order dated the 15th October)'Ist December, 1982 of the Allahabad High Court • in Election Petition No. I of1982.\n\n• And • Civil Aweal No. 10 of 1983\n\n Appeal by Special leave from the Judgment and Order dated. the 15th October, 1982 and !st December, 1982 of the. Allahabad High Court in Election Petition No: 1 of 1982 ·\n\nJ>- S. N. Kacker, R.L. Srivastava, Rajesh and J!. K. Verma for the Appellants in CA. No. 3702, of 1982,\n\nAppellant in person in CA. No. 10 of 1983.\n\nM.C. Bha11dare and V.K. Verma for the Appellant in CA. 9/83.\n\nYogeshwar Prasad, Ms. R. Chhabra; Sujat Ullah hnd K. k.\n\nGupta for'the Respondents.\n\nThe Judgment'of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL ALI, J. As these appeals involve. common points of law, we propose to decide them by one judgment. •\n\nCivil Appeal No. 3702 of 1982\n\nThis appeal arises out of. election to '375-Iglas Assembly Constituency, Aligarh to the Uttar Pradesh LegisliLtiVe Assemb\\y' which was held on May 28, 1980 and the result.of which was decfirre'd on _June 1, 1980, in which the appellan_t was declared elected. Respondent No: I, Snit:· Usha:.kani had:a1so contest¢' the nove mentiOned election but :Was defeil.ted. Aggrieved by the resulf of-th~ , aforesaid election,' Smt. Usha Rani filed an election petition oil. .\n\n' .\n\n., .\n\nRAfENDRA ~INGH v. USHA RaNI IFazai Ali, J.) 25\n\nJuly 15, 1980, at. the residence of the Registrar of the Allahabad A Hlgh'. Court. Thereafter, on September 24, 1981, the appellant filed a petition before the High Court for rejection of the election petition • filed by the respondent, on the ground that the copy of the petition served on him was neither attested to be d true copy nor a corect copy of the origii:tal : petition, as contemplated by the provis.ions contained in s. 81 (3) Of the Representation of the People Act (here-\n\n B inafter referred to as the 'Act') and hence the election petition should be rejected in limine under s. 86 of the Act. Snb-s. (3) of s. 81 niay be extracted thus ;\n\n. '\n\n\"SJ. Presentation of petitionsxx xx xx\n\n(3) Every election petition shall. be accompanied by as many copies thereof as there are respondents nientioned in . the petition, and every such copy shall be attested by the. petitioner under his own signature to be a true copy of the petiiton.'' ·\n\nAn analysis of this sub-section would reveal that every election p\"etition should be accompanied by as many copies as there\n\nc •\n\nare respondents and that every copy should be attested by the E\n\netitioner under his own signa:ture. If theke reqUirements are not f'ollowed stdctly and literally, it would result in dismissal or the\n\nection petition without any trial as provided by s. 86 of the Act. • .\n\nIn the instant case, the main point raised by the appellant was tltat two sets of copies were filed by the election-petitioner in th F Higl:i Court, one set bdng a corrrect and exact one and the othe; cblltaining vital omissions and mistakes. This position is not dispu.' . tild:by the responde11, t (election, petitioner). In reply to the preliminary objection rai.sed by the appellant, the respondent rebutted the\n\ncha.i; ge on the ground that the appellant had got a correct: copy as required by s. 8I (3) of the Act .and, therefore, he could not be heard G\n\nI@ complain of any non-compliance with the provisions of the afore- &aid sub-section. ' ..\n\n\"· -1' ' .. < - A; fter goinithrough the' judgment ofthe High Court it is not C!wr whQtlierthe appellant received-the correct copy of the petition ll 6i an: iricorrect due. On tlie other hand, on the evidence and admittetl faets the following cirumstances appear to be undisputed ;\n\nSuPREMB COURT REPORtS (i984J 3 S.C.it.\n\n(a) that two sets of copies were filed by the _election-petitioner in the High Court, ·\n\n(b) that one set was correct as required by the Act\" aud\n\n(c) the other set was incorrect as it contained vital missions\n\nand mistakes regarding the details of corrupt practices alle ged against the appellant. ·\n\nThere is, however, no clear evidence or finding to show that the copies which were received by the appellant were correct or incorrect • c • and there \\s some divergence on this point. The High Court seems to have come to the C<)nclusion that.as the respondent had filed cor . reel copies also, she did not violate the provisions of s. 81 (3j ao., d it was for the appellant to have chosen the correct copy from the two sets. The learned Judge of the'High Court has.also invoked )he . doctrine of benefit-of-doubt in order to cure the non-compliance of D the mandatory provisions of s. 81 (3). ·\n\n On going.through the relevant evidence we find that there is overwhelming material to show that the. appellant did not receive the correct copy and even the respondent in her evidence did not categorically deny this fact. The respondent in her evidence be fore the Courtadmitted that out \\>f the 22·23 copies filed by her, 10 copies were correct and were duly signed by her and the rest were left with the counsel with instructions to get them corrected, Therefore, she was nof at all sure whether all the copies were correeted or not. She further admitted that in some of the copies she did not initial the various corrections and that Exts. R-1,\n\nR~2, R-3 and R-4 were not out of those 10 copies which had been filed by he_r along with the election petition at the residence of the Registrar. There is, however, clear evidence to show that the copies which were received hy the appellant were Exts. R'i to R4, which admittedly were not correct. copies of the election petition.\n\nThis bein~ the position, it is manifest that he appellant did not receive the correct copi'es as contemplated by s. 81 (3) of the Act, The respondent has also not been able to prove that the copies served on the appellant were out oft he 10 corrected copies which she had\n\nsigned and filed. It appears that in view of a large number of copies H of the petition having been filed, there was an utter confusion as to which one was correct and which was not. It is obvious that if an .. . ' ,\n\nkAlENDRA SINGH v. USHA RANl'(Fazai Ali, i.) 21\n\nelectionpetitioner files a number of copies, sme of which may. be correct and s1>me may be incorrect, it is his duty to see that tire copy served on the.respondent is a correct oue. A perusal of ss. 81 \\3) and 86 of the Act gives the'impression that they do not contemplate filing of incorrect copies at all and if an election-petitioner disregards\n\n'the mandate contained ins. 81 (3) by filing incorrect copies, he takes,_\n\nthe risk of the petition being dismissed in limine under s. 86. _It is 8 no part of the duty _of the' respondent o wade thfough tl1e 'entire record in order to find out which is the correct copy. If out of the copies filed, the respondent's copy is found to be an incorrect one, it amounts to non-compliance of. the provisions of s. 81 {3) which is sufficient to entail a dismissal of the e.Jection petitionat the behest ..\n\nHence, the mandate contained ins. 81 (3) cannot be equated . with s. 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which makes certain omissions as a curable irregularity. No such concept can be imported into ihe electimilaw because the object of the law is that the electoral process should no~- be set at naught 'and an elected candidate should not be thrown out unless the grounds mentioned in the Act are clearly and fully proved. An election dispute con\n\ncerns the entire constituency and in a parliamentary democracy it is of paramount importance that duly elected representatives should be available to share the responsibility in the due discharge of their duties. - That is why the law provides time-bound dis)?osal of election disputes and holds out a mandate for procedural compliance.\n\nIn these circumstances, therefore, in the instant case there was absolutely 'no justification for the learned Judge to h_ave invoked the doctrine of benefit-of-doubt. We are satisfied that it has not been proved by the respondent that she filed correct copies of the election petition of, for that matter the appellant gol the correct copy and riot . the incorrect one, in the face of the -clear and categori1al assertion by him that he did not receive the correct c9py.\n\nFor these reasons, therefore, the appeal is allowed and the election petition fiied by the respondent is dismissed under s .. 86 of the Act. There will no order as to costs. ·\n\nCivil Appeal Nos._9 & 10 of 1983\n\nThere two connected appeals also involve more or less the same H point of law as was involved in. Civil Appeal No'. 3702 of 1982, with the difference that in Civil Appeal No. 9• of 1983, J.P. Goyal,\n\n28 ~UPREME coul<:t REPORTS\n\n[1984] 3 S.C.R.\n\nand in Civil Appeal No. 10 of 1983;.Bishamber Nath Pandey, (appel lantsl were declared elected to. the Rajya Sabha on March 29,\n\n1982. An election petition to sefaside their election was filed on May 10, 1982 by the. Respondent (Raj Narain) making a number of allegations. When the case came up before the Court on 5. 7 .82, an application was made by the respondents for amendment of the original petition by insertion of page 17, which was allowed. The. appellants filed a petition before the Election Judge for rejecting the election petition of the respondents because no amendment could be allowed which would have the effect of defeating or bypassing the provisions ofs.81 (3) of the Representation of the People Act (for short, referred to as the 'Act').\n\nIt may be stated here that Shri Bishamb_, r Nath Pandey has in the meantime been appofoted as Governor of OriSsa and has resig ned his membership of the Rajya Sabha, Therefore, as requested at the Bar, his name is deleted from the catego_ry ofappellqnts:\n\nThe main argument on behalf of the remaining appellants' was that 11 copies of the ebction petition were filed on 10.5.1982 and although the. copies wl1ich were served e>n them did contain page 17 yet the original petition.did not contain page 17 and was sought to be added orily by\". way of approacl1ing the Court for amendment of the petition. It was further con.tended that the Court had n~ jurisdiction to accede to the prayer for amendment of the petition when at the time of filing the petitioµ, the mandate contained in s. 81 (3) was not complied with. In other words, the . position seems to be that wl1ile the copies which were sei; ved on the appellants did contain page 17 yet the origi1ral election petitton dd. not contain page 17.\n\nThis being the admitted position, it could not be s•id that the copies served on the appellants were the correct. and exact copies of the electionpetition. The provision, ois. 81 (3) is clear and •pecific and requires that every copy of the election.\n\nPetition must be a .true and exact copy of the petition.\n\nThe learned counsel for the respondent S\\lbmitted that this is a highly technical objection and did not cause aity prejJ.ldice to the appellants bec.ause so far as their copies WeFe concerned they already contained page 17. Mr. Bhandare, counsel fot the .appellants, however, submitted that this is beside the point and does not cure the invalidity of the election petition filed on 10.5.8:2. The J:!jandate\n\ncontaind ins. 81 (3J enjoins that there should be no difference ~1'\n\n-J.. -·\n\n.. .-f\n\nJµJENDRA SINGH v. USHA RANI (Faza1 Ali, J.) 29 •\n\nany kind whatsoever barring some typographical \\lf insignificant omissions between the petition filed and the copy served on the respondent. If an entire page is missing in the petition but it is\n\nthere in the copy served on th.e respondent, then it is manifest that 'the copy served was not an exact and true copy of the petition. The consequences of the mandatory provisions of s.81 cft could not be. . got over by praying for an ame\"dment of the election petition\n\nbecaus~ that would defeat the very object and purpo; e of s. 81 (3). It is not disputed that this discrepancy between the election P'tition\n\nand the copies served on the appellants was undoubtedly there. In these circumstances, the High Court .was wrong and committed a serious error of law in allowing the amendment of the petition. The Fj:igh Court should have tried to appreciate the tenor and spirit of the mandate contained in s.81 (3) of the Act. In the case of Sharif udDin v. Abdul Gani Lone(') this Court dismissed the . election petition only on the ground that the words \"attested to be a true copy\" were not signed by the election-petitioner and held that this was not a sufficient compliance with the provisions of s.89 131 of the Jammu &Xashmir Repr-esentation of the People Act, which is the same as s.81 (3) of the Act. In the instant. case, the inconsistency \"is much greatethan in Sharif-ud-Din's case.\n\n Simllarly, in an earlier case of Satya Narain v. Dhuja Ral'f!-& Ors(')., this Court he Id as follows : -\n\n\"If there is any halt or arrest in progress of the case, the object of the Act will be completely frustrated. We are, therefore, clearly of opinion that the !'st part of section 81 (3) with which we are mainly concerned in this appeal is a peremptory provision and total non-compliance with the same will entail dismissal of the election petition under section 86 f the Act\". ·\n\nThis view has ben consistently taken all through in all the decided cases of this Court so far. Reliance was, however, placed by the counsel for the respondents on the fcillo\\Ving. observations of Divivedi, J., in Satya Narain's case:\n\n(1) [1980] l SCR 1177.\n\n, f..2) [1974] 3 SCR 20,\n\nE ..\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n\n\"Our decision restores that primacy of procedure over justice. It make s.86 (I) a tyrannical master. The rigidity of the rule of precedent ties me to its chains.\n\nMy only hope now. is _that Parliament would make a just choice between the social interest in the supply of c\"pies by the election petitioner alongwith hiselection petition and the social interest in the. puritY of election by excluding s.81 (3) from the.purview of s.86 (I) Of the Act. . • . .\n\nThe aforesaid observatiMs express a pious wish but do not at all detract from what has been decided in thfs case and with which . the learned Judge also agreed. Despite these ob.servations, the\n\nParliament in its wisdom has not made any attelllpt to interfere c with 'the peremptive and rnandatOry provisions of s. 81 (3) resulting in the consequence' of d_ismissal of the petition under s.86 of the Act.\n\nFor the reasons given above,. we allow the appeals, set aside the judgment of the High Court and. dismiss the election petitions D in limine Uf!.der s.86 of the Act. In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.\n\nN.Y, K.\n\nAppeals_ al lowed.", "total_entities": 76, "entities": [{"text": "RAJ.ENDRA SINGH & ORS. ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 26, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAJENDRA SINGH & ORS. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "USHA RANI & ORS. ETC", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 34, "end_char": 54, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "USHA RANI & ORS. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "February 27, 1984", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 57, "end_char": 74, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "February 27, 1984\n\n[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, A •. VARADARAJAN AND\n\nRANGANATH MISRA, JJ,]\n\nRepresentaiion, ofthe People Act 1951, ections 81(3) and 86."}}, {"text": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 77, "end_char": 97, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A •. VARADARAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 99, "end_char": 115, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A. 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N. Kacker", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5761, "end_char": 5773, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Allahabad High Court in Election Petition No: 1 of 1982 ·\n\nJ>- S. N. Kacker, R.L. Srivastava, Rajesh and J!."}}, {"text": "R.L. Srivastava", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5775, "end_char": 5790, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Allahabad High Court in Election Petition No: 1 of 1982 ·\n\nJ>- S. N. Kacker, R.L. Srivastava, Rajesh and J!."}}, {"text": "Rajesh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5792, "end_char": 5798, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Allahabad High Court in Election Petition No: 1 of 1982 ·\n\nJ>- S. N. Kacker, R.L. Srivastava, Rajesh and J!."}}, {"text": "J!. K. Verma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5803, "end_char": 5815, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Allahabad High Court in Election Petition No: 1 of 1982 ·\n\nJ>- S. N. Kacker, R.L. Srivastava, Rajesh and J!."}}, {"text": "M.C. Bha11dare", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5906, "end_char": 5920, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M.C. Bha11dare and V.K. Verma for the Appellant in CA."}}, {"text": "V.K. Verma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5925, "end_char": 5935, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M.C. Bha11dare and V.K. Verma for the Appellant in CA."}}, {"text": "Yogeshwar Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5968, "end_char": 5984, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Yogeshwar Prasad, Ms. R. Chhabra; Sujat Ullah hnd K. k.\n\nGupta for'the Respondents."}}, {"text": "R. Chhabra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5990, "end_char": 6000, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Yogeshwar Prasad, Ms. R. Chhabra; Sujat Ullah hnd K. k.\n\nGupta for'the Respondents."}}, {"text": "Sujat Ullah", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6002, "end_char": 6013, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Yogeshwar Prasad, Ms. R. Chhabra; Sujat Ullah hnd K. k.\n\nGupta for'the Respondents."}}, {"text": "K. k.\n\nGupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6018, "end_char": 6030, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Yogeshwar Prasad, Ms. R. Chhabra; Sujat Ullah hnd K. k.\n\nGupta for'the Respondents."}}, {"text": "FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6097, "end_char": 6106, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment'of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL ALI, J. As these appeals involve.", "canonical_name": "FAZAL ALI"}}, {"text": "Usha Rani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6658, "end_char": 6667, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Usha Rani filed an election petition oil. ."}}, {"text": "25\n\nJuly 15, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6758, "end_char": 6775, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RAfENDRA ~INGH v. USHA RaNI IFazai Ali, J.) 25\n\nJuly 15, 1980, at."}}, {"text": "s. 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7192, "end_char": 7197, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7209, "end_char": 7241, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7354, "end_char": 7359, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7386, "end_char": 7391, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8095, "end_char": 8100, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 8I", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8617, "end_char": 8622, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9730, "end_char": 9735, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9980, "end_char": 9985, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11089, "end_char": 11094, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11593, "end_char": 11595, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11710, "end_char": 11716, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11997, "end_char": 12002, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12270, "end_char": 12275, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 537", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12431, "end_char": 12437, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12445, "end_char": 12471, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "J.P. Goyal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14025, "end_char": 14035, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "9• of 1983, J.P. Goyal,\n\n28 ~UPREME coul<:t REPORTS\n\n[1984] 3 S.C.R.\n\nand in Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "5. 7 .82", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14398, "end_char": 14406, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the case came up before the Court on 5."}}, {"text": "Representation of the People Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14773, "end_char": 14805, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Bishamb", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14878, "end_char": 14885, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be stated here that Shri Bishamb, r Nath Pandey has in the meantime been appofoted as Governor of OriSsa and has resig ned his membership of the Rajya Sabha, Therefore, as requested at the Bar, his name is deleted from the category ofappellqnts:\n\nThe main argument on behalf of the remaining appellants' was that 11 copies of the ebction petition were filed on 10.5.1982 and although the."}}, {"text": "Sabha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15005, "end_char": 15010, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be stated here that Shri Bishamb, r Nath Pandey has in the meantime been appofoted as Governor of OriSsa and has resig ned his membership of the Rajya Sabha, Therefore, as requested at the Bar, his name is deleted from the category ofappellqnts:\n\nThe main argument on behalf of the remaining appellants' was that 11 copies of the ebction petition were filed on 10.5.1982 and although the."}}, {"text": "10.5.1982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15216, "end_char": 15225, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be stated here that Shri Bishamb, r Nath Pandey has in the meantime been appofoted as Governor of OriSsa and has resig ned his membership of the Rajya Sabha, Therefore, as requested at the Bar, his name is deleted from the category ofappellqnts:\n\nThe main argument on behalf of the remaining appellants' was that 11 copies of the ebction petition were filed on 10.5.1982 and although the."}}, {"text": "s. 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15629, "end_char": 15634, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bhandare", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16386, "end_char": 16394, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Bhandare, counsel fot the .appellants, however, submitted that this is beside the point and does not cure the invalidity of the election petition filed on 10.5.8:2."}}, {"text": "Faza1 Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16682, "end_char": 16691, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "81 (3J enjoins that there should be no difference ~1'\nJ.. -·\n\n.. .-f\n\nJµJENDRA SINGH v. USHA RANI (Faza1 Ali, J.) 29 •\n\nany kind whatsoever barring some typographical \\lf insignificant omissions between the petition filed and the copy served on the respondent.", "canonical_name": "FAZAL ALI"}}, {"text": "s.81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17083, "end_char": 17087, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17229, "end_char": 17234, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17603, "end_char": 17607, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.89", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17899, "end_char": 17903, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Xashmir Repr-esentation of the People Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17922, "end_char": 17963, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s.81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17986, "end_char": 17990, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Xashmir Repr-esentation of the People Act", "statute": "Xashmir Repr-esentation of the People Act"}}, {"text": "Sharif-ud-Din", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18070, "end_char": 18083, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "case, the inconsistency \"is much greatethan in Sharif-ud-Din's case."}}, {"text": "section 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18370, "end_char": 18380, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Xashmir Repr-esentation of the People Act", "statute": "Xashmir Repr-esentation of the People Act"}}, {"text": "section 86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18553, "end_char": 18563, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Xashmir Repr-esentation of the People Act", "statute": "Xashmir Repr-esentation of the People Act"}}, {"text": "Divivedi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18776, "end_char": 18784, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "observations of Divivedi, J., in Satya Narain's case:\n\n(1) [1980] l SCR 1177."}}, {"text": "Satya Narain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18793, "end_char": 18805, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "observations of Divivedi, J., in Satya Narain's case:\n\n(1) [1980] l SCR 1177."}}, {"text": "[1974] 3 SCR 20", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 18847, "end_char": 18862, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s.86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18966, "end_char": 18970, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19295, "end_char": 19299, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19324, "end_char": 19328, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19666, "end_char": 19671, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19742, "end_char": 19746, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.86", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19909, "end_char": 19913, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "N.Y", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 19985, "end_char": 19988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.Y, K.\n\nAppeals_ al lowed."}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_3_244_251_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "\" 244\n\nMUMTAZ HUSSAIN ANSARI\n\nSTATE OF U.P. &-t\\NR.\n\nMarch 21, 1984 . (S. MUllTAZA, FAZAL ALI, A. VARADARAJAN' AND\n\nRANGANATH MISRA, JJ) '\n\nT•avelling Allowances 'Rules (Financial f!andbook Volume Ill-Rule:\n\n20A(J~-Int:rpreiation of. . .\n\nI .\n\nG.O. No.. 419.7 R/V/fIA-SOO( / 46)68'-lnterpreWion of-Government 11JUJf pay expen3es of 1naterial defence witnesses.\n\n'\\Natural iustice_;_Asking delinquent ojfi:er lo. deposit expenses of 1nateria! dtfence wi1nesses-Vio[ates_p'rinc; pfes of natural jujtice.\n\nIn.a dePartmental inquiry coildUted by the Second respondent. U.P.\n\nAdministriltive Tribunal into certain charges levlled against the ai)pellant a- Deputy Superintend.ent of PQ!icc, the 'tribunal disnlissed'the application of tbe .appellant praYing for summQoiog 8 witnesses for being examined in his defence. The Tribunal relied .UP Jn rule 20A( l ). of 'the Travelling Allowanee• Rules (Financial Handbook Vol9mo II[) and observed !hat the appellant - had to deposit the expenes of the wita!sses, 'Yho were private p.erSons,. if be wanted to have \"them ex1mined i11 his dfence within a spcified time.\n\nT.he appeUant. did no.t deposit the ar.nou:it and the witnsse~ were not summoned. Pursuant to the finding orthe Tribunal the appellRnt' was remOved from service: The appellant filed a writ.Pe.ti.lion in theHigb CcUrt contending that in view of G.o. No .. 4197 R/VlllA-500(146)/6 l travel\\lng aIJOwance and diet money or witnesses to be examind before the T-ribu niil must haVe been paid by the State GOvernment but he was asked to deposit a sum ofRs ... 900 for. the witnessesbeing summoaed and this was in viola-· tion of tho releva'.l~ provision relating to conduct of pro:eediag .before\" the Tribunal. The High Court dismissed the Writ petition in lilnine. In this ; appeal.the question was whther on.- this account there was noncompliance ·\n\nwith the principles.of naturaljusice. - ,\n\nAllowing the appeal,\n\nHELD: There is no compliance with the principles of natural_ justk:o , intbiscase. [251C]_ ·\n\n' Rule 20A(l) of the Travolling A\\io Yances Rules (Financial Handbook Volume IID is __ not qllite clear, for it does not say who should beat_hc i!.Xpenses initially or w_be:ther the reference to be -made' by 'the inquiring;_ authority uader claae {c) should b3 .mid~ bf ore or after the examination of the witnesses. Claa; o (b) of this slib .. -rule seems lo have been oonsidel'elf\n\n•.. '\n\nM.H. ANSARI 1; U.P. STATB (Varadarajan, J.) 243\n\nutisfied in tho presont case as tho Tribunal had decided to summon tho A \"Witnesses provided the amount was deposited by tho appellant a• directed.\n\n[2498-C]\n\nG.O. No. 4197 ~/VIIIA-SOO(l.46) which )las evidently intended to .clarify Rule 20A of the Travelling Rules makes it clear that responsibility\n\n'for payment of travelling allowance to defence witnoase• produced in depart- B irneotal inquiry conduc'ted under s. 7 of the Police Act is Of-the Go_vefnmenf .andtbat,-if a witness -has been permittcd'to be prOduced in defence it is\n\n:!lOt open to the inquiry officer to lay down a condition that his travelling .. xpenses should be first deposited by the delinquent officer before the witness :is examined. [2SOGH)\n\nIo the present easel the Tribunal h'\\s considered the witnesses to be 0 fnaterial but has insisted on the appellant depositing initially .a sum of Rs. '900 for the travelling expense and daily allowan'ce of the witnesses -with an\n\n<>bligation to make good any shortfall ; a those allowlbces and loss of .professional. iDcome -Of tho witnesses. Tbei respondent-Stat<:: did not COD·\n\ntend that this G.O. does not apply to the case of tho appellant. Moreover, 1he appellant was under suspension from .11-12·1967 and there b nothing on record to show tlrat he was financially sou'nd and in a poSition. tCr deposit D the sum of Rs. 900 and pay any fu<ther amount which may be .required to meet any shortfall in the travelling and daily allo:anccs and the Josi of' - .professional income of the 8 more witnesses whom ho wanted to be examined -00 his side. Tbe failure to cause the pro.ductian of those 'witnesses at the\n\n-expense Or the Governmedl might have caused prejudice to th~ appellant for ·.it canno~ be predicated what conclusion the TribU'nal would haVe reached in Tegard to charges I to 3 if the evidence of those witnesses was available for B' its consideration. [250H; 2SIAC] •\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. '1234 of ' :1977. •\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 19.8.74 of Allahabad F High Court in civil Writ Petition No. 4827 of 1974\n\nR.K: Garg and Shakee/ Ahmed Syed for the appellant.\n\nPrithvirqj, Mrs. S. Dikshit, SJ(. Kulshreshta and P. Mishra for the respondent5.\n\nThe Judgment of the Cburt was delivered by\n\nVAl!ADARAJAN,\"J. This appeal by special leave is directed against an order of a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court H qated 19.8.1974 dismissing iii limine Miscellaneous Writ Petitio.n N•.\n\n4~27ef197~ which had been tiled by the appellant for quashina lkll\n\n' .\n\n.·~ . ·~\n\n24~\n\n. , [1984]3 S.C.R,\"\n\n~st r.e, spond, ent:s, order da\\d 3'.5.197~ rnioving him, from servic~ . ·.pllTsiiantio, thdinding of Uie . .second \\respondent, .U.P~.:Administra-. • tiv~ Tribunal, Lucknow dated 10.7.1972 that the appellant w.as'.guilty\n\nfthree of the four charges framed against him; The appellant was. employed as a Deputy Superintendent of P'olice 'at l'ilibhit. at. the relevant time.: The fourth chrge of which the appellant has been-.·\n\nexonerated was that 'he had transferred his' Vespa Scooter bearini ·. Registration .. No. UPi-9!l7 and valued at more than Rs.500/- to one . . ial .Mohd. without obtaining the previous sanctin of the appro- . priate authority and he thereby contravened Rule 24(2) of the. U .P ..\n\nGovernment Servants' Conduct Rules, 1956.' The appellant's. defence was that the transfer was effected through a reputed dealer arid'therefore previous sanCtion of tlie appropriate authority was not . necessary,. The Tribunal found that the transaction of sale. of th~\n\n. scoter by . the appellant o Lal Mohd. was effected through M/s.\n\nAnand Agencies, automobile 1engineers and. reputed.: dealers in; scooters and therefore there was sufficient compliance. with Ruie-\n\nD • 2~(2), . . . . . l . ' - \". . cha; ges I to '.J.were mor~ serious ones. The substance of thi:- . first charge was that the appellant while posted as .. Deputy Superin-. tendent of Police at Pilibhit was granted 30 days leave with effect'.\n\nE from 11.11.1967 and had to resume his duties on 10.12.1967 but failed to resume his 'duties and absented himself withou.t previoll!> -'\n\n. ' permission or intimation to the Superintendent of Police and without good or sufficient cause. He failed to report about his whereabouts until an application was made by'him oIY 24.41968 for extension of' the leave. The appellant's defence. was that he suffered from an F attack of a mental disease, melancholia and was under the treatment\n\n6fDr~-Mukerji at Calcutta from.l.i2.1CJ67 to 20.4.1968 and he had informed about his sudden illnes; and had.appliecf'for extensin of .ihe'leave directly and also through his wife and he had furniShed his leave . address ben he proceeded . on j(J. days leave~ . The . G ._. substanc'i. of.the second charge 'Yastbt whileapplyig for.extension ofleave !JD. 20.4.1968 he attmpted to wilfully deceiye the Inspector. . General of Police by att, mpting to make him believe that Ire hail ..... been ill from 1.12:1967 to 20A.1968arid was under. treatment of a . . - doctor at Calcutta althoglr in fact he had been to Pakistan during ·\n\nthe period and had obtained medical .certificate through deceitful H .ind. fraud;.len.t mean.s. '.:The. defence~ of the appellat was one of\n\ndeni~I. He_reite.rated that he wa~ u, nderireatment of Dri Mukerji at Calcutta from 1.12.1967, to 20A.1968 and contended that in that\n\n' . - . .,___ ,._. ·. ·-- ···-· ·- .\n\n\"\" J;\n\n.. M.H. ANSARI v. U.P. SfAtE (Va., adarajan,:J.) 247\n\nI . ., - -. , 11eriod lie ~s treated by Dr. Das at Howrah from IO. l.1968 fo\n\n30.1.1968 for injurij!s to his nose. The substance of the third 'charge\n\nwas that after havi.ng proce-eded on leave with effect from 11.11.1967 he unauthorisedly and unlawfully visited Karachi in Pakistan some- . time between 22. l l .1967 and 20.4.1968 without any valid passport\n\nor travl document .and he thereby contravened s. 3 of thePas.sport Act, 1967. The appellant denird 1he charge and contended that lle had never visited K1rac'1i and had been suffering from melancholia .11nd treated by Dr.MJke'ji at C1!cutta.'\n\nA number of witnesses for the. department and some witnesses for the defence were enmined before the Tribnnal which .· C .11fter considering the oral anif ctocum, ntary evidence found charges 1 to .3 against. the. appella, nt. Orie Harish Kumar,. Superintendent of Police who y, as appointed as an assessor in the inquiry conducted before the Tribunal agreed with the findings of the Tribunal.\n\nSubsequntly, the Tribunal submitted copies of its findings. to the\n\n-Oovernmnt with its recommendation that the appellant may be disli'li$se'd from service. The Governor accepted the TrihUnal's ilndings, took a tentative decision to dismiss the appellant from :service;' and issued a second show cause notice date\\! 29.9.1972 ro hlm. The appllant submitted his interim reply and final reply on 19.11.1972 and '3l.'.U973 respectively. After .considering 'the. :appellant's replies the Governor agreed with the Tribunal that the\n\n-charges I to 3 are fully established against the appellant and ordered ·\n\nJhis removal from service by the Order dated 1.8.1974 .. '- '' ,' ' . .\n\nThe appellant challenged' his removal from sevice in W.P.\n\n• No. 4827 .of 1974 which was dismissed i11 /imin~ by a t>ivisfon Bench it .of the Allahabad High Court. Hence this appeal by speciaMeave .\n\n, Jc,·\n\n) This appeal deserves to be allowed on a short poin.t which '11nfO'rtunately has not been noticed by the learned Judges of the High Court before dismissing the writ petition i11. 1imine. The appellant had prayed for ummoning'S wiinesses'forbeingexamined\n\nin his defence by filing n application dated. 17.1.1972 for that -purpose. The Tribun.al dismissed that application on. 19.1.1972 on ihe ground that iH1ad already taken into consideration 1he televant , JI . ules in the Financial CodeVolume HI and that itdoes not consider\n\n; it ne.cessary to revise its views. The Trib.unal observed in that order\n\n1that the'ltppellant bas to bea'r the .eK)Jenses of th, e wl'!nesses who\n\n,.are private. perso:ns jf he wanted to have .. them eKamined in; bis\n\nSUPREME CQURT REPORTS\n\n(1984) 3 S.C.R. t:\n\nclefence, \"He was, however, given one week's time to depo'sif a suJB> of .Rs.900 initially by way of trnvclling and daily allowances for°the- witnesses as weil as compensation for the loss of their prbfessiona~\n\nincome and he was ordered to make good any shortfall. 'fheappe.Jlant had not .deposited that ainountand the witnesses had not: been summoned for being.examined in his defence. . The questio11> for consideration is whether•on t4is account there is non-compliance: with the principles of natural justice.\n\nThe Tribunal has relied upon Rule 20A of the Travelling: Allowances Rules (Financial Handbook Volume III) in making' the: above order. Sub-rule 1 of that Rule reads thus: . .\n\n\"20A. (1) \"Persons, who, not being servants of the , Government, are called as witnesses ilf' a departmental:· inquiry either by the authority conducting the inquiry or c!n behalf of the government servant whose conduct is under inquiry, snail receive -the same travelling allowance and diet money as are admissible to non-official witnesses summoned;) in criminal cases, provided that in the case of such persom;. who are called.on behalf of the government servant whose conduct is under inquiry, the payment of travelling allowance and diet money shall be subject to ihe following principles:\n\n(a) travelling allowances may be paid to witnesse&. summoned in the event of .the . government servant concerned clearing himself;\n\n(b} such allowanc_es will.be paid only in. respect of wit- .nesses whose evidence .is considered of material value by\n\nthe authority conducting the inquiry; and\n\n( c) in exceptionai cases the authority conducting the . inquiry may, on grounds to be recorded, recommend t0>\n\nthe Government that the principles laid down above bedeparted. from owing to special reasons.\n\nI~ such cases. it will be for the Government to decide, after taking into-: con'sideration all the circumstances of the case; whether\n\nth~ recotnrnendat.ion should be accepted or not.·\n\n, Th~ .authority onducting the _inquiry . shall determine the class-of each witness for the-purpose of calculating travel-\n\n,:\"\\\n\nling allowance and diet-money under the .scale prescribed for witnesses in criminal cases.\"\n\nTl\\is sub-rule is riot quite clear, for it does not say who should bear the expenses initially or whether the reference .to pe made by the.inquiring authority under class (c) should be made before or after the examination of the witnesses.\n\nClause (b) of this sub-rule seems to\n\n0 haye been considered satisfied in the present case as the Tribunal had decided. to summ'on the_ witnesses provided the amount\n\nwas deposited by the appellant as directed. The appellant has contended in para 31 of his writ petition that in view of Q.O. No. 4197 R/VIIIA-500'(146)/68 travi; lling allowance and diet money of . witnesses to .be examined before the Tribunal must have been paid by the State G.overnment but h_e was asked to deposit a sum cif\n\nRs.900 for the witness; s being summoned and this is in violation of the relevant provisipn relating to conduct of proceedings before the Triqunal. The said G .0. marked as Annexurell to the writ petitien relates to one Kunhi Rarri and wasevidently intended-to clarify\n\nRule 20A of the Travelling R ties and it reads thus:\n\n\"In continuation of G.O. No. 1371-1/VIII B 2000 (10/61; dt. July 3, 1961) I am directed to say that in the.·· special appeal the appellant had contended that the additional S.P. Agra had asked him 10 deposit the expenses for T.A. etc. of defence witnesses before he summoned them. The position in this connection ha~ been examined by the Govt. and is being clarified here. Under para 490(5) of the police regulations the.S.P. has to decide wheatl; er he should rfuse to summon a witness whose evidence he does not consider material to the issue. The witnesses who are accepted by the S.P. for being produced in defence can be either summoned\n\nby him or allowed to be produced by'the party charged, So far its the question of payment of expenses for the journey by a defence witness is co_ncern ed it is not material when once a witness is perlnilted to be produced whether he is summoned officially or is called by the party charged himself. The responsibility for. payment of travelling expenses to the ' defence witnesses produced during departmental tria'! conduc-.\n\nted under section 7 of the Poiice Act, is of the Government.\n\nThus if a witn'ess has been 'permitted to be' produced id <lefence, it is not open, to the inquiring officer to lay down a\n\nondition that his travelling expenses should be first deposited\n\nA,·\n\n. .\n\n...\n\n•.1B\n\nz.; :JI\n\n250.\n\nSUPREM!l COURT REPORTS [1984].3 s .•. ll. ·'J;::\n\n~ ' before he is summoned~ . H.owever, no expep.ses ate to be paid\n\nfor_perons who are.not permitte4 to be produced in defence.\n\n The position with regard to the. pament of travelling . ..expenses to the d'efence witesses is a.;; follqws:\n\n(i). Govt. servaJits \\vho appear as defence witnesses to give\n\nevidence of the facts )Vhich.c.lJme to the\n\n0ir knowledge.· in their official capacit~ are governed by Rule 59(1) of the Financial Handbook Volu_m~ 1Ir for the purpose of travelling atrowance;\n\n(ii) .As rJgards govt. .ervants _who apvear . as witnesses to facts which have come to their knowledge in. the private capacity and appear as private individuals the position under rufo 59(2) of Financial Handbook Volume. Ill. is that they are entitled to receive their adual travelling ·. \"expenses from the Cq_urt and as such they will get T.A, •\n\non an ad hoc basis and as onrouc Thus if he'.is a Govi. servant travelling in a train ...... as an ordinary , passenger\n\narid has to bear witness. to that in his private .capacity he , should be paid T.A. as on tour. The Meharrirs. 'df, 4he Police.Stations bringing records which (hey ma'intain at P.S.s. in their officiai capacity will be governed by .elass\n\n(1) above.\n\n\" : {iii) Nqn-official witnesses called or allowed to be produced ' by the S:P. will get T.A. under rule 2PA of Finaneial Handbook'Volume UL\" •\n\n. Tl, Jis G, O. mak\\\\S it clear that responibility for payclent of ~\n\ntni\\i; lling ailowance t9 defence witnesses produced in deptrti:nenfal inqdiry conducted und.er s. 7 of the Po lie~ Act is of the a6vernment , an.a that if a witness has been permitted tci be prnduced in defence it is riot open to the inquiry officer to lay d6wn a condition. that . liis tfavel!ing expenses. should 1:\\e first deposited by . the delinquent officer before the witness is 'examined. In the. present case, the. Tri butilit has considered the witnesses to Ile material btit llas , in~!sttd on\n\nth~, ppellaht depositing liiitiilly a sum of Rs. 900fot the trii, velling\n\nexf1iis.ead daily allowances. of the\\vitnesses with. an obligation t.o\n\nma~~ good :\\DY shortfall in th<?s'< 11llow\\\\bces and Joss of pTl>feS5ional incciirie <if the wiineses. Mt. Prithvi'Raj, S-enit>r Counsel tl'p'Pearing ' .\n\n' .\n\n• . '\n\n,/;'<\n\nt •\n\n'.for the respondent-Stte did .not contend tbat this G.O. does not\n\n.apply. to the fase of. the appellant. Moreover, the appellant was under suspension from 11.12.1967 and there is nothing on record to show that he was financially sound and.in a position t'5 deposit the' sum of Rs.900 and pay any further amount which may be required .\n\nto meet any shortfall in -the travt!lling and daliy allowances and the lJ 1oss of professional income of the 8 more witnesses woom he wanted ' to be examined on his side. The failure to caµse the production of those witnesses at the expense bf the Government might have caused prejudice to the appellant.for it cannot be predicated what conclusion tne Tribunal would have reached in regard \\o charges I to 3 if the evidence of those witnesses was available for its onsideration. We .are, therefore, of the opinion that there is no compliance with the\n\nprinciples of n'atural justice in this case. The appeal has to be allowcd on tl1is short ground and it is accordingly allowed. The jlnding of the Tribunal that the appellant is guilty' of charges I t6 3 .and the consequent order of the Government}Govi:rnor removing •\n\nthe appellant from service are quashed. The. matter is rediilted to D the Trjbunal for fresh dispsal after summoning t gvernment \"expense suer of the .material witnesses as the appellant J)lay wish to be examined in his defence. The appellant shall be entitled to costs quantified at Rs.2,000. It is needless'to say thatthe appellant would be entitled to subsistance allowances from the date of his removal\n\nfrom service until he proceedings taken aga.inst him terminate and cfinal order is passed. This shall be paid in six weeks.\n\nllI.S.K\n\n1 Appea/a//owed", "total_entities": 29, "entities": [{"text": "244\n\nMUMTAZ HUSSAIN ANSARI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2, "end_char": 28, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MUMTAZ HUSSAIN ANSARI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 84, "end_char": 93, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. VARADARAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 95, "end_char": 109, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A. VARADARAJAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RANGANATH MISRA, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 116, "end_char": 135, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RANGANATH MISRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M.H. ANSARI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2403, "end_char": 2414, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Claa; o (b) of this slib .. -rule seems lo have been oonsidel'elf\n\n•.. '\n\nM.H. ANSARI 1; U.P. STATB (Varadarajan, J.) 243\n\nutisfied in tho presont case as tho Tribunal had decided to summon tho A \"Witnesses provided the amount was deposited by tho appellant a• directed."}}, {"text": "U.P. STATB (Varadarajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2418, "end_char": 2441, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Claa; o (b) of this slib .. -rule seems lo have been oonsidel'elf\n\n•.. '\n\nM.H. ANSARI 1; U.P. STATB (Varadarajan, J.) 243\n\nutisfied in tho presont case as tho Tribunal had decided to summon tho A \"Witnesses provided the amount was deposited by tho appellant a• directed."}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2868, "end_char": 2872, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Police Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2880, "end_char": 2890, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Tegard", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4241, "end_char": 4247, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tbe failure to cause the pro.ductian of those 'witnesses at the\nexpense Or the Governmedl might have caused prejudice to th~ appellant for ·.it canno~ be predicated what conclusion the TribU'nal would haVe reached in Tegard to charges I to 3 if the evidence of those witnesses was available for B' its consideration. ["}}, {"text": "Garg", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4541, "end_char": 4545, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4827 of 1974\n\nR.K: Garg and Shakee/ Ahmed Syed for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Ahmed Syed", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4558, "end_char": 4568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4827 of 1974\n\nR.K: Garg and Shakee/ Ahmed Syed for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Prithvirqj", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4589, "end_char": 4599, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prithvirqj, Mrs. S. Dikshit, SJ(."}}, {"text": "S. Dikshit", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4606, "end_char": 4616, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prithvirqj, Mrs. S. Dikshit, SJ(."}}, {"text": "Kulshreshta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4623, "end_char": 4634, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kulshreshta and P. Mishra for the respondent5."}}, {"text": "P. Mishra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4639, "end_char": 4648, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kulshreshta and P. Mishra for the respondent5."}}, {"text": "VAl!ADARAJAN,\"J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4715, "end_char": 4731, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Cburt was delivered by\n\nVAl!ADARAJAN,\"J. This appeal by special leave is directed against an order of a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court H qated 19.8.1974 dismissing iii limine Miscellaneous Writ Petitio.n N•.\n\n4~27ef197~ which had been tiled by the appellant for quashina lkll\n\n' ."}}, {"text": "Conduct Rules, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5751, "end_char": 5770, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Pilibhit", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6394, "end_char": 6402, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "tendent of Police at Pilibhit was granted 30 days leave with effect'."}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6945, "end_char": 6953, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was that he suffered from an F attack of a mental disease, melancholia and was under the treatment\n\n6fDr~-Mukerji at Calcutta from.l.i2.1CJ67 to 20.4.1968 and he had informed about his sudden illnes; and had.appliecf'for extensin of .ihe'leave directly and also through his wife and he had furniShed his leave ."}}, {"text": "22. l l .1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8235, "end_char": 8248, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "time between 22."}}, {"text": "20.4.1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8253, "end_char": 8262, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l l .1967 and 20.4.1968 without any valid passport\n\nor travl document .and he thereby contravened s. 3 of thePas.sport Act, 1967."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8337, "end_char": 8341, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "MJke'ji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8511, "end_char": 8518, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant denird 1he charge and contended that lle had never visited K1rac'1i and had been suffering from melancholia .11nd treated by Dr.MJke'ji at C1!cutta.'"}}, {"text": "Orie Harish Kumar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8761, "end_char": 8778, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Orie Harish Kumar,."}}, {"text": "TrihUnal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9112, "end_char": 9120, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Governor accepted the TrihUnal's ilndings, took a tentative decision to dismiss the appellant from :service;' and issued a second show cause notice date\\!"}}, {"text": "section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14945, "end_char": 14954, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "H.owever", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15301, "end_char": 15309, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H.owever, no expep.ses ate to be paid\n\nfor_perons who are.not permitte4 to be produced in defence."}}, {"text": "arid", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 16240, "end_char": 16244, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "servant travelling in a train ...... as an ordinary , passenger\n\narid has to bear witness."}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16802, "end_char": 16806, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_3_252_291_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "I l\n\n1-, !\n\nAJOY KUMAR BANERJEE & ORS. ETC.\n\nv.·\n\nUNION OF INDIA & ORS. ETC.\n\n12fst March, 1984\n\n[Y.V. CHANDRACHUD C.J., R.S. PATI!AK Al'D SABYASACHI\n\nMUKHARJI, JJ.)\n\nConstitution t>[ India 1950, Artie/~.• 14, I9(1) (g), ' Artie/~ JIB & G•~trar !murance Businrss (NatiatolisQtion) Act 1972 Src. 16, Rixhr ~( Cemrol Gam~ mcnt to from~ Jcht-s under tilt Act-Whtthtr affects fundamrnta/ rifhUof\n\n- rmp/oyeu of companlu constituted unclrr the Act.\n\n1nc/Ju/on of on 1Act In rite Ninth Srltt<lttle dors not prottct ordu at •4 cations luutd undtr the said Act. ·\n\nSchrm~ natifitd undrr Su. 16(1) uhethtr protutrcl.\n\nIntroduction of ,.fdrm through ft!litfalion-Law nud Ml ha>t unimsof oppficotion-Pit<Ymrof mttT.od of introducing r<forms-Whtthtr ptrntiSJib!<- Srutulory provlsio11 M'htth'r could bt srruck 1/own. 011 viet u/ umltdncllls[on.\n\nI huiMifial Disputrs Act /947-Witetlttr oppficabf~ le> grMral insurQna tom- .POnln \\\n\nCrn<ral Insurance lJus/nru (Nationali•atiull) Act 1971, &c. 16(1)/.g).\n\nGrn<ra/ Insurance (Rotlottalisatlon anJ Revision of Pay•Scalu nn:Ji!lhtr Condt1lon. of'St, lrt of Supervisory, Clerlcul and Subordittot6 Stoff) S~ Amrmlment Schrmc of 19SO-Sclttmt <>f 1980 rrfttllif/1/0 rvlsioll of pay sralts atJ4 othtr lrrnu ond condillons of service-Whtt!ttr u/11o vlru Sec. /6{2) oud ;,., JiJ-· IVhttlttr suf!rrs from vi\" oft.tcuslvc <lt/egatlun of /egis/uti!'<! p'uwtr. • ·\n\nlnttrputotlon of Stotuts-Couf/tt btwet!lt lire statttts..:..Ont iptclal othrt' II • ltntrai-Whlrlr; to prtvnii-TtJI$fur dttamln<ttlon o[. .\n\n/t /\"'rrpretat/on of slatttl<s-Not '\"~'' exur/u Ill ulllllcs-Pro•is!otll ~\n\ntrr \"''\" dtl•flallt!f poer-Curmruclion.\n\nf. t I\n\n__:.- .-\n\nA.K. B:\\NERJCE V. UNION . 253\n\n. to !972 tl\\cre were over l 00 lnsuranc~ Companies-Indian and rnor ' r 1 1 , The conditions of serv1cc o t1e emp oyees of these companies were (ore•gn. d by the rc.1pectivc contracts of service between th~ companies and the governc On t3th.May 1971, the Government oflndia a'Sumed managment ' (mployesc.ncral insurance companies under the General Insurance (Emergency of theseS . . .\n\nProvisions) Act, 1971. Th.e General Inuran; e Busmess~(Nat•onal 1sation) Act,\n\n1972 nationalised gcneralJnsurnce busmes5..o ·\n\nFo;•r merger schemes ere framed in 1973 b>· the Central Govrnment in ercise of the powers contained in s. 16(1) of the Act and four co:np, nies;\n\nriental Fire and General Insurance Company, Naliolkll Insurance Complny N•\"' India Assurance Compan)' and United India Insurance Company Ltd., wm merged into and they . alone \"ere allowed to carry OTl the busine.s of g<ocral insurane. The1c comp1nies started functioning from lst.January, 1973\n\nnd the process of mergr was completed by 1st January, 1974 when the 8forc- $3id four schemes came into force.\n\nThe Government of India_by a notification dat.:d 27th !>by, 1974, fronted a '.cheme' called the General Insurance (Rationalisation and Re, ision of Pay Sal,. and Other Cond1tions of Service or Supervisory, Clerical and Subordhate\n\nStU!') S:h<me, 1974 in exercise of the powers conferred by s. 16(,)(g) of the Act.\n\nThis achcme provided for tbe rationalisation and revisiC>n of pay scales and otbcr ltrms and condilions of service of employ\"s working in sup:rvisory, clericJI and !llbordioate positions 'and governed the pay scales, dearness atlowanec, other a!Jowaoces and other trms and conditions of the general insurance emp!oyees.\n\nPlroyaph 23 or the Scheme prolrided that the new 'seal~ of pay' shall remain in force till Decnnber 31, 1976 and thereafter shall continue to be in force\n\nWll<:!S modified by the Central Go,-emment.\n\nlo 1976, the Board of Directors approved a policy for promotion. On lit .\n\nJune, 1976. another SCheme by Which amendment~ y, erc made With reg:lrd tO\n\nPvidtnt Fund, Was Introduced. On 30th July 1977, a Scheme amending pro-\n\nY~IOfls regarding skk leave was also introduced.\n\nIC I The employees submit!ed a memorandum objtig to. the revision of pay\n\n1 t and other cond•tions or service and wntcd a n:f~nc.: to the Industrial ~\n\nnl. The class IU nod IV emploees .hoWe\\er did oot accept the revision of\n\nrvee Condllio • d d 1 di1pufe. The . ns, Pay. ,\"Cle-s l!earnes4 allowance, tc. ~d r'IJe n ustrta lnll bl ro \"'ere conctlltJon procccdinLS and thre was la1lurc to bmg about ca e scttktnent or dhpute1• . . •\n\nIn 1980 the G . . . . f' . and b 1 • ' overnment introduc~J the General Insurance (Rallona JSatJon. \"'\"' lton of p s · Cl • ~I and S bo . ay cak, and Other Conditions of Seryice of Supe1 vtsory, <;\"· ' was int du rdJnatc Stafl') Second Amendment Scheme, 1980. This Scheme wh1ch ro Uted b d d 'I d lion,\" 1.\n\nY a notifkation date..! Septemtxr 30, 1980 rna c eta1 e provt Allowan ° how the adjustment ullowunce iS to be dealt with so far u D:acness\n\nltti~~· CC. Ovenirnc Allowanc.: Contribution to Provident Fund and other\n\n \"\"'at bcneGt\\ \"' • 1 ! h • ' llopufattd 'ere concerned. Paragraph 7 which d:a t w I rettrcmo:nt that •n employee who was in service of the Corporation b<:for~ lh~\n\n. n.\n\nll .\n\n! i\n\nI .\n\nI I ·• i1\n\nr~ i\n\nD ·\n\n\\, ( ! !\n\nII ' '\n\n254 SUPRDIE COUllT REPOilJS • [19~413 s.c.l\\:\n\n. t ' . com'mencemcnt of the Scheme of 1980 shol~ retire fro\": service When he auains the age or 60 yea~. but an employee, who JOinS te servoce ?f the Corporation\n\n. free the commencement of the Scheme would reme on attaoning the ae or 58 .. ars. The FourthSchedule to the Scheme indicated the revised scales .or pay,. .. .-. The petitionetS in their writ petitio'ns to this Court contended that the te;.. .nd conditions of service enunciated in 1974 being a result of bilaceral agree men~ could not be changed unilaterally to the detriment of the employees and that the nolification deprived the rigllls of the employees to recei, e dearne•5 al'owallte ttc. with the rise in the cost of living index. It was furthe ... contended that ohe\n\nScheme was. violative of•. 16<2\\ of the Act and ultr:t vires Articles 14, 19(c)r~) and Anicle 3112) or the Conscicution, and that the Constitucion 44ch amendment . deleting Ankles 31 and 19 cannot sa, e the Schen1e, since the amendment came\n\ninto force only 20th June, 1979, whereas the impugned notification a!Toctin11 che rights ofthe employees to emolumtnts took effect from Jst January, 1979.\n\nThe ro<pondents contested the writ petition~ on 'the ground ohot s. 16(6) authorised .che Ctntro.l Government by notification, 10 odd, to emend r t~ v:uy any scheme framed under •· 16 and consequently rutionaliSlltion or re, i<ion of pay scale• was permi-., bl< by the 19Ril scheme. Moreovtr in compnri.on ll'ith other employees in governmental or 'public •ector<, the employ= or I he gener•l\n\nin5urnce comp3nies were 'High...,.ase i~!andcrs• and it was consequently nccnsary to put A ceiling on illeir emolumtnts and 'ooher amenitie! in ord<r to facilitale beller functioning or th~ insurance companies:>$ well as to subserve ohe. object and purpo<c of the nationalisation policy. . •\n\nA!lowine tho..writ pecitions,\n\n HELD : l. (a) The impugned scheme of 1980 js b;.d os heina beJiund the scope of the authority or I he Central Government, under tbc Gtneralln>Uroncc\n\nBu\"neu (JIIarlonali<aoion) Act, 1972, and therefor~ quashed. This, however, w!tl\n\nno~ prevens lhe Govtrnment, if it u w advi .. .J, co frame any appropriate lca•slallon or m•ke'any >ppropriote amendomnt , ivina power to the Central GoVI'rnment 10 frame any scheme as It considers fit and proper.·.\n\n(2900 ; :Z'JIABI ·\n\n1 (b) Tht !<:heme of 1980 so far a~ it~~ not relate<! t<' the amalgom•cio~· ~~ merr of insur&rce COmp•nies, ~~ not 10art301Cd by •uiH. (I) of s<CiiUO lu.\n\ne $4: com is therefore bad and beyond authority. [278Dl\n\n't .• ~.JI. Nodwn~ & Anothtr v, U•rlon of (rodia & Anothtr {1981) 2 S.C.R p. 46 j ,. auon MuhUII l'orlruk\n\nU I \" 1\\J , n Tlt LJ ~. n orr nflndia & Ot1. rc., ! t 1173) 3 s.c.,_. P • • Cit IO\"J'Itlnr'\"'\"d\"\" Curpo•mlull of India\" • D.J. Buhoc/u' & OrJ., [198111 S ....\n\nl) • rc crrr 10.\n\n'2. 11~< duty of the Co . . . • 1 n i$ tO ri•d lh• • .\n\nUrt In lnltrprrtinll Or construinllll proVO\\ O (. ...c<>' • '<•lion 1nd uod d 1 o • •· > ' <man lit mcanina in the contut. Jnterprctal on Ji 'out \"'\"\" or •tuae 4 t tO n• lloe me 001 a mtre uerd'e in ~<'mantic$ but an ottcmP 1 , oJ \"\"\"'1 of the leli;)atioo from the \"'Nds d, un~, rstun<l the , one\"\n\nI .I\n\n~~~~~::~-~~~~ _;.~ :·~~-.. -.\n\n--- ..:.---I . ,... ,, .~ .. :.:;:;; ... :.:~: ::: 00~·~· ....... ~.=-,\n\nthe pul (275CDl l . ¢slb f . . . -- . ·· j ,.h' hem~ is an e:tercise of delegated authority. The scope and .ambit\n\n 3 (ad 1 :ted QUthority must be so comtrucd, if posible, as not to make it t of such e eg of the vice of e:tcessive delegation of legislative power. In order to • . ••d bce\"USC d be ' !: ··\"\" he power valid, s.16 of the Act shoul 60 corut=d 1n such manner\n\nI \\ (\n\n~ (·\n\nmakct c h r d 1 r · that it docs not_ suffer rom t c v.ce o c egauon o excesstve leglSfauvc\n\nulltoritf. {275El • .\n\n_ ... ~_:(b) Unlimited right of delegation iS not inherent !n the legislative !)Ower. _ . . '\n\n[275 F] •\n\n_ G•a/iar Rayon-Silk Mfg. (Wtog.) Co. Ltd. v. Tlte A; m. CommiJ.Siou<r of Salts Tax & OrJ., {1974} '2S.C.R. p. 879, referred to. -\n\n' . ' ' . . . .\n\n- 4. Th$ , rowth of legislat-ive power of th~ executive is a sist6cant develop.\n\nm<11t of the 10th ccnrury. The theory of ltJi.rs•:-f<Jir~ hns been given a go-by and large nd comprehensive powers nrc being assumed by the State with a view to improve social and economic wcJI.being of the people. Most of the modern socioeconomic legislations passed by the lcila ture lay down the guiding principles of\n\n- the legislative policy: The lcgislntures, bccau5e or limitation imposed upon lhem and the time factor, hardly can r.o into the matters in detail. The pr.lctice of empowerinll the e•ecutive to mul<c - subordinate legisltion within the prescribed sphere has evolved out or practical necessity and pragmatic needs of the modern\n\n·~-\n\n. elfare Sttc.. -(275G216Al • '\n\nS. Rtgarding dclegatc!ilcgislation, the principle which has been wellestabfi•h:d 'ts th>t the lesislature must lay down the gui dlines, the principles of policy for the authority to who m powr to make lUbordinate leglilation is\n\nmtru~Jed. The le&itimacy of delegated legislation dop.:nd upon its b<:ing used as ancill:.ry which the kislature considers 1.., be nc•\"C>Sary for the purpose of eer~ ci•in& i.s lc~\\Siative power .:tfcctively and compktely. Tile l<gislature must n:tain it its o; oa bnd the es.cntiallcl!tslativc function which consists in d.:.:l<ring the lr!i>latht poicy nd lay down the standard which i' to be enacted into a rule of !'\"\"• ar.d ... -h:.t can bedolcgated is the ta1k of subordinate legislation' whkh by 111 \\ery nJture is ancillary to the ·tature which ddcgatcs the power to make it e!f<e1hc P'ovided the legislative policy i• cnunduted with suOkient clearness or a ' 1\"\"ilrd !.id down. Tho court,., nnnot and do not interfere on the discretion\n\nn.J th<:t ndoubtcdly rc.ts with the fe&i>I41Ure itself in dctcrn1ining !he c., tent of 1 e dtk¥O&t<d power in 11 particular case. [.!768-D] · 1\n\nor thf.. Th: ~thorily and scope for • , ut-onlialc k.; i•lation can t-e n!d In either It-It .c two ~0ay, ; numcly onel '' hlch ncatc1 wider ddgltiort :md one which\n\nr>ets tht dclc~; ation, {277El . . ·\n\n~~ . . ~Dd . e mstan~ case, the Acl must be read In conjunction \\\\ ith the Me in~·\n\n•bollliJl Claus~ No. 16 of the Dill whih Introduced the Ad in qucstjori. But\n\nAc1 ,.:~· h mu, t be read in cnjun.:tion with subse.:tion 2 '_'fsection 16 of the - 11.e &; h clearly iodk<Hcd the obct of framing the scheme: Wlder s. 16(1) of\n\nt. l271Dj\n\n--~~-~.\n\n~ I I\n\nI ! r:\n\n~ : : j, f!' ,-, ._,\n\nI t )'_\n\n~ . . , t r\n\n( f i\n\n~· .j\n\n.!:\n\nl.\n\n\\ I\n\n+56 ' Sl1PREME COuRT RI!POR~ [1984] 3 s.e.R~\n\n' . 7. In vi~ of tbe fanauaae of s~~~:'('l ofsection J6 and the memorandu~\n\nto the Bill, the one which restricts t})e.delegation must be preferred to the other.\n\nSo read, the. authority aiven um{er s, 16 under the different clauses of sub-section\n\n(l) mustbeolo subserv~ tbe object s envaged in ub-srction (2) of section 16 or the Act, and if it is so read thc_q framjng of a ache me for purposes mentioned i.n . different Clauses of sub-sectio, P m of .SI!ctiop.l6 must be. related, to lhe malgamation or merger of1hp .fusurance compnies . as. envisaged bO.th in the ineniol'tlndum on -delegated lepfation as well as !ub-section,.~) of section 16. · . . . .\n\n' [217F-G] . 8.\n\nSometim~ there have been rise i~ emoluments with the rie in the cC,')st of index in certain t>Ulllic 'Sector. corporations. The: lc\"islature h!lWever , is free to · . recognise the d.tgree <Pf harm or evil and to make provisions for the same. In m'aking disimilar ; proisions for one sroup of public sector undertaldng! does - not pl!r se•make a law discriminatory as. !uch. Courts w!ll not sit as sui>er-\n\nJegislature and strike down a p.Uticular classifkation on the ground that any under-tnctusion namely JtJat some others hve been. left untouched so long as there is ilo iolation ofconstitufioilal rtstraints.\n\n[~85D~E] ,.. . . '\n\n9. : Pite-'mealapproach to a general problem permitted by under-inclusive classifieations, is ometimesjustified when it is considered that legislatures deal · with $uch problm. usually <>n an expc:rimental basis. It is impossible to' tell how\n\nsuccessfl a prticular Jlpproach might. be, what dislocation might occur~ and Situatioii inight develop and what new evil might be generated in the attempt. 7\\.dminisl{ative expediettts must be forged and tested. Legislators recogniziog. these factors ll)lght wish to proceed cal!, tiously, and courts must allow to do so.\n\n[286B-C]\n\nSpecilil CotJrts Bill, [1978) 2 S.C.R. 'p. 476 at pages 540-541, Stare of Gujorat\n\nmd'Anr. v. Shri Ambica iJills Limited, Ahmedabad, etc., [1974] 3lS:C.R. p. 760 ·\n\nand f?..K. Garif etc. v. 'U11ion of India ct Ors.!etc., [1982] 1 S.C.R. p. 947, referred to. •\n\nInthe'instant case.-as there was no industrial dispute pending, the around that th~ pe.titioners'have been chosen out of a vast body of workmen to bediscri- , F . minatea against and exclu&d from the operation of the Indutrial Disputes- Act, is no grounlthatthere has been no violation of Article 14 of the Constitution.\n\n. [2860}\n\n.u\n\ntO. Differentiation is ttot:a!ways discriminatory. If there is a rational ne~ , orr the basis ()f which differentiation has bn made with the object sought' to be • achieved by particular provision, then such differenti!ltion .is n<>t discriminatory and does not violate the principles of Article 14 of the Constitution. There. is intelligible basis for differentiation. Wheter the same result or better result\n\noutd have been achieved and better basis of differentiation evolveq is within the .\n\n4omain ofleislaturl,}and mu!t be left to the wisdom o_f the legislature. . . . • · , . [21l8H-:a9Bl . . . t t •. Article 14 tloes not prevo11t the Leh\\fure from introducine a re'ft>rm i.e. by applying the Ieaislatin to .some instituions or objects or areas oJ!Ily .a\"ording. to-the-e:ttigency oNh1 situatiol'l d further classifiation of seliwtmn . Mn be SU&incd on historioalreasoas or reasons of admipistrativc exipaey .o•\n\n....\n\n} .\n\n~ . -} .\n\n. '\n\nA.K. BANERJEE v. UNION 257\n\n/ . . 'Piece-meal method of introducing reforms. The law need not apply to' all the 1lt; rs9Jfs in the sense of having a universal application to all persons. A law can\n\n-sustained if it deals equally with the people of[ well-defined \"Class-employees of\n\n\"Insurance Companies as such, and suc}l a law is not open to the charge of'deial ·of equal protection on the ground that it had not appliCation to other persons .. . . ~~~\n\nState of Karnataka & Anr. etc. v. Ranganatha eddyf & fAn;. etc. [1978] I S.C.R. p. 641 at pages 672, 676 & 6~1.., referredlto.\n\nA .\n\nTo the intant case, for the purpose of rationalisation, the illsuriince com- <, panies wanted to curtail the emoluments of class III nnd class IV employees on\n\na small scale. It cannot therefore be said that there are no distingui$hing factors .and that fot choosing a particular group for expe.riment, the respondents should C\n\nbe fonnd guilty of treating people differently while they are alike in all material respects. [~880] . 12.\n\nT~.,.e object of the General Insurance Business (Nationalisation) Act 1972 is to run the business efficiently so that the funds available might be utilised 1'or socially viable and core projects of national importance .. The Nationalised Banks and the Iqsurancc Companies for the purposes of appftcability. or other-\n\n. D wise of the provision_s of the Industrial DisputesiAct cannot be treated, as be- . longing to one class. Historical reasons provide an intelligible differentia ·<distinguishing Nationalised Insurance Companies from the Nationalised Banks.\n\nThe financial resources, structures and functions of the Banks are different from\n\nthose of the Insurance Companies. [288A-E]\n\n13.\n\nThe general rule to be foJJowed in case of conflicfbetweeri twottatu(es .is that the later abrogates the earlier one. A prior special law would 'yield to a\n\ntater general law if eitqerf these two conditions are satisfied : . .\n\n(i) The two are inconsistent with each other an'd (ii) there is some express ' Teference in the later to the earlier enactment.\n\n[282D-FJ ..\n\n14. (i). The Legislature has the undoubted right to alter a law already promulgated through subsequent legislation, (ii) A special law may be altered,\n\nabrogated or repealed by a later general law by an express provision, (iU).A later ce11eral Jaw will override prior special law if the two, are so repugn, ent to each other that they, cannot co-exist even though no express provision in that behalf\n\n. is found in the general law, and'.(iv) It is only in)he absence or a provision to G the contrary and of a clear inconsistency that a special hiw will remain wholly . upaJfectect by a later general law.\n\n{282G-HJ\n\nMaxU>ell--;-:\"Interpretation of Statutes\" Twelfth Edition pp. 196-198, referred\n\nJX (:ottoo- Spinning ' & Weavint Mills Co: J:.td. v. State of u.P. & , Ors., {1961] 3 S.C.R. t>· 185 and U.P. State Electricity Board &: Ors, v. Hari Skankt7 .rtiJA aiul Or:r., U979] 1 .S.C.R. p, il.55, referred to.\n\nI' ' ! . ;·\n\nl A 'j i' ,,, ';\n\n: I\n\n' : t\n\n,, B J\n\n!J c .rJ\n\n, ;. ; j• ,, ., ,. : r, t; . t :( D l\n\n'~ I E )\n\n'(:\n\nI F\n\n258 '\n\nSUPREME COUR~ RE~ORT~ . .,\n\n[1984) 3 s.c ·. .\n\nR~ .\n\nIS. Th~ Gene.,; llruurance Business (Nationalisation) Aci was PU . .\n\nNth Schedule of the Constitution as ltcm.9S on IOtll Augst 1975. 1/ ;: 1!1•· the rights of the petitioners had b\"n aectcd .by .te schme of 1980 thea~· risbts would not enjoy immunity from bemg •crutnased samply beuse the Act' uodet which the scheme was framed had been put m the N_inth Schedule. In\n\n. event any right which accrued to the persons concerned praor to the plac Y N\" 1r Sch d le c:n at be ret os~ t\" 1 ..\n\nCln<nt: of the Act in 'the ant e u n • r ,...cave y anccted by th, impugned prvisions: [284EGJ.\n\n\nIn the instant cse, empowering the- Go\\'crnment to frame schemes for carrying out the purposes of the Act does not in any way affect or abridge lhe fundamental tights of the petitioners nod would not attract Artick t9(1)(g). • ' (284H ; 2BlAi\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition Nos. 5370 74 of !980.\n\n(Under Art. 32 of the Constitution)\n\n• M.K. Ramamur1M, J. Rama;1111ri/ri nnd Miss R. Vaig11i for the petitioners in WPs. 5370-74\n\nR.K. Garg and V.J. Fr; ncis for the petitioners in WP. 5434.\n\nJ.P. Coma & Mukuf Mrrcigutfor Intervener in WPs. 5~70·74.\n\nK, Parasara11, Attorney Gneral, :\\f.K. Bmrn:il:'e, Addition; il Solicitor General, M1ss A. Sublraahini uotl c. v, Suhba Rua, for lh~ respondent (Union of 1ndi;1)\n\n• P.R. Mridul, O.C. Ma!lwr, S. Sukumaran, D.N. Mis/rrcJ & Miss J.hera Ma1hur for respondent no, 2 in WPs. 5370-74 &. 5434.\n\n 1/emant Sharma & lmlu Sharma for th~ respondent in Wi'S 5370-74.\n\nl'l!leet Kuma,, Lalit Bhasin Vinay Bhasin & AfiJ's.Arsill Singh,.. for Rspondcot Nos, 3 to 6 in V;'Ps. 5434 & 5370 74. .\n\n.AmbriJJs Kimlur for lntcr\\eoer iriWP. 5370.\n\nClsalu/idus Sinhu Intervener-in-person in '~Ps .. 5370 H.\n\nThe JuJgment f th C . . . o. e ourt was delm:rcd by\n\nA.K BANERJEE: v. U.'fiON (Mukharji, J.) -259\n\nSABYASACHI MuimARJI J. These petitions under Article 32 of the Comtitution are filed by the employees of the General Insurance Companies and the • All India Insurance Employeess Association. 'the respondents are, . Union of India, the General Insurance Corporation of InCfia and four General Insurance companies.\n\nThe petitioners chaHenge the Notification dated 30th September, 1980 of lhe Ministry of Finance (Department of Econo~ rnic Affairs) (Insurance) introducing what is called General lnsu4 ranee (Rationalisation and. Revision of Pay Scales and Other Con~\n\ndition~ of Service of Supervisory, Clerical .and Subordinate Staff)\n\nSecond Amendment Scheme, 1980 as being illegal and violative of their fundamental rights under Articles 14, 19(1)\"(g) and 31 of the Constitution of India.\n\nPrior to 1972, 1here were 106 General Insurance companies Indian and foreign. Conditions of service of these employees were governed by the respective contracts of service between the com panies and the employees. On 13th May, 1971, the Government of\n\n- India, assumed management of the general insurance companies under the. General Insurance (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1972.\n\nThe general insurance business was nationalised by the General Insurance Business (Nationalis'ltion) Act, 1972 (Act 57 of 1972).\n\nThe _preamble of the Act explains the purpose or'the Act as to provide for the acquisition and transfer of shares of Indian insurance companies and undertakings of other insurers in -order to serve better the needs of economy in securing development of general insurance business in the best interest of the community and to ensure that the operation of the economic system does not result in the concentration of wealth to the common detriment, for the regulation and control of such business and for matters connec~ ted therewith or incidental the1eto.\n\nAct 57 of 1972;: by Section 2, declared that it was for giving effect to the policy of the State towards securing the principles specified in clause (c) of Article 39 of the Constitution.\n\nUnder Section 3(a)of the Act, 'acquiring company' has been defined as any Indian insurance COJ!lpany and, where a scheme had been fram ed involving the merger of one or more insurance companies in another or amalgamation of two or moresuch companies, means the indian insurance company in which any other company has\n\ns:\n\n2~0\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1984) 3 S, C.R.\n\nbeen merged or te company. which has been framed as a result of the amalgamaion. ·\n\nSection A provides that on the appointed •ctay all the shaies in . the capital of every Iridian insurance company shall be transferred ·\n\nto and vested in the Central Governmei, J.t free of all trusts, liabilities\n\n JJ and encumbraces affecting these ..\n\n:.E .\n\nSection 5 provid-es for transfer of the undertakings of other . existing .insurers. -section 6 provides for the effect of transfer of undertakings. Section 8 provides for t)le Provident Fund, superan'nuation, welfare or any other fund existing. Section 9 stip.ulates that Central Government shall form a. Government company in accordance with the provisions of the Companis Act, to be known as the General Insuranct; Corporation of India for the purpose of superintending, controlling and carrying on lhe usiness of gerieraJ in$urance: Section 10 stipulats that all shares in the capital of every -Indian insurance company which shall stand transferred to and vested in the Central Government by virtue of Section 4 shall imediately after such vesting, stand transferred to and vested in t•l ·\n\nCorporation.\n\nChapter IV deals with the amounts to be paid for acquisition and as sucb. we are nof concerned in this case with that chapter in view of the controversy'involved. ·\n\nChapter V of the aforesaid Act deals with ''Scheme for re- • organisation of general insurance business\" Section 16 and.l7 of :F 'fhe Act in this chapter are as follows.:\n\n...\n\n. , H\n\n1 .\n\n• \"16. (1) If the Central Government i.s of opipion tha't for the more efficient carrying on of general insurance busi~\n\nness it is. necessary so to do, it may, by notification, frame one or more schemes providing for ail or any of the following. matters :·\n\n(a) ' the merger in one Indian insurance company of any other Indian insurance comp&ny, or the formation of a\n\new company by the amalgamation of two or more .\n\nIndian. insurance companfes ; .\n\ni< ...\n\n. .\n\n(b) the transfer to and vesting in the acquiring company .;., of the undertaking (including all its bsiness~ propertic~,\n\n\" ·-l\n\nA.~. BA.NERJE£ v. UNION (Mukharji, J.)\n\nttssets and liabilities) of any Indian insurance company\n\nwhich ceases to exist by reason of the scheme ;\n\nr(c) the constitution, name and registered office and the\n\ncapital structure of the acquiring company and the issue and allotment of shares ;\n\nIll, '(d)· the constitution of a board of management by whatever name called for the anagement of the acquiring company;\n\n>(e) the alteration of the memorandum and articles. of\n\nassociation of the acquiring company for such purposes 0 as may be necessary to give effect to the schee ;\n\nIf) the continuance in the acquiring company of the\n\nservices of all officers and other em-ployees of the Indian insurance company which has ceaSJ!e to exist by reason Of the scheme, on the same tenns and conditioqs which they were getting or, as .the case may be, by which they were governed immediately before the. commencement of tle scheme ;\n\n(g) the rationalisation or revision of pay scales and other 11 terms aqd conditions of service ott officers and other em~\n\n_, .. ployees wherever necessary;\n\n(h) the transfer to the acquiring company of the provi- dent, supperannuation, welfare and other funds relating to the officers and other employees of the Indian insurance company which has ceased to exist by reason of the scheme ;\n\n, (i) the continuance by or against the acquiring company of legal proceedings pendin!i.., by .or against any Indian insurance company which 'bas ceased to exist by reason / of the scheme, and the initiation of such legal proceedings, civil or criminal, as the Indian insurance company _might have initiated if it had not ceased to exist ;\n\n,,,(j) such incidental, consequential and supplemental matters as are necess; ry to give fuil effect to the .Sl::heme.\n\n...\n\n' .\n\n' . '\n\n.i.\n\n' A.\n\nSUEREME COURT RI!PORTS [1984] 3 s.c.R ...\n\n (2) :. In framing schemes under sub-section _(1). the . . . object. nf 'the} traF.GnveJD.ment shallbeto ensure 1hat ultimately there are only f,_our companies (excluding the Cor- / poration) in existence and that they are so situate as to render\n\ntht:ir combined services effective in all parts of India.\n\n(3) Where a scheme unrler sub-section (1) provides.·. for the transfrr of any property or liabilities, than, by 'Wrtue . of th~ scheme,_ the property shall stand tFansferred to and_\n\nvested in, and those liabilities shall be tramferred to and be come the Jiabilities of the acquiring company.\n\n(4) If the rationalisation or revision of any pay scalesor other terms and conditions of service under any scheme is not acceptable to any officer or other employee, the acquir- -ing company may terminate his employment by giving himcompensation equivalent to three months remuneration~·\n\n. J< unless the contract M service with such employee provides for- . a shorter notice of termination.\n\nExplanation.-The compensation payable to ::.n officer~ or other employee under this sub-section shall be in addition to, and shall not affect, any pension, gratuity, provident fund• .. of-other benefit to whfh the employee, may be entitled underhis contra¢t of service. J\n\n(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Indus-. trial Disputes Act, 1947 or in my other Jaw for the time be.;- ing in force, the transfer of the services of any officer orother employee of an Indian insurance company to the _acquiring company shall not entitle any such officer or otheremployee to any compensation under that Act or other Jaw, . and no s11ch claim!'shall be entertained by any court, tribu- - nal or oth_e_rl authority. •·\n\n(6) (.The Central Government may, by notification •. add to, amend or vary any scheme framed under thi~ section.\n\n(7) The provisiqns of this sectjon -and of any schemefntmed tinder it shall have effect notwithstanding anything to , the contrary contained in any other law or any agreement, . award or other instrment for the time being in force.\n\n. ,,., ._\n\n. ._ -J 1\\.1';:. BANERJEe v. UN10N (Afukharji, J.) 263\n\n17.\n\nA copy of every scheme . and e-very amendment \"thereto framed under section 16 shall be laid, as soon as .m:ty be afta it is m:tde, befor.:: each House of Parliament.\"\n\nThe object of any sc1cme undtr this chapter, according to -the petitioneh, w tS ckar from th~ main p.trt of Section 16(1) f the >;'Said A.ct, i.e. a sc!11!11l; m td~ under this chapter was only for the purpose of provicling fur the mrger of Indian insurance companies, and this was made Clc . .tr by Section i6(2} of the Act. Section 16(4) oUhe 'Said Act, it was co.1tentkd on beh'llf of the petitioners, implied that .any scheme of rationJiisation or revision of pay sc.tles and other\n\nterms could only b~ in the context of merger and amalgamation of one or more of tbe companies. In this connection mention was made in the petition ; r the \"Memorandum regarding delegated 11egislation\" submitted to the Parliament along with the General\n\nInsurance Business (Nationalisation) Bill, 1972 (Bill No. 60 of 1972), , which later became the aforesaid Act. It was made explicit,\n\nacording to the petitioners, that clause 16 of the Bill, later Section\n\n16 of the Act \"empowers the Central Government to frame one . -or more schemes for the merger of one Indian insurance company with another or for the amalgamation of the two or more Indian ; insurance companies and for matter consequential to such merger )--or amalgamation, as the case might be.\" It was in the aforeaid > -context of merger of companies that Section 16(l)(g) provided for rationalisation and revision of pay scales and other terms and coll- .Oitions of service of officers and other employees wherever necessary.\n\n In exercise of the powers contained in the aforesaid Section J6(1) ofthe said Act, four mrger schemes were framed in 1973 by --the Central Government and the four companies, Oriental Fire and r;... nd General Insurance Company Ltd., National Insurance Comt -.Pany Ltd., New India Assurance CoD)pany Ltd., and United India\n\n,..\n\nInsurance . Company Ltd., into one or the other of which several _general insurance companies in the country were merged, were alone allowed to carry-on the business. of genera[ insurance.\n\nThe j)reamble of the scheme,\" called the New India Assurance Company Limited (Merger) Scheme, 1973, had stated that'the Centntl Government was o( the opinion tha_t for the more efficient t; arrying on of\n\n~ ihe general insurance business, .it was necessary to frame scheme for\n\n the merger of certain . Indian Insurance companies in . the New lnd ia Assurance Company Limited. The preambles Of the merger\n\nchemes in respect of the other three companies were on similar\n\n, . B\n\n' B\n\nSUPR'EME COURT REPORTS [1984.]3 s.d.R. 1lines. These four companies are subsidiaries of the General Insurance Corporation of India. The cotnpanie~ started functioning from . \" 1st January, 1973 and the process of merger of the various com\n\npanies into one of , the othef four companies was completed by 1st January, 1974, when the said four schemes came into force. The said schemes povided for the transfer of officers and employees of the merged companies to the transferee Company. The memox nindum and the articles of association of the four Companies were. \" . also . suitably altered by the said schemes. Thereafter there had\n\nbeeli no merger or an:talgamation of any insurance company. The petitioners stated that there had been no reorganisation of generat . insurance business either. This position is not in dispute. . •·\n\nBy a notification dated 27th May, 1974, the Ministry of Finance (Department of Revnpne l/.nd Insurance), Government of _r India, framed a 'scheme' called the General Insurance (Rationalis'a- tionaild Revision of, Pay Scales and other CondHions of Service of Supervisory, Clerical and Subordinate Staff) Scheme, 1974, arid the ; reamble of the scheme. stated that \"whereas the Central Government is of the opinion that fot the mqre efficient carrying on genera! .t,_suiince business, it is necesary to' do~', therefore, in exercise or .\n\nthe.powers conferred by Section 16(l)(g) of the aforesaid Act, the\n\n' . . . . . Central Government framed the $sheme' to provide for the -..r <( .. rationalisation and revision of pay scales and other terms and con dition of service of ep}ployees working in supervisory, clerical and subordinate .position under the insurers. The sai'd scheme governed the pay scales, dearness allowance, other allowances and other terms aitd conditions of the general insurance employees. ·\n\nIt dealt, inter aHa, with nature and hours of work, fixation. . retirement, provident fund and gratuity.\n\nParagraph 23 of the 1974 A-- scheme providd that the ·· 'New scales of pay' shall remain in force . ' initially up to and inclusive of 31st December, 1976 and thereafter '\"' shall continue to be in force unless modified by the Central Govern~ .. ment. T'he scheme was framed after negotiations with the parties .\n\nncerned. The petitionets further state tnat the scheme was J?Brported to have been made under . Section 16(1)(g) of the said Acfand it was treated as one made under Section 16(1) as part of. 1\n\nt'h.e four merger schemes. The petitioners state that otherwise, it . weuld have been invalid. ·\n\n1he petitiones furher state that the employees of the 'in-su.:..\n\n4 ;\n\n' A.K. BANERJEE v. UNION (Mukharji, J.) . . 265~\n\nranee companies serving _throughout the country were, however, subsequently not satisfied with the pay scales, dearness allowance, other terms and conditions availab1e to them on account of several factors. Through tl\\eir associations, they submitted their charters , oJ demands to the General Insurance Corporation of India in 977\n\nfor the revision of terms and conditions of their servie. Negotiations were held between the management and the unions for the upward revision but according to the petitioners, nothing happened.\n\nIndustrial dispute was raised between the management of General Insurance Corporation of India and the class iii and IV employees on the demand of revi5ion of pay scales, dearness alk>wance and\n\nother allowances and service conditions. The Chief Labour Commissioner (Central), Government of India; Ministry of Labour,\n\nissued concifiation notice dated 11th September, 1980 under the Industrial Disp'utes Act, 1947 to the Chairman of the General Insurance Corporation and the general secretaries of the employees' asso.ciations. _There were several meetings. It was decided, accord ing,..t<r the \"etitioners, that in . the meanwhile until te talks wei.e\n\nresumed the employes would not resort to strike. There was representation to the respondents not to change the conditions of service pending the conciliation proceed_ings. It is not necessary to refer in detail to all these, which have been set out in the petition.\n\nBut nothing fruitful happened. The Labour Commissioner in the circumstances sent a failure report under the Industriall2Jsputes Act, 194 7 to the Secretary, Government of India, Ministry of Labour, stating that there was failure to bring about amicable settlement of of disputes. The petitioners con.tend that rio further action was taken and according to them the conciliation proceed_ings were still pending. This, however, is not accepted by th~ respondents, according to whom there was failure report and the conciliation proceedings ended thereafter. The scheme mntioned hereinbefore,\n\nwhich is under challenge was issued thereafter. We will have to deal with the scheme in great detail as the same is the subject rn1tter of challenge is these petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution. '\n\nAfter the 1974 scheme, in 1976, the Board of Directors approved of promotion policy .. On 1st June, 1976 another scheme by\n\nwhic~ there were amenchents with regard to Provident Fund, was ' introduced. As mentioned before in 1977, major unions submitted ll' • charters of demands to the respondent No. 2, seeking revision in the terms and conditions of service of the 'employees with retrospective\n\nI., I .,. \\\n\n. '\n\n~D .\n\n. '\n\nfF.\n\n...\n\n• II -\n\n•. ,.\n\n_.. '.\n\n'266\n\nSUPR, PM£ COURT REPORTS [l984J 3 S.C.R. .,\n\n-effect: Between lOth. March, 1977 to 30th March,. 1977, memo\n\nrandum was addressed by, the employees of all India Association.t~ the Union Finance Minister.\n\nIn the memorandum addressed, it was stated that in the normal circumstances on the expiry. of the prescribed period •r operation of an agreement, settlement of award, the unions usually submitted charters of demands and. the said charters of demantis . were settled eithe( through mutu1l neptiations or as a tesult of award of an inQ.ustrial tribunll, but as the . pay scales and other conditions of service of the .employees in general insurance industry were, however, governed oy a scheme or scheme t9 be formulated by the Central Government and it was the Central Government which could amend these, the unions submitted that there was justitlcation for making upward revisi0n in the scheme and shifting the base year fro, m 1960 to 1970-7 J for the purpose of prescrib, ing pay scales.· This point was stressed . by cJunsel appearing fbr the General J?surance Company, in order to ephasise thatthe Ut, ions always\n\naccepted the position prior to the present petition, that t].le govern ment had the power to amend or makefuriher schemes under the\n\nprovi.sion~ of the N:1tionalisation Act. Qn 30 July, 1977'scheme amending the provisions regarding sick leave was introduced. In 1978 Promotion Policy was revised by General Insurance Company . . Between 1979-80, there were dicussions. between the management of the Corporation and the representatives of the Trade Unions which were held on- 8th, 9th, lOth October, 1979, 7th,. 8th, 9th, April, 1980, 12th and 13th June and .1st August 1980. The manage ment of the Corporation after several rounds of discussions with the Unions sought to narrow down the area of differences and submitted to the Government the demands made by the Unions ·\n\n• .t • _, and the managment's recommendations. The General fnsurance Corporation submitted befc.re us that the Central Government after finally' considering the demands and recommendations of the . management of the Corporation framed nd notified the scheme under challenge on 30th September, 1980.\n\nIt was contended on behalf of tl1e petitioners that the _said notification had been issued by the Government suddenly and unilateraiJy, witho.ut any notice to the parties concerned. Th.e employees were taken unawares. It was contended that from the provisions of the said notification the service conditions of the employees including the petitioners employees, particularly with regard.\n\n,;....·\n\n. 1\n\n~ ..\n\nA.K. BANERJEE V. UNION (Mukharji, ].) 267\n\n\\to dearess allowance, stagnation increments, retirement age and •<lther increments had become worse than before and detrimental ·-to the employees. While the employees were eagerly awaiting ·.improvement in their service copd itions, this notification had unilaterally altered the service conditions to their prejudice. 'Pet!tioners in their petitions had alleged certain facts by certaia •\n\nilfustrations, which according to them, indicated tat employees had been affected adversely, inter alia, in gross stating salary of -(}ifferent group3 of employes, salary on confirmation of assistants who are graduates etc. It wa<;. further stated .that retirement age\n\n.. was 60 years for all the cmploes under the 1974 scheme. But\n\n.under the.new scheme, retirement age was reduced to 58 years for employees joining on or after I st January, 1979.\n\nClause 7 Of the impugned notification preribed different ages of retireent, though the employess were of the same class and 'Similarly situated ·<tccording to the petitioners. Para 12(1) of the impugned schem'e -provided that an employee who was in service befor~ the commencement of the said scheme would retire at the age of 60 years but f'rovided that an employee joining the service on or after the com-\n\n.nencment of the said scheme would retire from service on attainin'g the ag~ of 58 y.ears. This was. discriminatory, according to the :'Petitioners, being viola.tive of Article 14 of the Constitution.\n\nIt was further alleged that stagnation increments that is d.ncrements after reaching the maxinium of the grade t~ all cadres up. to muximum of 3 for every two years of service were given befo.re,\n\n~-but now under the present notification clause 5 substituted para- ; graph 7 and provided for no stagnation increment except only one increment for two years to the employees ifi record clerk cadre. :Previously, there was no maximum limit on salary. Now maximum -ilimit was fixed at Rs. 2750.\n\nEarlier, according to the petitioners,\n\nHose Rent. Allowance was given to all employees irrespective o~ havmg offictal accommodation, under the new scheme, house rent :.allowance was withdrawn for employees having'offici~!l accommoda-\n\n; tion. E2rned leave earJier could have been accumulated upto 180 ·\"<lays, but the new scheme lirititcd -the acumu!ation of earned leave •upto 180 day-s for the employees retiring at the age of 58 years and\n\n120 days for the employees retiring at the age of 60 years. , U was :stated in the petitions that this had substantially reduced the emolumients of the general insurance employees, and it had adversely \" H .:affected .thq:mployess throughout the country.\n\nf..\n\n\n' [1984] 3 S.C.R~ ( ~-\n\n1he maiQ ground of the challenge is that th~ impugned notification is illegal as the Central Government has no po\\vr to issue it under Sectiol). 16 of the said Act and such as the notification framing the present \"scheme\" is ultra .vires Section 16(1) of. the ·, ; Generallnsurance Business (Nationalisation) Act 1972. Accordi~ to . the petitioners, once the . merger of the insurance companies took\n\nplace and the process of reorganisation was complete on i lit\n\nJanuary, 1974 as mentioned before by forming the four insurance companies by the four schemes already framed in 1973, thre coulcf be no fur, ther'schemes except in . connection with further reorganisation of general insurance busfness and the merger of moreinsurance companies as mentioned in sub-section (1) of *Section 1& ''of tEe . said Act. By the present alleged scheme there was no . merger or reorganisation contemplated,\"•unlike 1974 scheme, ccord\n\ning to the petitioners. The petitioner's contend that merely maki; g: amendment to the terms and condition iS of service of the employees . ' unconnectd with or not necessitated by the reQrganisation of the-\n\n);>uiness or merger or ama!g\\mation of the companies ould n'ot\n\nfall within Section 16(l)(g) of the Act According to the petitioners. lhe' only properly called 'schemes'sanctioned under Secflon 16(1) arethose four 'merger 'schemes of 1973 as would b'e evident trom the ·\n\npreamble to the Act.\n\nThe petitioners further contend tliat under the Life Insurance C, orporation Act, Banking Companies Act, etc. there were poers; to frame regulations independently of reorganisation. But there is no su~ power, . according 'to the petitioners, under the General' Jnsural}ce Business (Nationalisation) Act, 1972. The said notification\n\ntherefore is without the authority of law. It is, further, submitted that the present service conditions .. of the employees unn:Hrted tO<· . . reorganisation of general insurance business or merger or ama1ga- ·•mation of insurance companies, could nat form part of any scheme-. or notification. und'~ section 1 q of the aforesaid Ac~. Section.1 8(7} of the Act would not come into play and the pmvisions of the: Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 rincloding section 94 were applicable-· . : . to the general insurance industry. Therefore tf the compantes wanted to change the service conditions of their employees affecting:; them adversely, they should baye given, the petition1:rs coBtend,.\n\nnotice of changes under section. 9A of the Industrial Disputes Act,. . 1947, negotiated with the employees and arrived at some!lettlerrient\n\nor .. had the dispute adjudicated upon l!nder the said Act. Since; this ha~ not been done, particularlywhen the conciliation proceed- ..\n\n. <\n\n• ,,....,\n\nA.K. BANERJEE V. UNION (Mukharji, J.) 269'\n\nings were still pending in the absence of Government's acknowledge- , ment of failure report of the conciliation officer, the action of the Government in issuing the unilateral notification is bad in law. It is submitted further that impugned n.otification is ultra vires being violative of Article 14 of the Co'nstitution because it discriminated between employees 'similarly situated, ptrticularly in the matter of\n\ndearness allowance and retirement age. . ' .\n\nThe petitioners contend that under the Sick Textile Undertakings (Nationalisation) Act, 1974, the Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1972 etc., spearate companies had been formed on nationafisation. The employees of those companies were entitled to have their service conditions regulated under Industrial Disputes , Act, 1947. In the present case, the employees jhave been deprived : 9f .the existing benefits without following the procedures prescribed under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Therefore, there was discrimination and violation of article 14 of the Constiution. The petitioners therefore contend that the terms and conditions of service enunciated in 1974 being as a result of bilateral agreement, could not be changed unilaterally, to the detriment of th.e employees' fundamental rights to carry on their employment for gain and as such -violative or article 19(1) (g) of the Constitution. It js stated that the notification was illegal, being ultra vires section '16 of the 'Act.\n\nSince, according to the petitioners, such notification deprived the rights of the employees to receive dearness allowance etc. with the rise in the cost of living index without any limit, it is deprivation of property without providing for compensation and is thus also violative of article 31(2) of the , constitution. The petitioners, further, contend that the Constitution 44th amendment deletin/ Articles 31 and I9(t) (f) cannot save the scheme since that Amend~' ment came into force only on 20th June, 1979, whereas the impugned • notification affecting the fights of the employees to emoluments takes et.Tect from 1st January, 1979. It was further urged that the protection of article 31B read with Nineth Schedule of the Constitution was not available to any scheme or notification much less the present one.\n\nThe present notification, according to the petitioners, disregarded the directive-principles enunciated in Article 43 of the Constitution.\n\nThe petitioners therefore ask for quashing the said notification by these petitions under Article 32 of th~ Constitution.\n\nThe second batch of Writ applications ~Writ Petition Nos. 5434-37 of 1980) are on behalf of the employees as well a, s the.\n\n.t:\n\n.270\n\nSUPR.I!MU COUR, T REPORTS 1\n\n[1984) 3 S.C.R.\n\n,; .\n\nGepral Insurance EmpJoyees. Ali India Association challenge the scheme of 1980 more or less on the same though not)dentical grounds mentioned in Writ Petition Nos. 5370-74 of 1980. Interim order ' was passed in the said application regarding payment of dearness aUowance as would appear frotri. t)1e Court's ordec dated 25.8.1981.\n\nIn the said order, dir, ections were given for payment of dearness allowance payable under th! old scheme from the beginning of 1981 -with quarter April, as ell as quarter beginning from July, 1981\n\n1Within ce'rtain time mentioned_in the said order. It was. further, directed that subsequent.dearness allowances' will be paid, in accordance with the directions to be given at the time of disposal of these writ applications, • .\n\n•• In the Writ Petitions Nos. 5370-74 of 1980, there is a petition ·-on behalf of All India National General Insurance Employees Association for intervention. It res presents a Trade Union of work\"\"\" n. men working in the offices of GeneraOnsurance Corporation of lndi~,\n\n.. Bombay as. well as its subsidiaries. They, inter alia, allege that the main petitions have challenged the scheme of 1980 op purely technical grounds and though it would be correct to say that the scheme\n\n--~ ; of 1980 does not meet _the aspirations of the workers wholly as . reflected in the various charters of .demands submitted to the .E maMgement, th; y are of the opinin that the same is not completely bereft of ay merit so that the sa)lle may be quashed by this Court. . ·. · They menti-oned certain additional benefits available in the said . scheme of .1980 in paragraphs 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19 of the said\n\napplication.· They therefore claim right to intervene in the said Writ F application Nos. 5370-74 of 1980. There is 51lso an application by . Senior Assistants of the New India Assrance Company Ltd. and National Confederation of Genera(Insurance Employees, represented by its Vice-president under Order XLVII Rule 6 of the Supreme Court Rules of 1966 praying for\" permission to intervene in these petitions. Upon this an Jinterim order was pased on 24.10.1980. \"; staying the operation of the scheme (operation of the Notification dated 30th September, 1980) and notice was issued in the stay application ..\n\nAll these will qe'disposed of by this judgment.\n\nIt will therefore be necssary, before we examine the contenti.ons raised 'in these ptitions, to briefly consider the scheme of 1980 . . As mentioned before, this scheme is caUe<i the General Insurance\n\n. ~\n\nt - . ...\n\nA.K •. BANERJEE v, UNION (Mukharji, J.) 27n\n\n(Rationalisation and Revision of Pay Scales and other Conditions of .Service 'Of :supervisory, G:lerical and Subordinate Staff) Second Amendment Scheme, 1980. Some new definitrons have been provided by paragraph 2 of 1980 scheme which included the meaning of the 'Company' and under the scheme it. mentioned that the 'Company' would mean the four nationalised comanies, National Insurance Company Limited, the New India Assuranc~ Company Limited, the Oriental Fire and General insurance Company Limited and the United India Insurance Company Limited. Sub paragraph\n\n(ii) of paragraph 2 of the said scheme defines 'Net monthly emolu4 rrients'.\n\nBy sub-paragraph (ii), the amended definition of 'Revised terms', (Revised Scales of .Pay) was inserted.\n\nBy paragraph 3, . adjustment of pay was stipulated on the coming into effect of\n\noperation of 1980 scheme. How the basic pay is to be fixed is provided by 1980 scheme. It also makes detailed provision! as to how the adjustment allowance is to be dealt' with so far as Dearness Allowance, Overtime allowance, Contribution to rovident Fund and other retirement benefits are concerned. Paragraph 51 deals with the ·\n\n'Increments'. Paragraph 6 deals with Earned Leave. and other encashrrient of leave at the time of retirement and death. Paragraph 7 deals with 'Retirement' and stipulates that an employee who was\n\nin service of the Corporation before the commencement of the\n\nI ' scheme of 1980 should retire from service when he attains the age of\n\n60 years .. But an employee, who joins the service of the Corporation after the commencement of the schem~\\vill retire on his attaining\n\n' the age of 53 years. It further stipulates that an . employee would . retire on the afternoon of_ the last day of the month in which he \"attains the age of 60 years' o~ 58 years as the case might be. Clause 8 deals with 'Gratuity'. Clause 10 provides the duration of revised te1ms and stipulates that the revised terms should be continued to oe in force unless modified by the Central Government. Then the Second chedule of 1974 scheme which dealt with Travelling Allowance category, Travel by Road and different allowances for the same, transfer grant were amended and the new Fourth Sehedule\n\nincluded scales of pay to be fixed). on the revised scales of pay indicated therein.\n\nIt is not necessary to set out further details ofthe actual provisions of 1980 scheme. While on behalf of the petitioners, it was contended that the revised .scales of pay. and the terms indud ed l\n\ntherein were highly detrimental t~ the employees concerned, on the\n\n0 ther hand; it was contended on behalf of the Union oflndia as well\n\nE.\"\n\n' ~· i '\n\n' I\n\n.,:\n\n~·\n\n~ I\\,\n\n1.72 ·, SUPRE¥¥ COURT REl'ORTS [1984] 3 s.c.~.\n\nas the General Insurance Company that on the whole, 'the revised s1c; ales of pay provided for better pay. and allowances and better opportunities to he employees concerned. One of the intervener unions alsO states that the 1980 scheme is not completely .devoid of merit. Parties pave taken us through in detail by help of charts and other 'figures in support' of the' respectiv~ cases and contentions. It . is not necess.ary, in view of the nature of the contentions raised . .. \" . ' ' ' ' beforC\\uS, to express any opinion on the merits or demerits of the rival contentions :Or the prties iti respect of the details of ei{her or . - . ' both the schemes. It may. however, be stated that there bas been a ceiling on increase of pay automatically with the increase of the ries in the cost of index. The respondents, namely, the union of India as well as the General Insurance Company, contended that in com paris( n with other employees is governmental sectors or public sector!j, the employees of. the general insurance companies were ''Hi&h -iage landers' and it was necessary to put a ceiling on the emolunients and other amenites in order to facilitate better function. ing of the ip.surance companies concerned as well as subrve the object and ptiq, se of the nationalis'ation policy. The . various defailed items of the scheme of 1974 and. 1980 have to be viewed in this background. ..\n\n' - ' The obsic and, in our opinion, the main questions are-has the Government and the respondents power in law to introduce the 19M scheme and if they hav~ that power, have they exercised that power in any arbitrat)l': and whimsical manner' to deny to the petitio- .. ners any of the fundamental rights and whether the petitioners. have been discriminated against? these, therefore, are the questions an• it is not nect; ssary, in our opinion, to detain ourselves with lengthy . extrcts from the. scheme of 1974 'and ,1980 to examine wicl) is better or ich is detrimental and if so, to what extent. On these~ there will be and are divergent' views. ·•\n\nThe scheme of 1980 has been framed by the Central Govern ment under the authority given to it by the Aci under General . Insurance Business (Nationalisation) Act; 1972. The scope of that ·\n\na)lthority has,· therefore, to be foun<; i u:nder Chapter V t:ontaining sections 16 & 17 of the- Act. We have set out hereinbefore the terms of Sections 16 & 17. Sub-section (1) of Section 16 authorises the Central Government, ~it is ofthe opinon that ~\"for the mote efl- - eiettt carrying or). of .general inmrance business, it is necessary to do so, may, by notification; fram .. oJie or mOre scemes\" proV'I.din , fiDr\n\n* ..\n\nA.K. BANERJEE v. UNION (Mukha, rji, J.) 273\n\n-all or any of the matters enumerated in the different clauses of\n\nsection 16(1) of the said Act, and the matters have been set out in the different clauses of the said sub-section. for the preseot purpose, .t; lause (g) is t; elevant, which gives authority to the Central Govern- , ment to frame scheme for rationalisation or revision of. pay scales\n\n.and other terms and conditions of service of officers and other . employees wherever necessary.\n\nC!ame (j) of the said sub-section gives authority to the Central Government also to frame.scheme for :Such incidental, consequential al)d supplemental matters as are\n\nnecessary to give full effect to the scheme. Therefore, the question\n\nth:rt 'is necessary [Jr this purpose to determine, is, whether the power :given to the Central Government by clause (g) for the rationalisation ,\n\n'()f revision of pay scales and other terms and. conditions of seryice of officers and other employees, whereyer necessary can be said to authorise the Centrai!Government t_o frame the present scheme uncter <Consideration. This must be judged in tconjuction with sub-section\n\n(6) of Section 16 which authorises the Central Governmnt, by notification, to add, to amend or to vary any scheme framed under 'Section 16. The point at issue, is, whether rationalisation or revision of pay scales and other terms and conditions of service of officers and other employees wherever necessary can . authorise the Central Government to frame scheme like the scheme of 1980, which is unconnected with or unrelated to the merge:r of one Indian insurance <:oropany with another imurance company or the formation of a new\n\ncompany by the amalgamation of two or more Indian insurance companies. In order to find that out, it is necessary to read the . provisions of this Act as a whole.\n\nPrimarily, if the words are intelligible and can be given full meaning, we should not cut down their amplitude. Secondly, the purpose!or object of the conferment of the power J; UUSt be borne in mind. Tne first indication of the said object in this case, as is often in similar istatutes, can be gathered from the preamble to the Act. We have noticed the preamble of the present Act. This preamble has also to be read in the light of sub-section (2) of'Section 16 which provides that lthe object of the Central Government in framing the schemes under sub-section ( l) was to give authority to the Centrai Government to frame schemes, to ensure that ultimately there are only four insurance companies (excluding the Corporation) in existence and that they are so situate as to render their combined services effective in all parts of India. 'Sub-section (2), therefore, to a large extent circumscribes the\n\namplitude.of the power given under sub-section (1) of Section 16 of- .the Act. As framing of the scheme is an exercise of the delegated\n\n• \\\n\n . .,,\n\n' ~~\n\nI .\n\n+ ·-\"\n\nA ,\n\n• B\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORJ:S ·\n\n\nauthority by the Central Government, the memorandum Fegarding:. delegated legislation submitted to the Parliament along with the General Inmranee Business (Nationalisation} BiH, 1972 will provide some. guidance also, As we have noticed. that clause 16 of the s, ai<L Bill Which later on oecame Section 16 of the Act' explained the -needl for delegated authority and stated the object as .'to frame one or more scheme for thnrlerger of one Indian insurance company with another or for the amalgamation of the two or more insurancecompani(ts and for matters consequential to such merger or' amalgamation as the case might be'. Bearing in mind that t, his is a. delegated kgislation and keeping in mind that the authority to frame: the scheme must be found within the object of the power given under- Chapter V of the Act and'reading the entire connected provisions. together, it appears tQ us, that the only authority or power to frame . scheme given was for the purpose of merger of one Indian insurance\n\ncompaJ?Y with another for amalgamation of two\"br more Indian insurance companies and for matters consequential to such merger or amalgamation as the case might be. Any scheme though, it might come within the wide expressions used in su~-section (6) of Section 16 as well as clause (g) or clause (j) of sub--section (1) of Section 16,. which is unrelated~ or unconnected with the amalgamation of the insurance companieS or merger consequent upon nationalisation would be beyond the authority of the Central Government. This. has to be So if read in conjupction with sub-section (2) of Section 16 ofthe Act. 1t is evident from the scheme of 1980 that it is not\n\n~ connected with r is not for the purpose to ensure that ultimately ther'e are only four insur<, tnce companies existing and they are SOo .situate as to render comb'ined services effective in all parts oflndia.\n\nIt is true that subsequent to the merger of the four insurance companies, scheme _ as indicated herein-before, dealing with P.rovident Fund, Gratuity etc. have been framed but these, in our opinion, aFe irrelevant when judging the question f the authority to frame a\n\n' ' ' particular scheme which is impugned. It is also true that the scheme of 1974 so far as pay scale was concerned as indicl\\ted in the scheme as .we have set .out hereinbefore provided that the scheme would remain in force initially for a period upto 31st December, 1976 nd thereafter shall continue to be in force unless modified by the Central Government. It is also true hat the employees themselves, as indicated hereinbefore, wanted revision of pay scales and claimed through their nmerous charters of -demands amending or framing of a fresh scheme by the Government on the basis tlrat the Central Government alone had the authotity to frame. fhe scheme under the,\n\nAct, Certain amount of revision of pay scale and other terms and\n\nA.K. BANERJEE V. UNION (Mukharjl~ J;)\n\n27.S\n\nconditions become inevitable. from time to time in all running. busi\n\nness or administrations. Clause (g) of sub-section (1) of Section 16 authorises the Central Gove{nment'to frame scheme for ratiol}atisatioh ahd revision of pay scales and other terms and conditions of\n\nser\\rices of officers and other employees wherever necessary. But it is evidnt that the cheme oJ 1980 impugned 'in these petitions is not related to the .object envisaged in sub-section (2) of Section: 16 of • the Act. In order to be warranted by the object of delegated legislatibn as explained in the memorandum to . the Bill which incorporated Section 16 of the Act, read with the preamble of the\n\nAct, unless it can. be said that the scheme is related to sub-sectjon\n\n(2) o0f SeCtion 16 of the Act, it wonldbe an exercise of power beyond delegation. The duty qr he Court in interpreting or .coristrubi.g a\n\npro-visio'n is to read the sectipn, and understand its meaning in the :context. Interpretation of a provision. or statute . is not a mere\n\nexercise ln sennntics but an attempt to find out the rneani.(lg of the\n\nIegislati'on fron1 the words use.d. understand the context and the purpose of the expressions used and then to construe the epressions .sensibly. ·\n\nThere is another aspect .which has to be kept in mind. The scheme is an exercise of delegated authority. The scope anq ambit\n\nof such delegated 'authority must be spconstrued, i( possible, as not to make it bad because of the vice of excessive delegation of legisia- . tive power. In order to make the power valid, we should so cosntrue. the power, if possible, given under Sectioh .16 of the Act in such . manner that is does not suffer from the vice of delegation of exces4 ' sive leislative authority.\n\nIt is well-settled that unlimited right of delegation is not . inherent in the legislative power itself. This Court has reiteratd\n\nthe aforesaid. principle in Gwalior R!lyon Silk Mfg. ( Wvg.) co: Ltd.\n\nv. The Asstt. Cammissioner of Sales Tax & Ors.{1) The growth of legislative power of the <h.ecutive is a significant development of the\n\n, 20th century. The theory is iaissez-faire has been given a go-by and G\n\n . large and comptehensive powers are being assumed b)l th'e State with a view of improve social an~ eonomic well-being of the ' people.\n\nMst of the modern socio-economic legislations passed by the legislature lay down the guiding principles of the legislative policy. The legislatures, because of limitation imposed upon them\n\n(I) [19741 2 S.C.R. P• 879.\n\n''276\n\n. SUPREME CO~T REI.'ORTS\n\n. [1984] 3 S.C.R~\n\nA r ·nd the. time factor, hardly 'cango irito the matters in detail. The\n\n.' 'practice Of empoweririg the executive to make subordinate legisl~ron\n\nwithin he prescribed sphere h<l; S .volved OUt of practical necesity\n\narid pragmatic needs of the modern welfare State. . .\n\n-··· Reg.arding delegated lgislation, the principle.which as been well-established is that legilaturc must lay down the guidelines, t.he . principles of policy for the. authority . to whom power t~ make\n\nsuborqinate legislation is entrusted. The legitimacy of delegate.d :legislation deBcnds upon its being used as ancillary which the legis- .'lature cons!ders to be necessllry for the pfpose pf exercising its . Igislature power effectively and completely . . The 'legislature must .. retain .in. its own 'hand the essential'legislative function which con.:.\n\n :sists in declaring the lgislative policy and lay down the. standarq :which is to be enacted into a' rle of law' and what. can be' oelegated , s the task of subordinat(: iegish1tlon which by' very nature is ancillary to the st.atute which delegates the power to make it effective provided the legislative policy is enunciated with suff'tcierit clear, ness -or a standard laid down. The courts cannot .and do not interfere on the discretion that undoubtedly rests with the legislature itself fn determining the .extent of \\he delegated . power in a particular cas~.\n\nIt is true that in his case. under Section 16(l)(g), rati.on'alisation or ·revision of pay scales and .other terms and conditions of service of officers and other ·mployees wherever necessary is one of the purpos~ for which scheme can be . framed under Se'ction 16(1) of the Act. :It is also true that incidptal, co.n squenlial and supplemenetary\n\n:ill alters as are necessary' to . give full effect to the schee are also authoriseq under clattS9 (j) of sub-section (I) of Se~:tion 16. It bas also to be borne in mi'nd • that scheme and every' amendment to a scheme framed under. sec.tion . 16 shaH be lid as soon as may be after.'itis made before each Huse of Parliament. The last provision is indicative of the power of superintendence that the legislature maintains ovet the subordinate iegislation of scheme frmed by the . . delegate under the authority gjven under the Act. , From that point.\n\nofview, it is possible to consid.er as indeed it was argued on behalf . bf the respondents in ihis\" case, that having regard to the fat that one . of the objects of the Preai:rj.ble is regulation and control of general insurance .business and other. mltters connected therewith. or inci\n\ndental thereto. and having regard to the fact that rationalisation and_ . revision of .pay scales whenever necessary . was one of the objects'\n\nenvisaged under sub-section (1) alongwith clause (j) of sub-section.\n\n(1) of Section 16 of Section 16 read with the safeguards of section\n\n.. A..K. BANJ:RJEE v. UNION (Mukharji, J.) . 277\n\n. -~ 17-aswe nave 'Set out hereinbefore in case of revision and rationalisa-\n\n-~. 'tio~ of pay spates whenever it bcomes neces.saryl as in this case,\n\n~ .accordipg to the respondents, it had become necessary, the scheme ·\n\n~ -Qf 1980 wa~ prmissible within th~ delegated authority:·. But we\n\nrnust bear in ininc\\ the observatio.ns of Mukhe:rjea, J. iri The Delhi Laws'l1) case to the following etrect' : ·\n\n''The. essential legislative function consists in the deter-\n\n::.. 'mination or choosing of the legislaive policy and .of enact- / ing that_ plicy into a binding rule of conduct. It _is open to . ·-the legislature to formulate the policy as broadly and with as\n\n little or.as -much 9etails as it thinks proper and it may dele. o ·:gate tbe rest of the legislative work to a subordinate autho- -' tity who will work out of the details ithin ihe framework of\n\nthat policy\". ' ·\n\n.--.\n\nBut as explained• befote the Act must be read as a whole. _,. 'The Act must be read in conjunction with the preamble to the Act .and in conjunction .with the memorandum in Clause No. 16 of the Bill which introdued the Act in questia1_1.\n\nBut above all it must be .. read in conjunction with -sb-section (2) of ection l6 of the Act which clearly indicated the object of framing the scheme under Section 16(1) of the Act. The auth-ority and cope for subordinate legislation can be read in either of the two ways ; name'ly one which .creates wider delegation and one which .res.tricts that delegation. In 1our opinion, in view of the _language of sub-section (2) of Section 16\n\nand the memoandum to the 'Bill, in the peculiar facts of this case the one which restricts tlie delegation. must be preferred to the other.\n\nSo read, in otir opiniqn, the authority under Section 16 under the .(fifferent ciause of sub-section (1) must pet(_) SQbserve the.object ' as envisaged in subsection (2) of Section 16 of the. Act,_ and _ ifit is so read than framing of a. scheme for purposes mentioned .\n\nin different clause of 'sub section (1) . of Section 16 must be 4il relat~ tQ the aalgamation or merger of the insurance companies _\n\nas . envisaged both in the memorandum pn delegated legislation as well as sub-section (2) Of Section 16, We may mention ' in this connection that in the case of A. V. Nachane & Another v.\n\nUnioi, of-India & Aiz(f)ther,(~) this cnention of delegated legislation was .adverted to. In that case the Court was concerned with Life\n\n~ (1) £l'SlJ S.C.R. 137.\n\n~) (1,12] 2 S.C.R 246.\n\n' ..\n\n. #\n\n' .\n\n!il !· p ;.,_ :.·\n\ni ' ...\n\n'~ I ! ,:\n\n278 $UP.Roi£ coiJ'Rr ilii>oP.is. [1984j 3 S.C, Jt. . .\n\n. A - Jsurance orp.oration (Amendment)·. Act, 1981 where the Plicy of: ''the Act as stated in the -preamble ·?f the Amendment Act was th ' \"for securing the interets of the Life lnsuram; e Cor~JQrarion :~ India and its policyholders and to control, the cost of administra tion, it is ecessary that revision of the terms. and condition o£·\n\nB < • service applicable to the emplorees and agents of the Corporntion: should be undertahn expendiously. That was the object or the Act in question. ·. Unfortunately that is not the object indicated: as the objec:t of the power to frame sceme under Section 16 or the\n\n- present Act.'. In view of that object mentioned in the said decision.\n\nand for other reasons in the case of.f.V. Nac!Jane &: Anbtherv c Union of /ndi~ & Another (supra), this Court held that the Act;~ question did not suffer from the vice of excessive dekgatioo. In . view of what we have stated herdnbefore, the scheme of 1980 sofar as it is not related to the amalgamation or merger of insuranee companies, it is !lot 'warranted by sub-section (I) of Section 16. If\n\nthat be 5o, the scheme. must be held to be bad and bcyon~ au tho- ~~· .\n\nThis being the position, it is not necessary to eaminc the various other contentions raised in this case. Various contentions havebeen made. Both sides relied on various dcciion$ i'n support of their respective contentions. Both sides relied on the decisins dealing with the employees of the Life Insurance Corporation and the ,\\cts and the _amendments in connection with their terms of employment. We will ju>t note the decisions. Reliance .was placed on the decision ill\n\nhe cas, of MaJmJ Mohan Pathak v. Union of httlia & Or.<, Erc.(ll , The question in that decision was that the validity of Section 3 <>fthG _.Life lrburance Corporation (Modification of Settlement) tiel, 1976. ~\n\nThe questions involved in that decision, in the vi~·\\\\ \\l\"e htW~ takcn'as- -.1 well as in the facL1 of the instant case, arc not relevant. In last mentioned Cae there Was a Writ pdition which was allowed b)' the learned single Judge of th~ High Cout 1111d appeal was pr-eferred>\n\nfrom that decision. During the pendency of the appeal, thr~ as\n\nan amendment to the Act namely, the life Insurance Corporuon (Modificatior of Settlement) Act, 1976. In-the Letters Putent Appeal, the Corpoation stated that in view of the imptlgned Act, there wiiS no nectbctty f_or procetding with_ the appeal and the Division Doc~ of Calcutta . H•gh Court made no order. on. the said npp(l11. ThtS.\n\n,1) (1918]3 S.C.R. 334.\n\n\\~:-~~-r . . ' .\n\nI . . . ;.>..\"K. Jl:\\~L\"RJ~I! v. W!ON (;1/uk/wr}i, J.) . . 2; 9\n\n _.· '. rt hlcl among otb; r things tl; at tlie rights r .the ~1rties had I\n\n.-ccu 11• ed in the JUdgment and became the basis of a Mandamus . rysta 11 . . 1 :1 b . .\n\nH'gh Coutt and 1t cou • not e taken away by mdirect fashion fthe I d by the Act undcr.chalknge before this Court. , . propose ·\n\nF . h-andrachud ,' J .• as th_e l 1arnd. Chief iustice then was, spak f. : for himself and Fzal. All and Shanghai, JJ: concurred with the I' .mg · 1 h · -majority vJ\":w on the bsl:i t.J.lt t e tmpugned Act violated Article j1(2}of the Constitu _lion and Wds therefore void. Bhugwati, J. speak- : iog for himself and_ on behalf o~ I yer & Desai, J J. was of the view . \\.,·that irr.espective of _wheth_cr the Impugned Act was constitutionally\n\n-, valid or not, the CorporatiOn was bound to obey the writ of Manda- (· 111us issued by the High Court and to p:y the bonus for the. year : 1975-76 to class Ill and Cl:m IV em;>loyees. The said. learned\n\n~ judgs held that writ of Mand .\\ms w:ts !lOt touched by the impugn- ' d Act. The other observations of the said Judges as well as the 'J -~Jlher learned Judges are not rkvnnt in the view we have taken. In\n\nl . instant CJSe before us we uJ n•lt have any cHe of settlement which\n\n was the subject matter there bctw<!en the workers and .tbe e.mployers f .and the rigllls flowing therefrom. , .. ,.\n\nI .\n\nReliance was also placed on th~ decisio.n in the case of Tlte ; lift luuran;:e Corpararlon of fndla v. D.J. Baltadur & OTs{1). as well\n\nas th~ decision in the case of A. V. N.J.:hane & Allotlter v. Union of. E .• . lni,!t & Anorltrr . (supra). In the view 'we have taken, it is not •\n\n-uecessary to examine these d~isions in C:ktail. In those cases, the\n\nquestion under consideration was the Life Insurance Corporation . Act, 19_56 and the subsequent amndments thereto as well as certain\n\n~;~ -ordrs_m respect of the same. i ' The basis upon which the aforesaid two decisions proceeded i, -.ere (a) a right had crystallised by thll directions in IJJ. Bahadur's Ci1$e ( • . . tf pra) and this could not be :dtered.or taken away except by\n\nfur~:h •ndustrial sc:ulemcnt or uward or by relevant t.:gislatlon and . .\n\nin~ •; relevant lcgblation which WJS the subjct matt.:r of challenge ·. G .had • Nochtm~'j' cas-: (supra) c-Jn not take away th~· rights which tvid nctcfrued to the 'emnloves with retrospective effect. As. is •II ro I ,. _ . . .· -.liffcr. rn 1 le facts of the case be Tore us, the 'situation is ent1rely\n\n-;, hct~:t. We un: conccrncJ here with the questi'on primarily r the schc d 'f · h , ·. me 1~ au_thoris.:d by tli.: Act un 1 1t 1s so aut pons- -· ... . l] I, S.C.R. 1033.\n\n~ l\n\n.:i\n\n; \\' ·{. f :; \" ' )! ,, 'i • ·; .t l\n\n:':1 il\n\nj . ~~\n\n'.i\n\nI I\n\n' l [,1984] 3 s.c . .._. 1\n\n_A . ed the question is . whether the Act in question is consiiiution 1·1\n\nSUPREMJ! COU~T REPORTS ·\n\n' h h' h a Y \"alid in the sense it had taken away any ng t_s w 1c had crystal!' :.. ed or whether it infringed Article 1'4 of the Constitu_tion. The~~ decisions also deal with the question whether a special legislation would supersede a general legislation and which legislation cold beconsidered. to be a special legislation.\n\nIt may be noted that we arc not concerned with any settlement or award. In t_hat view of the-,' matter, it is not necessary to detain ourselves with the said decisions.\n\nand the various aspect dealt with in the said decisions. .\n\nAnother aspect that was canvassed before us was whether ; ; Section 16 of the 1972 Act with which we arc concerned in any way 'I affected any ndustrial dispute and whether Jhe provisions of sub- I section {5) of Section 16 or sub-section (7) of Section 16 in any way curtailed any 'right in respect of any industrial dispute and if so.,. whether the General Insurance Business (Nationalisation) Act, 1972 ,\"j is a special legislation or whether !he Industrial Disputes Act, 194T is a special legislation in respect' of adjudication of rights between-. the employees and the emplo)'er.\n\nIf we bad held that the scheme of 1980 was permissible within, the power delegated under Section I 6 of the Gcnc:rl Insurance E . Business (Nationalisation) Act, 1972, it would have been necessary\n\nfor us to discuss whether there is any conflict between the provi~ sions of the said Act and the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and if so~ which would prevail. sction 16(5) of the 1972 Act, aS: we have noticed earlier, stipulates that notwithstanding anything contained in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 or iu any other law l' for the time being in force, the transfer of the services of any officer or othfr employee of an Indian insurance company to the acquiring company shall not entitle any such office! or other employee to any compensation under thut Act or other law and 00 such claim shall be entertained by any court, tribunal or ; ther authority. This, to a. c certain extent• clearly txc!udcs the operation of the Industrial Dis~\n\nputs Act, 1947 in respect of disputes arising on the tranfcr of the: busrncss of goeral insurance. There is no such question bef<Jrt us.\n\nHad it been posiblc to hold that the scheme of 1980 wus v; lic.l i[).\n\npropr c.terche of the authority under Section 16 of the Act. a\n\nq~stJOn would have , arisen as to whether the ceiling an_d othr con- 8 dillons on emoluments coulc.l be imposed on the employees in the manner proposed lo be done under the scheme of 1980 withoutreference to the procedure for adu}ication of these matters under tbC\n\nA.K. BANERJEE v. UNION (Mukharji, J.) 281'\n\nIndustrial Disputes Ac; t, 1947. Then the question had to be judged by reference to sub-section (5) .and sub-section (7) of Section 16 of the 1972 Act. Section i6.empoweFed the. Goveni.ment by nptification to add to, amend or very any scheme framed under Section 16(1 ).\n\nSub--section (7) provides that the provisions of this section, namely Section 16 of the 1972 Act and onmy sch.eme under t shall have effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or any agreement, award or other instrument for the time being iri force.\n\nWe have noticed the scheme of 1980: That schem~ puts certain: new conditions abou~ retirement, about emeluments and _ <>tber benefits of the empioyees. It may be noted that the applica- tion of Industrial Disputes Act as such in general is not .abrogated by the provisions of 1972 Act, nor made wholly inapplicable in respect of matters not covered . by any provisions of the. scheme.\n\nThis aspect is important and must be borne i~ n1ind.\n\nWrongful dismisal, other disciplinary proceedings, unfair labour practices, victimization etc. would _still remain unaffected by. any scheme or. any pfovision of the Act. The only relevant and material question that would have arisen, is, whether in ca?e where a statutory ceiling whith one f the counsel for the petitioners tried .to describe as \"statutory gherao on rise of increase in emoluments and o_ther benefits with the rise in the cost of index of prices\" affected the position _under the Industrial Disputes i\\ct: 194 7. •It may be noted as we have noted before that this. is not a case where any dispute was pending before any tribunal or before any authority\n\nunderthe Industrial Dis_putes Act, 1947 between the workmen con- . cerned and ihe insurance companies. Though there was conciliation proceedings, the conciliation proceedings could not rach to any successful soluti(; m and the Coi1ciliation Officer has mad~ a report failure of conciliation. The Goverment had the report Thereafter the Government has not referred the dispute to_ any industrial tribunal \"ut . has framed a scheme which is the subject matter of challenge before us. It cannot, in our opinion, be said that conciliat ' tion proceedings or any proceeding under the Industrial Disputes . Act were pending and therefore i.n the middle of the proceedin-gs under the Industrial Disputes Act,· the Government had acted an_d, framed the scheme _and as such th\" same was bad and i'!Jegal. There. were no proceediogs pending under _the Industrial Disputes _Act~\n\n1947. With the finding of the Conci_iiatfon Officer, the Government_\n\n. ' '\n\n' ..\n\n SUPRFJ4£ COURT REPORTS [1984] 3 s.C:R.\n\nha(\\':t\\\\10. options, either reaching a s-ttleme1,1t or framiDg a 5cheinc .\n\n1 on the one hand• Of to make a• reference to the tribunal ohhc\n\ndispute. regaring the points mentioned in the demands of the work:-. men. T:here is .. one factual dispute which, in our opinion, is.. not\n\nv.ey material. According to the petitioners, the <; Jovernment had . not. acknowledged the recipt of the failure report of the Concilia\n\ntion Officer. Acoording to he . rspop.dent~, the receipt \\vas acknowledged ; the. failure of the. conciliation proceeding~ however, is admitted_. 'No .further steps or proeedings were required as such.\n\nThe Government had. to assess on the failnre of the conciliation\n\npceedigs either io refer the matter to the tribunal or to take such steps as it considred necessary. lf.th~ Go:venunent had not taken anj! ofthe steps, then it was open, if the employees concerned wero io.an)cway aggrieved, t~ take appropriate proe<:edings agaJnst the Gov.erument for doing so. As mentioned hereinbefore if the scheme was belfto be valid, then the qu.e.stion what is the general law and what . is the speciallaw anq which .law in case of conflict would prevail wou.ld have arisen and that would have necessitated-the. application of the principle \"Generalia s.pl.'ialibus no1i d1rcgant\".\n\nTfie, general rule .to be fqllow.cd in case of conflict etween , t\\vo statutes. is tliat tbe late; abrogates the eatlter one.\n\nIn< otber words, a prior speialla.W would yi.~Jd tQ aJa_ter genral law, if ether.of the\n\n' . ' . .. . ( two f9Uo.wing c()nditions is satisfied. . . ·\n\n(i) The two are in<; onsistcnt with each other . • • . . . (H) There is some express reference in the latr to the.\n\nearlierenactment.\n\n. - If either of these tWO. conditiOnS is fulfilled, the Jater law, even though generl, would.prevail. . .\n\nJJt.\n\nFromthe text and the. decision~, four tests. are. deducible and.\n\nG . these ate : (i) The I_egislat1:1re bs the undubted rig lit to a, ltr a !a~ ..\n\nalre3cdy promulgated through subsequent legislation, ·(ii) A special law may be. al!erga'ted or repealed 'by a later general bw by a a express. provision, (iii) A i{l.ter. general law will override prior special law iftbe two are so repugnarit to each other that they c_al)not' co-eist even though no express provision in that behalf is found in th~ li genc; r~I Iw, and (iv) It is. only in. the ab5encc of a . provision to the\n\n_contrary and of a cler incosistency that a spciaJlaw wiJrremin wholly unaffected .by a later gen, eral 1aw.\n\nSee in this connction .• tt.\n\n,. \"'\n\n' ;.\n\nA.K. BANERJEE Jl, U'NlOJ.~,(Mulfltttrji, J,) 28-3\n\n~well on \"The lltmftlltion.<?f~.~tutes\" Twlfth Eqjtion; pages\n\nl~{i-19S. . .\n\nThe question was posed in the cse of 'file Life Insutance C<!r~ . poration of India v. D.J. Bahadur & Ors, (supra) where at page 1125, Krishna lyer, J. has dealt yvjth the aspect of th~ quetjon. There B the learned Ju9ge pose~ tl').e que!lti}l!l wi1ether the LTC Act was a • special legislation or a .geQeral legislation.\n\nRefrence in this. connecion may alo be mad~ on Cra.ies .on \"St<J, tute (aw\" Seventh Edition (1971) paras 377~3.8'2,.bp~ it has to be l:)rope in mind that ·-primary intention has .to be given effect to. Normally two aspects of the question woyld hav:e uemnded imwr&l if th~ sc;:hn:ie.of < c 1980 was held to bo valid on the first ground s w.e have disclls~; ed, {)ne is whether the Gel)~:'l..L)nural)ce Busins.s (Nntionalis~'\\on) Act, 1972 is a specil sttWe ang the Indusrial Diputs Act, 1947 . .\n\n'~ a general Act or vice v.t:rsa, !!.nd seconly wh5:tpcr there is a, ny --expressprovision in the General Insurance Business (Nationali~~\n\n1ion) Act, 1972 which deals with the &ubject. Now in.this .case \\XC\n\nhave categoricalreferenyY to the Industdal Disputes A_ct, 1941 in '$Ub-section (5) and suqsectioo (7) of Section 16 9f .the General Insurance Business (Nationalisat-ion) Act, 1972. There is, however, one apeCt where i, t would have bec;:.n neceS, suy ha9 Wf( heJd the .\n\n'Schmc to be vlid ohrwise, if there h. ad been no Genert insurance ~sinss {N ationalistion) Act, 1972, then (he employees -ould have been eJ?ti.tled to .ra!~.e a dispute on the question o( in~\n\n· frease of emoluments and revision of pay scale J¥ith r.ise in the cost ()f index • of the prices under the Jndust'rial Disputes Act, 1947 . . In such -a situation, the Government, after conciliation proceedings, ·.was empowerd to .make a referene if it considered so necessary . having regard to the nit.ure of the disputes raised .. Though it qm- . not be said that reference was a matter of right but it was within the\n\nrealm of power of tb.e Government and the Government has a duty\n\n:toact with discretion on rele:vai}t coosideratins. to make or ncit to .make a reference taking into consideration the facts and circum- : ~1ances of ea.ch case .. TQ that limitesl ete:~H it coul<l hve. en said\n\n, that this right or powr las be!!n c.u.rtaile9 by the Genera). Insra, nce\n\n. Business (Nation.alisation) Act, 9.72, if tqf! sl}me ww; qth.erwi:~~ .\n\n- '\"i:lid.\n\nHaving regard to the -context in which the question now arises H 'llefore us, in our opinion, there is no questipn i, s o whe-qer the\n\n'JlrOvisions of Industrial Disputes Act would vre:vjJ . 9Vf. tqe.'provi-\n\n' .\n\n. .\n\n\n. '[1984] 3 S.C.R~ ·:\n\nsions of General Insurance Business (Nationalisation) Act. -:There is no industrial dispute pending as such. The Gneral lnsranc~ . Business (Nationalisation) Act, 1972 has not abrt>gated the Indus-- . trial Disputes Act, 1957 as. such.\n\nThe question of the application of the principle of \"Genraliir specialibt1s non derogant\" has been. dealt with irt the case of J.K •.\n\nCotton Spining & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of u:P. & Ors.t1)' Some 9f these aspects were also discuss_ed in the case of U.P. State: Electricity Bodrd & Ors; v. Hari Shanker Jain and Ors,(2)\n\nHad it been possible to. upbold the scheme of 1980 as being: within the power of 1972.Act, it would have been also.necessary for us to consider whether such a scheme or Act would have been constitutionally valid .in the context of fundamental rights under Article-\n\n14, article 19(l)(g) and artiCle 31 of the Consttution and th~ effect of the repeal of article 31 by the 44th amendment of the Constitu-· tion. The General Insurance.· Business (Nationalisation) Act was; put n the Nineth Schedule of the Constitution as item.95 orr lOth- August, 1975. .The effect of putting a particular provision in the: Nineth Schedule at a particular timy has been considered by thi~\n\nCourt in the case of.of Prag fee & Oil Mills & Anr. Etc. v. Uniotl of India.<'3) It was held by the. learned Chief Justice in the said decisionr. . thaton a plain reading o( article 31A, it could not. be said that the protective umbrella of the Nineth Schedule took in not only the· acts and regulation~ specified thereiti but also orders and ntifica-_ tions issued under those acts and regulations.\n\nTherefre if any rights of the . petit.ioners had beeil. affected by the scherne of 198oi then th, ose.rights would not enjoy immunity from being scrutinised: simply because t.he Act unaer which the scheme was framed haibeen put in the .. Nintl1 Schedule. In any event any right whick. accrued to the porsons concerned prior to the placement of -the Act in the\"Nineth SchedtJfe cannot be retrospectiv_ely affected byr the impugned pr<)visions. ·\n\nIt was contended that the rights of the peritiones under article 19(1 )(g) have been affected by the iml)ugned legislation. and the: . scheme framed thereunder. Empo)Vering the Government to frame:-\n\n. shemes for carrying out the purpose of the Act, does not, in our\n\nI H\n\n(I)\n\n1961] 3 S.C.R. 185:\n\n(2) .[19791 1 S.C.R. 35S •\n\n. (3) [19781 3. S.C.R 29J.\n\n...\n\nA.K. BANERJEE v. UNlON (Mukharji, J.) 285\n\noptmon, in the fects an~ circumstances' o( the case, 'in any way, A. affect or abridge the fundamental , rights of the petitioners anq would not attract artiqle 19(1) (g). ,\n\nThe other aspect 'which was canvas~d before us. was whether the Act and the. scheme in question violate9 'article 14 of the.\n\nConstitution: This question has to be understood from two aspectsf\\ namely whether making a provision for sala'ry and emoluments of the petitioners who are the employees of the General Insurance .Corporation specijicaly and differently from the empwyees of other\n\n})ublic section undertakings is dcriminatory in any. manner or not and the other question, is,· wether making a prov.ision. for the employees of General Insurance Corporat_ion for settlement of their dues by schemes and not leaving the. question open to the general provisions of Industria] Disputes f'\\ct, 19~7 is discriminatory and violative of the rights of the employees.\n\nIt is true tbat sometimes there have. been rise . in emoluments with the rise io the cost of.indee in certain public sector corporatios: The legislature however is free to recognise the degree of harm or evil and to make provisions for the same. In making dis-similar provisions for one group of public sect\"Or undertakings does not per se make a law discriminatory as such.. It is well-settied that COtlts will not sit as super-legislature and strike down a particular classification on the ground that any under-inclusion namely that some others have ben len untouched so long as there is no vio1ation of constitutional restraints: It was contended that the application of • . the Industrial Disputes Act not having been excluded from the Nationalised Textile Mills, Nationalised Coal 'and Coking Coal .Mines and Nat'ionalised Banks but if and is so far as it excluded the appllcation o.f the Industrial Disputes Act, in case of general insurance companies, the same is arbitrary and bad. In this connection . reliance may be placed on the observations of the learned Chief . ·\n\nJustice in the case of 'Special Courts Bill197~'.(1) The same principle was reiterated b~ this Court in the case of State •of Gujarat and Anr.\n\nv. Shi Ambica Mills Limited, Ambedabad etc.(2) In that case, this 'court was of the view that in the matter of economic legislation or\n\ntefom, a provision would not be struck down on the vice of under inclusion, inter alia, (or the reasons tht 'the legisfature could' not be\n\n\n~ (2) [19741 3 S.C.R. 760 \"·\n\n(\\984] 3. s:c:R~\n\nA . ~; cqair{'.d:to impose \\l.POl; l dJn~tr~}ive agect~ ta*. W}1lc~. cu\\l,<J\n\nnot be<(.)atried .o.ut 01 whic.h ms.~ be. crri, e!, i; l}.t o.tl a Ia~¥ ~~~~a .single 'Stroke. It was further reiterated th~~ piec~~<!-l appr(j)acb to a,\n\n ; geQ.erl problem~ permitted by under-inclusive classifications, is sopletimes juStified when it is considered that legfslatures d'eal with such prblems USU?IIY on an expetimehtat.ba'sis. It is impossible to . 1ell how successful a particular approacl) trtigfrt be, what disloc-ation .\n\nmight occur, and what situa.tion might develop and what new evil\n\n.J)\n\n. ·. ' might be generated in. the attempt.· Administrative eJtpedients. must he forged and teste~.\n\nLeislators rcogni.irJg t!Iese factors might wish to proceed cautiously, and couJts m1:1st allow thernto do s.9.'. This pinciple was again reiterated. in the Constitution Bench decision.ofthis Court' in the case of R.K .. Garg ~~~. v. Union of India & Ors. tc.( 1)\n\nAs tliere was no indstrial dispute pending, we are of the opinion .that o~ the ground that the . petit.ioners bave been chosen out of a vast body o{ workmen to b~ discriminated aainst aud\n\nexcludin~ them fron;:~ the operatio~ of lndustril Disputes At, there\n\nha~ been no viQl\\ltion of Article 14 oft.he Copstitution. This question, however, it \"must be. emphasised again, does .not really arise in the wiew we have taken. .\n\nBefore us it was rcontended that sick mills whkh have been\n\n~ationalised have bee~ treted differently. than general jnsuranee .employees under 1972 Act ip. Section 16(5) and Section 16(7) and in . the scheme framed under the General Insurance Business (Nation:::- . lisafon) -Act, . 1972. The object and .purpose o•f tl; e Sick Textile\n\nUndertakings (Natior; alisation) Ac.t, 1974, was \"reorganising and rehabilitating such sick textile undertakings so as to subset:\\'e the\n\ninterest~ of genera) public by :augmentation of the products and\n\nsJistriution at fair prices f different varities of cloh and yarn\"7 The basic objective of the .said Act. was rehabilitation of the sick textile mil!s.\n\nTht~.t was different from the purpose of the present · Act.• The sick textile units had tinder them the bulk o~ their emplo yees as. W9rk1t1el1 tho; e wi10 came under the provisions of Industrial .\n\nDisputs Act; Section 14 of.the said Act stjitUtOI:ily recogni9es te special . position of th~ workmen as contra-distinguished. ffom the other employees by enacting . seperate. provisions in t:his respe<; t thereon. Further-more it has to be borne in mind that the aforesaid\n\n- • .. • • • • +\n\n(l) [1982] l S C.R-,947 ..\n\n. f\n\n,-h .. ·\n\n• 1\n\n• A.K. BANE'RJEE v. VNIOi'4 (M'tikh(trji, J.)- 281\n\nAt~ was -<::ancerii'hi wftlh the e'Mni.r{n:t attntation of production . A . :and disfflbufum.Of certit1n iroth 'and yarn which are commodities.\n\nessential to 'the ilationa:l economy \\iein~ imp.ortant consumer items ..\n\nTherefore 'the 'case of the t'fnployees of sick textile Ulldleitakings: .. Whtch ha-s been mflltiorted by the petitioners an'd argued before US;\n\nciitndt be ~6inpitte~ OJl shni1ar anes ;_, n tespect of. this aspect With tn'e present ptt1tioners. We ''/ould have rejected this subrnission on a behalf 6f'tlie peti(roners, hM it been necessary fdr us to .do so but in. tb:'e view that h'a's been tak\"e'b, it is not necessary.\n\nAtiott1e'r item mentioned o':!fOre us was tire employees of Coking- .\n\nCoal Mines (Nati&ralisatioh) Act, 1972.· It has to be.borne in mind ' that the object covered by 'the schem! of th:e Act was entirely 'diffe~\n\nrent 'from the General fnsurance Business (Natioballsation) Act,·\n\n19'72. 1'he Coki-rrg Coal Mines (Natiomli'sation) A1::t, 1972 was . entrcted to provide-for the transfer ol the interest 6f the owners' f\n\nsuch mines an(! also the transfer 6f the interest of owners of coke oven plants with a view 'to \"reorg1mising and recdnstructi.ng such cO'al mines and pbnts for the purpose of protecting, serving and permitting scientific de.velopment of resources of coking coal nee'ded. to meet the growing requirement of iron & steel industry\" .. Accor~\n\nding totbe normal prcvlent view, the workmen of Cokirig Coal Mines were sweate~ labour. These \\vorkmen constituted very large percentage of the employes. The act-in question namely the Coking . E:\n\nCoal M_ines (Nationalisation) Aet recognised the independent exis tence -c, f the said workers as a class. It has also to be kept in mind that coking coal is a commodity very vital to the national economy and prime raw materialS of iron & steel industry which is a basic ·. industry. The workmen employed ijl. the coal mines were also sweated labour, Their special position was also statutorily recognise(\\\n\nin the said Act: Coal-is also one of. the basic materials required to sustain gro:wth.\n\nThe provisions of Coking Coal Mines (Nationalisa~ tion) Act have been considered in detail and the special feature has been taken note of in the case of Tara Prasad Sing(l etc. v. Union of India &Ors(1). According to the respondents, Class Ill and Class G; IV employees of the General Insurance Company are high wage earners. They are islanders -by - themselves-accorqing to the\n\nrespondents. It is true that judges shoul(not bring their pers<;>nal knowledge into action in deciding. the controversy before the Courts but if common knowledge is ay guide, then undoubtedly these\n\n Hr . • '\n\n(1) [1 ,80] 3 S.C.R. 1042.\n\n~ .\n\n'il: .\n\n~88\n\n.SUPREME .COURT REPORTS\n\n(1984) 3 S; C; R.\n\nemptoyeesareveryhigbly paid in _compaison to mny ()tbers. The object ofthe Genr&-1 Insurlmce B.usness (Nationalisation) Act, 1972 is to run the busines~ efficiently so that the funds available might be utilised for socially viable and cor~ project~ of natioal 'importace. -From O!le point of yiew the Nationalised Banks and the Insurance ·\n\nCompanies for. the purpose· of . applicability or otherwise of the' .\n\npryisionsof t.he Indusrial Dl.sputes Act .canot' be treted as bel on ging , to one class: . Historical reasons . provide an intelligible .. differentia distinguishing Nationalis.ed l.Dsurance. Companies 'from,· .ihe Ntionalisea Banks. The reason suggested by the respondents ·. was that priOT to Banks Ntio-nalisation,. Industrial disputes between\n\n\\orkroen and the Banks .were treated since 1950 on All India basis with the totality of the-banks being involved therein. Several awards. have. ben made . treating them_ as su6idik'e Shastri Awar~, 1953.\n\nShastri Award Tribunal wasconstituted witli a :view to settle the disputes of the workmen of tbe Bnks with all commercial Banks (excluding Co-oprative Banks etc.) on the ope hand and the emplo\n\nyee~ on the other. Desai Award, 1.962 bipartite settlement between Indian Banks Association and the Ex.change BatJks Assodatin on .· . tb(( one hand and AU India ank Employees Associatton and AH lncfta Bank Employees Federation on the other, are some of t.he examples. As against this, prio! to th~ Act in question befre us, disputes between insurance companies arid their. work!Jlen were . settled on independent company' basis w_ith no All India projections ·.involved. It in.aY also be noted th.at unlike the case of some banks, there is no existi!lg award or settlement with the petitioner-6 emploees . of the general insurance companies . and .the for insurance companies. The financial resources, structures and functions of the Banks are-different from thqse of the insurance companies. It may also be noted as was pointed out to us on behalf _of the espondents (hat Bank's Class III. and IV employees are about. 4,85,000 in 198l . as compared to irisuance companies which empioy. about ,25,000 Class Ill and class IV employees.· Therefore for' the :PUrpose . of raiionalisation; the insurance companies . wanted to curtail their emoluments _on a small scale. -It cannot be said that there are no ·\n\ndist:'ingihing fators and that _for choosing a partiular . group for . eperirneot, the respondents should be.fourid guilty o£treating people differently \\llhile they' are alik~ in all ni(\\terial respects. :\n\n' . Differentiation is not always discriminatory. If there is a -.• . rationl!l nxus on ll1e. basis of which differentiation has been made with .the object sought to be acaieved by particular. provision,. then. .Qlch .differentiation . is noi . discriminatory and does a•t\n\n' \"'\n\nA.K'. BANERJEE v. UNION (Mukharjil J.) 289\n\n'\\'!alate the principles of article 14 of the Constitution. This principle\n\n:is too well-settlM now to be .reiterated by reference to cases. There\n\nis intelligible basis for differentiation. Whether the same result. or better result could have been achieved and better basis of differentia- ,\n\n. tion evplved is witin the domain of legislature and must be left to\n\n'tpe wisdom f the legislatu, re. Had it een held that the scheme of ·. B 198\\l was within the authodty given by the Act, we would have rejected the challenge to the Act and the scheme under article 14 ·()f the Constitutioil .\n\nIt was also urged before us on behalf of the respondents that c the petitioners being employees of public sector undertakings, and\n\nthese are economic instrumentalities pf the State and having regard\n\nto the contents and .contour of the concpt of public employment .as developed 'in the Iridian legal system, an employee in a public -sector can be approximated with and treted as a government\n\n'l!iervant. Having regard to the principles which govern the employer D '.and employee relationship in the governmental sectors, .the condi-\n\n.tions of service of employees in public employment should be -exclusively governed by the statute and by the rules and regulations 'framed thereunder. Predication of such power would necessarily exclude the provisions oflndustrial . Disputes Act and the principles of collective bargaining just as these would exclude the principles of E\n\no.ntractual relationship in such mtters. The point is interestitJ.g.\n\nHoweer, in the view we have taken; we neep p.ot discuss this aspect :any further. . ·\n\nIt was further submitted on behalf of the respondent that the ntionale, justification and the genesis of the law of nationalisation F being the creation of economic instrumentalities to -subserve the .constitutional and adfll'tinistrative goals of governance in a social welfare society, the running of public s.ector undertakings is neither for profit earnng of the management nor for sharing such profits with the workmen alone but to utilise the investible .funds available as a result of such ventures and undertakings for socially-oriented goals laid down by the governmental policies operating on the said sectors. In this connection reference was made before us to the decision in the case. of State'of Karnataka & Anr. etc.·~. Rangantha .Reddy & Anr. etc.(l)\n\nJ. {191$] 1 S.C.R. 64'1 at pages 672, 676 & 691.\n\n \"- __ .;._, . ., __ .\n\n29J SUPRB~IE eouar: REP.ORTS [193-lj 3 S.C.R~-\n\n. A. . . . .>(!pfoy'fuent in tb(!:pubHc s:ectot .undertakings erijoy.s. a statuh ·· nwas submitted th.at botlfbistbtically as well as a matter of.Hrw, the~\n\n': publiC\"sectdr utidertakli)gs being the economic . insti:timeritatrties or .tlie Stite ad dischargin~· the obligations which tlie Stafehave, the\n\nemployees of such undertakings iit principle. cannot be distinguished~ from the employees in the govetninennervices~ In this c6nnection B our.atterition was drawn to the case of Suklulev Singh & Ors. v. Bhagai.\n\nRam Sardar Singh .Raghuvanshf & :4nr:e) It \\Y3.S urged that in all cons- -. ' . : .. titutional de_mocracies, the relationship'between the govemmcnfand.\n\n.· the civil service i~ exciusively govered by the statutory .provisions ..\n\n-. with the power in the. Governenfto unil:Herally alter the condi- C _ tionsofservice ?th~ gvrnment em.pl9yees. Reference \\vas. made't~ - / . \"The Law of CIVII.Servtce' by Kaplan. It was furtber subm1tted that. . .::_ iri-Jndi~ - the aw, js tbat'.origin ·()f the Goverment ervice might be-\n\n' contractual but once appinted t~ a post under the Government, the .\n\n_ goveriment servant acquires a status nd .. the rights and ob\"iigations.. .\n\nare no longer dependenf<ln the consent o( both the parties but by D\n\n. ·.. . . . statut •.\n\nWe wo.uld have conside red . thse aspects had it been nccssry for s to do so but iUs not nece_ssary in the view taken. We may- - reiterate that article ·. 14 does not . prevent legislature from intro~ . . - .\n\n- . . . ',,; ducing a n; fofm i.e. by applying the legisla.tion to some institutions\n\nE : . . . _ or objects _ or areas only according. to the exigency of'the situation .\n\n.• _,.\n\n. .\n\n. . .\n\nand further classification of selection can b:: -ust~ ined on historical: . . -{ . reasons or reasons of administrative . exigency or piece-meal method .\n\n ..\n\n. of introducing reforms. The law need not apply . to au the persons-\n\n. in the sense of having a universal application to all peisons. A law\n\nca~ be sustained if it ueals equally with the people of _, veil-defined ·: class-employees of insurance c_ompanies as' such and such a law is. . . . not open to the charge of denial .of equal pro(e<; tion. on the ground . that it had not application to other persons. ·· · . . . .. ' . . . . . \" .· .\n\nIn the view we have taken of the matter •. these applications.\n\nG succeed and theimpugneds-cheme of 1980'must be hc:ld to be bad . as beyond .the scope . of the authority of the entral Government,.\n\nunder the Generai Insurance Business (Nationalisation) . Act, 1972. . . . : The operation of the scheme _has been restrained by the order passed . . a~ interin order in._th.ese cases: The impugned scheme is therefore- . . . quashed~ and ·will no( J>e given effect. to~. The parties. 'will be at ·\n\n- H ·. . . >. . . . . . . • .\n\n~· [1975]3 S.C.R~ 619 at page 646.\n\n.. -_ :.- ·\n\n. )\n\nA.K. BANERJEE v. UNION • (Mukharji, J.) 291 •\n\nliberty to adjust the if rights as if the scheme had not been framed.\n\nThe application for intervention isallowed. Let appropriate writs be issued quashing the-tcheme of 1980. This, however, will not prevent the Government, if it so advised, to' frame any appropriate legis~ 1ation or makeany appropriate amendment giving power to Central\n\n. Government to frame any .scheme as it considers fit and pre;> per. In . the facts and circumstances of these cases and specially in view of B the fact that petitioners had themselves' at one point of time wanted that new 1cheme be framed by the Central Government, we direct that parties will pay and bear theit own costs in all these matters.\n\nThe rules are made absolute o the extetlt indicated above.\n\nN.V.:K.\n\nPetitions allowed.\n\n• .", "total_entities": 196, "entities": [{"text": "AJOY KUMAR BANERJEE & ORS. ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12, "end_char": 42, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "AJOY KUMAR BANERJEE & ORS. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "UNION OF INDIA & ORS. ETC", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 50, "end_char": 75, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDlA & ORS. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Y.V. CHANDRACHUD C.J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 98, "end_char": 119, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Y.V. CHANDRACHUD*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Mifial Disputrs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 839, "end_char": 858, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "A.K. B:\\NERJCE", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1664, "end_char": 1678, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "f. t I\n\n:.- .-\n\nA.K. B:\\NERJCE V. UNION .", "canonical_name": "A.K. B:\\NERJCE"}}, {"text": "Government oflndia a'Sumed managment ' (mployesc.ncral insurance companies", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1950, "end_char": 2024, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "May 1971, the Government oflndia a'Sumed managment ' (mployesc.ncral insurance companies under the General Insurance (Emergency of theseS . . ."}}, {"text": "s. 16(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2311, "end_char": 2319, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "riental Fire and General Insurance Company, Naliolkll Insurance Complny N•\"' India Assurance Compan)", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2354, "end_char": 2454, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Th.e General Inuran; e Busmess~(Nat•onal 1sation) Act,\n\n1972 nationalised gcneralJnsurnce busmes5..o ·\n\nFo;•r merger schemes ere framed in 1973 b>· the Central Govrnment in ercise of the powers contained in s. 16(1) of the Act and four co:np, nies;\n\nriental Fire and General Insurance Company, Naliolkll Insurance Complny N•\"' India Assurance Compan)' and United India Insurance Company Ltd., wm merged into and they ."}}, {"text": "United India Insurance Company Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2460, "end_char": 2495, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Th.e General Inuran; e Busmess~(Nat•onal 1sation) Act,\n\n1972 nationalised gcneralJnsurnce busmes5..o ·\n\nFo;•r merger schemes ere framed in 1973 b>· the Central Govrnment in ercise of the powers contained in s. 16(1) of the Act and four co:np, nies;\n\nriental Fire and General Insurance Company, Naliolkll Insurance Complny N•\"' India Assurance Compan)' and United India Insurance Company Ltd., wm merged into and they ."}}, {"text": "Government of India_by", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2764, "end_char": 2786, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government of India_by a notification dat.:d 27th !"}}, {"text": "s. 16(,)(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3050, "end_char": 3061, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Articles 14, 19(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5900, "end_char": 5918, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 16(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6302, "end_char": 6310, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8710, "end_char": 8714, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11461, "end_char": 11471, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 16(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11546, "end_char": 11554, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12025, "end_char": 12035, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12349, "end_char": 12359, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14151, "end_char": 14161, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14486, "end_char": 14496, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14807, "end_char": 14817, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "General Insurance Business (Nationalisation) Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16192, "end_char": 16240, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19228, "end_char": 19235, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "M.K. Ramamur1", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19260, "end_char": 19273, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "32 of the Constitution)\n\n• M.K. Ramamur1M, J. Rama;1111ri/ri nnd Miss R. Vaig11i for the petitioners in WPs."}}, {"text": "R. Vaig11i", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 19303, "end_char": 19313, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "32 of the Constitution)\n\n• M.K. Ramamur1M, J. Rama;1111ri/ri nnd Miss R. Vaig11i for the petitioners in WPs."}}, {"text": "R.K. Garg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 19351, "end_char": 19360, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5370-74\n\nR.K. Garg and V.J. Fr; ncis for the petitioners in WP."}}, {"text": "J.P. Coma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 19413, "end_char": 19422, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J.P. Coma & Mukuf Mrrcigutfor Intervener in WPs."}}, {"text": "Mukuf Mrrcigutfor", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 19425, "end_char": 19442, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J.P. Coma & Mukuf Mrrcigutfor Intervener in WPs."}}, {"text": "K, Parasara11", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 19472, "end_char": 19485, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K, Parasara11, Attorney Gneral, :\\f."}}, {"text": "P.R. Mridul", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 19637, "end_char": 19648, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Bmrn:il:'e, Addition; il Solicitor General, M1ss A. Sublraahini uotl c. v, Suhba Rua, for lh~ respondent (Union of 1ndi;1)\n\n• P.R. Mridul, O.C. Ma!lwr, S. Sukumaran, D.N. Mis/rrcJ & Miss J.hera Ma1hur for respondent no, 2 in WPs."}}, {"text": "O.C. Ma!lwr", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 19650, "end_char": 19661, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Bmrn:il:'e, Addition; il Solicitor General, M1ss A. Sublraahini uotl c. v, Suhba Rua, for lh~ respondent (Union of 1ndi;1)\n\n• P.R. Mridul, O.C. Ma!lwr, S. Sukumaran, D.N. Mis/rrcJ & Miss J.hera Ma1hur for respondent no, 2 in WPs."}}, {"text": "S. Sukumaran", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 19663, "end_char": 19675, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Bmrn:il:'e, Addition; il Solicitor General, M1ss A. Sublraahini uotl c. v, Suhba Rua, for lh~ respondent (Union of 1ndi;1)\n\n• P.R. Mridul, O.C. Ma!lwr, S. Sukumaran, D.N. Mis/rrcJ & Miss J.hera Ma1hur for respondent no, 2 in WPs."}}, {"text": "J.hera Ma1hur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 19698, "end_char": 19711, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Bmrn:il:'e, Addition; il Solicitor General, M1ss A. Sublraahini uotl c. v, Suhba Rua, for lh~ respondent (Union of 1ndi;1)\n\n• P.R. Mridul, O.C. Ma!lwr, S. Sukumaran, D.N. Mis/rrcJ & Miss J.hera Ma1hur for respondent no, 2 in WPs."}}, {"text": "lmlu Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 19777, "end_char": 19788, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1/emant Sharma & lmlu Sharma for th~ respondent in Wi'S 5370-74."}}, {"text": "S 5370", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19814, "end_char": 19820, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Lalit Bhasin Vinay Bhasin", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 19842, "end_char": 19867, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l'l!leet Kuma,, Lalit Bhasin Vinay Bhasin & AfiJ's."}}, {"text": "idus Sinhu Intervener", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20001, "end_char": 20022, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Clsalu/idus Sinhu Intervener-in-person in '~Ps .. 5370 H.\n\nThe JuJgment f th C . . ."}}, {"text": "A.K BANERJEE", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 20106, "end_char": 20118, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "o. e ourt was delm:rcd by\n\nA.K BANERJEE: v. U.'fiON (Mukharji, J.) -259\n\nSABYASACHI MuimARJI J. These petitions under Article 32 of the Comtitution are filed by the employees of the General Insurance Companies and the • All India Insurance Employeess Association. '", "canonical_name": "A.K. B:\\NERJCE"}}, {"text": "Mukharji", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20132, "end_char": 20140, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "o. e ourt was delm:rcd by\n\nA.K BANERJEE: v. U.'fiON (Mukharji, J.) -259\n\nSABYASACHI MuimARJI J. These petitions under Article 32 of the Comtitution are filed by the employees of the General Insurance Companies and the • All India Insurance Employeess Association. '"}}, {"text": "SABYASACHI MuimARJI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20152, "end_char": 20171, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "o. e ourt was delm:rcd by\n\nA.K BANERJEE: v. U.'fiON (Mukharji, J.) -259\n\nSABYASACHI MuimARJI J. These petitions under Article 32 of the Comtitution are filed by the employees of the General Insurance Companies and the • All India Insurance Employeess Association. '"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20197, "end_char": 20207, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 14, 19(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20882, "end_char": 20900, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20919, "end_char": 20940, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "13th May, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21160, "end_char": 21174, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 13th May, 1971, the Government of\nIndia, assumed management of the general insurance companies under the."}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22028, "end_char": 22037, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22164, "end_char": 22174, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 3(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22203, "end_char": 22215, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22911, "end_char": 22920, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22996, "end_char": 23005, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23059, "end_char": 23068, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23156, "end_char": 23165, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 23183, "end_char": 23201, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 9 stip.ulates that Central Government shall form a. Government company in accordance with the provisions of the Companis Act, to be known as the General Insuranct; Corporation of India for the purpose of superintending, controlling and carrying on lhe usiness of gerieraJ in$urance: Section 10 stipulats that all shares in the capital of every -Indian insurance company which shall stand transferred to and vested in the Central Government by virtue of Section 4 shall imediately after such vesting, stand transferred to and vested in t•l ·\n\nCorporation."}}, {"text": "Government company in accordance with the provisions of the Companis Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23216, "end_char": 23288, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23447, "end_char": 23457, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Government company in accordance with the provisions of the Companis Act", "statute": "Government company in accordance with the provisions of the Companis Act"}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23617, "end_char": 23626, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Government company in accordance with the provisions of the Companis Act", "statute": "Government company in accordance with the provisions of the Companis Act"}}, {"text": "Chapter V of the aforesaid Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23886, "end_char": 23916, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23991, "end_char": 24001, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter V of the aforesaid Act", "statute": "Chapter V of the aforesaid Act"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 26814, "end_char": 26819, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "nf 'the} traF.GnveJD.ment shallbeto ensure 1hat ultimately there are only f,our companies (excluding the Cor- / poration) in existence and that they are so situate as to render\n\ntht:ir combined services effective in all parts of India."}}, {"text": "Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27842, "end_char": 27860, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28141, "end_char": 28144, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28716, "end_char": 28726, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Section 16(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28925, "end_char": 28938, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 16(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29143, "end_char": 29156, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29725, "end_char": 29734, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section\n\n16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29754, "end_char": 29765, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 16(l)(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30123, "end_char": 30139, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Oriental Fire and r;... nd General Insurance Company Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 30470, "end_char": 30527, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In exercise of the powers contained in the aforesaid Section J6(1) ofthe said Act, four mrger schemes were framed in 1973 by --the Central Government and the four companies, Oriental Fire and r;... nd General Insurance Company Ltd., National Insurance Comt -.Pany Ltd., New India Assurance CoD)pany Ltd., and United India\n\n,..\n\nInsurance ."}}, {"text": "National Insurance Comt -.Pany Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 30529, "end_char": 30564, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In exercise of the powers contained in the aforesaid Section J6(1) ofthe said Act, 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framed in 1973 by --the Central Government and the four companies, Oriental Fire and r;... nd General Insurance Company Ltd., National Insurance Comt -.Pany Ltd., New India Assurance CoD)pany Ltd., and United India\n\n,..\n\nInsurance ."}}, {"text": "New India Assurance Company Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 30855, "end_char": 30890, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The j)reamble of the scheme,\" called the New India Assurance Company Limited (Merger) Scheme, 1973, had stated that'the Centntl Government was o( the opinion tha_t for the more efficient t; arrying on of\n\n~ ihe general insurance business, .it was necessary to frame scheme for\n\n the merger of certain ."}}, {"text": "Centntl Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 30934, "end_char": 30952, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The j)reamble of the scheme,\" called the New India Assurance Company Limited (Merger) Scheme, 1973, had stated that'the Centntl Government was o( the opinion tha_t for the more efficient t; arrying on of\n\n~ ihe general insurance business, .it was necessary to frame scheme for\n\n the merger of certain ."}}, {"text": "New lnd ia Assurance Company Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 31153, "end_char": 31189, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the New lnd ia Assurance Company Limited."}}, {"text": "General Insurance Corporation of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 31388, "end_char": 31426, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These four companies are subsidiaries of the General Insurance Corporation of India."}}, {"text": "1st January, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31472, "end_char": 31489, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1st January, 1973 and the process of merger of the various com\n\npanies into one of , the othef four companies was completed by 1st January, 1974, when the said four schemes came into force."}}, {"text": "1st January, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31599, "end_char": 31616, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1st January, 1973 and the process of merger of the various com\n\npanies into one of , the othef four companies was completed by 1st January, 1974, when the said four schemes came into force."}}, {"text": "27th May, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 32153, "end_char": 32167, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By a notification dated 27th May, 1974, the Ministry of Finance (Department of Revnpne l/.nd Insurance), Government of r India, framed a 'scheme' called the General Insurance (Rationalis'a- tionaild Revision of, Pay Scales and other CondHions of Service of Supervisory, Clerical and Subordinate Staff) Scheme, 1974, arid the ; reamble of the scheme."}}, {"text": "Section 16(l)(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32690, "end_char": 32706, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "31st December, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 33383, "end_char": 33402, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "initially up to and inclusive of 31st December, 1976 and thereafter '\"' shall continue to be in force unless modified by the Central Govern~ .. ment."}}, {"text": "Section 16(1)(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33658, "end_char": 33674, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 16(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33727, "end_char": 33740, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chief Labour Commissioner (Central), Government of India; Ministry of Labour", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 34744, "end_char": 34820, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Chief Labour Commissioner (Central), Government of India; Ministry of Labour,\n\nissued concifiation notice dated 11th September, 1980 under the Industrial Disp'utes Act, 1947 to the Chairman of the General Insurance Corporation and the general secretaries of the employees' asso.ciations. _"}}, {"text": "11th September, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 34856, "end_char": 34876, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Chief Labour Commissioner (Central), Government of India; Ministry of Labour,\n\nissued concifiation notice dated 11th September, 1980 under the Industrial Disp'utes Act, 1947 to the Chairman of the General Insurance Corporation and the general secretaries of the employees' asso.ciations. _"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36190, "end_char": 36200, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "30th September, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 38865, "end_char": 38885, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "management of the Corporation framed nd notified the scheme under challenge on 30th September, 1980."}}, {"text": "Clause 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40184, "end_char": 40192, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 14", 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"metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Banking Companies Act", "statute": "Banking Companies Act"}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 44187, "end_char": 44216, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 94", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44228, "end_char": 44238, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 44507, "end_char": 44530, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45094, "end_char": 45104, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Sick Textile Undertakings (Nationalisation) Act, 1974", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 45306, 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"PROVISION", "start_char": 46674, "end_char": 46685, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "20th June, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 46771, "end_char": 46786, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioners, further, contend that the Constitution 44th amendment deletin/ Articles 31 and I9(t) (f) cannot save the scheme since that Amend~' ment came into force only on 20th June, 1979, whereas the impugned • notification affecting the fights of the employees to emoluments takes et."}}, {"text": "1st January, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 46895, "end_char": 46912, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tect from 1st January, 1979."}}, {"text": "article 31B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46958, "end_char": 46969, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47199, "end_char": 47209, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47322, "end_char": 47332, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Gepral Insurance EmpJoyees. 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"start_char": 51986, "end_char": 51995, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52921, "end_char": 52923, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 16 & 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55166, "end_char": 55182, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 16 & 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55238, "end_char": 55254, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55275, "end_char": 55285, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 16(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55634, "end_char": 55647, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56684, "end_char": 56694, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Governmnt", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 56716, "end_char": 56733, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This must be judged in tconjuction with sub-section\n\n(6) of Section 16 which authorises the Central Governmnt, by notification, to add, to amend or to vary any scheme framed under 'Section 16."}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56805, "end_char": 56815, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57826, "end_char": 57836, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Centrai Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 57970, "end_char": 57988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This preamble has also to be read in the light of sub-section (2) of'Section 16 which provides that lthe object of the Central Government in framing the schemes under sub-section ( l) was to give authority to the Centrai Government to frame schemes, to ensure that ultimately there are only four insurance companies (excluding the Corporation) in 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'"}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58333, "end_char": 58343, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58726, "end_char": 58735, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58778, "end_char": 58788, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chapter V of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 59282, "end_char": 59302, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59740, "end_char": 59750, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter V of the Act", "statute": "Chapter V of the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59810, "end_char": 59820, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter V of the Act", "statute": "Chapter V of the Act"}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60072, "end_char": 60082, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter V of the Act", "statute": "Chapter V of the Act"}}, {"text": "A.K. BANERJEE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 61368, "end_char": 61381, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "fhe scheme under the,\n\nAct, Certain amount of revision of pay scale and other terms and\n\nA.K. BANERJEE V. UNION (Mukharjl~ J;)\n\n27.S\n\nconditions become inevitable.", "canonical_name": "A.K. B:\\NERJCE"}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61541, "end_char": 61551, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62032, "end_char": 62042, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Asstt. Cammissioner of Sales Tax & Ors.{1)", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 63371, "end_char": 63413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "co: Ltd.\n\nv. The Asstt."}}, {"text": "Section 16(l)(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65420, "end_char": 65436, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 66046, "end_char": 66056, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'itis made before each Huse of Parliament."}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66793, "end_char": 66803, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66807, "end_char": 66817, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 16(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68188, "end_char": 68201, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68457, "end_char": 68467, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68656, "end_char": 68666, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68783, "end_char": 68793, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68927, "end_char": 68937, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69109, "end_char": 69119, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70095, "end_char": 70105, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70569, "end_char": 70579, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71254, "end_char": 71263, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bhugwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 72703, "end_char": 72711, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhugwati, J. speak- : iog for himself and on behalf o~ I yer & Desai, J J. was of the view ."}}, {"text": "Desai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 72767, "end_char": 72772, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhugwati, J. speak- : iog for himself and on behalf o~ I yer & Desai, J J. was of the view ."}}, {"text": "Article 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75086, "end_char": 75095, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75593, "end_char": 75603, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75745, "end_char": 75755, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75778, "end_char": 75788, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "General Insurance Business (Nationalisation) Act, 1972", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 75883, "end_char": 75937, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 75982, "end_char": 76005, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Act and the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 76402, "end_char": 76443, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 76593, "end_char": 76622, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 77309, "end_char": 77319, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 77769, "end_char": 77779, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 16(1 )", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 77900, "end_char": 77914, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 77987, "end_char": 77997, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 78394, "end_char": 78417, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 79989, "end_char": 80012, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Krishna lyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 83121, "end_char": 83133, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "poration of India v. D.J. Bahadur & Ors, (supra) where at page 1125, Krishna lyer, J. has dealt yvjth the aspect of th~ quetjon."}}, {"text": "ang the Indusrial Diputs Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 83766, "end_char": 83800, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 84119, "end_char": 84129, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "We ang the Indusrial Diputs Act, 1947", "statute": "We ang the Indusrial Diputs Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 84600, "end_char": 84618, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "JlrOvisions of Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 85478, "end_char": 85516, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "General Insurance Business (Nationalisation) Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 85594, "end_char": 85642, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Disputes Act, 1957", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 85792, "end_char": 85810, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "U.P. State", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 86083, "end_char": 86093, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "dealt with irt the case of J.K •.\n\nCotton Spining & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of u:P. & Ors.t1)' Some 9f these aspects were also discuss_ed in the case of U.P. State: Electricity Bodrd & Ors; v. Hari Shanker Jain and Ors,(2)\n\nHad it been possible to."}}, {"text": "article 19(l)(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86424, "end_char": 86440, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Disputes Act, 1957", "statute": "Disputes Act, 1957"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86507, "end_char": 86517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Disputes Act, 1957", "statute": "Disputes Act, 1957"}}, {"text": "article 31A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86999, "end_char": 87010, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 19(1 )(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87729, "end_char": 87746, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "1961] 3 S.C.R. 185", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 87950, "end_char": 87968, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88356, "end_char": 88366, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 89700, "end_char": 89723, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 89912, "end_char": 89935, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s.9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 91366, "end_char": 91369, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Constitution Bench", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 91416, "end_char": 91434, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in the Constitution Bench decision.ofthis Court' in the case of R.K .. Garg ~~~. v. Union of India & Ors."}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 91809, "end_char": 91819, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 16(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 92105, "end_char": 92118, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 16(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 92123, "end_char": 92136, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 92855, "end_char": 92865, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cokirig Coal Mines", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 94688, "end_char": 94706, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to meet the growing requirement of iron & steel industry\" .. Accor~\n\nding totbe normal prcvlent view, the workmen of Cokirig Coal Mines were sweate~ labour."}}, {"text": "AU India ank Employees Associatton", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 97327, "end_char": 97361, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "tb(( one hand and AU India ank Employees Associatton and AH lncfta Bank Employees Federation on the other, are some of t.he examples."}}, {"text": "AH lncfta Bank Employees Federation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 97366, "end_char": 97401, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "tb(( one hand and AU India ank Employees Associatton and AH lncfta Bank Employees Federation on the other, are some of t.he examples."}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 98941, "end_char": 98951, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 99468, "end_char": 99478, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ram Sardar Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 101945, "end_char": 101961, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Sardar Singh .Raghuvanshf & :4nr:e) It \\Y3.S urged that in all cons- -. ' . : .."}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_3_292_301_EN", "year": 1984, "text": ". I\n\n292 • ,\n\nUNION OF INDIA. AND ANOTHER\n\nG.M. KOKTL AND OTHERS\n\nMarch. 21, 1984\n\n, [V.D. TUL.ZAPURKAR AND R.S. PATHAK JJ.)\n\nFactorles Act, 1948-s. 59..-Benefit of Overti'me wage1 at daub le the rate of ordinary wages-Scape af Section •70 of Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948 extends the benefit under s. 59 of FactoHes Acr to all persons employed in factory irrespective of the fact whether they are workers under\n\n$, 2(1)- of the Factories Act or !tot and\n\n1whethet they are exempted under 1. 64 of Factories -let .read.with rule 100 made by State Government.'\n\n Bombay Shops & EStablishments Act. 1948S-. 70-ln'erprttation of .\n\n. The respondents who were workingin different capacities ia the factory of India Security Prss at Nasik, an establishment of the apyel lant, filed an application before the . Central Government Labour Court,· Bombay under s. 33 C(2) or the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 daiming\n\novertime wages at double th~ ordinary rate of wageS under s. S9 of 'the\n\nFctories Act read with s. 70, of the Bomay Shops and Establishment.a .Act, 194'8. The Labour Court dismissed the contentions of the appellant and granted relief.\n\nHence this appeal. ·\n\nDismissing the Appeal\n\n• ...\n\nHELD : Thecontention that the respondents were not workers with'.\" in tM meaning of s. 2(1) of the Factories Act and therefore not' entitled to the benefit of s. 59 of that Act read with s ! 10 of the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act 19 48 must fail on the plain language of s. 7.0. \"'I'be 'Qlain provision of s. 70 which is,'relevant consists of two parts; the first part states that if there be a factory the Shops and Establishments Act. ill not apply and the second part_ stat_cs. that 10 such a.factory ', the prQvisions of the Factorie.s Act shall, notwithst'anding anything co_nt_alned in that Act,\"apply.to airpe.rsons employed _in or in cOtinection with the factory\". Clearly, the underlined portion (the nonobstante .clauSe and the ·\n\npbase- 'au persotis employed') has th-e effect of enlargi, ng the scope of Factories ACt by making it applicable to all persons emPloyed in such factory irrespective of whether employed as worker~ or otherwise.\n\nTherefore although the respondeftts have 11ot been 'workers' within the meaning ofs. 2(1) they will get the benefit of.s. 59. [298 C-F)\n\n)-'. ·.\n\n• B.P. Htra, Works Manager, Central Raillfay, _Pare!, Bombay, etc. y.. ll.\n\nC.M, Pradhan etc .(1960] S.C.R. 137 referred to. . .\n\nH The contention.ttiat by reson of rq\\e 100 .inade by the late Govern\n\n' •\n\nUNiON v. G.M. KOKiL\n\nment under s. ()4 of the Factories Act the benefit qnder s. 59 was not available to the respoildents falling within the cxenJpted category by reason of their holding po.sts of supervision, has no force. [3001' and, 29SE]\n\nIt is weH-known, that a non-obstante clause is a legislative device \\Vhich is usually employed to give over-riding effect to certain provision over some contrary provision'\"'that m3.y be found either . in the same eqactment r some other enactment.; that is to say, to avpid the operation and effect of all contrary provisions. Thus the nonobstante clause in s. 1(), namely, \"notwithstanding anything'to the contrary contained in that Act -and as such it must refer to the exempting provisions which would be\n\ncontrary to tlie general applicability of .the Act. Jt!St-as because of the non-obstant.e clause the Act is applicable even to employees in the factory , who might not be rworkers' under s. 2(1), the same non-obstaote clause will keep away the applicability of exemption provisions Qua all tbose working in the factory· The Labour Court was therefore right in taking the view that because of the nono15stante clause s 64 read with Rille 100 itself would not. apply i:o the respondents and they would be entitled to-<; laim overtime wages under s. 59 of that Act read with s. 70 of tbe Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948.\n\n[300 C-G]\n\nThe contention that the respondents were nOt workmen under the Industrial Dispujcs Act and .as such th.eir application was not Maintain .. able, must be rejected.\n\nThe contention depends upon the appreciation of evidence led by th.e partie_~ on the nature of _duties and functions Performed. by the concerned respondents and it Was on an appreciation of the entire material that the Labotir Court recorded a findirig that having regard to the nature of thei'r-duties and functions all respondents, other than tho&e who were holdi_ng the posts of Senior Supervisors and supervisors, were industrial employees, Le •. workmen under.· the Industrial Disputes Act and it is not possible for this Court to interfere with such a finidng of fact recordelf by the Labour Court.\n\nEven othetwise '\"after considering some of the important material on record the courr is s:1tisficd that the Labour Court's finding is correct.\n\n(301 C-P]\n\nC!VlL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2736 of 1972\n\n From the Award dated the 31st December, 1971 of the Central Govt. Labour Court Bombay in application no. L.C.B.-32/i of 1969.\n\nHarbans Lal, N. S. Das Bahl and R. N. Podd1r for the appellants. • • V. M. Tarkunde, K. Shivraj Choudharp and K. R. Choudhary for therespondents. ,\n\nTlie Judment of the Court was delivered by •\n\nl H\n\n294 SUPRllME COURT REPORTS [1984] 3 s.c.R.\n\n. D.\n\nTULZAPURKAR, J .. The only point raised by counsei' for the App'lllants in this appeal is whether the respondents who are employees w9rking in the Factory of India l>ecurity Press, N;; sik are entitled to over-time wages at twice the normal rate of their wages under s. 59. of the Factories Act 1948 read withs. 70 of the . .\n\nBombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948 and the question depends upo!l' tlte true construction of s .. 70 of the latter Act.\n\nSince i.n our view the question of proper construction of the said s. 70 is concluded !>Ya decison of this Court 'in Shri B.P. Hira, Works Manager, Central Railway, Pare/, Bombay, etc. v. Shri C.M. Pradhan etc.( l) it is unnecessar}' to indulge in any elaborate statement of facts or discussion of all the rival contentions that were urged before the Central Government Labour Court Bombay, whose decision renliered on December\n\n0 3!, .1971 is challenged in this appeal. • • ·\n\n.Briefly stated t)le admitted facts are : The India Security press, Nasik is a very big establishmen't of the CenJral Govern ment headed by the General ManageP, who is also known as Master, India Security. Press. Apart from administrative offices it has a factory. The Press has four wings, namely,, (a) the stamp press, (b) currency note press, (c) new currency nbte press and (d} central stamp stores. There are various categorie:i' of workers who have been classified into two groups such as(!) employees work ing in the administrative offices and (2) those working in the factor)'. The 78 respondents, belonging .to all the four wings, have been employees working in. the factory (Of these, R' 1 to R-3 are Chieflnspectors (Control); R-4 to R-36 art! Inspectors {Control);.\n\nR37 & R-38 are Senior Supervisors; R39 to R52 are Super visors;' R53 to , R77 are Junior Supervisors and R-78 is a Store Keeper). These 78 Respondents filed an application.against the Appellants before the Central Government Labour Court, Bombay under s. 33C (2) of the. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 claiming over'time wages under s. 59 of the Facto1ies Act. . read with s. 70 of the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act.\n\nTheir case was that though, the normal working period for all those who were working under the roof of the factory was 44 hrs. per week, they were, along with the regular factory workers, required to work for more than 44.hrs. a week but the manage rnent had been causing loss to them by paying them, '.unlike the factory-workers, overtime' wages at the basic rates even for work done beyond 44 hrs. whereas they were entitled to ovHtime waes . . . j, (1960) 1 SCR 137,\n\n• * '\n\nf I\n\nYNION v. a.Iii. KOKIL (Tulzapurkar,\n\nJ.) 295\n\nat double the rate of their normal wage{( inclusive of dearness A allowance, etc.), al)d as such they were entitled to get the amount of difference ascertained, computed and paid to them; and they claimed this relief in respect of overtime work done during the past 12 years i.e. from 1-l-i956 to 30-8-1968. Along with the application they gave a detailed schedule and the particulars of their claim totalling to an amount of Rs. 7 ,00,000 and odd.' B\n\nThis claim was resisted by the Appellants on several grounds but we need mention only those grounds which have a Dearing on the only point that was raised and argued before us by counsel for the appellants. Inter alia it was contended that none of the Respondents was a 'worker' under s. 2 (I) of the Factories Act and as such they were not entitled to the benefit of s. 59 of that Act read withs. 70 of the Bombay Shops and Establishments At,\n\n1948. It was fUrther contended that even assuming that the respondents were entitled to claim the benefit of the s. 59 read with the s. 70 notwithstanding that none of them was a worker, by reason of Rule 100 nlade by the State Government in exercise of its powers under s .• 64 of the Factories Act, s. 59 became inapplicable to the Respondents and therefore could not be availed of by them inasmuch as quite a substantial number of them fell \\tithin . the category of peron who had been \"defined or declared to be\n\nholding positions of supervision or management or being employed in a confidential position in the factory.\" In other words. quite a large number of the Respondents fell within the exempted\n\ncatgory under s- 64 road with Rule 100 framed by the State Government and, therefore, the benefit of s. 59 was not available to them. It was fUrther urged that none of the Respondents was an industrial employee, i.e. 'a workman' within the meaning of s. 2 (s) of the Industrial Disputes Act and as such their applica. tion under s. 33C (2) of that Act was not maintainable.\n\nThe Central Government Labour Court, Bombay n?gatived the first two contentions in view of the decision of this Court in the case of B.P. Hira v. C.M. Pradhan (supra) and as regards the third contention on an appreciation ofihe oral and documentary evidence led by the parties, it came to the conclusion that all respondents holding the posts of Chief Inspectors (Control) (R 1 to R-3), Inspectors (Control) <R-4 to R-36), Jtinior Supervisors (R-53 to R~57) and Store Keeper (R-78) having regard to the nature of duties and functions performed by them were industrial employees i.e. workmen 'under the Indus.trial Disputes Act, 1947and as such were entitled to the relief claimed by them but as\n\n\" G\n\nH '\n\nSUPREM6.COURT REPORTS [1984j 3 S.C.R.\n\nregards th, e respondents who were holding the posts of Senior Snperyisors (R-37 and..R-38) and Supervisors (R-39 to R-5 '.)not being workmen under the lndustrfai Disputes Act were not entitled to the relief claimed,-of course, they were denied the relief only for the period during which they were holding those posts, This decision is challenged in the appeal. ·\n\nAs stated earlier, the validity or otherwise f the first two '!< contentions that were urged before the Labour Court and teiterat- • ed before us by Counsel for the., appollants depands upon the • proper construction of s. 70 of the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948 and in order to appreciate both the contentions it C will be necessary to , set outs. 59, s. 64 together with Rule 100 of the Factories Act and s. JO of the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948. Sections 59 and 64 occur in Chapter VI of the factories Act, l'H8 and the. material portions thereof run thus :\n\n• \"59: Extra. Wages for overtime.-(!) Where a worker works in a factory for more than nine hours in anyday or for more than forty-eight hours irr any week, he shall, in respect of overtime wo1'k, be entitled to\\Vages at the rate of twice his ordinary rate of wages.\"\n\n\"'6,4. Power to make exempting rules-(1) The State Government may make rules defining the> persons who hold . positions of supervisions or management or are em ployed in a confidential position in a factory, or empowering the Chjef Inspector to declare any persc.:tt, other than a person de'finea by '6Uch ruJes, as a person holding position of supervision or management or employedin a confidential position in a factory if, in the opinion of , the Chief Inspector, such person holds such position or is sq employed and the provi- .slons of this Chapter, other than provisions of clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 66 and of the proviso to that su{Jsection, .shall not apply to any person so defined or declared.:\n\nProvided that any person so defined -0r declared shall, where the ordinary rate of wags of such person does not exceed rupees seven hundred and fifty per month, be entitled. to extra wages in respect of overtime work under section 59 .''\n\nRnle 100 ire.med under s. 64 runs thus !\n\n)---\n\n' .\n\nUNION v. o.M:. KOKIL (Tulzapurkar, J.) , eg'\n\n\"Persons defined to hold positions of .supervision or A management or confidential position.\n\nThe' following persons shall be deemed to hold position of supervision or management or to be empluyed in a confidential positi<m in a factory-\n\n. {a) All' persons specified in the Schednle annexed hereto.\n\n(b) Any other person who, in the opinion of the Chief Inspector, holds a. position of supervision or management or is employed in .a confidentiatl positiOn.\n\nSchedule\n\nList of persons dfined to hold positions of supervision or managemeµt in factories :-\n\nManager\n\n. Assistant Manager\n\n·····\n\nDepartmental Heads and Assistants\n\nHead Store Keepers and Assistants\n\nTechnical Experts.\"\n\nSection 70 of the Bombay Shops and Establiskments Act: 1948 runs thus :\n\n\"70. Persons employed in factory to be governed by .\n\nFactories Act and not by this Act.\n\nNothing in this Act shall be .deeJ)led 'to apply to a• factory and the provisions' of the Factories Act, 1948 shall, notwithstanding anything c9ntained in that Act, apply to all persons employed in and in connection with a factory :\n\nProvided t!iat, where any shop or commercial establish\n\n.. 298\n\n f, __ A\n\n. - . -\n\n, , . . ( - - .\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS . [19~4) 3 s.c. k.\n\n. ment situate within the precincts of a factory is not /\n\nconnected with the manufacturing process of the factory the provisions of this Act shall apply to it; · ,· . ' \\ . .\n\nProvideforther that, the State Government ay, by notification in the Official Gazette, apply all or any of the provisions of the Factories Act, 1948 to any shop , or. com- mercial establishment situate within the precincts of a 'factory and on the application .Of that Act to such shop or commercial establishment, the provisions' of this Act shall cease to apply to it.\" . ·\n\n' ' ' Counsel for the appellants urg.ed that the respondents, though employed in the factory of the Press, were not 'workers'. within . the meaning of s. 2 (I) of the Factories Act and therefore were not entitled to the benefit ors. 59 of that Act read with s. 70. of the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948. On the plain language of sec. 7.0 of the Bombaf Shops and Establishments Act . this contention has to fail. W~ are concerned not with either of ·: the provisos but with the ma.in provision of s. 70 which consists of two parts; the first part states that if there be a factory the Shops . and Establishments 'Act will not apply and the second part states: that to such a factory \"the provisions of the Factories Act shall,\n\nnotv/itstanding anything contained in that Act, apply to ali persons employed in or .in connection with a factory.\" Clearly, the portion \"underlined (the 'non-obstante clame and the phrase 'all persons employed') has . the . effect of enlarging the scope of.\n\nFactories Act by making it applicable to all persons employed in . such factory irrespective of whether employed as workers or otherwise. Therefore although the respondents have not been 'workers' within the meaning of sec. 2 (l) they will get.the benefit\n\n' . ' of sec. 59:\n\n- This' idetical question arose for consideration before this Co;; rt in the case of B.P. Hira v. C.M. Pradhan (supra). In that .case Shri C.M. Pradhan and other respondents were emplgyed. as\n\ntime-keepers in the time. office of.the Central Railway. Workshop and Factory, Pare!, Bombay and they had claimed over-time wages. under s.59 of the Factories Act first on the basis that they were 'workers' within the meaning of s 2(1) of that Act and alternatively on the basis that assuming, they were not 'workers' within the meaning of s. 2{1) of thai Act, they were. entitled to claim over-' time wages nnder s.59 of the Factories Act read with . s. 70 of. the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948. The validity of the\n\n' •\n\n' '\n\n.. '\n\n. tl'NJON v. G.M. KOKIL (Tulzapurkar, j_) 299.\n\n. ( . , ' claim on hih th•, groun,.;> was di; puted by the appellant (Works Manageij .. The Authority under the Payment of Wages Act.found that only four of the responc!ents, who were required to do the . work of progress time-keeper, could claim the status of 'workers' within the meaning of s. 2( l) _of the Factories Act and the rest were merely employees ofthe workshop, but accepted. the alter-· native . case made by the respondents and held that each of the respondents was entitled to get the over-time wages under sec. 59 read with sec. 70 and this Court upheld the view of the Authority and confirmed its decision. The Court's view on the proper con1truction ofs. iO of the Bombay Shops and. Establishments Act 1948 has been succinctly snmmatised in the second head note, which appears at page 137 of the report, which runs thus:·\n\n\"On a propr construction of s. 70 of t!le Act it is ciear that the first part of the section excludes a factory and its_ . . employees from the operation of the Act; but the second part\n\nmakes the relevant provisions' of the FactoriesActapplicable ., to them. The'non-obstante. clause in the section shows that .· the employees.Jn a factory, , although they might not be workers within the meaning of s. 2( I) of the Factories Act, are entitled to claim overtime wages as provided for by that Act.\" ' . . .\n\nA pari from the fact that the decision is binding on us, we are in respectful agreement with the construction placed by it on s. 70 of the Act. , The first contention , has, therefore, to.be rejected.\n\nCounsel for the appellants next urged that the effecc of s. 70 as indicated bY .. the aforesaid decision is that it.makes the provisions . of the Factories-Act applicable to all persons (irrespective of their. capacity)' employed in a factory but· the provisions of the Act includes. 64 (oc_curring. in the same Chapter VI) whic.h gives . power to the State m:ivernment to make exemptions and it is under s. 64 that Rule 100 has been framed by the State Govt. under which the employees specified in the .Schedule to the Rule . . have been excfoded from the purview of s. 59 of that Act and since in the instant case a substantial number of the respondents fall within the exempted category (Departmen.tal Heads .and Assistants) and Head Storekeepers and Assistant they .would not be able to claim overtime wages under s. 59 of that Act read with s, 70 of the Bombay Shops and Establish' ments Act.· In other words, counsel contended . that. s.: 59 must be read· with s. 64 of the Factories Act and because of Rule 100 framed under s. 64, ~· 59 becomes inapplicable to the respondent~ •\n\nA ..\n\nG .\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1984] 3 S.C.R.\n\nfalling within the exempted categorles. On the other hand, counsel for the respondents urged that the non-obstante clause has the effect of keeping out of the way the exemption provisions, namly, s. 64 read wih Rule 100 and accord.ing to him such effect must follow from the ratio of this' Court's decision in the case of B.P.\n\nHira v. C.M. Pradhan (sup{a) and the Labpur Court had rightly taken the view that because of the non-obstante clause the respon .. dents' right to claim benefit of overtime wages under s. 59 read with s. 70 was not affected by t.he framing of rule 100 by the State\n\nGovernment in exercise of the power conforred on it under s. 64.\n\nSection 70, so far as is relevant, says \"the provisions of the Factories Act shall, Mtithstanding anything contained in that Act, apply to all persons employed in and in connection with a factory\". It is well: known that a non-obstante .clause is a legislative device which is usually employed to give over-riding effect to certain provisions over some contrary. provisions that may be found either in the same enactment or some other enactmen i, that is to say, to avoid the operation and effect of all contrary provisions. Tilus the non-obstante clause in s. 70, namely, \"notwith- ·\n\nstanding anythi.ng in that Act'' must mean notwithstauding anything to the contrary contained in that Act and as such it must refer to the exempting provisions which would be contrary to the . general applicability of the Act. In other words, as all the relevant\n\nproviSions of the Act are made applicable to a factory notwith, standi)lg anything to the contrary contained in it, it must have the effect of excfoding th1 operation of the exemption provisions.\n\nJust as because of the non-obstante clause the Act is applicable even to employees in the factory wo might not be 'workers' under sec. 2(l), the sime non-obstante clause Will keep away the applicability of exemption provisions qua all those working in the factory. The Labour Court, in our View, was, therefore, right in taking the view that because of the non-obstante clause s. 64 read with Rule 100 itslf would not apply to the respondsnts and ihey would be entitled to claim overtime wages under s. 59 of that Act\n\nrad withs. 70.of the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948.\n\nCounsel for the appellants pointed out that if such construC>- tion was placed on s. 70 if will lead to an anomalous situation that . even employees of a factory occupying positions of a Manager or a General Manager would become entitled to overiime wages which cnuld not have been the intention of the State Legislature, bu~ that, in our view, is a i; natter of the State Legisla ture and not for th11 Court bnt it must be pointed out that . since\n\n'-(\n\nUNION v. G.M. KOKILj (Tulzapurkar, J.) 301\n\nthe rendering oi the aforesaid decision by this Court in 1%0 the A State Legislature has .not intervened, which perhaps suggests that the State Legislature is not keen to limit the operation of the no11obstante clause in any manner. The second contention must also fail.\n\nCounsel for the appellants made a feeble attempt to contend that not merely such of the respondents who were holding the . posts of Senior Supervisors and Suparvisors were not industrial employees but all the other responde]Jts were also not industrial employees i.e. were not workmen under the Industrial Disputes Act. In the first place; the contention depends upon the apprecia- . tion of evidence led . by the parties on (he nature 'Of duties and functions performed by the concerned respondents and it was on an appreciation the entire material that the .Labour Court recorded a finding that having regard to the nature of their duties and functions all respondents, other tha~ those who were holdJng the post of Senior Supervisors and Supervisors, were industrial employees, i.e. workmen under the)ndustrial Disputes Act and it is not possible for this Court to interfere with such a finding of fact recorded by the Labour\"Court. Even otherwise after considreing\n\nsome of the important material on record through which we were . taken by counsel for the appellants, we are satisfied that the\n\nLabour Court's finding is correct.\n\nIn the result the appeal fails and is dismissed but there will be no order as to costs. ·\n\nH.S.K. Appeal, dismissed •\n\n. 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Htra", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2317, "end_char": 2326, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• B.P. Htra, Works Manager, Central Raillfay, _Pare!,"}}, {"text": "Factories Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2567, "end_char": 2580, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2599, "end_char": 2604, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 1()", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3122, "end_char": 3128, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3460, "end_char": 3467, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3689, "end_char": 3693, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3817, "end_char": 3822, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 70", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3845, "end_char": 3850, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3858, "end_char": 3899, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4548, "end_char": 4571, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Harbans Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5029, "end_char": 5040, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Harbans Lal, N. S. Das Bahl and R. N. Podd1r for the appellants. • •"}}, {"text": "N. S. Das Bahl", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5042, "end_char": 5056, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Harbans Lal, N. S. Das Bahl and R. N. Podd1r for the appellants. • •"}}, {"text": "R. N. Podd1r", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5061, "end_char": 5073, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Harbans Lal, N. S. Das Bahl and R. N. Podd1r for the appellants. • •"}}, {"text": "V. M. Tarkunde", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5098, "end_char": 5112, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. M. Tarkunde, K. Shivraj Choudharp and K. R. Choudhary for therespondents. ,"}}, {"text": "K. Shivraj Choudharp", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5114, "end_char": 5134, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. M. Tarkunde, K. Shivraj Choudharp and K. R. Choudhary for therespondents. ,"}}, {"text": "K. R. Choudhary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5139, "end_char": 5154, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V. M. Tarkunde, K. Shivraj Choudharp and K. R. Choudhary for therespondents. ,"}}, {"text": "D.\n\nTULZAPURKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5275, "end_char": 5290, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D.\n\nTULZAPURKAR, J .. The only point raised by counsei' for the App'lllants in this appeal is whether the respondents who are employees w9rking in the Factory of India l>ecurity Press, N;; sik are entitled to over-time wages at twice the normal rate of their wages under s. 59.", "canonical_name": "D.\n\nTULZAPURKAR"}}, {"text": "s. 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5546, "end_char": 5551, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Factories Act 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5560, "end_char": 5578, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5606, "end_char": 5647, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 70", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5801, "end_char": 5806, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948", "statute": "Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "Central Government Labour Court Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6085, "end_char": 6123, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l) it is unnecessar}' to indulge in any elaborate statement of facts or discussion of all the rival contentions that were urged before the Central Government Labour Court Bombay, whose decision renliered on December\n\n0 3!,"}}, {"text": "India Security press, Nasik", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6258, "end_char": 6285, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".Briefly stated t)le admitted facts are : The India Security press, Nasik is a very big establishmen't of the CenJral Govern ment headed by the General ManageP, who is also known as Master, India Security."}}, {"text": "Central Government Labour Court, Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7197, "end_char": 7236, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These 78 Respondents filed an application.against the Appellants before the Central Government Labour Court, Bombay under s. 33C (2) of the."}}, {"text": "s. 33C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7243, "end_char": 7249, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7262, "end_char": 7291, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7323, "end_char": 7328, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "s. 70", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7363, "end_char": 7368, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "(1960) 1 SCR 137", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 7866, "end_char": 7882, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "30-8-1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8240, "end_char": 8249, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "al)d as such they were entitled to get the amount of difference ascertained, computed and paid to them; and they claimed this relief in respect of overtime work done during the past 12 years i.e. from 1-l-i956 to 30-8-1968."}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8681, "end_char": 8685, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Factories Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8697, "end_char": 8710, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8764, "end_char": 8769, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8954, "end_char": 8959, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 70", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8974, "end_char": 8979, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Factories Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9127, "end_char": 9140, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9142, "end_char": 9147, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9650, "end_char": 9655, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9800, "end_char": 9804, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9816, "end_char": 9839, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 33C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9878, "end_char": 9884, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10538, "end_char": 10556, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 70", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11255, "end_char": 11260, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11268, "end_char": 11309, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11400, "end_char": 11405, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948", "statute": "the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "Factories Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11436, "end_char": 11449, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "JO of the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11457, "end_char": 11508, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sections 59 and 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11510, "end_char": 11528, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "JO of the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948", "statute": "JO of the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "Chapter VI of the factories Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11538, "end_char": 11569, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12505, "end_char": 12515, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Chapter VI of the factories Act", "statute": "Chapter VI of the factories Act"}}, {"text": "section 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12836, "end_char": 12846, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12875, "end_char": 12880, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Tulzapurkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12927, "end_char": 12938, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "KOKIL (Tulzapurkar, J.) , eg'\n\n\"Persons defined to hold positions of .supervision or A management or confidential position.", "canonical_name": "D.\n\nTULZAPURKAR"}}, {"text": "Schedule\n\nL", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13410, "end_char": 13421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 70", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13635, "end_char": 13645, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Factories Act and not by this Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13762, "end_char": 13795, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Factories Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13888, "end_char": 13907, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Factories Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14480, "end_char": 14499, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14879, "end_char": 14883, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Factories Act, 1948", "statute": "the Factories Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "Factories Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14895, "end_char": 14908, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 70", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14986, "end_char": 14991, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Factories Act, 1948", "statute": "the Factories Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15000, "end_char": 15041, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sec. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15068, "end_char": 15074, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948", "statute": "the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "s. 70", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15235, "end_char": 15240, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948", "statute": "the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "Factories Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15444, "end_char": 15457, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Factories Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15726, "end_char": 15739, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "sec. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15945, "end_char": 15951, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948", "statute": "the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "sec. 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15992, "end_char": 15999, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948", "statute": "the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "C.M. Pradhan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16141, "end_char": 16153, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that .case Shri C.M. Pradhan and other respondents were emplgyed."}}, {"text": "s.59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16332, "end_char": 16336, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Factories Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16344, "end_char": 16357, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s 2(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16424, "end_char": 16430, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16535, "end_char": 16539, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16609, "end_char": 16613, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Factories Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16621, "end_char": 16634, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 70", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16647, "end_char": 16652, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16661, "end_char": 16702, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Payment of Wages Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16901, "end_char": 16921, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 2( l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17082, "end_char": 17090, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948", "statute": "the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "Factories Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17099, "end_char": 17112, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "sec. 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17312, "end_char": 17319, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948", "statute": "the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "sec. 70", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17330, "end_char": 17337, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948", "statute": "the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "Establishments Act 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17491, "end_char": 17514, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 70", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17659, "end_char": 17664, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Establishments Act 1948", "statute": "Establishments Act 1948"}}, {"text": "s. 2( I)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18032, "end_char": 18040, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Establishments Act 1948", "statute": "Establishments Act 1948"}}, {"text": "Factories Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18048, "end_char": 18061, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 70", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18265, "end_char": 18270, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Establishments Act 1948", "statute": "Establishments Act 1948"}}, {"text": "s. 70", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18398, "end_char": 18403, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Establishments Act 1948", "statute": "Establishments Act 1948"}}, {"text": "s. 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18746, "end_char": 18751, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18909, "end_char": 18914, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19159, "end_char": 19164, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19308, "end_char": 19313, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Factories Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19321, "end_char": 19334, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19372, "end_char": 19377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19675, "end_char": 19680, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Labpur Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 19844, "end_char": 19856, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand, counsel for the respondents urged that the non-obstante clause has the effect of keeping out of the way the exemption provisions, namly, s. 64 read wih Rule 100 and accord.ing to him such effect must follow from the ratio of this' Court's decision in the case of B.P.\n\nHira v. C.M. Pradhan (sup{a) and the Labpur Court had rightly taken the view that because of the non-obstante clause the respon .. dents' right to claim benefit of overtime wages under s. 59 read with s. 70 was not affected by t.he framing of rule 100 by the State\n\nGovernment in exercise of the power conforred on it under s. 64."}}, {"text": "s. 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19992, "end_char": 19997, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 70", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20008, "end_char": 20013, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20131, "end_char": 20136, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 70", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20139, "end_char": 20149, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Factories Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20202, "end_char": 20215, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 70", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20697, "end_char": 20702, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 2(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21316, "end_char": 21325, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 64", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21563, "end_char": 21568, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21686, "end_char": 21691, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21726, "end_char": 21767, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 70", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21852, "end_char": 21857, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948", "statute": "the Bombay Shops and Establishments Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 22836, "end_char": 22859, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_3_302_308_EN", "year": 1984, "text": ", .. B\n\nARJUN CHAUBEY\n\nv. '\n\nUNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS\n\nMarch 23, 1984\n\n(Y.V. CHANDRACHUD, .C.J., V.D. TULZAPURKAR, R.S. PA1HAK, ·\n\n'D.P. MADON AND M.P. THAKKf\\R, JJ.J\n\nService Jurisprudence-Dismissal Order passed by the competent authority '-\n\ndspensing with an enquiry under Rule I4(ii) of'tht R(li/way- Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rafe., 1968 read with Proviso (b) to Article 311(2) of te Corutitution -Majority of charges of appellant's mlsconduct are in relation to competent authority who dismissed him-Doctrine 0fbias-Accusser cann'ot hf! a judge ofhiS own cause-NatuYa! Justice, Principles, violated.\n\nThe appellant was working as a senior clerk in the office of the cbiCf Com- . mercial Superintendent. 'Northern Railwa;, Vaanasi. On May 22, 198~, the ,.Caior Commercial Officer wrote a letter to him calling up.on him to offer his\n\nexpJanatic;>n i'n fegard to tWelve ch&rges of gross indiscipline, mos; Jy rel; lting to the Deputy Chief Commercial Superintendent. The appellant submitted his explanation to the charges by his reply dated June 9, 1982. On the very next day, the Deputy Chief Commercial Superintendent served a second_ notice upon the appellant saying that the exPlanation offered by -him was not convincing but t'hat another chance was being given to him tq offer his' ep{anationregardi1g the spetjfic charges which were conveyed to him earlir. By this letter, the appellant was als9 caned up_on to submit his explanation within three days' as to why l}eter, rent disCiplinary action should not be t{lken against him. The appellant subrilitted his further explanation on June 14;1982. but on the very next d_ay, the Deputy Chief Commercial Superintendent passed an order dismissing him fiom service on the ground that he was not fit to be retained in service.\n\nThe appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court of Allahabad challenging the order of dismissal on variqus grounds. The .writ petition was-dismissed and hence the appeal special leave of the Court.\n\nAllowing the appeal, the Court.\n\nHELD : I : J. The order of dismissal passed against the appellant siands vitiated for the simple reson that the issue as to who, betwun the ap(>ellant and Respondent No. 3 (the dismissing authority) was speitking the truth was\n\ndided by Respondent No. 3. The main thrust of the charges against the appel- . lant related to his conduct 'Illa Respondent '3. Therefore, it was not open to the\n\n18.uer tO sit in Judgment over. the eXplanation offered by the appelJant and, decided that the explanation was untrue. No person can be a judge in his own\n\n• '\n\nARJUN CHA UllEY V, UNIOl-l 303\n\ncause and no witness can certify thttt his oWn tCstimony is true~ Any one who A has a pers6na1 stake in an .enquiry must keep himself aloof from the conduct of thejnquiry. [306 F-Hl\n\nI : 2. On the facts of tho case, the illegality touching the proceedings which endetl in th~ dismissal of the appellant is, \"so patent apd loudly obtrllsive that it leaves an indelible stamp of infirmity\" on the decision of Respondent No. 3.\n\n[307 B-C]\n\n B\n\n• 2. From the-charges 2 to 7 and ll; it is obvious that if an enqiry were to be held into the charges framed against the appellant. the principal witness fen: the Department would have been Responden~ No. 3 (the dismisSing authority) himself as the main accuser and-the target of aP!iellant's misconduct. Surprisingly, the explanation dated June 9, 1982 of the appellant to the letter of accusation dated May 22, 1982 was considered on its merit~ by Respondent himself. Thereby, the accuser beame the Judge. [305 G-H, 306 Al\n\nNot O!flY that, the further explanation submitted by the appeJlant was consi'.' dered by Respondent No. 3 himself. The order of dismissal dated-June 15\", 1962 which was issued by Respondent No. 3 recites that he was fully . satisfied that it was not •easonabiy practicable to hold an inquiry into the appellant's conduct as provided by the Rules and that he had oome to the conclusion that the appellant was not fit to be\"retained in service and had, therefore,· to be dismissed, Evidently, Respondent 3 assessed the weight of his own accusation~ againSt the appellant and Passed a jUdgent 'Y}lich is one of. the ea; iest to pass-~ namely~ that be himself was truthful person and the appellant a liar. In ding this, Respondent No. 3 violaed a fundamental principle or natural justice.\n\n[305 B-C, 306 Fl\n\nThe State of U.P. v. Moltammad Nooh (1958) SCR ~95, referred to.\n\n3, The contention that inspite of the -above legal po&ition, the appellant does not deserve the assiStanco of the court, since he was habitually guilty of acts subversive of discipline cannot be accepted. In the first place, to bold the appellant guilty of habitual acts of indiscipline is to assume something which\n\nremain' unproved, Secondly, the illegaJity from which the order of dismissal Pl!Sfd by Respondent No. 3 suffers is of a character so grave and fundamental that the alleged habitual misbehiA-iour on the part of the appellant cannot cure . or condone it.\n\n[301 CB]\n\n4. The avio<; l needless complications in working out the mutual rights and obligations of the parties, the court directed :\n\n(i) The appellant who is due to retire from service shall be treated as having retired from service with effect from April 1, 1984 ; .\n\n(ii) He shall be paid arrears of salary due uhtil March 31, 1984 on the basis of salary last drkwn by him on June 15, 1982 without taking into\n\nH account the increments which he might have earned subsequent to Ii\\•\\ . \\l•t•: . . . .\n\n. (iii)\n\n/ The Provident Fund and gratuity sHall also be paid to the appellant as calculated in accordance with the rules, as if-no order'.or dismissal was passed against him; and '\n\n(iv) he ma)' not and shall nof rejoin his duties and he will Ill' treated as OD leave between 23rd March, 1984 and 31st March, 1984.\n\n)307 F-H, 308 A-Bl\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : CivH Appeal No. 2613 of '-1: 1983. ~\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 19-11-82 of Allahabad High Court in Civil Misc. Writ No. 8287 ofJ982.\n\nR..K. Garg, S.N. Singh and J).K. Garg, for the appellant. .\n\nP.R. Mridul, Miss A. Subhashini, R.N., Poddar, C. V, Subba Rao :.:· and A.K, Ganguli for the respondents. .,..\n\nThe judgment of the ourt was. deliverd by\n\nCHANDRACHl)D, C.J. The appellant was working as a senior clerk in ; tirn office of the Chief Commercial Superintendent, Northern .Railway, Varanasi. On May 22, 1982 the Senior Commercial Officer wrote a letter to him, calling upon him to offer his explanation in regard to 12 charges of gross indiscipline. The appellant submitted his explanation to the charges by bis reply .dated June 9, 1982. . . .\n\nOn the very next day, the Deputy Chief Commercial Superintendent served a second notice upon the appellant, saying that the explanation ottered by him was not convincing but that another chance was being given to him to offer his explanation regarding the specific charges which were conveyed to him by' the letter of May 22, 1982.\n\nBy this letter, the appellant was also cklled upon to submit hi!!' explanation within three days as to why deterrent disciplinary action should not be taken against him. The appellant submitted bis further explanation on June 1.4, 1982, but on the very next day; the Deputy Chief Commercial Superintendent' passed an order dismissing him from service on the ground that he was not fit to be retained in service. ·\n\n The appellant filed a writ' petition in the High Court of H Allahabad challenging the order of dismissal on various grounds.\n\nThe Union of India, the. Senior Commercial Officer and the Deputy\n\nChief Commercial Superintendent were impleaded to !hat petition\n\nARJUN CHAUBEY v. UN!ON (Chandrachud, C.J.) 305\n\nas Respondents 1 to 3. That writ petition having been dismissed by A the High Conrt, the appellant has filed .this appear by. special leave. . . .\n\nThe order dismissing the appellant from service .was passed by Respondent 3 under Ru.le 14(ii) of the .Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968 read with Proviso (b) to rticle 311(2) 9f B the Constitution. Respondent 3 recorded his reasons in writing for coming to the conclusion that it was not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry into . the conduct of the appellant in the manner provided by the relevant rnles, and thereafter, he proceeded.to pass . .. the or<ler of dismissal without holding any inquiry.\n\nQuite some time was taken by the appellant's counsel in-arguing upon the true meaning and intendment of the Disciplin~ and Appeal Ru\\es, 1968 and in urging that the appellant should have\n\nbeen affordetl an opportunity of being heard on the question as to whether, it was or was not reasonably practicable to hold an in, quiry. into the charges levelled against him. It was also urged by the learn-\n\nD. ed counsel that the fact that it was not reasonably practicable to 1\n\nhold a full-fledged inquiry as. contemplated by the Rules, did:not justify. the non-holdirig of any inquiry at alL We do not propose to enter into the merits of these contentions since, the appellant is entitled .to succeed on another ground.\n\nThe Jetter dated May 22, 1982 which contains accusations of gross misconduct against the appellant enumerates 12 charges, out . of which Charges Nos. 2 to 7 and JI refer to the appellant's misconduct In relation to Respondent 3. For exampfo, the second charge alleges that. the appellant entered the office of Respondent 3 and challenged him in an offensive and derogatory language. Charge No. 3 says .that the appellant was in the habit of forcing himself on }lespondent 3 two or three times every day with petty' complaints.\n\nCharge No. 4 alleges that the appellant stormed into the office of Respondent 3 and shouted at him, using foul words. Charges 5, 6 and 7 contain similar allegations. The allegation contained in Charge No. 11 is to the effect that behaving as a leader of goondas, the appellant hired the services of other goondas and created security problems for Respondent 3 and the members ot his family. It is obvious that if an inquiry were to be held into the charges framed against the appellant, the principal witness for the Department would have been Respondent 3 himself as the main accuser and the target of appellant's roisconuct. It is surprising in \\his context that tb~ . ' '\n\nexpl.anation dated June 9, 1982 which was furnished by the appellant to the letter of accusation dated May 22, .. 1982 was considered on its merits by . Respondent 3 himself. Thereby, the accuser beame the judge. The letter writt; n to the appellant by Respondent 3. on June 10,. 1982 says :· : .\n\n\"I have carefully gone through your defence explanation dated 9.6.82 to the charges given in this office Jetter of even No. dated 22.S.82 and the same i? not convincing at all.\n\nBefqre taking any actipn under D. & A.R., I would like io offer you another chance for giving your explaniations to the specific charges conveyed to you vide this ojjlce letter dated 22:5.82. . .\n\nPlease submit your days as to .why a deterrent taken against you\".\n\ndefence . explanation within three disciplinary action should•not be •\n\n:rhe appellant submjtted his further explanation, V.:hieh also ~Q6 . considered by Respondent 3 himself. . .\n\nThe order of dillmissal dated June 15, 1982 which was issued by Respondent 3 recites that he was fully satisfied that it was:not reasonably praeticable to hold an inquiry into the appellant's conduct as provided bytlje Rule~ and that he had come to the conclusion that the appellant was not fit to be retained in service. and had, therefore, to be dismissec\\. Evi.dently, Respondent 3 assessed.the weight of his own accusations against the , appellal)t and pas5ed a judgment which is one of the easiest to pass, namely, that he.himself was a trut11ful person and the appellant a liar. In doing , th~; Respondent 3 violated a fundamental principle of naturaLjustice.\n\nThe main thrust of the charges against the appellant related .to his conduct qua Respondent 3. Therefore, it was not open to t]le . latter to sit in judgment over the explanation offered. by the appel~ !ant and decide that the explanation was untrue. No person can be a judge in his own cause and no witµess can certify that hfs own testimony is true. Any one who has a personal .stake in, an lnquiy must keep himself aloof from the conduct of the : inqniry.\n\nThe order of dismissal passed against the appellant stands\n\nvitillte~ for tile simple rea!ll:m th<it the issue as to who, between th\n\n~ ..\n\nAJRUN CHAUBEY ~· UNION (Chandrachud, C.J.) 307\n\n\"· appellant and Respondent 3; was speaking the truth was decided by A Respondent 3 himself.\n\nIn The State of U11ar Pradesh v. Mohammad Nooh,1 S.R. Das, C.J., observed, while. speaking for the majority, that the roles of a judge and a witness cannot.be played by Dne and the same person .. and that t is futile to expect, when those roles are combined, thatthe It. judge can hold the scales of justice e\\'en .. We may borrow the lang-\n\n>i uge of Das, C.J., and record a finding on the facts of the case be- .{ fore us that the illegality touching the proceedings whiclr ended in the dismissal of the appellant is \"so patent and loudly obtrusive that it leaves an io, delible stamp of infirmity\" on the decision of Respondent3. . C\n\nMr. Mridul, appearing on lie half of the respondent, contended that though this may be the true le.gal position, .the appellant does not deserve the assistance of the Court since, he was habitually guilty of acts subversive• of discipline. This argument does not im- D press us.·\n\nIn the first place, to' hold tli.e appellant gui'Jity of habitual acts of indiscipline is to assume something which remains unproved . . $econdly, the illegality.from which the order of dismissal passed by\n\nRespondent- 3 suffers is of a character so grave and fundamental that the alleged habitual misbehivfour on the part of the appellant cannot cure or condone it. ·\n\nIn the result, we allow the appeal and set aside the judgment of the High Court. The order dated June 15, 1982 whereby the appellant was dlsinissed from service is set aside. In order, however, to avoid needless complications ' in working out the mutual rights. and obligations of the parties, we direct that the appellant, who is . due to retire within about six months, shall betreated as having retired from service with effect from April 1. 1984. He shall be paid the arrears of his salary due until March 31, 1984, on the basis of the salacy lasCdrawn by him on June 15, 1982, without taking itito account the increments which he might have earned subsequent to that date. The provident fund and gratuity shall also be paid to the appellant as calculated in accordance with the' rules, as if no order of dismissal w:ts passed against him.\n\nThe appellant may\n\n(I) [1958] SCR 595, 609 . . ,\n\n. not and shall not rejoin his .duties. He will be treated as on leave between.now and March 31, 1984.\n\nThe arrears of salary untilMarch 31, 1984 shall be paid to the appellant on the basis indicated above, on ot befoe that date and, in ariy event, not later than May I, 1984. The provident fund and gratuity shall be paid to him within a period of two months from today.. . y\n\nMr. Garg made a statement before us on behalf of his client, the appellant, that the appellant is neithi!'r in ocuption of any official residential accommodation, rior is.he. in possession of the garage which. is referred to in Ch; rge No. 6 in the letter of May 22,.\n\n1982, .\n\nThe appeal \\viii stand disposed of in terms of the above order. llespondent I, the Union of I.ndia, shall pay .to .the appellant a sum j of Rs. l; OOOf (Rupees one thousand) as .his costs.\n\n• S.R.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\n~ .\n\n. h • .,\n\n. '", "total_entities": 39, "entities": [{"text": "B\n\nARJUN CHAUBEY", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5, "end_char": 21, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "B\n\nARJUN CHAUBEY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 29, "end_char": 54, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Y.V. CHANDRACHUD", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 73, "end_char": 89, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Y.V. CHANDRACHUD*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V.D. TULZAPURKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 98, "end_char": 114, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.D. TULZAPURKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "D.P. MADON", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 133, "end_char": 143, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.P. MADON", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Article 311(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 376, "end_char": 390, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "May 22, 198~", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 748, "end_char": 760, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 22, 198~, the ,.Caior Commercial Officer wrote a letter to him calling up.on him to offer his\n\nexpJanatic;>n i'n fegard to tWelve ch&rges of gross indiscipline, mos; Jy rel; lting to the Deputy Chief Commercial Superintendent."}}, {"text": "June 14;1982.", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1602, "end_char": 1615, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant subrilitted his further explanation on June 14;1982."}}, {"text": "High Court of Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1835, "end_char": 1858, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court of Allahabad challenging the order of dismissal on variqus grounds."}}, {"text": "ARJUN CHA UllEY V", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2582, "end_char": 2599, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "No person can be a judge in his own\n\n• '\n\nARJUN CHA UllEY V, UNIOl-l 303\n\ncause and no witness can certify thttt his oWn tCstimony is true~ Any one who A has a pers6na1 stake in an .enquiry must keep himself aloof from the conduct of thejnquiry. ["}}, {"text": "June 9, 1982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3396, "end_char": 3408, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Surprisingly, the explanation dated June 9, 1982 of the appellant to the letter of accusation dated May 22, 1982 was considered on its merit~ by Respondent himself."}}, {"text": "May 22, 1982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3460, "end_char": 3472, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Surprisingly, the explanation dated June 9, 1982 of the appellant to the letter of accusation dated May 22, 1982 was considered on its merit~ by Respondent himself."}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5865, "end_char": 5893, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ")307 F-H, 308 A-Bl\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : CivH Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5980, "end_char": 6000, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 19-11-82 of Allahabad High Court in Civil Misc."}}, {"text": "R..K. Garg", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6039, "end_char": 6049, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R..K. Garg, S.N. Singh and J).K. Garg, for the appellant. ."}}, {"text": "S.N. Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6051, "end_char": 6061, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R..K. Garg, S.N. Singh and J).K. Garg, for the appellant. ."}}, {"text": "J).K. Garg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6066, "end_char": 6076, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R..K. Garg, S.N. Singh and J).K. Garg, for the appellant. ."}}, {"text": "P.R. Mridul", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6100, "end_char": 6111, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.R. Mridul, Miss A. Subhashini, R.N., Poddar, C. V, Subba Rao :.:·"}}, {"text": "A. Subhashini", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6118, "end_char": 6131, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.R. Mridul, Miss A. Subhashini, R.N., Poddar, C. V, Subba Rao :.:·"}}, {"text": "Poddar,", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6139, "end_char": 6146, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.R. Mridul, Miss A. Subhashini, R.N., Poddar, C. V, Subba Rao :.:·"}}, {"text": "C. V", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6147, "end_char": 6151, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.R. Mridul, Miss A. Subhashini, R.N., Poddar, C. V, Subba Rao :.:·"}}, {"text": "Subba Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6153, "end_char": 6162, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.R. Mridul, Miss A. Subhashini, R.N., Poddar, C. V, Subba Rao :.:·"}}, {"text": "A.K, Ganguli", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6172, "end_char": 6184, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and A.K, Ganguli for the respondents. .,.."}}, {"text": "CHANDRACHl)D", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6255, "end_char": 6267, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "deliverd by\n\nCHANDRACHl)D, C.J. The appellant was working as a senior clerk in ; tirn office of the Chief Commercial Superintendent, Northern .Railway, Varanasi.", "canonical_name": "CHANDRACHl)D"}}, {"text": "June 1.4, 1982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7212, "end_char": 7226, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant submitted bis further explanation on June 1.4, 1982, but on the very next day; the Deputy Chief Commercial Superintendent' passed an order dismissing him from service on the ground that he was not fit to be retained in service. ·"}}, {"text": "High Court of H Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7451, "end_char": 7476, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant filed a writ' petition in the High Court of H Allahabad challenging the order of dismissal on various grounds."}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7537, "end_char": 7551, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Union of India, the.", "canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS"}}, {"text": "S.82", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10740, "end_char": 10744, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "AJRUN CHAUBEY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12499, "end_char": 12512, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order of dismissal passed against the appellant stands\n\nvitillte~ for tile simple rea!ll:m th<it the issue as to who, between th\n\n~ ..\n\nAJRUN CHAUBEY ~· UNION (Chandrachud, C.J.) 307\n\n\"· appellant and Respondent 3; was speaking the truth was decided by A Respondent 3 himself.", "canonical_name": "B\n\nARJUN CHAUBEY"}}, {"text": "Chandrachud", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12523, "end_char": 12534, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order of dismissal passed against the appellant stands\n\nvitillte~ for tile simple rea!ll:m th<it the issue as to who, between th\n\n~ ..\n\nAJRUN CHAUBEY ~· UNION (Chandrachud, C.J.) 307\n\n\"· appellant and Respondent 3; was speaking the truth was decided by A Respondent 3 himself.", "canonical_name": "CHANDRACHl)D"}}, {"text": "S.R. Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12690, "end_char": 12698, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In The State of U11ar Pradesh v. Mohammad Nooh,1 S.R. Das, C.J., observed, while."}}, {"text": "Dne", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12810, "end_char": 12813, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "speaking for the majority, that the roles of a judge and a witness cannot.be played by Dne and the same person .. and that t is futile to expect, when those roles are combined, thatthe It."}}, {"text": "Das", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12993, "end_char": 12996, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "judge can hold the scales of justice e\\'en .. We may borrow the lang-\ni uge of Das, C.J., and record a finding on the facts of the case be- .{"}}, {"text": "Mridul", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13283, "end_char": 13289, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C\n\nMr. Mridul, appearing on lie half of the respondent, contended that though this may be the true le.gal position, .the appellant does not deserve the assistance of the Court since, he was habitually guilty of acts subversive• of discipline."}}, {"text": "April 1. 1984", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14366, "end_char": 14379, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "due to retire within about six months, shall betreated as having retired from service with effect from April 1."}}, {"text": "March 31, 1984", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14434, "end_char": 14448, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He shall be paid the arrears of his salary due until March 31, 1984, on the basis of the salacy lasCdrawn by him on June 15, 1982, without taking itito account the increments which he might have earned subsequent to that date."}}, {"text": "June 15, 1982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14497, "end_char": 14510, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He shall be paid the arrears of his salary due until March 31, 1984, on the basis of the salacy lasCdrawn by him on June 15, 1982, without taking itito account the increments which he might have earned subsequent to that date."}}, {"text": "May I, 1984", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15089, "end_char": 15100, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The arrears of salary untilMarch 31, 1984 shall be paid to the appellant on the basis indicated above, on ot befoe that date and, in ariy event, not later than May I, 1984."}}, {"text": "Garg", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15207, "end_char": 15211, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "y\n\nMr. Garg made a statement before us on behalf of his client, the appellant, that the appellant is neithi!'r in ocuption of any official residential accommodation, rior is.he."}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_3_309_314_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "30!1\n\nBIHARI CHOWDHARY.& ANR.\n\nSTAT, E OF BIHAR & ORS ..\n\nMarch 26, 1984\n\n(A.P. SEN AND V. BALAKRISHNA ERADI,. H.)\n\nCode of Civil Procedu; e 1908, Section 80;\n\n Suit against gvernment-lnstitutiorr afttr expiry of statutory period of two ft!Onths after 'notice has been delivere, d~NeCessity of.\n\nInterpretation of Statl; tes.\n\nLanguage of statute clear and unambiguous-Duty. of court to give effecrto\n\nD . statute ntwithstanding hardship liktly to be Caused: . ·,\n\nThe appellants-plaintiffs instituted a suit for deClaration of titIO and delivery of possession of immovable properties. The first fespondent was thC State -Oovernment. Prior to the institution of te suit the plaintiffs, had issued notice to the 1st respondent under section 80 CPC, but Without waiting for the.statutory period of two months to expire, the plaintiffs instituted the suit. Jn the written '. . statement filed on behalf of the State it was-contended that the suit was not QJaintainable for want of proper notice under section 80 CPC. The Trial court >Upheld the contention and dismissed the suit. The order was confirmed by the lirst appellate .court and the second appeal preferred by the. appellants to the High Court was dismissed in Iimine. .\n\n'Dismissing the appeal to this Court',\n\nHELD: 1. A suit against the Govrnment or a public officer, to which the requirement .of a_ prior notice .. under section 80 CPC iS attracted, cannot be validly instituted until the expiration of ihe period of two , months next after the 'notice in writing has beep delivered to the authorities concerned in the manner\n\nprescribed in the said section and if filed before the expiry of the said period, the suit has to ]Je dismissed as not maintainabl~. [314 ABl ·\n\n2. The effect of section 80 CPC prior to its amendment by Act 104 of 1976 .js clearly to iinpose a bar against the institution of a s\"Uit tlgainst the Govern,\n\nmentor a public officer in respect 6f any act purported to be done by him in his Offidal capat.ity until the expiration .or two months after notice has been deli .. .ered. There is clearly a public purpose underlying this manda.tory provision. [312 C, Hi.\n\n310 SUPRtMBCOURT REPORTS\n\n[1984] 3 S.C.R.'\n\n3. The examination of the scheme-of the Section reveals that the section has; been enaeted as a measure . of public policy \"'.ith. the object \"' ensuring that\n\n'\":re a suit is-,, instituted against .-the &vermnent Or a '.public _officer, th~ Government or the officer concerned is afforded an opportunity to scrutinise_ thercl3.im in respect of which the suit_ is proposed to be filed and if it-be fouDd to be~\n\n3.justclaim, to take immCdiate 13ction and thereby avoid unnecessary Iitigatibn1 and save public time and. money by settling the claim without driViog the~ pfrsOn wbo issued the notice, to institµte the :.uit . involving considerable expenditure and delay. [312 El ·\n\n4. When the language used in the Statute iS clea-r_ and una_mbi_guous, it is.~ the p}au'.i duty of._the COurt to give effect tC? it and considerations of hardship .. wnl not be a legitimate ground for not faithfully implementing the mandate or\n\nC the legislMure. [313 B]\n\nJj'\n\n. \" Bhagchand Dagadusa v. Secretary of .. Statefor India, 54 IA 338 ; .Velfayan v: Madras Province,· 74 Irtd!an Appeals 223; and SawaL?inghai Nirmal Chondv~ Union of Jndia [1966] 1 S.~.R. 956 referred to.\n\nNani Amma Nanninl Amnfa 'v . .State of Kerdla AIR 1963 Kerala 114,. -overruled.\n\nC!VrL APPELLATE JURISQICTION : Civil Appeal.Np. 1048 of. 1979 .\n\n. From the Judgment and Order dated 15. 12. 1978 of Patna. lligh Court in Second Appeal No. 215 of 1978\n\n'' '\n\n• L.N. Sinha, B.P. Singh, Ranjit Kumar a11d Ravi Prakash for the' appeallants.\n\nD.Goburefhan for the respondents.·\n\nThe Judgment of the Com; t was delivered by . ' • BALAKRISHNA ERADI J. The s]1ort question that arsies foP, c, onsideration in this appeal by special leave concerns the true scope, and application of.Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code.\n\n'The appellants. herin ar~ the plaintiffs in a. suit instituted in t)le i\\iunsiff's Court, Bihar S'harif, seeking the reliefs of dedaration of title and deliver¥ of possession with mesne profits in respect ot:. the properties descdbed in the plaint. The State of Bihar-the 1st respondent herein is the main defendant in the suit. Prior to the institution of the suit, the plah1tiffs had issued a uotice to the 1st\n\n-)';: ' ...\n\n)',\n\nB. CHOWDHARY v. Bll!AR (V.B. Eradi, J.) 311\n\nvespondent-State_:...under section 80 C.P.C. on 18.2.1969 and Exhit>it 2 is a copy ofthe said notice.\n\nHowever; without waiting for othe statutory period of two >n.ths, the plaintiffs instituted the.suit\n\n-0n 2.4.1969.\n\nIn the written statement filed on behalf of the State. of Bihar, it was contended.; inter a!ia, that the suit was not maintainble for want of proper notice under Section 80 C.P.C .. This contentiOn was uphelJ by the trial court which also recorded findings against the pblntiff; on the remaining issues concerning the title to the property and their erititlemwt to reliefs of declaration. :.and delivery of p'3session. The first appellate. court to which the ·.matter was ca.rried. in appral by 'the plaintiffs dismissed the appeal -on the ground that the plaintiffs' suit was not maintainable inasmuch as due .notice under Section 80 C.P.C. liad not been given. A , gecond appeal preferred by the appellants to the High Court at\n\nPatna did not meet with any success and it was dismissed in limine, .Hence this appeal by the plaintiffs.\n\nWe are concerned 'in this case with Section 80 C.P.C. as it D cStood prior to its amendment, by Act 104 of 1976 (Even under the .\n\n.amended provisiop, the position remains unaltered insofar as a suit of this nature is concerned). We s.hall extract the Section as it .stood at the matcr.ial ti me :\n\n\"so: No suit shall be instituted against the Government (inclu(ling the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir) or against a public officer .in respect of any act\n\n• lil\n\n purportingto be done by such public officer in his official capacity, until the expiration of two months next after notice in writing has been dtlivered to, or left at the office offa) in the cas.e-of a suit against the Central Government, except where it relates to a railway, a :Secretary to that Gover~_ment ;\n\n((b)' in the case of a suit against the Central Govern'\n\nment where it relates to a railway, the General Mana_ger of thatrailway ;\n\n' {(c) in the (:ase of a suit against the Government of the Sate ofJammu and Kashmir, the Secre- 1at\"y , to 'that Governme11t or any other officer authorised by that Government in this behalf;\n\n• •\n\n3.H SUPRE}.!E CQUl\\T. REPORTS\n\n(1984} 3 ~.C.R.\n\n(d) in. the case of a suit against any-0ther Govern,\n\n. inent,. a Secretary to that Government or the\n\nCollector of the district ; '\n\n*' * *\n\nand, in t4e case of a public offlcer, delivered to him or lfet at liis office, stating the cause of action, the nami:, description and place of residence of the plaintiff and relief wl1ich be claims ; and plaint shall contai\\1 a statement that such notice bas been so delivered ot left.\"\n\nThe effect of the Section is clearly to impose a bar against the institution of a. suit against the Government or a public officer in respect of any act purported to be dohe by him in his official capa- . city until the expiration of two months after. otice in writing has\n\n.been delivered to or left.at the office of the Secretary to Government or Collector of the poncerned district and' in the case of a public officer delivered to him or left at his office, stating the particulars enumerated in the last part of sub-section (I) of the Section. When we examine the' sch. eme\" of.the Section it becomes • . . obvious .that the Section has been enacted as a measure of public . ' .policy with the object of ensuring that before a suit is instituted against the Government or a public officer, the Government 6r the . officer concerned is afforded an opportunity to scrutinise the claim in respect of which the suit is proposed to be filed .and if it be . . . found to be a just claim, to take immediate action and thereby\n\navoid unnecessary litigation and save public time and money by settling the claim. wi.thout driving the person, _who has issued the 11otice, to institute the suit involving considerable expenditure and delay. The Government, unlike private parties, is expected to consider tlte matter, covered by the n.otice in a most objective manner, after obtaining such legal advice as they may think fit, and take a decision in public inierest within the period of . two months allowed by the Section as to whether the claim is just and reasonable and the contemplated suit should, . t!<ereforc, be avoided by speedy negotiations a:nd settlement.or whether the claim shouJ.d be 1esisted by fighting out the suit if and when it is instituted. There, is' clearly a. public purpose underlying. the mandatory provision o<intained in the Section insisting on the issuance of a notice setting eat the particulars or the , proposed suit. and giving two months' tillle to Government, or a public officer before a suit can be insti-.\n\n. .\n\n'(._ .\n\n; .\n\nB. CHOWDHARY v. BIHAR (V.B. EraJi, J.) .313\n\ntuted' against them. T!)e object of the Section is the advancement\n\nof justice and the securing of public good by avoidance of un- . necessary litigation.\n\nWhen the language used in the.Statute is clear and unambiguous, if is the plain duty of tlie 'Court to give effect to it ahd considerations of liardship will. not be a legitimate ground for not faithfully implementing the mandate of the legisiature:\n\nThe Judici .. al Committee of the Privy Council had occ.asion to consider the scope and. effect of Section 80 C.P.C. in an almost similar situation in Bhagchand Dagadusa and ors. v. Secretary of C- State for India in Council & Ors. l1) In that case, though a notice had been issued by the plaintiffs under Section 'so C.P.C. on 26th June 1922, the suit was insitituted before the expiry of the period of two montl1s from the said date. It was contended before the Privy Concil, relying on some early decisions o_f High Court of Bombay, that because one of t.he rlicfs claimed in the .suit was the grant of a perpetual injunction and the claim for the said relief would have become infrucluous if the plaintiffs were to wait for the statutory period of two months • prescribed in Section 80 C.P:C. before they filed the suit, the rigour of the Section should be relaxed by implication of a suita\\Jle excep- E: tion of a qualification in respect of a suit for emergent relief, such as one for injunction.· That contention did not find favour with the Privy Council nd it \\Vas held that Section 80 is express, explicit and mandory and it admits no implicati.ons or exception's. The Judicial Committee observed :\n\n\"To argue as appellants did, that the plaintiffs had a right urgently calling for a remedy, while s. 80 is mere procedure, is fallacious, for s. 80 -imposes a statutory and ur; qualified obligation upon the Court.''\n\nThis decision \"was subsequently followed by the Judicial G.\n\nCommittee in Ve//ayan v. Madras Prol'iF?ce.<\"') }'he dictum la'id down . by the Judicial Committee in Bhagchand Dagadusa v; Secreqry of State.for India:<•) was cited with approval and followed by a Bench\n\n(I) 54 I.A. 338\n\n(2) 74 I.A. 223\n\n(3) S4 I.A. 333\n\n. ,\n\n' ;\n\n(1984] 3 S.C.R j ~\n\nof five Judge_s of this Court in Sawai Singlrai Nirnial Chand v. Union\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nof India.(') ·\n\n. It must now be regarded as settled law that a suit against the Government or a public officer, to whic4 the requirement of a prioi: notice under. Section 80 C.P.C. is attracted, can not be validly ihstituted until the expir>ttion of the period of two months )-' next after the notice in writing has been delivered to t_he autho- • rities concerned in the manner prescribd for in the Section and if filed before the expiry of tile said period, the suit has to be dismissed as not maintainable .\n\n. On behalf of the appellaf1, ts, strong reliance was placed on. the decision of.a learned•Single Judge of the High Court of Kerala in Nani Amnia Nannini Amma v. State of Kera/a.(•) Therein the learned Judge has expressed the view that Sec. 80 is not a provision \"1f . of public policy .and there is no\\hing in the Section expressly affecting the jurisdiction of the court to try a suit\" instituted before the expiry of the period prescribei! _therein. , The reasons 'stated by the learned Judge in justification of his taking.lite said.view despite the clear pronouncement of the Judicial Committee of the Privy\n\nCouncil in Blzagchand's case do not appeal to us as correct or sound.\" 'In the light of the conclusion expressed by us in the fregoing. , paragraphs about the true .scope and effect of Section 80 C. P.C., the -+- afore cited decision of the learned Single Judge of the Ketala High Court cannot be accepted as laying down good law. •\n\nIIi the result, we confirm the judgment and decree of the :F High Court and· dismiss this appeal. The parties will bear the respective costs in this appeat\n\nN.V.K.\n\nAppeal dismissed •\n\n(I) Jl966](1) SCR 9'56\n\n(2) A.I R .. 1969 Kerala 114", "total_entities": 48, "entities": [{"text": "1\n\nBIHARI CHOWDHARY.& ANR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3, "end_char": 28, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BIHARI CHOWDHARY & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STAT, E OF BIHAR & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 53, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF BIHAR & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A.P. SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 75, "end_char": 83, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. BALAKRISHNA ERADI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 88, "end_char": 108, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. BALAKRISHNA ERADI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Section 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 147, "end_char": 157, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 732, "end_char": 742, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "CPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 743, "end_char": 746, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 998, "end_char": 1008, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "CPC", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "CPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1009, "end_char": 1012, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1381, "end_char": 1391, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "CPC", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "CPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1392, "end_char": 1395, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1749, "end_char": 1759, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "CPC", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "CPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1760, "end_char": 1763, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "L.N. Sinha", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3615, "end_char": 3625, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "215 of 1978\n\n'' '\n\n• L.N. Sinha, B.P. Singh, Ranjit Kumar a11d Ravi Prakash for the' appeallants."}}, {"text": "B.P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3627, "end_char": 3637, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "215 of 1978\n\n'' '\n\n• L.N. Sinha, B.P. Singh, Ranjit Kumar a11d Ravi Prakash for the' appeallants."}}, {"text": "Ranjit Kumar a11d Ravi Prakash", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3639, "end_char": 3669, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "215 of 1978\n\n'' '\n\n• L.N. Sinha, B.P. Singh, Ranjit Kumar a11d Ravi Prakash for the' appeallants."}}, {"text": "D.Goburefhan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3693, "end_char": 3705, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D.Goburefhan for the respondents.·"}}, {"text": "BALAKRISHNA ERADI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3779, "end_char": 3796, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BALAKRISHNA ERADI J. The s]1ort question that arsies foP, c, onsideration in this appeal by special leave concerns the true scope, and application of."}}, {"text": "Section 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3929, "end_char": 3939, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of Bihar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4224, "end_char": 4238, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Bihar-the 1st respondent herein is the main defendant in the suit."}}, {"text": "section 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4475, "end_char": 4485, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4486, "end_char": 4491, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Bihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4726, "end_char": 4731, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of Bihar, it was contended.;"}}, {"text": "Section 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4830, "end_char": 4840, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4841, "end_char": 4846, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5292, "end_char": 5302, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5303, "end_char": 5308, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5542, "end_char": 5552, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5553, "end_char": 5558, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6203, "end_char": 6221, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We s.hall extract the Section as it .stood at the matcr.ial ti me :\n\n\"so: No suit shall be instituted against the Government (inclu(ling the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir) or against a public officer .in respect of any act\n\n• lil\n\n purportingto be done by such public officer in his official capacity, until the expiration of two months next after notice in writing has been dtlivered to, or left at the office offa) in the cas.e-of a suit against the Central Government, except where it relates to a railway, a :Secretary to that Gover~_ment ;\n\n((b)' in the case of a suit against the Central Govern'\n\nment where it relates to a railway, the General Mana_ger of thatrailway ;\n\n' {(c) in the (:ase of a suit against the Government of the Sate ofJammu and Kashmir, the Secre- 1at\"y , to 'that Governme11t or any other officer authorised by that Government in this behalf;\n\n• •\n\n3.H SUPRE}.!E CQUl\\T. REPORTS\n\n(1984} 3 ~.C.R.\n\n(d) in."}}, {"text": "Government of the Sate ofJammu and Kashmir", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6471, "end_char": 6513, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We s.hall extract the Section as it .stood at the matcr.ial ti me :\n\n\"so: No suit shall be instituted against the Government (inclu(ling the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir) or against a public officer .in respect of any act\n\n• lil\n\n purportingto be done by such public officer in his official capacity, until the expiration of two months next after notice in writing has been dtlivered to, or left at the office offa) in the cas.e-of a suit against the Central Government, except where it relates to a railway, a :Secretary to that Gover~_ment ;\n\n((b)' in the case of a suit against the Central Govern'\n\nment where it relates to a railway, the General Mana_ger of thatrailway ;\n\n' {(c) in the (:ase of a suit against the Government of the Sate ofJammu and Kashmir, the Secre- 1at\"y , to 'that Governme11t or any other officer authorised by that Government in this behalf;\n\n• •\n\n3.H SUPRE}.!E CQUl\\T. REPORTS\n\n(1984} 3 ~.C.R.\n\n(d) in."}}, {"text": "Section 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9716, "end_char": 9726, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9727, "end_char": 9732, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9935, "end_char": 9940, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "26th June 1922", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9945, "end_char": 9959, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l1) In that case, though a notice had been issued by the plaintiffs under Section 'so C.P.C. on 26th June 1922, the suit was insitituted before the expiry of the period of two montl1s from the said date."}}, {"text": "High Court of Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10131, "end_char": 10151, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was contended before the Privy Concil, relying on some early decisions o_f High Court of Bombay, that because one of t.he rlicfs claimed in the .suit was the grant of a perpetual injunction and the claim for the said relief would have become infrucluous if the plaintiffs were to wait for the statutory period of two months • prescribed in Section 80 C.P:C. before they filed the suit, the rigour of the Section should be relaxed by implication of a suita\\Jle excep- E: tion of a qualification in respect of a suit for emergent relief, such as one for injunction.·"}}, {"text": "Section 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10396, "end_char": 10406, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "Section 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10701, "end_char": 10711, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "s. 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10925, "end_char": 10930, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "s. 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10969, "end_char": 10974, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11348, "end_char": 11350, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11650, "end_char": 11660, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "C.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11661, "end_char": 11666, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sec. 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12235, "end_char": 12242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "C.P.C", "statute": "Code of Civil Procedure"}}, {"text": "Blzagchand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12624, "end_char": 12634, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The reasons 'stated by the learned Judge in justification of his taking.lite said.view despite the clear pronouncement of the Judicial Committee of the Privy\n\nCouncil in Blzagchand's case do not appeal to us as correct or sound.\" '"}}, {"text": "Section 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12798, "end_char": 12808, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ketala High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12882, "end_char": 12899, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "paragraphs about the true .scope and effect of Section 80 C. P.C., the -+- afore cited decision of the learned Single Judge of the Ketala High Court cannot be accepted as laying down good law. •"}}, {"text": "N.V.K.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13104, "end_char": 13110, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The parties will bear the respective costs in this appeat\n\nN.V.K.\n\nAppeal dismissed •\n\n(I) Jl966](1) SCR 9'56\n\n(2) A.I R .. 1969 Kerala 114"}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_3_315_324_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "' .\n\nSMT. BIMLA DEVI ETC.\n\nv.'\n\n' .\n\nIST ADDITIONAL •DISTRICT JUDOE AJ'!\"D OTHERS )OTC.\n\n, B March 27, 1984\n\n[S; MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, A. VARADARAJAn AND RANGANATR\n\nMISRA, JJ.J\n\nUlla.r Prad~\"'' U1ban Buildings (Regu:atlon of Letting, Rent and Eviction) ...Act. 1972, Scope of-Words ad Phrases-lnport, inrerpreration ar:d nieaning\n\n•. of the word''occup_;/ifJn\" occurring in Exp!anarion {JV) to section 22(l}{bJ- The words used are not a rule pf evidence-A tenant ha1 no r-iCht to queltion\n\n.he mode in which tire. Land.orcl 111ay choose to fi1•e in.\n\nJn both Civil Appeal No.41 or 1979 and Civil Appeal No. 319 of 1980, 1he &ppellants are the unsuccessful house-owners. to get an eviction --order againt their tenants from tl1c portions of their' respective houses from\n\nth~ court's l-e!ow. In the first case, the question af-ose whether the .. porlion ·-Of the pi\"emises sought to be vaCa1ed by the landlady was one single u:iit or two separate unitS. In t1'e sec_ond case, the point involved was whether. the\n\n1 word \"occupation\":included actual residence of the landlord eVen though \\; he maY not hJve'bcen'fesiding there .\n\nAHowing tliO' appeals, by sp !cial leave, the Court,\n\nHELD: (C.A. No. 41/1979)\n\nIn view of the Trial Court's finding basiDg its decision on the report\n\n~\"°f the Co_mmii::.sioner appointed for the purpose, that the en.tire building con ··; Stituted one single .unit, the appellant being 'in occupation of a portion of 'f.he same, she is entitled to get release of the other portion occupied by the\n\n_ lienant. [32JF-G]\n\nIn C.A,. No. 379//980.\n\n1: _I. The case of the a;'lpe:Ilant is clearly covered by-lhc provi:.ions of 'Explanation (iv) to section 21(\\)(bl or the Ut•ar Pradesh U.rban Buildings •(Regulation or Letting, Rent and Eviction), Act 1972. [323C]\n\n1:2; The policy-of the law was to give a facility. to the landlord so :as to securr the entire building where he 'is in occUpation of a part of the \"\"1me and wa11ts to occupy the whole ho.use. [32 lD]\n\nSUPJ\\EME COURT _RE)'ORTS.\n\n(1984] 3 S.C.R-\n\n1'3. lo Babu Singh.Chauhan v. Rajkumari Jain & Ors. [1982l3 S C.R •. 114, the Supreme C0urt;, whi16construing tbe word ·occup1tio1\" oocurring.• . in section 21(l)(b) of the 1972 Act, uied the word ''po:i'iessio.1\", treating. the word ·\"possession\" as synonym of \"occuf)ation\" a:Jd sioca the word ''possession\" or'' occupati'oa\" may take vari\"0us forn1s held that even kep .. ing the house-hold effects by' the owner is an act of occupation. _. . ' [l 19H, 3200-GJ\n\nTherefqre, even if a landlord iS serviflg Outside or living with his near relations bilt makes casu:il visits :to his hou'l.e and thus retains cOntrol or-·\n\nove~.the entire area~ or a.Portion 9f th.e-proPerty, he. Would. in law be deem~ ed to be in occupation of.the same1 To accept the co::iteotion th1t Explaaa· tion IV required actu1l physical occup1,1tion by tblj landlord of the portiol).. _ re.t8ip.ed by him. would destory the Very concept of constructive or actria• possession or occupation. [320H ;· 32 iA-B] • ·\n\n2: 1. All the Rent Control Acts try o Qep.rive and curtail -the right of an. onwer of his property and hlve put 'coOstrJinis anJ restraints on hisi. right by giving suQstantial protectiO:i to the ten1nts io p:.iblk: interest, other- \\Vise if Rent Acts_, wereto b3 nbolishi+t or wer~ not th.er7 the landl\"ord could 'get a tenant eviCted only by a notic~ after expiry of the.tenancy in accor dance with the provisions of the Transfer ofPcopaty Act. [l21EF]. . . .\n\n2:2:.The words \"shall be conclusiveto prove\" in Explanation (iv)' clearly indicte that it is a s11bstantive right which belongs to the Jand 1ordi and w; tiich has been affirmed and recogni.sed if a p-art of an accommodatiol}· is retainfd by the landlord. The words \"concluivc to prove that the building is bona fide requ'ired_by the landlord\" dos not con.stitute a rule of cvi~ . dence. [J2JF-G] · ·\n\n2:-3. The right to j-ectment bavirig accri.led to tbe apDellant und-er E~~ p1anation (iv) was a vested right as an owaer and could not be affCcied hy the 1976 amendment unless it. was couched in a language which was either expressly Or by necessary intendm'ent 'ineant to b~ operative retrosoectively~ Explariation {iv) deals not merc.ly wit, h a particular procedure but \\\\-ith the-.• substaritive rights of the parties.\n\nThe Said E'xplan:it[on tias asserted f}nd~ affirmed tho substantive 'tight ora landlord to get portion of a buliding v.u1a.- ted where he is in occupation.· of a p'art of iJ.\n\nSuch a sub.itantive rigbt can--· not be taken away mere1y by a procedural amendment nof does the languagO''\n\nof the amendment introdu::ed the 1976- .A:ot envisage or cotemplat~ Sl, lch a position. section .i 4 of. the 19 7 6 'ACt m'erely recites' tJJ.at Explanation (ii) and (iv) of s.21(1)(b) shafr be omitted. There is nothing to show that th<> legislature intended , to give, any. retrospective cffct to the delCtioil, of ExPll •· natioo (lv). [321H, 322A-D]\n\nThe .argument that merely because the 1andlor.d was living withi -his son or bis r~Jation after retirement and, therefore, was not ia occupatio[)\n\nof the house cannot b~ accCpted because it was not for the tenant to dictate t~ the Jani;\\lord.as to_ hOw he sbOuld use his own premises. A tenant to has got: . no right ilor an; y busi_ness\n\n0 to interfere with .the .mode or manner .in which a. landlord may choose \\o QS<; Ms property or live therein. {323 A-BJ ' - . ' .\n\naJMLA DEVI v. ADDL. DJSTI': JUDGE (Fazal Ali, J.) 317\n\nCIVIL {\\PPELLATE JURI_smicnoN : Civil Appeal .\n\nA No. 4\\ of 1979. (From the Judgment and Order dated 23rd August, 1978 of Allahabad Hi•hCourt in Writ Petition No, 1483 of 78) . 0 . .\n\nWITH Civil Appeal No. 379 of 1980. ,,· From the Judgment and order dated.28th March, 1979 of the < Allahabad High Court in civil Misc-Writ No. 1287 of 1.977- G.L. Sanghi, V.A. Bobde & H.K. Puri for the appellant in C.A.\n\nNo. 41/79.\n\nR:K. Jaln for the appellant in C.A.No. 379/80 ..\n\nK.P. Gupta for the respondents in C.A. No. 41/79.\n\nShanti Bhushan and R.B. Mehrotra for the respondent in C.A.\n\nNo. 379/80.\n\nThe Judgment of, the Court was dlivered by\n\n' I> FAZAL Au J.\n\nWe would first take up Civil appeal No. 379 or 1980 which is .directed against an Order dated March 28, 1979 passed by the Allahabad High Court dismissing the writ petition of the appellant and arises in the following circumstances.\n\nThe appellant owns a house bearing No. 113, Amroha Gate, Fruit Market, Morada bad, in a portion of which he had inducted. respondent No.3 (Vishwa Nath K1por) as a tenant white rtaining some portion for himself, when he (appellant) was servlng as a . Judi, i; ial Officer in the State of Uttar Pradesh. In the year !968, the appellant retired as a District Judge as a result of which he had to vacate his official residence, which necessitated the present eviction proceedings against respond~.nt No.3. The application for eviction was tiled on 2.l.!973 under s.21(1) (b) of the Utar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the '1972 Act') in which the appellant prayed that the portion occupied by respondent No.3 i'uay be released on the ground of personal requirement as after retirement he wanted to occupy the entire house.· The appellant further claimed that due to shortage of accommodation he had to stay with bis son elsewhere-.. The eviction proceedings were contested by the respondent on the following grounds:-\n\n(a) that since .the appellant was already living with .his spn there was no particular urgency or personal necessity fot him to occupy the rented portion also,\n\nIA I\n\n(b)\n\n(c)\n\nSU\"Pll.EME COURT REPORTS'\n\n[1984] 3 S.C.R.\n\nthat the appellant badin bis occupation a part of th~ house which was retained by him even after inducting him.\n\n(respondent) as a tenant and which was sufficient tor his needs, and . . tha.t !be.appellant after keeping his household effects in the portion retained by him bad locked up the. same and was, therefore, .not ill actual occupation of the home as equired by Explnation (iv) to s. 21 (1) (b). ·\n\nIn the same token, it was submitted as a point of law that the essential ingredient ofExplanation (iv) to s.21(1) (b) was that the building must have been in occupation of the landlord for residential purposes which alone would be a conclusive proof cif personal . necessity. It was also contended as a question of fact that• as the\n\nappellant-landlord was not in actual occupation of the premises, Explanation (iv) would not be attracted in the instant case. To buttress this argu'.llent it was submitted that the landlord never occupi; d .or possessed the premises but had locked up the same and. was.re.siding e!sewhe.re. Thhplea of the respondent-tenant did not find favourwith the Prescribed Authority or the High Court ..\n\n . TI1e .domiriant question, therdore, turns upon the import and interpretation of Explanation (iv). to s.21(1) (b), particularly the nature and meaning of the word 'occupation' as used in Explanat\\on (iv). The crux of the inatter, therefore, was as to whether or not the case of the appellant squarely fell within the four corners ofExplana-, tion (iv) and'whether the word 'occupation' included actual residence of the landlord even though he may not have b, een residing there.\n\nWe migl1t mention that while the eviction proceedings were pending\n\n• I I , ' ' before.the Prescnbed Authority the 1972 Act was amended by U.P.\n\nAct No.28 of 1976 (for short to be referred to as the ' 1976 Act') which came into force with effect fro~, 5th July 1976. and which '. deleted Explanation (iv).\n\nThe Prescribed Authority, relying on Explanation (iv), held that the need of the landlord was fully made .uut and accordingly passed an order -f .eviction against the tenant., partly re) easing some portion in appellanes favour.\n\nThe appellant tlien filed an appeal befoR.the District Judge which was heard by an Additional District Judge who accepted the offer of the tenant and modjfied the Order of the Prescribed Authority by further 'releasing some other portion In his favour.\n\nThe appellant then filed a writ\n\n' '\n\n. BIMLA DEVI v. ADDL. DJSTT. JUDGE (Fazal' An; J.) 319'\n\npetition before the High Court which upheld the decision of the A Disttict Judge and dismissed the writ petition.\n\nBefore we approach the. question cif law raised before us it may be nec.essary to give a detailed picture of the position of the premises retained by_the landlord and hat rerited out to the tenant. The house in question is a double'storeyed one containing some rooms 0n the first floor and some on the_ ground floor which were retained by the landlord at the time.of th• lease and the rest of the portion. was let out to the tenant.\n\nThe learned counsel for the appellant coatended that in view of the requieme.nts of the landlord he had a real and tona fide need Cf9r o:cupying the entire house and. therefore, the entire portion occupied by the tenant should have been released' in favour of the appellant. This argument was countered by Mr. Shanti Bhushan, counsel for the respondellt, who put forward the following legal su bmissioo:\n\nIn the first place,. he con\\ended that Explanat.ion (iv) woulc; l not in terms apply to the facts of the present case because on the findings of fact arrived at by the courts below it was not shown that the appellant was in actual '°ccupation of the portion retained by him, which js a prerequisite for the application of Explanation (iv) to s.21 (l} (b). In this connection, it was sµbmitted that the admitted position being that the application was previously employed as a.\n\nDistrict Judge and was living elsewhere, he could not be deemed to be in occupation of the portion retained by him. In order to appreciate this argument, it my be necessary to examine closely the language of Explanation (iv) which may be extracted thus:\n\n\"(iv) the factthat the building under tenancy is a part of a building, the iemining part thereof is.in the occupation of the landlord for residential purposes, shall be conclusive to . prove that the building is. bona fide required by the landlord.\"\n\nThe pivotal argument of the counsel for the respondent turns upon the interpretation of the word 'occupation'. This, however,. does not present any d1fficulty because in a recent decision in the case of Babu Singh Chauhan v. Ra1kumari Jain & Ors.(') this Co)lrt while\n\n(I) [1982] 3 SCR 114. ·\n\n• H:\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1984) 3 s.c.R. ·\n\ncostruing a sim}lar term in the same Act obseed as follows : ·\n\n\"We have gone through the judgment .of .the High Court in the light of the arguments of the parties and we .are. inclined to agree with the view taken by the High Court that\n\n~ the mere fact . that the lady did not actually reside in the premises. which were locked and contained her household effects, it cannot be said that she was not in possession of the premises so as to make s. 17 (2J •inapplicable. Possession by. a landlord of his property \"may assume various forms. A lanlllord may be se_rving outside while retaininii his possession over a property o( a part of the property by either leaving it in-charge of a servant or by putting his household effects or. things locked up in the premises; such an occupation also would be full and complete posses, Sion .in. the eye of law.\"\n\n.• It is true that the court used the word, 'possession' but in • • Explanation.(iv) !O s.21(1) (b) the word used is 'occupation' and not 'possession' but this Court treated the word 'possession' as being a synonym of 'occupation'. In Webster's Third New Jl)tcrnational DictiOllary the word 'occupation' has been denned at page 1560 thus: ·• ·\n\n\"Occupationto take possession of, occupy, einploy\"\n\n, The Black's Law Dictonary (5th Edn.) defines 'occupation' at page 82 thus: ·\n\n\"occupation.::...possession; control; enure; use.\"\n\n. F Jn Corpus Juris Secundum (vol.67) at pge 74 'occupation' hs\n\nbeen .mentioned thus:\n\n\"The wor.d may be employed \"as referri'ng to the. act or process 'of occupying, the state of being occupied, occupancy, or tenure.''\n\nThis, Court in the observations, extracted above, has clearly pointed out that 'possession' of 'ocoupatio_n' may take various forms and it was expressly held that even keeping the houtehold .effects by the own.er is an act of occupation.\n\nIt is, therefore, manifestly clear that even if a landlord is serving outside or , Jiving 'l(ith his near relations but makes cas\\l!il\n\nBIMLA DEVI v. ADDL. DISTT. JUDGE (Fazal All, J;) 32l ' isits t.ohis house and thus retains control over the entire .or .a por •tion of th.e property, he would in law be deemed to be in occupation ·-Of the same.\n\nTherefore, we are unable to accept the' argument of Mr. Shanti Bhushan that the essential. ingredient of Explanation (iv) 11as not been made out, there being no actual physical occupation . 'by . the lanqlord of the portion retained, by him. Indeed, if the broa.d argument put forward by the counsel is.to be accepted then\n\nhat would destroy the very concept of coqsructive or actual posses- ·sion or occupation. For, instance, even if a. house is not let out to any)Jody but is locked up, can it be said that the owner who is not 'living there but.has kept his household effects, would not be deemed tp be in occupation of the same? The answer must necessarily be in . the negative.\n\nIt seems to us that the policy of the law was to give a facilitf to the landiord so as to secure the entire building where he is in\n\n1 -0ccupation of a part of the same and wants to occupy th~ whole .house.\n\nMr. Shanti Bhushan then argued that Explanation (iv) •does not confer any substantive right but merely raises a preump, •tion that if a landlord is in occupation of a part of the premises, his need would be deemed to be bona fide, We are, .however, unable to agree with this argument.\n\nWe must remember that all the Rent Control Acts try to deprive and. curtail the legal right of an owner to his property and have pnt constraints and restraints on his right by giving substantial protection to the tenant~ .in public interest; otherwise if'the Rent Acts were to be abolished or were not there, the landlord could get a tenant evicted only by a notice after expiry of the tenancy in accordance with the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. The words \"shall be condusive to prove\" In Explanation (iv) clearly indicate that it is a substantive right which belongs to the landlord and which has been affirmed and recognised if a part of an accommodation is retained by the landlord. We are unable to agree with Mr. Shanti Bhushan that the words \"conclusive to prove that the building is \\Jona fide required by the landlord\" constitute a rule of evidence.\n\nIn fact, this argument . was put forward before usbecause the learned counsel wanted to submit that in view of the 1976 Amendment Act, deleting Explanation (iv) to s.21(1) (b) of the 1972 Act, it would be -deemed to be retrospective and therefore the relief given by Explanation (iv) wonld . -Oisappear. We cannot agre.e with this somewhat far-fetched submis-\n\n\n[1984) 3 S.C.Rsion because Explanation (iv) deals not merely with a particular procedure but with the substantive rights of the parties. The said< Explanation has assserled and affirmed the substantive right of a . . landlord to get a portion of a building vacated where he is in occupa~\n\ntion of a part of it. Such a substantive right cannot be teyken away merely by a procedural amendment nor. does the language of the amendment introduced by the .1976 Act envisage cir cntempfate such. a position .. Section 14 of the 1976 Act merely recites that Explanations (ii) and (iv) of s.21(1) (b) shall be omitted. There is nothing; to show that the legislature intended to give any retrospective effect to the deletion of Explanation (iv). ·\n\nIn these circumstances, therefore, the right to ejectment having: accrued to the appellant under Explanation (iv} was a vested right as an owner and could not 'be affected by t!Je 1976. amendment unless. it was couched in a language which was either exp.ressly or by necessary intendment meant to be operative retrospectively.\n\nLastly, it was argued by Mr .. Shanti Bhushan that the fact reinains that the appellant, even after retirement, was not in actual possession of the portion retained by him and was living with his. son or Qtber relati.ons most of the time excepting casual visits to the premises in dispute. A farther argument was raised in an additionat Note supplied by the counsel for the respondent that as the bathroom and the latrine were in occupation of the tenant, the landlord could not possibly have occupied the premises retained by hi!D' and could not have lived there in the' absence of these facilities. The High Court rightly rejected thes.e argumets by observing thus:\n\n- \\ ~· \"The last argument was that the view ofthe Prescribed\n\n~ ' ' ' .\n\nAuthority that since the petitioner did not occupy the por- . tion retained by him and lived with his son anrl, therefore. his need was not bona fide has nomerits inasmuchas the petitioner did not have .either a latrine._ or a bathroom• and that he could not possibly occupy the hoi1se in the. posit.lop; in which it bad been .retained: There may be some truth in. the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner.\n\nBut, as neither the Prescribed Authority nor the Appellate Authority based their judgment on this feature of the case an\"d . th'ey examjned the merits of the. claii:n ofthe respective parties. it is not possible to interfere with the j, udgments of tlie courts; below.\"\n\n. . '\n\nI..._.\n\nBIMLA DEV! v. ADDL. DISTT. JU;)Gb (F aza/ Ali, J,) 323\n\nAn attempt was made by the parties to come to a settlement but, unfortunately, the efforts failed. T}le argument.of Mr. Shanti' Bhushan .that merely because the landlord was living with his son or his relation a(ter :etirement and, therefore, was not in occupation of the' house cannot be accepted because it was not for the tenant to dictate to the landlord as to how he should use his own premises.\n\nA tenant has got no right nor any business to interfere with the mode or manner in which a landlord may choose to use his propecty or live !herein.\n\nJn these circumstances, therefore, we are satisfied that the case\n\nof the appellant is' clearly covered by the provisions of Explanation o\n\n(iv) to s.21(1) (bl and a decree for release of the entire premises should have been passed by the District Judge against the respondent.\n\nWe, therefore, allo; v this appeal, set aside the judgments of all the courts below and grder release of the entire premises in possession of the respondent to the appellant. Time is granted to the respondent to vacate the premises on or.before 31st December 1984, subject D to the usual undertaking to be given and filed by him in the Court within four weeks frqm .today, failing which the.grant of time shall st1nd revoked without further reference to the Bench and the appellant would be entitled to be put in possession forthwith. . - .\n\nCivil Appeal No. 41 of 19,79\n\nThis appeal was heard alongwith civil appeal No. 379 of 1980 which we have decided by our judgment.• The main point involved in , this appeal was as to whether theportion of the premises sought to be vacated by the landlady was one sjngle unit or two separate units. This Court remanded the, matter to. the trial court for examining this po int and the trial court has returned a finding, basing its decision on the report of the Commissioner appointed for the purpose, that the entire building cons1ituted one single , unit.\n\nIt is, therefore, manifest that if the entire building was one unit and the appellant being in occupation of a portion of the same, she is entitled to get release of the other portion also.\n\nIn view of our decision in civil appeal No. 379 of 1980, the appeal is allowed and we order release of the entire portion in favour of the appellant • . Time is grantd to the respondent to vacate the premises on or before\n\n31st October 1984, subject to the nsuaf undertaking being given and fited within four weeks from today, failing which the .grant of time\n\n. 324\n\n\n[1984) 3 S.C.R •• . . . j shall stand revoked without f\\)rther refaence to the Bench. There wiH be no order as io costs.\n\n• Let a certified copy of this judgment be placed civil appeal No.41 ofl979.\n\nS.lt. '\n\n• • \\.\n\non the file of\n\ni4ppeals allowed.", "total_entities": 40, "entities": [{"text": "BIMLA DEVI ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10, "end_char": 24, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BIMLA DEVI ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "IST ADDITIONAL •DISTRICT JUDOE AJ'!\"D OTHERS )OTC", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 37, "end_char": 86, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "1ST ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE AND OTHERS ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MURTAZA FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 113, "end_char": 130, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. VARADARAJAn", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 132, "end_char": 146, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A. VARADARAJAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MISRA, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 162, "end_char": 171, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RANGANATH MISRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "section 21(l)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2179, "end_char": 2195, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "All the Rent Control Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3024, "end_char": 3048, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Vise if Rent Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3252, "end_char": 3268, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3576, "end_char": 3579, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Vise if Rent Act", "statute": "Vise if Rent Act"}}, {"text": "s.21(1)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4764, "end_char": 4774, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Fazal Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5450, "end_char": 5459, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "DJSTI': JUDGE (Fazal Ali, J.) 317\n\nCIVIL {\\PPELLATE JURI_smicnoN : Civil Appeal .", "canonical_name": "Fazal Ali"}}, {"text": "CIVIL {\\PPELLATE JURI_smicnoN", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5470, "end_char": 5499, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "DJSTI': JUDGE (Fazal Ali, J.) 317\n\nCIVIL {\\PPELLATE JURI_smicnoN : Civil Appeal ."}}, {"text": "G.L. Sanghi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5812, "end_char": 5823, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1287 of 1.977- G.L. Sanghi, V.A. Bobde & H.K. Puri for the appellant in C.A.\n\nNo."}}, {"text": "V.A. Bobde", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5825, "end_char": 5835, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1287 of 1.977- G.L. Sanghi, V.A. Bobde & H.K. Puri for the appellant in C.A.\n\nNo."}}, {"text": "H.K. Puri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5838, "end_char": 5847, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1287 of 1.977- G.L. Sanghi, V.A. Bobde & H.K. Puri for the appellant in C.A.\n\nNo."}}, {"text": "R:K. Jaln", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5887, "end_char": 5896, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R:K. Jaln for the appellant in C.A.No."}}, {"text": "K.P. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5937, "end_char": 5947, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "379/80 ..\n\nK.P. Gupta for the respondents in C.A. No."}}, {"text": "Shanti Bhushan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5988, "end_char": 6002, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shanti Bhushan and R.B. Mehrotra for the respondent in C.A.\n\nNo.", "canonical_name": "Shanti' Bhushan"}}, {"text": "R.B. Mehrotra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6007, "end_char": 6020, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shanti Bhushan and R.B. Mehrotra for the respondent in C.A.\n\nNo."}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6247, "end_char": 6267, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "379 or 1980 which is .directed against an Order dated March 28, 1979 passed by the Allahabad High Court dismissing the writ petition of the appellant and arises in the following circumstances."}}, {"text": "Vishwa Nath K1por", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6497, "end_char": 6514, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "respondent No.3 (Vishwa Nath K1por) as a tenant white rtaining some portion for himself, when he (appellant) was servlng as a ."}}, {"text": "State of Uttar Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6636, "end_char": 6658, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Judi, i; ial Officer in the State of Uttar Pradesh."}}, {"text": "2.l.!973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6902, "end_char": 6910, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The application for eviction was tiled on 2.l.!973 under s.21(1) (b) of the Utar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the '1972 Act') in which the appellant prayed that the portion occupied by respondent No.3 i'uay be released on the ground of personal requirement as after retirement he wanted to occupy the entire house.·"}}, {"text": "s.21(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6917, "end_char": 6924, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8057, "end_char": 8062, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.21(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8181, "end_char": 8188, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.21(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8908, "end_char": 8915, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shanti Bhushan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11031, "end_char": 11045, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This argument was countered by Mr. Shanti Bhushan, counsel for the respondellt, who put forward the following legal su bmissioo:\n\nIn the first place,.", "canonical_name": "Shanti' Bhushan"}}, {"text": "s.21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11468, "end_char": 11472, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1982] 3 SCR 114", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 12383, "end_char": 12399, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12898, "end_char": 12903, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.21(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13395, "end_char": 13402, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Fazal All", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14467, "end_char": 14476, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "JUDGE (Fazal All, J;) 32l ' isits t.ohis house and thus retains control over the entire .or .a por •tion of th.e property, he would in law be deemed to be in occupation ·-Of the same.", "canonical_name": "Fazal Ali"}}, {"text": "must remember that all the Rent Control Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15827, "end_char": 15870, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Transfer of Property Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16259, "end_char": 16283, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s.21(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16862, "end_char": 16869, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "We must remember that all the Rent Control Act", "statute": "We must remember that all the Rent Control Act"}}, {"text": "Section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17563, "end_char": 17573, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.21(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17640, "end_char": 17647, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shanti' Bhushan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 19760, "end_char": 19775, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T}le argument.of Mr. Shanti' Bhushan .that merely because the landlord was living with his son or his relation a(ter :etirement and, therefore, was not in occupation of the' house cannot be accepted because it was not for the tenant to dictate to the landlord as to how he should use his own premises.", "canonical_name": "Shanti' Bhushan"}}, {"text": "s.21(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20339, "end_char": 20346, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_3_31_36_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "THE PUNJAB UNIVERSITY, CHANDIGARH ETC.\n\nSUNDER SINGH AND OTHERS\n\nFebruay 27, 1984\n\n[S. MuRTAZA fAZAL Au, A. VARADARAIAN AND\n\nRANGANATH MISRA, JJ.] •\n\nPunjab University Calendar Vol. l/, 1976, Chapter III Rule 27./ (a) inter, prttation of-Whether the allowance of grace mark under Sub-Rule ·(a) or (b) wi// apply to candidates reappear)ng in all)' subject-Award of graCe n'1ark at Posl Graduate levl deprecated. ' •\n\nRe.spondents in each of these appea]s could not clear the LLM examination in accordance with RegulatiOn 7 of the Punjab University Regulations D either in the first atte'mpt or later while taking on compar.tmcntal basis even aftet addition' of grace marks as laid down in Rule 27(1)(b) of the University -\n\nRegulations. The respondents filed. separate writ pethions praying for a d-irection to give the benefit of moderation grace. mark as calculated under Role 27(1)(a). The High Court. rejected the plea of the Appellant University holding that it was Rule 27(l)(b) that applied and not Rule 27-l(a). f[ence the \\ \". appeal by Special Leave.\n\n' '\n\nAllpwing the appeal, the Court\n\nHELD : A bare reading of the Rule 27 (referred !to as the. Regulations by the High Court) makes it clear that clause(•) is applicable where the fu 1 examinatioti is taken and clause (b) is attracted where the !candidate reappears to.clear the compartment or subject and part in which he has been declared eligible to re3; ppear.\n\nJn each of these cases the candidate was reappearing to clear the paper in which he or she had failed; clause (b) was clearly attracted and the benefit under clause (a)•was not .available. .The language of clause (b) -ris such as would squarely apply to such a .situation. The provision in clause\n\n(b) is clear and on reappearing the candidate becomes entitled to grace marks\n\nof up to OI!ll per cent of the total marks of the subjecvsubjecis in which he reappears. Once clauSe {b) applies no referenee is availabJeto the performance in the regular examination taken earlier and the benefit of grace marks to the extent indicated has to be confine_d to the performance at the reappearance.\n\nOnce this is the position each of the candidates was 6ot eligible to pass.\n\n. (34GH, 35B-C] . .\n\n[In view of the-declaration dated 19.6:1980 made . before the court that irrespective of the result of the appeals, the candidates will be declared to' have\n\npassed~ t4e Court as a special ca~~ did n9t want to disturb the result.] u\n\n\" ' -\n\n(35D] ' .\n\n. '18\n\n>>G\n\ni-tH\n\n(1984) 3 S.C.R.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS . .\n\nObservation :\n\nThe J?OSition obtaining in (be Punjab University in re.s.pect of Post Graduate degrees namely grace marks beiag awarded is disapproved. A Master's degree in any specialityis con$idered to be the highest qualification in tha normal ruh. It is very much necessary that such a degree. should be conferred only on th.e deserving students who having studied the subject and taken the appropriate examination conducted by tho University at the end of such studies h:1ve d:!served the degree on the basis of their performavce. There should be no scope for looking for grace marks at such level and the sooner the . Punjab U !l'iversity abandons the practice of awarding grace marks in .. -respeCt of post-graduate examinations the better it would be in the interest of\n\nhigher eduCation in this country.'[35F-H]\n\nCIVIL APPELLA'IE JURlSDICTION; Civil Appeal No. 6009 of 1983.\n\nAppeal by.special leave from the Judgment and Order dated , the 19th April, 1983 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in .c.w.P. No. 1484 of 1983.\n\nWITH\n\nCivil .Appeal Nos. 1207 and 1208 of 1980.\n\nAppeals by special leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 30th May, i980 of the Punjab and Haryana High Comif in Civil Writ Petition Nos. 1759 and 1846 of 1980.\n\n J.L. Gupta, D.N. Gupta and V.K, Verma for the Appellant in CA. No. 6009 of 1983. i . . . ·.\n\nJ.L. Gupta and C.M, Nayar for the Appellant in CA. No.· 1207 and 1208 and \\980.\n\nHardev Singh and R.S. Sodhi for the Respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the_ Court was delivered by •\n\nRANGANi\\.TH MiSRA J. Each of these appeals .is' by speaial leave and is directed against the decision of the High'Courtof Punjab and Haryana in separate, writ petitions, A common .'\\uestion i_s involved in all the three matters and that relat.es to a corret interpretation of Rule 27. l(a) in Chap.ter Ill of the Punjab University Regulations.\n\nResponderrts in each . of these appeals was a student of the funjabUniversity for the Master Deree in Law (LL.M,).\n\nRill~\n\n-:' .. -! ;\n\nPUNJAB UNIVERSITY v. SUNDER siNGH (Ranganath Misra, J.) 33\n\n7 of the Punjab University l!.egulations provides :\n\n\"7. The minimum marks required to pass Part 1/U examination, as the case may be, shall be :\n\n (i) 45 per cent in each paper; and\n\nIii) 50 per cent in the aggregate.\"\n\nIt may be stated that 'there are eight papers in all each carrying 100 marks and Part-I covers four papers while Part-II covers the remainder. R.ule 27 reads as follows :\n\n\"27.l(a). A candidate who appears in all subjects of an examination and who fails in one or more subject (written, practical, sessional or viva voce) and/or the aggregate (if there is a separate requirement of passing on the aggregate) shall be given grace marks up tq. maximum of I per cent of the total aggregate marks (excluding marks .for internal assessment) to make up the deficiency if by such addition the candidate can pass the examination. . While awarding grace marks fraction working to 1/2 or more will be rounded . . to a whole;\n\nProvided that grace marks be also awarded to .a candidate if by awarding such marks he can earn exemption or comp\n\n0artment in subject/s and part/s. E\n\n(6) A candidate wh'? re-appears to clear the compartment or subject/s and part/s in which he has been declared ·\n\n(eligible) to re-appear shall be .awarded grace marks up to I% of the total marks of the subject/s and part/s in which he reappears if by such addition the cand.idate can pais in that subject/s or part/s.\" .\n\nEach of the respondents Jailed to satisfy the requirements of Rule 7 and being eligible to .clear the subject in which he failed on compartmentel basis reappeared in such subject in the next exami.nation. As on the 'pe'rformalice of the subsequent eii:amination each of the respoli.dents was not eligible to pass by. complying\n\nwlth-l)e requirements of. Rule 7, the need for invoking Rule 27\n\n-- arose. The University authorities took the view that Rule 27.l(b), authorised addition of the grace !llarks of up to l per cent al). the marks scured in the suoject/s in which the Cal)didate reappa'r, ed H and as: with that benefit given the c, andidates di!l not pas, f.hey . ·\n\nwefouqd qo\\ \\o haye l?el! ~11¥cesef, ul, lhat led \\o ea~ oJtb~\n\n\"! '~\n\n. E\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1984) 3 S.C:R• • respondents filing a separate writ applicatiqn' before the High G:!ourt.\n\nlfhe High Court referred to the rule and observed :\n\n\"The only , Question to be seen is whether Regulation ·: 27. l(a) in Chapter III of . the Punjab University Calendar, Volume II, 1976, relating to Mo.deration of Question Papers and results of examinations, is applicable or not. We have gone through. clauses (a) and (b) of this Regulation very carefully and we find that clause (b) is not applicable. We are unable to agree with the contention of Shri Gupta; the . learned.copnsel for the University that the case would fall under clause (b). This contention is without any merit as it is clear that . this clause will only come into pliiy if tte candidate is failing in the subject in which he or she reappears. It is quite clear from ihe facts that the petitioner has not so far availed advantage as given in clause (b) so that she could get one per cent mark of the total marks in all the subjects .... ,.\n\nThe contention of the learned counsel for the University, that clase (a) will only apply if a candidate appears in . all the subjects in the examination, is without any merit.\n\nThe language of this provision does not show what bas been contended beforeus.\n\nFor the reasons recorded above, we allow this writ application and direct the University to make available the benefit of clause (a) of the said Regulation to the petitioner and declare the result of the petitioner accordingly.\"\n\nA bare reading of the Rule 27 (referred to as the Regulations by the High Court) makes it clear that ciause (a) is applicable where the full examination is taken and clause {b) is attracted where the candidate reappears to clear the compartment or subject and part in which be has been declared eligible to -reappear. In each of these cases the candidate was reappearing . to clear the paper in which be or she had failed ; clause (b) was clearly attracted and the benefit nnder clause (a) was not available.\n\nThe University had taken th.at.decision and.took the same stand before the High Court ill ;1nswer to tl!e r11le pisi, We:ar~ clearly of the opinion that th~\n\n\"'\n\n.... ;\n\nPUNJAB UNiVERSiTY v. SUNDER SINGH (Ranganath Misra, J.) 3,\n\nHigh Court we.nt wong in taking the view that when a candidate\n\nreappeard to clar a paper or a subject on being found eligible to do so, clause (a) was attracted. The language of clause (b) is such as would squarely apply to such a situation. Having taken the view that clause (a) governed the matter, the High Court had no occasion to express any' opinion as to if clause (b) applied what benefit the candidate would have got. The provision in clause (b) is clear and on reappearing the candidate becomes entitled to grace marks of up to one per cent of the total marks of the subject/subjects in which he reappears. Once clause (b} applies no reference is available to the performance in the regular examination taken earlier and the benefit of grace marks to the extent indicated has to be confined to the performance 'at the reappearance.\n\nOnce this is the position each of the candidates was not eligible to pass. We, however, find thata direction was giyen in this Court.on 19.6.80 on the concession of the University that the respondents in the two appeals of 1980 would be declared to have pass_ed irrespective of the result of the appeals. Learned counsel\n\nappearing for the University before us reiterated his consent and even agreed that the respondent ln the remaining appeal may be given the same advantage as the University did 11ot intend to make any discrimination. In view of this special feature we do not disturb the dclaration of the University that each of the respondents has passed the examination taken by him or her.·\n\nWe must indicate our disapproval of the position obtaining in the Punjab University that in respect 1 of po:; t-graduate degrees grace marks are being awarded. A master's degree in any specia- lity is considered to be the highest qualification in the normal run.\n\nIt is very much necessary t.hat such a degree should be conferred only on the deserving students who having studied the subject and taken the appropriate examination conducted by the University at the end of such studies have deserved the degree on tQe basis of their performance.\n\nThere should be no scope for looking for grace marks at such level and.the sooner the Punjab University abandons the practice of awarding grace marks in respect of post• graduate examinations the better it would be in the interest of higher education in this country.\n\n'<,'\n\n ~PRE\"'B COURT REPORTS\n\n[1984] 3 S.C.R.\n\nWe allow each of these appeals. and set aside the judgments of the High Court in each of. the writ petitions without any order for costs.\n\nT>i avo.id confusion we reiterate that our vacat:Og the the judgments .of the High Court do not in any manner affect the declarations made in favour of the respondents by the appellantlJniversity in regard to passing ofthe Master Degree Examinatfons in law.\n\nS.R.\n\nAppeal a/lowde.\n\n' •", "total_entities": 21, "entities": [{"text": "THE PUNJAB UNIVERSITY, CHANDIGARH ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 37, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE PUNJABI UNIVERSITY, CHANDIGARH ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SUNDER SINGH AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 40, "end_char": 63, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUNDER SINGH AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RANGANATH MISRA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 125, "end_char": 145, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RANGANATH MISRA, JJ.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Chapter III Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 192, "end_char": 208, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Punjab U !l'iversity", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3153, "end_char": 3173, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Punjab U !"}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLA'IE JURlSDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3351, "end_char": 3380, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'[35F-H]\n\nCIVIL APPELLA'IE JURlSDICTION; Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "J.L. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3779, "end_char": 3789, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J.L. Gupta, D.N. Gupta and V.K, Verma for the Appellant in CA.", "canonical_name": "J.L. Gupta"}}, {"text": "D.N. Gupta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3791, "end_char": 3801, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J.L. Gupta, D.N. Gupta and V.K, Verma for the Appellant in CA."}}, {"text": "V.K, Verma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3806, "end_char": 3816, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J.L. Gupta, D.N. Gupta and V.K, Verma for the Appellant in CA."}}, {"text": "J.L. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3872, "end_char": 3882, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J.L. Gupta and C.M, Nayar for the Appellant in CA.", "canonical_name": "J.L. Gupta"}}, {"text": "C.M, Nayar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3887, "end_char": 3897, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J.L. Gupta and C.M, Nayar for the Appellant in CA."}}, {"text": "Hardev Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3953, "end_char": 3965, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hardev Singh and R.S. Sodhi for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "R.S. Sodhi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3970, "end_char": 3980, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hardev Singh and R.S. Sodhi for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "RANGANi\\.TH MiSRA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4050, "end_char": 4067, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the_ Court was delivered by •\n\nRANGANi\\.TH MiSRA J. Each of these appeals .is' by speaial leave and is directed against the decision of the High'Courtof Punjab and Haryana in separate, writ petitions, A common .'\\uestion i_s involved in all the three matters and that relat.es to a corret interpretation of Rule 27.", "canonical_name": "RANGANATH MISRA, JJ."}}, {"text": "Ill of the Punjab University Regulations", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4352, "end_char": 4392, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Punjab University", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4600, "end_char": 4617, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PUNJAB UNIVERSITY v. SUNDER siNGH (Ranganath Misra, J.) 33\n\n7 of the Punjab University l!.egulations provides :\n\n\"7."}}, {"text": "Each of the respondents Jailed to satisfy the requirements of Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6002, "end_char": 6068, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Gupta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7325, "end_char": 7330, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are unable to agree with the contention of Shri Gupta; the ."}}, {"text": "Ranganath Misra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8985, "end_char": 9000, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The University had taken th.at.decision and.took the same stand before the High Court ill ;1nswer to tl!e r11le pisi, We:ar~ clearly of the opinion that th~\n\n\"'\n\n.... ;\n\nPUNJAB UNiVERSiTY v. SUNDER SINGH (Ranganath Misra, J.) 3,\n\nHigh Court we.nt wong in taking the view that when a candidate\n\nreappeard to clar a paper or a subject on being found eligible to do so, clause (a) was attracted.", "canonical_name": "RANGANATH MISRA, JJ."}}, {"text": "19.6.80", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9990, "end_char": 9997, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We, however, find thata direction was giyen in this Court.on 19.6.80 on the concession of the University that the respondents in the two appeals of 1980 would be declared to have pass_ed irrespective of the result of the appeals."}}, {"text": "Punjab University", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10620, "end_char": 10637, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We must indicate our disapproval of the position obtaining in the Punjab University that in respect 1 of po:; t-graduate degrees grace marks are being awarded."}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_3_325_341_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "SUDHIR CHANDR, A SARKAR\n\n--:rATA IRON & STEE_L CO. LTP .. AND OTHERS.\n\nMarch 27, 1984\n\n(D.A DESAI, A .. P. SEN ANQ V. 'BALAKRTS r.-; A ERADI, JJ.]\n\nRttirlng Gratuity Rults, I9J7-Rule /(g)-Definition of 'Retirtmtllt' scop~ of -Empluytt after y; orklttg fur 29 years left service by reslgl!ation which .;01 arce,_ udbyemplo)'U-Whtthn employee cotJid be said to hav~ rttittdfrom :ervice. ·\n\n 1/ttlring Gratuity Rules, 1937-Ru/e 10 validity of. Part af Rule 10 which fNiftrs abso/JJre diScretion 011 tmplvyer to pay gratuity, even of it is earned, at il.r dJJOiute discretion, u inefftcrive am/ enfurceab/e,\n\nInJ.strial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946-Sation 3--Certi/ieJ !ilrl!llling Ordtrs-:Nawr' of-Whther form parr of contract of suvice-IVherflu flotlr brtarlo can be rtpaired b) civil suit.\n\n Words and Plorases-''Gmtuity\"-Concept of. Gratuity is a retirul benefit a1 \"\"as11re of social seatrity ; it Is not lfrttlrlitous but has to be eumed by lo>nz N .Lontinuout sen•il't; il can be rc., vt!red Jlrrough ciril Juit.\n\nlbe app:llant .,..ho ro, igned from service of the: respondent company after '<'tvinc for o•er 29 years wu• not paid retiring grntl, lity by the respondnt, even ., hen the appclbnt had become elil!ible. for it unJer the relevant gmmity ruloos 111tltd as tbe RetiriOII: Gratuity Rules. J9J7 \\Grtuity Rules for short). Tbo . •PP<llantlilcd a 'uit in the Court of Subordinate Jutlge for recovering tbe\n\n\"mount of Voltuity. The Subordinate JuJgc decreed the suit. The High Court . allowed tilt app:al f1led by the rc, pondent. Hence this appeal. The respoo. • . dent• submitted; (I) that since the appo:llant did not retire from the service but\n\n~It the ICnu by resining the po!l, he was not eligible for gratuity untler\n\nult 6 or the Retiring Gr11tuity Rules, t 937 ; l2) that uoJer Rule 10 the ..:tiring . :atu!!y wu payable Mt the absolute discretion or tho responent and rol\\ld not\n\nt claoacd •• a matter or right by the appellant even if he had become clisiblo\n\nor~ ; and (JJ thut claim to aratuity could not be enforced in the dvil rourt.\n\n. Allu., inathc appca I,\n\n. H£Lo : Rule 6(a) which preribcd the eligibility criterion f<>r p:~.yment gf lfllrlllJ . cratUJy pmvidcs, f/11ter ulla, that every permanent uncovenanted em of tbe Comtany, will be elivible tor rdirinll Qratulty • . The expression ttlremcnt• h ... __ I . . r . by . as uocn defined in Rule l(a) to mean 'I ld ternunat1oo o serviCe ll ~<:owq. or any cau~ other then rcmovul by dhdlDrge due to misconduct'.\n\nii!Jnott<4 thQt the appellant wu permanent uncovenan; ed :mployee or\n\n1.f i\\ A 'f , j .i\n\n...\n\n c\n\n E\n\n. c\n\nj 26\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [l9S4j 3 S C . it. . . .. . . .. . ihe Company paid on monthly basis and he redercd sc, rvicc for over~ Y•• and his srvice came to an end by rea<on of hts tcndcnng resignation V.hit~ was unconditionally aa:cpted. II Is. not suggested that he was romovcd I> discharge due to misconduct. un.questJonabl~. therefore, the appellant h: within the meaning of the cxprcsston, thus .r•t•_red r\"'IJ'l service of the '\"llOo: . dent and he is qualified .for payment of gr.ttutty to terms of Ru!c 6. [Jl2D.f] .\n\nAccording to the High Court, ihc , service conditions of the apP<ilant,,;,;~ gavemed by !he Works Standing Orders or the rc~ondcnt. No C<Ctption h\" . be•n taken to this finding. These Wqrks Standtn~; Orders were framed •n~\n\ncertified under the Industrial Employment (Standing Order:;) Act, 1946. n ..\n\nAct wu 8 kgi.slatlvc response to the /abJ~Z [airt rule or hire and fire ot sweet . will. It w3s an auempt at intposing statu(Ory comrac:t of'service b¢twcn tv.\"Oparties unequal io negotiate, on the footing of equ3 1 ity. The intendment .. j ·.·.· underlyini the Act and the provi•ions of the Act enacted to give rffect to the intendment and the scheme of the At l=lve no roorn for doubt that Stand · ing Orders cerjificd under the Act become part or the staiU10ry t<rms an~ conditions of .. rvice between the employer and hi• cmp!o)<< nnd they eo .em the relatiouship bet wren the parti<s.I333E-3J4G] ...\n\nWrttrn India March Company !.rd. v. Workmn.,: [1974] I SCR 4H. WJtk . man of Mtssrs FirtJiont T)\" & Rul>ber Ca. of frtdia (Pl Lrtl. v, Manoxrinnr\n\nand Or1; [1973] 3 SCR '87 ot 612. Workmn: ill fJurki!oglwm uurl Cumurfc Mill• Mudros v. Buckingham ond Cantalic A[; /Is: ]1970]1 labour Law Journ•l 26 at 29. M /s. Glaxo l.Aborarorl-. (I) Ltd. v. Tl.t Prmlill/! OJTrur, Lob..•:v Court, Mfrrut & Ors; [19R4] t SCC 1. A.\\\"'11 Efu('{cily Supply Cu. I.J.d. f, s, i Allot/in & Ors: [197U]l SCR 805, ref\"rred to.\n\nUpon a corTbined r•ading or Srandio11 Order (S.O ,) S4 ulong with RuleS and 6(u) or the Grtuity Ruks, it becomes diltinctly ck\"r th•t PJY••~<nt of arouuily W.u dn cxprcs~ or st.tlutory conditiont of service eovcrlnv th.: h:lJai.:>n ohip bct.,.\"Q the appcllanl and the rc>po; ulcn t. Thorcfor~, It wuuiJ lJ<; <•bli~\" t.'r)' Upon the rnpondcnt lO pay (I•Jtuity O; J rtiwn!Ut to tho arp:i!Jht. JfthC rrtpondcnt rdu' C'1 to pay or dl\\ChJrgcits stJtutory obli~tuoo. th: claim on be enrorc<d by. civil uit, Te Hl Court WJS or the orinion th>l in\"\"\" of . Rule)'' or the Gratuity Rb. t\":ovcty of gr>lUJty c..nnct b<: cnrom:d by. ci•il ,_uit. But upon an lndu.ttrial ui•rute jng r:thcd the lmlu•trl.il Tntuc.Jt\n\nmy _bc n I positiOn 10 award th: if:J1Uity ;11 3 m:lltc; or rh; ht ev.:n unJ.:r lh.: <ltltrn& rules, In reochlna this c\"nctu5ion th~ lllt:h Cuurtovrlool.cd the erT ct. of the certified litandinv Ord:r1 and th~. inl<rrelutiun b<twe<:n rhe GrJtu'l)'\n\n. Rulo ar.d S.O H, Whco under 19-tG Act, nn obiliw:n'10n is c:1>l o.1 the~·\n\nJllo>er to spccofi<ully nd prcci>cly Ia)· down the cunditions or crvice, 5<:· tJt.) •uhjccu the en•plo>)cr to~ V<n•ht if any act is <lone In contr.tvrntlv~ uf t~¢ Suondinf Orden e<:rtilied unJcr the Act, A rae~ I of collective bar~:inin& h th.ll •n) ~et\\l<m<nt rrivcd at between the JHrtiC~ would be treated ws inccrr\"•t•J In the c:.ontroct of~··\"' 0 f ... h cmpiO)~C voverncu by the >ettl<nt<nt. Sm•iiJr~ Y\n\nrllfo :.d StJndins Ordcrt wh~~:b Sttut<mly prcs.:ribe the comlitk'ns r scrv~<.'#.\n\no.b~ I be dcerncd to be lncorporatt<l in lhc contra~! of tmpk>ym<nl of ea.:h ••~· p:O}cc \"'ith hi> cmp[O)Cr.\n\nJ( tht employer C<>mllliti U brcadl Of th< ,,, ntr~'t or en.plvJn:<Ut. the tn:e con tc cnfocced or c.meJicJ dondill~ Ul\"-'\" ,,, e ...\n\ns.c. SARKA.R 1' •• TA.TA IRO~ &_ Sl'EfLS CO. 327\n\n: bY ~-civ11 suit. The jurisdictbn of civil court among<! others is\n\n,.r~C suh\\ the natur~ of reliofclaimd. If the relief claimed is a money\n\n• termlned 1 d' r h r .c forcing statutory con 111ons o scrv1c~. t e ctv1 court would\n\nG\"l~ byh ~~ 1udsdiction to grant the relief. [JJSF-337Bl (tf!JIOIY ••~ • . • , '. •\n\n. [:Wuur [a,. f,.rt aiul Matda/J bj• PaulDavl-. and Mark Freedland p.233\n\nS O.~Jn<lustrial Rdtim>J in Great 8 itnfn p. 5~-59, referred to. •\"\" yJ:tl ' . . • ..\n\nJn the instJnt ca<•. the appcll~t filed the uit alkging taf he wa~ entitled tOpl)m<nt of ~\"'tu ity o~ co:nplc•thon _or scrv1c~ fo_r, the pertod _prescribed. He\n\n:· .. ~!ltgtd it and the Hrh_C''.U' t accept,·~ tt as _B condn1on of sery; ce. Its breach •®ld give rise to a CIVIl dr.<putc nnd crv1l sUit would be the only remedy. In the weofv.orkmcn t:ov.•rnerl by th~ lnd\"'trinl Dispute< Act, 19-l7, Sec. 33(c)(2) ,., y provide an aJditional forum to reCO\\'Cr monetary benefit. It is nt suggesu41hat appellant wa< a wo, kman_governcd by the Industrial Disputes Act. The tlilh Court wa~, :herdore, in error in holding that the remedy was only by .-ayoran indu!lrial dispute and not by a civil suit, [JJ 7C-D] ·\n\nI l\n\nThe Court while interpr:ting nnd enforcing the relevant gratuity rules will IIJvtto be.:ir in mind th~ co1cePt of gratuity. The fundaJllental principle under\n\n!inc ar.uuity i~ that it it a rctirment benefit for long service as a provision Cor\n\nld •et Deri1ands of socia! '' curity and social justice made it necessry to ,..,.; de for payme••t of gratuity. On the enactment of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 a statutory llabiluy was cast on the employer to pay gratuity. .. . . . .\n\n[3JSCD1\n\nPauion and , ratuity which have much in common are wellrecognised retirol lrmrfi11 n musurt:! of soda! sccrity. It Is now wctl-,.n led that pension is a\n\nIJht lnd payment O( it docs not depend UpOn the discretion Of the employer,\n\n'-It~ C.ln I* denied at the sweet will or fancy of the employer. If pension 080 ::; e:o.-cred through civil su:t, there js no jultilication In treating gratuity on a\n\n\"'\"~ foot inc. Pension and gratuity in the muller of retirnl benefits and for 110&the\\Ome must be put on par.l339G-H; 340AJ. .·\n\nUJ ::vha~Pi'r Tapti Mil/, Lid. v. 8;1rltanpur Tapll Mil/$ McJ:door Smgll: [1965] 'll 4~3• Dtukinundun PraJotl v. Slille of Bihar & o,.., [1971] Supp. 'SCR o,,: t <{ Pun}ob & ~\"' v. f<tbal S/nftlr, [1976)3 SCR 360, D.S. Nakara ..1 '. nlun of India, [198}] 2 SCR 16~; referred to. •\n\nlrtht, ur.,~ . • s •· 0,41 or P•Y>t:ent of gratuity become incorporated in the tanum& llllJdtheL . \" f • R •lbrtrary dto \"\"Y lcqulrctl the status of tho statutory condH 10n o servtCC. a : rt}C{tfd otl rcferl>lt to whim funcy or wect will or the employer n•ust bo\n\nf)~ t\\lli.~' l<bitrary, Sc. 4 oC ; he 19~6 Act whkh confers power on the ttrti• t 'ltnt, j .ef or the lppcllacc authority to adjudicate Ul\"-ln the fulrn<'>> or reason. •Mr.'!) or the Provisions would cnabl• thh Court to rj\"ct that part t>f Rule IO \">nrrs ,__ . \" r · !'\"\"d . ~\"\"'lute discretion on the employer to pay 11rntu•ty even I It IS ,.,•t, tsabr n:f d trr!Cittr.b so Ute di<crction a~ ullerly unr<asonable, IOC ec !YC an \"'l., ro, le.Th; at Part or Rulo 10' mu•t therefore be 1reated ns ineffective D.lld tfib~. l3.10c.o] • •\n\n8 ( .\n\nc r:\n\nD (,\n\nA . ~\n\n.; G\n\n328 ,\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS U984J 3 s.c.lt..\n\nTbc claim to absolute discretion not to pay gtatuity even When it is t:l \" is a bang o\\ltr of the /oiJstZ fa ire days and utterly inconsistent with the mOdrne.J notion of fair industrial relations and, therefore, it must be rejected as inctr.; rn and beoce unenforceable. [340H) . .\n\nWuttrn India Match Company Ltd. v. Workmen, [1974] I SCR {l-4 referred to.\n\nOur Contitution envisages a society governed by rule of law. Ao!ute discretion uncontrolled by guidelines \"'hich may permit denial of equality bcfo~ Jaw is the anti-thesis of rule of law. Absolute discretion not )\\ldicinlly rc\\'icwabl~ inheres the pernicious tendency to be arbitrary and is, tb<refor~. violative of Art. !4. Equality before law and absolute discretion to grant or deny bcncGt of the law iue di3metrically opposed to each other and cannot co-exist. Thcn:for<. also the conferment or ab!olute discretion by Rule 10 of the Gratuity Rules toai've or deny the benefit of the rules cannot be upheld and mu•t be rejected :u. uneoforceable.I34JA-CT\n\nCIVIL ArPrLLA.TlO JURISlJICTJON :Civil Appeal\n\nNo. 1803 of 1070\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 6.8.1968 of Pijtna High.\n\nCourt in first appeal No . .444 of 1967. -\n\nD.N. Mukheiu, Ronjun Mukherjee, A.K. Gonguli & S.C. Ghosh for the appellant •.\n\nR.B. Da!ar and Ms. Vina Tamta for the respondents . .\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDv.sJ J. Appellant, an employee of Tata Jron nnd Suet Company. Limited ('Company' for short) bas bee a chasing n mirag~: to wit !o recover a paltry sum of. Rs 14040 bemg the amount of gratuity to which he was entitled for the. continuous service rcnMr ed by him from Dcember 31, 1929 till Augut 31. 1959 under wiHtt are styled as Retiring. Gratuity Rules, 1!137 ('Gratuity Ruks' fr sbort) from the Company and in this wholly unequal tight he 1; rlll\n\ndown his life before enjoying the pillance to which he wus cntil\"t after three dcades of loy11l service. What a dreadful return for abJect loyally'! h(n the appellant retired by resignation from service ~~ was patd hts provident fund dues but gratuity which he wus cntttl to be paid under the relevant rules was not paid to him. WheO th~ appellant climed payment of gratuity, the respondnt turned dca\n\n' .\n\n' I\n\nS.C. SARK~R V. TATA IRON & .STEEL CO. (Desai, J.) . 329\n\nears to it. Appellant sevred a notice dated September 6, 1981 call~\n\ning_ upon the r.espondent to pay the amount of gratuity being Rs. ·.\n\n14040~. The Company did not respond to the notice. Thereupon the appellant 'file<l,.M .S. No. 452 of 1962 in the court of Subordinate\n\nJudge at Jamshedpur.\n\nThe respondent appeared and CO!J.tested the snit inter-alia contending that 'in terms of the contract of service and particul.arly having regard t? the relevant rules under which gratuity can be claimed, the same -is payahle. on certication of sntisfactory service by the\n\n' hea~ of-the department; and it is payable at the absolute discretion\n\nof the Company irrespective of whether the employee ha.s or has not . C performed all or any. of the conditions stated in the'rules and no employee howsoever otherwise eligible is entitled as of right to any payment under the rules.'\n\nThe learned trial Judge framed the issues bn which parties . were at variance.\n\nTh~ learned Judge held that the plaint does dis-* D• close a cause of action and the. plaintiff was entitled to claim and' recover the amont of gratuity with interest thereon. Accordingly, the suit was decre<; d against the Company directing it t_o pay the amount claimed in the plaipt with future interest at 6% per an11um .4 with costs. ·\n\nE . ...\n\nThe respondent Company preferred Fist Appeal No: 444 of 1963 in the High Court of Judicature at Patna. A Division Bench of the High Court h'eld : ~) that the service conditions of the plain: tiff were governed by the. Works Standing Orders and that It was an implied condition of service .that the pal in tiff could get gratuity in accordance with the Gratuity RuleS ; (ii) that in view of Rule 6, ......-.. an employee governed by the Gratuity Rules. is not entitled .to claim the same as a matter of right but he merely attains the benefit of eligibility or suitability f9r the retiring gratuity and not the rigqt iii) that until and unless the Company has decied to pay the gratuity in accordance with Rule 7 or otherwise, the mere fact of the employee becoming eligible to get it under the.relevant rules which can be enforced in a civil court because the matter ?f\n\nG ..\n\n, payment of gratuity is at the a qso!t1te discretion of the Company as -1 provided in Rule 10, and the employee, howsoever; unfortunate the position may be under the mod ern stage of the society is not entitled to ct'airn it as a matter of right because even though payment of\n\ngptuity underOthe Gratity Rules is an implied _condition of service,\n\n-+ 330\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[ 1984) 3 S.C.R. l\n\nyet tlie cndition is further conditioned by the provisios made in the. . . . .\n\nRules and is subject to them; .iv) that such a claim may be enforced before the Industrial Tribunal under the Industrial Dispu.tes Act, 1947 brit it is not possible to hold . that the law contract or the law of master and servant which is the only law to be enforced in a civil court can justify orr interpretation of the Gratuity Rules jn question that the' plaintiff can be gran fed decree for payment of gratuity on the footing that it 'f3S he unconditional or uncondition- ed contractu~! obligation of. the employer to pa)' such a money ; v) . the 'payment of gratuity money is not a gift-pur~ and simple, but ·\n\nunder the relevant rules lt IS in the nature of an incohate claim Of interestand not a right enforceable by a Suit in COUtt, because under the contrac~ of service, the grant of gratuity has been left.to the sole discretion of the emp1oyer as the relevant rules provided that no employee howsoever othcrvise eligible shaH be.deemcd to be'entitlcd\n\nas of right to any payment under the rules.\n\nAccordingly the appeal was allowed and the, judgm ent and decree of the tdal court were set _.aside and he plaintiff's suit was dismissed, directipg the parties to\n\nbear their costs.\n\n.~· tJ ence this appeal by the ptaintff by special leave:\n\n. E At the ote.t it is necssary to ntice the relevant rules rtlied. ·~ upcn by the respondcpt in support of its submission that the gratuity cannot be 'Claimed as a matter of right and the c1aim to gratuity can.not be enforced in the civil court. The Retiing Gratuity Rules came into force with effect from April.}, 1937 and at the relevant time, the rules as Bi11ended in 1948 were in. 9peration. Rule 5\n\n F provides for 1 retiremnt of every uncovenanted employe~ of tl1e Company on attaining the .age of 60 years 'subject to the right of the company to grant extension. This rule is a mere incorpo'ration pf /-1 S.O. 54 which provides for retirement on attaining tl'te age of 60.\n\nRule.s 6, 7 and 1_0 may be.Cxtracted : ·\n\n''6. (a) Subjed to the conditions referred to in these rules, evl!ry per mapcnt unconvenanted employee.of the Com~ pany, whether paid on _monthly, weekly or on daily basis, inpluding those borne on the pay rolls of the Company of the Collieries and <tt Ore Mines and Quarries, will~ eligible for a retiring gratuity wh.ich shall be equal to half a month's salary or wag; s for every completed year of continuous sel'vice~~\n\nI .,..\n\nS.C. S, l..RKAR v. TATA :iRoN & STEEL CO. (Desai, J.) 331 • subject to•a maximum of twenty months salary or wages in A :all,\n\n(b) Provided that when an employee dis. retires or is 4ischarged under Rule ll(2)(ii) and (iii) hereof, before he. 'has.served the Company for a continuous period of 15 years~ a gratuity ordinarily limited to half a month's salay or wages for each qualifying year ma'y be paid subject, however, to a maximum of 6 n\\onths' sa1ary OJ wages in an.\n\n(Amended vide {3oard Resolution No. VII 'dated 2nd\n\nB . '\n\n.. July, 1953.) C\n\n. (c). The retiring gratuity will be basd on the rate of <the salary or wages applicable to the employee in: .the last\n\nmont~ of ctive service or if the employee has retired while. <On leave, in the last month prior to the employee going on 1Ieave . .\n\n(d) In the case. of an uncovenanted employee wl\\o hs 'been transferred to another Tat a concern, the retiring • gratuity payable to him under Rule (4) 8 (a) heretlnder will be based on the rate of the salary or wages:applicable to the -employte in the lastmontlr of' service with the Company,\n\nOn focc from 1.4.1-946 as per Board Resolution ,.<fated 8.4.1948.)\n\n7. Notwithstanding atything contained in these Rules :a gratuity shall become due and be payable and shall always 'have been deemed to have become due and payable only in ·\n\n:such instalments an.d over such period or periods as may • be fixed. by the Board of Directors of the Com2any or subject .to the direction of the Board by the Managing Agents. Until . . ' . ' :any such instalment shall become {)r have become due and payable, .the employee or any dependent who qualifies for :paynicnt under the Gratuity Rules shall not be eligible to\n\nreceive or be paid any such instalment of the gratuity.\n\nl 0. AU retiring gratuities granted under these Rules nther than special gratuity to be paid l}rider the provision~ of :Rule 22 hereof shall be at the absolute discretion of the Com-\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [I984] 3 s.c.!tl . . . . . . . . pany Irrespective of whether an employee .has S)r has not performed ail or any of the conditions herein after stated, and no employee howsoever otherwise eligible shall be deem~ ed to be\" entitled as of right to any pamyent under these -\n\nRule~\n\n...\n\n.(Amended vide Board ..Rso!ution No. v dated 25 S~ 1955).\"\n\n•I? ...\n\n.. .,\n\nThe contentio~ of therespndent is thatthe plaintiff did not retire from servi?e but he left the serviCe, o~ the CQmpany by resigning his post. This aspect to some extent agitated the mind of the- . \"High Court. It may be dealt with first. It is not only not in dis- . pute, but is in fact conceded that 'the plaintiff did render continuous ..\n\nservice from Deccmber.31, 1929 till August31, 1959. On exact computation, the plaintiff rendered service for 29 years and 8 months. Rule\n\n6(a) which prescrjbed the eliglbility criterio'n for payment of gratuity • provides that every -permannt uncovena11tetl employee of the Com-· pany whether paid on monthly, weekly or daily basis will be eligible for\n\nretiring gratuity which shall be equal to half a month salary or wages for ever.y omp]etedyear of continuous service subject io a maximum. of 20 months sala, ry or wages in all provided that when an employee dies, ntires or isdischa; ged under Rule 11(2)(ii) and iil) before he has. served the Company for a continu, us period of 15 years he shall be paid a gratuity at. he rate, therein mentioned.\n\nThe expression .. \"retirement' has been dfin_ed in Rule 1 (g), to mean 'the termi'nation,; of.service. by reason of any cause other than removal by diseh argc due to misconduct'. It is dmitted that the plaintiff was a perilla-- nent unconvena'ted employee of the Company paid on rrionthly' . . basis and he rendered service for over 29 years and his service. came . to an end by reason of his tendering resjgnation which was uncondi~- . tionally accepted. It is not suggested that he was removed by disclrge due to misconduct. Unquestionably, therefore, the plaintiffre.tired from service because by the letter Annexure 'B' dated Au'gust\n\n26, 1959, the resignation tendered by the plaintiff as per his letter dated July,. 27, 195.9 was accepted and he was released from his service with effect from September 1,1959, The tetminatio.{l of' service was thus on account of resignation of the plaint.iff being,\n\naccepted by the respondent. . The plaintiff has, within the meaining,. of the eJ~.pression, thus r.:tired from service of the respondent .and-A ·. h~ is qualified for payment of gratuity in terms of Rule 6.\n\n~ . )\n\nS.C •. SARKAR. v. TATA IRON & STEEL CO. (Desal, J) 333\n\nRule 7, i~ our opinion, has hardly any relevance because it enables the Company to pa, y gratuity by iilstalments.\n\nIt is Rule 10 which is material for the purpose. It provides that'payment of retiring gratuity under the Gratuity Rules, othr . . than special gratuity to be paid under the provisions of Rule 22 which is not the case herein, shall be at the absolute discretion of the Company irrespectiv~! of whether an employee has or has not performed all or any of the •condition<; hereinafter stated, and no employee howsover otherwise eligible shall be deemed to be entitled as of right to any pyment under th~ rules. The stand taken by the respondent to deny gratuity to the pl\\lntiff is that gratuity pay~\n\nable under the rules is a matter of employer's largesse to be distributeJ atthe absolute discretion of the Company and cannot be clai- .med as a matter of right even if the concerned employees has fulfilled the eligibility criteria. It is the interpretation of this Rule which would govern the outcome of this appeal.\n\nIt 'may be mentioned that the High Court which ultimately upheld the cqntention of the respondent has.specifically held that gratuity was an implied condition of service of the p1aintiff in accor dance with the relevant -rules.\n\nThe High Court reach.ed this .conclusion by first referring to Works Standing Orders framed by the\n\nCompny which govern t.he conditions ofservice of the plaintiff.\n\nIn other words accmding to the High Court, the service conditio11s of the plaintiff wsre g9verned by the Works Standing Orde, rs. It is therefore necessary to determine the character of the Works ' Standing Orders Exh. C framed by the Company. This aspect was\n\nuverlooked by the High Cow-t with the consequence that tne High\n\nCourt found it difficult to enforce the claim of gratuity against the respondent by a decree of the court. What then is the character of the W otks Standing Orders framed by the Company '? Are .they mere unenforceable rules or arc they statutory in character or have a statutory flavour'? If they are statutory in character and they form part of'the contract of service of every employee governed by the same, then the question would be whether its brch can be 'repaired or enforced by a civil suit ? -\n\nF -\n\nThe Parlaimet{t enacted the lnudstrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 ('1946 Act' for short). 'fhe longtitle of the Act, Ht providys that it was an act to require employers in industrial esta~ blishments formally to define conditions of employment under them.\n\n' !.~\n\n...\n\nIE .\n\n! .. .\n\nIf \"\n\n<G ·\n\n334 _SUI'{(EMe CO~JRT REPORTS [1984]3 s .\n\n'\"\"•· ..\n\nTile pramble of \"the Act pr9vides that it is expedicni t~ ' . , . , . d fi . require employers m ~~ustnal estbhshments to e ne With suffieitnt Prcci- . sion th!! condtttons of employment under. t)lem and to malce.th\n\nsaid conditipns known to workmen employed by theni. Bv Scc11-.e . . 3, a duty was c_ast on the employer , governed by the Act to submit to the Certifying Officer draft standtn.g orders proposed by him for adoption in his industrial establishment. After going througlt tlJe procedure prescribed in the Act, the Certif) ing Officer ha~ to mtifv the draft standing orders . . _Section 8 requires the Certifying Oflicw to keep a copy of standing orders as finally certified under the Act · in a register to be maintained for the purpose.\n\nSub-sec. 2 of Section I~ Imposes a pealty on employer who does any act in contravention of the standing orders finally certifid under the Act. The act was a lcgi<lative response to the /oisse: firs rul¢ of hire and fire at swed will. It was an attempt at fm; Jo>ing a statutory contract of service between A'II\"' parties unequal to negoti3te, on the footing of equality. This wa~ vividly noticed by tilis Court in ws/em India MIIUI: Company Ltd. v. lVorkmenL a; und:r:\n\n\"In the sunny ·. days of the market economy theory people incercly believed thut the economic lawbf demand and . supply in the labour marl; ct would settle a mutua!ly b:neliciJI\n\nbargain between the employer and the workmen •• Such a ba•jpinth)!Y took it for granted, would, sccun: f; ir terms nnd conditions of employment to the work man. This \\a IV the~ vnc rated as nturallaw, They had an ubiding fjith in thcvrity_ of this law. But the experience of !he working of this law . over a long period has belied their faith. ••\n\nThe intcndmcJ; t underlying the Act and ihe provisions of the Act enacted to give clfcct to the intcndmnt and the scheme of the Act leave no.· room for doubt tliat the Standing Orders\n\nccrtJc_d unucr the 19~6 Act become part o(the tatutory t, rms and conLIHtons of\" >crvicc: between the employer and his cmploye 30J they &<>Vern te rd.ttionship between the p.trtics. Jl'orJm, n pf\n\nMnrJ Ftrc' .. tvtu TJr~ & Ru?hr Ca. uf Jrrdiu (P) Lrtl. v, Manas(\"\n\n111 ~' 11 11'1\" OfT.' Workrwtl in B t klrtglttm cr1.1 C.mt&Jtic Mills M<~J(IJS v, B.tki, gha''' Ulll/ Curmulc Mlll.f~ .mtd M/J GI<I.~ :J LJ1bcJratrHit\"J (/l\n\n(!) )197~J I SCR 43-1.\n\nll) 111173) 3 SCR S87 at612. (lJ [1970) bour Liw Joornal 26 at 29.\n\n ..\n\nS.C SARKAR v. TATA lRO~ AND STI!£L CO. (.tJesai; f.)' .\n\n. Lfd. v. Y:he Presiding Officer, Labourcoart, Meerut & Ors. 1\n\nThe High Gourt recorded the finding that service conditions of the plaintiff were governed by_ the Works Standing Orders. No exception has been taJ<.en to this finding . .a may at once be noted that the . Works Standing Orders of the Company are Certified Standing Orders, under the 1946 Act evidenced by Certificate No. 45\n\ndated. March 18, 1950. S. 0. 54 provides that every uncovenanted employee of the Company shalt retire from service on attaining the age of 60. yars. This S.O. 54 is bodily incorporated in Rule 5 of the Gratuity..Rules. Relying.'on S.O. 54 and the evidence 'recorded in the case, the High Court reached the conclusion that payment of gratuity was an implied condition of service of the pbintiff. Rule 6(a) provides that 'st\\hject to the conditions prescribed in the :rules, every permanent uncovenanted employee of the Company will:\n\nbe eligi b1e for a retiring gratuiLy in the manner and to the extent for a retiring gratuity in the manner and to the ex\\ent inentioned therein. Reiring gratuity becomes payable on retircmnt, w\\lich\n\nmeans termination of\" service by reason. of any cause other than removal by discharge due to misconduct. On a combined reading of S.O. 54 an~ the Rule 5 of the Gratuity Rules the High Courtrightly concluded that payment of gratuity was a condition of. service but somehow the High Court . qualified it by saying that it was an\n\nimplied condition of service. It is weU-s-ettled by a catena of decisions, that Certified Standing Orders bind all those in employment at the time of service as well as thos.e who arc appointed thereafter., Agra Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. v. Sri Alladilz & Ors.2 Now upon a combined reading. of S.O. 54 along with Rule 5 and 6(a) of th~ Gratuity Rules, it becomes distinctly clar that payment-of gratuity was an express or statutory condition of service and. ro this limited extent the finding of the High Court has. to be ;. modifie9.\n\nIf payment of gratuity is thus shown to be a statutory or express condition of governing the relationship between the plaintiff and the company, it would be obligatory t.1pon the company to pay the gratuity on retirement of the_plaintiff. If the company declines or refuses to pay or discharge its statutory obligation, could the claim be enforce..d by a civil suit? The High \"court was of the opinion\n\n(1) [1984] lSCC 1\n\n(2) (1970]1 S.C.R. 806.\n\n-If\n\n.!)\n\nSUPREME.COURT REPORTS. [l984j 3 S.C; R ·\n\n. that even though payment of gratuity was a C<}ndition of service. in ·\n\nview of the provision contained in Rule 10, the same cannot be . claimed as.a matter of rig4t or its recovery canno.t be enforced by a civiJ suit. The High Court was constrained to observe that Rule 10 wh1ch 'confers absolute discretion on tl1e Company to pay the gratuity at its sweet .will is' unconscionable and incompatible with the modern notions or cpnditions whic;:h ought to -govern .the. relations -bet\\veen employer and tha~ upon an i_ndustrial dispute being rais(!d,\n\nthe lndt!Strial Tribunal may be in a posjtio!i to award the gratuty as a matter or right even under tlre existing rules, but according to : High Couit, it cannot be enforced by a civil suit. In reaching this conclusion the High. Court overlooked the effect\"' of certified Sta-nding OrderS' ad the inter-relation between the Retiring Gratuity Rules and S.O._ 54 ..\n\nAt this stage it would be appropriate to examine the effe<.(t of . a breach of condition of service which is either. statutory in 'characte_r\n\nor has . the statutory flavour: When under 1946 Act, an obligation is cast on the employer to specifically and precisely lay down the conditions of s-ervice, See:' 13(2) subjects the employer to a peQalty if any act is d-one in contravention of the Standing Orders certified under the Act. It woJJld appear that such conditions of service pres .cribed in Standing Orders get incorporated in the contract of service of e.ach employee with his employer .. A facet of collective bargaining is that any' sett1einent. arrived at between the parties would be treated as incorporated in the contract of service of each employee governed by the settlement. Similarly certified Standing- Orders which statutotily prescrib.e the 9onditins o(service shall be deemed to be inco~:ported in the contract of employment of each . employee\n\nwith his emploYer.· As far as the incorporatori -of the results of . collective bargaining into the individual contract of. employmen~ .\n\n-is concerned, the courts h ae --in . effect created a presumption\n\nof more or less systematic translation of the results of collective bargaining. into individual contracts where these results . are in practice operative and effective in co~ trolling the ter\"ms on. which: employment takes place : (Labour Law Text and Materials bJPaul.\n\nDavies and Mark Freedland p. 233) 0 Kahn Freund describes. collective bargaining as -ctystalised custom to be imported into con tracts of employn1ent on t--he same basis. as trade custom (System of Industrial-Relations in• Great Britain p. 58-59)~ This w.9uld be all the moe true of ctrtified Standing .Orders governing conditions of seryic'e between workman and his employer. If the eployer -com mits a breach of the .contract ef mpJoyment; the -same' cn be en-\n\n-y ....\n\n.. J... ..\n\n' . '\n\n'I S.C. SA~K'AR v. TATA IRON AND STEEL CO. (Desai, J.) 337\n\n:forced or remedied depending upon . the relief sought by a civil suit. . lf contract for personal service is sought to be specific<lly enforced\n\nby a decree or civil court, the court will have to keep in view the provisions of Sc. 14 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 which provid- . es that contract for personal service cannot be specifically enforced.\n\nWe are not concerned with the ex<oeptions to this rule such as the power of Industrial Tribunal to grant relief of reinstatement. We\n\nare co.ncerned with the jurisdiction of civil court, The jurisdiction of civil court amongst others is determined by the nature Of relief claimed .. Now if the relief claimed is a money decree by enforcing\n\nstatutory conditions of service, the civil curt would certainly have jurisdiction to grant the relief. Plaintiff filed the suit alleging that he was entitled to paytrient of gratuity on completion Of service for th.e period prescribed. He alleged it and the High Court accepted\n\nit as a condition of service. Its breach would give rise to a civil dispute and civil suit would be the only remedy. In the case of work~\n\nman governed-by the Industria( Disputes Act, 1947, Sec. 33(c)(2)\n\nmay provide an additional. forum to recover monetar)' benefit. Jt n , is not suggsted that plaintiff was a workman governed by the Industrial Disputes Act. The High Court was, therefore, in error in holding that the remedy was only by way of an industrial dispute aJld not by a civil suit. In reaching this conclusion, th'e Court Higlt\n\nclsed the door of justice to every employee though entitled to gr:atuity but would not be a workman within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 to recover the same, except' where a pro~ secution an be successfutly launched for an offence . under Sec. 13(2) against the employer.\n\nOne more difficulty the High Court experienced in the way of .the plaintiff maintaining the suit and recovering the amount of gratuity was that under Rule 10 gratuity was payable at the absolute dispretion of Company and cannot be claimed as a matter of right ..\n\nUndoubtedly, Rule 10 confers discretion on the c61pany to pay the\n\ngratuity even if the same is earned by satisfying the condition3 subjectto wbich gratuity becomes payable.· Rule 10 provides that\n\nail retiring gratuities .grantyd tinder the rules shall be at the absolute discretion of the Companyirrespective of whether an e1n- . ployee has or has not performed all or any of the conditions set out in the rules and ilo employee howsoever otherwise eligiblefshidl be deemed to be entitled as of right to any payent under the rules.' Such absolute discretion is wholly destructive of the chatacter of gratuity as a retiral benefit. It is satisfactorily established and the High\n\n338 . SVfRI;~T; COURT REPORLS\n\n(1984] 3 S.C.R~ .\n\nCurt has so rp.lp tb, at P~Yni~_pt of gratuity was a condition of\" service lbeit implied cpndition or'srvice .which part .does not stand . scrutiny. 1946 Act was . amended speifically_ in 1956 by. Amend--\n\n.ing Act 36 of 1956 by whi.cli power was c'onferred upon the Certifying Officer or appellate authority to adjudicate.upon the fairness or reasonableness of the' provisions of any standing orders. If is not. . clear. whether the Rule JO wich apppears to h; tVe been framed in the heyday or laissez faire has been recast, modified or alnended to. ·bring the same in conformity with the. modern notions of social justice and Part 1 V of the Cqnstitution. Assuming it is not done, the court while interpreting and enforcing the relevant rules wili have to l:iear in mind the oncept of gratuity. The fundamental principte'underlying gratuity is t, hat it is a retirement bnefit for long. · service as a provision for old age. Demands of social security and so.cial justice made it neoessaty to provide for payment of gratuity.\n\nOn the enactment of Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 a statutory liability was cast on the employer to pay gratuity.\n\nPensob a'!id gratuity coupled with contributory Provident Fund are \\Velhecognised retiral bnefits. '{hese retiral benefit&\n\narenowgoverned by various . statutes such as the Employees Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952, the Paym.::nt of Gratuity Act, l972. These stati1tes were legislativf? responses tOthe developfng notions of fair nd lnnnane conditions of work, be· ing the promise Of Part IV of the Constitution. Art. 37. provides that 'the-provisions contained jil PartIVDirective PrinciP.les of State Policy, shall not be enforceable by. any court, but the principles therein laid down are nevertheless -fundamental in the governance of the country and it shall be the duty of the Stu(e to apply, these _ principles in aking laws.\" Art. 41 provides that 'the State shall •\n\n. within the limits of its economic capacity and development, make\n\neffective provision for securing the right to work, to education and to publi_c assistance in \"pases of unemployment, old_ age,• sicknesS: and disablement, and in othet cases of undeserved want.' Art. 43 obligates the State to s'ecure, by suitable legislation to all workers, a living wage, conditions of work ensuring a decen.t standJ:lrd oflife anti full enjoyment of leisure ...... :·' The State discharg ed its obligation by enacting these laws, But much before the State\n\nnacted relevant legislation, tlw trade unions either by e'?llective bargaining .. or by statutory adjudication acquired certain benefits, gratuity being one of them. Pension and gratuity are botli retiral benefits ensuring that the workman _who haS. spent his useful san\n\n~ -\n\n··~ ;\n\nS C. SARKAR v. TATA lRO'N AND S.TE::L CO. {D.!; ai; 1.) 339.\n\nof life in rendering service ancl who never got a living wage, which would h<we enabled him to save for a. rainy. day, should not 6e re~ . duced to destitution and p nury in his old age. As a return of long service he should be assured social security to some extent in the fonn. of eithe'r pension' gratu'ity or provident' fund whichever retiral ber; lefit is operative i\"n the industrial .establishment. Jt must not be 'forgotten that it is not a grati.tious payment, it has to be earne-d by\n\nl?ngand continuous service . .\n\n<'in such social security measures be denuded of'its efficacy and enforcement by so interpreting t~~ relevant rules that the work~ man could be denied the same at the absolute discretion of the em~ ploycr notwithstanding the fact that lle or she has earned the sne by long continuou~ service? If Rule 10 is interpreted as has been done by the High Court, such wohld pe . the stark albeit unpalatable outcom~ ... It is therefore necessary to take a leaf out of history bear~ ing 0:1 the. question of ret ira! benefits like pension to which gratuity i$ equated. In B<trhanpur Tapti 'Mills Ltd .. v. B:trhanpur. Tupti Mills\n\nMazdoor Sangh(1) wherein thiS Court observed that:\" a Scheme of.. gratuit.v and a ; cheme of pensio.o1 have much in tomr, non. Gratuity i~· a lump sum payment white pecision is a period payment of a stated sum.\" Undoubtedly both have to be earned .try long and\n\ncontinli<; ms service. ·\n\nFor cnturies thcourts swung in favour of the view that pension is either a bounty or a gratitious payment for local service render ed. depnqing upon the sweet will or grace or'thc employer not claim~ able as a right and therefore, no right to pension c.ari be enforced. through court. This view held the field. and a suit to recover pension was held not maintainable. With the modern notions of social justice and social security, concept ofpens!on underwent a rad.i:.:al change and it is no, w wellsettled that pension is a right a'nd payment of it does not depend upon the discretion of the employer, nor can it be denie.d at the sweet will or fancy of the employer.. Deokinandan Prasad v. State of Bihar & Ors.,(2) State of Punjab & Anr. v. Iqbal 'Singhe) and D.S. Naka; a & Ors. v. Union of India(~). If pension which\n\nIs the retiral benefit as a measure of social security can be recovered . . ( . .\n\n(L) [1965] 1 LLJ 453.\n\n(2) . (1971] Supp. SCR 634.\n\n(3) ( 19761 3 SC'R 360. 0)\n\n[1983] 2 SCR 165\n\n F\n\n.,...\n\n. A\n\n340 . 'ruPREME COURT REPORTS [l984J3 S.C.R.\n\nthrough civil suit, we seeno justitlcation in treating gratuity on a .\n\ndifferent footing. Pension a.nd gratuity in. tlie matter of retirat benefits and •for recovering the same must be put on par .\n\n. ' -\n\nThe question then is : C::tn the court ignore Rule 10- 7 If gratuity is a retiral benefit :!ild can be earned as a mauer ofright on ;\n\nfulfilling the conditions subJect to which it is.earned-;· any rule co;. feriqg absolute discretiol, l not testable 'on reason, justice or fairplay must be treated as utterly arbitrary and ureasonable and discarded.\n\nJf rules for payrn, ent of grattity became incorporated in the Standing Orders and thereby acquired the status of statutory condition of ser- _vice, iJ, n arbitrary denial ref.erable to whim, fancy or sweet will of the employer must be rejected as arbitrary. Sec. 4 oftbe 1946 Act which: . c<:mfers power on rhe Certifying Officer or <_ppellate authority to ad~\n\njudicate upon 1-he fairness or reasonableness of the p(oVisiqns would .enabie this Court to reject that pa1t of Rule 10 conferring absolute discretion on the.employer to pay or not to pay the gratuity evt:, n D . if it is earned as utterly unreas6nable and unfair. It must be treated as.ineffective and unenforceable. It is well-settled that if the Certify.\n\ning Officer and the appellate authority under the 1946 Act while .certifying tj.1e Standing Orders has power to .adjudicate upon the fairness or reasonableness ofthe provisions -of any standing orders, E this C'..ourt in appeal under Ait. 136 shll have the power to do the same thing when especially it is called upon to enforce the unreason- -able and unfair pa'rt of the Standing Order. It therefore follows that part of Rule 10 which confers absolute discretion on the em~ ployer to , Pay gratuity~ even if it is' earned, at its absolute discretion\n\nisine'ifective and unenforceable. This approach does not acquire . anY. precedent but. if one is needed the decision of this Court in Westem India Match Company Ltd. case clearly rules'to that effect.\n\nIn that Cilse, the company reliec;\\ on a special agreement which was to some extent in _derogation of the provisions of the certified Stan- . ding Order:. The Court observed that to uphold such special agree~ rnent would. mean giving a go-by to the principle of three party particip, iltion, -in the settlement of the terms of employment, as represented by the certified Standing Orders and the[eforc, the inconstani part of special agreement is ineffective and unenforce. able. Tile claim to absolute discreti<; ln n, ot to pay gratuity even when it is earned is a hangover of the laissez faire days and utterly inconsistant with the modern notions of fair industrial relations and therefore, it must be rejected as ineffective and hence unenfor ....\n\nable.\n\n''t\n\n...\n\n~·- ' :'\n\n' -\n\nS.Q, SARIAR I!'; T/I, TA IRON AND STSEL CO~ (DeaiJ J.)\n\nViewed from a sliahtly different angle, our Constitution envisages a society governed by rule of law. Absolute discretion un- -Controlled by guidelines -., hich may permit denial of equality efore\n\nJaw is the anti-thesis of rule of law, Absolute discretion U()t judicially reviewable inhers.the_ pernicious tendency to be arbitrary .and is therefore violtive of Art. 14. Equality before law and absolute\n\n<l.i9Cretion to grant or. deny benefit of the law are diametrically\n\n.opposed to each other and cannot co-exist. Therefore; also the • .conferment of absolute discretio~ by Rule- 10 of the Gratuity Rules to give or deny t.he benefit of the rules cannot be upheJd .and must .be rejected as unenforceable.\n\nThe High Court reversed thedecree of the trial colirt on t1te .sole ground that Rule 10 confers an absolute discretion on the .\n\n-respondent-company to pay or notto pay gratuity at its sweet will.\n\nQnce Rule 10 is out of the way, the judgment of the High Court .lJ.as to.be reserved. Accordingly, this appeal succeeds and will have\n\n-19 be allowed.\n\nI The trial court decreed the plaintiff's suit with ,-costs and. with interest at 6% per annum. Interest at 6<ya.per\n\nnnum has become uttrly irrelevant in these days with devaluation . .()f the-rupee. further in our opinion, the company declined to meet\n\n.it~ obligation on an utterly unreasonable . stand apd denied to' the •plaintifff or a period of a quarter of a century what the plaintiff was legitimately entitled with01.1t the slightest shadow of. doubt. Therefore, while allowing the appeal in order to compensate the loss s; ffered by the plaintiff who died before enjoying the fruits of his .Jecree, we direct that the interest shall be paid at 15% per aimum . ·\n\nand full costs throughout.\n\nAccord iogly, this appeal is allowed and the judgment and decree -of the High Court are set aside and the decree of the trial court is restored with thi~ modification that the interest shall be paid on the . principal amont of , Rs 14,04~ at 15% frm-1.7.1959 till payr:ne?t\n\nand full costs throughout be paid to the plamtlff. The costs plamtiif .in this Court is quantifie~ at Rs 5,000. The payment shall be made\n\nithin a period of two months from today.\n\nR.S.K~ •", "total_entities": 45, "entities": [{"text": "SUDHIR CHANDR, A SARKAR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 23, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUDHIR CHANDR, A SARKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "rATA IRON & STEE_L CO. LTP .. AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 28, "end_char": 68, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "TATA IRON & STEEL CO. LTD. AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "D.A DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 88, "end_char": 97, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.A. DESAI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A .. P. SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 99, "end_char": 110, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. 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BALAKRISHNA ERADI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Gratuity Rules, 1937", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 399, "end_char": 419, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4602, "end_char": 4604, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mark Freedland", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6732, "end_char": 6746, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and Mark Freedland p.233\n\nS O.~Jn<lustrial Rdtim>J in Great 8 itnfn p. 5~-59, referred to. •\"\""}}, {"text": "Sec. 33(c)(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7239, "end_char": 7252, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7380, "end_char": 7403, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "On the enactment of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7911, "end_char": 7964, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "D.N. Mukheiu", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10924, "end_char": 10936, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D.N. Mukheiu, Ronjun Mukherjee, A.K. Gonguli & S.C. Ghosh for the appellant •.\n\nR.B. Da!ar and Ms. Vina Tamta for the respondents . ."}}, {"text": "Ronjun Mukherjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10938, "end_char": 10954, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D.N. Mukheiu, Ronjun Mukherjee, A.K. Gonguli & S.C. Ghosh for the appellant •.\n\nR.B. Da!ar and Ms. Vina Tamta for the respondents . ."}}, {"text": "A.K. Gonguli", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10956, "end_char": 10968, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D.N. Mukheiu, Ronjun Mukherjee, A.K. Gonguli & S.C. Ghosh for the appellant •.\n\nR.B. Da!ar and Ms. Vina Tamta for the respondents . ."}}, {"text": "S.C. Ghosh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10971, "end_char": 10981, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D.N. Mukheiu, Ronjun Mukherjee, A.K. Gonguli & S.C. Ghosh for the appellant •.\n\nR.B. Da!ar and Ms. Vina Tamta for the respondents . ."}}, {"text": "R.B. Da!ar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11004, "end_char": 11014, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D.N. Mukheiu, Ronjun Mukherjee, A.K. Gonguli & S.C. Ghosh for the appellant •.\n\nR.B. Da!ar and Ms. Vina Tamta for the respondents . ."}}, {"text": "Vina Tamta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11023, "end_char": 11033, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D.N. Mukheiu, Ronjun Mukherjee, A.K. Gonguli & S.C. Ghosh for the appellant •.\n\nR.B. Da!ar and Ms. Vina Tamta for the respondents . ."}}, {"text": "Augut 31. 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11392, "end_char": 11406, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "continuous service rcnMr ed by him from Dcember 31, 1929 till Augut 31."}}, {"text": "S.C. SARK~R V. TATA IRON", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11966, "end_char": 11990, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' I\n\nS.C. SARK~R V. TATA IRON & .STEEL CO. ("}}, {"text": "High Court of Judicature at Patna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13398, "end_char": 13431, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent Company preferred Fist Appeal No: 444 of 1963 in the High Court of Judicature at Patna."}}, {"text": "Othe Gratity Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14499, "end_char": 14517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s 6, 7 and 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16627, "end_char": 16639, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1.4.1-946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18206, "end_char": 18215, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of an uncovenanted employee wl\\o hs 'been transferred to another Tat a concern, the retiring • gratuity payable to him under Rule (4) 8 (a) heretlnder will be based on the rate of the salary or wages:applicable to the -employte in the lastmontlr of' service with the Company,\n\nOn focc from 1.4.1-946 as per Board Resolution ,.<fated 8.4.1948.)"}}, {"text": "8.4.1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18249, "end_char": 18257, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of an uncovenanted employee wl\\o hs 'been transferred to another Tat a concern, the retiring • gratuity payable to him under Rule (4) 8 (a) heretlnder will be based on the rate of the salary or wages:applicable to the -employte in the lastmontlr of' service with the Company,\n\nOn focc from 1.4.1-946 as per Board Resolution ,.<fated 8.4.1948.)"}}, {"text": "Section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24918, "end_char": 24927, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25083, "end_char": 25089, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S87", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26726, "end_char": 26729, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 0", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27250, "end_char": 27254, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Qalty if any act is d-one in contravention of the Standing Orders certified under the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30585, "end_char": 30674, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Kahn Freund", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31723, "end_char": 31734, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Davies and Mark Freedland p. 233) 0 Kahn Freund describes."}}, {"text": "Specific Relief Act, 1963", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32481, "end_char": 32506, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33385, "end_char": 33403, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sec. 33(c)(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33405, "end_char": 33418, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33551, "end_char": 33574, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33883, "end_char": 33912, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sec. 13(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34015, "end_char": 34025, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "On the enactment of Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36072, "end_char": 36121, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Employees Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36360, "end_char": 36423, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 37", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36622, "end_char": 36629, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Employees Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952", "statute": "the Employees Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "Art. 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36943, "end_char": 36950, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Employees Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952", "statute": "the Employees Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "Art. 43", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37249, "end_char": 37256, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Employees Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952", "statute": "the Employees Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "[1983] 2 SCR 165", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 40299, "end_char": 40315, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sec. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41196, "end_char": 41202, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Westem India Match Company Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 42346, "end_char": 42377, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "if one is needed the decision of this Court in Westem India Match Company Ltd. case clearly rules'to that effect."}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43617, "end_char": 43624, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_3_342_349_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "VNION OF INDIA AND 0THERS\n\nv. .\n\nOSWAL WOOLLEN MILLS LTD. AND. OTHERS\n\n'.B\n\n• March 27, 1984\n\n[(). CmNNAPPA REom< A.P. SEN AND E.S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.J\n\nlmpori Control Order, 1955. CtaU.se 8-B-Writ petitlon by company_impug- C ring order un, der Clause 8-Bgrant of exjJarte lnteri111 stay by lfigh Court\n\nM•hether 11nlid and , legal. ·\n\nPractice ·& Procedu, e-Statqtoty Or; lers-Grant o.f exparte interim stay by Courts.:..validity of. '\n\nPetitiner company.situated in Punjab-Relief sought against Union Of lnd; fl\" .· situated in New Delhi-Writ petition in Calculta High Cor1t-Fllig of whether vafid-\n\nThe respondeflts filed. a Writ petition in the High Court. of Calcutta against an order made under Clause 8-B of the Import Control ordr 1955, in respect or a consignffient of beef tallow \\vhich arrived.at the Calcutta Port. A Single Judge\n\nisue4_ a rule-andranted an interim ordey restrainin& the Union of India\" and -the Chief Controller of ImP.orts and Export,<; from fil ihg any criminal complaint against the respotident-firm or its Directors and also a direction to pCrmit the: . respondents to re-export the consignment of tallow. A.n application \\vas madeby the-Union of India to vacate the interim order, In the mean\\vJ1ile the respOndents sent letters and telegtams to. the departn1ent. intimating that. the interim order of the High .Court had not been obeyed, and, threatening actioa for contempt of Court,' An application to co_.11mit _the Chief Controller or Imports ad Exports, and others for contept Of c9urt was filed by the com- .pany. Over-ruUng the request made on behalf of the Department to vacate the\n\niriterim order, the cou'tt issued a rule in the application for conten1pt and direc~ ted the..r>epar.ti; nent officials.to appear i~ person.\n\nBein'g aggrieved by the ot;:der, the Department filed'!- Special Leave Petition against the interim order a.nd the rule for contempt.\n\nAllowing the appeal, vacating the ifiterim orde! and quashing the !ule fOi::- -contempt\" of Coutt ;· ·\n\nHELD: I. Writ' petitions .are often deliberalely filed in distant High B . ,,. Coitfts, s.part of a manoeuvre ia legal battI~, so as. to fenPer it difficult r°\"\"·\n\n'A ' ' 't\n\n• - •...._,·\n\n. ,,.\n\nL\"J-; JON 'v. OSWAL.WOOLLEN MILLS, 343. . . . . • the' ffici:ils at D!lhi to cio_v>!· appliction<J to. vaca~~ _stay where it becomes\n\n.A\n\n- • 11eCessary to file such applications. 'An .irieitable. 'reult or ihe filing or' writ\n\nl)Ctitions -elsewhere_ than at, tl1t viace her~ the concernedOffi;::cs and. ihe re1e-.\n\n: .J ... ,\n\n--vant recOrds re localed is to d.!l~Y proJVpt retul-n and contest. [345BC, A) . . . .\n\n- Jo ; he i~tant-~<>t. th'! rit pel; tiOn w~'i flied. in the .Calctta .Hih- _Curt: --When the pl'fx:e oftJie c\"fn)1dny-is-in th~ Staie c.'f Pu.jab and all the prin.ciPat Tespondnts r.: in.Delhi. ' · . . , .. -·\n\n2. A 'St1rurory or Je; a:h\" a:; th~ Ol)e ~der\" Clause 8-R of_ the Import . Control Ordet purporis to be made'. in the pub Ii.: interest and Unless there are\n\nyen strogr grOupcls 'Or\" rublic interest ari x.'p:a'rte intefrn Order ~:ill nOt be.\n\n, :jll5tified •. T~: illy rippl\"ep_riatt'oi\"dei 10 m?ke in .. suCli cses is_'tO _issue notlce tO . a\n\n- the respondents. and make it rclurnable\" \\vithin a !-hortperiod.'This should parti.,; , culafy bC so where 'the--Offi.:~~ of th.: Principal respondents and reieVant reCofdS •' lie. outside the. odinary juisdiction or the C<?urt. '.To , grant ·. interi_Ill relief\n\ntraight away and 1eave it_ to.therespondents to h_ave the interim order vacat'=<! may j:::opJ.rdi'>e th~ p_ublic-interest- [346G-J47A] ' . .· . . - ' '' . . . ..\n\n. _3. -1{3.n intenm or:ler. is one.! m1d6 by a cou'r\"t, parties 'employ every_ -device and tactic to wa~ off the final hearing or he applicatioa. It is theeT'. fore. necessary for the courti to be circumsp.:ct in the matter or granting . inerim relier. more particularlyso where the interi~ relief is direcied against.: ·,\n\n:0rders Ur actions of public officials actipg in discharge of their public duty _and in' exercise Or statutory powefs. C347BJ ·.. . . .. , . ·. . -· . . . ·.\n\n-~ . .\n\n: ·; In th~ instant case, :no inierim relier Should hav~ been grantCd by the\n\nHigh\n\n. ·Collft. The. futerim, order iS Of a drastic character With a great potential for\n\n~ mischief and has. the effect or prcictically _aIJOwing the writ petition at the stage\n\nOr admission wit!loUt hearing the appoire P<irties. [347C, 3460] . . . . _/ <\n\n- 4. The application JO cOmmit the allthoritie~ for' cOntelnpt of .ars tO bC a'dcvice to exct licences frOm tbeln~ [349BJ: court appe •\n\n. In the-instant case.- th~ stJ.y of the oeration of the •abeyanCe' orde-r merely mei\"nt that the \\Vrit petitionCrs were entitled .-to have their applications disposed or bYthe coOcerned -authori!ies. The Hi_gh Court nOt haVing .set .any Jiritit- Or .\n\n.. time for the disposal or the appJic:i.tiOns.· it was -not for the writ petitioiiers tO\n\n'Jrllpo'ie time liffiit and demand that their applicatioris should be disPQ.sed 'of\n\nfofthwith •. If-the writ petltionrs were aggrieved by the failure of thC aUtho.ri .\n\n-tieS to dispose Pf ther ap'plication3 expeditiously, _it was open to them to seek a H. furth_:r direction from the court fixing a limit of_ time Within which the aPplica. . !' . tion!i wer~ to be disJ, OSed of. [348G.J49A] . - . ' \\\n\n. l . . . . ,' • . - •\n\n' . Sl(PR~MB COURT REPORTS\n\n[1984] 3 S.C.R:\n\nC1viL APPELl; ATB JURISD\\CTION : Civil Appeal\n\nNo. 19'./2 of 1983\n\nFrom the Judgment and o'rder dated 22.11.83 Of the Calcutt:¥ High Court in Civil Rule No. 10933 W of 1983 and order is.suillg. conte!llpt notice dated 3:2.84 being Civil Rule No. 571 w.of 1984.\n\n Milon K. Banerjee, Additional Solicitor General, A.K.\n\nGanguli an4 R.N. Poddar for th~ appellauts. ·\n\n. Soli J. Sorabjee, Mrs. Manik Karanjawa!a, Ratan Karanjawala.\n\nKu/deep Pablay, Sumit Kacliawha and Dr. Roxana Swamy for the respondents. .\n\nA. Subba Rao for STC .\n\nThe Order of the Court was delivered by\n\n. CHINNAPPA REDDY J: We. grant .special leave and procee<l to dispose of the -appeal.\n\n' M/S. Oswal Woollen Mills Limited having its registered office at Ludhiana in the State of Punjab and a branch office-at Calcutta,\n\nand Narayan Das Jain, Secretary of the Company have filed a wtit. /a petition in the Calcutta High Court seeking variom; reliefs against . 1.. _ the Union of India (through the Secretary, Ministry of Commerce, New Delhi), the Chief Controller of Imports and-Exports, New Delhi, the Deputy Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, Amritsar, , 'the Collector of Customs, Calcutta and the. State Trading Corpora- .\n\nJ! tion of India, New Delhi. The primary prayer in the writ petition-\" is to prevent or to quash an apprebend.ed or purported action under\n\nclause 8-B of the Import Control 'Order. All the other reliefs sought in. the writ petition revolve round the principal_ relief regarding clause- 8-B.of the Import Control Order. The other prayers are eitherancillary or inc.idental to the principal prayer or are of an inter-' locutory charar.tor. Having regard to the fact that the registere<i office of the company is at Ludhiana and the principal respondents. against whom the primary relief is sought are at New Delhi, one would liave expected the writ petition to be filed either in. the Higlh\n\nCourt of Punjab and Haryana or in the Delhi High Court. The writ ,';- petitioners however have chosen the Galcutta Hiih Court as theforum perhaps because one of the interlocutory reliefs which is sought is i:n respect of a consignment of beef tallow which has aqived at the ·\n\n' '\n\n. -\n\n• UNION v .. OSWAL WOOLLEN MILLS (Chinnapa Reddy, J.) 345\n\nCalcutta Port. An inevitable result <;>f the filing of writ petitions A -elsewhere than at the place where the concerned offices and the relevant records are located is to delay pro111pt return and contest.\n\nWe do not desire to probe further into the question whether the writ_ petition was filed by design or accident in the Calcutta High Court when the ot)ice f the company is in the State of Punjab and all the B principal respondents are in, Delhi. But we do feel d.isturbed that sue!) writ petitions are often deJibetately filed in .distant High Courts, as part of a manoeuvre\"in a legal battle, . so as to render it difficult for the officials at Delhi to move applications to vacate stay where it becomes necessary to file such applications. More about . this later. C\n\nIt appears that an order under clause 8.-B of the Import Control Or.derhad been made against the company on Noveber 9, 1983, but the writ petition was filed aif the order was in the offing and might be made at any time, The writ petition was apparently filed in professed or real ignorance of the order made under clause 8-B of D the Import Conirol Order. ..\n\nOn November 22, 1983, a learned single judge of the Calcutta' High Court issued a rule Nisi and granted an interim order in the following terms:.\n\n\"There will be an interim order of stay/injunction in terms of prayers {j), (.kl, (I) and (ii) of the writ petition till the disposal of the rule.\n\nLiberty is given to the respondents to app1y for vacation or vaiation\".\n\nThe rule was made returnable on January 31, 1984.\n\nPl-ayers • (j), (k), (!) and (n) of the petition were !iJr .the grant of:-\n\n\"(j)-Injuction restraining the respondents their servants and/or agents from filing any criminal' complaint G against the petitioners or any of its director or employees from initiating any departmental proceedings under the Import and Export (Control) Act, 19-17 and Import (Control) Order, 1955 against the petitioners or.any of its Directors or Employees till the-disposal of the Rule; ·\n\n(k)__:Injuction restraining the respondents from issuing an order of abeyance under clause 8 B oHhe lmport Control\n\nII ...\n\n• 346 . SUP!l.EME C0URT REPORTS [1984] 3 s.c.R.\n\nA Order, 1955 and/or from taking anyaction under such o\"rder of abeyance till the disposal of the rule ; ·\n\n(!)--Mandatory ordet directing tbe respondent ,No.5 Coflector of Customs to permit the petitioners t_o .re-export the consignment of inedible Beef Tai low in terms of I.T.G; Public Notice No.37 of 19.83 dated l.9.83 with respect to the consignment weighing 456.316 MT which is.lying at Calcutta under section A9 of the Customs Act; ·\n\n. (n)-An order that pending the hearing and final dis- C posal of this writ petifion the pefitioners be perm1ited to re- Ship and/or re-export the consignment of 456.216 MT of inedible Beef Tallow which arrived at Calcutta as more part\\cular:y. menticihcd in Annexure T.\"\n\n. Ho\n\nIt is obvious that the. interim order is of a drastic character with a great potential for mischief.\n\nThe principal prayer _in the writ peiition is the <:hallenge to the .. order !'lade or propo.sed to be made under clause 8-B of the Import Control Order. The interim order. in terms of prayers (j) and (k) has the effect (If practically allowing the writ petition at the stage of admis, ion without hearing the oppo- , siie parties.\n\nWhile we do not wish to .say that a drastic inte-rim order may_never be passed without hearing the opposite parties even_ if the circumstances ju; tify it, we arc very firmly of the opinion that a statutory order sc:ch as the one made iri \\he present case unde'r .. ·.\n\n- clause 8-B of the Import Control Order ought not to have been siayed\n\n without at least hearing tl10se that made the order. Such a stay m;; y lead tq devastating consequences leaving no way of undoing tl\\e mischief. Where a plentitude of power is given under.a statute, designed to meet a dire situation, it is nq answer to say that the very nature of the po, ver and the conequences \\\\'hich may ensue is itself a sufficierit justification for. the grant of a stay of that order, unless, of course, there are stlfficient circun1stances to justify a strong prhna facie inference\n\nthat the otaer was made in abuse of the power conferred by _tbe statute.\n\nA statutory order such as the one under clause 8--B purports. to be niade in the public interest and uni em there are even stronger gro.unds of public interest an exp-arte interim order will not be justified.\n\nThe only appropriate order to make. in such . cases is to issue notice.to the respondents and make. it returnable within a short period. This should partii; ularly. be so. where the -offices of the principal respondents and relevant records lie outside\n\n• -·\n\n• .\n\n' UNIO'.'l v. OSWAL WOOLLEN.MILLS (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 347\n\n1he ordinary .jurisdiction bf ihe court. To grant interim relief <11traight away and leave it to the respondents to move the court to vacate the interim order may jeopardise the public interest. It is notorious how if an interim order is once made by a court, partieg . i:mploy every device and tactic to ward off the final hearing of th~\n\napplication. It is, therefore, necessary for the courts to be circum- spect in the matter of granting interim relief, more particularly so. where _the .interim relief isodicected against orders or actions.of public -Officials acting in discharge of their public dut)* and in exercise of statu, tcrry powers.\n\nOn the facts. and circumstances of the present case, we are satisfied that no interim rnlief should have been granted by the High Court in the terms in w.t.ich it wa, s <lone.\n\nOrders. under .clause 8-B of the Import Control Order, similar to the.one made against Oswal Woollen Mills Limited, were made against various import-export houses and others.\n\nSome of. these -0rders have been questioned by the.affected pa1ties in diffrent High .. Courts and, in some cases, interim orders have also been obtained.\n\nOne such writ petition filed by Liberty Oil Mills Pvt. Limited has been. transferred to this court from the Bombay High Court at the instance of the Union of India.\n\nThe case is novr pending in this -court and has in fact been heard_ in part by this vary Bench.\n\nApparently, under the impression that 1ho questions at issue will be finally determined by this court in the c.isc of the Liberty Oil Mills, the Union of lrtdia aml the other autho1 ites do not seem to h_ve\n\nmoved expeditiously to contest the writ petiticllls filed in the H''<l!'h Courts and to have the interim orders vacated.\n\nIn the present cae. an application to vcate the interim order was filed in the Caicutta\n\nBigh Com£.on February I, 1984. Jn the mean_;, hile; Oswal Woojien Mills Limited went on writing letters _and sending telegrams compla'. . ining that the interim orders of the High Court had not been opeyed\n\n, and threatening action for contempt of Court.\n\nOn January 6, 1984, :ar:i application to commit the Chief Controller of Imp9rts and Exports and others for contempt of court was filed by the company. Notice to the r'espondents was ordered on the same day and on February 3, 1984, overruling .the request made on behalf of the respondents that the petition to vacate the interiin order may be hear<) first, the High Court issued a rule in the appliction for cont- .empt of court againsnhc Ch.ief Controller of Imports & Exports :and the Deputy Chief Controller of Imports and Exports and\n\nirected them to appear in person on March 6, ]984. Thereupon the Union oflndia, the Chief Controller of Imports & Exports, etc.\n\n-...\n\nH .....\n\nSUPRIME COURT REPORTS .\n\n[1984} 3 S.C.R... : ' .\n\nhave filed tli.e present special leave petition against the interim ordei-c dated November 22, 191!3. of the Calcutta High Court i~ Civil Ruli:c.\n\nNo.10933Wof1983 and the rule for contempt .of court issued on Februrary .3, 1984 inCivil Rnle No. 571 W ofl984. f..We have beard: Shri Milon Banerjee, learned Additional Solicitor General for the.\n\npetitioners and Shri Soli Sorai:Jlee, learned senior Advocate for the respondents. .\n\n. -\n\n We have already mentioned. that the High Court \\as not right in granting interim relief in the terms in which it had done so.\n\nWe~ therefore, vacate the interim order dated November 22, 1983 mad~ by the Calcutta J:ligh Court. It has been pointed oui to us that .th\" Chie(Cqntroller oflmports &.Exports has himself issued a Public: . N:otice dated 1st September, 1983 permitting re-shipment/re-export of import consignment which qould not be cleared consequent upon\n\nthe Ministry of Commerce Import Trade Control Order No 27/81 dated the 24th August, 1983. The. Public .Notice empowers th\" customs authority to allow reshipment/reexp6rt having _regard tO-- the extent to which foreign exchange spent on import will be earned . back and subject to snch other conditions relating .t.hereto as 'the\n\nCustoms authority may.impose.· We wish to make.it clear thaUht:o vacating of the interim order. will riot disentitle the writ petitioner!>- . from seeking and taking advantage of the public notice\n\n0dateci Sepiember 1, 1983. • • ,\n\nIn regard to the rule for contempt ofcou; t, we find it difficult to sustain thesame. Though ordinarily we would hove.· left the. matter to be decided by.the High Court, we think it unnecessary to . ' - . do so in the present case having regard to the elaborate argument~ addressed to us by bJth parties. The complaint of .the wdt. pe.ti- tioners in seeking the rule for contempt of court was that the authorities had not dealt with. their applications for licences, etc~ .. despite the .'abeyance' order having been stayed. It is obvious that the stay ofthe operation of the 'abeyance' order merely inant that the writ petitioners wereentitled to havetheir applications disposed of by the concerned authorities. The Higi1 Court not having set anylimit of time for the disposal of the applications, it wasnot for the . writ petitioners to impSse a time'.limit and dmmd that their applica-· tions should be disposed of forthwith. If the writ petitioners were aggrieved by the failure of° their authorities to. dispose of their applications expeditiously, it was open to them to seek a further direction from the court to fixing a limit of tim: within. which. the: . . .\n\n'..,\n\n--f\n\nUNION v. OSWAL WOOI, Ll:N MILLS (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 349:\n\napplications were tobe disposed of. We fail to see how the Chief A.\n\nController of Imports & Exports or the Deputy Chief Controller of Imports & Exports could be said to have committed any contempt of court, even priifl.a facie, by their mere failure to take action. in the matter. of the disposal of the applications of the writ petitions.\n\nIn the circumstances, we perceive the. application to commit the authorities for contempt of court to be a device to exact licences R from them. ·\n\nWe accodingly allow the appeal, vacate the interim order dated November 22, 1983 of the Calcutta High Court in Civil Rule No. 10933 Wof 1983 and quash the rule for contempt bf court issued on February 3, 1984 in Civil Rule No. 571 W of 1984.\n\nBefore we part with the 'case , we may refer to a statement made by Shri J.P., Sharma, Deputy Chief Controller of Imports and Ex , ports, New Delhi inth.e affiidavit filed by him before us to the effect that 'in the larger public interest Government was un~ b le to obey the interim order and had taken the question to this Hon'ble C.ourt wl]ich is pending decision shortly'. Torn out of the context in which it was made, the unhappy language in which it has been expressed is suggestive of contumaciousness on the part of J.P. Sharma.\n\nHowever; he.has_ filed further affidavits before us ewlain, ing the context in which the statement was made and expre5Sing his unqualified regret. We accept his explanation an<! expression. of regret. We are satisfied that Shri J.P. Sharma .did not mean what the language employed by him suggested. However, we. do wish to express our disapproval of the language emplQyed which is certainly suggestive of contumaciousness. • '\n\nN.V.K.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 62, "entities": [{"text": "VNION OF INDIA AND 0THERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 25, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "OSWAL WOOLLEN MILLS LTD. AND. OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 33, "end_char": 69, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "OSWAL WOOLLEN MILLS LTD. AND. OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "CmNNAPPA REom< A.P. SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 99, "end_char": 122, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "E.S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 127, "end_char": 149, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "E.S. VENKATARAMIAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Clause 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 246, "end_char": 254, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court. of Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 650, "end_char": 673, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a Writ petition in the High Court."}}, {"text": "Clause 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 702, "end_char": 710, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "OSWAL.WOOLLEN MILLS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2219, "end_char": 2238, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L\"J-; JON 'v. OSWAL.WOOLLEN MILLS, 343. . . . . •", "canonical_name": "OSWAL WOOLLEN MILLS LTD. AND. OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Clause 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2880, "end_char": 2888, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Court in Civil Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5518, "end_char": 5542, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Milon K. Banerjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5653, "end_char": 5670, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Milon K. Banerjee, Additional Solicitor General, A.K.\n\nGanguli an4 R.N. Poddar for th~ appellauts. ·", "canonical_name": "Milon K. Banerjee"}}, {"text": "A.K.\n\nGanguli", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5702, "end_char": 5715, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Milon K. Banerjee, Additional Solicitor General, A.K.\n\nGanguli an4 R.N. Poddar for th~ appellauts. ·"}}, {"text": "R.N. Poddar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5720, "end_char": 5731, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Milon K. Banerjee, Additional Solicitor General, A.K.\n\nGanguli an4 R.N. Poddar for th~ appellauts. ·"}}, {"text": "Soli J. Sorabjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5757, "end_char": 5773, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Soli J. Sorabjee, Mrs. Manik Karanjawa!a, Ratan Karanjawala."}}, {"text": "Manik Karanjawa!a", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5780, "end_char": 5797, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Soli J. Sorabjee, Mrs. Manik Karanjawa!a, Ratan Karanjawala."}}, {"text": "Ratan Karanjawala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5799, "end_char": 5816, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Soli J. Sorabjee, Mrs. Manik Karanjawa!a, Ratan Karanjawala."}}, {"text": "deep Pablay", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5822, "end_char": 5833, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ku/deep Pablay, Sumit Kacliawha and Dr. Roxana Swamy for the respondents. ."}}, {"text": "Sumit Kacliawha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5835, "end_char": 5850, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ku/deep Pablay, Sumit Kacliawha and Dr. Roxana Swamy for the respondents. ."}}, {"text": "Roxana Swamy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5859, "end_char": 5871, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ku/deep Pablay, Sumit Kacliawha and Dr. Roxana Swamy for the respondents. ."}}, {"text": "A. Subba Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5896, "end_char": 5908, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. Subba Rao for STC ."}}, {"text": "CHINNAPPA REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5963, "end_char": 5978, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CHINNAPPA REDDY J: We.", "canonical_name": "CHINNAPPA REDDY"}}, {"text": "Oswal Woollen Mills Limited", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6055, "end_char": 6082, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' M/S. Oswal Woollen Mills Limited having its registered office at Ludhiana in the State of Punjab and a branch office-at Calcutta,\n\nand Narayan Das Jain, Secretary of the Company have filed a wtit.", "canonical_name": "OSWAL WOOLLEN MILLS LTD. AND. OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Narayan Das Jain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6185, "end_char": 6201, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' M/S. Oswal Woollen Mills Limited having its registered office at Ludhiana in the State of Punjab and a branch office-at Calcutta,\n\nand Narayan Das Jain, Secretary of the Company have filed a wtit."}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6266, "end_char": 6285, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "/a petition in the Calcutta High Court seeking variom; reliefs against ."}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6330, "end_char": 6344, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1.. _ the Union of India (through the Secretary, Ministry of Commerce, New Delhi), the Chief Controller of Imports and-Exports, New Delhi, the Deputy Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, Amritsar, , 'the Collector of Customs, Calcutta and the.", "canonical_name": "Union of India"}}, {"text": "clause 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6734, "end_char": 6742, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ludhiana", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7107, "end_char": 7115, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Having regard to the fact that the registere<i office of the company is at Ludhiana and the principal respondents."}}, {"text": "New Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7196, "end_char": 7205, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "against whom the primary relief is sought are at New Delhi, one would liave expected the writ petition to be filed either in."}}, {"text": "Higlh\n\nCourt of Punjab and Haryana", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7277, "end_char": 7311, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Higlh\n\nCourt of Punjab and Haryana or in the Delhi High Court."}}, {"text": "Delhi High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7322, "end_char": 7338, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Higlh\n\nCourt of Punjab and Haryana or in the Delhi High Court."}}, {"text": "OSWAL WOOLLEN MILLS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7584, "end_char": 7603, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• UNION v .. OSWAL WOOLLEN MILLS (Chinnapa Reddy, J.) 345\n\nCalcutta Port.", "canonical_name": "OSWAL WOOLLEN MILLS LTD. AND. OTHERS"}}, {"text": "Chinnapa Reddy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7605, "end_char": 7619, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• UNION v .. OSWAL WOOLLEN MILLS (Chinnapa Reddy, J.) 345\n\nCalcutta Port.", "canonical_name": "CHINNAPPA REDDY"}}, {"text": "Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8025, "end_char": 8031, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We do not desire to probe further into the question whether the writ_ petition was filed by design or accident in the Calcutta High Court when the ot)ice f the company is in the State of Punjab and all the B principal respondents are in, Delhi."}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8076, "end_char": 8081, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We do not desire to probe further into the question whether the writ_ petition was filed by design or accident in the Calcutta High Court when the ot)ice f the company is in the State of Punjab and all the B principal respondents are in, Delhi."}}, {"text": "clause 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8438, "end_char": 8446, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8721, "end_char": 8729, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "November 22, 1983", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8770, "end_char": 8787, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 22, 1983, a learned single judge of the Calcutta' High Court issued a rule Nisi and granted an interim order in the following terms:."}}, {"text": "Calcutta' High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8819, "end_char": 8839, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 22, 1983, a learned single judge of the Calcutta' High Court issued a rule Nisi and granted an interim order in the following terms:."}}, {"text": "January 31, 1984", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9167, "end_char": 9183, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The rule was made returnable on January 31, 1984."}}, {"text": "Directors or Employees till the-disposal of the Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9597, "end_char": 9649, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "clause 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9738, "end_char": 9746, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Directors or Employees till the-disposal of the Rule", "statute": "Directors or Employees till the-disposal of the Rule"}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10254, "end_char": 10265, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10484, "end_char": 10492, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "n)-An order that pending the hearing and final dis- C posal of this writ petifion the pefitioners be perm1ited to re- Ship and/or re-export the consignment of 456.216 MT of inedible Beef Tallow which arrived at Calcutta as more part\\cular:y. menticihcd in Annexure T.\"\n\n."}}, {"text": "clause 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10765, "end_char": 10773, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11256, "end_char": 11264, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11949, "end_char": 11957, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chinnappa Reddy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12419, "end_char": 12434, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'l v. OSWAL WOOLLEN.MILLS (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 347\n\n1he ordinary .jurisdiction bf ihe court.", "canonical_name": "CHINNAPPA REDDY"}}, {"text": "clause 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13286, "end_char": 13294, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Oswal Woollen Mills Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13358, "end_char": 13385, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "under .clause 8-B of the Import Control Order, similar to the.one made against Oswal Woollen Mills Limited, were made against various import-export houses and others."}}, {"text": "Liberty Oil Mills Pvt. Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13635, "end_char": 13665, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One such writ petition filed by Liberty Oil Mills Pvt."}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13711, "end_char": 13728, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "transferred to this court from the Bombay High Court at the instance of the Union of India."}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13752, "end_char": 13766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "transferred to this court from the Bombay High Court at the instance of the Union of India."}}, {"text": "Liberty Oil Mills", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13988, "end_char": 14005, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Apparently, under the impression that 1ho questions at issue will be finally determined by this court in the c.isc of the Liberty Oil Mills, the Union of lrtdia aml the other autho1 ites do not seem to h_ve\n\nmoved expeditiously to contest the writ petiticllls filed in the H''<l!'h Courts and to have the interim orders vacated."}}, {"text": "Oswal Woojien Mills Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14337, "end_char": 14364, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jn the mean;, hile; Oswal Woojien Mills Limited went on writing letters and sending telegrams compla'. ."}}, {"text": "January 6, 1984", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14544, "end_char": 14559, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On January 6, 1984, :ar:i application to commit the Chief Controller of Imp9rts and Exports and others for contempt of court was filed by the company."}}, {"text": "February 3, 1984", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14754, "end_char": 14770, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Notice to the r'espondents was ordered on the same day and on February 3, 1984, overruling .the request made on behalf of the respondents that the petition to vacate the interiin order may be hear<) first, the High Court issued a rule in the appliction for cont- .empt of court againsnhc Ch.ief Controller of Imports & Exports :and the Deputy Chief Controller of Imports and Exports and\n\nirected them to appear in person on March 6, ]984."}}, {"text": "Union oflndia", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15145, "end_char": 15158, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereupon the Union oflndia, the Chief Controller of Imports & Exports, etc.", "canonical_name": "Union of India"}}, {"text": "Milon Banerjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 15556, "end_char": 15570, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "f..We have beard: Shri Milon Banerjee, learned Additional Solicitor General for the.", "canonical_name": "Milon K. Banerjee"}}, {"text": "Soli Sorai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 15640, "end_char": 15650, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "petitioners and Shri Soli Sorai:Jlee, learned senior Advocate for the respondents. ."}}, {"text": "Calcutta J:ligh Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 15914, "end_char": 15935, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We~ therefore, vacate the interim order dated November 22, 1983 mad~ by the Calcutta J:ligh Court."}}, {"text": "J.P., Sharma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18786, "end_char": 18798, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before we part with the 'case , we may refer to a statement made by Shri J.P., Sharma, Deputy Chief Controller of Imports and Ex , ports, New Delhi inth.e affiidavit filed by him before us to the effect that 'in the larger public interest Government was un~ b le to obey the interim order and had taken the question to this Hon'ble C.ourt wl]ich is pending decision shortly'.", "canonical_name": "J.P., Sharma"}}, {"text": "J.P. Sharma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19236, "end_char": 19247, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Torn out of the context in which it was made, the unhappy language in which it has been expressed is suggestive of contumaciousness on the part of J.P. Sharma.", "canonical_name": "J.P., Sharma"}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_3_350_360_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "i .\n\nA .\n\nUJ'E INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA\n\nv. .\n\nRAJA VASIREDDY KOMALLAVALLI KA MBA & OTHERS\n\nMarch 27, 1984\n\nf.\\1. BALAKRISHN!' ERADI AND SABAYASACHI MUKHARJI, JJ.]\n\nInsurance Law~ Contratt of lnsuran-ce.:;_P, rOpoJa/ an(!. acceptanre-lnsli.red filling up the proposr:il for .insurance for Rs. 50,000 on 27. f2.!960 and after 'undergofffg-tnedical exa111ination rm the same d; te issues two cheques of. Rs. 300. and Rs. 210 towards cotisideration Dy wy fir\"st p'emium-Thi-Jnsuran_ce .Corporation encash the cheques 011 1 J. I .196/ and the insured dies on I 2~1.1961~ Whethur there is a co11cluded contract of fnsl1ra11ce-When is. the acceplance said to be con1plete in Cases of contract of 1!1surance-C(}nfrac( Act, Sect(ons 2(h) and 4:\n\nOne Lare Raja: Vasireddi Chandr-a Dhara. Prasad died intest::1te on 12th January, 1961.\n\nHe had fil.led a propo.;; a1 for i{lsurance for Rs. 50,000 cry 27th December 1960. There was medical examination by the. doctor on the life of the deceased on 27th, D.ecembcr, ]960. The deceased issued two ch!qu:s being the consideration. ·!award'> tho! first premium f0r Rs 300 and.Rs. 220 respectively which. were cncashed by the appellant on 29th Decembe~ 1960 and 11th Ja.nuary1I96!. On 16th January, 1961,\" the widow of the deceased wrote to the appe11ant iiitint<lting the deatl\\ of. the deceased and de1nanded payment cir Rs. so; ooo: The Divisi; Oal Manager, Masulipatm Branch denied liabilit)i\" on behalf of. the ·\"appelJant .on 28lh January~ l961. Thereafterthere was cones~ pondence between the parfies between 1st February 1961 and 23rd December 1963 .. On 10th Janl:1ai:y. 19.64, th~ . respo.:ident5 filed a suit in the Court of\n\nSubordine Judge,· MaSUliIJi, tam. The trial court dismissed the suit holding, interalia 1 that there Was no .conclud.:d contra\"ct, th.at. the Proposal was not. accepted by the Divisional Manager for some reas6n or the other by the time the decead.had died,. that neitiler the encashmen~ of the two Cheques crea-ted a contract of ins.ura.1ce. In appeal, the High Caurt aftr ordering c_eqain other. additional documents set aside t:1e Trial Court Judgment.\n\nHe.nee the appeal by the Corporation after .obtaining thi! s'p.:cial leave.\n\n~ Allowing the.appeal, the Court\n\n' HELD ; f. Havin'g regar2f to the clear position in law about acceptance of . insu.rance proposal and the evidence of record in thi'> case, it is. clear that the, ·• High CQurt was in error in coming to th~ conclusion that ther!!. was a on-.\n\neluded contract of irisurancc between th.: dc_eased and the Life I11surance. '\"f..- 11 Corporation. [360D'E]\n\n? .. '(hough in certain human r-elatipilship silence to a pfoposal n1i-ght\n\nL.J.C. v. R.V. KA!\\IBA 351\n\nconvey acceptance ut in the ca\"se of insurance proposal, silnc~ docs not denote consent and no binding contract arises until the person to \\Vhom an offer is ·\n\nmade 5ays or does something to signife' his _acceptance.\n\nMere delny in giving 3R an'i\\Ver canilot be const(ued.as an acceptance, as, p-rin1a facie, acceptance must be communicated to the offerer. Thi! general rule_ is that the contract of insurance will be concluded only wh.:n -the p1rty to whorr1 an off:r has been n1ade accepts it unconditionally and con1municate-; his acceptance to the per-\n\n- son-making the 9ffer.\n\nWbeher the final ac:; eptance i'ithat of the assured or insurers, hOWC\\.'Cr, dpCnds sfrnply :on the way in which negotiations for an\n\ninsurance hilv~ progressed. [359H, 360A-B)\n\n3 : 1. When an insurance policy becon1eseffective is v.'Cll-scHled by the authorities bufit is clear that the eApressio:i \"underwrite\" sig1;1ifics accept 1iability unOer that. The. dictionclry meaning a.lso indicaies that. lt is true 1l1at\n\nnormally the expressi.on \"uodrwrite\" is used in ivlarine insui:ancc bu~ 'the expression used in Chapter Ill of the Financial Powers of the S1anding Order in this casi; specifically used the expl-cssiOn 'funder ... riting and rev iYals\" of policies in case of Lifo Insurance Gorj1oration and stated 1lat it was. the Divisional Manager who \\vas Competent to uil.derwrite policy for Rs, 50,000 iJnd alove.\n\n[3598,-D]\n\n3 : 2. The mere receipt and retention of pren1ium until after the death of J) the applicant or the mere preparation of the policy document is not acceptance; Acceptance 1nust be signified by some acts or acts agreed on -by the parties of from which the law raised a presumption of acceptance. [359D~E) ·\n\n3 : '3 'rn th~ instant case, the Iiigh Cuurt was in error in coming to the• foUowing conclu.lions ; E.\n\n(j.) that there was not sufficient P_leading that there w1s no concluded contract_. and pun acceptance of the proposal 'vas not sufficieit averrpent ,.that\n\nthe Divisional Manager as the only competent authority to accept the propo sal; (ii) in its view a.bOut the pow_i.!rs of the diffrent authorities under Chapter III of the Standing Orqer 1950_, dealing with the financial po, wers ; (iii) about\n\nthe-view that the Assistant Divisional Manager having accepted the proposal and (;·~) about the assurance given by the Field Officers that the acCeptance of the-first premium would auton:iatically . create a concluded contract of insu\n\nrnce' j358E-H]\n\n_The Coun however directed half the amJunt of the insurance amount of Rs. 85,000 paid to the Repondents to berefunded to the Corporation. [360FG] . . .\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil appeal No. 2197\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 16.4.70 of .Andhra Pradesh High, Court in appeal No. 4)1 of 1965.\n\nDr. YS Chitale, V. G. Shanker, KL.Hathi, Ms. Sadhana, DK Chhaya, MK Arora and Mrs. H. Wahi for the appellant.\n\n352 SUPRl!MI COURT RSPORTS.\n\n[198\"4]3 S.C.R.\n\nT. S. [<riJhnamoorthi Iyer, K~. Choudhry and KS. Choztdliary . for \\he respondents: · •\n\nThe Jtidgment of the Court was de!ivred by\n\nSABYASACHI MUKHARJJ, J. This appeal is by a certificate granted on 18th September, 1970 .bY the f:!igh Court of Andhra Pradesh under Articl'e 133(1) (a) of the Constitution as ft stood at the relevant time against the Judgment and decre~ of the. High Court dated 16th April_, 1970. - By the said Judgment' and decree, the High Conrt of Andhra Pradesh had .reversed the Judgment of the :learned Subordinate Judge, Masulipaiam dated 19th November, 1964 dismissing the suit of the plaintiffs-respondents agaiast the . appellant. Late Shri Raja Vasireddi Chandra Ohara Prashad was the husband. of respondent No .. I and father of the respondents No. 2 to. 5 herein. The respondents filed a suit in the_Subordirtate Court of Sub-Judge being Original suit No. 2 of 1964 on 10th January; 1964: The short facts leading to this case are :\n\nOne Late Raja Vasireddi Chandra Ohara Prasad (hereinafter E •referred to as a 'deceased') died intestate on 12th January, 1961.\n\nHe had filled a proposal for insurance for Rs, . 50,000 on 27th December, 1960. There was medical examination by the doctor on the life of the deceased on 27th December, 1960. The deceased had issued two cheques fo.r Rs. 300 and Rs. 220 respectively in favour of the appellant as first premium.\n\nCheque for '[ls. 300' was P encashed by the .appellant on 29th December, 1960. Cheque for Rs. 220 was dishonoured three times and finally encashed on 1 Ith.\n\nJanuary, 1961. As mentioned hereinbefore, the deceased died on the day following i.e. on 12th January, 1961.\n\nOn 16th January, 1961, the widow o(the d.eceased, .respondent No. 1 herein, wrote\n\n-G to the appellant intimating the death of the deceased and deroahded payment of Rs. 50,000. The Divisional Manager, Masulipatam Branch, 'denied liability on beh'alf of the appellant Corporation on 28th January, 1961. Thereafter there was correspondence between . the parties between !st February, 1961 to 23rd' December, 1963 wherein the respondents-plaintiffs had claimed the payment and the app.eliant had denied liability fov the s; ime.\n\n_, . '\n\nL.1.c. v. R.v. KAMBA (Mukharji, J.) 353\n\nOn the 10th January, 1964, the plainfiffs'filed the smt rn the .court of Subordinate Judge, Masulipatam. It was alleged in the\n\nplaint after setting out the facts which have been set out herein .before, that the medical examination repott was submitted to the .J1ppellant-corp3ration by Dr. Sri C. Sambasiva Rao, Approved Medical practitioner of the appellant in regard to the medical' .examination of the deceased. A report .described as. \"All the Friend's report\" was duly. sent to the appellant with regard to that proposal ; and all the prelimitiaries werecompleted ani; I it was further alleged that the deceased was assured.and told by the. local agent and the Field Officer of the Corporatioh that the paymnt of the first premium wou.ld amount.to the acceptance of tho proposal and advised the deceased to pay the first premium in full. It was, further, st!ted that the said two cheques were ehcashed and the .appellant had duly appropriated the amount and credited in the .accounts towards the premium payable by the deceased. Therefore, it was stated that the deceased had fulfilled his part of the insurance .contract and the appellant, Corporation by its overt acts of en- .cashing the cheques and crediting. the amounts in its accounts accepted the proposal of -the deceasea. In the premish it was said fo the plaint that there was a concluded. and valid insurance cont .ract between the deceased and the appellant-Corporation and that the ins.urance contra'cted commenced on I Ith Janurary, 1961 being the date of the receipt of the balance towards premium by the Cor.poration. It was further stated in the plaint that the Office of -the. Divisional Manager of Masulipatam was the concerned authority to settle the claim of the plaintiffs-respondents and to pay the amount. The contention of the Corporation that -the proposal was -not accepted and as such there was no _concluded insurance cont- -ract between the deceased and the Corporation, was untenable, according to. ilie plaintiffs. It was alleged that with full knowledge . pf the completion of all the preliminaries, the Corporation had encashed the cheques issued towards the first premium and. there- .fore it was the case of the plaintiffs-respondents that the enc, ashment , of the cheques amounted in those circumstances In law to an .acceptance of the proposal of the deceased. It was further alleged 1hat the appropriation of the amounts by the Corporation towards •the first premium by the deceased was only consistent with the\n\n.. acceptance of the proposal. The case of the plaintiffs further was\n\n!hat in . this case the first premium was not only received by the Corporation completely _on I Ith January, 1961 but it was als& . _J!ppro.priated by it in its accounts and the said premium amount\n\n' E\n\nSUP, REME CQURT REPORTS .\n\n(!984] 3 S.C.R,;.\n\n. A. was re.ceived by t)le Corporation without any demur or qualifica-·\n\ntion and th.at in any event t11e Corporation must be deemed tc> have Waived by it.s conduct tlie formality, if any, of sending co\"\"\n\n' .. ' - ' --· mrnunication of its acceptance of the proppsal. In the premises, th~ plaintiffs claimed the said amount along with il)terest at six per .cent per annuin from the date of refusal of payment till th~ dat~ or\n\npayment ofthe demand.\n\nWritten statement was filed on .behalf of the appellant.\n\nJn, the said written statement, after setting out the facts, it was denied . . that t11e payment of the first premium amounted to acceptance of the proposal and the allegation about the assurance given to the\n\ndecesed as alleged° in the.· plai11t was not true nor the alleged assurance.i( any, valid und.er law. It was, futher stated that the two cheques were not e11cashed and credited towards the premium . . account of .the proposal b.ut these were kept only in deposit in\n\nsupense account without any tiability of the appellant. It was. further stated that tb.e averments in' the plaint that the defendant Corporation cashed the above tw0 cheques and appropriated the.. am9unts and credited these. Jn the account towards premium payable for the proposal were false. It was stated that on the death of the.deceased;· the amount covering two cheques were lying in the deposii and in the suspense account of the Corparation and: . was.not adjusted towards the premium since the proposal was not considered, the terms of acceptance was 'not fixed and the premium amount required for the proposal was not calculated. In tho$e circumstances, the appellant Corporation cktime<i that there was no liability for the risk and as such the . plaintiffs had no right ti> claim and there was no cause of action. It was categorically stated that the cheques were not' credited and adjusted towards the. prelliinm accounts.. . . ' 'During the trial before the learned Subordinate Judge, fivedifl:eient issue~ were raised. It i.s not necessary to set out in detail those issues but the important and main issue was wh)!ther there was a concluded valid insurance. contract between'the deceased and the Life Insurance Corporation of India,\n\nBoth documentary and oral evidence were adduced at .the Trial. The respondents-plaintiffs examined Shri.. R.V. Bhupa\\a\n\nPrasad, son of the deceased and the Corporation on its beh<tlf examined Shri Jagannadhacha1{ the Superintendent of the Corpo-\n\n'_, •\n\n. .\n\nL.I.C. l'. R.V. KAMBA (Mukhar)i, J.) 355\n\nration branch at Guntur. He also produ'ced ex. B-4, the reviw. slip, prepared by the Branch office, Guntur and. sent to the Divi- ,; ional Officer, Masulipatam. ln his deposition, he had stated that the Divisional Manager was the competent authority for accepting the proposal for Rs. 50,000: Normally it took some t'ime for the Divisional Maoage19to accept. There was no communication from the DivisioQal Office \\o the Branch Officer accpting the proposal.\n\nHe, further, stated that the amount would be transferred into t.he first premium register after the proposl was accepted and the risk covered.\n\nHe had produced the account books, namely; deposit account book and the first premium account .book of the Branch Office at 'Guntur. '\n\nSbri Brahmandrao Ramiah, Assitant Divisional anager .of the Ufe Insurance Corporation office at Madras was also examined as the second wit!IW!; s of the defendants.\n\nHe had further stated that the proposal form was S\\'nt.from the office at Guntur to the Divisional Office at Masulipatam, and Ex: B-1. to B-4 and B-8 were sent in this connection.\n\nHe further stated that accord.ing to the financial powers Standing Order, it was the Divisional Manager who was competent to accept a proposal for Rs. 50,000 Ex. B-13 is the copy of the Standin.g Order. The purpose of review slip Ex. B4 was to enable the Divisional Officer to assess the risk and take a decision according to the deponent. In this connection we\n\ni'lay refer Ex. B-14 .which is the Life Insurance Corporation of India's Proposal Review Slip .regarding proposal in the case of the deceased. The\" endorsement therein of the assistant Divisional\" Manager read as follows : •\n\n\"NOTES AND DECISION : may be accepted at 0.R.\"\n\nWITH E.D.B.\n\nShri Jirahmandrao Ramiah had further stated that the papers were scrutinised by him in addition to the scrutiny by the concerned clerks.\n\nHe stated that the endorsement marked as Ex. B-14 was initialled by him. He further stated that the Jetiers 'DM' were a'lso written by him indicating that the papers should go to the Divisional Manager on Ex. B-4.\n\nH., e reiterated that the order of acceptance would not be communicated to the party if all the formalities were not complied with ; this policy, he stated, was not accepted. When the acceptance was complete and when there wes no r, equirement necessary and if the full first instalment was\n\nG •\n\nlE.\n\nSUPREME COD.RT REPORTS\n\n[1984] 3 S.C.R. • in deposit, it would be adjusted towards premium amount, he stated.\n\nIn this connection. before the learned Trial Judge, \"reliance was placed on the Life Insurance Corporation •f India Standing Order, 1960 (Financial Powers).\n\nChapter Ill of the Sta11\\iing Order dealt with the powers of the different authorities for, inter alia, 'Underwriting aod Revivals of Policy'; The relevant portion of th~ said Standing Order read as follows :-\n\n\"Nature of P_ower\n\nl. Underwriting and\n\nRevivals:\n\n(a) Standard\n\nlives and reviva! on original terms\n\nAuthority Extent of Finaizcial power (up to and Including)\n\nSection Head Supdt or J.O.\n\nA.S.O.\n\nA.D.M:\n\nD.M.\n\nRs.\n\n2,000 5,000 10,000 25,000 1,00,000\n\n(Sum Proposed) ( do- ) ( -doj ( -do ) ( -do- )\n\nNote: Proposalson standard lives for mor, e than Rs: 1,00,000\n\nshould be refercd to the Central Underwriting Section.\"\n\nLearned Subordinate Judge by his judgment_ dated 19th f ]\\!ovember, 1964 held that there was no concluded cqntract. He held . that as per\" the pro1; pectus of Life Insurance Corporation oflndia the risk under the Corporation policy commenced on th~ date of receipt of the first permium in full or the date of acceptance which ever was later and the scconJ instalment . of the premium falls due\n\n 0~ a date calculated from such date of commencement of risk.\n\nLearned Trial Judge was of .the OJ1inion that the documents in this case. coupled with evidence on. behalf of the Appellant-Corporation\n\nestblished that the proposal sent by the deceased was for SOfl\\e reason\n\n, -1~\n\n• L.kC. v. R.V. l(AMBA (Mukharji, J.) 357\n\n<0r other not accepted by the Divisional Office by the time the decea-\n\n$ed had died. The Trial Court therefore held that there was no -concluded valid insurance contract between the deceased and the Corporation. The Trial Court further noted that it was significant 1hat the case set out in the plaint and the basis of the claim made in the notices sent to the Corporation was not that the proposal was as a matter of fact accepted by the Divisional Manager, on the other hand, cbim was that it should be. deemed to have been accepted .\n\nConsidering the evidence.and the averments, the Learned Su'bordinate Judge came to the con.clusion that the accounts do not show the ., position alleged by the plaintiffs-respondents that the amounts paid\n\nwere appropriated towards the premium and the Trial Court was of ·, the opinion that encashing of the cheques and the want of aqy further action. to be done by the deceased did not themselves create a contract of insurance between the deceased and the Corporation.\n\nThe Trial Court was ofihe opinion that the proposal must be accept- .ed by the Divisional Manager and that alone cquld give rise to a valid contr.act of insurance which never happend in this case. The Trial Court further expressed the view that the other averments in the claim that the deceased was assured and told by the local agent .and the field officer of the Corporation that the payment of the first premium would . amount to the acceptance of the proposal were . . not established-and even if such a representation was made, that did not alter the position as under.the rules the payment of the premium -could nev'!!r amount. to the acceptance oft.he proposal if the proposal was not otherwise accepted. In the result, the suit filed by the respondents-plaintiffs was dismissed with costs. Being aggrieved by\n\n- the said decision, the plaintiffsrespondnts field appeal in the High.\n\nCourt. The appellants before the High Court also filed civil miscellaneous petition praying that in the circumstances. stated in the affidavit filed therewith the High Court might be pleased to direct the Life Insurance Corporation to produce certain documents viz., proposals, review slips and proposal dockets and the connected ,\n\npapers of th\" present case and statements furnishea by the Divisional Office to the Zonal Office showing the new, business in the year 1960 and proposal register work of Divisional Office for the year 196Q.\n\n• .\n\nThe High Couri. directed the Life. Insurance Corporation to produce the documents referred to above. The High Court by its judgment dated 14th April, 1970 held after conidering the stad\n\ning order Ex. B-13 and the various documents produced for .the ; first time on record that there was acceptance of proposal and like\n\n0 '\n\n• B\n\n• B\n\n• 35&\n\nSUPREME COUKT 11.EPCRTS [I 984] 3 s.c.R.:\n\n-Other contracts, the contract of insurance was complete by offer ancl . acceptance, , In coming to --this:.£anclusiori tJie High Court relied'. on the alleged-adjustment and the 'endorsement of the review slit> recommending that the proposal \"may .be accepted\" made on therelevant file by the Assistant Divisional Manager. Relying on certain other documents which were called for, for the first 'time by the. High Court relating to certain other cases where only the- . Assistant Div.isional Manager inade similar endorsement, the Higl:J\n\n.Coµrt came; to the condusioll that there was a valid contract. The . High Court was of.the view that the plea that Divisional Manager\n\nwas the only authority to accept had not been categorically taken i~ the written statement filed on behalf of the Corporation. On theother hand, there was a general statement that there was no conclu- . ded contract, The High Court was of the view that having regard!\n\nto the conduet of the parties, there was a concluded contract.. The High Court took the view that Ex, B-13 dealing. with Chapter !Hof the Financial Powers did not categorically deal with the aceptance of proposals. The High Court was of the view that the Corporation had not filed any evidence of any order prohibiting other\"officers one step below in rank, in this case the Assistant Divisional Manager, to exercise the power of Divisional Manager .\n\n. In our opinion, the High Court was in error in appreciating the facts and theevidence in this case.\n\nWe cannot accept the High Court's criticism with the avermenl in tbe written statement that there was not sufficient pleading that there as no con'cluded •\n\ncontract and non-acceptance of the proposal was not sufficient 'averment that the Divisional Manager was the only competent authority to accept 1be proposal. The. High Court, in our opinion. was also wrong in its view about the powers of the differenl autho- . rities under Chapter JII of the Standing Order, 1960 dealing with the financial .powers. Indeed there was. no evidence that the Assistant Divisionai Manager had accepted the proposal on the contrary he in bis deposition as we have indicated before had stated otherwise. He bad stated that the purpose of review slip was to enable the Divisional Manager to asses the risk and take a decision.· He had never stated that he bad taken a decision to accept the proposal. The allegaiion that there was assurance on behalf of the field officer and local agent to the deceas<;_d that the payment ;, r first premium would amount to the acceptance 6f the proposal can.not ~!so be accepted • firstly because factually it was no.t proved and secondly becaus~\n\n..,.\n\nL.I.C. v. R.V K,\\MBA (Mukharji, J.) 359\n\nthere was no evidence that such could have been the deposition in A 1aw.\n\nWhen an insurance poEcy , becomes effective i1 well-settled by the authorities but before we note the said authorities, it may be 'Stated that it is clear that the expression 'underwrite\" sig!1ifies \"accept liability under'.\n\n., The dictionary m; aning also indicates that. . (See in.this connection The Concise Oxford Dictionary Sixth Edition p. 1267.)\n\nIt is true that normally.the expression \"underwrite\" is used in Marine insuranc~ but tl1e expres.sion used in Chapter III of t1'e Financial powers of the Standing Order in this case specifically used 1he expression \"ii°nderwriting and revivals\" of policies in case of'\n\nLife Insurance Corporation and stated that it was the Divisional Manager who was competent to underwrite policy for Rs 50,000 and aj>ove. ' ·\n\nThe mere receipt and retention of premium until after the .death of the applicant or the\n\nmere preparation of the policy document is ot acceptance. Acceptance must be signified by some :act or acts agreed on by the parties or from which the law. raises\n\nn presumption of acceptahce. ·\n\nSee in this connection the statement of law in Corpus Juris SecundJlm, Vol. XLV page 986 wherein it has bee, n stated as:-\n\n. \"The merneceipt and retention of premiums until . after the death of applicant does not give rise to a contract, alth9ugh the circumstances may be sue!\\ thatapproval could be inferred from retention of the premium. The mere execu- · .tion of the polic; y is not an acceptance ; an acceptance, tp be , complete, must be communicated to the offeror, either direi:t- 'ly, or by some definite act, such as placing the contract in the mail. The test is no! intention alone. When the application so requires, the. acceptance must be evidenced by the signature of one of the company's executive officers.\"\n\nThough in certain human relationships silence to a proposal H might convey' acceptance but in the case of insurance proposal ·\n\nsilence does not denote consent and no binding contract arises until.\n\nSUPREME COCRT REPORTS\n\n(1984) 3 S.C.R,\n\nthe peron to whom an offer js m; de says or does something to . . signify his acceptance. Mere delay in giving an. answer caiinot be\n\nconstrued as an acceptance, as, primafacie, acceptance must be\n\ncommunicated to the offerer. The general rule is that the contract of insurance will be concluded only when the party to whom an offer bas been made accepts it unconditionally and communicates his acceptance to the person making the offer. Whet.her the final acceptance is that of the assured or insurers, however, depends simply on ' the 'YaY in which negotiations for an insurance have progressed. .\n\nSee in . this connection statement. of law in M acGil/frray & Parkington on Insurance Law, Seventh Edition page 94 paragraph its.\n\nReference in this connecfion may be_ made to the Statement of law in Ha/sbury's Laws of England 4th Edition in paragraph- 399 at\n\npae 222.\n\n•.' 1> Having regard to the clear position in law about acceptance\n\nf insurance ptoposal and the e\\iiden'ce on record in this case, we are, therefore, of tbe opinion that the High CQurt was in error in. -coming to the conclusion that there was a concluded contract of\n\ninsurance between the deceased and the Life Insurance Corporation. and oh that basis reversing the judgment and the decision of the E _learned Subordinate Judge. -_ .\n\n. . ' The appeal must, therefore, be allowed. We however record 1 that in view of the fact that sµch a long time has elapsed and further in view of the fact that principal' amount together with interest amounting to about Rs. 85,000/- have already been paid to the wife I' of the deceased and bis childern, •the Life insurance Corpbration in this case does not insist on .the full repayment of the sum paid and counsel on behalf oftbe Life Insurance.Corporation has stated that they would accept if half of what has been received by the respondents, namely principal together .with interest. is paid bck te> the Corporation. We order accordingly that the respondents wil~ G therefore pay back half of the actual 'amount rece!ved both of the principal together with interest within three months frorn this date. •\n\nIn the fcts and. c, ircumstances of the case there will be ne> order as to costs in this Court.\n\nWith the above observations, the appeal is allowed .\n\nS.R .• Appeal al/owid •\n\n-,...\n\n. .\n\n.... ·", "total_entities": 32, "entities": [{"text": "UJ'E INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA\n", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10, "end_char": 46, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RAJA VASIREDDY KOMALLAVALLI KA MBA & OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 53, "end_char": 96, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAJA VASIREDDY KOMALLAVALLI KAMBA & OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "f.\\1. BALAKRISHN!' ERADI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 114, "end_char": 138, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. BALAKRISHNA ERADI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Vasireddi Chandr-a Dhara. Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 759, "end_char": 791, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the acceplance said to be con1plete in Cases of contract of 1!1surance-C(}nfrac( Act, Sect(ons 2(h) and 4:\n\nOne Lare Raja: Vasireddi Chandr-a Dhara."}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3842, "end_char": 3844, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5333, "end_char": 5361, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil appeal No."}}, {"text": "YS Chitale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5492, "end_char": 5502, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. YS Chitale, V. G. Shanker, KL.Hathi, Ms. Sadhana, DK Chhaya, MK Arora and Mrs. H. Wahi for the appellant."}}, {"text": "V. G. Shanker", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5504, "end_char": 5517, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. YS Chitale, V. G. Shanker, KL.Hathi, Ms. Sadhana, DK Chhaya, MK Arora and Mrs. H. Wahi for the appellant."}}, {"text": "KL.Hathi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5519, "end_char": 5527, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. YS Chitale, V. G. Shanker, KL.Hathi, Ms. Sadhana, DK Chhaya, MK Arora and Mrs. H. Wahi for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Sadhana", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5533, "end_char": 5540, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. YS Chitale, V. G. Shanker, KL.Hathi, Ms. Sadhana, DK Chhaya, MK Arora and Mrs. H. Wahi for the appellant."}}, {"text": "DK Chhaya", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5542, "end_char": 5551, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. YS Chitale, V. G. Shanker, KL.Hathi, Ms. Sadhana, DK Chhaya, MK Arora and Mrs. H. Wahi for the appellant."}}, {"text": "MK Arora", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5553, "end_char": 5561, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. YS Chitale, V. G. Shanker, KL.Hathi, Ms. Sadhana, DK Chhaya, MK Arora and Mrs. H. Wahi for the appellant."}}, {"text": "H. Wahi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5571, "end_char": 5578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. YS Chitale, V. G. Shanker, KL.Hathi, Ms. Sadhana, DK Chhaya, MK Arora and Mrs. H. Wahi for the appellant."}}, {"text": "riJhnamoorthi Iyer", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5653, "end_char": 5671, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[198\"4]3 S.C.R.\n\nT. S. [<riJhnamoorthi Iyer, K~. Choudhry and KS."}}, {"text": "K~. Choudhry", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5673, "end_char": 5685, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[198\"4]3 S.C.R.\n\nT. S. [<riJhnamoorthi Iyer, K~. Choudhry and KS."}}, {"text": "KS. Choztdliary", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5690, "end_char": 5705, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[198\"4]3 S.C.R.\n\nT. S. [<riJhnamoorthi Iyer, K~. Choudhry and KS."}}, {"text": "SABYASACHI MUKHARJJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5778, "end_char": 5797, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "for \\he respondents: · •\n\nThe Jtidgment of the Court was de!ivred by\n\nSABYASACHI MUKHARJJ, J. This appeal is by a certificate granted on 18th September, 1970 .bY the f:!igh Court of Andhra Pradesh under Articl'e 133(1) (a) of the Constitution as ft stood at the relevant time against the Judgment and decre~ of the.", "canonical_name": "SABYASACHI MUKHARJJ"}}, {"text": "High Conrt of Andhra Pradesh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6100, "end_char": 6128, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By the said Judgment' and decree, the High Conrt of Andhra Pradesh had .reversed the Judgment of the :learned Subordinate Judge, Masulipaiam dated 19th November, 1964 dismissing the suit of the plaintiffs-respondents agaiast the ."}}, {"text": "Raja Vasireddi Chandra Ohara Prashad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6314, "end_char": 6350, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Late Shri Raja Vasireddi Chandra Ohara Prashad was the husband.", "canonical_name": "Raja Vasireddi Chandra Ohara Prashad"}}, {"text": "Raja Vasireddi Chandra Ohara Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6618, "end_char": 6653, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 of 1964 on 10th January; 1964: The short facts leading to this case are :\n\nOne Late Raja Vasireddi Chandra Ohara Prasad (hereinafter E •referred to as a 'deceased') died intestate on 12th January, 1961.", "canonical_name": "Raja Vasireddi Chandra Ohara Prashad"}}, {"text": "Divisional Manager, Masulipatam Branch", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7483, "end_char": 7521, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Divisional Manager, Masulipatam Branch, 'denied liability on beh'alf of the appellant Corporation on 28th January, 1961."}}, {"text": "10th January, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7885, "end_char": 7903, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "KAMBA (Mukharji, J.) 353\n\nOn the 10th January, 1964, the plainfiffs'filed the smt rn the .court of Subordinate Judge, Masulipatam."}}, {"text": "C. Sambasiva Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8173, "end_char": 8189, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was alleged in the\n\nplaint after setting out the facts which have been set out herein .before, that the medical examination repott was submitted to the .J1ppellant-corp3ration by Dr. Sri C. Sambasiva Rao, Approved Medical practitioner of the appellant in regard to the medical' .examination of the deceased."}}, {"text": "Masulipatam", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9552, "end_char": 9563, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Divisional Manager of Masulipatam was the concerned authority to settle the claim of the plaintiffs-respondents and to pay the amount."}}, {"text": "Life Insurance Corporation of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12906, "end_char": 12941, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "contract between'the deceased and the Life Insurance Corporation of India,\n\nBoth documentary and oral evidence were adduced at .the Trial."}}, {"text": "R.V. Bhupa\\a\n\nPrasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13050, "end_char": 13070, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondents-plaintiffs examined Shri.. R.V. Bhupa\\a\n\nPrasad, son of the deceased and the Corporation on its beh<tlf examined Shri Jagannadhacha1{ the Superintendent of the Corpo-\n\n'_, •\n\n. ."}}, {"text": "Jagannadhacha1", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 13141, "end_char": 13155, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondents-plaintiffs examined Shri.. R.V. Bhupa\\a\n\nPrasad, son of the deceased and the Corporation on its beh<tlf examined Shri Jagannadhacha1{ the Superintendent of the Corpo-\n\n'_, •\n\n. ."}}, {"text": "R.V. KAMBA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13214, "end_char": 13224, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.V. KAMBA (Mukhar)i, J.) 355\n\nration branch at Guntur."}}, {"text": "Guntur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13973, "end_char": 13979, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He had produced the account books, namely; deposit account book and the first premium account .book of the Branch Office at 'Guntur. '"}}, {"text": "Brahmandrao Ramiah", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 13989, "end_char": 14007, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sbri Brahmandrao Ramiah, Assitant Divisional anager .of the Ufe Insurance Corporation office at Madras was also examined as the second wit!IW!;"}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14080, "end_char": 14086, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sbri Brahmandrao Ramiah, Assitant Divisional anager .of the Ufe Insurance Corporation office at Madras was also examined as the second wit!IW!;"}}, {"text": "Jirahmandrao Ramiah", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14986, "end_char": 15005, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The\" endorsement therein of the assistant Divisional\" Manager read as follows : •\n\n\"NOTES AND DECISION : may be accepted at 0.R.\"\n\nWITH E.D.B.\n\nShri Jirahmandrao Ramiah had further stated that the papers were scrutinised by him in addition to the scrutiny by the concerned clerks."}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_3_361_371_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "ASSOCIATED CEMENT COMPANIES LTD. E.TC.\n\nT.C. SHRIVASTAVA & ORS.\n\nMarch 29, 1984 B\n\n[V.D. TULZAPURkAR AND R.S.' PATHAK, JJ.]\n\nIndustrial Ernploynient (Standing Orders) Art, 1946-Standing Orde1s-Certified Standing Order. No. Ji-Praiding that all disn1issal orders shall be passed by the Manager or A Cring A1anager who shall do so after giving the accusd an cppot tunity to o_ffer any exp!anation-Jr:terpreation of-IVhether co11te1nplates sei:ond ;'.) opportunity to\" workman aftfi conclusion of ehquiry and before inflicting puish n1ent of dis1r1isSal_.:._Whether enquiry gets vitiated in absence of such opportunitjl.\n\n Fol.Jr workmen of the appellant company in Civil Appeal No. 209/73 \\Vere charged for mis-conduct as defined in Standing Order No. 16. The enquiry -Officer found them guilty of the charges .• on the basis of the Enquiry Officer's\n\nreport and after looking into the previous record of the workmen, the' General Manager dismised theITi.\n\nOn a dispute having been raised it was referred to the arbitrator, first respondent, un<ler section lOA of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947. The arbjtr<itor held that the enquiry which was otherwise fair and valid was viiatep because no secOnd opportunity was given to the workrrien be~ fore disrcissing them as required by the Standing Order No: 17. The Arbitratot set aside the dismissal of two workmen and confinTied that of-the other hvo: The managem!nt and theworkn1en challenged the award in the High Court by two writ petitions. lfhe High Court cor, firmed the. a, vard arid di_smissed both lhe writ petltions. Hence these appeals by management .and the workmen.\n\nAllowing the appal of the managcn1cnt and dismissing that of the workmen.\n\nIIELD: Under Standing Order No. 17 no second _opportunity of showing cause on the question of punishment is contemplated. [3670]\n\nNeither. under the ordinary Jaw of the land nor under industrial law a\n\nsecondopportunity 'to show cause against the proposd punishment is nece'isary.\n\nThis of course, does nOt n1ean th1t the sta'nding order may not. provide far it but unless the standing order provide for it either expressly or by necessary iin'pl!cation, no enquiry which is otherwise fair and alid Will be vitiated by non-affording of such opportunity. 13698-D]\n\nStanding Ordef No. 17 provides that a worker mii.y be suspended, fined or\n\ndismissed if found guilty of mis-conduct as defined in Stnding Order No. 16. . ., Para 3 of Standing Order No. 17 says that \"all dismissal orders shall be passed by the Manager or Acting Man.ager who shall do so after giving the accu<ed an H opportunity to Offer any explanation.\" The question is whether para 3 provides for such second opportunity eing given to the delinquent The words ''all dis~\n\nmissal orders shall be passed by ihe Manager Ofter giving the accused an opportunity to any offer explanation\" in para 3 of Sanding _Order No. 17 are wholly inappro\"':..\n\np'tiate to convey the idea of a second hearing or opportunity On the que'stion of punbhment but appropriate in th~ contl!Xt of seeking an 61Xplanation in regard to the alleged mis-conduct charged against hin1: An 'explanation• is to be call ed from the 'accused' which suggests that the _sam.e is to be called for prior to the recording of a finding that the. dl!linquent is guilty of mis-conduct ; W: is the alleged misconduct that is. to be -explftincd by him and not the proposed punish ment. On a plain reading of the relevant words no second opportunity of 5how . ing cause against the. proposed punish1nent is conten1plated either exprcsS?y or . by necessary implication. In other word<>, it is'.Ctear that the opportunity spoken of by para 3 of Standing Order No. 17 is the opportuni.ty to be given to the delin9i1ent to meefte charges framed against hin1.\n\nFurther, since the instant\n\nStanng Order \\Vas certified prior to the enunciation of the law by. Courts regarding the observance of the principles' of natural justice such as i-; suance of a charge-sheet, holding vf an inquiry, opportunity to lead evidence, etc. It\n\nerey contains a bald provision for 'giving tl):e accued an oppOrtunity to offer any explanation'. In Other W; Jrd3, diff::re_nt stages in do1nestic inquiry \\vere never in the contemplation of the framers.<tof the Standing Order. That being the posilion it would be difficuh to attritbute any inrension to the framers thereof to provide for a second opportunity being given to the delinquent of s.howing.cause against theproposed p_unisijrnent. l368A-E; 369C-H ; 370A-B)\n\nThe view of tl:rc Arbitrator as also the view of the High Cciurt proceecl. on\n\na11 assumption the .Stnding Ordr o 17 d.!{lls with t\\VO different stages..concerning disciplinary proceding5 agairist a dlinquent, first holding of~ departn1ental inquiry into the charges where principles or natural justice must be irnpl_i- \"'ed and second' the infliction of graver punishment before awarding whch opportu'\"\n\nnity io show cause has been provided for ; but the .plain reading of the Standing Order read as a whole does not warrant any such assumption and, therefcire, the coustruction placed on Standing Order No. -17 by t.he Arbitrator or.the High Court is.not possible much less reasonabl) possible. [37JH; 371A B] • ·\n\n' ' .\n\nIn the inHanl case; admittedly, opportunity to offr explanation i:i regard to the <illeged mis-col\"\\, ducr was not oly afforded but was availed of by theco_n c.; rned four workers by submitting their written explanations to the ~1:inai; er whereafte.r the departmenta'J inquiry was held. In other words Standing. 01der No. 17 was fully con1plkd with and what is more the Arbitrator has held that the inquiry was otlierwie f:'iir and valid. [371DJ\n\nCtv1L APPELLATE. JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No .. 2Q9 of 073.\n\n(Appeal by Special leave frbm the Judgment and Order dated the 27th July 1972 of the Madhya Pradesh High Coo.rt in Misc\"._\n\nPetition No. 129 of 1970)\n\nAND\n\nCivil Appeal No .. 1140 of 1974 (From the Judgment and order dated the 27th July, 1972 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc. Case No. 365 of 197().)\n\ni-· :\n\n--f' •\n\n• ASSOCIATED CEMENT v. T.C. SHRIVASTAVA (Tulzupurkar, J.) 363-\n\nF.N. Kaka and D.N, Misra for the Appellants in CA. No. 209 .\\ -0f 1973 & Foi;, the Respondent No.2 in CA. l.l40/74.\n\nM.K.' Ramamurt/Jy, Vieet Kumar and Naresh .K. Sharnw, for -the Respondent Nos.2 & 4 in CA.209/73 & for the Appellant in 'CA. No.1!40 of 1974.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was deliercd by\n\nTULZAPURKAR, J. The principal question raised for our <:letermination in these appeals is: Whether on its proper construction -the certified Standing Order 17 providesfor second opportunity being\n\n-given to a workman after conclusion of the inquiry into his mis-· >Conduct and before inflicting on him the punishment of dismissal\n\n.and if so whether the enquiry gets vitiated by not affording.him such -Opportunity?\n\nFacts giving rise to the question may\"be stated. The Associated Cement Co; npanies Limited. (hereinafter called 'the Appellant') has quarries worked by its department called Kymore & Bamangaon Lime-stone Mines at Kymore, District Jabalpur, M.P, Workers employed _in the sa:id quarries have a unio,; called Kymorc Qu1rry\n\nKaramchri Sangh and the four concerned workmen Ram1 Shanker, llarmapradhan, Emmanual arid Mohd. Rauf (hereinafter tailed \"the '.Respondents') were at the material time the office bearers in the\n\n-1.lnion.\n\nIn connection with the implementation of the Recommenda- 1ions of Second Central Wage Board for the cement industry, after -serving a strike notice on the' m1nagement of the Appe)lant on !3th 'Septem'Jer,' l 968, the Kara1hchari Sangh and all its Members went\n\non a strike for 24 hours commencing from.the mid-nig, ht of !9th 'September, 1968 which was accompanied by acts of intimidation, . G 1hreats, ghearoes and unlawful obstruction.\n\nAccording to the management before the commencement of the strike two meetings -were organized by the Respondents, one at 4 P.M. and the other at 11 P.M. on 19th September at which fiery speeches were made by them wherein they not only instigated the quarry workers to resort to strjke. buhnti\\fiiclated and prevented the willing workers from ft ..\n\ngoing to their work and threatened the supervisory staff and officers with 4ire consequences if they tried to work thejquarries and wha1 is more from the mid-night of 19th September till 4.30 A.M. on 20th September the quatry Manager and the supervisory staff were ghearoed and at 4.30 A.M. the Agent's car stopped at the gate and he was unlawfully obstructed from visiting the \"querry premises. Since resorting to a strike without giving 14 days' prior notice as , also the aforesaid acts on the part.'of the Respondents amounted to serious. mis-conduct under the ce\\tified Standing Orders applicable to the quarries th.e Management served Charge-sheets dated 3rd of October, 1968 on t])e Rspondents in which four common charges were level: led against all of them; in addition a fifth charge was. levelled against two of them Emmanual and Mohd. Rauf; and yet another 6th charge Was levelled against Mohd. Rauf. The common charges were (a) themselves going on strike without 14 days' prior notice, (b) , inciting and instigating othe~ workers to go on strike, (c) gheraoing the Quarry' Manager and other supervisorystaff between mid-night and 4.30A~M. on 20th September and inciting others to gherao the said staff and (d)-forcibly , and unauthqrisedly occupying the area near. the quarry can.teen between 4 P.M. on 19th Sept. and l A.M. • .on 20th Sept. and insta.!ling and using loud-speakers for inciting the . workers. Shri Emnianual and Shri Rauf were forth.er charged_, with threatening the gheraoed staff with dire consequences, if they moved ' ' out; and Mohd. Rauf was charged iii addition for having Testrained the Quarry Agent from entring the quarry premises. The respon : dents were called upon to submit their explanlltion . in r.espect of the charges to the General Manager which they did; in their Explana tions they by and large denied the charges levelled against them. A departmental enquiry was held against them by Shri H.S. Mathur during the course of which at one stage the Respond'ents withdrew. from the enquiry on 24th October, 1968 on the plea that the Quarry Agent should be examined first which was not bein.g done, whereafter~ the enquiry proceeded ex-parte and on a consideration of the entire\n\nevidence)d before him the Enquiry Officer came to the conclusion that the first three charges were fully _proved and the fourth charge was partly proved against al!the respondents while the additional charges against Emmanual and Mohd. Rauf were also. proved. The Enquiry Report was forwarded to t)1e Genera\\. Managerl. who after considering the same and after taking into accou.nt the previous service record of the Respondents by his order dated 31st December, 1968 dismissed the Respondents from service. That order was served: on the Respondents on 30th January, 1969 . •\n\n. -\n\n' .\n\nASSOCIATED CEME!<T v, T.C. Sl!R!VASTAVA (Tulzapurkar, J.) 365\n\nA dispute having been raised with regard to their dismissal, by common consent, the same was referred tb the arbitration of Shri T.C. Shrivastava, a retired Judge of M.P. High Court, under sec. 1@cA of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 on 14th 'April, 1%9. The . .\n\nArbitrator gave his Award on 9th February, 1970 whereby he came to the conclusion that the enquiry which was otherwise fair and valid was viti_ated because no second o\"pportunity was given to _the Respondentsof showing cause against the proposed punishment before the issuance of their dismissal order as required by the Standing Order ·\n\nNo.17; he further held that though before him che Management had by leading evidence proved their mis-conduct by establishing the first three charges against all, the fiiftli charge against Emmanual and Mohd. Rauf (fourth charge be'ing held not to have been proved) the punishment of dismissal in respect of Emmariual and Mohd. Rauf , could be confirmed but set aside t!ie .dismissal in respect of Rama Shanker and Barmapradhan n the ground that while fomenting the strike the conduct of Emmanual and Mohd. Rauf was graver than that of Rama Shanker and Barmapradhan and instead ordered their reinstatement but without back wages. The Appllant challe11ged\n\nthe Award in the High Court by means of\" a Writ Petition (Misc.\n\nPetition No. 129 of 1970) contending that the Arbitrator had misconstrued Standing Order No. 17 and that no second opportunity was required to be given to the Respondents and that in the alternative . the interference with the punishment of dismissal in respect of Rama\n\nSha11ker and Barmapradhan was erroneous while another writ petition (Misc. Petition No.365 of 1970) was filed by the Respondents against the punishments that were awarded to each one of them- The High Court by its judgment dated 27th July, 1972 confirmed the Award of the Arbltra(or by dismissing both the writ petitions.\n\nThe Appellant.has come up irt appeal' (beiug Civjl Appeal No .. 209/73) by special leave challenging the interference with the dismissal of Rama.Shanker and Burma Pradhan while the Respondents have preferred their appeal (being Civil Appeal No. i 140 of 1974) on a Certificate granted by the \"High Court challenging the punishments operating against each one of them. At this stage itJ may be stated that as regards Emmanual and Mohd. Rauf the maiter has been compromised between the-parties which has already ibeen recorded' by this Court with the result that Civil Appeal No.11<\\0 of 1974 in so far as their dismissal is concerned no longer survives and the same needs to be dealt with by us only as regards back wages that have be.en denied to Rama Shanker and Burmapradhan.\n\n4C' •\n\nWPRIME COURT REPORTS [1984] 3 s.c.R.\n\nIn support of civil Appeal N:o. 201} of J973 Counsel for the Appellant raised three contentions before us. In the first place, he contended that the learned Arbitrator as well as the High Court ha.ve erroneously construea the certified.Standing Order No. '17 as requiring a second opportunity being given to a workman at the conclusion of the enquiry into his mis-conduct and before inflicting. upon him th~ punishment of dismissal ; he urgecP\"that the <?oncept . of second opportunity being given to a delinquent which obtained under sec. 240(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935. or Art. 311 of the Constitution prior to the insertion of the Proviso to Article 311 (2) could not be invoked or applied to the instant cas.c nor wa$ such second opportunity any requirement of the ordinary Jaw .of the 'land or of Industrial law and in this. behalf reliance was placed on two decisions 'Of this Court in fla; ndard DJwakhanal') case and in Saharnpw Light Rly, l') case. Counsel u'rged tha! on proper construe-• tionof the Standing Order it should have been held that no second opportunity was contemplated thereunder a!ld therefore the finding that the enqniry was vitiated deserved to be set aside and according to him , if the enquiry was valid and was not \\•itiated the punishment of dismissal imposed on Rama Sl)anker and Barmapradhan could not be interfered with. In. the alternative coi.msel contended that assuming that the enquiry was vitiated for the reason mentioned by t.he Arbit.rator even than once serious mis-conduct was proved by leading evidence before the learned Arbitrator it was not open to him to' interfere with the punishment of dismissal unless the punish men! was so harsh as to smack of victimisation. In the further alternative counsel contended that assuming that-the Arbittator had power to interfere with the punish.men! in the.insta.nt case having to the facts and .. circumstances he was not justified in setting aside the dismissal of Rama Shanker and Bafmapradhan especially on the grou!'d on which he diq so namely, that the conduct of Sh.ri Emmanual and Mohd. Rauf was more grave tf1an that of. Rama Shanker and Barmapradhan while fomenting the strike ; counsel urged that passively taking part in the strike was distinguishable from the more serious miS-conduct. of fomenting or inciting the strike and all the .retpondents wer; found guilty by the learned Arbitrator of such\n\ns, erious mis-conduct and as snch .no distinction on the distinction on the basis indicated between the two sets of workmen should . have been made in. the matter of punishment, On the other hand coun- . t\n\n(I) [t96l 2 LLJ. 772. (2) [1969] 2 LW. i34.\n\n• ASSOCIATED CEMENT v. T.C. SHRIVA5TAVA (Tulzapurkar, !.) 367\n\nset for the Respon.denis urged that Standing Order No. 17 had been\n\nproperly construed by tlie Arbitrator and the High Court and that construction should be upheld and in any case if twoconstructions were reasonably possible no interference by this Court was called for and counsel in thlt behalf relied upon the decision Agnanl (W.M.) v. B2dri JJas and Ors.(1! Counsel further urged that once the enquiry got vitiated the entire field of determining the mis-conduct\n\na~ also the' purnshment th.erefor became. open and the Arbitrator had jurisdiction and power to consider both the <ispects and1 that the Arbitrator in the facts, and circumstances of the case had justifiably interfered with the dismissal of Rama Shanker and\n\nBarmapnrtlhan and had directed their reinstatement.\n\nFrom the rival contentions summarised above it will appear clear that the real question that arises in these-appeals is, does the certified Standing Order , No. 17 provide forsecond opporlOJnity being given to a workman to show cause agaiost the proposed punish ment of dismissal, for, it was not disputed before us that if no such second opportunity is contemplated by it then the only ground on which the inquiry has been held to be invalid by the learned Arbitrator and the High Court would disappear and the Arbitrator could not have entered into merits of the case or interfered with the punishment of dismissal inflictd upon Ramashanker and Barmapradhan. The question obviously depends upon the proper construction to be placed on said S.0. 17.\n\nIt may be stated that the certified S.0.16 enlists several acts or omissions that constitute 'mis-conduct' and striking work either singly or with other workers witfiput giving 14 days previ?us noiice, inciting whilst on the premises and. worker to strike work and indulging in a Gherao, which would amount to an 'act subversive of discipline or efficiency' are obviously included therein. S.0.17 which deals with punishments and procedure therefor runs thus : .\n\n\"17. A worker may be suspended for a period not exceeding 4 days or fined in accordance wfrh the Payment of Wages Act or dismissed without notice or any compensation in lieq of notice it found guilty of misconduct defined in Standing Order No. 16.\n\n(!) '[1963] 1 LLJ. 684. •\n\nlB .\n\n.. .\n\nAli Orders of suspensfon and fines shall be in writing setting out the misconduct for which the punishment is award-· ed. No officer below the rank of the Head of Oepartment shall award the above punishinent.\n\nAll dismissal order shall be passed by the Manager or Acti1ig Manager who shall do so after g;~; ng ac<; used an opportunity to qfferany explanation. Due consideration to the. gravity of the misconduct and the previous record of the worker shall be. given in awarding the maximum punishment.\n\nIn the event of a discharge of dismissal, the worker shall be paid off. within the second working day following the discharge or dismissal.\"\n\nTh,.ciuestion is whether when paragraph 3 0f the S.O. says : \"all dismissal , orders shall be passed by the Manager or. Acting Manager who shall do so after giving the accused ah opportunity to offer any explanation\", it contemplates giving of a second opportunity to the delinquent to show cause against the proposed punishment of dismissal after he has been found guilty or.the opportunity spoken of is the opportunity to meet the charges in the domestic inquiry?\n\nAt the outset the legel position a-s has been clarified by this Court in the Sa!!aranppr Light Railway Co.'s case (supra) may be stated: In the context of certain modification sought .to be introduced in a.Standing Qrder requiring a second show couse notice this Court .has observed thus :\n\n\"As regards the modification requiring a second show cause notiCe, neither he ordinary law of the land nor !ht industrial Jaw requires an employer to give such a notice. In none of.the decisions given by the Courts or the Tribunals such a second show cause notice in the oose of removal has ever been demand or considered necessary. The only class of cases where such a notice has been held to be necessary are those arising under Art.3ll.\n\nEven that has now been removed by the recent <1mendment of that. Article. To import such a retirement f(om Art. 311 in industrial matters does qot\n\nappear to_be either necessary. or poper and would be equating industrial employees with civil servants. In our view, there is no justification -0r any principle for such_ equation.\n\nA.SSOCIATED cs>tmff v. T.C. SHRIVASTAVA (Tulzaplirkar, J.)' 369\n\nBesides, such a requirement would unnecessarily prolong A. disciplinary enquiries which in the interest of industrial peace should be disposed of in short time as possible.\n\nIn our view it is not possible to consider this modification as justifiable either on the grouhd of reasonableness of fairness and should therefore be _set aside.\"\n\nIt is thus clear neither under the ordinnry law of the land nor under industrial law a second opportunity to show cause against the proposed punishment is necessary. This, of course, does not mean that a Standing .Order may not provide for it but unless the Stand- . jng Order provides for it either expressly or by necessary implication .no inquiry which is otherwise fair an!! valid will be vitiated by nop- . .affording of such second opportunity. The question is whether para\n\n3 of the Standing Order No. 17 provides for such second opportunity being\" given to the delinquent ? The relevant words are \"all dismissal order shall be passed by the Manager·······a/M giving the accused an opportunity to offer any explanation\". The underlined words are wholly inappropriate to convey the idea of a second hear- . ing on opporiunity on the question of punishment but appropriate in the context of seeking an explanation in regard to the alleged misconduct charged against him. An 'explanation' is to be c\"alled from the 'accused' which suggests that, the same is to be called for prior to the recording of finding that the delinquent is guilty of misconduct : it is the alleged misconduct that is to be e)Cplained by\n\nB ,\n\nhim and not the proposed punishment. On a plain reading of the relevant words no second opportunity of showing cause against the' propose.d punishment is contemplated ither expressly or by necessary implication. In other words, it is clear clear to us that the opportunity\" spoken of by\" para 3 of S.0.17 is the opportunity to be given . F to the delinquent to meet the charge framed against him .• In this connection it will be pertinent to mention that the concerned S.O.\n\nwas framed and came into force on March. I, 1946 and was duly certified on October 16, 1954 under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 i.e. prior to the enunciation of the law by Courts regarding the observance of the principles of natural justice such as issuance of a charge-sheet, holding 0f an inquiry., opportunity to lead evidence, etc. and it is well-known that after the enunciaiio1i of these principles model standing orders have been framed to provide for the detailed steps required to be undertaken ·\n\nduring .!\\. domestic inquiry. Since the instant Standing Order was certified prior to the formulation of the above principles it merely\n\n{ E\n\ncontains a bald provision for 'giving the accused an opportunity t<> offer any exjllanation'. In other words, different stages in domestic; inquiry were never in the contemplation of the framersof the S.O. That being the pqsition it would be di!Iicult to attribute any intention to the framers thereof to provide for a second opportunity being given to the delinquent of showing cause against the proposed. punishment. The latter part . of para 3 merely casts a unilateral obligation on concerned authority or the officer , to give due consideration to the gravitiof the misconduct and the previous record of . t.he delinquent in awarding the maximum pu.nishment.\n\nIt is true that the Arbitrator. has undoubtedly taken the view that the opportunity spoken qi by para 3 does not refer to theopportunit~ to meet the charges but refers to the further opportunity being. given to the dJ.'linquent to show cause against the graver punishment of dismisal that may be proposed to be inflicted on . him. But for. reaching such a conclusion he has reso.rted to sorne; . involved reasoning which 'is not warranted by the Standing Order if\n\nread as a whole. According to him in the earlier paragraph which speaks of awarding lighter punishment there is no reference to any opportunity being given to meet the charges but no punishment-not even lighter punishment-can be inflicted without inquiry being held according to the principles of natural justice and if such an inquiry\n\n1s implicit in cases of lighter punishments it would be so in cases of graver. punishmnt like dismissal and since specific mention of opportunity is made in cases of graver ppnishment in the relevant sentence of para 3 jt n1ust have a meaning and the words cannot be, considered a surpulsage, and, therefore, the opportunity mentioned in the relevant sentence of para 3 refers to the second opportunity being given to tile\n\ndelinquent at the stage of inflicting the punishment 6f ?ismissal. The Hiih Court has confirmed the view of the basis that the first part of the Standing Order deals with several punishments and requires finding of guilt in respect of each one of them and_ this pro.cedure is, therefore, different from that which has been contemplated iri the last part of the Standing. Orde~ and that last. part dtals only with: the punishment of dismissal arid for that punishment alone makes a special prbvision that no orde.r awarding that J:\\llnishment wilJbepassed unless the Manager gives n opportunity to a workman t<> offer his explanation. In our opinion, the.viewof the. Arbitrator as.\n\nalso the view of the High Couri proceed on an assumption that the Standing Order No, 17.deals with two different stages concerning qisciplinery proceedings' against a delinquent, first holding of a\n\n. '\n\nASSOCIATED CEMc>'-:T v. T.C. SHRIVASTAYA (Tulzapurkar, J.) ': 371\n\ndepartmntal inquiry into the charges where principles cif natural A justice must be implied and second the infliction of graver punishment\n\nbeforJ awarding whicb opportunity to show cause has been provid\n\nci for ; but the p1ain reding of the Standing Order read as a whole does not warrant any such assumption and, therefore, we do not feel that the construction placed on Standing Qrder No. 17 by .the Arbitrator or the High Court is possible inuch less reasonably\n\npossibl~. The ratio of tis tourt's decision in Agnani ( W. M.) v.\n\nBadri Das & Ors. (supra) is, therefore, not attracted. _\n\nIn view of the construction which w~ are-placing on S.O. No. 17, it Wjll be clear that th\"o only'8fOUOd On which inquiry 'was held to be invalid by the Arbitrato.r and by the High Court must dis~ . appear. Admittedly, opp)rtunity to.\" offe~ explanation i~ regard to the alleged miscdnduct..vas not only afforded\"but was availed. of by\n\nthe con:erned four workers (including !lam1 Shankar and Burma) Pradhan) by submitting thei.r written explanations to the Manager wher.eafter t~ departmental inquiry was held by H.S, Mathur. In . I> other. words S.O. 17 w.is fully complied with and what is more the Arbitrator has held that the inquiry was otherwise fair and valid.\n\nThe solitary grou;1d on which the inquiry was held to be invalid having disappeared it must follow that the Arbitrator had no Jurisdiction to enter into the merits of the case or interfere with the punishment of dismissal inflicted upon Rama Shankar and Burma . Pradhan. That part of the Arbitrator's award which has been\n\nconfirmed by.the High Court is, therefore, set aside. The alter-·. native contentioas raised by counsel for the Management in these appeals do not survive.\n\nC.A. No.' 209 of 1973 (filed by the Management) is allowed and C.A; No. 1140 of. 1974 (filed by the two workmen Rama Sha:nkar and, -BLlrma pradhan) is dismissed.\n\nThere will he no order as to costs.\n\nH.S.K.\n\nC.A. 209/72 allowed and CA.· JJ40/l4 dismissed .", "total_entities": 66, "entities": [{"text": "ASSOCIATED CEMENT COMPANIES LTD. E.TC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 37, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "ASSOCIATED CEMENT COMPANIES LTD. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "T.C. SHRIVASTAVA & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 40, "end_char": 62, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "T.C. SHRIVASTAVA & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "March 29, 1984", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 65, "end_char": 79, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "March 29, 1984 B\n\n[V.D. TULZAPURkAR AND R.S.' PATHAK, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "V.D. TULZAPURkAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 84, "end_char": 100, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.D. TULZAPURKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R.S.' PATHAK, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 105, "end_char": 122, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. PATHAK", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "OA of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1056, "end_char": 1094, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Tulzupurkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6114, "end_char": 6125, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "i-· :\nf' •\n\n• ASSOCIATED CEMENT v. T.C. SHRIVASTAVA (Tulzupurkar, J.) 363-\n\nF.N. Kaka and D.N, Misra for the Appellants in CA.", "canonical_name": "Tulzaplirkar"}}, {"text": "F.N. Kaka", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6137, "end_char": 6146, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "i-· :\nf' •\n\n• ASSOCIATED CEMENT v. T.C. SHRIVASTAVA (Tulzupurkar, J.) 363-\n\nF.N. Kaka and D.N, Misra for the Appellants in CA."}}, {"text": "D.N, Misra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6151, "end_char": 6161, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "i-· :\nf' •\n\n• ASSOCIATED CEMENT v. T.C. SHRIVASTAVA (Tulzupurkar, J.) 363-\n\nF.N. Kaka and D.N, Misra for the Appellants in CA."}}, {"text": "M.K.' Ramamurt", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6254, "end_char": 6268, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M.K.' Ramamurt/Jy, Vieet Kumar and Naresh .K. Sharnw, for -the Respondent Nos.2 & 4 in CA.209/73 & for the Appellant in 'CA."}}, {"text": "Vieet Kumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6273, "end_char": 6284, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M.K.' Ramamurt/Jy, Vieet Kumar and Naresh .K. Sharnw, for -the Respondent Nos.2 & 4 in CA.209/73 & for the Appellant in 'CA."}}, {"text": "Naresh .K. Sharnw", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6289, "end_char": 6306, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M.K.' Ramamurt/Jy, Vieet Kumar and Naresh .K. Sharnw, for -the Respondent Nos.2 & 4 in CA.209/73 & for the Appellant in 'CA."}}, {"text": "TULZAPURKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6440, "end_char": 6451, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was deliercd by\n\nTULZAPURKAR, J. The principal question raised for our <:letermination in these appeals is: Whether on its proper construction -the certified Standing Order 17 providesfor second opportunity being\ngiven to a workman after conclusion of the inquiry into his mis-· >Conduct and before inflicting on him the punishment of dismissal\n\n.and if so whether the enquiry gets vitiated by not affording.him such -Opportunity?", "canonical_name": "Tulzaplirkar"}}, {"text": "Kymore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7031, "end_char": 7037, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "hereinafter called 'the Appellant') has quarries worked by its department called Kymore & Bamangaon Lime-stone Mines at Kymore, District Jabalpur, M.P, Workers employed _in the sa:id quarries have a unio,; called Kymorc Qu1rry\n\nKaramchri Sangh and the four concerned workmen Ram1 Shanker, llarmapradhan, Emmanual arid Mohd."}}, {"text": "Jabalpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7087, "end_char": 7095, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "hereinafter called 'the Appellant') has quarries worked by its department called Kymore & Bamangaon Lime-stone Mines at Kymore, District Jabalpur, M.P, Workers employed _in the sa:id quarries have a unio,; called Kymorc Qu1rry\n\nKaramchri Sangh and the four concerned workmen Ram1 Shanker, llarmapradhan, Emmanual arid Mohd."}}, {"text": "Ram1 Shanker", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 7225, "end_char": 7237, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "hereinafter called 'the Appellant') has quarries worked by its department called Kymore & Bamangaon Lime-stone Mines at Kymore, District Jabalpur, M.P, Workers employed _in the sa:id quarries have a unio,; called Kymorc Qu1rry\n\nKaramchri Sangh and the four concerned workmen Ram1 Shanker, llarmapradhan, Emmanual arid Mohd."}}, {"text": "llarmapradhan", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 7239, "end_char": 7252, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "hereinafter called 'the Appellant') has quarries worked by its department called Kymore & Bamangaon Lime-stone Mines at Kymore, District Jabalpur, M.P, Workers employed _in the sa:id quarries have a unio,; called Kymorc Qu1rry\n\nKaramchri Sangh and the four concerned workmen Ram1 Shanker, llarmapradhan, Emmanual arid Mohd."}}, {"text": "Emmanual arid Mohd. Rauf", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7254, "end_char": 7278, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "hereinafter called 'the Appellant') has quarries worked by its department called Kymore & Bamangaon Lime-stone Mines at Kymore, District Jabalpur, M.P, Workers employed _in the sa:id quarries have a unio,; called Kymorc Qu1rry\n\nKaramchri Sangh and the four concerned workmen Ram1 Shanker, llarmapradhan, Emmanual arid Mohd."}}, {"text": "of October, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8838, "end_char": 8854, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "mis-conduct under the ce\\tified Standing Orders applicable to the quarries th.e Management served Charge-sheets dated 3rd of October, 1968 on t])e Rspondents in which four common charges were level: led against all of them; in addition a fifth charge was."}}, {"text": "Emmanual", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 9001, "end_char": 9009, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "levelled against two of them Emmanual and Mohd."}}, {"text": "Mohd. Rauf", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9014, "end_char": 9024, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "levelled against two of them Emmanual and Mohd."}}, {"text": "Emnianual", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9602, "end_char": 9611, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Emnianual and Shri Rauf were forth.er charged_, with threatening the gheraoed staff with dire consequences, if they moved ' ' out; and Mohd."}}, {"text": "Rauf", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9621, "end_char": 9625, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Emnianual and Shri Rauf were forth.er charged_, with threatening the gheraoed staff with dire consequences, if they moved ' ' out; and Mohd."}}, {"text": "H.S. Mathur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10115, "end_char": 10126, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A departmental enquiry was held against them by Shri H.S. Mathur during the course of which at one stage the Respond'ents withdrew."}}, {"text": "24th October, 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10214, "end_char": 10232, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "from the enquiry on 24th October, 1968 on the plea that the Quarry Agent should be examined first which was not bein.g done, whereafter~ the enquiry proceeded ex-parte and on a consideration of the entire\n\nevidence)d before him the Enquiry Officer came to the conclusion that the first three charges were fully _proved and the fourth charge was partly proved against al!the respondents while the additional charges against Emmanual and Mohd."}}, {"text": "Emmanual", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10617, "end_char": 10625, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "from the enquiry on 24th October, 1968 on the plea that the Quarry Agent should be examined first which was not bein.g done, whereafter~ the enquiry proceeded ex-parte and on a consideration of the entire\n\nevidence)d before him the Enquiry Officer came to the conclusion that the first three charges were fully _proved and the fourth charge was partly proved against al!the respondents while the additional charges against Emmanual and Mohd.", "canonical_name": "Emmariual"}}, {"text": "Tulzapurkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11028, "end_char": 11039, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ASSOCIATED CEME!<T v, T.C. Sl!R!VASTAVA (Tulzapurkar, J.) 365\n\nA dispute having been raised with regard to their dismissal, by common consent, the same was referred tb the arbitration of Shri T.C. Shrivastava, a retired Judge of M.P. High Court, under sec.", "canonical_name": "Tulzaplirkar"}}, {"text": "T.C. Shrivastava", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11179, "end_char": 11195, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ASSOCIATED CEME!<T v, T.C. Sl!R!VASTAVA (Tulzapurkar, J.) 365\n\nA dispute having been raised with regard to their dismissal, by common consent, the same was referred tb the arbitration of Shri T.C. Shrivastava, a retired Judge of M.P. High Court, under sec.", "canonical_name": "T.C. SHRIVASTAVA & ORS"}}, {"text": "M.P. High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 11216, "end_char": 11231, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ASSOCIATED CEME!<T v, T.C. Sl!R!VASTAVA (Tulzapurkar, J.) 365\n\nA dispute having been raised with regard to their dismissal, by common consent, the same was referred tb the arbitration of Shri T.C. Shrivastava, a retired Judge of M.P. High Court, under sec."}}, {"text": "sec. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11239, "end_char": 11245, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Industrial Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11256, "end_char": 11285, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "9th February, 1970", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11345, "end_char": 11363, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Arbitrator gave his Award on 9th February, 1970 whereby he came to the conclusion that the enquiry which was otherwise fair and valid was vitiated because no second o\"pportunity was given to the Respondentsof showing cause against the proposed punishment before the issuance of their dismissal order as required by the Standing Order ·\n\nNo.17; he further held that though before him che Management had by leading evidence proved their mis-conduct by establishing the first three charges against all, the fiiftli charge against Emmanual and Mohd."}}, {"text": "Emmariual", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11963, "end_char": 11972, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rauf (fourth charge be'ing held not to have been proved) the punishment of dismissal in respect of Emmariual and Mohd.", "canonical_name": "Emmariual"}}, {"text": "Rama Shanker", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12053, "end_char": 12065, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rauf , could be confirmed but set aside t!ie .dismissal in respect of Rama Shanker and Barmapradhan n the ground that while fomenting the strike the conduct of Emmanual and Mohd.", "canonical_name": "Rama\n\nSha11ker"}}, {"text": "Barmapradhan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12070, "end_char": 12082, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rauf , could be confirmed but set aside t!ie .dismissal in respect of Rama Shanker and Barmapradhan n the ground that while fomenting the strike the conduct of Emmanual and Mohd.", "canonical_name": "Barmapradhan"}}, {"text": "Rama\n\nSha11ker", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12641, "end_char": 12655, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the interference with the punishment of dismissal in respect of Rama\n\nSha11ker and Barmapradhan was erroneous while another writ petition (Misc.", "canonical_name": "Rama\n\nSha11ker"}}, {"text": "27th July, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12876, "end_char": 12891, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Petition No.365 of 1970) was filed by the Respondents against the punishments that were awarded to each one of them- The High Court by its judgment dated 27th July, 1972 confirmed the Award of the Arbltra(or by dismissing both the writ petitions."}}, {"text": "Rama.Shanker", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13110, "end_char": 13122, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Appellant.has come up irt appeal' (beiug Civjl Appeal No .. 209/73) by special leave challenging the interference with the dismissal of Rama.", "canonical_name": "Rama\n\nSha11ker"}}, {"text": "Burma Pradhan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13127, "end_char": 13140, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shanker and Burma Pradhan while the Respondents have preferred their appeal (being Civil Appeal No.", "canonical_name": "Burma Pradhan"}}, {"text": "Burmapradhan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13734, "end_char": 13746, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rauf the maiter has been compromised between the-parties which has already ibeen recorded' by this Court with the result that Civil Appeal No.11<\\0 of 1974 in so far as their dismissal is concerned no longer survives and the same needs to be dealt with by us only as regards back wages that have be.en denied to Rama Shanker and Burmapradhan.", "canonical_name": "Burma Pradhan"}}, {"text": "sec. 240(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14329, "end_char": 14340, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14348, "end_char": 14377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14382, "end_char": 14390, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Article 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14452, "end_char": 14463, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "ndard DJwakhanal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14704, "end_char": 14720, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "behalf reliance was placed on two decisions 'Of this Court in fla; ndard DJwakhanal') case and in Saharnpw Light Rly, l') case."}}, {"text": "Saharnpw Light Rly", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14735, "end_char": 14753, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "behalf reliance was placed on two decisions 'Of this Court in fla; ndard DJwakhanal') case and in Saharnpw Light Rly, l') case."}}, {"text": "Rama Sl)anker", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15103, "end_char": 15116, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on proper construe-• tionof the Standing Order it should have been held that no second opportunity was contemplated thereunder a!ld therefore the finding that the enqniry was vitiated deserved to be set aside and according to him , if the enquiry was valid and was not \\•itiated the punishment of dismissal imposed on Rama Sl)anker and Barmapradhan could not be interfered with.", "canonical_name": "Rama\n\nSha11ker"}}, {"text": "Bafmapradhan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15781, "end_char": 15793, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in the.insta.nt case having to the facts and .. circumstances he was not justified in setting aside the dismissal of Rama Shanker and Bafmapradhan especially on the grou!'d on which he diq so namely, that the conduct of Sh.ri Emmanual and Mohd.", "canonical_name": "Barmapradhan"}}, {"text": "Barmapnrtlhan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17252, "end_char": 17265, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "open and the Arbitrator had jurisdiction and power to consider both the <ispects and1 that the Arbitrator in the facts, and circumstances of the case had justifiably interfered with the dismissal of Rama Shanker and\n\nBarmapnrtlhan and had directed their reinstatement."}}, {"text": "Ramashanker", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17936, "end_char": 17947, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "17 provide forsecond opporlOJnity being given to a workman to show cause agaiost the proposed punish ment of dismissal, for, it was not disputed before us that if no such second opportunity is contemplated by it then the only ground on which the inquiry has been held to be invalid by the learned Arbitrator and the High Court would disappear and the Arbitrator could not have entered into merits of the case or interfered with the punishment of dismissal inflictd upon Ramashanker and Barmapradhan.", "canonical_name": "Rama\n\nSha11ker"}}, {"text": "S.0", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18047, "end_char": 18050, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S.0", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18093, "end_char": 18096, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S.0", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18447, "end_char": 18450, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Payment of Wages Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18618, "end_char": 18638, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "All dismissal order shall be passed by the Manager or Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19019, "end_char": 19076, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sa!!aranppr Light Railway Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19998, "end_char": 20027, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the outset the legel position a-s has been clarified by this Court in the Sa!!aranppr Light Railway Co.'s case (supra) may be stated: In the context of certain modification sought .to be introduced in a.Standing Qrder requiring a second show couse notice this Court .has observed thus :\n\n\"As regards the modification requiring a second show cause notiCe, neither he ordinary law of the land nor !"}}, {"text": "Art.3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20643, "end_char": 20648, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20760, "end_char": 20768, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Tulzaplirkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21024, "end_char": 21036, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A.SSOCIATED cs>tmff v. T.C. SHRIVASTAVA (Tulzaplirkar, J.)' 369\n\nBesides, such a requirement would unnecessarily prolong A. disciplinary enquiries which in the interest of industrial peace should be disposed of in short time as possible.", "canonical_name": "Tulzaplirkar"}}, {"text": "S.0", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22907, "end_char": 22910, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "October 16, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23159, "end_char": 23175, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I, 1946 and was duly certified on October 16, 1954 under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 i.e. prior to the enunciation of the law by Courts regarding the observance of the principles of natural justice such as issuance of a charge-sheet, holding 0f an inquiry.,"}}, {"text": "Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23186, "end_char": 23235, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Shankar", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 27573, "end_char": 27580, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lam1 Shankar and Burma) Pradhan) by submitting thei.r written explanations to the Manager wher.eafter t~ departmental inquiry was held by H.S, Mathur."}}, {"text": "Rama Shankar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28099, "end_char": 28111, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The solitary grou;1d on which the inquiry was held to be invalid having disappeared it must follow that the Arbitrator had no Jurisdiction to enter into the merits of the case or interfere with the punishment of dismissal inflicted upon Rama Shankar and Burma .", "canonical_name": "Rama\n\nSha11ker"}}, {"text": "Burma", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 28116, "end_char": 28121, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The solitary grou;1d on which the inquiry was held to be invalid having disappeared it must follow that the Arbitrator had no Jurisdiction to enter into the merits of the case or interfere with the punishment of dismissal inflicted upon Rama Shankar and Burma ."}}, {"text": "Rama Sha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28454, "end_char": 28462, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1974 (filed by the two workmen Rama Sha:nkar and, -BLlrma pradhan) is dismissed.", "canonical_name": "Rama\n\nSha11ker"}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_3_372_382_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "( .·. n\n\nSlkh Gurdwaras .Act; 1925 Section 16~2)(iii)-Gurdwara-Tests /ordetermina.' If on of -, Tv be s.hown irititution established /or use by Sikhs for pu/)lic\\lorship. ·\n\nSikhs and Udasis-Di$/incdcms-What are.\n\n. •·\n\n' .\n\n~ .\n\nA'group of persons .reiding. in .a village and profssing the Sikb r~Jigion made an application to t11e State Government requesting the Government -to declare the religious and ..charitabla institution described in the appliCation at a Sikh Gurdwara. . This application was puNishe~ in the Officiai Gazeue and res poodent No._l filed objections under section 8 of 1he Sikh Gurdwars Act, 19is eontendil1g that the institution was not Sikh Gurdwara and tha1 he was eiuit1 ed to raise the said con'teritiorrbeca!Jse be was the hold.!r of'the hereditary ffice\n\nf mahant of the insit~1ion. . '\n\nThe application was forwarded by the State Gvernment undr ··ectio~ t4 to the' Sikh.Gurdwara Tribunal which held tJ:tat th! respondent as the beredi ta-ry holder of the office of mahant of the institution and that the institution w~ ~-~ a Sikh Gurdwara ang was governed by the_ Act. ·\n\n. The respo,1dent, thereupon flied an a.ppeal. in the High Curt which\\etd' _that the institution 's set upby a mahant for commemorat.ing the memory of\n\nhiS Guru and that the land o~ wbic; h the institution was set upwhh the grt of Muafi had been donated by. a .Muslim ruler. After considering of [be\n\netries . in the land records; the High Court fur'thr he!<\\ that institution was not only sering as a Gu(d\\ara for the worship of Granth Saheb but was also us~ as a Dera or lodging house or Sadhus 'or Faqirs 'of the Udasi Sect and 'that .4.. . there was a duality of fait he;. in the institution; The High Court conciuded lhac - the institution was catering to .th~ religious fews and beliefs of both the sects m.ongst the local pop, ulali.on and that the .. Tribunal was n error in declaring~ that the institution was a: ... Stkb Gudrara, wh1ch woufd permit one of the com. •\n\n'• '\n\nmunities to approtiate the institutioo to its exclllsive use and to cleprive the other community or sect frorn the dual use to which the institution has been put evet since ft wa'\\ founded or estabtished. Th:: High ourt, coJ_lsequently aUowed the appeal and set aside the cia ration made. by l)e Tribuna 1.\n\n Dismising the further. appeals this Court , - '\n\n' ... ,., . . . .\n\n ..\n\n\\ . .\n\nS.G.P.C. v. MAllAl'lT KIR.PAR.AM .. • .. . . - 373 • HJ;!LD : 1. The appraisal of the evidence by the High Court is correct and .\n\nnexcetional~ 'fhe evidnce discloses .that the insdtution in question was not $hown to hve been c:.stablished for' use by Sikhs for the purpose of public\n\nwonip• and therefore one of the material conditions for attracting section;\n\nJ6{2, till) of the Sikh Gurdwara Act, 1925 was not established. It is immaterial\n\nthat at .the time of. presentation oftbe petttion 1t was along with tli.e followers .\n\n<Jf Uasi.Sect used foi. worship of Granth .Sahi~ by the. Sikhs. (3.82EFJ .·\n\n2. In orper .to bring a case under .section 16(2}(iii) of the Act it must not ·.only be established .that the institution was established by Sikhs-for the purpose -of public worship but was used for such worship by Sikhs before and at the time\n\n<>f the presentation .of the petition. 1he. ue of the corijunciive •and' 'clearly .imparts that in order to attract Secton l6(i)(iii) both the conditions must be . • cumulatively satisfied. [380A-.B] ·\n\nGurmukh Singh v. Risaldar Dtva Singh &: Ors .• AIR 1937 Lahore S77, .ajlowed, '\n\n3. Udasis form an independent sect ·: They do venerate Sikh Scrip'ture!l. 'Therefore, in an institution of Udasis sect, one can visualise reading of Granth Sahib or veneration of Sikh scriptures. Tbat itseff is ot decisive oft he character -<>f tb'e fnstitution. If the succession . was from . Guru to Chela and those Gdrus were f.Uowets of Udasi faith and the institution. was known as Dera of Udasi Bhekh 'and they followd some of the practices of Hindu traditional religion 'that would be completely destru:tive of the character of the institution as Sikh . . ) .Ourdwara. f381E-FJ\n\nMahant Daram Dass tic. v. The Siate of Punjtlb & Drs.\n\n[19~~] 3 SCR 160 .Hem Singh & Ors. v. Basapt Das aud.Anr., Al~ 1936 PC 93 at IOO.and Pritam l I.Da1s Mahant v: Shiromani Gurdwara Prabha, dak Comm(ttu, C.A. No. 1983 of\n\n'1970 dated 16.2.84 referred to. • . ·\n\nIn the instant case, there is no evidence to show that 'the institution was ·(!Stablished for use by Sikhs for the pmpose of public worship. Though the\n\n-totitution may be established by anyone may be a Sikh or follower of any other ·faith, 'but it mu.st established for use by Sikhs for the purp.ose of public wor-\n\n.. ship. \"{'he original' grantor was a Musllm ruler put there is . nothing to show that when Gulab .Das Faqir of Udasi Sect .estl'blished the instituton, be did it\n\n~ 'for use bY Sikhs for the purpose of public \\VOrship. Later on as the majority of\n\n..the population of the village were followers of Sikh religion -and as Udasis also , venerate Granth Sahib, reading of Granth Sahib may have commenced and •(herefore, generally speaking people may describe, and . revenue record may -show it to be' Gurdwara, btit that would neithr be decisive of the character of\n\nth~ institution nor sufficient to bring the institution•within Section 16(2)(iii) ·-'t)f the Act. [3SODF]\n\n• ClVlL APPELLATE .JU.RI.SDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 1685-16S& • n97I .,. •\n\nAppeals by Specialleav~ from the Judgment and.On1er dated\n\n~.1..1971 & .t4.Jl.l969 cf th• Punjab and' Haryana Hiah Courj\n\nI .If\n\nt .•..\n\n... =-···\n\n~/-, ... :\n\n- • ih S.C. Appei- No. 96oi 1970 & First Appeal No. 59 of 1964 ..\n\n-IJ •\n\n-. ' .. . . . ..\n\n. ., . ' Harbans La/, Urmi/a Kapoor, Kamini Jaiswal, Nishi Puri,..\n\nShahsi Ktran and Thal Singh Mmigal for' the Rspondents.\n\n - The Jtidginent of the Curt Wits dlivered by\n\nDESAI, J, Whether a. religious and/or charita-ble institution~ situated invillage Malial Khurd~- Tehsil armila 0f Sangtur District.\n\nis a sikh.· duf(fwaia wii~1n the meaning of the expression in the Sikh Gurdwaras Act, 1925 ('Act' for short) is the subject matter_ o1\n\ncBtitroversy between .the parties in this app!al by speciaiierve. . - About 56 persons residing in village Mahal Khurd and profess-ing Sikh religion made an: application to the G<)vermnent of Punjab -on December 23, 1960 requestip.g the GJvernment lo declare the institution more particularly described in the application as a. Sikh Gurdwara .. This aJ?plication_ was publi3hed jn.the Official Gazette-: \\vhereupon Mahant Kirpa Ram, respondenJ No: 1. ('respondent' for short) flied <?bjections unde_r Sec._ 8 of tpe Act contending_ tha~. the institution was not a Sikh Gurdwara a-nd 1hat he was entitled te>\n\nraise tliat confentidn because he -was the holder of hereditary . office of mahant of the. institution ..\n\n' The• application was forwarded under Sec. 14 to the Sikll- Gurdwata Tribunal st up undet the Act. Upon rival contentions.\n\nthe Tribunal framed two issues asunder:\n\ni' . ,· ~'1. Is the petitioner a herditary office holder of the. Gurdwara?\n\n- 2 .. Is the Gurdwara in dispute a Sikh. Gurdwara?'' .__.\n\nThe Tibunal by its judgme.nt dated Jpuary 21 1964 answered Issue No. 1 in favour of the re$pondent holding that he was a hereditary hlder of the ffice of mahant ftof Ule institution .. On Issue No. 2, the Tribunal held that the institution is, a Sikh. Gurdwara-and , is govered by the Act. · ·\n\nThe resp_ondentprefered F.A...O. No. 59 of 1964 in the Hig ..\n\nH Court f Punjab and Haryana at Chandigrah. A Division Bench of . the High Court held that the in-stitution uplsct was by Gulabdas for commemorating the memory of his Guru named Jad Guru. The\n\n' '\n\nS.G.P.C. V. MAHANT K~RPARAM (Desai, J.) 375\n\n~- . .High Coqrt furth.er held that the land -on which the instftution was A\n\n' et up with the grant of Muafi had been donated by a Muslim ruler\n\n. named Rai Kala of Rai Kot in favour of Mahant Gulabdas• It was\n\n. .2lso held. that the succes; bn to the office of mahant is from Guru to Ch.:Ja. After ref.!rring to varioJs entries in the land records, it was , held that way b!ck in t861, t!le ins.titution was not only serving as a UlJ_rdwara\" for the W.) ship of G anth Saheb but was als~ sed as a\n\n..... .Dera or l'odging house.for sadhusor Faqirs or the Udasi Sect and that there w•lS a Jua:ity of faiths in the institution. After taking all .the aspects into comideration, the High Court concluded that the . . institut1on.in question was cater.ing to the religious views and beliefs\n\n u\n\n• 0f bot~ the sects amongst the local pop'ulation and that therefore,. C \"the Ti.buna.J was in. error in declaring that it w.1~ a Sih Ourdwara\n\nIll\n\n. which. would permit one of the commu.nities .to appropriate.the\n\ninstitution to its exdusiv~ use and to deprive the other community ..or sect fro~ the dual u>e to which the institution has .. been pnt evr ·:Since. it wa~ founded or established. Accordingly, the High Court • .allowed the appeal and set aside the declaration made. by. the\n\nTibunal. · p\n\nOriginal applicants moved the High Cort for a certificate ··.under Art. 133(1) (af and (c) of the Constitution which was num- .bered lS S:C.A. No .. 96 of 1970. .The High Court on receipt of a\n\n:.report as a result of enquiry directed by it, by its ordf!r dated January\n\nI ' L • 8, 1971 rejected the application .for certificate both under Art. 133 (1') (a) and (c). Thereupon the original appli_cants led these two . ·\n\n.· ~H?Pals by speciaJ leave; one against the. decision -of the High Court reversing the decision of the Tribuna1 and another against the order of the High Court rjecting the applicaton 'for certificate,\n\nMr. M.N .. Phadke; learned couDsel who appeared. for the . appellant urged that if on evidence the app.eUants (original petitioners) are in a position to show that the institut}on ws -established for use by Sikhs for the purpose of public worship and was used for such . worship 9Y Sikhs, before and at the time of . the presentation of the\n\npe.tition under subsection (I) of Sec, 7, the i1.1stitution would be a Sikh Gurdwata as conte.mplated in Sec. 16(2) (iii) of the Act.\n\nProceeding along it was urged that there is evidence to show .and even the High Court has not round to .the co.1trar.y .that the. institu- tion was established for use by Sikhs for the purpose of public worsip and was used for .such worship by Sikhs, before and at the time . ' -cf the presentation oi the petition undet sub-section (l) .of. Sec. 7\n\n376 SUPREME COURT ltEPORTS . [1984] 3 s.c.lt ..\n\n-..(\n\n, A.\n\n. and therefore, notwithstanding the fact that some other members '\n\nbelonging to some other faith or sect also' venerate the institution, it. would nw detract from the character of the institution nor would iti be destructive of the character of the institution as Sikh Gurdw.ara .. .\n\nSec; 16(2) (iii) of th~ Aciprovides that 'if ifi! tribunal finds- . that the gurdwara was established for use by Sikhs) for the purpse\n\nof public worship and was used for such worsi\\fp by Sikhs, bfo; re\" )!- . and at the time of the presentation or the petition. tinder sub-sec. (l)t\n\nof Sec. 7, the tribunal shall. decide that it should be declared to be a' • Sikh Gurdwafa, and record an order accordingly.' 'Sikh 'is define<! . .in Sec~ 2(9) of the Act to mean 'a person who professes the Sikli\n\nreligion, or was kn&wn to be a Sikh during his lifetime/ If a disputdarises as to whether any particular person is or is not a Sikh, the: outcome will depend upon his. willingness to subscribe-to a declara.L tion a'S-prescribd in the Act. Amongst Sikhs, t)lere can be Amritdharr Sikhs-and. Sabjdhari Sikhs: One can-be said to be a Patit if he being 1\n\na:Keshdhari Sikh trims or shaves .his beard or kcshas or who afternking arit commits any , one pr more of the four kurahits ...\n\nThe first questin is: whether .it has bee-n satisfactorily est.abli- .1ihed that the institution was set UP. by Sikhs for the purpose of public== • worship and was used fhr sch ; orship -by Sikhs. The Tribunal' found tht the institution is an old one and. no director.al or ·\n\ndbcmentary evidence . regar'ing the purpse for which it wa!i.. . founded is available. . Reliance was p1aced on the cop'ies of thd-\n\n- evenue records, to 'sho~ how the institution was described in 1'.- . Government Jand records. On appra_isal of the entries, it has beea\n\nconcurrently found :that the institution was set up by' Mahnf Gulabdas upon a grant of land m1de to him. It appears a Sanad was issued but it was los{ when the Mahratta-, over ran this part . of\n\n~ 1he. countzy. The High Court 'then .traced the origin of village\n\nMahl Khurd and recorde_d a finding that the first settlers camt: tc>r G. . tltat area in the beginning of' the 18th Centu'ry and amongst them\n\nwere Bir Pal, Garib Da5s and Bhoja.. They . cleared the forest _land , , arid started cultivating he land. The High o-.mrt then.exammed\n\nwhat area of land can b.ecultivated 'with the help of one pa1r of\n\n~ :bullocks~ After asserting the pr9bative value' of Kafiat-Delzi or\n\n. -w.Qjah. Tasmif1s, Ext. P-21 and F-22, the High ourt concluded that\n\nB,. the muaft'i.e. exemption from payment of land -revnue had. been iran ted to the institution froiiJ. the time village had fil'$t been , founded .\\)out 200 years before the .ttcords were prepared, but these record!~\n\n; . •\n\n.. ..\n\nS.G.P.C. v. MAHANT KIRPAR AM (Desai, J.) 377 .\n\ndo not help in assciog the purpose for which mu.afi was granted or , the purpose for 'which the institution was established. This conclu- A sion was not commented upon , and deserves to be accepted a~\n\nrcasonaplc inference from the evidence.\n\n. . .. .\n\nMr. Phadke ho\\'lcvcr invited s to xamine jamrrbandi entries and on tlfe strength of them attempted to urge that since remote past the entries describe the iihtitution as gurdwar~. .n-.\n\n, Ex. P~ l is a will dated .May 10, 1958-exccuted by Mahant . Rasi!i Ram by which the respondent was appointed as his chela with a right to succeed to the office of mahant of tbis institution.• . This is a document of recent origin and is not of much assistance. We may next turn to Ext. P-2 datc'd the 25th Baisakh, 1927 corresponding to 1 ~71 A. D. It is a decisipn recorded in a muafi enquiry proceeding in respect of'land admeasuring 2b6 Bigha~ and 16 Biswas then found to be in possession of the institution. It recites that . the land was given to Gulab Dass Faqir . by Rai Kalha of 'Rai Kat real donce:-\n\nbcing his Guru known as Jad Guru who ris the muafidar. It was also found that entries in lnnm register show that the land admensuring J 2J Bighas has been entered in the name of muafldar .and tbat area of land remained muafi to the muafidar with the approval of Rai Nizam Sahib and the remaining land measuring 86 Bighas and 16 Biswas which was in cx.cess of grant should bt! resumed to the Gover\n\nnmcnt afta ohtaining the approval of the Diwun Saheb. Two things ' emt:rge from Ext. P-2. that the original munfi grant wns made by a \"Musltm rukr in favour of M:thant Guh\\b Dass Faquir of Udasi sect who appears to have set up the institution to commemorate the\n\nmemory of his' Guru, Jud Guru. These earlier entries do not support tbe claim ndvanced on behalf of the <rpcllants that the\n\nin:>titution was set up by Sikhs for the purpose ,.of public worship.\n\nOo the contrary, the institution appcnrs to hnve been set up by . Gulab Da!ls a follower of Udac; i sect and sutccssion to the office of •, l\\hlhant i'i by Guru to Chd.t. . .\n\nRt:frcnce Wa!: next made to Exts. P 7 nnd P8 which appear to be statements of Lambardars nnd P.nwaris in question answer form which show that they hcnn.l from their ancestors that the munfi had, been granted by Rai Knlha to Baba Gulab Doss. by way of Punartlt for meeting the expcnse:s of the D-:ra nnJ D; tl Bhog Parshad Granth Sahib. • Relying on these statc:mcnts it. wns urg(d that at the time of rccordio& lh~ r.tt\\!mcnts on April 19. 187~ Granth Sahib was being\n\n• I\n\n. \\\n\nJ. l '. ; i ', '\n\nI '\n\n. ·. . .. . .. •\n\n378' : .\n\n. .\n\nSUPREMB COURT JtEPOR.lS\n\n. :(1984}3 S.C.R· . .. . . ' ' . . vcnerat'd in the io.stitution and the grnt ws for Bal Bho~ Prd , .• . ·.A-·· of Granth Sahib. There statcmcts suer from the vice of hearsay evidence i!1 as 111uch.as the reference tothe Granth Sahib . for the first time appears in these statements not based on any penon i .\n\nknowledge-but of wha~ thy had heard from _their_ ancestor~: Ex~ . . .\n\nP\"~S . purports to be a statement of the then ·. Mahant Ram Dass . : ·.s Muafidar faqir Udasi of the_year 1873. It' shows that the muafi . . . laod was granted by Rai Kalha of Rai Kot to Baw~ Gulab Dass his · . .·. great'grand Guru fo~. Bhog of Gnmth Sahib and for . the e:xpen.ses of .'\n\n. . the Dera and Faqirs. Mr. Phadke urged that the Mahan't. himdr ..\n\n < has admitted that the grant as for Bal Bhog of Granth Sahib nnd : • ~- that this admission cooo1udes the point. ··· Th~ 1-:ligh Court: declined . . .C to ttct this ad'mission as conclu>ivc on th.-: ground thl.t the admis- .... . . sion wns made more than a century afrcr the originnl grnnt and .\n\nestablishment of the institution und three or four generations had . . . . jntcrvencd and_ the Ma.hant was talking about fcts . which had\n\n. bappend tong before his irth. These, in our opinion, are relevant l> considerations for. not treating the admission as 'conclusive more so\n\nbecause the carli::r .entries do not either r.:fe{ to th; in.stitution as Gurdwara or.m1ke any nentilm of the worship of Granlh Sahib therein. .·\n\nMr. Phauke then' invited our attention to Ex. P-18 being on E order of ljlasY-Kh<ts Committee of the State of Patiala at 'he rele·\n\nf \\ '30t time, :\\CCording 'approval to the successionto the offic~ of '\n\nMahant of the institution. In this order dated June 10, 1.937 tb~\n\n- instutition WJS described as: ' ·· .. . . ''Prem o'as ~-tahan't of oera of Ud.asi Bhc.l.:h • (Gurd wara Sahib) situate at MahaJ Khurd Tehsil Barnala : having died on 18.10.1982, the Administr; tive Committee · recommends appoint.ment of Rikhi Ram Chela of Narain .\n\nDass us Muhunt on the condition set out in the order.;• : •\n\n. . •G :rhis order wus 'signed by Her Hihne ss Mharani -f Patiala,· the thc:u Prime Minister and Revenue M inistcr n'mongst otltrs. Mr.\n\nPhadke emphasised that the institution apart fron\\ bing ·.described as. Dera of Udasi Bhdh is also de!scribcd as Gurdwara Sahib and. therefore, it would show that WJ.Y back in 1937 the State nuthtJrities 'U had ac_~(ptcd the institution to be a Gurdwara. \\Ve are not irnpres,\n\nied by the submi~ion for lb¢ obvious reason that the expression . 'Gurdwura' is in the bracket and primarily th~ institution is:dccribcd .. as era o( U~<lsi Bhckh.. C'onceding that the use of the txprcssion ·\n\n< ·•\n\ns.G.P.C. v. ~AHANT KiRPARAM (Desai, J.) 37'j.\n\n- . OCoera' does not militate against the institut1on being a \"Sikh Gut A dwara as held by this Court in the decision in Civil Appeal No. 446 --of 1962 rendered on November 9, 1984 wherein, Sarkar, J ... speaking for tbe Court observed that. 'Dera' in many cases was synonymous :with a 'Gurdwara', a description of the institution as Dera of Udas'\n\n'Bhekh would certainly have a distinct connotation Showing that it. was an Udasi institution as recognised by the highest State authori-\n\n. B. ties. . The expression •Gurdwara Sahib • in the bracket may at best indicate .that the Granth Sahib was also venerated in the institution.\n\nMr. Phadke never drew our attention to xt. P-23 being an e-,; tract from the,. register of mutations relting to Muza Mah.al Khurd dated September 27, . 1984. The entry under the column ·· .. name of owner' with description rads: \"Shri Guru G:anth Sahib -situate in the Gurdwlra :of tl1e village under the management of\n\nRikhi Ram chela Partap Dass Faqir Udasi'~ '.Jn fact, these entries\n\napear : to have been 'made in implementation of the order of the Jjlas-1-Khas and has no independent probative value. Ext. P-24 i.s a similar eK.tract dated October 1; t959 and doesnot advance the ase of the appllants. any further.\n\nNot much reliance w'as placed on the .oral evidence led by the .parties and therefore we refrain fro1n .. refcrring to it.\n\nOn the evidence as herein discu5sed, the question Is: whether . . . ·he view taken by the High Court \"that the institution catered to\n\nw_orship by people belonging o two different faith~ , . naine.Iy; Udasis :.and Sikhs is reasonableand proper or calls, for inte.rferenc~7\n\nIn our opinion, the view . of the High Cour't. is reasdn_<ble, prop:!f and jut on the evidence placed on record, There is evidence to show that Gulab Ihs who founded the institUtion Whs an Udasi ·Fattit. It is satisfacto-rily es\"tablished that the succession to the office -of Mahant is from Guru 1o Chehr. H appears that the express'ion ., G.urqwa'ra' qualifying he Dera of Udasis B.hekh in \"the Government\n\nrecords at a much later date. It is established that tne origina1 gra'nt' was by a Musliin ruler in favaur of a P:1qir and S1.dhu 6f Uda'i sect. . On' this evdence atle'ast a negative con.c1usio~ would satisfactorily\n\nemerge that the appellants have , failed to prove that t was an :institution set up for use y Sikhs-for the purpose of publi~ worshp.\n\nIt must be conceded that nearly a centu'ry after the setth1g up . r the institutio:1, Granth Sahib was venerated and read in this\n\n• # F.\n\n• 380.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS • [1984] 3 s.c .. R ..\n\nistitution. ·.Does it provide conclusive evidnce that the institution was set up and used for public worspip by Sikhs? In order to bring the case UJ1der Sec. l6Ci) (iii) it must not oly be established that .. the institution was established for use. by Sikhs for the purpose of\n\npublic worship but was used fo:r such worship by the Sikhs before and at the time of the presentation of the petition. The use of ·-the . conjuctive 'and, dearly imports that in order to attract Sec. 16(2)-\n\n. (iii), both the conditions must be cumulatively satisfied.\n\nNot was only that it must satisfactorily established that the institution was established for use by Sikhs for' the 'purpose of public worship . . .- but was used for such worship . by the Sikhs before and at the time of the presentation of the petition. It was so held in . Gurmukh Singhv.Risaldar Del'a Singh'& Ors.(1) and it our opinion tbatrepresnts the correct interpretation of Sec.._ 16(2) (iii). In fhis case- ' there. is no' .evidence to show tha.t the institt}tion was established for useby Sikhs for the purpose ofp\\lblic wor§.hip. It must be conce-· ded hat th~ institution mal; be established by anyene, may be a Siz -\n\nor follower of any other faith, but it must be establihed for use by- -Sikhs for the prpose of .wqrship. One can therefore,. ignore the\n\nfact hat th~ Q_riginal grantor was a Muslim. ·ruler Rai Kalha bu~ there is nothing to show that when aulab Dass Faquir of Udasi sect established the institution, he did itfor .use by Si.khs for the pur- . pose of.public worship.\n\nLater on, as the majority of the population of the village was follower of Shik-h religion. a:nd as Udasis a1S'<>· Ventate Granth Sahib, reading of Qranth Sahib may have com-.-\n\nme:pcd and 'therefore, generally speaking-_ people may describe and. revenue record may snow .it to .be Gurdwara but that would neither be decisive of the character of the-institution no_r sufficient to .bring: the institution within Sec. 16(2)(iii) <?f the Act .\n\nIt is at this stage necessary to point -opt the distinction between Sikhs nd _ Udasis. In the past ft was attempted to be urged· that Udasis are a mee order of Shikh preaqhers and that'there is no\n\ndifferenc~ between two faiths. - In fact it was urged that they are. not 'two separate faiths 'but two seperate interpretations _of the -sae: faith.: Repelling this contention way back i~ Jfem Singfz. &. Ors. v.; . Basm1t Das and 1hr.e>. It was observed as under ;\n\n(l) AIR 1937 Lahore 577 • . (2) AIR 1936 PC 93 at 100. . '.\n\nI .\n\n.. __..,.\n\n. '\n\nS.G.P.C. V. MAHANT ~IRPARAM (Desai, J.) 381\n\n\"Indeed tlle Udasis do .not appear. to their Lordsliips to.have been a merorde'r of mendicant preachers among the\n\nSikhs. Nor can it be held proved that they were merejy Sikhs who had lapsed into Hindu practices. On the con- . trary, they appear. to have a long .and independent history as a seperate sect or persuasion occupying a position some- . where between the Sikns and the orthodox Hindus. The\n\ndifferences in belief as well as in practice between Sikhs and\n\nUdasis -deserve to be described s seriou~, extesive and inveterate and some were outwardly striking.'~· ·\n\n• . .\n\nAt another stageit was observed that since tbe time of Siri Chapd, the founder of Udasi sect there c.ame into existence a sect of Udasis who, wbile uing the same sacre~ writings as the Sikhs; kept up much more of the 6Jd Hi11du practices, foiiowed\n\nasceticism, were given to the veneration of Samadhs and tom.bs, . =and continued .. the Hindu, rite' concerning birth, niar!iage _and\n\nSbradh. It was also obse-rved that the Udasis so far as the lnatter can be decided by beliefs and pn!ctices, are, from the point of view • of Sikhs, schisatics who separated in the earliest days of the movemen! and never merged thereafter. It wo.uld thus appear that Udasis form an independent sect. They do venerate Sikh scriptures. There fore_, in an institution of Udasis sect, one ean visualise r'eading of - Granth Sahib or . veneration of Sikh scriptur.es. That itselfis hot decisive of the character of the insthution. On the contrary, jf the\n\nj • succession was from Guru to Chela and th@se Gurus we.re followers ' . of Udasis faith and the institution was known as Dera of Udasi Bhekh an~ they followed some of tha practicesof Hindu traditional ·\n\nre]igion that would be completely destructive of the character of the institution. as Sikh Gu1dw(\\ra. In a. very recent decision of this Court in Pritam.Dass Mahant v. Shirr; mani Gurdwara Prabhandhak Com• mitteeP> it has been held that mere reading of Gfanth Sa:hib or yencration of Sikh scriptures is not decisive of the characer of the institution because Udasis are midway between, Sikhs . on the one\n\nhnd \"and Hindus on the other !lDd that the Udasis also venerae Granth Sahib. Earlier also thi~ view has been consistently take_n. by, this Court as will appar from the .decision of this Court in Mahm1t - Dh.aram Dass etc. ~.\"The State of Punjab and Ors :(~) ·\n\n(1) C.A. Eo. 1983' of 1960 dated 16.2.8-4 (2)\" [1975] S.C.R. 160 at 168\n\n:B\n\n. ~-\n\n'F\n\n'- 382\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1984] 3 S.C.R\n\n''They do not subcribe to idol worihip and poly- . .theism, nor do _they have any Samadhi ilf their shrines. The teaching of Sikhs was against asceticism. They believe in Guru Grarith Sahib, which is a Rosary of sacred poems, exhortation!ietc. Duriag the time of the Sikh Gurus, the ·\n\nGurdwaras were under their irect supervision and control or under their Mascnds or missionary agents. After the death of Guru Gobind Singh the Panth is recognised as th~ corporate ' repres'entative of the Guru on earth and thereafter they were managed y tbe Panth through tht.ir Graotliis and .other sewadars who were under direct supervision of the lcal San gat or congregation~ During Mahraja Ranjit Singh's time Sikhism became the religion of the State and large estates and Jagirs were granted. to the Gurdwaras, apart from the Jagirs\n\nwhich had been earlier gra-nted dUTing the Mughal period.' The position 6f the Gurdwaras changed during British regime. The Mahants who wwe in charge o.f the Sikh . tiurdwaras .could either:. be a Sikh Mahant or Udasi .•\n\nMahint.\" ·\n\n. .It thus clearly appear~ that t'he apprisal of the evide.nce .by . the Hlgh Court fs correct and . unexceptional and-weight of the evidence disCloses that ihe institution in questi'on was not shown to . have been estblished for use by Sikhs for the purpose of public wotship and therefore one of'the material conditions for attracting Sec.:l6(2)(iib of the Act is not'estab)ished. It is immaterial that at\n\n• • • • • ' the time of presentation of the petition jt wM;· along .with the follower of Udasi sect used for worship . of Granth .Sahib by the Sikhs. We broadly. agree with the view taken by the Hih . Court 'therefore these appeals fail and are. dismi!!sed with costs. Hearing fee 'in one set. •\n\nN.V.K.\n\n.. ,.\n\n. '", "total_entities": 64, "entities": [{"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35, "end_char": 45, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 580, "end_char": 589, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sikh Gurdwars Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 597, "end_char": 614, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Granth Saheb", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1534, "end_char": 1546, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in the land records; the High Court fur'thr he!<\\ that institution was not only sering as a Gu(d\\ara for the worship of Granth Saheb but was also us~ as a Dera or lodging house or Sadhus 'or Faqirs 'of the Udasi Sect and 'that .4.. .", "canonical_name": "Granth Saheb"}}, {"text": "Sikh Gurdwara Act, 1925", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2758, "end_char": 2781, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 16(2}(iii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3021, "end_char": 3039, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Sikh Gurdwara Act, 1925", "statute": "the Sikh Gurdwara Act, 1925"}}, {"text": "S77", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3496, "end_char": 3499, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Sikh Gurdwara Act, 1925", "statute": "the Sikh Gurdwara Act, 1925"}}, {"text": "Udasis", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3517, "end_char": 3523, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Udasis form an independent sect ·: They do venerate Sikh Scrip'ture!l. '"}}, {"text": "Chela", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3816, "end_char": 3821, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Guru to Chela and those Gdrus were f.Uowets of Udasi faith and the institution."}}, {"text": "Gulab .Das Faqir", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4775, "end_char": 4791, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "nothing to show that when Gulab .Das Faqir of Udasi Sect .estl'blished the instituton, be did it\n\n~ 'for use bY Sikhs for the purpose of public \\VOrship.", "canonical_name": "Gulab .Das Faqir"}}, {"text": "Section 16(2)(iii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5310, "end_char": 5328, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Harbans La/", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5692, "end_char": 5703, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Harbans La/, Urmi/a Kapoor, Kamini Jaiswal, Nishi Puri,..\n\nShahsi Ktran and Thal Singh Mmigal for' the Rspondents."}}, {"text": "Kamini Jaiswal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5720, "end_char": 5734, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Harbans La/, Urmi/a Kapoor, Kamini Jaiswal, Nishi Puri,..\n\nShahsi Ktran and Thal Singh Mmigal for' the Rspondents."}}, {"text": "Nishi Puri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5736, "end_char": 5746, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Harbans La/, Urmi/a Kapoor, Kamini Jaiswal, Nishi Puri,..\n\nShahsi Ktran and Thal Singh Mmigal for' the Rspondents."}}, {"text": "Shahsi Ktran", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5751, "end_char": 5763, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Harbans La/, Urmi/a Kapoor, Kamini Jaiswal, Nishi Puri,..\n\nShahsi Ktran and Thal Singh Mmigal for' the Rspondents."}}, {"text": "Thal Singh Mmigal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5768, "end_char": 5785, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Harbans La/, Urmi/a Kapoor, Kamini Jaiswal, Nishi Puri,..\n\nShahsi Ktran and Thal Singh Mmigal for' the Rspondents."}}, {"text": "DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5856, "end_char": 5861, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Jtidginent of the Curt Wits dlivered by\n\nDESAI, J, Whether a. religious and/or charita-ble institution~ situated invillage Malial Khurd~- Tehsil armila 0f Sangtur District.", "canonical_name": "DESAI"}}, {"text": "Sikh Gurdwaras Act, 1925", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6055, "end_char": 6079, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Mahant Kirpa Ram", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6540, "end_char": 6556, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "About 56 persons residing in village Mahal Khurd and profess-ing Sikh religion made an: application to the G<)vermnent of Punjab -on December 23, 1960 requestip.g the GJvernment lo declare the institution more particularly described in the application as a. Sikh Gurdwara .. This aJ?plication was publi3hed jn.the Official Gazette-: \\vhereupon Mahant Kirpa Ram, respondenJ No: 1. ('", "canonical_name": "MAHANT KIRPA RAM & ORS"}}, {"text": "Sec. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6880, "end_char": 6887, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Sikh Gurdwaras Act, 1925", "statute": "the Sikh Gurdwaras Act, 1925"}}, {"text": "V. MAHANT K", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7708, "end_char": 7719, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The\n\n' '\n\nS.G.P.C. V. MAHANT K~RPARAM (Desai, J.) 375\n\n~- ."}}, {"text": "RPARAM", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7720, "end_char": 7726, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The\n\n' '\n\nS.G.P.C. V. MAHANT K~RPARAM (Desai, J.) 375\n\n~- ."}}, {"text": "Mahant Gulabdas•", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7931, "end_char": 7947, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "named Rai Kala of Rai Kot in favour of Mahant Gulabdas• It was\n\n."}}, {"text": "Art. 133(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9109, "end_char": 9120, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9382, "end_char": 9390, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "M.N .. Phadke", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9671, "end_char": 9684, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "decision -of the High Court reversing the decision of the Tribuna1 and another against the order of the High Court rjecting the applicaton 'for certificate,\n\nMr. M.N .. Phadke; learned couDsel who appeared."}}, {"text": "Sec. 16(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10114, "end_char": 10124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10486, "end_char": 10492, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11130, "end_char": 11136, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mahl Khurd", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12635, "end_char": 12645, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court 'then .traced the origin of village\n\nMahl Khurd and recorde_d a finding that the first settlers camt: tc>r G. ."}}, {"text": "Bir Pal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12783, "end_char": 12790, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "tltat area in the beginning of' the 18th Centu'ry and amongst them\n\nwere Bir Pal, Garib Da5s and Bhoja.. They ."}}, {"text": "Garib Da5s", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12792, "end_char": 12802, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "tltat area in the beginning of' the 18th Centu'ry and amongst them\n\nwere Bir Pal, Garib Da5s and Bhoja.. They ."}}, {"text": "Bhoja", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12807, "end_char": 12812, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "tltat area in the beginning of' the 18th Centu'ry and amongst them\n\nwere Bir Pal, Garib Da5s and Bhoja.. They ."}}, {"text": "Phadke", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13661, "end_char": 13667, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Phadke ho\\'lcvcr invited s to xamine jamrrbandi entries and on tlfe strength of them attempted to urge that since remote past the entries describe the iihtitution as gurdwar~. .n-.", "canonical_name": "Phadke"}}, {"text": "Mahant . Rasi!i Ram", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13896, "end_char": 13915, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P~ l is a will dated .May 10, 1958-exccuted by Mahant .", "canonical_name": "MAHANT KIRPA RAM & ORS"}}, {"text": "Gulab Dass Faqir", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14397, "end_char": 14413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the land was given to Gulab Dass Faqir .", "canonical_name": "Gulab .Das Faqir"}}, {"text": "Rai Kalha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14419, "end_char": 14428, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "by Rai Kalha of 'Rai Kat real donce:-\n\nbcing his Guru known as Jad Guru who ris the muafidar."}}, {"text": "Diwun Saheb", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14894, "end_char": 14905, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "resumed to the Gover\n\nnmcnt afta ohtaining the approval of the Diwun Saheb."}}, {"text": "thant Guh\\b Dass Faquir", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 15015, "end_char": 15038, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that the original munfi grant wns made by a \"Musltm rukr in favour of M:thant Guh\\b Dass Faquir of Udasi sect who appears to have set up the institution to commemorate the\n\nmemory of his' Guru, Jud Guru."}}, {"text": "Gulab Da!ls", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15378, "end_char": 15389, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gulab Da!ls a follower of Udac; i sect and sutccssion to the office of •, l\\hlhant i'i by Guru to Chd.t. . ."}}, {"text": "Udac", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15404, "end_char": 15408, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gulab Da!ls a follower of Udac; i sect and sutccssion to the office of •, l\\hlhant i'i by Guru to Chd.t. . ."}}, {"text": "Baba Gulab Doss", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15712, "end_char": 15727, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P 7 nnd P8 which appear to be statements of Lambardars nnd P.nwaris in question answer form which show that they hcnn.l from their ancestors that the munfi had, been granted by Rai Knlha to Baba Gulab Doss."}}, {"text": "Granth Sahib", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15933, "end_char": 15945, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "187~ Granth Sahib was being\n\n• I\n\n. \\", "canonical_name": "Granth Saheb"}}, {"text": "SUPREMB COURT JtEPOR.lS\n\n. :(1984}3 S.C.R", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 16023, "end_char": 16064, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREMB COURT JtEPOR.lS\n\n. :("}}, {"text": "Mahant Ram Dass", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16479, "end_char": 16494, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mahant Ram Dass . : ·"}}, {"text": "Phadke", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16748, "end_char": 16754, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Phadke urged that the Mahan't.", "canonical_name": "Phadke"}}, {"text": "Granlh Sahib", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17491, "end_char": 17503, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "not treating the admission as 'conclusive more so\n\nbecause the carli::r .entries do not either r.:fe{ to th; in.stitution as Gurdwara or.m1ke any nentilm of the worship of Granlh Sahib therein. .·", "canonical_name": "Granth Saheb"}}, {"text": "Phauke", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17521, "end_char": 17527, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Phauke then' invited our attention to Ex.", "canonical_name": "Phadke"}}, {"text": "Desai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18777, "end_char": 18782, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gurdwura' is in the bracket and primarily th~ institution is:dccribcd .. as era o( U~<lsi Bhckh.. C'onceding that the use of the txprcssion ·\n\n< ·•\n\ns.G.P.C. v. ~AHANT KiRPARAM (Desai, J.) 37'j.", "canonical_name": "DESAI"}}, {"text": "Sarkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18985, "end_char": 18991, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "446 --of 1962 rendered on November 9, 1984 wherein, Sarkar, J ... speaking for tbe Court observed that. '"}}, {"text": "Guru G:anth Sahib", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19662, "end_char": 19679, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The entry under the column ·· .. name of owner' with description rads: \"Shri Guru G:anth Sahib -situate in the Gurdwlra :of tl1e village under the management of\n\nRikhi Ram chela Partap Dass Faqir Udasi'~ '.Jn fact, these entries\n\napear : to have been 'made in implementation of the order of the Jjlas-1-Khas and has no independent probative value."}}, {"text": "Gulab Ihs", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 20590, "end_char": 20599, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "is reasdn_<ble, prop:!f and jut on the evidence placed on record, There is evidence to show that Gulab Ihs who founded the institUtion Whs an Udasi ·Fattit."}}, {"text": "Udasis B.hekh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20821, "end_char": 20834, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G.urqwa'ra' qualifying he Dera of Udasis B.hekh in \"the Government\n\nrecords at a much later date."}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20978, "end_char": 20980, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 16(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21875, "end_char": 21885, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "aulab Dass Faquir", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22821, "end_char": 22838, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ruler Rai Kalha bu~ there is nothing to show that when aulab Dass Faquir of Udasi sect established the institution, he did itfor .use by Si.khs for the pur- ."}}, {"text": "Sec. 16(2)(iii)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23362, "end_char": 23377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S.G.P.C. V. MAHANT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23939, "end_char": 23957, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.G.P.C. V. MAHANT ~IRPARAM (Desai, J.) 381\n\n\"Indeed tlle Udasis do .not appear."}}, {"text": "Siri Chapd", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24620, "end_char": 24630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At another stageit was observed that since tbe time of Siri Chapd, the founder of Udasi sect there c.ame into existence a sect of Udasis who, wbile uing the same sacre~ writings as the Sikhs; kept up much more of the 6Jd Hi11du practices, foiiowed\n\nasceticism, were given to the veneration of Samadhs and tom.bs, ."}}, {"text": "Dh.aram Dass", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26316, "end_char": 26328, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "by, this Court as will appar from the .decision of this Court in Mahm1t - Dh.aram Dass etc."}}, {"text": "State of Punjab", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 26341, "end_char": 26356, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~.\"The State of Punjab and Ors :(~) ·\n\n(1) C.A. Eo."}}, {"text": "Guru Gobind Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26914, "end_char": 26931, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the death of Guru Gobind Singh the Panth is recognised as th~ corporate ' repres'entative of the Guru on earth and thereafter they were managed y tbe Panth through tht.ir Graotliis and .other sewadars who were under direct supervision of the lcal San gat or congregation~ During Mahraja Ranjit Singh's time Sikhism became the religion of the State and large estates and Jagirs were granted."}}, {"text": "Mahraja Ranjit Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27180, "end_char": 27200, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the death of Guru Gobind Singh the Panth is recognised as th~ corporate ' repres'entative of the Guru on earth and thereafter they were managed y tbe Panth through tht.ir Graotliis and .other sewadars who were under direct supervision of the lcal San gat or congregation~ During Mahraja Ranjit Singh's time Sikhism became the religion of the State and large estates and Jagirs were granted."}}, {"text": "Granth .Sahib by the Sikhs. We broadly. agree with the view taken by the Hih . Court 'therefore these appeals fail and are. dismi!!sed with costs. Hearing fee 'in one set. •\n\nN.V.K.\n\n.. ,.\n\n. '", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28098, "end_char": 28291, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of Granth .Sahib by the Sikhs."}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_3_37_50_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "' 37\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF WEALTH TAX? KANPUR\n\nM/S. J.K. COTTON MANUFACTURERS LTD.\n\nFebruary 28, 1984\n\n(V. D. TULZAPURKAR AND SABYASACHI MUKHARJI, JJ.]\n\nW•alth Tax Aci. 1967. Sections 2(m), 4(3), 5 and 6-W1a/th tax-Deduc tions-Sett, ement allowing payment in instalments-Instalments unpaid and showed i~ balance sheet, as \"debt\"' owed by assessees-- Whether allawable dedifc- ct ion-Whether 'debt owed and outstanding' .\n\n' I\n\n,_\\A\n\n. Words & Phrases : \"al/ the debts . owed by th1 assessee\"-M, aning of- •C S. 2 (m) Wealth Tax Act, 1957.\n\nAs a result of proceedings taken and 'settlement arrived at in 1952 under the Taxation on Income (lnvestigiltion COmmission) Act, 1947 certain sums were determinecl as payable by 'the respondentsassessee-ccimpii.nies on its secreted profits, and schemes for the payment of the said liability l!y instalments were I; iid dowh. . .\n\nThe assessee:-companies claimed th3.t the balance of the demand that had remained unpaid was a debt owed by it and should be \"allowed as a deducion .. while computing its D.et .. wealth for te concerned year of assessment (1957-58).\n\nThe Wealth-tax Officer computed the net-wealth. of each company by adopting the figures of assets and liabilities as shown ih their balance-sheets E as on their respective valuation dates after making sucQ 4<lj_u_:ttpie'nts _as considered necessary but in both the cases he disallowed the aforesaid claim for deduction on the ground that the liability was outstandina for more than\n\n12 mon!Hs on the valuation dates. ·\n\nThe Appellate Assistant Commissioner confirmed the disallowancc.\n\nHe took the view that the tax liabilities assessed by the Income-tax Investi- ~F ga\\ion Commission had no relatjon to .the assets or the declared wealth of\n\nassesseC<ompan_ies, which were the basis of the wealth.tax assessment and r. since the assets_ on which. the said liability.was aSscssedJ namely, the secret profits, were not included in the declared assets the disallowance was\n\n. ' justified. . .\n\nIn further appeals , by theassessee-co111panies to the Tribunal, the\n\n. G Tribunal conJirmed the !lisallo,..aoce .011 the ground that sections 2 <m) (i), 2 (ml (ii), 5, (!)and S (21. inpicated a scheme of the Act which u&gested that\n\n!lebts which qualified for deduction in . c<!lll.lluta.tion of the net-wealtq w.ere only those which were incurred in. relation to the assets declared by tho assessee, that is to say, In, COD)P, Utlpg. he netcfealth the principle to be adopted was that when an)' assets were included the i:orresponding!lebts\n\nshould be allowed, but that when such assets were ecluded or were liable to\n\n H be excluded from the net'wealth the\"eotresponding debts should also be ogluded.\n\n' SUPREME dotlllt REPORTS (1984] 3 s.c.R..\n\nIn the Referi:ces to the High Court, at the instance of the assessee .. companies the Tribunil's conclusion was overruled and the High Court opined that the deductions claimed were allowable in cpn1pting the net wealth of the assessee-compan ies.\n\nIn the appeals to this Court; by the Revnue on the question whether the balance of the payments payable by the Companiess 3 result of the findings and orders of the Income-Tax Investigation Commission in the\n\nsetlements made u'nder the Taxation on Income {Investigation Commission) Act 1941 are eductable as, debts owed by them in determining the net wealth of the companies.\n\nDismissing the appeals,\n\n HELD : [BY the Court] Section 2 \\Ill) .. \\iii) i'equires that lhe tax liability must be one which is \"payable in consequence of any order Passed\" -under any \\w relating to taxation on income or rofits etc. suchli11bilitY so payable under an order must remain \"outstanding for a period br more than 12 n19ntbs0n the\n\nvaluation_ date\". The expression 'outstandh_1g' in section 2 _(n1) (iii) la)· and\n\n(b) will have_to be construed in tpe-background of the phrase \"amount of tax ,, .... payble in consequence Of an O_Cdr,\"· arid in that Context it ffiust Inean remainfng unPaid affer the obligation to pay is inurred. [48D, 48G]\n\nIn the instant. case, it was the, admitted p_osition before the Tribunal that µndr the scheme of instalments sanctionCc\\ ip the, settlements lhe two. sums, in respect thereof deductions were claimed, had not becon1e due for' . payn1ent before the valuation dates.\n\nTh~ deductions clitned, thcrCfore, 1\n\ndo_ riot fall within the exclusionary part containe.d in section 2 (in).' (iji) of the Act. [48H-49Al . . . .\n\nPer Tulzapurka r, J.\n\nTlte scheme emerging frotn the keYprovisiolls ot the Act, sections ' .. z' (m), :r and-4 clearly show tht barring those . debts which fa 11. \\vithi.n /l)e\n\nexclusionary part of section 2 (m) all other debts owed by the assesSee 11ave to be deducted from the aggregate value _of the assets .belongiagto him ori the\n\n:P :valualion date; In order to get disqualified for the purposes of tleduc'tion a debt Jnust fail withi~ _tlte .exclusionary part and there is nothing, , in.Jhe\n\n~; eJ:clusionary part -which suggest~ -tb{lt_ the debt-must- \"either byre1~_tap1~,-:to\n\n:· any iissei-at all oJ: if it is relatable to any ass>!t; such asset ust, Pe i~.clu.\n\n:-· .d.ed iq the book$ of accounts Or the Palance s:heet , Of Sfte assesee bef9re.a depuction in respeet thereof is allowed. [450D]\n\nI~· the instant_ cases, the ecret profits admittedly_ecirne'd by the. assessee-compnies related _to an aSsessment year priorto September, 1948 (as proceedings under TaxatiOn on lncOme' (InyCtigtol! _CommiS_sion) _Act,\n\n1947. could be taken only in respect of lhe asses.sment Yaar prior to 1.9°;1948) and the ta~ liability in respect thereof was determined. in 1952, bqt the valuation dtes are 30.6.1956 and 31.12.1956, [47D] ' Annamma .Paul Perlncherry v.- Commissio_nei~ of Weal/h-Tax,. Ke/14/a 88 I.T.R. 204 and Conimlssio.ner of Wealth-Ta~, Kanpur v. J.K.: Jute Mills Co. Ltd., 120 I.T.R. ISO, approved .\n\n' \"\n\n, d.w :r. v J.K. corroN (Tulzapurkar, f.)\n\n[Per Sabyasachi Mukharji J.]\n\nThere is no evidence to show whether the profits had remained wih the 'assessee-companies either in the form of assets in the Balance sheet or . otherwise.· The re1vant valuation dates-were n1uch later. Had there ben .any finding that these profits, in some form, .either as assets in the BalanCe\n\nSheet or otherwfse were with the' assessee. It could have perhaps been . ' examtnd whether so long as the assessee does not brii1g those profits in the computation of the wealth, the assessee would be disntitled to the deductions\n\nof Jiabilities in respect of the same. These should have been examined by the Wealth-tax Officer. with the aid of the principles of section 106 and section 114 of te Evidene Act. Had that been done) it could have, perhaps been examined whether by the principle of purposive interpretaion, in orrler the giVe effect to the intentiori of the legislature in enacting the Wealt.h Tax and evolving the scheme of settlement under .Taxation [On Income (lnvcstigtion CommissjOn\n\nACt, 1947, whether the assessee was entitled to the deduction Of these two tax liabilities. [50 A-DJ\n\nciimmissionq of Wealth-Tax, West Bengal Ill v. Bana.rashi Prashad iediQ, 77 I.T.R. 159 and Commissioner of Wealth-Tax, U.P. and Others v, Padampat Singhania, 84 l.T.R. 799, approved.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JuRISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos.1179-1180 (NT) of 1973.\n\nAppeals by Special leave from the judgment and Order dated the 29th Aprif, 1970 of the Allahabad High Court in W. T. R. Nos. 327 & 330 of 1964.\n\nT. A. _ Ramachandran, Mrs. Janki Ramachandran, Miss A, Subhashini and Mrs. Sarla Chandra for the Appellant.\n\nS.T. Desai, B. P. Maheshwari and B.P. Singh.for the'Respon• p dents.\n\nThe following Jlidgments were delivered\n\nTuLZAPURKAR J, The only question raised in these appeals is whether the two sums of Rs. 5,49,041' (in the case of M/s J. K.\n\nCotton Ltd.) and Rs. 21,61,788 (in the case of J.K. Jute Ltd.) being the balance of the demands payable as a result oft.he findings\n\n.· and orders of the Income-tax Investigation Commission in the settlements made under the Taxatio.n on Income (Investigation Commls• sion) Act (30of1947) are dedu9tible as debts owed by them in determining the net-wealth of these companies ?\n\nThe question arises in these circumstances :\n\n\" B\n\n..,\n\nSuPREME COuRT REPoRTS li 9S4] 3 s.c.R. .\n\nM/s, J. K. Cotton Manufacturrs Ltd., the assessee, is a limited company engaged in the manufacture of cotton textiles,. etc. and the assessment involved is the wealth-tax assess!iient for the year 1957- 58 based on the valuation date 30.9.1956. It appears that as a result of proceedings taken and a settlement arrived at in 19S2 under the Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Act1947, a sum of Rs. 15,99,041 was determined as payable by the assessee company on its secreted profits and a scheme fqr the payment of the said liability by instalments was laid down. Out of this, a sum of\n\nRs: J0,50,000 had been paid before the valuation date (30.9.1956) and Rs. 5,49,041 .remained .unpaid on that date. The assessee company claimed that the balance of the demand that had remained unpaid . was a debt owed b/ it and she>uld be allowed as a deduction while computing its netwealth for the concerned year of assessment (1957\n\n58) .\n\n. In the case of Mis. J. K. Jute Mills Co. Ltd. the assessmePt\n\n.. i11; v, oled under the Wealth-tax Act is also for the assessment year 1957-58 but the valuation date is 31.12.1956. In the case oft\\lis company also as a result of proceeding taken and a settlement . arrived .at irt7 1952 under the Taxation on. Income (Investigation\n\nCommision) Act 1947 a sum of Rs. 112,93,392 was determined as\n\n'pyable by it on its secreted profits and a .scheme for the paymeht of the said liability by instalments was laid down. Out of tlils; a sum.of Rs. 21, 31, 604 had bean paid before the valuation date '(3L12.t956) aild Rs. 21,61,788 remained unpaid on that date. The assessee comj>any claimed that the balance of the demand that liad remained unpaid was a debt owed by it and should be allowed as a\n\nllductioh while computing its net-wealth for the concerned year of assessment (1957-58).\n\n. - . . .\n\nThe Wealth-Tax Officer.computed the net-wealth of ea6h com- ; oony by adopting the figures of assets and liabHities a.s shown in their balance-sheets as on their respective valuation dates after Jn\\lldPg such adjustments as he considered necessary but in both the\n\ncaes he disallowed the aforesaid claim for deductiOn on tne ground that the.liability was outstanding for more than 12 nionths o\\'t the valuation dates. The Appellate Assis.tant Commissioner confirmed the disaUowance of the amounts but for different a reason, Hetbok the view that the tax llabilities. assessed by the Incoine-tn I.nvesti . gation Commission had no relation to the iisets or the \\iecfar'ed\n\nwealth of the assesse, e compal\\ies, whic~ '!'(ere tre basis of the. wea Ith\n\ntx assessment and since the assets on which tlie aid liability was\n\n,,...\n\nc.w.±. v 1.K. corroN (Tlzapurkar J.) 41\n\nassessed, namely, the secret profits were not included iu the declared assets the disallowance was justified. In further appeals preferred by the assessee:companies to the Tdbunal, the reasons given by the Wealth-Tax Officer as well as the Appellate Assistant Commissioner were assailed but without ex.pressing any view on the validity or otherwise of the reason given by the Wealth-tax Officer, the Tribunal confirmed.the disallowance by substantially agreeing l)'ith the view expressed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The Tribunal pointed out that in s.2 (m', which defines'net wealth', sub-s. (i). excludes debts located outside India in the case of certain class(IB of assessees, in w.hose case assets located out side India are ecluded; that s.2 (m) (ii) bars the deduction of debts secured on or incurred\n\njn relation to exempted assets mentioned ins. 5 (l) and 5 (2); that\n\ns.4 (3) permits the deduction of debts relating to assets, which do not stand in the name of the assessee, but. which are nevertheless to be incjuded in the net wealth of the assessee by virtue of the provi sion in s. 4 (I) ; tliat s.6 (I) repeats 'the provision in s. 2 (m) (i) ' excluding the . debts located outside India . where corresponding assets are excluded; and according to the Tribunal these provisions indicated a scheme of the Act which suggested that debts which ·\n\nqualified for deduC!ion in computation of the net-wealth wr~ only those which were incurred in relati!n to the assets declared by the\n\nassessee, that is to say, in computing the net-wealth the principle to be adopted was that when any assets were included the corresponding debts should be allowed but that when such assets were excluded or were li(lble to be excluded from the .net-wealth the corresponding . debts should also be excluded. Th e Tribunal further observed that . since in the case of the tw6 companies it was not disputed on their behalf that the tax demands made by the Investigation Commission were in respect' of secret profits which were not disclosed in their\n\n- books of atcounts and since it was also conceded that the assets , 'Shown in the balance sheets did not includJl any assets acquired out :of such secret profits the balance of tax demand (Rs. 5,49,041 in '.one case and Rs. Zl ,61,788 in the other case) was not deductible.\n\nfa the References that were made at the instance of the asses~ \"\"see-companies, the High Court took a contrary view. It over-ruled :the Tribunal's conclusion that the provisions relied\"upon by it indica• .· te, d any scheme leading to the principle that only such debts as were ''rncurred in relation to the asset declared r disclosed in the books • '.9ualified for deduction because the concerned provisions merely ''dealt with typical situations or special categories of assets and no\n\n....\n\n.. C\n\n:a\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984 J 3 s.c.i.\n\ngeneral pattern or scheme as suggested could be inferr'ed therefrom.\n\nThe High Court therefore opined that the deductions claimed were allowable in computing the net wealth of the assessee-companies.\n\nThe revenue has .come up in appeals to this Court.\n\nIn support of these appeals Counsel for the revenue rised. two contentiqns before us. In the fir'st place the counsel canvassed for the acceptance by us of the Tribunal's view that the scheme of the Wealth Tax Act shows that where a liability is incurred in relation to anJi asset, that liability is not deductible if the asset is, for any reason,. not included in the net-wealth and in this behaif p'rovistons contained in sections 2 (m) (i) and (ii), 4 (3), 5 and 6 of the Act were relied upon. By way of elaboration it was further urged that since under the settlements made under the Taxation on Income (Investigation Gommission) Act, 1947 certain tax liabilities were .deter. . . mi.ned as payable by the assessee-compariies, the assessees inust be taken to have ad'mitted having made secret profits and as Euch only the assessees could.know about the use OP destination thereof and it was for them to show that became of the secret profits and in the absence of any explanation from them in that behalf the secret profits must be presumed to be with them as on the valuation dates and when. such was the position •if such secret profits or other assets . acquired out of them were not brought into or Were not reflcted in the Balance Sheets the tax liabilities in relation ther.eto could not be allowed to be deducted. Counsel pointed out that the presumption which he is seeking to raise against the assessees as above was only a different facet of the same rule w\\lich obtains in Income-tax cases that once a sum is found credited in ihe assessee's bOoks then it is for hiin to prove the nature and source thereof failing which the cash credit is regarded as his income from undisclosed source (a rule previously enunciated by judicial decisions which now finds a statu tory recognition in s:68 of the Income.Tax Act, 1961). Secondly, counse I contended that since the deductions claimed were in respect of tax liabilities which were outstanding for a period of more than 1.2 months on the_ valuation dates the deductions could not be allowed under .s.2 (m) (iii) of the Act. On the other hand counsel for the assessee-companies supported the view taken by the High Court on the first contenti.oti and as regards the secop.d 'it was urged that since the same did not find favour either with the A.A.C. or with the Tribunal and was not even urged before the High Court the Revenue must be taken to have given it up as being without any substance, Jn any event the tax liabilities herein do not fall within the exclu• sionary provision contained in sec. 2 (m) (iii). '\n\nc.w.t. v i.K. COTION (Tuizapurkar, i.)\n\nIn order to examine, the first contention it will be necessary to est out the concerned provisi; ns includillg the charging provision contained in .sec. 3 of the Act. Section 3 provides that there shall be charged for every assessment year. commencing from 1.4.1957 a tax, called Wealth-tax, in respect of the net-wealth on the corresponding valuation date of every individual, Hindu Undivided Family and Company at the rate or rates specifiedin the Schedule I. \"Net wealth\" is defined in s.2 (m) whiCh runs thus :\n\n2 (m) \"net wealth means the amount by which the aggregate value.computed in accordance with the provisions of this Act of all the assets, wherever located, belonging to the .assessee on tire valuation date, including assets required tel\n\nbe included in his net wealth as on that date under this Act, is in excess of the aggregate value of all the debts owed by the assessee on the valuation date other than-\n\n(i) debts which under section 6 are not to be taken into account ;\n\n(ii) debts which are secured on or which have been incurred in relation to any property in respect of which wealth-tax is not chargeable under this Act ; . (iii) the amount of the tax, penalty or interest payable in consequence of any order passed under or in pursuance of this Act or any law relating to taxation of income or profits, or the Estate Duty Act, 1953 (34 of 1953), the Expenditure Tax Act, 1957 (29 of 1957), on the Gift-tax Act, 1958 (18 of 1958),-\n\n(a) which is outstanding on the valuation date and is claimed by the assessee in appeal, revision or other proceeding as not being payab.le by him; or\n\n(b) which, although not claimed by the assessee as not being payable by him, is nevertheless out- . standing for a period of more than tewelve months on the valuation date;\" Section 4 (1) provides for inclusion of certain assets in computing the net-wealth of an individual-assets which on the valuation date are held not by that individual but by the spouse or by a minoo child.of such individual to whom they have been tvansferred by such\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984] 3 s.c.lt.\n\n• individual directly or i.ndirectly, otherwise than for adequate consi- \" deration, etc; in otherwol'lls such assets held by the spouse or the minor are deemed to be the assets of such individual; and in respect of such deemed assets sub-sec. (3) provides :\n\n\"'(3) Where the value of any assets is to be included in the net wealth of an assessee in accordance with clause (a) o'f subsection (1) or sub-section (IA)\n\n(a) they shall be deducted from such value.any debts owing on the valuation date by the transferee mentioned in C that clause in so far as such debts are referable to such\n\n<; D\n\nil F\n\nassets, and\n\n(b) the provisions of section 5 shall apply in relation to such assets as if such assets were assets b.elonging to the assessee.\"\n\nSecti.on 5 exempts certain assets held by an assessee from being . inCiudedin his net-wealth and provides that Wealth-tax shall not be payable l)y him in respect of those assets and then follows a list of a large number of such exempted assets. Section 6 deals with exclusion of assets and debts outside India and provides that in computing the net-wealth of an individual who is not a citizen of India or of an individual or a Hindu Undivided Family not resid.ent of India or resident but not ordinarily resi<lent in India, or of a company not resident in India during the year ending on the valua• tion date, the value of assets and debts located. outside India and the value of assets in India of the types specified in cl. (ii) shall not be taken into account.\n\nThe question is whether the aforesaid provisions of the Act on which reliance has been placed by counsel for the revenue indi- .;;> G cate a scheme of the Act sugges9ve of the principle that only such debts as are incurred in relation to the assets declared or disclosed in the books qualify for deduction in computing the net-wealth of an assessee ? In other words, do these provisions show that in com• puling the net-wealth the rule to be dopted is that when any assets\n\n~. are included while aggregating the total assets the corresponding U H '\" debJs should be allowed but when such assets are excluded or iire\n\n .. liable to be excluded the corresponding debts sho1Jld also be .. excluded ? ·\n\n. .,.\n\n--.\n\nC.W.T. v J.K. COTTON (Tu/zapurkar, J.)\n\n4S,.\n\n Ona careful analysis of the aforesaid 'provisions it seems to us\n\ncar that the key provisions are the charging section and the defini~ tion of the net-wealth givn in sec. 2 (m). Under se'c. 3 wealth-tax is chargeable on the net-wealth held by every assessee on the valua tion date and 'net-wealth' under sec. 2 (ml means the excess of the aggregate value of all his assets wherever located (computed in\n\nccordance with the Act) over the aggregate value of all the debts . owed by him on the valuation date other than the debts which fall within the exclusionery part of sec. 2 (m). The scheme emerging from the key provisions clearly shows that barring those debts which fall within the exclusionery part of sec. 2 (m) all other debts owed by the assessee hav.e to be deducted from the aggregate value of the assets belonging to him on the valuation date. In other words, in order to get disqualified for ihe purposes of deduction a debt must fall within the exclusionary part and there is nothing in the exclusionary part which suggests th'llt the debt must either be relatable to anY asset at all or if it is relatable to any asset such asset must be ·· Included in the books of accounts or the balance-sheet of the asses• . see before a deduction in respect thereof is allowed. If such were the intention of the Legislature the exclusionary part of sec. 2 (m) would have made a specific provision in that behalf by adding an 11ppropriate sub-clause therein. In the absence of such a provision beiq.g found in the exclusienary part of sec. 2 (m) it would be diffi-' cult to accept he contentiOn of counsel for the revenue which in substance requires a restricted meaning being given to the expression 'all debts' occurring therein in the context of its deductibility under the Act and the acceptance of such a contention would lead to anomalous results which could .be demonstrated. For instance, where an assessee has taken an over-draft from the bank for the purpose o~ carrying on his day to day business and the over'draft Is not utilised for acquisition of any tangible asset for the business then on the argument of counsel for the Revenue such overdraft woulcl become disallowable beause the liaoility is not referable to any asset reflected in his books but obviously under the scheme of sec. 3 read with the definition of net-wealth und.er sec. 4 (m) such a liability will have to be allowed as a debt owed by the assessee in .computing his wealth-tax. Similarly, if a limited company after earning a certain amount of profits in a year were to distribute the whole of it to its share-holders by way of dividends, it would e absurd to suggest that the income-tax payable on such .profits would\n\nnot be allowable as a debt .owed by the assessee in the computation ff of its net-wealth simply jlecause such profits are lio longer available _ fOI! bein~ r-efiect~ in its, J?oo~ wle awegatitig its total ssets. lPi . fl\n\n, j,.\"\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1984] 3 S.C.R.\n\nthe bsence of an appropriate provision in the exclusionery part of sec. 2 (m) therefqre, it is difficult to accept the counsel's contention that a restricted meaning as suggested should be given to the expression 'all debts' occurring in sec. 2 (m). •\n\nTurning to the other provisions, namely, sec. 2 (m) (i) and (ii), sec. 4 (3) and secs. 5 and 6 of the Act, we are in agreement with the High Court's view that these prnvisions deal with typical si!uations or special categories of assets. 'Section 4, for instance, deals with certain assets which are deemed assets of an individual for computing his net-wealth\"assets held by his or her spouse or minor child, etc . . under a transfer made by him to them otherwise than for adequate consideration. and when such assets, though held by the transferee, are to be included as if belonging to t!Mt individual it is but natural 'and fair that debts owed by the transferee on the valuation date in\n\nrelation to such assets should be deducted while computing the value of such asset in the hands of the individual and this is precisely what sec. 4 (3) provides ; it is clearly a typical case dealing with deemed assets. Section 5 has to be read with sec. 2 (m) (ii) and so read the provision is that debts in relation to exempted assets. i.e.\n\nasets which are not chargeable to wealth-tax at all 'should 1).0t be\n\nllowed to be deducted ; similarly sec. 6 has to be read with sec. 2\n\n(m) (j) and so read the. effect is that both the. assets and debts located outside India of a non-citizen or of an assessee who is non-resident or is a resident but' not ordinarily a resident in India.during the yee.t ending on the valuation date shall not be taken into account in\n\nomputing the net-wealth of the assessee. From. these particular or special provisions it will.be illogical to deduce any general principle that only such debts as are incurred in relation to the assets declared or reflected in the books qualify for deduction in computing the net' V:.ealth of an assessee, especially as in the definition of 'net-wealth'\n\ngiven in sec. 2. (m) there is no warrant for it.\n\nAs regards theelaboration of the contention based on a presumption sought to be raised by counsel for the revenue against the asses see-companies from the analogy. of the presumption arising in income-tax cases under se.c. 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the c<>11tention is fallacious for two reasons. It is true that by reason- ' of the settlement made under the Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Act, 1947 the assessee companies must be .taken to . have admitted that they had made secret profits which were kept out\n\nof the books of accounts and it is also true that no explanation was (<1rthcoming from the assessee companies as to hat became of snch\n\n;- '\n\ni.· ..\n\n. .\n\n--,\n\n. •t\n\nc.w.r .. v J.K: COTTON (Tulzapurkar, J .) 41 •\n\nsecret profits but the question is whether from £uch absence o( explanation any presumption can. be raised that such secret profits were still retained by them on the valuation date'in the circumstances of the case? In the first place the analogy of the rule applicable in income-tax cases would be inapplicable in wealth-tax cases inasmuch as In the fonner case the unexplained cash credit item is regarded as income of1he assessee from undisclo~.ed source having accrued to:· Wm during the accounting year while in the latter case only the valuation date is relevant on which date the assets (secret profits) must be held by the assessee and it will not do that such .asset . was held byhimsometlmeduringthe.concerned year. Secondly, after\n\n a lapse of sufficiently long period no presumption can be raised that · a secret profit earned some time during the concerned year has continued to be held by the astessee on the valuation date. In tlie instant case the secret profits admittedly earned by the assessee companies related to assessment years prior to September, 1948 (as procee dings under Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Act1947\n\ncould be taken only in respect of assessment years prio~ to 1.9. 1948) D and the tax liability in respect thereof was determined.in 1952 but. we o;: are concerned.with the valuation dates 30.6. 1956 and 31.12.1956 and, therefore, the presumption. as suggested by the counsel cannot be drawn against the assessee companies after a lapse of 8 long years. In .Annamma Paul Perincherry v. Commissioner of Wealth-Tax, Kera/a(') and Commissioner of Wealth-Tax. Kanpur v. J.K. Jute Mills Co.\n\nLtd(')., the Kerala High Court as well as the Allahabad High Court have taken a similar view that no such presumption can be raised after a lapse of sufficiently long period and we approve of the said view. In any case, as stated above, the deductibility :or the two tax liabilities in question 'does not depend upon whether the assets, in respect whereof such liability has been determined, are available or not while aggregating the assets of the assessee companies. The contention of the counsel for revenue, therefore, must fail.\n\nComing to the second 'contention the question i~ whether the deductions claimed fall within the exclusionery part of sec. 2(m) (iii) of Jhe Act, that is whether the two. sums of tax liabilities were outstanding for more than 12 months on the respective valuation dates ?\n\nAccording to counsel the expression \"outstanding\" means. remailling unpaid after becoming due and since the Iiabil)ty to pay income-tax for any assessment year crystallses on the last day of the previous\n\n(I) 88 I.T.R. 204\n\n\\2) 120 l.T.R, !SQ\n\n. .\n\nF . •\n\n4$ •\n\nSUPREMBCOURT REPORTS\n\n(1984] 3 S.C.R.\n\nyear and becomes payable for that assessment year even before it gets quantied, the two tax liabilities in question which pertained to • assessment years prior to 1948; must be regarded as having become due by the last day of the concerned previous years arid since these were not cleared soon thereafter these were outstanding since at least 1948 and .thus became disallowable. In the alternative counsel urged that if payability is made to depend upon the date of a, n order passed quantifying the same then at least in 19)2 these became payable when the order of the Investigation Commission was passed and more than 12 months had pased since then. Counsel urged that granting of instalments under the settlement merely amounted to showing some concessions to the. assessee-companies.and did not affect the payability in 1952 of t.he arrears of tax. Jn our view, there is no force in any of these submissions made by counsel. The aspect that the liability to pay income:tax for any assessment year crysta!ises on theJast day of the previous year and,· therefore, be comes payable on the expiry of the last day irrespective of quantifica tlon of the dues would be irrelevant having regard to the express language of sec. 2 (m) (iii). Sub-cl. (iii) requires that the tax liability must be one which is \"payab!e in consequence of any order passed\" under any law relating to taxation on income or profits, etc .. such liability so payable under an order passed must remain \"outstanding for a period of more than I) months on th-e valuation date.\" The alternative submission that the tax liabilities in the instant case must\n\nb~ taken to have become payable in 1952 under the Investigation Commission's order and must be regarded as having remained out standing since 1952 is. equally of no avail for the payability of the dues must depend upon the terms of the Commission's order and admittedly a scheme for payment of t)le dues by instalments was provided in the order imd each instalment wouldbecome payable on the date on which it is directed to be paid. in our view, the expres sion 'outstanding' in sec. 2 (m) (iii) (a) and (bl will have to be construed in the background of the phrase \"amount of tax ...... payable in consequence of an order\" and in that context it must mean remaining unpaid after the obligation to pay is inourred. We are informed that similar construction has been placed on the expression 'outstanding' occurring in sec. 2 (ml (iii) of the Act by. the Calcultta High Court in Commissioner of Wealth-tax, West Bengal Ill v. Banarshi Prasad Kedia(') and by the Allah'abad High Court in Commissioner. of Wealth-Tax, U.P., nd Others\n\nv. Padampat . Singhania(') and we ailiirm the same. Jn the instant qise it was an\n\n(1) 771. T. R. 159.\n\n(2) 84 I. T. R. 799,\n\n. ' c.w.T. v J.K. COTl'ON (S. Mukharji; !J 49\n\nadmitted position before the Tribunal that under the scheme of instalments sanctioned in the settlements the two sums, in respect whereof deductions were claimed, had not become due 'for payment before the valuation dates. It is therefore, clear that the deductions claimed do not falJ within the exclusionary part contained in sec. 2 (m)\n\n(ill) of the Act ·\n\nIn the result the High Court's view is confirmed and the appeals.are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. ·\n\nSABYASACHt MUKHARJI, J. On the second aspect, namely whe ther the deductions of two sums of Rs. 5, 49, 041 and Rs .. 21,61, 788 being the outstanding liabilities as a result of the determination under settlement arrived at in 1952 under the Taxation on Income (Investigation Comission) Act, 1947 , I respectfully .agree with the views expressed by my learned brother. I adhere to the opinion I expressed on the experession 'outstanding' in Commissioner of Wealth-Tax, W.es~ Bengal III v. Banarashi Prasad Kedia(') which is in consonance with the views experessed by the Allahabad High Court in Commissioner of Wealth-Tax, U. P. and Others V. Padampal Singhania('). I am, therefore, of the opinion that these deductions do not fall within the exclusiontry part contained in Section 2 (m) (iii) of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957.\n\nOn the first contention urged on behalf of the revenue I would, however, if I may, express my views. I respectfully agree with my learned brother thatfrom the relevant provisions of the W, ealth Tax Act to which my learned brother has referred, in the facts ::ind circumstances ava, iiable in this case, the deductibility of the two tax liabilities. in question does not depend upon whether the . assets in respect whereof such liability has been determined are available or not :while aggregating the assets of the assessee companies. In the facts of this case, it appears that in the case of M/s J. K. Cotton Manufac •. turers Ltd., proceedings were taken under the Taxation on income (Investigation Commission) Act, 1947 and a settlement was arrived. in 1952 and a sum of Rs.15,99, 041 was determined as payable by theassessee on its secreted profits and a scheme of payments of such liability by instalments was agreed upon. Similarly in the case of M/s J. K. Jute Mills Co. I!td., a settlement was arrived at in 1952 under the aforesaid Act and a sum of Rs. 42,93,392 was determined as payable by it on its secreted profits and a scheme of liquidation of such, liability was agreed upon. It is true that as a result of the admission made by the assessee, the assessee made profits, which\n\n(I) 77 I.T.R. 159'\n\n(2) 84 1.T.R. 799,\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984] 3 s.c.R.\n\nyear and when we have no material though the income tax liabilities for the same had been settled in 1952. There is no evidence to show whether thesf} profits had remained with the assessee either in the form of assets in he Balat)ce Sheet or othewise. The relevant valuation dates were much later, 30. 9. 1956 and 31. 12. 1956 respectively in the case of the two companies. Had there 15een any finding that these profits, in some form either as asssets in. the Balance Sheet\n\nor otherwise, were with the assessee, it could have perhaps J, een examined whether so long as the a:ssessee does not bring those profits in.the computation of .the wealth, the assessee would be disen titled to the deductions of liabilities in respect of the same. These should have been examined by the Wealth-tax Officer with .the aid of the principles of Section 106 and Section 114 of the Evidence Act. But these were not done. It is unfortunate. Had that been done, it could have, perhaps, been examined whether by the principle of purposive interpretation in otder to gjve effect to the intention of legislature in enacting the Wealth Tax Act and evolving the scheme of settlement under Taxation on Income (Investigation commission) Act, 1947 whether the assessee was entitled to the deduction of these two tax liabilities. On the materials on record, I respectfully agree with the conclusion arrived at by my learned brother on the first contention urged on behalf of the revenue ..\n\nN.V.K.\n\nAppeals disrnissd.", "total_entities": 95, "entities": [{"text": "37\n\nCOMMISSIONER OF WEALTH TAX? KANPUR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2, "end_char": 40, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "COMMISSIONER OF WEALTH TAX, KANPUR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. J.K. COTTON MANUFACTURERS LTD", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 44, "end_char": 76, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M/S. J.K. COTTON MANUFACTURERS LTD", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. D. TULZAPURKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 99, "end_char": 116, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.D. 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that s.2 (m) (ii) bars the deduction of debts secured on or incurred\n\njn relation to exempted assets mentioned ins."}}, {"text": "s.2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11710, "end_char": 11713, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11844, "end_char": 11847, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12059, "end_char": 12063, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12076, "end_char": 12079, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12110, "end_char": 12114, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sections 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14504, "end_char": 14514, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Tax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15897, "end_char": 15910, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s.2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16138, "end_char": 16141, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Tax Act, 1961", "statute": "Tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "A.A.C.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16383, "end_char": 16389, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other hand counsel for the assessee-companies supported the view taken by the High Court on the first contenti.oti and as regards the secop.d 'it was urged that since the same did not find favour either with the A.A.C. or with the Tribunal and was not even urged before the High Court the Revenue must be taken to have given it up as being without any substance, Jn any event the tax liabilities herein do not fall within the exclu• sionary provision contained in sec."}}, {"text": "sec. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16635, "end_char": 16641, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Tax Act, 1961", "statute": "Tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "sec. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16844, "end_char": 16850, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Tax Act, 1961", "statute": "Tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16863, "end_char": 16872, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Tax Act, 1961", "statute": "Tax Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "Schedule I", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17146, "end_char": 17156, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17185, "end_char": 17188, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17643, "end_char": 17652, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Estate Duty Act, 1953", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18032, "end_char": 18053, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Expenditure Tax Act, 1957", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18072, "end_char": 18097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Gift-tax Act, 1958", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18119, "end_char": 18137, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18480, "end_char": 18489, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Gift-tax Act, 1958", "statute": "the Gift-tax Act, 1958"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19425, "end_char": 19434, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19779, "end_char": 19788, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "zapurkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21037, "end_char": 21045, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C.W.T. v J.K. COTTON (Tu/zapurkar, J.)\n\n4S,.", "canonical_name": "Tlzapurkar"}}, {"text": "sec. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21225, "end_char": 21231, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21363, "end_char": 21369, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21629, "end_char": 21635, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21767, "end_char": 21773, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22411, "end_char": 22417, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22596, "end_char": 22602, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23357, "end_char": 23363, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23410, "end_char": 23416, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24102, "end_char": 24108, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24273, "end_char": 24279, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24329, "end_char": 24335, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24354, "end_char": 24360, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24527, "end_char": 24536, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25121, "end_char": 25127, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25200, "end_char": 25209, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25230, "end_char": 25236, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25428, "end_char": 25434, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25455, "end_char": 25461, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26110, "end_char": 26116, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Income-tax Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26384, "end_char": 26404, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Tulzapurkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 26874, "end_char": 26885, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "•t\n\nc.w.r .. v J.K: COTTON (Tulzapurkar, J .)", "canonical_name": "TuLZAPURKAR"}}, {"text": "31.12.1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 28255, "end_char": 28265, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1956 and 31.12.1956 and, therefore, the presumption."}}, {"text": "Kerala High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 28551, "end_char": 28568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Kerala High Court as well as the Allahabad High Court have taken a similar view that no such presumption can be raised after a lapse of sufficiently long period and we approve of the said view."}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 28584, "end_char": 28604, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Kerala High Court as well as the Allahabad High Court have taken a similar view that no such presumption can be raised after a lapse of sufficiently long period and we approve of the said view."}}, {"text": "sec. 2(m)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29190, "end_char": 29199, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30864, "end_char": 30870, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31749, "end_char": 31755, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32088, "end_char": 32094, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Calcultta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 32124, "end_char": 32144, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Calcultta High Court in Commissioner of Wealth-tax, West Bengal Ill v. Banarshi Prasad Kedia(') and by the Allah'abad High Court in Commissioner."}}, {"text": "Allah'abad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 32231, "end_char": 32252, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Calcultta High Court in Commissioner of Wealth-tax, West Bengal Ill v. Banarshi Prasad Kedia(') and by the Allah'abad High Court in Commissioner."}}, {"text": "Padampat . Singhania", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 32305, "end_char": 32325, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of Wealth-Tax, U.P., nd Others\n\nv. Padampat ."}}, {"text": "sec. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32803, "end_char": 32809, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "SABYASACHt MUKHARJI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32954, "end_char": 32973, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SABYASACHt MUKHARJI, J. On the second aspect, namely whe ther the deductions of two sums of Rs.", "canonical_name": "SABYASACHI MUKHERJI*"}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33727, "end_char": 33736, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Wealth Tax Act, 1957", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33754, "end_char": 33774, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "J. K. Cotton Manufac •. turers Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 34375, "end_char": 34410, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the facts of this case, it appears that in the case of M/s J. K. Cotton Manufac •. turers Ltd., proceedings were taken under the Taxation on income (Investigation Commission) Act, 1947 and a settlement was arrived."}}, {"text": "J. K. Jute Mills Co. I!td", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 34735, "end_char": 34760, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Similarly in the case of M/s J. K. Jute Mills Co. I!td.,"}}, {"text": "30. 9. 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 35449, "end_char": 35460, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The relevant valuation dates were much later, 30."}}, {"text": "31. 12. 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 35465, "end_char": 35477, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1956 and 31."}}, {"text": "Section 106", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35985, "end_char": 35996, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36001, "end_char": 36012, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "N.V.K.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 36618, "end_char": 36624, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the materials on record, I respectfully agree with the conclusion arrived at by my learned brother on the first contention urged on behalf of the revenue ..\n\nN.V.K.\n\nAppeals disrnissd."}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_3_383_390_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "_,· •\n\n.. ;\n\n• . .\n\nMANMOHAN KAUA\n\nY'ASH & OTHERS\n\nApril 2, 198'\n\n[S. MURTAZA\n\nFAZAL ALI, A. YARADARAJAN\n\nAND\n\nRANGNATH.\n\nMISRA, JJ.]\n\nEleclion Lo•s-Corrupt P; ac1ict. aJlgotiQn of;_StantMrd of proof must\n\nb~ prnved s1ric1Jy at a crimhsal char1e a\"fd lhe p. i1cipJe of prepond.:ra11C<!. of\n\nprobabi.dlits woUJJ Ml app.I> tothtt Rtpresenta1ion of tht People A(f, I 9Sl- Cred1bil( .v a.1d rtlvaf!ct: Of Nt\"'s item pub/1shtd ApplicaliJn-1•/ the principle 'of Jnut1.do-Rtprstn ation of Iht P1oplt Act, J9jJ, Sttrion-.J 2:J (4} 1 scope of.\n\nl.J tbe oloction to the A1scmb1y consituehcy No -31 J_ullundur Cntt., which. -was held on 31.S 1980, the total Voles polled from the cons.1itueacy ·· were 47t>50, out of which the appellantpolled 19710, whereas te res~\n\npo:ldnt Yash secured 41_8 voco1. more i.e. 20118 vqtes.\n\nTherefor.e, the appe11ant+sou1b.t to challcn10 \\he clcctioa of Respon.:11nt No. l on-various grounds c005-i•tin• of corrupt practio:es com:iliSted by .res;:toodent No. 1 wb, ch materially affected the result of the election.· 1\\cCording to the \"app:llartt,. Re&, oad.m1 No . .I thr0uah spec.ches ci thcr ma.de by him or his\n\nff1end carded out a vilhfyi.na ca.mpai111_ to show that he appellant was directly connected Wt1h the murd\" of one Asa Rai1 a ha\"r.ijan and one of\n\nth•; supporters of Cona:rffs ll) party, 50 as to w.eaa away the votes of the hanj-1ns of th_e locality and tnembers of the Conaress (l) party. The Punjab and H:lry3-n1 -High Court disbelieved the 9!al vidence and found no nexus with tbc riews items etc. and dii.miid the election petition.\n\nHence the appealb'y special leaYc.\n\nHELD L 1 It is well soa1ed that where the doctrine of iouendo is applied, it m11Jt be clearly proved that the defamatory alteaation -was m3de ia rCp_ect of a person thoUgh rio~ named Jet so fully described -that•\n\ntile allegation wOUtd refer to that. person and that person alone. lnuendo cannot be proved merely by inFerentiJ.I evidence whih 'm:i.y be capable of two possibilities. [386F-G]\n\n1. 2 ln the instant case, the evidence.statement pf.. witnesses aad the documents produced,- do not can for ar{y. inference Qr any close COn9ection or direct iink between the imputations made against the appellarit in 1978 and those made in 1980.\n\nIn none of the documents produced by the 3ppellant whicb °refer to the activities of the_ first respondent,\"' there is the\n\nslightest possible hint that th• appellant had anything to do with tho\n\nmuder of Aia Ram.\n\nFurther more, the allegadons made in 1978 being far too remote and there being no cootinuou~ link between those allega- . tions.and the allegati0115 made io 1980, thC first c1tcgory of the cbarse\n\n11gaiost 'tb-e respondent cannot be sustained, more particularly because in\n\n38 3',\n\n. .\n\n' SUPREME COURTS REPORTS\n\n. [1984] 3 S.C.R\"\n\n1978. a fre&h election was not in the offina because .th.e Jznata' GOvernent came into.power iq 1977 and._in normal course would have completed its fuJI term~ in ~82_ ... Thus, ac that tinlno bp~1 coiil~ have predicted that the election would be held only two ye'ars Jter which happened by a suddtn spurt of events.\n\n~386E--F; G-H]\n\nN. Vimala [Jevi v. K •• Madhusudhana Reddy [1975] 3. S.C.R. 128 Jo!lowed.\n\n2.J It is'now well settled by Eevcral aufkorities of the Sup1eme\n\nourt. t~1 an -aUe8a1iqn of: corrupt Practice musi be proved as. :stric tlY as a 1=rirninal charge and the principle of prepondertnce of .probaf:?iliti .es woutd not apply'- to corrupt practices envisaged by the Act because if th1 s test is no(applied a very sericus prtjudi.ce would be caused to the elected candidate who may be diqualified _for period of six years f1 om fight in& any election, whiCCh will adversely affect the elctoral process. !.JB7F-G]\n\n2.2 In the instant case, ths evidence.both oral and documentary_ .. Jed by the appellant falls short of the •tandard of proof required to bring his case within the four corners of.section 123 (4) of the Representatjon of\n\nth~ People Act 1951 (!) .• Aboutthe speech made on May 18, 1980, the deposition of PW8 ca'nnot be relied on inasmuch as it is i{qpolible to conceive of contradicti'On5 made by him..\n\nIf tho Witness a:pari from being 'interested and part jsan, had been Present in 'the meeting throughe_ut, he\n\nwould not forget whOspoke Brit.\n\nEv\"en PW J 3 c.annot. b~ believed since,. : white admittinjl in Iris cross exaniinatio.p: that he did not make a notc:d of Wh3t YB.sh had Sl)okcn, yet he was able to givr: \"full and grotesque details 'of t\"be .spcech 1 that toa, when he was exarnind in 'thecourt after more .thati a year and half.\n\n[390Q--D; ; J88B-D] ·\n\n3. It is very difficult for a Court to rely on , news items pi.iblished in ;:i:ny new!papCr <:n the basis of infrrnation given b, r crrespondents beC-ause that may .not represent the true state of affairs.\n\nIt is at best a secoDd , h•nd •econdary evidence.\n\n[388F-G]\n\n:samant N. Balkrishnt1 v. George Fernandez & Ors. f1969] 3 S.CR •\n\n. 603, reit~..fated.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JUR!SDICTiON : Civil Appeal No. 2691 of .· 1982.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated the 4th day of Jun'e, 1982 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Election Petition No. 2 of !980.\n\nAppllant in Person\n\nO .. P. Sharma, .K, R. llu1i11, R. t:. 6ub;'1~. and R. ·~ •. 'Bhqftt1, . for the Regpondents.\n\n,.\\...:\n\n' .\n\nMANMOHAN f<AtJA v. YASH (s. , pazalAli, J.)\n\nTh~ Ju13.n:nt of the Court was delivered by\n\nPAZAL Au, J. This election appeal is directed agaimt a judgment dated June 4, I 982 of the Punjab & Haryana High Court <lism'ssing the election petition filed by the appellant against the respondent. The present appeal arises out of an election to , the Assembly constituency No. 31-Jullundur Cantt., which wa~ held on 31. 5. 1980 and the result of which was declared on 3.6.1980.\n\nBoth the appdlanl and respondent No ... ) wee the main rival \"clnd'd3tes.\n\nTti: total votes pollea from the constituency were 47650, oqt of which the appellant polled 19710 whereas respondent No. 1 securd 20128' votes, the margin being rather small,\n\nVif'., 4JS. .\n\n• The appelhnt sought to challenge the election of respondent No. I on various grounds consisting of corrupt practices committed by him (respondent No. !}, which, according to the appelhnt,\n\n.mterially affected the result of th election.\n\nThe appellant, who is an Advocate, argued his case with brevity and ingenuity and fairly concedeathat l)e was not going . to press alJ. the allegations made inthe petition but would confine ·\n\nhis arguments only to the allegations pertaining to s. 123 (4) of : the Representation sif the People Act, 1951 (for short, to be referred to as the 'Act'). In orde' to understand the ambit and scope within the c?nfiites of which the appellant h1s argued his . case, it mw be necessir)' to extract sub-section (4)-\n\n\"The publication by a candidate or h!s agent or by\n\nmy other person, with the onsent Of a candidate or his' election agent, of any staten1ent of fact wh'ch is false, and which he either believes to b.e false or does not believe to . \"be true, in relation to the personal character or conduct of\n\nany candidate, or in relation to the candidature, or with-. drawal, o( any candidate, being a statement reasonably calculated to prejudice the prospects of that oondidate's\n\nelection.\" ·\n\nJn view of the concessions made by the appellant, the case lies within a very narrow compass. ']; he allegations made by the appellant against the respondent consist oftwo categories-,\n\n(I)' speeches having been made y , the respondent or his friends near about. the. time. of the electi6n and after the , respondent was , nominated as a candidate, which amounted\n\n'G.\n\nto serious character aisasination of the appellant by projec- . trng bimas a murderer of one Asa.Ram, who died as far\n\nback as 1978. ·\n\nAccording to the appellant, the respondent No. I carried out . a villifying compaign to show that be (appellant) was directly conneted with the aforesaid murder so as to wean way the vote~. of the harijans 9f the locality. and members of the Congress (I). part)' because Asa Rm was harijan an.d one of the supporters or Congress (I) party. Jn thi~ <;.onnection, the allegations made ma:ir be clased under t'Yo. separate categ()ries:. -\n\n(a) Utterances; speeches, 31e'l'(s items and articles regarding the allegation that •tho appellant was directly connected with tbe murder of Asa Ram in.1978, and ·\n\n(b} speeces 'and news item~ mde and issued by respondent N1>. 1 on varic us occasions proximate to the date of the election. ·\n\n(2)' Similar acts comm(tted by respondent No. I in closeproximity vto the election, i.e., sometime in May 1980_ After, hav!ng gone through the ovidonce. statemcnr.ofwitnesses. andt he ·.iocuments placed before us, weare. un.able to find any close connection or direct link beNeen the imputations n:iadc against the appelillnt in 1978 and those made in'l980. In none ofthedocui; nents produced by the 'appellant, which refer t6 the act.ivities of the firstrespondent, there is the slightest possible hint that the appellant had anything to do wilh tho murder of Asa Ram .. Realiiing. this diffiCl!ltY, the appellant sought the application of the doctrine of inµendo: It is well settled that where t.his doctrine is applied, it must be cl¢ar)y proved that the defamat9ry allegation was m.:i1le in respect of a person though not . nam.ed . Yet so fully described that the allegation would refer to. that person and that.\n\nprson alone.· ]nuendo canot b.e proved. '?rely by inferentiat evidence which may be capable of two po~1b1ht1es. Furthermore, the allegations made in l 978 being far to? remote and there being: no continuous link botween those al!egat1on9 aod the allegations. made in J 980, the first categor)' of the charge against the respon' dent cannot sustai, ned, more particularly because in. 1978 a. fresh election was not in . the offi!lg because the Janata Govern,\n\nent came into power in 1977 and in normal courae would have:> :rinpleted itsfuU term in 1982. Thus, at that time nobody could have.predicted that the elections .would be held only two yean .. later which happened by a , udden spurt of events.\n\n' --t .\n\n<.•\n\n)u.\n\n~·\n\nA..\n\n' j. •\n\n\" MANMOHAN KALIA v. YASH ( Fazal Ali, J.)\n\nIn these circumstances, we would place no reliance at all so far as the first category of the allegations against the respondenth is concerned. In N. Vimala Devi v. K. Madhusud!uma Reddy(1) this Court corrtpletely ruled out documents containmg instances of corrupt practice which had nothing to .do with the 1972 election with which their Lordships were concerned in that case and in.' this connection while overruling an important documeltt they observed thus : ·\n\n, \"We are not impressed by the argument on behalf of the. respondent that Ex. A-57, whiph shows that even in\n\n1970 a representation of a similar kind was made,' shows that there were many others out to besmirch the name of the appellant. Ex-A-57 contains many instanees which have nothingto do with the election in 1972'or the detting up of a Congress candidate in that election. T.hat is the affinity between Ex. A-48 and E, x-Al.\"\n\n' A\n\nOn a parity of reasoning, tl\\erefore, we cannot call into aid D the allegations made as far back as 1978. It is, therefore, not necessary for us to consider or to go into the 'evidence offered by • tlie appellant as far as the 1978 incident it concerned.\n\nComing now to the second category of allegations, as the appellant has confined his arguments only to the averments made regarding the application ofs. 123 (4) of the Act, the ambit of the case is greatly reduced.\n\nBefore examining the allegati'ons, we might mention that the learned election Jndge of the High Conrt had dealt with all the allegations and has given convincing and cogent reason§ for holding that they had not been proved either by oral or documentary evidence. It is now well settled by several authorities of this Court that an allegation of corrupt practice must be proved as .strictly as a criminal charge and the principle of preponderance of probabilities would not apply to corrupt practice envisaged by the Act because .if this test is not applied a very serious prejudice would be caused to the elected candidate who may be disqualified for a period of six years from fighting any election, which will adversely affect the electoral process.~\n\nKeeping in view, therefore, the strict standard of proof required in. such cases, we proceed to consider the evidence on which the appellant has relied in order to determine whether or not the corrupt practice alle$ed has been proved. In this connection, the first circ.uinstance stNssed before 11s was that a meeting\n\n(Jl [191s] 3 s.c, R,. 1;:s,\n\n,,.\n\n- \\ was convenea in Gopal Nagar, Ward No. 22, on May 18, 1980 where respondent No. 1 and, with his consent, his friend Sansar Chand, delivered fiery speeches connectmg the appellant with the •murder of Asa Ra!ll, which was deposed to by PWs 8 and 13.\n\nPW 8 has stated that he attended a meting on 18. 5. 80 at Bas ti Guzan. The. learned Judge disbelieved his evidence as being wholly improbable. Moreover, there is a .contradiction• in his evidence li'ecause at one place he says tl; l.at Yash (respondent .\n\nNo. 1) spoke first and was followed by Sansar Chand and yet at another place. he says. that Sansar Chand spoke first and w.as followed by Yash. It is. impossible to conceive of such a co~ trad}ction if .the witness apart from being interested and partisan, had been present in the meeting throughout, he would not forget the sequence of such 2n important matter. Another witness relied upon by the appellant was PW 13 who has also been dis believed by the learned Judge, and he had admitted in his cross examination that he did not make a note of what Yash had spoken and yet.he was able to give fult and grotesque details of the speech when he was examined in the court, after more than a year and a half. Furthermore, _he states that when he talked to the appellant he was told that the respondent already knew about the meeting. this shows that the appellant himself did not take this witness very seriously. We, therefore, entirely agree with the appreciation of the evidence of these two witnesses made by the learned High Court Judge.\n\nThe evidence of.PWs 8 and 13, however, is alleged to have been corroborated by a news item published in an Urdu-daily 'Milap' whose Chief Sub-Editor (PW 5) was examined by, the • appellant. But the witness far from supporting his case has deposed that he had absolutely no personal knowledge of the Report'made by Prnshar which was published on 24.5.80. M; ore, over, it is very difficult for a court to rely on, new; jtems published on the information given by correspondents because that may not represent the true state of affairs.\n\nIn Samant N. Ba!akrishna etc. v. George Fernandez..&> Ors. eta. (l) while dwelling on the relevance and credibility of such type of news items. this Court made the fqJlowing observations :\n\n\"The best proof would have been his own speech or soine propaganda ma, terial such as leaflets or pamphlets etc., but none was produced ...... A news item without any fur- • ther proof of what had actually happened through witnesses is of no value. It is at bes\\ a secondha1,1d secondary evi-\n\n(1) (1969] 3 S.<;.R.~603.\n\n.. Jr\n\n... •\n\nMANMOHAN KALiA v. YA.SH (Faza!.A/i, J.)\n\ndence. It is well-known that reporters collect information and pass it on to the editor who edits the news item and then publishes it. In. this process the trnth m\\ght i; et\n\nperverted or garbled: Such news items canuot be said to pcove themselves although they may be taken into account with other evidence if the other evidence is forcible,\"\n\nIn the instant case, there is no evidence to show the actual record of the speech made by respondent No. I or Sansar Chand and, therefore, the said news item does. not advance the case of the appellant any further, particularly when it has been stoutly denied by respondent No. I and PW 5.\n\nReliance was also placed on another news item (Ex. PW 25/4) appearing on 20-. 5. 80 which also has to be rejected on the same gronnd as the firstitem •\n\n. The learned Judge has rightly pointed out in his judgment that PW 25, after he was shown the newspaper dated 12. 5. 80 (Ex. PW 25/3), has said that he did not know anything else, that is to say, neither the correspondent revealed the source from which he got the information nor does he ay that he was actually present when the speeches were delivered. On the other.hand, RW-3, Dev Raj Puri, had clearly stated that certain changes were made in the items which he had filed and this statement of RW3 was n<)t challenged .\n\nThus, the evidence furnished oy the aforesaid items is also of little value to the appellant. On the same principles of reasoning the reports ot the meetings published in 'Milap' regarding the\n\nspeeches delivered on 17th and 28th May 1980 also suffer from the F same infirmity.\n\nStrong reliance was placed on the document, Ex. R W-24, which had been admitted by the first respondent.\n\nWe have gone . through the entire speech published in the daily 'Milap' on 18.5.80\n\nand we do not find even a •ingle word to connect the appellant with the murder of Asa Ram.\n\nIn fact, the entire speech repro duced in the said Paper does not at all show that the speaker, viz., the first respondent, made any reference to the appellant at all.\n\nIll these circumstances, therefore, even the appellant himself had to admit before us that as the text of the speech has been reprodu. ced, no allegation has been made against him. ·\n\nThe appella11t, h9wever, tried in vain to argue that the afore-\n\nA said speech would amount t9 inuendo because it has expressly referred to the drcumstances under which Asa Ram was murdered. By no stretch of imagination can the doctrine of inuendo be invoked to the aforesaid .speech. We therefore, reject this contention also.\n\n. ,,\n\nAfter a careful consideration of the documents, the circum- . stances of' the case and the oral evidence of the witnesses placed before us. We find ourselves in agreement with the judgment of . the High Court. Indeed, it is very difficult to prove a charge of\n\ncorrupt practice merely on the basis. of ornl evidence because in . election cases, it is very easy to get the help of interested witnesses but very difficult ro prove charges of corrupt practice. Iu the instant case, the evidence-both oral and documentary-led by. the appellant falls short of'the standard of proof required to bring his case within the four corners f s. 123 (4) of the Act.\n\nWe must, however, record our appreciation of the crisp and candid manner ill which this case has been presented before us by the appellant.\n\n. ·~: . .\n\nFor the reasOl)S given above; the judgment of the High Court is affirmed and . the appeal is dismissed but in the circumstances without any order ils to costs. ·\n\nS. R ..\n\nAppeal dismissed •\n\n...", "total_entities": 30, "entities": [{"text": "MANMOHAN KAUA\n", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 20, "end_char": 34, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MANMOHAN KALIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ASH & OTHERS\n", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 37, "end_char": 50, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "YASH & OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 79, "end_char": 88, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MISRA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 122, "end_char": 132, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RANGANATH MISRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 216, "end_char": 218, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S 1980", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 629, "end_char": 635, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Asa Rai1", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1252, "end_char": 1260, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".I thr0uah spec.ches ci thcr ma.de by him or his\n\nff1end carded out a vilhfyi.na ca.mpai111_ to show that he appellant was directly connected Wt1h the murd\" of one Asa Rai1 a ha\"r.ijan and one of\n\nth•; supporters of Cona:rffs ll) party, 50 as to w.eaa away the votes of the hanj-1ns of th_e locality and tnembers of the Conaress (l) party.", "canonical_name": "Asa Rai1"}}, {"text": "Aia Ram", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2458, "end_char": 2465, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In none of the documents produced by the 3ppellant whicb °refer to the activities of the_ first respondent,\"' there is the\n\nslightest possible hint that th• appellant had anything to do with tho\n\nmuder of Aia Ram.", "canonical_name": "Asa Rai1"}}, {"text": "section 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3912, "end_char": 3923, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "People Act 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3958, "end_char": 3973, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "pazalAli,", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5319, "end_char": 5328, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MANMOHAN f<AtJA v. YASH (s. , pazalAli, J.)\n\nTh~ Ju13.n:nt of the Court was delivered by\n\nPAZAL Au, J. This election appeal is directed agaimt a judgment dated June 4, I 982 of the Punjab & Haryana High Court <lism'ssing the election petition filed by the appellant against the respondent."}}, {"text": "PAZAL Au", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5379, "end_char": 5387, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MANMOHAN f<AtJA v. YASH (s. , pazalAli, J.)\n\nTh~ Ju13.n:nt of the Court was delivered by\n\nPAZAL Au, J. This election appeal is directed agaimt a judgment dated June 4, I 982 of the Punjab & Haryana High Court <lism'ssing the election petition filed by the appellant against the respondent."}}, {"text": "s. 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6511, "end_char": 6517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation sif the People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6531, "end_char": 6570, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Asa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7722, "end_char": 7725, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "trng bimas a murderer of one Asa."}}, {"text": "Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7726, "end_char": 7729, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram, who died as far\n\nback as 1978. ·"}}, {"text": "Asa Ram", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8343, "end_char": 8350, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(a) Utterances; speeches, 31e'l'(s items and articles regarding the allegation that •tho appellant was directly connected with tbe murder of Asa Ram in.1978, and ·\n\n(b} speeces 'and news item~ mde and issued by respondent N1>.", "canonical_name": "Asa Rai1"}}, {"text": "Sansar Chand", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12798, "end_char": 12810, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 and, with his consent, his friend Sansar Chand, delivered fiery speeches connectmg the appellant with the •murder of Asa Ra!ll, which was deposed to by PWs 8 and 13.", "canonical_name": "Sansar Chand"}}, {"text": "Asa Ra!ll", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 12881, "end_char": 12890, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 and, with his consent, his friend Sansar Chand, delivered fiery speeches connectmg the appellant with the •murder of Asa Ra!ll, which was deposed to by PWs 8 and 13."}}, {"text": "18. 5. 80", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12976, "end_char": 12985, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PW 8 has stated that he attended a meting on 18."}}, {"text": "Sansar Chand", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13280, "end_char": 13292, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that Sansar Chand spoke first and w.as followed by Yash.", "canonical_name": "Sansar Chand"}}, {"text": "Yash", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 13326, "end_char": 13330, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that Sansar Chand spoke first and w.as followed by Yash."}}, {"text": "Yash", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13740, "end_char": 13744, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Another witness relied upon by the appellant was PW 13 who has also been dis believed by the learned Judge, and he had admitted in his cross examination that he did not make a note of what Yash had spoken and yet.he was able to give fult and grotesque details of the speech when he was examined in the court, after more than a year and a half."}}, {"text": "Prnshar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14544, "end_char": 14551, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But the witness far from supporting his case has deposed that he had absolutely no personal knowledge of the Report'made by Prnshar which was published on 24.5.80."}}, {"text": "24.5.80", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14575, "end_char": 14582, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But the witness far from supporting his case has deposed that he had absolutely no personal knowledge of the Report'made by Prnshar which was published on 24.5.80."}}, {"text": "20-. 5. 80", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16041, "end_char": 16051, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PW 25/4) appearing on 20-."}}, {"text": "12. 5. 80", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16232, "end_char": 16241, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Judge has rightly pointed out in his judgment that PW 25, after he was shown the newspaper dated 12."}}, {"text": "Dev Raj Puri", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 16501, "end_char": 16513, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the other.hand, RW-3, Dev Raj Puri, had clearly stated that certain changes were made in the items which he had filed and this statement of RW3 was n<)t challenged ."}}, {"text": "17th and 28th May 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16862, "end_char": 16884, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the same principles of reasoning the reports ot the meetings published in 'Milap' regarding the\n\nspeeches delivered on 17th and 28th May 1980 also suffer from the F same infirmity."}}, {"text": "s. 123", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18525, "end_char": 18531, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_3_391_406_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "UNION OF INDIA & ANR\n\nAVTAR SINGH & ANR .\n\n• April 4, 1984\n\n(D. A. DESAI, A.P. SEN AND V. BALAKRISHNA E~AD!, JJ.]\n\nPunjab Refugees (RegiJtration of Land Claims). A ct; 1948-s. 33- Revisional ppwer 'of Central Government-Scope of-Whether can be ex'ercised repeatedly.\n\nOne Harnam Singh, filther of the respondents, was owner of some agricultural land in the erstwhile Siad Province now forming part of Pakistan.\n\nAfter the partition of the country he along with his wife and three sons migrated to India.\n\nAs displaced person, J:ie lodged a claim on March\"lS, 194g in respect of his entire holding on Pakistan.\n\nOn the introduction of the Punj.ab Refugees' (Registration of'La.nd Claims) Act,\n\n1948. on April 3, 1948 the said Harnam Singh, his sons and. his wife filed separate claims alh; ging that in 1946 there was an oral partition of the land which origioaIJy belonged to Ha.roam Singh.\n\nThe claims were\n\nverifid and allotments were made in favour of each claimant.\n\nThe Chief Settlement Commissioner rejected a .reference from the department and by his order dated August 21, 1961 held the allotments to be valid.\n\nApprehending that tlle claim of ownership of I.and in Sind and the partitioD. between himself, his sons and his wife and the allotnicnt of land was being reexamiped, on March 13, 1962 Haroam Singh submitted a\n\nrepresenation to the Government of India for issuing a direction under s. 33 of the Act that the matter be treated as finally settled.\n\nOn this representation, Shri N. _P. Dube, Joint Secretary to the Governmentof India, Department of .Rehabilitation wrote a D. 0. let1er dated Ma)' 31,\n\nJ 96f to Shri J.• M. Tandon, Deputy Secretary to the Government\" of Puojab, Rehabilitation Department, saying, inter alia.- c'that there is no ' polnt in \\\\aitii1g any more and the mater should be finalised on lhe basis of the judical findings arrived t in the case.\n\nWe also feel that there are no reasons to differ from those judicial pronouncemeots at this stage~ The record received from the Punjab Government is, theefore, returned with thC request that the case may be finalised as mentioned above\".\n\nIt appears \"thaf the Managing Officer of the Rehabilitation Departinent, Punjab Goeernment sublllittd a 'note to moVe the Central Government under s. 3 3 of the Act for reopening and cancellation of the order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner dated August 21, 1961.\n\nThereupon a notice was issued to the allotees calling upon them to show cause why the order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner datod August 21, 1961 should not be set aside and allotment in .favour of each of them should\n\n. . 392\n\n~.:\n\nsUPREMll COURT REPORTS . !1984} 3 s.c.R .\n\nnot be cancel1ed.\n\nThe al!otees contended that since.the power of revision conferred by s. 33 of the Ac~ had already been exercised by the Central Government. the same pow.Jr Qf revisioncould not be.repeatedly exercjsed particularly when no fresh material against the allotees was prOduced after the ee).rlier decision.\n\nUltimately a Joint Secretary to the Government of India exercising Power of revision conferred bys. 33 by his order dated March 15; 1965 quashed and set aside the order of the Chief Settlement Comniissioner datd August 21, 1961 and further directed that the .allotment of land in favour of Harbans Siog!'t~ bi~ sons and his wif~ be cancelled and that a fresh' allotment be made on the fc;>oting that Harnam Singh alone was_ the owot:_r of lb~ Ian~ situated in Sind.\n\nThe validity of the order dat'd March 15, 1965 of the Joint Secretary was challenged in the.Higb, Court by two sons of Harnam Singh, respondents in this apptaJ. roadly agreeing with the view taken bya learned o&in8; le Ju.dge, a Division Bench while dismissing the Letters: Patent appeal in the High Court, held that the D. 0. Le\\ter of the Joint Secretary dated May 31, .1963 conveyed the decision of the Government of India in exercise. of powers under s. 33 and therefore, the power of revision against the order : of the Chief Settlement Commissioner was eXhaustedbecause.a quasi .. judicial tribunal bad no power to revise or review its earncr decision on merltS even if the earlier decision was wrong on facts OJ law. Acc, ordingly , th.e.High Court eldthat the impugn, ed order of the Go.vrnm:nt df.India •ctated March 15, 1965 waswitbout jurisdiction and w.5 invalid and' of -no lega~ effi.C!fY Hence this appeal.\n\nAllowing the appeal,\n\nHELD : The. contention that he power of revision cannot bo repea tedly exercised and finality must attach to the orders would necessilat .. an examination iil depth rof the nature and extent of power conferred by section 33 of the Punjab Refugees (Registrati.on of Claims) Act, 1!>48 which enables the Central Government to revise nd reopen any proeceeding under be Act and to pass any Order in relation thereto as in the opU:tion of the Central Governmenl the circumstances of the -case i'equire\n\nand a& is not-inGonsistent with any of the provisions contained in the Act or the Rules4Dade thereunder.\n\nBut in the facts of the 4present case it is not necessafy to undertake this exercise.\n\nThe Court would proceed on the assumption that section 33 of the Act does not provide reservoir .of power from which revisional jurisdiction.can b~ exercised more than once in.respect of the same order or the same proceeding. [403E-F]\n\nJn the instarit case the questic~ which would squarely arise is .wbe . ther on an earlier occasion, tbe Central Government h::d exercised any r.evisional power cenferred by section 33 in tespect of the order dated -August 21, 1961 of the Chief Seltlet'nent Col'pmissioner.\n\nIn other .Words, whether, as contended by the appellants, the letter of Shri N. P. Dube, Joint Secretary dated May 31, 1963 is a decision recorded by the Central Governnlcnt in exetcise of .the power conferred by section 33 7 The letter of Mr. Dube dated May 31, 1963 does not record any decision of the Central Government.\n\nIt merely says that it is not necessary to wait any tnore fQr r.espons~ to the queries addreSsed to authorities in .Pakistan and\n\n~· ..\n\n.· .\n\n• -\"\n\n. ,\n\n• UNION v. A vTAR SINGH (Desai, J.) 393 • the matter should be finalised .on the basis of finding-arrived at in tbe A case.\n\nIL further proceeds to aver that there is a feeling that there is no ,.q reason to differ from those judicial pronou11ce.ments at 'this stage'.\n\nSuch . expression of feelingcould hardly tentamount to a decision of the Ceptral Government under Sec. 33. By this letter the Central 'Government lnformed~\n\nthe Government of Punjab that the record is -returned with the request that the case may b~ finalised as indicated in the letter.\n\nThe rev, isional B power is tl1e po, vcr of the Central Government and not of the Punjab Government.\n\nThe decis.ion was Jeft to the Punjab Government. There was nothing pending with the Punjab 9overnment for finalisation Therefore, the High Court was clearly in error in tteq.ting, the letter of Shri Dube dated May 31, 1963 as a decision of the Central Government in\n\nexercise of the power conferred by Sec. 33. There was no occasion for the Central Government to exercise power under Sec. 33 and therefore, C it is not possible to agree with the, Righ Court that the letter records the decision of the Central Government under sec, 33. If the letter of Shri Dube is not a decision al the Central Government uDder Sec. 33 of the .' Act. as a necessary coro11ary, the impugned decision must be treated as one renderer. for the first time in exercise of the revisional power under Sec. 33 and therefore, it cannot be said to be one without jurisdiction.\n\n(403 G; 404 A; F_:G; 405 B-E] 0\n\n'D. N. Roy and S. K. Bannerjee & Ors.\n\nv. State of Bihar ·&Ors. (1971] 2 S.C.R. s2'2.\n\nIf every litigant in whose favour a competent authority has made an order can still appn1ach the bighei authority for the affirmanCe of the orJer witbont any rhyme or reason, the whole gamut of power of revisional jurisdiction )VOUld become a play thing for already successful party who muy fOreclose the decision and when needed can successfully urge that lhe power of revision is exhausted.\n\n[404 E-F]\n\nCivIL APPELLATE JURisDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 503 of 1971.\n\n. From the Judgme11t and Order dated 2-2.5.1969 of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in LP.A. No. 384 of 1966.\n\nM.M. Abdul Khader and Ms. A. Subhashinifor the appellants.\n\n P.P. Rao foF the Respondent No. I and R.S. Bindra and Har G bans Singh for respondent No. 2.\n\nThe Judgment of the .Court was delivered by\n\nDEs~1, J. Avfa~ Singh and Dr .. Kartar Singh two sons of S.Harnam Singh filed Civil Write No. 1242 of. 1965 against their fathers. H,;;\\rnam Singh, respondent No. 2 and Union of India and Tehsildar cum Managing Officer, respondents Nos. I and 3 res\n\n'394\n\n. E\n\nSUPRm.iE COURT REPORTS .U984] 3 s.c.lt.\n\npectively questioning the correctness and vali<lity of an order dated March 15, oi96~, Anneimre 'G' to the petition.\n\nS. Hanam Singh was the owner of agdcultural land compri sed in DehNo.)00 as also a portion of the land included in Qoh No. 99 situated in District Nawab Shah, in erstwliile Sind Pr0vi-. nee now forming part .of Pakistan. Harnam Singh hd three sons : Avtar singh, Dr. Kartar Singh and Hu bans Singh. Smt.\n\nTej Kaur was the wife of Harnam Singh. It was alleged that ia the year 1946 Harnam Singh dfected a partition of agricultural land between himself, his three sons and hi\"s wife Smt. Tej Kaur each being given an almost equal share. It was alleged thaf intimation of the alleged partition was sent to the revenue authorities of Sind Province with a request to effect necessary mutation .in the revenu\\records showing land as haying been given in the partition to the particular person .. After the partition oft)le conn- .· try S. Harnam Singh his three sons and hi; wife migrated to India and they claim to be displaced persons. ' Harnam Singh lodged a claim on March 15, 1948 in respect 6.f the entire land including the Jand belonging to •the heirs of Ch. Attar Singh who was his father-in-iaw. Later on, on April 21, 1948 Harnam Singh intimated to the ehabilitation Authorities that out of a total claim of 300 acres of land lodged y him, about 75 acres of land• was of ti)e ownership of Ch. Attar Singh and confine?! his clai111 to•the total area of 225 acres of land. It may be mentioned that in the claim lodged on March 1,5, 1948 there was no reference to the partition effected by Harnam Singh between himself his sons and his wife.\n\nOn the introduction of the Punjab Re.fugees (Registration of Ljtnd Claims) Act, 1948 ('Act' for short) on April 3, 194S Harnam Singh and his sons as also Smt. Tej Kaur filed separate claims ~µ the basis of the partition of the land which originally belonged to .s. Harnam Singh. It was alleged that .these claims were verified and allotments of land were made to th.e extent of 21-8 standard\n\nacre~ in favont of each claimant on temporary liasis. On October\n\n5, 1953, Harnam Singh and his sons approached the .authorities in the Rehabilitation Department' to convert temporary allotment into quasi-permanent allotment. Deputy Registrar °Land. Claims accepted the request of Harnam Singh and his sons, both with regard to the ownership of the land as well as partition thereof amongst various members of the family.\n\nI!owever, it was recomended that on the basis of the revjsed calculations, each claimant would be entitled to 19-LH S.A. of land instead of 21-8 S.A. and the excess allotment should be cancelled This recommenda; tion was approved by the competent antho.rity vide its order dated,\n\n. .J • •\n\n. I\"\n\nUNION v. AVTAR SiNGH (l>esai, J.) • October 28, 1953 as also by the Deputy Custodian of Evacuee Property as per its order dated November 11, 1953. Conseqirently\n\nexcess allotment of 8-14, l . standard a.ores in respect of five claimants was cancelled and the remaining allotment was ordered to be made on cjuasi-permane1if basis.. It was alleged that later on proprietary rights were conferred on each claimant in respect of . the land allotted to him by the Managing Officer. Some time in\n\n39S\n\n1960, a notice was received by the allottees from ihe Chief Settlement Commissioner1 Punjab calling upon them to show cause why their allotment should not be cancelled. In view of the notice, it became necessary for the allottees to eatabhsh not only the ownership of land in Sind but the partition thereof amongst themselves. The allottees claimed that they offered the necessary proof which satisfied the Chief Settlement Commissioner who had issued notice on the basis of Jamabandi entries received from Pakistan.\n\nAccordingly the Chief Settlementcommissjoner by his rder dated . August 21, 1961 c_onfirmed the allotment, directed conferment of quasi-permanent status and rejected the departmental reference.\n\nSomewhere in October 1961 , Harnam Singh apprehended that the claim to ownership of land in Sind and the partition between\n\nhimself, his sons and his wife and the allotment of land was being re-examined whereupon on March 13, 1962 he submitted a representation to the Government of India for issuing a direction under Section 33 of the Act that the matter be treated as finally .. settled. It is alleged.that on this representation, the Government\n\nof India sent for the record of the whole case, called for the comments of the Punjab Rehabilitation Department which led Land Claims Officer to forward his note dated October 27, 1961 to the Government of India alongwith the whole record of the case. It' is alleged that the case was examined and the Joint Secretary 'to the Government of India, Ministiy of Rehabiiitation, one Shri Dube, conveyed the decision. of the Govrn ment of India to the Deputy Secretary to the Government of Punjab, Rehabilitation. Department, Jullundur vide his D.O.\n\nLetter No. 13(66) L&R0-62 dated May 31, 1963 with certain observations which it is alleged tend to ; how that the power of revision under Sec. 33 was ex_ercised and. both, the holding of the land in Sind, partition thereof betwen, Harnam Singh, his sons and his wife and the allotment of land to them as displaced persons in India were considered as valid and finally settled. It appears that the Managing Officer of the Rehabilitation Department, Punjab\n\nGovernment submitted a. note dated November 5, 1963 to move the Central Government under Sec. 33 of the Act for cancellatiou ·\n\nof the order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner dated 11.ugust\n\n~- B\n\nD ..\n\n. SUPRBMB COURT REPORTS\n\n21, 1961. 1hereupon the Chief Settlement Comissioner issued a notice da!ed May 21, 1964 to the ~Ilottees calling upon them to show cause why allotment in favour of each of them should not be cancelled The allottees appeared and submitted .their objections . to the re-opening of the cas_e inter alia contending that the power of revision conferred by Sec. 33 of the Act cannot be repeatedly exercise and it having been earlier exercised and the al!otfilent having been held to be valid as Per the letter of Shri Dube dated , May 31, 1963, the Central Government had no jurisdictio11 either to revise or review its previous decision more prticularly when no fresh material -against the allottees is produced after the earlier decisio11. Ultimately the Joint Secretary of the 6overn- -ment of India exercising power of revision co11ferred by Sec. 33 . by his order ilated March 15, 1965 Annex. G to the writ petition\n\nquashed and set aside the order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner .dated August 21, 1961 and. further directed that the allotment of lal)d in favour of Harnani Singh, his sons and his wife be cancelled and that a fresh allottnent be made on the footing that Harnam Singh alone was the owner of the land situated in Sind.\n\nIn other words, the claim that each sons of Harnam Swgh ha\\i acquired land on partition was rejected as untenable. Thereupon, two sons of Harnam Singh, Shri Avtar Singh and Dr. Kartar Singh filed Civil Writ Ptition in the High Court of Punjab at Chandigarh.\n\nAn affidavit in opposition was filed on behalf of respondent Nos. I and 3 by one A. G. Vaswani, Settlement Commissioner (A) & Ex-Officio Under Secretary to the Gvernment of India, Ministry of Labour Employment & Rehabilitation inter a/ia contending that in April 1948 when for the first time Shri Harnam Singh lodged his claim a~ displaced person against the loss of his land and property, in Pakistan, he had categorically stated that 225 acres _of land situated in Sind belonged to him and there was no express or implied, overt or covert reference or even a whisper of a partition between himself and .his sons and wife before he migrated to lni!ia. 'It was also contended that the claim lodged by Harnam Singh in Aplil, _ 1948 was attested by Shri Harnam Singh, then Deputy Custpdidn of Evacuee Property, East Punjab and at the relevant time Judge.· of the Punjab High Court. It is alleged tbat on the basis of the alleged partition, separate claims were lodged for the first time in Jum; 1948 each claiming\n\n48 acres of land which was reduced to 32 acres. It was specifically contended that tJu, separate claims on the basis of\n\n\\llleed oral partition were an after thohugt and wre submitted '\n\nUN'roli v. A VTAR SINGH (Desai, J.)\n\nto escape a higher graded cut under the Quasi-permanent Allotment Scheme. Other averments in the affidavit are hardly releyant.\n\nWith respect to the D. 0. Letter of Shri Dube, it was stated that the opinion expressed in it was not a judicial decision in exercise of the revisionai jurisdiction under Sec. 33 of the Act nor could it constitute an exercise of power under Sec. 33 of the Act. It was submitted that the revis; onal power was exercised for the first time when the allotment was cancelled and a direction was given for fresh allotment on the basis that Harnam Singh alone, was the owne1: of the land situated in Sind.\n\nThe wr.it petition came up before a learned Single Judge of the High Court. The learned Judge by his Judgment and order dafed October 4, 1966made the rule absolute and quashed the : order dated March 15, 1965.\n\nThe Union of India prefer1 ed Letters Patent Appeal No. 384 of I 966 . which was heard by a Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court. 1 he Di vision Bench broadly agreed with the view taken by the learned Single Judge that the 'D. 0. letter . of Shri Dube dated May 31, 1963 conveyed the decision of the Government of India in exercise of powers under Sec. 33 and therefore, the power of revision against the order of the Chief Settlement Commissicne'11 was exhausted because a quasi-judicial tribunal has no p'ower to revise or review hs earlier decis on on merits even if the 'earlier decision is wrong on facts or law'.\n\nAccordingly, while dismissing the L.P. Appeal the High Court held that the impugneo order of the Government of India dated March 15, 1965 was without jurisdiction and was invalid and bf no legal efficacy. Hence this appeal byspecial leave by the Union of India.\n\n• Mr. Abdul Khader, learned counsel for the appellant urged that the High Couri was in error in treating D. O. letter No~ 33 (66)/L&R0-62 of Shri N._ P. Dube dated May 31, 1963 as a decision reached or. re.corded in exercise of the power conferred by Section 33 so as to cxhailst'the power of.revision. Consequently, it, was urged that the High C<, mrt was in error in holding that the aecision of the Central Government dated March 15, 1965 was without jurisdiction. ·\n\nChronology of events and the assertion and counter assertion would reveal that controversy centres ronnd the nature and cha-. racter of the letter dated May 31, 1963 of Shri N. P. Dube, Joint\n\nsUPREME COURT REPOR'fS\n\n[1984) 3 S.C.R.\n\nSecretary to Shri J.M. Tandon, Deputy Secretary to the Government of Punjab, Rehabilitation Department, Jullundur.\n\nMore specifically the question is whether it was an inter-departmental c.ommunication or it was the decision 1ecorded in exercise of the power conferred by Sec. 33 of the Act? If it was not a decision recorded by the Central Government in exercise ot the power conferred. under Sec. 33 the judgment of the High Court would be unsustainable.\n\nThe Act as its long title shows was enacted to provide for the payment o( compensation and rehabilitation grants to displaced .. persons and for matters connected therewith: Consequent upon the pllrtition of the country, there was migration of population both the ways. Large number ofresidents of atea now forming part of Pakistan migrated to India and there was also a flow in the reverse direction-. Those who migrated under those tragic, traumatic and compulsive circumstances were forced to leave their properties at the place t)ley were settled for generations. Both India and Pakistan were faced with a huge pro):ilem of settling persons thus displaced. In order_ to compensate such displaced . persons who were uprooted out of their abodes, the Act was enacted.\n\nSec. 2 (b) defines 'displaced. person' to mean 'any person who, on account of the setting up of' the Dominions. of India and Pakistan, or pn account of civil disti.Jrbapces or the fear of such disturbances in any area now forming part of West Pakistan, has, . after the first day of March, 1947, left, or been di6placed .from, his place of residence in suc'h area and who has been subsequently residing in India, and incluc!'es any person who. is resident in any place now forming .part of India.and who for that reason is unable or has been tendered unable to manage, supervise or control any immovable property belonging to him in West Pakistan, and also includes the sqccessors-ininterest of any such person.' 'Evccuee property'_ has been defined in Sec. 2 (cJ to mean 'any pro perty which has been declared or is di:emed to have been declared as evacuee property under the A4ministration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950.' Sec, 14 of the Act envisages constitution of a compensation pool .which shall consist of evacuee proprty both.in cash and kind.\n\nSec. 4 requires all displaced persons having a verified claim to make applications for the payment of c()mpensation. Sec. 7 casts a duty on the Settlement Commissio11er to make an enquiry in such maruter as may be prescribed and having due regard to the . prescribed scales of compensation, the nature .of the verified\n\nuNioN ' AVTAR SINGH (Desai, J.)\n\nclaim'and other circumstances of the case, to ascertain the amount of 'compensation to which the applicant is entitled. After following the procedure prescribed m several sub-sections of Sec. 7, the Settlement Commissioner has to make an order determining net amount of compensation, if any, payable . to the applicant. • Sec. 8 prescribes the form and manner of payment of compensation. Compensation.can be paid in cash, in Government bonds, _,; by sale to the displaced person of any property from the compen- \" sation pool and setting off the purchase money against the compensation payable to hi111 etc. Sec. 22 provides for appeal against the order of tho Settlement Officer or . a Managing Officer to the Settlement Commissioner as the case may be, in such form anc\\ manner as may. be prescribed. Sec. 23 provides for an appeal against the orders of the Settlemnt Commissioner. or the Additional Settlement Commissioner or an Assistant Settlement Commissioner to the Chfef Settlement Commissioner in such form ..... (· and manner as may be prescribed, with this proviso that no appeal shall lie from any order passed in appeal under Sec. 22. The next important section material for the present appeal is Sec. 33 which reads as under:-\n\n\"33 : The Central Government may at any time call for the record of any pro; eeding under the Act ad may pass such order in relation thereto as in its opinion the circumstances of the case. require and as is not inconstent with any of the provis; ons containe<I in the Act or the rnles made thereunder.\"\n\nHaving noticed the relevant provisions, certain facts may be reiterated. Harnam Singh a displaced person submitted a land claim on March 15, 1948 at Delhi for an area of 300 acre, S said to have been abandoned by him in Nasrat Tehsil, district Nawabshah 'in Sind. He filed another claim at Jullundur on April 1, 1948, reducing , his claim to 225 acres. On July. 13, 1948, Harnam\n\n Singh and his three son~ Kartar Singh, Avtar Singh and Harbans Singh and his wife.Sm!. Tej Kaur lodged separate claims each for 48 acres of land in lieu of land alleged to have been abandoned by each one of them in Pakistan. There was a modified claim submitted on Febrnary 22, 1949. The' difference b.etween the first and the second claim arises from the altered tand adopted by the claimants. Initially Harnam Singh claimed to be. the exclusive owner of 225 acres of land but when separate claims were sub- . lliltted by hi~ three sons [ind his wifo it was alleged that thre was orapl artition. of the property belonging to Harnam Singh betwee~\n\nJJ'\n\nIi •\n\nStjPRllMll COURT IUlPORTS [1981] j s.c.ti.\n\nhimself his wife and his three sons. Each one of the. five claimanis Verified hii own claim, whereupon each was alloted 21-8 s. A. of land: Upon thejrreqtiest !<1 convert emporary allotment into quasi-permanent allotment, their cases #'ere eamined by the Managing Officer who found that there was an excess aliotnierlt of 1-121/2 standard acres in case of each of the claimants and with their consent the. excess area of 8-141/2 standard areas was cancelled.\n\nA. little while after the officer in-charge (Land claims) Jullundnr examined the case of each of the clai!]iants and made a reference to the Chief Settlement Commissioner on September 2, !960 recommending that 48-14 standard acres was in exess of the entitlement of the five claimants in view of the entries in Jamabandi and the excess allotment-be cancelled. A further enquiry revealed that the claim of Harnam Singh that there was partition between himself and his sons. was uµtenable and. that except Harnam Singh, the other claimants did riot have any land of their ownership and therefore tl{e etire allotment deserved to be cancelled. 'fhe Chief Settlement Commissioner rejected the reference by his order dated August 21, 1961.\n\nIt is this order which has .been revised by the Central Governmentin exercise of . the power conferred by Sec. , 33 by the impucd .order dated March 15, 1965;\n\n• It would appear from the mere recital of the facts that the . . . .\n\nChief Settlement Commissioner who rejected the reference as per its order dated August 21, 1961 held the allotment in favour of the five claimants to be valid, legal and correct.\n\n' If the decision of the chief 'settlement Commissioner dated August 21, 1961 is wholly in favour of Harnam Singh and his sons and wife, they' could, .by no stretch of-imagination, be said to be pers6ns aggrieved by t_he decision of the-Chief Settlement Commis-. sioner.\n\nHarnam Singh a.nd his sons contended that the allotment was valid and that the reference niade by .the Officer-in-charge (land claims) department must be rejected. The Chi'ef Settlement Commissioner accepted this submission of'llarnam Singh and his sons and rejected the reference. Can it ever b~ said that a decision wholly .in favour of Harnam Singh and his sons is one adverse to them or that they are aggrieved by the decision.?\n\nH It is now necessary to turn to an intervening event .. It appears that the Chief Settlement Commissioner whi!e rejecting the refe- '> ~.., rence and accepting the allotment in favour of Harnam in~ am;\\ . . ..\n\nUN!ON v. A.VT/.R SINGH (Desai, J.)\n\nhis sons on the basis of holding and oral partition as legal and i\\ valid observed in para 12 of the order as.under;\n\n\"Further in the terms of the proprietary rights Sarlad if any, evidence comes to the notice of the department which\n\n~ establishes any of the facts mentioned in the clause below, the Central Govt. can at any time resume whole or any part B J. of the property.\" ,.\n\nAfter convening temporary allotment into quasi-permanent allotment a Sanad was issued to each ctaimant. One condition in the Sanad was trult if it appears at any time that the grant or allot- c ment of land described in the Sanad, is obtained by fraud, lalse . representation or concealment <;>f any material fact, it shall be lawful for the President to resume the whole or any part ofthe said\n\nproperty so allotted.\n\nIn view of the aforementioned observations and in absence D of any document evidencing partition of the property as cJaimed by Harnam Singh, the Punjab Government made. a reference to the Pakistan authorities for the necessary verification of entries in the Government record.\n\nA similar request was also addressed to • the Central Government which lrd to a query being addressed to the High Commissioner for India in Pakistan to obtain documen- Ii\n\n- tary evidence if any in this behalf. Nothing concrete emerged from these queries. In the meantime, Hamam Singh submitted • a rpresentation (Annexure 'B' to the petition) dated March 13, 1962 to the Government of India for issuing a directic!n under Sec. 33 of the Act that the matter be treated as finally settled.\n\nSome correspondence ensued betwe'll.J the Union Government and F\n\n' the Government of Punjab which ultimately led to Shri NJ>. Dube, Joint Secretary, Ministry of Rehabilitation sending a letter dated •\n\n.J.\n\nMay 31, 1963 tp the Deputy Secretary to the Government of Pnnjab, Rehabilitation Department, Jullundur which reads as under: G\n\n\"N.P. Dube, Regd. A.D.\n\nJoint Secretary.\n\nD.O. No. 13 (66)/L&R/62\n\nW.H.&R.\n\n-... .J' (Department of Rehabilitation) H\n\n~!st May, l963\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1984] 3 S.C.R.\n\nA My dear Tandon,\n\nE •\n\nPleas~· refer to Balmukand Sharma's D.O' .. letter. No. 422/ SINGH dated the 29th August, 1962, in connection with the re- . presentation filed by Shri Harnam. Singh P.C.S. (Retd.) .. The High' Commissioner for India in Pakistan was also addressed by Secretary in. August, 1962, to get the required information but the Pakistan Government have 'not been able to supply it so far.\n\nThe. matter has, therefor, ·.been considered in this office and it is frlt that there is.no point in. waiting any more and the matter should _be finalised on the basis of the judicial findings arrived at in the, case. We also feel that there arc no reasons to differ fr<ill, l those judicial' pronouncements at this stage. The record received from the Punjab Government is, therefore, returned with the request that the case may be finalised as mentioned above.\n\nShri J.M. 'fandon, Deputy Secretary to the Government of Punjab, Rehabilitation Department, Jullundur.\"\n\nYours sincerely, . Sd/- N.P. Dube 1.6..63\n\nOn November 5, 1963, the Managing Officer, Rehabilitation Department, Goyernment of Punjab submitted a note inter alia pointing out that the story . of partition alleged by Harnam Singh . and his sons is a myth and conseuently, except Harnm Singh, no other claimant was entitI.ed .. to any allotment and.therefore, the decision of the Chief .Settlement Comissioner dated August 21, !961 requires to be reopened under Sec 33 and allotment upheld by him should be cancelled. Upon this note a reference was made \". to the Central Government. Thereupon a nouce dated Maj 21,\n\n1964 was issued to Haruam Singh and his sons, his wife Smt. Tej Kaur having, died in the meantime, calling upon them to show why the order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner dated August 21, 1961 should not be set aside and the allotment in. favour of each allottee be not cancelled. Ultimately, the impugned order was passed.\n\n1J11dou.btedly, the impul1!led order is 111a<!e under Se9. 3~\n\n...\n\nUNiON v. AVTAR SINGH (Desai, J.) 403 ' which confers a wide power' of revision on the Central Government. The power of widest amplitude for revising and reopening any proceeding under the Act and to pass any order in relation thereto as in.the opinion of the Central Government the drcu.mstances of the case require and is not inconsfstenhvith any of the provisions contained in the Act or the rules made thereunder is conferred on the Central Government This is undoubtedly a power of revision.\n\nIt is not even hedged in by any concept of limitation. Such power of wide plenitude had to be conferred on the Central Government to set. right any illegal unfair, unjust or plainly untenable order because the proceedings under the Act. were not adversary in form and character which may. lead to the one or the other party approah ing \\he Central Governmeflt to set right the matter. If a displaced person obtains allotment from the_ compensation pool, to which be was not entitled, certainly .the Central Government would hlrdly come to know in the absence of any opposite party or' adversary drawing attention of the Central Government to such \" unjust enrichment. Therefore, Parliament coaferred a very wide power of revis10n on th_e Central Government. to reopen any proceeding or order under the Act. This was hardly dispute'd . .\n\n It was, however, contended that a power of revision cannot be r_epeatedly exercised and there must be attached finality to the orders. This submission would necessitate an examination in depth of the nature and extent of powr conferred by Sec. 33. But 'in the facts of the preent case we consider it unnecessary to undertake this exercise. We would proceed on the assumption that . Sec. 33 does not provide a reservoir of power from which , • revisional jarisdiction can be exercise.cl more than once in respect\n\nof the same order or the same proceeding. In this view of the matter the decision in Everest Apartments Co-operative Housmg Society Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra and OrS. ('l is hardly of any assistance.\n\nThe question that would. squarely arise is : whether on an earlier occasion, hat\\ the Central Governn1ent exercised any\" revi- -sional power conferred by Sec. 33 in respect of the order dated August 21, 19~1 by the Chief Settlement Commiss_ioner by which the llepartmental reference was rejected and \"the Chief. Settlement Commissioner had upheld the allotment of land in. favour of fiarnam Singh and bis sons.\n\nO> [196~] 3 s.c.R. 365.\n\n404.\n\n, .\n\n.. SUPREME COURT RllPORTS\n\n[1984] 3 S.C.R .\n\nMr. P.P. Rao, learned counsel for the resllondents strenuously urged that the lette.r of Shri N.P. Dube dated May 31, 1963 is a Mcision recorded by the Central Government in exercise .of the power conferred by Sec. 33 in respect of \\he . proceeding in which allotment made in favour of Harnam Singh and his sons was upheld by the Chief Settlement Commissioner and therefore, the order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner dated August 21, 1961 . became final and could not be the subject matter of a revision second iime, under Sec . .33 of the Act. There is no. substance in this contention.\n\nIt needs to be recalled that the decision of the Chief Settle . ment Commissioner dated August 21, 1961 was wholly in favour\n\nof Harnam Singh and his sons. Atleast Harnam Singh ahd his sons could not be said to be persons agglleved bf tlie order SQ as to move the Central Government invoking its revisional power under Sec. 33. Mr. Rao however, contended that the rej:>resen tation Annexure •ty dated March 13 of Harnam Singh reveals that he apprehended that the case. may be reopened and therefore, by , his representation h~ moved the Central Governnientoto affirm or. confirm the decision .of the Chief Settlement Commissioner , dated August 21, 1961. We remain unimpressed. If every litigant in whose favour a competent authority has. made an order ca~ still approach the higher authority for the affirmance of the order without any rhyme of reasoµ, the whole gamut of power of revisional jurisdiction would become a play thing for alreaQ.y_ successful party who may' foreclose the decision and when needed can successfully urge that the power of revision is exhausted. Fur ther, assuming Harnam Singh made the representation apprehending danger to his allotment, the letter of Mr. Dube dated May 31, 1963 does riot record any decision of the Central Government. It merely says that it is not necessary to wait any more for response to the queries addressd to authorities in Pakistan and the matter should be fiiria!ised cm the basis of finding acrived at in the case. It further proceeds to aver that there is a feeling that thre is no reason to differ from those judicial pronouncements at 'this stage'.\n\nSucl; t expression of feeling could hardly tentamount to a decision of the Central Government under Sec. 33. It is not for a moment sugg@sted that the decision. of the Central Government hasto be recorded in atiy particular form. In D.N. Roy and S.K. B_annerjee & Ors. v. State of Bihal\"& Ors. (1) a letter adpressed by Under Secretary to the Government of Judi& to a particular person\n\n\n• \\JNiON v. AVTARSiNGll (Desai, J.) •\n\n' Stating therein 'that with reference to the application of thee-add\n\nressee on the subject noted, he was directed to say . that after careful consideration the Central Government by the letter rejects the revision application as being time-barred' was treated as a decision of the Central Government. This calls for no comments because the letter is self-explanatory. There is nothing ip Shri Dube's letter remotely comparable with the letter in the afore . mentioned case. On the contrary the Central Government infor\n\nmed the Government of Punjab that •the record is returned .with the request that the ciise may be finalised as indicated in the letter.\n\nThe revf; ional power is the power of the Central Government and not of the Punjab Government. The deci; ion was left to the Punjao Government: There was nothing pending with the Punjab Government for finalisation.\n\nTherefore, the High Court. was clearly in error in treating the letter of Shri Dube dated May 31, 1963 as a decision of the Central Government jn exer. ise of the power conferred by Sec. 33. There was no reason for decision nor any occasion for the Central Goven, iinent to exercise power under Sec. 33 and therefore, it is nol possible to agree with the High . Court that the letter records the decision of the Central Government under Sec. 33. If the letter of Shri Dube is not a decisiOn of the Central Government under Sec. 33 of the Act, as a neces sary corollary, the impugned docision .must tie treated as one rendered for the first time in exercise of the revisional power under Sec. 33, and therefor.e, it cannot be said to be one without jurisdiction. In this view of the matter, th(appeal will have ti> be alloVLed. ·\n\nMr. Bindra, learned counsel who appeared for some of the respondents made a strenuous effort to persuade us to look into the equities of the case. \"rn fact, we are wholly disinclined to undertake this exercise of evaluating facts or evidence in a petition for a writ of certiorari. Further in the impugned decision the fac!s as appearing from the record and submissions made by the learned counsel for claimants are exhaustively dealt with and ho cse for interferente is made out. Only two aspects howevr may be referred to,\n\nHamam Singh claimed to be the owner of 225 acres of land situated in erstwhile Sind Province .. In the first claim lodged by him, he clearly stated that h•; was the owner of 300 acres. He then modified it to 221 acres. In neither of the two claims he ever . ' suggessed that there was a partition between him and his sons also giving a share to his wife. The story of partition clearly appears\n\n~ .\n\n406' • SUPREME COURT REPORTs\n\n[1984] '.} .S.C.R.\n\nto be an fter t.hought because it is helpful in obtaining . higher allotment. No documentary evide, nce has been placed on record .to supportthe case of partition which clearly appears to have been an after thought. Earlier .tamabandi entries from Pakistan permitted a negative. inference that there was no partition. The Central Governmens while setting aside the order pf. the. Chief Settlement Commissioner dated August 21, 1961 recorded the. fin'ding that : (i) there is no writing or deed of partition : (ii) Revenue records show the name of Shri Hamall] 'Singh alone. on.the basis of the sale ded in his exclusive name : (iii) there are no receipts indicating s'epar.ate payment of land revenue by any' one of the respondents after alleged partition; (iv) .no objection w11s taken by the sons at the time of the filing of. the claim by the. father;\n\n(v) there is .no mention .of individuals •hare in the claim filed by the father; These are relevant considerations which wonl<l certainely throw doubt on the claim of oral partition alleged to _ ·.have been effected by Haniam Singh: Once the allegation of oral partition.is rejected, the respondents are not entitled io arty consi- . deration even on equitable. \"grounds, ..\n\nIn°fho concluding . stages of the arguments the .respondents contended that Harnam Singh has died and his heirs ha.vi11g ii.ot been substitued, the appeal has abated. T!\\ere is no merit in this contention. Harnam singh was not the petitioner before the high Court.\n\nHe was respondent No,. 2. No relief was claimed against him. Further Hamara Sillgh was not asked to surrender tlje ljlnd.\n\nPetitioners before the Hi, gh Court were adverself affected by the . impugned dec.isiori. Death of Hilrnatn Singh would therefore, have no impact on this appeal. . Therefore, the contenti9, n is rejected.\n\nIn view. of the above discussion, this appeal is allowed and the judgment and the order of the learned Single judge dated October 4, 1966 in Civil Writ No. 1242 of 1965 as also the judg- ment aud order in.LP.A. No. 384 of 19.66 dated May 22, 1969 of the same High Court are quaslfed and set aside and the. decision of the Central Government dated March 15, 1965 is resiored with n0 order as to costs throughout.\n\nH. S. K.", "total_entities": 167, "entities": [{"text": "ANR\n\nAVTAR SINGH & ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17, "end_char": 39, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "AVTAR SINGH & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 4, 1984", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 45, "end_char": 58, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• April 4, 1984\n\n(D. A. DESAI, A.P. SEN AND V. BALAKRISHNA E~AD!,"}}, {"text": "D. A. DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 61, "end_char": 72, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.A. DESAI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A.P. SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 74, "end_char": 82, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 173, "end_char": 178, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Harnam Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 272, "end_char": 284, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Harnam Singh, filther of the respondents, was owner of some agricultural land in the erstwhile Siad Province now forming part of Pakistan.", "canonical_name": "Harnam. Singh P.C.S."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 497, "end_char": 502, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the partition of the country he along with his wife and three sons migrated to India."}}, {"text": "Pakistan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 600, "end_char": 608, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As displaced person, J:ie lodged a claim on March\"lS, 194g in respect of his entire holding on Pakistan."}}, {"text": "April 3, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 702, "end_char": 715, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on April 3, 1948 the said Harnam Singh, his sons and."}}, {"text": "Ha.roam Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 876, "end_char": 889, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "his wife filed separate claims alh; ging that in 1946 there was an oral partition of the land which origioaIJy belonged to Ha.roam Singh.", "canonical_name": "Harnam. Singh P.C.S."}}, {"text": "August 21, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1070, "end_char": 1085, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Chief Settlement Commissioner rejected a .reference from the department and by his order dated August 21, 1961 held the allotments to be valid."}}, {"text": "March 13, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1289, "end_char": 1303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Apprehending that tlle claim of ownership of I.and in Sind and the partitioD. between himself, his sons and his wife and the allotnicnt of land was being reexamiped, on March 13, 1962 Haroam Singh submitted a\n\nrepresenation to the Government of India for issuing a direction under s. 33 of the Act that the matter be treated as finally settled."}}, {"text": "Haroam Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1304, "end_char": 1316, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Apprehending that tlle claim of ownership of I.and in Sind and the partitioD. between himself, his sons and his wife and the allotnicnt of land was being reexamiped, on March 13, 1962 Haroam Singh submitted a\n\nrepresenation to the Government of India for issuing a direction under s. 33 of the Act that the matter be treated as finally settled.", "canonical_name": "Harnam. Singh P.C.S."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1351, "end_char": 1370, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Apprehending that tlle claim of ownership of I.and in Sind and the partitioD. between himself, his sons and his wife and the allotnicnt of land was being reexamiped, on March 13, 1962 Haroam Singh submitted a\n\nrepresenation to the Government of India for issuing a direction under s. 33 of the Act that the matter be treated as finally settled."}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1401, "end_char": 1406, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "N. _P. Dube", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1495, "end_char": 1506, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On this representation, Shri N. _P. Dube, Joint Secretary to the Governmentof India, Department of .Rehabilitation wrote a D. 0.", "canonical_name": "N. _P. Dube"}}, {"text": "Governmentof India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1531, "end_char": 1549, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On this representation, Shri N. _P. Dube, Joint Secretary to the Governmentof India, Department of .Rehabilitation wrote a D. 0."}}, {"text": "J.• M. Tandon", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1632, "end_char": 1645, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "let1er dated Ma)' 31,\n\nJ 96f to Shri J.• M. Tandon, Deputy Secretary to the Government\" of Puojab, Rehabilitation Department, saying, inter alia.- c'that there is no ' polnt in \\\\aitii1g any more and the mater should be finalised on lhe basis of the judical findings arrived t in the case.", "canonical_name": "J.• M. Tandon"}}, {"text": "Punjab Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2014, "end_char": 2031, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We also feel that there are no reasons to differ from those judicial pronouncemeots at this stage~ The record received from the Punjab Government is, theefore, returned with thC request that the case may be finalised as mentioned above\"."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2272, "end_char": 2276, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2764, "end_char": 2769, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2815, "end_char": 2833, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The al!otees contended that since.the power of revision conferred by s. 33 of the Ac~ had already been exercised by the Central Government."}}, {"text": "Harbans Siog!'t~", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3287, "end_char": 3303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "33 by his order dated March 15; 1965 quashed and set aside the order of the Chief Settlement Comniissioner datd August 21, 1961 and further directed that the .allotment of land in favour of Harbans Siog!'t~ bi~ sons and his wif~ be cancelled and that a fresh' allotment be made on the fc;>oting that Harnam Singh alone was the owot:r of lb~ Ian~ situated in Sind.", "canonical_name": "Harnam. Singh P.C.S."}}, {"text": "s. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3919, "end_char": 3924, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4622, "end_char": 4632, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5147, "end_char": 5157, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5509, "end_char": 5519, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "N. P. Dube", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5687, "end_char": 5697, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In other .Words, whether, as contended by the appellants, the letter of Shri N. P. Dube, Joint Secretary dated May 31, 1963 is a decision recorded by the Central Governnlcnt in exetcise of .the power conferred by section 33 7 The letter of Mr. Dube dated May 31, 1963 does not record any decision of the Central Government.", "canonical_name": "N. _P. Dube"}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5823, "end_char": 5833, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Desai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6114, "end_char": 6119, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• UNION v. A vTAR SINGH (Desai, J.) 393 • the matter should be finalised .on the basis of finding-arrived at in tbe A case."}}, {"text": "Ceptral Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6432, "end_char": 6450, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "expression of feelingcould hardly tentamount to a decision of the Ceptral Government under Sec."}}, {"text": "Sec. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6457, "end_char": 6464, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7051, "end_char": 7058, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7133, "end_char": 7140, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7362, "end_char": 7369, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7527, "end_char": 7534, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7714, "end_char": 7716, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "M.M. Abdul Khader", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8298, "end_char": 8315, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M.M. Abdul Khader and Ms. A. Subhashinifor the appellants."}}, {"text": "A. Subhashinifor", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8324, "end_char": 8340, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M.M. Abdul Khader and Ms. A. Subhashinifor the appellants."}}, {"text": "P.P. Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8359, "end_char": 8367, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.P. Rao foF the Respondent No.", "canonical_name": "P.P. Rao"}}, {"text": "R.S. Bindra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8397, "end_char": 8408, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I and R.S. Bindra and Har G bans Singh for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Har G bans Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8413, "end_char": 8429, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I and R.S. Bindra and Har G bans Singh for respondent No."}}, {"text": "J. Avfa~ Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8505, "end_char": 8519, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the .Court was delivered by\n\nDEs~1, J. Avfa~ Singh and Dr .. Kartar Singh two sons of S.Harnam Singh filed Civil Write No."}}, {"text": "Kartar Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8530, "end_char": 8542, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the .Court was delivered by\n\nDEs~1, J. Avfa~ Singh and Dr .. Kartar Singh two sons of S.Harnam Singh filed Civil Write No.", "canonical_name": "Kartar Singh"}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8667, "end_char": 8681, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 and Union of India and Tehsildar cum Managing Officer, respondents Nos.", "canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA & ANR"}}, {"text": "S. Hanam Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8918, "end_char": 8932, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Hanam Singh was the owner of agdcultural land compri sed in DehNo.)00 as also a portion of the land included in Qoh No.", "canonical_name": "S. Harnam Singh"}}, {"text": "Sind Pr0vi-", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9091, "end_char": 9102, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "99 situated in District Nawab Shah, in erstwliile Sind Pr0vi-."}}, {"text": "Avtar singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9168, "end_char": 9179, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Harnam Singh hd three sons : Avtar singh, Dr. Kartar Singh and Hu bans Singh.", "canonical_name": "Avtar singh"}}, {"text": "Kartar Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9185, "end_char": 9197, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Harnam Singh hd three sons : Avtar singh, Dr. Kartar Singh and Hu bans Singh.", "canonical_name": "Kartar Singh"}}, {"text": "Hu bans Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9202, "end_char": 9215, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Harnam Singh hd three sons : Avtar singh, Dr. Kartar Singh and Hu bans Singh."}}, {"text": "Tej Kaur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9223, "end_char": 9231, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tej Kaur was the wife of Harnam Singh."}}, {"text": "S. Harnam Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9748, "end_char": 9763, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "try S. Harnam Singh his three sons and hi; wife migrated to India and they claim to be displaced persons. '", "canonical_name": "S. Harnam Singh"}}, {"text": "March 15, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9883, "end_char": 9897, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Harnam Singh lodged a claim on March 15, 1948 in respect 6.f the entire land including the Jand belonging to •the heirs of Ch."}}, {"text": "Ch. Attar Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9975, "end_char": 9990, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Harnam Singh lodged a claim on March 15, 1948 in respect 6.f the entire land including the Jand belonging to •the heirs of Ch."}}, {"text": "March 1,5, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10342, "end_char": 10357, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may be mentioned that in the claim lodged on March 1,5, 1948 there was no reference to the partition effected by Harnam Singh between himself his sons and his wife."}}, {"text": "April 3, 194S", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10569, "end_char": 10582, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the introduction of the Punjab Re.fugees (Registration of Ljtnd Claims) Act, 1948 ('Act' for short) on April 3, 194S Harnam Singh and his sons as also Smt."}}, {"text": "Harnam Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10583, "end_char": 10595, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the introduction of the Punjab Re.fugees (Registration of Ljtnd Claims) Act, 1948 ('Act' for short) on April 3, 194S Harnam Singh and his sons as also Smt.", "canonical_name": "Harnam. Singh P.C.S."}}, {"text": "October\n\n5, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 10913, "end_char": 10929, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On October\n\n5, 1953, Harnam Singh and his sons approached the .authorities in the Rehabilitation Department' to convert temporary allotment into quasi-permanent allotment."}}, {"text": "Section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13103, "end_char": 13113, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government\n\nof India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13222, "end_char": 13242, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is alleged.that on this representation, the Government\n\nof India sent for the record of the whole case, called for the comments of the Punjab Rehabilitation Department which led Land Claims Officer to forward his note dated October 27, 1961 to the Government of India alongwith the whole record of the case."}}, {"text": "Punjab Rehabilitation Department", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13313, "end_char": 13345, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is alleged.that on this representation, the Government\n\nof India sent for the record of the whole case, called for the comments of the Punjab Rehabilitation Department which led Land Claims Officer to forward his note dated October 27, 1961 to the Government of India alongwith the whole record of the case."}}, {"text": "October 27, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13402, "end_char": 13418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is alleged.that on this representation, the Government\n\nof India sent for the record of the whole case, called for the comments of the Punjab Rehabilitation Department which led Land Claims Officer to forward his note dated October 27, 1961 to the Government of India alongwith the whole record of the case."}}, {"text": "Government of Punjab", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13705, "end_char": 13725, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the Govrn ment of India to the Deputy Secretary to the Government of Punjab, Rehabilitation."}}, {"text": "Sec. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13918, "end_char": 13925, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14325, "end_char": 14332, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14818, "end_char": 14825, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15307, "end_char": 15314, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Harnani Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15538, "end_char": 15551, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "further directed that the allotment of lal)d in favour of Harnani Singh, his sons and his wife be cancelled and that a fresh allottnent be made on the footing that Harnam Singh alone was the owner of the land situated in Sind.", "canonical_name": "Harnam. Singh P.C.S."}}, {"text": "Sind", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15701, "end_char": 15705, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "further directed that the allotment of lal)d in favour of Harnani Singh, his sons and his wife be cancelled and that a fresh allottnent be made on the footing that Harnam Singh alone was the owner of the land situated in Sind."}}, {"text": "Harnam Swgh ha\\i", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15752, "end_char": 15768, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In other words, the claim that each sons of Harnam Swgh ha\\i acquired land on partition was rejected as untenable."}}, {"text": "Avtar Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15865, "end_char": 15876, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereupon, two sons of Harnam Singh, Shri Avtar Singh and Dr. Kartar Singh filed Civil Writ Ptition in the High Court of Punjab at Chandigarh.", "canonical_name": "Avtar singh"}}, {"text": "High Court of Punjab at Chandigarh", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 15930, "end_char": 15964, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereupon, two sons of Harnam Singh, Shri Avtar Singh and Dr. Kartar Singh filed Civil Writ Ptition in the High Court of Punjab at Chandigarh."}}, {"text": "A. G. Vaswani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16048, "end_char": 16061, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I and 3 by one A. G. Vaswani, Settlement Commissioner (A) & Ex-Officio Under Secretary to the Gvernment of India, Ministry of Labour Employment & Rehabilitation inter a/ia contending that in April 1948 when for the first time Shri Harnam Singh lodged his claim a~ displaced person against the loss of his land and property, in Pakistan, he had categorically stated that 225 acres of land situated in Sind belonged to him and there was no express or implied, overt or covert reference or even a whisper of a partition between himself and .his sons and wife before he migrated to lni!ia. '"}}, {"text": "Ministry of Labour Employment & Rehabilitation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16147, "end_char": 16193, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I and 3 by one A. G. Vaswani, Settlement Commissioner (A) & Ex-Officio Under Secretary to the Gvernment of India, Ministry of Labour Employment & Rehabilitation inter a/ia contending that in April 1948 when for the first time Shri Harnam Singh lodged his claim a~ displaced person against the loss of his land and property, in Pakistan, he had categorically stated that 225 acres of land situated in Sind belonged to him and there was no express or implied, overt or covert reference or even a whisper of a partition between himself and .his sons and wife before he migrated to lni!ia. '"}}, {"text": "Harnam Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16668, "end_char": 16680, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was also contended that the claim lodged by Harnam Singh in Aplil,  1948 was attested by Shri Harnam Singh, then Deputy Custpdidn of Evacuee Property, East Punjab and at the relevant time Judge.·", "canonical_name": "Harnam. Singh P.C.S."}}, {"text": "Aplil", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16684, "end_char": 16689, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was also contended that the claim lodged by Harnam Singh in Aplil,  1948 was attested by Shri Harnam Singh, then Deputy Custpdidn of Evacuee Property, East Punjab and at the relevant time Judge.·"}}, {"text": "Punjab High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 16828, "end_char": 16845, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the Punjab High Court."}}, {"text": "Sec. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17504, "end_char": 17511, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17574, "end_char": 17581, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "October 4, 1966made", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17960, "end_char": 17979, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Judge by his Judgment and order dafed October 4, 1966made the rule absolute and quashed the : order dated March 15, 1965."}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 18049, "end_char": 18063, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Union of India prefer1 ed Letters Patent Appeal No.", "canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA & ANR"}}, {"text": "Punjab and Haryana High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 18159, "end_char": 18188, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "which was heard by a Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court."}}, {"text": "Sec. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18408, "end_char": 18415, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "March 15, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18803, "end_char": 18817, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly, while dismissing the L.P. Appeal the High Court held that the impugneo order of the Government of India dated March 15, 1965 was without jurisdiction and was invalid and bf no legal efficacy."}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18926, "end_char": 18940, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Hence this appeal byspecial leave by the Union of India."}}, {"text": "Abdul Khader", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18949, "end_char": 18961, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• Mr. Abdul Khader, learned counsel for the appellant urged that the High Couri was in error in treating D. O. letter No~ 33 (66)/L&R0-62 of Shri N._ P. Dube dated May 31, 1963 as a decision reached or."}}, {"text": "N._ P. Dube", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 19089, "end_char": 19100, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• Mr. Abdul Khader, learned counsel for the appellant urged that the High Couri was in error in treating D. O. letter No~ 33 (66)/L&R0-62 of Shri N._ P. Dube dated May 31, 1963 as a decision reached or.", "canonical_name": "N. _P. Dube"}}, {"text": "Section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19194, "end_char": 19204, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sUPREME COURT REPOR'fS\n\n[1984) 3 S.C.R.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 19607, "end_char": 19646, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "racter of the letter dated May 31, 1963 of Shri N. P. Dube, Joint\n\nsUPREME COURT REPOR'fS\n\n[1984) 3 S.C.R.\n\nSecretary to Shri J.M. Tandon, Deputy Secretary to the Government of Punjab, Rehabilitation Department, Jullundur."}}, {"text": "J.M. Tandon", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 19666, "end_char": 19677, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "racter of the letter dated May 31, 1963 of Shri N. P. Dube, Joint\n\nsUPREME COURT REPOR'fS\n\n[1984) 3 S.C.R.\n\nSecretary to Shri J.M. Tandon, Deputy Secretary to the Government of Punjab, Rehabilitation Department, Jullundur.", "canonical_name": "J.• M. Tandon"}}, {"text": "Sec. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19920, "end_char": 19927, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20042, "end_char": 20049, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20877, "end_char": 20883, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "West Pakistan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 21115, "end_char": 21128, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jrbapces or the fear of such disturbances in any area now forming part of West Pakistan, has, ."}}, {"text": "first day of March, 1947", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21147, "end_char": 21171, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "after the first day of March, 1947, left, or been di6placed .from, his place of residence in suc'h area and who has been subsequently residing in India, and incluc!'es any person who."}}, {"text": "Sec. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21630, "end_char": 21636, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Evacuee Property Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21772, "end_char": 21798, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sec. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21930, "end_char": 21936, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Evacuee Property Act, 1950", "statute": "Evacuee Property Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Sec. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22047, "end_char": 22053, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Evacuee Property Act, 1950", "statute": "Evacuee Property Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "AVTAR SINGH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22258, "end_char": 22269, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "prescribed scales of compensation, the nature .of the verified\n\nuNioN ' AVTAR SINGH (Desai, J.)\n\nclaim'and other circumstances of the case, to ascertain the amount of 'compensation to which the applicant is entitled.", "canonical_name": "Avtar singh"}}, {"text": "Sec. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22470, "end_char": 22476, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Evacuee Property Act, 1950", "statute": "Evacuee Property Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Sec. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22605, "end_char": 22611, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Evacuee Property Act, 1950", "statute": "Evacuee Property Act, 1950"}}, {"text": "Sec. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22891, "end_char": 22898, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23086, "end_char": 23093, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23422, "end_char": 23429, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23493, "end_char": 23500, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 23979, "end_char": 23984, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Harnam Singh a displaced person submitted a land claim on March 15, 1948 at Delhi for an area of 300 acre, S said to have been abandoned by him in Nasrat Tehsil, district Nawabshah 'in Sind."}}, {"text": "Nasrat Tehsil", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 24050, "end_char": 24063, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Harnam Singh a displaced person submitted a land claim on March 15, 1948 at Delhi for an area of 300 acre, S said to have been abandoned by him in Nasrat Tehsil, district Nawabshah 'in Sind."}}, {"text": "Jullundur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 24120, "end_char": 24129, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He filed another claim at Jullundur on April 1, 1948, reducing , his claim to 225 acres."}}, {"text": "April 1, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24133, "end_char": 24146, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He filed another claim at Jullundur on April 1, 1948, reducing , his claim to 225 acres."}}, {"text": "July. 13, 1948", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24186, "end_char": 24200, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July."}}, {"text": "Harnam\n\n Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 24202, "end_char": 24216, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "13, 1948, Harnam\n\n Singh and his three son~ Kartar Singh, Avtar Singh and Harbans Singh and his wife.", "canonical_name": "Harnam. Singh P.C.S."}}, {"text": "Harbans Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 24266, "end_char": 24279, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "13, 1948, Harnam\n\n Singh and his three son~ Kartar Singh, Avtar Singh and Harbans Singh and his wife.", "canonical_name": "Harnam. Singh P.C.S."}}, {"text": "Febrnary 22, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24476, "end_char": 24493, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was a modified claim submitted on Febrnary 22, 1949."}}, {"text": "Jullundnr", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 25432, "end_char": 25441, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. little while after the officer in-charge (Land claims) Jullundnr examined the case of each of the clai!]iants and made a reference to the Chief Settlement Commissioner on September 2, !"}}, {"text": "September 2, !960", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25548, "end_char": 25565, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. little while after the officer in-charge (Land claims) Jullundnr examined the case of each of the clai!]iants and made a reference to the Chief Settlement Commissioner on September 2, !"}}, {"text": "Jamabandi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 25685, "end_char": 25694, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "960 recommending that 48-14 standard acres was in exess of the entitlement of the five claimants in view of the entries in Jamabandi and the excess allotment-be cancelled."}}, {"text": "Central Governmentin", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 26158, "end_char": 26178, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is this order which has .been revised by the Central Governmentin exercise of ."}}, {"text": "of'llarnam Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27017, "end_char": 27033, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Chi'ef Settlement Commissioner accepted this submission of'llarnam Singh and his sons and rejected the reference."}}, {"text": "Harnam", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 27415, "end_char": 27421, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H It is now necessary to turn to an intervening event .. It appears that the Chief Settlement Commissioner whi!e rejecting the refe- '> ~.., rence and accepting the allotment in favour of Harnam in~ am;\\ . . ..", "canonical_name": "Harnam. Singh P.C.S."}}, {"text": "Central Govt", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 27776, "end_char": 27788, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "UN!ON v. A.VT/.R SINGH (Desai, J.)\n\nhis sons on the basis of holding and oral partition as legal and i\\ valid observed in para 12 of the order as.under;\n\n\"Further in the terms of the proprietary rights Sarlad if any, evidence comes to the notice of the department which\n\n~ establishes any of the facts mentioned in the clause below, the Central Govt."}}, {"text": "Hamam Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 28828, "end_char": 28839, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the meantime, Hamam Singh submitted • a rpresentation (Annexure 'B' to the petition) dated March 13, 1962 to the Government of India for issuing a directic!n under Sec.", "canonical_name": "Harnam. Singh P.C.S."}}, {"text": "Sec. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28978, "end_char": 28985, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "NJ>. Dube", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 29167, "end_char": 29176, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J the Union Government and F\n\n' the Government of Punjab which ultimately led to Shri NJ>."}}, {"text": "N.P. Dube", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 29382, "end_char": 29391, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dube, Joint Secretary, Ministry of Rehabilitation sending a letter dated •\n\n.J.\n\nMay 31, 1963 tp the Deputy Secretary to the Government of Pnnjab, Rehabilitation Department, Jullundur which reads as under: G\n\n\"N.P. Dube, Regd.", "canonical_name": "N. _P. Dube"}}, {"text": "Balmukand Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 29597, "end_char": 29613, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "13 (66)/L&R/62\n\nW.H.&R.\n... .J' (Department of Rehabilitation) H\n\n~!st May, l963\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1984] 3 S.C.R.\n\nA My dear Tandon,\n\nE •\n\nPleas~· refer to Balmukand Sharma's D.O' .. letter."}}, {"text": "Harnam. Singh P.C.S.", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 29732, "end_char": 29752, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "presentation filed by Shri Harnam.", "canonical_name": "Harnam. Singh P.C.S."}}, {"text": "Pakistan Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 29899, "end_char": 29918, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "August, 1962, to get the required information but the Pakistan Government have 'not been able to supply it so far."}}, {"text": "J.M. 'fandon", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 30429, "end_char": 30441, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri J.M. 'fandon, Deputy Secretary to the Government of Punjab, Rehabilitation Department, Jullundur.\"", "canonical_name": "J.• M. Tandon"}}, {"text": "Government of Punjab, Rehabilitation Department, Jullundur", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 30467, "end_char": 30525, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri J.M. 'fandon, Deputy Secretary to the Government of Punjab, Rehabilitation Department, Jullundur.\""}}, {"text": "November 5, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30575, "end_char": 30591, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sd/- N.P. Dube 1.6..63\n\nOn November 5, 1963, the Managing Officer, Rehabilitation Department, Goyernment of Punjab submitted a note inter alia pointing out that the story ."}}, {"text": "Harnm Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 30807, "end_char": 30818, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and his sons is a myth and conseuently, except Harnm Singh, no other claimant was entitI.ed .. to any allotment and.therefore, the decision of the Chief .Settlement Comissioner dated August 21, !", "canonical_name": "Harnam. Singh P.C.S."}}, {"text": "August 21, !", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30943, "end_char": 30955, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and his sons is a myth and conseuently, except Harnm Singh, no other claimant was entitI.ed .. to any allotment and.therefore, the decision of the Chief .Settlement Comissioner dated August 21, !"}}, {"text": "Sec 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30989, "end_char": 30995, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Haruam Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31163, "end_char": 31175, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereupon a nouce dated Maj 21,\n\n1964 was issued to Haruam Singh and his sons, his wife Smt.", "canonical_name": "Harnam. Singh P.C.S."}}, {"text": "21, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31333, "end_char": 31341, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tej Kaur having, died in the meantime, calling upon them to show why the order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner dated August 21, 1961 should not be set aside and the allotment in."}}, {"text": "Central Governmeflt", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 32379, "end_char": 32398, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lead to the one or the other party approah ing \\he Central Governmeflt to set right the matter."}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 32718, "end_char": 32728, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therefore, Parliament coaferred a very wide power of revis10n on the Central Government."}}, {"text": "Sec. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33117, "end_char": 33124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33260, "end_char": 33267, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33749, "end_char": 33756, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "August 21, 19~1", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 33787, "end_char": 33802, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "33 in respect of the order dated August 21, 19~1 by the Chief Settlement Commiss_ioner by which the llepartmental reference was rejected and \"the Chief."}}, {"text": "fiarnam Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 33978, "end_char": 33991, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "favour of fiarnam Singh and bis sons.", "canonical_name": "Harnam. Singh P.C.S."}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT RllPORTS\n\n[1984] 3 S.C.R", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 34046, "end_char": 34084, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".. SUPREME COURT RllPORTS\n\n[1984] 3 S.C.R ."}}, {"text": "P.P. Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 34092, "end_char": 34100, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. P.P. Rao, learned counsel for the resllondents strenuously urged that the lette.r of Shri N.P. Dube dated May 31, 1963 is a Mcision recorded by the Central Government in exercise .of the power conferred by Sec.", "canonical_name": "P.P. Rao"}}, {"text": "N.P. Dube", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 34182, "end_char": 34191, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. P.P. Rao, learned counsel for the resllondents strenuously urged that the lette.r of Shri N.P. Dube dated May 31, 1963 is a Mcision recorded by the Central Government in exercise .of the power conferred by Sec.", "canonical_name": "N. _P. Dube"}}, {"text": "Sec. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34298, "end_char": 34305, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35001, "end_char": 35008, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 35014, "end_char": 35017, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Rao however, contended that the rej:>resen tation Annexure •ty dated March 13 of Harnam Singh reveals that he apprehended that the case."}}, {"text": "May 31, 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 35879, "end_char": 35891, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Fur ther, assuming Harnam Singh made the representation apprehending danger to his allotment, the letter of Mr. Dube dated May 31, 1963 does riot record any decision of the Central Government."}}, {"text": "Sec. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36393, "end_char": 36400, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Punjao Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 37504, "end_char": 37521, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The deci; ion was left to the Punjao Government: There was nothing pending with the Punjab Government for finalisation."}}, {"text": "Sec. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37777, "end_char": 37784, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Goven", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 37844, "end_char": 37857, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There was no reason for decision nor any occasion for the Central Goven, iinent to exercise power under Sec."}}, {"text": "Sec. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37890, "end_char": 37897, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38032, "end_char": 38039, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38118, "end_char": 38125, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38282, "end_char": 38289, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bindra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 38429, "end_char": 38435, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Bindra, learned counsel who appeared for some of the respondents made a strenuous effort to persuade us to look into the equities of the case. \""}}, {"text": "Hamam Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 38951, "end_char": 38962, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Only two aspects howevr may be referred to,\n\nHamam Singh claimed to be the owner of 225 acres of land situated in erstwhile Sind Province .. In the first claim lodged by him, he clearly stated that h•; was the owner of 300 acres.", "canonical_name": "Harnam. Singh P.C.S."}}, {"text": "Hamall] 'Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 39953, "end_char": 39967, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "fin'ding that : (i) there is no writing or deed of partition : (ii) Revenue records show the name of Shri Hamall] 'Singh alone.", "canonical_name": "Harnam. Singh P.C.S."}}, {"text": "Haniam Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 40476, "end_char": 40488, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "father;\n\n(v) there is .no mention .of individuals •hare in the claim filed by the father; These are relevant considerations which wonl<l certainely throw doubt on the claim of oral partition alleged to _ ·.have been effected by Haniam Singh: Once the allegation of oral partition.is rejected, the respondents are not entitled io arty consi- .", "canonical_name": "Harnam. Singh P.C.S."}}, {"text": "Harnam singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 40839, "end_char": 40851, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Harnam singh was not the petitioner before the high Court.", "canonical_name": "Harnam. Singh P.C.S."}}, {"text": "Hamara Sillgh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 40968, "end_char": 40981, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Further Hamara Sillgh was not asked to surrender tlje ljlnd.", "canonical_name": "Harnam. Singh P.C.S."}}, {"text": "Hilrnatn Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 41121, "end_char": 41135, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Death of Hilrnatn Singh would therefore, have no impact on this appeal. ."}}, {"text": "May 22, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 41462, "end_char": 41474, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "384 of 19.66 dated May 22, 1969 of the same High Court are quaslfed and set aside and the."}}, {"text": "H. S. K.", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 41641, "end_char": 41649, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H. S. K."}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_3_407_411_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "' •\n\n• KOSHAL KUMAR GUPfA & ORS.\n\nSTATE OF J. & K. AND ORS.\n\nApril 6, 1984\n\n[D. A. DESAI, A. p; SEN AND V. BALA, KRIS!lNA BRAD!, JJ.]\n\nEducational Institutions-Admission to Engineering Col!eges-A_dmission to-Viva-Voce tes1-All.1trn~1Jt of 15 marks-Wheiher arbitrary. l;>lalogue between members of_ Selecdon COmmittee and candidate recorded on-tape.\n\n_recorr-Procedu.re_.;.Wheth'er fair a/id reasonable. •\n\nThe Third Respoodant-Principal of the College by a public adver' tiscment invited applications for admission to the _ Bac_helor Degree EngineeriOg Course in the Regional Eog-ioeeriog College in fhe State. The candidates seeking admission were requi('ed to appear at a joint entrance examination, thos_e who. qu;1.lified had to appear at a viva-vOce test~ aad the sele.ction was to be based on the combined performance in the written and vivaMvoce-examinatiOn.\n\nThe petitjoners who-applied and were admitted to the written test andon being qualified~ were cal\n\n1led for viVa-Vbce test; In their writ petitions they challenged the m1ni:ier, the. method and the number of mar)s:s assigned for the vlva-voce test.\n\nIt was conteQded that the rescr .. vation of IS marks for the viva-vOce. test conferred __ arbitrary, unguided and uocannalised power on those conducting the viva-voce tCst and tha.t tbC reservation of JS ma_rks would have th~ pernicious_ tendency of affecting merit disclosed by the marks obtai 1ed at the \\vritten examination.\n\nThe writ puHtion was contested on behalf of ._respondents l ,2 and 3 by sub:nitting that in order to avoid a1y ch1rge_o~ arbitrariness being levelled against the Selection Committee, 15 marks assi8aed for viva'9'oce test were further split-Up urider four heads, viz. (i) Science-5 marks, (ii).\n\nGeneral Knowledge4 marks, (iii) -Curricular Activilies--3 marks and {i~) Personality tCst-3 marks, and that the Selection Committee prep1red cards on each of which a quest.ion was typed referable fO Physics, Chemistry, Mathematics and General K.nowledge and they were kept in 4 different boXes.\n\nWh_eri the Candidate entere<; l the room for interview, he wa~' requited to pick-up at random one card from eaC:h , of the four boxes, eaCh.box containing 150 cards and answer the question. A tape4\n\nrecorder was kept on the table in frontof the members of tho SolMion Committee and the candidaie appearilig for the interview, aad the two 4\n\nway dialogue was recorded in full. Mark• were aHigned undor each head of 1iva-voce test dapendiog UPJJ th;, m'!:rit or th;, anJwer. fheral.fter, .. tho merit list was prepared on the basis of tho total marks obtainod at\n\n40S.\n\nSUPRE$ COURT REPORTS tt984j 3 s.c.R. -1\"'\n\n.A t be written and vivaVoce tests.\n\nDismissiOg the Writ Petitions & Transferred cases, • HELD :Merit.ha& been 'asqerlairied by the.most scientific mCihod tha can be applied for selecting candidates on merit leaving n6 room for_ any arbitrar§ choice. 'Ibe viva; voce test that was conducted was fair, free from the charS'e of arbitrariness, reasonable and just.\n\n[410 F]\n\nIn the instant case, respondents Nos. 1 to 3 have practically set at naught some of the drawbacks and deficienciespoint.ed out in Ajay' Basia etc. v. Khalid Mujib Sehra, ard1 & others etc. [1981] 2 SCR 79•· in the manner . of holding of oral interview and the marksassigned at it.\n\nThe respondents in order to avoid any charge of arbitiiirjness reduced tbe marks assigned to the Viva-voce test, prepared the questions 1o advance kept them ready in the boxes and 'tbe candidatJ bad to .pick-up bis own <i, ueslion . nod answer it.\n\nThe record .'Of the answer was mint'llined in the candidate~ own voice. [41'Q Q-411 E] ·\n\nORiGINAJ, JURISDICTION : Writ Petitiri No. 8964 of 1982. ~\n\n. (Under Article 32 of the Constitution of Irtdia)\n\nWITH\n\nTransfer Cases Nos. 13-15 of 1984.\n\nAnil Dev Singh, Subhash Sharma and S.K. Sabharwa/ for the\n\nE petitioners.\n\nG.L. Sangh1 and Altaf Ahmed'for the respondents.\n\nK.R.R. Pillai 'for the Petitioner in Transfor Cases Nos. 13-15 of84.\n\nF The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDESA~ J.\n\nAt' the conclu.sion of the hearing of the .writ. petition and the transferred cases on Jan.24, 1984, the Court pronounced the order dismissing the writ p, etition. agd the transferred cases, reserving that the reasons will follow later on. Here arc\n\nthe reasons.\n\nTo put.into' focus the controversy, the fact$. alleged in Writ Petition No. 8964 of 1982 may be taken as representative of the allegations in all allied cases.· ' · '\n\nNine petitioners in this petition questioned the legality and 'i..-Y correctness of admissions to Bachelor degree course for 1982-83 session in Regional Engineering Colleges at Srinagar, simtllta-.\n\nneously praying for quashing the admissions of respondents Nos.\n\nk. It GlJPTA v. i. AND.K. STATE (Desai, J.) 400\n\n5 to 13 and Seeking a direction that the petitioners be admitted to A the same session.\n\nA Regional Engineering College has been sd up at Srinagar in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Third respondent, Principal of the College by a public advertisement dated March 13, 1982 i.nvited appLcations for admiSsion to the Bachelor Degree Engineering Course for 1982-83 session not only in the Regional Engineering College, Srinagar but also in eleven Regional Engineering Colleges set up in different States.. Candidates seeking admission had to fulfill the following requirements. They were required to appear at (i) a joint entrance examination in four papers viz. Physics, Chemistry, Mathematics and English; (ii} candidates who qualify in the written test had to appear at a viva-voce test; '(iii) the selections were - to be based on the combined performance in the written and viva-voce examination; and\n\n(iv) the seats reserved for specified categories were also Bhown.\n\nPursuant to this advertisement, the petitioners applied and were admitted. to the' written test and on being found qualified, they were ealled for viva-voile' test. The challenge is to the manner, the mothod and the number of marks asigned for the viva-voce test. Broadly stated, the allegations were that reservation of 15 marks for viva-voce test conferred arbitrary, unguided and• un canna!ised power on those c2nducting the viva-voce test and that reservation of 15 marks for viva-voce'!est would have the perni- cious tendency of affecting the merit disclosed by the marks obtained at written examination. Tbere were other allegations which d9 not merit examination.\n\nOn rule nisi being issued, respondents Nos. I to 3 appeared and one Dr. O.N. Kou!, Head of the Mechanical Engineering . Department (Co-ordinator Admissions for session 1982·83), Regional Engineering College, Srinagar filed an affidavit in opposition on behalf of tlie Principal of the College. After • pointing out that 85 marks were assigned for written examination and 15 for viva-voce test, it was further pointed out that in order to. avoid any charge of arbitrariness being levelled against the Selection Committee 15 marks assigned for viva-voce test were further split-up under four heads, namely, (i) Science-5 marks\n\n(ii) General knowledge-4 marks (iii) Curricular Activities-3 marks and (iv) personality iest-3 marks. It was pointed out that vltimately out of a total of 100 marks, only 3, marks were assigned for personality test and this is the area where if at all; discretion can be exercised which may not be reviewable on any\n\n• • D\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS tJ984J 3 s.c.I\\.\n\ndocumentary evidence. In respect of the three other heads, it was pointed .out that the Sele'!:tion Committee prepared cards on each of which a question was typed referable to the 4 subjects, llllmely, Physics, Chemistry, Mathematics and General Knowledge. and they were kept in 4 difforent boxes .. When the candidate entered the room for interview, he was required to pick up at random one card from each of the four boxes, .each box containing atleast 150 cards and answer the question. A tape recorder was kept on the table in front of the members of the SelectiQ!l Committee and the .. candidate appearing .for the interview and the two-way dialogue was recorded in full.\n\nMarks were assigned undereach head of viva-voce test depending upon the merit of the answere. Thereafter, the merit list w11s prepared on the basis of the total marks obtai11ed at written test and the vivavoce test and it was stricily adhered to save and except for reserved seats whete alw persons seeking admission to reserved seats 'had t.o stand in queu~ as in the merit list. . ·\n\nAt the hearing of these pebtions, the respondents Nos. 1 to 3 produced before the Court the cards on which questions ll'.ere typed, the cassette and a tape recorder. They also produced the entire merit list with marks obtained by each candidate. The court at' random directed \\)lorn to point out which card was pickedup by om of the candi'1atl's from amongst; the petitioners and then play the cassette on whi1; h . his intetview was taped. Learned counsel for the petitioners and some of the , petitioners were . preent during this demonstration.\n\nWe a; e fully satisfied that in this case merit has ben ascertainod by the most scientific method .that can be. applied for selecting candidates on merits leaving no.room for any arbitrary. choice. . .\n\nThere was no challenge to the written test and 85 marks assigiled for the written test. In A; ay Ha1ia etc. v Kha/id Mujib Sehravardi &; Ors. etc. (') whorein \"admission to this very Regio· nal Engineering College for the year 1979-80 was challenged, this Court observed tha.t 'there can be no doubt that, having regard to the drawbacks and deficifncies in the oral interview test and the conditions prevailing. in the country, particularly .when\n\nthere is deterioratiou in n!oral values and corruption and nepotism are very much on the focrease, allocation of a high per- • centage of marks for the oral inte1vie.w as compared to the marks allocated llr the written test, cannot be accepted by thti court as . _____ , .\n\n, OJ [19s1j 2 s.c.R. 79.\n\n..... . . '\n\n...\n\n' \" l\n\n. }\n\nk. 1::. GtiPTA V J. AND K. STATE (Desai, J.)\n\nfree from the vice of artrariness. The Court concluded by observing that in the existing circumstances, allocation of more than 15% of the total marks for the oral intervie.w would be arbitrary and unreasonable and would be liable to be struck down 'as constitutionally invalid.\n\n• The respondents took one from these observations of the Court and reduced the marks assigned for viva-voce. test to 15.\n\nNot only that but some of the drawbacks and deficiencies pointed out by this Court in the manner of holding of oral interview and the'marks assigned at it, the respondents split-up the marks under four heads and a; least in respect of three, there is direct evidence\n\nas recorded mi the tape to show how the :andidate has faired.\n\nAnd as for the dreaded persona.lily test, the marks assigned are 3 only. Not a single case was pointed out to us in the course of the hearing in which the candidate othetwise being eligible for admis&ion on merit, lost the ·same .because of inability to get som~\n\nmarks under the personality test, the maximum being -3 only.\n\nIt is to the credit of rescondents Nos. I to 3, how they in order to avoid any charge of arbitrariness reduced the marks assigned to viva-voce test, split them up under different heads and even in respect of questions to be put at the viva-voe\\' test prepared the questions in adva:ic!', kept them ready. in boxes and the candidate had to pick-up his own qestion and answer it. The record of the answer is maintaintlli in candidates own voice. We must record our appreciation that respondents Nos. I to 3 have practically set .at naught drawbacks and deficiencie; in oral interview as pointed out by thi.s Court. The viva-voce test conducted mu; t be held to be fair, free from the charge of arbitrariness, reasonable' and just.\n\nUndoubtedly, the expectation of the Court which frowns upon anything arbitrary or unreasonable has added to the workload of the 'Selection Committee. But today when there is ru; h for admission. to Engineering Colleges like the Ceasar's wife, the\n\nselection must be objective and beyond reproach. That has been scientifically achievecUn this case: We hope that bodies charged with the difficult task of ascertaining merits for admission will take cue from.what has been done by respondents Nos. r to 3 and the lead provided by them in this fUd would restore faith of young aspirants in 'the system. Therefor, the Court dismissed the writ petition and the transferred cases. ·\n\nN.V.K.\n\nPetitions &: Transfer Cases dismissed,\n\nG •", "total_entities": 16, "entities": [{"text": "KOSHAL KUMAR GUPfA & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7, "end_char": 31, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "KOSHAL KUMAR GUPTA & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF J. & K. AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 34, "end_char": 58, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF J. & K. AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "D. A. DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 77, "end_char": 88, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.A. DESAI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 96, "end_char": 99, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "[1981] 2 SCR 79", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 3210, "end_char": 3225, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ORiGINAJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3642, "end_char": 3650, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "41'Q Q-411 E] ·\n\nORiGINAJ, JURISDICTION : Writ Petitiri No."}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3711, "end_char": 3721, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Anil Dev Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3796, "end_char": 3810, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Anil Dev Singh, Subhash Sharma and S.K. Sabharwa/ for the\n\nE petitioners."}}, {"text": "Subhash Sharma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3812, "end_char": 3826, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Anil Dev Singh, Subhash Sharma and S.K. Sabharwa/ for the\n\nE petitioners."}}, {"text": "S.K. Sabharwa/", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3831, "end_char": 3845, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Anil Dev Singh, Subhash Sharma and S.K. Sabharwa/ for the\n\nE petitioners."}}, {"text": "G.L. Sangh1", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3871, "end_char": 3882, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G.L. Sangh1 and Altaf Ahmed'for the respondents."}}, {"text": "Altaf Ahmed'for", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3887, "end_char": 3902, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G.L. Sangh1 and Altaf Ahmed'for the respondents."}}, {"text": "K.R.R. Pillai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3921, "end_char": 3934, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K.R.R. Pillai 'for the Petitioner in Transfor Cases Nos."}}, {"text": "O.N. Kou", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6507, "end_char": 6515, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I to 3 appeared and one Dr. O.N. Kou!,"}}, {"text": "GtiPTA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10027, "end_char": 10033, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "GtiPTA V J. AND K. STATE (Desai, J.)\n\nfree from the vice of artrariness."}}, {"text": "Desai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10053, "end_char": 10058, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "GtiPTA V J. AND K. STATE (Desai, J.)\n\nfree from the vice of artrariness."}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_3_412_416_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "- 412\n\nR. S. NAYAK\n\nA.R. ANTULA Y\n\nApril 5, 1984\n\n(D.A. DESAI, R.S. PATHAK, 0. °CHINNAPPA REDDY,. A P, SEN AND\n\nV. BALAKRISHNA BRAD!, JJ.] .\n\nCrlmf 1ja/ , Appel/ate -Jurisdi'ctioft-Transfer of a pending criminal trial from the court oi Sessions to the High Caurt-Proc.edure to be followed iS the\n\nsame as prescribed in chapte.- XIX !Fof the Code of Criminal Procedure-If the Cognizance of an offence is taken upder section B{J} of the Criminal' Law {Ame11dment) Aci,- J.952-State need notappoint Q Public Prosecutor--The. comp}ail.zant's ad-JoCate will the Pu.b(iC Prosecutor.\n\nIn comPiianc: with directions given by the_ Constitution Bench of.the Supreme Court, tho Bombay High Court withdrew to itself Special Case No, 24 of 1982 and Special Case No. S/83 pending in the Court of the Special Judge, Greater Bombay and assi8ned the said two c8ses to Mr. !1Jstice S.N. Khatri a sitting Judge of the said court. When the cases were tken up for heariagJ two prelimioarY. contentions were raised as to wbeihel'. State should appOint a. PU:blic ProseCutOr to conduct the tdal and what should be the 'procedure to bo followed and from what stage_ .Of the trial. Hence the twO applications for classification. The court; • HELD: 1. The learned Judge has to .hoLd the trial according to tho procedure prescribed in chapter X(X B i.e,, !le . procedure prescribed' in section 244 to 247 (botb inclusive) of\"the Code of Criminil Procedure. To be precise, the Jearned J\\idge has .to try thC-case according to tbe proc_edµre pr(iscribed for cass insti•uted ctherwise than on police report by. Magistrate, The trial was to proceed from the stage when the acused was discharged. [ 4140-B] '\n\nIf the cognizance of an olfcace is taken under section s(;) of tlie criminal law (Amendment) Act, 1952, and the trial has t.o be held acdording to: the procOdure prescribed 'thereicl, under seciOn 8(3), the learned advocate engaged by the complainant to coaduct the prosecution will be Cteemd tO be a Public prosecutoc, Io such a situation, there is\n\nDO questiOn. of the State appointed Public Prosecutor to conduct~' the prosecution. It is for the complaiila1lt io decide who should be his learned advocate in charge of tho Prosecution.\n\n[4 !SB-C] ' \\ . . .\n\nCRIMINAL JUR\\sDiCT\\ON :.Criminal Misc. Petition No. 1740 of 1984. (For Directions)\n\n(Crimin'll Appeal No; 356 of 1983)\n\n.( ..\n\n' j\n\nit .. s. NA.YA.K v. A.:tt A.NWLA.Y (Desai, J.)\n\nAnd • (Criminal Misc. Petition No. 22rl7of1984)\n\n(For Directions)\n\n(Criminal Appeal No. 356 of .1983)\n\nRam Jethmalani, Ms. 1 Rani Jethmalani, Naresh Jethmalani and J. Wad for the Petitioner.\n\nA. K. Sen, M. N. Shroff and Dalveer Bhandari for the\n\nRespondent.\n\nThe Order of the Court wa.s delivered by\n\nDESAI,· J. Consequent upon the order made by a Constitution Bench <!f this Court on February 16, 1984 in the Judgment rendered iu Criminal Appeal No. 356 of 1983 and Transferred Case No. 347 of.'1983 alongwith Transferred Case No. 348 of 1983, , Special Case No. 24 of 1982 and Special Case No. 3/83 pending in the Court of the Special Judge, Greater Bombay (Shri R.B. Sule) were withdrawn and sto9d transferred to the High Court of Bombay. Jn compliance with the direction. given in the same judgment, the learned Chief Justice of the High Court of Bombay assigned both the cases to Mr. Justice S.N. F;, hatri, .a\n\nsitting Judge of the High Court. The learned Judge called upon the parties to appear before him on March 12, 1984. When the cases were taken UI> for hearing, certain preliminary objections were raised on behalf of the accused which we were .told have been dealt with by the learned Judge in his order dated March 16,\n\n1984. In respect of two issues further consideration was postponed.\n\nThese issues turn upon the q.uestion of procedure to be adopted by the learned Judge in the trial of the two cases and who should . be .incharge of the prosecution. In our opinion, if the judgment ·\n\nof this Court was read with care and precision, these two questions would have hardly arisen. However, two misc. petitions were moved in tliis Court for clarification of the judgment so as to .thwart avoidable delay in the trial of cases.\n\nThe operative portion of the judgment which has a bearing on the question i:afsed reads as under:\n\n\"Therefore, Special Case No. 24 of 1982 .and Special Case No. 3/83 pending in the Court of Special Judge,\n\n. SU.!>REM1! C:OURT Ral>ORTS ·\n\n[!9S4) 3 S.C.R.\n\n'A.\n\nGreater Bomb~ Shri R.B. Sule are withdrawn and transferred to t)'te High Court of Bombay with a request to the learned Chief Justice to assign these two cases to a sitting .\n\nJudge of the High Court\".\n\nIn the penultimate paragraph of the jii:dgment while allowing the appeal this-.Court directed as Under : . .\n\n\"This appeal accordingly succeeds and i~ allowed. The\n\n order and decision of thp learned Special Judge Shi'i R.B~ Sule dated July 25, 1983 discharging the a.ccused in Special Case No. 24 of 1982 alid Special Case No. 3!83 is hereby set aside and the trial shall proceed further from the stage , where the accused was discharged.\"\n\nReading two dir.e.ctions togethet, it clearly emerges that the learned Judge has to hold trial according to the procedure . prescribed in Chapter XIX' B i.e. the procedure prescribed in . Secs .. 24.4 to 247 of the Code of Crimina.l Procedure, 1973. .T-0 ·\n\nbe precise;· the learned Judge has to try the case according to the procedure prescribed for cass mstituted. otherwise. than. on'poli~ report by Magistrate. This position 'is clear. and. unambiguous in view of the fact that this .Co1m while allowing the appeal was hearing amongst others Transferr.ed Case .No. 347 of 1983 being the Criminal Revision pplicatfon No .. 354 of 1983 on the fil.e of the Hig]j Court of the Judicature at' Boin bay against the 'or'der'of. the learned Special Judge Shri RB. Sule disc)larging\n\nthe accus.ed. 1f the criminal revision application was not withdrawn to ti; lis Court, . the lligh' Court while hearing criminal . . revision application could have under Sec. 407 Code of Crim.inal f Procedure, 1973 transferred the Special case from which criminal revision application arose to itself for trial and irr such a situation the High Court under Sec. 407 (8), Code of Criminal Procedure, !973 would have to follow the same procedure which the Court. of Speai Judge would have followed it the case would .not have been so transferred. His 11ot in dispute that th() learnd Special •.\n\n!ff\n\nJudge while holding the trial was required to follow the pro, cedure prescribsd by tlie Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for trial of .warrant cases by Magistrates and in the facts of this case the :procedure would !J, tl in respect of cases instituted. oth.erwise than on police report. \"(he trial was to proceed further from the. stage when. the accused was discharged. This in our , opinion is obvious and needs no furbher clarification. Sec. S(I) o[Jhe Criminal.Law (AmeD; dmeilt) Act, 1952 as interprete~ by this Court in Criminal\n\n, ,\n\n. \".\n\nI .\n\nR. s. NAYAK v. A. R. ANTULAY (Desai, J.)\n\nAppeal No. 247 of 1983 decided on February 16, 1984 makes this position unambiguous and.abundantly clear.\n\nThe clarification in re, pect of the first point read with the' judgment rendered in Criminal Appeal No. 247 of 1983 in which Sec. 8 (3) of the 'Criminal Law (Amendmnt) Act, 1952 had come in 'for interpretation, it follows as a corollary that iflhe cognizance of an bffence is taken under Sec. 8(1) of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952 and the trial has to be held according to the procedure prescribed therein, under Sec .. 8 (3) the learned advocate engaged by the complainant to conduct the1Jrosecution will be deemed to be a public prosecutor. In such a 'situation, there is no question of.the State appointed public prosecutor to onduct the prosecution. It is, threfore, clarified which to some extent may appear tautologus in view of the af0<ementioned judgment, that it would be for th~ complainant to .decide who would be the learned advocate iucharge of the prosecution and ' . ' .the advocate so appointed would be deemed to be a public prosecutor.\n\nDr. Singhvi who appeared for the respondent-accused sub- 'mitted that in the guise of a petition for clarification, it is a covert attempt to forestall or foreclose the deCision on the aforementioned two points .which. are pending before the learned Judge before whom both the cases are pending. There was no.question of\n\npeciding the aforementioned two. poi.nts afresh because the answers to them are implicit in the judgments referred to aBove. Dr,' Sing'hvi had nothing to say when invited by the Court about the clarification which the Court my offer in respect of the afore- • mentionecftwo questions. He left us in no doubt that he does not wish to make any submission on the , question of clarification in respect of the aforementioned two questions.\n\nWe note that the Government of Maharashtra has entered appearance before us through Shri A.K Sen and 'shri M.N.\n\nShroff but no submission were made by them. ·\n\nMr. Jethmalani, learned counsel for the complainant wanted this Court to consider. prayers Nos. (c) and (d) in the , misc. petition which we consider for the disposal of the misc. petitions as irrelevant and we do not propose to deal with the same in these petitions.\n\n• Tn sum the clarification is that the learned Judge in the tril\\\\\n\n.. F\n\n4i6 . '\n\nSUPRJ!Mll COURT REPORTS\n\n(1984) 3 S.C.R.\n\nof the two.cases pending before.him has to follow the procedure prescribed in Secs. 244 to 247 (both-inclusive} included in Chapter XIX-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. It is for the\n\ncomplainant to decide who shonldbe his learned advocate focharge \"or tjle prosecution and there is no question 'of entrusting the trial of the two cases to a State appointed public prosecutor.\n\n. •\n\n• ,\n\n....-", "total_entities": 38, "entities": [{"text": "412\n\nR. S. NAYAK", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2, "end_char": 18, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R. S. NAYAK", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. ANTULA Y", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22, "end_char": 33, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.R. ANTULAY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 5, 1984", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 35, "end_char": 48, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "412\n\nR. S. NAYAK\n\nA.R. ANTULA Y\n\nApril 5, 1984\n\n(D.A. DESAI, R.S. PATHAK, 0."}}, {"text": "D.A. DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 51, "end_char": 61, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.A. DESAI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R.S. PATHAK", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 63, "end_char": 74, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. PATHAK", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "0. °CHINNAPPA REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 76, "end_char": 95, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 103, "end_char": 106, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 341, "end_char": 367, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Court of the Special Judge, Greater Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 773, "end_char": 815, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S/83 pending in the Court of the Special Judge, Greater Bombay and assi8ned the said two c8ses to Mr. !"}}, {"text": "section 244 to 247", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1359, "end_char": 1377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ram Jethmalani", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2521, "end_char": 2535, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "356 of .1983)\n\nRam Jethmalani, Ms. 1 Rani Jethmalani, Naresh Jethmalani and J. Wad for the Petitioner.", "canonical_name": "Rani Jethmalani"}}, {"text": "Rani Jethmalani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2543, "end_char": 2558, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "356 of .1983)\n\nRam Jethmalani, Ms. 1 Rani Jethmalani, Naresh Jethmalani and J. Wad for the Petitioner.", "canonical_name": "Rani Jethmalani"}}, {"text": "Naresh Jethmalani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2560, "end_char": 2577, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "356 of .1983)\n\nRam Jethmalani, Ms. 1 Rani Jethmalani, Naresh Jethmalani and J. Wad for the Petitioner."}}, {"text": "A. K. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2610, "end_char": 2619, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen, M. N. Shroff and Dalveer Bhandari for the\n\nRespondent.", "canonical_name": "A. K. Sen"}}, {"text": "M. N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2621, "end_char": 2633, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen, M. N. Shroff and Dalveer Bhandari for the\n\nRespondent.", "canonical_name": "M. N. Shroff"}}, {"text": "Dalveer Bhandari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2638, "end_char": 2654, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A. K. Sen, M. N. Shroff and Dalveer Bhandari for the\n\nRespondent."}}, {"text": "R.B. Sule", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3083, "end_char": 3092, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3/83 pending in the Court of the Special Judge, Greater Bombay (Shri R.B. Sule) were withdrawn and sto9d transferred to the High Court of Bombay.", "canonical_name": "R.B. Sule"}}, {"text": "High Court of Bombay", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3138, "end_char": 3158, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3/83 pending in the Court of the Special Judge, Greater Bombay (Shri R.B. Sule) were withdrawn and sto9d transferred to the High Court of Bombay."}}, {"text": "S.N. F", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3315, "end_char": 3321, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "given in the same judgment, the learned Chief Justice of the High Court of Bombay assigned both the cases to Mr. Justice S.N. F;, hatri, .a\n\nsitting Judge of the High Court."}}, {"text": "March 12, 1984", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3434, "end_char": 3448, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Judge called upon the parties to appear before him on March 12, 1984."}}, {"text": "March 16,\n\n1984", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3642, "end_char": 3657, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the cases were taken UI> for hearing, certain preliminary objections were raised on behalf of the accused which we were .told have been dealt with by the learned Judge in his order dated March 16,\n\n1984."}}, {"text": "R.B. Sule", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4441, "end_char": 4450, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "9S4) 3 S.C.R.\n\n'A.\n\nGreater Bomb~ Shri R.B. Sule are withdrawn and transferred to t)'te High Court of Bombay with a request to the learned Chief Justice to assign these two cases to a sitting .", "canonical_name": "R.B. Sule"}}, {"text": "Shi'i R.B~ Sule", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4838, "end_char": 4853, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The\n\n order and decision of thp learned Special Judge Shi'i R.B~ Sule dated July 25, 1983 discharging the a.ccused in Special Case No."}}, {"text": "RB. Sule", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5822, "end_char": 5830, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the learned Special Judge Shri RB.", "canonical_name": "R.B. Sule"}}, {"text": "Sec. 407", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6016, "end_char": 6024, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 407", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6203, "end_char": 6211, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6217, "end_char": 6243, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6533, "end_char": 6565, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Desai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7028, "end_char": 7033, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. s. NAYAK v. A. R. ANTULAY (Desai, J.)\n\nAppeal No."}}, {"text": "Sec. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7273, "end_char": 7279, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973"}}, {"text": "Sec. 8(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7436, "end_char": 7445, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973"}}, {"text": "Singhvi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8116, "end_char": 8123, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Singhvi who appeared for the respondent-accused sub- 'mitted that in the guise of a petition for clarification, it is a covert attempt to forestall or foreclose the deCision on the aforementioned two points .which.", "canonical_name": "Sing'hvi"}}, {"text": "Sing'hvi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8564, "end_char": 8572, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr,' Sing'hvi had nothing to say when invited by the Court about the clarification which the Court my offer in respect of the afore- • mentionecftwo questions.", "canonical_name": "Sing'hvi"}}, {"text": "Government of Maharashtra", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8888, "end_char": 8913, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We note that the Government of Maharashtra has entered appearance before us through Shri A.K Sen and 'shri M.N.\n\nShroff but no submission were made by them. ·"}}, {"text": "A.K Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8960, "end_char": 8967, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We note that the Government of Maharashtra has entered appearance before us through Shri A.K Sen and 'shri M.N.\n\nShroff but no submission were made by them. ·", "canonical_name": "A. K. Sen"}}, {"text": "M.N.\n\nShroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8978, "end_char": 8990, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We note that the Government of Maharashtra has entered appearance before us through Shri A.K Sen and 'shri M.N.\n\nShroff but no submission were made by them. ·", "canonical_name": "M. N. Shroff"}}, {"text": "Jethmalani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9035, "end_char": 9045, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Jethmalani, learned counsel for the complainant wanted this Court to consider."}}, {"text": "Chapter XIX-B of the Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9549, "end_char": 9574, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_3_417_421_EN", "year": 1984, "text": ". •\n\n-. -\n\nHARI SINGH & ORS.\n\nSTATE OF U.P. AND ORS.\n\n'(A.P. SEN E.S. VENKATARAMIAH. JJ.]\n\nApril 6, 19$4\n\nLand Acquisition Act, I 894-s. 4 and s.6-Acq>lsltlon proceedings (Notification u/.<.4 incorporating ordr u/s. 17 (4) exempting application of s .. ~A and notification u/s. 6 containing. order u/s. I 7 (/) authorising Collector 10 1ake possesSion issued and published in official Gazette)- Validity of acqui.dtion proceedings challenged by ay of writ petiticm 0.fter a period of o'1er two years-Whether petition could be dismissed on ground af delay-Whtther court could interfere when facts alleged in petition are disputed.\n\nOn January 8, '1980 the respondent State issued a notification urider\n\nSe~. 4 (I) of the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 for acquisition of 60 adjoining pJots of land of_ two small villaacs for construction of a market yard. Th_e notification alSo contained an order of the Government made under Sec. 17(4) of the Act directing that Sec. SA would not apply to tho said proc.eedings. The notification was publiShed in the. Official Gazetto dated January 9, 1980. That notification was followed by another·· notification dated January .9, 1980 issued under Sec. 6 of the Act. This notification contained an order made under Sec .. 17 (I) of the Act authorising the ColleCtor to take possession of the plot's.\n\nThe notification was published in the official Gazette dated January 10, 1980.\n\nTho possessfon of the Plots was taken in course of the acquisition proceedings. Jn or a, bout June 1982 notices were issued by the CollectOr to the interested persons for determining the compensation . pa:Yable tothem.\n\nBy filing a writ petition in the High Court 1he appellants qdestioiied the validitY\n\nof the acquisition proceedings in regard to certain plots -on the groundS that : (!) t)ley had no knowledge of the acquisition proceedings and were prejudiced by the order made under sec. 17 (4)i (2) there was no urgency sufficient in law to sustain the .order made under. Sec. 17 (4); and 13) Sec. 17 (4) would not be applicable because on a part of a plot of land there was a house.\n\nThe High Colt<! d'ismissed the writ petition.\n\nHence this appeaJ.\n\nDismissing the appeal;\n\n'HELD : In a pmall place whero these plots are situate, the acquisition of these llQds would be the talk of the town in a shortwhilo and it is difficult to believe that tho appellants who are resident.• of that place l'f9Uld l)Ot have qoW!j till Jutr 1982 tqat the impune<J notjfiation had\n\nA been published in l98tr. Any interference in this case filed after two and U half years' Wirh the acqt.iisition protecdings is likely to cause -serious 'public prejudice.\n\nThis appea.1 should, th:rcfote1 fail , On the ground of. delay alone. [420G-H) . • :\n\n; .K\n\nAppellant No. r claims to be the owner of plot No. 249, On beb•lf of .the respondents it) is urged that appella9-t No. 1 is recorded only as a, co-tenure holder alongwith five others and they hve not iplpeached the notifications.\n\nWith regard to the allegations about the existenc'e of a house on this plot, it is seen that the said. fact is denied.\n\nTho resPon .. dents rely upon some statements recorded by th.e revt'nue authorities\n\nuggesting that there was no_ house- on thi's plot on the dafe of the notification.\n\nThis is a.disputed question of fact. Appellant No. 2 who claiins to be_the owiier of plot No. 261 is. stated to have purchased it . op-NQvember 17, -19.80 .. after the impugned notificJtions. were published. The title of appellant No. 3 to pl it No. J33 is denied by R K. Kannaujia, Secreh\\, ry,, Krishi Utpadan .M1odi _Sarni ti, Kheragarh.\n\nIa tis Stte._of affSlirs. where there are disputed questions_ of f;.lcts it cannot be said that (he appe11ants have made out any case for .inteiference under Article 226 of the Const.itution.\n\n[42 IBD]\n\nThere is.no ground to held that the order made undei: scti.on J7 (4)-0f the A>t exempting the operation of section 5-A ot the Act is bad in Jaw. even though _there appears to be .some adminis_tralive delay irr commencing the construction 9f the Market Yard.\n\n[421FG] . ' '\n\nState. of Punjab v. ·. Gucdlal Singh & Ors.,\n\n[1980] .1 S.C.R. 1011, feferrid to. ·\n\n. CivIL APl'fLLAl'E JuRlSDIQTION :Ci.Yi! Appeal No. 5313 of 1983,, ·\n\nAppeal by Special leave fr.om the Judgment and Order dated the 17th January, 1983 in CMWP. No. 8397of1982. ,, . :' . .\n\nShanti Bhusharj and S. Markandeya for the Appellant ..\n\nGopal Subrtimanlam and Mrs. S. Di\":shit for the Respondents. ·\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by ' VENKATARAMiAa, J.. About 45 plots of land of Kheragarh village. and about 15 adjoining plots of land of Naala Udaiya village situated in the district of Agra were notified under\n\nection 4 (I) of the Land Acpuisition Act, 1894 (Act No. 1 of\n\n1894) (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') for acquisition fora p'Ublic .purpose, namely, for the construction of the Market Yard of tl:te Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, Kl:teragarl:t under a. noti fication dated .January 8, 1980 issued by the Government of the\n\nStti; Qf tJttr Praclesll . As tl:te plots of land . in question w)Jich;\n\nL • ~\n\nF::\n\n'\" .. --\n\n'!-.,\n\n. HARi SINGH v. U; P. STATE (Venkataramiah, J.)\n\nwere agricu.Itur.al lands were urgently reqLtired for the aforesaid . purpose and tho Government was of the view that it was necessary to direct that section 5-A of the Act should not apply fo the said acquisition proceedings, it simultaneously made an' order under section 17 (4) of The Ac! direeiing that section 5-A wouhl not\n\napply to the said proceedings and incorporated the said order also in the notification issued under section 4 (1) of the Act. The notification was published in the Official Gazette dated January 9, 1980. This. was followed by a notification dated January 9,\n\n1980 under section 6 of the Act published in. the Official Gazette dated Janury IQ, 198.0. That notification containe<) an/order made under section 17 (I) of the.Act authorising the Collector to take possession of the plots on the expiration of fifteen days from the publication of the notice under section 9 (I) of the Act though no award under section 11 of the Act had been made. The above said plots of land which were in all aoout 60 in number belonged to a number of persons. The total extent of land proposed to be acquired was about 41 .46 acres. The possession of all the plots .of land was also taken in the course of the said acquisition proceedings. In or about June. 1982, notices were issued by the Collector to various persons having interest in the said plots under. sectiop 9 (3) of the Act for the purpose 'of determining the compensation payable to them. After the issue o.f the said notices, three persons Hari Singh (appellant No. 1), Pooran Chand (appellant No. 2) and Munna Lal (appellant No. 3) filed a writ petjtion in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 8397 of 1982 on the file of the High Court of Allahabad questioning the validity of the acquisition proceedings as regards 6 plots of land in Kheragarh village out of th~ total of about 60 plots of land which had been acquired by the State Government in the above said prnceedlngs. Appellallt No. 1 claimed to be the owner of plots Nos. 249, 250 and 252.\n\nAppellant No. 2 claimed. to be the owner 'of plot No. 261 and appellant No. 3 claime.d to be the owner of plots Nos. 133 and ·\n\n134. Appellant No. I pleaded that there was a house sittiated on plot No. 249 and that he had also installed a flour mill on it.\n\nThey all pleaded thllt they had . uo knowledge ot the. acquisition proceedings and were prejudiced by the order made under section 17 (4) of the Act exemptiag the operation of section 5-A of the Act in the case of these proceedingJ. They further pleaded that there was no urgency sufficient in Jaw to sustain the order made under .. section 17 (4) of the Act as nothing had been done on the Jiirtds for nearly two years. Appellant No. I also pleaded that\n\n• A\n\n.420\n\nsection 17 ( 4) of the Act would not b; applicable becase on a part of his land there was a house., They also applied for an interim order restraining the Collector from dispossessing them from th~ plots in qu<; stion. On September 9, 1982 the High Court made an interim order restraining the. respondents from <lispossessing the appellants from the plots until. further orders, unless they had already been dispos.sessed. But. on January J 7, 1983, the High Court rejected the writ petition at the stage of admission after hearing the advocates for both the parties. This appeal by special leave is filed by the appellants under Article 136 of the Constitution on against the order of the High Court.\n\nThe High Court has not given any reasons for its order dismissing the writpetition. TJie order reads : 'Rejected'. ·\n\nWe have been taken through the writ petition, counter affidavits. and other papers filed in the High Court and in this Court.\n\nAt the .out set we are of the view. that the writ petition filed in July, 1982 questioning. the notification issued in 1anuary, 1980 after a delay of nearly two and a half years is liable to be dis missed on the ground of !aches only. It is.no doubt true that th~. appellant have pleaded that they did not know anything about the notifications which had been published in the Gazelle till they eame to know of the notices issued under section 9 (3) of the Act but the'y have not pleaded that there was . no. publication in the locality of the public notice or' \\he substance.of the noti- . fication as required by . section 4 (1) of the Act. Jt should be\n\npresumed .. that official acts would have been performed duly as. ·: required by law. It is significant that a large number of persons who own the. remainin~ plots have not challenged the acquisition proceedings. J\"he only other petition in wh!ch these proceedings. are challenge'd is Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. I 1476 of 1982 on the file of the High Court filed subsequently by. Amar Singh and (our others. Moreoverin a small place like Kheragarh where these plots are situate, the acquisition of these lands-would be the. talk of the town in' a shortwhile and it is difficult to believe that the appellant who are residents of that .pla'ce would not have kriown till July, 1982 that the impugned notification had been published in 1980. Any interference in this case filed after two ' and a half years with the acquisition proceedings is likely to cause serious public prejudice. This apl'eal should, therefore, fail on the ground of delay)lone. ·\n\nHAR\\ SiNGH v. u. p, STATE (Venkotaramiah, J,) 421\n\nNow evenonmerits there appears to be no substance in the A case of the appellants.\n\nAt the.hearing of this appeal, the appellants have confined their case to plots Nos. 249, 26! and 133 and have given up their case in regard to pl?ts Nos. iso, 252 iµid 134,\n\nAppellant No. 1 claims to be the owner of plot No. 249.\n\nOn behalf of the respondents it is urged that appellant No. I is recorded only as a co-tenure hotqer alongwith five others and they have not impeached the notifications. With regard to the allegation about the existence of.a house on this plot, it is seen that the said fact is denied. The respondents rely upon some\n\nstatements recorded by tlle revenue authorities -suggesting that there was no house on this plot on the date of the notification.\n\nThis is a disputed question of fact, Appellant. No. 2 who claims to be the owner of plot No. 261 is stated to have purchased it on November 17, 1980 after the impugned nol!fications were published.\n\nThe title of appellant No. 3 to plot No. 133 is denied by R. K Kannaujia, Secretary, Krihi Utpadari Mandi Samiti, Kheragarh.\n\nIn this sta, te of affairs where ther~ are disputed . questions of fact it cannot be said that the appellants have made out any case for interference tinder Article 226 of the Consti. - tution.\n\n' On behalf of the appellants reliance is, however, placed on a decision of this Court in State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh & Ors.(1) In that decision the main point mde out was that the acq\"isition proceedings had been engineere!i ma/a fide by a State Minister.\n\nWe do not have any such allegation in the' present case; In the circumstances of this case we do not find that there is any ground to hold that the order made Ul)der section 17 (4) of the Act.exempting the operation of seetion 5-A of th~ Act is bad in law even though there appears to be some administrative delay in commencing the constr11ction of the Market Yard.\n\nSome photographs of the la.nd produced before us, howevei;, show that the work of\n\nconstruction has already been commeneed. ·\n\nG-0\n\nWe do not, .therefore, find that there is any ground to interfere •with the order of the High Court dismissing the writ petition. The appeal fails and it is dismiS£ed with .costs.\n\nH. S.K.\n\nAppeal dismissed.\n\n(1). (1980] 1 $.C, R, I07i.\n\ni H", "total_entities": 56, "entities": [{"text": "HARI SINGH & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11, "end_char": 27, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HARI SINGH & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF U.P. AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 30, "end_char": 51, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF U.P. AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A.P. SEN E.S. VENKATARAMIAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 56, "end_char": 83, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "E.S. VENKATARAMIAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Land Acquisition Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 106, "end_char": 126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 134, "end_char": 138, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Acquisition Act", "statute": "Land Acquisition Act"}}, {"text": "s.6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 143, "end_char": 146, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Acquisition Act", "statute": "Land Acquisition Act"}}, {"text": "s. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 213, "end_char": 218, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Acquisition Act", "statute": "Land Acquisition Act"}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 275, "end_char": 279, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Acquisition Act", "statute": "Land Acquisition Act"}}, {"text": "January 8, '1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 634, "end_char": 650, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On January 8, '1980 the respondent State issued a notification urider\n\nSe~. 4 (I) of the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 for acquisition of 60 adjoining pJots of land of two small villaacs for construction of a market yard."}}, {"text": "Sec. 17(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 924, "end_char": 934, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Acquisition Act", "statute": "Land Acquisition Act"}}, {"text": "January 9, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1073, "end_char": 1088, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Official Gazetto dated January 9, 1980."}}, {"text": "Sec. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1183, "end_char": 1189, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "January 10, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1397, "end_char": 1413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The notification was published in the official Gazette dated January 10, 1980."}}, {"text": "sec. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1904, "end_char": 1911, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1994, "end_char": 2001, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2015, "end_char": 2022, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "R K. Kannaujia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3542, "end_char": 3556, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J33 is denied by R K. Kannaujia, Secreh\\, ry,, Krishi Utpadan .M1odi Sarni ti, Kheragarh.", "canonical_name": "R K. Kannaujia"}}, {"text": "Krishi Utpadan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3572, "end_char": 3586, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J33 is denied by R K. Kannaujia, Secreh\\, ry,, Krishi Utpadan .M1odi Sarni ti, Kheragarh."}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3775, "end_char": 3786, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3927, "end_char": 3936, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shanti Bhusharj", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4369, "end_char": 4384, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shanti Bhusharj and S. Markandeya for the Appellant ..\n\nGopal Subrtimanlam and Mrs. S. Di\":shit for the Respondents. ·"}}, {"text": "S. Markandeya", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4389, "end_char": 4402, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shanti Bhusharj and S. Markandeya for the Appellant ..\n\nGopal Subrtimanlam and Mrs. S. Di\":shit for the Respondents. ·"}}, {"text": "Gopal Subrtimanlam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4425, "end_char": 4443, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shanti Bhusharj and S. Markandeya for the Appellant ..\n\nGopal Subrtimanlam and Mrs. S. Di\":shit for the Respondents. ·"}}, {"text": "S. Di\":shit", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4453, "end_char": 4464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shanti Bhusharj and S. Markandeya for the Appellant ..\n\nGopal Subrtimanlam and Mrs. S. Di\":shit for the Respondents. ·"}}, {"text": "VENKATARAMiAa", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4534, "end_char": 4547, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ' VENKATARAMiAa, J.. About 45 plots of land of Kheragarh village.", "canonical_name": "VENKATARAMiAa"}}, {"text": "Land Acpuisition Act, 1894", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4733, "end_char": 4759, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Venkataramiah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5169, "end_char": 5182, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "HARi SINGH v. U; P. STATE (Venkataramiah, J.)\n\nwere agricu.Itur.al lands were urgently reqLtired for the aforesaid .", "canonical_name": "VENKATARAMiAa"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5339, "end_char": 5348, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Land Acpuisition Act, 1894", "statute": "the Land Acpuisition Act, 1894"}}, {"text": "section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5455, "end_char": 5465, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Land Acpuisition Act, 1894", "statute": "the Land Acpuisition Act, 1894"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5496, "end_char": 5505, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Land Acpuisition Act, 1894", "statute": "the Land Acpuisition Act, 1894"}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5619, "end_char": 5628, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Land Acpuisition Act, 1894", "statute": "the Land Acpuisition Act, 1894"}}, {"text": "January 9,\n\n1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5766, "end_char": 5782, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was followed by a notification dated January 9,\n\n1980 under section 6 of the Act published in."}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5789, "end_char": 5798, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5918, "end_char": 5928, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6077, "end_char": 6086, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6124, "end_char": 6134, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hari Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6704, "end_char": 6714, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the issue o.f the said notices, three persons Hari Singh (appellant No.", "canonical_name": "HARI SINGH & ORS"}}, {"text": "Pooran Chand", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6734, "end_char": 6746, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1), Pooran Chand (appellant No."}}, {"text": "Munna Lal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6769, "end_char": 6778, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2) and Munna Lal (appellant No."}}, {"text": "Kheragarh village", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6994, "end_char": 7011, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8397 of 1982 on the file of the High Court of Allahabad questioning the validity of the acquisition proceedings as regards 6 plots of land in Kheragarh village out of th~ total of about 60 plots of land which had been acquired by the State Government in the above said prnceedlngs."}}, {"text": "section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7589, "end_char": 7599, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7642, "end_char": 7651, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7799, "end_char": 7809, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7933, "end_char": 7943, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "September 9, 1982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8155, "end_char": 8172, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On September 9, 1982 the High Court made an interim order restraining the."}}, {"text": "January J 7, 1983", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8364, "end_char": 8381, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on January J 7, 1983, the High Court rejected the writ petition at the stage of admission after hearing the advocates for both the parties."}}, {"text": "Article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8563, "end_char": 8574, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9316, "end_char": 9325, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9497, "end_char": 9506, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Amar Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9920, "end_char": 9930, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Amar Singh and (our others."}}, {"text": "Kheragarh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9978, "end_char": 9987, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Moreoverin a small place like Kheragarh where these plots are situate, the acquisition of these lands-would be the."}}, {"text": "Venkotaramiah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10518, "end_char": 10531, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "HAR\\ SiNGH v. u. p, STATE (Venkotaramiah, J,) 421\n\nNow evenonmerits there appears to be no substance in the A case of the appellants.", "canonical_name": "VENKATARAMiAa"}}, {"text": "November 17, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11438, "end_char": 11455, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "261 is stated to have purchased it on November 17, 1980 after the impugned nol!fications were published."}}, {"text": "R. K Kannaujia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11564, "end_char": 11578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "133 is denied by R. K Kannaujia, Secretary, Krihi Utpadari Mandi Samiti, Kheragarh.", "canonical_name": "R K. Kannaujia"}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11789, "end_char": 11800, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 17", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12256, "end_char": 12266, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_3_422_428_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "- 422\n\nSMT. SURINDAll KAUR SANDHU\n\nHARBAX SINGH SANDHU & ANR.\n\nApril II, 1984\n\n[V.V. Cl!ANDRACHUD, C.J, AND SABYASACl!I MUKHARJf, J, j ·\n\nHindu MlnoTity ancl Guardiahshtp Act, J9S6·1Vec•iOn 6-Interpretalion of-Custody of the child. Conflict of Laws'-Jurisdlction 'Of the court to decid~ the questloa of custody of o minOr. child-who is a , British citizen while the parents are Indian .. citizens.\n\nAppellant and Respondent No. I wore married io 1975 at Bodni Kalan District Paridkot, Punjab according•to Sikh rites. Soon after the marriage, they left for England, where a boy naed Pritpal Singh wa.s born to them on October 24,. 1976. Soon thr:rep.fter, their relationship came under a strain with the. reSult Respondent 1 'was trYing to negotiate witb ·• hitman to have tho appellant run over by a oar.\n\nThe Berkshire Police got.-=ent o(it rCsultiog in the Responderit's conviction and'Sentence for a period of three years. Ironically the' appellant. wife interovcncd and succeeded 1u obtaining a probation order for the man who-ha~ attn; iptcd to procure her murder; The husband was released on probation on February 4, 1982. The period of probation expired on December 24, 198i. On January 31, 1983, while the wife.was away at wor~, Respon dent No. 1 removed tho boy from England and brought him to India. On the same date, the appeUant~Wife obtaind an order under section 41 of tho Supreme Court Act, 1981 under which the boy became the ward of the Court with effect from that date. This order was codfirmed on July 22, 1983.\n\nIn tho meantime the appellant came to India in April, 198.3 and on 5.5.1983 filoda petition under section 97 of the. _Code of Criminal Procedure -in the Court of the learn_cd Judicial Magistrate first .class Jagraon praying for° tho custody o(, the child. The Respondent No .. l contested and took an objection . that under section 6 of' the Hinda Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 he was the natural guardi_an .of the . . . minor.boy. Thecontention was accepted and thepetition was dismissed.\n\nThe_appellant went back to England to resume her work and obtained the confirmation order dated 22.7.1983 referred to afove. Armed with the said order sh$' returned to Iodf8 and filed a writ Petition in the- High_ Court of Punjab and Haryana. The Wrif Petition was dismissed on the grounds inter a/ia that her status in England fs that of a foreigner, factory worker and a wife.Jiving separately from e husband and h1ving no: relatives and as such the ohiid would have to live in lonely and dismal 5UrroUtldiogs in .England~ while it WOUid grOw in an atmosphere _Of seJf confidence and seff respect, if it was permi\\teq tq Uve with its fa(her aq \"and preg tu,\n\n• • s. K. SANDHU v. H. s. SANDH{J (Chandrachud, c J.)\n\nHence the appeal arter ohtainiog special leave of the Court.\n\nAllowing the appeal, the Court,\n\nHELD : I. Section 6 of the Hindu Minority and' Guardianship Act, 1956 onstitutes the father as the natural gllardian of a mi'nor son. But that povision cannot upersede the paramOunt co_nsideration as to what is conducive to tho welfare of the minor. As the rnatters are presented to the Court the boy, from bis. own point of view, ought -to be in the\n\ncustoy of the mother.\n\n[427AB]\n\n2: 1 The modern theory of conflict of laws recognises 3nd, in any event, prefers the jurisdiction of the State whiCh has the most intimate contact with tho issues ari.sing in the case.\n\nJurisictian is not attraCtcd bY the operation or' creation of fortUitous circumstances such as the\n\ncircumstance as to whC:rc the child, whose custody is in 'issue,. is brought C or for the time being lodged. To allow the assumption of iurisdiclion by another State in such circumstances will only result in encouraging forumshopping. Ordinarily, jurisdiction must follow upon funCtional lines. That is to say, foi example, that in matters relating to matriony • and custody, the law of that place must govern which has the closest concern with the welJ.beine of the spouses and the welfare of the offsprings of marriage rhe spouses in this case had made BDgtand their D home where this boy was QOrn to them.\n\nThe_ father cannot deprive the English. Court of 'its jurisdiction to decide upon bis custody by , removing him .to India, not in the normal movement. of the mtrimonial home but, by an act which was gravely detrimental to the place of that home.\n\nThe fact that the. matrimonial home of the spouses was in England, establishes sufficient contacts or ties with that Sta tc in order to make it. reasonable\" and just for. tho Courts of that $tate to assume jurisdiction to E enforce obligations which were.incurred therein by the spouses. [427-CG)\n\n2:2 The spouses had set up their matrimonial home in England . where the wife was working as a clerk and the husband as a bus driver.\n\nThe boy is a British citizen,. having been born in Bngfand, and he holds a British passport. It cannot be controverted that, in these cjrcumstances the England Court had jurisdiction to decide the question of his custody. p '\n\n[427B-C] International Shoe Company V. Stale of Was.hington, 90 L.ED 95. [1945] quoted with approual. 3;1 Jo the instance case; (i) The welfare of the boy does not require that he should live with his . father or with the grand parents;\n\n(ii) the \"traumatic experience of~ cqoviction on a criminal chargo'' is not a factor in favour of the father especially when his conduci following jmmediately upon his release on probation shows that the experience has not chastened him, and (iii) The father is a man without a character who offered s9Iicitation to the commis&ion of his wife., s murdCr.\n\nThe wife, obtained an order of probation for him but, ho abused he'r magnanimity .by rtinniiig away with the boy soon after the probationary period was over. Even i~ that act., he displayed a singular lack of respect for law y obtaining a duplicate passport for the boy on an untrue represen- :tation that the original passport was lost. The Original passport was, to his knowledge, in the keeping of his wlfo. Iii Ibis background, tho\n\nSUPRaMB COURT lulPORTS [1984] 3 s.C.it.\n\naffliJ.ence of tbC husband's parents cannot be reg:irded as a circumstance of such overwhelming imporianCe as to tilt the balance in favour of the father on the question of what is l:ruely, . .for the \\velfare of thC niinor. At any rate it .will not be les:i for the welfare of the minor if the lived with his mother. He was whi3kt; d away from her and it cannot be said that there are any circumHances to support the view that lbe new environment in which he is wrongruliy br\"ought is more conducive to his welfare. He jsabout _8 years of age and thJ loving care of the mother ought not to be denied to him. The father is made of coarse stuff.\n\nThe mother earns an. income. of £ioo a week, which is certainly not 13.rge by English standards, but is not so low as not to e:iablo her totake reasonable . care of the boy. [426E•H}\n\n3:2 It is the duty and functioff of the court to protect the wife C against the bur<ten cf litigating in an inconvenient foru; n which-she and her husba.nd bad left volunt<irily in orde'r to make their living in England, where they gave birth .to this unfortunate boy.\n\n[427H]\n\n(The court directed the custody of the child to the mother forthwith and awarded c.ost of Rs. 3000) [428B] Y\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JvRISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 183 of 1984.\n\nAppeal by Special leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 26th August, 1983 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Cr. Writ Petition No. 392 of 1983.\n\nC. M. Nayar and Vijay Jhanji for the Appellant:\n\nPuran. Chand, Mrs. Naresh Bakshi and Miss Kailash Mehta for the Respondents.\n\nF The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRACHUD C. J., : The appellant, Surinder Kaur Sandhu, is the wife of respondent l; Harbax Singh Sandhu. Respondent 2 is the father of respondent l. , Appellant and respondent I were married in 1975 at Bodni Kalan,. District Faridkot, Punjab, according to Sikh rites. Soon after the m11_rriage they left for . England, where a boy named Pritpal Singh was born to them on October 24, 1976.\n\nWithin a short period after the bitth of the boy, the relationship lietween the spouses came under a strain resulting in 'a serious episode. The husband was trapped by the Berkshire Police who got the scent that he was negotiating with a hitman to have the wife run over by a car., The husband was convicted and sentenced . - . . . t\n\n.. •· '\n\ns. R;. SANDHU v. H. s. SANDHU (Chandrachud, c. J.) 42;\n\nto a term of three years for that offence. Ironically, it was the wife who intervened and succeeded in obtaining a pr-0bation order for the man who had attempted to procure her murder. The husband was released on. probation on February 4, 1982.\n\nThe period of probation expired on December 24, 1982.\n\nOn January 31, I'l83, while the wife was away .at work, the husband remove<) the boy from England and brought him to India.\n\nOn the same date, the wife obtained an.order under section 41 of of the Supreme Court Act, 1981 under which the boy became the Ward of the Court with effect from that date. That order was confirmed on July 22, 1983 by Mrs. Justice Boo\\h of the High Court of Justice (Family Division). By the said order, the husband was directed to haud over the custody of the ininor boy to the wife or her agent forthwith.\n\nThe wife came to-India ii} April 1983. On May 5, 1983 she filed a petition under section 97 oHhe Code of Criminal Procedure. in the Court of the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Jagraon. She asked for the custody of her son, contending t)lat he was in the illegal custody of the respondents.\n\nSection 97 authorises the Magistrate to direct a search to be made for persons wrongfully lonfined and, on their being found, to be produced _in the Court in order to facilitate the passing of Stich order as the\n\ncircumstances of the case may .require. The respondents relied. upon section 6 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, and opposed the petition on the ground that Respondent I . was the natural guardian of the minor boy. Accepting that contention, the learned Magistrate dismissed the petition; leaving the question of the custody of the child to be decided in an. appropriate proceeding. , The wifethen went back to England to resume her work and obtained the order dated July 22, 1983 to which we have already referred.\n\nShe came back to India once again, this time armed with _the aforesaid order of the English High Court. She then filed tb.e present writ petition in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, asking for the production and custody of her minor son.\n\nThe learned single iudge of the High Court who dealt with th.e petition JUlide an excellent effort to bring about a rapproachement between the spouses but, , he did not succeed. He questioned the boy more than once and he even presi1aded the spouses to live together for a couple of days in the house 'or the lnspector General of Prisons; Haryana. The spouses reported back to him that they\n\nG. ~\n\nH •\n\n A were unable to resolve their differences.\n\n.. F\n\n' The iearn_ed Judge dismissed the wife's petition on the grounds, inter alia, that her sttus in England is that of a foreigner, a factory worker and a wife living separately from the' husband: that she had no relatives in England; and that, the child would have to live in lonely and dismal surroundings in England. On t]\\e other hand, according to the learned. Judge, the father had gone through a traumatic experi, ence of a conviccion on a criminal charge; that he was back home i.n an atmosphere which welcomed him; that his parents were in affluent circumstances; and that, tpe child would grow iu an atmosphere of self-confidence and self\n\nrespect if he was permitted to live with them.\n\nSome of these circumstances mentioned by the learned Judge are not beside the point but, their comparative assessment is diffi cult to accept as made,. For example, the 'traumatic expei; ience of a conviction on a criminal charge' i~ riot a factor in favour of the father, especially when his conduct following immediately upon his release on probation shows that the experience has 11ot chas tened him. On the whole, 'we are unable to agree that the welfare of the boy requires that he should live with his father or with llie grand-parents. The father is a man without a charscter who offered solicitation to the commission of his wife's murder. The wife obtained an order of probation for him but, he abused her magnanimity by running away with the boy soon after the probationary period was over. Even in that act, he displayed a singular la.ck of respect for Jaw by obtaining a duplicate passport for the boy on an untrue representation that the original passport was lost. The original passport was, to his knowledge, in the keeping; of his wife.\n\nIn this background, we do not. regard the aJlluence of the husband's par, nts to be 'a circumstance of such overwhelming importance as t,0 tilt the balance in favour of the father on the question of what is truly for the welfare of the minor. At any rate,· we are unable to agree that it will be less for the welfare of the minor if he lived with his mother. He was whisked away .froni ii.er and the question is whether, .there are any\n\ncircun, stances to support the view that -the new environment' in which he is wrongfully brought is niore conducive. fo his welfare.\n\nHe is about .8 years of age and the lovirig care of the mother ought not to be denied to him. The father is made of coarse stulf. The mother earns an income of £100 a week, whicl:i is certainly not large_by English standards, but is not so low as uot to enable her,\n\n, ..\n\n. -)\n\ns: K..SANDHu v. it. s. S/\\, NDHU (Chandrachud, c. J.)\n\nto take reasonable care of the boy.\n\n. Section 6 of the Hindu Minority and Guardia!Jship At. 1956 .-constitutes .the father as the natural guardian of a minor son. But that provision cannot supersede the pai:amount consideration as to what is conducive to tho welfare of the minor. As the matters are presented' to us to-day, the. boy, from his own point. of view, ought to be in the custody of the mother.\n\nWe may add !hat the spouses had set up their matrimonial home in England where the wife wasworking as a clerk and the husband as a bus driver. The boy is a British citizen, having .been borr in: England, and he holds a British passport.\n\nIt cannot\" be controverted that, in these circumstances, the English Court had jurisdiction t.o decide the question of his custody. The modern theory of Conflict otLaws recognises and; in any .event, prefers the jurisdiction of the State which has the most intimate contact v.ith the issues arising iµ the .case. Jurisdiction is not attracted by the operation or creation of fortuitous circumstances such as the circumstance as to where the child, whose custody is in issue, is brought or for the time being lodged. To allow the assumption Of jurisdiction by another State , ir, such circumstances will only remit in encouraging t'orum-shopping. Ordinarily, jurisdiction must follow upon functional lines. That is to say, for example, that. in matters relating to matrimony and custody, the law of that place must govern which has the closest concern with the well-being of the spouses and the welfare of the otfsprings of marriage. The spouses in this case had made Engjnd their .home where this boy was born to them: The father cannot deprive the English Court of its jurisdiction to decide upon his custody by removing him to India, not in the. normal m9vement of the matrimonial )lome but, by an act which was gravely detrimental to the peace .of that home.\n\nThe fact that the matrimonial home of the spouses was m England, establishes sufficient contacts or1ies with that 'State in order to make it reasonable and jnst for the Courts of • that state to assume jurisdiction to enforce obligations which were incurred therein by the spouses.,. (See lntejnational Shoe Company\n\nv. State of Washington, (l) which was not a matrimouial case but which is regarded as the fountainhead of the subsequent develop\n\nmets ofjurisdictional issues like the one involved in the instant case.) It is our duty and function to protect the wife against the burden of litigating in an -inconvenient forum which she and her husband had left voluntarily in order to make their 1iv1ng in England, where they gave birth to this unfortunate boy .\n\n(I) 90 L. Ed. 95 [1945]\n\n_..,.\n\nFor these reasons, we set asid; the judgment of the High Court and direct that the custody of the child shall be handed over to the appellant-mother. lhat shall he done during the course of fuis day. ,\n\nThe High Court has referred to the evidence showing that the annual income of the father's family is in the range of Rs. 90,000.\n\nThat would justify an order directiug the respondents to pay a sum of Rs. 3,000 (three thousand) to the appellant for her costs of this appeal.\n\nOrder accordingly,\n\nS. R.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 45, "entities": [{"text": "SURINDAll KAUR SANDHU", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12, "end_char": 33, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SURINDAll KAUR SANDHU", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "HARBAX SINGH SANDHU & ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 35, "end_char": 60, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "HARBAX SINGH SANDHU & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Hindu MlnoTity ancl Guardiahshtp Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 138, "end_char": 174, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "October 24,. 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 617, "end_char": 634, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Soon after the marriage, they left for England, where a boy naed Pritpal Singh wa.s born to them on October 24,."}}, {"text": "February 4, 1982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1111, "end_char": 1127, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "wife interovcncd and succeeded 1u obtaining a probation order for the man who-ha~ attn; iptcd to procure her murder; The husband was released on probation on February 4, 1982."}}, {"text": "December 24, 198i", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1164, "end_char": 1181, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The period of probation expired on December 24, 198i."}}, {"text": "January 31, 1983", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1186, "end_char": 1202, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On January 31, 1983, while the wife.was away at wor~, Respon dent No."}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1276, "end_char": 1283, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 removed tho boy from England and brought him to India."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1303, "end_char": 1308, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 removed tho boy from England and brought him to India."}}, {"text": "section 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1369, "end_char": 1379, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Supreme Court Act, 1981", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1387, "end_char": 1410, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "July 22, 1983", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1516, "end_char": 1529, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This order was codfirmed on July 22, 1983."}}, {"text": "5.5.1983", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1599, "end_char": 1607, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In tho meantime the appellant came to India in April, 198.3 and on 5.5.1983 filoda petition under section 97 of the."}}, {"text": "section 97", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1630, "end_char": 1640, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Supreme Court Act, 1981", "statute": "Supreme Court Act, 1981"}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1856, "end_char": 1865, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Supreme Court Act, 1981", "statute": "Supreme Court Act, 1981"}}, {"text": "Hinda Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1874, "end_char": 1915, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "22.7.1983", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2125, "end_char": 2134, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Theappellant went back to England to resume her work and obtained the confirmation order dated 22.7.1983 referred to afove."}}, {"text": "Chandrachud", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2725, "end_char": 2736, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jiving separately from e husband and h1ving no: relatives and as such the ohiid would have to live in lonely and dismal 5UrroUtldiogs in .England~ while it WOUid grOw in an atmosphere _Of seJf confidence and seff respect, if it was permi\\teq tq Uve with its fa(her aq \"and preg tu,\n\n• • s. K. SANDHU v. H. s. SANDH{J (Chandrachud, c J.)\n\nHence the appeal arter ohtainiog special leave of the Court.", "canonical_name": "Chandrachud"}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2850, "end_char": 2859, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Hinda Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956", "statute": "the Hinda Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Guardianship Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2887, "end_char": 2909, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bngfand", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4851, "end_char": 4858, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "having been born in Bngfand, and he holds a British passport."}}, {"text": "s9I", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5565, "end_char": 5568, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "SUPRaMB COURT lulPORTS [1984] 3 s.C.it", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6058, "end_char": 6096, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Iii Ibis background, tho\n\nSUPRaMB COURT lulPORTS [1984] 3 s.C.it."}}, {"text": "C. M. Nayar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7541, "end_char": 7552, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. M. Nayar and Vijay Jhanji for the Appellant:\n\nPuran."}}, {"text": "Vijay Jhanji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7557, "end_char": 7569, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. M. Nayar and Vijay Jhanji for the Appellant:\n\nPuran."}}, {"text": "Puran. Chand", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7590, "end_char": 7602, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "C. M. Nayar and Vijay Jhanji for the Appellant:\n\nPuran."}}, {"text": "Naresh Bakshi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7609, "end_char": 7622, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chand, Mrs. Naresh Bakshi and Miss Kailash Mehta for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "Kailash Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7632, "end_char": 7645, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chand, Mrs. Naresh Bakshi and Miss Kailash Mehta for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "CHANDRACHUD", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7714, "end_char": 7725, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRACHUD C. J., : The appellant, Surinder Kaur Sandhu, is the wife of respondent l; Harbax Singh Sandhu.", "canonical_name": "Chandrachud"}}, {"text": "Surinder Kaur Sandhu", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7750, "end_char": 7770, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRACHUD C. J., : The appellant, Surinder Kaur Sandhu, is the wife of respondent l; Harbax Singh Sandhu.", "canonical_name": "SURINDAll KAUR SANDHU"}}, {"text": "Pritpal Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8054, "end_char": 8067, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "England, where a boy named Pritpal Singh was born to them on October 24, 1976."}}, {"text": "October 24, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8088, "end_char": 8104, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "England, where a boy named Pritpal Singh was born to them on October 24, 1976."}}, {"text": "January 31, I'l83", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8811, "end_char": 8828, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On January 31, I'l83, while the wife was away .at work, the husband remove<) the boy from England and brought him to India."}}, {"text": "section 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8984, "end_char": 8994, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Supreme Court Act, 1981", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9005, "end_char": 9028, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Boo\\h", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9164, "end_char": 9169, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That order was confirmed on July 22, 1983 by Mrs. Justice Boo\\h of the High Court of Justice (Family Division)."}}, {"text": "High Court of Justice (Family Division)", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9177, "end_char": 9216, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That order was confirmed on July 22, 1983 by Mrs. Justice Boo\\h of the High Court of Justice (Family Division)."}}, {"text": "section 97", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9423, "end_char": 9433, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Supreme Court Act, 1981", "statute": "the Supreme Court Act, 1981"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9439, "end_char": 9465, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 97", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9644, "end_char": 9654, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Supreme Court Act, 1981", "statute": "the Supreme Court Act, 1981"}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9926, "end_char": 9935, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Supreme Court Act, 1981", "statute": "the Supreme Court Act, 1981"}}, {"text": "Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9943, "end_char": 9984, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "High Court of Punjab and Haryana", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10543, "end_char": 10575, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Armed with the said order sh$' returned to Iodf8 and filed a writ Petition in the- High Court of Punjab and Haryana."}}, {"text": "JUlide", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10706, "end_char": 10712, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned single iudge of the High Court who dealt with th.e petition JUlide an excellent effort to bring about a rapproachement between the spouses but, , he did not succeed."}}, {"text": "Section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13782, "end_char": 13791, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_3_429_434_EN", "year": 1984, "text": ".. ,\n\nDELHI VETERINARY ASSOCIATION\n\nv •\n\nUNION or INDIA & ORS.\n\nApril I 2, 1984\n\n[E.S. VENKATARAM!AH AND D.P. MADON, JJ.]\n\nConstitution of India 1950-Artic/e 39 (d) 'Equal pay for equal work' -Principle--Applicability of-Factors to be taken into conslderatlon while fixing pay scales. ·\n\nVeterinary Assistant Surgeoas emp/Oyed In Delhi Administration, ,-1 UnlOn Territory Of Chandigarh and' Central Government-Disparity , in pay scales-\"-Whether IJeterinarY asiistant 5Urgeons in Delhi Administration entitled to equal scales of pay.\n\n. The Petitioner in a writ petition sought relief in respect of Veteri- . nary Assistant Surgeons working in the Delhi ·.Administration, alleging . that the Veterinary Assistant Surgeons have been denied the benefit of the principle of 'equal pay for e'qual work' ioCorporated i-n Article 39 {d) of the Constitution and that there has b<:een violationof the furida rriental :ights guaranteed under Arti~Jes 14 and 16, because their scale of salary (Rs. SS0-990) was lower than the pay scalo of Veterinary Assistant Surgeons employed by the Union Territory of Chandigarh . (850-1700), or by the Central Government in the IndoTibetan Boarder\n\nl;'olice and by the Border Security Force (Rs. 6S0-!200).\n\nThe Writ petition was oPposed by the Union of India denying many of the allegtions in the pe.tition, while the Development Commissioner, while. the o\"ethi Administration contested the writ petitiOn by justifying -\n\nthe impugned pay scale and also by pleading that the matter should be allo.wed tO be examined by the Fourth Pay Comnlission.\n\nLJ;\n\nDismissing 'the writ petition.,\n\nHELD : !.\n\nThe question, of the fixation of pay scale for Veteri nary Assistant Surgeons should be Jeft to be decided by the Government on the basis of the recommendation of the Fourth Pay Commission.\n\nThe question of dirimiiiation canno~ be decided in isolation.\n\nHaving regard to the long delay in approaching this Court after the fixation of the pay scale, no relief can'be granted in respect of the periC>d between 1973 and 1984.\n\nThe pe(itioner is at liberty to make its representation before the Fourth Pay Commission.. [ 434 HE)\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984) 3 s.c.ll..\n\n\\ 2.\n\nIn a:ddition to the principle . of i equal pay for equal. work', the pay structure of tl,1e employees of. the Government' should rCflect many other social values.\n\nApart frdm being the Qominnt empl_oyer, the Government is also eXpccted to be a 'model employer. It has, there fore, to follow certain, basic pr, inciples in fixing 1he pay scales of various posts <ind C3.dres.\n\nThe degree of skill; strain of work, experience in volved, train'fng required, reSponsibility, uadertakeo, mental and physical requirement' disa:greeBblooess of the t.ask,- hazard attendant on work and faHgue involved ate some of the factors , which should be taken into ·· consideration in fixing pay scales.\n\nThe met bod of recruitmentJ ihe level at which the initial recrpitment is made in the' hierar\"cby of service Or\n\ncadre~ minimum educational and 'technical qualification prescfibed for - the post, the nature of 'dealings with the p'Jblic_, avenues of pfomoti.on available arid horizontal and vertical relativity with other jobs in .the same service or outside are also relevant.factors. [432fi-H; 433A]\n\nWil.e fixing the pay scales, the paying capacity or:the Government, the total financial btirden which has to be .borne by .the general public, the disParity between the incomes of the Government employees and the incomes of those who are not in government service and tho net amount available for governmentat the current tax1tion level, after paying the salaries and allowances to the-GOvernment servants have also to be borne in mind. [4338-0]\n\n4. It is imperative that thefe should b~ an evolution and impJe .. menta_tiOo of a scieatific national Policy of incomes; wages and pr\\ces which would be ap\\)Iicable not merely to Government services but als9\n\nto the other sectors of the national eco1101ny.\n\nAs Llf.as -possible tbeneeds of a family-unit have to be borne ill mind in fixing the wage scales.\n\nThe 'needs' are not static.' They include adequate nutrition, mediCal facilities, clothing, housing, education, cultural, activities etc.\n\nCare• should also bo taken to seQ that what is fixed today as an adequate pay scale does not be-Come inadequate withi 1 a.short period by providing an automatic mechanism for the modification of the pay scale.\n\n (433B-G) ORIGINAL JURISDICTION i Writ Petition No. 9080 of 1983\n\n(Under article 32 of the Constitution of Illdia)\n\nK.K..Singhvi, A .K. Gupta and Bri} Bhushan for the petitioner.\n\nK. (J_. Bhagat, Addi. Sol; General, Harbans [Al and R. N. PoddGr for the Respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVBNKATARAMIAll, J. The Delhi Veterinary AssociatJon is the petitioneF in the above case. It is an association of veterinary doctors who are residing in the Uuion Territory of Delhi. By this petition ilnde.r Article 32 of the Constitution, the petitioner\n\n_,.\n\nDELHI VETERINARY\n\nASSN. v. UNION (Venkataramiah, J.) 4ll • is seeking relief in respect of Veterinary Assistant Surgeons workig in the office of the Development Commissioner, Delhi Administration, Delhi; who are its members. It is alleged that these Veterinary Assistant Surgeons havebeen denied ti1e benefit\n\nof the principle of 'equal pay for equal work' incorporated in Artide 39 (d) of the. Constirution and that there bas been violation of their fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 14 and\n\nArticle 15 of the Constitution because their scale of salary is lower than the pay scale of Veterinary Assistant Surgeons employed by tlie Union Territory of Chandigarh or by the Central Government in the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (I.TB.P.) and in the Border\n\nSecurity Force (B.S.F) It is .also alleged that the Veterinary Assistant Surgeoqs are persons who have obtained Bachelor's Degree in Veterinary Science and Animal Husbandry (B.V.Sc. & A.H.) from colleges of veterinary medicine and the minimum qualifications for entering the said course are more or less the same as those prescribed for M.B.B.S. or B.D.S. Examinations.\n\nThey would be taught in the colleges of veterinary medicine inter alia subjects like Biochtmistry, Pharmacology & Toxicology; Bacteriology, Pathology, Hygiene,. Parasitology, Surgery, Radiology, Clinical & Preventive medicine, Obstetrics, Gynaecology and additionally Animal Husbandry. Some of them, it is stated, have also undergone some special courses after thefr degree. Having regard fo the period of study in the college and the subjects taught the)' claim that they are almost equal to those who have obtained\n\nM.B.B.S.-and B.D.S. degrees.\n\nIt is alleged that whereas the Veterinary Assistant Surgeons in tho Union Territory of Chandigarh were .paid salary in the pay\n\nscale of Rs. 850-1700 on the basis of.the pay scale prevailing in the adjoining State of Punjab and the Veterinary Assistant\n\nSurgeons in the Union Territories of Arunacbal Pradesh and Mizoram were paid in the pay scale of Rs. 550-900, the Veteri- ·; nary ·Assistant Surgeons of the Union Territo'ry of Delhi were given pay in the pay scale of Rs. 425-750 from January l, 1973 and on a represerttation being made by tJiem, their pay scale was modified to Rs. 550-900 with effect from 'November 2, 1977 as was being paid in the Union Territories of Arunachal Pradesh and Mizoram with effect from January 1, 1973 even though the Ministry of Agriculture had recoml\\lendcd that their pay scale should be revised to Rs. 650-1200. The petitioner .contends that even now the disparity between their pay scale and the pay scale 9f ~Jie Veterinary Assistant Surieons of the Union 1errito1?' of\n\n• B\n\nSUPREM!l COURT REPORTS\n\n[1984.J 3 S.C; R,\n\nChanigarli and of I.T.B.P. and B.S'.F. which is fixed at Rs. 650- 1200 persists. On the basis of the abo_ve aliegation.s the petitioner prays that a direction should be issued to the respondents to treat the Veterinary Assistant Surgeb_ns or'the Delhi Administration at par with the Veterinary Assistant Surgeons of Chandigarh, I.TB P. and B.S.F .\n\nA counter affidavit is fil'd on beh1lf of the Union Government denying many of the aliegations in the petition an<i in parti- . crilat the recommendation said to have been m1de by the .ministry of Agriculture.\n\nThe Developtneut CommissiOner, Delhi has fifod a counter affidavit justifying the impugned pay scale and at the 11ame time he has pleaded that this is a matter which should be allowed tobe examined by the Fourth Pay Commission. .In view' of the latter plea, we feel that it is not appropriate to deal with the merits of tho claim of the Veterinary Assistant Surgeons Of Delhi . in the course of this order although we feel tharprima facie their grievance appears to he a legitimate one. Since any alteration in their pay scales ; vould involve modification of the pay scales of officers in the higher cadres in the same department and in the corresponding cadres in other departments, the work of refixation of the pay scale should not ordinarily be under.taken by the Court at this stage because the Fourth Pay Commission is required to co.nsider the '{ery same question after taking into consideration all the relevant aspects.\n\nIn addition to the principle of 'equal pay for equal work', the pay structure , of the employees of the Government should reflect many other social values.\n\nApart from belng the dominant \" employer, the Government is also expected 'to be a model employer. It has, therefore, to follow certain basic principles in fixing the pay sc.ales of various posts and cadres in the Government service.\n\nThe. degree of skill, strain of work, eperience involved, training required, responsibilily undertaken, mental and physical requirements, disagreeableness of the task, hazard attendant on work and fatigue _involved are, according to the Third Pay Commission, some of the relevant factors which should be taken into consideration in fixing pay scales. The method of recruitment, the level at which the initial recruitment ismade in the hierarchy of service or cadre, minimum educational and techniGal qualifications prescribed for the post, the nature of\n\ndealins with the public, avenues of 1'toinotion available and hori-\n\n. j\n\n' ;\n\nDELm VETERINARY ASSN. v. UNION (Venkdtararniah, J.) 433 .\n\nzontijl and vertical relativity with othor jobs in the same service A or outside are also relevant factors.\n\nAtthe same time while fixing the pay scales, the paying capacitY of the Government, the total financial burden which has to be borne by the general public, the disparity between the incomes of the Government. employees and the incomes of those who are not in Government service and the net amount available for Government at the current taxation level, which appears to be very high when compared with other countries in the world, for developmental purposes 11fter paying the salaries and allowances to the Government' servants hwe also to be bonie in mind.\n\nThese are, however, not exhanstive of the various matter& which should be considered while fixing the pay scales. There may be ma, ny , others including geographical considerations.\n\nAbove .1111, it should be noted that the work of a Pay Commission . does not really mean an increase of Rs. 100 here or recommending an additional allowance of Rs. SO there.\n\nIt does also mean a mere reduction of the number of pay. scales or an attempt at the reduction of the gap between the highest pay scale and the lowest pay scale It is a big exerc; jse in gearing up the national economy to secure the highest good to the milli1ms of our countrymen. Jn. an egalitari; m society based on planned economy it is imperative that there should be an evolution and . implementation of .a scientific national .\"policy of incomes, wages and prices which would be applicable not merely to Government services but also to the other sectors of the national economy, As far as possible the needs of a family unit have to be borne in mind 'in fixing the wage seales. The 'needs' are nQt static.\n\nThey include adequate nutrition, medical .facilities, clothing, housing education, cultural activities etc.\n\nAny provision made while fixing the pay scales for the development of a society of healthy and well educated children irrespective of the economic position of the parents is only an investment and not just an item. of\n\nexpnditure. In these days of gallopping inflation, care should alsq be taken to see that what is fixed today as an adequate pay scale does not become inadequate within a short period by providing an automatic mechanism for the modification of the pay scale.\n\nThe duties of a Pay <:; ommission are really onerous. -But we\n\nave no doubt that the Fo11rth Pay Comission will keep in view\n\n' . '\n\n434•\n\n'' •· G\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984] 3 s.c.R.\n\nall the relevant considerations, some of which are referred to above, whjfo dealihg with the complex problem of determining the equitab!; pay SCljles for the vast number of employees of the Central Government and of the Union Territories. We have also no douht tltat the Fourth Pay Commission will not just be another Pay Commission as in the past but will lay down sound principles regarding the salary structure of the public services.\n\nIn the above sittiiti()n, we do not feel called upon to decide in isolation the question of discrimination raised before us. This is a matter which should be left to be decided by the Government on the basis of the recommendations .. of the Fourth Pay 'Commis- ,,_ . . .\n\nS!OQ. . , • '\n\nIt was, however, urged that since the Fourth Pay Commission would not be making any recommendation in bspect of the period\n\nbetween 1973 and ; the dateon which the new. pay scales to be fiired on the recommendation of the Fourth Pay Commissloi: would come.into force, the Court should. eons id er whether the VetetiJlary Assistant' Surgeons were entitled to any retrospecti'Vei beniftt in respect Qf the said' pastperiod. Having regard to the . !orig delay in approaching this Court after the fixation of their pay sca'e earlier, we do not propose to grant 11ny relief in respect . of that period. ·\n\nThe. petition is,, therefore; dismis§ed. The petitioner is at liberty to make its representation befor tho .Fourth Pay Commission to determine the pay scale of the' Veterinary Assistllnt Surgeons of Delhi. We a; re sure that the Fourth Pay Commls sion which js presidedoover by a former Judge of this Coiil'li would consider theii: representation sympathetically.\n\nN.V.K. . Petition dis\"!is:teif.", "total_entities": 32, "entities": [{"text": "DELHI VETERINARY ASSOCIATION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6, "end_char": 34, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DELHI VETERINARY ASSOCIATION", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "UNION or INDIA & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 41, "end_char": 61, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "D.P. MADON, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 105, "end_char": 120, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.P. MADON", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 123, "end_char": 144, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 816, "end_char": 826, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "SS0", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 988, "end_char": 991, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Chandigarh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1094, "end_char": 1104, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SS0-990) was lower than the pay scalo of Veterinary Assistant Surgeons employed by the Union Territory of Chandigarh . ("}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1129, "end_char": 1147, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "850-1700), or by the Central Government in the IndoTibetan Boarder\n\nl;'olice and by the Border Security Force (Rs."}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1272, "end_char": 1286, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Writ petition was oPposed by the Union of India denying many of the allegtions in the pe.tition, while the Development Commissioner, while."}}, {"text": "Fourth Pay Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1792, "end_char": 1813, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The question, of the fixation of pay scale for Veteri nary Assistant Surgeons should be Jeft to be decided by the Government on the basis of the recommendation of the Fourth Pay Commission."}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4517, "end_char": 4527, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "K.K", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4560, "end_char": 4563, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "9080 of 1983\n\n(Under article 32 of the Constitution of Illdia)\n\nK.K..Singhvi, A .K. Gupta and Bri} Bhushan for the petitioner."}}, {"text": "..", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4563, "end_char": 4565, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "9080 of 1983\n\n(Under article 32 of the Constitution of Illdia)\n\nK.K..Singhvi, A .K. Gupta and Bri} Bhushan for the petitioner."}}, {"text": "Singhvi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4565, "end_char": 4572, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "9080 of 1983\n\n(Under article 32 of the Constitution of Illdia)\n\nK.K..Singhvi, A .K. Gupta and Bri} Bhushan for the petitioner."}}, {"text": "A .K. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4574, "end_char": 4585, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "9080 of 1983\n\n(Under article 32 of the Constitution of Illdia)\n\nK.K..Singhvi, A .K. Gupta and Bri} Bhushan for the petitioner."}}, {"text": "Bri} Bhushan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4590, "end_char": 4602, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "9080 of 1983\n\n(Under article 32 of the Constitution of Illdia)\n\nK.K..Singhvi, A .K. Gupta and Bri} Bhushan for the petitioner."}}, {"text": "K. (J_. Bhagat", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4624, "end_char": 4638, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. (J_."}}, {"text": "R. N. PoddGr", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4676, "end_char": 4688, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sol; General, Harbans [Al and R. N. PoddGr for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "VBNKATARAMIAll", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4755, "end_char": 4769, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVBNKATARAMIAll, J. The Delhi Veterinary AssociatJon is the petitioneF in the above case."}}, {"text": "Delhi Veterinary AssociatJon", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4778, "end_char": 4806, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVBNKATARAMIAll, J. The Delhi Veterinary AssociatJon is the petitioneF in the above case.", "canonical_name": "DELHI VETERINARY ASSOCIATION"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4962, "end_char": 4972, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "DELHI VETERINARY\n\nASSN. v. UNION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5015, "end_char": 5047, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "DELHI VETERINARY\n\nASSN."}}, {"text": "Venkataramiah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5049, "end_char": 5062, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. UNION (Venkataramiah, J.) 4ll • is seeking relief in respect of Veterinary Assistant Surgeons workig in the office of the Development Commissioner, Delhi Administration, Delhi; who are its members."}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5502, "end_char": 5512, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5518, "end_char": 5528, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Arunachal Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7374, "end_char": 7391, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "550-900 with effect from 'November 2, 1977 as was being paid in the Union Territories of Arunachal Pradesh and Mizoram with effect from January 1, 1973 even though the Ministry of Agriculture had recoml\\lendcd that their pay scale should be revised to Rs."}}, {"text": "Mizoram", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7396, "end_char": 7403, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "550-900 with effect from 'November 2, 1977 as was being paid in the Union Territories of Arunachal Pradesh and Mizoram with effect from January 1, 1973 even though the Ministry of Agriculture had recoml\\lendcd that their pay scale should be revised to Rs."}}, {"text": "Ministry of Agriculture", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7453, "end_char": 7476, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "550-900 with effect from 'November 2, 1977 as was being paid in the Union Territories of Arunachal Pradesh and Mizoram with effect from January 1, 1973 even though the Ministry of Agriculture had recoml\\lendcd that their pay scale should be revised to Rs."}}, {"text": "Delhi Administration", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8006, "end_char": 8026, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the basis of the above aliegation.s the petitioner prays that a direction should be issued to the respondents to treat the Veterinary Assistant Surgebns or'the Delhi Administration at par with the Veterinary Assistant Surgeons of Chandigarh, I.TB P. and B.S.F ."}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8351, "end_char": 8356, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Developtneut CommissiOner, Delhi has fifod a counter affidavit justifying the impugned pay scale and at the 11ame time he has pleaded that this is a matter which should be allowed tobe examined by the Fourth Pay Commission."}}, {"text": "Third Pay Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9880, "end_char": 9900, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "degree of skill, strain of work, eperience involved, training required, responsibilily undertaken, mental and physical requirements, disagreeableness of the task, hazard attendant on work and fatigue _involved are, according to the Third Pay Commission, some of the relevant factors which should be taken into consideration in fixing pay scales."}}, {"text": "N.V.K.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 14542, "end_char": 14548, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.V.K. ."}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_3_435_460_EN", "year": 1984, "text": ",-.•\n\nVIJAY NARAIN SINGH\n\nSTATE OF BIHAR & ORS\n\nApril 12, 1984\n\n[O. CI!INNAPPA REDDY,, A.P. SEN AND\n\n0 E.S.\n\nVENKATARAMIAI!, JJ.]\n\n. Bihar Control of Crimes Act 1981-Section 12 read .with section 2 (d). For preventive detention under section 12 authorities mu1t be atisfied\n\nthat the.person to be detained is anti-social element as defined in section 2 (d).\n\nBihar Control ofC,'imes Act, 1981-Sectlon 2 (d)- Definition of 'antl social element' -Interpretation of expression 'habitual/I in sub-clause (j), (Ii) and (iv)-M_eanlng of. ·\n\n[titerpretatlon of statutes-Rule o~-Law of pre11entive detention must be strictly construed.\n\nPractice-When ,, erson enlarged on bail by competent criminal court, great caution should be exercised in scrutinising validity of preventive detention order which is based on ihe 'Jery atne charge which is to be tried by cr 1mlnal court.\n\n '.ff'ords and Phrases-Expression 'habitually'-Meaning ~!•\n\nThe petititiner, /\\'ho Was facing a Sessions trial for Offences under section 302 read with sections 120B, 386 and 5ll of the Indian Penal Code, \\Vas allowed to be enlarged on bail by the l-Iigh Court.\n\nBut before the retitloner was released, the District M; lgistrate passed an order on August 16, 1983 under section -12 (2) of the Bihar Control of Crimes. Act 1981 for detention of the petitioner, in ord\n\n0er to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicia'l to the maintenance of public order. The grounds of deteo\\ion supplied to tbe petitioner related to the incidents which took place in 1975 and 1982 and also the incident which gave rise to the above-mentioned trial.\n\nThe petitioner challenged the order of detention bef\\'re ihe High Court under Article 22() of the ContsitutiOn.\n\nThe High Court dismissed the petition on a technical ground.\n\nHence this petition under Article. 32 of tho Constitution. The petitioner contended : (1) lhat the i1npugned order ot detention was void uiider Article 22 ($) of the Constitution as one or the grounds was too remote and not proxima.te in point of time and had therefore no rational connection {or the subjective satisfactiotl of the District Magistrate under section 12 (2) of the Act, ap<l (il ttiat the imp11gned order of detention was mala fide and consli\n\n436 SUpR~NIE COURT REPORTS [198413 S.C.\\l.\n\nA toted a ftagf.ant abuse of ower on the part of the District Magistrate as it was meant to subvert judicial proCess by trying to circumvent the order passed by the High Court .enlarging .the petitioner on bail.\n\nA II owing the petition by majority,\n\nHELD : (Per Venataramiah and Chinnappa Reddy, JJ.)\n\nThe law of preventive detention is a. )lard law and therefore it !<.hould be strictly construedw Care should e taken that the liberty of a persqn is not jeopardised unless his case falls squarely within the .four corners of the relevant law.\n\nThe Ja_w of J:l'reventive d1:tention shOuld.not be used merely to clip the wings of an accused who is -involved in a criminal ' prosecution.\n\nIt is not intended for the purpose of\n\n0keeping a man under detention when _under ordi.Iiary criminal Jaw it may not , be possible to resist the is.sue of orders of baiJ, unless the 1naterial .available is si.ich as would satisfy the requiremelits of-the legal provisions authorising such detention.\n\nWhen a , Person is_ enlarged on b::t.il by a competent Criminal court, great caution sh_ould be exercised in scrutinising tlte validity of an. order or preventive detention which is based on the very same charge • which is to be tried by the criminal court.\n\n[459CD)\n\nStion 12 of the Bihar Control of Crimes Act, 1981 makes pro vision for the detention of an anti social elemei:J.t.\n\nThe detaining authority should, therefore, be satisfied that the person against whom an order\n\nis made under section 12\" of the Act is an-.aati-social element as defined in section 2 (d) of the Act. The two sub-clauses of section 2 (d) which are relevant for the purposes of this case are Sub-clause {i) and sub.clause\n\n- (iv). Unde; sub-clause (i) a person who either by himself or as a melnber\n\n-of or leader of a. gang habitually comtrlits or attempt; to.commit or abets\n\nthe commi.ssion of Offences punishable undr Chapter XVI dealing with . offences affecting the human body or Chapter XVII dealing with. offences against property, of the ladian Peria! Code is considered 'to be an anti .. social element.\n\nUnder sub-clause (iv) a person who has been habitually passing indecent remarks to, or teasing women or girls, i's an anti-social element; Io b'oth these sub.clauses, the wofd 'babitually..,_s used.\n\nThe expression 'habitually' ri'1aos 'IeSpeatedly' or 'persistently'.\n\nIt implies a thread of continuity stringing toiether similar repetitive acts.\n\nRepeatedJ persJstent and similar, but not isolated, individrial and dis-similar acts are necessary to justify an infereoi;; e of habit. It _connotes frequent commiS-sion of acts or omissions of the same kind referred. to in each of the said ub\n\n~Iau'Ses or an aggregate of similar acts or on1issions.\n\nWhereas under sub-clause (iii) :>r sub-clause (v) of section 2 (d) a. sing-10 act or omission referred to in tbe.m may be enough to treat the pCrson concerned as ai:J. ianti-social element', in the case of subciause (i), subclause (ii) or subclaUse {iv), there should be a repetition of acts ur omissions of, the sme kind referred to in sub-clause_ (i), sub-clause (ii) or in sub-clause (iv) by the person concerned to tre_at him aS an 'anti-social.element,. This appears to be clear from the use of the word 'habitually' separately in sub-clause (i), sub-clause (ii) and sub-clause (iv) of .-ection i (d) and not in subclauses (iii) and (v).-of section 2 (d).\n\nI~ the acts or omissions in question\n\n\"r~ nqt qf the . s\"111e ind or or even if ther are of the same llin.d wbeq\n\nl . •\n\nv. N •. SINGH v. BIHAR (Sen, J.)\n\nthey are committed with a long interval of tin1e bel\\veen them thy be treafed as habitual ones.\n\n[457B-458C] . cannot\n\nlo th~ present case the District Magistrate has relied on three inci .. dents: to hold that the P.etitioner -is an antisoclal element.\n\nThey are:- ... (o) that on April 15, 19T5 the petitioner alongwith his associates had\n\n.. gone to the shop of a cloth dealer of Bhagalpur Town armed with an\n\nUnlicensed pist01 and had forcibiy demanded subscription at the point of gun and (iif ibat on June. 11i1s, ~82 the petitioner was found te.asing and mhbehaving with femals retuning from a cinema ball.\n\nThe third grouad is the. crtminal case now pending against the petitioner in the Sessions cOurt.\n\nThe first incident is of 1he year 1975. It js not stated hciw the criminal ca~~ filed on the bc:sis of that ch_arge eadd. The i:iex't incident relates to the yeaf J982.\" The detaining authority does not state how the criminal case filed in that connection terminated. rr they -have both ended in favour of the petitioner finding him clearly not guiltyJ they cannot certainly. constitute acts or omissions -habitually committed by the Petifioncr Moreover. the said to incidents are Of different kinds altogether. Whereas the first one may fall under sub-clause (i) of section 2 (d) of the ActJ the second one falls under sub-clause Uv) thereof.\n\nThey are, even if true, not repetitions of actsor Omissions of the same kind.\n\nThe third ground which is based on the pending Sessions case is no doubt of the nature of acts or onihsioris referred to in subclause (i) of secttion 2 (d) but_ the interval between the first ground which falls under this sub-cla'use and _this one is nearly sight years and cannot, therefore, make the petitioner .a habitual offender of the type falling under sribclause (i) of section 2 (d). Therefore, it is not possible to hold tbat the petitioner can be called an tantisocial element• as defined by section 2 (d) of the Act. The order of detention impugned in this case therefore, could not h .. ve been.passed under section 12 (2} of the Act which authorises the.detection of anti-social elements only.\n\n[458D459D)\n\n(Per Chinnappa Reddy J. _concurring)\n\nI do not agree with the view of' my brother Sen J. tb'at 'those who are respcn, ib'e for the natioral sccuri1y or for the maintenance of public order must be thesole judges of what' the nationa I security or public Order requires.' It is too perilous a proposition.\n\nOur Constitution does vot g:ve a cartablanche to any organ of the State to be the sole arbit61' in such matters.\n\nPreve.Diive detention is considered so iaea:cherous and such en anathema to civilized rhouglit anddemocratic polity that - safe. guards against dndue exercise of the power to detain withOut trial,- have . been built into the Constitution itself and incorporate.d as Funnamental Rights. 'there are two sentinels, one at either end.\n\nThe Legislature is required to make the law circumscribi ig the limits within which persons may be preventively detained :fnd providing for the safeguards prescrfbed by the-Coristitution and the courts arc required to examine, when deman ded, whether there has been any exces'sive detention, that 'is, whether the lin1its set by the Constitution and the legislature have been transgressed.\n\nPreventive detention is not beyond judicial scrutiny, While adequacy or sufficiency may not be a ground. of chf'llenge, relevancy and ProximHy are\n\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1984) 3 S.C.R.\n\ntertainly grounds of challenge.\n\nNor is it for the court to put itself in the poition of the detaining authority and to satisfy itself that the un tested facts reveal a path of crime.\n\n[440E441B]\n\n I am of the view that the deCision in Kamalkar Prasad Chtiturvedi's case and the host of earlier cases are not disliQguishable.\n\nThis Court has always taken the view 1bat remoteness in point of time niakes a groun<1 of detention irreleyant.\n\n[441D] • Shibban Lal Saksena v. State ofUttar Pradeih ·& Ors., [19S4] SCR 418 and Kamlakar Prasad Chaturvedi v. State of Matbzya Pradesh & Anr., [1983] 4 S, CC 433 referred to •\n\n(Per Sen J, dissenting) ·\n\nOn the facts set out in the grounds \"Of detention the petitioner answers the description of an antisocia1 element as define.a in s. 2' (d) of 'the Act.\n\n[444F]\n\n~ The wrird rhabitually, connotes some degree of frequency and cnti• nuity .. 'Habitually' requires a contiouance and perinanericQ of sonie\n\ntendency. something that was develOped into a propensity, that is, preseq, t from day-today.\n\nA person is a hab-it'ual crimi'nal who by foce of habit or inward disposition, inherent or latent in h_im,. has grown accustomed to Jead a 1ife of criine.\n\nIt is the force of. habit inherent or latent in an individual with a criminal instinct, with a criminal disposition of mind, tµat ma.kes. him dangerous to the society ii:i general.\n\nIo simple !an_guage the word 'habitually' means 'by force uf habit'.\n\n[444G445E] . .\n\nStroud's Judicial.Dictionary, 4th end .. vol. 2, p. 1204 and Shorter Oxford English Dictionary; vol. !. p. 910<referred to.\n\nIt is not neces, ary that because of the_ word 'habitual1y' in sub-cl. (i), subcL (H) or sub-cl. (iv), there hould be a repetition of Samei class of acts or omissions referred to in sub-c1. (i); sub-cJ •. Cii) o\"r in subcl •. (iv) by the person concerned before he can be treated to be Sn aot.i-social element and detained bf the District Magistrate under s. 12 (2\\ of the Act.- .\"It is not required that the .nature or chaiacter of the .antisocial acts should be the same\n\n0 or similar. There may be commission or attempt to commit or abetment of diverse nature of facts Constituting offences under Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII o(the Indian Penal Code ... What has to be 'repetitive' are the antisocial acts.\n\n[447B-C] • , The operation of s. 12 (2) of the Act cannot be confined against habitual criminals who have a certain number of prior convictions for H offences of the 'character' specified. The definition of 'anti-social elem1X1t' in s. 2 {d) of the Act nowhere requires that the.re should be a number of prior <; Qpyii;\\i<>ns of. person in respect of, offence~ of a particular tye.\n\n-~'\n\n~- N. SING!{ v. B!l!AR (Sen, i.) 43~\n\nIt is notcorrect to say that merely because there was an acquittal A of a person, the detaining authority c.1.nnot take the act con1plained of leading to his trial into consideration.\n\nIt may be that the trial of a dangerous p_erson may end in an acquittal for paucity qf evidence due to unwillingness of witnesses to Come.forward and depose against him out of fright.\n\nIf a person with criminal teadeacies consistently or persistently or repeated'y commits or attempts to commit or abets the commission of Offences un_der Chapter XVI aealing with offences affecting human body or B Chapter XVI dealing with offences against property of t4e Indian Penal Code, there is no reason why he should not be consid_ered tO be an 'anti .. social element'.• [446G-H]\n\nThose who are responsible for the national ecurity or for the main· tenance of public order must be the sole judges of what the national security or-pµblic order requires.\n\nSufficiency of the . grounds is not for the court but for the detaining authority for the formation of his subjective satisfaction that the detention of a person is necessary with a view to preventing him rrom acting in any m.anner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.\n\nThe sufficiency of the grouods upon which the Subjective \"sitisfaction of the detaining authority i;;; based, provided they have a rational probat\"i~. value and are not extraneous to the scOpe or pllrpose of the legish, ltive provision, cannot be challenged in the court accept on the ground of mctla fides.\n\nIt is not \"rOr the court to examine whether the grounds upon which the detention order isbased are good or bild nor canit attempt to assess in what manner and to what extent each Or the grounds operated on the inind of the appropriate luthority and contributed to the creation of .the satisfacti-on. on thci basis of which the detention order was based.\n\n[447D-4'49E)\n\nKes/w; Ta/pade v. The KiniEmperor, [1943] FCR 88, refered to\n\nShibban Lal Saksena v. State of Urtar Pradesh & Ors., [1954] SCR 318 a, nd Kamlakat _Prasad Chaturvedi v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr., [1983] 4 sec 443, distinguished • • •\n\nThe past conduct or the antecedent history of a person can pf\"operly be taken into account in making order of detention. It is usual1y from prior events showing tendencies or inclinations of a \"\"man that an inference can be drawn whether he is likely, in the future, to act in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.\n\n[451B]\n\nMerely because there is pending prosecut Ion_ and thC( accuse'd is in (j jail, that is no impediment for his Peteatio~ if the detaining authority is satisfied that his being enlarged on bail would be prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.\n\n[451D]\n\nFitrat Raza Khan v. State of U. P. & Ors., (1982] 2 SCC 449, Alijan Mian v. District Magistrate, Dhtinbad & Ors.,. [1983] 3 SCC 301 and Ral suddln Babu Tamchi v. State of [}. P. & Anr., AIR [1984] SC 46,\n\nreferred to.\n\n. .\n\nSUPREME COUR'!' REPORTS • [l984] 3 S.C. R ..\n\n(Per Sen & Chinnappa Reddy; JJ;)\n\nIt has always been the view of this court that the .detention of individuals without trial for any length of time, however short, is wholly inconsistent with_ the basii;; .ideasof our .. Govef.Dment and the gravity of the evil to the community resulting from anti.social a-ctivities c, an never. furnish an adequate reasJn for inVading the personal liberty of the citizen\n\nexcep~ in acc.ordance with'the procedure establish.e~ by law .... [t41CJ\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 47 of 1984.\n\n(Under article 32 of the Con1titution of India}\n\nR.K. Garg and U.S. Parsad for the Appellant,\n\nS.N. Jha for the Respondent.\n\nThe following Judgements were delivered\n\nCHINNAPPA REDDY, J. I entirely agree with my brother D . Venkataramiah, J. both on the. question of interpretation of the pro\n\nvisiOns of the Bihar Control of Crimes Act, 1981 and on the question of the effect of the order of grant of bail in the criminal proceeding arising out of the incident constituting one of the grounds of deten- tion. It is 1eally unnecessary for me to add anything to what has been said by Venkataramish, J., but my brother Sen, J. has taken a\n\nE ·· different view and out of respect to him, I propose to add a few Jines· I am unable to agree with my brother Sen, J. on several.of the view expressed by him i11 his dissent. In particular, I do not agree with the. view that 'those, who are responsible for the national security or for the maintenance of pblic order must be the sole judges of what the national security or public order. requires.' It is too perilous a F •proposition: Our' Constitutio11 does not give a carta blanche. to any\n\norgan ofthe State to be the sole arbiter in such matters. Preventive detention is considered .so. treacherous and such an anathem:a to\n\ncivilized thought and democratic plity that safeuards against undue exercise of the power to detain without trial, hve bee_n built\n\n• G into the Constitution. itself and incorporated as Fundamental Rights.\n\nThere are two setinels, one at either end. The legislature is rquir ed to make the law circumscribing the limit.s within which persons may be preventively detained and providing for the safeguards prescribed by the Co.nstitution and the courts are rec{Uired to exa-.\n\nH mine, when demanded, whether there has been any excessive deten tion, that is, whether the limits set by the Constitution and the legislature have been transgressed. Preventive detention is notbe\n\nv. N. SING!! v. Bll!AR. (Sen, J.)\n\nyond judicial scrutiny. while adequacy or sufficiency may not be a ground of challeug:, relevancy and proximity are certainly grounds of chaUenge. Nor is it for the court to pnt itself in the position of the det3ining authority and, to satisfy itself that the untested facts reveal a path of crime .. I agree with my brother Sen, J. when he says, \"It has always been the view of this Court that the detention of individuals without trials for any length 9f time, however, short, is wholly inconsistent with the basic ideas of our Goverment and the gravity of the evil to the community resnlting from anfrsocial activities can never furnish an adequate reason for invading the personal liberty of the citizen except in accordance with t4e procedure established by la'Y\"· ·\n\nI am of the view that the decision in Kam!akar Pra.oad Chaturvedi's(1> case and the host of earlier cases are not distinguishable. This Court has always taken the view that remotenessi!l point of time makes a ground of.detention irrelevant. In Fitrat Raza Khanis( 2l cse, the two incidents were not separated by any great length of time. On the other hand, they were bound by a strong bond of inflmmable communal violence.\n\nI agree with all thllt has been said. by my brother . .\n\nVenkataramiah, J. and concur with him nnd direct the detenu to be\n\nset at liberty forthwith. •\n\n• S_EN, J. I have had the benefit of reading the opinion prepared by my learned brother Venkataramiah, J. and it is my misfortune that I cannot subscribe to the views expressed by my learned brethren. I would like to give my reasons for tile dissent.\n\nAlthough the petitioner claims to be a student leader and has taken his degree in Master of Arts in Sociology in the year 1982 and at present is a student of Law in the Bhagalpur Law College, and asserts that at one !lme, in the year 1980:81, he was elected as the Pressident of the Post-Graduate Department of the Bhagalpur University and also selected as aSenator, the facts emerging from the grounds of detention clearly show that he has taken recourse to a life of crime. The petitioner applies for a writ -0f habeas . corpus for quashing an order of detention dated August 16, 1983\n\n(I) [1983J 4 sec 443,\n\n(2) [1982J 2 sec 449.\n\n....\n\n. B\n\n' '\n\nsUPREMa COURT RHPORTS '\n\n[1984} 3 S.<?.R•\n\npassed by the District Maghtrate, Bhagalpur on being satisfied that his detention was necessary w\n\n0 ith a view to preventing him 'from acting in any manner prejudicial. to the maint01unc1 of public ord, er'. The facts have been set out in t!ie'majority opinion and all that is necessary is to mention the horrendous incident\n\nwhich is the direct and proximate cause of ihe impugned order of detention. •\n\nIt appears that there was a gruesome murder of two young sons of Kashinath Bajoria, owner of Bajoria petrol pump of Bhagalpur, on April 20, 1983. In fhe coures of imestigation by the police ittranspired that they were kidnapped from the petrol pump on the earlier day i.e. on April 19, 1983 and the petitioner Vijay Narain Singh demanded a ransom of Rs. 50,000 from the father of the victims, The demand for ransom having not been. fulfilled, the two boys we-re done to death . brutally and their dead bodies were thrown at a place near M; ount Assis School and Zila\n\nScho.ol and ere discovered the next morning.\n\nOn~ the. basis of first information report a case was registeJ'<<d a, t Bhagalpur Kotwali (Police Case No. 281 dated April 20, :1983) un\" er ss. 364,. 302 and 201, all read withs. 34 ands. 120B of the Ind:al'IPenal Code,\n\n1860 against the . petitioner Vijay Na; ain Singh, his brote.r Dhanonjoy Singh, one Bimlesh Mishra and two U!).known 11ccl1l>ed.\n\nThe petitio.ner along with his co-accused.has. been co.mmitted to the Court of Sessions to stand his trial in Sessions Case No. 348 of 1983 aud charges have been framed under s. 302 read with s. 34/l20B, 386 and 511 of the Indian Penal Code and tjie case • was set down for evidence on February 27, 198,4. A learned Single Judg~ of tile Patna.High Court by his or\\ier dat¢ August 9, 1983 appears to have directed that the. petitioner be, enlarged on bail of Rs. 10,000 with two sureties of the like, iunountto the satfsfaction of the ChiQf Judicial Magistrate, Bhagalpur. •The Districl Magistrate, Bhagalpur on being. satisfied that his detention was necessary witfi a view to preventing him from acting 'in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, passed the impugned order of detention on August 16, 1983 before the petitioner could be released on bail. Bu~.the petitioner moved a\n\npetition in the Patna High Court for grant of a writ of beas corpus while he was still in jail' challenging the.· impugned order of detention. When the matter came up for hearing before the High Codrt on October 5, 1983, the leiirned Judges adverted to, the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the State that the impug.ned order of detention was prepared in advance for. serv.ice on th.~ petitioner when e comes out .of jail on the strength of the bail\n\n.;>·\n\nv. N. S\\NGH v. BIHAR (Sen, i.)\n\norder issued by the High Court but by mistake the three copies of the order. imtead of being. sent to the Disirict Magistrate's office for service were wrongly delivered at the Central Jail, Bhagalpur.\n\nThe learned Judges , accordingly .by their order of .ewn date dismissed the writ petition holding that they were satisfied that the petitioner was not in detention under the impµned detention order. They however observed that if and when the petitioner was served a copy of the detention order and placed underaeten tion in prison, he could fib a fresh petition for a writ of habeas corpus. In stead of moving the High Court, the petitioner has filed this petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution before this CoutJ. The order of detention is in two parts, the first of which lays a factual basis for making the order on the ground that the petitioner is an anti'.social element.\n\nThe .second part of the . impugned order is styled as grounds. But it would be seen that the grounds mentioned therein are one and the same . viz. his detention was necessary with a view to preventing him 'from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of' public order'. ,,,.\n\nAt the hearing, learned couhsel for the petitioner advanced no submiss10n that the petitioner was not an 'anti-social element' within the meaning of s: 12 (21 o the Bihar Control of Crimes Act, 1981 but rested himself content by advancing a twofold submission, namely: (l) The impugned order of detention passed by the District Magistraie, Bhagalpur under s. 12(2) of the Act must be held to be void under Art. 22( 5). of the Constitution as one of the grounds was too remote and not proxil)late in point of time and had therefore no rattonal connection for the subjective satisfaction of the District Magistrates. 12(2) of the Act. He relied upon the principles laid down by this Court h Shibban Lal Saksena v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. (l} followed in serveal siibsequent cases, apd particularly on the majority decision in the . recent case of Kam/akar Prasad Chaturvedi v. State of Madhya .\n\nPradesh & Anr( 2 And The impugned order of detention was 'ma/a fide and constitutes a flagrant abuse of power on the part of ' the District Magistrate as it is meant to subvert the judicial ' process by trying to circumvent the order p11ssed by the High Court enlarging the petitioner on bail. There is, in my opinion,. no substance in any of these contentions. but before. I deal with' them I must touch upon the question raised in the majority . opinion.\n\n(I) {1954] S.C.R. 418\n\n(2) [l 983] s.c.c. 443.\n\n. B :\n\nSUPREME COi.JJ\\T REPORTS [1984) 3 s.c.P..\n\nInasmuch as the District Magistrate has chosen to take recourse t.o s. 12(2) of the Act which is designed to make special provisions for con'trol and suppression of anti-social elements with a vll!w to maintenance of public order, the question at once arises : Whether the petitioner answers the description of an 'antisocial. element' as defined ill s. 2(d) of the Act. 'Anti-social elemeJlt' as defined in s. 2{d) means-\n\n\"2(d) Anti-social efement\" means a person who is-\n\n(i) either by himself or as a member of or leadr of a. gang, habitually commits, or attempts to commit or abets the c . the commission of offences, punishable under Chapter\n\nXVI or Chapter XVII of th.e Indian Penal Code; or\n\n (ii) habitually or abets the commission of offences under the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in women & Girls Act, 1956; or\n\n(iii) who by words or otherwise promotes or attempts to . promote on grounds of religiop, race, language, caste\n\nor community or any other grounds. whatsoever ,.feelings of enmity .or .hatred between different religions, racial or language groups of caste~ or communities; or ·\n\n(iv) has been found habitually passing indecent remarks to\n\n-0r teasing women -0r girls; or\n\n(v) who .has been convicted of an offence under ss 25, 26, 27, 28 or 29 of the Arms Act, 1959.\"\n\nThere is no reasonable do.ibt that on te facts set out in the . grounds of detention the petitioner answers the description of an\n\nautisocial element; but the suggestion in th.at he is not to be treated as one under s. 12(2) of the Act because .the definition. of 'anti§ocial element' in S', 2(dJ of the Act is too natrow to inolude it. The word 'habitually' connotes some degree of frequency and continuity. 'Habitually' . require§ a continuance and per- . manence of some tendency, something that has developed into a propensity, that is, present from day-locday; Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 4th edn,, vol. 2, p. 1204.\n\nMy learned brother Venkataramiah, J. is inclined to give a restricted meaning to the word 'habitually' as denoting 'repetitive'\n\nv. N. SlNGI! v. BiHAR (Sen, J.) 445\n\nand he is of the view that no order of detention under s. 12(2) A of the Act could be made on the basis of a 'single instance', as a single act cannot be said to be forming the habit of the person.\n\nThat is to say, the act complained of must be repeated more ihan once and be inherent in his nature Further, he is inclined to think that section under s. 12(2) of the Act can only b~ taken in' respect of persons against whom there are verdicts of guilt B after the conclusion of trials.\n\nAccording to him, merely on the basis of institution of criminal cases a person cannot be leb.elled as an anti-social element. I find considrnble difficulty ln subscribing to either of his views.\n\n'According to its ordinary meaning, the word 'habitual' as C given irt Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, vol. I, p. 910 is :\n\n\"A. adj (1) Belonging to the habit or inward disposition, inherent qr latent in the mental constitution;\n\n(2) of the nature of a habit; fixed by habit; constantly repeated, customary.\n\nB. A habitual criminal, drunkard, etc.\"\n\nA .person is a -habitual criminal who by force of .. habit or mward disposi<ion, inherent or latent\"in him, has grown ac.customed to lead a life of crime.. It is the force of habit inherent or latent in an individual with a criminal instinct, with a criminal' disposition of minJ, that makes him dangerous to the society in genera] • In strengthen language the word 'habitually' means 'by force of habit'. The Act appears tO' be basd on Prevention of Crime Act\n\n1908 (c-59). By Prevention of Crime Act, as amende\\I by the Indictments Act, 1915, a person after three previous convitions, after attaining sixteen years of age could, with the consent of the Director of Public Pros, cution in certain cases, be charged with being a habitual criminal and, if the charge was established, he could, in addition to a p1, mishment -0f penal serviiude, in respect of crime for which he bas been so convicted, receive a further sentence of-not less than five years or more than 10 years, called a sentence of preventive detention. Upon this question of a man'; • leading .persistently a dishonest or criminal life, :where there has been a considerable lapse of time between a man's last conviction and the. commission of the offence which forms rhe subject of the primary indictment at the trial, n.otice containing particulars must have been given and prqved of the facts upon which the'prosecution relied for saying that the offender is leading such a life,\n\n. c\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS tl984] 3 s.c.ll..\n\n.If, on th3 othr han1, the tim~ between a man's discharge from prison and the commiS'sion of the next offence is .a very swrt one, . it may be open to the..juri to find that he is leading persistently a .dishonest or criminal life by reason of the mere fact that he has again committed an offence so. soon after his discharge from a previous oqe, provided the notice has stated this as a ground.- This essentially is a quc; tion of . fact. The scheme under the English Act is entirely different wl].ere a person has to be charged at the trfal of being a habitual criminal. Therdore, the consi- . derations which govern the matter do not arise in case of preven\n\ntlve detention under s. J 2(2) of the Act .\n\nI find it difllcnlt to share the view that w)lereas under sub-cl.\n\n(iii) or sub-cl. <v) ofs. 2 (d) a sfogle act or omission referred to ill them may be enough to treat the peron concerned as an 'antisocial element', in the case of sub-cl. (i), sub-cl. (ii) or su, b-cl. (iv) be1:ause of th~ word 'habitually' there should be a repetition of same class of acts or omissions referred to in sub-cl. .. (i), sub-cl. (ii) or in sub-cl. (iv) by the person concerned to treat him as an 'anti-social element'.\n\n1 also do not see whys. 12 (2) of the Act should be confined in its operation against habitual criminals who have a. certain number of prior convictions fot offences of the 'character' specifiled. The definition of 'anti-social element in s.2 (d) of the Act nowhre requires that there should be number of prior convictions of a pefsOn in resl'ect of offences of a particular. typ~. I cannot also share the. view that the commission of an act referred to in one of the sub-cl. (i), sub-cl. (ii) or sub-cl. (iv) of-s 2 (d) and any other act or omission referred to in any other of the said sub-clauses would not be suflic; ient to treat a person as an 'anti-s0cial element'. Further, I do not think it is . correct to say that. merely because there was an acquittal of such a person, the detaining authority ca•mot take the. act complained of leading to histrial into consideration. It may be that the trial of a dangerous p•rson may end in an acquittal for paucity of evidence due to unwilling qess of witnesses to come :forward and depose against him out. •of fright. If a person with. criminai tendencies consistently or peJJistently or repeatedly commits or attempts 'to commit or apets, the commission of offences punishable under Chapter XVI dealing with offences affecting human body or Chapter. XVII dealing with offences against property of the llldian Penal Code, there is no reason why he should 'not be considered to be an\n\n'1111ticsocial element' •\n\n-~.\n\nV.N. siNGH v. BiliAR (Sen, J.) 447\n\nIt is not difficultto conceive of a person who by himself or as a member or leader of a gang habitually commits or attempts to commit or abets the commission of offences punishable under Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code. It however does not. follow that because of the word 'habitually' in sub-cl. (i),, sub-cl. (ii) or sub-cl (iv), there should be a repetition of same class of acts or omissions refen.ed to in sub-cl. (i), sub-cl. (ii). or in subcl. (iv) by the person concerned before he can be treated to be an anti-social element and detained by the District Magirtrate under s.12(2) of the' Act. In my view, it is not required that the nature or character of the anti-social acts should be the same or similar.\n\nThere may be commission or attempt to commit or abetment of diverse nature of acts constituting offences under Chapter XVI of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nWhat has to be 'repetitive' are the anti-social acts.\n\nThose who are responsible for' the national security or for the maintenance of public order must be the sole judges of what the national security or public order requires. Sufficiency of grounds is not for the.Court but for the detaining authority for the formation 9f his subjective satisfaction that the detention of a person under s. 12(2) of the Act is necessary with a view to preventing him from acting, in any manner prejudiCial to the maintenance of public order.\n\nThe power of preventive detention by the District Magistrate under s.12(2) is necessarily subject to the limitations enjoined on the exercise of such power by Art. 22(5) of the CQnstitution. It has always been the view of this Court that the detention of individuals without trial for any length of ti!lle, howe\".er short, is holly inconsistent with the basic ideas of our Government and the gravity of the evil to the conimnnity resulting from anti-social activities can never furnish an adequate reason for invading the personal liberty of the. citizen except in accordance with the procedure established by law.\n\nThe Court has therefore in a series of decisions forged certain\n\nproce(lural safeguards. in .the case of preventive detention of citizens.\n\nAs observed by this Court in Narendra Purshotam Umrao v. B.B.\n\nGujra/(1), when the liberty of the subject is involved, whether it Is under the Preventive Detention Act or the Maintenance of Internal Security Act or the Conservation of Foreign Exchange & Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act or any other law providing for preven- . tive detention.,..-\n\n\"It is the bounden duty of the court to 'satisfy itself tliat all t.he safeguards provided by the law have been scru1ml- Vl [1979] 2S.C.R. 31~-\n\n' .\n\n\nA ously observed and. that the subject is not deprived of his personal liberty otherwise than in accordance with law.\"\n\nNonetheless, the. community has a vital interest in the proper enforcement of its laws particularly in an area where there is worsening law and order situation, as urifortunately. is the case in some of the States today in dealing effectively with persons engaged in anti-social activities seeking to create serious public disorder by ordering their preventive detention and at the same time in assuring that the law is not used arbitrarily to suppress the citizen of his right to life and liberly. The impugned order of detention has\"not been challenged on the ground that. the grounds furnished were not adequate or sufficient for the satisfactfon of the detaining authority or for making of an effective representation. The Court must therefore be circumspect in striking down the impugned order of detention where it meets with the requirements of Art.22(5) of the Constitution and where it is not suggested that the detaining autho-. rity. acted ma/a fide' or that its order constituted anabuse of power.\n\nTurning to the merits of the contentions raised, I am quite satisfied that the impugned order. is not vitiated beCi\\USe some of the groundswere non-existent or irrelevant or were too remote in point . . . of time to furnish a rational nexus for the subjective satisfaction. of th.e.detaining authority. The two decisions in Shibban Lal Saksena's and Kamlakar Prasad Chaturvedi's cases are clearly distinguishable on facts. In Shibban f., al Saksena's case, th~ detenu had beeh supplied with two grounds for his deteniion. Subsequently, the detaining authority revoked one of the grounds communicated to him earlier. It was contended on his behalf that in such circum- . stances the detenti_on was illegal'and he was entitled to be released. ·\n\nThe contention on behalf of the State was that although one of the grounds uponwhich the original order of detention was based was unsubstantial or non-existent an.d could not be made a ground of detention, nonetheless the r<emaining ground was sufficient to sustain the detention order. The Court rejected this contention and held that it was stated that the sufficiency of the grounds upon which the\n\nsubjetive satisfaction of the detaining authority is based, provided .. they have a rational probative value and are not extraneous so the scope or purpose of the legislative provision cannot be challenged in the Co11rt expept on the round or'mala fides, lt ws observed;\n\nV.N. S/NG!I v. DIHAR (Sen, J.) 449\n\n\"A court of law is not even competent to enquire into , the truth or otherwise of the facts which are mentioned as\n\nground£ of detention in the commuuication to the detenu under s.7 of the Act, What has happened, .however, in. this case is somewhat peculiar. The Government itself, in its\n\nco~unication da'ted the 13th of March, 1953, has plainly admitted that one of the grounds upon which the original on or of detention was passed is unsubstantial or non-existent\n\nand cannot be made a ground of detention. The. question is, whether in such circumstances the original order made under s.3(1) {a) of the Act can be allowed to stand. The answer, in our opinion, can only be in the negative.\"\n\nThe question was whether in such circumstances the original ordermade under s.3(1) (a) of the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 could be allowed to stand. The Court laid down that if one of the twq grounds was irrelevant for the purpose of the Act or was wh..olly\n\nillusory, this would vitiate the detention order as a wh?le .. That is, D a principle well-s-ettled since the well-known case of Keshav Ta/pade.\n\nv. Th~ King Emperor('), The Court reiterated the prineiple and said that it was not for the Court to examine whether the two grounds upon whfoh the detention order was based were good or bad nor could it attempt to assess in what manner and to what extent each of the grounds operated on the mind of the propriate authority E and contributed to the \"creation of the satisfaction on the basis of which the detention order was based. It then added:\n\n\"To say that the other ground, which .still remains, is 9uite sufficient to sustain the <;>rder, would .be to substitute an F objective judicial test for the subjective decision of the executive authority. which is against the legislative policy underlying the statute. In such cases, we think, position would be the same as if one of these two grounds was irrelevant for the purpose of 'the Act or was wholly illusory and this would vitiate the detention order as a whole.\" . {>\n\nFollowing the decision in Shibban Lal Sakesena's case, the Court in Kamlakar Prasad Chaturvedi's case, supra, by a mjority of 2:1. held the detention order dated May 6, 1983 passed by the District.\n\nMagistrate under s.3'(2) of the National Security Act, 1980 to l?e Q\n\n\\I). Jl943} FCR 88.\n\n450 SUPREMll COURT REPORTS\n\n[1984) 3 S.C.R.\n\ninvalid inasmuch as some of the grounds were lfound to be too remote andnot proximate in point of tirile. Per contra, Desai, J. following the recent , decision of this Court in Fit,:at Raza Kht:ln v.\n\nState of U.P. & Ors' . . held that there is no rigid or mechanical test to be applied. In Fitrat Raza Khaa's case, the.Court held that when both. the incidents there were viewed in close proximity, the propensity of the petitioner to resort to prejudicial activity became\n\nmanifest. ·\n\nIn Fitrat Raza Khan's case, supra, the first incident was of August 13, 1980 when the communal riots broke out in Moradabad city, and the second of July 24, 1981. Although there was a lapse of a year between the two incidents, the second incident of July 24, 1981 was just on the eve of the Id festival and the grQund alleged was that the petitioner was trying to instigate the Muslims to communal violence by promise of better arms, with a view to an open confrontation between the.two fommunitie~. It was '.observed that the two grounds as set out in the order of detention were nothing tiUt narration of fects brining out the antecedent history of the detehu and that the past conduct or the arltecede.nt history of a person can properly be taken into account in making an order of detention and had observed : ..\n\n\"It is true that the order of detentiim is based on two grounds which relate to two incidents, one pf August 13, 1980, and the other of July 24, 1981, i.e., the second incident was . after a lapse of about a year, but both the incidents show the propensities of the petitioner to instigate the pi embers of the Muslim cbmmunity. to' communal violence: The unfortunate communal riots which took place in .Moradabad city led to . widespread carnage and bloodshed resulting in the loss of many innocent lives. The memory of the communaLriots is 'Ill too recent to be a thing of the past. The past conduct or antecedent history of a porson can appropriately be taken into account in making\"a detention order. It is uually from prior events showing tendellctes or incliiiations of. a man that an inference can be drawn whether he is li!<ely, in the future, to act in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.•••••••••••••• It cannot be said that the prejudicial .conduct or antecedent history of the petitioner was not\n\n-;;\n\n. .)....\n\nVcN. SINGH v. BIHAR (Venkatamniah, J.) 451\n\n. proximate in point of time and had no rational connection\n\n\\vith the cotictusion that his detention was necessary for\n\nriiaihtenance of public order.\"\n\nIt is usually from prior events showin11 tendencies or inclinitions of a man that an inference can be drawn whether he is likely,\n\nB' in the future, to act in a manner prejudicial to the maintenace cif public ocder.\n\n• Learned counsel for the petitioner also submitted thaf the ordinary criminal processcould not be circumvented by resort' to preventive detention.\n\nJn somewhat similar circumstances, the .Court recently in Alijan Mian v. District Magi.itrate, Dhdnbad & Ors('). hld that merely because there was pending prosecution and the accused were in jail, that was no impediment for the.ir detention under s.3(2) of the National Security Act, 1980 if the detaining authority was 'satisfied.that their being enlarged on bail would be preju<licial to the\n\nmaintenance of public order. The same view has been reiterated by this Court in Raisuddin Babu Tame/Ii v. State of U.P. & Anr('!. -\n\nFor my part, I would. therefore, for the reasons stated, dismiss the writ petition as well as the connected special leav~ petition.\n\nVENKATARA:MIAH, J. This is a petition under Article 32 of the Constitutio.n, The petitioner has questioned in this case the validity of an .order of detention dated August 16, 1983 passed by the District Magistrate, Bhagalpur, State of Bihar, directing the detention Of the petitioner under subcsection (2) of section 12 of the Blhar Control of Crimes Act, 1981 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') read with Notification No. H(P) 6844 dated June 20, 1983 of the Government of Bihar vesting the powers of detention in the\n\nDistrict Magistrate, Bhagalpur.\n\nThe petitioner states that he having passed him M.A. Examina- . tion was studying llrw 1n the Bhagalpur Law College in ttle year,\n\n1983. On the basis of information received 01i April 20, 1983 about ' the unnatural deaths of two persons within the jurisdiction of the Bhagalpur Kotwali .Police Station, the police conducted fovestigation ancl at the conclusion of that investigation they filed a charge sheet\n\n(I) (t 9331 3 sec JOI.\n\n.(2)AIR 1984 SC 46.\n\n\n[1984] 3. S.C.R,. '\n\nin the court of the Magistrate having jurisdiction over the area in question, who' committed him alongwith some others to the Court of Sessions for b.eing tried for offences punishable under section 302 read with section 120B, 386 and 511 of the In di.an Penal Code. The said case is even now pending. The petitioner moved the High Couit of Patna. for enlarging him on bail during the pend ency of ·· .the said Session trial On August 8, 1983, tl)e bail petition was heard and the High Court made an order enla(ging the petitioner . on bail, the relevant part of which read thus: •.\n\n\"8.8.83. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and the State.\n\nThe submission of the petitioner is that he has not been named in the F.I.R. and the only material against him is that when Kashi Nath Bajoria; father of the deceased learnt about taking away of his sons from the petrol pump he weut to the house of petitioner and his brother Dhananja Singh and enquired about his sons.\n\nOn his enquiry the petitioner, bis brothei; Bijoy and his mother de; nanded a sum of Rs 50,000. for release of his sons. It is further submittd\n\nthat three persons gave their confessional. statement but even they did not name the petitioner-\n\nWhether the petitioner was in conspiracy or had hand :in the crime. will be examined at the trial if such occasion arises. In the circumstances of the present case, let petitioner be released on bail of Rs 30,000 (Rupees ten thousand with two sureties of the like amount each) .. to the satisfction of the Chief Judicial !.Magistrate, Bhagalpur in Bhagalpur Kotwali P.S. Case No. 281/83 dated 20.4.83.\"\n\n.Even before the petitioner could furnish bail and secure his ·, release from jail as per the above order,' the District Magistrate . passed-the impugned. o.rder of detention OQ, Aug)lst 16, 1983, the .'relevant part of which reads thus : . ·\n\n\"Order No. 151dated16.8.83\n\nWhereas I am satisfied that with a view to preventing Shri Vi jay Singh s/o Late Shri Jagannath Singh of Mohalla Mundichak P.S. Kotwali. District Bhagalpur from acting in\n\n, .. -\n\nV.N. SINGH v. BIHAR (Vtnkataramiah, J.) 453\n\n.any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, it is necessary to make an. order that he pe detained. .&\n\nNow, therefore, in exercise oi:the powers conferred lty . (Bihar A6t 7 of 19SI) sub-section 2 of section 12 of the Bihar ·\n\nControl of Crimes Act, 1981 read with Notification H(P) 6844 <lated 20.6.83 of the Government of Bihar vesting the powers\n\nof detention in District Magistrate, Bhagalpur, I hereby direct that Shri Vijay Singh be detained.\n\nHe shall be detained in Special Central Jail, Bhagalpur and classified as C and in division III.\n\nDistrict Magistrate 8 Bhagalpur\"\n\nThe grounds of detention in support of the above order rea• ithus :\n\n\"In pursuance of section .17 of the Dihar Control ef\n\n. D Crimes Act, 1981 (Bihar Act 7 of 1981) Shri Vijay Singh s/& Late Shri Jagannath Singh of fy!ohalla Mundichak, P.S.\n\nKotwali, District Bhagalpur is informed that he was beea directed to be detained in my Qrder No. 151/C dated 16.8.83.\n\nThe following incidents conclusively show that Shri a 'Vi jay Singh is an \"anti-social element\". , ·\n\nHis criminal activities enumerated below dat~ back to the ye11; r 1975.\n\n(i) On 15.4.75 Vijay Singh alongwith his associates went-to the shop of Gopal Ram Ramchandra, cloth dealer in Hariapatti market of Bhaga, lapur to\\vn armed with unlicensed , pistol an.d forcibly demanded subscription at the ppint of pistol. On refusal, he created a row in the shop and indulged in filthy abuses, as a result of which the !lhopkeepers of the , are.a be.came terribly panicky and feeling of uttar insecurity prevailed in the area. A case was instituted in Kotwali p, s. vide Case No. 25 dated 15-4-75 under section 144/448 I.P.G •• Jn this case, he was chargesheeted.\n\n(ii) On 17./18-6-82 at night Vijay Singh was founii ; teasing and misbehaving with females returning from Cine111a\n\nhall at {<.halifabagh Chowk, one of the busiest thr6ughfarcs tf\n\n/:A ,\n\n•. 0 (J\n\nSUPREMB COURT REPORTS [1984) 3 s.c.R.\n\n, .,1,. ' ., . •\\~ . ' . , ~:- _,::. . ' '... -.. \\' . ... ' ' the to.wn.~ On. in{o<niatjgp, )he, poli_sr ,, ruhe? )o.tne ppt.\n\nViJay Singh had the avdacity to misbehave with the pol\\ce psQ!llleLincludipg l!.e _J1¥, ~.p, tl;!qr~,) whq.al?pened to n:ach, Uiwei ~-S?~'?.<'\"fa, s1 insHt,~\\~<l .. in th.i• c~, nect.io~, v.de 1$;0{1Y, ali . .S. ,~_se .. o:1 ?1%:.~/l\\lji J ~.-6;,8~.u/s 294/353 I.P:C ..\n\nIn lh1s case, V1iay Smgh was cbargeslleeted . . sbri v1]~;, Sr'if~ h~\"s ill'iJ dtai&d on !ri~ roirc\\ihg; grou11d.s :-1\n\n•-.: i i., L.1- '1~' Grounds:\n\n:. , .J;?l\\J.9 .4.1983; the criminal activities of Vijay Singh> mounted to its peak, when two yong sons of Sbri Kashinath BliJtlria, nwner of, Bajqri~ ~trsJ, •. P.9!1'I?• l'IJ1aalJ?; Uy n, mely, Krishna Kumer Bajoria and Santosh Kumer BaJoria wre . kidnapped from their petrol pump. Vijay Singh demaridd\n\n~ siim of Rs 5Q', Ol)O (Fifiy . .tbousandJ .f(l)JnJ}1eir father as. rariso:.h. As the demand could not b~ ful; filled, th.e aboven!undd two innocent )!DUllg rn.eii W,<re c\\OM to d\n\n0 t;.ath in a\n\nti, astly manner altd their •. dea4 bo>lies thi-o_wn a!vay nar Mo\\int Assisi School and.~Zi'a Scb.ooJ whi, ch wer~ dij9ovo;:, ed. n.ext morning. These >iouble murders caused panic throughout tflh nhagalpur Town and public order was gravely disturbed. Only after io.tensive deputation of police force, public conJi>ience was rcst0red and public order maintained. A case\n\n~s instituted yide l.t6twtili P.S. Case No. 281 dated 20-4-83 .under sections 364/302/201/_34/120(b} I.P.C.. Charge-sheet ha's. been submitted in this case against . Vijay Singh and ot!Jers. lnyestiga{ion _shows that Vi]ay Singh is. mainly instrumentarto this heinous crime. ·\n\n, (Copy of F.I.R., brief of the case and copy of Memo of evidence enclosed).\n\nJn the circumstances, I am. sat.ified that if e is allowed to remain at large, he will indulge i.il activities prejucl.icfal to the\n\naintenance of public order. ·\n\n. . . .For prevent'ion of such. activities, I considered\" his. -detention necessary. Shri V ijay Singh is informed that he\n\nnlllY make a representation in writing against the or>!er-under\n\nwhich he is detained. His representation, if any, liiay be addies-.\n\nV.N. SINGH v. ilIHAR (Venkararamiah, J.) 455\n\ntied to the Deputy Secretary, Home (Police) Department,\n\n-Oov'ennient of B!har, r>atna, 'arid forwarded 'by the Supcrintendeht of Jaifthrough special messenger with a copy.to the undersigned. -\n\nSd/~S.K. Sharma\n\n' 16f8/83 District Magistrate\n\n'Bhagalpur\"\n\nAggrievd by th, ao we orJ :.r of. deteotion .the petitioner filee a petitfon under A•ticlc 2!,6 of the Consiiiu\\ion before the High <:ourt. On behalf of the d.talning authority it' was c'ontended that the detention o•der had 'been' pre.rared 'in aovance for service on the petitioner when he came' out or tlie' jail dn ine strength of the bail oi-d'e'r which h'e had obtain\"ed ii\\ i!ie criminal case ; that all the -copies of order had been sent to 'the District Migisfrate's office but , l>Y mistake of the messenger three c0pies had been wrongly delivered ai the Centrai Jail Ohagalifur w,11ere the petitioner hairbeen kept and that when the mistake ; as detected by the 'Superintendent of D the Central Jail, he did not serve the copy of the o'rder and had \" returned all the 'Copies. It was urged that since th~ orcter\n\n0 0f detelltion had not be.en served on the petitioner, the petition was not . maintainable.\n\nAccepting the above plea, the High Court held that there was no occasion to quash \\he order of detention as the p<!titiorier had not been detained pursuant to it.\n\nAccordingly it\n\nrjec•ed .the prayer of. the petitioner.\n\nThereupon the petitioner :filed the above writ petition before teis Court, He has -also !jle..t a special leave petition being S.L.P. (Criminal) 3306 of 1983 agai11st the .order of the Hillh Court.\n\nJn this Court, the respondents have not depended upon tlae .F <technical 'plea raised by them' bef'ore fhe Hish . Cotirf b'u't have'tdell to justify ihe order of detention 'oi) me, rits. ' · . ·~ .\n\nI shall give a brief summary of the relevant provisions of the Act. TM Act was passed in 191\\1. It was 'enacted, as Its Jimg'title sug- :gests, to make special provisions for lhe control and suppression: of G :antisocial elements with a view to maintenance of public order •\n\n.Section 2(d) of the Act define.s the .expression 'Anti-Social Element'\n\n1hns ·: -\n\n''.2.(d) \"Anti-Social 1$le)lle1!ts\" means a per.son who is\n\n(i) either by himself or as a member of or leader of a iang, habitually commits; ciratteqipts to'c'6'nln:i1t\n\n• {\n\n- • •• \"' - -.i ·,•t '' ' --' .- , \"· I • '.d . .-'' .,;.1\n\n. I:\n\n• • •\n\n\n[1984] 3 S.C.R~\n\nor abets the commission of offences, punishable under Chapter XVI or ChapterXVU of the Indian.\n\nPenal Code ; or\n\n(ii) habitually .comints or abets the commission of\n\noffence under the Suppression of Immeral Traffic\n\ni.n Women and Gir!sAct, 1956 ; or:\n\n (iii) who by words or otherwise promotes. or attempt to promote on grounds of religion, race, language, cast or community, or any other gr<1Unds whatsoever feeHngs of enmity or .hatred between different religions, racial or language groups of castes or communities ; or\n\n(iv)· has been found habitually passing indecent remarks-\n\n!<:> or teasing women or girls ; or\n\n(v) who has been convicted of an offence under sec-\n\n. tions 25, 26, 27, 28 or 29 of tloe Arms Act.of\n\n1959.\" (underlining by us)\n\n. ' Section 3 to 11 of the Act deal with the provisions relating tcr extcrpment of anti-social elements. Chapter II of the Ac.t deals witb the provisions providing for the preventive deterition of anti-social elclllc.nts. The releant part of sec'tion 12 of the A•t which is in\n\n@ltapter JI of the Act reads :\n\n\"12. Power to make order detaining certain persons • 'Ihe State Government may-(!) If satisfied with re•pect to. any person that with a view to pieventirig him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and there is reason to fear that the activities of anti-social element cannot be prevented otherwise than by the immediate arrest of such person make an order directing that such anti-sociaf element be detained.\n\n (2) If, having regard io the i:; ircumstances prevailing o; likely to prevail in any area within the local limits of the. jurisdiction of a District Ma, gistrate, the State Government fa. satisfied that it is necessary so to do, it may by an order in writing direct, that during such periodas may be specified in (he order, such District Magistrate may also, if satisfied a~\n\n. .\n\n._,;\n\nV.N. SINGH v. B!lfAR (Venkataramiuh, J.) 451'\n\nprovided in sub-section (I) exercise the power conferred upon by the said sub-section ..................... (underlining by us),\n\nIt is seen from secfrm 12 of the Act that it makes provisiom for the detention of an anti-social clement. If a. person is not a11 anti-social element, he cannot be detained under the Act. .The detaining authority should, therefore, be satisfied that the person against whom an order is made under section 12 of the Act is aa 'antisocial element as defined in section 2 (d) of the Act; Subclauses (ii), (iii) and (v) of section 2 (d) of the Act which are not quite relevant for the purposes of this case may be omitted from consideration for the present. The two other sub-clauses whicla need to be examined closely are sub-cla.uses (i) and. (iv) of sectioa 2 (d). 'Under sub-clause {i) of section 2 (d) of the Act, a. persoa who either by ftimself or as a member of or leader of a gang halli: tua//y commits or at\\empts to commit or abets the cominission of offences punishable under Chapter XVI dealing with offenences affecting tlie human body or Chapter XVII dealing with offences against property, of the Indian Penal Code is considered to be an anit-social element. Under sub-clause (iv) of section 2 (d) of the Act, a persoa who has been habitually passing indecent remarks , to, o{ teasini: women or girls, is an anti-social element. In both thes.e sub-.clauses the word 'habitually' is used. The expres\"sion 'habitually' means 'repeatedly' or 'persistently'. lt implies a thread of continuity stringing together similar repetitive acts.\n\nRepeated, persistent and similar, but no.\\ isolated, individual and dissimilar acts are necessary to justify an inference of habit. I( cnnotes frequent cominissio11 of acts or omissions of the same kind. referred to in each of the said subclauses or an aggergate of similar acts or omissions. This appears to be clear from the use bf the word 'habitually' separately in sub- • clause (i), subclause (ii) and subcla.use (iv) of section 2 (b) and not in sub-clauses (iii) and (V) of section 2 (d). If the State Legisla ture had intended that a commission of twp or more acts or omissions referred to'in any of the sub-clauses (i) to lv) of of section 2 (d) was sufficient to make a person an 'artti-social element', the definition would have run as 'Anti-Social Element' means 'a person who habitually is . ·· .............. .' A's section 2 ( d) of the Act now stands, whereas under sub'.clause (iii) or subclause (v) of section 2 (d) a single act or omission referred to in them may be enough to treat the person concerned as an .'anti-soda! element', in the case of sub- clause (i}, sub-clause (ii) or sub'clause (iv), there should be a repetition of acts or omissions of the same kind refrrred to in sub-clause\n\nII .\n\nSUPREME CCURT Rll'ORTS [1984] 3 s .. c.R.\n\n(i), sub-clause (ii) or in sub-clause (iv) by the peyson concerned to treat him as an 'anti-social elment'. Con1mission ofan act or oillis- . sion referred to in one of the sub-clauses (i). (ii) and (iv) an.'t'of\n\nanother act or omission referred to in any other of the said sub-\n\n· c1uses , ould nof be sufficient to treat a person as an 'anti-social ekfuent'. A.single act or omission falling under sub-dause (i) end a single act. or oniission falling under sub-clause (iv) of section 2 (d) cannot, therefore; be characterised as a habitual act or omission referred to in either of them.\n\nBecause tbe idea of 'habit' involves an element of persistence and a tendency to repeat the acts or omissions of the same class or kind, if tire acts or omission in qucs- . tion are not of the same kind or even if they are of the same kind\n\n. when they are committed with a long inicrval of time betwen them\n\nthey cannot be treated as habitual ones. .\n\nIn the pre\\ent case th.e District - Magistrate has relied pn three incidrnts to hold that the petitioner. is an. anti-social ele~ O c: mnt~ Tley are-(iJ that en April 15, 1915 the petitioner alongwifl) his associates llad gone }o the sl1op of a . cloth dealer of B4,?galjiur To'!\"n armed )Vi th an unJicens\\!d pistol and bad forcibly demande.d subscription at the po in( of a gun. and (ij) that on June\n\nI77i's, 198.2 the petitioner was fourid-tasing and misbehaving wiih feljlales rturning from a cinema half.\n\nThe third ground '.is the crfwlria, l cse now pending agaiµst th~ potitioner. ii; i the eS>ions\n\nCort. The first incident is of the year I 975. It is not 'statccj how\n\nth~ criminal cs~ filed on the basis of that charge ended. The next ini;:io!\"nt rel9tes to tht year 198.2. The detafoing authority does not stat.e hoiv the cri111ial cese filed in that. cbnnection temi na(ed. ff they have b0th ended in favour of the petitioner fin.ding' -him clearly not guilty, they oonnot certainly constitute acts or\n\n0njlssions hbi1uajly cJmmittd by the petitioner. M.Qreove; the sai, d (WO incidents .arc of different kinds altogether.\n\nWhereas the nrs.t one 'may fatt unQer sub-clause (i) of section 2(dJ of the Act, 1he secon!i one foils iinder sub-clause (iv) thereof.\n\nThey arc, . even if true, npt repetitions of acts or omissions of tl; e s; ime !<ind.\n\nTh.e ):listrict Magistrate does not appear to have applied his mii1d to t)le above aspects of the case.\n\nThe thfrd ground. which is based on !Ue pendipg'Sessions cµse is no doubt of 'the. nature of acts or couiissi, ons re(erred to in sub-claµse ti) of section 2(o) but the interval betw.een the' first groun'd wl; ich falls under thls sub-clause and\n\nth~ ne js nearly eight years an.d Cf!nrot, therefore, make the peii- ·. tioper a habitual offeder of the type failing under sub'.cJause {iJ of\n\n.~ ·:. :_ ! ' -· : '. ' - ,' t - ''' ' • ; ' •\n\n~·, -\n\nV.N. SINGH v. BIHA!l, (Vnkataramiah, J.) 459\n\nsection 2 (d). WJ1en I ay o I go i; i9, t crtainly minimise the gravity\n\n-0f the offence alleged to have been committed by the petitioner -which is still to be tried by the Sessions Court. If the petition:er\n\nis found guilty by the Court,· he will have to be awarded app, ro. priate punishment.But the point for consideration now is whether the filing of the charge sheet is sufficient to bring the petiiioner\n\n-witin the mischief of the Act. The Court should examine the case\n\nwithout being overwhelmed by the gruesomeness of the incident involved in the criminal trial. It is well settled that the.Jaw of preventive detention is a hard Jaw and therefore it should be strictly <:onstrued.\n\nCare should be taken that tee liberty of a person is not jeopardised uriless pis case falls Squarely within the four corners of . the relevant Jaw. The law of preventive detention should not be used merely to clip the wings of an accused who is involved in a criminal prosecution. It is notintended for the purpose of keeping a man 'under detention when under ordinary criminal law it may not be possible to resist the issue of orders of bail, unless the material available is such as would satisfy the requirements of the legal provisions authorising such detention. When a person is enlarged on bail by a competent criminal court, great caution shouli! be exercised in scrutinising the validi!y of an order of preventive deten -tion which is based o.n the v<'ry same charge which is to be tded by\n\n•the criminal court.\n\nHaving given my anxious consideration to the case; I am of the view that it is not possible to hold that the petitioner 'can be -called an 'anti-so9ial ekment' as defined by section 2 (d) of the Act. \"The order of detention impugned in this case, therefore, could not\n\nhave been passed under section 12 (2) of the. Act which authorises F ; tke detention of anti-social elements only.\n\nBefore leaving this case, I should state that a number 0f decisions were ciied' before us in whi.ch it had been held that an Order of detention based on a criminal charge which is still .to be .tried may riot be invalid and that an order granting bail by a crinli\n\nnal court cannot be a bar to the passing of an order of detention. • But I have not found it necessary to deal with them h<; re as they -would have become relevant only if I had been satisfied that the ; petitioner was an anti-social element. Moreover the oraers of detenaion questioned in those cases were governed by the provisions of the statutes undCI which they had been issued~\n\n• •\n\n490.\n\n. SUPREME COURT )\\); PORTS [1984) 3 s.c.R..:.\n\nt In the result, I quash the order o( detention, pssect: against the petitioner. The petition is accordingly allowed. The petitioner shall be set at liberty forthwith unless he is required to be.- ht custody on some other ground.\n\nH.S; K.\n\nPetition allowed_ 1\n\n......-", "total_entities": 180, "entities": [{"text": "VIJAY NARAIN SINGH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6, "end_char": 24, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VIJAY NARAIN SINGH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF BIHAR & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 26, "end_char": 46, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF BIHAR & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "O. CI!INNAPPA REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 65, "end_char": 84, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A.P. SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 87, "end_char": 95, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Bihar Control of Crimes Act 1981", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 133, "end_char": 165, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 166, "end_char": 176, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bihar Control of Crimes Act 1981", "statute": "Bihar Control of Crimes Act 1981"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 188, "end_char": 197, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bihar Control of Crimes Act 1981", "statute": "Bihar Control of Crimes Act 1981"}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 234, "end_char": 244, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bihar Control of Crimes Act 1981", "statute": "Bihar Control of Crimes Act 1981"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 343, "end_char": 352, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bihar Control of Crimes Act 1981", "statute": "Bihar Control of Crimes Act 1981"}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 999, "end_char": 1010, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bihar Control of Crimes Act 1981", "statute": "Bihar Control of Crimes Act 1981"}}, {"text": "sections 120B, 386 and 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1021, "end_char": 1045, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bihar Control of Crimes Act 1981", "statute": "Bihar Control of Crimes Act 1981"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1055, "end_char": 1072, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "August 16, 1983", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1217, "end_char": 1232, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But before the retitloner was released, the District M; lgistrate passed an order on August 16, 1983 under section -12 (2) of the Bihar Control of Crimes."}}, {"text": "Article 22()", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1689, "end_char": 1701, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1930, "end_char": 1940, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2145, "end_char": 2155, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Venataramiah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2553, "end_char": 2565, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A II owing the petition by majority,\n\nHELD : (Per Venataramiah and Chinnappa Reddy, JJ.)", "canonical_name": "D . Venkataramiah"}}, {"text": "Chinnappa Reddy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2570, "end_char": 2585, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A II owing the petition by majority,\n\nHELD : (Per Venataramiah and Chinnappa Reddy, JJ.)", "canonical_name": "Chinnappa Reddy"}}, {"text": "Bihar Control of Crimes Act, 1981", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3563, "end_char": 3596, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3772, "end_char": 3782, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bihar Control of Crimes Act, 1981", "statute": "the Bihar Control of Crimes Act, 1981"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3836, "end_char": 3845, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bihar Control of Crimes Act, 1981", "statute": "the Bihar Control of Crimes Act, 1981"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3885, "end_char": 3894, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bihar Control of Crimes Act, 1981", "statute": "the Bihar Control of Crimes Act, 1981"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5079, "end_char": 5088, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5672, "end_char": 5681, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7123, "end_char": 7132, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7658, "end_char": 7667, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7783, "end_char": 7792, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7901, "end_char": 7911, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Per Chinnappa Reddy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8002, "end_char": 8021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[458D459D)\n\n(Per Chinnappa Reddy J. _concurring)\n\nI do not agree with the view of' my brother Sen J. tb'at 'those who are respcn, ib'e for the natioral sccuri1y or for the maintenance of public order must be thesole judges of what' the nationa I security or public Order requires.'"}}, {"text": "Sen", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8083, "end_char": 8086, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[458D459D)\n\n(Per Chinnappa Reddy J. _concurring)\n\nI do not agree with the view of' my brother Sen J. tb'at 'those who are respcn, ib'e for the natioral sccuri1y or for the maintenance of public order must be thesole judges of what' the nationa I security or public Order requires.'", "canonical_name": "S_EN"}}, {"text": "Kamalkar Prasad Chtiturvedi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9568, "end_char": 9595, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[440E441B]\n\n I am of the view that the deCision in Kamalkar Prasad Chtiturvedi's case and the host of earlier cases are not disliQguishable.", "canonical_name": "Kam!akar Pra.oad Chaturvedi's(1"}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10107, "end_char": 10111, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Stroud", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10798, "end_char": 10804, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Stroud's Judicial."}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11279, "end_char": 11284, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11557, "end_char": 11574, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11663, "end_char": 11668, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11866, "end_char": 11870, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12700, "end_char": 12717, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "[1943] FCR 88", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 13984, "end_char": 13997, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sec 443", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14158, "end_char": 14165, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15610, "end_char": 15620, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "R.K. Garg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 15652, "end_char": 15661, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Under article 32 of the Con1titution of India}\n\nR.K. Garg and U.S. Parsad for the Appellant,\n\nS.N. Jha for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "U.S. Parsad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 15666, "end_char": 15677, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Under article 32 of the Con1titution of India}\n\nR.K. Garg and U.S. Parsad for the Appellant,\n\nS.N. Jha for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "S.N. Jha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 15698, "end_char": 15706, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Under article 32 of the Con1titution of India}\n\nR.K. Garg and U.S. Parsad for the Appellant,\n\nS.N. Jha for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "CHINNAPPA REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15769, "end_char": 15784, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The following Judgements were delivered\n\nCHINNAPPA REDDY, J. I entirely agree with my brother D .", "canonical_name": "Chinnappa Reddy"}}, {"text": "D . Venkataramiah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15822, "end_char": 15839, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The following Judgements were delivered\n\nCHINNAPPA REDDY, J. I entirely agree with my brother D .", "canonical_name": "D . Venkataramiah"}}, {"text": "Ons of the Bihar Control of Crimes Act, 1981", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15900, "end_char": 15944, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Venkataramish", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16185, "end_char": 16198, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is 1eally unnecessary for me to add anything to what has been said by Venkataramish, J., but my brother Sen, J. has taken a\n\nE ·· different view and out of respect to him, I propose to add a few Jines· I am unable to agree with my brother Sen, J. on several.of the view expressed by him i11 his dissent.", "canonical_name": "D . Venkataramiah"}}, {"text": "Kam!akar Pra.oad Chaturvedi's(1", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18394, "end_char": 18425, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nor is it for the court to pnt itself in the position of the det3ining authority and, to satisfy itself that the untested facts reveal a path of crime .. I agree with my brother Sen, J. when he says, \"It has always been the view of this Court that the detention of individuals without trials for any length 9f time, however, short, is wholly inconsistent with the basic ideas of our Goverment and the gravity of the evil to the community resnlting from anfrsocial activities can never furnish an adequate reason for invading the personal liberty of the citizen except in accordance with t4e procedure established by la'Y\"· ·\n\nI am of the view that the decision in Kam!akar Pra.oad Chaturvedi's(1> case and the host of earlier cases are not distinguishable.", "canonical_name": "Kam!akar Pra.oad Chaturvedi's(1"}}, {"text": "Fitrat Raza Khanis", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18600, "end_char": 18618, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Fitrat Raza Khanis( 2l cse, the two incidents were not separated by any great length of time.", "canonical_name": "Fitrat Raza Khanis"}}, {"text": "Venkataramiah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18837, "end_char": 18850, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Venkataramiah, J. and concur with him nnd direct the detenu to be\n\nset at liberty forthwith. •", "canonical_name": "D . Venkataramiah"}}, {"text": "S_EN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18935, "end_char": 18939, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• S_EN, J. I have had the benefit of reading the opinion prepared by my learned brother Venkataramiah, J. and it is my misfortune that I cannot subscribe to the views expressed by my learned brethren.", "canonical_name": "S_EN"}}, {"text": "Bhagalpur Law College", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19354, "end_char": 19375, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Although the petitioner claims to be a student leader and has taken his degree in Master of Arts in Sociology in the year 1982 and at present is a student of Law in the Bhagalpur Law College, and asserts that at one !"}}, {"text": "sec 443", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19786, "end_char": 19793, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec 449", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19809, "end_char": 19816, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kashinath Bajoria", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20349, "end_char": 20366, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that there was a gruesome murder of two young sons of Kashinath Bajoria, owner of Bajoria petrol pump of Bhagalpur, on April 20, 1983.", "canonical_name": "Kashi Nath Bajoria"}}, {"text": "Vijay Narain Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 20594, "end_char": 20612, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In fhe coures of imestigation by the police ittranspired that they were kidnapped from the petrol pump on the earlier day i.e. on April 19, 1983 and the petitioner Vijay Narain Singh demanded a ransom of Rs.", "canonical_name": "VIJAY NARAIN SINGH"}}, {"text": "Zila", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20846, "end_char": 20850, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "brutally and their dead bodies were thrown at a place near M; ount Assis School and Zila\n\nScho.ol and ere discovered the next morning."}}, {"text": "ss. 364", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21039, "end_char": 21046, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "IPenal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21106, "end_char": 21117, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Vijay Na", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 21150, "end_char": 21158, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "petitioner Vijay Na; ain Singh, his brote.r Dhanonjoy Singh, one Bimlesh Mishra and two U!).known 11ccl1l>ed.", "canonical_name": "VIJAY NARAIN SINGH"}}, {"text": "Bimlesh Mishra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21204, "end_char": 21218, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "petitioner Vijay Na; ain Singh, his brote.r Dhanonjoy Singh, one Bimlesh Mishra and two U!).known 11ccl1l>ed."}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21425, "end_char": 21431, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPenal Code,\n\n1860", "statute": "IPenal Code,\n\n1860"}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21442, "end_char": 21447, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "IPenal Code,\n\n1860", "statute": "IPenal Code,\n\n1860"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21473, "end_char": 21490, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "February 27, 198,4", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 21536, "end_char": 21554, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "348 of 1983 aud charges have been framed under s. 302 read with s. 34/l20B, 386 and 511 of the Indian Penal Code and tjie case • was set down for evidence on February 27, 198,4."}}, {"text": "Patna.High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 21587, "end_char": 21603, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A learned Single Judg~ of tile Patna."}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 22168, "end_char": 22184, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bu~.the petitioner moved a\n\npetition in the Patna High Court for grant of a writ of beas corpus while he was still in jail' challenging the.·"}}, {"text": "October 5, 1983", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 22356, "end_char": 22371, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the matter came up for hearing before the High Codrt on October 5, 1983, the leiirned Judges adverted to, the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the State that the impug.ned order of detention was prepared in advance for."}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23319, "end_char": 23326, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bihar Control of Crimes Act, 1981", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23983, "end_char": 24016, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bhagalpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 24158, "end_char": 24167, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the hearing, learned couhsel for the petitioner advanced no submiss10n that the petitioner was not an 'anti-social element' within the meaning of s: 12 (21 o the Bihar Control of Crimes Act, 1981 but rested himself content by advancing a twofold submission, namely: (l) The impugned order of detention passed by the District Magistraie, Bhagalpur under s. 12(2) of the Act must be held to be void under Art."}}, {"text": "s. 12(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24174, "end_char": 24182, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bihar Control of Crimes Act, 1981", "statute": "the Bihar Control of Crimes Act, 1981"}}, {"text": "Art. 22( 5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24224, "end_char": 24235, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bihar Control of Crimes Act, 1981", "statute": "the Bihar Control of Crimes Act, 1981"}}, {"text": "s. 12(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25342, "end_char": 25350, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25625, "end_char": 25632, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25682, "end_char": 25686, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25951, "end_char": 25968, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Girls Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26079, "end_char": 26094, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss 25, 26, 27, 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26520, "end_char": 26537, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Girls Act, 1956", "statute": "Girls Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Arms Act, 1959", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26551, "end_char": 26565, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 12(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26785, "end_char": 26793, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Arms Act, 1959", "statute": "the Arms Act, 1959"}}, {"text": "s. 12(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27414, "end_char": 27422, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Arms Act, 1959", "statute": "the Arms Act, 1959"}}, {"text": "s. 12(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27710, "end_char": 27718, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prevention of Crime Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28834, "end_char": 28857, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Indictments Act, 1915", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28919, "end_char": 28940, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s.2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31343, "end_char": 31346, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31617, "end_char": 31620, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s0", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31760, "end_char": 31762, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "XVII dealing with offences against property of the llldian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32405, "end_char": 32474, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32828, "end_char": 32845, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s.12(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33207, "end_char": 33214, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "XVII dealing with offences against property of the llldian Penal Code", "statute": "XVII dealing with offences against property of the llldian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33474, "end_char": 33491, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 12(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33883, "end_char": 33891, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There may be commission or attempt to commit or abetment of diverse nature of acts constituting offences under Chapter XVI of the Indian Penal Code", "statute": "There may be commission or attempt to commit or abetment of diverse nature of acts constituting offences under Chapter XVI of the Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s.12(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34089, "end_char": 34096, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There may be commission or attempt to commit or abetment of diverse nature of acts constituting offences under Chapter XVI of the Indian Penal Code", "statute": "There may be commission or attempt to commit or abetment of diverse nature of acts constituting offences under Chapter XVI of the Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Art. 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34181, "end_char": 34191, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "There may be commission or attempt to commit or abetment of diverse nature of acts constituting offences under Chapter XVI of the Indian Penal Code", "statute": "There may be commission or attempt to commit or abetment of diverse nature of acts constituting offences under Chapter XVI of the Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Is under the Preventive Detention Act or the Maintenance of Internal Security Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34908, "end_char": 34989, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35032, "end_char": 35070, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art.22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36256, "end_char": 36265, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shibban Lal Saksena", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 36739, "end_char": 36758, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The two decisions in Shibban Lal Saksena's and Kamlakar Prasad Chaturvedi's cases are clearly distinguishable on facts.", "canonical_name": "Shibban Lal Sakesena"}}, {"text": "Kamlakar Prasad Chaturvedi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 36765, "end_char": 36791, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The two decisions in Shibban Lal Saksena's and Kamlakar Prasad Chaturvedi's cases are clearly distinguishable on facts.", "canonical_name": "Kam!akar Pra.oad Chaturvedi's(1"}}, {"text": "Shibban", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 36841, "end_char": 36848, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Shibban f., al Saksena's case, th~ detenu had beeh supplied with two grounds for his deteniion."}}, {"text": "Saksena", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 36856, "end_char": 36863, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Shibban f., al Saksena's case, th~ detenu had beeh supplied with two grounds for his deteniion."}}, {"text": "s.7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38048, "end_char": 38051, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "13th of March, 1953", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 38184, "end_char": 38203, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government itself, in its\n\nco~unication da'ted the 13th of March, 1953, has plainly admitted that one of the grounds upon which the original on or of detention was passed is unsubstantial or non-existent\n\nand cannot be made a ground of detention."}}, {"text": "s.3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38458, "end_char": 38464, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.3(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38640, "end_char": 38646, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Preventive Detention Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 38658, "end_char": 38688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Shibban Lal Sakesena", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 39927, "end_char": 39947, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ">\n\nFollowing the decision in Shibban Lal Sakesena's case, the Court in Kamlakar Prasad Chaturvedi's case, supra, by a mjority of 2:1.", "canonical_name": "Shibban Lal Sakesena"}}, {"text": "s.3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40117, "end_char": 40120, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "National Security Act, 1980", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 40132, "end_char": 40159, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Desai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 40354, "end_char": 40359, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Per contra, Desai, J. following the recent , decision of this Court in Fit,:at Raza Kht:ln v.\n\nState of U.P. & Ors' . ."}}, {"text": "Fitrat Raza Khaa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 40527, "end_char": 40543, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Fitrat Raza Khaa's case, the.", "canonical_name": "Fitrat Raza Khanis"}}, {"text": "Fitrat Raza Khan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 40726, "end_char": 40742, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Fitrat Raza Khan's case, supra, the first incident was of August 13, 1980 when the communal riots broke out in Moradabad city, and the second of July 24, 1981.", "canonical_name": "Fitrat Raza Khanis"}}, {"text": "August 13, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 40784, "end_char": 40799, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Fitrat Raza Khan's case, supra, the first incident was of August 13, 1980 when the communal riots broke out in Moradabad city, and the second of July 24, 1981."}}, {"text": "Moradabad city", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 40837, "end_char": 40851, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Fitrat Raza Khan's case, supra, the first incident was of August 13, 1980 when the communal riots broke out in Moradabad city, and the second of July 24, 1981."}}, {"text": "July 24, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 40871, "end_char": 40884, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Fitrat Raza Khan's case, supra, the first incident was of August 13, 1980 when the communal riots broke out in Moradabad city, and the second of July 24, 1981."}}, {"text": ".Moradabad city", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 41944, "end_char": 41959, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to' communal violence: The unfortunate communal riots which took place in .Moradabad city led to ."}}, {"text": "s.3(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43397, "end_char": 43403, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "National Security Act, 1980", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 43411, "end_char": 43438, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "VENKATARA:MIAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 43811, "end_char": 43825, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "VENKATARA:MIAH, J. This is a petition under Article 32 of the Constitutio.n, The petitioner has questioned in this case the validity of an .order of detention dated August 16, 1983 passed by the District Magistrate, Bhagalpur, State of Bihar, directing the detention Of the petitioner under subcsection (2) of section 12 of the Blhar Control of Crimes Act, 1981 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') read with Notification No.", "canonical_name": "D . Venkataramiah"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43855, "end_char": 43865, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the National Security Act, 1980", "statute": "the National Security Act, 1980"}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44121, "end_char": 44131, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the National Security Act, 1980", "statute": "the National Security Act, 1980"}}, {"text": "Blhar Control of Crimes Act, 1981", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 44139, "end_char": 44172, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "AIR 1984 SC 46", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 44807, "end_char": 44821, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45037, "end_char": 45048, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Blhar Control of Crimes Act, 1981", "statute": "the Blhar Control of Crimes Act, 1981"}}, {"text": "section 120B, 386 and 511", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45059, "end_char": 45084, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Blhar Control of Crimes Act, 1981", "statute": "the Blhar Control of Crimes Act, 1981"}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 45101, "end_char": 45111, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Patna", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 45187, "end_char": 45192, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner moved the High Couit of Patna."}}, {"text": "August 8, 1983", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 45274, "end_char": 45288, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "for enlarging him on bail during the pend ency of ·· .the said Session trial On August 8, 1983, tl)e bail petition was heard and the High Court made an order enla(ging the petitioner ."}}, {"text": "8.8.83", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 45431, "end_char": 45437, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on bail, the relevant part of which read thus: •.\n\n\"8.8.83."}}, {"text": "Kashi Nath Bajoria", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 45620, "end_char": 45638, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The submission of the petitioner is that he has not been named in the F.I.R. and the only material against him is that when Kashi Nath Bajoria; father of the deceased learnt about taking away of his sons from the petrol pump he weut to the house of petitioner and his brother Dhananja Singh and enquired about his sons.", "canonical_name": "Kashi Nath Bajoria"}}, {"text": "Dhananja Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 45772, "end_char": 45786, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The submission of the petitioner is that he has not been named in the F.I.R. and the only material against him is that when Kashi Nath Bajoria; father of the deceased learnt about taking away of his sons from the petrol pump he weut to the house of petitioner and his brother Dhananja Singh and enquired about his sons."}}, {"text": "Bijoy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 45861, "end_char": 45866, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On his enquiry the petitioner, bis brothei; Bijoy and his mother de; nanded a sum of Rs 50,000."}}, {"text": "Vi jay Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 46795, "end_char": 46807, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "151dated16.8.83\n\nWhereas I am satisfied that with a view to preventing Shri Vi jay Singh s/o Late Shri Jagannath Singh of Mohalla Mundichak P.S. Kotwali.", "canonical_name": "VIJAY NARAIN SINGH"}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47164, "end_char": 47173, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47177, "end_char": 47187, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Control of Crimes Act, 1981", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 47204, "end_char": 47231, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Crimes Act, 1981", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 47686, "end_char": 47702, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Vijay Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 47730, "end_char": 47741, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D Crimes Act, 1981 (Bihar Act 7 of 1981) Shri Vijay Singh s/& Late Shri Jagannath Singh of fy!ohalla Mundichak, P.S.\n\nKotwali, District Bhagalpur is informed that he was beea directed to be detained in my Qrder No.", "canonical_name": "VIJAY NARAIN SINGH"}}, {"text": "Vi jay Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 47976, "end_char": 47988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The following incidents conclusively show that Shri a 'Vi jay Singh is an \"anti-social element\". , ·", "canonical_name": "VIJAY NARAIN SINGH"}}, {"text": "15.4.75", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 48103, "end_char": 48110, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(i) On 15.4.75 Vijay Singh alongwith his associates went-to the shop of Gopal Ram Ramchandra, cloth dealer in Hariapatti market of Bhaga, lapur to\\vn armed with unlicensed , pistol an.d forcibly demanded subscription at the ppint of pistol."}}, {"text": "Vijay Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 48111, "end_char": 48122, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(i) On 15.4.75 Vijay Singh alongwith his associates went-to the shop of Gopal Ram Ramchandra, cloth dealer in Hariapatti market of Bhaga, lapur to\\vn armed with unlicensed , pistol an.d forcibly demanded subscription at the ppint of pistol.", "canonical_name": "VIJAY NARAIN SINGH"}}, {"text": "Gopal Ram Ramchandra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 48168, "end_char": 48188, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(i) On 15.4.75 Vijay Singh alongwith his associates went-to the shop of Gopal Ram Ramchandra, cloth dealer in Hariapatti market of Bhaga, lapur to\\vn armed with unlicensed , pistol an.d forcibly demanded subscription at the ppint of pistol."}}, {"text": "Kotwali", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 48567, "end_char": 48574, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A case was instituted in Kotwali p, s. vide Case No."}}, {"text": "15-4-75", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 48604, "end_char": 48611, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "25 dated 15-4-75 under section 144/448 I.P.G •• Jn this case, he was chargesheeted."}}, {"text": "section 144", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48618, "end_char": 48629, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Crimes Act, 1981", "statute": "Crimes Act, 1981"}}, {"text": "17./18-6-82", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 48688, "end_char": 48699, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(ii) On 17./18-6-82 at night Vijay Singh was founii ; teasing and misbehaving with females returning from Cine111a\n\nhall at {<.halifabagh Chowk, one of the busiest thr6ughfarcs tf\n\n/:A ,\n\n•. 0 (J\n\nSUPREMB COURT REPORTS [1984) 3 s.c."}}, {"text": "ViJay Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 49044, "end_char": 49055, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ViJay Singh had the avdacity to misbehave with the pol\\ce psQ!llleLincludipg l!.e J1¥, ~.p, tl;!qr~,) whq.al?pened to n:ach, Uiwei ~-S?~'?.<'\"fa, s1 insHt,~\\~<l .. in th.i• c~, nect.io~, v.de 1$;0{1Y, ali .", "canonical_name": "VIJAY NARAIN SINGH"}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49191, "end_char": 49193, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s 294", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49295, "end_char": 49300, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "V1iay Smgh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 49329, "end_char": 49339, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1%:.~/l\\lji J ~.-6;,8~.u/s 294/353 I.P:C ..\n\nIn lh1s case, V1iay Smgh was cbargeslleeted . ."}}, {"text": "Krishna Kumer Bajoria", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 49661, "end_char": 49682, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Uy n, mely, Krishna Kumer Bajoria and Santosh Kumer BaJoria wre ."}}, {"text": "Santosh Kumer BaJoria", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 49687, "end_char": 49708, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Uy n, mely, Krishna Kumer Bajoria and Santosh Kumer BaJoria wre ."}}, {"text": "20-4-83", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 50391, "end_char": 50398, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "281 dated 20-4-83 .under sections 364/302/201/34/120(b} I.P.C.. Charge-sheet ha's."}}, {"text": "sections 364", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50406, "end_char": 50418, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 50438, "end_char": 50443, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Vi]ay Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 50554, "end_char": 50565, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lnyestiga{ion shows that Vi]ay Singh is.", "canonical_name": "VIJAY NARAIN SINGH"}}, {"text": "V ijay Singh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 50947, "end_char": 50959, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri V ijay Singh is informed that he\n\nnlllY make a representation in writing against the or>!er-under\n\nwhich he is detained.", "canonical_name": "VIJAY NARAIN SINGH"}}, {"text": "Centrai Jail Ohagalifur", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 51982, "end_char": 52005, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On behalf of the d.talning authority it' was c'ontended that the detention o•der had 'been' pre.rared 'in aovance for service on the petitioner when he came' out or tlie' jail dn ine strength of the bail oi-d'e'r which h'e had obtain\"ed ii\\ i!ie criminal case ; that all the -copies of order had been sent to 'the District Migisfrate's office but , l>Y mistake of the messenger three c0pies had been wrongly delivered ai the Centrai Jail Ohagalifur w,11ere the petitioner hairbeen kept and that when the mistake ; as detected by the 'Superintendent of D the Central Jail, he did not serve the copy of the o'rder and had \" returned all the 'Copies."}}, {"text": "Section 2(d)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53231, "end_char": 53243, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 53676, "end_char": 53686, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Arms Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 54290, "end_char": 54298, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 3 to 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54335, "end_char": 54350, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55949, "end_char": 55959, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56011, "end_char": 56020, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56071, "end_char": 56080, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56341, "end_char": 56350, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 56661, "end_char": 56678, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56748, "end_char": 56757, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57525, "end_char": 57534, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57579, "end_char": 57588, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57739, "end_char": 57748, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57928, "end_char": 57937, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58018, "end_char": 58027, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58840, "end_char": 58849, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2(o)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60919, "end_char": 60931, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61263, "end_char": 61272, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62950, "end_char": 62959, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63068, "end_char": 63078, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_3_461_481_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "461 •\n\nMANICK CHAND PAUL & OTHERS ETC ..\n\nUNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS\n\nAptil 17, 1984\n\n~\\ (V.D .• TULZA¥URKAR, V. BALAl:R!SHNA BRAD! AND D.P. MADON, JJ.]\n\nGold Control Act 1968, Sections 16(7), 52, 79, JOO read with rule 3(1) Qf the Go:/d Control (ldenific.ation of Customers) Rule1, 1960,. whet he~. violatte of the provisions of Articles U,19(1)(/l), 301anl.302 of the Constitution. . .\n\nGold Control (Forms, Fees and Misce/lane1us Mattefs)· Rules, 1968-For11t1 GS, J J and GS 11 as amended are unworkable anti require modification-,.-Govern· 1nel/t of India's Letter of Instructions ani the Trade Notices withdrawint the-· faciility of sale by licensed traders throuzh their trflvtlli111 sales1nen whether 1•islativ~ Articles U, 19(/)(t) and 301 ofrhe &nstituti1n.\n\nIn Harak Chand Rotan ChanJ Bamhia's c.u [1~70] I SCR 479, where tao Gold (Control) Act, 1969 and some of its provision; prioi to the amendment by Act 26 of 1969 were challenged, the Supreme Court poiilted out that even tho, P&h.' import of Gold into India had been banned, considerable quantities Of contrab&, nd glod were findinii. their \\Vay into the cciuntry through illei!al channels;.. affecting the national economy and hamperin: the country's economicstability and progress, th!!:t the Customs . DCpartment was not in a position to effectively combat the sn1ugglinu over the long borders and coast lines, that, therefore, anti-smugglinu measur~ l'iad to be supplemented by a detailed •ystem of control over internal transaclions and that the Gold (Contro1) Act, 1968 was passed for this purpose. In other words, the several restrictions that have be-en put oll the activities of the trad!rs doing business in e01d, go Id orname'nts and articles of gold, will have to be viewed frbm the aforesaid perspective. The Court further held the enactment to be within _the Jegl.slative compeie_nce of P.1rliamen.f:and out of the several provisions that were challenged only ss. 5(2)(b), 27(2)(d), 27(6), 32, 46. 8-8 and lOO were invalid. As a result of the aforesaiddecisions and, the obServations made by this Couft therein t\n\n0 he Act of 1968 was suitably amended by Gold Control (Amendment) Act (i6) of 1969. These amended provisions, the Gold Control (Identification of Customers) Rules, 1969, th~ Gold Coritrol (Forms, Fees and Miscellaneous Matters) Rules 1968 are chaJ!enged by the Writ Petitioners as being: violative of the provisions. of Article 14, 19(r)(g), 301,_ and 302 of the Constitution. Some of the pet_itioners including the petitioners in S.L.P. Civil 5J8 of 1973 have also challenged the Govern1nent of lndias Letter of Instructions and the Trade Notices withdrawing the facility of permitting Jicensed dealers to send naments for. sale through their travelling salesmen, on te same grouds.\n\nDismissin&: the petit!ons, the~Court\n\n_-\\ HELD: 1:1, Section 16(7) of the Gold (Cootrol) Act, 1968 as .amended is\n\nconstitutionally valid. [269E, 47IB] '\n\n1:2. The counteraffidavit of the Urilon. of India not merCiy furrilshes the inteI!igible classification ffiade betwen the.licensed dealers and non-dealers and\n\nnonrCfiners~ but .. also shows th.at the 'ctassitic3.tioil has a reaSonable nexus with the object of the Act and the reasons for denying e>.emption limil~'tO liceriscd deJ.Jers or refiners are also valid and r.eferable to the Object of the ct, namely \"to provlde, in the economic arid financial intefests of thC co'nimunity, for the confroJ of production, manufacture, supply distribution, se and poss::ssion of' and business in, gold ornaments and articles of goid and for matters connectCd\n\nterewith r incidntal thereto:; [t69F, 4700-E}\n\n~ .\\Vhile.ordinary citizens (nondealers and. non.rCfinCrs) are pot premitted-by - Jaw to have any primary gold in their possession• a deah:r or a, refiner 1s permit tej under the law to have unlimited quantity of primary rold in hi..; poss.:ssion and therefore, it is tasr for a dealer or a refinC:r to acquire !rpugg!ed rold and \\\\-ith a viw to preventing\" det~1.:tion of such golJ, to convert .1he same into or.na . ' . . ments and to claint such ornaments as his personal property. This necessitated a provision for a dcdaration cf all ornaments and articles, owned, possessed.\n\nhld or controlled by th!m o lha, t they_could not _caim any clandestinely manu. factured oranaments, when detected to be their p!rsonal property and that is\n\n,- \\\\; hy it has been providd in S.t6(7) i1; at e'veiYliCensed dealer or refiner hould\n\ndeclare all g6Td articles arid ornaments which belong to h1m or Which are in his custody; posssC'sion o.r control, and that is why it has been further.provided that th~ e.o.:cmption limit-> permissibl~ for general public in rel::uion to the\n\nrequirment of.declaration of articles and ornaments shouid not be available lO the dealers and refinerS: [469G-H, 470B-D]\n\n1 :3. 1 hC provi5ion in section 16(7) could not be regarded as unnecessary or \" one ·,-\\lhich c3.sts an unrea!iOnable burden on the licensed dealer or refiner. The reasons for-introducing thi;: provision justify its enaetmcnts, if the objects of the . Act are to be achi_ev:J. , -Oath: sp!c:t of casting unreasonable burd.:n on the\n\ndealer refiner, tirStly, the burde~ orl the dealer or refiner i:s the same as that which haS been Casi on a non-de:il:r (iridividual or family) whenever the l.ttter come:;.' to own, posses5, h;)ld or have under hi1 cOntrol articles or oriiamenti of sold in .excess of the exempted limit ; secodly visits of guests and relationS (including , maried daught:rs and siters) on festive o.:casiofi5 aod requestsproct.eding frOn1\n\n• them ro lh~ houe-k.e.:p:r to keep their orilam!nts in safe\" custody during their stays \\\\-i!h him, which are ordinary inciden'ts iri li_fe, arc common to licensed dealers Or refiners aiid nCln'-dealers and thi::refi.Jr.! the requirement of rriaking a declaration uild.:r section _16(7) does not cao; t any additional burden on him; and. thirdly under section 16(i) it is provided that 'the licensed d:aler or refiner shall inake a -dec-laratioa- \"'in iccordanc: with the provisions of this section\" \\vhich means he his to '&J so wi\"1hin 30 days of his acquiring the O\\\\-n.erShlp, ('9ssession, custody or conlrol of such gold. \\Vith such, time limi-t being Provided the burden casttcannot be, said to be unreasonable.~ especialiy Y.ben the provision is found to be nCcessary to carry out the objectives of the Act, .\n\n. [470E-H, 471AB] ..\n\n' \\\n\n--¢\n\ntl.C. PAUL v, UN:O~ 463\n\n2:t\". Section 52 of the GOid (Coptrol) Act, 1968 -as am.endd does not suffCr from the vice of excessiVi! delegation of the power and therefore the said provi\n\nsion iS constitutional. [472G-HJ\n\n2:2. it is true that section 52 os not contairi any guide-line~ or pinciples which would regulte the exercise of the ppwer of the Administrator in the matter of gi-ant or refusal or approval to change in lhe Partnership of a firm but in the exercise of the powers confrred by s.114 readwith s.27(6) of the Act the Central Government has framed the 'Gold Control (Licensing of Dealers) Rules 1969'_ and Rule 2 enlists matters to Which regard. is tq be had before issuing a licence and Rule 3 indicates the conditions on the fulfilinent of which\n\n_a Hcence could bC ref!ewed. It 'is true that the5c RuJes. w.hich deal wi1h Jicens .. ing of d:!alers and renewal of their licences, in tenns do not cover a case of a change in the partnership of a firm and the.approval to t-e accorded thereto by the Adminbtrator but in a sense a case of a change occurrin'g in thC -partnership of the _ fifin and the occasion to app_ly for grant. of approval thi:reto by the Administ'rator would be a ca1J~ of 5eekin& renewal of the licence by the firm in which a change has occurred eith'r by death or re tiremefit of a partner or aS a result of reconstitution of th~ firm and therefore to such a: case .th-!se licensig Rules, particularly Rule 3, must and will apply and these rules; in so far as they. are appli.:able to the situation, afford. the n, ecessary guidi.lincs on the basis of which approval to the change could be given or rfused .. Obviously, if the charige in he .firm involves fntroduction of a new panner into the firm these guide-lines under Rules, 2 and 3 will play an important part ia the matter of ac.:ording or refusing to accord ihe approval but if the change nearly involves. alteration in lhe share..capit<il or Profit harirlg basfa an1ngst the se!f-same partners who coatin1,1e the .firm the .ipproval Would be a nlatter of forma!i{y, In view of the Licensing Rule1J, 1969 which must apply, it cannot be said that any unfeuered or unregulated discretion has beeO conferred upon the Adminis trator in th~ matter of grant of refusal of appro(al to a change in the partaCr. 'ship of a firm. [47JH, 472A-E] ,,\n\n2:~. On the aspect of absence -of a prov1s1on from appe!ll, a remedy by wa:Y of an appeal to correct any erroneous order that may be pasSed undel'. section 52 has beeil provided for by Notificafion dated 26August, .. 1983 issued ·.\n\nby tht: Ad1ninistrator under seC. 4 (4) of thC Act whereunder the exercise of the poWer under sec. 5-2 has been delegated to the Deputy Collector of the Centre Excist: with the result that.aq ippeal; against his order und.er s.52 will lie to the . Collector of. Centre Excise under s.80 of t?c ACt. -[472E~G] •\n\n3. The power to grant extension under section 79 of the Gold (Control) Act as amended is not arbitrary and does not suffer fronl.Jack of guidelines. Of\n\ncourse two in built .; afeguards will have to be and must b-= read into the Provision. Since every extensio_n involves civil Consequence in that the owner's or the r::cerned person's right to have the seize_d g0Jd returned to him is adversely affected by beingpostponed. before granting any extensio_n he must be given a notice and an opportunity to make representatiou aga'int the Proposed exten Sloe. 474H,,47SA-lJJ '-\n\n-464\n\nS~PREME COURT REPORTS (19811] 3 s.c.R.\n\nIt is true that s.79 docs not expressly mention the iuidelinc5 on 'the ba, sis of which the power to grant ext; psion of die initial period of six Il!Ontbs is to be exercised buL if regard is had to the provh.ions ._dealing with &:izure (s.66), Confiscation (s.71), .Adjudication (s.78). and Giving of ('pportunity (s.79) the Policy of the Legislature becomes qi.lite clear that -·- herl!:<1'3 tlo' .. l---Ower to seize'. can be_ exercised by any Gold Control Officer if ht: Las\"'reason to lxlieve\" that in repect ot any -gold _any provision of the A.ct has been or is beini or is _ attempted t? 'be contravened the confication._of gold can takC_ pla.cC only if'\n\n: actual contravention bas taken place Or is apprehended or is attempted and such\n\nco;, fisCatiori can b~ adjudged or o?defed withOut limit tiy a Gold cOntiol Officer not below the rank of a Collctoi Or Central Excise or of Customs and subject _-to such.limitsas may __ be specified in that behalf by'such other Gold COntrol\n\n0f!1ccr not beTOw the rank of a Superintendent of Central Excise as the Centrai\n\nGovemmentSma~ autliorise in that behalf; but the power _to 8raot extension of\n\n- -- the initial period of six moflths has been conferred under the second proviSo to\n\n's.~9 only upon a superir officer, namely tl1; e COlfector of Ceiitral Excise or of\n\ncustoms, Further under the second proviso to s.79 tbe owner oi the person con 'Cemed has been iliven the right to have the seized gold returned to him where Ilo ... o-tice _p.roposing Cofiscation is_ served uPon him within' a period of six months\n\nfrom\"the d'ate of th~ seizure of _the gold which shows that the Legisla:ure clearly intended that ordinarily the investig<ition in corinection with the seized gold is Cxpected to be over within six months ; but only in caseS where such investigation may not be complet'ed owing to some gen.uine or bonafide diffi culties the Legislature gave undi:r the proviso power to the Co11ector tO'\"e'l!\"tend that time. Iii other word3 Collector is expected to pass extension order~ neither mech.anicaUy nor as a atter Of routine but only on being satisfied that fact! or circumstances Cxist which ind.icate that the investigation could not be completed for bona fide reasons withln the initial period of six moI}ths. Such guidelines\n\n- would be imP1icit if the extra-ordinary powe; to effect seizure and adjudge confis. cation conferred by the Act is considered in jllstaposition with the rig.ht confer , ted upon the owner or the person cOncerned to have the seized gold.returned to him \"norniauY at the eX.piry of the initial Period of six months. Presumably, the ramifications of any gold smllgg\\ing 3.ctivity which are usually' extensive and. cclmplicated must haVe Jed the. LegisJature ·not to 'impose a Jimit or ceiling on_ the power to gtant. extension but , jf the above gllidelines are to gov_ern every-· extension that may be granted then mere absence of a limit or ceiling will not be or any consequence. [473H, 474A-G] . -\n\nAsSistant Collector of Customs v. Charan Das Malhot'ra, [1971] 3 S.C~R. -802;\n\naPPtied~ '\n\n4:1 Section JOO of ihe Gold Control Act read with Rule 3(1) of the Gold Controi (ldentificaliOn of Customers) Rules~ 1968 is constitutiona1Jy v:ilid and' does not restrict. ihe licensed dealers to arry on their business iricludins their . inter-state trade-, (478FeG]\n\n4':2. Section 100 of thC Act as it originally stood prior to its amendment in t969 imposed a statutory obligation Upon a dealer to-take all reasonable steps to 'sati:c; fy himself about the identity .of the person fro~ :n.hom gold wa! boug.h; t liut h did not specify the ntuII cf steps which a dealer as supposed to t-ak.o ..\n\nM.C. PAUL v. UNION 4~5\n\n-for such -satisfaction and therefor~ this Court i~ .1/arakchtind: Ratanchand\n\n...Banthia's case took the view that the obliiatioa, cast thereunder' was uncertain -2nd incapable of proper_ co:npliance and therefore the section was uncqnstitu~\n\ntional on the ground that it imposed an imposSible and unreasonable burden. In the light of this decision, ~.100 was appfopriately ameilded and the •Gold Control ·{ld<.!ntification of Customers) Rules, 1969 were. frarried and p.irticularly Rule 3(1) n::>w prescribed the Several steps one. or more of which have to be iakCn by the '11censed dealer to satisfy himself as to the identitY of the Customer from whom be proposes to accept, buy or otherw_ise receive any go?d, 477E-G]\n\n4:3. From the. mere fact that most of the custon1ers who come from villages .:as also from outside their own State. prefer to recive payments in.cash_in Jieu of\n\nold sold and arenot prepared to receivepayments by crossed cheque!. for the £Cason that they do not ha Ve a.ny_ bank account or their apprChen .. ion that the ---said cheques may-_ not be enca-stied, it cannot be said complianCe is either incap . able or hnpOssiable even frcm-a practical or commercial point of view. More :\n\n-Over. thi provisions contained in sub-rule_ (2)(a) of Rule 3 i!I apPlicable in all -cases. v.:hcre gold is accepted bought or otherwi:so received by th: dealer irrespec - tive -Qf whether the. customer is personi; Jlly _known to the dealer or not known tc> :him; The Purpose served b:Y s_ub-rul.! (2)(a) of Rule 3 is entirely diffl;!rept from . the purpose served by one or more _of the step:s that are 1equired to be taken by \"a dealer under sub-rule (I) of Rule 3 and therefore, it canD.ot be said that be .. ---Cause of the provisions contained in sub-rule 2(a) ihe stePs contemplated under sub.-rulc (If are unreasonable •. [ 47SA-B, E; Fl\n\nBihCir State Bullion Merchafits, Assn. &: Others v. Union of India an_d Otheu, A. \\.R. 1971 Pat. 240; approved.\n\nS. The amende~ prescribed form3 Nos. G.S.11 and GS. 12 required to be maintained ur..der section 5.$ of the Gold Control Act read with Rule J l of the -Oold Gontrol (Forms Fees, and Miscellaneous Matters)Rules, 1968 brought into-.\n\nforce v.:lth effect frOm 31st Octobr. 1975 do not.-provide, as conceded by the Government, for all tbituations under which gold would be received by him in his possession or custody and keeping the account of their gOid in . aCcordance\n\n- with the said For.ms Would -give rise to anomalies and the dealer \\VOuld not\n\nbe' able_ to discharge his st1tutory duty of disclosing a true and complete .=:cunt of the gold in his possession or custody. [478H, 479G-1!]\n\nTh~efre. the Court directed .the- Adrllillistrator .to look into theSe \\1lriev1nces and remedy the same by taking appropriate action and hope that in the meanwhile no action penal or otherwise would be taken against Iicens -cd dealers for f; J.ilure io maintain aecounts in the amended Forms G, S. 11 .and G.S. 12. [480C-D]\n\n6. Secti0n 27(7J(b) of the Gold Control Act. y, rhich confines a licensed dealer to carry on business as such dea!er to the premises specified in his licence. being\n\nregulatorY in Charact!r does not violate any ot his rights under the constitution.\n\nThe Ltter of Instructions or the trade Notices does not privet or stop inter . State trade but were issued with a view to prevent the several malpractice:s that were indulged iii while availing of the facility or hawking: ornam\"ents throuch\n\nt[aveling :salesmen. [431CFl 1\n\n' A.\n\n\nk ORIGINAL Jur'1SDICTION: Writ'Petitios Nos. 918-953,. 1159-\n\n1186 of 1977, 88 of)973, ,107, 664 & 575 So 618 f 1973 •\n\n. (Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India)\n\nWmr ,.\n\nSpecial Leave Petition (Ciyil No. 538 of 1973\n\n(From the Judgment and Order dated 24th July. 1972 of the Punjab ancj Haiyana High Conrt'in C.W. No. 1221 of 1972)\n\n• A.K. Sen and G.S. Chatterjee for the ~Petitioners in WP. 918_ ' . and 95~/77 .\n\n. Gobindas, G.S.\n\nChatterjee and D.P. Mukherjee for the Petitioners iri W.Ps. Nos. 1159-86 of 1977. . . ' Dr. Y.S. Chitale; Mrs. A.K. Verma, R.N. Banerjee and D.'N •.\n\nJfishra' for the Petitioners in WP. No. 88 of 1973 ·& WP, No. 107 /73. .\n\n•. D.N. Mishra for the Petitio~rs in WPs. 564, 575-618/73 and: (Civil) No. 538/73. ·\n\n.. Ms. A. Subhashini for th(Respondents in WPs. 918-953/77.\n\nSLP 1159-86 of 1977 ..\n\nI ;\n\n88/73 Abdul Khadder, D. Goburdhan 1 for the Respon.dnts in WP.. >- . ' D. Goburdhan .for the Respondents. ·\n\nThe Judgment of the CoJlrt was delivered by\n\nTuLZAPURKAR:· J. 'By these. writ petiticns, the petitioners whoa re licensed dealers, are chailenging the constitutional validity of tliec Gold (Control)Act, 1968 and in particular the provfaions. contained in ss. 2(p), 16, 27 (as amended), 44, 48, 52,. 79 and 100 (as amended)\n\n...\n\nM.C. PAUL v. UNION (Tulzapurkar, J.) 467\n\nand the Gold Control (Forms, Fees and Miscellaneous Matters) Rules, 1968 (as amended in 1975/1976) and the Gold Control . (Identification of Customers) Rules, 1969 as being violative of /\n\nth,. fundamental rights under Arts. 14 and 19(l)(g) and are seeking suitable directions restraining the respondents from giving: effect to any of those provisions, Some of the petitioners (including the petitioner in S.L.P. (Civil) No. 538of1973) are challening the Government of India's Letter of Instructions and the Trade Notices withdrawing the facility of permitting licensed dealers to , end ornaments for sale through their travelling salesmen as being\n\n' violative of the constitutional guarantee under Art. 301 as also their fundamental rights under Arts. 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.\n\nAt the outset we would like to observe that the several grou\\lds of challenge will have to be considered in the background of two things: (a) the object with which the Act was nacted and (b) this Court's decision and the observations made by it in Harakchand Ratanchand Banthia'sl'l case where the Gold (Control) Act and some of its provisions prior to its amendment by Act 26 of 1969 were challenged. The Long Title to the Act shows that it was put on the Statute Book with a view (\"to provide, in the economic and 'financial interests of the community, for the control of production . . ,\n\nmanufacture, Supply distribution, use and possession bf, and business in, gold ornaments and articles of gold and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.\") In Harakchand Banthi~'s case\n\nthis Court bas further pointed out that even though import. of Gold into India had beed banned, considerab1e quantities of contraband gold were finding their way into the country through illegal channels, affecting the national economy and hampering the country's economic stability and progress. tbftt the Customs Department was not in a position to effectively combat the smuggling over the Jong ' borders and coast lines, that, therefore, anti-smuggling measures [had to be supplemented by a detailed system of control over inter-\n\n: nal transactions and that the Gold (Contfol) Act, 1968 was passed ' G for this purpose. In other words, the several restriciions that have been put on the activities of the traders doing business in gold, gold ornaments and articles of gold, will have to be viewed from the aforesaid perspective. We might also mention that in Harakchand .' Banthia's case the enactment (prior to its amendment in 1969) had\n\n(I) [1970] I SCR. 479\n\nbeen challenged riot merely on the ground of legislative incompe- . tence on the part of the Parliament but several of its provisions , were also challenged on the ground that the same were in violation of the petitioners fundamental rights under Arts. 14 and 19(1.~\") & (g). This Court held the enactment to be within the legislative m- IL . petence of Parliament and out of the several provisions that were\n\n. challenged only ss. 5(2)(b), 27(2) (d) 27(6), 32, 46, 88 and 100 were held to be invalid.\n\nAs a result of the aforesaid decisionand the observations made by this Court thercrin the Act of 1968 was suit\n\nably amend.ed by Go!<,! Control (Amendment) Act (26) of 1969). It j . is the provisions of the Act,. as amended in 1965 t.hat are being\n\nthal!engcd by the petitioners before us and we. may state tht • though a large number of provisions have been made the subject of . challenge in the writ petitions, at the hearing only some provisions were selected against which the ch.allcnge was pressed before us an'd • we propose to deal with only those provisions.\n\nThe first provision that has been Act which provides : challenged is\n\ns. 16(7) of the\n\n\"Every licensed dealer ot refiner shall make a declaration in accordance with the provisions of this section in relation to any gold owned, possessed, held or controlled by E him, in any capacity other than the capacity of a licensed dealer or refiner and the provisions of sub-s.(5) shall not apply to such gold\". '\n\nThe requirement of making a declaration under this prov1S1on . is in respect of any gold owned, possessed, held or conttolled by a licensed dealer or refiner otherwise than in his capacity as a ·~ I licensed dealer or refiner and the examption granted to' a nondealer in respect of articles and ornaments of gold, total weight whereof does not exceed 2,000 gms. in the case of au: individual ancl 4,000 gms. in case of a family in the matter of making a declaration under sub\"sec. (5) is. not applicable.\n\nCounsel for the petitioners challenged this. provision on two ground : (a) it is discriminatory under Art. 14 and (b) it imposcs'.unreasonable restriction on licensed f dealers and is violative of Art. 19(1 )(g). It was pointed out that\n\n•very licensed dealer is reqµired to furnish, under s. 56, returns in 1 'escribed form as to the quantity, description and other prescribed\n\n'pa.iculars of gold owned, possessed, held or .controlled by him as such dealer nd the aforesaid requirement of making a declaration in respect of any other gold owned, possessed. helcl or controlled •\n\nM.C. PAUL v. UNION (Tu/zapurkar, J.) 46?\n\n'by him as non-dealer is an additional requirement and while prescribing such additional tequirement the exemption under s. 16(5) which is available to non-dealers (individuals and families) has been .denied to him and according to counsel the classification made is not based on any intelligible differentia having any nexus to the . -0bject sought to be achieved by th~ Act ; in other words, every licensed dealerin his capacity as a non-dealer is subjected to dis- Criminatory treatment.\n\nSecondly, counsel urged that imposing £uch a requirement on a licensed dealer to make declarations on\n\n,. evety occasion in respect of any quantity of gold coming in his possession or custody as an individual or a member of a family .amounts to putting an unnecessary and unreasonable burden on him and the .requirement may at times become impossible to comply with ; counsel elaborated his submission by giving an example that if guests or relations, particularly married daughters and sisters visit the residence of a gold dealer for a short stay on festive .occasions and request him, as it frequently happens in normal . .course of events, to keep their ornaments in safe custody during their stay he has to oblige them, but in terms of the requirement of s. 16(7) the dealer has to make a declaration in respect of such gold. ·\n\nwhich has come in his custody or possession and to require him to dp so on every occasion is to cast unreasonable burden on him amoun- ting to unreasonable restriction especially as. non-compliance there entails penal consequences and therefore the provision must . be regarded as unreasonable and arbitrary.\n\nln our view neither of the contentions has any force.\n\nAs regards the attack under Art. 14, sufficient material has been placed before us in the counter affidavit of Shri K.S. Venkataramani, Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Finance (filed in W.P. Nos. 918-953 ef 1977) showing how the classification made between the two cate- :gories in the context of making a declaration under s. 16 in relation to gold owned, possessed, held or controlled by them is based on intelligible differentia having a nexus to the object of the Act. In para 5 of the counter affidavit it has been pointed out that while ordinary citizens (non-dealers and non refiners). are not premitted by law to have ony primary gold in their possession, a dealer or a refiner is permitted under the law to have unlimited quantity of primary gold in his posse1sion and therefore, it is easy for a dealer or a tenner to acquire 11muggled gold and with a view to preventin& .ctetectioa of such gold, to convert the same into ornaments and t.\n\n.claim Hl'l1l ornaments as bis i>crsonal property. It is further poia\n\n470 BUP}lEME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1984] 3 S.C.R.\n\nted out that it had been repeatedly observed that licensed dealers.\n\nA in gold, when found in.possession of stocks of ornaments in excesi.\n\n. of those entered in the prescribed accounts. often took the plea that these represented their personal property and it was further notied\n\nthat they kept the ornaments manufactured by them clandestinely at their residences and at other places and when such stocks were\n\n• detected thee were cla.imed as tfleir personal property ; it therefore became necessary to provide for a declaration of all ornaments ' ancll ... articles owned, possessed, held or controlled by them so that they . could not claim any clandestinely manufactured ornaments, when • detected, to be their personal property and that is why it has been ' provided in s. 16(7) that every licensed dealer or 1efiner shoold C, dedare all gold articles and ornaments which belong to him or\n\nwhich are in his custody, possession or conttol, and that is why it has been further provided that the exemption limits permissible for general public in relation t_o the requirement of declaration of arti- .J cles and .ornaments should. not be available to the dealers and D refiners. The aforesaid materials in the counter.-affidavit not merely furnishes the intelligible differentia for the classification mad_e lint also shows thaHhe classification.has a reasonable nexus with the object of the Act and the reasons for denying the exemption limits. to_ licensed dealers or r; finers are also valid and referable to the object of the Act.\n\nAs regards the second ground of challenge it is difficult t<> ap_preciate how the provision could be regarded as unnecessary or one which casts an unreasonable burden on the licensed dealer or refiner.\n\nIn fact the reasons for introducing the provision as indicated F above justify its enactment if the objects of the Act are to be achieved. On the aspect of castiug unreasonable burden on the dealer or refiner it must in the first place be observed that the burden oi:i the dealer or refiner is the same as that which bas been cast on a non-dealer Qlidividual or family) whenever the latter comes to own,· possess, hold or have under his control articles or ornaments of gold G in excess of the exempted limit. Visits of guests and relations\n\n(inluding 'married daughters and sisters on festive occasions and requests proceeding from them to the house-keeper to keep their ornaments in safe custody during their stays with him. which are ordinary incidents in life, are common to licensed dealers or refiners H and ilon-dealers and there is no reason to suppose that the requirement of making a declaration under s. 16(7) casts any additional burden on him than on a non-dealer when be has in his possession\n\n1 ·-4\n\n• f\n\nM.C. PA.UL v. UNION (Tulzapurkar, J.) 471\n\n-Or 'custody articles and ornaments in excess of the exemption limit. & Moreover, unders.16(7) it is provided that the licensed dealer or refiner shall make a declaration \"in accordance with the provisions -of this section'' which means he has to do sowithin 30 days pf his acquiring the ownership, possession, custody or control of such gold.\n\nWith such time limit being provided the burdeu cast tannot be said to be unreasonable, especially when the provision is found to be B necessary to carry out the objectives of the Act.\n\nHaving regard to\n\nhe above discussio:1, the challenge to the constitutionality of s.16(7) must foil.\n\nThe next provision challenged is sec. 52 of the Act which provides for licence issued to a firm becoming invalid if there is any •£hange in the partnership of the firm. fhat section runs thus:-\n\n\"52. Where any firm has been licensed under this Act to carry on business as a dealer or refiner, such licence shall, notwiths•anding anything contained in this Act, become invalid on and from the date on which there is a change in the partnership of such firm, unless such change in the partnership has been approved by the Administrator\".\n\nCounsel for the petitioners contended that change in partnership\n\n~ a normal and usual thing that occurs when business is carried on\n\nty a firm and such change may arise on account of death or retirement of a partner or reconstitution of , the firm but the above provision imposes an nnrcasonable restriction in so far as it provides 'that the licence of a firm shall become invalid on and from the date -0n which there is a change in the partnership of such firm unless the , -<:bange has been approved by the Administrator. According to .counsel the restriction imposed is excessive and what is more no ; guide-lines or principles arc !\"id down on the basis of which approval to a change may or may not be given by the Administrator; besides there is no appeal or other corrective machinery provided against .an!adverse order oftthc Administrator refusing at)proval. Counsel therefore, urged that this provision clearly suffers from the vice of .excessive delegation of legislative power and is liable to be declared\n\n.unconstitutional.\n\nIt is true that sec. 52 does not contain any guide-lines er J>rinciples which would regulate the exercise of the power of the .\n\nAdministrator in the matter of grant or refusal of approval to a <£h ange in the partnership of a Ii.rm but in the exercise of the powers\n\n.A conferred by sec.114 read with sec. 27 (6) of the Act the CentraF Government has framed the 'Gold Control (Licensing of. Dealers) Rules 1969' and Rule 2 enlists matters to which regard is to be had before issuing a licence and Rule 3 indicates the conditions on the fulfilment ofwhfch a licence could be renewed. It is true that these B Rules, which deal with licensing of dealers and renewal of their licences, in terms do not cover a case of a change in the partnership of a firm and the approval to be accorded thereto by the Administrator but in a sense a case of a change occurring in the partnershil\" of the firm and the occasion to apply for the grant of approval thereto by the Administrator would be a case of seeking renewal of the Cl licence by the firm in which a change has occurred either by death or retirement of a partner or as a result of reconstitution of the firm, and therefore to such a case these Licensing Rulos, particularly Rule 3, must and will apply and these Rules, in so far as they are appli- . .:able to the situation, afford the necessary guide-lines on the basis.\n\nof which approval to the change could be given or refused. Obviously, 8 if the change in the firm involves introduction of a new partner into the firm these guide-lines under Rules 2 and 3 will play an important part in the matter of according or refusing to accord the approval but if the change nearly involves alteration in the share capital or profit sharing basis amongst the self-same partners who continue the E firm the approval would be a matter of formality. Inview of tlw Licensing Rules, 1969 which must apply it is difficult to accept the contention 'that any unfetterred or unregl, llatcd discretion has been .£onferred upon the Administrator in the matter of grant or refusat\n\n<Jf approval to a change in the partnership of a firm.\n\nOn the aspect of there being no appeal or other corrective machinery provided • against an adverse order of refusing approvat\"that may be passed 11nder this ection it may be stated that Counsel for the respondents. produced before us copy of a (Notification dated 26th Augus~. 1683 ' issued by the Administrator under sec.4(4) of the Act whereunder the exercise of the power under sec .52 has been, delegated to the G • Deputy Collector of Ceqtral Excise with the result that an appeal'\n\nagainst his order under sec.52 w!ll lie to the Collector of Central Excise under sec.SO of the Act.\n\nIn other words, a remedy by way ef an appeal to correct any erroneous order that may be passed under 11ec.52 has been provided for.\n\nIn this view of the matter i\\is difficult. to accept the contention that s. 52 suffers from the vice of excessive B .telegation of legislative power or for that reason the said \"provision, is unconstitut.ional. The challenge to that section therefore, has to- 1tc rejected.\n\nM.C. PAUL v. UNION (Tulzapurkar, J.) 473\n\nThe next provision that has been challenged is s.79 read with A. the second proviso thereto.\n\nSection 79 provides that no order. of confiscation of any gold, in respect whereof contravention of any provision of the Act or any rule or order made thereunder has occurred or is apprehended or at(empt<; d, shall be made unless the owner of such gold has been given a notice in writing informing him of the grounds on which it is proposed to confiscate such gold and is\n\n B; further given a reasonable opportunity of making a representation in writing against the proposed confiscation and if he so desires, of being hc?rd in the maMer; and the second proviso which is material runs thus:\n\n\"Provided further that where'no such notice. is given within a period of si.x months from the date of the seizure of the gold, or such jimher period as the Collector of Central Excise or of Customs may allow, such gold shall be returned aft\" the expiry-of that period to the person. from whose possession it was seized.''\n\nCounsel for the petitioners coritended that the section does.not 1 provide for any guidelines or principles regarding the conditions 'and\n\ncircumst.\\l-nces governing the grant of further extention of the initial statutory period of six months on the expiry of which, in the absence of extention, the ow.ner or the person from whose possession the gold has been seized is entitled to have the seized gold returned to him; furthermore, there is no limit or ceiling over the period a for which further extension may be granted. In contrast, counsel pointed out that in parallel legislation like the proviso to sec. 110(2) of the Customs Act, 1962 such limit or ceiling is laid down by providing that the initial period of six months may, on sufficient cause being shown, be extended by the Collector of Customs for a period not exceeding six months; moreover thewords \"on stifficient cause being\n\nshown\" that occur in the Customs Act are absent here .. Counsel, therefore, urged that in the absence of any guidelines and in the absence of any limit over the period of extenion that could be granted, the provision (s.79. read with second proviso) will have to be regarded as conferring an arbitrary power and is unreasonable and hence violative of Arts. 14 and 19(\\)(g) of the Constitution.\n\n, It is true that s. 79 does not expressly mention th~ guidelines on the basis of which the power to grant extension of the initial period of six months is to be exercised but if regard is had .to . the' provisions dealing with Seizure (sec. 66) Confiscation (sec. 71),\n\nSUPREME CO\\JRT REPORTS [1984] 3 s.c.R.\n\nAdjudication (sec. 78) and Giving of Opportunity (sec. 79) the policy of the Legislature becomes quite clear that whereas the power to seize can be exercised by any Gold Control Officer if he has \"reason to believe\" that in respect of any gold any provision of the Act been or is being or is attempted to be contravened the confiscation of gold can tike place only if actual contravention has taken place or is apprehended or is attempted and such confis cation can be adjudged or, ordered without limit by a Gold Control Officer not below the rank of a Collector of Central Excise or of Customs and subject to such limits as may , be specified in that behalf by such other Gold Control Officer not below the rank of a Superintendent of Central Excise as the Central Government may anthodse in that behalf ; but the power to grant extension of the initial period of six months has beer1 conferred under the second proviso to s. 79 only upon a superior officer, namely, the Collector of Central Excise or of Cust9ms.\n\nFurther under the stcond proviso to s. 79 the owner or the person concerned has beed given the right D to have the seized gold returned to him where no gotice proposing confiscation is served upon him wit[1in a period of six months from the date of the seizure of the gold which shows that the Legislature clearly intended that ordinarily the investigation in connection with the seized gold is expectea to be over witliin six months ; but only\n\nin casts where such investigation may not be completed owing to some genuine or bonafide difficulties the Legi, slature gave under the proviso power to the Collector to extend that time, In oth\" words the Collector is expecied to pass extension orders neither mechanically nor as a matter of routine but only on being satisfied that facts or circumstances exist which indicate that, the investigation could not be completed for buna fide reasons within the initial period of six months.\n\nSuch guidelines would be implicit. if the extraordinary power to effect seizure and adjudge confiscation conferred by the Act ill considered in juxta-pasition with the right conferred uponthe owner or the person concerned to !Jave the seized gold returned to him normally at the expiry of the initial period of six months.\n\nPresumably, the ramifications of any gold smuggling activity .which are usually extensive and complicated must have led the Legislature not to impose a limit or ceiling on , the power to grant extension but if the above guidelines are to govern every extension that may be granted then mere absence of a limit or ceiling will not be of any consequence. '\n\nIt is, therefore, not possible to accept the contention that the power to grant extension is arbitrary orsuffers from lack of guide-\n\n-\"1\n\n\\ i ' '\n\n• ~\n\n...\n\nM.C. PAUL v. UNION (Tulzapurkar, J.) 475\n\ntines. Of course two inbuilt safeguards will have to be and must be read into the provision. Since every extension involves dvil\n\nconsequences in that the owner's or the concerned person's right to have the seized gold returned to him is adversely affected by being postponed, bafore granting any extension he must be given a notice and an opportunity to make representation against the pro- .posed extension. In Asst/. Collector of Customs v. Chwan Das\n\nMalhotra,('! a case under sec. 110(2) proviso of the Customs Act, 1962 this Court has taken the view that sue~ opportunity is necessary, not merely on the ground that the proviso contains the words \"upon sufficient cause being shown\" but also on the ground that the civil right of the concerned pers.on to the restoration of the goods on the expiry of the 1N'riod whether initial or extended is 2ffected.\n\nSecondly since the Collector's decision or order granting extension of time is appeal able under sec. 81(2) at the instance of the Administrator, who could be moved by the aggrieved person, .and in any case could be challenged by the aggrieved person in an appeal against the order of confiscation every order granting exten- sion must recor.d reasons for it as otherwise the appeal will be ineffective. In oti.er words the power to extend the initial period or the extended period must be exercised subject to the ob>ervance of 1he aforesaid' two safeguards. In view of the above discussion it\n\n1s clear that the challenge to s. 79 and the second proviso thereto :has to fail.\n\nThe next provision challenged is s. JOO of tqe Act as amended) read with Rule 3(1) of the 'Gold Control (Indentification of Customs) Rules 1969' on the ground that the said provision is focapable of compliance in a practical sense and from a commercial point of view and has the effect of running the business of the peti- 1ioner sand since the said Rule 3(1) unreasonably restricts the right of the petitioners to carry on their business including their inter state trade the same is violative of Art. 19(l)(g), 301 and 302 of the Constitution. Section 100 as amended by the Amending Act 26 -0f 1969 provides for certain precautions to be taken by a licensed\n\n.dealer before acquiring any Gold. It runs thus : •\n\n\"JOO(!) Every licensed dealer or refiner or certified :goldsmith, as the cas.i; may be, shall, before accepting, buying or otherwise receiving any gold from any person,· take such\n\n,(!) .[1971] 3 SCR 802.\n\nG '\n\nI I\n\nsteps as are specified by the Central Government by rules made in this behalf, to satisfy himself as to the identity of the person from whom such gold is proposed to be accepted bought or other.wise received by him.\"\n\n. The Gold Control (Identification of Customers) Rules framed by the Central Government in exercise of the powers conferred. under sec. 114 read with sec. 100(1) of the. Act provide for the several steps, one or more of whi_ch have to be taken by the licen-· sed dealer to satisfy himself as to the identity of the customer from Whom he proposes to accept, buy or otherwise recive any goid.\n\nUnder Rule 3(1) it has been provided tJpt except in cases where the customer is personally known to the licensed dealer or cases. where transactions are put through by means of crossed cheques, the licensed dealer shall take one or more of the following steps tosatisfy himself as to the identity of the customer, namely :-\n\n(!) Introduction or identification of the customer by a person who is eithe.r personally known to the licensed dealer or whose idntity has been established to the satisfaction of the licensed dealer,\n\n(2) The production of any document which establishes. ·\n\nthe identity of the customer, such as-\n\n(a) a valid passport held by the customer,\n\n(b) a valid identity card issued to the customer by the\n\npostal authorities,\n\n(c) a valid identity card issued by the Secretariat of Parliament or of any Legislature in a State or Union Territory_;\n\n(d) a valid identity card issued to the customer by his.\n\nemployer if such employer is a local authority or a body corporate or Government or a corpo ration owned or controlled by Government,\n\n(e) a rooter driving licence held by the customer as a.\n\npaid employee ;\n\n(f) an identity card issued by the Gold ControU\n\nOfficer.\n\n.... '\n\nM.c, PAUL v. UNION (Tu!zapurkar, J.). 477\n\nSub-rule (2) of Rule 3 which is also material runs thus:-\n\n' .. (2) Before accepting, buying or otherwise receiving any gold from a customer, a licensed dealer shall, in every case:-\n\n (a) obtain on the voucher, the signature and full p; istal address of the customer,\n\n(b) where the licensed dealer's satisfaction as to the identity of the customer is based on the. identification made by another person, obtain on the voucher the signature and full postal address of such identifier, and where such identifier is not personally known to him, he shall also note, on the voucher, the particulars of the documents on the strength of which he has been satisfied as to the identity of such identifier,\n\n(c) where the licensed dealer's satisfaction as to the identity of the customer is based on any other documen!, note on the voucher, the date and other particulars of such document.\n\nIt may be stated at the outset that sec. 100. as it originally stood prior to its amendment in 1969 imposed a statutory obligation upon a dealer to take all reasonable steps to satisfy himself about the identity of the person from whom gold was bought but it did not specify the nature of steps which a dealer was supposed to take for such satisfaction and therefore this Court in Harakchand ...\n\nRatanchand Banthia's cas.e took the view that the obligation cast\n\n:~, thereunder was uncertain and incapible of proper c0 n.'J?liance and therefore the section was unconstitutional on the ground that it imposed an impossible and unreasonable b urdrn. In light of this decision, s. JOO was appropriately amended ard tbe 'Gold Control (Identification of Customers) Rules, 1969, were framed and particularly Rule 3(1) now prescribes the .several steps one or more of which have to be taken by the licensed dealer )O satisfy himself as to the identity of the customer from whom he prop3ses to accept, buy or ~-otherwise receive any gold.\n\nA two-fold submission challenging t'1: an :n d ed s. 100 read with Rule 3(1) was made by counsel for the petitioners. In the first\n\n!fl\n\nplace it was submitted that the steps indicated in Rule 3(!) one or more of which are required to be takell by the licensed dealer to satisfy himself about the identity of the customer are incapable or impossible of compliance in a practical sense and from a commercial point of view. The precis~ argument was tl\\at most of the cust<fmers of the petitioners come from villages as also from outside their own State and it becomes extremely difficult for the dealer to demand from them production of either a passport or identity card specified in the Rules and further thafmost of the customers prefer to receive payments in cash in lieu of gold sold an<l are not prepared to receive payments by crossed cheques since many of them do not have bank accounts and even the dealers equally haye the apprehension that the cheques issued by the customers may not be encashed. Secondly, it was urged that since sub-rule (2)(a) of Rule 3 provides for_ sufficient safeguards regarding the identity of the customers when the uealer is requird to obtain their signatures on the vouchers and the full address of the customer and or of the ideniifier, the insistence upon .a dealer to tal::c steps as contemplated under sub-rule (I) of Rule 3 would b& unreasonable.\n\nWe are .not impressed by either of the submi5sions. The grievances articulated under the first submission do not at all indicate that compliance of one or more.of steps indicated in Rule 3(1) is either incapable or impossible even from a practical or co!)'lmercial point of view. Moreover, the provision contained in sub-rule (Z)(a) of Rule 3 is applicable in all cases where gold is accepted bought or otherwise received by the dealer irrespecti'\\'e of whether the customer is personally known to the dealer' or not known to him. The purpose served by sub-rule (2)(a) of rule 3 is entirely different from the purpose served by one or more of the steps that nre required to be taken by a dealer under sub-rule (!}of Rule 3 and therefore, it cannot be said that because\n\nof~!\" provision contained in sub-rule (2)(a) the .steps contemplated under.sub-rule(!) are unreasonable. The validity of the amended sec. 100 read with Rule 3(.1) must therefore be upheld. We were informed that a similar contei!ion challenging the said provision (amended sec. !00 ead with sub-rule (I) of Rule 3) was raised before the Patna High Court in .the case of Bihar Stat< Bullion\n\nMerchants' Assn. & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.l1J and the same was rejected. We approve of that decision .\n\nLastly the petitioners as- Jicensed dealers seem to have some JI grievance against the amended prescribed Forms Nos. G.S. [ l and\n\n(l) A.J.R. 1971 Patna 240\n\n'!>=\n\n._r ..\n\nM.C. P.<UL v. U;!ION (Tulzapurkar, J.) 479\n\nG.S. 12 required to be maintained under s. 55 of the Act read with Rule 11 of the Gold Control (Forms, Fee, .and Miscellaneous Matters) Rules, 1968,-Forms which have been brought into force with effect from 31st October, 1975.\n\nUnder s. 55 of the Act every licensed dealer is required to keep, in such form and in such manner as may be prescribed, a true and complete account of the gold owned, possessed, held, controlled, bought or otherwise acquired or accepted or otherwise received or sold, delivered, transferred or otherwise disposed of by him in his capacity as such licensed dealer and Rule 11 provides that the account of gold shall be kept in Forms G.S. IL and G.S. 12. It appears that prior to the amendment of the Rules on 31st October, 1975 the licensed dealer was required to keep the account of gold in prescribed Forms No>. G.S. 10, G.S. 11 and G.S. 12 but after the amendment Form No. G.S. JO was completely deleted while new amended Form G.S. 11 and G.S. 12 were prescribed and according to the pet!tioners the deletion of old Eorm No. G.S. IO and insertion of the new Forms G.S. 11 and G.S. 12 has resulted in the licenSfd dealer being prevented from maintaining a true and correct account of the gold owned, possessed, held, controlled, etc. by him. The precise grievance is that the new prescribed Forms G.S. 11 and G.S .. 12 do net provide for all situations under which gold would be received bY. him in his possession or custody and keeping the account of their gold in accordance with the said Forms would give rise to anomalies and the dealer would not be able to dischage his salutary duty of disclosing a true and complete account of the gold in his possession or custody. For instance, it was pointed out that old Form G.S. IO contained a comprehensive column No. 2 which required the dealer to indicate \"name and address of the person from whom (gold was) received or to woom (gold was) sold\", which Po.rm under the amended Rules has been dekted, while the new amended Form No. G.S. 11 requires the licensed dealer to indicate in column No. 3 only two categories of persons from whom gold is .received, namely, (a) Seller's name and full address or (b) Dealer's name and Licence No. and that there is no provision in the Form to account for the receipts of gold by the licened dealer from artisans or certified golil-smiths; further.\n\nForm No. G.S. II does riot provide for accoi..uting the receipts of samples and old ornaments intended to be converted into new ornaments from the customers. Counsel further pointed out that in the amended Form No. G.S. 11 column 11 requii; es a dealer to record the weight in terms of pure gold which requirement cannot be satisfied by any dealer unless and until the gold ornaments received from the customers are broken and refined. It was further pointed out\n\n:'B\n\n480 SUPREME COURT REPORl'S\n\n(1984] 3 S.C.R.\n\nthat in the old Form No.G.S.11 colunm No. 12 was provided to record the loss of weight ('ghat') which would necessarily follo-.y an account of re-mo king, melting, refining and polishing of new ornaments from old ornaments received by the dealer from bis customers but in the amended new Form G.S.11 there is no such column where this 'ghat' (loss of weight) could be recorded.\n\nSimilarly other deficiencies in the amended Form G.S.12 were pointed out by counsel for the petitioners. 'In brief the contention has been that the old Forms were better but the .new Forms lack in providing adequate or proper columns with the result that by filing these a trne and complete account of gold owned or possessed or held or controlled, etc. by the dealer could not be reflected. We find some substance in the aforesaid grievance made .bY the petitioners and when these aspect of the amended Forms were put to the counsel for the Respondents, he fairly conceded that either the new Forms will have to be suitably revised or the old Forms could again be revived. We, therefore, direct the Administrator to look into these grievances and remedy the same by taking appropriate action and hope that in the mean while no action penal or otherwJse would be taken against licensed dealers for failure to maintain accounts in the amended Forms GS.11 and G.S.12\n\nSome of the petitioners have challenged Government of India's Letter of Instructions issued to all the Collectors of Central Excise through out the country directing t)lem to withdraw the facility till then afforded to the licensed dealers to send ornaments for sale through travelling salesman and the Trade Notice issued by the Collectors of Central Excise pursuant thereto actually withdrawing the s.aid facility with immediate effect (specimen Letter of Instructions dt. 1 Sth February, 1972 and Trade Notice dt. 17th March 1972 are enclosed as Annexures A & B to Writ Petition No. 88/1973) on the ground that it has the effect of preventing the licensed dealers from undertaking inter-State trade and commerce which is in violation of the constitutional guaranteed under Art. 301 of the Constitution as also their fundamental rights under Arts. 14 and IO(l)(g) of the Constitution. It appears that the said Letter of Instrnctions and the Trade Notice have been issued with a view to prevent the ... sev\\iral ma! practice that were being indulged in while availing of the said facility (of llawking ornaments through travelling salesman) aifd in the counter-affidavit of Shri Kulwant Ram Mehta, . Dep.l!\\y Secretary, M, inisfry of Finance (filed in W.P. No. 88 of 1983) t!l, tse Dial-practices have been enfated. Bt apart from this aspect ofi)le\n\n.>, I\n\n• ....\n\n. '-' > f\\\n\n~ .\n\n• ..\n\n, .\n\nM.C. PAUL v. UNION (Tulzapurkar, J.) 4sr\n\nmatter it has been clarified in the said eounter-affidavit that there is no intention to prohibit or siop illter-State trade or co.mmerce in gold ornaments but that merely the facility of permitting the licensed dealers to send ornaments for sale outside their licensed premises through thir saiesman has been withdrawn_; in paragraph 12 _the relevant averment in that behalf runs thus :\n\n, \"I reiterate that the dcalrs can send. ornaments, on such o; ders' haing been placed with them,· through post parcels, air.freight or through miy other means of commercial trapspoi4tation of goods, besides deliveri!\\g the ;. ornaments to . the cuStomers in their own premises. i'emphaiical!y say that. no (iirection or notice is issued which may resu!t'i:l. any stoppage of interState trade.\"\n\nJn view of this statement the contention'that the Letter of -Instructions or the Trade Notice has. the effect of preventing or stopping inter-State trade has no substance. Realising this postilion and in view of the aforesaid. statement contained in paragraph 12 of the aforesaid counter-affidavit counsel for the petitioners did not press the challange to.the impugned Letter of instructions and the trade Notice. The cb.allenge to s._27(7) (b) of the Act; in furtherance whereof the f; cility of effecting peripatetic sales of gold ornaments through travelling salesman in various parts of the country was with dra'j\\'n, must-also faH. Section 27(7) (b}, wbich confines a licensed .. dealer to carry on business as .such dealer to the premises specified\n\n in his licence, being regulatory in character does not violate any of his rights under the Constitution. ·\n\n' . • In view of the foregoing discussion all the writ l)etitions. as also S.I;.P. No. 538 of 1973 are dismissed. In ati the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs.\n\nS.R. • Petitions dismissed • • •", "total_entities": 136, "entities": [{"text": "MANICK CHAND PAUL & OTHERS ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7, "end_char": 37, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "MANICK CHAND PAUL & OTHERS ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 42, "end_char": 67, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "D.P. MADON, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 135, "end_char": 150, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.P. MADON", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Gold Control Act 1968", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 153, "end_char": 174, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sections 16(7), 52, 79", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 176, "end_char": 198, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Gold Control Act 1968", "statute": "Gold Control Act 1968"}}, {"text": "Harak Chand Rotan ChanJ Bamhia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 770, "end_char": 800, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Harak Chand Rotan ChanJ Bamhia's c.u [1~70] I SCR 479, where tao Gold (Control) Act, 1969 and some of its provision; prioi to the amendment by Act 26 of 1969 were challenged, the Supreme Court poiilted out that even tho, P&h.'"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 949, "end_char": 962, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Harak Chand Rotan ChanJ Bamhia's c.u [1~70] I SCR 479, where tao Gold (Control) Act, 1969 and some of its provision; prioi to the amendment by Act 26 of 1969 were challenged, the Supreme Court poiilted out that even tho, P&h.'"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1017, "end_char": 1022, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "import of Gold into India had been banned, considerable quantities Of contrab&, nd glod were findinii."}}, {"text": "ss. 5(2)(b), 27(2)(d), 27(6), 32, 46", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1939, "end_char": 1975, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 14, 19(r)(g), 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2413, "end_char": 2438, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 16(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2831, "end_char": 2844, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 16(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4850, "end_char": 4863, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 16(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5936, "end_char": 5949, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6465, "end_char": 6475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6673, "end_char": 6683, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6928, "end_char": 6933, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.27(6)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6943, "end_char": 6950, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6966, "end_char": 6984, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "it is true that section 52 os not contairi any guide-line~ or pinciples which would regulte the exercise of the ppwer of the Administrator in the matter of gi-ant or refusal or approval to change in lhe Partnership of a firm but in the exercise of the powers confrred by s.114 readwith s.27(6) of the Act the Central Government has framed the 'Gold Control (Licensing of Dealers) Rules 1969'_ and Rule 2 enlists matters to Which regard."}}, {"text": "section 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8916, "end_char": 8926, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9095, "end_char": 9101, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9226, "end_char": 9230, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9283, "end_char": 9287, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 79", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9351, "end_char": 9361, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.79", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9950, "end_char": 9954, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10172, "end_char": 10176, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.71", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10193, "end_char": 10197, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.78", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10215, "end_char": 10219, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.79", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10250, "end_char": 10254, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.79", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11301, "end_char": 11305, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section JOO of ihe Gold Control Act read with Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13025, "end_char": 13075, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13296, "end_char": 13307, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Section JOO of ihe Gold Control Act read with Rule", "statute": "Section JOO of ihe Gold Control Act read with Rule"}}, {"text": "Banthia", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13724, "end_char": 13731, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "boug.h; t liut h did not specify the ntuII cf steps which a dealer as supposed to t-ak.o ..\n\nM.C. PAUL v. UNION 4~5\nfor such -satisfaction and therefor~ this Court i~ .1/arakchtind: Ratanchand\n\n...Banthia's case took the view that the obliiatioa, cast thereunder' was uncertain -2nd incapable of proper_ co:npliance and therefore the section was uncqnstitu~\n\ntional on the ground that it imposed an imposSible and unreasonable burden."}}, {"text": "S.11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15652, "end_char": 15656, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15702, "end_char": 15711, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16600, "end_char": 16605, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16613, "end_char": 16618, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17290, "end_char": 17300, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17308, "end_char": 17329, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "A.K. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17505, "end_char": 17513, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1221 of 1972)\n\n• A.K. Sen and G.S. Chatterjee for the ~Petitioners in WP."}}, {"text": "G.S. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17518, "end_char": 17533, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1221 of 1972)\n\n• A.K. Sen and G.S. Chatterjee for the ~Petitioners in WP.", "canonical_name": "G.S.\n\nChatterjee"}}, {"text": ". Gobindas", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17585, "end_char": 17595, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "."}}, {"text": "G.S.\n\nChatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17597, "end_char": 17613, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gobindas, G.S.\n\nChatterjee and D.P. Mukherjee for the Petitioners iri W.Ps.", "canonical_name": "G.S.\n\nChatterjee"}}, {"text": "D.P. Mukherjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17618, "end_char": 17632, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gobindas, G.S.\n\nChatterjee and D.P. Mukherjee for the Petitioners iri W.Ps."}}, {"text": "Y.S. Chitale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17695, "end_char": 17707, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Y.S. Chitale; Mrs. A.K. Verma, R.N. Banerjee and D.'N •.\n\nJfishra' for the Petitioners in WP."}}, {"text": "A.K. Verma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17714, "end_char": 17724, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Y.S. Chitale; Mrs. A.K. Verma, R.N. Banerjee and D.'N •.\n\nJfishra' for the Petitioners in WP."}}, {"text": "R.N. Banerjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17726, "end_char": 17739, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Y.S. Chitale; Mrs. A.K. Verma, R.N. Banerjee and D.'N •.\n\nJfishra' for the Petitioners in WP."}}, {"text": "D.'N •.\n\nJfishra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17744, "end_char": 17760, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Y.S. Chitale; Mrs. A.K. Verma, R.N. Banerjee and D.'N •.\n\nJfishra' for the Petitioners in WP."}}, {"text": "D.N. Mishra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17830, "end_char": 17841, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "•. D.N. Mishra for the Petitio~rs in WPs."}}, {"text": "A. Subhashini", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 17920, "end_char": 17933, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".. Ms. A. Subhashini for th(Respondents in WPs."}}, {"text": "D. Goburdhan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 18024, "end_char": 18036, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SLP 1159-86 of 1977 ..\n\nI ;\n\n88/73 Abdul Khadder, D. Goburdhan 1 for the Respon.dnts in WP.. >- . '"}}, {"text": "ss. 2(p), 16, 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18367, "end_char": 18383, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Arts. 14 and 19(l)(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18702, "end_char": 18723, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18938, "end_char": 18957, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "538of1973) are challening the Government of India's Letter of Instructions and the Trade Notices withdrawing the facility of permitting licensed dealers to , end ornaments for sale through their travelling salesmen as being\n\n' violative of the constitutional guarantee under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19183, "end_char": 19191, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Arts. 14 and 19(1)(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19231, "end_char": 19252, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Harakchand Ratanchand Banthia'sl'l", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19523, "end_char": 19557, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At the outset we would like to observe that the several grou\\lds of challenge will have to be considered in the background of two things: (a) the object with which the Act was nacted and (b) this Court's decision and the observations made by it in Harakchand Ratanchand Banthia'sl'l case where the Gold (Control) Act and some of its provisions prior to its amendment by Act 26 of 1969 were challenged."}}, {"text": "Harakchand Banthi~", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20041, "end_char": 20059, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Harakchand Banthi~'s case\n\nthis Court bas further pointed out that even though import.", "canonical_name": "Harakchand .' Banthia"}}, {"text": "Harakchand .' Banthia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20932, "end_char": 20953, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We might also mention that in Harakchand .'", "canonical_name": "Harakchand .' Banthia"}}, {"text": "Arts. 14 and 19(1.~\")", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21283, "end_char": 21304, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "ss. 5(2)(b), 27(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21464, "end_char": 21482, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 16(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22179, "end_char": 22187, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23122, "end_char": 23129, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 19(1 )(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23217, "end_char": 23231, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 56", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23310, "end_char": 23315, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 16(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23765, "end_char": 23773, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 16(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24896, "end_char": 24904, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25363, "end_char": 25370, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "K.S. Venkataramani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25451, "end_char": 25469, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "14, sufficient material has been placed before us in the counter affidavit of Shri K.S. Venkataramani, Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Finance (filed in W.P. Nos."}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25657, "end_char": 25662, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 16(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27175, "end_char": 27183, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 16(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29053, "end_char": 29061, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.16(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29816, "end_char": 29823, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29869, "end_char": 29876, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31429, "end_char": 31436, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec.114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31697, "end_char": 31704, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31715, "end_char": 31722, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Inview of tlw Licensing Rules, 1969", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33252, "end_char": 33287, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "26th Augus~. 1683", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 33795, "end_char": 33812, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "produced before us copy of a (Notification dated 26th Augus~. 1683 ' issued by the Administrator under sec.4(4) of the Act whereunder the exercise of the power under sec .52 has been, delegated to the G • Deputy Collector of Ceqtral Excise with the result that an appeal'\n\nagainst his order under sec.52 w!ll lie to the Collector of Central Excise under sec."}}, {"text": "sec.4(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33849, "end_char": 33857, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Inview of tlw Licensing Rules, 1969", "statute": "Inview of tlw Licensing Rules, 1969"}}, {"text": "sec.52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34043, "end_char": 34049, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Inview of tlw Licensing Rules, 1969", "statute": "Inview of tlw Licensing Rules, 1969"}}, {"text": "s. 52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34326, "end_char": 34331, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.79", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34617, "end_char": 34621, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 79", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34664, "end_char": 34674, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 110(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36186, "end_char": 36197, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Customs Act, 1962", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36205, "end_char": 36222, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 36498, "end_char": 36509, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s.79", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36691, "end_char": 36695, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Customs Act, 1962", "statute": "the Customs Act, 1962"}}, {"text": "Arts. 14 and 19(\\)(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36824, "end_char": 36845, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Customs Act, 1962", "statute": "the Customs Act, 1962"}}, {"text": "s. 79", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36886, "end_char": 36891, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Customs Act, 1962", "statute": "the Customs Act, 1962"}}, {"text": "sec. 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37105, "end_char": 37112, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Customs Act, 1962", "statute": "the Customs Act, 1962"}}, {"text": "sec. 71", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37128, "end_char": 37135, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Customs Act, 1962", "statute": "the Customs Act, 1962"}}, {"text": "sec. 78", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37193, "end_char": 37200, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Customs Act, 1962", "statute": "the Customs Act, 1962"}}, {"text": "sec. 79", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37229, "end_char": 37236, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 79", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38104, "end_char": 38109, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 79", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38232, "end_char": 38237, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 110(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40491, "end_char": 40502, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Customs Act, 1962", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 40518, "end_char": 40535, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "sec. 81(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40968, "end_char": 40978, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Customs Act, 1962", "statute": "the Customs Act, 1962"}}, {"text": "s. 79", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41498, "end_char": 41503, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Customs Act, 1962", "statute": "the Customs Act, 1962"}}, {"text": "Art. 19(l)(g), 301 and 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42048, "end_char": 42074, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Section 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42096, "end_char": 42107, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1971] 3 SCR 802", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 42451, "end_char": 42467, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sec. 114", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42829, "end_char": 42837, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 100(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42848, "end_char": 42859, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Tu!zapurkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 44310, "end_char": 44321, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".... '\n\nM.c, PAUL v. UNION (Tu!zapurkar, J.).", "canonical_name": "Tu!zapurkar"}}, {"text": "sec. 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45252, "end_char": 45260, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Harakchand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 45597, "end_char": 45607, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "as it originally stood prior to its amendment in 1969 imposed a statutory obligation upon a dealer to take all reasonable steps to satisfy himself about the identity of the person from whom gold was bought but it did not specify the nature of steps which a dealer was supposed to take for such satisfaction and therefore this Court in Harakchand ...\n\nRatanchand Banthia's cas.e took the view that the obligation cast\n\n:~, thereunder was uncertain and incapible of proper c0 n.'J?liance and therefore the section was unconstitutional on the ground that it imposed an impossible and unreasonable b urdrn.", "canonical_name": "Harakchand .' Banthia"}}, {"text": "Ratanchand Banthia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 45613, "end_char": 45631, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "as it originally stood prior to its amendment in 1969 imposed a statutory obligation upon a dealer to take all reasonable steps to satisfy himself about the identity of the person from whom gold was bought but it did not specify the nature of steps which a dealer was supposed to take for such satisfaction and therefore this Court in Harakchand ...\n\nRatanchand Banthia's cas.e took the view that the obligation cast\n\n:~, thereunder was uncertain and incapible of proper c0 n.'J?liance and therefore the section was unconstitutional on the ground that it imposed an impossible and unreasonable b urdrn."}}, {"text": "s. 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46299, "end_char": 46305, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 100", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48542, "end_char": 48550, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Patna High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 48745, "end_char": 48761, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "00 ead with sub-rule (I) of Rule 3) was raised before the Patna High Court in .the case of Bihar Stat< Bullion\n\nMerchants' Assn. &"}}, {"text": "Tulzapurkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 49103, "end_char": 49114, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ">=\n\n._r ..\n\nM.C. P.<UL v. U;!ION (Tulzapurkar, J.) 479\n\nG.S. 12 required to be maintained under s. 55 of the Act read with Rule 11 of the Gold Control (Forms, Fee, .and Miscellaneous Matters) Rules, 1968,-Forms which have been brought into force with effect from 31st October, 1975.", "canonical_name": "Tu!zapurkar"}}, {"text": "S. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49127, "end_char": 49132, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49165, "end_char": 49170, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "31st October, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 49332, "end_char": 49350, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ">=\n\n._r ..\n\nM.C. P.<UL v. U;!ION (Tulzapurkar, J.) 479\n\nG.S. 12 required to be maintained under s. 55 of the Act read with Rule 11 of the Gold Control (Forms, Fee, .and Miscellaneous Matters) Rules, 1968,-Forms which have been brought into force with effect from 31st October, 1975."}}, {"text": "s. 55", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49359, "end_char": 49364, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49799, "end_char": 49804, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49968, "end_char": 49973, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49977, "end_char": 49982, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49989, "end_char": 49994, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50084, "end_char": 50089, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50096, "end_char": 50101, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50221, "end_char": 50226, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50233, "end_char": 50238, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 50453, "end_char": 50458, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51136, "end_char": 51141, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51708, "end_char": 51713, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S.11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52031, "end_char": 52035, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S.11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52300, "end_char": 52304, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S.12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 52435, "end_char": 52439, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S.12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53344, "end_char": 53348, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 53390, "end_char": 53409, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We, therefore, direct the Administrator to look into these grievances and remedy the same by taking appropriate action and hope that in the mean while no action penal or otherwJse would be taken against licensed dealers for failure to maintain accounts in the amended Forms GS.11 and G.S.12\n\nSome of the petitioners have challenged Government of India's Letter of Instructions issued to all the Collectors of Central Excise through out the country directing t)lem to withdraw the facility till then afforded to the licensed dealers to send ornaments for sale through travelling salesman and the Trade Notice issued by the Collectors of Central Excise pursuant thereto actually withdrawing the s.aid facility with immediate effect (specimen Letter of Instructions dt."}}, {"text": "Art. 301", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54126, "end_char": 54134, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Arts. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54194, "end_char": 54202, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Kulwant Ram Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 54530, "end_char": 54547, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "practice that were being indulged in while availing of the said facility (of llawking ornaments through travelling salesman) aifd in the counter-affidavit of Shri Kulwant Ram Mehta, ."}}, {"text": "Section 27(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56209, "end_char": 56222, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_3_482_483_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "' •\n\nA 482\n\nAjlDUL REHMAN ANTULAY\n\nUNION OF INDIA AND ORS. ETC.\n\n[AMARENDRA NATH SEN AND D.A. DESAI, JJ.] .\n\nApril 17, 1984\n\n~ .· # . constitution of India Ari. 1'41--i>uty of all courts to follow dcision of the Supreme Court;\n\nSpreme Court Ruf es-Whether Supreme Court cafl. entertain writ petition aiafnst its own .ofder anti i; tdgmfnt. ·\n\nORJGIN, l.L\n\n& CRIMINAL APPELLATE . JURISDICTION : Writ Petition (Cr!) No. 708 of !934. ·\n\n'(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India)\n\nAnd\n\nSpeial Leave Petitiob (Cr!) Nos. 1949·50 of 1984\n\n(From the Judgment and Order dated 13.3.84 and 16,3.84 of the Bombay High Court in Speciat'Case Nos. 24/82 & 3/83)\n\nMtirli Bhandare; Govindtfas, Ms-. Bina Gupta, H.R: Bhardwaj and PP. Singh for the petitioner. ' R.am Jethma/ani, Ashok Desai and Ms. Rani Jethmalani for • the _respondents.\n\nThe Order, 'of the Court was delivered by\n\nAMARE'WRA NATH SEN, J. There is' no merit in this Writ Petition. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. ,\n\nIn inY view, the writ petition challenging the validity of the order and judgment passed by this Court as nullity or otherwise incorrect cannot be entertained. \"t wish to make it cleat that the dismissal of this writ petition will not prejudice the right of the petitioner, to approach the Court with an appropriate review petition or to file any other application which be may be entitle<! in law to file.\n\n. .\n\n,.. .\n\n.,., .A..\n\n. ,.,_\n\n' ')r ' \"\n\n. {\n\nA.R. ANT1JLAY v. UNION (Desai, J.) 483\n\nDESAI, J. I broadly agree with the. conclusion recorded by A my br9ther.\n\nThe learned Judge in deciding the S.L.P (Crl) Nos. 1149-50/ 1984 has followed the decision of this Court: The learned Judge was perfectly justified and indeed it was the duty of th.e learned Judge to follow the decision of this Court which is binding on B him.·\n\nSpecial 'leave petitions are dismissed.\n\nH.S.K.\n\nPetitions dismissed. • c", "total_entities": 10, "entities": [{"text": "482\n\nAjlDUL REHMAN ANTULAY\n\nUNION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7, "end_char": 40, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "ABDUL REHMAN ANTULAY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "AMARENDRA NATH SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 66, "end_char": 84, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "AMARENDRA NATH SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "D.A. DESAI, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 89, "end_char": 104, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.A. DESAI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 442, "end_char": 452, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 460, "end_char": 481, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bina Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 689, "end_char": 699, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bina Gupta, H.R: Bhardwaj and PP."}}, {"text": "PP. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 719, "end_char": 728, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bina Gupta, H.R: Bhardwaj and PP."}}, {"text": "R.am Jethma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 751, "end_char": 762, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.am Jethma/ani, Ashok Desai and Ms. Rani Jethmalani for • the _respondents."}}, {"text": "Ashok Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 768, "end_char": 779, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.am Jethma/ani, Ashok Desai and Ms. Rani Jethmalani for • the _respondents."}}, {"text": "Rani Jethmalani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 788, "end_char": 803, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.am Jethma/ani, Ashok Desai and Ms. Rani Jethmalani for • the _respondents."}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_3_484_501_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "• E\n\nANANT ~BE & ORS.\n\nPURUSHOTTAM RAO & ORS\n\nApril 17, 1984\n\n[D.A. :0ESAI, A.P. SEN AND v. BALAKRISHNAERA'n1, JJ.]\n\nMadhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code 1959, s. 158(1) complete extintiTon iJf ino\"l rights [and conferral of bhumiswami rights-lnam ./and~ became.· bhumiswami lands-fmpartibility and devolution by survivorship by rule 0/ lineal primo¥eniture Jost. . , ·\n\nWords and Phrases-\"in respect of land held by him\"-Mean~.$ of s 158 (IJ(b) Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code 1959. • '\n\nIn 1837 the. late Maharaja Harihar Rao Holkar 'made a grant of an inam of a garden to the •priest of the Holkar family. The grant of inam was on Putra Pautradi Vansh Paramp_ara conditionby w8.y of parvariah i.e.,. _ maintenance,·\n\nThe ihree appellants 'in the appeal were the legal heirs and successors bf the grandson of the original inamdar,'and tlie !st Respondent as the sole survivor of the eldest male line of the last holder, the inamdar and as also the.karta of the joint Hindu family.\n\nThe appellantsplanitiffs instituted a suit for partition and separate possession of their half-share in the joint family property alleging that defendant No. 1 in his capacity as the karta of the io.int Hindu family was in possession and mangement .of the joint family property, including the inam _lands. The claim wascontested by re1pondents-defendants 1 and \"2 who contenQ'ed that the plaintiffs predecessor-:in-interest had separated from the family by taking his share in the year 1917·18 and therefore the plaintiff• had no kind ofrig_ht or title in the suit property and that the inam lands and the propertis acquired 'from and out.of the in am :being irnpartible in nature. the succession-to which was_ governed by 'the rule of lineal primogeniture, the properties exclusively belonged to defendant No. 1 and \\hat the conferral ' ofbhumi$wami right on defendant No. i under S. 158 (li(b) of' the Madhya\n\nPradesh Land Revenue cOde, 19S9 .made \\the su.i t lands his separate and exdusive property and it was not part of the joint estate of the undivided family.\n\nB The Additional District Judge held that the. inam lands together with ., the property acquired from the income of the inam . were ancestral impariible\n\nestatesince the same' h•d \\\\evolved lby s\\ll'vivorshjp \\lY the rµ!e of lil'l'll\n\nANAN i' KIBE~. PURUSHOTTAM RAO\n\nP!}mpgeniture and therefore constituted if int family proper[t and.- \\hat th~ ; rule, of impartibtlity and\" the sp, ecial. mode of succession by the rule _qf _, iiO.eal primo&enit1:1fe were nohio$ but iilcidnts of .. the inam whi'* , stdd\n\netinguished by S. l58(1)(b) o(the Code. The, plaintiff's claim for partition and separate possession to the ex_tnt Of their h:alfshare in. the plaint schedule , properties and to me'.sne profit$ were. decreed.\n\nOn ppeaJ, the High Court reversed the judgment' of the Additional.\n\nDis-trict Judge with regard to the jnam lnds aqd the houses and other prbpe_rt)' : -acquired out of the _inam holding. '!'he High Court held that the plaintiffs\n\nwliO\\Ver~ the jUnior embers of the fa_mily had no kind -of riiht or tiU~. to the inamlands except the right -to mainfenance and thtit defendant No. 1, tbt'inamdar for the.time beins, became the bhumiswami_ of. the suit lands und.er S.158(-l)(b) of the Code' whJch constituted his separate property, The HigJl Q>urt ho.wever main_tained \\he decree of the Addftional District Judge with regard to partition and sepaation of t1le plaintiffs' hare or imm'?vable property.\n\nAllowing the appeal,\n\nHELD: I. S.158 (1)\\b) of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code,: )959.effected a complete extinction of the inam rights followed by simul~ taD.eous conferral of bhumiswami rights. Every person, in .respect of di~ l<itid held bY him in the Madhya Biiarat regiOn, as an inamdar, at the time. • of-the' coming into force of the Code,_ became a bhumi.swami thereof, and'\"\n\na~Qriire'd all the rights and became subject to. all ihe liabilities of a. bhumisivami under the Code. [493B) ,. -· .\n\n'. ', °'2. The word; \"in respect of land held by him\" appeiuig inS. (158)(1)\n\n(b) refer to the status and character of the tenure holder i'n relation to the JwJdipeon the appointed day. 'fhe accrual of the status of bhumiswami b}' such: person was automatic and 'he acquired an the rights and became subject to an the liabilities cop.ferred_or imposed upon a .. bhtlmiswami by or ll, llder. the Code. [493C) i.< - . <\n\nl_: _, ,), .Oil a combined\" reading of SS. 158(1) (b} and 164 the legal consequence that ensued was that the incident of the impartibility and the special mode of s.uccession by the rule of tlimogeniture which wefe terms of the grant of\n\nam l~!Jds under t!w Jagir. Mami.~I of the .Holkar State stood. extinguished.\n\nAfter the conferment of.bhumiswami rights, the• incidents and character of the tenure beame transformed the restrtctions placed thereon disappeared~ a_qd '!l.~ la!J.ds became capabl_e of being held in joint ownership like any other coparcenary property. [493E]\" ·\n\n 4. The\"\"conferral of bhumiswami rights on the holder for the time being under S. 158(l)(b) of the Code in respect of ancestral inarri lands neeessarily enures to the benefit of all the members of the joint family.· [493FJ . . .\n\n5. Impartibilfty is essentiaily a creature of custom. Here it is a\n\nter~ of the grant. The Junior members of a family in the case of an ancient\n\n486 SUPREMB COURT RBPORTs . t 1984 j 3 s.c.!l.\n\nA impartiblej'oint family estate take no :rlghf in th'e property by birth and.·\n\n...\n\nc ..\n\ntherefore have no right of prdtioll ha:ving: fegard to the very nature of the ·. estate th.I! it is imartible, The onIY incidence for join\\ property which still ·, attaches .\\9 tI?.e joint family property .is the right of survivorship which, of course, is not inconsistent with the-custom ofimpartibilit)'. [4950] ·\n\nIn the instan't Case, the incident of impartibility attached to inam lands no longer exists by reason \"of S. 158(1)(b) of the Code as they have now become bhumiswmi lands. The right of juriior me_mbers of the family for maintenance.is governed by custom nd (not based_ upon ally joint lright or interest in the property al co-owners. [495EJ ,• . 6. To establish that a family governed by the Mitakshara in whi!b there i& an irri.partible state. has ceased to \"b~ joint, it is necessary to p_rove an intention, express or implied, on the part ot the junior members o.f the family to renounce their succes!ion to the estate. [49SH] ·\n\n7, The impartibi!ity of the tenure governed by tl)e Jagir Manual of the Holkar State and the rule of lineal iPrimogeniture governed by the 'llagir Manual, Chapter 11, rules-2 and 3 did not 'per. se destroy its nat.ure aS\n\njoint family property Eor render' it the separate property of the last holder sg.as t~ destroy_ the right o~ survivorshiP ; the estate its charaCter of joint farp.ily property and its devolution was governe\\l by the d :!Vol ution \\\\as governed by the ruk: of sutvivorship as modifie_d by the rule of lineal priinoge; niture.\n\n. . [49501 .\n\n. .\n\nShiba Pra•al/ Singh v •. Rani Prayag Kum>ri Debi & Ors., LR (1931-32) S91A 331 and Nagesh Bi'1o Desai v. Khando Tirmal Desai, (1982) 3 SCR 341,\n\nreferred 10;\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JUR!SD]CTICiN : Civil Appeal No. 4~7. of 1971.\n\nAppeal by certificate from the Judgment and Decree dated 2.5.1969 ofthe High Court of Madhya .Pradesh, (Indore Bench) in Civil First Appeal No. 91 of 1962.\n\n• • •\n\nV.A.\n\n~ appellants.\n\nBobde, S.D. Mudaliar and A.G. Ratnaparkhi for .. the\n\nG.L. Saghi, D.N. Misra and S. Sukumaran for the respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was deliverd by . . . . SEN, J. This appeal on certificate is directed against a judg ment anll decree of the Madhya Pradesh High Court dated May 2, 1969 substantially reversing the judgment and decree passed by\n\n- .. the.third\"Additiomil District Judge, Indore dated June 18/19, 1962\n\n.;,.. •\n\n-<. , , .\n\n.. 'r t I\\\n\nANANT KIBE y. PURUSaottAM RAO (Sen, J.) 481\n\nand dismissing the plaintiffs' suit for partition apd separate possessfon of their half share of the suit properties detailed in' Schedul~ •.\n\n'A' appended to the plaint except with respect.to a house and the agricultural lands at , Ujjain. Duridg the course of the hearing t.he parties have come to a settlement and the terms of the compromise have been recorded. Nevertheless, the correctness of the judgment delivered by the High Com; t is open to serious doub.t. and as it involves a question of general impJrtance, we proceed to record our views.\n\nThe facts giving rise to the appeal are as follows. The repor\\ of the Inam Commissioner discloses that in 1837 the late Maharaja Hariliar Rao Holkar made a grant of an inam of a garden known as Rambag in Kasba Indore admeasuring 15.62 acres to Abaji Balla!, the priest of the Holkar family on his representation that he was in. service of the Huzur Dar bar for .a long period but had no garpen . at Kasba tndore and was therefore finding it difficult iu getting tulsi leaves and flowers for.malfing offerings to the deities. The grant of. inam to him was on P1ftru Pautradi Van sh Parampara condition by way of parvarish. It appears from the report that Abaji Ballai h11d\n\nonly one son name,9 Laxman and he also had only one son named . Raghunath Rao. After the d.eath of Abaji Bailal be was succeeded by Laxman. It appears that Laxman represented in the year 1886 that he was entitled to hold as inam an area of 15.62 acres in Kasba Indore while the land in his possession was only 5;91 acres, the remaining aren having been acquired by the Durbar and prayed for a grant of an area of 9. 72 acres in exchange. An inquiry was there\n\nupon held and the claim was found to be true. By Durbar Order .\n\nNo. 9 dated December 14; 1888 the inamdar was given 9.'72 acres of land in Mauja PalashiN Hana. It also appears that the family built residential houses 'lt Indore presumably out of the income of the inITT!l and also acquired immovable properties at ujjain\n\nconsisting of a house and some agricultural lands. After the death of Laxman Rao, his son Raghunath Rao was recognized to be the inamdar.\n\n\" The common ancestor Raghunath Rao had three sons, Madhav Rao, Sadasbiv Rao and . Gopal Rao. Of these, Madhav Rao and Sadashiv Rao had pre-decased their father , Raghunath\n\nRao. Madhav Rao .died without leaving an heir while Sadashiv\n\nc '\n\n• •\n\n488. .\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984) 3 s.c.IL\n\nRao left a son Purushottam l,'lao. the third son Gopal\" Rao -dis appeared about an yea.r before the death. of his father Raghunath - R; i1> and his whereabouts were not known till the news of his death ill 1932 ai the.Secunderabad was received, after the death of.\n\nRaghnath .. Rao in 1928.\n\nOn the death of Raghunath Rao-, th.e last Purushottam Rao being the sole siirvivor of the eldest male' line of holder became the inamdar and also the karta of lhe\n\njoit IDndu fani'i!y; ·\n\nThe suit out of which this appeal arises was instituted by . c;:,, . . the three appellants , Anant, Gov ind and their mother Smt. Laxmi\n\n Baj being te legal heirs and successos of Gopal Rao, as plain . tiffs on DeC'ember J2, 1955 for partition and separate possession of their half share in the joint family property described In'' Schedule 'A' appended to th-e plaint against respondents 1 and 2 '\n\nPurushoitam 'Rao and his mother Smt. Rama Bai beiQg defen_dants '\n\nI) ; '1 and 2, impleading Krishna. Ra'c>, h.e eldest soa of Go pal Rao ·\n\nas defendant 3 bca11se he failed to JOJO them .a~ a plaintiff in the suit. The case of the plai_ntiffs was tl\\at defendant No. (.' ..\n\nci.:\n\nu.:\n\n. ~Purushottam Rao in his capacity as tlie karta of tlje joint Hindu\n\nfamily was in possession and management of the joint .family property, including the iuam lands at Kasha, lndore and Mauja .\n\nPafashiya Hana. The plaintiffs' claim was coutested by defendants , l '.and 2 Purushottam Rao aud Smt. llama Bai. They pleaded inter afia thqt the plaintiffs' predecessor-in-interest Gopai Rao had separated from the family by taking his share in the Y, ear 1917,13 . and ·.therefore the plaintiffs had no kind of right or title in tlie suit properties that the inaIIi lands and the P'roperties acquired. from out of. the inam being impartible in nature, the succession to which was governed by the rule of Jib.ea! primogeniture, the properties exclusively belongedto defen -\n\ndant No. 1 Pnrushottam Rao ; and that the conferfJll or' bhumiswami rights on respondent l under s. 158(1)(b) or' the.\n\nMadhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959 mad_e the suit lands his. separate and exclus\\ve property and it was not part of the joint estate of the ulldivided family. Iucidehtally, the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue code, 1959 was brought into force w.e.f,. October, 1, 1959 which had the effect o( ehanging the nature of the\n\n. The point in controversy in this appeal is now -limited to the\n\n. ('-. •\n\n. '\n\nANANT KIBE .v. PURUSHOTTAM (Sen, .1/1 4~9\n\nin.m lands and Jh~ !rouses and other 'prbperties built from O\\!t of the income of the inam lands at K_asba Indore and Mauja .\n\nPalashiya Hana.\n\nThe Jearn.ed \"Additional. District Judge held that the inam lands together with the properties acquired from th, e iQcome qf the inam were ancestral impartible estate since tJie same had devolved. by survivorship by the rule of lineal ' pt; imogeniture and therefore constituted joint family J'rop_er~ and\n\ntb, at t_he rule of impartibility and •the special mode of succession\n\nb:.J the rule of lineal primogenit!1re were nothing bl\\! incidents_ of\n\nth~· lnam which stood etinguished by . s. 158(l)(b) oC the Code b~ virtu~ of which the foanifands bec!!ime bhumiswami, the successl'6n to which )Vas governed by the personal 'law of the partibs. The.learned Additional District Judge accordingly held that the inam lands at Kasba Indore and Mauja Palashiya Hana constituted joint family property of' the pariies and decreed the plaintiffs'. claim for partition and separate possession to the extnt •\n\nof their half share in the properties described in Schedule 'A' to . the plaint at!d to mesne profits thereof. On appeal, the . High\n\nCourt reversed the judgment of the learned•:Additlonal District Judge with regard to the _inam -lands and the -houses and othr property. acquired at Indore out of the jncome. of the inam holding that they constituted a special .irant regulated by the ,\n\nJagir Manual o.f the Holkar State, According to the High Court, the pfaintiffs who were the junior. members of 'the family had no kind of right .or title to the inam lands except perhaps. the right,. of n)lintenance and that too up to a certain degree and subject to its determination by the State. Accordingly ' the High Court held that defendant N_o. I Purushottam Rao, the inamdar for the time being, became the bhumiswami of the suit Jancjs under s. 15\\(1) (b) of the Code which constituted his separate property. The High Cour~ however maintai.ned tbe decree 'of the learned Additional District Judge with regard to partition nnd sparation of the plairrtiffs' share of immovable . properties at Ujjain.\n\nThe short and narrow question involved in this appeal is whether the inam iands which became bhun'iiswami lands under \"i1'5.8(l){b) of ihe Code were the self-acquired property of the inamdar and defencjant No. 1 Purushottam Rao was entitled to remain in full and exclusive possession and enjoyment thereof, or the conferral of bhumiswami rights in respect of such. inam .\n\nF< •\n\n. .\n\n496 \\ sliPRBME t:OUtlT REPORTS [19841 3 s.c.tt;\n\nlands on him .must enure to the, benefit of the.members of the joint Hindu family and therefore the bhumiswami lands were liable to be partitioned -like any other coparcenary property,\n\nIt is common ground that the inam lands were .. impartibl~. the s11ccession, to which was governed by the rule of lineal primo• genitul'e. That must be so because the Jagir Manual of the . ' . olkar State by r. 134 ptovides , that the rule which refers to . . jagirs will apply 'to inams also except to the' extent modified by\n\n any Darbar Order. or cir&ular. Chapter II, r. 2 provides: ..\n\n\"Z. A Jagir grant shall be indivisible and impartible , property;''\n\n' . -~ . , .\n\nR. 3 provides for the rule of lineal primogeniture and it ;;.. follows :\n\n \"3. Every Jagir grant, which is not a purely lifegrant, 'Shall desend in the. order of primogeniture h. to the\n\nCldest male line of the last holder e.g. If a grantee. has\n\ndescndants as sho9n. in the following pedigree table :\n\nI I E\n\nI I J(\n\nI I\n\n' A (Grantee)\n\nI I c I\n\n- I G H l\n\nI ..\n\nI N\n\nI r I J\n\nI I\n\nL > M.\n\nThe Jagir will after A's death descend to B. After B it will descend to E to K.\" ,\n\nProviso to r.3 preserves the right of maintenance of the ir ; unior members or the family and it reads : . ...-4 •\n\n\"Pr9vided that the right of the members of the\n\n·/\n\n ANANT KibE v. PUROSHOTTAM (Sen, /.) 491\n\njunior branches, claiming de1cent from the originat grantee A to a share in the income of the Jagir or maintenance acc\"or • ding to the custom. of the family or orders of the Government, shall not be affected thereby.\" ·\n\nAlthough the original sanad gran\\ed to Abaji Balla! in 1837 is not forthcoming, the report of the Inam Commissioner discloses that the grant of ina\"m to him was on Putra Pautradi Vanash\n\nParampra condition by way of parvarish i.e. lllaintenance. Thus the grant of the inam lands was for maintenance of the. members of the joint famHy and was also heritable.\n\nThere is ample evidence on record to show that the inam .\n\nlands-althougimpartible were always treated by members of the family as part of the joint family properties and the sucqession to the inam was by the rule of -survivorship as modified by the rule of lineal primogeniture. It is - also clear that (be junior members were in joint enjoyment of the inam lands and that was because the proviso tor. 3-expr.essly recognized their ights of maintenance.\n\nFurther, the evidence shows that the properties acquired by the inamdar for the time being from out. of the income of the in am such as the two houses at Indore a.nd other properties were always t!ealt ; vith as part of !_he joi11t family propertt. There is on record,\n\nad'applic.ation for mutation made by defendant No. I Purtio ttam Rao on December 15, 1928 (Ex:P-6) wherein he had stated that his grand-father had died on August 8, 1928 and therefore he -\n\nprayed for substitution of the names of the legal peirs in the inam register, the material portion of which reads :\n\n\"I am his son's son i.e. his grandson and as such his heir. (A) Besides me the sons. of my uncle i.e. (I) Krishna Rao (2) Anant Rao and (3) Govind Rao are also his . helrs, Besides us no other person is his heir (A).\" .. ...\n\nThe prayer was that the names of all these heirs be substituted. There is also an affidavit of Purushottam Rao dated Decem ber 7, 1928 (Ex. P-5) regrding the death of his grand-father Raghunath Rad and it rr, entions that he had three sons viz, Madhav Rao, Sadashiv Rao and Gopal Roo. It was averred that Madhav\n\n• '\n\n4ill)' -';!'1:'., ' SUPRB!lli. ~OUR T REPORTS [t984l 3 s.c.it\n\nAt., ·· Rao. .wh-0 wa~ the eldest had alrea+!y. expired leaving no issue. and • his wif:'had also died and that the .whereabouts of Gopal Rao were not known since 3! or 4 years. It was $tated that Gopal Rao had t!Tree sons viz. Krishna, Anant and Govind nd all the three of them, were minQfsl It then recites:~ \"'All th.e three minor sons of Gopal Rao' were living jointly with me.\" Purushottal!l Rao . examined as DW 24°has stated that the whereabouts of Gopal Rao were not known when his grand-father Raghu9ath Rao was opera: , t~ upon resulting in his death' in the hospital. When confronted< . - ,- ; with'portion marked 'AA.' in Ex. P-6 he unequivocally admitted tlmt lfe.could n<lt deny the statement made therein. He however, Q::. wen.t .on to assent that the expenditure incurred . by him on .the,:\n\nplaintiffs by way of maintenance was not incurred by reason of their l:>eiQg.the members of th~ joirit family but because they had , n6\"feiiources o( their' own and it was necessary to give them.\n\n'rtiainfo11ance allowance under the Inam Rules. It if quite appa-:\n\ni:en\\?r6m\n\n0the course of dealings that the ip lands at Kasbii' Ind'ote and Mauja PalaShiya Hana and other 'riiam properties lir . tlie 'hands of the common ancestor Raghtinath . Rao which devoi::'\n\nl(eif upon defendant , No.· 1. Punishottan\\ Rao were nothing but an ancestral impartible estat~. '\n\n\"\". Under the scheme of the Code there was a, drastic cMnge\n\nbi.ught about not on. in th, e nature of the tenure of inam lanq~ but:.1\\so iri the mode of succession., S.158(1 )(b} of the colte . provides:\n\nI '' •\n\n- \"158. Bhumiswami-(1} Every person who at the time of c9ming into force of this Code, belongs to any of the following classes shall be calkd a Bhumiswami and ,·$ball )lave all the. rightS and be subject to all the liabili , ties conferred or imposed upona Bhumiswami by or . , under this code, namely : . •\n\n.'' .\n\n<al •• ** . **. ill• ..\n\n., .. ,(b), every person in respect of land held by him in the .\n\nMadhya Bharat region as .a Pakka Tenant or as a.Muafi• .· dar, Inamdar, or Concessional Holder, as defined in the\n\n' '\n\n., . '.'\n\n• ANANT KIBE v. PURUSHOTTAM (Sen, J.) -, 493\n\nMadhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act, ~; unfa, t . ; ii.A 2007(66 of 19.50)\"; . . '. \"\n\nThe plain language -0f s.158(1)(b) effected a complete extinctibn of the inam rights followed by simultaneous conferral of bhumiswami rights.\n\nEvery person, in respect ot the land hold by him .in the . Madhya Bharat region a~ an inamdar, at the time of the coming into force of the code, became a bhumiswami thereof, and acquired. all the rights and became. subject to all the liabilities of a bhumiswami under the Code. The words ''in respect of land held by him\" appearing in s. l58(l)(b) refer to the stains and character. of the tenure holder in relation to the holding on'the appointed day. The accrual of the status of bhumiswami by such person was automatic and be acquired all the rights and became subject to all the fiabi!ities conferred or imposed , upon a bhumiswami by or under the Code. As a necessary\n\ncomllary, he became subject. to the provisions ofs.164. S.164. provides that subject to his personal law, ihe intersest of a Bhumiswami shall, on his death, pass by inheritance, 'survlvorship or be<juest, as the case may be. On a combined reading of ss.158(l)(b) and 164, the legal consequenc~ that ensued was that the incident of impartibility and the special mode of succession by thctrule of.primogeniture whicji were terms of the grant of inam lands itnder the JagirManual of the Holkar Stale, stood extingui • shed. After the conferment of bhumiswami rights, the incidents arid char; icter of the tenure became transformed and the restrictions placed thereon disappeared, and such. lands became capable of being held in joillt ownership like .any other coparcenary property, It must logically follow that the confemil of bhumiswami rights on the holder for the time being under s.158(l)(b) of the Code in respect of ancestral inam lands must necessarily 'enQje to the benefit of all the members of the joint family.\n\nIn our judgment, the view expressed by the High Court that the inam lands and the two houses constructed at Indore and ther proprties acquired from out of the income. df the inam e; clusively belonged to defendant No. 1 Purushot, tam Rao, tfte holder for the time being at the time when the Code was brought into force, can hardly be sustained. Since the deci!!ion of the Privy Cuncil in Shiba Prasad Singh v. Rq.izi Prayag Kumdri Debi and Orsfl'. it must.be taken as well-settled that an estate which is impartible by custom cannot be said to be the separ11t~ or exlusiv~\n\n\\I) L.R. (1931-3~) 59 I. A.3~J\n\n'I F\n\n.. B\n\n. SUPREME C0URT REPORJ:S\n\n(198 4] 3 S.C.R •\n\nproperty of the holder of the estate. Where the property is ancesttal and the holder has succeeded tp it, it would be part of the joint estate of the undivided Hindu family. In the following illuminating passag~ Sir Dinshaw Mulla observes : . \"The keynote of the whole position, in their Lord-. ships view, is to be found. in the following passage in the judg111ent in the Tipperahl1\\ case : • , ..\n\n\"Where a custom is prove~ to exist, it supersedes the general law, which however, still regulates all beyond the custom.\"\n\n\"Impartibility is eMentially a creature of custom. In the case of ordinary joint family property, the members of the family have (I) the right of partition; (2) the right.to restrain alienations . by the head of the family except for necessity, : (3) the right of maintenance and (4) thp right of survivorship. The , first of these rights cannot exist In tjle case of an lmpartible estate, though ancestral from the very nature of tlie estate. The second is incom• .. patible with the custom of impartibility as laid down in Sartaj Kumari's casel•\\.and the first Pittapilr casem, ands~· also the third as held in the second Pittapur easel•'. To thi$ . ' . . . extent the general Jaw of the Mitakshara has been super• seded by eustom, and the impartible estate though ancestral is clothed with the incidents of self-acquired and separate property. But the right of survivorship ls not inconsistent with the 'custom of impartibility. This right, therefore, stiil remains and this is what.was held in Baijanth's case\"'.\n\nTq this extent the estate still retains its character of joint family property, and its devolution is governed by the general Mitaksbara law applicable. to such property. Though the other rights whi.ch a coparcener acquired by birth in joint family property no longer exist, , the birthright of the senior member .to take by survivorship still remains, N, or is this right a mere sucressionis -siqiitar to that of a reversioner succeeding on the death\n\n1. 12 MIA 523 .\n\n3. LR(l86P) 26 IA. 83\n\n~· LR 49 IA 19?\n\n2. CR(l883) 15 A 51\n\n. 4. LR\\1618) 4~ IA 14?\n\n:'!' , , .\n\n• '\n\nANANT KIBE v. PUR.USHOTTAM (Sen, J.). 495 •\n\n of a Hindu widow to her husbanq's estate. It is a right which is capable' of beicg renounced and surrendered.\n\nSuch eing their Lordship's view, it follows that in order to establish that a family governed by the' Mitakshara in which there is an impartible estate has .Gease'tl to be joint it is necessary to prove an inte11tion, express or implied, on the part of the junior members of the family to renounce their right of succession to the estate.\" The incidents of impartible es(ate. laid down in Shiba Prasad Singh's case and the law there stated have been reaffirmed in the subsequent decisions of the Privy Council and of this Court. It is r.ot neecssary to refer to them as they have all been dealt with in a ecentjudgment of this Court in Nagesh Bisto fJesai v. Khando .\n\nTirmal Desaf11\\, Jmpartibility is essentially a creature of custom.\n\nHere i.t is a term of the grant. The junior members of a joint family in the case of ancint impartible joint family estate • take no right in the property by birth and therefore have no rig4t of partition having cgard to the very nature of the estate that it is impartible. The only incidence for joint property which still attaches to the joint family property is the right of survivorship which, of course, is . not inconsistent with the · custom of impJlrtibility. The incident of impartibiliy attached to inam lands no longer exists by reason of s.158(1)(b) of the Code as they have , now become bhumiswami lands. The right of junior members of the family for maintenance is governed by custom and not based upon any joint right or interest in the property as coownets. In case of inams in the Holkar State .. such right was again a.condition ofthe grant. In view of the authorities cited in\n\nNagesh Bisio Desai's case, supra, it must be held that the inam lands though impartible were nevertheless joint family properties of the parties. The impartibility of the tenure governed by the Jagir Manual of the Holkar State and the rule of lineal primogeiture • governed by the Jagir Manual, Chapter JI, rr'.2 and 3 did not per se destroy its nature .as joil'lt family property or render it the separate JTroperty of the last bolder so as to destroy the right of survivorship ; the estate retained its character of joint family property and its devolution was governed by the rule of lineal primogeniture.· To establish that a family governed by the Mitakshara in which. ' there is an impartible estate has ceased to be joint, it is necessary to prove ap intention, express oi: implied on the part of the junior members of the family to renounce their succession to the estate, . . '. - ' . \" ,' . ( ' t. [19821. 3 SCR 341 ..\n\n• •\n\nSUPREMB COURT REPORTS\n\n{1984) 3 S.C.R.\n\nThe\"learnefl. Ad\\litioual District Judge durin~. the , c_ourse of his judgment has hld on consideratio, n of the evideµce that tnere was\n\nno partition in•the joint. family as alleged DY defendants 1 and 2 and that finding has not been. reversed l; Jy the High Court in appeal.\n\nThe learded Additional District 1udge\n\n0 has referred to several . 'Welbknown decisions of the Privy Council dealing with the incidents of an impartible estate, including that of ShibJ Prasad , Pingh's case •. supra, l; Jqt the High Court surprisingly did not refer to anyote of them. He has also particularly referred to the nature arid inci- : denc.e of a rofected thekedari under. s.102 of the .e:l'. Larid Revenue Act; 1917 and relied upon the decision of thePtivy ¢ouncil in. Thakur Bhagwan Singh v. Darbar Singh111 aml also to • several decisionsofthe Nagpur . and Madhya Pradesh High Couilts and in particular to Man( Ram v. Ram Dayal\">° and Smt. Pi/andni . j(lllkram v. Anandsingh Sakharam'3' where a similar question are.\n\nHe further felt tiratthe principles laid do\\vn by the )lomhay High . CVnrt in Lingappa . Rayappa Dsai v. Kadappa Bapur'ao , Desai\"\\\n\ndealing with lhe Bombay Hereditary Offices Act, 1874 holding tlfat\n\n'wata~ lands stand in the same footing as ancestral iinpable\n\nestate in a joint Hindu family passing by survivorshipfrom::pne : line to another according to primogeniture, must govern the cll!e . . , The. High Court declined to follo'w the. long line of decisions ofe ' Nagpur and Madhya Pradesh High Courts. dealing with the protec- <ted the kedari tenure under s.109 of the C.P. Land Revenue t:'odt,.\n\n1917 saying.that they were \"inapplicable\" 'to the case of jagir a11d •in am properties which at no time were considered to be jilfut family properties but constituted a.'special kind of grant' regulatd .. by the terms of the.grant or the rules governing the same.· ltall; o . declined to follow the decision of the Bombay High Courth . Ungappa's case, supra, because ii did not \"appeal\" to the ccrlirt\n\nas it distinguished the decision of the Madras High Court il1 'Sri Pavu Janardhana Krishna Ranga Rao Bahadur v.\n\nThe State of Madras'•i \"for reasons \"hich did not appear to be sound\". Jt!is difficult to sustain both on principle and .precedent the view of the • High Court that inam lands being 1mpartible in nature, the : s11ccs sion to which was governed by the rule of lineal .Primogeniture; the\n\nto houses constructed at Indore and other prop, rties acquii-l:d\n\n' .. --(.,, l)-:L-::R:-[c:-19::2c::8J'\"'. S:::S-::IA-:--:-t=-so. ·.\n\n' • (2) A.1, R. 1960 MP 7. '\n\n(3) 1960MPLJ96Z.\n\n(4) tL.R. 1940Bo!n. 721, - ' \\S}. A.I.R. 1953 Mad. 18?.\n\nANANT KIBE v. PURUSHOTTAM (Sen. J.) 497\n\nfrom out of the income of the inam exclusively belonged to def en-. dant No .. 1 Purushoham Rao, the holder for the time b.eing and . aonstituted his separate property. ·\n\nIn the former State bf Madhya. Pradesh, the existence of such and.impartible tenure was not unknown. The nature and incidence of a protected thekeqari tenure. under s.\\09 .of the C.P. Land Revenue Act, 1977 came up for co11sideration before the Privy\n\nI i. .\n\nCoundl in Bhagwan Singh's case, supra. The Privy Council observed that though thy tenure of'a protected thekedari was impartil; lle and descended.by primogeniture and was made inalienable, and it\n\n• !\n\nI ' '\n\nwas provided that only one person at a time shall be entitled to succeed. to such status, at the saroe time :\n\n\"The Act recognises that leasehold interests, though , impartible, may nevertheless be joint fa_mily property of the thekedar and hjs family.\" ·\n\nThis was in consonance with the view expressed by Sir Bipin Krishna Bose, Addi. J.C. inFagwa v. Budhram11\\ that the . grant of a protected thekedari tenure to the eldest male member of a family did not make the property his separate property: In\n\nNarayan Prasad v. Laxman. Pra, ad12 > J. Sen, J. hold tat where . protected thekedari rights in respect of a village were acquired out of joint family 'funds, the village would be joint family property and a mmber of the joint famiiy would be entitled to a share in the theka and to be maintained out of it. In Chandanlal v. Push- ...\\ karraJI'), Kaushalendra Rao, J. , peaking for the Court observed:\n\n\"It has always been the accepted view that the grant of protected sttus to a thekedar did not make thetheka\n\nthe exclusive property of the person on whom the protected status is confe(red!'\n\nThe leartied Judge then referred to the decision of the Privy Council in Bhagwan Singh' s case and rejected the contention that the con, ferral of the protected status on one of the member~ destroyed the pre existing rights of the other rnembers of .the family. ·\n\nIn Sukhwnboi & Anr. v. Ramsharan Doma Sao and Orsi•\\.\n\nMudholkar, J. tned to draw a distinction between the present rights and futuie rights of the members of the family and held that / wliile the junior members have future or contingent rights such as .... ' -(1) (1913) 10 Nag. LR 64.\n\n(2) (1945) Nag. LJ 1291. •\n\n(3) !LR[ [1952] Nag. 318,\n\n(4) [1951] Nag. LJ 433.\n\nA. /\n\n498 WPREMa COURT REPORTS\n\n[1984) 3 S, C(.R\n\na right of survivorship, they hav.e, apart from custom or relationship, no present rights as, for instance, a right to restrain alienation or to claim maintenance.\n\nThe decision of Mudholkar J. in Sukhambai's case taking a narrow anti restricted view of the rights of the members of a joint Hindu family to participate in •the preseµt enjoyment and management of a protected thekedari tenure was, however reversed on appeal by B.P. Sinha, C.J. an.d Hidayatu!lah, J. in Shiv Prasad Sao v. Sukhan Bai (Letters Patent Appeal No. 19 of 1449 decided on -December, 30, 19.54) observing thaf if there was a family arrangement for the joint enjoyriient of ·\n\nth~ theka In the. past, it would bind not only the protected thekedar for the time being but the whole family and so long as the family arrangement is not rescinded by the family itself, it must conti.nue. :i'he learned Judges considering the implications of s.109(l)(a) of the Act observed :\n\n• \"The conferral of protected status does not disturb . the rights of the members inter se though they may not be recognised by the State. As between mrmbers the rights of.any particular_ member under the arrangement must continue.\"·\n\nAs regards the validity of arrangements made by the co-sharers in-a theka dividing the property between themselves for beneficial enjoyment of the thekedar, they said :\n\n\"From the year 1881 when all existing arrangements were to continue, down to this day when private partj- • tions and family arrangements have been recognised as\n\n. binding on the' family, there is an underline/current of recognition of joint family status. Most of these villages, when they were acquired, belonged, to a joint family ad the intention in conferring protection was not to disturb arrangements but to recognise one member as a Thekedar and to restrain transfers . and . impose impartibility and . primogeniture. Even though the Act of 1917 eQacted\n\nabout-private partitions and arangements, the law was merely declaratory offamily custom\"as is apparent from a\"persual of the various Settlements Reports.\"\n\nThe' learned' Judges then added a word of caution:\n\n\"Under the C.P. Land Revenue Act, a protected status could be conferred not only upon Hindus but also upon [ Mmlin-s. ad cters .. 'Ilie niks cf inputitle . .\n\n) .\n\ni '>--. '\n\n• ANANT KIDE v. PURUSHOTTAM (Sen, J.) 499\n\nestates as understood in Hindu law cannot, iherefore, be A lllade applicable and the analogy is apt to be misleading.\"\n\nSimilar question arose in.Mani Ram v. RalJ1 Dayal, supra, and Smt, Pilanoni Janak'ram y. A11andsingh Sakharam, supra. The decisien in Mani Ram's case is of sowe importance. Here, T.C.\n\nShrivastava, J. had to consider the impact of s.39(1) of the M.P.\n\nAbolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act, 1951 which provided that where I.he proprietary rights held .by a protected thekedar vest in the State under s. 3, the Deputy Commissioner may reserve to such proprietor the rights of an occupancy tenant in the. whole or part of the home-farm land and shall determine the rent thereon. S. 39(2) thereof. provide'd tbat any person becominj! an occupancy tenant under sub-e.(l) shall lze a tenant of the State. The contention on behalf of the protected thekedar. who brought the suit was that by virtue of such settlement he _became the ftlll andJexclusive tenant thereof. The learned.\n\nJudge after rnferriug to the decision of the Privy Council in Bhagwan Singh's case, supra, and the aforesaid decision of the High Court in Shiv Prasad Sao's case, supra, reiterated that although . s. 109(l)(a) of the C.P. Land Revenue Act, 1917 provided that protected thekedari rights would descend by the rule of primoge- .niture and the thkea was impartible in nature, the rights of the\n\nother inembers of the joint Hindu family in the theka continued\n\nthouh they could nt obtain a partition of .the lands in the thka or claim to be in possession of any lands pertqinin.g to the theka; He refrred to the observations made in Shiv Prasad Sao's case set out above and observed.that it was. open to the protected thekedar to come to an acrangement with his co-sha_rers to divide the lands attrtched to the theka and' such a family arrangement would be binding on the co-sharrs. Repelling the contention based on s. 39 (I) of that Act be held that after the abolition of the proprietary rights in 1950, the rights of protected thekedars had completely disappeared and the statutory bar of impartibility and inalienability' removed and therefore the lands which were joint.family lands subject to statutbry restrictions assnmed the.character of norlnal joint family property free from the statutory restrictions. In Smt. f.ilanoni's case, supra, K.L. Pandey; J. held that although under. cl.(5) of the Sarangarh State Wzibul-erz there: was no right of partition given to a thekedar gaontia, but it permitted joint and \\Jivide\\l management of the bhogra landsattached to the theka\n\nSUPREMB COURT REPORTS\n\n[1984] 3 S.C.R. 0\n\namong the members of the family and though the State had reser• ved to itself under cl.(15) the .right to in'duct a new thekedar who became entitled to the r.ntire ohogra lands in the village, the effect of the two provisions was that. the State could not be bQund by a partition effected among the members of the family by way <>r a family arrangement but it would be binding on the members. or the family, inclnding the new thekedar who may have succeeded to the status of a thekedar gaontia. As. to the settiement of such bhogra lands wit.h the thekedar in raiyati rights under s,54(1) of' the M.P. Afiolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alie nated Lands) Act, 1951, the Court held that such settlement must enure to the benefit of the bhogra holders under a family arrange• mtlllt since th¢ lands continued to be impressed with the character of being joint family property.\n\nThe point in controversy really stands concluded by the recent decision of this Court in Nagesh Bisio Desai's case, supra. There, the question was whether the plaintiff being the holder fot the timebeing of the Kundgol Deshgat estate whicli was an impartible estate, the. succession to which .was governed by the rule of lineal primogenitnre, was entitled to remain in full and exclusive possession and enjoyrrient of the watan. lands resumed umler s. 3(4) of the Bombay 'Pargana & Kulkarni Watans (AbOlition) Act, J950 ands. 4 of the Bombay Merged Terri\\ories Miscellaneous .Alienations Abolition Act; 1955 which had been regranted to himas an occupant thereof under ss. 4 and 7 of the Acts respectively. twas held that the plaintiff' a. contention ran counter to the scheme of the Bombay Hereditary Offices Act, 1874 and as against settled legal principles, and that the Watans Act was desigqed to preserve the preexisting rights of the members of. the joint Hindu family. The . subrriission based on the alleged impartibility of watan property and-the applicability of the rule of lineal primogeniture regulating succession to the estate was rejecte.d on the .ground that it° could not prevail as these being nothing more than the incidents of the' watans stood abrogated by. s; 3(4) of the 1950 Act ands. 4 of the 1955 Act. It was held that the efl'ect of\\be no.nobstante clause in s. 3(4) of qie 1950 .Act. was to bring about a change in the tenure or character of tbe holding as watan lands but did not affect the other legal incidents of the property under the personal law and if the property belonged\n\nto the joint Hindu family, then the porma\\ rihts of tjle memer@\n\n• 'r • •\n\n-< •\n\n' .\n\nA.NANT KID!! v. PUl\\USHOTTAM (Sen, J.) 501\n\nof the family to ask for partitiOh were not in any way affected and therefore the re grant of the lands to the watahdar under s. 4(.1) of the 1959 Act ands. 7 of the 1955 Act must ensure to the benefit . of the entire joint Hindu family. That precisely Is .the position here.\n\nAlthough under the Bombay Pargana & Kulkarni Watans (Abolition) Act, 1950 and the Bombay Merged Territories Miscellaneous Alienations ;\\bolition Act, 1955 there was' at first an abolition of. watans nd resumption of watan lands, followed by re-grant of such.lands to the watandar as. an occupant. under the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879, that hardly makes a difference in principle. The only difference is that under s. 158(l)(b) of the M.~: Land Revenue C9de, there was a simultaneous extinction of the inams resulting in conferral of. bhumiswami rights on .every person holding inam I.ands on the date on which the Code was brought into force.\n\n• T]le result the-refore is that the appeal must succeed and\n\n. is allowed. The judgment and decree passed by the High Court D are reversed and those of the .learned .Additional District Judge decreeing the plaintiff's suit for partition and separate possession of their half share in the properties described in Schedule 'A' '.to the plaint re restored. :fhe decree shall be drawn in terms of the compromise arrived at.\n\n• There shall be rio order as to costs.\n\nN.V.K.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\n, , ..", "total_entities": 137, "entities": [{"text": "E\n\nANANT ~BE & ORS.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2, "end_char": 21, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "ANANT KIBE & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PURUSHOTTAM RAO & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 23, "end_char": 44, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PURUSHOTTAM RAO & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 17, 1984", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 46, "end_char": 60, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PURUSHOTTAM RAO & ORS\n\nApril 17, 1984\n\n[D.A. :0ESAI, A.P. SEN AND v. BALAKRISHNAERA'n1, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "A.P. SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 76, "end_char": 84, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code 1959", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 117, "end_char": 154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 158(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 156, "end_char": 165, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code 1959", "statute": "Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code 1959"}}, {"text": "s 158", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 429, "end_char": 434, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code 1959", "statute": "Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code 1959"}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code 1959", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 442, "end_char": 479, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 158", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1863, "end_char": 1869, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S.158(-l)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3230, "end_char": 3242, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S.158", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3498, "end_char": 3503, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "SS. 158(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4434, "end_char": 4444, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 158(l)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5055, "end_char": 5067, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Impartibilfty", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5209, "end_char": 5222, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Impartibilfty is essentiaily a creature of custom."}}, {"text": "S. 158(1)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5914, "end_char": 5926, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S91A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7078, "end_char": 7082, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "(1982) 3 SCR 341", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 7134, "end_char": 7150, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JUR!SD]CTICiN", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7167, "end_char": 7196, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "LR (1931-32) S91A 331 and Nagesh Bi'1o Desai v. Khando Tirmal Desai, (1982) 3 SCR 341,\n\nreferred 10;\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JUR!SD]CTICiN : Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Bobde", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7416, "end_char": 7421, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bobde, S.D. Mudaliar and A.G. Ratnaparkhi for .. the\n\nG.L. Saghi, D.N. Misra and S. Sukumaran for the respondents."}}, {"text": "S.D. Mudaliar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7423, "end_char": 7436, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bobde, S.D. Mudaliar and A.G. Ratnaparkhi for .. the\n\nG.L. Saghi, D.N. Misra and S. Sukumaran for the respondents."}}, {"text": "A.G. Ratnaparkhi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7441, "end_char": 7457, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bobde, S.D. Mudaliar and A.G. Ratnaparkhi for .. the\n\nG.L. Saghi, D.N. Misra and S. Sukumaran for the respondents."}}, {"text": "G.L. Saghi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7470, "end_char": 7480, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bobde, S.D. Mudaliar and A.G. Ratnaparkhi for .. the\n\nG.L. Saghi, D.N. Misra and S. Sukumaran for the respondents."}}, {"text": "D.N. Misra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7482, "end_char": 7492, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bobde, S.D. Mudaliar and A.G. Ratnaparkhi for .. the\n\nG.L. Saghi, D.N. Misra and S. Sukumaran for the respondents."}}, {"text": "S. Sukumaran", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7497, "end_char": 7509, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bobde, S.D. Mudaliar and A.G. Ratnaparkhi for .. the\n\nG.L. Saghi, D.N. Misra and S. Sukumaran for the respondents."}}, {"text": "ANANT KIBE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7876, "end_char": 7886, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".. 'r t I\\\n\nANANT KIBE y. PURUSaottAM RAO (Sen, J.) 481\n\nand dismissing the plaintiffs' suit for partition apd separate possessfon of their half share of the suit properties detailed in' Schedul~ •.\n\n'A' appended to the plaint except with respect.to a house and the agricultural lands at , Ujjain.", "canonical_name": "ANANT KIBE"}}, {"text": "PURUSaottAM RAO", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7890, "end_char": 7905, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".. 'r t I\\\n\nANANT KIBE y. PURUSaottAM RAO (Sen, J.) 481\n\nand dismissing the plaintiffs' suit for partition apd separate possessfon of their half share of the suit properties detailed in' Schedul~ •.\n\n'A' appended to the plaint except with respect.to a house and the agricultural lands at , Ujjain.", "canonical_name": "PURUSHOTTAM RAO & ORS"}}, {"text": "Ujjain. Duridg", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8154, "end_char": 8168, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".. 'r t I\\\n\nANANT KIBE y. PURUSaottAM RAO (Sen, J.) 481\n\nand dismissing the plaintiffs' suit for partition apd separate possessfon of their half share of the suit properties detailed in' Schedul~ •.\n\n'A' appended to the plaint except with respect.to a house and the agricultural lands at , Ujjain."}}, {"text": "Maharaja Hariliar Rao Holkar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8594, "end_char": 8622, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The repor\\ of the Inam Commissioner discloses that in 1837 the late Maharaja Hariliar Rao Holkar made a grant of an inam of a garden known as Rambag in Kasba Indore admeasuring 15.62 acres to Abaji Balla!,"}}, {"text": "Kasba Indore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8678, "end_char": 8690, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The repor\\ of the Inam Commissioner discloses that in 1837 the late Maharaja Hariliar Rao Holkar made a grant of an inam of a garden known as Rambag in Kasba Indore admeasuring 15.62 acres to Abaji Balla!,"}}, {"text": "Abaji Balla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8718, "end_char": 8729, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The repor\\ of the Inam Commissioner discloses that in 1837 the late Maharaja Hariliar Rao Holkar made a grant of an inam of a garden known as Rambag in Kasba Indore admeasuring 15.62 acres to Abaji Balla!,", "canonical_name": "Abaji Ballai"}}, {"text": "Abaji Ballai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9128, "end_char": 9140, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears from the report that Abaji Ballai h11d\n\nonly one son name,9 Laxman and he also had only one son named .", "canonical_name": "Abaji Ballai"}}, {"text": "Laxman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9167, "end_char": 9173, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears from the report that Abaji Ballai h11d\n\nonly one son name,9 Laxman and he also had only one son named .", "canonical_name": "Laxman Rao"}}, {"text": "Raghunath Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9211, "end_char": 9224, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raghunath Rao.", "canonical_name": "Raghnath .. Rao"}}, {"text": "Abaji Bailal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9246, "end_char": 9258, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the d.eath of Abaji Bailal be was succeeded by Laxman.", "canonical_name": "Abaji Ballai"}}, {"text": "December 14; 1888", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9684, "end_char": 9701, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "9 dated December 14; 1888 the inamdar was given 9.'72 acres of land in Mauja PalashiN Hana."}}, {"text": "Mauja PalashiN Hana", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9747, "end_char": 9766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "9 dated December 14; 1888 the inamdar was given 9.'72 acres of land in Mauja PalashiN Hana."}}, {"text": "ujjain", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9922, "end_char": 9928, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It also appears that the family built residential houses 'lt Indore presumably out of the income of the inITT!l and also acquired immovable properties at ujjain\n\nconsisting of a house and some agricultural lands."}}, {"text": "Laxman Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10000, "end_char": 10010, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the death of Laxman Rao, his son Raghunath Rao was recognized to be the inamdar.", "canonical_name": "Laxman Rao"}}, {"text": "Madhav Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10121, "end_char": 10131, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\" The common ancestor Raghunath Rao had three sons, Madhav Rao, Sadasbiv Rao and .", "canonical_name": "Madhav Rao"}}, {"text": "Sadasbiv Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10133, "end_char": 10145, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\" The common ancestor Raghunath Rao had three sons, Madhav Rao, Sadasbiv Rao and .", "canonical_name": "Sadasbiv Rao"}}, {"text": "Gopal Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10152, "end_char": 10161, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gopal Rao.", "canonical_name": "Gopal Rao"}}, {"text": "Sadashiv Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10188, "end_char": 10200, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Of these, Madhav Rao and Sadashiv Rao had pre-decased their father , Raghunath\n\nRao.", "canonical_name": "Sadasbiv Rao"}}, {"text": "Rao", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10362, "end_char": 10365, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "IL\n\nRao left a son Purushottam l,'lao."}}, {"text": "Raghnath .. Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10628, "end_char": 10643, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raghnath .. Rao in 1928.", "canonical_name": "Raghnath .. Rao"}}, {"text": "Raghunath Rao-", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10670, "end_char": 10684, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the death of Raghunath Rao-, th.e last Purushottam Rao being the sole siirvivor of the eldest male' line of holder became the inamdar and also the karta of lhe\n\njoit IDndu fani'i!y; ·\n\nThe suit out of which this appeal arises was instituted by .", "canonical_name": "Raghnath .. Rao"}}, {"text": "Purushottam Rao", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10696, "end_char": 10711, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the death of Raghunath Rao-, th.e last Purushottam Rao being the sole siirvivor of the eldest male' line of holder became the inamdar and also the karta of lhe\n\njoit IDndu fani'i!y; ·\n\nThe suit out of which this appeal arises was instituted by .", "canonical_name": "PURUSHOTTAM RAO & ORS"}}, {"text": "Anant", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10936, "end_char": 10941, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the three appellants , Anant, Gov ind and their mother Smt.", "canonical_name": "ANANT KIBE"}}, {"text": "Laxmi\n\n Baj", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10973, "end_char": 10984, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Laxmi\n\n Baj being te legal heirs and successos of Gopal Rao, as plain ."}}, {"text": "Purushoitam 'Rao", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11243, "end_char": 11259, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "tiffs on DeC'ember J2, 1955 for partition and separate possession of their half share in the joint family property described In'' Schedule 'A' appended to th-e plaint against respondents 1 and 2 '\n\nPurushoitam 'Rao and his mother Smt.", "canonical_name": "PURUSHOTTAM RAO & ORS"}}, {"text": "~Purushottam Rao", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11532, "end_char": 11548, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~Purushottam Rao in his capacity as tlie karta of tlje joint Hindu\n\nfamily was in possession and management of the joint .family property, including the iuam lands at Kasha, lndore and Mauja .", "canonical_name": "PURUSHOTTAM RAO & ORS"}}, {"text": "Purushottam Rao", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11804, "end_char": 11819, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The plaintiffs' claim was coutested by defendants , l '.and 2 Purushottam Rao aud Smt.", "canonical_name": "PURUSHOTTAM RAO & ORS"}}, {"text": "Gopai Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11909, "end_char": 11918, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They pleaded inter afia thqt the plaintiffs' predecessor-in-interest Gopai Rao had separated from the family by taking his share in the Y, ear 1917,13 .", "canonical_name": "Gopal Rao"}}, {"text": "Pnrushottam Rao", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12313, "end_char": 12328, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 Pnrushottam Rao ; and that the conferfJll or' bhumiswami rights on respondent l under s. 158(1)(b) or' the.", "canonical_name": "PURUSHOTTAM RAO & ORS"}}, {"text": "s. 158(1)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12399, "end_char": 12411, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12422, "end_char": 12460, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ANANT KIBE", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12823, "end_char": 12833, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ANANT KIBE .v.", "canonical_name": "ANANT KIBE"}}, {"text": "s. 158(l)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13499, "end_char": 13511, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14193, "end_char": 14199, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "acquired at Indore out of the jncome."}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14749, "end_char": 14754, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ujjain", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14998, "end_char": 15004, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "properties at Ujjain."}}, {"text": "s11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15690, "end_char": 15693, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Putra Pautradi Vanash", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17171, "end_char": 17192, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in 1837 is not forthcoming, the report of the Inam Commissioner discloses that the grant of ina\"m to him was on Putra Pautradi Vanash\n\nParampra condition by way of parvarish i.e. lllaintenance."}}, {"text": "Purtio ttam Rao", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18145, "end_char": 18160, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I Purtio ttam Rao on December 15, 1928 (Ex:P-6) wherein he had stated that his grand-father had died on August 8, 1928 and therefore he -\n\nprayed for substitution of the names of the legal peirs in the inam register, the material portion of which reads :\n\n\"I am his son's son i.e. his grandson and as such his heir. ("}}, {"text": "Krishna Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18505, "end_char": 18516, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of my uncle i.e. (I) Krishna Rao (2) Anant Rao and (3) Govind Rao are also his .", "canonical_name": "Krishna Rao"}}, {"text": "Anant Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18521, "end_char": 18530, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of my uncle i.e. (I) Krishna Rao (2) Anant Rao and (3) Govind Rao are also his .", "canonical_name": "ANANT KIBE"}}, {"text": "Govind Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18539, "end_char": 18549, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of my uncle i.e. (I) Krishna Rao (2) Anant Rao and (3) Govind Rao are also his .", "canonical_name": "Govind Rao"}}, {"text": "Decem ber 7, 1928", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18742, "end_char": 18759, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is also an affidavit of Purushottam Rao dated Decem ber 7, 1928 (Ex."}}, {"text": "Raghunath Rad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18809, "end_char": 18822, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P-5) regrding the death of his grand-father Raghunath Rad and it rr, entions that he had three sons viz, Madhav Rao, Sadashiv Rao and Gopal Roo.", "canonical_name": "Raghnath .. Rao"}}, {"text": "Madhav", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18870, "end_char": 18876, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P-5) regrding the death of his grand-father Raghunath Rad and it rr, entions that he had three sons viz, Madhav Rao, Sadashiv Rao and Gopal Roo.", "canonical_name": "Madhav Rao"}}, {"text": "Gopal Roo", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 18899, "end_char": 18908, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P-5) regrding the death of his grand-father Raghunath Rad and it rr, entions that he had three sons viz, Madhav Rao, Sadashiv Rao and Gopal Roo.", "canonical_name": "Gopal Rao"}}, {"text": "Krishna", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19234, "end_char": 19241, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Krishna, Anant and Govind nd all the three of them, were minQfsl It then recites:~ \"'All th.e three minor sons of Gopal Rao' were living jointly with me.\"", "canonical_name": "Krishna Rao"}}, {"text": "Anant", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19243, "end_char": 19248, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Krishna, Anant and Govind nd all the three of them, were minQfsl It then recites:~ \"'All th.e three minor sons of Gopal Rao' were living jointly with me.\"", "canonical_name": "ANANT KIBE"}}, {"text": "Govind", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19253, "end_char": 19259, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Krishna, Anant and Govind nd all the three of them, were minQfsl It then recites:~ \"'All th.e three minor sons of Gopal Rao' were living jointly with me.\"", "canonical_name": "Govind Rao"}}, {"text": "Purushottal!l Rao", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 19389, "end_char": 19406, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Purushottal!l Rao ."}}, {"text": "Raghu9ath Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19509, "end_char": 19522, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "examined as DW 24°has stated that the whereabouts of Gopal Rao were not known when his grand-father Raghu9ath Rao was opera: , t~ upon resulting in his death' in the hospital.", "canonical_name": "Raghnath .. Rao"}}, {"text": "Punishottan\\ Rao", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20309, "end_char": 20325, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Punishottan\\ Rao were nothing but an ancestral impartible estat~. '\n\n\"\"."}}, {"text": "Bhumiswami-(1", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20599, "end_char": 20612, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bhumiswami-(1} Every person who at the time of c9ming into force of this Code, belongs to any of the following classes shall be calkd a Bhumiswami and ,·$ball )lave all the."}}, {"text": "Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21174, "end_char": 21216, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s.158(1)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21291, "end_char": 21302, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act", "statute": "Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act"}}, {"text": "S.164", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22141, "end_char": 22146, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act", "statute": "Madhya Bharat Land Revenue and Tenancy Act"}}, {"text": "ss.158(l)(b) and 164", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22335, "end_char": 22355, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.158(l)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22968, "end_char": 22979, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Purushot", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 23327, "end_char": 23335, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 Purushot, tam Rao, tfte holder for the time being at the time when the Code was brought into force, can hardly be sustained.", "canonical_name": "PURUSHOTTAM RAO & ORS"}}, {"text": "Dinshaw Mulla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23986, "end_char": 23999, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the following illuminating passag~ Sir Dinshaw Mulla observes : . \""}}, {"text": "Sartaj Kumari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24818, "end_char": 24831, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The second is incom• .. patible with the custom of impartibility as laid down in Sartaj Kumari's casel•\\.and the first Pittapilr casem, ands~· also the third as held in the second Pittapur easel•'."}}, {"text": "Baijanth", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25291, "end_char": 25299, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This right, therefore, stiil remains and this is what.was held in Baijanth's case\"'."}}, {"text": "LR 49 IA 19", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 25807, "end_char": 25818, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Shiba Prasad Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26430, "end_char": 26448, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "laid down in Shiba Prasad Singh's case and the law there stated have been reaffirmed in the subsequent decisions of the Privy Council and of this Court."}}, {"text": "Tirmal Desaf11\\", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26710, "end_char": 26725, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tirmal Desaf11\\, Jmpartibility is essentially a creature of custom."}}, {"text": "s.158(1)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27329, "end_char": 27340, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Holkar State", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 27577, "end_char": 27589, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In case of inams in the Holkar State .. such right was again a.condition ofthe grant."}}, {"text": "Nagesh Bisio Desai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27676, "end_char": 27694, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In view of the authorities cited in\n\nNagesh Bisio Desai's case, supra, it must be held that the inam lands though impartible were nevertheless joint family properties of the parties."}}, {"text": "SUPREMB COURT", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 28611, "end_char": 28624, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3 SCR 341 ..\n\n• •\n\nSUPREMB COURT REPORTS\n\n{1984) 3 S.C.R.\n\nThe\"learnefl."}}, {"text": "ShibJ Prasad", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29108, "end_char": 29120, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Welbknown decisions of the Privy Council dealing with the incidents of an impartible estate, including that of ShibJ Prasad , Pingh's case •. supra, l; Jqt the High Court surprisingly did not refer to anyote of them."}}, {"text": "Pingh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29123, "end_char": 29128, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Welbknown decisions of the Privy Council dealing with the incidents of an impartible estate, including that of ShibJ Prasad , Pingh's case •. supra, l; Jqt the High Court surprisingly did not refer to anyote of them."}}, {"text": "s.102", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29313, "end_char": 29318, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Larid Revenue Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29333, "end_char": 29350, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bombay Hereditary Offices Act, 1874", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 29811, "end_char": 29846, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s.109", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30225, "end_char": 30230, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Bombay Hereditary Offices Act, 1874", "statute": "Bombay Hereditary Offices Act, 1874"}}, {"text": "Ungappa", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30602, "end_char": 30609, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ungappa's case, supra, because ii did not \"appeal\" to the ccrlirt\n\nas it distinguished the decision of the Madras High Court il1 'Sri Pavu Janardhana Krishna Ranga Rao Bahadur v.\n\nThe State of Madras'•i \"for reasons \"hich did not appear to be sound\"."}}, {"text": "Madras High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 30709, "end_char": 30726, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ungappa's case, supra, because ii did not \"appeal\" to the ccrlirt\n\nas it distinguished the decision of the Madras High Court il1 'Sri Pavu Janardhana Krishna Ranga Rao Bahadur v.\n\nThe State of Madras'•i \"for reasons \"hich did not appear to be sound\"."}}, {"text": "State of Madras'•i", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 30786, "end_char": 30804, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ungappa's case, supra, because ii did not \"appeal\" to the ccrlirt\n\nas it distinguished the decision of the Madras High Court il1 'Sri Pavu Janardhana Krishna Ranga Rao Bahadur v.\n\nThe State of Madras'•i \"for reasons \"hich did not appear to be sound\"."}}, {"text": "s11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30992, "end_char": 30995, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Land Revenue Act, 1977", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31706, "end_char": 31728, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bhagwan Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31792, "end_char": 31805, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Coundl in Bhagwan Singh's case, supra."}}, {"text": "Bipin Krishna Bose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32302, "end_char": 32320, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This was in consonance with the view expressed by Sir Bipin Krishna Bose, Addi."}}, {"text": "J. Sen", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32533, "end_char": 32539, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pra, ad12 > J. Sen, J. hold tat where ."}}, {"text": "Kaushalendra Rao", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32842, "end_char": 32858, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Chandanlal v. Push- ...\\ karraJI'), Kaushalendra Rao, J. , peaking for the Court observed:\n\n\"It has always been the accepted view that the grant of protected sttus to a thekedar did not make thetheka\n\nthe exclusive property of the person on whom the protected status is confe(red!'"}}, {"text": "Mudholkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 33409, "end_char": 33418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. Ramsharan Doma Sao and Orsi•\\.\n\nMudholkar, J. tned to draw a distinction between the present rights and futuie rights of the members of the family and held that / wliile the junior members have future or contingent rights such as .... ' -(1) (1913) 10 Nag."}}, {"text": "Sukhambai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33969, "end_char": 33978, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decision of Mudholkar J. in Sukhambai's case taking a narrow anti restricted view of the rights of the members of a joint Hindu family to participate in •the preseµt enjoyment and management of a protected thekedari tenure was, however reversed on appeal by B.P. Sinha, C.J. an.d Hidayatu!lah, J. in Shiv Prasad Sao v. Sukhan Bai (Letters Patent Appeal No."}}, {"text": "B.P. Sinha", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 34199, "end_char": 34209, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decision of Mudholkar J. in Sukhambai's case taking a narrow anti restricted view of the rights of the members of a joint Hindu family to participate in •the preseµt enjoyment and management of a protected thekedari tenure was, however reversed on appeal by B.P. Sinha, C.J. an.d Hidayatu!lah, J. in Shiv Prasad Sao v. Sukhan Bai (Letters Patent Appeal No."}}, {"text": "an.d Hidayatu!lah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 34216, "end_char": 34233, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decision of Mudholkar J. in Sukhambai's case taking a narrow anti restricted view of the rights of the members of a joint Hindu family to participate in •the preseµt enjoyment and management of a protected thekedari tenure was, however reversed on appeal by B.P. Sinha, C.J. an.d Hidayatu!lah, J. in Shiv Prasad Sao v. Sukhan Bai (Letters Patent Appeal No."}}, {"text": "s.109(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34682, "end_char": 34693, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Land Revenue Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35911, "end_char": 35927, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Pilanoni Janak'ram", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 36300, "end_char": 36318, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mani Ram v. RalJ1 Dayal, supra, and Smt, Pilanoni Janak'ram y. A11andsingh Sakharam, supra."}}, {"text": "A11andsingh Sakharam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 36322, "end_char": 36342, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mani Ram v. RalJ1 Dayal, supra, and Smt, Pilanoni Janak'ram y. A11andsingh Sakharam, supra."}}, {"text": "Mani Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 36367, "end_char": 36375, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decisien in Mani Ram's case is of sowe importance."}}, {"text": "T.C.\n\nShrivastava", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 36412, "end_char": 36429, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Here, T.C.\n\nShrivastava, J. had to consider the impact of s.39(1) of the M.P.\n\nAbolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act, 1951 which provided that where I.he proprietary rights held .by a protected thekedar vest in the State under s. 3, the Deputy Commissioner may reserve to such proprietor the rights of an occupancy tenant in the."}}, {"text": "s.39(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36464, "end_char": 36471, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Revenue Act", "statute": "Land Revenue Act"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36665, "end_char": 36669, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Revenue Act", "statute": "Land Revenue Act"}}, {"text": "S. 39(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36842, "end_char": 36850, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Revenue Act", "statute": "Land Revenue Act"}}, {"text": "Shiv Prasad Sao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 37280, "end_char": 37295, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Judge after rnferriug to the decision of the Privy Council in Bhagwan Singh's case, supra, and the aforesaid decision of the High Court in Shiv Prasad Sao's case, supra, reiterated that although ."}}, {"text": "s. 109(l)(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37338, "end_char": 37350, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Land Revenue Act, 1917", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37363, "end_char": 37385, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 39", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38053, "end_char": 38058, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Revenue Act, 1917", "statute": "Land Revenue Act, 1917"}}, {"text": "f.ilanoni", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 38460, "end_char": 38469, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "f.ilanoni's case, supra, K.L. Pandey; J. held that although under."}}, {"text": "K.L. Pandey", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 38485, "end_char": 38496, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "f.ilanoni's case, supra, K.L. Pandey; J. held that although under."}}, {"text": "[1984] 3 S.C.R. 0", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 38743, "end_char": 38760, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 3(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40102, "end_char": 40109, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Alienations Abolition Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 40229, "end_char": 40254, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 4 and 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40321, "end_char": 40332, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Alienations Abolition Act", "statute": "Alienations Abolition Act"}}, {"text": "Bombay Hereditary Offices Act, 1874", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 40436, "end_char": 40471, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 3(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41039, "end_char": 41046, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Hereditary Offices Act, 1874", "statute": "the Bombay Hereditary Offices Act, 1874"}}, {"text": "s. 4(.1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41520, "end_char": 41528, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 41978, "end_char": 42008, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 158(l)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42089, "end_char": 42101, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879", "statute": "the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879"}}, {"text": "N.V.K.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 42782, "end_char": 42788, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.V.K.\n\nAppeal allowed."}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_3_502_521_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "MANCHEGOWDA ETC.\n\nSTATE OF KARNATAKA ETC.\n\nApr.if 17, 1984\n\n(P.N. BHAGWATf, AMARENDRA NATH SEN AND\n\nRANGANATH MISRA, JJ.J\n\nKarnataka Sched•led Castes and Schedu(ed Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) 'Act, 1978, sections 4 & 5. constitutipnaJ validity-Whether the jro_hibition of transfer of granted land5 and_ ResumpiOon or, restitution thereof without paymeni Of compensttion or providinti any appeal for. such order:iofresumption violates. Art. 19 (/) (/), 31and3/A of the Co, nstitution- . Wheiher making such special provisions only with regard to. Scheduled Ciistes and '\n\nScheduled .Tribes to. the exclusion ~!persons belof!King to th_er communities, violated Art~14-of the Constitution.\n\n, The petitioners are purchasCrs of lands which, had been original1~ granted by the State to persons belonging to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribes.\n\nSuch lands -had been originally granted to persons beiorlging,_ to Scheduled Castes alld Scheduled Tribes Under the proviSons of Law or on the basis .. of _rules or regulations governing such grant.\n\nAfter the passing of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibitiop of Transfer Of Ce£tain Lands A€t), 1978, notices have been issued by the appropriate . authority tO the transferees of such lands to show cause as to'\\vhy the 'lands transferred' to them should not be resumed for being restored to the original grantees br their legal heirs or for distributioD. otherwise to the mebers of .Scheduled Castesand Scheduled Tribes iri. aecorditnce with the provlsions of the Statute, as the transfers iO: their ravp_ur .are in view of the provisionS of .the Act now nu11 and void. The appellants, who were aggrieved by th~ said notices challenged the vires of the Act. Accordingto them, ss. 4 & S of -the Act violated lhe provisions of Arts 14, 19 (1) (f), 31 and 31A of the Constitution. The High Court for reasons recorded in the Judgii1ent upheld the validity ot the Act and dis . •missed the, p'etitions. However,· the High Court granted certificates , ui:ider Arts. 132 & 133 of the Constitution and hence.the app_eals.\n\nDismissing the appels, the Coui:t\n\nHELD:. I: I. Sections 4 .& S of the Karnataka Scheduled Castca and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfers of Certain }.ands) Act, 1978 is constituliona~Jy val_id~L510FJ · •\n\n' .\n\n~MANCHEoOWDA v. KARNATAKA 503\n\n1 : 1. However, the prov1s1ol of the Act must be read down and _ held that the Act will apply to transfers of grapted lands made in breach of the condition_ imposing prohibition ori tfansfer. of granted lands only in 'those cases where the title acquired by the transferee was still voidable at the. date of the commencement of the Act and had n9t Jost its defeasible character at the d; i.te wjien he A:t c.1m~ into force. -Transferees Of granted land having a prfected nd not~ void:J.ble title at the cOmmencement of the Act must be held to be outside the pale cf the provisions of the Act. S: 4 Of\n\nthe -Act must be so construed as not to have the effect of rendering void the title of any transferee which was not voidable at the date of the commencem.:nt of the.Act. Granied lands which had ben transferred after the expiry of the period _of prohibition o not come within the purView of the Act, an~ cannot be proceeded ag1inst under the provisions of this Act.\n\nThe' provisions o( the Act mak.! this position clear, as s .. 4 5 IJecome\n\napplicable only when grante& lan\\ls. are transferred in bt{'ach of ihe condition relating to.prohibition of such lands. Granted lands transferred before the cominence111ent of the Act and not iP contraventio-n of prohibition On_ trans- . fr are clearly beyo.qd the scope and p:.irview of the Present Act. Also in case where gfanted lands had been. tran.sferred be for_~ the commencement of the Act in violat'fon of_ the condition regarding prohibition on such trartsfer and the transferee whohad initially 3.oquired only a voidable' title in such granted lands had perfected his title in the grant'ed lands bY prescription by long and continuous.enjoyment therofin accordance with law Defore the commencement of the Act, such granted lands would also not come wilhiii the purview of the present Act, as the title of such trinsferees to the granted lands has beeri perfected before the commence:1nent oJ the ct.\n\nSince at the tiate of the comm:encemen t of the Act the title of such transferees\n\nbad ceasl!d to bs: voidableby reason f acquisition of prescriptive rights on account of long and continued user , for the requisite period, the title of such transferees could not be rendered void by viJL.ue of the provisions of the Act 'Without violating the constitutional guarantee. [520DH, 521A-CJ ·\n\n1 : J. As the provisions of appeal has been incorporated by the Amending Act which fecejveJ. the assent of the Governor on the 29th February •. 1984 and first cam~ to -be published iit the Karnataka Gazette Extraordinary on the 3rd day of March, 1984, the Deputy Comn1issioner to whonl the appeal wiH be presented \\vill n~ doubt take thfs fact into consideration iil deci\"ding the question of Iin1it&tion in reg; ird to any appbal which n1ay 'be ftled agains_t an order-of the Assistant CommisS'ionr; if .any appeal is pf'!ferred within a period of three months from the date the amended\n\npi:ovision conferriilg the right of appeal caJ!le into force, the Deputy cOmmissioner taking int~_consideration the fact that a period of three n1onths has been prescribed for preferri'n~ an appeal from the ddte of the order of the Assistant Commissioner, may have no_ difficulty \"in entertaining the appeal by condoning the deaJy under s. 5 of the.Lfmitation Act in tefms of the power conferred o~ the DepUty Comn1issioner under the -said s. SA, -proVide~ the Deputy Comissioncr is satisfied that the appeal is otherwise niaintainable alld the interest of justice rCquires that the.appeal should be entertained and not be thrown:out on the ground of limitatiob. [521-D-G]\n\n•. ! • ·- .-.\n\n. •\n\n•. 'SM\n\nSUPREME CO!JRT REPORTS\n\n [1981) 3 S.C.R.\n\nA 1 : 4 It is no dOubt true th.it before the .passing of the p; eseo. t A.Ct_.\n\nL -· .any transfr bf.granted lnd in breiicli of he .cOlldition rClating_to prohibitiOn On such.trausfer wollld not have the effeCt of fenderin8: the ti:ansfer void. aii..d Would _make'anY.such trailsfer onlY-vJidable. But the St<ite,.consistently with\n\n. the ?irectiVe principleSof th~ _COnstitulio~, .. bas·ade it a Polic:r arid Yery . ·· · . rightly,, to -preserve,_ protect and pfomote the interest of the Scheduled Castes and Schedllled Tribe:i which by and lafge form the wea'.kei alld pOOr.er seciiori1 of __ the people. in Ol; lC coufitry .. This may b~ said to. be the dcclared'pOtiCy or -the Siate au lithe p{Ovsk:-ns seeking to nllliify such_ transfers is quite in keeping\n\nWith, the polic-y_o(the State which may properly be regard~4 aspublic policy for -rendering social and economic justice to these weaker sctiOrls of the Socie.ty •\n\n• - • • • •• 1\" • .-· • _. • ·,:_ • • • • • \" • ·- ••\n\n.. ,,-:\n\n. \\ in pursuanc~ -of this policy, thC: Jegis.lature js. undoub.tedly\" compeiem. to. 'paSs. an .. enact.ment -providing that transfrs Of such granted lands will 'be void . . C ..... anc1\"not merely voidable fof prop.!rlY safl!guarding'and protecting the iD.terests of.\n\n- the Scb.edu.led Castes an..!· S::ned.ili;:d Tribei3 for whose beilefit onl> these l<inds .1' rui.d b\n\n1.:en, g\"ranted. EVen ullder the Contra:t Ac!, any Contract whieh is oPP'osed\n\nto public policy is rendered void. [512DE, 513CEl.\" ·\n\n. 1 :· 5. ·Even in t_he abs:nc\"e of any s uh statil tory prviSions, the tranS~ fer of granted lands in .cJntraventiP1:1 of the terml of the g7ant cir in_brC:aCh of. nY-laW, cule or regulat_ion covering such grant will clearly_ be voidable.and the a sum\\)tlciO f sqch grnted lau.Js., aitl.'.:f.· _ .avoid1Dg .. the 11'.oidab_le transferS_in . :cordance With law wiH b.;, p.:rmitt.::d., _Av..>idance of ·sch vo_idabe tansJers_ . • d resumption of th.; graned lands thr!>ugh process of law is.bound to take ~- 3: 0 e Ally. negiignc~- anJ delaY On the part o{tbe authoritiCs entitled to take ttID; n t~ avoi_d_ such transfers throUgh, apprOpriate lega_l process of law i>. bound aef:lO ke time.'-: Ant\"nt!gligence and~ dCaly on the part of the authorities entitled to tke action,.. to avoid' such trnsers through app[Opriate legal\" process .\n\n~r:resumption of su_ch grant maY .b.; further ill?-pdipl:rltS._i~.th~ _matter of _\n\n ·\"· g such transfers and resumption of possess1on of the granted lands •. av01\"m · · b di b • d\" ' I h PrOlonged \\egal procee_d1ngs w1ll _und.Ju te ! e preJU 1c1a to. t e interests of. the \"\"memb.:rS' _of ihe Sche!Jul,; d _Castes and Schedule~ Tribes fur whose benefit_\n\nthe granted lands ar'.; intenJcJ to b: resum~. As ranfer~ of granted Jands '\n\ni~ _Contrave\n\n0nt!o.n of. the. terrlls of th~. grant or any ~w, egulation or rue •1n,, such grants can b~ legal_ly avo1dedap.d possession of sue~ , lands c_an. govern \"\"- - , t:· - •. · \"d' -·be recovered throug.h poc.:s or law i~:!: -L_egslature. for the prp_o~.e of ao1 tg , delay and \"harassment Of j'.!rotracte~ hugaUOn _ anQ in fUrthenng. l~S. object Of. •·\n\n- Speedy .re.stQratiOi:t. o.f these sranted lands t~- he_ me1:1crs of the eae~ . ·\n\n.- comm Unities is pr[ctlY _: compeen.t to ake suitable Ptov1sion !or resupucn\n\nof such granted lands Dystipulating in the enactment'_ that. taI?sers or such G lands in . cOr.it~_avntion · _o.r _the ·ern:.s _o_f th~. rant or ny regulauon_; rule or\n\n---:<. Jaw regulating such grant wN._! be void. in. pro\".1d1ng ~. u1tabl_e. prcedure_ con~. sistent with the principles of . __ natual_ JUtlce fr ac_h1e\".1ng_ this _purpose w1thut\n\n' ·. e io Prolonged.' litigation in Court ID •the larger interests or benefiung\n\n~~: 0 ;~:..bers of the Scheduled Casie~ and Schedulod Tribes. , [513£'-H; Sl4APl\n\n. , 2 .. 1. .. Any pefson. who .acquires:sUch granted land by transfl.!r from the~:.:. J\n\nH ·.. ; I gr.an tee in breach of.-the condition relating to prohibition on suh ong1na ·\n\n- b · d . [ r. ustncessarily be presumed tO be aware Of the-proh1 ltlOn Impose trans e m \"' . · · d b On the tranS.rer of such, granted land,. and tby cannot be cons1dere to ea\n\n\"\"' .\n\n...\n\n,• I\n\nI i ..\n\nMANCHEGOWDA v, KARNAfAI{A sos\n\nhon a fide acbaSer for valUe ;'and ev~-rY such. trnsf~ee. acquire~ tri -his k.llo...y . . 1Cdge only-a vo-idable title to the. grantdti11d. _Th~ it le acquired by such tradsfet ·\n\n. is defeasibie and is Iiableto be defeated by an aPprop_riate action.taken iri this regard. _-If the Legislatllre Und:r .suCh circ.ums\"tances seek to inteivene n t~~ inter\"ests Or these W.!akef sectioD..s Of. he-· Community anJ_ choose to substitute a sPecdieS and. chiJptr methoi 'orr2cpveri __ of th:sc granted land!.· which were .otherwise.- liable 'to .be resu411ed. through J:gal process~ it caO.no_t. be said that any veSted_.right~~ of th~ tiaiisf!ree~ ire alfecfed. Transreiees .or' granted laos\n\n- with full knOwledgC of. the legal position that the trans.fers made in their favour in contravcUtion ofthe _terins Qf grant or any, law. rule_ or_ regulation\n\ngornirig suchgral)i:. are lible to be defaied in Ia~. canrioi and do not h<l; ye in law or equity; a genuine or feat .grieVance that the\"ir defeiisibte titt~ in· su, ch . gfallted lands so -tranSferrCd iS, ill fact, bein3 defeated . and they • afe_ b::ing _\\ . di$pOssessed _ Or uCh 1ands Jrom -whiCh they were. in law -Hable-· to be\n\n.. d.ispossessod by.process Of law, [S.14F-H, s.LSAC]. .. . . .\n\n, . ·., • 2 :· 2. ·. The position. will, ho--'evir, be somwhit different where the . ·.\n\n.. c\n\n ···. transferees' ha Ve acquirCd Such granted _lands not in violation of any term of the .·. - intor' any law regUlaOrig such grant as a.tsO where :any transferee who maY\n\nhaye acqulrCd-a defeasible titlC insUchgranted. lands by the transfr-therof in' coi:itravention of the terfils \"or the grant_ or apy_ law regulating stich grant -- . q) _has perf:cted his litte by pr:s~iptfo~ of time or i;:ithe[ise. [lSC-D] :. ··, -....\n\n. . -. .... .-·. -.. ' . '. , .. ··:· ·.-· . .. .2 o 3~ But where the1transferee acquires only a dcfeasible title liable to be defeated in accord.in.cc with law,. avoida.nce o( such d, feasibletitle Wh.ich still . . remains liable to bt defe; ited in accorda°-'e with law_ at. the date of commence\n\nnientof the, Act and recovery of thC posstssion of such granted 1and on the\n\n :E basis of the provisiOns Contained in'Ss. 4 & 5 of the Act- -cannoi be said to be. ' coriStitutionally inv.1.tid arid such a pr0Visi9n cannot be termed as Uncorisci9na- .. ble_,.unjust aµd a_rbitiai:y. [.5150:.E],_ · -, '.· . 3: C Grnted lands 'were .. intended. fr the benefit nd enjoyment of ,_the ori_ginal &ran tees whO h1ppen' to '\"betoO.g t~ thC.; SchCduled oistes'and ·\n\nScheduled ·.Tribes .•. The. condition.'. impo<ied .againSt ·the tiansfer fof a Parti-\n\n'F . cular period of such gradted land's which : wefe: 'grallted essen.tialfy_ for the: benefit Of the grantees c3nnot be-said to constitute ally unreasonable restric-. . . . tion. The granted 'lands wer~ nOt _in the nature o~ proPrties acquired 3.:0d ..\n\nheid by the i;; r, antee~ n the Sense of acquisitio_n, or_ hOtding r P.roPei-t; r •within , ··.\n\nthe meaning .of Art •. 19 ( lf (fJ of the -Constitution. ·.It was a -case' of a 'graoi byt_he ow Der of the. lafi~ -to the grantce for the possession \"and enjoymetit\n\n.. ; G Of thC gfanted I.ands by the. &ran.tees and the Prohibition ontrcirisfer of Such . • granted lands for the specified period was an \"essential term. or c'ondition on the basis of\"which the grant was mJde.-. The prohibition on .trinSfer was not for an indefinite per-i¢d . or perpetual.: It 'was_onty for a pa_tticular per10d,-· the-:'\" .'fi. obji:ctbeing that the grantees shou_1d. enjoy the gtanted lands them'lelves at . least for the period dring. which the. pr'ohibition_ was to remain operative.\n\nPersons belonging to scheduled Castes an.d scheduled tribes:- to whom the landS -:. _ -B were granted were,_ because of their poverty, lack of educ3.tion arid general back wardness, exi, iloited }'i various persohS. W&O could and would take advantage Or . . . . .. '\n\n$06\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS' [19o4j 3 s.c; il.. .- .A hon~ fide the. said plight or those poor persons for depriving them of th:eir lands.\n\nThe Imposi:ion 9f the condition of prohibition on transfer for a pafticular period could not,.- therefore, be con.sidercd. _to constitute anyunreasonable i:estrictiol'l on the right of the grantees to dispose of the granted lands. The imposttion Of such a condition pnprohibition in the very nature of the graD.t Was perfectly valid and legal. [575G-H, 5HiA-B, E-FJ\n\nD '.\n\nG ·\"\n\n3 : 2. rhe. transferees of the grnted lands from the original grantees,\n\nacquird the lands improperly and illegally in Contravention of the condition imposed o'n such transfers. Such transferees must have be.en aware and nlust \"'in any event be deemed to have been aware of the condition regarding the ·.prohibition 90 transfer and they cannot be C<?nsideied to . be bona fide trans• ferees for value. sUch persons acquired inthe granted lands only avoidable title which was liable to b-: defeated and possession of such lai:J.ds cOulQ: be. resumed from.such trnsferees. Such a person who only acqu'ires a defeasible legal right cannot make \"a grievance of any violation o, f Art, .19 (1) (f) of the cOnstitufion, when the defe\"\"sibie legal right is, in fact, defeated by appropriate ,_ legal action· or b}'t any suita_ble provision enacted in an Act passed \"by the co.inpetent legislature. Further .in most cases such transferees have afier the transfer, Which -is liable o be avoided in accord_ance With law, elljoyd for a. sufficiently tong period the benefits cf ., lands transferred to them before the lands could be recoveied from them Art. 1.9 (I) (f), therefore, did not invali ' dates. 4 of the Act. [516G-H, 517A-BJ\n\n3: 3. The right.or. property which a transferee acquires in the ted Jantls, is _a dfeasibteright and the-- transferee renders himself liable tp lose his\n\nrigM or property at the instance of the granter. This kind of defeasible right of the transferee in the ga1l.ted lands cannot be considered io be ProPerty as contemplated in art. 31 and 31A. The nature of the right of the tranfseree in the gra1\\ted lands on transfer ·.of such lands in breach of\"the condition • prOhibition _relating to -_such,-· transfer, the object of such grant and the terms therefor, alsO the h\\w governingsuch grant~ and the object and the. scheme of the pree:nts Act enacted for the benefit of the weaker _sectiorrs of our community, clearly go to .indicat~ that there is in this case no deprivation of slich right or proRerty as may attract the provisions of Art.;31 and 31A of the Con stitution. (517C-G)\n\nWith the enactment of the Act, the, voidabl~ rjght or title of the transferee in the grant lands l)ecornes void and the transferee is left with no riglit or prop.erty in. th:: granted lands. The landswhich are sought to' be...~ recovered from t'hctransferees of the granted lands are lands in.which the transferees cease to, have any interest orproperty. The effect of ttie:· provisions contained in ss. 4 & s-of the Act iS that the di.::fasible right or interest Of the transferees .in the granted lands is defeated and the voidable tranaction is rendeied void. AS soon as such transferees are rendered void by Virtue of the provisions of the Act transferee does not have any right in the grauieci lands so transferred, and possesion is sought to be recoveid of Sqch lands in which .the transferees have lo.st_ their right and interest. TherCfore, the question cf acqUistio.p_ of any property by the State or any modification_ or extiilguishmept of right of prope:rty does not realiy arise and Art. 3IA carinot be applied. 'TheJefOre, there is no infringeme:nt of Aits~ 31.&.3JA of the Constitution. [5180-H)\n\n. }, '\n\n, •\n\n. '\n\n! •\n\nMt-NCHBGOWDA V. KARNATAKA 501\n\n4. The S)!:ial pr)visiJns m td! for the re; umption of granted lands originally granted to t:\" .m nb :rs of S:h, dJld Castes ad Scheduled Tribes and resoration -Of the same to the original grantees or their heifs and legal .' representatives and' falling them to other mmbers of these communities do not' infringe Art. 14 of the Constitution. This Act has undoubtedly been passed for the benefit of members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes who are recognised as backward citizens and weaker sections in the country; There cannot' be any mannerof doubt that persons belonging to Scheduled Castes aQ.d Sche4_uled Tribes can be considered to be separa\"te and distin<;:i classes particularly in thi;:: , matter or Preservation and protection of their economic and educational interests. In view of the peculiilr plight of these two classes, the Constitution in~Art. 15 (4) makes specific 'mention of these two classes and in Art 16 (4) speaks of backward class of citizens. One\n\nof the directive princrples as contaihed in Art.· 46 of the Constitution enjoins , that \"the State shall proinote with sPecial care.and educational and econOmic interests of the weaker sections of the people . and in partiCular of the Scheduled C:rstes and Scheduled Trib!; s ii\\d shall protect them frqm social jnjustici:: and all forms of exploitation.\" The object of this A_ct is 'to pfotect and preserve the economic: interests of persons belonging to ScP, edule Castes-and Seheduled Tribes and to preve~_t their exploitation. For the purpqse of the present Act, the-classification has a clear nexus to the object sought to be achieved.\n\n. .\n\n[519 A-F)\n\n5. It 'is true there was no provision for any appeal ita the original\n\n'>.. ct. It may bo that such a provision wls not ofigina1ly made, as the Legislature 'might have felt that providing for ai:i appeal -'Yould unnecessarily prOlong the proceedings and might, defeat the purpose of the act. However, the Karnataka Scheduled casteS and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition . of Transfer of Certain Lands) (Amend1nent) Act, 1984 (Karnataka Act Ill of\n\n1984) now provides a suitable provision for appeal against an order of the Assistant Commissioner under s. 5A. [519GH, 5!0A]\n\n C1viL A\"PPELLATE JuR1smcnoN : Civil 1ppeal Nos. 3U6 cand2608 of 1983 etc. etc.'\n\n(From the , Judgments and Orders dated 30th .September, 1982 & 5th October, 1981 of the Karnataka Hig, h Court in Writ Petition Nos. 12680 and 12681/1979.etc. etc.\n\nFor the Appellants/Petitioners.\n\nU.R. La/it Shanti Bhushan, B.P. Singh •. S.N. Kacker, S.L.\n\nBenadikar' and M/s. PR Ramassesh, KR Nagaraja; B.P. Singh, M. '-Veerappa, N. Nettar & K.N. Bhat, C.R. Soma Sekharan, TVS\n\n.:t.farasimhu/u, Vineet Kumar, S., Laxminarasu, Swaraj Kaushal, Mukul Mudgal, A.G. Ratnaparkhi, R. Satish, C.K. Ratnaparkhi, S.K.\n\nMehta, SSJavali, S.N. Bhat, Naunit Lal, Kai/ash Vasdev, Ms. i.clita Kohli, Manoj Swarup, Ashok Benadikar, AG Ratnaparkhi For the Respondents :\n\nR.P. Bhat, S.N, Kacker, L.N. Sinha~Swaraj Kaushal, Girish <; hander a11d Miss A. Subhilshini. •\n\nThe Judgment of the Curt was delivered by\n\nSUPREME COURT REP OR l'S . [1984] 3 s.c.ll. . .\n\nAMARENORA NATH SEN, J. The question for 'considera.tiQn _in Civi!'Appeal No. 3116 of 1983 by certificate grahted by tile\n\nHigh Court is, whe\"ther the Karnataka Sched11led Castes and Seheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 (hereinafter referred to as the Act for the sake of b.revity) is constitutionally valid or not.\n\nThe writ petition oµt of which this appeal arises -. was filed in the High Court along with a number of other writ petitions filed by various other parties challenging the validity . of th~ Act. The High Curt for reasqns recorded in the judgment nphfd. the validity of the Act and dismissed this writ petition _and also the\n\nother writ 'petitions: The High Court granted certificate ilnder Arts.)32 and 133 of the C6nstitution an1 this appeal has' been~\n\nfiled with the certificate granted by the High Court. As 'the identical question is involved in all these appeals and special leave petitions, this judgment will also dipose of all the appeals and special leave petitions. . ·\n\nIn as _much as. the vires f the Act has been challenged ess'entially on legal grounds, it docs not' become necessary for' •118 to set out the facts at any great length. The broad facts cominon to: all wri_t petitions which were filed in the High Court may, however, be briefly noted. The Petiiioners are purchasers .of lands which bad been originally granted. by the State to persons . belonging to Scheduled Castes or Scheduled ._Tribes.\n\nSuch lands had been originally granted . to persons belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes under the :provisions of Law ot on '.the • basis of rules or regulations governing such grafit. After the passing of the .Act _in question notices hav~ been issued b;,\"the appropriate authority to the _transferees of such lands to llhow cause as to why the lands transferred to then should not be resumed for being restored to the original grantees -or their legal heirs or for disiribution otherwise to the members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in accordance with the provisions of the Statute, as the transfers in their favour are in view of.th.e provisions of the Act nqw null and void.\n\nBefore we proceed to deal with the various -contentions railed\n\n0'n behalf of the a:ppellant and the other petitioners in the other writ pejjtions, .it would be appropriate to set 0ut the relevant provisions of the A ct. - Granted land is defind in S. ~(b) of the mean \"any land iiranted by the Government to a, person 'belonging to any of the\n\n• ~-\n\nMANCHEGOWDAy, KARNATAKA (A.N. Sen, J.) 509\n\nScheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes and includes land A allotted or granted to such person under the relevant law for the time being in force relating to agrarian reforms or land ceiling or abolition of Inams, other than that relating to hereditary offices or rights and the word \"granted shall be construed accordingly\". #\n\n' .\n\nSections 4 and 5 of the Act read as follows_: .\n\nJb \"S. 4. Prohibition. of transfer of granted land-(1) Notwithstanding anything in any law, agreement, contract or\n\ninstrument, any transfer of granted land made either before or after the commencement of this Act, in contravention of the terms of the grant of such land or the law ,, roviding for such grant, or sub-section (21 shall. he. null and void and no right, title or interest in such land shall he conveyed or be deemed ever to have conveyed by such transfer.\n\n(2) 'No person shall, after jbe commencement of this Act, transfer or acquire by transfer any granted land without the previous permission' of the Government.\n\n(3) The provisions of suh'section (I) and (2) shall . apply also to the sale of any land in execution qf a decree or order of a civil Court or any award or order. of any other authority.\n\nS. 5. Resumption or restitution of granted lan_ds . ..:...\n\n(1) Where, on application by any interesed person or on information given in writing by any per; on or su'o motu, and after such enquiry as he deems necessary, the Assistant Commissioner is satisfied that the transfer of any granted land is null and void under sub-section ·(I) of Section 4, he may.-\n\n(a') by order . take possession of such land after evicting all persons in possession °thereof in such manner as may be prescribed : Provided that no such order shall be made except after giving the person affected a reasonable opportunity ·\n\nof being heard .;\n\n(b) restore such land to the original grantee or his legal heir. Where it is not reasonably practicable to restore the land to such grantee or legal heir, such land shall be deemed, to have vested in the government free\n\nfr<;>m all enumrances, The Government may grant sue~\n\n• B'\n\nF ':\n\nG'•.:\n\nSIO\n\nSUP!\\EMB COURT REPORTS\n\n(1984] 3 S; C.R.\n\n.land io a person belonging to any of the Scheduled Castes\n\nor Scheduled Tribes in accordance with therules relating to grant of land. ·\n\n(2) Any order passed\" under sub-section (I) shall be finai\"and shall not be questioned in any court of law and no injunction .shall be granted by any court in res{lect of any proce'eding taken or about to be taken by the Assis tant Commis.Sioner in_ purswmce of any power conferr.ed by or under this Act.\n\n(3) For the purposes of this sectio11, where any gran ted land is in the possession ofa person, other than the original grantee or bis .legal heir, it shall be presume<>, until _ihe contrary is proved, that such person has acquired the land by a transfer which is null and void under the provisions of sub:section (!). of section 4.\n\nTh~ valiility of the Act has been challenged mainly because of the provisio11s contained in ss. 4 and 5 of the Act which purport to declare transfers of 'granteq land.' made either before or after the commencement of the Act in contravention of the terms of. the grant of such.land or the'law providing for such grant null and void and confer powers on the authority to take .possession of such land after evicting all' persons in possession thereof and to restore . such lands to the orfginal grantee or his legal heirs and where it is not reasonably practicable lo so retore the land to a person belonging to the Schedule.ct Castes o\"r Scheduled Tribes in accordance with the rules relating to the grant bf such land. It may be noted that the validity of the Act in so. far as it imposes prohibition on transfer of granted land after the commencement of the Act has not been challenged and the principal ojection to the validity of the Act is taken because of the provisions in th~ Act seeking to nullify the tranfers of granted lands• effected before the commencement of the Act.\n\nThe main grounds on which the validity of the Act has been . challenged are : L Granted lands which had been transferred by the\n\ngrane in contravention of the prohibition imposed\n\non the transfer of any granted land under the terms of the grant, under the\" rules relating to such grant\n\nor under anY law governing such grant, renders the tran.sfer voidable and not void and it is not permissible to nullify such transfers and tq ~clare the111- void by any provisions of the Act;\n\n~ ... '\n\n' '\n\n• MllNCHEGOWDA v. KA_RNATAKA (A.N. Sen, J.) Sil\n\nThe _power conferred on the authority to recover possession of the granted land on the basis of the provisions contained in the Act defeating the vested rights of , the purchasers who have acquired such lands bona fide for consideration and have been in enjoyment and possession thereof for years is unconscionable unjust and invalid :\n\n3. Ss. 4 and 5 of the Act which empower the authority\n\nto take possession bf the granted lands without payment of any compensation are violative of Art. 19(l)(f) of the Constitution.\n\n_4. \" Ss. 4 and 5 of the Act contravene Art. 31 and the. second proviso of cl. (I) of Art. 3.IA of the Constitution and are, therefore, void.\n\nInvalidation of tra)lsfers of land granted to persons .belonging. to only scheduled castes and scheduled tribes and resumption of only such granted lands are discriminatory and they infringe Art. 14 of the Constitution.\n\nIt may be qoted that these very grounds were urged before the High Court. . The High Court hls carefully considered all the ·\n\narguments advanced on behalf of the appellants who were the petitioners in the writ petitions filed before it. The High Court in its judgment has referred to the relevant rules governing the grant and . has also discussed the v_arious decisions w1!ich were cited before it. The High Court for reasons stated in tlie jugdment negatived all thecontentions and upheld the validity of the Act.\n\nWe may mention that in addition to the aforesaid grounds a further ground has a!so been .mgefi;, before us and the said ground is that as the Act m queshon does not provide for an appeal against the order of th_e competent authority, the Act should be held to. be unreasonable,. unjust and unconscionable and should, therefore, be struck down .\n\n. Before w~ proceed to examine the contentions .. iaisecl before us, it will be appropriate to refer to the objects and reasons for the passing of th'is p'articular ena1; tment. The objects and reason~ flUl as follows ;\n\n.. \" .. -~.\n\n'·\n\n--~------\n\n512 -\n\n.. SUPREME COURT REPORTS . ' .:. [1:9S4j 3 S.C, R •. ·.·\n\n\"The non-alienatioO: clase contained in the exis.: • .:1 .. Land Grant Rules and the provisions for conc~IE:tion .;, . ' grants where the land fs .alienated in ccntravcnfa n of the\n\nabove said pr?vision: are found not su.flicient tc} help . 'the 'Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes grantees. ·\n\nwhose. ignorance and poverty. _hav.e been expioite.d by· persons. belon'ging_ to the afilucnt and powerful sections · to.obtain sales or mortgages either for a. nominal consi-·\n\nderation or for no consideraiion at all and ·.they have become the-victims of circumstances .. _ To.fulfill the pur- pose of the grant, the land even i.f it ; iias' been alienated, . should be-restored to the origin_al grantee. or his heirs.\n\n-·· ..\n\n. . Th~ Government .of India bas· al; o bee~ urgig the State Governirlent .for enactipg _.alegislation to prevent ... alienation oflands granted to Scheduled Castes and Sche- . ·. duled Tribe~ by .Government orithe_ lines ofthe'model. legislation prepared by _it and cjrciilated to .the . State .· GoverD.ment\". · ' ·\n\n- It is no doubt trl.le that before th~ passing of . the preset At ··.\n\n. J\"\n\n'\\ :\n\n any transfer of granted land iii breah of the coditfon relating to _. . prohibition on such transfe~ would not. have the \"effect of rendering .·\n\nthe transfer 'void and would make any. such transfer only voidable. . . ' r . The present.Act seeks to introduce a change in the legal position ...\n\nThe prohibition oi;. transfer.of granted land hd been imposed by · law, rules or. regulations ' governing'. such grant or_ by -the terms .. of the grant ... The relevant provisions imposing such P!ohibition : by rules, 'reguldions and laws have been. referred to in the judgment f the High Court; 1( is quite clear that the cindition , regarding proh}bition of transfer of grantee! land had been intro-·\n\n.. du_ced iri the interest of the grantees for the purposes of upkeep of\n\n' the grants a_nd for preventing the economically dominant sections of. _.the coinniunity from depriving the grantees wlio belong to the wak.er . ·. sections o(the people\"oftheir enjoyment and po'ssessiori of these Ian_ds and for sa(eguading their interests against any exploitation by the richer 'sections in regard to .the . enjoyment. an~ .possession of these . lands granted essentially for their . benefit, As the Statement of • Objects and Reasons indicates, this ._ rrohibition oi:i 'transfer of . · .f.. . gianted ; iand has ·. noi . proved to l:e a sufficiently strong . safe-. . guard in t!ie matter of preserving grants in the hands of the grante~·\n\n.. --_ . -. . +-.-.• •• _. . -. ,_ .·•·. , .• .,,,\n\n.. ..\n\n.\\·\n\n~ .\n\n' !\n\n........ ,\n\n\"'\n\nMA~; C'.IIEG.OWDA v. KARNATAKA (A.N: Sen: J.) $13\n\n.be!on;; ing b t!{e Scheduied Castes and.' Scheduled Tribes ; and .in , '!iolation of the prohibition on . tansfer of the granted land, irans~. fers of such lands on a large scale to the serious detriment of the interests of these poorer sections of the people belonging to the .\n\nScheduled Castes and Schduled Tribes had taken pface. In view ofthis unfortunate. experience the Legislaiure in its wisqom and . - in pursuance of its declared policy of safeguarding, protecting and ·\n\n.. improving the conditions of these weaker . sections of the commu- . nity; tho'ught it fit to bring about this. change in the !egalposition by providing that any such .. transfer. except in ierms of the provisions of the Act will be null . and void and not merely voidable •. ·.\n\nTh~ Legislature no doubt is perfectly competent in pursuance of the aforesaid policy to provide that such transactions will be nulr and void and nofmerly voidable. :Even undei the Contract Act any contract which is opposed to' public policy. in rendered void.\n\nThe State, consistently with .the directive princjples cf.the <;:onsti: tution, has made it a policy. and. very rightly, to Neserve, protect arid promote the interests of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled . '.Tribes which by and large form the: weaker .and poorer sectios of the people in our country. This may be said .to be the delared policy of the State.· and the. provision . seeking to nullify . such transfers is quite in keeping with the policy of the State which may. properly be regarded as public policy. for . rendering social and economic justice to these weaker sections of the soCiety. · . . .. \"- . .- .' . . .\n\nin pursurice of this policy, the Legislature is undoubtedly . competent to pass. an enactment providing thattransfers of such granted lands will be void. and not merely voidable for properly safegiiarding and protecting the fotersis of the Scheduled Castes ·and Scheduled Tribes for whose benefit only these lands had ben gtanted; ·, Even in the. absence of any such .statutory provisions, the transfer cir granted lands in contravention of the terms of the grant . or in breach of any law, rule or regulation covering such grant will .. clearly be voidable and the resum.ption of such granted lands .after . avoiding the voidable transfers in accordance with.' law . will be ·permitted. Avoidance oC:such voidable transfers and resumption cf the• grnted lands. ih; ogh process of_ law is boUnd to take_tim~.\n\nAny negligen.ce and delay on the part of the authorities entitled to. ·take action to avoid such transfers through appropriate legal process for resumption of such grant may be further impediments in the 111atter'of llVOiding such ttansfers and rernrnption ofpossessfon of\n\n. B\n\n' .\n\nE .\n\n•. G\n\nH\n\n.- .\n\n¥ ;•· •\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS .\n\n[1984] 3 S.C.R. ., ...\n\nthe granted lands. Prolonged iega\\ proceedings wii1-udoubtedly I\" be prejudicial to the foterests of , th.; members or' the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe for whose.benefit the granfod .lands are.· . . intended to be resumed. As-transfers of granted lands in contra- . :. vention of the terms of the grant or any law, regulation :or rule governing such grants car{ be legally avoided and possession of such .. • . lands can be recovered through process oflaw, it must be hel_d tliat · ·:r\\ . the .Legislature i'or the purpose of avoiding delay. and hairassment . of. protracted litigation and .in furthering its object of speedy restoration of tliese granted lands to the members of the weaker ..:ommunities is perfectly: cimpetent to.make .suitabl~ provision for ; resumption of suh granted lands by.· stipulatiqg fothe enactment that transfers of such'. land$ i~ . contravention of .. the .terms of the . grant or any regulation, rule or. law regulating such' grant will be _y vo_id and in. providing. a suitable. procedure consistent with the\n\nprinciples of natural justice for achieving this purpose' without ·· · . recourse to prolonged litigation .iri Court in the' larger interests of benefiting tlie members of . the Scheduled Castes: and Scheduled 'Tdbes. '· .· ... ' ... . , . We iny note that the cowpetence', of the legislature to declare\n\nany transfer of granted land in contravention of the terms. of grant '.· of snch land ii~ any rule; regulation or law providing for sucbgra nt . or without ihe previous permission of the _Government iii case I ' of transfers after the pass.ing. of .the Act bas not been .seriously disputed and cannot possibl.Y be disputed. . . . .\n\n;. What hs been strngly urged before us ii that'the.provisions corttained in s. 4 in. so far as the 'same seek to nullify transfers effected before the Act had coine into force, are invalid. ... •,.\n\n ... -.\n\n- . ~\n\n. Any person who aquires such grantd lalld by irasfer fro~ . ·. ·\"' . 'the original grantee in breach of the condition elating to prohibi- :\n\nti on bn such transfer musi nec~sarily be . presumed 'to be: aware of . the prohibition imposed on the transfer of sucli granted land. Any-\n\n.bcdy who acquires such' granted . land , in ; contra-verition . o(the\n\nprohibition relating to transfer of such': granted land cannot be ' . considered to be a bona fide purchaser for . value: and. every such. ,, , transferee acquires to his knowledge \"niy . a voidable title fo the /' . granted land;' . The title aquired' by such trnsfer is defeasible. and . . is liable to. be defeated by an appropriate. action taken in thfa\n\n'regard; If the Legislatre >under' uch ircullistarices seek to · intervene in the interests of these weaker sections of the cc;>mmunity, .•\n\nMANCHEGOWDA v. KARNATAKA (A.N. Sen J.) 515\n\nand choose to substitute a speedier and cheaper .method of recovery of these granted' lands which were otherwise liable to be l'esmned through leg_al process, it cannot, in our opinion, be said that any vested rig.hts of the transferees .are affected. Transferees of.granted . lnds with full kno\"lledge of the legal position that the transfers made in .their favour 'in contravention of th.e terms of grant or any law, rule or regulation .governing suoh grant are liable to be defeated in law, cannot and do not have in law .or ·\n\nequity, a genuine or real grievance that their defeasible title in such granted lands so transferred is, in fact, being defeated and they are being dispossessed of such lands from which they were in .law liable to be dispossessed by process of law. The position will however, be somewhat different where the transferees have acquired such granted lands nQt in violation 'of any term of th~ grant or any law regulating such grant as also where any transfere who may h.ave acquired a defeasible title in such graated lands by tjie transfer\n\ntherof in contravention of the terms of the grant or any law regulating such grant has perfected his title by j1rescription oftime or otherwise. We shall consider such cases later on. But where the transferee acquire~ only a de(easible title liable to be defeated in accorclanee with law, avoidance of such defeasible title iwhich still : remains liable to be defeated in accordance . with law at the date of commencement of the Act and recovery of possession of such grante.d Jarid on the basis of the provisions contained in s. 4 ands .. 5 of the Act.cannot be said to be constitutionally invalid and such a provision cannot be termed as unconscionable, unjust and arbitrary.\n\nThe first two contention ra-ised on behalf of the petitioners are, therefore, over-ruled. ·\n\nThe next contention that Ss. 4 and 5 of the Act empowering the authority to take possession. of the granted lands without payment of any compensation are violative of Art. 19(1)(f) of the Constitution is without.any merii. Art . .19(1)(f) which was in force at the relevant time provided that all dtizens shall have the right\n\n\"to acquire, holcl and dispose of property.\"\n\nGranted lands were intended for the benefit and enjoyment of the original grantees who happen to belong to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. At the time of the grant, a condition had been imposed for protecting the interests of the miginal\n\ngrantees in th~ granted lands by restricting the transfer of the same.\n\nThe condition regarding the prohibitiop on transfer of such granted )ands for a.specified per(ql),.w:1s iposed b~ virtue of the specific\n\nc •\n\no ....\n\n. ' ' ..\n\n. ·. 516.\n\n. SUPREME COURT REPORTS . (1984] 3 s.C.R •\n\n. '\n\n. 'term in the grant itself or by r'easn of any law, rule o;· regulation . governing such g; ant. It' was undoulitedly open to ihe grantor. at · .. the time of granting lands. to. the original grantees to stipulate stich\n\n . a condition the condition being a term of the grant itself, and the condition was imposed in the interests of the grantee; Except on the basis of such a condition the granicir might not have made any . .such grant at all ... The condition iin!losed against the transfer fora . ·\n\nparticular. period of such granted· lands which were grated essentially for the benefit of the grantees cannot be said 'ta 'constitute , any unreasonable restriction. The .granted lands.were . not in the nature of properties acquired and held by the grantees in . the sense o(acqi; isition~ or holding of property within the ineaning of Art. 19(1)(£) of the Constitution. It was a case of a grant by the owner .of the land to the grantee for the possession and enjoyment of the granted lands by the grantees and the 'prohibition on transfer of such granted lands for the specified.· period was an essential term or cpndition on the basis of which the grant was made. It has to \"\n\n• '• ; - •, .\n\nI : . ' . be pointea out that the prohibition on transfer was pot for aii indefinite period oi perpetual. It was onlyfor a particuiar period, . the object being that .the graniees should enjoy the granted Jaiids :_ themseI-.es at leastfor the period during which the. prohibition was tci remain operative .. Experienc'e had shown that persons'belonging to scheduled° castes and scheduled tribes to v.hom the lands were granted were: because 'or their' poverty' lack of. e'ducation arid. general backwardness, exploited by various persons 'who. cou14' and would. take advanlage .of the sad plight. of these poqr persons for. depriving them of their lands. The imposition of the condition of . prohibition on transfer for a particular period could.not; therefore, . . be considered• to. constitute .any unreasonable restriction on' the right of the grantees tci :dispose of the granted )ands.\n\n0 The impositio~· • -of such' a condition on prohibltion in thevery nature of the grant . was perfectly valid andolegal. ·\n\n.Th~ transferees of th; granted , lands from the origiai.:· grantees, acquired the lands improperly _and illegally in. conttavention of. the conditio.n imposed -on such _transfers. Such transfe; ees must have been aware and must in any event be deemed\n\nto have been aware of the condition . regarding the prqhi\\>itioli on : transfer and they canoi be considerd to be bona fide transferees . · for value. Such persons acquired , in the granted• lands only a r voidable .title which was liable to be. defeated. and possession of such lands could be resumed from such trnrisferes. Such.a person ·.who only acquires a defeasible leg; I right cannqt II1ae a. grievanc~\n\n. ' }\n\nMANCiiEGOWDA v. KARNATAKA (A.N. Sen, J.J 511\n\nof any. violation •of Art. 19( I )(f) of the Constitution, when the defeasible legal right is, in fact, defeated by appropriate legal action or by any suitable - provision enacted in an Act . passed by the competent legislature. .It may further be noted\n\nthat in most cases such transferees have after the trans(fr, whichis liable to be avoided in accordance with law,· enjoyed for a :Sufficiently long period. the benefits of lands transferred to them before the fands could be recovered from them. Art. 19(1J(f), therefore, did not invalidate S. 4 of tlie Act.\n\nWe have earlir noticed that the title which is acquired by by a transferee in the t; ranted lands, transferred ill contravention of the prohibition against the transfer of the granted. lands, is a voidable.title which in law is liable to be defeated through appropriate action and possession of ; uch gra11ted lands transferred in. breach of the condition of prohibition could be recovered by the grantor. The right or. property which a transferee acquires in the granted lands, is .a defeasible right and the .transferee renders. himself liable to lose his right or prnperty at the instance of the\n\ngranior, We have further ob.served that by the enactment of this Act and particularly s, 4 ands. 5 thereof the Legislature is seeking to defeat the defeasible right o\"f the transferee in such lands without the process of. a prolonged legal action with a view fo speedy resumption of such granted lands for. distribution thereof the\" otiginal grantee or their legal representatives and in their absence to other members of the Scheduled.Castes and Scheduled Tribes Communities. Jn our opinion; this kind of defeasible right of .the transferee in the granted lands cannot be considered to be property as contell1plated in Art. 31 and 31-A .. The nature of the right of the transferee in the granted land on transfr of such lands. in breach of the ondit.ion of prohibition relating to such transfer, the object of such grant and the terms thereof, also the. !'aw governing such grants and the objeet and the scheme of the present .Act. enacted for the benefit of weaker sections of our community, clearly .go to indicate that there is in this case\n\nnO\" deprivation of such right or property as may attract. tlie provisions of Arts. 31 and .3·1-A of the Constitution.\n\nIn the case of Amar Singh v.. Custodian, Evacuee Property, Punjabl'l, this ourt while considering the provisions of A.dministratipn of Evacuee Property Act 1950 (XXXI of 1950) and the nature of right in the property allotted to a quasi-permanent\n\n(I) (1951) S, C.R, 801\n\nSl8 SU~REME COURT REPOJ.l.TS\n\n(1984) S.<;.R.\n\niillottee held that the interests of a quasi-permanenl allottee did not constitute' property within the meaning of Art. 19(1)(f), l (I) and 31(2) of the Constitution. .This Court observed at p. 834:\n\n\"Learned counsel for' tM Petitioners has strenuosly urged . that .under the quasi-parmanent allotment scheme . the allottee is entitled to a right to possession within the\n\nlimits' of the relevant notification and that such right to possession is itself 'property'. That may .be so in. a sense.\n\nBut it does not affect th.e question whether it is property so as to attract the protection of fu11damental rights under .\\he Constitution. If the totlity of the bundle of rights of the quasi-permanent allottee in the evacuee land constituting an interest in such land, is not property entitled fo protection of fundamental rights, mere posses&ion.ofthe land by virtue of 'such interest is not on any higher footing\"._ ·\n\nWith the enactment of the Act, vpidable right or the t.itle of the transferee in the granted lands becomes void and . the transferee is left with 110 right or property in .the granted lands.\n\nThe lands which are sought to be .recovered from the transferees of the granted lands are lands in . which the transferees cease to 'have any interest or property. The effect of the provisions contained in Ss. 4 and 5 of the Act is that the defeasible right or interest of the transferees in the granted lands is defeated and .the voidable transaction is rende.red void.\n\nWe have earliar held that it is c)e; rly open open to . the Legislature to declare void the transfers of granted lands in . contravention of the condition of prohibition OD' tra.1sfer. As soon as snch transfers are rendred void by virtue of the provisions of the Act, he : transferee does not h.ave any right. in the granted lands so 'tansferred, and possession . is souiht to be recovered of. such lands in which the transferees hav! lost-their rigb.t , ind interest Therefore, the question of acquisition of any property by the State or any : modification or extinguishment of right of property does not. really arise and Art. 31-A cannot be applied. We are, the.refore, of the opinion that there is no infringement of-Ar.t' 31 and Art.· SlA of the Constitution. We may further observe that this .aspect has been carefully and: elaborately eonsidered by the learned Judges of the High Court while holding thµt Arts. 31 and 31-A !Ire not violated. • ·\n\n;-._. , T\n\n. 'f\n\n\\. \"\n\nI ; ,\n\nMANCHEGOWDA V. KARNATAKA (A, N. Sen, J.) ' 519 • The next contention urged is that Ss. 4 and 5 of the Act, are violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution inasmuch as these sections make special provisins only with regard to Sheduled Castes and Schedul.ed Tribes to the _exclu<ion of persons belonging to 'other.\n\nComi; nunities. This Act has undo, pbtedly been passed for the benefit of membersof the Schedu!fd Castes and Scheduled Tribes who. are recognised as backward cifo:ens and weaker.sections in the country.· There cannot be any manner of doubt that persons belonging to Scheduled Castesand Schedulea 'tribes can be considered to be separate_ and distinct classes particularly in the matter of preservation and protectien:. of their economic and educational interests. ·. In view of the peculiar plight of these two classes, the Constitution in Art. 15(4) make.s specific meritio.n of t!iese two classes and in Aft . 16(4) speaks of backward class of citizens. One of the directive priiJ.Ciples as contained in Art. 46 of the Constitution enjoins ihat. ·\n\n\"the State shall promote with specbl care the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people and in particular ofthe Scheduled Castes and Schedu.led Tribes and shall protect them from social injustice and all forms of exploitation.\" The object of this Act is to protect and preserve the economic interests of persons belonging to Scheduled Castes and Schetluled _Tribes and to prevent their exploitation. f'or the purpose ofthe preserit Act, the classification has clear nexus to the object sought to' be achieved, We are, therefore, of the opini0n, that special provisions made for the resumption of granted , lands; originally granted to the members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and resoration of .the same to the . original grantees or their heirs and legal representatives and failing them ' to other members of these communities do not infringe Art. 14 of the Constitution.\n\nThe last contention raised is that the Act should be consider ed to be unjust and unereasqnable as no provision has been made for any app'eal against the order of the authority concerned. it is true that there was no provision for any appeal in the original Act. It may be that such a provision was not originally made, as the Legislature might have felt that providings for .an appeal would unnecessarily prolong the proceedings and might defeat the purpose of. the Act. '1n course of. the hearing, the. learned Counsel for the State had however submitted that in the interest ofjustice a provision regarding appeal would be incorporated ill the Act by an\n\np ropriate amendment of the Act It .has subsequently been\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1984) 3 S.C.R,\n\nbrought to our Qotice that by the Karnataka Scheduled Castes an~ .Scheduled Tribes (ProhibitiOn of Transfer of Certain LandSi\n\n(Amendment) Act, 1984 (Kar, nr.taka Act 3 of 1984) which received the asseI!t of the Goven1or on. the 29th day ofFebruary, i984 and came , to be published in the Karniitaka Gazette Extraodina ry on the 3rd of March, .1984, a suitable provision. for appeal against &n\n\norer of the Assistant Commissioner has been made in S. 5A which has b•en incorporated by the Amending . Act. We have had some 'doubt whether lack <;>f provision for an appeal in an enactment of this. kind would have infected the Act with the tice of procedural un.reasonableness and would have.ffected the Constltu• tional validity of the Act.· As, however, a suitable provision for an.appeal against the order ofthe Assistant Commissioner has been made by the Amending Act, this question does not survive to require any further consideration and it d6es not become necessary for us. to make any final pronouncement on it.\n\nThough we have cgme to the conclusion that the Act is valid, Yet, in our opinion, we have to make certain aspects clear. Granted lands which had heel) transferred.after the expiry of the period of prohibition do not come within th.e purview of the Act, and cannot be proceeded against under the provisions of this Act. The provisions of the Act make this position clear, as ss. 4 and 5 become applicable only when granted lands are transferred. in 'breach of the col)dition relating to prohibition. on transfer of such granted lands. Granted lands transferred befote the 'commencement of the Act nd not in contravention of prohibition on transfer: are clearly beyond the scope and purview of the present Act .. Also in case where grante~ lands had been transferred before the commencement of the Act in violation ()f the condition regarding prohibition on such transfer and the transferee who had initially acquired. only a voidable title in such granted lands had perfected his , title in the granted lands by prescription by long .and continuous enjoyment thereof in accordance with law before the commencement of the Act, such granted .lands would also not come within the purview of the present Act, as the title of.snchtransferees to the granted laqds has been perfected before the commencement of th.e Act.\n\nSince at \"the .date. of the commencement of the Act the title of.such trans~\n\nferees had ceased to be voidable by reason of acquisition of prescriptive rights on account of long and continued user for the\n\n} .\n\nI \\.\n\nMANC!lEGOWDA v. k~RNATAKA (A. IV. Sen, J.) Sii • ..\n\nI .\n\nrequisite period, the title of such transferees could no.t be renden; d void by virtue of the provisions of the Act without violating the constitutional guarantee. We rims!, therefore, re.ad down the provisions of the Act by holding that the Act will apply to transfers of granted lands made in breach of the condition imposing prohibition on transfer of granted lands only in tl)Ose cases where the title acquired by the transferee was still voidable'at the date of the commencement of the Act and had not lo; t its defeasib!e character at the date. when the Act came into force: Transferees of granted lands having a perfected and not a voidable title at the commence- .\n\nment of the Act must be held .to be outside the pale of the provisions of the Act.\n\nS. 4 of the Act must be so construed. as not to have the. effect of rendering void the title of any transfree which was hot voidable at the date ohhe commencement of the Act.\n\nWe may further observe that as the provision of appeafhas been incorporated by the Amending Ac\\ which received the assent of the Governor on the 29th day of l'ebruary, 1.984 and first, came . to be published in the Karnataka Gazette Extraordinary on the 3rd day of March, 1984, the Depuiy Commissioner to whom the appeal will be presented will no doubt take this fact into consi- . deration in deciding the question of !imitation in regard to any appeal which may be filed against an order of the Assistant Commis. sioner; if any •£Peal is preferred within a period of three months from the date tlic amended provision conferring the right of appeal came into.force, the Deputy Commissioner taking into considera•\n\ntion the fact that a period of three months has been prescribed for preferring an appeal from the date of the order\" of the Assist.ant Commissioner, may have no difficulty in entertaining the appeal by condoning the delay under S. 5 of the Limitation Act in terms of the power conferred on the Deputy Commissioner under the said Section SA, provided the Dep.uty Commissioner is .satisfied that the appeal is otherwise maintainable and the interest. of justice requires that the appeal sliould be entertained and not be thrown out on the ground of limitation.\n\nWith these obser.vations we .dismiss the appeals and the Special Leave Petitions with no order as to costs.\n\n.S.R.\n\nAppeals & Petitioi1s dismissed . 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Subhilshini. •"}}, {"text": "Laxminarasu", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20673, "end_char": 20684, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U.R. La/it Shanti Bhushan, B.P. Singh •. S.N. Kacker, S.L.\n\nBenadikar' and M/s. PR Ramassesh, KR Nagaraja; B.P. Singh, M. '-Veerappa, N. Nettar & K.N. Bhat, C.R. Soma Sekharan, TVS\n\n.:t.farasimhu/u, Vineet Kumar, S., Laxminarasu, Swaraj Kaushal, Mukul Mudgal, A.G. Ratnaparkhi, R. Satish, C.K. Ratnaparkhi, S.K.\n\nMehta, SSJavali, S.N. Bhat, Naunit Lal, Kai/ash Vasdev, Ms. i.clita Kohli, Manoj Swarup, Ashok Benadikar, AG Ratnaparkhi For the Respondents :\n\nR.P. Bhat, S.N, Kacker, L.N. Sinha~Swaraj Kaushal, Girish <; hander a11d Miss A. Subhilshini. •"}}, {"text": "Swaraj Kaushal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20686, "end_char": 20700, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U.R. La/it Shanti Bhushan, B.P. Singh •. S.N. Kacker, S.L.\n\nBenadikar' and M/s. PR Ramassesh, KR Nagaraja; B.P. Singh, M. '-Veerappa, N. Nettar & K.N. 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Bhat, Naunit Lal, Kai/ash Vasdev, Ms. i.clita Kohli, Manoj Swarup, Ashok Benadikar, AG Ratnaparkhi For the Respondents :\n\nR.P. Bhat, S.N, Kacker, L.N. Sinha~Swaraj Kaushal, Girish <; hander a11d Miss A. Subhilshini. •"}}, {"text": "A.G. Ratnaparkhi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20716, "end_char": 20732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U.R. La/it Shanti Bhushan, B.P. Singh •. S.N. Kacker, S.L.\n\nBenadikar' and M/s. PR Ramassesh, KR Nagaraja; B.P. Singh, M. '-Veerappa, N. Nettar & K.N. Bhat, C.R. Soma Sekharan, TVS\n\n.:t.farasimhu/u, Vineet Kumar, S., Laxminarasu, Swaraj Kaushal, Mukul Mudgal, A.G. Ratnaparkhi, R. Satish, C.K. Ratnaparkhi, S.K.\n\nMehta, SSJavali, S.N. Bhat, Naunit Lal, Kai/ash Vasdev, Ms. i.clita Kohli, Manoj Swarup, Ashok Benadikar, AG Ratnaparkhi For the Respondents :\n\nR.P. Bhat, S.N, Kacker, L.N. Sinha~Swaraj Kaushal, Girish <; hander a11d Miss A. Subhilshini. •"}}, {"text": "R. Satish", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20734, "end_char": 20743, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U.R. La/it Shanti Bhushan, B.P. Singh •. S.N. Kacker, S.L.\n\nBenadikar' and M/s. PR Ramassesh, KR Nagaraja; B.P. Singh, M. '-Veerappa, N. Nettar & K.N. Bhat, C.R. Soma Sekharan, TVS\n\n.:t.farasimhu/u, Vineet Kumar, S., Laxminarasu, Swaraj Kaushal, Mukul Mudgal, A.G. Ratnaparkhi, R. Satish, C.K. Ratnaparkhi, S.K.\n\nMehta, SSJavali, S.N. Bhat, Naunit Lal, Kai/ash Vasdev, Ms. i.clita Kohli, Manoj Swarup, Ashok Benadikar, AG Ratnaparkhi For the Respondents :\n\nR.P. Bhat, S.N, Kacker, L.N. Sinha~Swaraj Kaushal, Girish <; hander a11d Miss A. Subhilshini. •"}}, {"text": "C.K. Ratnaparkhi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20745, "end_char": 20761, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U.R. La/it Shanti Bhushan, B.P. Singh •. S.N. Kacker, S.L.\n\nBenadikar' and M/s. PR Ramassesh, KR Nagaraja; B.P. Singh, M. '-Veerappa, N. Nettar & K.N. Bhat, C.R. 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Bhat, Naunit Lal, Kai/ash Vasdev, Ms. i.clita Kohli, Manoj Swarup, Ashok Benadikar, AG Ratnaparkhi For the Respondents :\n\nR.P. Bhat, S.N, Kacker, L.N. Sinha~Swaraj Kaushal, Girish <; hander a11d Miss A. Subhilshini. •"}}, {"text": "SSJavali", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20776, "end_char": 20784, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U.R. La/it Shanti Bhushan, B.P. Singh •. S.N. Kacker, S.L.\n\nBenadikar' and M/s. PR Ramassesh, KR Nagaraja; B.P. Singh, M. '-Veerappa, N. Nettar & K.N. Bhat, C.R. Soma Sekharan, TVS\n\n.:t.farasimhu/u, Vineet Kumar, S., Laxminarasu, Swaraj Kaushal, Mukul Mudgal, A.G. Ratnaparkhi, R. Satish, C.K. Ratnaparkhi, S.K.\n\nMehta, SSJavali, S.N. Bhat, Naunit Lal, Kai/ash Vasdev, Ms. i.clita Kohli, Manoj Swarup, Ashok Benadikar, AG Ratnaparkhi For the Respondents :\n\nR.P. Bhat, S.N, Kacker, L.N. Sinha~Swaraj Kaushal, Girish <; hander a11d Miss A. Subhilshini. •"}}, {"text": "S.N. Bhat", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20786, "end_char": 20795, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U.R. La/it Shanti Bhushan, B.P. Singh •. S.N. Kacker, S.L.\n\nBenadikar' and M/s. PR Ramassesh, KR Nagaraja; B.P. Singh, M. '-Veerappa, N. Nettar & K.N. Bhat, C.R. Soma Sekharan, TVS\n\n.:t.farasimhu/u, Vineet Kumar, S., Laxminarasu, Swaraj Kaushal, Mukul Mudgal, A.G. Ratnaparkhi, R. Satish, C.K. Ratnaparkhi, S.K.\n\nMehta, SSJavali, S.N. Bhat, Naunit Lal, Kai/ash Vasdev, Ms. i.clita Kohli, Manoj Swarup, Ashok Benadikar, AG Ratnaparkhi For the Respondents :\n\nR.P. Bhat, S.N, Kacker, L.N. Sinha~Swaraj Kaushal, Girish <; hander a11d Miss A. Subhilshini. •", "canonical_name": "K.N. Bhat"}}, {"text": "Naunit Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20797, "end_char": 20807, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U.R. La/it Shanti Bhushan, B.P. Singh •. S.N. Kacker, S.L.\n\nBenadikar' and M/s. PR Ramassesh, KR Nagaraja; B.P. Singh, M. '-Veerappa, N. Nettar & K.N. Bhat, C.R. Soma Sekharan, TVS\n\n.:t.farasimhu/u, Vineet Kumar, S., Laxminarasu, Swaraj Kaushal, Mukul Mudgal, A.G. Ratnaparkhi, R. Satish, C.K. Ratnaparkhi, S.K.\n\nMehta, SSJavali, S.N. Bhat, Naunit Lal, Kai/ash Vasdev, Ms. i.clita Kohli, Manoj Swarup, Ashok Benadikar, AG Ratnaparkhi For the Respondents :\n\nR.P. Bhat, S.N, Kacker, L.N. Sinha~Swaraj Kaushal, Girish <; hander a11d Miss A. Subhilshini. •"}}, {"text": "Kai/ash Vasdev", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20809, "end_char": 20823, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U.R. La/it Shanti Bhushan, B.P. Singh •. S.N. Kacker, S.L.\n\nBenadikar' and M/s. PR Ramassesh, KR Nagaraja; B.P. Singh, M. '-Veerappa, N. Nettar & K.N. Bhat, C.R. Soma Sekharan, TVS\n\n.:t.farasimhu/u, Vineet Kumar, S., Laxminarasu, Swaraj Kaushal, Mukul Mudgal, A.G. Ratnaparkhi, R. Satish, C.K. Ratnaparkhi, S.K.\n\nMehta, SSJavali, S.N. Bhat, Naunit Lal, Kai/ash Vasdev, Ms. i.clita Kohli, Manoj Swarup, Ashok Benadikar, AG Ratnaparkhi For the Respondents :\n\nR.P. Bhat, S.N, Kacker, L.N. Sinha~Swaraj Kaushal, Girish <; hander a11d Miss A. Subhilshini. •"}}, {"text": "i.clita Kohli", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20829, "end_char": 20842, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U.R. La/it Shanti Bhushan, B.P. Singh •. S.N. Kacker, S.L.\n\nBenadikar' and M/s. PR Ramassesh, KR Nagaraja; B.P. Singh, M. '-Veerappa, N. Nettar & K.N. Bhat, C.R. Soma Sekharan, TVS\n\n.:t.farasimhu/u, Vineet Kumar, S., Laxminarasu, Swaraj Kaushal, Mukul Mudgal, A.G. Ratnaparkhi, R. Satish, C.K. Ratnaparkhi, S.K.\n\nMehta, SSJavali, S.N. Bhat, Naunit Lal, Kai/ash Vasdev, Ms. i.clita Kohli, Manoj Swarup, Ashok Benadikar, AG Ratnaparkhi For the Respondents :\n\nR.P. Bhat, S.N, Kacker, L.N. Sinha~Swaraj Kaushal, Girish <; hander a11d Miss A. Subhilshini. •"}}, {"text": "Manoj Swarup", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20844, "end_char": 20856, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U.R. La/it Shanti Bhushan, B.P. Singh •. S.N. Kacker, S.L.\n\nBenadikar' and M/s. PR Ramassesh, KR Nagaraja; B.P. Singh, M. '-Veerappa, N. Nettar & K.N. Bhat, C.R. Soma Sekharan, TVS\n\n.:t.farasimhu/u, Vineet Kumar, S., Laxminarasu, Swaraj Kaushal, Mukul Mudgal, A.G. Ratnaparkhi, R. Satish, C.K. Ratnaparkhi, S.K.\n\nMehta, SSJavali, S.N. Bhat, Naunit Lal, Kai/ash Vasdev, Ms. i.clita Kohli, Manoj Swarup, Ashok Benadikar, AG Ratnaparkhi For the Respondents :\n\nR.P. Bhat, S.N, Kacker, L.N. Sinha~Swaraj Kaushal, Girish <; hander a11d Miss A. Subhilshini. •"}}, {"text": "Ashok Benadikar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20858, "end_char": 20873, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U.R. La/it Shanti Bhushan, B.P. Singh •. S.N. Kacker, S.L.\n\nBenadikar' and M/s. PR Ramassesh, KR Nagaraja; B.P. Singh, M. '-Veerappa, N. Nettar & K.N. Bhat, C.R. Soma Sekharan, TVS\n\n.:t.farasimhu/u, Vineet Kumar, S., Laxminarasu, Swaraj Kaushal, Mukul Mudgal, A.G. Ratnaparkhi, R. Satish, C.K. Ratnaparkhi, S.K.\n\nMehta, SSJavali, S.N. Bhat, Naunit Lal, Kai/ash Vasdev, Ms. i.clita Kohli, Manoj Swarup, Ashok Benadikar, AG Ratnaparkhi For the Respondents :\n\nR.P. Bhat, S.N, Kacker, L.N. Sinha~Swaraj Kaushal, Girish <; hander a11d Miss A. Subhilshini. •"}}, {"text": "R.P. Bhat", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20913, "end_char": 20922, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U.R. La/it Shanti Bhushan, B.P. Singh •. S.N. Kacker, S.L.\n\nBenadikar' and M/s. PR Ramassesh, KR Nagaraja; B.P. Singh, M. '-Veerappa, N. Nettar & K.N. Bhat, C.R. Soma Sekharan, TVS\n\n.:t.farasimhu/u, Vineet Kumar, S., Laxminarasu, Swaraj Kaushal, Mukul Mudgal, A.G. Ratnaparkhi, R. Satish, C.K. Ratnaparkhi, S.K.\n\nMehta, SSJavali, S.N. Bhat, Naunit Lal, Kai/ash Vasdev, Ms. i.clita Kohli, Manoj Swarup, Ashok Benadikar, AG Ratnaparkhi For the Respondents :\n\nR.P. Bhat, S.N, Kacker, L.N. Sinha~Swaraj Kaushal, Girish <; hander a11d Miss A. Subhilshini. •"}}, {"text": "S.N, Kacker", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20924, "end_char": 20935, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U.R. La/it Shanti Bhushan, B.P. Singh •. S.N. Kacker, S.L.\n\nBenadikar' and M/s. PR Ramassesh, KR Nagaraja; B.P. Singh, M. '-Veerappa, N. Nettar & K.N. Bhat, C.R. Soma Sekharan, TVS\n\n.:t.farasimhu/u, Vineet Kumar, S., Laxminarasu, Swaraj Kaushal, Mukul Mudgal, A.G. Ratnaparkhi, R. Satish, C.K. Ratnaparkhi, S.K.\n\nMehta, SSJavali, S.N. Bhat, Naunit Lal, Kai/ash Vasdev, Ms. i.clita Kohli, Manoj Swarup, Ashok Benadikar, AG Ratnaparkhi For the Respondents :\n\nR.P. Bhat, S.N, Kacker, L.N. Sinha~Swaraj Kaushal, Girish <; hander a11d Miss A. Subhilshini. •", "canonical_name": "S.N. Kacker"}}, {"text": "L.N. Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20937, "end_char": 20947, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U.R. La/it Shanti Bhushan, B.P. Singh •. S.N. Kacker, S.L.\n\nBenadikar' and M/s. PR Ramassesh, KR Nagaraja; B.P. Singh, M. '-Veerappa, N. Nettar & K.N. Bhat, C.R. Soma Sekharan, TVS\n\n.:t.farasimhu/u, Vineet Kumar, S., Laxminarasu, Swaraj Kaushal, Mukul Mudgal, A.G. Ratnaparkhi, R. Satish, C.K. Ratnaparkhi, S.K.\n\nMehta, SSJavali, S.N. Bhat, Naunit Lal, Kai/ash Vasdev, Ms. i.clita Kohli, Manoj Swarup, Ashok Benadikar, AG Ratnaparkhi For the Respondents :\n\nR.P. Bhat, S.N, Kacker, L.N. Sinha~Swaraj Kaushal, Girish <; hander a11d Miss A. Subhilshini. •"}}, {"text": "A. Subhilshini", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20991, "end_char": 21005, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "U.R. La/it Shanti Bhushan, B.P. Singh •. S.N. Kacker, S.L.\n\nBenadikar' and M/s. PR Ramassesh, KR Nagaraja; B.P. Singh, M. '-Veerappa, N. Nettar & K.N. Bhat, C.R. 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{"document_id": "1984_3_51_58_EN", "year": 1984, "text": ".. . • .•\n\nv.S.TALWAR . . . v.\n\nPREM CHANDRA SHARMA\n\nMarch I, 1984\n\n s; MuRTAZA FAzAL Au, A. VARADARAIAN AND\n\nRANGANATII M1s:KA, JJ. . ,\n\n• _ Com true ti on .0/ dcument1, :Principie o/-'!'rut meaning of claUst 12 of th•\n\nieas~ deed dated 5.l .19687 Mealli•g of ''offic1\"-Wh1th1r -'\"p1rso11al OjjiceH .in clause 12 would. mean that tht premi•eJ were ,,, out for composite purpostJ axi not for residentia/'purPoseJ and th1rtfor• eVictio11 under 1ectio• .14(1} (•)of the Delhi Rent Control Actannot_l1e I -\n\nPrem Chai:td Sharma was admitted intotenancy. of the suit prenlises under a lease deed dated 5th-January, 1968, clause 12, threof provided: . . . . - . .\n\n''That the lessee shall use _the premises !Or the ptirpose of Re!identia\\ Personal '!ffice only a•d llOl for convrurcial Purp•ses!'. /. • .• ' . The landlord; appellant, applied to the Jtent Controller on Mar;:h 4, 1972, (or evicti_on of the Respondent under section 14(1) (c) of the Delhi Rent Control Aci. 1958. Th~ rep_odent tenant obtained ICaVe to contest and pleaded i111er alia that the premises. were Jet out_ both for re1idential as also for office and the composite purpose of the.tenancY took the pre.mises out of the Purview of rcsi\n\n~Cntial accommodation. VTbe Coritroller did not accept tbC defence and pasied -' &n_orderforeviction.\n\nInrision, however,_ the High Court.rejected.the Jand ·.O lord's submissioD.: holding that the use ofthe_wOrd \"personal\" before ·officeu wa5intendcd to convey the idea that the-tenancy. was not for thepurpose ot accominodating a place of business and reversed the decision of eviction. HenCe _\n\nthe appeal_ Dy. th~ lanlord, after obtairitng special leave o! the C9ui-t.\n\nAllowing the appeal, the Co'urt: . . .\n\n -HE-LD: (ti The.word ~'offie\"' is used in different senses andin e3.h case that mea_ning must be assigned to it wh!Ch conform.s with the language U, Jed. Therefore, in the instant case, the High Court was not right in. picking one of the meanings giyen . in the chaffiber's dictionary aOd procding to 'the conclusion tha.t Hoffice'\" is certainly ~'not residence'' and a Jetting purpose. which . , includes office must be undCrstood to include a_ purpose other than residence , only. [54A, 55AB] ..\n\n. Macmillan v; Guest (1942) A.C. 561 ; Smt. Kaota\n\n (:hand_Surana, (1970) 2s.c.c. 232, rferred to. Kathuria. v. Manak • .\n\n• . .\n\n·.n.\n\nG ..\n\nJ. c\n\n• D\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS l!984) 3 S.C.R\n\n- 2:1. Law is fairly se.ttled that in construing a document the ordinary rule is to give effect to the normal and natural meaning of the words employed in the document itself. [55 D-El • '\n\n. Krishna Bihari/al v. Guiab Chand and Others, [1971] Supp, S.C.R. 27; D.D.A. v. D.C. Kaushish, (1974) I S.C.R. 535; MonypenilJ v. Monyp.nny, [186ll 9 H.j:..C. 114; In re: Meredith, e;,;-parte Chick, [1879] JI Cb. D. 731, referred to. · . . •\n\n2:2. In_thC instant case if; is clear thlit the parties.to the doc.ument were anxious enough and took proper care in order to keep the user of the premises confined to resdential purpose; that is why it was expressly''.stipulated in the lease to prohibit commercial user. Even while permitting an office to be located, equal care was taken to put the)word_ •personal' before -'Office' to convey the idea that the tenant would not be ent!Ued tO transact official business connected with his avoca\n\ntion. Although .ordinarily an office would me'an the place where official business is transacted, a personal office in contradistii1ction to anoffice simpliciter or a -- commercial office would be a place where an outsider would not normally be admitted; commercial transactions would .not take place; there w\"ould be no fixity of the location and the tenant would be entitled to use any portion of the premises as his personal office and the like. Such a place is referred to as - personal office would essentially be residential and obviously while entering into the present -lease deed~ the parties were nof trYing to cteate a lease of premises for any other purposes. In para 2 of the document, there was no descriptioµ of an)' existin~· officroom and avilable for such u_se to the tenant, nor was space cal-marked' for any personal offiCe Out of this accommodation. It was in the discretion of the lessee to use any part as a personal office.\n\nEvery lessee, or for,- the' matter of that every petson maintaiiiing an acceptable standard of living does set ipart a porti6n of the aCcommodation available to hiin which can ansWer tlie description of a personal office. .Even the clause relating to payment\" of iax by the fossor do not support the stand of the lessee. As contemplated under tlie Tran.t'er of Property Act a document of 1ease normally provides the . rights and obiigations of both the lessor and the lessee. In. stipulating the rent\" payable for the use and occupation of the premises the lessor bad undertaken the liability of payment of.taxes.as-described therein as long as the premises were used for residence only. This clause necessarily me3.ns .that what had been stipulated was only residential user. In fact, the lessor bad been paying the taxes and the lessee had not been called upon to share the burden. ibis clause is an added prOvision to clinch the point in dispute against the tenant. Therefore the High Court, went Wrong in reversing the decision of the Rent Contro11er by merely, relying upon clause 12 of the lease deed. [SSC, 56F-G, 57A-B; DE, ·\n\nGR. ss' ABl\n\n 3. _ Though t}le .fact that the tenant has ben in occupation. for more than. 14 years after the litigatiori began will djsentitlC him to any furthertime to. vacate, taking judicial notice of the fact that these days an alternative premises would be very difficult to find, the Court considered it appropriate to grant time to tbi>,.Respondent: to yacatethe premises upto 31st December, 1984 subject to furnishing usual undertakin~ within for weeks or to face evictio!1 after f0\\11'\n\nwi; ek~,\n\n. ,\n\nv.S, :TALWAR v. P~EM <:liANDRA .(Rang11nath Misra, i.)\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : GivH Appeal No. 2999 Qf 1980.\n\nFroni the judgment and order dated the 22nd April, '1980 of A the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in C.R. Petition No. ;336 of A 1979.\n\n G:L. Sanghi, Mr. A.K. Ve, rma and S. Kashwafor the appellant'.\n\nD.D. Tfiakur, P.H. Parekh, P.K. Menon and R.K. Sharma. fQr B the respondent. \"\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nRANGANATH MISRf, J.-The Jandlor<l whose application for evic tion of the tenant, respondent before us, 'was rejected by the High Court by reversiiig the order of the. eviction passed by the Additional Rent Controllt has come before this Court on obtaining special leave and the short ppint arising for consideration is as fo the true meaning of a clause in the rent deed .\n\n. . The respondent was admitted into tenancy of the premises 'in question under a lease deed dated 5th January, 1968.\n\nClause '12 thereof provided :\n\n\"That the Jessee' shall use Residential/ Personal office\n\npurposes\". ·\n\n• the premises for the pw:'pose of only and Not for commercial (underlinings are our own)\n\nthe landlord, appellant before us, applied to the Controller on March 14, 1972, fol' eviction ofihe respondent under Section 14 (I) '(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 ('the Act' for short). The tent\n\nobtained leave to contest and pleaded, inter alia, that the premises were let out both for residential as also office ond the composite purpose of the tenancy took the premises out of the purview of reslden• iial accommodation. the controller did not accept the <lefence '!rid passed an order for eviction.\n\nThereupon, the tenant carried a revision 10 the Delhi High Court. and reiterated his defence that lhe tenancy was not for residential purpose. 'Fhe High Court found that there was no infirmity in the finding about the bona fide requirement but adverting to the conclusion on the letting purpose held :\n\n!'It is well known that premises tnay be let out .for residence only, for use as an office, for use as a shop alld for other com-\n\n• i:\n\nStJl'llllMB COURT REPORTS [1984j 3 S.C.R.\n\nmercial purpose. Once any of the latter purposes is combined with the purpose of use as residence, the premises let out for a\n\n.. composite purpose and for residence only.\n\nThe meaning of the word 'office', not defined in the Act, in the Chamber's dictio)lary is a place where business is carried on, Office\n\nis certainly not residence and a lettint purpose which includes office must be understood to include a purpose other than residence,9nly\". And ultimately concluded by saying :\n\n\"CJapse (e) of Section 14(1) is availabl;: as. a ground to seek eviction of tenants only, among other requirements, if the premise<i were let out for residence only and once the letting • purpose is shown to be composite, an eviction petition under Section 14(1) (e), without more, must fail.\" •\n\n' .. • • The High Court rejected the landlord's submission that the use of the word 'personal,.before 'office' was intended to convey the idea 1hat the tenancy was not for the purpose of accommodating a place of business._\n\n• • Counsel for the appellanttook us to the terms of clause 12 of the lease agreement and emphasised on the feature that ommercial purposes were clearly kept out and the lease was for residence and authorised the location of a personal office. He also relied upon the description of the prembes as re_sidential in the ap'plication made by the tenant to the controller for fixation of fair rent in respect of the . . very premises.\n\nThe word 'office' is used in different senses and in each case that . meaning must be assigned to it which conforms with. the language\n\nused. In Volume 67, Corpus Jµris Secundum at page 96, the following statement appears : \"The ten; n 'office' is one which is employed to convey various meanings, and no one definition thereof can be relied on for all purposes and occasions\". This Court has approved. the\n\nobseration Of Lord Wright in Macmillan v. Guest,1 where it was statecl :\n\n\"The word 'office' is of indefinite content. Its various meanings\n\n(1) [1942] A.C. 561.\n\n'r.l.l:..WAR v. PRBM CHANDRA (Ranganath Misra;.}.) 55 , cover four columns of the New English Disctionary ......... \"\n\nSee Smt. Kanta'Kathuria v. Maak Chand Surana(l).-. In this view of the position the High Court was not right in picking one of the meanings given to the word in the Chamber's dictiona, y and proceeding to the conclusion that 'office' is certainly not residence and a letting purpose which includes office must be understood to in.elude a purpose other than residence only.\n\nSection 2(i) of the Act defines- 'premi$es' to mean \"any building or part of a building which. is, or is intended to be, le.t separately for use as a residence or for commercial use or for any other purpose ..... . ... ... \" Respondent's counsel has argued that tenancy under the Act . can be for three purpose ;,(l) residential, (2) commercial and (3) for.any other purposes depending upon the use for which the premises are let out. Conceding that thi:, definition is capable of such an argumei; it being built up; a reference to the pleadings in this case shows that the permission in the rent deed of Iocating a personal office had been stated to be a commercial purpose. Great eare seems to have been taken by the-landlord while inducting the tenant under the _rent deed to put a total prohibition to commercial user' of the pre-· mises. That is why in clause 12 it has been specifically stated . that it is\"'not for commercial purposes\". In the back-drop of such a. provision in the lease agreement, the true meaning of the words 'personal office' has to be found out. Law is fairly settle~ that in construing a document the ordinary rule is to give effect to the normal and natural meaning of the words employed in the d.ocument itself. See Krishna Bihari/a/ v. Gulabchand and Ors. (') This Court in D.D.A. v. D.C.\n\nKaushish(') observed :\n\n\"There {at pages 28-29) 'Construction of Deeds and Statutes' by Odger's (Stb ed. 1967) the First General Rule of \"Interpretation formulated is : 'the meaning of the document or of a particular part of it is therefore to be so11ght for in the document itself'.\n\nThat is, undoubtedly, the primary rule of construction to which Sections 90 to 94 of the Indian Etjdence Act give statutory re cog. nition and effect......... Of course, 'the doeument' means 'the document' read as a whole and not piecemeal.\n\n(I) . [1970] 2 s.c.c. 232.\n\n(2) [1971] Supp. S.C.R. 27,\n\n(3) [1974) I S.C.R. 535.\n\nc.\n\n[1984i 3 s.c.R.\n\nThe rule stated above follo\"ws logically from the Literal Rule gf Construction which, U{lless its application produces absurd results must 0e resorted to first.\n\nTbis is clear from the following passages cited in Odgers' short book under the First Rule of Interpretation set out above :\n\nLord Wensleydale in M onypenny v. M onypenny1 said :\n\n\"the question is not what the parties to a deed may have intended to do by entering into that deed, but what is the meaning of the words used. in that deed; a most important . distinction in all cases of construction and the disregards of which often leads to erroneous conclusions\",\n\nBrett, L.J. ill Re Meredith, ex-parte Chick2 observed :\n\n\"I am c\\isposed to follow the rule of construction which was laid down by Lord Denman and Baron Parke.~.... They said that in.construing instruments you must have regard not to the presumed intention of the parties, but to the meaning of the words which they haw used.\"\n\nSinee we agree with this exposition of the law reference to the oral evidence or even to the tenant's documents would be wholly out of place. The. terms of the document if the.y make any good meaning must be given effect to.\n\nAll the provisions of the lease deed have to be read and in fact. with the assistance of counsel we h:ive read the same. more than once \" during the hearing.\n\nThe parties to the document. were anxious enough and took proper care in order to keep the user of the premises confined to residential purpose; that is why it was expressly stipulated in the lease to prohibit commercial user. Even while permitting an office to be located, equal care was taken to put the word 'personal' before 'office' to convey the idea that the tenant would not be entitled to transact official business connected with his avocation. Although ordinarily an office would mean the pla1:e where official business. is transacted ·\n\na personal office in contradistinction to an office simpliciter or a com mercial office .would be a plallC where an outsider would not normally\n\n(1) (1861] 9 H.LC. 114.\n\n(2) [1879] ll Ch. D. 731.\n\n~ ..\n\n-r\n\n\\/.$. f~LWR v. PRllM CHANDltA (Ranganath M; isra, i.) 57\n\nbe admitted;' commercial transactions would not take place; there .\n\nwoltl be no fixity of the location and the tenant would be entitled to•\n\nuse any . portion of the premises as his personal office. and the like. . .\n\nSuch a place if referred to as personal office would essentially be res.idential and obviously while entering into .the .present lease deed, the parties wer.e not trying to create, a lease of premises for any other purposes .as now contended by Mr. Thakur for the respondent. The . High Court, therefore, went wr&ng .in reversing .the decision of the.\n\nRent Controller by merely relying upon clause 12 of the lease deed. ·\n\nIt is relevant to note the description of the premises as given in the lease deed itself. Paragraph 2 of the document described the premises thus :\n\n\"The lessor hereby leases to the lessee tlie following• described premises of the entire house built on plot No. 125. Greater Kailash-1, New Delhi comprising of th_ree bed rooms with two bath rooms, drawing-cum-dining room, one kitchen one front ... and central veranda, front and back lawn, garage, servant qur-\n\n 'ir, above garage, a servant w<oc. and terrace.\"\n\n·.;~, '\n\n-·.· .\n\nThere w.as no, Aescription of any existing office room and available for such use 'to the. tenant. nor was space earmarked for any personal office out of this accom_modation. As indicated above it was in the discre~· tion''i>f the lessee to use any part as a personal office. Every lessee,' or for the matter of that every person maintaining an acceptable . standard of living does set apart a portion of the accommodation . available to him which can answer the description of a personal office.\n\n• • Mr. Thakur placed reliance on another clause of the lease deed , which reads as follow1 :\n\n\"That the lessor .shall pay all the taxes of any kind whatsoever including house tax, ground rent as are of. may hereinafter be assessed on the demised premises by the municipality or any other authority whatsoever provided the premises are used for residence only.\"\n\nWe do not think the terms of this clause . support the stand of the lessee. As Contemplated under the Transfer or Property Act a docn• meat of lease normally provid'es the rights and obligations of both the\n\nB .•\n\nc .;\n\nD •\n\nE I\n\n[198.:IJ 3 S.C.R •.\n\nlessor and the lesses. In stipulating the rent payable for the use and oq:upation of the premises t_he lessor had undertaken the liability of A . , payment of taxes as described therein as long as the premises were. used for residence oply. This clause necessarily means that what had been stipulated was only residential user. It is appropriate to take note. of the admission of Mr. Thakur. that . the lessor had been paying the taxes and the lessee has not been called upon to share the burden.\n\nThis clause is an added provision to clinclt the poiqt in dispute against B the tenant.\n\nc ·.·~\n\nWe are, therefore, of the view that the High Court cka{IY erred in law in reversing the decision of the Controller allowing the eviction. The appeal is allowed and tl)e order of the High Court is . set aside and the order of the Additional Rent Controller is restored.\n\nParties are directed to bear their respective cost throughout.\n\nThis is a litigatii>n which began in 1970. The tenant has been in occupition and continuing for about 14 years now after the apli\n\ncation for eviction had been filed. Ordinarily we would not have allowed any time to the tenant keeping this aspect in view: But Mr.\n\n· Thakur bas urged upon us to lake judiciai notice Qf the fact that these days an alternative premises would be very difficult to find.\n\nWe allow time to the tenant until 30th December, 1984 to vacate the prelnises subject to furnishing usual.u.ndertaking within four weeks from towiy.\n\nIn the absence of the undertaking the tenant becomes liable to eviction\n\n.. after four weeks. •\n\nS.R. .\n\nAppeal allowed • •\n\nf~_.\n\n• ..", "total_entities": 33, "entities": [{"text": "v.S.TALWAR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11, "end_char": 21, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. S. TALWAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PREM CHANDRA SHARMA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 32, "end_char": 51, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PREM CHANDRA SHARMA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "clause 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 304, "end_char": 313, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 617, "end_char": 626, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 919, "end_char": 932, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Meredith", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2772, "end_char": 2780, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Krishna Bihari/al v. Guiab Chand and Others, [1971] Supp, S.C.R. 27; D.D.A. v. D.C. Kaushish, (1974) I S.C.R. 535; MonypenilJ v. Monyp.nny, [186ll 9 H.j:..C. 114; In re: Meredith, e;,;-parte Chick, [1879] JI Cb."}}, {"text": "clause 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5369, "end_char": 5378, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "G:L. Sanghi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6193, "end_char": 6204, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G:L. Sanghi, Mr. A.K. Ve, rma and S. Kashwafor the appellant'."}}, {"text": "A.K. Ve", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6210, "end_char": 6217, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G:L. Sanghi, Mr. A.K. Ve, rma and S. Kashwafor the appellant'."}}, {"text": "S. Kashwafor", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6227, "end_char": 6239, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G:L. Sanghi, Mr. A.K. Ve, rma and S. Kashwafor the appellant'."}}, {"text": "D.D. Tfiakur", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6257, "end_char": 6269, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D.D. Tfiakur, P.H. Parekh, P.K. Menon and R.K. Sharma."}}, {"text": "P.H. Parekh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6271, "end_char": 6282, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D.D. Tfiakur, P.H. Parekh, P.K. Menon and R.K. Sharma."}}, {"text": "P.K. Menon", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6284, "end_char": 6294, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D.D. Tfiakur, P.H. Parekh, P.K. Menon and R.K. Sharma."}}, {"text": "R.K. Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6299, "end_char": 6310, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D.D. Tfiakur, P.H. Parekh, P.K. Menon and R.K. Sharma."}}, {"text": "RANGANATH MISRf", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6381, "end_char": 6396, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nRANGANATH MISRf, J.-The Jandlor<l whose application for evic tion of the tenant, respondent before us, 'was rejected by the High Court by reversiiig the order of the.", "canonical_name": "RANGANATH MISRf"}}, {"text": "Section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7185, "end_char": 7195, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7212, "end_char": 7240, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Delhi High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7630, "end_char": 7646, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereupon, the tenant carried a revision 10 the Delhi High Court."}}, {"text": "Section 14(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8566, "end_char": 8579, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 14(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8800, "end_char": 8813, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9125, "end_char": 9134, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Wright", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9931, "end_char": 9937, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the\n\nobseration Of Lord Wright in Macmillan v. Guest,1 where it was statecl :\n\n\"The word 'office' is of indefinite content."}}, {"text": "Ranganath Misra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10105, "end_char": 10120, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RANGANATH MISRf", "offset_not_found": true}}, {"text": "Section 2(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10568, "end_char": 10580, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11426, "end_char": 11435, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sections 90 to 94", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12240, "end_char": 12257, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Odgers", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12735, "end_char": 12741, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tbis is clear from the following passages cited in Odgers' short book under the First Rule of Interpretation set out above :\n\nLord Wensleydale in M onypenny v. M onypenny1 said :\n\n\"the question is not what the parties to a deed may have intended to do by entering into that deed, but what is the meaning of the words used."}}, {"text": "Wensleydale", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12815, "end_char": 12826, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tbis is clear from the following passages cited in Odgers' short book under the First Rule of Interpretation set out above :\n\nLord Wensleydale in M onypenny v. M onypenny1 said :\n\n\"the question is not what the parties to a deed may have intended to do by entering into that deed, but what is the meaning of the words used."}}, {"text": "Brett", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13149, "end_char": 13154, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "distinction in all cases of construction and the disregards of which often leads to erroneous conclusions\",\n\nBrett, L.J. ill Re Meredith, ex-parte Chick2 observed :\n\n\"I am c\\isposed to follow the rule of construction which was laid down by Lord Denman and Baron Parke.~.... They said that in.construing instruments you must have regard not to the presumed intention of the parties, but to the meaning of the words which they haw used.\""}}, {"text": "Denman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13285, "end_char": 13291, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "distinction in all cases of construction and the disregards of which often leads to erroneous conclusions\",\n\nBrett, L.J. ill Re Meredith, ex-parte Chick2 observed :\n\n\"I am c\\isposed to follow the rule of construction which was laid down by Lord Denman and Baron Parke.~.... They said that in.construing instruments you must have regard not to the presumed intention of the parties, but to the meaning of the words which they haw used.\""}}, {"text": "Thakur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15144, "end_char": 15150, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Such a place if referred to as personal office would essentially be res.idential and obviously while entering into .the .present lease deed, the parties wer.e not trying to create, a lease of premises for any other purposes .as now contended by Mr. Thakur for the respondent."}}, {"text": "clause 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15287, "end_char": 15296, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "30th December, 1984", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18327, "end_char": 18346, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We allow time to the tenant until 30th December, 1984 to vacate the prelnises subject to furnishing usual.u.ndertaking within four weeks from towiy."}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_3_522_529_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "S. SHAMSB!JDDJN & ORS. :ETC\n\nSTATE OF KARNATAKA & ORS.\n\nApril 18; 1984 ·\n\n[D.A. DESAI AND RANGANATH'MrsRA, JJ.]\n\n'Niotor VehfcJes Act, 1939 as 'amended by Mo'ior Vehicles (Amendtfient) Act 56of1969 s;63(7}-lnterp retatio~ of. Quota of 50 all India tor{st permits fixed by Central Govrnment by No(ijication No.S.0.22 dated Dcember 19; 1977-\n\n. Whether valid.\n\nPowr !o.f{x quot~ and power to.grant all India pernzits-Whethe.r\n\neparable. The expression In res pee t of such .itumber of tourist vehi'c.les as the •.\n\nCeiltra/.-GovertunetZi tii:iy, in. respect of that State~ sj; ecify in this behalf-Whether. severable. ·\n\nIn order to promote tourism, the Motor Vc.hicles Apt, 1939 was amended by. the Mot.or Vehicles (Amendment) Att 56 of '1969. Suhs.\"(7) . which was introduced .in s. 63 ~Y thee.Amending Act pr.ovided that Ilo!withstanding anything conta.ined in Sabs. (l} but s•Jbj~ct toaOy rules that may be made 1:1nd'er this Act, any State_ Transport , Aut\\1.oritY may, for th~ purpose of ' promotin& touTiam, grant permits valid Jor _th<! -whole or any. part of India,. in respect of sUch number of t, o-irist Vehicles as he Central _Government inay, ' in -resPect. of that _State, specify in 1.liis behalf. In exercise Of this eoWer the Central Government by its notification No. S. o _ -22 dated pecemb>!r 19, 1977 jjxed -a quota of 50 as the\" an. Indi_a tourist p:ermitS for each _State. _Tlle petitioners challenged this quota as discriminatory and v olaiive of Art. 14 of the Constitution.\n\n DismiSsing the writ petit; ons,\n\nHELD :- It apperS that.s. ti3 (7} was introduced after ascertaining the needs of developing tourist ttade. The Central Government fixed quota of 50: permits -_for _each s'tate. It may _be that a smaller State like .ltimachal Pradesh or Jamm:u and Kashmir [nay have -larger number of places of .tourist interest. EqUally area-wjse the biggest State Madhya Pradesh:rnay have few spOts' Of tou{ist interet. Therefore, Unless an te relevant facts are placed on record _which may point to the invidiousness of ;,: fiXing .a flat cj_uota, _the Petitioners Contention th:it the quo{a, is arbitray ari~ viOlative of Ar_t. 14 of the Constitution has no force. [5280-F, 525E)\n\n....\n\n1 '1 ..\n\n. J.\n\n.. ~\n\n. s. S\\IAMSHUDDlN v. KARNATAKA (Desai, J.) 523\n\nth~ Patlianient enact.ed Stib-s_. (7) of s. '63 conferring an enabling power or State Transport Authority to grant a permit validfor _the whole Of India which but ftj-r 'the provfsion cotained in Sub-s. (7) of s. 63 it was not en.titled to ·\n\ngrant -and that th_is power to grant was subject to the conditirn that the Central Government will specify the quota. Therefore. the. quota is not severable , frOm the power to grant the permit. Assuming that _the quota is iS Severable fro_in -the enabling .Provision, no materia~ .has been pla;; ed on record to point out the needs of eacll State, the places of tourist intf!rest, the influx of tourists, ihe facility for their boatding and lodging_ and the con<f:ition of roadS-in resPect of eaa State. In the absence of this fact s!tuation, the petitioners' submission that the'. expression, in respeCt of such tiumber of tourist vehicles as the Central Gornment may-, in respect of that State., specify in this behalf' is severable and therefor'e he enabling pai\"t of sub-s. (7)_ will permit St3.te Transport Authority in each State to grant all India tourist Permit keepingin \"'.iew the need of the tourists and the needs of the State,\n\ncannot be examined on merits. [527H, 528A-B, 527G] . '\n\nIt is reCO!llniended:that' in view or the vast expanding tourist trafficthe Central Governme, Qt mus.t undertake an exercise _within, a reasonable .time and .at regulf intervals to re-evalute the quota of all India tourist permistS to keep pace with devetOping notion of attracting tourists. [529C-D] _:\n\nORIGINAL JuRISDICl:ION ; Writ Petitions Nos .. 13033-38 13650-52, 13197, 13355-58.-· 13389, 13393-97; 13003:_08; 13488,13654-67, 13850-.58, 13790 to 13801, 13836-49, of 1983,\n\n8-22,24-30, 34-35, 126 130 arid 223-26 of 1984 E\n\n(Under artick 32 of the Constitutibn of India)\n\nAdvocates for the apJ]earingparties :\n\nS.S. Java/i, Mr. 'fJ.P. Singh, Ran1it Kumar, Shanti Bhushan, K.R. Nagaraja, K.S, Hegde, S.K. Prasad, K.N. Bhatt, Ms. Madhu Mulchandani, . RJJ.\n\nDatar, N.K.\n\nSharma, P.N. Rama/ingam, R. Ramachandran, V.K. Verma, K.G. Blltgat, Addi. So/. General, M.N. Shroff; P.K. Pillai, Mrs. H. Wahi, M. Veert'ppa, SwtlflClj , Kaushal, Vineet Kumar, S. Chatterjee and .l.R. Das.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered. by\n\nDESAI,. J.Th~ intrepid albeit affluent transport operators again suc.ceeded rn their none-too-legal . designs to operate vehicles not by obtaining statutory permits but to put it mildly by abuse of the court's process. ·\n\n.· B\n\n...\n\nSUPREMB COURT REPORTS [1984] 3 S.C.lt.\n\nBy a judgment . rendered by this Court in S. Kannan and .\n\nOrs: v. &cretary, Karnataka State. Road Transport Authority etc.'1\\ . ori August 29, 1983, this Court held that grant ofa temporary all- India tourist permit is forejgn to the. very concept ofall-lndia .tourist permit as envisaged by sub-s.(7) of Sec.63 of the Motor Vehicles Act.' 1939 and accordingly an unusually large number of temporary all-India tourist permits obtained persuant to tl1e interim relief granted by this Court were. set at naught. Some of the present petitiOners were directly parties to t.h.e petitions disposed of by that judgment. Indefatigueable as they are, they again\n\napproached. this Court by a camouflage of challenging the validity of quota of fifty such permits fixed by the Central Govern.men! in respect of allIl)dia tourist permit for each State as per Notification No. ~.0; 22 dated December 19, 1977 as als9. failure to fill-in the • vacancies by the State Transport Authority in Karnataka State.tq the extent of the s.anctioned quota. The challenge was a clever. camouflage, .the sole,. underlying motive. beijj.!i io obtain some interim relief by which again temporary permits in compliance\n\nwiih the interim reli<:f granted by .this Court may be obtainad and the impermissible trade being carried on without a break. To unravel this plot engineered by the petitiouers, it may be mentioned . . that even though the Court by the judgment in the case of\n\n S. Ka1111a1i & Ors. rendered on August 29, 1983 set at naught all temporary all-India tourist permits obtained as a onsequence. of the interim relief granted by thi~ Court, .at the special request of some of the petitioners, t!ie Court keeping in view the investment . - - . made by the petitioners in providing tourist vehicles continued the interim reHef which kept operative the temporary permits till December 31, 1983. TlJe present petitions were filed somewhere in Noel11ber, 1983.\n\nBy the order dated Nomber 23, 1983 notice directed to be issued both ol1.the main petition as well as on the . stay application was made returnable on.December 6, 1983. The petitioners Were in no ., rr-;' to snatch. the interim relief because the .. ordemade earlier had infused life into their so-called temporarypermits and kept them operative upto December .31, 1983. On December 16, 1983. in the renewed atteflip! the Court granted interim relief to the effect that those operators of vehicle~ who had held all-India tourist permit on october 23, )983 and who were plying theiCvehic]es shall be permitted to ply the ¥ehides until April 30, 1984. Jt is necessary to p9int out that the peti!ioners who obtained this interim relief were plying thefr vehicles on Octob, r\n\n' (!) f1984J I S.C.C. 375.\n\ns. SHAMSHUDDIN v. KARNATAKA (Desai, J.) 525\n\n23 1983 under an earlier interim relief which bad exhausted itself ' . . on. August 29, 1983 and this very relevant aspect which would be determinative of the 'issues involved in the matter appeared not to\n\nhave . been brought even to the notice of the Court which granted interim relief. •\n\nTlie respondents appeared and pointed out the facts her; in~ above delineated with the result that the petitions were set down for hearing on March 23, 1984. ·\n\nMr. Shanti Bhushan who led on behalf of 'the petitioners ,. . • ' .I raised three contentions. It was urged that even though a quota of 50 tourist permits has been sanctioned by the Central Govern- ment for each State, the State of Karnataka has not utilised the\n\n' quota to the maximum and there are either 25 or 14 vacancies which have been kept unfilled for a long time and therefore, a mandamus must be issued directing the State Transport Authority, Karnataka to perform its statu.tory duty by considering the applicatio)ls rec\"eived for all-India tourist permits and dispose of the same within a reasoflable time. It was next contended that if the object underlying the enactment . .of Sec.63(7) was to promote tourism and facilitate movement of tourists, a flat quota of 50 permits for each State completely ignorig the needs of the Stat_,, capacity to cater to the tourist traffic, significant number of plces of tourist interest, ihe local population and other relevant factors, ls vio.lative of Art. 14 of the Constitution and the Central Government must be directed to refix the quota.\n\nThe last submission specifica1ly referring to the State Transport Authority of Karnataka was that it has failed to perform its statutory duty by not granting all-India tourist permit. in existing 14 vacancies according to the State Transport Authprity and . 25 vacancies according to. the petitioners, and that hy a mandamus the State Transport Authority should be directed to examine an 'the applications received for the same and to grant permits and thereby perform its statutory duty.\n\nThe mere enumeration of the contentions raised by Mr,· Shanti.Jlhushan shows. that the first and. the third contentions are almostidentical except that th.e fact situ.ation with regard to tbe\n\neisting numberof vacancies in the sanctioned quota of all-India tourist permit for Karnataka State is in controversy. It would have been necessry to probe in depth the statutory duty or State Transport utbo~1ty on whom . power is conferred by Sec.63(7) to i.irant permit vahd for tpe whole or any part ofindia for th~\n\n, Q .;\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS ( 1984] 3 s.C.R,\n\npurpose of promoHng tourism.\n\nBu~ we. are spared this exercise because Mr. Swaraj Kaushal, learned counsel who appeared for the State of Karnati!ka undertook that the State Transport Autho', rity would dispose of all applications pending before it for a permit as contemplated bj Sec,63(7) by April)O, 1984. He also stated that the State Transport Authority . of Karnataka State wiH as far as possible im in all the vacaucies if sufficient number of applica' tions are pending before it and there are eligible applicants among them. We leave it. to the State Transport Authority to determine how mariy vacancies at present exist and fill ih the same by cons.idering the . applications pending with it for the type of permit as contemplated by Sec.63(7!. .\n\nTh.erefoie; there remains one contention to be examined by us. It was urged that Regional Transport Autho.rity can grant a . stage carriageor a contract carriage permit, as the case m.ay be, valid for operation in the region and .wheri countersigned by the State Transport Authority valid for ci:ttiguous regions \\n the same State.\n\nA necessity was felt that tourist vehicles having an inter- . . .\n\nState and intra-siate operational area throughout the country. may be l.icensed by all-India tbl)rist permits Go that facility of easy .road transport is available to both t\\Je domestic and foreign tourists. To achieve, this end and with a viw to promoting tourism, sub-s.(7) was introduced in Sec. 63 ofMotor Vehicles A.ct,. 1939 by Motor Vehicles (Amimdment) Act 56 of 1969 which reads as under: · ' . \"63(7) ; Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (!) but . subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, any State Transport Authority may, for the purpose of promoting tourism, giant permits va]jd for the whole or any part of India, in respect of sh number of tourist vehicles .as the . Central Government may, in respect of.that State, specify in this behalf, and the provisions ·• of Sections 49, 50, 51, 571 58, 59, 59-A, 60, 61 and 64 shall, as far as may be, apply in rlation to. such permits :\n\nProvided that preference shall be given to applications for permits from-\n\n(i) the India Tourisn; i Development Corporation ;\n\n(ii) a State Tourism Development Corporation ;\n\n(iii) a Slate Toiuis.t Department;\n\nI -1.\n\ns. SHAMSHUDDJN v. '.KARNATAKA (Desai, J.). 527\n\n(iv) such operators of tourisr cars or such travel agents as may be approved in this behalf by the Ministry of the Central Government dealing in tourism.\"\n\nThe power to grant permit valid for the whole or any part of India was conferred on the State Transport Authority of each State. To guard against the big fish not swallowing the smaller one, Parliament took care to statutorily provide that the Central Government will have power to fix. quota of such permits .that can be granted by State Transport Authori°ty in each State. In exercise of this power, the Central Government has fixed aquota of 50, euphemistically called, alHn.dia tourist permit, but statutorily described as permit valid for whole of India for each State by the Notification No.s.~.22 dated December 19,. 1977. ·\n\nMr. Shanti Bhushan pointed out that the large and. sprawling States like Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Karnataka, Tam.ii Nadu and Uttar Pradesh each have a quota of 50 permits and also Assam, Nagaland, Manipur, etc. which are cographically and populationwise small States have the same quota. .It was urged thalthis equal treatment of unequals is clearly arbitrary and vio lative of Art.14. It was s.ubmitted that quota. ca'n be fixed with a view to promoting tourism by keeping in view the population, places of tourist interest, facility for . tourist halt, conditioqs of roads etc. and that having not been done the fixation offlat quota of 50 permits for each. State must be struck down as discrimina.\n\ntory and arbitrary. ·\n\nWhile hearing this argument, a question was posed to Mr.\n\nShanti Bhushan that if Jhe quota of 50 permits for each State is str.uck down, not a sing]~ . Siate Transport Authority in. any State will be entitled to grant a single tourist. permit because fix'ation of quota. is an integral part of .Sec. 63(7). Mr. Shanti Bhushan ·\n\nurged .that the expression in respect of such number of tourist vehicles as the Central G.overnment may, in respect of that State, specify .in this behalf is severable and therefore, the enabling part of Suh-s.(7) will permit State transport Authority in each State to grant the all-India tourist pe.rmit keping in view the needs of the tourists and . the needs of the State. We are not. persuaded to accept this subl)lission. The Parliament enacted silbs(7) conferring a.n enabling power op State Transport Authoritr\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS.\n\n[1984) 3 S.C.R.\n\nto. grant a permit valid for the wholeof India which but for the ptovision contained in sub-s.(7) of Sec.63 . it was not entitled to grant .and that this power to grant was. subject to the condition that the, Central Government will specify the quota. Therefore, the quota is not severable. from the .Power .to grant the permit.\n\n' Assuming that the quota is severable from the enabling provi;\\on, no material has been placed on record to point out the needs .of each State, the places ·'oCtbririst, 'interest I.he . influx of . , tourists, the facility for tbeir-boardin, g and lodging and the condition . of roads in: respect of each State. In the absence of this fact . situation,. the contention cannot be examined on rrierits. .\n\nrt.may be pointd out that Sec. 63-A envisages s'etting up of an Inter-State Transport Commission for the purpose.of developing, co-ordinating . and regulating the operation of transport vehicles in respe'ct of any area or route common to two or more States (hereinafter referred to as inter-State region) and perform, ing such other functions as may be prescribd under sec: 63-C. It was not made clear whether the Inter-State'Transport Commission has b.een set up but it appears that Sec. 63(7) wai; infroduced after ascertaining the peeds of developing tourist trade. The Central Governnient fixed quota of 50 permits for each State. It may be that a smaller. State like Himachal Pradesh or Jammu and' Kashmir may have larger number of places of tourist interest. Equally area-wise the biggest State Madhya Pradesh.may have few spots of tourist .interest. Therefore, unless all the relevant facts are placed\n\n· on record, which. may point to. the invidiol)sness of fixing a flat quota, the contention of Mr. Shanti Bhushan does not commend to us and it may be rejected;\n\nMr. Javali, learned counsel iifsome of the petitions' urged that notification No.S.0.22 . i; lated , December ,19, 1977 specifying , the number of tourist vehicle of all States at 50 each suffers froltl the vice of non-application of mind. It was said that the notification does not disclose as to . what relevant factors were taken into consideration for fixing the. quota. The contention thus raised is the same contention raised by Mr. Shanti Bbtlshail .under a diffeent garb and must'be rejected for the same reasol]j.\n\nIt.was urged that the Central Government should be asked to refix th~ .quota keeping. in view the chanlle in the steep rise in . . .\n\ns. SHAMSHUDDIN v. KARNATAKA (Desai, J.} 529\n\nthe influx of tourists from 1977 to 1984. It was submitted that with the rapid increase in tourist traffic, cheaper, and speedy air transport and a new culture of augmenting knowledge by visit to places of historical interest has increasi; d piimifold tourist traffic.\n\nIt was urged that tourism is a well-recognised mode for earning\n\n• A\n\nforeign exchange badly n.eeded for economic developmeni. It was B then urged that better facilitities would attract more tourists. It was urged that a period of ?years provides a water-shed re-e, valuating the demands of time and needs for augmenting the quota fixed way-back in December, 1977 ..\n\nThere is considerable force in this 'submission. We are of the opinion that iri view of the fast expan<ling tourist traffic: the Central Government must undertake an C exercise at regufar intervals to re-evaiuate the quota of alHndia: tourist permits to keep pace 'with deve!vping notion of attracting tourists. We therefore, recommend to the Central Government to undeitake. this exercise within a reasonable time.\n\nAs we find no merit in ay of the contention, all petitions\n\n. D fail and are dismissed with costs.\n\nH.S.K.\n\nPetitions dismissed.\n\n' ' ' .", "total_entities": 72, "entities": [{"text": "ETC\n\nSTATE OF KARNATAKA & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24, "end_char": 53, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF KARNATAKA & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "D.A. DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 75, "end_char": 85, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.A. 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Java", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4135, "end_char": 4144, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "529C-D] :\n\nORIGINAL JuRISDICl:ION ; Writ Petitions Nos .. 13033-38 13650-52, 13197, 13355-58.-· 13389, 13393-97; 13003:_08; 13488,13654-67, 13850-.58, 13790 to 13801, 13836-49, of 1983,\n\n8-22,24-30, 34-35, 126 130 arid 223-26 of 1984 E\n\n(Under artick 32 of the Constitutibn of India)\n\nAdvocates for the apJ]earingparties :\n\nS.S. Java/i, Mr. 'fJ.P. Singh, Ran1it Kumar, Shanti Bhushan, K.R. Nagaraja, K.S, Hegde, S.K. Prasad, K.N. Bhatt, Ms. Madhu Mulchandani, ."}}, {"text": "fJ.P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4153, "end_char": 4164, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "529C-D] :\n\nORIGINAL JuRISDICl:ION ; Writ Petitions Nos .. 13033-38 13650-52, 13197, 13355-58.-· 13389, 13393-97; 13003:_08; 13488,13654-67, 13850-.58, 13790 to 13801, 13836-49, of 1983,\n\n8-22,24-30, 34-35, 126 130 arid 223-26 of 1984 E\n\n(Under artick 32 of the Constitutibn of India)\n\nAdvocates for the apJ]earingparties :\n\nS.S. Java/i, Mr. 'fJ.P. Singh, Ran1it Kumar, Shanti Bhushan, K.R. Nagaraja, K.S, Hegde, S.K. Prasad, K.N. Bhatt, Ms. Madhu Mulchandani, ."}}, {"text": "Ran1it Kumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4166, "end_char": 4178, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "529C-D] :\n\nORIGINAL JuRISDICl:ION ; Writ Petitions Nos .. 13033-38 13650-52, 13197, 13355-58.-· 13389, 13393-97; 13003:_08; 13488,13654-67, 13850-.58, 13790 to 13801, 13836-49, of 1983,\n\n8-22,24-30, 34-35, 126 130 arid 223-26 of 1984 E\n\n(Under artick 32 of the Constitutibn of India)\n\nAdvocates for the apJ]earingparties :\n\nS.S. Java/i, Mr. 'fJ.P. Singh, Ran1it Kumar, Shanti Bhushan, K.R. Nagaraja, K.S, Hegde, S.K. Prasad, K.N. Bhatt, Ms. Madhu Mulchandani, ."}}, {"text": "Shanti Bhushan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4180, "end_char": 4194, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "529C-D] :\n\nORIGINAL JuRISDICl:ION ; Writ Petitions Nos .. 13033-38 13650-52, 13197, 13355-58.-· 13389, 13393-97; 13003:_08; 13488,13654-67, 13850-.58, 13790 to 13801, 13836-49, of 1983,\n\n8-22,24-30, 34-35, 126 130 arid 223-26 of 1984 E\n\n(Under artick 32 of the Constitutibn of India)\n\nAdvocates for the apJ]earingparties :\n\nS.S. Java/i, Mr. 'fJ.P. Singh, Ran1it Kumar, Shanti Bhushan, K.R. Nagaraja, K.S, Hegde, S.K. Prasad, K.N. Bhatt, Ms. Madhu Mulchandani, .", "canonical_name": "Shanti.Jlhushan"}}, {"text": "K.R. Nagaraja", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4196, "end_char": 4209, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "529C-D] :\n\nORIGINAL JuRISDICl:ION ; Writ Petitions Nos .. 13033-38 13650-52, 13197, 13355-58.-· 13389, 13393-97; 13003:_08; 13488,13654-67, 13850-.58, 13790 to 13801, 13836-49, of 1983,\n\n8-22,24-30, 34-35, 126 130 arid 223-26 of 1984 E\n\n(Under artick 32 of the Constitutibn of India)\n\nAdvocates for the apJ]earingparties :\n\nS.S. Java/i, Mr. 'fJ.P. Singh, Ran1it Kumar, Shanti Bhushan, K.R. Nagaraja, K.S, Hegde, S.K. Prasad, K.N. Bhatt, Ms. Madhu Mulchandani, ."}}, {"text": "K.S, Hegde", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4211, "end_char": 4221, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "529C-D] :\n\nORIGINAL JuRISDICl:ION ; Writ Petitions Nos .. 13033-38 13650-52, 13197, 13355-58.-· 13389, 13393-97; 13003:_08; 13488,13654-67, 13850-.58, 13790 to 13801, 13836-49, of 1983,\n\n8-22,24-30, 34-35, 126 130 arid 223-26 of 1984 E\n\n(Under artick 32 of the Constitutibn of India)\n\nAdvocates for the apJ]earingparties :\n\nS.S. Java/i, Mr. 'fJ.P. Singh, Ran1it Kumar, Shanti Bhushan, K.R. Nagaraja, K.S, Hegde, S.K. Prasad, K.N. Bhatt, Ms. Madhu Mulchandani, ."}}, {"text": "S.K. Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4223, "end_char": 4234, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "529C-D] :\n\nORIGINAL JuRISDICl:ION ; Writ Petitions Nos .. 13033-38 13650-52, 13197, 13355-58.-· 13389, 13393-97; 13003:_08; 13488,13654-67, 13850-.58, 13790 to 13801, 13836-49, of 1983,\n\n8-22,24-30, 34-35, 126 130 arid 223-26 of 1984 E\n\n(Under artick 32 of the Constitutibn of India)\n\nAdvocates for the apJ]earingparties :\n\nS.S. Java/i, Mr. 'fJ.P. Singh, Ran1it Kumar, Shanti Bhushan, K.R. Nagaraja, K.S, Hegde, S.K. Prasad, K.N. Bhatt, Ms. Madhu Mulchandani, ."}}, {"text": "K.N. Bhatt", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4236, "end_char": 4246, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "529C-D] :\n\nORIGINAL JuRISDICl:ION ; Writ Petitions Nos .. 13033-38 13650-52, 13197, 13355-58.-· 13389, 13393-97; 13003:_08; 13488,13654-67, 13850-.58, 13790 to 13801, 13836-49, of 1983,\n\n8-22,24-30, 34-35, 126 130 arid 223-26 of 1984 E\n\n(Under artick 32 of the Constitutibn of India)\n\nAdvocates for the apJ]earingparties :\n\nS.S. Java/i, Mr. 'fJ.P. Singh, Ran1it Kumar, Shanti Bhushan, K.R. Nagaraja, K.S, Hegde, S.K. Prasad, K.N. Bhatt, Ms. Madhu Mulchandani, ."}}, {"text": "Madhu Mulchandani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4252, "end_char": 4269, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "529C-D] :\n\nORIGINAL JuRISDICl:ION ; Writ Petitions Nos .. 13033-38 13650-52, 13197, 13355-58.-· 13389, 13393-97; 13003:_08; 13488,13654-67, 13850-.58, 13790 to 13801, 13836-49, of 1983,\n\n8-22,24-30, 34-35, 126 130 arid 223-26 of 1984 E\n\n(Under artick 32 of the Constitutibn of India)\n\nAdvocates for the apJ]earingparties :\n\nS.S. Java/i, Mr. 'fJ.P. Singh, Ran1it Kumar, Shanti Bhushan, K.R. Nagaraja, K.S, Hegde, S.K. Prasad, K.N. Bhatt, Ms. Madhu Mulchandani, ."}}, {"text": "N.K.\n\nSharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4286, "end_char": 4298, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Datar, N.K.\n\nSharma, P.N. Rama/ingam, R. Ramachandran, V.K. Verma, K.G. Blltgat, Addi."}}, {"text": "P.N. Rama", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4300, "end_char": 4309, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Datar, N.K.\n\nSharma, P.N. Rama/ingam, R. Ramachandran, V.K. Verma, K.G. Blltgat, Addi."}}, {"text": "R. Ramachandran", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4317, "end_char": 4332, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Datar, N.K.\n\nSharma, P.N. Rama/ingam, R. Ramachandran, V.K. Verma, K.G. Blltgat, Addi."}}, {"text": "V.K. Verma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4334, "end_char": 4344, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Datar, N.K.\n\nSharma, P.N. Rama/ingam, R. Ramachandran, V.K. Verma, K.G. Blltgat, Addi."}}, {"text": "K.G. Blltgat", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4346, "end_char": 4358, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Datar, N.K.\n\nSharma, P.N. Rama/ingam, R. Ramachandran, V.K. Verma, K.G. Blltgat, Addi."}}, {"text": "M.N. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4380, "end_char": 4391, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So/. General, M.N. Shroff; P.K. Pillai, Mrs. H. Wahi, M. Veert'ppa, SwtlflClj , Kaushal, Vineet Kumar, S. Chatterjee and .l."}}, {"text": "P.K. Pillai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4393, "end_char": 4404, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So/. General, M.N. Shroff; P.K. Pillai, Mrs. H. Wahi, M. Veert'ppa, SwtlflClj , Kaushal, Vineet Kumar, S. Chatterjee and .l."}}, {"text": "H. Wahi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4411, "end_char": 4418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So/. General, M.N. Shroff; P.K. Pillai, Mrs. H. Wahi, M. Veert'ppa, SwtlflClj , Kaushal, Vineet Kumar, S. Chatterjee and .l."}}, {"text": "M. Veert'ppa", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4420, "end_char": 4432, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So/. General, M.N. Shroff; P.K. Pillai, Mrs. H. Wahi, M. Veert'ppa, SwtlflClj , Kaushal, Vineet Kumar, S. Chatterjee and .l."}}, {"text": "Vineet Kumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4455, "end_char": 4467, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So/. General, M.N. Shroff; P.K. Pillai, Mrs. H. Wahi, M. Veert'ppa, SwtlflClj , Kaushal, Vineet Kumar, S. Chatterjee and .l."}}, {"text": "S. Chatterjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4469, "end_char": 4482, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So/. General, M.N. Shroff; P.K. Pillai, Mrs. H. Wahi, M. Veert'ppa, SwtlflClj , Kaushal, Vineet Kumar, S. Chatterjee and .l."}}, {"text": "R. Das", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4490, "end_char": 4496, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. Das."}}, {"text": "DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4544, "end_char": 4549, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "by\n\nDESAI,."}}, {"text": "S. Kannan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4859, "end_char": 4868, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "rendered by this Court in S. Kannan and ."}}, {"text": "Sec.63", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5123, "end_char": 5129, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5137, "end_char": 5155, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Karnataka State.tq", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5793, "end_char": 5811, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "failure to fill-in the • vacancies by the State Transport Authority in Karnataka State.tq the extent of the s.anctioned quota."}}, {"text": "S. Ka1111a1i", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6269, "end_char": 6281, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that even though the Court by the judgment in the case of\n\n S. Ka1111a1i & Ors."}}, {"text": "August 29, 1983", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6301, "end_char": 6316, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "rendered on August 29, 1983 set at naught all temporary all-India tourist permits obtained as a onsequence."}}, {"text": "December 6, 1983", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6909, "end_char": 6925, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "December 6, 1983."}}, {"text": "March 23, 1984", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8038, "end_char": 8052, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tlie respondents appeared and pointed out the facts her; in~ above delineated with the result that the petitions were set down for hearing on March 23, 1984. ·"}}, {"text": "Shanti Bhushan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 8061, "end_char": 8075, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Shanti Bhushan who led on behalf of 'the petitioners ,. . • '", "canonical_name": "Shanti.Jlhushan"}}, {"text": "Karnataka", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 8289, "end_char": 8298, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was urged that even though a quota of 50 tourist permits has been sanctioned by the Central Govern- ment for each State, the State of Karnataka has not utilised the\n\n' quota to the maximum and there are either 25 or 14 vacancies which have been kept unfilled for a long time and therefore, a mandamus must be issued directing the State Transport Authority, Karnataka to perform its statu.tory duty by considering the applicatio)ls rec\"eived for all-India tourist permits and dispose of the same within a reasoflable time."}}, {"text": "Sec.63(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8749, "end_char": 8758, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9062, "end_char": 9069, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State Transport Authority of Karnataka", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9205, "end_char": 9243, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The last submission specifica1ly referring to the State Transport Authority of Karnataka was that it has failed to perform its statutory duty by not granting all-India tourist permit."}}, {"text": "Shanti.Jlhushan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9700, "end_char": 9715, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The mere enumeration of the contentions raised by Mr,· Shanti.", "canonical_name": "Shanti.Jlhushan"}}, {"text": "Sec.63(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10081, "end_char": 10090, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Swaraj Kaushal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10280, "end_char": 10294, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "are spared this exercise because Mr. Swaraj Kaushal, learned counsel who appeared for the State of Karnati!ka undertook that the State Transport Autho', rity would dispose of all applications pending before it for a permit as contemplated bj Sec,63(7) by April)O, 1984."}}, {"text": "State Transport Authority . of Karnataka State", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10537, "end_char": 10583, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He also stated that the State Transport Authority ."}}, {"text": "Sec. 63", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11656, "end_char": 11663, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12010, "end_char": 12015, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, any State Transport Authority may, for the purpose of promoting tourism, giant permits va]jd for the whole or any part of India, in respect of sh number of tourist vehicles .as the ."}}, {"text": "Sections 49, 50, 51, 571", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12170, "end_char": 12194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12898, "end_char": 12908, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To guard against the big fish not swallowing the smaller one, Parliament took care to statutorily provide that the Central Government will have power to fix."}}, {"text": "December 19,. 1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13317, "end_char": 13335, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In exercise of this power, the Central Government has fixed aquota of 50, euphemistically called, alHn.dia tourist permit, but statutorily described as permit valid for whole of India for each State by the Notification No.s.~.22 dated December 19,."}}, {"text": "Maharashtra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13413, "end_char": 13424, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "sprawling States like Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Karnataka, Tam.ii Nadu and Uttar Pradesh each have a quota of 50 permits and also Assam, Nagaland, Manipur, etc."}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13426, "end_char": 13440, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "sprawling States like Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Karnataka, Tam.ii Nadu and Uttar Pradesh each have a quota of 50 permits and also Assam, Nagaland, Manipur, etc."}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13469, "end_char": 13482, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "sprawling States like Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Karnataka, Tam.ii Nadu and Uttar Pradesh each have a quota of 50 permits and also Assam, Nagaland, Manipur, etc."}}, {"text": "Assam", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13524, "end_char": 13529, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "sprawling States like Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Karnataka, Tam.ii Nadu and Uttar Pradesh each have a quota of 50 permits and also Assam, Nagaland, Manipur, etc."}}, {"text": "Nagaland", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13531, "end_char": 13539, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "sprawling States like Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Karnataka, Tam.ii Nadu and Uttar Pradesh each have a quota of 50 permits and also Assam, Nagaland, Manipur, etc."}}, {"text": "Manipur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13541, "end_char": 13548, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "sprawling States like Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Karnataka, Tam.ii Nadu and Uttar Pradesh each have a quota of 50 permits and also Assam, Nagaland, Manipur, etc."}}, {"text": "Art.14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13722, "end_char": 13728, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 63(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14364, "end_char": 14374, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec.63", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15059, "end_char": 15065, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 63", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15719, "end_char": 15726, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Inter-State'Transport Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16107, "end_char": 16139, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and regulating the operation of transport vehicles in respe'ct of any area or route common to two or more States (hereinafter referred to as inter-State region) and perform, ing such other functions as may be prescribd under sec: 63-C. It was not made clear whether the Inter-State'Transport Commission has b.een set up but it appears that Sec."}}, {"text": "Sec. 63(7)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16177, "end_char": 16187, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Himachal Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16365, "end_char": 16381, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State like Himachal Pradesh or Jammu and' Kashmir may have larger number of places of tourist interest."}}, {"text": "Jammu and' Kashmir", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16385, "end_char": 16403, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State like Himachal Pradesh or Jammu and' Kashmir may have larger number of places of tourist interest."}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh.may", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 16494, "end_char": 16512, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Equally area-wise the biggest State Madhya Pradesh.may have few spots of tourist .interest."}}, {"text": "Javali", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16769, "end_char": 16775, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the invidiol)sness of fixing a flat quota, the contention of Mr. Shanti Bhushan does not commend to us and it may be rejected;\n\nMr. Javali, learned counsel iifsome of the petitions' urged that notification No."}}, {"text": "S.0", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16846, "end_char": 16849, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shanti Bbtlshail", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17204, "end_char": 17220, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The contention thus raised is the same contention raised by Mr. Shanti Bbtlshail .under a diffeent garb and must'be rejected for the same reasol]j."}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_3_530_543_EN", "year": 1984, "text": ".. [D, .A. DESAI, AMARENDRA NATH SEN AND R. B. MISRA, JJ.].\n\nDefen<e of Indid Rules,\n\n1962. Rules j15 and . 125A Sutor Mill Ciosed-Order of Central Gov(3rnmenr taking over Managemet-Authorisd control/er appointed order of Central GoVernm, nt-Whethei valid. . ' . ·- . .\n\nWOrds & Phrases: 1Undertaking'-'Engaged_ inthe product{on of'- Meanint of-Rule 125A Defence of Indian Rules, 1962. . - .\n\nE •\n\nThe management of the Suar Mill of th.e. Appellant was tal<en over under Rule 125 of the l>efence of India Rules 1962 and an Authorised _Con• !roller was appointed • . 1nthe appeal by certificate to this Court, it was .contended on behalf _ pf the Appellant that long before passing.of the order and even before sugar was decl, ared to be an essential. commodity; the appellant bad, completely .F stopped the. rUnning of the Mill with no intent{on to starfit again, there_was, therefore, no undertaking within the me&ning of Rule 125.A and the ordr passed under Rule 125A whicb was not attracted mu't. be held to 1\"', bad ai; id inv31id.\n\n_ .• on behalf o.f the Union of India, it was contended that Rule 12SA G confers juisdiction and authority to_ pass. ao order eveo in respect of.an undertaking cloSed and int.ended to be permallently shut own.\n\nDismissing the app~1,\n\n' HELD: the taking over of the manag<m<nt Of the sugar mill of the appellant and the appointment cf the aU1hcri<Cd contrclkr \"ere perfectly valid and lawful and. the act dote by iheauthorim! contro!Juin tecours~ of roantiiement is bindill\\l op the app~)lant• (SS3Al ·\n\ny '.\n\n'\\'.D. JHUNJHUNWALA V. UNION 531\n\n2. Although Ru)e 125 confers very wide powers for genbral controi of an undertaking, there is no provision in .the said ruie to ta.ke over the management of any_ underta\\ing. Rule: 12.SA by way of amendment was; therefore. inserted to confer further power of taking over the ruanag{tn<nt of-partculr undertakings and of appointing authorised controllers for running such undertakings. [541G, 542AJ\n\n3. Rule 125A makes it clear that the rule was not intended to apply to each and every undettaing within the meaning of Rule 125. Speciitl provision. is. P, ade i.n ule 125A i0' respect of particular undertakings only.\n\nRule 125A describes and particularises the undertakings to which this rule will be applicabie. [542B] ·\n\n4. 1'.he provision in Rule 12SA that \"in this rule unless the context -.otherwise requires, an •undertaking' means any undertaking (includfJg an\n\nunderiaking vested ill or contro1led or managed by, a lcicalauthority) which is , engaged in--_;,, is merely descriptive ofte undertaking to_ which this rule is applica, b1e. The words \"which is engaged in the production\" . merely\n\nD : i:Iescribes. the .kind Of und.ertakinS .by referring to _the nature of the activity qf the -Undert.akirig for bringing it within the purview of Rule 12SA and they hav'e no be>-ar-ing on the question. hether the activities. are in the prOcess of being carried on or have been stopped. The expression any undertaking whi, ch\n\nis 'engaged in' has been used to d..escribe the nature of business of the undf; rt<iking and is m:rely descriptive of the undertaking w which t.kis rule willapply. [542C-EJ · E\n\n. CIVIL APPELl\\A.TE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 481 9f 1971.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Decree dated the 22nd Deci:_mber, F' 1969 of the Allahabad High Court in Writ Petition No. 210 of 1967 ..\n\nS.T. Desai and H.S. Parihar for the Appellant.\n\nHarbans Lal, Miss A. Subhashini and V, B, SDharya for the Respondent.\n\n. Mrs. Shobha Dikshit fqr Respondent. No. 3.\n\nThe Judgment of t)le Cort was deliveed ~\n\nE·\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984) 3 s.c.R.\n\n. .\n\nAMARENDRA NATH Sm, J.\n\nWhether the order of the Central oovernment taking, over the management of t)\\e Sugar Mill of the Appellant. under Rule 125A of the Defence of India Rule;; and appointing an authorised Controller of the .said Mill thereunder is valld, is the principal question which falls for determination in this appeal by certificate.\n\nThe main contention of Mr. S. T, Deasi, learned Counsel for the appellant, is that .on a proper construction of Rule l 25A of the Defence of.Indi~ Rules (hereinafter referred to as the Rules) . the o.rder taking over the management of the Sugar Mill under this rule is invalid, as on the date ofthe order the Sugar Mili was · closed .and the appellant had.no intention ofre-op<!ning the snme.\n\nIt has not .been dispnted that if the order of the take. over of. the\n\nmanaeme!lt is held. to be valid the appellent will not be entitled to any relief and the appeal must fail. . .\n\nWe may observe that the question whether the Mill was closed or n.ot on the date the order taking over the management and appointing an authorised Controller under Rule 125 was passe<l, is in serious dispute.\n\nHowever; for the purpose of <leciding the question raised in this appeal it does not become necessary . . . to go Jnto any dispute with regard to the. facts.\n\nWe propose to. proceed on the basis that the Mill haq remained closed and the appellant had shut it down permanently on the date the order came' to be passed, as, in our opinion, the order in .question, even. if the same be held to have been passed at the time when the Mill was lying so closed, must be held to be . perfectly vaild on a proper interpretation of Rule 125A As.in out opinion, on a propr interpretation of R.ule 125A, the -order.in question is lawfuland justified even if we accept the submission of Mr. Desai that the Mill was fatually s9 closed, it does not becon1e necessary for us to advert to the facts of this particular case. The real question is one of interpretation of Ru1e 125A.\n\nRule 125A was introduced by an amendment and inserted by a. S. R. 1813 dated 28ih December, 1962.\n\nThe provisions of this Rule relevant for the purpose of thjs appeai are .contained in sub• rules 0) and (2) which provide as follows :-\n\n\"125A '(!).\n\nIn this rule. unless the contellt otherwise requires, 'undertaking' means- .\n\n- . . . (a) any undertaking (including an unertaking vested ip1\n\n, k i\n\nV.D. lHUNJf!liNWALA v, UNION (t!..N. Sen, J.) 533\n\nor con.trolled or managed by, a local ulhor, ity) which is engaged in the production, generation, supply,· distribution 0r provision pf water, transport, fuel,. lighi electricity or other power, ot any other thing or service which is notified by the Government as .. . essential to the life of the community ;\n\n(b) any system of public conservancy and sanitation and any hospital or dispensary ; •\n\nand also includes an.Y part or . property of an . c undertaking.\n\n (2) If. it appears . to the C.entral Government or the State Government that for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community, it is necessary to tak.e over. the managcinent of any .undertaking, .that Government may, by notified order, authoi:ise any . . . p¢rson or body of persons to take over the management of any undertaking specified in the order and thereupon such undertaking shall be manageo in accordance with the provisions of that order ;\n\nProvided that powers UJlder this sub-rule shall he exercised by the State Government in respect of a. company to which the Comp<tnies Act 1956 applies .\n\n. Mr. Desai referring to sub-rule (I) (a) ofRule 125A of the.\n\nI!' Rules has argued that the Mill of the Appellant was not an undertaking within the meaning of this Rule, as the Mill on the date of the order was not engaged in .. production, generation, supply,\n\ndistribupn, or provision of water, transport, fuel, light, elect(icity or other power or any other thing or service which is notified by the Government as esse.ntial to the life of the community because the Mill bad been lying closed. It is his argument that an order under Rule 125A ca.n only be validly passed in respect of an under• . takin~ within the meaning of the Rule and in terms of the definition of 'undertaking' in the rule, an undertaking to which this rule may apply, must be one which is .engaged in the production,\n\ng:nertifln, supp!y: distribution or provision of water, transport, fuel, hght, electnc1ty or other power or an}' other thing or service\n\n~ .. .\n\n. A.\n\nc, D.\n\n5~4 SUPRl!ME COtJRt REPORtS [1984]3 s, c.R.:\n\nwhich is notified by the Government as essntial to the life of the community. He contends that the Mill had been closed and had not been fUnctioning and therefore, the. Min was not engaged in the production, generation, supply or distribution oL any sugar or ·\n\nany other .thing or service essent_ial_ to the life of the coinmunity.\n\nIt is his contention .that as the _appellant had !OJ]~ before the pas-. sing of the order and even before sugar was declared to be iln essential co:nmodity. completely_ stopped th.e running of the Mill . witQ.: .no intention to start it again, the. Mill had ceased to be engaged in the manufacture or production of sugar and there was •therefore, no undertaking within the meaning of Rule 125A and. the order passed under Rule 125A which was not attracted must . be held. to be. bad and invalid. He has submitte<; l that an. order\n\nunder Rule 125A call only be• passed in respect of an undertakig which is actually engaged in 'the activ.ity of production 'at the time the order is passed; In support of the submissions made-, Mr.\n\nDesai has' referred to :the decision of this Court in R. C Cooper v.\n\nUnion of India\"l and also !o the decision of the Delhi High Court 'in the case of , National Projects Constructio11 Corporation Ltd.v. · Cinnmissioner of Wealth Tax. Delhi\"'.\n\nOn behalf of the. Union: of India, it has been submitted that stoppage of production and non-fonctioning of the Mill even with ·\n\nan intent to close it down permneritly does not, _in any way, affect the power to take over. the_ management under Rule J25A and thejurisdiction and authority to pass an order even in respect of an undertaking cloed and intended to be permanently shut down\" can validly be exercised under rule 125A. The submission is that merely because an undertaking has been shut down with no intention of being. reopened ii will not on that ground only cease .to be an undertaking wiihin the meaning of the rule,· The learned counsel argues that for a proper appreciation of the (rue import and meaning of the word 'undertaking' and for under§ianding the true. scope and effect of rule l2SA, it is necessary to refer to rule-\n\n125. It is his argument that in the light of the provision contained in rule 125, rule 125A which was introduced by way of amendment to confer' further power of take. over _of ihe management of an undertaking will have to be understood anq construed ; anti on. proper interpretation it is clear that fa the larger public interest,\n\n(l} [19701 3 S. C. R. 530\n\n(2) [1969] 74 I. T. R. 4'65 .\n\n. .,\n\n. I\n\n~- •••\n\n.. ..\n\n.. .\n\n. -.\n\n' -\n\n' -._.\n\nv:o. ; fiuii1IluNWALA v~ UNION (A.N. Sen, J.) · 535\n\n . . ·. : .· • f . d . . d. . ule !25A can undoubt- A the power and authority con erre un er r .. . . . , . 'edly be exercised in respect of an undertaking which, may not be . functlonin.a and may have even been closed with intent•. of not\n\n' ' - 0 . • . . ··, :\n\nreopening the same;. ·\n\n• •\n\n. . ' . . . . The relevant proviSions of rule 125 read :-\n\n\" 125. General control of indusiry, etc . ..::(!) rule, unless the ontext otherwise requires,~.. .\n\nIo this\n\n(a) ~~Y reference to ay artile or thing shall be const-\n\n. rued .as including a reference to electricai energy ; ·\n\n:' _-.. ·\n\n(b) the . exprssion 'undertakiiis mean's any undertaking\n\n : by way of any industry~ trade or business and includes.\n\n, the occupation of hanJ!ing, loading or unloading Of . gcicidsio the course. f trasport, · ·\n\n(:l) If the C.entral Gvernmnt (; r the . State Gi1ver.n\" ment is of.opinion . that it is necessary or expedient so to . -do for securing the defence. of• India and civil defence,.· . 'the efficient conduct of military operations or the mainte- . . nance or. increase of supPlies . and services ssential to the Ufe of the community or for securing.: the equitable distribution and availability of any article or thing ai, fair .prices, . it may;. by 'order, provid~ for regulating or prohibiting the production, manufacture, supply and distribution, use and consumption of articles 'or thing and. trade . and . comineri:e therei.n or . for. preventing any corrupt paictke of abuse of authority ln respect of. any such .matter;. ·\n\nc '\n\n,. -·,\n\n.• .F\n\n(3) Without. prejudice . to the generality of the . powers tonferred by 'sub' rule. (2); an order made there~\n\n. G under my provide' . ..\n\n(a) . for regulating' by iicences, . permits or otherwiSe the\n\nthe :production, manufacture,: treatment;': keeping •. st9rage; movement; transport, '.distribution, disposal; . acquisition/ use or consumption ofarticles or things\n\nof any description whatsoever ~: · ·\n\n. •.· ..\n\n.• H\n\n, I\n\n. 536.\n\nSUPR, EME COURr REPORTS\n\n(1984] 3 S.C.R •\n\n(aa) for regulating o.r prohibiting any. class of commercial or financial transactions. iri respect of any artiC!e or thing which in the opinion of the Government are, or, if not regulated or prohibited, are likely to be, detrimental to any of the purposes specified.in subrule (2). ·\n\n(b) . for prohibiting the. with holding from sale, either generally or to specified persons 'or clilsses of persons, of articles or things ordinarily kept for sale and for requiring articles or things ordinarily kept for sale to be sold either generally or to specified persons or class. or classes of persons or in specified circumstances ;\n\n(c) for requiring any perspn holding in tock any article or thing to sell !he whole or a specified part of the stock to the Government or to an officer or agent of the Government . or to such other person. or class .or classess of persons and in such circumstances as may be specified in the order and if the 'order relates to food-grains, at such prices.as. may be' specified in the order having ri;.gard to ;-\n\n(i) the maximum price, if any, fixed by order under clause (e) or by or under any other law for the time being in force,· for the grade or variety of food-grains to which the order this clause\n\n(ii)\n\napplies ; and ·\n\nthe price: for that grade or variety of foodgrains prevailing or likely . to prevail during the post. harvest period. in the. area to Which the order applies ;\n\n(d) for securipg. the production or manufacture of specified articles. or things in specified quantities and for\n\neffecting modification in the pattern of production .or manufacture of.su'ch article_s or things ;\n\n. (dd) for securing the production, manufacture supply or\n\nsale according to the prescribed standards\" and. speci- . fications, of any article or thing appearing to .the . Government essential to any of the purposes specified in sub-rule (2) ; ·\n\n.· \"- •\n\n' '\n\n. ..,.\n\nV.D. JHUNJJIUNWALA v. UNION (A.N. Sen, J.)' 531\n\n(ddd) for the minimum and maximum stock of any article\n\nor thing appearing to the Government essential to any the pur-poses specified in sub-rule (2),, to be held by any . consumer or by any producer, manufcturer, distributor, dealer or.other person;\n\n (e) for controlling the prices or rates at which articles\n\nQT things of any description whatsoever may be sold or hired or for relaxing any maximum or minimum limits otherw'ise imposed on such prices or rates;\n\n(() for controlling the rates at . which any vessel registered in India may be hired and the rates at which C. persons or goods may be carried in or on any such vessel ;\n\n(g) for requiring any employers or class or classes of employers to suppli to all or any class of their employees or to any class of dependants of such employees such articles or things in such quantities £nd at such price as may be specified in the order and to provide such accommodation and other • facilities for taking meals at or near. the place of employment as may be so .specified ;\n\n(h) for controlling the recruitment and employment of labour in such areas as may be specified in the ord.er with a view to seuring that efficient workers are available for undertakings which, .in the opinion of the Government, are essential undertakings ;\n\n(i) for regulating the carrying . on of any undertaking engaged in or capable of doing, work appearing to the Government essential to any of the above men- . tioned purposes, and, in particular :\n\n(i) for requiiing work to be done by ari under\n\ntaking ; • G\n\n(ii) for determining the ordr of priority in which, and the period or periods within which work shall be done by an undertaking ; ·\n\n(iii) for controlling or fixing the charges which may be made by undertaking in respect of .the doing of any work by it ;\n\n- •\n\n53s\n\n• A\n\n• D\n\n; H\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984] 3 s.c.R. ~- \"'\n\n(iv) for requiring, regulating or prohibiting the engageroent in the undertaking of any employees or class or classes of employees ; •· ..\n\n. (v) for requiring the undertaking io provide adequate safeguards against sabotage ;\n\n(j) for requiring rersons .engagep in the production, manufacture, supply or distribution of or trade and commerce in any article or thing, to maintail) and produce for inspection sµch . books, accounts and records relating . to. their bussiness and to . furnish such inforroation relating thereto and to .employ such accounting and auditing staff as may be specified in the order;\n\n{k) for collecting any informatio_n or ·.statistics with a view to regulating or prohibiting any of the aforesaid matters ;\n\n(i) for requiring persons carrying on any Int!ustry, trade\n\n. r+\n\n-or business or employed in conl)ection with any undertaking to produce to such authority as may be specified in . the order, any books, account or other documents relati\"ng thereto ; and for requiring-such . persons to furnish such authority as may be specified in the. order such estimates returns or other information relating to any industry. irade or business or any undertaking .as m_ay . be specified ill the order or demanded thereunder ; ¥'\"\n\n(m) for the grant or issue of licenpes, permits or other\n\n documents, the charging of fees therefor, the depost of such sum; if aoy as may be specified.· in . the order as security for the due perfo)'mance of the conditions of any such lic:ence, permit or other document, \"the forfeiture ., f the sum to deposited for any part ·\n\nthereof for 'contravention of any such conditions, and the adjudication of such forfeiture by such authority\n\n• ,.;\n\nV.D. JHUNJHUNIYALI\\ v. UNION (A.M Sen, J.) 539 \" as may be specified in the order ;\n\n* * .. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • * • • • * * • •• • • • • • . * . • • • • • • .. • • • • • • • • • •\n\n(4) Ifit appears to the Central Government or the State Government that in the interests of the defence of India and civil defence; or the efficient co_nduct of .military operations,. or for maintaining supplies and services esential to the life ofthe community, it is necessary to exercise control over the whole or any part of an existing undertaking, that Government may by order . authorise any person (hereinafter referred t'o as an auth- ·\n\nrised controller) to exercise, with respect to the undertak ing or. any part thereof specified in the order, such. functions of control as may be provided by the order ; aad so Icing as an order made undeF this sub-rule is in force with respect to any undertaking or part of an undertaking-.· ·\n\n(a) the authorised controller shali exercise his functions E . in accordance with any instructions given to him by. the Central Government or the State Government, s_o, however, that he shall not have power to . give any directions inconsistent with the provisions of any\n\nACl or other instrument determining the functioning of the undertakers except in so far as may be specifica)iy provided b.J' the order ; and\n\n(b) the undertaking or part shall be. carried on in acco1-\n\n'dance with any directions given by the authoiised\n\ncontroller in accor.dance with the provisions of the order, and an JC person having any function of manage ment in relation to the undertaking or part shall comply with any such directions ;\n\n(5) The Central Government, so far -as it appears to it to be necessary or expedient for securing .the defence of.\n\nIndia and civil defence or the efficient conduct of military\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1984 j J S.C, lt.\n\n'A operations, or for maintaining. supplies and• services essential to the life of the community, may direct the employment of persons subject to .the Army Act, 1950 o.r . ·, the Air Force Act; 1950, or the Navy Act, 1957~ .\n\nD ..\n\n(a)· in any public utility service as defined in section 2 of the Indusirial Disrutes Act. 1947; or ·\n\n(b) in any undertaking or part thereof,\n\n(i) wl1icb is being carried on by the Central or a\n\nState Government, or . .\n\n(ii) • which in the opinion of the Ceniral Gvernment is engaged in any trade or business esse.ntial to , the life of the community, or\n\n(iiii with respect to whi.ch an order made under' sub-·\n\nrule (4) is in force. ·\n\n~- ..\n\nand thereupon it shall be the duty of every person so sub:. ject to obey any command given by. any superior offic.er • . in relation tci such employment •and every such command\n\nshall be. deemed. to . be. a lawful command within the. meaning .dnd for t11e purpose of the Ar111y Act,1950, or Air Force Act, 1.950, or the Navy Act,· 1957, as the case may be. ·.>-.\n\n(6) A direction under sub-rule (5) may be made with or without the consent of the person carrying .on the undertaking ·.or part thereof to which the direction relates but if made without his consent shall. ]?e comm uni: cated to such person who shMI thereupon be deemed to hRVC contravened an order made under this rule jf ne obstructs or fails to facilitate the employment of perons subject to the Army Act, 1950, or the Air Force Act; 1950 . or the Navy Act,.1957, in pursuance of the direction.\"\n\nSub-rule (2) of rule 125 makes it clear that for securing the defence of India and civil defence, efficient conduct of.military operations.or .the maintenance or' increase of supplies and servic.es. essential to the life ofthe community or for seeking equitaqle distri- bU:tioi1and availability of any article or thing at fair 'price, s very' . .wide powrs which are indicated in sub:section(3) without prejudice .. to the gen<; ratity of the powers conferred by this sub-section have .\n\n. '\n\nV.D. i!IUNl~NWALA v. UNION (A.N. Sen, J.) 541\n\n'provided for regulatin& or prohibiting production,_ manufacture; supply and distribution, use and consumption of articles or things and trad_e ang commerce and for preventing any corrupt practlcli or abuse of authority ln .tesp.ct of any such matter. Rule 125())(b) which defines all undertaking makes it clear thar the expression 'undertaking' meaus any undertaking by way of any industry, trade or business and includes the occupation. of handling, loading or-unloading of goods in the course of transport. Sub, rule 3(i) of rule 125 makes provision for regulating the carrying on of an undertaking engaged in, . or capal)le of doing work appearing to the Government .essential to any of the purposes mentioned above in sub-rule (3) and in particular Ii) for requiring work 'to be done by an undertaking and (ii) for determining tbe order of Priority in which, and the period or periods within whiph the work shall be done by an undertaking. It has to be noted that'the expression undertaking has been given a very wide. meaning in rll!e 125(1)(b) and.is i; iot limited to any undertaking which is functioning, or is a going concern. Sub-rule 3(i) confers powers and jurisdiction for regulating the carrying on of any undertaking not only engage<! in but a!so capable or doing, work appearing to the Gqvernment essential and this provision makes this position abundantly clear, Iii the larger interest of the country a.nd particularly for the purpose specifically mentioned fo rule 125, power of general control of very wide amplitude is conferred under rule 125 and th. ere is . noth!Dg to indicate in the s!id rule that the power~ conferr~\n\nunder rule 125 cannot be exercised over any undertaking which h'as stopped functioning. Indeed; such a construction is clearly unwarranted on a plain reading_ of the section which clea:i; ly provides that such powers can be exercised not only in respect of an undertaking engaged but also capable of doing the kind 'of activity contemplated in the rule. Such a narrow construction is likely to defeat the .very purpose for which the rule has been enacted.\n\nAlthough rule 125 confers very wide powers for general control of an_ undertaking, there is no provision in the said rule to take over the management of any undertaking.\n\nOrders and directions under .rule 125 to exercise general control over an undertaking were not considered o be sufficient and the authority felt that further power to take over the management of\" an undertaking in appropriate oases was necessary, when such general control may not prove effective particularly in respect of certain undertakings. Rule\n\nJ25A by way of ?mendment was, therefore, inserte\\l to co!Jfer\n\nSUPREME. COURT REPORTS\n\nU9 84) 3 S.C.R A .\n\n•. !!1rther power of taking over. the . mnagement of prlicular uiidr\n\ntakings and of appointing auhorised .. c0ritollers for running such undertakings .. The 'meaning of the.· •word. 'undertaking' inrule\n\n125A has to be nnde_rstood in .this background and context .. Rule\n\n: 125A makes it clear thafthe rule\"l25A is not. intended to apply to each and every uqdertakingiwithin the m<; aning of rule 125. Special. . provision is made .in rule 125A in respect of particul.ar undertakings... ·.\n\nOnly Rule 125A describes and particularises the undertakings to . which this rule will. be applicable. Tbe proyision in this rule that ''in this rule unless the. context otherwise r; iquire~ an under-. taking' means ariy undertaking (including an un.dertaking vested in . or controlled o.r managed by, a 1.ocal authority) .. which is eng:ige_d\n\niii the production; generation, \"supply, distribution .or provision of . water,_transfer, fuel, light, electricity or other power 'or any other\n\nthing or.service which is notified by the Government 'as essential.to the life of the< community\", is. merely .descriptive of the tlnderta: . . ing to which this rule .is applicable. The words. \"which .is engagd\n\nin the pruduction. * * *\" merely describes the kind of undertaking by.referring to the. nature of. the .activity of the undertaking for : ·.bringing it within the . purview of rule. 125A and they have no ·\n\n.bearing on the question whether. the activities ae in t!ie. process :or being carried on or have been . stor.ped. . The expression any undertaking which is. 'engaged. in' has been.used.to.describe the . nature of business of .. the undertaking and is merely descriptive of :-the undertaking to which this rule wilt'.· apply. The take over of the management. of an undertaking to which rule 125A.is _applica- . ble may become. ali the more necessary in larger public. interest\n\n.and for effectively serVing the purposes for which this 'rule has been.\n\nincorpo.rated; particularly when an undertaking engaged in any kind of.· activity coming within the purview . of this rule stops. functioning, to enable. tee.· undertaking to function. for achieving '>'(\", the purposes for which , these provisions have been made .. The 'construction '.contended for by Mr .. Desai wiU be inconsistent with . the provisions of the rule ·:and will defeat the purposes \\Vhich .. this\n\nrule seeks to serve •.. The. decisions relied on by Mr. Desai are of ... no. assistance as the expressions 'undertaking'. and 'engaged' .. which'\n\n•. caine to be considered in these cses, wer~ usd in different status · and jn entiely different context. . . ·\n\nc We must, th(refote~ -hfld ttitthe td<iqg over of the manage rrent cf tl:e iug•r mi11 cf tle . app(Uel\\tar.d the apoointment of\n\n, • '.: • 4 ,,_\n\n..+ v.D. JHUNJHUNWALA v; UNION (A.N: Sen, J.) 543\n\nthe authorised controller were perfectly valid and lawful and the A . act done by the authorised control.ler in the course of management\n\nby virtue ofthe provl:; ions ofthese rules must be held to be bind ing on the appellant. iii<\n\nThe appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed with no order as to costs.\n\nN.V.K. . Appewl dismissed,\n\n. ''1' .\n\n.'t • •", "total_entities": 37, "entities": [{"text": "A. DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8, "end_char": 16, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.A. DESAI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "AMARENDRA NATH SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 18, "end_char": 36, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "AMARENDRA NATH SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R. B. MISRA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 41, "end_char": 57, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.B. MISRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Indid Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 72, "end_char": 83, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Defence of Indian Rules, 1962", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 355, "end_char": 384, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "India Rules 1962", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 499, "end_char": 515, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1060, "end_char": 1074, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".• on behalf o.f the Union of India, it was contended that Rule 12SA G confers juisdiction and authority to pass."}}, {"text": "SS3A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1531, "end_char": 1535, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S.T. Desai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3382, "end_char": 3392, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "210 of 1967 ..\n\nS.T. Desai and H.S. Parihar for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "H.S. Parihar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3397, "end_char": 3409, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "210 of 1967 ..\n\nS.T. Desai and H.S. Parihar for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Harbans Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3430, "end_char": 3441, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Harbans Lal, Miss A. Subhashini and V, B, SDharya for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "A. Subhashini", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3448, "end_char": 3461, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Harbans Lal, Miss A. Subhashini and V, B, SDharya for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "V, B, SDharya", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3466, "end_char": 3479, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Harbans Lal, Miss A. Subhashini and V, B, SDharya for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "Shobha Dikshit", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3508, "end_char": 3522, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mrs. Shobha Dikshit fqr Respondent."}}, {"text": "AMARENDRA NATH Sm", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3637, "end_char": 3654, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "AMARENDRA NATH Sm, J.\n\nWhether the order of the Central oovernment taking, over the management of t)\\e Sugar Mill of the Appellant.", "canonical_name": "AMARENDRA NATH SEN"}}, {"text": "S. T, Deasi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4010, "end_char": 4021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The main contention of Mr. S. T, Deasi, learned Counsel for the appellant, is that .on a proper construction of Rule l 25A of the Defence of."}}, {"text": "Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5448, "end_char": 5453, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "perfectly vaild on a proper interpretation of Rule 125A As.in out opinion, on a propr interpretation of R.ule 125A, the -order.in question is lawfuland justified even if we accept the submission of Mr. Desai that the Mill was fatually s9 closed, it does not becon1e necessary for us to advert to the facts of this particular case.", "canonical_name": "Desai"}}, {"text": "s9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5481, "end_char": 5483, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "28ih December, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5712, "end_char": 5731, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The real question is one of interpretation of Ru1e 125A.\n\nRule 125A was introduced by an amendment and inserted by a. S. R. 1813 dated 28ih December, 1962."}}, {"text": "N. Sen", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6068, "end_char": 6074, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a) any undertaking (including an unertaking vested ip1\n\n, k i\n\nV.D. lHUNJf!liNWALA v, UNION (t!..N. Sen, J.) 533\n\nor con.trolled or managed by, a local ulhor, ity) which is engaged in the production, generation, supply,· distribution 0r provision pf water, transport, fuel,."}}, {"text": "C.entral Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6579, "end_char": 6598, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to the C.entral Government or the State Government that for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community, it is necessary to tak.e over."}}, {"text": "Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9249, "end_char": 9254, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "order\n\nunder Rule 125A call only be• passed in respect of an undertakig which is actually engaged in 'the activ.ity of production 'at the time the order is passed; In support of the submissions made-, Mr.\n\nDesai has' referred to :the decision of this Court in R. C Cooper v.\n\nUnion of India\"l and also !", "canonical_name": "Desai"}}, {"text": "Delhi High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9368, "end_char": 9384, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "o the decision of the Delhi High Court 'in the case of , National Projects Constructio11 Corporation Ltd.v. ·"}}, {"text": "A.N. Sen", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10813, "end_char": 10821, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "fiuii1IluNWALA v~ UNION (A.N. Sen, J.) · 535\n\n . . ·. : .· •"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 15346, "end_char": 15351, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "which any vessel registered in India may be hired and the rates at which C. persons or goods may be carried in or on any such vessel ;\n\n(g) for requiring any employers or class or classes of employers to suppli to all or any class of their employees or to any class of dependants of such employees such articles or things in such quantities £nd at such price as may be specified in the order and to provide such accommodation and other • facilities for taking meals at or near."}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 18602, "end_char": 18620, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(4) Ifit appears to the Central Government or the State Government that in the interests of the defence of India and civil defence; or the efficient co_nduct of .military operations,."}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20048, "end_char": 20066, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "carried on in acco1-\n\n'dance with any directions given by the authoiised\n\ncontroller in accor.dance with the provisions of the order, and an JC person having any function of manage ment in relation to the undertaking or part shall comply with any such directions ;\n\n(5) The Central Government, so far -as it appears to it to be necessary or expedient for securing .the defence of."}}, {"text": "Army Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20411, "end_char": 20425, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Air Force Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20439, "end_char": 20452, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Navy Act, 1957", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20467, "end_char": 20481, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20541, "end_char": 20550, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Navy Act, 1957", "statute": "the Navy Act, 1957"}}, {"text": "Air Force Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21230, "end_char": 21243, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Navy Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21259, "end_char": 21267, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Army Act, 1950", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21702, "end_char": 21716, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Air Force Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21725, "end_char": 21738, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Navy Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21754, "end_char": 21762, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sen", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27890, "end_char": 27893, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4 ,,_\n\n..+ v.D. JHUNJHUNWALA v; UNION (A.N: Sen, J.) 543\n\nthe authorised controller were perfectly valid and lawful and the A ."}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_3_544_549_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "544.\n\nSEBASTIAN M. HONGRAY\n\nUNION OF INDIA & ORS .. . .\n\nApri( 23, 1984\n\n'[D.A.I)esAI AND 0. CIUNNAPPA REDDY, JJ.]\n\n. . .\n\n Writ :of Habeas Corpus served on Respondent3 dire.ctlg 1hem to produce_\n\nte t_wo _nanted per.ons-Re.\\pondent.i.fail to file .a return bpt exPtdin the reaS<ilt.<J for not producing 1hem-Appropd'ate mr.uf.e of_e-nforci'ng _abedience to a Writ of Habeas Co1pus, explained-Contempt of <..1ourt A_ct, .]971 Sections 2 (a) a1id ·. J (b} Hciv(l onte1npt\" and wilful. di obedience~', explained Examplary Cost by way of Compensation ordered under Ru/eh of order KLVII oj Supreme , Court Rules, 1966. · ··\n\nO.n Novmber 24, 1983, the Court by its iudgmen t and .order directed that writ of Habeas Corpus be issued-Though the 1st, 2nd and 4th tesponderJs°\"e.re served, .they failed to file.a-re.turn to the _Writ. However 8.re, urn on affidavif by one Aja.i Vikram Singh Dirctor, .Ministry of Defence was filed on 12.12.1983 expr.essing their inability to produ.ce the two nS:t'ned officets duo to circutristance! be}tond their control arid thCir failure tO trace the~ ev.en with. the. assistance of. Cent.raI Bureau of Jiives tigati<i.J.\n\nThis was supported by a copy of the report by the Dy. Inspector GeneraJ-0f i'olice (s) .\n\n. Making the Rule absolute .the Court,\n\n.HELD :i. 10 complianc~ whb thC mandatory direction contained ii:t the Writ of Habeas Corpus, the pers.on to whom itis dir\"eced is .under a legal .obiigation to produce 1be body cif the. person alleged to be l!nlawfully detained.before the Court on the day specified and to mak~ a form.al returri to the wri.t.\n\nHere, uch a Writ' has been issued.and there.bas be\"en fi!Ure to p'rodu-; e the .missing persons in respect of whoni _writ. js isstieid and to file the re.tur.n as mandated by law. [547B.F] . · ·\n\n.z:l 'fh\"e Contempt ·or Courts Act,. 19·11 define_s , colltmpt of court•. i.n Sec. 2(a) io mell 'civil contempt ot criminal.con.teinpt'. 'Civil Contept' is_-defined in Sec. 2(b) to mean. wilful disobed_ience: t.o. any judgment decree~ direction, order, .writ or ot.her. process ()fa Court or wilful breach .. of.an undert.aking .. given to a c.ourt' .. Wilful .disObedince .. to awr.it issud by tne Court constitutes civil conte'!'pt. [547H; .548A]\n\n2:2 Mere failure to obey th_e Writ inay not.constitut.e civil contempt depending upOn th_e facts and circumStanCes Of.the Case. Bt1t wllful disobe .. dierice-to a writ issµed -by fl. Court constitute~ .. civil .contem.pt.\n\nAgain it is wen-Settled that tbeappropriate mode .of cnfd\"rciflg obeditnce :t.o a writ of\n\nln\\be~S COtPll;, is by. om, mitt~J for ontempt.\n\nA, COffili\\itt~\\ O(der mari?~ •\n\n' r-.· •\n\n) ..\n\n• •\n\n• r\n\ns. M. HONGRAY v. UNiON 545\n\nt-i:made ·agl1inst a person 'Who inteniionally makes a false return to a writ <'l(\n\nhabea!\" corpu~ but an unintentional misrepresentation an a return is not a grouo4 for committal. [S4~BC]\n\n2:3 The-- view of ibis Court as expressed ip the .main judgment 'clelrly indicates that \\he assertion of respondents I. 2 and'4 that C. Daniel\n\n\" .\n\nand C. Paul left P.hungref camp where 21st . Sikh Regiment were stationed B is not correct and that to avoid _responsibility flowing from the -mysterious dH;&j)pearance of C. Daniel and C. Paul an -atteµipt as mad¢ to .suggest that they .bad left alive , in the COIT\\pany of their compatriots. On that con-clusion one can say that 1:here is a wilful OisobedieOce to the writ _or ·:tflabeas corps by misteadillg the court by pr~.seDfing a djstortcd versio11.of facts not qorne out by the rec.ord .. It is thqs established. that th~ respondents\n\nt, 2 and 4 have committed civil .contempt by .their wilful disobedience to\n\n.. C the writ. [548DE]\n\n3: 2 In the facts and circumstances of the ca.se, eeping in view the\n\n;;- t<irture,· the agqny and the mental oppression throu8; h which Mrs. C.\n\nThingkhuiia, wife o(Sbri C. Daniel and Mri .. C. Vangamla, wife of Shri \\- C. Palil had to pa'.ss and they being the -proper applicants, the f'oxma(\n\napplication :bein'g by Sebastibn M. Hongray> the c_ourt considered ·t. proper \"' and directed that as a measure of exempla.rJtt costs as is perniisible in such , cases,· resPoodents Nos. 1 (lnd :i -shalT pay Rs. 1 lac to each of the afore .. mentioned two women ); Vithin a period of four weeks frQD) April 23, 1984. . . . .\n\n. [5480-H; S49A) . . .\n\n4. Further adjourning the matter to enable.the resp0ndcntsto trace 'or locate the tWo missing. pt; rsons is to shut the e¥es to\\tl?e reality and to\n\npcrsue a mirr.ge.\n\nThe two officers have not met their:. tragic end in an F\n\neDounter as is usually claimed and the only pos'.iiblc inference that can be drawn from circUmsraoce of the case is that both ofthe_ll1 m_ust have met ,--ari unnatural death. Prima facie, it W(luld be a_o offence of murder. Who Is\n\n'fildividuallYor collectively the Purpetrator'of the crime of is responsible ) , Jfo:t: their c; Jilappearance will h_ave .. to be\"· determined by a proper, thorough ?•·and r~SP, onSible police , investigation.\n\nIt is nt necessary to .start -casting a lloubt on anyone or any particular perspn. But p•ima facie there is material G On record .. to reach an affirmative conclusion that botb Sbri c ... DaBiel and 'Sltri C. Paul are' not alive and have met .an uQnatutal _-death. And the\n\ntJfiion of In.dia cannot disown the responsibility in this behalf. [S49B•E] . \\ - - '\n\n. \" (Tho Court is; uod a writ of madamus to th6'!ll1!Jerintedent' of Po.lice, 1Ukbml, Manipur S1ate to.tfC.at ELll the p_apers.in the Writ of Habeat1 Corpus -'as:\"\"'informS:tion of a cognizable offence aqd to commence inve'.stiga_tion as\" ff\n\n0 preacrlbed by jb~ relev~t provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedur~) . , . .\n\n. [S49E-F]\n\nj .. •\n\n•'546\n\nSUPRllMll COURT REPORTS [1984] 3 s.C.\\l.\n\nc ' 0RIGiN>.L JuR1so1c110N : Writ Petition (Criminal) No.148. of 19~3.\n\n. B\n\n.(Under article' 32 of the Constition of India)\n\n.Ms. Nandita Hak!iar and C.S. Vaidyqnatha11 for the Petitioner.\n\nMs: A. Subhashini for Respondent . . '\n\nMrs. Urwitla Kapoor for Respondent.\n\n,. V.C. Mahaj4n, P.N. Purl S.K. Mehta and Balbir Singh Shant for Respondent. · ,\n\n' ' The Judgment of the Courl was delivered by\n\nDESAI, J. 0n Nov. 24, 1983, the Court by its. Judgment and order directed that a writ of habeas corpus 'be issued, The qperative portion Of the order reatls as under : . . . , .\n\n#'Accordingly, this petition is allowed and we direct that a writ of habeas corpas be iss11ed to theresp<)ndents I, 2 nd 41:ommanding them to produce C. Daniel, 'retired Naik Subedar of Manipur Rifles and Headmaster Of the Junior High School of I; fuining Village and C. Paul, Assista'Jlt Pastor ofHuin'g Baptist hurch, who wre taken to Phurtgrei Camp by the jawans of 21st Sikh Regiment. on March' 10, 1982 before this Court on Dec. 12, 1983 and file the return.'' • •\n\n'i'he R-egistry issued the wdt nd served the same upon first, respondent-Union of India, second respondent-Secretary, Ministry ofHc>nie Affairs and 4th 'respondentcomma'ndant, 21st S.ikh Regi- . ment, Phungrei Calilp. Pursuant to the writ, it was obligatory\n\n11pon respondents I, 2 and 4 to file the return and' to produce C; Daniel and c .. Paul. A retµrnon affidavit by one Ajai Vikram Singh, Director, Ministry of Defence dated December 9,, 1983 was produced in the Court on December 12, 19S3. stating therein \"that with all the will and the best efforts, th.e resp~>ndents are Unl)ble to produce S/Shri C. Daniel and C. Pail! for the reasons set out in • \\. . . the affidavit and crave for indulgence of the Hon'ble Court for their inability to produce the abovenamed individuals due to circumstances beyond their control.\" . It was• ritetated that c .\n\nDaniel an4 C. Paul were not in thecustody or controi of respondent& l., 2, and 4, To thi~ r¢turn several alfidavi~ <Ind Pteiles wort . . .. . .. - '\n\n.r . •\n\n.~·\n\n. \"\"l'\n\n\\ s. M l!ONGRAY v. UNiON (Desai; J.) 547\n\nannexed saying that the Anny authorities conducted an extensive search for tracing C. Daniel and C. Paul but nothing Tniitful has been achieved One Surendra Kumar, Deputy Secretary, Ministry or Home Affairs had also filed the return stating that C. Daniel and C. Paul are neither in the custoily or confrol o( respondent No. 2.\n\nIt was stated that Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI for short) r have been directed to eonduct enquiries' to locate the aforementioned two persons and to 'intimate the result thereof. The matter was adjm+rned to enable the respondents to pursue their efforts.\n\nNothing 'fruitful .came up even though 'the'matter was twice adjcurned at the T-equest of !earned AttornQy General who entered appearance on behalf of respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 4. The writ petition wa~ posted for further hearing and orders on April 19,\n\n1984. On that day, a summary of enquiry made by CBI was sub- . mitted to the -Court in which if was stated that 'the fieid enquiries made' by the CBI and the efforts made to locate the two persons • have yielded no results .and it has-not been possible tO locate Sri Daniel and Sri Paul', The report was submitted by the Dy.\n\nInspector General of-Police (S). '\n\nIt is now necessary to deal with tilt failure of respondents I, 2 nd 4 to file the return to the_ writ ofhabas corpus. After a , preliminary enquiry and after hearing tho responents and after negativing their contentions that Shri C. Daniel and Shri C. Paul . were !lot seen last alive. in the custody or the 4th respondent, the Court directed to issue a writ of habeas corpus. The 'writ of habeas corpus w~.s issued and was served on respol)dcnts !, 2 and 4. In compliance with the •mandatory direction contained in the writ of habeas corpus, the 'person 'to whom it is direct rd is under a legal obligation to produce the body of person, alleged to be unlawfully detained before the Court on the day specified and to make a formal return. to tbe writ. (1} 6uch a writ has been issued and there has been failure to prod11ce the missing persons in respect 'of .whom writ is issued and to file the 'return as m1mdated by law:\n\nThe next question therefore, is : what is the appropriate mode of ¢nforcing obedience to a writ of habeas corpus ? •\n\nThe Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, defiries 'contempt of court' in Sec. 2(a) to. mean 'civil contempt ot criminal contempt'. 'Civil con-\n\n. (!)· Halsbury's Laws ofEngland, Fourth Edition, Vol. 11 para. 1492 at\n\n• page 791,\n\nff,\n\nSUPREME (:OURT REPORTS (.1984] 3 s.c. Ji.,. ,\n\n, A\n\n. c\n\ntempt' is defined 'in ec .. 2(b) to mean wilful di; obedience to any judgment decree, direction, order, writ or. other process of a Court or wil fnl breach 'of an undrtaklng.gi\\len to a Court.' Wilful disobedience to a. writ issued by the Court constitutes civil contell)pt: The question is : whether this disobedience is Wilful ? Mere failure to olley the writ may not corrstitute civit contempt depending .upon the facts and circumstances of ihe case.· Butwilful disobedi_ence to.a, writ issued by.a Court constituts civil contempt; Again it is well' i ' s.ettled that 'the appropriatu ...\\]iode' of enforcing :obedience to a wtit .f of habeas corpus is by committalfor.contemP.t.'. A committal order . may be m11de against a per&on '. who intenilonally makes a false return to a writ. of habeas corpus, 1lut11n •unintentional misrepresen: ~. • tation on a return is .not a ground f!)r .committal.'{')\n\n.,...,..t The view of this Court a's. y:Ipfessed in the main judgirient '. clearly indicates that the ai;.rtion of respondents t, 2 al)d 4 that .._ • C. Oaniel and C. Paµ! left Phu, i}grej, Camp .where 21st Sikh .· Regi 7-· ,. ment were stati_oneq js not correct aaid. that to avoid responsiliili~ 'flpwing from the mysterious 4isappeara11ce of c::oaniel and c . .P~.IJi\n\nan attempt . was• . made to suggest that tjiey- /lad left alivci in J)l.e • • company of their compatriots.· J'he Court has rejected this submis\n\nsion as \\lntenable fllld U9~9r.\\'l'ct. Qn that con., tusion one can 111\\Y that there is a wilful 4i$obe<lie!.!.ce to the )Vrit .. or babea~ corpµs -by ' misleadin~ tJie con rt .. by preSel)ting a Q, isjorted V.erion of facts :b.jl(\n\nborne out by the rotd:.-It is tp\\lJ stablished, that. the respond~!!l;•\n\nI.· 1, 2 and 4 have. col}lmitted .dviC: contempt by their wllfUI diso, Q~· !' . diene to the wri!· '\n\nCivil contempt is punishable with jmprisonment as well as fine. .\n\nIn a given case, . tb.~ .co'ui:tniay a~ penalise the party in con tempt . by ordering him to pay the costs of th~ application. <2l A fine ca~ also be imposed upon the contemnor. t ' . ' ' . . .\n\nNow in the facts and circumstances of the case, we do not propose to impose imprisonment' nor any amount as and by way of fine but. keeping in view 'the' torture, . the agony and the mental oppression through which Mrs. C. • Thingkhuila; wife of .Shri c; Daniel and.• Mi:s. C. Vangamla, wife of Shri C. Paul had to p~. and they being the proper applicants, the i'<;>rmal app, lication being by Sebastian M. Hongray, we direct that as a measure of exem\n\n(1) ibid para 1497\n\n(2) Halsbury's Laws of Eneland, l'ollrtl> Ellitiop, VoJ.' 9 para 100\n\nat p. 61. .\n\n. ,.\n\n• s. !.! .. ~Ol; GRAY v. uNioN (Dsai, j,) . 549\n\n p!ary costs as is permissible ill such. cases, respondents .Nos. 1 'and 2 shall pay Rs I 'lac. to' each of llie aforementioned: two women within a period of four weeks from today.\n\n•A query was posed to the learned Attorney General about the further step to. be taken .. It was made clear that further adjourning 'r the matter to enable the respondents H> trace or locale the two ·\n\nmissipg persons is to shut the. eyes to the reality and to p_nrsue a mirage. As we are inclined to direct regjstration of an offence and , an investigation, we express no opinion as to what fate has befallen to Shri C'. Daniel and Shri C. Paul, tlie missing two persons in res- . pect of whom the writ of ha!Jeas corpus was issued save and except saying; fhat they have not met their tragic end in an encounter as Is\n\nusually claimed and the only possible inference that can be drawn from circumstance already discussed is that b.oth of them must have \"\"1' met an unnatural death. Prima facie, it would be an offence of\n\n murde~. Wh.o is individually or collect1vely the purpetrator of the crime or is reonsible for their disappearance will have to be deter-. ' mined by a proper, thorough an'd responsible poJi.ce investigation.\n\nIt is not neeessary to start casting a doubt on anyone or any particular person. But prima facie there is material on record to reach an. affirmative conclusion that both Shr1 C; Daniel and Shri C. Paul\n\nare not alive and have met an unnatural death. And the Union of ,..( India cannot disown the responsfoility in this behalf. If this \"inference is permissible which we consider reasonable in the facts and circumstances of the case, we direct that the, Registrar (Judiciali shall forward aU the pap.ers of the case ace:ompanied by a writ of . manda.mus to. the Superintendent of Polie, Ukhrul, Manipur State to be'treated as' information of a cognizable offence and to commence i1westigation as prescribed by the r~Ievant provisions of the Code of Crimiital .procedure. \"\n\nS. R.\n\nRule made absolute •\n\nA ' '\n\n. E", "total_entities": 43, "entities": [{"text": "SEBASTIAN M. HONGRAY", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6, "end_char": 26, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SEBASTIAN M. HONGRAY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "UNION OF INDIA & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 28, "end_char": 48, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "0. CIUNNAPPA REDDY, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 90, "end_char": 113, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Sections 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 426, "end_char": 436, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Court Rules, 1966", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 596, "end_char": 613, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Aja.i Vikram Singh Dirctor", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 864, "end_char": 890, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "However 8.re, urn on affidavif by one Aja.i Vikram Singh Dirctor, .Ministry of Defence was filed on 12.12.1983 expr.essing their inability to produ.ce the two nS:t'ned officets duo to circutristance!", "canonical_name": "Aja.i Vikram Singh Dirctor"}}, {"text": "Sec. 2(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1868, "end_char": 1877, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 2(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1958, "end_char": 1967, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2872, "end_char": 2874, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "C. Daniel", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3013, "end_char": 3022, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S4~BC]\n\n2:3 The-- view of ibis Court as expressed ip the .main judgment 'clelrly indicates that \\he assertion of respondents I. 2 and'4 that C. Daniel\n\n\" .", "canonical_name": "C'. Daniel"}}, {"text": "C. Paul", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3033, "end_char": 3040, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and C. Paul left P.hungref camp where 21st .", "canonical_name": "C. Paul"}}, {"text": "C.\n\nThingkhuiia", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3815, "end_char": 3830, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "548DE]\n\n3: 2 In the facts and circumstances of the ca.se, eeping in view the\n\n;;- t<irture,· the agqny and the mental oppression throu8; h which Mrs. C.\n\nThingkhuiia, wife o(Sbri C. Daniel and Mri .. C. Vangamla, wife of Shri \\- C. Palil had to pa'.ss and they being the -proper applicants, the f'oxma(\n\napplication :bein'g by Sebastibn M. Hongray> the c_ourt considered ·t. proper \"' and directed that as a measure of exempla.rJtt costs as is perniisible in such , cases,· resPoodents Nos."}}, {"text": "Sebastibn M. Hongray", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3992, "end_char": 4012, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "548DE]\n\n3: 2 In the facts and circumstances of the ca.se, eeping in view the\n\n;;- t<irture,· the agqny and the mental oppression throu8; h which Mrs. C.\n\nThingkhuiia, wife o(Sbri C. Daniel and Mri .. C. Vangamla, wife of Shri \\- C. Palil had to pa'.ss and they being the -proper applicants, the f'oxma(\n\napplication :bein'g by Sebastibn M. Hongray> the c_ourt considered ·t. proper \"' and directed that as a measure of exempla.rJtt costs as is perniisible in such , cases,· resPoodents Nos.", "canonical_name": "SEBASTIAN M. HONGRAY"}}, {"text": "S49A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4306, "end_char": 4310, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "DaBiel", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5177, "end_char": 5183, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But p•ima facie there is material G On record .. to reach an affirmative conclusion that botb Sbri c ... DaBiel and 'Sltri C. Paul are' not alive and have met .an uQnatutal _-death.", "canonical_name": "DaBiel"}}, {"text": "S49B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5331, "end_char": 5335, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5444, "end_char": 5446, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S49E", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5679, "end_char": 5683, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Nandita Hak!iar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5876, "end_char": 5891, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nandita Hak!iar and C.S. Vaidyqnatha11 for the Petitioner."}}, {"text": "C.S. Vaidyqnatha11", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5896, "end_char": 5914, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nandita Hak!iar and C.S. Vaidyqnatha11 for the Petitioner."}}, {"text": "A. Subhashini", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5940, "end_char": 5953, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ms: A. Subhashini for Respondent . . '"}}, {"text": "Urwitla Kapoor", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5981, "end_char": 5995, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mrs. Urwitla Kapoor for Respondent."}}, {"text": "V.C. Mahaj4n", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6016, "end_char": 6028, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V.C. Mahaj4n, P.N. Purl S.K. Mehta and Balbir Singh Shant for Respondent. · ,"}}, {"text": "P.N. Purl S.K. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6030, "end_char": 6050, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V.C. Mahaj4n, P.N. Purl S.K. Mehta and Balbir Singh Shant for Respondent. · ,"}}, {"text": "Balbir Singh Sha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6055, "end_char": 6071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V.C. Mahaj4n, P.N. Purl S.K. Mehta and Balbir Singh Shant for Respondent. · ,"}}, {"text": "DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6143, "end_char": 6148, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' ' The Judgment of the Courl was delivered by\n\nDESAI, J. 0n Nov. 24, 1983, the Court by its."}}, {"text": "Ajai Vikram Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7169, "end_char": 7186, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A retµrnon affidavit by one Ajai Vikram Singh, Director, Ministry of Defence dated December 9,, 1983 was produced in the Court on December 12, 19S3.", "canonical_name": "Aja.i Vikram Singh Dirctor"}}, {"text": "December 9,, 1983", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7224, "end_char": 7241, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A retµrnon affidavit by one Ajai Vikram Singh, Director, Ministry of Defence dated December 9,, 1983 was produced in the Court on December 12, 19S3."}}, {"text": "December 12, 19S3", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7271, "end_char": 7288, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A retµrnon affidavit by one Ajai Vikram Singh, Director, Ministry of Defence dated December 9,, 1983 was produced in the Court on December 12, 19S3."}}, {"text": "C. Pail", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7414, "end_char": 7421, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "stating therein \"that with all the will and the best efforts, th.e resp~>ndents are Unl)ble to produce S/Shri C. Daniel and C. Pail!", "canonical_name": "C. Paul"}}, {"text": "Surendra Kumar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8012, "end_char": 8026, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "l'\n\n\\ s. M l!ONGRAY v. UNiON (Desai; J.) 547\n\nannexed saying that the Anny authorities conducted an extensive search for tracing C. Daniel and C. Paul but nothing Tniitful has been achieved One Surendra Kumar, Deputy Secretary, Ministry or Home Affairs had also filed the return stating that C. Daniel and C. Paul are neither in the custoily or confrol o( respondent No."}}, {"text": "Central Bureau of Investigation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8212, "end_char": 8243, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was stated that Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI for short) r have been directed to eonduct enquiries' to locate the aforementioned two persons and to 'intimate the result thereof."}}, {"text": "April 19,\n\n1984", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8701, "end_char": 8716, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The writ petition wa~ posted for further hearing and orders on April 19,\n\n1984."}}, {"text": "CBI", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8760, "end_char": 8763, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On that day, a summary of enquiry made by CBI was sub- ."}}, {"text": "Daniel", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8979, "end_char": 8985, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "mitted to the -Court in which if was stated that 'the fieid enquiries made' by the CBI and the efforts made to locate the two persons • have yielded no results .and it has-not been possible tO locate Sri Daniel and Sri Paul', The report was submitted by the Dy.", "canonical_name": "DaBiel"}}, {"text": "Paul", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8994, "end_char": 8998, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "mitted to the -Court in which if was stated that 'the fieid enquiries made' by the CBI and the efforts made to locate the two persons • have yielded no results .and it has-not been possible tO locate Sri Daniel and Sri Paul', The report was submitted by the Dy."}}, {"text": "Contempt of Courts Act, 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10122, "end_char": 10150, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sec. 2(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10184, "end_char": 10193, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971", "statute": "The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971"}}, {"text": "C. • Thingkhuila", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12716, "end_char": 12732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the agony and the mental oppression through which Mrs. C. • Thingkhuila; wife of .Shri c; Daniel and.• Mi:s. C. Vangamla, wife of Shri C. Paul had to p~. and they being the proper applicants, the i'<;>rmal app, lication being by Sebastian M. Hongray, we direct that as a measure of exem\n\n(1) ibid para 1497\n\n(2) Halsbury's Laws of Eneland, l'ollrtl> Ellitiop, VoJ.' 9 para 100\n\nat p. 61. ."}}, {"text": "Sebastian M. Hongray", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12890, "end_char": 12910, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the agony and the mental oppression through which Mrs. C. • Thingkhuila; wife of .Shri c; Daniel and.• Mi:s. C. Vangamla, wife of Shri C. Paul had to p~. and they being the proper applicants, the i'<;>rmal app, lication being by Sebastian M. Hongray, we direct that as a measure of exem\n\n(1) ibid para 1497\n\n(2) Halsbury's Laws of Eneland, l'ollrtl> Ellitiop, VoJ.' 9 para 100\n\nat p. 61. .", "canonical_name": "SEBASTIAN M. HONGRAY"}}, {"text": "Halsbury's Laws of Eneland", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12973, "end_char": 12999, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the agony and the mental oppression through which Mrs. C. • Thingkhuila; wife of .Shri c; Daniel and.• Mi:s. C. Vangamla, wife of Shri C. Paul had to p~. and they being the proper applicants, the i'<;>rmal app, lication being by Sebastian M. Hongray, we direct that as a measure of exem\n\n(1) ibid para 1497\n\n(2) Halsbury's Laws of Eneland, l'ollrtl> Ellitiop, VoJ.' 9 para 100\n\nat p. 61. ."}}, {"text": "C'. Daniel", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13707, "end_char": 13717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As we are inclined to direct regjstration of an offence and , an investigation, we express no opinion as to what fate has befallen to Shri C'.", "canonical_name": "C'. Daniel"}}, {"text": "Daniel", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 14501, "end_char": 14507, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "affirmative conclusion that both Shr1 C; Daniel and Shri C. Paul\n\nare not alive and have met an unnatural death."}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_3_550_551_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "UNION OF INDIA\n\nBIDHUBHUSHAN. MALIK AND OTHERS\n\nAprf/·~4,1984 ..\n\n(0. CHINNAPPA REDDY;.A.P, SEN AND E.S. VENKATARAMiAH, JJ.J\n\nHigh Court Judges (Condition• of Service) Act, 1954 (as ame,, ded)- , First Schedule-Para JO-Validity of,\n\nAffirming the decision of tho High Court and dismissing t.he special leave petition, . • HELD : (I) The words \"and who has retired on or after the Jsl day' of October, 1984\" appearing in para 10 of the First Schedule to the High Court Judges (Conditions of Service) Act, 1954 (as amended) are unconsti mtional and are struck down.\n\n[SSO A] •\n\n ' (2) The Judges (including the Chief Justices) of the High Courts are entitled lo pensfon as comput~ under the Act (as amended) irrespective of their date of. retirement. Bot they will not be entitled to arars of pension for the period preceding October I, 1984, the date which continues to be releVant as. being one from which the libcalised pension bCCame operative.\n\n lsso e.:.., c] ~\n\nDecision of Al/a/rabadHigh Curt In W.P. No. 3281 of 1979 (Judgment delivered on March 2, 1983) upheld.· · ·\n\nCIVIL AP)'ELLATB Ju1t1~DicrioN : Special Leave Petition (Civil) '.No. 9616 of 1983.\n\nF From the Judgment and Order dated 2nd March, 1983 of the\n\nAllahabaa High Court in Writ' Petition No. 3281 of 1979. \"'\n\nK. Parasaran,. Attorney General, R.D.4 garwala and R.N. Poddar for the Petitioner .\n\n. The Order of the <;; ourt was delivered by .\n\nCH!NNAPPA REDDY, J. The Allahabad High Court has held:\n\n'\".: .... The High Court Judges (Conditions of Service) Act, .. 195·4, (as amended) hal1°be read down as under, in para 10 of the\n\n\\ UNION v. B!DHUBHUSHAN (Chinnappa Reddy, i.) .551\n\n.First Schedule, the wordi \"and win has retired on or after the !st' day of.October, 1974\" are unconstitutional and are stru9k down. Omittin_g; the unconstitutional part it is declared that the Judges (including the. Chief Justices) of the High Court are entitled. to pension as computed wider the High Court Judges ( Condions of Service) Act, 1954, (as amended) irrespective of the date of retire\n\nment., The date October I, 1974, continues. to be relevant as being One from which the liberalised pension beeame operative underthe High Court Judges (Conditions of Service) (Amendment) Act, 1976, irrespective of the date of retirement and hence there is no question .of payment of a1rears of pension for tli.e period preceding October\n\n1., 1974 ......... \"\n\n• For the reasons mentioned by the learned Judge's of the ,\n\nAllahabad High .Court in their Judgment, we agree with their ' conclusion and dismiss the special kave petition .\n\n B:.S.K Petition dismissM .", "total_entities": 14, "entities": [{"text": "UNION OF INDIA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 14, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "BIDHUBHUSHAN. MALIK AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16, "end_char": 46, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BIDHUBHUSHAN MALIK AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "0. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 67, "end_char": 85, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 92, "end_char": 95, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "E.S. VENKATARAMiAH, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 100, "end_char": 122, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "E.S. VENKATARAMIAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "High Court Judges (Condition• of Service) Act, 1954", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 126, "end_char": 177, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CHINNAPPA REDDY;.A.P, SEN AND E.S. VENKATARAMiAH, JJ.J\n\nHigh Court Judges (Condition• of Service) Act, 1954 (as ame,, ded)- , First Schedule-Para JO-Validity of,\n\nAffirming the decision of tho High Court and dismissing t.he special leave petition, . •"}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 196, "end_char": 210, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 435, "end_char": 449, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "K. Parasaran", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1282, "end_char": 1294, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Parasaran,."}}, {"text": "R.N. Poddar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1333, "end_char": 1344, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Attorney General, R.D.4 garwala and R.N. Poddar for the Petitioner ."}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1439, "end_char": 1459, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CH!NNAPPA REDDY, J. The Allahabad High Court has held:\n\n'\".: ...."}}, {"text": "High Court Judges (Conditions of Service) Act, .. 195·4", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1485, "end_char": 1540, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court Judges (Conditions of Service) Act, .. 195·4, (as amended) hal1°be read down as under, in para 10 of the\n\n\\ UNION v. B!DHUBHUSHAN (Chinnappa Reddy, i.) .551\n\n.First Schedule, the wordi \"and win has retired on or after the !"}}, {"text": "B!DHUBHUSHAN (Chinnappa Reddy", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1613, "end_char": 1642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court Judges (Conditions of Service) Act, .. 195·4, (as amended) hal1°be read down as under, in para 10 of the\n\n\\ UNION v. B!DHUBHUSHAN (Chinnappa Reddy, i.) .551\n\n.First Schedule, the wordi \"and win has retired on or after the !"}}, {"text": "First Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1655, "end_char": 1669, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_3_552_553_EN", "year": 1984, "text": ". '\n\nS5~L\n\n- -~ ...\n\nN.L. ABHYANKAR AND OTI~ERS ETC ..\n\n. •. • v • -.\n\nUNION OF.INDIA· . . April l4, 1984 • .\n\n. [O~ CHINNAPPA: RmoY, A.P. SEN AND E.S.\n\nvrNKATARAMIAu,· 1n -:t. • .High Court iude~ (Co.1ditidns. ~! .se.rvice) Ac/ 19.54. s. 1.5 First -Schedule_ Pari] para -10 & The High. Co; t JuiJt!S (Conlitl.Jns of SeTvic~)\n\nAmendment Act 1976.: '. · · · : . : ·\n\n~ . . . -- - . . ' .\n\nSup:i'eme Court Ji.idge3 -(Condition's of Serlie) Act i9S8, S. 14 & '(he Supreme Conrt Jndges (Condltlons of ; service) Amend1neizt Act 1976. r . . .\n\nRetired Judie:_;.High Court & Suprme Court enhancedPenionary ben-efits entitlemeni fo.....;.lrrt[spective OJ date ofretirem_ent, :; .. - < ; -\"i - ' - . . . , . . ·. , ._ . ' -.\n\n- \" • The Judges of the' High C0ur.t and of the Supreme. Court will be entitled to 1he'pension1ry be:iCfitS u11der- the amended Act of 1976 irres.=. . pective or the dateS of their -re_tiremcnt. They will be sci ea'titled with e_tf ect ·• from t.to.1974. Arrears of pension calculated under th~ .Pro\\'jsions of th~ new Act \"wiU be paid to those to Whom it is -due within four. months. In~ tbO. ·\n\ncase of Judges' who have died after' t.10.19'74 theamout1ts. due wiTI b~ p1id ··to the legal heirs of the Judges withiO four months. The family\"pension due tothe Widows _will be calculated under the' proVi.sioos of the 1976 Amending Act and paid.to them. Ad-boC p.iym;:nts rOadeJ if any, V:.in be {ldjllsfed while _!Daking sue~ payments.\n\n[S52 D:-F] . '\n\n. .\n\nCIVIL. ORIGINAl. . JURISDICTION:· Writ Peiition '(Civil) Nos. 3S31 to 3534' of 1983;. )I\n\n(Under Article 32 of th~ Cotlstitution)\n\n• With . . . . . . . . ( \" Writ Petition (Civil) Nos. 4831 to 4833 of.1'}83.\n\n' (Under Article 32 of the Contitution) •\n\nAnd Writ Petition°cCivil)_:rfo. 13243_ of 1983\n\n(l, Jnd•:\" Article 3.2 of the. Constitution) - V. A. Bobde; A. K. Sanghi,' Ms .. Amaljit . Chauhan and Smt.\n\n:. R. B. Bobde for the petitioners: . . . , . . ..\n\n, N. L. ABHl'AN!(l\\R ' lJNlON (Chinnappa-Rerjdy, J.)\n\nSS3 1 D. K. Garg for the Petitloner in Writ Petition No. 13243 of 1983. -\n\nK. Parasaran, Attorney General, R. D. Agarwal ad R. N.\n\nPoddar for the Repondent ·\n\nThe Order <?f the Court was delivered by\n\n' CaiNNAPPA RiiooY, J. In view or'our decision in D.S. Nakara 1\n\nv. Vnion of India, l'i'[I983] I SCC 305 and for the reasons mentioned . by the Allahabad High Court in Writ Petition No. 3281of1979 dated 2.3.1983 in the case of Bidhubhushan Malik and otlters-v.\n\nUnion of India, wh-ich we have accepted as correct in Special Leave Petition No. 9616 of 1983 just now dismissed by us we allow the , writ petitions. The Judges of the High Court anl! of the Supreme Court will be ei<titled to thepensionary benefits 'under the amended Act of 1976 irrespective of the dates of their retirement. They will \"'1 be so entitled with effect from 1.10.1974, Arrears of pension calculatedunder_ the provlsio\"n, s of the new Act will be paid to those to whom it is due within four months from today. In the case of Judges who have died after 1.10.1974 the amounts due will be paid to the legal heirs of the Judges within four months from today. The family pension due to the_ widows will b, e calculated unper the provisions_ of the 1976 Amending Act and paid to them. Ad hoc paymenis made, ifany, will be adjusted while making such pay· _; ments. The writ petitions are disppsed of accordingly. What we_ have said a!iout pensionary benefits does not llPPIY to payn:tent of . gratuity. .,\n\nN.V.K.\n\nPetition allowed.\n\n1)[1984] 3 S.C.R. SSO", "total_entities": 24, "entities": [{"text": "S5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5, "end_char": 7, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "L. ABHYANKAR AND OTI~ERS ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 23, "end_char": 51, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "N.L. ABHYANKAR AND OTHERS ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "UNION OF.INDIA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 71, "end_char": 85, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF.INDIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A.P. SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 134, "end_char": 142, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 236, "end_char": 240, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Amendment Act 1976", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 327, "end_char": 345, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "S. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 448, "end_char": 453, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Amendment Act 1976", "statute": "Amendment Act 1976"}}, {"text": "S52", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1455, "end_char": 1458, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1572, "end_char": 1582, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1693, "end_char": 1703, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1786, "end_char": 1795, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "V. A. Bobde", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1822, "end_char": 1833, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Constitution) - V. A. Bobde; A. K. Sanghi,' Ms .. Amaljit ."}}, {"text": "A. K. Sanghi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1835, "end_char": 1847, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Constitution) - V. A. Bobde; A. K. Sanghi,' Ms .. Amaljit ."}}, {"text": "Amaljit . Chauhan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1856, "end_char": 1873, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Constitution) - V. A. Bobde; A. K. Sanghi,' Ms .. Amaljit ."}}, {"text": "R. B. Bobde", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1887, "end_char": 1898, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. B. Bobde for the petitioners: . . . , . . .."}}, {"text": "N. L. ABHl'AN!(l\\R ' lJNlON (Chinnappa-Rerjdy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 1938, "end_char": 1983, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ", N. L. ABHl'AN!(l\\R ' lJNlON (Chinnappa-Rerjdy, J.)\n\nSS3 1 D. K. Garg for the Petitloner in Writ Petition No."}}, {"text": "SS3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1990, "end_char": 1993, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "D. K. Garg", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 1996, "end_char": 2006, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ", N. L. ABHl'AN!(l\\R ' lJNlON (Chinnappa-Rerjdy, J.)\n\nSS3 1 D. K. Garg for the Petitloner in Writ Petition No."}}, {"text": "K. Parasaran", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2065, "end_char": 2077, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Parasaran, Attorney General, R. D. Agarwal ad R. N.\n\nPoddar for the Repondent ·\n\nThe Order <?"}}, {"text": "R. D. Agarwal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2097, "end_char": 2110, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Parasaran, Attorney General, R. D. Agarwal ad R. N.\n\nPoddar for the Repondent ·\n\nThe Order <?"}}, {"text": "R. N.\n\nPoddar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2114, "end_char": 2127, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Parasaran, Attorney General, R. D. Agarwal ad R. N.\n\nPoddar for the Repondent ·\n\nThe Order <?"}}, {"text": "CaiNNAPPA RiiooY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2193, "end_char": 2209, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "f the Court was delivered by\n\n' CaiNNAPPA RiiooY, J. In view or'our decision in D.S. Nakara 1\n\nv. Vnion of India, l'i'[I983] I SCC 305 and for the reasons mentioned ."}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2453, "end_char": 2467, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3281of1979 dated 2.3.1983 in the case of Bidhubhushan Malik and otlters-v.\n\nUnion of India, wh-ich we have accepted as correct in Special Leave Petition No.", "canonical_name": "UNION OF.INDIA"}}, {"text": "1.10.1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3019, "end_char": 3028, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the case of Judges who have died after 1.10.1974 the amounts due will be paid to the legal heirs of the Judges within four months from today."}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_3_554_571_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "' I\n\nJ ' I\n\n~ •. ! ·· I t ''\n\n A\n\nE ·\n\nELECTION 'co¥MISSlON OF IN'DlA\n\n: v.\n\nSTATE OF HARYANA\n\nApril 25, 1984\n\n[Y.V. CANDRACHUD; C.J., V.D. TULZAPURKAR, R.S. PATHAK,\n\nD.P. MAD<?N AND M.P. THAKKAR, JJ.] .\n\n• • Practice & Proctdure-PaufiiJr of E; c.parte order3; by tlte' Courll m 3<>11ghi 'lor by tlte parties .. -htn they give prior Intimation of the pre posed proc .. d/110! to thi\n\nopposit~ side without much lnconvellience or prejudice d1sappruv tel.\n\nCotulilitlio•r o(lndia 1950 Article i36:_lntcr[ernce by the Suprtmt CoMrl against an ad interim order poS1td hy the High Court. . .\n\nto fill i11the v.1c.tncy ari•iog from tbo setting aside or the elociioo of tbc returned candidate from the 59 Taoru Assembly Constituency ilt\n\nJiaryaoa, by the Supremo Court, the Rppellaot'Commission sent 'a mcssap and programme on April 6, 19 84 to the Chief Elccloral Officer for tbe State\n\nof Haryana.\n\nAccordin1 to that ptogr3mrne, tho notification under section 150 of the Rcpre<eotauon of tho People Act.,19Sl , was'to be issued on April 18, 1984, the last date for filing nomination\\ was AprillS, 1984 while the date .cfpoll wao llf,, y 20, 1984 The Election Commission !bed an identical programme for filling 23 other vcauics irt ihe logi.slnuvo asscm blies of Aodhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Wost Bcngl.\n\nOa April 7, 198~, I he Election Commission was requested by tho Haryana Government. to hold tho proposed byel<ction ulor.gwith the gcnero1l elections to the Lok\n\nsabb~, duo later In tbe x.ear. On .Aprll I 1, 1984, tho Chior Secretory wrote\n\nI lett<r to th' Election Ct>111 ni .. ioacr roncwina the request to defer the by election.\n\nOn April 12, 1984 tho Election Commissiuoer informed tho Chid Election Officers by n telex mcs•.ago thlt it bod dectd<d to 'adb•:o to\n\ntho programme or byelcction\\ to ollthc 24 constituencies and copies of notificatio\"' to be published on April IH, 1984 were sent to tho Cbi<f\n\nElcctorul Offi:or, liary•na.\n\nA Press out was issued to that effect after informin11 Jll the political parties. •\n\nThe Chief Sccrtary, Hary; na met the Chief Elcctiou Co;, missioner on .April 14, ln4 and explained to him pcrsonlly why it wu neil: ndvoaable nor P9SSoble to hold tile by.clcction to tbo Tuuru lt(ll os proP\" by tho .fuller. Oa April 16, 1984, tho Chief Sccrotouy wroto a lettct rcl1er3tin1 Jho view or the Guvcrnmont to th~ Cbict Elc<:tiuo Commi;; siooorn On April 17, 1984, the Chief Commissioner replied to tho leiter of APrld\n\n16, 1984 by IDYina thai the Commision hat.! taken tho dc'cisioo to h? the by. election uftcr tuking tho Punjub situation nod toldna into considerJii~ all r •elora in<ludin& tho fact of non fact that I be polil ical . partios wcro oppo-.d In the propo\"\"d bydcction. On the santo d:ty tho Govcrn111t111 '\n\nHaoyapa nkd a writ potition irt the Hi¥b Court or Punjab and H>rY~: and ubliocd ao ; x parte orcla llaylua tbc issuance aoJ pubhcatio>n oft\n\n.... ...\n\n' .i I\n\n.:~;-:--. #:~~~:::----::--~·. -.-.·\n\n- ---~- -\n\n-· ·--\n\nI .. •\n\nllLfCTION COMMISSfON P. HARYANA sss\n\n• ·• 0 by the Election Commission undor ss. 30, S6 and ISO or tbe\n\n10t:~ 1 '3 tioo or tbe Pcoplo Act, 1951. Hence tbc appeal by special\n\nR<P r the Courth . ,,.,-e 0 • • .\n\nAflowios tbe appeal, the Court.\n\nJ{ELD : (.Per .Majority)\n\np; r.ChQJ!drac/rud C .J. . . . . ' . 1; 1. The wide!~ prcv.lcn~ pactic of putices obiaioing ex parte ll!d<rS when they co.'\" g1ve pn~~ mumaton of tho pr?psed proceedings ~0\n\nppositc side, w•lhout much lnconvtDleuca or preJUdice bas often been :a:rroved by this Court. )Vheo tho public authorilics do so it ia all tho\n\norcoptb to disapprobJUon. [5610-E] • . .\n\n1 : 2. The Oovrnmeot of Haryana obtained on e~. parte order rrom the High Court when it could eas1ly have given prior intimation of tbe iotend<d procccJings to the Election Commission onndia • . Tbc letter is >OOstilutiJo>lly identifiable, conveniently ncce>siblc and easily aVJilablc\n\nfD< be1ng contact<d on the most modern systems of communication. Tbc\n\nEl\"lioo Commission of India, too .rushed to this Court oo the I 8th witbou t D ioformios the Govcrnm<nt . o( H 1 ryaoa that it propose.s to cbJiknge tbc order oltbo H1gh Court and to nslc for Sti!Y of tbat order.\n\nTho Govern•\n\nII<Ol or HJryana is also identifiable and accesstble with the same amount\n\nofc:t~. Were it not f0r tho fact that this matter brooked no delay the Supreme Court wouhl b*yo hesitated to pass any interim order wit bout the •PP•IIant givlna prior intimation of lis proposed action to the re-spocdcot. ,.\n\n[S6!E-G)'- E\n\nl :. 3. D.:spite 1he guideline indicatr<.l by tbo suprcme Court io tbc ll't>t Btn, al poll case, A.K M. Hauan Uz:amon v. Uuion uf lndio., [!982] 2 S.~:C. 21 ~. regurdtg tlto, passing of orders by the High Courts in acrtlte of tb<ir wdt jurisdiction, the High Court of Punj\"b & Harya!l• for frorD abowing any reluctoncu to interfere with. the programme or tho proposed elcct.ion, tho High Court h•u only too readily pssed the . 1'\"\"' order which wouhl hav~ had the effect of postponing the lectioo. ·.\n\nIDitfinlle!,. Clnsidering thnt the electi01t process was just round the\n\ncorue~, the High Court ought not to have intorfcrcd with it. Tho non- ~1!1& order passed by it u!Tords no OS$istaoce oo the question wbctbcr\n\ntcrc ccpt!onal drcumta::ccs to justify that onlor. iS62A-C] .\n\nto t The GovernmcQt a( Hryaoa is undoubiedly i~ tho s{ position \"<e>a lbo I 1 • d' . d 1 tual on of law and order io nrcas within Its Juns ICIIOD 00\n\na.~, •r hs. lllrol. But tho uttimuto decision as to wbetbcr it Is possiblo \"ili''Pt<lacnt to hoiJ tltil clcclions Ill ouy aivcn point of time must ret ·\n\n•'1a41,~~ Elcclion C<Jtnmission.\n\nArbitrariness an<.! nlalQ fiJes .tcs.troy the\n\nlor,~ 0~ <tncaty or ull order. PJ>><d by public aulbodti\"l• It t~ thc.re~ tf Ia.., t<>l<lrY. I hut on no l.ssuc liku the prc•ent wbi.; h con.:crns 8 situauon •· •od ord 11 • . ' • th ¥i.sws of the \"\"lc G cr, 1c Elt.:ctton Coanrull.ion must con>~!!<t 0 in& t\"'\"nment and all other con.:crn<d bo.Ji.:s of uutboritks before . 0 lho <oncluiun that th<\"ru b hll objc.:tiou to tbe bold_ing of .ttiC\n\n:;) .. .\n\nI . ~: !\n\n' . ,.\n\n.'I\n\n•I .,• l ' . . -}\n\n1 ..\n\n! >!\n\nI . ;\n\n' ' • • I\n\nI ... . . .. i'. · . l\n\n~ . '\n\n. I I\n\nI ' I\n\n~ I ' I ... ' ' .. i\\ .\n\n: I I\n\nI I\n\nI ' I I\n\n~· '' t ' t'·\n\n' ' '\n\nt\n\n,_;; ... :·· L\n\n_. \"'~\n\nSUPREME COI, JRT REPORTS il9S4J3.' S. .\n\n.c.~ tections a; this point of lime.\n\nHonce the Et.ltio.l Com ni .•. . . ' e . . . d h d '•'On ••~ its decision after ben.ng 10 m1n t e pros aq con~ of tho. whole sh \"'to I! had the data bforc it. It c_annot be as.sumed th1t it turned a bl~ Ilion, .to it.\n\nIa !bese Clrcums!ao:es, II WdS no~ IQ !pe ower or tho fligb nd eye\n\n10 decid: whether !he law and order SJtU ll!OO m tho Stale of Puoja; ut Haryaa1 is such as not tow trrJnt or permit !ho holdial or lb~ by. 1 .aad ·\n\n! ·\n\nI'' b' h t ih f 0 001•o• n is procisely in a s tultJO~ 1 .. = t IS t a e rat1o o tb.J Weu Be 1 case wouid apply io its fulf rigor. [S62BH. 563!\\, D] • nga Pol/\n\n3:1. However, it would be open to the Chief Etectio~ Comrn~; sioner to review hir decision :u to the exp; d.'ency of bo!din11 the poll 00 th: notifieJ date. In fdcl, not oaly wo•l~ Jt b~ o?:n to h1m to recG1iidor hi! decision to bold the pnll a\\ nollficd, tl IS platoly Ius du!y an J o!lilgatioa 1 . ketp the .siruotion under constant scrutiny so as to ad]u\\t I be decisio~ 10 th~ . roli!ies of the situation.· All the facts and circurn>tucces, past and. present\n\nwhicb !:cor upon the question of the advisability of holding tbe poll on th; aorified dte hao to be taken into account llnd kept under vigil. That ;, to coblir.uiog prucess which can only cease afrcr the poll is sbcld. Uotil theo, the Election Commission has the locus, for ~; ood rcaon<, p to alier its\n\ndcision The taw and order situatioa in 1 he State, or in any art or it, or in a nci_bbouring State, is a c\"nsidcr.uion of vital importance for decidiot lbe question of expediency or po;\\lbillty of ho'ding an olcclion at anYPJrti cu!ar point or time. If he cunsidera it necessary, he shoud held further di<cu<1ioas witb tho Chief Electoral Officer of llar)'UD.I and cotbult, on-:c apin, lcad•:rs of the v;•rious political putics on the question whether 11 it fea5ible to h.>ld the poll o~ rh' due date.\n\nOn un imp)rtJnt ism: such\" lb: b<:>!din; of no 'ci>CIIOB, wbic'l is o( grc.t ao:J (IJlmcdute c..>ocern IO tb' eotir: polidcll commu•tily, tb:rc can be no qu!S<ion of any pablic olliml •·•ll<liog OQ prejtig~, an pprebea; ion which WJ& fat, tly p~j,-ctcd in tbe\n\nrlc's t•aumet~. A sense of ralisnt, obj<ctivdy and .oo.t:>. hgnmcn_t • 1 mllll JDf.., rm tltc deci>IOD or the clccllon Comrnl>llOil <'0 that ts>\\JC. [56JD H\n\nM, ftd, YuJUI$ Sale<m \"· Shlr l<ttmar Slmtrl. {1974! 3 s.c.R. 7n@ p .. 743-44; fallowed. . • .\n\n. . . 3:2: lndc.c.J, every citiz•n r th~ c.lu•ltry who h~ soe dcrc, no;\n\npolucal .n.rcun,, would have a fair ide:l of the 11111111\\Jn PI Punt£ ana h• Impact on the even flow of life intho neighbouring Stuto o(.JhrY ill But he circum.tance thd tbc Hl&li Cour1 h; n tho lr; nowlcdgo of a. ~~~~; ill not JUSt try be 6Ubslitutiotl by it of Its owu opiniOII for tbl of un titutioO\n\ndly appoJOted for a lpecific ptarpoiC by tho law and, lhu CoUl idc11.\n\nDI!Tercnt pooplu bold dilferent views on public issues, wl)ich arc of~: ; ubliC dlvcr&<nt. Even I be Judaea.\n\nA Judge Is en lit kd lo biJ .view$ o~•tioG\n\n1~•ues bijl ha caunot proiei:t hi• pemmal view& on tho decisJoD 0.r 11 q ; rtrio4 Joke tile situation ur 4w and order In a particulmr area at a pruculrai!lll rJ or 11111' and hold th•t tb¢ Electloa Cotnmluioo I• in error io its oppr Jlat \"tuatloa. {'640 -FJ\n\nl'r '17u!k!car, /. (Co~tru) :\n\nTho ~A•CI parameters of tbe decision in Haua , •• c~SO 11114 tb• ttl~' ..\n\nI •\n\nI }\n\n. .\n\n~:u:C'fiON COM~!ISSION v. H.\\RYANA\n\n' • be known tin the judgme:tl containing rcHotJs is bo.rn.\n\nAs 00 ra•io C3:~ 0~0c .can predict what el!actly will be . decided by the Courl io 1odaf 's c:se when the Judgment eventually comes to be proonounced\n\nf{tJJSOft ke a guess about the colour or shade of the eyes of a child ( bo can 013\n\n B b b · \"'. . 1 to be bor!l ?~. ut tt can c rcasona ly sa1d tht Hasson's c:aso bicb IS ye . ' d f b' \" oot enjoin tbat .an ontcnm or cr o sue a tJature can , never be passed\n\ndoy situation.\n\nIf that were not o. the c_ourt .• would not have said (l)\n\nID 1 roinence of electoral process IS a factor wbtcb must guide and govern IMt Jllsiog of orders (meuoing thereby that while such order-scan be pased tb• pas d d. d 'd ) d ( • tbis factor must be nccor c uo const eratton an\n\n2) tbat 'more . roineot such process, the greater C'ught to be the rcluctooce of the H:gb\n\nurt to co eoytbing or direct unythig to t-e done which will po>npone tht protcs• inddinitcly:• (\\\\hich m<ans it mu<t be doo~ only witb rclutance wbcn eJection' rrc tmmmcnt).\n\nIn other IH'tds tle power must be exercised\n\ntplt igly (with rclucraocd particularly when the order would be to postrooo tbc io, tlllatioo of a, demo:rat ically elected popuhr Government. These observations were made by the Court io Ha..uon's case in the coat ext or the\n\npiry or the term t>f legislature as cnvfsiooed by Arr; cle J72 of tbe Cqnstitution of Ir.d'ta and conslquc:ntial general eicdions for such lcgilature . u is evident f•om the dlusioo to ·\", mmiornce of elections\" sod \"indefinite postponement of elections io legislative todies which arc the ess.!nco of democratic functions of the Constitution.\" This rnn•t be so becou<e the kaislaturc would stand di.sohed on tbc expory of the term, and e new legisla lure has to be elected. It is in this context (presumably) that a reference is made to \"immioco_cc ofelectioO>\". [561DE-H; ~68A-F] • ·\n\nFor n Byo; Oc:ction lika the present one, to fill a single vacancy. tero.\n\nea~ be no Question of \"imminence'; or \"indifioite postponement of elections\" wh!cb 1\\'0Uid Stall the in\\totlatioo or a dmocratical\\y elected government.\n\nIt •• nobody'• C11so tbt tho party position was such tb:.t the result or the dectloa to Ibis \\acant sent would have tilt(d the majority one way or other.\n\nNo ob!ique motive has even been hinted ar:. The High Court was .therefore ttot UOJustillcd in procecxling on the assumptln that it had such a po.ver.\n\n[S68POJ\n\nt~ Tb.e High Court cannot be fuultcxl for . passio~ tb< impugne~ order\n\nCogt 01 .'t was by on unprecdcntcd situation like the Pto!!cnt. rr the High . to~ had not smnted the order and thb Election Commision h:ld not chosen\n\n~<lr on or be foro April 18 19 84 tho Htgh Court would hove p.:rhaps it, as hp~erless to P:t.ss any o; ber order, what; ver bo the ju>tificnttoo for • Cou o el\":toral-l'roccu\" would hav~ actually commenc.:d.\n\nTbo Htijh\n\nta~:tl was Ptitna.f., ci<: satisfied that the Election Commission b.ad failed .10\n\n. t:oaid~~~ acoun t vital mttcrs, nppearcd to have acted on oonconsequenttal\n\nStote 0 a to )ns, nnd had acted nrbitrarity in turning down the request of tho , Court ov•rnmcnt ns also tho Chief Election Officer of Haryan:\\. The High . \"'•s therefore cotitled to grant o stay. [S69AB] ·\n\nlite cho Surcmo Cuun in cxcrcis~ of tho jurisdiction undrrtic:o 136-of td bStltuttan 0( India ahould 110t interfere )\"llh th? dtOtenm order\n\n1!.1~11on tho Hi&h Court in such n fact situation.\n\nOil tht n~ ltaNI t~• 4llt!C!IIi ornmission appeared to have been ultugotber ob!JVous , h> tIde 0 Q aa n to the lof~ an . reaards tho bonnfidc apprch~!lsioo pcrtaour ~\n\n.G ll\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS . [1984] 3 s.c.R.\n\nsecurity of the National leaders. who might address public , mec; tings, the Candidates the cfficers engaged in' election work, and the voters.\n\nThe. danger was further aggrevated in the face cf open thre1ts held but to the lives of the National leaders of different potitical parties. What is more, the Elec. tion Commission has shown total unawareness dr 1he circumstance that public meetings :were prohibited under s. 144 of the Cr. P. C. in the conslitutency going to the polls. 'On the other ltartd the only conseque;1cc of granting a stay would bave been to postpone the election programme by a few days in the . event of the Elect'ion Commision commission not choosin'g to appear , jn the Court (to show cause why 1be adinterim order 'should not be made absolute) on or before April 18, 1984 which.was the scheduled date F.or issuance of.the notification announcing the election progrmme_ The Election Commission.\n\ncould hve appeared-bcf, o .e the High Court and got the stay. vacated in ti'me instead of approaching this Court by way of the present appeal by Special Leave. The Election Commission could not have failed -to refraise that no serious consequence would have flowed from the impugned -order even if s.tay was vacated, not immediately, but a few cfays ljiter, for, it was only a .by. election tO one'siOI!lle seat of DO sigoifican~ which WOUld. not have 'resulted\n\nin posH>onement ·.of. the installatin of an elected government. Wor'se come to worse, the by-eletion could not have bben held along with by-elections in\n\ndther states on the!same day'. [569BG]. ·\n\n. More so when the Election Commission has not been able' to show what possible detriment would hve been suffered if the by.election \"could not have been so held on that particular day. How and by what process of ratio cination did the Election Commission convinced itselfthat free elections could. be held in a situation where the candidates would consider it hazardous, to conte.st or to indulge. in election propoganda, and even voters would be afraid to vote, even to this coul t. [569GH~ 570A]\n\n. \" .\n\nIt is no doubt true that theoretically the Election Commission can still postpone the polling, if it. is so minded. lfut the Court should riot remain a passilfe spectator in this extraordinary situJ!, tion and leave the Nation to the mercy of an individual, however high be bis office, when it i 8\n\n1 evident th3t he has secluded himself in his ivory tower and has shut his eye 8 to the realitie~ of the ftituatioo and closed his mind to the progrosis of this mattor. The Court can certainly Sltisfy i.tself whether the Election ComtniS : sioner bad kept his eyes, ears and mind open, and whether he was able to\n\nshow that all relevant factors including the consideration as to what advan tage was to. be secured as against the risk to b~ faces, entered into h.is reckoning, If this is nqt shown to have been done, as 'io 1he present case>\n\nhis decision is yitiated a'nct the. Court nec!d no~· fel helpless.\n\nThe High O>urt was therefore fully justified in passing the impU; lDCd order, and ttie\n\nSuj1ree Gourt should not upture it. [571BD]\n\nCIVIL ~PPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2182 of 1984.\n\n Appeal by Special leave from the lodgment and Order dated the 17th April, 1984 of the Punjab and Haryape High Court in W.P.\n\nNo.- il c;>f l984\n\n .~\n\nELECTION COMMISSION v. HARYANA (Chandrachud, C.J:) 559\n\n. . ' S.S. Ray and Krishnamurthi Swami for the Appellant.\n\nK.G. Bhagat Addl. Sol. General, A.K, Sen, H.B. Singh Ad.tocate · of Harayana, A. Subbha Rao, CV. and ltN. Poddar, for Respondent.\n\nGeneral, ·\n\nThe following Judgments .were delivere<; l .\n\nCitA?-!DRACHUD, C.J. We had passed an interim order on April 18, suspen4ing the peration of the order passed by the.'High Court of Punjab & aryan a, on April 17, 1984. The High Court,' by its ' aforesaid order; bad stayed the issuance and publication Of the ·\n\nnotification~ l?Y the Election Commission oflndia undu sections 30, 56 and 150 of the Representation of People Act, 1951. We had ' . ' djrected that the special leave petition should be listed befbre us . the next day for considering whether the interim order should be confirmed.\n\nOn February 28, 1984, this Court gave a judgment in Civil Appeal No. 5501 of 1983, setting aide the election of the returned candidate from the 59-Taoru Assembly Constituency in Hryana.\n\nAs a resplt 'of that judgment, a vacancy arosejn the. Lgislative\n\nAssembly 9f the State of Haryana from that Constituency. On April 6, .1984, the Election Commission of India sent a message to the Chief Secretary, Haryana, who is the Chief Electoral Officer for the State of Haryana, informing him that the Conimissio:n had fixed a certain\n\nprogramme for hoiding the by-election to the Taoru Constituency . . According to that programme, the notification under section I 50 of\n\nthe Representation of te .Peopie Act, 1951., was to be issued on Apri118, 1984, the last date for filing nominations is April 25,1984, while the date of poll is May 20, 1984. The Election Commission fixed an identical programme for filling 23 other vacancies-in the legislative assemblies of Andhra P.radesh, Karnahlka' and 'fest Bengal.\n\nOn April 7, 1984, tb~ Election Commission receiv~ a telex message from the Chief Secretary, Government of Haryana; convey-\n\n. F\n\ning the request of the Haryana Government that the proposed' byelection should be 'held along witft the general elections to the Lok\n\nSahil which are due later this year. 0~ April~ 11, 1984, the Chief . .t.· Secretary wrote a letter to the Chief Election Commissionr rc; newq in.g the aforesaid request for two reasons ;\n\n.. . .· ' .\n\n' ' .\n\n.. B ·\n\n: E\n\n-.c\n\n-II\n\nSUPREME COtmT .REPORTS\n\n. (1984J 3 S.G.R .\n\n(1) The next general e'ection to the Hayana, Vidhan Sabha\n\n.. Is~ due in May, 1~87 nd since. the Taoru vacancy had\n\noccurred ucently on February 28, J 984', there was no\n\nimmdidate n_ecessity. to fill it ; and ·\n\n(2) 'deferriRg the by-lection would save time,' labour and\n\nexpense.\n\nOn April 12, 1984, the Election Commission informed the Chief Elecoral Officers by a telex. mssage -that it bad decided to adhere to the programme of by-election to 24 vacancies in their respective jurisdictions. The telex message mentioned specificalJy that the Commision had :takc:n into consideration the replies receiv ed by it from various State Government and their Chief Electoral 'pfficers on the question of holding the elections as prop_osed. On\n\nthe same date. i.e. April 12, 1984 copies of notifications to be\n\n~ published on Aprill8, 1984 in , the Haryana Gazette'were sent to\n\n the Chief Electoral Officer of Haryana. By a separate communica-\n\n.tiot~ of-the .same dater' the- Commission informed -all the politicar'\n\nparties about the programme fixed by it for holdin:g the by-elections.\n\nA press note was also issued to the same effect on the same dato.\n\nThe Chief Secretary, Haryana, me~ the Chief Election Commissioner on April 14 nd e_xplained to him' persoally why it was neither advisable nor possible to hold the by-election to the Taoru seat as proposed by the tatte.r:. On Aprill6, the Chief Secretary wrot-e a Jetter to the Chief Election Commissioner reiterting the view of his Government. He added in that leter tbat it would not be possible to hold the election during the proposed period because, .the neighbouring_ State of Punjab was going through a s.erious problem of law and order, that there \":was a dispute regarding territorial a'dj\"ustment and division of waters between the State of . Haryana and the Akati )>arty in _Punja~, that the said dispute was u'ed by the Akali Party for stepping up terrm; ist activities, tha't the terrorists had attacked perons occupying high .public offices, that there was a serious threat io the lives of many impoitimt persons in flaryiuia, that public meetings had been \\>anned by the District Magis- .\n\nt1ate 1mdede:ction 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code and that the eiti; Jation in .the State was such that it would not be possible to hold ·. _--~ public meetings for ~Jection purposes. for a few months: On April 17, the Chief Election Commissioner replied to the Chief Secretary's ·. ~. letter. of April 16 by aying that the Commission hl!d taken the\n\ndecyision to hold the byelectiop ftr 1aking.into consieratio~ alt\n\n' ' I • ' ' • . • • l ', • • --\n\n.. . •\n\n' ,.\n\n. . ELECTION COMMI~ON vr HARYANA (Chandrachud, C.J.) 561\n\n' factqrs, that it was not clear how the Gonstituency of Taor'u in .Gurgaon, which is about 35 kilometers from Delhi, aQd which is\n\nquite far away from Punjab would have any fallout •o(the Punjab. sifuation and that the political parties who were duly informed of the proposed election programme had not.opposed the \\tolding of\n\nby .election at this point of time.· On the same date that. the- Chief Election Commissionr wrote the aforesaid letter; the Government of Haryana filed a writ petition in the High Court of Punjab and Harya:na and obtained an ex-parte order, which is impugned in this. special leave petition.\n\nWe passed the interim order on April 18 after hea.ring a fairly long and exhaustive argument from Shri Siddhartha Shankar Ray who appeared on behalf of the appellant, the Election Commission or India, and the learned Additional Solicitor General whoappeared on\n\nbehalf of_ res'pondent, the. 'State of Haryana' We heard further argu- . ments of the parties on the 19th, Shrj Asoke Sen appearing. for the .. re$pondent. Since th~ matter raises questions of general public : , jmportance. we grant special leave to appe'al to the petitioner. ·\n\nWe often express our disapproval of the widely prevalent\n\n! ' practice of parties obtaining. ex parte orders when thy can give priot\n\nintimation of the proposeq proceedings to the opposite side. without\n\n.· much incO'ltvenience or prejudice. When the public authoiities do ' : so, it is aU the more open to disapprobation.: But here, the parties\n\n', ' bave taken a tooth for a tooth .. 'The Government of Haryana ' obtned an ex parte order fro in the High Court when it could easily\n\n'have been given prior intimation of the intended proceeding to the\n\nElection.Coimhission of India. The latter is constitutionaliy identifi\n\n4 able. conven}efitly.accessible and easily available for being contacted. ., o'nthe most mo<lern systems of commlJnication. The Election Commission oflndia, too, rushed to this Court ori the 18th without informing the Government of Haryana that it proposes to challenge . the order of the HigH Court and to ask for stay of that order. The\n\nGovernment of Haryana is also. identifiable and accessible with the sa}Ile amount of case: We do Iiope thatthe smaller litiga{!.ts will not form the belief that the bigger ones can get away with such 'lapses. Were it not for the fact that this matter brooked no delay,\n\nwe woul.d have hesitated to pass any interim ruder without the\n\nappellant giving prior intimation of its proposed action to the\n\n~oode~. · - As stated earlier notifications setting the election process .in motion were to be issued <;>n Aprill ~; One day bef<;>re that, the State\n\n' A '\n\n.... 0\n\nt 562\n\nSUPREME COURT R.EOORTS ..\n\n[1984}3 S.C.R..\n\nGovernmnt approached the Hjgh Court in a hurry, asking it to stay the election prby.ess, which the Hign Court; bas done. This Court held in the West Bengal poll case, 'A..K. M. Hassan Uzzaman v. Union of fndra,(l) that the _imminence qfthe electoral process is an important factor hich must guide and govern.; the passing of orders in the . exer.cise of the Hgh Courts writ juisdiction ahd that, the .more\n\nimminent such process, the greater ought to be th~ r'eluctance of the High Court to take any step which wiU result in the postponement of the elections. We regret to find that far from showing any reluc~ ta!lce t9 interfere with the programme of t, he propos.ed election, the High Court Jlas only too readily passed the interim order which would have had the effect of postponing the election indefinitely ..\n\nConsidering that the election process was j1;1st round the corner, the High Court ought not to have interfered with it. The nonspeaking order fassed. by it 'affords no assitance on the questio~ whether there were exceptional circumstances t~ justify that order.· .\n\n. The fact that the lection proeess was imminent is only one reason' for our saying that the Higl) Court should have refused its , Ftssistance in the matter . . The other reason for the view which w•\n\nare taking is provided by the very nature of the controversy wlilch. is involved herein. The difference between the. Govern.inent of Haryana and -the Chief Election <iomniission centre's round the\n\nquetion asto whether the position of law and order in. the State of Haryana is such as to make it inexpedient or undesirable to hold . the proposed byelection at this point of time. The Government of Haryana is undoubtedly in the best position to assess the situatioQ of law and order in areas within its jurisdiction and under its coqtrol.\n\nBut the ultimate decision as to whether it is possible and expedient to hold the elections at any given point of time must rest with the Election Commission. It is not suggested that the Election Commis~ . sion can exerCise its discretion in an arbitrary or mala fide manner .. . Arbitrariness and mala .fide destory the validity and efficacy of all orders passe~ by public authorities. It is therefore necessary that on an issue like the present, which concerns a situation ofJaw and order; the Election C.ommisfiOn fl{USt consider the viws of the State Government and all other concerned bodies or authorities befor•\n\noming to the conclusion that' there is flo objection to the holdina of the elections at this point of time. On this aspect of the matter, the correspondence between the Chief Secretary of Haryana and tbeo ChieF Election Commissioner shows tbat the ltter had taken all th~\n\n(1) (t982l2 s.c.c. 218,.\n\n'ELECTION COMMissioN v. HARYANA (Chandrachud, C.J.) 563\n\nrelevant facts and . circumstances into account while taking the deCision to hold the by-election to the Taoru Contituency 'in accro-\n\n-dace with the proposed progrmme. The situation of law and order • j~ Punjab and, -to some extent, in Ifaryana is a fact so notorious . that it would be naive to hold that the Election Cqmmission. is not\n\naware of it. Apart from the means to the knowledge of the situation ' ·<if law and order in Punjab and : Haryana, which the Election Commission would have, the Chief Secretary of Haryana had personally apprised . the Chief Election Commissioner as to why the State . novemment was of the view that the elections _ shol!ld -be postponed until the Parliamentary elections. We see no doubt that the Election 'Commission came to its decision after bearing in mind tha pros and . - cons of the whole situation. It had the data before it •. It cannot\n\nbe asumed that it turned a blind .eye to it. In these circumstances, ; .. it whs not in the power of the High Court to decide whether the -..._ -·- Jaw and.order situation in the State of Punjab and Haryana is such\n\n:as not to warrant or permit the holding of the by-elction. lt is\n\n-\\\n\n. ;:...., .-\n\n _precisely in a sit)lation like this that the ratio of the West BengalPoll\n\n~ .. COSe W<?Uid apply in its full rigor._ : .\n\n. We _must add. that \"it . would be. open to the Chief Election ', Cotnissioner, as held in .Mohd. Yunus v. Shiv Kumar Shastri,(l? to\n\n:·~ -review his decision as to the expediency of holding the poll on the ·,:'htrfified date. In fact, not only.woulq it'be open to i)iUl to reconside-r\n\n~, : .his decision to hold the .poll as notified, it is plainly his duty and .. obligation to keep the situation under con:stant scrutiny so as to ·;. adjusttbc decision to the realities of the situation. All the facts and circumstances; past and present, which bear upon the question of the advisabiiity 'of holding the poll on the notified date have to be taken. ittto account and kept •under vigil. That ts .. a oontimJing process which can only cease after the poll is held. Until then, the Election Comission has the . locus, for good reasons, to alter its -decision: The Jaw and order situation in the State, ()r in any part of it, or in a neighbouring State, is. a consideration of vital importance for deciding the question of ex}?ediency or possibility of holdipg an election atany partiular poin~ of time. W.e are confident that the Chief Election Commissioner, who is vested with important duties and obligations by the Constitution, -will discharge those duties and obligations with _a high sense of responsibility, worthy of the high office which he holds. If he' considers it necessary, he\n\n_. {1) . [1974) 3 S.C.R. 7~8, 74~-~44. ·\n\n• ••\n\n' ..\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS . [1984] 3 s.c.tt.\n\nshould hold further discussions with the Chief Electi(m Officer of .\n\nHaryana and consult, once again, leaders of the various political parties on. the questioQ whether it is feasit?le to hold the poll on\n\n~}le due date .. On as _important issue such as : the hoJding of an election, which is of great and immediate concern of the entire political community;'there. can be no question of any public fficil standing on pre.stige. an apprehension which was faintly projected in i tlie State's arguments. A sense of realism, objeCtivity and itonalignmen~ must inform the de-cision of the Election Commission on . that issue. ·\n\n. It was urged that the High Court of Punjab and Haryana would have a fair and clear. understanding of the happenings in Punjab and their respercussions in Haryana which would justify its interference -with the decision of. the Election Commission to hold 'rl!' the by-election vow. Tlie first part of this argument need. not be - disputed and 'may even be .. accepted as correct.- Indeed, every citizen of this country who has some degree of political awareness . . - . . would have a fair idea of:. the situation in Punjab and its impact on the e:\\ren flow .in the neighbouring State of Raryana. But the second part oJ the argument is untenable. The circumstane that the High Court has 'knowledg~ of a fact will not justify the substittion .by it of its own opinion for that of an authority duly appointed for a specific purpose by the law and the Constitution. Diffeent pepplc f hold different views on public issues, which ,.are often -idely divergent. Even the judges. A Judge is entitled to his views on public . issues but the question :is whettier he can project his personal views -on the decision of a question like the situation of f'aw and orde~ in\n\nil particqlar area at a particular periodiof time bold that the Election\n\nCommissin is'in error in 'its appraisal of that sit'l!aion. We SUppOse not.\n\nFor these: reasons, we confirm the interim order which was passed by us on April 18; allow this appeal and set aside the High Court's order of-April 17. Unless otherwise directed by the Chief _\n\nElectin Commissioner, the election programme will have to go .• through as already notified.\n\nThere. will be no order as to costs.\n\nTHAKKAR, J.\n\nHolding of a by-election to fill even a single vacancy at the earliest date is an extremely desirable end in a demortic framewok. Even so if . such circumstances exist, and a\n\n• t\n\n. .\n\nELEC!ION COMMISSION v. HARYANA (T.hakkar, J.) 56$\n\nreasonable progrosis can be .Ponafide made, that holding, the byelection fDr filllng Up that vacancy, is fraught with grave danger, !lOt only to the lives of election officers, andidates as also political leaders addressing election meetings, as also of voters, and poses a grave danger which alogethei outweighs the advantage of holdng the ekction along . wit]l the by-elections in other States, should the matter not engage very serious attention of the Election Com~ mission ? Not even when it is shown that with regard to the sensitive and explosive ituation it was likely to worsen a situation which\n\nwas already worse? More is when all that was to be gained by holding 'the by-election as-propos-ed was to be able to hold it alqng with\n\nother by-elections on the same day as in other States which bad by itself no significance or virtue. And if the Elction Coll)mission without de deliberntion surn, marily turns down the request to defer .the ele\"ti()n programme for that byelection everi by a few days in such circumstances, can .the Higl: Court be faulted for passing an. ap-interim order, which has the ~:esult of potponing the election, not for an indefinite period, but for a few days ill the parties are heard ? Is the order passed QY the Higli Cq.urt in such circumstances , so gross that instead of' allowing the High Court to confirm it o~\n\nvacate it, upon the other side showing cause, this Court should invoke the jurisdic-tion under Article 1.36 of the: -onstitution of India tt;>_ set it aside? More particularly when the consequence would . be no more serious than .this, namely, that the by-election cannot be. held (there is no virtu~ in doing so} on th~ same day . along with otper by-lections. ·\n\nT!At the, High Court has 'the power to issue a direction or order which has the effect of postoning an election if the situation so demands ould appear. to be the law declared by a five-judge Constitution Bench presided over by the learned Chief J4stice who p1:esides over this Benc:h as well. In A.K.M. Hassan Uzzaman and\n\nothrs v. Union of India and others and Lakshmi Charan Senand\n\noiher~· v. A.K.M. Hassan Uzzaman and others<1> the concJusions are recorded in the operative order dated March 30, 1982, reading as under: ·\n\n, \"L The transferred case and the appeals connected with it raise important quetions which require .a careful and dispassionate considerations. The hearing of these matters was conCluded four days ago, on Friday, the 2§th. Since the judg- 'ment will hrke. some time to prepare, we propose, by . this\n\n(1) [1982)2 s.c.c. 218 •.\n\n.'H\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1984] 3 s.c:tt.\n\nOrder, to state our conciusions on some of the points involved in controversy : ·\n\n(1) The High Court acted within its jurisdiction . in entertaining the writ petit-ion and in issuing a rule nisi, uponit, since the petition questioned the vires of the laws of eleclion. But, with rc;!spect, it was not justified in\n\nassing the interim orders dated February 12 and 19, 1982 and in confirming those orders by its judgment dated February 25, 1982. Firstly, the High Court had no\n\nmteial before it to warrant the passing of those orders.·.\n\nThe allegations in the writ petition are . of a vague and gene.t:al nature, on the basis of which no relief could be granted. Secondly, though the High Court did not lack the jurisdiction to entertin the writ petition and to isue , appropriate directions. therein, no High Court in the exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Consti tutio, n should pass' any orders, interim or otherwise~\n\nwhich has the tendency or effect of postponing an election, which is reasonably iinminent and in relation to which its writ jurisdiction is invoked. The imminnce of ,\n\nthe electoral process is a factor which must guide and govern the passing of orders in the exercise of the High Court's writ jurisdiction. The more imminent such pro~ . c.ess, the greater ought to be the reluctance of the _High •\n\nCourt to do anything, or direct anything t~ be dene; which will postpone that process indefinitely by creating a situation in which, the.Government of a State cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. India is an _oasis of democracy, a fact of contemporary history which demands the courts the use of wise statesmanship in the. exercise of their extraordinary powers under the Constitution. The Hi~ Courts must observe a self-imposed limitation on their power to act under Article 226, by refusing to pass orders or give . directions which will inevitably result in an indefinite postponement of elections to legislative hodies which are /' the very essence of the democratic foundation and func\n\ntioning of our constitution. The limitation ought to be observed irrespective of the fact whether the-preparation • add publicati6n of electoral rolls are a part of the process . of 'election' within the meaning ofArti9le 329 (b) of the\n\ni •\n\n-{-\n\n... . , . - J!LECtiON COMMISSION •. IIARYANA (Thakkar, J.) . 561 .\n\n. Costitution. We wiU pronounce upon that question later in our judglcnt.\n\n(2) X X\n\n(3) X\n\n. X\n\nX X .x X\n\n • 2. For thcs~ reasons ad those . which we ill give in our judgment later, w~ dismiss the writ petition filed in te Calcutta Jligh Court whtch w:ls transferred fur disposal to this Court. All orders, including interim orders, passed by the.\n\nCalcutta High Court are hereby set asid.:. Civil Appeals 739 to 742 of 1982 will stand disposed of in the light of the dis-· missal of the writ petition, out of whih they arise ..\n\n:3. X\n\n4. X X x\n\nX X\n\nX X\n\nDos Hasan's case ;, join that no such interim order an ever be d by the High Court ?\n\nThe relevant ctract from the conclusion. recorded in Hassan's. case has been reproduced hereinabove. Of course, the e:tact para-\n\nIICiers of the decision and the true ratio cannot be known till the judgment containing reasona is born. As on today no.one can predict what eJ(actly will' be decided by th~ Court in Hassan's case • whrn the judgment eventually comes to be pronounced (who can I ale a guess about the colour pf shad.: of the eyes of a chnd which\n\n: a Yet to be born ?) • But it can b~ reasonably said th.lt the following:\n\nextract.(') • . . . . . ' .. ,. . .\n\n. \"The imminence of the clectornl process is a factor Wh•ch, must guide and govern the passing of orders in tll.e ' . excrci; c of the i l•gh Court's writ jurisdiction. The more imminent such p . 1 f ) tb. 1 . roccs. t 1c grc.!lcr ought to be the rductauce o • wlc' 1\n\n11&h Court to do anytuing, or dirc:c( anything to be done, , j/'c 1. Wt.ll postpone t!Jat procc:; s indefinitely by creating a\n\nu.hou ID which, the Gov.:rnmcnt of .a Stal.: cannot be earned . . tut.. on tn accordance witu the provisions of the consttton ... • . :\n\n'lrarra · . nt, the · . . · · Ord,1 or Vtcw that Jlussu11•3 case docs not enJOin that an JnteFim . auct, a nature can nvcr be passed in any situation. If that . 2J 2 s.c.c. 219.\n\nG .\n\nj ·.1\n\n' I\n\nj ...\n\n.·. •: ...\n\n' .'} . ' ·. ~ . •!.! . ;\n\n• I '\n\n(I .\n\n. . '\n\n; !\n\n' ..\n\ni B {· j ;\n\n! ..\n\nE .\n\n•' Jl\n\n.. .: r G ! ,,\n\n( • If I\n\n.;, . 3\n\n$68 • SUPRE!ol!l:couRT REPORTS\n\n[1984) 3 S.C.R, ·\n\nwere not ; o, the court would not jiave said (I) that imminence of 'electoral process is a factor which must guide and govern the passing\n\nof orders (meaning thereby that while such orders can be passed this 'factor must be accorded due consideration) and (2) that more\n\nimminent such process, the greater ought to be the reluctance of the 'High.Court to do anything or direct anything to be done which will\n\npostpone the process indefinitely\" (which means it must be done . only with reluctance when elections are imminent.) The aforesaidstatement of law made in the contc;~:.t of \"general election's\" does not warrant the view\" that Hassan's case enjoins that an election pro~ ' gramme cannot be postponed even for a few days even in the case of a by-election, whatever be the situation, and whatever be the circumstances, in which the Hih Court is called upon to exercise its jurisdiction. It is therefore not unreasonable to pro1=eed on the premise that even according to Hassan's case the Court ha~ the power to issue : an interim order which has the e[.:ct of postponing no election but it must be exercised sparingly (with reluctance) particularly when the result of the order would be to postpone the installation of a democratically etcctcd popular government. The portion extracted from the operative order in Hassan's case: brought ioto focus a short while ago which adverts to .. imminence of elections\" and to \"directions which will inevitably result in indefinite postponement of elections to legislative bodies wbich are the very essence of the democr.atic functions of our Constitution\" leaves no room for doubt that the observations were being made in the context of the expiry of the term of Jcgilatui-e as envisioned by Article l 72 of the Constitution of India and consequwtial general elections for such Jcgblature. This inust be so because the •1 legi>lature would stand dissolved on the e;~:.piry of the term, . and a new legislature has to be ckcted. 1 t is in this context\n\n(presumably) that u r.:fcrence is made to \"imminence of ·: J elections\". For 11 by-election like the one we are cncerned with, there can bc no question of \"imminence\" or \"indifinite postpone·\n\nment of elections\" which would stall the inslilllation of a democrllticully ckctcu tnvcrnmcnt. It is no boJy's case that the party JlOiiliHil iYIIK Ml\"h I hut lhll rsuJt Of tit¢ dcctil'n tv this yacaot seat wuul-1 huvo ttlttl th11 tnlljurity unc Wll)' or oth.:r. Nv obliqu¢ motive hull tVn IJ,•en hinkd ut. lh11 High (.'ourt ws thcrcTv~ not unjusti.\n\nlkJ lu rrucccdutll on lhc ussumption that it bad su.:n a p.:!wcr.\n\nDocJ the u.l-inralm <Jrd.:r passeJ by th~ High Court merit b.tln~ llptumcd in ~.Ya<'ise of th.: jurisJhthm tmcl.:r Art, 136 of _the CoiJ$/I• tulivn of i!Jt/ia l ·\n\n' t\n\n' .\n\nELECTION COMMIS.SION v. ll~YA.NA (Thakkar, J.)\n\nThe only question which arises.is whether the presence was a case where. the High Court , could not have granted-the adinterim order. Be i( realized that if the High Court had not granted the order and the .Election Commission had not chosen to appear on or before April 18, 1984 the High Court would have perhaps become power- . less to pass any order, whatevr, be the justification for -it, as the\n\n\"electoralpr6cess\" would haye 'actually' commenced. Can the High Court then be faulted for\"passing the impugned ordet: faced as it was by an unprecedented situation like the present? On the one\n\n\"' hand the Election Commission appeared to have been altogether\n\noblivious to the dimension as regards the bonafide apprehension pertaining-to the life and securlty of the NationaHeades who might address public meetings, the candidates; the officers engaged in elec- .tion work, and the vters. The danger was furtqer. aggravated in\n\nthe face of.open threats held out to the lives of the National leaders of different political partie~. What is more, the Election Commis- . sion has shown total unawareness of the circumstance that public r • . . meetings were prohibited under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the constituency going to the polls.\n\nOn the other hand the only consequence of granting a stay would have been to ppst pone the election .programme by a few days in the event of the Election Commission not choosing to appear in the Court (to show\n\ncae why the ad-interim order-should not be made abwlute) on or\n\nbefore April 18,,1584 which was thesclleduled date .for issuant~ of the notification announcing the election programme. The Election . Commission could~ have il(>peared before the High Court and got the stay vacated in time in.stead of approaching th1s Court by way of the _present appeal by Special Leave. The Election Commission could not have failed to realis~ ti1at no serious consequence would. have ·flowed from the .impugned order even if stay w:as vacated, , not immediately, but a few days later, for, it.was only a by-election to one single seat of no significance which would not have resulted .-in postponement of tile installation of an t:lected government. Worse\n\ncome 'to wors~. the by-election cou.ld not have been held along with .. by-elections in other States on the 'same' day. The Election Commission has not been able to show what possible deterim-ent 'would have ben suffered .if the by-election could not have been so held on that particular day. If the High Court was prima facie satisfied that the Election Commission nad failed to take into account vital matters and app.eared to have acted on . non:-consequential con's]derations, andad acted arbitrarily. in turning down the request . of the State Government as also th~ Chief Election Officer of\n\nB ·\n\nG.,\n\n576 SUPREME COVR T RlWO'R TS [19841 3 s.C.R..\n\n. Haryana, why cou.ld the High Court not grant a stay? And should.\n\n, this Court interfere in such a fact-situation? Learned Counsel for the Election Commission, tb.ough repeatedly requested, is unable to point out eitper from the affidavit filed on 18th, or from the addi- . tiona] affidavjt filed on the 19th, that the. aforesaid factors were taken into reckoning by the Commfssion. It. is not 'stated that these factor's do not exist or have been invented by the State Government . with any oblique motive. The contents pf the affidavits filed by the Election Commission reveal that it was altogether oblivious to all the relevant factors recounted earlier. There is nothing to .show that a\n\nsinle factor was preser1t on its mental . screen. The Election Commissioh has. not apprised the Court as to how~ and why any or all of these factors were considered to be immaterial. No inkling • . , is given as to how the Election Commission thought that the problems.\n\n. c.;>uld be overcome. By what process of self-hypnotism did the Election Commission convince itself that free a-nd fair elections could be held even , when public meeting~ were banned in the constituency?\n\nHow, and by. what process of ratiocination did the Election.Conimis- D ·. sion convince itself that free elections co.uld be held in a situation\n\n::where the candidates would. considr it hazardous to contest or to ' inClu1ge in election propaganda, and , even voters y.rould be afraid to vote? If the Election Commission had any idea as to how. the hurdless could be crossed 'and problem resolved, it hs chosen not to reveal -its perception of the matter. The Election Co.mmissio'n\n\n,-.. ,\n\n, perhaps has good answers. But silence is the only answer which has been given by the Commission as aloits counsel on this aspect. 'II know my-joband-it-'i.s-none--of-the-business-of-the-Courts\" seems to be. the. ttitttde. All that has been stated by the learned counsel for the Commission is that everytbing was considerl!d (without even disclosing the content 9f the expression 'everything').. Counsel has , of course set up an-alibi by saying that affidavits.. had to be prepared by burning mid-night oil. But in that case the concentration would have been on everything of importai)ce and what was •the essence\n\nf the matter couid not have been overlooked or forgotten. And\n\nif it h; s escaped attention~ ,:'the conclusion is inevitable that the Election Commission had not attached due importance and weight-\n\n.· ,·, age to the , bas!c problem and had not appled itself seriously to a\n\n serious problem. . ·. ' .. '\n\nThe fact is establisbd that tlie Chief Secretary and the Chief Election Officer. of Haryana, had personally apprised the. Chief Election Commissioner of the prevailing situation sometime .before 14th April, 1984. ~The Election Commission has not even disclosed ,- ' . . .• .....\n\ni .\n\n. .\n\n{·. ' . ~-c:'\"\"\" \"'\"\"'\"'\"\" ' HARV \"'A (7Mko,, J.)--~:-. -1\n\ntlus ract in the petition or in the additional affidavit. Nor has . the , ·.·1\n\nElecion Co01missio~ apcpriscd. u~ as 1 to what transpired at. the\n\n A (ng: The Election ommtsston 1as• been less than -candid mee 'to this Court.· No doubt the Chief Election Commissioner is ·. ~:~:io.g a respos!ble post. But that does no~ ma~7 him infalliable or j derhis dectston or act any the less arbttrary tf he has failed to . )\n\n:~orrn himself of all the reiC'Vant .factors and has failed to direct his B ! , attention to the core problem. I~ ts no doubt true that theoretically 1 ) , the Election Commission can sttll postpone the polling, if it is\n\n10 rnindcd.\n\nBut should the Court remain a passive spectator in j this clttraordinary sitution and leave thcNation to the mercy of an , I individual, however high be his office, when it is evid.ent that he has. secluded himself in. his ivory tower and has shut his eyes to the\n\n C realities of the situation and closed his mind to the progrrosis of the matter. The Court can certainly satisfy its_elf w!J.etber the Election Commissioner had kept his' eyes, ears and mind open, and whether •. he was able to show that all relevant factors including the consideration as to what advantage ws to be .securd as against the risk to . . be fuced, entered into his reckoning. If this is not shown to have . . D ·... :- been done, as in the present case, his decision is ' vitiated and the · l Court need not feel helpless. TI1e High Court was therefore fully 'iu.s\\ificd in passing the impugned order. . . ·. • • • t • • ·•\n\n. Appeal is acco•dingly dismissed.: E . '\n\nI .J\n\nS.R.", "total_entities": 64, "entities": [{"text": "ELECTION 'co¥MISSlON OF IN'DlA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 39, "end_char": 69, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "ELECTION COMMISSION OF INDIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V.D. TULZAPURKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 135, "end_char": 151, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V.D. TULZAPURKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R.S. PATHAK", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 153, "end_char": 164, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. PATHAK", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M.P. THAKKAR, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 183, "end_char": 200, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M.P. THAKKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "tbe State\n\nof Haryana", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 870, "end_char": 891, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF HARYANA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "section 150", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 947, "end_char": 958, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3060, "end_char": 3066, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3068, "end_char": 3070, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Pcoplo Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3110, "end_char": 3126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Oovrnmeot of Haryana", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 3622, "end_char": 3642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Oovrnmeot of Haryana obtained on e~. parte order rrom the High Court when it could eas1ly have given prior intimation of tbe iotend<d procccJings to the Election Commission onndia • ."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4340, "end_char": 4353, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tho Govern•\n\nII<Ol or HJryana is also identifiable and accesstble with the same amount\n\nofc:t~. Were it not f0r tho fact that this matter brooked no delay the Supreme Court wouhl b*yo hesitated to pass any interim order wit bout the •PP•IIant givlna prior intimation of lis proposed action to the re-spocdcot. ,."}}, {"text": "S6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4496, "end_char": 4498, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "A.K M. Hauan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4606, "end_char": 4618, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D.:spite 1he guideline indicatr<.l by tbo suprcme Court io tbc ll't>t Btn, al poll case, A.K M. Hauan Uz:amon v. Uuion uf lndio., [!"}}, {"text": "S62B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6942, "end_char": 6946, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "H.\\RYANA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9766, "end_char": 9774, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~:u:C'fiON COM~!ISSION v. H.\\RYANA\n\n' • be known tin the judgme:tl containing rcHotJs is bo.rn."}}, {"text": "Hasson", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10137, "end_char": 10143, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~. ut tt can c rcasona ly sa1d tht Hasson's c:aso bicb IS ye . '", "canonical_name": "Hasson"}}, {"text": "uon", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11051, "end_char": 11054, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These observations were made by the Court io Ha..uon's case in the coat ext or the\n\npiry or the term t>f legislature as cnvfsiooed by Arr; cle J72 of tbe Cqnstitution of Ir.d'ta and conslquc:ntial general eicdions for such lcgilature ."}}, {"text": "S68P", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12209, "end_char": 12213, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S69A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13019, "end_char": 13023, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Elec. tion Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13742, "end_char": 13763, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "What is more, the Elec."}}, {"text": "s. 144", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13856, "end_char": 13862, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Election Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15039, "end_char": 15058, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "More so when the Election Commission has not been able' to show what possible detriment would hve been suffered if the by.election \"could not have been so held on that particular day."}}, {"text": "S.S. Ray", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16843, "end_char": 16851, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.S. Ray and Krishnamurthi Swami for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Krishnamurthi Swami", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16856, "end_char": 16875, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.S. Ray and Krishnamurthi Swami for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "K.G. Bhagat", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16896, "end_char": 16907, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K.G. Bhagat Addl."}}, {"text": "A.K, Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16928, "end_char": 16936, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "General, A.K, Sen, H.B. Singh Ad.tocate · of Harayana, A. Subbha Rao, CV."}}, {"text": "H.B. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16938, "end_char": 16948, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "General, A.K, Sen, H.B. Singh Ad.tocate · of Harayana, A. Subbha Rao, CV."}}, {"text": "A. Subbha Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16974, "end_char": 16987, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "General, A.K, Sen, H.B. Singh Ad.tocate · of Harayana, A. Subbha Rao, CV."}}, {"text": "ltN. Poddar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16997, "end_char": 17008, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and ltN. Poddar, for Respondent."}}, {"text": "sections 30, 56 and 150", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17401, "end_char": 17424, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Representation of People Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17432, "end_char": 17466, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "February 28, 1984", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17631, "end_char": 17648, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On February 28, 1984, this Court gave a judgment in Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Hryana", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 17806, "end_char": 17812, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5501 of 1983, setting aide the election of the returned candidate from the 59-Taoru Assembly Constituency in Hryana."}}, {"text": "Election Commission of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17961, "end_char": 17989, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 6, .1984, the Election Commission of India sent a message to the Chief Secretary, Haryana, who is the Chief Electoral Officer for the State of Haryana, informing him that the Conimissio:n had fixed a certain\n\nprogramme for hoiding the by-election to the Taoru Constituency . ."}}, {"text": "Haryana", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 18029, "end_char": 18036, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 6, .1984, the Election Commission of India sent a message to the Chief Secretary, Haryana, who is the Chief Electoral Officer for the State of Haryana, informing him that the Conimissio:n had fixed a certain\n\nprogramme for hoiding the by-election to the Taoru Constituency . ."}}, {"text": "Peopie Act, 1951", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18319, "end_char": 18335, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Karnahlka", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 18602, "end_char": 18611, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Election Commission fixed an identical programme for filling 23 other vacancies-in the legislative assemblies of Andhra P.radesh, Karnahlka' and 'fest Bengal."}}, {"text": "Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 20806, "end_char": 20812, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He added in that leter tbat it would not be possible to hold the election during the proposed period because, .the neighbouring State of Punjab was going through a s.erious problem of law and order, that there \":was a dispute regarding territorial a'dj\"ustment and division of waters between the State of ."}}, {"text": "Akali Party", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 21055, "end_char": 21066, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Haryana and the Akati )>arty in _Punja~, that the said dispute was u'ed by the Akali Party for stepping up terrm; ist activities, tha't the terrorists had attacked perons occupying high .public offices, that there was a serious threat io the lives of many impoitimt persons in flaryiuia, that public meetings had been \\>anned by the District Magis- ."}}, {"text": "Chandrachud", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21831, "end_char": 21842, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ELECTION COMMI~ON vr HARYANA (Chandrachud, C.J.) 561\n\n' factqrs, that it was not clear how the Gonstituency of Taor'u in .Gurgaon, which is about 35 kilometers from Delhi, aQd which is\n\nquite far away from Punjab would have any fallout •o(the Punjab."}}, {"text": ".Gurgaon", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 21922, "end_char": 21930, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ELECTION COMMI~ON vr HARYANA (Chandrachud, C.J.) 561\n\n' factqrs, that it was not clear how the Gonstituency of Taor'u in .Gurgaon, which is about 35 kilometers from Delhi, aQd which is\n\nquite far away from Punjab would have any fallout •o(the Punjab."}}, {"text": "Government of Haryana", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 22308, "end_char": 22329, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the- Chief Election Commissionr wrote the aforesaid letter; the Government of Haryana filed a writ petition in the High Court of Punjab and Harya:na and obtained an ex-parte order, which is impugned in this."}}, {"text": "Siddhartha Shankar Ray", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22580, "end_char": 22602, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We passed the interim order on April 18 after hea.ring a fairly long and exhaustive argument from Shri Siddhartha Shankar Ray who appeared on behalf of the appellant, the Election Commission or India, and the learned Additional Solicitor General whoappeared on\n\nbehalf of_ res'pondent, the. '"}}, {"text": "Election Commission oflndia", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 23773, "end_char": 23800, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Election Commission oflndia, too, rushed to this Court ori the 18th without informing the Government of Haryana that it proposes to challenge ."}}, {"text": "[1974) 3 S.C.R. 7", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 30115, "end_char": 30132, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "High Court of Punjab and Haryana", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 30851, "end_char": 30883, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was urged that the High Court of Punjab and Haryana would have a fair and clear."}}, {"text": "Raryana", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 31416, "end_char": 31423, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the situation in Punjab and its impact on the e:\\ren flow .in the neighbouring State of Raryana."}}, {"text": "THAKKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 32467, "end_char": 32474, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "THAKKAR, J.\n\nHolding of a by-election to fill even a single vacancy at the earliest date is an extremely desirable end in a demortic framewok."}}, {"text": "Article 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34169, "end_char": 34178, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution Bench", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 34631, "end_char": 34649, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to be the law declared by a five-judge Constitution Bench presided over by the learned Chief J4stice who p1:esides over this Benc:h as well."}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36192, "end_char": 36203, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 36909, "end_char": 36914, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "India is an _oasis of democracy, a fact of contemporary history which demands the courts the use of wise statesmanship in the."}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37181, "end_char": 37192, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "IIARYANA (Thakkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 37689, "end_char": 37706, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J!LECtiON COMMISSION •. IIARYANA (Thakkar, J.) ."}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 38070, "end_char": 38089, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Calcutta High Court are hereby set asid.:."}}, {"text": "Dos Hasan", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 38278, "end_char": 38287, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "X X x\n\nX X\n\nX X\n\nDos Hasan's case ;, join that no such interim order an ever be d by the High Court ?"}}, {"text": "Hassan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 38417, "end_char": 38423, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "recorded in Hassan's.", "canonical_name": "Hasson"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 41619, "end_char": 41640, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "April 18, 1984", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 42957, "end_char": 42971, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Be i( realized that if the High Court had not granted the order and the .Election Commission had not chosen to appear on or before April 18, 1984 the High Court would have perhaps become power- ."}}, {"text": "Section 144", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43866, "end_char": 43877, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 43885, "end_char": 43911, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Election . Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 44352, "end_char": 44373, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Election ."}}, {"text": "Election Commissioh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 46311, "end_char": 46330, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Election Commissioh has."}}, {"text": "w!J.etber", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 49539, "end_char": 49548, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Court can certainly satisfy its_elf w!J.etber the Election Commissioner had kept his' eyes, ears and mind open, and whether •. he was able to show that all relevant factors including the consideration as to what advantage ws to be .securd as against the risk to . ."}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_3_572_581_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "'572\n\nRAl\\1 NATH & ORS.\n\nv.·\n\nUNION OF INDIA\n\nApril 25, 1984\n\n[D.A. DrsA1, AMARENDRA NATH SEN AND R.B. M1sRA, n:1\n\n C1Jnstitution of Irtdia:_Art. 31-B-Scope of-Whether protection UtZder Art. 31-B to Acts inserted in the Ninth Schedule against l'iolation of fundame, n(al r.ights inPqrt 111 of the Cpnstiiution extends against violaiion of rights undr C s. 299 of the Government of India Act .1935-He/a yes.\n\nRe.settlenie_nt of-DisplacedPersolls (larid Acqufsitiun) Act, 1948-Two pro visons to sub-cl. (e) ofs•b-s. (/) ofs. 77Vq/idity of-Held, valid-\n\n_ S. 7 of lthe Reset.t_le'n1ent of Displaced Persons (Lacd Aquii_t_ip) Act, 1948 broadly. p, rovided for payment, cf com_peos1tio11 for the land to be acquired for carrYin!J OUt the! purpose~ of tb-e Act aod the minner ad method of computation of compensation. Subclause. (a) of sub-s (I) . provided for determinirlg the compensation having due regard to the provi sioils of sub-scc_tion (1) 9f Sec. 23 of the- Land Acquisition Act, 18?4, that is the n1arkct price of the land on. the da.te -of acquisition.\n\nTho , two prOvisos carved out ao c:iccCption.\n\nThe first~ 'part of .the first proviso \"Was in cdnson1nc~ \\.Vith ss. 4 and 6 or the Land Acquisition Act n1meJy that the m.irket valucshall be de'crn1ined as on the date of the public.Ltioo of tho notic\\! under -section, 3. Notice under sectiOit 3 served the Purpoe of a. 11otificJtion under s. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act. f! is the second paft of the first' proviso that really affected the.compensation, when it said th1t. either the market value referred to Jn the firSt claue of Subs. (I) of s. 23 of\n\nthe s:.iid Act shall be deemed to be the niark-:t value of such land on the date of .pubfii;; ition f the no.tice under s. 3 or rnar-ket VJ.Jue of the land on the Jst d:iy of Sepcemb,.::r, 1939, with an adition of 40% whichever was less.\n\nThe 'iecnd p.rcvisn catered to the situ1tit>n wnere !::ind acquired had\n\nbeenhld by the owner thereof und::r a purchase made before the Ist'.day of April.; 1984 but 5!fter the rst day of September, 1939. .\n\n2. These J>lots of lari'H i>ituated in Delhi and possessed by the two appellants were aCqulred by the respondent in 1950 under the Reseitlerncnt of Displaced Persons (Land Acq1Aisition) Act, 1948.\n\nAri arbi.trator was appointed as envisaged bys. 7(1) (b) of ihe Act to assess the compensation.\n\nT_he appel\"lants and the Union .of [ndia appeafed before th~· arbitr3.tor and the compensation was determi.ned by the arbitrator.\n\nThe appellants perfcr .. red two' separate appeals against the aard of the .aritrator in the High Ccurt.\n\nA Divsion .Bench Of the High Court fo-llow ing a decision of the Full Bench of the High Court dismissec:I the appeals, but gr'anted a certificate under A rt. 133( I) (c). .In these appeals-the appep ants contended that. the two provisos to sub-clause (e) of subs.(1) of s.7_of the Act were violative or\n\ni '\n\ns.299(2) of the Government of India Act, 1935 which gdranteed a fair\n\n• A compensation for deprivation and/or acquisition or propefty,\n\nDismissing the appeals,\n\nHELD: 1: The two provisoes to sub'ciause (o) of sah-s.(I) of s. 7 of the Resettlement of Displaced Persons (Land Acquisition) Act 1948, are valid. [5810] ;1 ll\n\nThe contention that reducing the compens3tion to the m1rkct '\"' value plus 40% as on !st day of September, 1939 is thoroughly irrelevant to the payment of compensation_ and arbitrarily selects the date much earlier to the date of acq'uisiiion and ignores thC escalation Of price of the ~) had is without much force .. The choice of the date September !st, 1939 d.Oes not appear to be arbitrary but has a real. Dexus to the Object sought to e tie•• the 198.4 Act .. The choice of the date as !st .September 1939 is very relevant S.nd cannot be truck down as arbitrary becuse on-o -cannot over~ loot the historical fact tht thC Second World War was declar'ed on September 2, 1939 and lndf~ was draggd intO it by a foreign power on\n\n._eptem_ber 3,_ 1939 an~ te_wa( situation contributed .to the escalation in\n\nvrice _of the land .. It is however not necesary to examine iil depth this ': r;\n\naspect. [577E; G] .\n\nArticle ,31.B or the' Constitution which was added by the CODStitutioll (Firit Amendment) A.ct, '1951 provides that once. ao Act is placed iJl. the. Nint); l_ chedule to th~ Contlt:utioll -eithe_r the Act.or any\n\n.- Pc?''ision threOf shall not be demed to be vo_id_ o_r <1, v.er to _ have beCome\n\n~9_id, n tli_e ~o~-~~:that s!-lch Act_ or ny~ prQvis!oh thereof is incon!t?Stent wilb, or takes away or abridges apy of the right! cottferred by any , provi sion of part Jli of tho Constitution.\n\nThe Protection under Article 31-B against the violation of the fum; lamental rights n1entiooed in Part III must exfend to the rights unaer srCtion 299 of the Government at' India Act', 193S also which has Peen t_epealed~ s.299(2~ ,,-yas in suOStan.ce a fundamental risht which was Hfied :b_odily as it:w!)s from 'th_C Government of India, Act, I(\n\n1935 and put into Part Ill of the Constitution. The Resdttlemen\\ of Displaced Persons (Land Acqu; sition) Act, 1948 is admittedly in!erted in the Ninth Schedule by the Constitution (Fir.st Amendment) Act, 1951.\n\nTherefore this Act' ecjoys the umbrella of protection of Article 31-B and is immuned from tc cballer.ge of_beiog violative Qf any of the iig]its under s. 299 of the Oover'!lment of India Act, 1935 or !fundamental rights in Part III of the Constitution. (577GH ; 578A; C-D ; GH] ,, •··\n\nUnion of India v. Sm/. Mohinder Kaur, !LR 1969 Delhi,1154, upheld.\n\nDhirllbha Devisingh Gohil v. State of Bombay, [1935] SCR 691; State bf Uttar Pradesh and Othets v. H.H.Maharaja Brijendre Singh, [1961] 1 SCR 362; N.B. Jeejeebhoy v. Assistant Collector, Thona Prant, Thana, [196S] I SCR 636; Ru tom Cavasjee Coojier v. Union of ndia, [1970) 3 SCR 530; Stpre of Gujarat v. Shanti/al Mongaldas 011d Others [1969] 3 SCR 541 1\n\n,, H\n\n1errre~ to, ·\n\n.I Jf\n\n C!vn. Arl'ELLATE JuRrsmcnoN : Civil Appeals Nos: 922-23 of 1971. · . '\n\nAppeals from the Judgment and Order dated the 16th December, 1969 of the Delhi High Court in F.A.O. No. 94-D/~9 &.\n\n46-D/1960. ·\n\nK.C. Dua Co: the' Appellant.\n\nM.S. Gujaral and R.N. Poddar for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\n\\ DESAI, J. A hangover of the hey day of Article .31 permeates the controversy , in these two appeals: The attempt is to salvage something from the debris of repealed.Art. 31 by the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978. . ·\n\nIn Re Civil Appeal No. 922/71 ; Ramnath, the appe1lant, who is now dead took on Jease a plot of land bearing No. 64 'Block L, Daryaganj,))elhi admeasuring 590 sq. yards from J)clhi Improvement Trust under Exh.· A-4 dated February :10, 1942. The period reserved under lease was 90 years. The. appellant paid Rs. 10,253 as initial premium and had to pay recurring half-yearly reut in the amount of RS. 102-8-6 under the agreed terms an ct conditions oflthe le, ase. On payment of Rs. 10,253, the initial payment, the iippeliant. was put in\" possession: ·\n\nIn.Re Civil Appeal No. 9 23/71 : Appellant R.S. Ram Peishad since deceased took on lease two plots of land bearing No. 66,67 in Block L, Darye . n', Delhi from the Delhi Improvement Trust. The appellant ex .u• .d o registered lease deed dated March 9, 194~ in respect of PLt 1;0. 66 and with respect to Plot No. 67, 'the. transact'un wa> th; ough an oral sale dated May 1, 1942. Each plot\n\na, dm~:isured 591.1 sq. yards. The appellant.was put in possession of both t:.e plo• '\n\nTho Ci:tief Commissioner ofDelhi issued the nctitfication No.\n\nF. 6(3) SQ R & R dated December 15, 1950 under Section 3 of 1he Resettlement o( Displaced Per>ons (Land Acquisition) Act, 1948 ('1948 Act' for, short) for acquiring the plots of both the appellants.\n\nAn arbitrator was appointed as envisaged by Section. 7(I)(b) of: the J948 Act to assess the compensation. Both the appellants and the Union of India appeared before the arbitrator and t.lie compensation was determined by .thC:arbitrat()f, ·\n\n. i '\n\n• -\n\n......\n\nll.AM NATH v. UNION (Desai, J.) 575\n\nBoot the appellants preferred two separate appeals against the :. award of the arbitrator in the then High Court of Punjab at Delhi.\n\nOn the formation of the High Court of Delhi both the appeals came up before the.Division Bench on two differe11t dates. The Division Bench following the decision of the Full Bench in the Union of Irrdia v. Smt. Mohinder Kaurl'i dismissed the appeals but . granted a certificate under Art 133(I)(c) of the Constitution.\n\nHence both these appeals by certificate. •\n\nThe only contention canvassed before' the High Court was that Ist and'2nd proviso to sub,;:lause (e) of sub-section 1 of Section 7 of the.1948 Act are violatiye of S_ec. 2<l9(2) of the Government of India Act, 1935 .as it thenstood and the compensation awarded by the arbitr.ator in consonance with the provisoes is.illusory and therefore both the proviso es are constitutionally. invalid. A Full Bench of the High Court in the deci1ion hereinaove noticed negatived this contention but granted the certi.ficate under Act. 133(1}(c) on the ground that the decision in Union of India v. Smt. Mohinder Jfaur .was pending in appeal before the Supreme Court 11nd as the , High Court in. rejecting the appeals of the presents appellants followed tqe same decision, it was imperative that the certificate should be granted. ·\n\n,.,\n\nWhen the appeals came up for hearing, we. enquired from Mr. ' K.C. Dua, learned counsel for.the appellants as to what happened to the appeal preferred in Smt. M()hinder Kaur's case which enabled . the appellents to obtain the requisite certificate under Art. 133(I)(c): There was no clear or straight. answer to the querry and it. appears that there was no such appeal and therefore on this .short ground ' the certificate could have been canc.elled. But as even the other side was not in a position to shed light on tbe questjpn heiher any appeal at all was preferred against the decision of the High Court in Smt: Mohinder Kaur's case ad if so what fate it' met, we persuaded ourselves not to cancel the certificate.\n\nMr. K.C. Dua, learned counsel, who appeared f<; ir the , appellants in both the appeals; was rather on uncertain ground when he first stated hat he does not wish to challenge the constitution validity of Section 7 and or the provisoes to sec. 7(i)(e) and then:\n\nlater on stated that he does challenge the two provisoes to sub-. , ff clause (e) of sub-sec; (I) ofec. 7.on the /.'round that these two pro-\n\n.• ~\n\n. '\n\nvisoes are violative of Section 299(2) of the Government of India l\\ct, 1935 .\n\n. Sec. 7(1)(e) and the two provises r.ead as under:\n\n\"7. (1) Where any land has been acquired under this Act there shall be paid compensation, the am, ount of Y,'.hich !shall be paid compensation, the amount of which shall be determined in the manner and in accordance with the principles .hereinafter set out, that is to say,-\n\nxx xx xx xx xx xx\n\n(e) the arbitrator, in making his award, shall have due regard to the provisions of sub-section (!) of section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (I ofl894) ;\n\nProvided that the market-value referred to in clause first of sub-section (1) of section 23 of the said Act shall be deemed to be the market-value of'such land on the date of publication of the notice under section 3, or on the first day of September, 1939 with an addition of 40 per cent, whichever 'is less : .\n\nProvided further that where such land has been held by t11e owner thereof under a purchase made before the first day of April, 1948, but after the. first day of September, 1939, by a registered document, or a decree for pre-emption between tbe aforesaid dates, the compensation shall be the price actually paid by the purchaser or th.e amount on paymeni of which he may have acquired the land in the decree for pre-emption as the case may be.\"\n\nThe 1948 Act was enacted. to acquire land for reettlement of displaced persons.\n\nAs an aftermath of the partition of India thousands of persons were uprooted from their habitats and, they had to be resettled. Urgen! necessity was to acquire the land at!d that too at reasonable price. In order to circumvent the prolix and time-consuming procedure under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, a special act was enacted. Sec. 7 broadly provides for payment of compensation for the land to be accquired for catrying out the purposes of the Act and tfre. manner and method of computation of \\)Ompensatioµ. Stib-cla11se (e) provides for determining the comenp:\n\nr ,\n\n~ . '\n\nRAM NATH v. UNION (De, ai, J.) 577 . $aiion having the due regard to the provisions of sub-sction (l) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, that is the market price of the land . on the date ofacquisltion. The two provisoes carve out au exception. The first part of the first proviso is in consonance with Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act namely that the • market value shall be determined as on the date of the publication of the notice under section 3.\n\nNotice under section 3' served the purpose of a notification urider Sec. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act.\n\nIt is the second part of the first proviso that really affects the compensation, when, it says that either the market value referred to in the first clause of sub-section (I) of sec. 23 of the said At shall be deemed to be the market value of such land on the date of publication of the noticiMmder section 3 or market value of the land on the first da.y of September, 1939, with an addition of 40 per cent, whichever is less.\n\nThe second proviso caters to the situation' where land acquired has been held by the owner thereof under a purchase made before the !st day of April, 1948 but after the !st day of April, 1948 but after the 1st day of September, 1939 which is not the question herein. . ' Mr. Dua urged that reducing the compensation to the market value plus 40 per cent as on Is! day of September,1939 is thoroughly irrelevant to the.payment of ompensation and arbitrarily .selects the date much earlier to the date of _acquisition and B: ignores the <scalation of price . of the land. It was urged that the situation is. not improved by adding 40 per cent to the market value as determined on Ist day of September ; 1939. The choice. of the date September !st, 1939 does not appear to be arbitrary but has a real nexus to the object sought to be achieved by F: the 1948 Act. We are of the opinion that tlte choice of the date as Ist September, 1939 is very relevant cannot be struck down as arbitrary because one can not overlook the historical fact that the Second World War was decJared on September 2, 1939 and India was dragged into it by a foreign powrr on September 3, 1939 and the war situation contriouted to the escalation in price of the land. It J Q is however. not necessary to examine, in depth this aspect. ·\n\nThe 1948 Act is admittedly inserted in the Ninth Schedule by' the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 which also simultaneously added Art. 31-B. The Act firds its place at plecitum 16 in the Ninth.Schedule.\n\nOnce an act is. placed in the Ninth Schedule, H Article 31 B, provides that either the act or any provision thereof shall not be deemed to be void or ever to have becoine void.on the ground of such act or any provision thereof is inconsistent with,\n\n'fl<\n\nor takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by any provision of Part III of the Constitut.ion.\n\nOnce the act is brought under the umbrella of protection of Art. 31-B by inserting it in the Ninth Schedule, th~ act is not open to tqe challenge that it as a whole or any provision thereof violates or contravenes any of the fundamental riglits containd in J?art III of the Constitution. The allegation here is that the two pro\\lisoes violate the guarantee of fair compensation and therefore it constitutes deprivation of property withontjust compensation, a relic of Art. 31(2) lilied from Sec. 29.9(2) of the Government of India Act, 1935.\n\nThe 1948 Act.is a pre-Cohstitution statute. /t was therefore urged that it does not qualify for the protection of Art. .31-B in as much as when enacted it was violative of Sec. 299(2) of the Government of India Act, 1935 and as it was void ab initio, it was not an exi>ting law within the meaning of expression in Article 366(10] and therefore is. not qualified for umbrella o( protection enacted in Art. 31-B.\n\nBee. 299 of the Government of India Act, 1935 is almost in pari materia with repealed Art. 31(2) .. A Constitution .Bench of this Court in Dhirubha IJ.evisinglz Gohil v. The State of Bombay<'> while' upholding the constitutional validity of the Bombay T)llukdari Tenure Abolition Act, 1949 on the ground that it was not covered by the umbrella of protection of Art. 31-)3 and the Ninth Schedule held that Sec. 299(2) of the . Government of India Act was in substance a fundamental right which.was lifted bodily as it was from the Go-; ernment of India Act, 1935 and put into the Patt III of the Constitution. Accordingly repelling the contention that the Bombay Act violated Sec. 299(2) and was not qualified for the protection of Art,. 31-B; it was held that the marginal difference in the language of Sec. 299 and Art. 3l'B does not make any difference because what Art. 31-B protects is. not a mere 'contravention of the provisions' of Part Ill of the Constitution but an attack on the grounds that. the impugned act is 'inconsistent with, or takes away . or abridges any o.f the rights conferred by any provision o[ Part HI.' It was accordingly held that even though the Bombay Talukdari Tenure Abolition. Act, 1949 was a pre-Constitution statute, it would nonetheless be covered by the umbrella of protection of Art. 31-B.\n\nIn this connection it was observed as under :\n\n(I) [l955] S.C.R. 691.\n\n/>--·\n\nRAM NATH v. UNION (Desai, J.)\n\n\"It will be illogical to construe article 31-B as affording 'Protection only so far as these rights are taken away by an .Act in.violation of the provisions of the new Constitution but not when they are taxen away .bl( an Act in viotion of section 299 of the Government of India Act which has been npealed. The intention of the Constitution to protect each and every one of the Acts specified in the Ninth Schedule from any d1allenge on the ground of violation of any -0f the fundamental rights secured under Part III of the Constitution, irrespective of whether they are p_re-existing or new rights, is placed beyond any doubt or quest.ion by the very emphatic .language of article 31-B which cleclares that none of the provisions of the specified Acts shall be deemed to be void or ever to have become void on the . ground of the alleged violation ofthe rights indicated and\n\n\"notwithstanding any jgment, decree or order of any court or tribunal.\" That intention is also phasised by the positive declaration that \"each of the said Acts. or Regulations shall,\n\nsubjecl to the power of any competent egislature to repeal or amend it, continue in force.\"\n\nThis very question again surfaced in The State of Uttar\n\nPradeli and Others v. II. H. Maharaja Brijendra Singhli) in which .constitutional validity of U; P. La.nd Acquisition (Rehabilitation of\n\nRefugees) Ac!, 1948 was questioned. The title of the Act impugned in that case clearly shows that it was in pari materia with the Act, 1948 both being enacted wi\\h a view to acquire power to acquire land for .rehabilitation of refu\"gees and that too in the same year. It may as well be ment.ioned that U. J>. Act XXVI of 1948 is also inserted in the Ninth Schedu!e. The entry just precedes the 1948 Act. The High Court while upholding the validity of Sec. 11 which is in pari materia with Sec. 7 of 1948. Act struck down the two provisoes to Bee. 11 similarly worded as the two provisoes to Sec. 7 (I) (e). Both :the provisoes are in pari materia wit!i the impugned ptovisoes. This\n\n, Court, reversing the decision of the High Court ahd following the -decision in Dhirubha Derisingh Gohil's case while upholding the constitutional vafidity of the Act held that the protection under Art. 31B against the vio4tion of the fundamental rights mntioned therein 1DUSt extend to the rights under Sec. 299 of the Government of India Act also. The reasons which weighed with the Con.stitution Bench of this Court while upholding the validity of the U. P. Act. will\n\n{I) (1961) I SCR 362.\n\n. sso: SUl'!i.iiMB .totJRT REPORTS [1984] 3 s.c.Jt,\n\nmutatis mutandis appply here and we must uphold the' validity of th<).\n\ntwo provisos on parity of reasoning. . . !t is thus satisfactorily established that in view of the imertfom of the 1948 Act in Ninth Schedule it ejoys the umbrella of protection of Art. 31-B and therefore it is immune from .the chailenge as.\n\nB. violating any of the provisions in Part Ill of the Constitution. In fact this should end the controversy.\n\n.F,\n\nMr. Dua however urgedthat in view of the decision of this-. court in N.B. Jeejeebhoy v. Assistant Col/eccor, Thana Pi'ant, Thanal')•\n\nwherei~ this Court struck .down tJ:ie Land .Acquisition (Bombay' Amendment) Act, 1.948 as constitutionally invalid, would necessitate re, examination of the decisions in Dhirubha Dev/singh Gohil's case and Maharaja Brijendra Singh's case. It \\\\as submitted that the decision in Jeejeebhoy's case comes later .in point of time both to .the decision in Dhirub}ja Gohil's and flaharaja Brijendra Sing)i's\n\ncase, and therefore the later decision should prevail with this Court_ In J.eejeebhoy's :ase, this. (Oourt repelled the conten.tionthat t!)e Amendment Act 1s saved by Art. 31-A of t.he Const1tut1on. The argument of the 'learned Attorney General th?t Sec. 299 of the Government of India Act, 1935 declared a fundamental right of a citizen', that it is bodily lifted and introduced by the Constitution ilh Art. 31(2)thereof and that if Art. 31-A saved an attack against the Amending Act on the ground that it infringed Art. 31(2) thereof, it would equally save the attack based on the infringement of Sec. 299(2) of the Government of India Act, 193 5 was disposed of b)( merely observing that the argument is far fetchetl. It may however be mc; ntioned that in this later decision, the decisions of the Constitution Bench in Dhirubhi Devisingh Gohil's case 3Dd the Maharaja.\n\nBrijendra Singh's case were merely referred to but riot overruled.\n\nThey were distinguished on the ground that the statutes impugned in those cases enjoyed the protection of Art. 31-13.\n\nThat is a fact. and would make all the difference. The impugned Act in Jeejeebhoy's case did not enjoy the protection of the Ninth Schedule and Art. 31-B, and therefore the decision in Jeejeebhoy's case is hardly of any assistance. .\n\nIt was lastly urged that the deci.sion of the larger Bench iO: &stom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India(') would clearly sl; tow that,\n\n- (Jl , [l965ll S, C.R. 616,\n\n(2) [1970] 3 S.C.R. 530,\n\n: ;\n\n' j\n\n, .\n\n1t AM NATH v. UNION (Desai, J.) 581~.\n\nthe decision of this Court in State of Gujarat v. Shanti/al Mangaldas <ind Others(') is no more good law and therefore it is open to the Court to examine whether compensation offered _by the relvant pro- visions of the Statute is illusory . or prescribe principles well-recog- :nised for valuation of land. In our . opinion, this aspect is hardly irelevant because once the impugned statute or the impugned provioSions of the statute enjoy th~ protection of Art. 31-B, it is not open to the Court to cxam.ine whether the principles for valuation therein J?rescribed are -relevant to the land valuation 'because that' question , arises where a complaint as to the contravention of fundament11! csights enaeted in repealed A rt.31 can be entertained and examined. !hat complaint has to be rejected at the thereshold as soon as it is . i'Ointed out that the impugned statute or the impugned provisions\n\n-.of statute enjoy the protection of Art. 31-B. It may be mentioned that in Smt. Mohinder Kaur's case, a Full Bench of Delhi-High Court 'examined and upheld tlie onstitutfonal validity of the two proviiloes to Sec. 7(l)(c) of the 1948 Act. We agree with the view taken by the High Court and upheld the same. .\n\nConstitutional validity of the provisoes to Sec. 7(l)(e) 'of the 1948 Act was the 'only point canvassed in these two appeals and as . . : 'there is no merit in it, both the appeals fail and are dismissed with-\n\n-out any order as to costs. . .\n\n' In Civil Appea I No. 922 of 1971 the appellant died pending ihe appeal and substitution is sought by one Kumari Abha Gupta basing her claim ou the will dated July 27, 1980 of the deceased. 'The will has neither beeri probated nor anywhere its validity is deiermined. It is.not necessary for us to undertake this exercise here.\n\nWe grant the substitution limited'to the purposes of the appeal but if in any appropriate proceeding, the question of the validity of the -will arises, the same could not be said to have been concluded by this Court granting thy subs, titution. Subject to this condition, the 1lubstitutWn. is granted.\n\n• Appeals dismissed •\n\n(1) [1969] 3S.C, R. 341.", "total_entities": 130, "entities": [{"text": "UNION OF INDIA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 30, "end_char": 44, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "April 25, 1984", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 46, "end_char": 60, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v.·\n\nUNION OF INDIA\n\nApril 25, 1984\n\n[D.A. DrsA1, AMARENDRA NATH SEN AND R.B. M1sRA, n:1\n\n C1Jnstitution of Irtdia:_Art."}}, {"text": "AMARENDRA NATH SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 75, "end_char": 93, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "AMARENDRA NATH SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 186, "end_char": 193, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ninth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 220, "end_char": 234, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 353, "end_char": 359, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 553, "end_char": 557, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 946, "end_char": 953, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Land Acquisition Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 962, "end_char": 982, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "ss. 4 and 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1172, "end_char": 1183, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Acquisition Act", "statute": "Land Acquisition Act"}}, {"text": "s. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1399, "end_char": 1403, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Acquisition Act", "statute": "Land Acquisition Act"}}, {"text": "s. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1606, "end_char": 1611, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Acquisition Act", "statute": "Land Acquisition Act"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1736, "end_char": 1740, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Land Acquisition Act", "statute": "Land Acquisition Act"}}, {"text": "s.7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2864, "end_char": 2867, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.299(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2903, "end_char": 2911, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2919, "end_char": 2948, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3125, "end_char": 3129, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4649, "end_char": 4659, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ninth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5122, "end_char": 5136, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5245, "end_char": 5255, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5339, "end_char": 5345, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5369, "end_char": 5384, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1961] 1 SCR 362", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5671, "end_char": 5687, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1970) 3 SCR 530", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5809, "end_char": 5825, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1969] 3 SCR 541", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5879, "end_char": 5895, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "K.C. Dua Co", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6130, "end_char": 6141, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K.C. Dua Co: the' Appellant.", "canonical_name": "K.C. Dua Co"}}, {"text": "M.S. Gujaral", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6160, "end_char": 6172, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M.S. Gujaral and R.N. Poddar for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "R.N. Poddar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6177, "end_char": 6188, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M.S. Gujaral and R.N. Poddar for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6256, "end_char": 6261, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\n\\ DESAI, J. A hangover of the hey day of Article .31 permeates the controversy , in these two appeals: The attempt is to salvage something from the debris of repealed."}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6421, "end_char": 6428, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ramnath", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6522, "end_char": 6529, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "922/71 ; Ramnath, the appe1lant, who is now dead took on Jease a plot of land bearing No."}}, {"text": "J)clhi Improvement Trust", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6664, "end_char": 6688, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "yards from J)clhi Improvement Trust under Exh.·"}}, {"text": "R.S. Ram Peishad", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7087, "end_char": 7103, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "9 23/71 : Appellant R.S. Ram Peishad since deceased took on lease two plots of land bearing No."}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7632, "end_char": 7641, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7919, "end_char": 7933, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Both the appellants and the Union of India appeared before the arbitrator and t.lie compensation was determined by .thC:arbitrat()f, ·\n\n.", "canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA"}}, {"text": "High Court of Punjab at Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8186, "end_char": 8215, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "award of the arbitrator in the then High Court of Punjab at Delhi."}}, {"text": "High Court of Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8242, "end_char": 8261, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the formation of the High Court of Delhi both the appeals came up before the."}}, {"text": "Art 133(I)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8502, "end_char": 8515, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8690, "end_char": 8699, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8703, "end_char": 8712, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8767, "end_char": 8796, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9221, "end_char": 9234, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mohinder Jfaur .was pending in appeal before the Supreme Court 11nd as the , High Court in."}}, {"text": "K.C. Dua", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9469, "end_char": 9477, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "enquired from Mr. ' K.C. Dua, learned counsel for.the appellants as to what happened to the appeal preferred in Smt.", "canonical_name": "K.C. Dua Co"}}, {"text": "M()hinder Kaur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9566, "end_char": 9580, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M()hinder Kaur's case which enabled .", "canonical_name": "M()hinder Kaur"}}, {"text": "Art. 133(I)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9661, "end_char": 9675, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Mohinder Kaur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10023, "end_char": 10036, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But as even the other side was not in a position to shed light on tbe questjpn heiher any appeal at all was preferred against the decision of the High Court in Smt: Mohinder Kaur's case ad if so what fate it' met, we persuaded ourselves not to cancel the certificate.", "canonical_name": "M()hinder Kaur"}}, {"text": "K.C. Dua", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10131, "end_char": 10139, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. K.C. Dua, learned counsel, who appeared f<; ir the , appellants in both the appeals; was rather on uncertain ground when he first stated hat he does not wish to challenge the constitution validity of Section 7 and or the provisoes to sec.", "canonical_name": "K.C. Dua Co"}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10331, "end_char": 10340, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 7(i)(e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10365, "end_char": 10377, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 299(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10567, "end_char": 10581, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 7(1)(e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10625, "end_char": 10637, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11074, "end_char": 11084, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11092, "end_char": 11118, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11214, "end_char": 11224, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "statute": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11340, "end_char": 11349, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "statute": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12009, "end_char": 12014, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As an aftermath of the partition of India thousands of persons were uprooted from their habitats and, they had to be resettled."}}, {"text": "order to circumvent the prolix and time-consuming procedure under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12180, "end_char": 12276, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sec. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12305, "end_char": 12311, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "In order to circumvent the prolix and time-consuming procedure under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "statute": "In order to circumvent the prolix and time-consuming procedure under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894"}}, {"text": "Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12664, "end_char": 12690, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sections 4 and 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12858, "end_char": 12874, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "statute": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13008, "end_char": 13017, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "statute": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13033, "end_char": 13042, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "statute": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894"}}, {"text": "Sec. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13088, "end_char": 13094, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "statute": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894"}}, {"text": "sec. 23", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13303, "end_char": 13310, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "statute": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13424, "end_char": 13433, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894", "statute": "the Land Acquisition Act, 1894"}}, {"text": "Dua", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13828, "end_char": 13831, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Dua urged that reducing the compensation to the market value plus 40 per cent as on Is!"}}, {"text": "September 2, 1939", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14629, "end_char": 14646, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are of the opinion that tlte choice of the date as Ist September, 1939 is very relevant cannot be struck down as arbitrary because one can not overlook the historical fact that the Second World War was decJared on September 2, 1939 and India was dragged into it by a foreign powrr on September 3, 1939 and the war situation contriouted to the escalation in price of the land."}}, {"text": "September 3, 1939", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14699, "end_char": 14716, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are of the opinion that tlte choice of the date as Ist September, 1939 is very relevant cannot be struck down as arbitrary because one can not overlook the historical fact that the Second World War was decJared on September 2, 1939 and India was dragged into it by a foreign powrr on September 3, 1939 and the war situation contriouted to the escalation in price of the land."}}, {"text": "Ninth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14904, "end_char": 14918, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15000, "end_char": 15007, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ninth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15104, "end_char": 15118, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15122, "end_char": 15132, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15496, "end_char": 15503, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ninth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15529, "end_char": 15543, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 31(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15904, "end_char": 15914, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15927, "end_char": 15934, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15947, "end_char": 15976, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sec. 299(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16151, "end_char": 16162, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16170, "end_char": 16199, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Tenure Abolition Act, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16654, "end_char": 16680, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16752, "end_char": 16759, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Tenure Abolition Act, 1949", "statute": "Tenure Abolition Act, 1949"}}, {"text": "Ninth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16771, "end_char": 16785, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Tenure Abolition Act, 1949", "statute": "Tenure Abolition Act, 1949"}}, {"text": "Sec. 299(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16796, "end_char": 16807, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Tenure Abolition Act, 1949", "statute": "Tenure Abolition Act, 1949"}}, {"text": "Government of India Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16817, "end_char": 16840, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16937, "end_char": 16952, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Accordingly repelling the contention that the Bombay Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17000, "end_char": 17056, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sec. 299(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17066, "end_char": 17077, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Accordingly repelling the contention that the Bombay Act", "statute": "Accordingly repelling the contention that the Bombay Act"}}, {"text": "Sec. 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17194, "end_char": 17202, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Accordingly repelling the contention that the Bombay Act", "statute": "Accordingly repelling the contention that the Bombay Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17207, "end_char": 17213, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Accordingly repelling the contention that the Bombay Act", "statute": "Accordingly repelling the contention that the Bombay Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17259, "end_char": 17266, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Accordingly repelling the contention that the Bombay Act", "statute": "Accordingly repelling the contention that the Bombay Act"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17708, "end_char": 17715, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Accordingly repelling the contention that the Bombay Act", "statute": "Accordingly repelling the contention that the Bombay Act"}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17863, "end_char": 17873, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Accordingly repelling the contention that the Bombay Act", "statute": "Accordingly repelling the contention that the Bombay Act"}}, {"text": "section 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18069, "end_char": 18080, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ninth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18229, "end_char": 18243, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "article 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18504, "end_char": 18514, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "title of the Act impugned in that case clearly shows that it was in pari materia with the Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19219, "end_char": 19318, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sec. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19630, "end_char": 19637, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The title of the Act impugned in that case clearly shows that it was in pari materia with the Act, 1948", "statute": "The title of the Act impugned in that case clearly shows that it was in pari materia with the Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "Sec. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19668, "end_char": 19674, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The title of the Act impugned in that case clearly shows that it was in pari materia with the Act, 1948", "statute": "The title of the Act impugned in that case clearly shows that it was in pari materia with the Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "Sec. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19770, "end_char": 19776, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The title of the Act impugned in that case clearly shows that it was in pari materia with the Act, 1948", "statute": "The title of the Act impugned in that case clearly shows that it was in pari materia with the Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "Dhirubha Derisingh Gohil", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19943, "end_char": 19967, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This\n\n, Court, reversing the decision of the High Court ahd following the -decision in Dhirubha Derisingh Gohil's case while upholding the constitutional vafidity of the Act held that the protection under Art.", "canonical_name": "Dhirubha Derisingh Gohil"}}, {"text": "Art. 31B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20061, "end_char": 20069, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The title of the Act impugned in that case clearly shows that it was in pari materia with the Act, 1948", "statute": "The title of the Act impugned in that case clearly shows that it was in pari materia with the Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "Sec. 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20167, "end_char": 20175, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The title of the Act impugned in that case clearly shows that it was in pari materia with the Act, 1948", "statute": "The title of the Act impugned in that case clearly shows that it was in pari materia with the Act, 1948"}}, {"text": "Ninth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20610, "end_char": 20624, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20664, "end_char": 20671, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Dhirubha Dev/singh Gohil", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21145, "end_char": 21169, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "court in N.B. Jeejeebhoy v. Assistant Col/eccor, Thana Pi'ant, Thanal')•\n\nwherei~ this Court struck .down tJ:ie Land .Acquisition (Bombay' Amendment) Act, 1.948 as constitutionally invalid, would necessitate re, examination of the decisions in Dhirubha Dev/singh Gohil's case and Maharaja Brijendra Singh's case.", "canonical_name": "Dhirubha Derisingh Gohil"}}, {"text": "Maharaja Brijendra Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21181, "end_char": 21205, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "court in N.B. Jeejeebhoy v. Assistant Col/eccor, Thana Pi'ant, Thanal')•\n\nwherei~ this Court struck .down tJ:ie Land .Acquisition (Bombay' Amendment) Act, 1.948 as constitutionally invalid, would necessitate re, examination of the decisions in Dhirubha Dev/singh Gohil's case and Maharaja Brijendra Singh's case.", "canonical_name": "flaharaja Brijendra Sing)i"}}, {"text": "Jeejeebhoy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21253, "end_char": 21263, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It \\\\as submitted that the decision in Jeejeebhoy's case comes later .in point of time both to .the decision in Dhirub}ja Gohil's and flaharaja Brijendra Sing)i's\n\ncase, and therefore the later decision should prevail with this Court_ In J.eejeebhoy's :ase, this. (", "canonical_name": "J.eejeebhoy"}}, {"text": "Dhirub}ja Gohil", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21326, "end_char": 21341, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It \\\\as submitted that the decision in Jeejeebhoy's case comes later .in point of time both to .the decision in Dhirub}ja Gohil's and flaharaja Brijendra Sing)i's\n\ncase, and therefore the later decision should prevail with this Court_ In J.eejeebhoy's :ase, this. ("}}, {"text": "flaharaja Brijendra Sing)i", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21348, "end_char": 21374, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It \\\\as submitted that the decision in Jeejeebhoy's case comes later .in point of time both to .the decision in Dhirub}ja Gohil's and flaharaja Brijendra Sing)i's\n\ncase, and therefore the later decision should prevail with this Court_ In J.eejeebhoy's :ase, this. (", "canonical_name": "flaharaja Brijendra Sing)i"}}, {"text": "J.eejeebhoy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21452, "end_char": 21463, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It \\\\as submitted that the decision in Jeejeebhoy's case comes later .in point of time both to .the decision in Dhirub}ja Gohil's and flaharaja Brijendra Sing)i's\n\ncase, and therefore the later decision should prevail with this Court_ In J.eejeebhoy's :ase, this. (", "canonical_name": "J.eejeebhoy"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21545, "end_char": 21552, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21628, "end_char": 21636, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India Act, 1935", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21644, "end_char": 21673, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 31(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21782, "end_char": 21792, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21812, "end_char": 21819, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Art. 31(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21895, "end_char": 21905, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Sec. 299(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21977, "end_char": 21988, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Constitution Bench", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 22179, "end_char": 22197, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may however be mc; ntioned that in this later decision, the decisions of the Constitution Bench in Dhirubhi Devisingh Gohil's case 3Dd the Maharaja."}}, {"text": "Dhirubhi Devisingh Gohil", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22201, "end_char": 22225, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It may however be mc; ntioned that in this later decision, the decisions of the Constitution Bench in Dhirubhi Devisingh Gohil's case 3Dd the Maharaja.", "canonical_name": "Dhirubha Derisingh Gohil"}}, {"text": "Brijendra Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22252, "end_char": 22267, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Brijendra Singh's case were merely referred to but riot overruled."}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22426, "end_char": 22433, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Ninth Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22564, "end_char": 22578, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22583, "end_char": 22590, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Government of India Act, 1935", "statute": "the Government of India Act, 1935"}}, {"text": "[1970] 3 S.C.R. 530", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 22843, "end_char": 22862, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23377, "end_char": 23384, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23856, "end_char": 23863, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Delhi-High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 23938, "end_char": 23954, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mohinder Kaur's case, a Full Bench of Delhi-High Court 'examined and upheld tlie onstitutfonal validity of the two proviiloes to Sec."}}, {"text": "Sec. 7(l)(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24029, "end_char": 24041, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 7(l)(e)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24174, "end_char": 24186, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Kumari Abha Gupta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 24481, "end_char": 24498, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "922 of 1971 the appellant died pending ihe appeal and substitution is sought by one Kumari Abha Gupta basing her claim ou the will dated July 27, 1980 of the deceased. '"}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_3_582_622_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "!582\n\nSADHURAM BANSAL\n\nPULIN BEHARI SARKAR & ORS.\n\n, April 26, 1984\n\n[FA2(AL ALI, A. VAR~DARMAN AND SABYASACHI MUKHARll, JJ.j\n\n'Code of Civil Procedure 1908, Order XL\n\nReceiver appointed by Cofirt-Property in custody of receiver-Interference. with possession, not to be encouraged-No party can acquire title or\n\nright over property in possession of receiver.\n\nCode of Criminal Procedure 1973, Section 145\n\nOrder passed in prOceedings under this section-Does not affect titlet; Jf parlies to disputed premises-However reflects iactuin. of possesJi01t.\n\n\" AdministrGtion of Justice.-Socia! Justice-Courts . no longr merely Protector of ltgal rights-Technicalities of law dnd procedure not to be inistecf' upon--Subst_antial ju1tice to be meted out to parties~Necessity of.\n\nIn a suit filed in the High C(lurt for a declaration and relief in respect or several properties, the OffiCial Receiver of the High Court was appointedc Receiver.\n\nOn tbe request of the parties, the Official Receiver, c!ecided to• sell one of the properties with the permission of the <; curt. 1he price of the property was fixed at Rs. 3.S lakhs.\n\nThe appellant o.ffered .a sum of\" Rs. 4 lakhs for purchase of the property,. and by hi; advocate's letter\" enclosed a. draft for.Rs. l h!kh, being 1/4 of the amount.\n\nA-mee.ting \\vas.. held in the presence of the plaintiff and their counsel, an.d at the meeting the_ offer received from the appellant was consideied and it was decided that the offer of Rs. 4 lakh by bank: draft .. The Official Rc&eiver accepted the offer of the .appellant, communicated the accep.tance nd uested the appellant to deposit the balance amount.\n\nThe Official Receiver, thereaftermoved the High Court for directions.-. to rem'ov, e repondents 1 to 4 on. the ground' that they had trespassed i.nt°'\"\" the property a few months earlier.\n\nRespbodents l to 4\"moved an 3ppli'\" cation for being impleaded in the suit and contend,!d that .they were residing with their fdmilies under a licence since 1975 and had coastructedi pllcca-, huts thereon and. that with the knowledge of this continuous possession, the parties _to .the suit -have filed the suit among themselves without.· impleadiog them (respondents 1 to 4). •\n\n1 '\n\nSi\\DHURAM V. )'. ll SARKAR\n\n• The Single .Judge.., rejected the aforesaid contentions ofresPc; indent.s 1 to 4 and held that though they were prepared to offer the sum of Rs. l iakh more thin the appellant the property could not be sold to them.\n\nThe Division Bench, however allo\\\\•ctJ their appeal, directed. respon .. dents I to 4 to pay to the Official Receiver a sum of Rs. 1.25 lakhs immedia,_ttY and tho balance of Rs. 3.75 lakhs theTeafter and on such payme-nt ordered sale of the disputed proPerfy. to respondents .1 to 4 and their 34 nominee~ oo the ground that the Court should do s.ocial just_ice and in doing such justice no te; hnicality of law would stand in its way.\n\n' Dismissing the Appeal to this Court,\n\nHELD: [P<r Fazal Ali & Sabyasachi Mukha.rji~JJ MaJority]\n\nIn administering justice-social or legal-jurisprudence h_as shifted\n\naay from finespi.ln technicaUties and abstract rUJes t.o recognition of bu man beings as human beings.\n\nThe Division Bench of the High Court ti h:ld adopted ihe above apJ)roach, and no law is brcached y the view t'aken by i~. -It is improper for this Court in exercise uf tbe discretion vested under Art. 136 of the Constitufion to interfere with that dechion.\n\n[595-_FG; 622AB]\n\n[Pet Fazal Ali, J.]\n\nJ~ In our opinion, there appears to be some misapprehen&ion about what actually social justice ts.\n\nThere is no ritualistic formµla or any magical charm in the cOncept of social justice.\n\nAll that it meanS is that as bt\\veen _two parties if a deal is m:!dc witb one party without serious detriment to the otherJ then the Court W0uld lean in favour of the weaker section of the society.\n\nSocial justice is the recogniticn of greater good to larger num'ier without dprivation of acc1ued legal rights of anybody.\n\nIf such a thing can be done then indeed social _justicrr.u; t prevail over any \"tcchnic:\"il rule.\n\nIt iS: in response tothe felt necessities of tim~.\" f'nd situation in order to do greater good to a larger number CV(D though it might detract frpm some technicalrule in f,1vour of a party.\n\nLiving accomrnO .. dation is a hum2n Problen1 fOr vast millions i\"r our country\". [5958-D]\n\n• 2.\n\nCall it social justice or solving a socio-economic problem or give. it any other' name or noinenclnture, the 'tr.ct qf the matter is that this was. the best course in the circumstances that could have been adOped by the court.\n\n3, Justice-social~ economic end politica.1-is Preamble to our Constitution.\n\nAdriiinistration of justice can no .longer be merely protector of legal rights but must whenever possible be dispenser of socia1 justke.\n\n. . l595H-596A]\n\n- 4.\n\nTbe Division Bench of the High Court has d-0ne substantial ju Stice by throwing aboard. the technicalities particularly for the reason\n\nth;_t cour1S fron over a champartous liti&ation or agreement even though .t.he c; ame ay be valid.\n\nThe Division -Bench by its decision got mQrc\n\nS84\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORT~\n\n[1984] 3 $.C.R.\n\n<A money for the owners on the one hand and one the other sought to r'eha bilitate the 38 families of the rcsporident who had already - built perma- .nent sauctures. [l97G-H]\n\n• Jn the instant case, the Division BenCh \\v3s perfe.ctly .justified in • accepting the offer of the respondents because : (a) the respondents were pteparcd to pay Rs. l lakh n1ore than the cppellant and the appellant did not pay the balance of Rs. 3 lakhs, (b) possession being 9/IOth of litle, . r \"the respondents being in actull possssion would hJve no difficulty in becoming the owners, (c) tcspoadnts were . prepared to purchase the property notwithstanding lhigation, bec?use if they became owners no one could cha-Henge their title or poss:s'iion.\n\nThe Single Judge completely ignored two ma'teria, l, aspects : (a)· 1hiit a bulk or the considrat1on money. viz. RS. 3 lakhs out or Rs: 4 lakhc; was Oot pa.id by the < ppellant, and (b) that an owner also bas right t~ in1pose certain conditions, and in exercise ofthat, the condition that th~ purchaser would have to buy the land subject to the pending litigation was imposed. [597C-F; 5\"6AD]\n\nCI:er Varadarajan, J. dissentir.g)\n\nD 't. The Dlvision Bnch had no fight or juHiticatioa to alter or modify the earlier order n1ade for the sale of the property which had become final,. or to hold th::it a sub; equ!nt offr m ide by respondents \\ to 4 to purchase the p:-operty ror Rs._ 5 lakhs shou Id be accepted merly\n\nbecaue it appears to b! a 1yant1geaus to the owners of the property in th.: name of social justice. [6 l 2F] ·\n\n2-.\n\nThe benefit c\\aimed on behalf of rspond.;:nts I to 4 which can_. not calle4 a right, for there rs no corre'iponding obligation-cannot be equated with or even brought aoy . .vhere near the soci , J ju_stice IDentioned.-- in the preamble or the Constitution. (612G]\n\nRespondents 1 to 4 arc trespassers in respect of the properly which ls in custodi:z legi· and they are in contempt of the Court.\n\nThy cannot be: allowed to coninue to be in contempt and urge it as a/gr0und for obtain'ing the btnfit of tile saleof the p.ropJrty in their fovour.\n\nI( the appellant has not com;>! ieJ with any condition it m1y be gnund for the owners and the Official\" Ileciver no't to :iccep\n\n0 t .his offer and refu'>e to sell the proper1y to im and not for respondents 1 to 4 to raise any objection.\n\nThe offer has been accepted rightly or wrogly niore than once and there. , fore the appellant.may have a right to sue for pecific prforril1nce of the contract on the basis of that acceptance by the ofii::ial Receiver given with the approval of the parries The same iS the position -in regard to the delay of about a month in paying the balance of Rs. 3 lakhs by the appellant. [6 llD-F]\n\nIn lhe instant cac; e, the woperty has bee11 agreed to be so 1d bjr Private treaty and the Official Receiver has been authorised to sell the propertY\n\neiher by public auction Or hy private treaty. , The Court does not come into the picture in such a case and there is no need for the Court to -apiJr\"ove •\n\n, I\n\nSADHURAM V. P. B. SARKAR 585\n\noC,?r confirm such sale; The parties who are sui juris must be dec.:ined to A bav e knov.-n their interest best when 'they chose to approve the sale of. the\n\nproperty for Rs. 4 lakhs in favour of the appellant notwithstanding the ·-fact that repondents l to 4 had offered to purchase the proJ'erty for :Rs. S !akhs.\n\nThe appeal has therefore to be allowed. [6 l 2E; 61 JB]\n\nEvere; t Coal. Company d>) Ltd v. State of Bihar & Others, [1974] I SCR P. 571 at P. 513, Kayjay Industries (p) Lti. v.\n\nAsneiv Drums (P) Ltd. & Othm, [1974] 3 SCR P. 678, Jibon Krishna Mukhe.fee. v. New .Bheerbhum Coal Co. Ltd. & Anr., [!960] 2 SCR P. 198, Tarinikamal Pandit ·.a Others.v. Pra[ull\" Kumar ChatierjOI!, [1979] 3 SCR P. 340, referred to.\n\n<(Per Sabyasachi M\"kharji, J.l\n\n. J. The pcndency of the procceedings under Section 145 of the Code -cf Criminal Procedure and oder, if any, paed thereon does not in any\n\nway affect the ti:tle.of the parties to the disputed premises though it rt:fl.ects 4he Lc!um or possession.[616D]\n\nBhinka and Others v. Cirarcn Sirgh, [1959] Suppl. 2 S.C.R. P. 798 ireferreO to, .-\n\nWhen the pi-opcrty is in custody of a receiver appointed by the .court; the property is in the custody of the court and interference with such\n\n.possession hould not be encouraged and no p:i.rty' ~1n acquire any title or right by coming in or ovet'the property whi-ch is iil the possess.ion of the &:ecei ver or sanction of t.he court [t\" I SF]\n\nIlalsbury's Laws of England, 4rh Edn., Vol, 39 pages 451, 452 para .. \"'graph1 890, 89.1: Kerr On Receiers-16th Edn. p:iges 121 referred-to .\n\n• 3,· The concept of social justice is not foreign to legal juStice or -.social \\Veli-being or benefit to the community rooted in the caccpt of justice i_n the 20th. century: The ch1Jlcnge of social justice is prirnariiy a '.challenge .to th~ society at large more than to the court immediJtely.\n\n.Social justici:Js one of the aspirations o\"f our CoJstitution.\n\nBut 1 h-:! curts, .are pledged to. administer justice as by law established. [620F]\n\nIn ,1he instant cat.e, in formu13ting the cncept of justice, however,\n\nhe inartku 1ate factor thit lrge number of human be'iJlgs should not be dislodged frorn their 1)ossessio1 if it is otherwise possible to do so cannot\n\ntu: be a factor which mun and should infl.u !nee the mids of judg.!s.\n\nIt is true thJ.t {he persons who were alleged to be in possession are with\n\nualean, haRds, bu[ they can1e for shelter and built in hutineutg.\n\nThey do n6t want to be rehabilitated at competitive birgain .piice.\n\nIn the circum- '1itances they-ih.ould oot be denied rehabilitation on the ground of their .originil .ilkgitimacy. l620G-H]\n\nl)J,. The felt n_ecessities or time and in this case the convenience of the Si1.uation and the 1,1eed tor. adjl!sting the rights of a larger au nbr of\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [198.f] 3 S.C.R- . ,._ . '\n\n.JI\n\npeople v.'ithout deprivation. of <1riy .accrued right of anybody would b~ justice according. to 1aw.\n\nBefore social justice as something alien to legal justice, is rejected, it. shcu'd be remembered, th.at a meaningful definition of the rule of law must be based on the re'} Ji ties of contemporary so.:ieti-e.sand the realities of the cOntemporary societies are-men are in acute shortage of living accommcdation-and if they are prepared to' bargain.. and rehabilitate tbemselvs on competitive teyms, they should be. encouraged and no technical rules sbou1d stand in their way.\n\nThat would be justice. 'by highways' and not infiltration 'by t?elanes'. [6i!H-622B]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION . 1983 .\n\nCivil Appeal No. 5887 qf\n\nf .\n\n. c Appeai by Special leave from th~ Judgment and Order dted\n\nthe 25.7.1983 of the Calcutta High Court in Appeal No. 271 of 1983.\n\nS.S. Ra;1, S. N. Kaker, P. K. Mullick, R. Deb, N. P. Agf{arwala 'r'• and B.P. Singh for the Appellant.\n\nG.L. Sanghi, and H.K. Puri for Respondent.\n\nAnil Dev Singh and Ashok Sil for Respondent No: 5.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL Au. J, This ''lppeal by special leave against th, e judg-. men! of the Calcutta High Court discloses an unfortunate litigation .which proves the-well-known legal maxim \"del'1y defeats justice'' . and arises out of a Will executed by the testator which was hotly contested by various rival claimanti resulting in an action which went on merrily and sprightly for almost three decades as a result of which i.n the back-waters of the long-drawn litigation most of the claimants died and their successors were interested not iu the property but in the money which the prop.erty would bring, if sold.\n\nAs a result of internecine disput> between 1he heirs, an Official Receiver had to be appointed to look after the property and the I . final end of the drama seems to have begun .when the Receiver, on the request of the .parties, decided to sell the property with the permission 6f the court by a pr; vate treaty least the litigation might draw the last drop of the blood of the property rights of theuheirs.\n\nMeanwhile, some more events followed which made the task of the Receiver botb complex and complicated as the respondents put up their claim to.possession of the property e.ither as trespassers or as. license.es from some. of the hefrs. ·\n\n' lr\n\nSADllURAM v. P. B. SARKAR (Fazal Ali, J.)\n\nThus, while ihe negoti.ations for the private treaty were going on a new upshot in the guise of the repondents' claim seems to nip in the bud the attempt of the owners to get the property back.\n\nDuring the course of the three decades, lot of changes took place in\n\nHowrah-the population rose by leaps and bounds, $. number of build.ings came up and perhaps it )Jecame next to impossible for the heirs to occupy the premises again.\n\nTo add to this, came ilp a new lltigation in the shape of proceedings under s. 145 of the Code of\n\nCiminal Procedure between the parties.\n\nThe heirs having given up all hopes of getting vacan~-posses sion became \"sadder and wiser\" to sell the property if they could get a handsome amount for the same.\n\nA bargain was, therefore, struck, with th.e approval of the Receiver, by which )he entire pro- perty was agreed to be sold to the appellant fot a sum of Rs. 4 lakhs, uder which he paid Rs. I lakh and promi>ed to pay the remaining amount of Rs. 3 lakhs at an early date. The appellant also expressed his willingness to take the. property under sale subject to the pending litigation.\n\nThe matter, bowevor, did not end here because the trespassers jumped into the fray in order to stop or render the sale nugatory.\n\nWhen the matter came up before the court, it, on being satisfied that the sale was from all points of view in the intrest of the heirs, affirmed the said sale. The appellant contended th•t the possessions of t]je premises by the respondents did not pose any problem because they being rank tespa>Sers could be evicted summarily by\n\ntli~ Receiver under the provisfons of the Civil Procedure Code.\n\nBut, we think that the matter was not so simple as that because once possession of the premises by the respondents had la•ted fOr a year or more and proceedings under s. 145 of'the Criminal I'rocedure Code bad already started, the Jaw bad totake its normal course.\n\nSo far as the criminal court \"it concerned, the only course which could at best be taken was to declare possession of the pai; ty who . was in possession two months next before the initiation of the procee-. dings under s.145 or of the party who was found to be in poss; ssion of the property at tne relevant tilne.\n\nThe relevant portion of s. 145 may be extracte\"d below:·\n\n587 ·,\n\n\"145. Proeedure where dispute concerning land or H water 1s likely to cause breach of peace.\n\n• .1>\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1984] 3 S-C.R.\n\n( 4) . The Magistrate shall then, without reference to the merits Or the claims of any of the claims of any of the parties to a right to possess the subject of the dispute, peruse. the statements so put in, here the parties, receive all such evidence as may be procfuced by them, take such furthe( evidence, if any, as he thinks necessary, and, if possible,. decide whether any and which of the.parties was, at the date of the order made by him under sub-section (I), in possession of the subject of dispute :\n\n• ' Provided that if it appears to the Magistrate that any party has been forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed within two months next before the date on which the report of a poHce officer or other information was recei.ved by the Magistrate, or after that rlate and before the date of his order under sub-section (I), he may treai the party so dis possessed as if that party had been in possession on the date of his order under sub-section (!J,\n\n(6) If the Magistrate decides tht one of the parties was, or should under the proviso to. sub-section (4) be treated as being, in such possession of the said subject, he shall issue an order declaring such party to be entitled to possession thereof until evicted therefrom in due course. of law, and forbidd1ng all disturbance.of such possession unfl\n\nsuch evition; and when he proceeds under the proviso to sub-section ( 4), may restore to posse1sion the party forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed.\"\n\nWith this primordial preface and institutional introduction, we now proceed to summarise the facts of the case, most of /--..; which have been reffeoed in what we have said above.\n\nThe story of the case begin's with the execution Of a Will and testament by one Jitendra Kuniar Das on May 22,.1952 in favour of sonie .of l1is near relations, in respect of pre, nises No. 7, Duffers Lane, Liluah, Howrall as also some premises in. No. 211, Old China\n\nBaar Street, Calcutta. The suit was instituted for a . declaratfon that the aforcsa'd Will was void and . invalid, hence the legatees under the Will. had no right, title or interest. The suit went on dingdong frC>nl one stage to another until 1973 when, according to, the ri:spondent~, two of the uwners, viz., .Smt. Malati Das and\n\n' lr\n\nSADHURAM v. P. B. SARKAR (Fazal Ali, J.) 58!1-\n\n Jienqra Kumar Das or a.t least one of them put them (respon A. dents) in po.ssession of the Duffers Lane property under a leave and licence. During the course of their possession the respondents constructed permlnent structures and have been regularly residing there since. 1975. ·\n\n.It is alleged that.in February 1983, nre broke out in the factory adj1cent to the premises in question and .firebrigado men entered ,\n\ninto the premises by .breaking a portion of the v.all to get access to the pond. It is t'h! case of the appellant tbat on March 14, 1983, respond, ent Nos. 1 to 4 ... alongwJth some miscreants forcibly entered into the land. This, however, is disputed and j,. the root of contro\n\nversy in this case.\n\nIt.appears that the present ppellant, v.ho had not yet b.ecome a purchaser, informed the Official Receiver that certain persons had entered into the premises in question.\n\nOn this the Official Receiver informed the parties. On 13th May, 1983 the Offi\"ial Receiver authorised the appellant 'to take steps for prote~\n\ntion of the pr0perty. lt is difficult to appreciate !low before a con eluded co; J.tract and a conveyance in fa1 our of the appellant, the Offici1I Rec, iver could have authorised the present appellant to take steps for removal of respondents treating them unilaterally as trespassors. Ordoi was obtained on May 24, 19S3 from a learned Single Judge of the High Court directing the police to remove the unauthorised occupants. On June 22, 1983 respondent Nos. I to 4 made an application for being added as parties to the said pending, suit for recalling the order for police help to eject them from the premises in dispute;\n\nIn the said application four of the' respondents, viz., Pulin Behari Sarkar, Manick Seel; Gope Nath Sarkar and Sudhanshu Bimal Dey, mentioned the fact that they had come to know ab'outthe appointment of the Official. Receiver from the police and they had further come to know abont the offer made by the appellant for the purchase of the pJemises in dispute. The said applicants (being respondents herein) alleged thaf they .alongwith their families, with, the leaveand licence of one of the co-.owners, were residing in the premises since 1975 and had constructed pncca huts and in spite of the same, the appellant did not inform th.e Court of the.said fact before obta.ining police help against them. I.t is further alleged . that on May 2, 191!3 they had come the know tht the appellant had obtained ex parte .order from the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate (Executive) directing the Superintendent of Police to restore posses sion of the disp}lted premises, comprising bout six bighas of land, by' arranging police pickets. ' ·\n\n:a.·\n\n.~·\n\n, I\n\n\n[1984) 3 S.C R.\n\n, di\n\nThereafter, the said applicants filed an application before the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate. (Executive), Howrah, under s. 145(5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure with a prayer to ecall . the ex parte Order mentioned hereinbeforc and to call for a report from the local police and others regarding possession of the said applicants in the dispnted premises. The Sub-Divisional M1gistrate d'.d not pass any order but adjourned the said application to 7th May 1983. Though no formal older was passed, the s>id applicativn was kept on the record. After coming to know that certain other orders might be passed, the applicants moved a revision i!pplication , under the Criminal Revisional Jurisdiction of the High Court and thereafter obtained the stay of the Order of 26th April 1983, passed 'by the learned Sub Divisional Magistrate. This position is not disputed. So, th.e Revision application under s. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is still pending before the High Court.\n\n The learned Single Judge of the High Court did not make a deeper probe into the history. of the litigation and the fact that if the respondents were in possession even as trespassers and procee.· dings under s. 145 were pending aild had not been quashed, they could not have been summarily ejected. The learned Judge further noted that the tesponcfent~ .hd offered to pay R.s. 1 .lakh more for purchase of the premises in dispute but the learned Judge was of the view tha1the said offer cannot and should not be accepted.·\n\nThe Division Bench, however, was of the view that the offer made on behalf of .respondents 1 to 4 should be accepted as there was no conc\\Uded .contract of sale in favour of the appellant and hence the.re was no completed sale yet. The Division Bench further noted thus:\n\n\"On the other hand, we find .that 38 families have been residing fo the disputed land. \\tis submitted by Mr. Bhabra that these persons are all trespassers without any vestige of title. It is, however, the case of the .petitioners that they have been residing in the disputed land by making certain structures under the. leave and licence of two of the owners of the said premises although one of the owners, Smt.\n\nMalati Das, . who is alleged to 'have granted the iicence, has denied granting land of such'licence. If the disputed land is sold to the respondent No. 2, then 38 families who have\n\nbeen residing therein would be evicted with police help. In . . .\n\nSADHURAM V. p, B. SARKAR (Fazal Ali, J:Y\n\n-0ur opinion, the Court should do social justice .and in doing such justice ai, y tchnicality of law will not stand in its way.\n\nSocial justice require.s that the disputed land should be sold to the petitioners and others residing on the disputed land.\n\nMoreover, the petitioners have offered to pay the price of Rs. 5,00,0CO, that is to say Rs. 1,00, COO more than the offer of the respond, nt No. 2.\" ·\n\nAt this stage, it may be necessary to notice the terms and . . -conditions under \"which the owners agreed to sell the properties to => • <the appellant, which may ; be extracted thus: ·\n\n.'\\\n\n\"We further undentand that a meeting held by you it has been i:\\ecided that an cffer should be accompanied by a:.\n\nDank Draft on State Bank of India of ah amount equivalent to 25% of the offer.\n\nWe hereby make an offer for purchase of the above property for Rsc 4, CO, CCO (Rupees fcur lacs) subject to the Vendors' making out a good and marketable little free from 'encumbrances on behalf of ou_r client Sri Sad!zuram Bansal\n\nof No. 23A, Netaj1 Subhas Road, Calcutta-700 001. The sale will be completed within six months or such further extended time as may be ag.reed up,)n in one o~ more lots by one or more. sale deeds in favour of our client or his nominee or nominees .\n\nWe hereby enclose a diaft of State Bank of India for Rs. l ,00,000 drawn in your favour as desired by you.\n\nAfter hearing from you that om client's offer had been accepted, we shall forward to you the agreement for sale for your approval.\"\n\nThis offer was made by the appellant on December 20, 1982 :and at a meeting convened by the receiver thp owners while generally cagreeing with the terms of the said offer, imposed some conditions.\n\nFor instance, Mr. Mitra. counsel for. some of the .Objectors while indicating his clients' view emphasised that the acceptance of the -o!fer would be subject to the' buyers agreeing to purchase the land with pending litigation; the exactentence may. be extracted thus:\n\n~'My clients have no objection with regard to the\n\n• 591\n\n\n(1984] 3 S.C.R\n\naccepten¢e oftlte said offer or'M/s. L.P. Agarwalla & Co •• subject to Jhejr clients Mreeing to purchase the same land with pending litigation in respect of the said poperty.\"\n\nSimilarly, )he counsel for the other owners also accepted the. offer of the purchaser. After having accepted the offer, it was decidect . to circulate a draft agreement for sak for finalising approval of theowners.\n\nBefore proceeding to another important stqge in the -case, it may be mentioned that from w(lat has been extracted above, foe .offer of the appellant through their mtorney (LP. Agarwalla & Co.)\n\nwas not accepted unconditionally but with ccrt•in reservations which on a close scrutiny ran counter to the stipulation mentioned in the o(fer of the purchaser. For instance, while the prchaser insisted . that he would buy th> properties subject to the vendor's making out a good and marketable title free from encumbrances but this does not appear to have found favour with one of the owners .b<cause the clients of Mr. Mitra had dearly_ indicated that the offer would be accepted only if the purchasers were prep1red to buy the land with the pending litigation.\n\n Thereafter, the matter having been placed before the court, the receiver informed L.P. Agarwala & Co. that the offer or the purchasers was accepted and the balance of Rs. 3 lakhs had to be paid at mi early date. Thdetter informing L.P. Agarwala & Co. was. written by the receive, r on 13.1.83. In the context of the circumstanees mentioned above, the term 'at an early date' had to b~ construed literally so as to mean 'expeditiously and. without any reasonable delay'. It cannot be interpreted to give a long rope t~ the purchaser-to deposit the balance of the amount whenever he liked .. It would hwe been better if the receiver could have fixed a particular date by which the balitnce amount .was to be deposited, failing w!)ich the contract would .stand cancelled. Even so, as a corollary of the cgrresporrdence beiween the parties, this condition must be read into the letter of the receiver. However, the balance Of . .Rs. 3 !akhs was never paid until the matter came up to this Court.\n\nIn between, the purch1Sers approached the receiver to evict the trespassers summarily ven though by t~t time the contract had not passed. into the domam of an exee, uted contract but was only a execiltory contract and conferred no.title on the purchasers. It seems to us that the purchasers were more concerned with taking the posse, ssipn and evi_cting thetrespassers because they knew full well\n\nSADHURAM \"· P. B. SARKAR (Fazal Ali, J.) 593\n\nthat in view of the proceedings under;. 145, it would have been.\n\nA difficu1t for them to get the possession and therefore reserved the balance amount of R, s: 3 lakhs until they got the possession.\n\nThey, ho)Vever, rose up from their deep slumber oly when, they realised that the respondents had made an application for being\n\narrayd as parties to the suit by putting forward their case that since. they \\)'ere in possession ofthe,, roperties and had also constructed .· their own structures; they co11ld .not be evicted summarily because the matter was sub judice. ~\n\nIn order, however, to cut the matter short, the respondents themselves made a cle.ar offer to purchase the properties in question . by paying Rs. I lakh more than the appellant and prayed to the court that their offer should be accepted; In fact, there was no bar to the receiver in accepting a higher offer because the appellant's offer had not yet bern translated into action or become. operative.as the purchaser had not yet fulfilled the two conditions, viz., (!) not makmg the.payment of the balance amount of Rs. 3 lakhs, and (2) not indicating that they would buy the properties subject to the pending litigation:\n\nIt was argued by th.e appellantthat so far as he was concerned, the contract was complete and couH not be superseded even if a higher offer was made to the receiver: This argument cannot be accepted because the purchasers having themsdves committed a breach of the contract could not insist that the contract should be enforced without their having complied with the conditions agreed to. between tire parties. Afterall, this.was not a court sale where the highest bid was made and the amount. was deposited , that the sale • l>ecaine irrevocable.\n\nIn these circumstances the Division Bench directed that Rs. !,25,000 shold be paid by the present respondents 1 to 4 on or before !st August 1983, which it may be noted has been paid; and thereafter pay the balance sum ofRs. 3,75,000 by 29th August 1983, which could not be paid because in the' meantime .special leave to appeal was granted by this Court and a stay was obtained. The Division Bench flirther directed that in case payments were made within the time, the property in question should be conveyed to the persons named in the said Order. It was. furthe~ directed thatin case respondents 1 to 4 committed default in paying the purchase\n\npric~ Within the stipulated ti111e, the S!>id order 11c.11ld stand \\aeat(d\n\n59.4 SUPRH!Ji COURT REPORTS\n\n(1984] 3 S.C.R.\n\nA and the Order of the Learned Single Jtidge would stand confirmed, i:e., the sale would be made in favour of the appellant.\n\nCorning .back tci the facts, the respondents' claimed before. the learnetl trial Judge for mvestigation of their right to be in possession of the disputed premises by virtue of the leave or licence granted by OI)e or two of' the co-owners. The. investigation of that point on evidence did not take place though there are passing observations in. the decision of the learned Single 1!idge that Smt. Malati Da&and Jitendr&.Kumar .Das bad no title or interest to create any licence in their favour. and that one of them further denied hiiving given any such licence. It has te be borne in mind that there has been no in.vestigation of the respondents' right to be in the premises; even a. trespasser cannot .be thrown \"out of his occupation or posse.ssion, except by due process of law. The. owners.appeared in these proceedings and supported. the appellant. In fact, In the affidavit filed - on behalf of the Receiver it has been made clear that theY leave the matter to this H on'ble Court.\n\n• The appellant's rights which have not yet crystallised would not be hampered. court's dominipn civer:the property is still tliere.\n\nThe Official. Receiver is after all an agent of the . Court. as has been held by this Court in a number of cases. ' ' ' .. '\n\nf '\n\nIn the case of Evrest Coal Company (P) Ltd. v. State of. Bihar .. k\n\n& Ors.('), this Court reiterated that when a court placed a Receiver ·· in possession of property, the property came under the custody of the court, .th.e Receiver being merely an officer or agent of the court.\n\nIn Kayjay Industries (P) Lid. v. Asnew Drums (P) Ltd. & Ors.c' this Court reiterated the court's obligation to exercise discretion to 'make out a fair sale out of a bargain.\n\nIn Tariikamal Pandrt & Ors. v.\n\nPrafull Kumar Chatterjee\n\n(dead) by Lrs (') th1~ Court reiterated (at p. '.153) that the receiver was appointed under Order 40 Rule I and a property could be, sold . by the receiver on the directiqn of the Court ev.en by private negotiations. '\n\n(!) (1978] 1 S.C.R .. 511.\n\n(2) (1974) 3.S.C.R. 678.\n\n(3).(1979)) S.C.R. 340 .. •\n\n; ,,... .\n\n\"' . I\n\nSADHURAM v. P. Jl. SARKAR (Faza/ Ali, J.) 59~\n\n{_ ·~ if in these circumstance~ ihc court directs that on payme.n.t of. ' ' ' ' . - a '1riglier . sum of money for the benefit of the owner, and w1thi:mt any brach of any tegal right cif the intending purchaser, the property:· can be conveyed .to persons in occupation with large number. r.\n\nfamilies, the Court acts properly and with social wellbeing in mind.\n\n':Mr. S, S. Ray, appearing for the appi1Iant, submitted .that . ' • . the entite question was a legal 'issue and there was no warrant for the le'irnea Judges'ofthe Higt C~\\irtto r cvi,-imported the eloctrie\n\n'-·~· ,\n\n. of secial justice. fo our opinion, there app:ea:ts\"to be som~ misapprehension about )Vhat actually .social justi\\:e. is .• Th, efe Ml o\n\nritualistic formula or any magical charm, i.n the concept of social justice. All thatit means is.that as beiween two part; es if 3\" deal\n\nis made with orie party without serious de\\riment.to the other, then the Court would.lean infav<)ur of the weaker sec, tion of the society,\n\nSocial justice is the recognition of greater good to larger number without dprivation ofaccrued legal rights of anybody. 1r' such a thing can be dorie then indeed social justice musfjirevil ovr any technical rule. It is in respom1e to the felt necessities of time and situalion in. order to do greater good to a larger : number even thciugh it might deiract frbm some technical rule in favour of· a party. Living acommodation is a human proJ?lem for vast millions : in-Our.country.\n\nThe owners, in this case, are getting legally Rs~ 1.·: lai, hmore.\n\nWe must remember that in administering justice-sopial pr legal jurisprudence has shifted away from ; llnespuri technicalities and abstract rules to recognition of humanbeing as bU:inan beiiljlS, and as human. needs and if thse can be . fulfilled without . .deprivation Of existing lega!'rights of any party concerned, courts must .lean to wards that and if the Division Bench .. Gf the. H; gb Court, in the facts atid circumstances of the case, has leaned towards that, it is improper for this Court in exercise of the. discretion :vested. under Aft. f.36 of the Constitution fo interfere with that decision;' -.w~ would do. well to remember that justicesoCial, economic and p9li\n\nticalis preamble to our Constitution. Administration of justice can no longer be merely. protector of legal rights but must whenever possibl1;.be dispenser ofsocial justice.\n\n. .\n\n- . . 'Call it s9cial justice or solving a socio.economic problem or give it any other name or nonienclature, ihe fact of t])e matter is that this was the best course in the circumstances that could hav~\n\n. . . .\n\n.\\_~·\n\n• ''t'. '\"\n\n11.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984) 3 s.c.R.\n\nbeen adopted by the court, Unfortunately, the Single Judge completely ignored the following .. important facts which have been indicated by me earlier:_;\n\n(l) that.a bulk of the consideration money, viz., Rs. 3 Lakhs out of Rs. 4 Lakhs, was not paid by the appellant even until the time when tJie learned Single Judge had passed the order nor was it paid even when t.he mi!jter was in the Higli Court, and ·\n\n(2) the leai=ned Single Judge overlooked the (act . that an . owner ajso has a right to impose certain conditions and in exercise of that he had imposed. the condition that the purchaser would have t(i buy the land subject to the pending litigation whereas in the offer made by the purchaser he had placed the onus on the owners to give him a good market able title free from litigation. . .\n\nThus, there was a clear.cut contradiction on this point wJiich doe1 not appear to have been notice<! by the Single Jlidge and per. ·\n\n~Jll not oven by the owners because they were concerned more in getting the l\\loney a1 early. as Possible. The Division Bench, therefor., acGepted the offer of the respondents and passed the followina Order!\n\n\"In the circumstances, we vacate the said two orders of the learned Judge dated.May 24, 1983 and May 26, 1983 and set.aside the impugned order.dated July 18, 1983 and direct as follows;\n\nt. The petitioners shall pay sum of Rs. I, 25, 000/-to the Offidial Receiver on or before August I, 1983 and \\here after 'PBY the balance sum of Rs. 3,75000 by August 29, 1983 to the Official Receiver, •\n\n2. If the aforesaid s_µms are paid within tlie dates mentioned above, the Official Receiver shall sell the land of the disputed premises No. 7, Puffers Lane, Lilluah, Howrah to the petitioners and to their following nominees who have' been residing in the said premises .... \"\n\n At page .90 in 'The Dictionary of Essential Quotations' comf ..\n\n' . .\n\n....\n\nSAbllURAM v. P. B. SARKAR (Fazal Ali, J.) $91\n\npiled. by Kev.in: Goldstein-Jackson, John St0art Mill aptly observes A thus: • • \" .. :the sole end for which mankind are. warranted, individually 01 collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the. only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His .own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.\" ·\n\n. Striking; therefore, a just balance betwe, eil the claims put forward by the appellant and the respondents, we are convinced tliat the Division Bench of the High Court was. perfectly justified in accepting the offer of the respondents for the fo!lowing reasons: . .\n\n(I) that the respondnts were prepared to pay much liigher amount than the appellant (i.e., Rs. 1 Lakh more) even at the very behest; the appellant did not pay the balance of . Rs. lakhs, which was a substantial part of the considera- . tion, at the earliest moment as stipulated in the .agreement\n\nbut depoited the amount only when the case came up before this Court,\n\n(2) that pc!ssession being 9/!0th of title and the respon- . --\" dents being in actual possession of the property would have had no difficulty at all in becoming .the owners without any further litigation.\n\n(3) that the respondents were prepared to purchase tho property notwithstanding the\"Iitigation obviously because if they had become the owners, no one could have challenged 'their title or possession .. ·\n\n• In such a situation, therefore, in our opinion, the Division Bench of the Hi?h .ourt has done . substan.tial justice throwing aboard the techmca1It1es particularly for the reason that courts frown over a cmpl!rtus litigation or agreement evn though the same may be valid. Thus, by its decision the Division Bench got more money for the owners . on the. one hand and on the other sought to rehabilitate the 38 families of the respondent who had already built permanent structures.\n\n.; •.\n\n. , c\n\n''- D\n\n\"' F\n\nSUPRBMB COURT REPORT~\n\n(!984) 3 S.C.R. ).-- ·\n\nFor the: reasons .given al; wve,' we find onrselves in complete agreement with the judgment of the Divisioµ Bmch of the High Court which we hereby affirm with the observations that since the ctates mentio.ned .in the Division Bench's Order have already passed,· we modify the said Order to this extent that as the respondents . have already paid a sum of Rs. 1.25 lakh. to the Official Re eiver\n\nthey shall pay him the balance of Rs. 3.75 lakhs by August. 15,\n\n1984. and shall also insert a condition that they would be b ying . \"/ • the properties riotWithstandirtgthe pending litigation, failing wh'ch the appeal shall stand allowed and the Order oflhe Single Judge stand restored; In the circumstance$ of the case, we make no order ·!Is \\o costs .\n\nV ARADARMAN,' J. This appeal by special leave is direCted against the order of a Division. Bench of the Calcutta High Court dated 25.7.1983 made in an application of respondents l to 4 for the .issue . of an interim order pending consideration of the appeal filed against the order. of a learned Single Judge of that High Court dated 18.7.1983 dismissing their application for beir.g impleaded as defendants in SuitNo .. 2024 of 1952 .ori the file of that High Court as also in the applicat•on of the Official Receiver, Calcutta High Cowt afi\\.tm<'td by oue Ashok Kurnar Rai on 20.5.1983 and for staying and setting aside that. court's earlier orders dated 24.5.1983 and 26.5.1983.\n\nSuit No. 2024. of 1952 was filed in. the Calcutta High Court on 28;5.!952 by '()Ile l'.ras.ad Nath Das, husband' of Malati Das and father of the then minors l'rabir Kumar Das and l'radeep Kumar\n\nDs. for declaration and other reliefs in respect of certain properties including.No. 7, Duffer:s Lane, Howrah, hereinafter referred to as the 'disputed property' against certain i>ersons including oue Jitendra :&:umar Das who is the second defendant inthat Suit. The Official _ Receiwr of the High . Court was appointed as Receiver in that suit on tl.8.1953in resect of ceriain properties includiQg the disputed property and he . took possession of the disputed propeUy on ;: 13.8.19_53.\n\nAn application was made in August 1982 for.sale ot .the\n\n::..: disputed property and-.di_stribution of the sale proceeds amongst the_\n\n:_ pa, rties ent!tled-thereto. . ()n l J. I0.1982 C. K. Banerjee, l. pas~~<l . ; ; ari.. order i, n that application for sale of the disputed proprty Ill\n\n:c .theseterm8::\n\nr-·\n\nr;:II~, ''ln that view of the matter .there will b'e an rder for sale in t.enns of prayer (a). In the event the properties are\n\n---..j.\n\n' '\n\n' . .\n\nSADHORAM v. p, il. SARKAR (Varadrajan,,.J.)\n\nsold by private treaty . the Official -, Receiver will call a meeting of the parties and obtain l, l; l.eir approval to such sale by private treaty. The proviSional. allottees or any other party to the suit would be entitled to bring intending pur- ·cJ:iasers for the said property. There will.also be an order in terms of prayer (b). In)he event the properties are sold the petitioner Ajit Kumar Das would be.paida sum of Rs; 10000\n\nout of the sale .proceeds subject to adjustment against his share in the estate. The rest of the sale proceeds would be invested by. the Official Receiver in short term fixed deposit in a nationalised bank for a period not exceeding one. year and to be renewed from year to year until further orders of Co\"urt.\"\n\nIt has to be s.tated that the le.acned Single Judge fixed an upset price of Rs. 3;50,000 for the disputed. property in that order. and there is no dispute about ; t. . The appellant Sadhu Ram Bansal offered a sum of Rs. 4,00,000 for.the property to the Receiver by his advocate's letter dated 20.U.19S2. enclosing a .draft \"i'or Rs. 1,00,000 being one fourth of the amount and saying that f11e offer is subject to the vendors making out a good ai:tdmarketable title fre~ from encumberances and that the sale will be completed within 6 • months or &uch other time as may be agreed upon in favour of the appellant °ilr his nominees. Thereinafter, a meeting \\'(as. held before,·\n\nthe Official Receiver on 12.1.1983 in presence of Prabir Kumar Das and Pradeep Kumar Das a.nd their Counsel as als6 }iiendra Kumar Das and others. That meeting was convened in. terms Ol a motion of a meeting dated 23. 12. I98i for deciding upon the steps to be taen re.garding the intending offers for _the sale of the disputed property. . In that meeting.all the three offers r_eceived by the .Official Receiver were placed before the parties for their consideration and it was det; ided that the offer of Rs .. 4,00,000 made on behalf of the appellant should be accepted in view of the payment- -of Rs. 1,00,00.0 by ban~ draft.\n\nThe Official Receiver thereupon accepted the offer of the appellant and communicated the acceptance by hiS letter dated 13.1.198! and requested the appellant to deposit the .balance of Rs. 3,00,000 at an early date, In view of Court's . order dated 1.8.1983 another meeting was conveed before the Official Receiver on 9.8:198) and the parties to sui.t agreed in that\n\nmeeting\"to sell the disputed property to the appellant for Rs. 4,00,000\n\ninview of his prior payment of Rs. 1,00.000 by bank draft and sei:tdfog the balance of Rs. 3,00,000 to ihe Official Receiver on 8.8.1983.\n\nSubsequently on the application of the Official\n\nstiPRru.iii cotlR(ruiPORTs\n\n(!984) 3 S.C.R • • A Receiver,· P. Banerjee, J. of the Calcutta High Court passed an\n\nG 0\n\norder dated 24.5.1983 .directing the police to remove respondents\n\nI to 4. from th~ disputed property and put the Official Receiver in possess10n thereof on the allegation of the Official Receiver that they' had trespassed .into the property a few months earlier .. That.order was modified orl 26.5.1983 as regards the designation of the Deputy InspeClor General of Police to whom also the earlier letter dated 24.5.1983 was directed.\n\nOn 22.6.\\983 respondents 1 to 4 nanieiy, Putin Behari Sarkar, Manik . Seal, Gopinath Sarkar and Sudhansu Bimal Dey moved the. Calcutta High Court for being imple.aded as defendants 1n Suit No. 2024 of 1952. (wrongly mentioned in that application as Suit No. 2024 of 1982) as well as m the application of the Official Receiver affirmed by one Ashok Kumar Rai on 20.5.1983 and for stayiqg and setting asicie the said orders dated 24.5.1983 and 26.5 1983 as stated above .. In. that application respon dents I to 4 alleged that they came to know from the police about.· the orders dated 24.5.1983 and 26.5.1983 on 18.6.198:!, that Suit No. 2024 of 1982 (mistake for Suii No. 2024 of 1952) had been filed by Prasa, d Nat.h Das on 28.5.1982 (mistake for 28.5.1952),' that the Official Receiver had been appointed on 11.8.1982 (mistake for 11.8.1952),. that the Court I1as granted leave to t)le Official Receiver to sell the. property either by public auction or by private ' tre; ity subject to a reserve price of Rs. 3,50,000 and that the offer of Rs. 4,00,000 made by the appellant .has been accepted and .one fourth of the amou.nt has already been paid to the .Official Receiver Respondents 1 to 4 further stated in tbat application that they are residing on the diputed property w.ith their families under a licence since 1975 and have constructed pucca huts there<)n and that with knowledge of their continuous possession of tae property as licencees since 1975 the paities to the suit have filed t)le suit among themselves withont impleading them (respondents 1 to 4) as parties knowing fully well that they would not get pzsession of the same if they filed the suit against them. ·\n\n'fhls application of respondents I to 4 was opposed by the appellant through a counter-affidavit o~ his son Sajan Kumar . Bansal.\n\nJt was stated in that counter-affidavit inter alia that in the application filed for grant of leave to the Official Receiver to sell the disputed .., property it was alleged that it was under the unauthorised anti\n\nillegal occupation of one Kamal Hosiery. claiming to be tenant of the property on a rent of Rs. lOb/per month for a long time and that no rent has been paid to or collected by the Official- Receiver in the last 20 years, It was also stated in that counter-affidavit that in\n\n.H.\n\nf' ..\n\nSA[)I!URAM V. P. B. SARKAR (Varadara}an, J.) . 60i.\n\nthe draft agreement for sale it is stated there is litigation for the\" last 20 years between the Official Rceiver on the one hand and Kamal Hosiery on the other and that Secrnd Appeal No. 1267 o(\n\n1982 filed by Kamal Hosiery against the Official Receiver was pending in the Cakutta High Court. Denying that there was'llny such licence as claimed by respondents l to ,;(.it was stated in that counter-affidavit that in the p0 ceeding~ taken by respondents 1 tg 4 under s. 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in tlie Court of the Sub-Divisional Executive Magistrate, Sadar,· Howrah respondents l to.4 claimed to have been in possession of the disputed property for the last 15 years which will take us to 1968 and not 1975 It is\n\nthat application of respondents 1 to 4 for being impleaded as parties 0 to Suit No. 2024 of 1952 and for staying and setting aside the High ..\n\nCo .1rt's orders dated 24.5.1983 which came up before Monjula !lose, J. 'Fhree points were urged before that learned Judge. .\n\n The first point urged before the leared Judge was •the alleged deliberate omission . of \"the. parries to Suit No. 2024 of 1952 to imp\n\n!ad respondent> l to 4 as parties with the object of getting a receiver appoil'ted and having the property sold behind their back. The learned Judge rejected that contention of respondents I to 4 in these terms :\n\n\"I accept the contentions of the. learned Advocate for the purchaser Sadhu Ram Bansal as .also the co.ntentions of the Learned Advocate for the leamd Official Receiver that deliberate mis-statements hav<: been made in the petition with. a view to impress upon the Court that the suit was filed without impleading the petitioners (respondents I to 4) as parties so that possession could be obtained .and an order of appointment.of Receiver and leave to sell the property could be obtaintd behind the back -0f the petitioners (respondents I to 4). It is significant that the proceedings were instituted in 1952 (Suit No. 2024 of 1952) and. the Official Receiver was appqinted as .Receiver as fa.r back as in 1953.\n\nSince that date te suit property is irt the possession of the Official Receiver as offi.cer of the Court. . The petitioners , (respondents l to 4) claim to be in pdssession since !Q75 with the leave of one Malati Das and Jitendr11 Kumar Pas.\n\nIt is significant that the said Mala ti Das . was brought on record only in the year 1977 after the death of her husband and in any event no leave or lice.nee coulCI have been gran ted by either Malati Das or Jitendra Kumar Das wJ1en th¢\n\n.. F\n\n. JI\n\n\"r-·\n\n' '.'\n\nSUPREME COURT RtPORtS\n\n(1984) 3 S.C.R.\n\nOfficial Receiver was; in poss'ession of the suit premises. On 21.6.,1983 Malati Das appeared in Court and denied giving any leave to any of the parties to remain in possession' of the suit premises. Falsity of the. petitioners' case 1s thus .prima facie apparent and it appears that they have no locus standi to intervene in this proceeding and eek any order to be adde.d as party-defendants to the.suit and/or any other proceeding in connection therewith.\" · .\n\nThe second point urged before the learned Single Judge as . . as regards the validity of the orders dated 24.5.1983 and 26.5.1983 ·\n\nmade for delivery of possession of the property to the Official Receiver with police aid and witho.ut notice to respondents 1 to 4; . It was contended before the Ie;1rned Single Judge on behalf of respon- dents l to 4 that those orders made behind the back of respondents\n\n~ 1 to 4 \\1-lf o would be affected thereby are invalid in law and should, therefore, be set' asid\"' . The learned Judgc rejected. that contenti!?n in these tems : .\n\n\"In any event the decision reported ill A.I.R .. 1957 Calcutta 252 is an authority for the proposition.that the Court has unfettered discretion al)d ample powe1 to do jusiice The Court is also fortified in its view by the decision in Hira Lal Patni v..\n\nMnokaram Setlziya, reported in A.I.R. 1962 SC 21 where tlie Court viewed that under Order 40 .Rule I the Court may remove any perso~ who interferes or intermeddles with the Receiver's po.ssession In lhy view . different considerati.ons apply in cases where property In the possession of Court through its officers are sought to be the Receiver of the Court is sought to be interfered with, and the cases cited are distinguishable.. To iny mind the orde.rs passed on .the 24th and 26th May, 1983 are orders pa'ssed by tl; le Court in the course of the administration of the estate through the agr11cy of the Receiver and the said' orders were passed at the instances ofthe Receiver in the circumstances stated in the affidavit affirmed by Ashoke Roy on 4t!i July, 1953 It in apparent. from paragraph 5 (vii) .that certain persons had entered _the. premises on the 14th\n\nM\"rcli, 1983. requiring the Official Receiver to take steps . with the police authorities and it appears that his lette1s ·\n\nwnt unheeded requiring an application to be made for: seeking direction JJpon t_he police auth?rities to rinove he squatters and thereby assistance sought m the admm1strat1on\n\nj .\n\n.r..-\n\n. \"\"\n\n.. ...,,\n\nSADFlURAM v. P. B. SARKAR (Varadarajiin, J.) 003\n\nof the estate by the Receiver. The case reported in A.LR..\n\n-~A 1962 SC 21 Hira Lal Patni v.' Moakaram Sethiya is an authority in support of this proposition.• The order for police help th11s obtained cannpt be said to have been obtained improperly or by suppression of any fact.\"\n\nThe third point urged by respondent l to 4 before the learned Single Judge was that they were prepared to offer a sum of Rs. 1,00,000 more than the amount offered by the appellant and that the property should be ordered to be sold to them. The learned Single Judge rejected that contention in these terms_: ''\n\n''The thircl.point .... has no merit and is not requir.id to be considered inasmuch as the Court by its order dated l l th October, .1982 directed that the Official Receiver will sell the property by public auction or private treaty to the. highest . offerer or offerers subj_ect to a reserve price or' Rs. 3,50,000\n\nand had. directed that in the event the property is sold bY private. treaty the Official Receivenvould call a meeting of: the parties and obtain approval for such sale. It appears . from the records. of the minutes of the Receivds meeting held on 12.1.1983 that in the presence of parties each one\n\nof them supported the sale to M/s: L. P. Aggarwal's client, namely, Sadhu Ram.Bansal and as such the Official Receiver accepted_ the offer of the said Sadhu Ram Bansal, after. the parties considered the price offered to be adequate. The case reported in A.LR !97() SC 2037 is an -authority in . . support of the propnsition that once. a Court comes to . a conclusion that .the priceotreed is adequate no subsequent higher. offer can constitute a valid ground for .r£fusing confirmation.\n\nTo my niiod although the transaction in suit does not require to be confired as the Official.Receiver was invested with the direction given on II th October, 1982 the\n\ns1id decision with the approval of the parties cannot now be te-opcned and/or reagitated.\"\n\nFor tlie above reasol)~-the learmd .. Single Judge dismissed. the petitiQJ) of respondents 1 to 4 witlt costs.\n\nAgainst that order res: ponde!lts I to 4 filed an appeal before the Division Bench.\n\nIn that . appeal respondents' I .to 4 .made an application for an interim order, and it came up for considei; ation before the Division Bench consisting M. M. Dutt and C. K. Ilanerjee,.JJ. After setting out some facts foa1ing to the application filled by respondents 1 to 4 for being\n\n664 sb~REME coukT REi>oRrs [l <}84] 3 s.c.R.\n\n. A added as parties to Suit No. 2024 of !952 as well as in the. application of the Official Receiver and for staying and setting aside the High .Court's oi; Pers dated 24 .. 5.1983 and 26.5.1983 referred to above, what. M. M. Dutt, J. whospoke for the Bench has stated in the order impugned in this appeal is this: ' ·\n\nB i\n\n,.F\n\n. .\n\n\"At the bearing of this application Mr. Som Nath Chatterjee,. learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners has offered to purchase the disputed land at a sum of Rs. 5,00,000..\n\nIt. has also been offered by him that .the petitioners would deposit ih Court a sum of Rs. 1,25,000\n\nbeing the '25 per. cent of the sal'e . price within a week and pay the balance slim of Rs. 3,75,000 within a month 'thereafter. •\n\nThe application has been vehemently opposed by the respondent No. 2, the purchaser. Mr. A. C: Bhabra, learned Counsel appearing for respondent Nb. 2 submits that as . parties themselves have agreed to sell the disputed land to ·\n\nthe respondent No. 2 this Court has no jurisdiction to override the said agreement and direct the sale of the disputed land t3 the petitioners. fo our opinion this contention is without substance: The sale has not yet been completed.' AS\n\nstated already respondent No. 2 paid a sum of Rs. 1,00,000\n\nbeing 25 per cent of the sale price some time .in January 1983.and since then respondent No: i has not paid the balance, .sum of the sale price. If the sale bad. been comple ted their is no question of any offer being made by the petiiioners for the sale of the disputed land to them. More- - over; the sale will be subject to the approval of the Court . . As the sale bas not yet been completed there is no scope for the approval of the sale.\n\nOn the other hand, we find that 38 families have been residing in the disputed land. It is submitte.d by Mr. ]Jhabra that .those persons are all trespassers without any vestige of title. It is,· however, the case @f the petitioners that they have been residing in. the disputed land by making certain structures under -the leave and licence of two of the owners of.the said premises although one of the owners, Smt.\n\nMalafr Ds who is alleged to have granted the licence, has denied granting of such licence. If the disputed land is sold to rosp,111dcnt No. 2 then 38 families who have been resi-\n\n1 '\n\nSADl!URAM v. P. B. SARKAR (Varadarajan, J.)\n\n'60S\n\nding thereon. would be evicted with police help. 1 n our A, opinion the Court should d_o social justice and in doing such\n\njustiG~ no technicality of law will stand .in its .way. Social justice re9uires that the disputed land should be sold to the • petitioners ; ind otlier residing on the disputed land. More over, the petiti'oners have offered to pay a price of .\n\nRs. 5,00,000 tha_t is to say, Rs. 1,00,000 more than the o'ffer B of the respondent No. 2. In the circumstances, we vaQate the said two orders of the lea.rued Judge dated 24.5.1983 an<l\n\n26.5.1983 and set aside the impugned order dated July 181 19e:· •\n\nThe learned Judges directed. respondents 1 to 4 fo pay to the Official Receiver a sum of Rs. I.25,000 on or befor\"' 1.8. 1984 and the balance f. Rs. 3,75,000 by 29.8.1983 'and ordered that on such payment the Official Receiver shall sell the disputed property to respondents 1 to 4 and their 34 nominees mentioned in the impugned order without any other descriptive particularsand have observed that in the event of default in payment of the sum of Rs. 5,00,000 as aforesaid their order will stand vacated and the learned Single Judge's.order dated 18.7.JgaJ shall stand confirmed.·\n\nThus it is seen that the learned Judges ofthe Division Bench have set aside the impugned order ofthe learned Single Judge dated l8.7.1983 and directed the sale of the disputed property to 'respondents I to 4 and their 34 nominees subject to the . condition that respondents 1 to 4 deposit a sum.of Rs. 1,25,000 by l.819_83'and the balance of Rs. 3,75,000 by 29.8;1983 towards. the sale price of Rs. 5,00;000 offered by respondents 1 to 4 mainly on the ground of social justice and incidentally having regard to the fact that sale has not yet been approv_ed by the Court _without however deciding the question whether approval of the Court to complete the sale of the disputed property by the. Official Receiver to the appellant by private treaty subject to the approval of the parties which has been given on 12.1.1983 and 9,8.1~83, as stated .above; is_necessary or not. They ' have at the same . time observed m their impugned order that the order dated' 18. 7 .1983 of the learned Single Judge. will stand con, firmed \\f respondents I to 4 fail to deposit the SU!ll of Rs. J,25,000 oy I.8.1983 and the balance of R, s. 3,75,000 by 29.81983. The learned Judges of the Division Bench have thus left in tact the order dated 18.7.1983 of the _learnd Sin&Ie Judge in the_ eyent of respon\n\ndents I to 4 not takipg advantage of the opportunity given to them in the name of social Justice to purchase the disputed property for\n\nF ,\n\n.. 606.\n\n- ' SUPREME COURT REPORTf (1984] 3 s.c.1t\n\nRs. s, o0,000 by paying that amount in two instalments as aforesaid.\n\nHence this appeal b)' special leave.\n\nWith respect to the learned Judges of the Division, cBench of the High Court lam at a loss to understand ho~ their order which virtually disposes of the apPeal filed by respondents l to 4 against the order of the teamed Single Judge dated 18.7.1983' declining to add them as parties to Suit No; 2024 of 1952 as well as in the application moved by the Officbl Receiver in May 1983 and to stay and set aside the orders dated 24.5.1983 and 26.5.1983 and direct.s the Sale of the disputed property to respondents 1 to 4 and their 34 nominees on payment of the. sum of Rs. 5,00,000 in two instaJments as mentioned above could be made in an application which has been filed. by respondents .I .to 4. for on~ an interim prder pnding disposal of .the main appeal filed against the order .of the learned Single Judge dated 18.7.1983. I also fail to see what remains to be done by. the le.rried Judges of the Division Bench in the main D appeal filed by respoudents 1 to 4 against the learned Single Judge's order dated 18.7.1983 after the learned Judges of the Division Bench have passed the order impugned in this appeal before this Court. 'Fhat appeal before the learned Jndges of the Division Benell has now .become totatly redundant and unnecessary; for what responde, nts 1 to 4 wanted has been ordered 'in their favour vtz., etting aside the orders daied 24.5~1983 and 26.5.1983 which is one of the prayers in tfte application made before the learned Single Judge and the sale of the property in their favonr and in favour of their nominees for R, s. 5,00,000 subject to payment of that ramount'in two instalments . within the time mentioned above, a relief which was not even prayed for by them in their application before the. learned Single Judge but' F . granted even before they. had been imp leaded as parties in .the suit\n\nor i.n the application filed by the Official Receiver in May 1983, which prayer was refused by the learned Single Judge and has not . been granted even by the learned Judges of the. Division Bench in ' their order made in the application filed only for interim relief. This. must strike.any one as an extraordinary feature in this case, and I . therefore think it must be noticed before proceeding to consider the merits of the case in the light of the arguments advanced by Mr.\n\nS.S. Ray, Senior Counsel apparring for the .appellant and Mr. G.L..\n\nSanghi., Senior Counsel appearing for respondents 1 to 4 in the' appeaL Another extraordinary .feature in this case is that in.the name of social justice the learned Judges of the Division Bench of\n\n~ • the High Court have conferred the .benelit of purchasing the dispute!l property on rank trespassers, not 01diilary trespassers in respect of. ·\n\n:.• ..\n\n' > -·\n\nSADHURAM v. P. lJ, SARKAR (Varadarajqn, J.) 607\n\nproper.ty in the possession of some .. Private individual who is not .. vigilant about his.rights but trespassers in respect of property :W.ich. ·\n\nis in custadia !egis through a Receiver who was vigilant enough to mov ethe .Cour~ for a direction that the police to remove respondents 1 .. to 4 from their unlawful possession of the disputed property and .. put him in possession thereof after his own letters to the police fotT help in that behalf did not evoke the necessary response. I will now; proceed to consider how respondents 1 to 4 are rank trespassers in respect of the. disputed. property .which is in custodia legis and are contemners who are liable to be committed for contempt. and not persons on whom any benefit could be ·•conferred by any Court of law.\n\nMr. Ray submitted rightly that respondents 1 to4 are ra.nk trespassers iri respect of. the disputed property which is in custodia /egfs. The case of respondents 1 to 4 is that they .became licencees in respect of the property in 1975 under a leave granted to them by Malati Das and Jitendra Kumar Das. This case has been found by Monjula Bose; J. to be false having regard to.the fact that Malati Das came on record a• a leaal representative of her husband Prasad Nath Das only in .1977 and she appeared in Court and denied jlaving granted any such licence to respondents 1 to 4. There is no documentary evidence about the alleged grant of the licence ... If at all, it could only have.been oral. Respondents I to 4 have not examined Jitendra Kumar Das to prove th• alleged. grant of the licence.\n\nJitencira\" Kumar rias is a party to the approval granted on 12.1.1983 and 9.8.1983 for the sale of the disputed property by the, Official Receiver to the appeHant by private treaty. It is. impossible that such a valuable property has been a11owed to be enjoyed by respondent 1 to 4 for no benefit or consideration to the . owners by ony of the owners of the property.' Respondents l'tq 4 had n<;> consistent case about when the alleged leave . was granted. In the present proceedings their stand is that it was granted in 1975: But ih the proceedings before the Sub Divisional Executive Magistrate-, Sadar; Howrah under s .. 145 Criminal Procedure Code they stated that the licence was granted 15 years prior to the date of that petition which will take us to 1968 as stated above. Therefore, faciually the alleged grant of licence does not appear to be true as has been found , by Monjula Bose, J. Mr. Sanghi on the other hand, contends that the \"right\" claimed by respondents 1 to 4 has not been gone into-or determined and that they are entitled to the equitable relief granted to them by the learned Judges of the Divisio.n Bench on the basis of their admitted posseio!l of the propertr. The contention that.theµ-\n\n\n(1984) 3 S.c.R.\n\nA position has not been determined by the learned Single Judge is not\n\nC9frt. . .\n\nIn paragraph 801 and 808 at pages 403 and 407 of Halsbury's Laws of England, }'ourth Edition, Volume 39 we find the following\n\npassage:\n\n/ \"A rcceiveds a person appointed for the collection or protection of property. He is appointed either bf the court or out of court by individuals or corporations. lf he is appointed by the court, he is an officer of-the court deriving his authority from the court's order. If he is appointed out of court, he is an agent and has such powers, duties and liabilities as are defined by the instrument or statute under which he i's appoin\\ed and derive from the general law of agency ...... A receiver appointed by the. court is ip no. sense an agent or trustee for the party at whose instance the appointment is. made. He is an officer of the court appointed for the benefit of all the parties to the action, and 'their rights among themselves are not affected.\" . ' .\n\n•In Kerr on Receivers, Fifteenth Edition, we find the fo]Joing J, assage at page 155: ·\n\n\"A person who dist11rbs or .interferes with the posse ssion of a receiver is guilty of a contempt of court, and is liable to be committed. In extreme or aggravated cases, the court will, for the purpose of vindicating. its authority, order a committal. The court is generally tatisfied with ordering the party in conteµipt to pay the costs and expenses occasi\n\noned by his improper conduct, and also the costs of the application to commit.\" ·\n\nTh1s Couft has observed in Everest Coal Company (P) Ltd.\n\nv. State of llihar &Others (1l thus: ·\n\n\"When a. court put9 a Receiver 'in possession of property, the property comes unde'r court custody, the Receiver being merely an officer or agent of the court. Any obstrlit:tion or interference with.· the court'& possession sounds in contempt of that court. Any legal action in • respect .of that property is in a sense such an interference.\n\n\\I) (1978] 1 &, C.R. 511 at F~ •..\n\n. .•\n\n- ...\n\n\" .\n\nSADHURAM v. P. a SARKAR (Varadarajan J.)\n\nand invites the contempt penalty of likely in validation of the. su; t or other proceedings.\"\n\nIt is not disputed that after the institution of Suit No. 2024 of 1952 in the Jfigh Court, the Official Receiver was appointed as Receiver in respect of the d:sputed property on 11.8.1953 and that he took possession of the same on 13 .8.1953 and it continues to b~\n\nin cu:; todia /egis through the Receiver since then.\n\nThis has been found by M:onjula Bose, J. in the order dated 18.7.1983. When-the\n\nproperty is in cusiodia \"tegis neither Malati Das nor Jitendra Kumar Das, who may have rights of ownership in the property, could grant any licence in 1975 or at any -time after the, Receiver had been appointed and possession had been' taken in August 1953. Even 'if there was such a grant of licence it is invalid in law. Even if possession of the property had been obtained by respondents 1 to 4 pursuant to any such grant oflicence it would, in law, be only that of trespassers. Therefore, even on the admitted case of respondents -\n\n1 to 4 that their possession_ started in 1975 as !icencees, in the light of the the unnispnted fact that the Receiver got into p_ossession of the property as far back as in August 1953 under the orders of _the Court, -the possession f respondents l to 4 could only be that of trespassers; They are trespassers who are liable to be committed for contempt of the Court inasmuch as they are trespassers in respect\n\nof the property which is _in custodia legis. Their_ possession and conduct have to be frowned upon by the Court and riot treated as grounds for conferring a benefit on them to purchase the property a/-beit for a higher amount than the. amount for which the Official Receiver has 11greed to sell the property to the appellant with the approval of the parties to the suit. The learned Judges of the Division Bench have treated thi3 illegal acf of trespass of respon<lents\n\nI to 4 on the property which is in custodia ief(is as the -ground for conferring tile benefit on them in the name of social justice, and 1t .. is this order which Mr. Sanghi, with all his vehemence, wants this Court to confirm. In my view itwill be totally wrong to do so.\n\nIt was conceded by Mr. Sanghi that while rendering social justice no violence to any established and well-known principles of law could\n\nbe committed. In these circumstances, I am of the opinion that no relief could be granted to respondents I to 4 who are trespassers in respect of the property in cuitodia /egis on the basis of their wrongful possession which is a continuing act of contempt of the .\n\nCourt. ·\n\nMc Sani invited thi~ Court's attention.to the Calcutta High\n\n6IO\n\n'..\\\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984] 3 s.c.R. • .\n\nCourt's ord.er dated 11.10. 1982 for the sale of the disputed property particularly to the portion thereof which says that Rs. I0,000 out of the sale proceeds should be paid-to Ashok Kumar Rai subject to adjustment against his share and that the balance should be invested by the Official Receiver, in fixed dep'<l'sit every time for a term not exceeding one year.\n\nA sum of Rs. 1,00,000 was sent by a ba_nk draft to the official Receiver along with the offer made on behalf of the appellant for purchasin°g the property for Rs. 4,00,000. According to the offer made in that letter the appellant had to pay the. balance of R~. 3,00,000 within six mo'nths from 13 .1.1983.\n\nMr.\n\nSanghi invited this' court's attention to the nonpayment of the balance o.f Rs. 3,0_0,000 until it was sent to the Receiver on 8.8. 1983 in spite of the Receiver 'asking for its paymei1t at an early date by his letter !lated 13.1~983 by which h{had communicated the approval of the parties granted on 12.1.1983 for the sale of the disputed, property to the appellant for Rs. 4,00,000 and submitted that the appellant has hot complied with the spirit of the order for the sale of theproperty by private treaty. Mr. Sanghi next invited this Court's attention to the fact that in the parties' meetmg held before the . Receiver on 12.1.1983 to consider which of the3 offers made to the\n\nOl!icial Receiver could be accepted Mr. D.N .. Mitra, Advocate for Prabir Kumar Das and Pradeep Kumar Das ha\\! stated that they have no objection to the sale subject -to tbe appellant agreeing to purchase the property subject_ to pending litigatio1;1. The pending litigation referred to. by Mr. Mitra evidently refers fo the litigation about the property pending in Second Appeal , No. 1267 of 1982 filed in the Calcutta High Court by Kamal Hosiery against the Official Receiver. The appellant's learned Counsel\" had earlier offered in _his letter dated.20.12.1982 to purchase the property for Rs. 4,00,000 subject 'to the vendors making out a good and marketable title free from encumberanes. The Official Receiver hits not referred to that condifion mentioned by the , Advocate for Prabir Kumar Das and Pradeep Kumar Das that the acceptance of the offer of the appellant is subject' to his agreeing to purchasethe property subject to the pending litigation. but he has merely stated in his letter dated 13.1.1983 that the appellant's offer to purchase the property for Rs. 4,00,000 has been accepted and that he should pay the balance of Rs. 3,00,000 at any early date. The parties bad accepted the appellant's offer even in the subsequent meeting held on 9.8.198) after the appellant.had sent the balance of Rs. 3,00,000 on 8.8.198~ to the Receiver. Mr. Sanghi submits that there was a counter-offer\n\nby reason of the statement made on tehalf of the two plaintiffs\n\n}'rabir Kul!'ar ras an<,1 Pr2deep Kumar Pas ip the meetin~ ccnvene~\n\ni .\n\nSADHURAM •. P. B. SARKAR (Sabyasachi Mukhaiji, J.) 611\n\nby the receiver on 12.l.1983 that the appellant's offer should be accepted subject to the condition that he will purchase the property subject to the pending litigation and that ther~ should have been a fresh acceptance by the appellant thereafter, and he has not done ' so and therefore there . is no concluded contract.· There is . no such conditional acceptance as the condition required by Prabir Kumar Das and .Pradeep Kumar Das has not been specially communicated to the appellant by the Offici~I Receiver for his acceptance.\n\nTherefore there is no merit in this contention of Mr. Sanghi:\n\n. Mr. Sanghi hext submitted that respondents 1. to 4 have ojfered Rs. 5,00,000 for the disputed property and that since the owners of the property stand to gain a sum of Rs. 1,00,000 by accepting that offer, the order for sale of the property made by the learned Judges of the Division Bench in favour of the respondents 1 to 4 and\" their 34 nominee.s should be confirmed.\n\nRespondents 1 to 4 are trespassers in respect of the property which is in custodia ,/egis and they are in cori.tempt of the Court.\n\nThey cannot be allowe.d to continue to be in contempt and urge it\n\nas a ground for obtaining the benefit of the sale of the property in their favour, If the appellant has not complied with any condition it may be a. ground for the owners and the Official Receiver not to accept his offer and refuse to sell the property to him and not for respondents . 1 to 4 to raise any objection. The offer has been accepted rightly or wrongly more than once and therefore the appellant may have a right tb sue for specific• performance of the contract on the basis of that acceptance 'by the Official Receiver\n\ngiven with the approval of the parties. The same is the position in regard to the delay of about a montl) in paying, the balance. of Rs. 3;00,000 by the appellant. In Kayjay lfldu.<tries (P) Ltd v. Asnew Drums (P) Ltd. & Other; (1l it has been held that tl:ie executing court had committed no material irregularity in the conduct ot the sale in accepting the highest offer and concluding tl:ie sale at Rs. 11,50,000 though the market value of the property may be over Rs. 17,00,000. In Jibon Krishna Mukherjee v. New Bheerbhum Coal Co. Ltd. & Anr.\n\n(1) it has been held that the sale held by the Receiver appinted by the Court is not governed by the provisions' of Order 21 rule 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure which enables\n\nte persons specified in sub-rule 1 to have the sale held in execution\n\n(1) [1974] 3 SCR 678\n\n' (2l. [1960] 2 SClR 198\n\n\n(1984]3 S; C.R. y\n\nproceedigs set aside on the two onditions therein mention.ed being satisfied, namely, as regards ihe depqsit of poundage, balance of decree amount due etc. In !hat case, .as in the present case, the Receiver was given liberty to sell the property by private treaty or by. public auction. In rarinikamal Pandit <h Others v.\n\nPrafulla Kumar Chatterjee (') we find the following observation :\n\n\"The procedure envisaged for, sale generally and sale of an immovable property under Order 21 is sale by public . auction. Sale by a Court through the Receiver appointea ·\n\nby Court is not contemplated under these provisions ...... A Receiver is appointed under Order 40 Rule l and a property, can be sold by the Receiver on the direction of the Court evim by private negotiation.\"\n\n.Jn the .present case the property has been agreed to be sold by private treaty and as required by the order made for the purpose the approval of the parties has been obtained by the Official Receiver who has been authorised t6 sell the property either by public auc'tion or by private . treaty.\n\nThe Court does not come into the picture in such a case and there is 'no need for the Court to approve or confirm such sale.· The parties who are sui juris must be deemed to have known their interest best when they chose to approve the sale of the property for Rs. 4,00,000 in favour of the appellant not with standing the fact that respondents .l to 4 had offered to purchase the property for Rs. 5,00,000 therefore, in my view the learned Judges of the Division Bench had no right or justification to alter or modify the earlier order made for the sale of the property by even private treaty, which ha.d become fiqal, or to hold that subsequent offer made by respondents . 1 to 4 to purchase the property fot Rs. 500,000 should be accepted merely because it appears to be advantageous to the owners of .. the property in the name of social justice. I am unable to pursuadc myself to hold that the benefit claimed on behalf o1 respondentS 1 to 4-J would not call it a right, for there is no corresponding obligation-.cali. be equated with or even brought anywhere near the social justice mentioned in the preamble of our Constitution.\n\nFor these reasons, I am of the opinion that the learned Judge& of the. Division Bench . were not right in interfering with tho well considered order of the learned Single Judge Monjula Bose1 J. by\n\n(1).(i979) 3 SCR 340\n\nr *\n\nSAD!lURAM v. p, B, SARK>':R (Sabyasachi Mukharji, J,) 613\n\ntheir order made in the application cif respondents 1 to 4 for a mere interim order pmding coasidrtion of the appeal preferred bj them\n\ngains! that order of the foarned 3ingle Judge d1ted 18.7.1983 in the manner done by them which has rendered the nnin. appeal itself redundant and wholly u'rnecessary as stated above. The impugned\n\norder of the barned Judges of the Division Boncli which purports to stand on the fragile and imagiriary prop of social justice has no legs .in law to stand and c11mot bi allowed in law. to >tand. I would, therefore; allow the appoil and set aside the order of learned Judges of the Division Bench and restore that of the learned Single Judge' dated. 18.7.1983 with costs quantified at Rs. 3,000 and pay- able by respondents 1 to 4. ·\n\nSABYASACHI MUKHARJ!, J, With respect I agree with the order proposed by Brother Fazal Ali. In view, however, of the question posed in this case, I would' like to recapitulate the facts as I view these and to state the principles upon wliich I would like to rest my\n\nconcurrence with the order proposed. Though .the controversy arises in a long pending litigation, the question bfore this Court lies . within a short compass.\n\nPremises No. 7, Duffers Lane, Hpwrah, comprising of about six bighas of land is nearabout Calcutta. It formed part of the .estate of one late Radha Kanta Das, since deceased.\n\nThe premises is hereinafter called \"the disputed premi>es\". Suit No. 2024 of 1952 was filed in the High Court of (;1lcutta on May 29, 1952 by one\n\nPrasad Nath Dasc!aiining it decree for construction of the will and . testame11t of the sai.d Radha Kanta Das since deceased and for\n\ndclaration that the purported will dated May 22, 1952 executed by one Jitendra Kumar Das, since deceased in respect, inter a!ia, of the dispute.ct premises was invalid, void and for other reliefs. The\n\nOfficial Receiver was appointed receiver over certai.n properties belonging to or alleged to have belonged to that estate including the disputed premises on or about A.ugust II,.1953. Some oftbe parties lo the suit, namely respondents Nos. 13, 14 and 15. to this appeal took out an application for granting leave to the Officer Receiver to sell the disputed premises, as some of the parties required immediate funds. An order was passed on October II, 1982 by a learned\n\nSingle Judge of the High Court directing the Official Receiver to sell the disputed premises either. by a public auction or private treaty to the higl:icst offerer subject to a reserved price of Rs. 3,50,000 and the order further directed that \"in the event the property is sold by private treaty, the Official Receiver, High Court, Calcutta, would call a meeting of the parties and obtain their ·.approval to such sale by private treaty. The. provisional al!ottees or any other party to .\n\n\n(1984) 3 S, C.R. r\n\nA the suit would be entitled to bring intending purchasers for the same.\" On Dece.mber 20, 1982 by a letter, an ffor was made to the Offiicial Receiver for purchase of ihe said premises for Rs. 4,00,000 . . on behalf of the present appellant. The said letter contained the following :-\n\n\"We muke an offer for purchase of the above property for Rs. 4,00,000 (Rupees four lacs) subject to the Vendors' making out a good and marketable title free from encumbrances.\"\n\nA Bank draft for Rs. 1,00,000 in favour of th~ Oflkial Re'ceiver was also sent along with it.\n\nAt a me, ting held on Jan. 12, 1983 the said off<; r along with two bther offers were coasiderod by the ; epr; sentativcs and advocates apparing for the different parties in the suit . . It appears that parties more or les3 agreed that the offer received on behalf of the appellant was best but one Shri B.N. Mitra, represen- D ting his client observed that it might be accepted subject to the appellant's agreeing \"to purchase thesame land. with pendin, g litiga- . tion in respect of the said property.\" It may be mentioned that the terms in which the Ollicial Receiver intimated by letter dated January 13, 1983 addressed by the Official Receiver to the advocate of the present appellant contained the following :-\n\nE \"This iS to inform you that your clien.t's offer of Rs. 4,00,000 for the purchase of the above premises has\n\n• been accepted.\n\nYou are, therefore, requested to.advise your .client to F deposit the balance sum .of Rs. 3,00,000 at an early date.\"\n\nIt would be relevant to bear .in mind.that it was not communicated that the acceptance of tile offer was subject to the appellant\"s agreeing to 'purchase the land with pending litigation in. respect of the said land. The offer of the appellant which had been originally communicated did not contain any condition that the offer to purchase was sulijct to pending.litigation. It was, therefore, nrged .before us that there was nq acceptance of the offer by letter dated January 13, 1983 because the acceptance was with a condition. It was urged that .it was really a co!lnter offer. The Division Bench of the High Court came to the conclusion that there was no concluded contract, Such a view is a view which is possible to take, and as such the Division Bench proceeded on the basis that there was no concluded\n\nr •\n\n. '\n\nSADHORAM v. P. n .. SARKAR (Sabya.siach Mukhar}i, J,.) .615\n\nbargain between the appellant alrd the parties r.el?resented by the receiver. It may, however, be mentioned that in February, 1983, it is stated, certain documentswere forwarded to the appellant's advocate. It may be mentioned that in the letter referred to hereinbefore dated December 20, 1982, the appellant had also stipulated that the sale be completecfwithin six months or such further exten-. ded time as may be agreed upon in one or more lots by one or more sale deeds in favour of the .appellant or his nominee or nominees.\n\nT, lie letter dated January 13, 1983 by the Official Rccei.ver also requested the appellant to deposit the balance su'!! at an early date.\n\nIt may be mentioned that the said balance sum was deposited after August, 1983 after the special leav~ was granted in this matter by this Court. It is also significant to bear in mind that though the application for sale of the property in question was made because the parties were in urgent need of.money, there does not appear to be any document or letter aking the appellant for the money.\n\nIt is alleged that in February, 1983,' fire broke out in the factory. adjacent to the premises in question and ftre brigade men had entered into the premises by breaking a portion of the well to get access to'thi: pond inside the disp\\ltcd premises. It is the case of the appo\\lant that on March 14, 1983, the responcfents nos. 1 to 4 along with some miscreants bad forcibly entered into the disputed premises. This, however; is disputed by the contesting respondents nos. I 'to 4 herein\" out of whose application to the High Court for intervention, the order impugned was passed by the Division Bench and which is the subject matter of this appecial leave, they in their application asserted that they had come to know about the appointment of the. Official Receiver from the pol; ce and they further came to know about the offer made by the appellant for the purchase of the premises in dispute. The said respondent alleged that they along with 38 families with the leave and licence of one of the co.-owners were residing in the premises i11 question since .1975 and had constnictcd pucca h.uts and structures and in spite of the same, according to tee said respondents, the appemnt did not inform the court of· . the said fact before obtaining police help against them. The said\n\nrespondents claimed that they were licencees under theoriginal\n\nowners, Smt. Malati Das and Jitendra Nath Da~; in 'certain specified ' plots mentioned in their application. They further alleged that on May 2, 19~3. they had come to know that the appellant had obtained ex-parte order from the Sub-Divisional Maj>, istrate (Executive) directing the Superintendent of Police to restore possession of the premises in dispnte by arranging police help.\n\nTh.e applicants had\n\n. , ,•\n\nSUPREME COURT RliPORts\n\n[1984] 3 S.C.[{,\n\nfiled an application before the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure with a prayer to recali the ex-parte order mentioned hereinbefore and to call for a: report from the local police regarding posses1ion of the said applicants in the said disputed prembes. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate, it was alleged, did not pas> any• order and was pleased to direct' to put up the said application on May 7, 1983. T.hongh no\n\nformal order was passed the said application was kept on (ecord. The applicants further alleged that coming to know that certam • other order might be passed, the applicants tnoved a 1evision application under the Criminal Rev\\sional jurisdiction before the High Court and thereafter had obtained the stay of the order of April 26, 1983 passed by the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate. The said . application nnder Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is pending. The pendency of th~ proceedings under Section 145 of Code of Criminal Procedure and order, if any, passed thereon does no.t in any way affect the title of the parties to the disputed. p enises\n\nthough it reflects the factum of possession. See the decision of this Court in the case of Bhinka and Others v. Charan Singh. (1)\n\nIt is in this background that the applicants in their application before the learned Singfe Judge of the High Court prayed 'that their claim to be in l?ossession and their right to b~ in possession should •be determined. and as such they should be added as defendents to the suit and as a consequence, the order for police help granted by the High Court in ejecting the applicants should be recalled. The said application came up to, be heard by a learned Single Judge of the High Court and by an order passed and judgment delivered, the learned Judge rejected the application hording that the respondents nos. 1 to 4 being . the applicants therein were tresspassers and had no right to be in possessi.)n of the premises alter the Official Receiver hail been appointed receiver ,, nd further it was held that the parties had no right to grant any leave or licence after the pro- . party came under the custody of the Ofliicial Receiver. as receiver appointed m the 'suit. The learned Judge further held that a sale had been concluded in favour of the present appellant and therefore though noting that the respondents nos. 1 to 4 being the applicants therein had offered to pay a sum of Rs. 1,00,000 more for the purchase of the premis.es in dispute, the learned Judge rejected the said offer and dismissed t_heir application.\n\n(IJ [1959] Suppl. 2 s.c.R. 798.\n\nSAl>ltuRAM v. P. B. SA1\\KA.R (Sabya<achi Mukhatji, J.)\n\nAs mentioned hereinbefore there was an appeal from this decision to the D; vision Bench of the High Court. The Division Bench was of the view that the offer made on behalf gf the respondents nos. l to 4 should be accepted. The Division Bench took the. view that there wa> no concluded contract for sale in favour ofthe present appellant. \"The Division Bench was of the view that there was not then any completed sale. The Division Bench further noted\n\nr as follows : ...,.\n\n\"On the other hand, we find that 38 families have been residing in the disputed land. It is submitted by Mr.\n\nBhabra that these persons are all tresspassers without any , vestige of title. It is however, the case of the petitioners . that they haye been residing in the disputed land by making certain structures nnder the leave and licence of two of the owners pf the said premises altl;10ugh one of the owners, Smt. Mala ti Das, who is alleged to have granted t!ie licence; has denied grantin~ of such licence. If the disputed land is . sold to' the respondent No. 2 then 38 families who have\n\nbeen residing therein would be evicted with police help. In our opinion, the Court should do social justice and in doing such justice any technicality of law will not stand in its way. Social Justice requires that the disputed land should be sold to the petitioners .and others residing on the disputed land. Moreover, the petitioners have offered to pay the price of Rs. 5,00,000 that is to say Rs. 1,00,000 more than the offer of the respondent No. 2.\"\n\nThe Division Bcn:ch directed that Rs. 1,25,000 should be paid by present respondents! to 4 on or before August I, 1983 which it may be noted has been paid and thereafter pay the balance sum of Rs. 3,75,000 by August 29, 1983' which sum however could not be paid because in the meantime. special leave to appeal was granted by this Court and a stay had been obtained. It may be mentioned that the balance of the considersti.on of Rs. 3 lacs offered by the\n\npresnt appellant has been paid only after the special leave had been obta.ined from. this Court. The Division Bench further directed that in ease payments were made within the time, the property in quest10n should be conveyed to the persons named in the said ord It was further directed that in case the respondents 1' to 4 com 'tterd. . . . m1 e . dfault m _paymg a urn of .Rs. 1,25,000 or 3,75,000 within the\n\nstipulated time, the said order .would stand vacated and the order of\n\n\n[1984] 3 S.C.R.,\n\nlearned Single Judge would stand confirmed i.e. ale would be made to the appellant.\n\nIt is the v~Iidity and the propriety of the said order which is impugned in this appeal. The question mainty is whether there was a. concluded and confirmed sale in favour of the appellant and if not could the Court direct the disputed premises to be conveyed to resj:londcuts nos. 1 to '4 for the benefit of 38 families relying on social justice.\n\nOa the qnestion whether in the 'facts and circumstances that have happened, the Court could pass the order it had done, some contentions were urged whether the sale in question was a court sale or a private s1le or a sale by the receiver. and whether confirmation of the court was required for such a sale.\n\nSome of the decisions cited at !he Bar ou this point have been noted by my Brother. Jn the view I hwe take, n it is not necessary in this case to decide whether a confirmation of sale by the court ih the circum- . stancos under which the prop, rty was directed to be sold was necessary or not, !bough it may be sufficient lo note that there was some divergence of opinion on this point. On the nature of the possession by the receive;· and how interference with such possession should; bo dealt witl1 by law have also been noted in the observations in Halsbury's Law of England, 4th Ed., Volume 39 pages 451 and AS2, paragraphs 890 and 891.\n\nSee also Kerr On Receb'ers-15th Edition page 155 and also Kerr On Receivers-16th Edition pages 121 and\n\n122. It is well-settled that when the property is in custody of a\n\nrceiver appointed by the court; the property is in the cu, tody of the court and interference with such possession should not be encouraged and no p1lty can acquire any title or right by coming in or over th' property which is in the possession of the receiver without leave. or consent Of the receiVcr 'or sanction of the court.\n\nIt was ' urged tint in as much as no such leave had been obtained, by the\n\nrspoadnls.niJs. 1 to 4, possession, if any, of the sai9. respondents or entry into the land by .the said respondents at a time when . indisputa.bly there was receiver was illegal. In view of tl)e. fact~\n\nth1t have happened and in the light of the controversy before us now, in my opinion, it would. be futile to determine at this stage whether tlie entry of the respondellts nos. I to 4 was legal or illegal.\n\nIt may be mentioned, however, that so long as proceedings under Section. t45 of Code of Criminal Procedure were pending before the appropriato court, without any adjudication of the respondents nos.\n\n. r\n\n• t\n\n-. 1\n\nSAD!lURAM v, p,9, SARKAR (Sabyasachi Mukharji, J,} 619\n\n. .. , J to 4's right to be in possession and di_recting that they be phys1 ca!ly ejected by police help without hearing them or without notiC.e to the mis not a correct leg1l position to take for court of law adm1ms\n\ntering justice, But it is not necessary for the purpose of this appeal to express any final opinion on Jhat\n\nIt appears in the background of the facts and circumstances of the case that the Division Bench took the view that there was no concluded contract of sale in favour of the appellant and it appears to us that such a view was a possible view to be taken in view of the facts I have mentioned and if that -is so, such a conclusion cannot and should not be interfered with in.appeal under Article !36 of the Constituticm, Assuming even that though not legally but as a reality of fact, the respondents nos. 1 to 4 were and are in possession of the dispute premises, they want to purchase the premises by' paying more than the offer then made, the offer 111ade by the appellant to purchase the premises in dispute seems to be. rather low in the context of facts and circumstances prevailing in such arehs nearaboui Calcutta. The area comprises of about six bighas Le, about 120 cottabs of land. It has been suggested , in one ofthe affidavit on behalf of respondents nos. l to 4 that the prices prewlent in those areas are about.Rs, 14,000 per cottah\" Thorefore 1t was suggested that in the transaction between the appellant and receiver or with tlie parties, there is more than what meets the eye, We, however, need not speculate on the same. The facts on which I would like to rest my decision are: (I) there is not a concluded contract in favour of the appeilant This view has been accepted by the Di vi sion Bench. It is a plissible , view, This view sho.u]d not. be interfered within appeal under article 136 of the Constitution;, and\n\n(2) the fact is that the respondents J to 4 are in possession with large number of their families, The original entry might be, if their version is rejected, illegal and without\" the authority of the court as no leave was obtained but their possession is a reality. Illi gitimacy of entry does not debar them from offering a higher price in purchasing a property, contract for sale in respect Of which has not yet been concluded; and (3} the , property is in custodia /egis.\n\nThough the court directed the receiver to sell, as the sale has not been concluded .• the court .retains its power to direct its officer to sell to such other person the transaction of which will apparently , benefit the parties as appearing from the facts on record or as from the facts which meet the eye, ( 4) The factor that large number of people are in. possession with their families and conclusion of sale\n\n620 SUPREME COURT REP OR ts [JcJ84) S.C; lt\n\n• to them would cause non-interference with their continuance are factors which the court can and should tke into consideration in deciding the controversy in this case. (5) There has not indeed been any proper. adjudication of the right of the respondents nos. I to 4 to be in possession of the premises in questi<rn and even if their entry was tainted with illefality, it is not of such a magnitnde, in view of subsequent facts that because of illegitimate entry, they will be deprived of the right to bargain on propr term; to p1rch1s~ the property which is in the custody. of the court. If there has not been any proper sanction of the court, this is only a procedural irregularity and as is well-settled that rules of procedures are Hand Maids of justice not their mistresses.\n\nThe appellant in this appeal poses a question whether the concept of social justice empowers the court to grant relief in favour. of persons who interfere with the admitted possession of the receiver\n\nt the expense of the bona fid, e purchaser at a court sale. As I see the facts, the basisupon which this question is posed namely, that the appellant is a bona fide purchaser of the property is not correct in the light of the view taken by the Division Bench. There .had not bem. any concluded contract of sale when the Division Bench passed the order.\n\n• The concept of social justice is not foreign to legal 'justice or social well-being or benefit t<? the commnnity rooted in the concept of justice in the 20th century. The challenge. of social justice as I see it, is primarily a challenge to the society at large more than to the court immediately. Social justiee is tnc of the aspirations of our Constitution.\n\nBut the courts, we must remember are pledged to admin:stcr. ju, t'ce as by law established. In formulating the concept of justice, however, the inarticulate factor that large number of human beings should not be dislodged from their possession if . it is otherwise possible to do so cannot but be a factor whic)1 must and should influence the 1\\linds of judges in ihe facts of this case. It is truO' that the persons who were alleged to be in possession are with unclean hands but they came for shlter and built in hntments. They do not want to legitimis~ their stay by illegal entry, they want to be rehabilitated at competitive bargain price. Should they be denied that opportunity on the ground of their origini'l illegitimacy '!\n\nI am defmi\\ely of the opinion that in these circumstances they should not be so denied rehabilitation. Jn administering justice-justice according to law In this case, no law is breached in the view taken\n\n• f-\n\n, •\n\nSADHURAM v. P. B. SARKAR (Sabyasachi Mukharji; J.) 621\n\nby the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court. The American\n\nBar Association in its report in 1964 had observed that ju.risprudence has shifted away from finespun technicalities and abstract rules to . practical justice to a recognition of human beings, as the most distin• ctive and important feature . of the universe which confronts our senses, an.d of the funciion of Jaw as . the historic means of guaranteeing that preeminence. (See The 'Fourteenth Amendment . Centennial Volume Edited by Bernard Schwartz. page\n\nioj. I. therefore respectfully agree with Brother Fazal Ali when he says, that in administering justice-:-social or legal, jurisprudence bas shifted away from finespun technicalities and abstract rules to recog• nitiori. of human beings as 'human beings.\n\nIt is true that.original entry was illegal and we are sometimes urged \"to do a great right, do a little wrong\" (See the plea of.\n\nBassanio in Merchant of Venice). In this case, however, the court has done no legal wrong at all.\n\nThe court has only ignored the non-compliaqce of not seeking court's leave for the allege!) grant of licence.\n\nJn administering justice, or social legal, we do well to bear , in mind the words of Justice Holmes \"The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt necessities of the time, th<: prevalent. moral and . political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, evei:i the preiudices which jqdges share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism .in determining the rules by which men should be governed.\n\nThe law. embodies the story of a nation's development through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathe.natics. In order to know what it is, we must know what it has been, and what it tends to become.\n\nWe must alternately consult history and existing theories of legislation. But the most difficult Jabour will be to understand the combination of the two into new prod.ucts at. every stage. The substance of the law at any given te pretty nearly corresponds, so far as it goes, with what is then understood to be convement but its , . form and machinery; and the degree to which it fa able to work out desired results, de.pend very much upon its past.\" (The common Law by Oliver Wendell Holmes-.Edited by Mark De Wolfe Howe- Lecture I-page I).\n\n!he '.elt necessities of time and in this case the convenience of\n\ns1tution a11d the need for adjusting the rights of a larger number\n\n• ' 0\n\n\n. [1984) 3 S.C R\n\nA of people without deprivation of any accrued ight of anybody would be justice according to law. Before we raject social justice' as, something\" alien to legal justice, we should remember that a meaningful definition of the rule of law must be based on the realities of contemporary societies and, the realities of the contemporary societies' are-\n\nB men are in acute shortage of living accommodatio11 and if they are prepared to bargain and rehabilitate , themselves on competitive terms, they should be encouraged and no technical rules should stand in their way.\n\nThat would be justice 'by highways' and not frtfilt(ation 'by bye-lanes':\n\nC fothat view of the matter, I hold that there is no merit in this appeal. I agree with the order proposed by Brother Fazal , Ali and the reaons given by him.\n\nN.V.K.\n\nAppeal dismissed\n\ni ..", "total_entities": 181, "entities": [{"text": "582\n\nSADHURAM BANSAL", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1, "end_char": 21, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SADHURAM BANSAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "PULIN BEHARI SARKAR & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 23, "end_char": 48, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PULIN BEHARI SARKAR & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "FA2(AL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 70, "end_char": 80, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "FA2(AL ALI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 128, "end_char": 156, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 360, "end_char": 391, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 393, "end_char": 404, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Code of Criminal Procedure 1973", "statute": "Code of Criminal Procedure 1973"}}, {"text": "s 1 to 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2324, "end_char": 2332, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Fazal Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2956, "end_char": 2965, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' Dismissing the Appeal to this Court,\n\nHELD: [P<r Fazal Ali & Sabyasachi Mukha.rji~JJ MaJority]\n\nIn administering justice-social or legal-jurisprudence h_as shifted\n\naay from finespi.ln technicaUties and abstract rUJes t.o recognition of bu man beings as human beings.", "canonical_name": "FA2(AL ALI"}}, {"text": "Sabyasachi Mukha.rji", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2968, "end_char": 2988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' Dismissing the Appeal to this Court,\n\nHELD: [P<r Fazal Ali & Sabyasachi Mukha.rji~JJ MaJority]\n\nIn administering justice-social or legal-jurisprudence h_as shifted\n\naay from finespi.ln technicaUties and abstract rUJes t.o recognition of bu man beings as human beings.", "canonical_name": "Sabyasachi Mukha.rji"}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3372, "end_char": 3380, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Pet Fazal Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3453, "end_char": 3466, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[595-_FG; 622AB]\n\n[Pet Fazal Ali, J.]\n\nJ~ In our opinion, there appears to be some misapprehen&ion about what actually social justice ts."}}, {"text": "S84", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5120, "end_char": 5123, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "er Varadarajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6295, "end_char": 6309, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "597C-F; 5\"6AD]\n\nCI:er Varadarajan, J. dissentir.g)\n\nD 't. The Dlvision Bnch had no fight or juHiticatioa to alter or modify the earlier order n1ade for the sale of the property which had become final,."}}, {"text": "Sabyasachi M\"kharji", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8977, "end_char": 8996, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "<(Per Sabyasachi M\"kharji, J.l\n\n.", "canonical_name": "Sabyasachi Mukha.rji"}}, {"text": "Section 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9047, "end_char": 9058, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S.S. Ra;1", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11979, "end_char": 11988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.S. Ra;1, S. N. Kaker, P. K. Mullick, R. Deb, N. P. Agf{arwala 'r'• and B.P. Singh for the Appellant.", "canonical_name": "S.S. Ra;1"}}, {"text": "S. N. Kaker", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11990, "end_char": 12001, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.S. Ra;1, S. N. Kaker, P. K. Mullick, R. Deb, N. P. Agf{arwala 'r'• and B.P. Singh for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "P. K. Mullick", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12003, "end_char": 12016, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.S. Ra;1, S. N. Kaker, P. K. Mullick, R. Deb, N. P. Agf{arwala 'r'• and B.P. Singh for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "R. Deb", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12018, "end_char": 12024, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.S. Ra;1, S. N. Kaker, P. K. Mullick, R. Deb, N. P. Agf{arwala 'r'• and B.P. Singh for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "N. P. Agf{arwala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12026, "end_char": 12042, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.S. Ra;1, S. N. Kaker, P. K. Mullick, R. Deb, N. P. Agf{arwala 'r'• and B.P. Singh for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "B.P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12052, "end_char": 12062, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.S. Ra;1, S. N. Kaker, P. K. Mullick, R. Deb, N. P. Agf{arwala 'r'• and B.P. Singh for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "G.L. Sanghi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12083, "end_char": 12094, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G.L. Sanghi, and H.K. Puri for Respondent.", "canonical_name": "G.L..\n\nSanghi"}}, {"text": "H.K. Puri", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12100, "end_char": 12109, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G.L. Sanghi, and H.K. Puri for Respondent."}}, {"text": "Anil Dev Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12127, "end_char": 12141, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Anil Dev Singh and Ashok Sil for Respondent No: 5."}}, {"text": "Ashok Sil", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12146, "end_char": 12155, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Anil Dev Singh and Ashok Sil for Respondent No: 5."}}, {"text": "FAZAL Au", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12223, "end_char": 12231, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL Au.", "canonical_name": "FA2(AL ALI"}}, {"text": "s. 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14031, "end_char": 14037, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Receiver under the provisfons of the Civil Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15109, "end_char": 15166, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15336, "end_char": 15342, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Receiver under the provisfons of the Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Receiver under the provisfons of the Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "s.145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15655, "end_char": 15660, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Receiver under the provisfons of the Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Receiver under the provisfons of the Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "s. 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15776, "end_char": 15782, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Receiver under the provisfons of the Civil Procedure Code", "statute": "Receiver under the provisfons of the Civil Procedure Code"}}, {"text": "Jitendra Kuniar Das", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17681, "end_char": 17700, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The story of the case begin's with the execution Of a Will and testament by one Jitendra Kuniar Das on May 22,.1952 in favour of sonie .of l1is near relations, in respect of pre, nises No.", "canonical_name": "Jitencira\" Kumar rias"}}, {"text": "Liluah", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 17807, "end_char": 17813, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "7, Duffers Lane, Liluah, Howrall as also some premises in."}}, {"text": "Howrall", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 17815, "end_char": 17822, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "7, Duffers Lane, Liluah, Howrall as also some premises in."}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 17882, "end_char": 17890, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "211, Old China\n\nBaar Street, Calcutta."}}, {"text": "Malati Das", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18186, "end_char": 18196, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Malati Das and\n\n' lr\n\nSADHURAM v. P. B. SARKAR (Fazal Ali, J.) 58!1-\n\n Jienqra Kumar Das or a.t least one of them put them (respon A. dents) in po.ssession of the Duffers Lane property under a leave and licence.", "canonical_name": "Mala ti Das"}}, {"text": "Jienqra Kumar Das", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 18257, "end_char": 18274, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Malati Das and\n\n' lr\n\nSADHURAM v. P. B. SARKAR (Fazal Ali, J.) 58!1-\n\n Jienqra Kumar Das or a.t least one of them put them (respon A. dents) in po.ssession of the Duffers Lane property under a leave and licence.", "canonical_name": "Jitencira\" Kumar rias"}}, {"text": "March 14, 1983", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18798, "end_char": 18812, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "case of the appellant tbat on March 14, 1983, respond, ent Nos."}}, {"text": "13th May, 1983", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19204, "end_char": 19218, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 13th May, 1983 the Offi\"ial Receiver authorised the appellant 'to take steps for prote~\n\ntion of the pr0perty."}}, {"text": "May 24, 19S3", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19601, "end_char": 19613, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ordoi was obtained on May 24, 19S3 from a learned Single Judge of the High Court directing the police to remove the unauthorised occupants."}}, {"text": "June 22, 1983", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19722, "end_char": 19735, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 22, 1983 respondent Nos."}}, {"text": "Pulin Behari Sarkar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19973, "end_char": 19992, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pulin Behari Sarkar, Manick Seel; Gope Nath Sarkar and Sudhanshu Bimal Dey, mentioned the fact that they had come to know ab'outthe appointment of the Official.", "canonical_name": "PULIN BEHARI SARKAR & ORS"}}, {"text": "Manick Seel", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19994, "end_char": 20005, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pulin Behari Sarkar, Manick Seel; Gope Nath Sarkar and Sudhanshu Bimal Dey, mentioned the fact that they had come to know ab'outthe appointment of the Official.", "canonical_name": "Manik . Seal"}}, {"text": "Gope Nath Sarkar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20007, "end_char": 20023, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pulin Behari Sarkar, Manick Seel; Gope Nath Sarkar and Sudhanshu Bimal Dey, mentioned the fact that they had come to know ab'outthe appointment of the Official.", "canonical_name": "Gope Nath Sarkar"}}, {"text": "Sudhanshu Bimal Dey", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 20028, "end_char": 20047, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Pulin Behari Sarkar, Manick Seel; Gope Nath Sarkar and Sudhanshu Bimal Dey, mentioned the fact that they had come to know ab'outthe appointment of the Official.", "canonical_name": "Sudhanshu Bimal Dey"}}, {"text": "May 2, 191!3", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20653, "end_char": 20665, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that on May 2, 191!3 they had come the know tht the appellant had obtained ex parte .order from the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate (Executive) directing the Superintendent of Police to restore posses sion of the disp}lted premises, comprising bout six bighas of land, by' arranging police pickets. ' ·"}}, {"text": "s. 145(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21117, "end_char": 21126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21134, "end_char": 21160, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21897, "end_char": 21903, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21911, "end_char": 21937, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22188, "end_char": 22194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22354, "end_char": 22358, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bhabra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22885, "end_char": 22891, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\\tis submitted by Mr. Bhabra that these persons are all trespassers without any vestige of title."}}, {"text": "Malati Das", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 23190, "end_char": 23200, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Malati Das, .", "canonical_name": "Mala ti Das"}}, {"text": "SADHURAM V. p", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23439, "end_char": 23452, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SADHURAM V. p, B. SARKAR (Fazal Ali, J:Y\n0ur opinion, the Court should do social justice .and in doing such justice ai, y tchnicality of law will not stand in its way."}}, {"text": "B. SARKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23454, "end_char": 23463, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SADHURAM V. p, B. SARKAR (Fazal Ali, J:Y\n0ur opinion, the Court should do social justice .and in doing such justice ai, y tchnicality of law will not stand in its way."}}, {"text": "State Bank of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 24208, "end_char": 24227, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dank Draft on State Bank of India of ah amount equivalent to 25% of the offer."}}, {"text": "Sad!zuram Bansal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 24488, "end_char": 24504, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We hereby make an offer for purchase of the above property for Rsc 4, CO, CCO (Rupees fcur lacs) subject to the Vendors' making out a good and marketable little free from 'encumbrances on behalf of ou_r client Sri Sad!zuram Bansal\n\nof No.", "canonical_name": "Sad!zuram Bansal"}}, {"text": "Calcutta-700", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 24538, "end_char": 24550, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "23A, Netaj1 Subhas Road, Calcutta-700 001."}}, {"text": "December 20, 1982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25037, "end_char": 25054, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This offer was made by the appellant on December 20, 1982 :and at a meeting convened by the receiver thp owners while generally cagreeing with the terms of the said offer, imposed some conditions."}}, {"text": "Mitra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25213, "end_char": 25218, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For instance, Mr. Mitra."}}, {"text": "L.P. Agarwalla & Co", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 25577, "end_char": 25596, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "be extracted thus:\n\n~'My clients have no objection with regard to the\n\n• 591\n\n(1984] 3 S.C.R\n\naccepten¢e oftlte said offer or'M/s. L.P. Agarwalla & Co •• subject to Jhejr clients Mreeing to purchase the same land with pending litigation in respect of the said poperty.\""}}, {"text": "L.P. Agarwala & Co.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 26775, "end_char": 26794, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter, the matter having been placed before the court, the receiver informed L.P. Agarwala & Co. that the offer or the purchasers was accepted and the balance of Rs."}}, {"text": "13.1.83", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 26978, "end_char": 26985, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "written by the receive, r on 13.1.83."}}, {"text": "P. B. SARKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 28096, "end_char": 28108, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It seems to us that the purchasers were more concerned with taking the posse, ssipn and evi_cting thetrespassers because they knew full well\n\nSADHURAM \"· P. B. SARKAR (Fazal Ali, J.) 593\n\nthat in view of the proceedings under;."}}, {"text": "st August 1983", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30002, "end_char": 30016, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "st August 1983, which it may be noted has been paid; and thereafter pay the balance sum ofRs."}}, {"text": "29th August 1983", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30108, "end_char": 30124, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3,75,000 by 29th August 1983, which could not be paid because in the' meantime .special leave to appeal was granted by this Court and a stay was obtained."}}, {"text": "Malati Da&and Jitendr&.Kumar .Das bad no title or interest to create any licence in their favour. and that one of them further denied hiiving given any such licence. It has te be borne in mind that there has been no in.vestigation of the respondents' right to be in the premises; even a. trespasser cannot .be thrown \"out of his occupation or posse.ssion, except by due process of law. The. owners.appeared in these proceedings and supported. the appellant. In fact, In the affidavit filed - on behalf of the Receiver it has been made clear that theY leave the matter to this H on'ble Court.\n\n• The appellant's rights which have not yet crystallised would not be hampered. court's dominipn civer:the property is still tliere.\n\nThe Official. Receiver is after all an agent of the . Court. as has been held by this Court in a number of cases. ' ' ' .. '\n\nf '\n\nIn the case of Evrest Coal Company (P) Ltd. v. State of. Bihar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31165, "end_char": 32085, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Malati Da&and Jitendr&.Kumar .Das bad no title or interest to create any licence in their favour."}}, {"text": "S, S. Ray", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 33274, "end_char": 33283, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "':Mr. S, S. Ray, appearing for the appi1Iant, submitted .that . ' • ."}}, {"text": "s9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35330, "end_char": 35332, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984) 3 s.c.R.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 35553, "end_char": 35590, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984) 3 s.c."}}, {"text": "Howrah", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 37296, "end_char": 37302, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "7, Puffers Lane, Lilluah, Howrah to the petitioners and to their following nominees who have' been residing in the said premises .... \"\n\n At page .90 in 'The Dictionary of Essential Quotations' comf ..\n\n' . ."}}, {"text": "V ARADARMAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 40374, "end_char": 40385, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V ARADARMAN,' J. This appeal by special leave is direCted against the order of a Division."}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 40478, "end_char": 40497, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bench of the Calcutta High Court dated 25.7.1983 made in an application of respondents l to 4 for the .issue ."}}, {"text": "umar Das", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 41465, "end_char": 41473, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "7, Duffer:s Lane, Howrah, hereinafter referred to as the 'disputed property' against certain i>ersons including oue Jitendra :&:umar Das who is the second defendant inthat Suit."}}, {"text": "Ajit Kumar Das", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 42634, "end_char": 42648, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In)he event the properties are sold the petitioner Ajit Kumar Das would be.paida sum of Rs; 10000\n\nout of the sale .proceeds subject to adjustment against his share in the estate."}}, {"text": "Sadhu Ram Bansal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 43177, "end_char": 43193, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant Sadhu Ram Bansal offered a sum of Rs.", "canonical_name": "Sad!zuram Bansal"}}, {"text": "20.U.19S2", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 43288, "end_char": 43297, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4,00,000 for.the property to the Receiver by his advocate's letter dated 20.U.19S2."}}, {"text": "12.1.1983", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 43697, "end_char": 43706, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "held before,·\n\nthe Official Receiver on 12.1.1983 in presence of Prabir Kumar Das and Pradeep Kumar Das a.nd their Counsel as als6 }iiendra Kumar Das and others."}}, {"text": "Prabir Kumar Das", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 43722, "end_char": 43738, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "held before,·\n\nthe Official Receiver on 12.1.1983 in presence of Prabir Kumar Das and Pradeep Kumar Das a.nd their Counsel as als6 }iiendra Kumar Das and others."}}, {"text": "Pradeep Kumar Das", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 43743, "end_char": 43760, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "held before,·\n\nthe Official Receiver on 12.1.1983 in presence of Prabir Kumar Das and Pradeep Kumar Das a.nd their Counsel as als6 }iiendra Kumar Das and others.", "canonical_name": ".Pradeep Kumar Das"}}, {"text": "iiendra Kumar Das", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 43789, "end_char": 43806, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "held before,·\n\nthe Official Receiver on 12.1.1983 in presence of Prabir Kumar Das and Pradeep Kumar Das a.nd their Counsel as als6 }iiendra Kumar Das and others.", "canonical_name": "Jitencira\" Kumar rias"}}, {"text": "23. 12. I98i", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 43886, "end_char": 43898, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "terms Ol a motion of a meeting dated 23."}}, {"text": "13.1.198", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 44423, "end_char": 44431, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Official Receiver thereupon accepted the offer of the appellant and communicated the acceptance by hiS letter dated 13.1.198!"}}, {"text": "P. Banerjee", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 44992, "end_char": 45003, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "984) 3 S.C.R • • A Receiver,· P. Banerjee, J. of the Calcutta High Court passed an\n\nG 0\n\norder dated 24.5.1983 .directing the police to remove respondents\n\nI to 4."}}, {"text": "Putin Behari Sarkar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 45528, "end_char": 45547, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 22.6.\\983 respondents 1 to 4 nanieiy, Putin Behari Sarkar, Manik .", "canonical_name": "PULIN BEHARI SARKAR & ORS"}}, {"text": "Manik . Seal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 45549, "end_char": 45561, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 22.6.\\983 respondents 1 to 4 nanieiy, Putin Behari Sarkar, Manik .", "canonical_name": "Manik . Seal"}}, {"text": "Gopinath Sarkar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 45563, "end_char": 45578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Seal, Gopinath Sarkar and Sudhansu Bimal Dey moved the.", "canonical_name": "Gope Nath Sarkar"}}, {"text": "Sudhansu Bimal Dey", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 45583, "end_char": 45601, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Seal, Gopinath Sarkar and Sudhansu Bimal Dey moved the.", "canonical_name": "Sudhanshu Bimal Dey"}}, {"text": "Ashok Kumar Rai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 45829, "end_char": 45844, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2024 of 1982) as well as m the application of the Official Receiver affirmed by one Ashok Kumar Rai on 20.5.1983 and for stayiqg and setting asicie the said orders dated 24.5.1983 and 26.5 1983 as stated above .. In.", "canonical_name": "Ashok Kumar Rai"}}, {"text": "Sajan Kumar . Bansal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 47280, "end_char": 47300, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'fhls application of respondents I to 4 was opposed by the appellant through a counter-affidavit o~ his son Sajan Kumar ."}}, {"text": "SA[)I!URAM V. P. B. SARKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 47805, "end_char": 47831, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lOb/per month for a long time and that no rent has been paid to or collected by the Official- Receiver in the last 20 years, It was also stated in that counter-affidavit that in\n\n.H.\n\nf' ..\n\nSA[)I!URAM V. P. B. SARKAR (Varadara}an, J.) ."}}, {"text": "Kamal Hosiery", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 47992, "end_char": 48005, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the draft agreement for sale it is stated there is litigation for the\" last 20 years between the Official Rceiver on the one hand and Kamal Hosiery on the other and that Secrnd Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Cakutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 48132, "end_char": 48150, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1267 o(\n\n1982 filed by Kamal Hosiery against the Official Receiver was pending in the Cakutta High Court."}}, {"text": "s. 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48326, "end_char": 48332, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 48340, "end_char": 48366, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Monjula !lose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 48786, "end_char": 48799, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2024 of 1952 and for staying and setting aside the High ..\n\nCo .1rt's orders dated 24.5.1983 which came up before Monjula !", "canonical_name": "Monjula !lose"}}, {"text": "Sadhu Ram Bansal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 49278, "end_char": 49294, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "learned Advocate for the purchaser Sadhu Ram Bansal as .also the co.ntentions of the Learned Advocate for the leamd Official Receiver that deliberate mis-statements hav<: been made in the petition with.", "canonical_name": "Sad!zuram Bansal"}}, {"text": "Malati Das", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 50128, "end_char": 50138, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Q75 with the leave of one Malati Das and Jitendr11 Kumar Pas.", "canonical_name": "Mala ti Das"}}, {"text": "Jitendr11 Kumar Pas", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 50143, "end_char": 50162, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Q75 with the leave of one Malati Das and Jitendr11 Kumar Pas."}}, {"text": "Mala ti Das", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 50197, "end_char": 50208, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is significant that the said Mala ti Das .", "canonical_name": "Mala ti Das"}}, {"text": "Jitendra Kumar Das", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 50374, "end_char": 50392, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was brought on record only in the year 1977 after the death of her husband and in any event no leave or lice.nee coulCI have been gran ted by either Malati Das or Jitendra Kumar Das wJ1en th¢\n\n.. F\n\n.", "canonical_name": "Jitencira\" Kumar rias"}}, {"text": "21.6.,1983", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 50532, "end_char": 50542, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 21.6.,1983 Malati Das appeared in Court and denied giving any leave to any of the parties to remain in possession' of the suit premises."}}, {"text": "Ashoke Roy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 52497, "end_char": 52507, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "different considerati.ons apply in cases where property In the possession of Court through its officers are sought to be the Receiver of the Court is sought to be interfered with, and the cases cited are distinguishable.. To iny mind the orde.rs passed on .the 24th and 26th May, 1983 are orders pa'ssed by tl; le Court in the course of the administration of the estate through the agr11cy of the Receiver and the said' orders were passed at the instances ofthe Receiver in the circumstances stated in the affidavit affirmed by Ashoke Roy on 4t!i July, 1953 It in apparent."}}, {"text": "L. P. Aggarwal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 54251, "end_char": 54265, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the minutes of the Receivds meeting held on 12.1.1983 that in the presence of parties each one\n\nof them supported the sale to M/s: L. P. Aggarwal's client, namely, Sadhu Ram."}}, {"text": "Sadhu Ram.Bansal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 54284, "end_char": 54300, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the minutes of the Receivds meeting held on 12.1.1983 that in the presence of parties each one\n\nof them supported the sale to M/s: L. P. Aggarwal's client, namely, Sadhu Ram.", "canonical_name": "Sad!zuram Bansal"}}, {"text": "Sadhu Ram Bansal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 54367, "end_char": 54383, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bansal and as such the Official Receiver accepted_ the offer of the said Sadhu Ram Bansal, after.", "canonical_name": "Sad!zuram Bansal"}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54872, "end_char": 54874, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "M. M. Dutt", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 55314, "end_char": 55324, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "appeal respondents' I .to 4 .made an application for an interim order, and it came up for considei; ation before the Division Bench consisting M. M. Dutt and C. K. Ilanerjee,."}}, {"text": "C. K. Ilanerjee,", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 55329, "end_char": 55345, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "appeal respondents' I .to 4 .made an application for an interim order, and it came up for considei; ation before the Division Bench consisting M. M. Dutt and C. K. Ilanerjee,."}}, {"text": "Som Nath Chatterjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 55868, "end_char": 55887, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\"At the bearing of this application Mr. Som Nath Chatterjee,."}}, {"text": "A. C: Bhabra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 56335, "end_char": 56347, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. A. C: Bhabra, learned Counsel appearing for respondent Nb."}}, {"text": "Jhabra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 57331, "end_char": 57337, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is submitte.d by Mr. ]Jhabra that .those persons are all trespassers without any vestige of title."}}, {"text": "Malafr Ds", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 57638, "end_char": 57647, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Malafr Ds who is alleged to have granted the licence, has denied granting of such licence."}}, {"text": "Varadarajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 57850, "end_char": 57861, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 then 38 families who have been resi-\n\n1 '\n\nSADl!URAM v. P. B. SARKAR (Varadarajan, J.)\n\n'60S\n\nding thereon."}}, {"text": "18.7.JgaJ", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 59045, "end_char": 59054, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5,00,000 as aforesaid their order will stand vacated and the learned Single Judge's.order dated 18.7.JgaJ shall stand confirmed.·"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60199, "end_char": 60203, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "26.5.1983", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 62034, "end_char": 62043, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "etting aside the orders daied 24.5~1983 and 26.5.1983 which is one of the prayers in tfte application made before the learned Single Judge and the sale of the property in their favonr and in favour of their nominees for R, s. 5,00,000 subject to payment of that ramount'in two instalments ."}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62213, "end_char": 62217, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S.S. Ray", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 62975, "end_char": 62983, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "therefore think it must be noticed before proceeding to consider the merits of the case in the light of the arguments advanced by Mr.\n\nS.S. Ray, Senior Counsel apparring for the .appellant and Mr. G.L..\n\nSanghi.,", "canonical_name": "S.S. Ra;1"}}, {"text": "G.L..\n\nSanghi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 63037, "end_char": 63050, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "therefore think it must be noticed before proceeding to consider the merits of the case in the light of the arguments advanced by Mr.\n\nS.S. Ray, Senior Counsel apparring for the .appellant and Mr. G.L..\n\nSanghi.,", "canonical_name": "G.L..\n\nSanghi"}}, {"text": "Ray", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 64233, "end_char": 64236, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Ray submitted rightly that respondents 1 to4 are ra.nk trespassers iri respect of."}}, {"text": "Jitendra Kumar Das", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 64511, "end_char": 64529, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The case of respondents 1 to 4 is that they .became licencees in respect of the property in 1975 under a leave granted to them by Malati Das and Jitendra Kumar Das.", "canonical_name": "Jitencira\" Kumar rias"}}, {"text": "Monjula Bose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 64559, "end_char": 64571, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This case has been found by Monjula Bose; J. to be false having regard to.the fact that Malati Das came on record a• a leaal representative of her husband Prasad Nath Das only in .1977 and she appeared in Court and denied jlaving granted any such licence to respondents 1 to 4.", "canonical_name": "Monjula !lose"}}, {"text": "Prasad Nath Das", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 64686, "end_char": 64701, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This case has been found by Monjula Bose; J. to be false having regard to.the fact that Malati Das came on record a• a leaal representative of her husband Prasad Nath Das only in .1977 and she appeared in Court and denied jlaving granted any such licence to respondents 1 to 4.", "canonical_name": "Prasad Nath Dasc!aiining"}}, {"text": "Jitendra Kumar Das", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 64963, "end_char": 64981, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Respondents I to 4 have not examined Jitendra Kumar Das to prove th• alleged."}}, {"text": "Jitencira\" Kumar rias", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 65027, "end_char": 65048, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jitencira\" Kumar rias is a party to the approval granted on 12.1.1983 and 9.8.1983 for the sale of the disputed property by the, Official Receiver to the appeHant by private treaty.", "canonical_name": "Jitencira\" Kumar rias"}}, {"text": "9.8.1983", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 65101, "end_char": 65109, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jitencira\" Kumar rias is a party to the approval granted on 12.1.1983 and 9.8.1983 for the sale of the disputed property by the, Official Receiver to the appeHant by private treaty."}}, {"text": "Sub Divisional Executive Magistrate-, Sadar; Howrah", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 65589, "end_char": 65640, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the present proceedings their stand is that it was granted in 1975: But ih the proceedings before the Sub Divisional Executive Magistrate-, Sadar; Howrah under s .. 145 Criminal Procedure Code they stated that the licence was granted 15 years prior to the date of that petition which will take us to 1968 as stated above."}}, {"text": "Criminal Procedure Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 65656, "end_char": 65679, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sanghi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 65930, "end_char": 65936, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Therefore, faciually the alleged grant of licence does not appear to be true as has been found , by Monjula Bose, J. Mr. Sanghi on the other hand, contends that the \"right\" claimed by respondents 1 to 4 has not been gone into-or determined and that they are entitled to the equitable relief granted to them by the learned Judges of the Divisio.n Bench on the basis of their admitted posseio!l of the propertr."}}, {"text": "Couft", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 67790, "end_char": 67795, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Th1s Couft has observed in Everest Coal Company (P) Ltd.\n\nv. State of llihar &Others (1l thus: ·\n\n\"When a. court put9 a Receiver 'in possession of property, the property comes unde'r court custody, the Receiver being merely an officer or agent of the court."}}, {"text": "M:onjula Bose", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 68760, "end_char": 68773, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This has been found by M:onjula Bose, J. in the order dated 18.7.1983.", "canonical_name": "Monjula !lose"}}, {"text": "Mc Sani", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 70926, "end_char": 70933, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mc Sani invited thi~ Court's attention.to the Calcutta High\n\n6IO\n\n'..\\\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984] 3 s.c."}}, {"text": "Ashok Kumar Rai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 71218, "end_char": 71233, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I0,000 out of the sale proceeds should be paid-to Ashok Kumar Rai subject to adjustment against his share and that the balance should be invested by the Official Receiver, in fixed dep'<l'sit every time for a term not exceeding one year.", "canonical_name": "Ashok Kumar Rai"}}, {"text": "D.N .. Mitra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 72442, "end_char": 72454, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Receiver on 12.1.1983 to consider which of the3 offers made to the\n\nOl!icial Receiver could be accepted Mr. D.N .. Mitra, Advocate for Prabir Kumar Das and Pradeep Kumar Das ha\\!"}}, {"text": "13.1.1983", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 73407, "end_char": 73416, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "but he has merely stated in his letter dated 13.1.1983 that the appellant's offer to purchase the property for Rs."}}, {"text": "9.8.198", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 73660, "end_char": 73667, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The parties bad accepted the appellant's offer even in the subsequent meeting held on 9.8.198) after the appellant.had sent the balance of Rs."}}, {"text": "8.8.198~", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 73729, "end_char": 73737, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3,00,000 on 8.8.198~ to the Receiver."}}, {"text": "rabir Kul!'ar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 73873, "end_char": 73886, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Sanghi submits that there was a counter-offer\n\nby reason of the statement made on tehalf of the two plaintiffs\n\n}'rabir Kul!'ar ras an<,1 Pr2deep Kumar Pas ip the meetin~ ccnvene~\n\ni ."}}, {"text": "Sabyasachi Mukhaiji", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 73971, "end_char": 73990, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SADHURAM •. P. B. SARKAR (Sabyasachi Mukhaiji, J.) 611\n\nby the receiver on 12.l.1983 that the appellant's offer should be accepted subject to the condition that he will purchase the property subject to the pending litigation and that ther~ should have been a fresh acceptance by the appellant thereafter, and he has not done ' so and therefore there .", "canonical_name": "Sabyasachi Mukha.rji"}}, {"text": ".Pradeep Kumar Das", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 74416, "end_char": 74434, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "no such conditional acceptance as the condition required by Prabir Kumar Das and .Pradeep Kumar Das has not been specially communicated to the appellant by the Offici~I Receiver for his acceptance.", "canonical_name": ".Pradeep Kumar Das"}}, {"text": "Order 21 rule 89", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76367, "end_char": 76383, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 76387, "end_char": 76414, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "[1974] 3 SCR 678", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 76505, "end_char": 76521, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Monjula Bose1", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 78954, "end_char": 78967, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "were not right in interfering with tho well considered order of the learned Single Judge Monjula Bose1 J. by\n\n(1).(i979) 3 SCR 340\n\nr *\n\nSAD!lURAM v. p, B, SARK>':R (Sabyasachi Mukharji, J,) 613\n\ntheir order made in the application cif respondents 1 to 4 for a mere interim order pmding coasidrtion of the appeal preferred bj them\n\ngains!", "canonical_name": "Monjula !lose"}}, {"text": "SABYASACHI MUKHARJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 79829, "end_char": 79847, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SABYASACHI MUKHARJ!,", "canonical_name": "Sabyasachi Mukha.rji"}}, {"text": "Fazal Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 79909, "end_char": 79918, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J, With respect I agree with the order proposed by Brother Fazal Ali.", "canonical_name": "FA2(AL ALI"}}, {"text": "High Court of (;1lcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 80530, "end_char": 80553, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2024 of 1952 was filed in the High Court of (;1lcutta on May 29, 1952 by one\n\nPrasad Nath Dasc!aiining it decree for construction of the will and ."}}, {"text": "Prasad Nath Dasc!aiining", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 80578, "end_char": 80602, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2024 of 1952 was filed in the High Court of (;1lcutta on May 29, 1952 by one\n\nPrasad Nath Dasc!aiining it decree for construction of the will and .", "canonical_name": "Prasad Nath Dasc!aiining"}}, {"text": "October II, 1982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 81354, "end_char": 81370, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An order was passed on October II, 1982 by a learned\n\nSingle Judge of the High Court directing the Official Receiver to sell the disputed premises either."}}, {"text": "High Court, Calcutta", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 81706, "end_char": 81726, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3,50,000 and the order further directed that \"in the event the property is sold by private treaty, the Official Receiver, High Court, Calcutta, would call a meeting of the parties and obtain their ·.approval to such sale by private treaty."}}, {"text": "Jan. 12, 1983", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 82479, "end_char": 82492, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At a me, ting held on Jan. 12, 1983 the said off<; r along with two bther offers were coasiderod by the ; epr; sentativcs and advocates apparing for the different parties in the suit . ."}}, {"text": "B.N. Mitra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 82761, "end_char": 82771, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that parties more or les3 agreed that the offer received on behalf of the appellant was best but one Shri B.N. Mitra, represen- D ting his client observed that it might be accepted subject to the appellant's agreeing \"to purchase thesame land."}}, {"text": "January 13, 1983", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 83893, "end_char": 83909, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was, therefore, nrged .before us that there was nq acceptance of the offer by letter dated January 13, 1983 because the acceptance was with a condition."}}, {"text": "Jitendra Nath Da~", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 86751, "end_char": 86768, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Malati Das and Jitendra Nath Da~; in 'certain specified ' plots mentioned in their application.", "canonical_name": "Jitencira\" Kumar rias"}}, {"text": "May 2, 19~3", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 86861, "end_char": 86872, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They further alleged that on May 2, 19~3."}}, {"text": "Section 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87251, "end_char": 87262, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 87270, "end_char": 87296, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "May 7, 1983", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 87617, "end_char": 87628, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Sub-Divisional Magistrate, it was alleged, did not pas> any• order and was pleased to direct' to put up the said application on May 7, 1983."}}, {"text": "Section 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88057, "end_char": 88068, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 88076, "end_char": 88102, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 145", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88153, "end_char": 88164, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 88168, "end_char": 88194, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Mala ti Das", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 90749, "end_char": 90760, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mala ti Das, who is alleged to have granted t!ie licence; has denied grantin~ of such licence.", "canonical_name": "Mala ti Das"}}, {"text": "August 29, 1983", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 91592, "end_char": 91607, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "3,75,000 by August 29, 1983' which sum however could not be paid because in the meantime."}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 92982, "end_char": 92984, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 94792, "end_char": 94818, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 96808, "end_char": 96819, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "American\n\nBar Association", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 100544, "end_char": 100569, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The American\n\nBar Association in its report in 1964 had observed that ju.risprudence has shifted away from finespun technicalities and abstract rules to ."}}, {"text": "Bernard Schwartz", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 100988, "end_char": 101004, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Centennial Volume Edited by Bernard Schwartz."}}, {"text": "Fazal Ali", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 101062, "end_char": 101071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I. therefore respectfully agree with Brother Fazal Ali when he says, that in administering justice-:-social or legal, jurisprudence bas shifted away from finespun technicalities and abstract rules to recog• nitiori.", "canonical_name": "FA2(AL ALI"}}, {"text": "Bassanio", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 101398, "end_char": 101406, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bassanio in Merchant of Venice)."}}, {"text": "Venice", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 101422, "end_char": 101428, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Bassanio in Merchant of Venice)."}}, {"text": "Holmes", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 101701, "end_char": 101707, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jn administering justice, or social legal, we do well to bear , in mind the words of Justice Holmes \"The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience."}}, {"text": "Oliver Wendell Holmes-.Edited", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 102826, "end_char": 102855, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The common Law by Oliver Wendell Holmes-.Edited by Mark De Wolfe Howe- Lecture I-page I)."}}, {"text": "Mark De Wolfe Howe-", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 102859, "end_char": 102878, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The common Law by Oliver Wendell Holmes-.Edited by Mark De Wolfe Howe- Lecture I-page I)."}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 102966, "end_char": 102968, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Fazal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 103821, "end_char": 103826, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I agree with the order proposed by Brother Fazal , Ali and the reaons given by him.", "canonical_name": "FA2(AL ALI"}}, {"text": "Ali", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 103829, "end_char": 103832, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I agree with the order proposed by Brother Fazal , Ali and the reaons given by him."}}, {"text": "N.V.K.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 103863, "end_char": 103869, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.V.K.\n\nAppeal dismissed\n\ni .."}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_3_59_73_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "'-.\n\n. -...\n\n• ROHTAS INDUSTRIES LTD. &, ANR. ETC.\n\nv •\n\n. THE CHAIRMAN; BIHAR-STATE ELECTRICITY\n\n' .\n\nBOARD AND OTHERS -\n\nMarch 2, 1984\n\n- [D. A. DESAI AND V. BALAKRISHNA ERADi, JJ]\n\n,, Efectricity (SU]Jply) Ac1,-·-194a2s. -49-Electricity .Board divided corisume; s into various cateiories-_CosunzerS of only those cafliories ~/ready enjoying conces-- sion in general tari..tr as incentive to esrab/is/;·; ndl; Strjes in the State asked io pay fuel surchatge-;-Whether classification of consun1ers and levy_ of fuel suchar; e o, n -\n\nsome consumers only qrbitrary and violqtive of Art . . 14 of the Constittion. ,\n\nSection 49 of tlie. Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 provided for the .sale of\" electricity by the electricity. Board lto anypefson not being a\n\nliceflsee and to fr.ime. uniform. tariffs . for the purposes of such . supply \" having. egafd~ .. inter alia to - the_': ii.atre of the.··. supply,. ·. the purPose1.for which the. supply_ is required and other_. relevant factprs, In exercise ofthc po_wef-s conferrCd\n\n0 by s. 49.'.'ofthe Act, \"the responden~ Bihar State ElcciriCity Board bad classified the Consumers irito ten categoics and had . ,_been, from timt;. to time, issuing notifiC.ltiOns :fixing the tariff 'and the tefms and\n\nconditions for the uppJy of-- electricity) .rothose consulners. With a vieW to -encouraging the tstblishment of industrieS in the State, the general tariff r3:te f applicable in respeCt of high tension supply to industries and factories had been fixed at rates which were muc; h lower ~'hen comparea: to thoSe applicable to other . __ -tyPes of consumers. On 6.4. 1979 the_ respop.d_en_t Board, in. sui)ers_ession of ts\n\nearlier notification fixing the tariff, isSUed a notifiCation revising the tariff for all categories of consumers served by it. Para 16.7 of the .-said Tariff Notification provided that the consumers of low tension indu-stiial service~ high tetision ser vice, eXtra high tension service, and. railway traction Service shall be liable to pay , fuel surcharge'. at a rate to be determined.every year J~ acCordance with lthc fc;:>r• -. mula set out in sub-para 2 of that paragraph. The appelJants who had entei-ed into agreements with the respondent Board for the supply of high tension electric . current fcrr their factories. arid \\vere admittedly nOt lice\"nsees, filed writ petitions\n\nin the High Cou;'.t thaIIenging the levy. of fuel surchafge on the grouned that it \\ ; was arbitrary and devoid of legal sanction.· A Division Bench of the High Court\n\n.di!missed' the writ petitions. '-Hence these, appCals -and- special leaVe petitions.· : The appCnanucharge of discrimination was_ based On the_groulld that only . nsumers of low tension industrial service high tension service~ extra high ten-·\n\n~ s1on serviCe, and railway traction service had been singled out for being subjected\n\n':to a Jevy of surcharge, '?'.'bile consumers of -elec-tricity for. dome'stic, commercial -- and irrigation purposes were left unaffected by any such burden:\n\n .... 'Dismissing the appeals.and special leave petitions,.- .. _ - . - . - - . - . -\n\nHELD; It Is ;, ell-established tba; where a corporation is an . instr;,,;, eniallty H . or an agecy of Government it would, in the exorcise of Its powers and function,\n\n- ~- . ;\"\n\n'c.\n\n60 . SUPREME COURT JlFPORrS\n\n. .\n\nR. [1984] 3 s.c .. •\n\nbe subject to the same c.Onstitutlonal or public law &Hmittioa~ as apply -to the Government and the principle of law inhibitin& arbitrary Action by Government would apply equally where such a corporation is dealing with the public, Whether by way of giving jobs or entering into relationship with any person in any manner.it likes according to its sv.1eet will. The acts of such a. coiporation must be in conformity with soe principle which ineets the test of reaso.nableness and relevence. (71 F-H]\n\n- ' ·\n\n-The-contention that the imposition or fuel surcharge under paragraph :16.7 of the 1979 tariff notification is arbirary and violative of Art. 14 of the Cons ti tu~\n\n- tion has no fofce. -The BOard was Perfectly within its rightsin deciding to ---r.estrici _the levy of fuel suriJiai&-e to those categories of consumers who were enjoying the-benefit of.a concession in the general rate and ill sparing Smaller \\type of consumers such as tile agricultural irrigation and commercial consumers\n\nfrdm being subjected to that burdny in view of the fact that they were already . being subjected to a basic _levy at.s-Obstantially higher rates. The true consequence /\n\nof the action taken by the Board is only to effect a reduction in the quantum of concessionthat was being enjoyed by the consumers b'elonging to the industrial - -and railway tractiqn categories. The appeltantS: had no case that any illegality , was involved in treating the industrial consumers, as a separate cla:Ss 'and grant .. ·\n\ning them the benefit of a preferential treatment for -the purpose of fiXing the , basic rate of levy for supply of electricityJ _ A classification. which is legally . ·-valid and permissible for the grant of a concession in the basic rates will equally\n\n~-bold good for the purpose of a subsequent scheme of distribution of the. burden\n\nin the forrri of fuel surcharge. A-clasification of \"these bulk . consumers has a ·-rational nexus with the_ object and purposes of the levy of surcharge.\n\n[65 G, '67 B-D, 66-G, 67 DF]\n\n. .\n\nThe arg\\lment that\" levy of fuel surcharge can only be\" for the purpose of ·:recouping the\" amounts actually aid by the Board by way of 'fuel surcharge• to the D.V.C. and the U.P. S_tate Electricity Board for the quantities of energy •purchased by the Board fro~ these sources and the extra cost that the Board had\n\nactually to incur on fuel consumed in those - two generating stations at Patratli 'a.Iid Barauni has Ilo force. From the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the :-Board, it is sceii that in respe_ct of the. increase in the Cost of production of :eleCtricity in the two generating _stations of the Boards the fuel surcharge has\n\ntaken intoaccount only that part of the increase in cost which is relatable to.'the 1tiCieased price of the coal and oil i.e. fuel aloD.e. In rspect of the energies\n\npUrchased by the Board from outside sources, narr.ely, ¢.e Damodar Valle}'\n\n~COti}oration and .the U.P. State Electricity\" Board, the increase in cost per unit\n\n'incurred by the' Board has been included in the contPutation of the fuel surcharge. ·.Though the nomenclature giv, en to the levy is \"fuel surcharse 0 it is really. a\n\n~ufcharge levied to meet the increased cost of genetatiOn 3.nd purchase of electri\n\n'city and this is made absolutely clearly in the formula given in para 16.7.2. ·• . ' . [67 H,\" 68 A-Fj\n\nThere is no forc.e in the cOntention that the words \"lncreise in the average unit rate of purchase of energy•' used in Ct below paragraph 16. 1.i should be\n\ni\"tefpreted as 'taking.their colour froin the cOntents of parapraph 16.7.3. From\n\n- , a_ reading of these proviSions it is abundantly clear that the entire increase in\n\ncosts incurred in the purchase of energy. froin the D.V.C. an.d the U.P. State : \\,... -\n\n'I ', ..\n\n; -\\.\n\nI •\n\nROITTAS INDUSTRiES v. BiHAR sr. ELEC. BOAAD 6J\n\nEl.ectricity Board has ._-to go into the computation of the surcharge leviable under A paragraph 16.7. Thece is no ambiguity whatever in thf: , words used in Cl so as ·-to require the court __ to. take_ light from par3graph .16.7.3 for the purposeo~ understanding their scope and meaning. [69 B-D] .. .... .\n\nThe contention that the financil capacity of individual industrial COnsumers. bad not been taken into account while fixing the revised tariff is devoid of forCe. - It is not contemplated by section 49 or. any of the other p.rovisions of the Act: that as amongst consumers talling within' a specified category.different rates are to be charged depending upon the financial capacity of the paticular consumer to!·\n\nPay~ On the other band, the.very core of the .scheme of section _49 is that the _tariff should be uniform in r:espect of each class or Categor~. {70 H,,7~ A~B] ,\n\n- It is found.i-hat notwithsta.nding the mandaio!y provision contained in s.59 of the Act obliging the Board to carry its operations and adjust its tariffs in such a; w, iy as to nsure that the total revenues e3!ned in an,, year of amount shaU, after mting all expenses properly chargeable to revenue leave. such surplus as. the State Government may,- frOm time to time, specify. the Board has-been selling-. ener&y at rates which are lower than the actual post insurred by it per unit of production. Such being the factual situation, there is absolutely -no basis fof . . the contention that the tariff fuaion .effected by the .Board sUffers from the vice\n\nof arbitrariness and is liable to be jnterfered with by the Court on that ground. .. ' . .. . , (73 B,.72 AC, '73 q •\n\n:_ CiVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos .. 2855-56: of 1982. ·\n\nAppeals by special leave from the Judgment and Order dated ' the 9th April, 1982 ofthePatna High Court in C.W.J.C. No; 3503/\" 81 & 504 \"of 1982. - · •\n\nWITH . ; Civil Appeals Nos; 2857-58 & 2859-60 ?f 1982\n\nAppeals by Special leave from the.Judgment and .Order dated the 9th/10th February, 1982 of the Patna High Court in C.W.J. c.,\n\nNos. 1026/82; 1855/81, 1516/81 (R), 1355/81 (R)., . , . .\n\n~ . , . .\n\nAND ,\n\n' Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 2904. of 1982. ·\n\nFrom the. Judgment and Ordr: dated the'8th• December,1981 ··· of the Patna High Court in Civil Writ . Jurisdiction Case No .. 1237 of 1981.\n\nDr. Shankar Ghosh, Parveen Kumar, Padam Khaitan, C.A. . Vaidyanarhan' N.R: Khaitan for the Appellants in. C.A. 28?$-\n\n56/8~. . .\n\nB . ~-...\n\n: ~J\n\n''1\n\n/ G\n\nt}•\n\n.D'\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984) 3 s.c.R.\n\nA.K. Sen, Padam Khaitan, Parveen Kumar and N.R. Khaitan for the Appellants in C.A. Nos. 2857~58/82,\n\nC.S. Vaidyanathan, Anil Kumar Sharma, and Mr.. Parvee11 Kumar for the Appellants in CA. Nos. 2859-60/82. ·\n\nK.K. Venugopal, C.S. Vaidyanathan fof the Petitioner in SLP Nos. 2904/82.\n\nL.N. ?inha, Att. General, Rqm Balak Mehto, Pramod Swaru\"' and P.P. Singh for the Respondents in all the appeals & SLP.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBALAKRISHNA ERADJ, J. These appeals (by special leave) and the Special Leave Petition involve common questions concerning the . validity. of the supplementary bills issued to the appellants by the ·\n\n!st respondent-Bihar State Electricity Board-r \"fuel suichllrge\" as per the revised tariff dated 1st April, 1979, and hence they were heard together. Having regard to the fact that by reason of interlocutqry orders passed by this Court, the realisation of large amounts demanded from the appellants by the respondent by way of charges for electric energy supplied by it stood stayed and the consequent urgency in passing final orders in these cases, as soon as the hearing was completed we. passed the ollowing order announcing the conclusion reached by us :\n\n\"All these Civil Appeals and Special Leave Petition are dismissed wfth costs in each case. All interim orders made in each of these matters at various staj!es ar~ vacated.\n\nReasons wlll follow\".\n\nWe now proceed to state the f' reasons in support of the said conclusion .\n\n.The Bihar State Electricity Board hereinafter called 'the Board') is incorporated under Section 12 of the Electricity (Supply) Mt 1948 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). The general powers and duties of.the Board are set out in Sec•iou 18. Thereunder the Board has the duty, inter alia, to arrange for the supply of electricity that may be required within the State and for the transmission and dfstribution of the same in the most efficient and economic manner, with particular reference to those areas which are not, for the time being, supplied or adequately supplied with electricity.\n\nSe91ion 49 of the Act makes provision for the sale of electricity by the Board to peI&onl!J_()the~ than the licen&ees an\\! to fra!lle unif9rm ,\n\nROIITA.S iNDUSTRiES v. BIHAR ST. ELEC. BOARD (B. Eradi, J.)\n\ntriffs for the purposes of such supply. That section is in the follow Al Ing a terms:\n\n\"49. .(!) Subject to the provisions of this Act and of regulations, if any, made in this behalf, the Board may supply electricity to any person not being a licensee upon 'iiuch terins 'and conditions as the Board thinks fit, and.may for the purposes of such supply flame uniform tariffs.\n\n(2) In fixing the uniform tariffs, the Board shaU have\n\nregard to all or any of the following factors, namely:-\n\n(a) the natufe of the supply and the purposes for which it is required ;\n\n(b) the co-ordinated development of the supply and distribution ortelectricity within the State in the most, efficient and economical manner, with particular reference to such development . in areas not for the time being served or adequately served by the licensee ;\n\n(c) the simplification and standardisation of methods and rates of charges for such supplies ;\n\n(d) the extension and cheapening of supplies or electricity to sparsely developed ateas.\n\n(3) Nothing in the foregoing provisions of this section shall derogate from the power-of the Board, . if it considers it necessary or . {lXpedient to fix different tariffs for the supply of electricity to any person not belng a licensee, having regard to the geographical position of any area, the nature of the supply and purpose for which such supply is required and any other relevant factors.\n\n(~) In fixing the tariff and terms and cciditlons for the supply of electricity, the Board shall not show undue prefe1ence to any person.\"\n\nIn exercise of the powep conferred by the above section, the D9afd ~S been, ffO!ll 'ime to tjrne, jssUin¥ UOtifiations jixing the\n\nff;\n\nI>'\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1J84j :f S\\C.R.\n\ntariff and the terms and conditions for the supply of electricity _to: the various classes of consumers. In supersession of the tariff rates till then obtaining under -an earlier notification, tJ:te Board by its\n\n\"tariff notification 1979\" published in the Bihar Gazette Extraordi nary No. 3'$11 dated 6.4.1979, iSsued a revised tariff for all categories of consumers served by it. The said tariff was to take effect from\n\n1st April, 1979.\n\nThe appellants are companies having factories in different parts of the State to Bihar and they have entered into agreemepts with the Board for supply of high tension electric current. The agree\n\nment~ so executed are in a standard forl'.1 containing substantially Identical terms. Annexnre I in the Writ Petition C.W.J.C. No. 1855/ 81 out of which -C.A. 28 58/82 arises in a copy of the agreement entered into by M/s Usha Martin Black (Wire Rods)- Ltd. with the Board on 18.8:1961. In clause 4 of _th¥gteement, it is _stipulated that the consumers shall pay to the supplier (Board for) the energy supplied and registered by the meters \"at the rates from time to time in force and paid-by similar consumers\". It has been further provided in clause 11 .that the agreement should be read and construed as subject in all respects to the provisions of the Indian Electricity Act 1910 and the rules for the time being in force thereunder. After the introduction of the revised tariffs, 1979, all the appellants continued io draw and consume high tension electric energy in their factories.\n\nPara 16.7 of the Tariff Notification, 1979, provides that the consumers of low tensfon indutrial service, high tension service, extra high tensioh service, and railway traction service shall be liable to pay 'fuel surcharge' at a rate to be determined every year in accordance with the formula set ,_out iµ sub-para (2) of the said paragraph (16.7.2). This levy of fuel surcharge was in addition to the other charges specifiecl in the tariff schedule. J?uring the\n\ncour~ of the year 1979, fuel surcharge a a provisional rate of one paise per unit was initially levied and that was_ subsequently increased to three paise per unit, again on a provisional ba~'s. In the final bills issued for the financial year 1979-80 the fuel surcharge was levied at 6.242 paise per unit. Along with the -finaJ bill of fuel\n\nsurcharge for .the year 1979-80, a provisional Qjll of fuel surcharge for the year 1980-81 was also issued to theappellant companies !icmanding paymeqt Qf qrcharge at the vate of ei$ht -paise per unit\n\n...\n\nROITTAs iNDusrRiEs v. BIHAR sr. ELEC. soARD (B. Eradi, J.)\n\n• thereupon the appellants filed Writ Petitions in the High Court of Patna contending that the provision contained in Paragraph\n\n16. 7 in the Tariff Notification of 1979 for the levy fuel surcharge is devoid of legal sanction and is arbitrary and void. The charge of arbitrariqess leveUed against the .imposition of fuel surcharge was based on the ground that only consumers of low tension industrial service, high tension service, extra high tension service, and railway traction service had been singled out for being subjected to a levy of surcharge, while consumers of e\\eccity for domestic, commercial and irrigation purposes were left unaffected by any. such burden.\n\nA futher contention was also ralse.d that the bills issued to the. peti• . tioners were not even' in accordance. with the provisions of the\n\ntariff notification and the demands made against thei!ppellants were, in excess of what was warranted even by the impugned notification.\n\nEight writ petitions, of which C.W.J.C. 1237 of 1981, filed by M/s.\n\nShriram Bearings Ltd., Ranchi (Petitioner in SLP No: 2904/1982) was apparently treated by. common con.sent as the main case, and were heard together as one single batch by a Division Bench of the High Court. By a detailed and well-considered judgment, the Division Bench rejected all the contentions ra.ised by the petitioners and dismissed the Writ Petitions after recording an undertaking given by the poard that certain small amounts which were found to have been charged in the bi Us In excess of what was payable by the appellantspn a correct computation of the surcharge would be adjusted in the next bills to be issued to them. Writ. Petitions subsequently filed in the High Court by the appellants in the other appeals were lafer dismissed in limine by separate' short judgments, following the decision of the Divisional Bench in C.W.J.C. 1237 of\n\n1981. Hence these appeals and special leave petitions by the appellant companies.\n\nAt the outset, we may dispose of the contention urged on behalf of some of the appellants that the.levy of fuel surcharge under the impugned tariff notification (parapraph 16.7) is discriminatory . and hence violative of Articl~ 14 of the Col).stitution. Sub-section 3 of Section 49 xpressly authorises the Board to fix different tariffs for the supply of electricity to any \"petson not being a licensee, having regard, inter alia, to the nature of the.supply, the purpose for . which the supply is requfred and other relevant factors. The power to classify. the c<>nsumers into di!l'erent categories and to fix diffren-\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[I 984] 3 S.C.R,\n\ntial tariffs has thus been conferred on the Board by the Section itself. The Constitutional -validity of this Section has been upheld by this Court in Maharashtra State Electricity Board v. Kalyan Borough Municipality & Another(').\n\nThe expression \"licensee\" means a person licensed under Part II of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910, to supply energy or a person who has obtained licence under Section 28-of that Act to engage in the business. of supplying eitergy through definition in Section 2 (6).\n\nAdmittedly, the appellants before us are not licensees. They are c_O'!lsumers receiving high tension supply to their factories. For the purpose of tariff fixation, the Board hrrs classified the consumers into 10 categories, viz., \"domestic\", \"commercial (i)\", commercial (ii)\", \"street light\", \"irrigation\",- \"light tension industrial\" (small scale industrial upto 100 h.p.), \"11 k.v. h.t:s.\", \"33 k.v.h.t.s.\", \"132 k.v. h.t.s.\" and \"railway tractiol) (25 k.v.)\". It is seen from the materials on record for us that the industries between themselves consume nearly 65% of the total quantity of energy supplie<l by the Board. Apparently with a view to encouraging the establishment of industries in the State, the generl tariff rate applicable in respect of high tension supply to industries and factories has been fixed at rates _which are much lpwer when compared to those applicable to other types of consumers. While the general rate applicable for supply of high tension electric energy for industries of the class to which the appellants belong was 22 paise per unit, consumers belonging to \"commercial\" categories were charged at rates ranging bet ween 48 paise to 58 pais_e per unit, \"agricultural\" consumers at 29 paise per unit, \"low tension\" consumers at 34 to 38 paise per unit and \"domestic\" consumers at rates ranging between 38 to 43 paise per unit. Thus, in the fixation of th~ general tariff rate, a substantial concession has been shown in favour of .industria 1 low tension and high tension consumers. The appellants have no case that any illegality was involved in treating the industrial consumers, as a separate class and granting them the benefit of a preferential treatment for the p1irpose of fixing the basic rate of levy for supply of . electricity. The stand taken by the Board is that it was found absolutely neessary at the time of the revised traiff fixation effected in 1979 to augment its revenue by levying of the additional fuel surcharge in order to offset the heavy increase in expen<liture and after taking into account all relevant facts and circumstances, it wasdecided to distribute that burden amongst the privile$ed class of\n\n(I) l1968]}_S C.R.. 137.\n\nROTHAS iNDUSTRiES. v. BiHAR ST. ELEC. BOARD (B. Eradi, J.) 67\n\nconsumers; namely those belonging to categories of low tension industrial service, high tension service, extra high tension service and railway traction service. Even after taking into account the fuel s.urcharge so levied under 1979 tariff, the rates applicable to 'high tension consumers like the petitioners range between 40.31 paise al), d 58.80 paise per unit only, while the coi; imercial (ii) consnmer has to pay 71.33 paise per unit and even the domestic coil.sumer has to pay\n\n48pise per unit. The position that obtains under the 1981 tariff which also has been challenged by some of the appe!lants is substantially similar. In our opinion, the Board was perfectly within its rights in deciding to. restrict the levy of fuel surcharge to those categories of consumers.who were enjoying the benefit of a concession in the general rate and in sparing smaller type of consumers such as the agricultural, irrigation and commercial consumers from being subjected to that burden, in view of the fact that they were already being subjected to a basic levy at substantially higher rates.\n\nThe true consequence of the action so taken by the Board is only to effect a reduction in the quantum of concession that was being enjoyed by the consumers belonging to the industrial an.d railway traction. categories. A classification which is legally valid and permissible for the grant' of a concession in the basic rates wBI\n\nequally hold good for the purpose of a subsequent scheme of distribution of the burden in.the form of fuel surcharge. In this context, .it is also relevant to remember that thdevy of surcharge was necessitated by reason of the extra expenditure which the Board had to incur in the generation of electricity in the two power stations run by the Board and in the. purchase of power from the two outside sources, namely, the D.V.C. and the U.P. State Electricity Board and 65% of the total quantity of energy supplied by the Boatd is consumed by the industrial and railway traction consumers. A classification, of these bulk consumers has a rational nexus with the object and purposes of the levy of surcharge. Having regard to all these facts and circumstances, we find 'no substance in the contentfon adanced by some of the appellants that the imposition of fuel surchargt under paragraph 16.7 of the 1979 tariff is arbitrry and violative of.Art. 14 of the Constitution.\n\nThe next atgument advanced ori behalf of the appellants wag that even if the Board is legally entitled to levy the fuel surcharge, that can only be for the purp()se of recouping the amounts actuaily\n\npaid by the Board by Way of 'fuel surcltarge' to the Damodar Valley n Corporation and the U.P. State Electricity Board for the quantities of energy purchased by the Board from these sources and the_ el\\tra cost\n\n63 SVJ>REMn COURT°RllfORTS\n\n[1984] 3 S.C.R.\n\nthat the Board had actually to incur on fuel consumed i~ those two generating stations at Patratu and Barauni. From the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the Board, it is seen that in respect of the increase lnthe cost of productfon of electricity in the two generating statiOJ)S of the Board, the fuel surcharge has taken into account only that part of the increase in cost which is relatable to the increased price of the coal and oil i.e. fuel alone. The increase Jn expenditure\n\nrefemble to the enhancement in cost of the energy generated on other accounts such as wages, maintenance, etc. has not been taken into account in the foe! surcharge. Such increase iii. cost of production on account of those other factors has been offset by a revision of the basic general tariff by 16.5. per cent payable. not on!~ by the industries but by all classes except the agriculturist class. In respect of the energies purchased by the Board from outside sources, namely, the Damodar Valley Corporation and the U.P. State Electricity Board, the increase in cost per unit incurred by the Board has .been included in the computation of the fuel surcharge. We see no substance whatsoever in the contention advanced by the appellants that o.nly such amounts, if any, as might have been paid by the Board to the D.V.C. and the U.P. State Electricity Board as and by way. of fuel surcharge ca:n go into the computation of the fuel surcharged levied by iM Board under paragraph 16.1 of the 1979 tariff. Though the nomenclature given to the levy is \"fuel surcharge\" it is really a surcharge levied to meet the increased cost of genera•ion and purchase of electri city anq this is made absolutely clear in the formula given in para 16.7.2.\n\nThe formula for deterinining the fuel. surcharge set out in\n\npataraph 16. 7. 2 reads :\n\n[Al XA3+Bl XB3+Cl XC3+Dl X D3+El xE3\n\n\"S=\n\n [A2+B2+C2+D2+E2]\". • This is followed by detailed explanation as to what the di!!- . erent alphabets used in the numerator and denominate or signify ..\n\nThe explanation given in respect of Cl is \"Increase in the average unit rate of. purchase of energy from D.V.C. during the year for which the surcharge is to be ca1culated. The said increase to be calculated with respect to the base year 1977-78.\" C3 stands for \"units purchased from D.V.C. duriµg the year\". Likewise, El and IP hav<; beeµ explaiµe4 a, s \"lµcrease ill: h~ avera~? wii! rate 9f\n\nitoHfAS INIJUSTRES v. Bl!!AR, St. ELEC. BOARD (B.:Eradi, J,) 69\n\npurchase of energy from Uttar Pradesh State Electricity Board during the Year for which surcharge is to be calculated, the. said in'crease, to be calculated with respect to the'base Year 1977-78\" and \"units\n\npurchased from Uttar Pradesh State Electricity Board\" re'spectively.\n\nWe see no force in the i; ontention put forward on behalf of some of the appellants that the words\" increase in the •average unit rate or'purchase of energy\" used iu Cl below paragraph 16.7.2 should be interpreted as taking their _colour from the contents of paragraph 16.7.3. From a reading of these provisions it is abundantly clear that the entire increase in cost incurred in the purchase of energy from the D.V.C. a:nd the U.P. State Electricity Board has to go into the computation of the sui:charge leviable under paragraph 16.7.\n\nThe contention to the contrary advanced by the appellants is there\n\nfore, onty'to be rejected. There is no am, biguity whatever in the words used in Ct so as to require us to take light from paragraph\n\nf6.7 .1 for the purpose of under.standing their scope and meaning.\n\nIt was strongly urged on behalf of the appellants that tlfe provision in Cl for increase in the average rate of price of energy from the D.V.C. to be calculated with respect to the. base year 1977-78 is arbitrary.in as much as in fixing the basic tariff as per ihe 'impugned notification' of 1919, the <lifference in cost between Year 1977-78 and the current.year 1979-80 ohas already been -taken foto account. From the counter -affidavit and the statements filed in the High Court on behalf of the respondent Board which form part of the record before us in these appeals, it is seen that only· the fuel surcharge accrued duringthe Year 1977-78 had been merged while fixing the revised rates for energy and it wµs specifically mentioned in paragraph J.5 of the resolution of the Boai:d containing the proposals for the tariff revision, 1979, which the Board forwarded to the State Government that only the fuel surcharge that had accrued\n\nuring 1977-78 ':as being merged in the rev\\sed tariff rates and that\n\n. the subsequent increase or decrease in the. cost of fuel or ihe cost of\n\n'll!Prted energy will, therefor~, reflect in the fuel surcharge hereafter\".\n\nSimilar is the position with respect to the tariff revision effected in J981. Hence th_ere is rto factual foundation for the argument. that there has ben a double neutralisation of the incre.ase in the fuel s_urc?arge_ m respect of.the energy purchased by the Board from outside sources. ~\n\nParagraph 16.7.4 of the tariff notification states that the fuel Surcharge for a financial year shall be calculated by the Board after\n\n.ji\n\n7o SUPREME cotrn.t REPORTS\n\n[19S4] 3 S.C.R.\n\nthe expiry ot the financial year and until such calculation is actually made, fuel surcharge may be levied during each financial year at a rate provisionally calculated on monthly or quarterly or half-yarly basis as decided by the Board, and .in case of short or excess realisation, the sameis to be adjusted in the next bill to be served on the 0 consumer. Based on these provis'ioris, it was falntly argued on behalf of some of the appellants that the Board was under an obligation to issue provisional bills in respect of fuel surcharge 'during the course of.each financial Year and on account of its failure. to do.so, the appellants w.ere unable to include the saiq elemenf in their price structure in respect of ceme.n~, paper and vanaspati produced in the factories of some of theappellants, This contention has to be rejected for two reasons : firstly, the provision contained in the afore said pargraph of the notification is purely an enabling one and it dose not cast any mandatory obligation on the Board to issue any • provisional bills for fuel surcharge, monthly, quarterly, or half-yearly during the course of each financial yeor; secondly apart from merely\n\nputting forward such a plea in the course of arguments before us the appellants have not furnished any'factual data as to how arid in what manner .they had fixed the prfce structure for the different pro.' ducts produced in.ihe appellants' factories .\n\n• Yet another point urged on behalf.of the appellants was that under Section 49 of the Act, while exercising the power of framing uniform tariffs, the Board was under a duty to apply its mind to all relevant factors but there had been an omission to discharge the said mandatory duty inasmuch as the capacity of the concerned industry to pay for the energy at the rate proposed . to be fixed, which is a highly relevant .factor, had not beeen taken into account at all.\n\nClauses (a) to (d) of sub-section 2 of Section 49 enumerated the various matters whfoh the Board shall have regard to in fixing the uuiform tariffs and the capacity of any particular mdustry to bear the energy charge at the proposed rate of levy is not included in the said enumeration. Under the scheme of the tariff flxation incorporated in the section, the tariff is to be uniform subject to the classification of consumers into different <:ategories. . Under sub-section 3 of the said section, the classification of the consumers into such different cattegories<>is1to he made only with reference to the nature of the supply, the purpose {or which supply is required the geographical . position of any area and other like relevant factors. It is not contemplated by the said\n\nection or any ot:. the other provisions of the Act that as amongst\n\n\"j •\n\nR.OltTAS INDUSTRIES v. BIHAR ST. ELEC. BOARD (B. Eradi, J.) 71\n\nconsumers fallin5 within a specified category. different rtes are to be charged depending upon the financial capacity of the particular consumer to pay. \\:)n the other hand, the very core of the scheme of Section 49 is that the tariff should be uniform in respect of each class or category. Hence the attack levelled against the tariff fixation on ihe aforesaid ground, that a. relevant factor, namely, that\n\nthe financial capacity of individual industrial consumers had not been taken into account, is devoid of force.\n\nThe appellants in some of the appeals have challenged the sub sequent tariff fixation of 1981 also on gro11nds that are substantially the same as those which we have dealt with above. For the reasons\n\nalready indicated by us, none of those grounds can be accepted as C correct or tenable.\n\nIt was urged on behalf of the appellants that the supply of electricity being a monopoly service conducted by an agency of the State, namely, the Board, it must be carried out reasonably and not arbitrarily, that such reasonableness should be reflected in the price fixation and if the prices fixed are .arbitraty, they are liable to be called in qu.es!ion before the Courts o\"n lhe said ground. In support of the above contention, reliance was placed by counsel for the ap. pellants on the decisions of this Court in Akadasi Padhan v. State ofOrissa(1), f.ashbihari Panda,. etc. v: State of Orissa,(') Vraj/al Mani/al & Co. & Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.,(') Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. The international Airport Authroity of India and Ors.('). It is wellestablished that where a corporation is an instrumantality or an agency of Government it would, in the . exercise of its powers and function, e subject to the same Constitutional or Public Law .limitations as apply to the Government and the principle of law inhibiting arbitrary action.by. Government would apply equally where such a corporation is dealing with the public, whether by way of giving jobs or entering into ontracts or otherwise and it cannot act arbitraily and enter into relationship with any person in any manner it likes according to its sweet will.\n\nThe aets of such a corporation must be in conformity with some principle which meets the test of reasonableness and relevance. In the case before us, the appellants have totally faiied to establish that the rates specified in the impugned tariff notifications of 1979 and 1981 are arbitrary and unreasonable.\n\n(I) [1963] Supp. 2 s.<;.R. 691\n\n(2) [1969) 3 S.C.R. 374 ··\n\n(3) [1970] l S, C.R. 400\n\n\n(;/\n\n72 SUPREME toU!lt R.EPOJ!.TS [1984] 3 s.c.Ji..\n\nl Sec.ti on 59 of the Act as it now stands after the amendment of 1978 is in t'he following terms :\n\n\"59. (I) The Board shall, after taking credit for any subvention. from the State Government under section 63, carry on its operations urtder this Act and adjust its tariffs so as to ensure that the total revenues in any year of account shall, after meeting ~II expenses properly chargeable to reve . nues including operating, maintenance and management expenses, taxes (if any) on income and 'profits, . depreciation and interest payable on all debentures, bonds and loans, leave . such surplus, as 'i:he State Government may, from time to .\n\ntime, specify.\n\n(2) In specifying the surplus undersub-section (1), the State Government shall have due regarding to the availability of amounts accrued by way of depreciation and the liability for loan amortization and leave;\n\n,,. (a). reasonable sum to contribute towards the cost of capital works; and\n\n(b) where in respect or the Board, a notification has been issued under sub-section (1) or section 12A, a reasonable sum by way of return on the capital provided by the State Government under Sub-section (3) of that section and the amount of the loans (if' any) converted b, y tlte State Govern-' ment into capital under sub-section (I) of section 66A,.\" Under the above provision, the Board is under a statutory obligation to carry on its operations and adjust its tariffs in such a way-as to ensure that the total revenues earned in any year of 'account shall, after neet1ng all expenses poperly chargeable to revenue; leave such surplus as the State Government may, from time to time, specify.\n\nThe tariff fixation has, therefore, to be so made as to raise sufficient revenue which will not mer, ely avoid any net loss being incurred during the financial year but will.ensure a profit being earned, the rate of minimum profit to be earned being such as may be specified by the State Government. The learned Attorney General appearing on behalf of the Board has placed before us tabulatedstateml'nts showing the workingresults (financial) of the Board in the years subsequent to 1977-78. Jt is found therefrom that the net\n\n\": ..\n\n... >\n\nROiiTAS INDUSTRiES \"iliHAR 'sT. U.EC. BOARD(B. Eradi, J.J . 73 ·\n\nresult\"fthe Board; s working ir. each of the year .1978-79 to 1981- 82 was a substantial deficit or ioss. The deficit in 1978-79 was Rs: 15.31 crores, in 1979-80 Rs. 10.27 crores, in 1980-81 Rs. 32.69 crores and in 198i-82 Rs. 18.60 rores. The statemen_t. also shows that th~ reucnue earned per unit of electric energy sold was much lower than the actual cost of production incurred by the Board per . unit. The cost. of prodµction. per unit in the four . years afore~ . mentioned was 51.IO p., 65.10 p., 73.86 p., and 87.16 p. respectively,. whereas the revenue .per unit was only 38.48 p., 47.17 p., 53.07 p., and 66.39 p. respectively:It is thus found that notwithstanding has the mandatory provision contained in Section 69 the Act, the Board . been selling energy at rates which are lower than of the actual cost . incurred by it per unit of.production. Such being the factual .siimi-\n\n. tion, there is absolutely no basis for the. contention urged on behalf. of the appellants that the tariff fixation effected by the Board si.iffers from the voice of arbitrariness and is liable to be interfered with by,\n\nthe Court on the. ground .. , As . pointed. out by this Court. in Prag Ice & Oil Mills and another v. Union of India,' in the ultimate '. D analysis, the mechanics of price fixation -is . necessarily. to be left to the judgment of the executive and unless it is patent that there is . hostile discrimination agairist a class of persons, the processual basis of price fixation is to be accepted in the generality of cases as valid. ·, .,· . . some of the appellants have en.deavoured to persuade us to go into the minutest 'details of the mechanism of the tariff fixation effected.by the Board in an endeavour to demonstrate in relation thereto that a factor here or a' factr th'Cre which_ , ought to - have p_een taken into account has been ignored. .We have declind to go into thos~ factors which are really in the nature of matters of price fixation policy and the Court will be exceeding its jurisdction if it to embark pon a scrutiny of matters of this kind which are\n\nessentially in the. domain of the executive to determine, subject, of. course, to the Constitutional limitations. ,\n\n. . The conchisi.on that.emerges from the foregoing discussion is that the High Court was perfectly right in upholding the validity of the impugned tariff notifications of 1979 and 1981, and these appe'ats . and the S.L.P, have only to be dismissed. · . ,,- ~- - -\n\nH.S.K. Petition's & Appeal.J Disn:lssed. ·\n\n(1) 1197) 3 SCR 293. . .\n\n,!', \\ ll J•\n\n. .", "total_entities": 66, "entities": [{"text": "ROHTAS INDUSTRIES LTD. &, ANR. ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15, "end_char": 49, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "ROHTAS INDUSTRIES LTD. & ANR. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE CHAIRMAN; BIHAR-STATE ELECTRICITY\n\n' .\n\nBOARD AND OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 59, "end_char": 119, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE CHAIRMAN BIHAR STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "D. A. DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 141, "end_char": 152, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.A. DESAI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. BALAKRISHNA ERADi, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 157, "end_char": 181, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. BALAKRISHNA ERADI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Section 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 616, "end_char": 626, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1032, "end_char": 1037, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "6.4. 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1607, "end_char": 1616, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 6.4."}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2770, "end_char": 2772, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3987, "end_char": 3994, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "D.V.C.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5534, "end_char": 5540, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The arg\\lment that\" levy of fuel surcharge can only be\" for the purpose of ·:recouping the\" amounts actually aid by the Board by way of 'fuel surcharge• to the D.V.C. and the U.P. S_tate Electricity Board for the quantities of energy •purchased by the Board fro~ these sources and the extra cost that the Board had\n\nactually to incur on fuel consumed in those - two generating stations at Patratli 'a.Iid Barauni has Ilo force."}}, {"text": "U.P. S_tate Electricity Board", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5549, "end_char": 5578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The arg\\lment that\" levy of fuel surcharge can only be\" for the purpose of ·:recouping the\" amounts actually aid by the Board by way of 'fuel surcharge• to the D.V.C. and the U.P. S_tate Electricity Board for the quantities of energy •purchased by the Board fro~ these sources and the extra cost that the Board had\n\nactually to incur on fuel consumed in those - two generating stations at Patratli 'a.Iid Barauni has Ilo force."}}, {"text": "Patratli", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5763, "end_char": 5771, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The arg\\lment that\" levy of fuel surcharge can only be\" for the purpose of ·:recouping the\" amounts actually aid by the Board by way of 'fuel surcharge• to the D.V.C. and the U.P. S_tate Electricity Board for the quantities of energy •purchased by the Board fro~ these sources and the extra cost that the Board had\n\nactually to incur on fuel consumed in those - two generating stations at Patratli 'a.Iid Barauni has Ilo force."}}, {"text": "Barauni", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5779, "end_char": 5786, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The arg\\lment that\" levy of fuel surcharge can only be\" for the purpose of ·:recouping the\" amounts actually aid by the Board by way of 'fuel surcharge• to the D.V.C. and the U.P. S_tate Electricity Board for the quantities of energy •purchased by the Board fro~ these sources and the extra cost that the Board had\n\nactually to incur on fuel consumed in those - two generating stations at Patratli 'a.Iid Barauni has Ilo force."}}, {"text": "U.P. State Electricity\" Board", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6284, "end_char": 6313, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In rspect of the energies\n\npUrchased by the Board from outside sources, narr.ely, ¢.e Damodar Valle}'\n\n~COti}oration and .the U.P. State Electricity\" Board, the increase in cost per unit\n\n'incurred by the' Board has been included in the contPutation of the fuel surcharge. ·"}}, {"text": "El.ectricity Board", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7190, "end_char": 7208, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BOAAD 6J\n\nEl.ectricity Board has .-to go into the computation of the surcharge leviable under A paragraph 16.7."}}, {"text": "section 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7689, "end_char": 7699, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8149, "end_char": 8153, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shankar Ghosh", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9539, "end_char": 9552, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Shankar Ghosh, Parveen Kumar, Padam Khaitan, C.A. ."}}, {"text": "Parveen Kumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9554, "end_char": 9567, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Shankar Ghosh, Parveen Kumar, Padam Khaitan, C.A. .", "canonical_name": "Parvee11 Kumar"}}, {"text": "Padam Khaitan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9569, "end_char": 9582, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Shankar Ghosh, Parveen Kumar, Padam Khaitan, C.A. ."}}, {"text": "C.A. . Vaidyanarhan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9584, "end_char": 9603, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Shankar Ghosh, Parveen Kumar, Padam Khaitan, C.A. ."}}, {"text": "A.K. Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9741, "end_char": 9749, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.\n\nA.K. Sen, Padam Khaitan, Parveen Kumar and N.R. Khaitan for the Appellants in C.A. Nos."}}, {"text": "N.R. Khaitan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9784, "end_char": 9796, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.\n\nA.K. Sen, Padam Khaitan, Parveen Kumar and N.R. Khaitan for the Appellants in C.A. Nos."}}, {"text": "C.S. Vaidyanathan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9842, "end_char": 9859, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2857~58/82,\n\nC.S. Vaidyanathan, Anil Kumar Sharma, and Mr.. Parvee11 Kumar for the Appellants in CA."}}, {"text": "Anil Kumar Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9861, "end_char": 9878, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2857~58/82,\n\nC.S. Vaidyanathan, Anil Kumar Sharma, and Mr.. Parvee11 Kumar for the Appellants in CA."}}, {"text": "Parvee11 Kumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9889, "end_char": 9903, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2857~58/82,\n\nC.S. Vaidyanathan, Anil Kumar Sharma, and Mr.. Parvee11 Kumar for the Appellants in CA.", "canonical_name": "Parvee11 Kumar"}}, {"text": "K.K. Venugopal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9950, "end_char": 9964, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K.K. Venugopal, C.S. Vaidyanathan fof the Petitioner in SLP Nos."}}, {"text": "L.N. ?inha", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10025, "end_char": 10035, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "L.N. ?"}}, {"text": "Pramod Swaru", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10068, "end_char": 10080, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "General, Rqm Balak Mehto, Pramod Swaru\"' and P.P. Singh for the Respondents in all the appeals & SLP."}}, {"text": "P.P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10087, "end_char": 10097, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "General, Rqm Balak Mehto, Pramod Swaru\"' and P.P. Singh for the Respondents in all the appeals & SLP."}}, {"text": "BALAKRISHNA ERADJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10189, "end_char": 10206, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nBALAKRISHNA ERADJ, J. These appeals (by special leave) and the Special Leave Petition involve common questions concerning the ."}}, {"text": "Bihar State Electricity Board", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10404, "end_char": 10433, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "st respondent-Bihar State Electricity Board-r \"fuel suichllrge\" as per the revised tariff dated 1st April, 1979, and hence they were heard together."}}, {"text": "Bihar State Electricity Board", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11226, "end_char": 11255, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".The Bihar State Electricity Board hereinafter called 'the Board') is incorporated under Section 12 of the Electricity (Supply) Mt 1948 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act')."}}, {"text": "Section 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11310, "end_char": 11320, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "B. Eradi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12008, "end_char": 12016, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "BOARD (B. Eradi, J.)\n\ntriffs for the purposes of such supply."}}, {"text": "1st April, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14183, "end_char": 14198, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The said tariff was to take effect from\n\n1st April, 1979."}}, {"text": "Bihar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14282, "end_char": 14287, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellants are companies having factories in different parts of the State to Bihar and they have entered into agreemepts with the Board for supply of high tension electric current."}}, {"text": "Usha Martin Black (Wire Rods)- Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14619, "end_char": 14654, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1855/ 81 out of which -C.A. 28 58/82 arises in a copy of the agreement entered into by M/s Usha Martin Black (Wire Rods)- Ltd. with the Board on 18.8:1961."}}, {"text": "18.8:1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14673, "end_char": 14682, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1855/ 81 out of which -C.A. 28 58/82 arises in a copy of the agreement entered into by M/s Usha Martin Black (Wire Rods)- Ltd. with the Board on 18.8:1961."}}, {"text": "clause 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14687, "end_char": 14695, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14942, "end_char": 14951, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Electricity Act 1910", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15053, "end_char": 15080, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "High Court of Patna", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 16417, "end_char": 16436, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "soARD (B. Eradi, J.)\n\n• thereupon the appellants filed Writ Petitions in the High Court of Patna contending that the provision contained in Paragraph\n\n16."}}, {"text": "Shriram Bearings Ltd.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 17384, "end_char": 17405, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Eight writ petitions, of which C.W.J.C. 1237 of 1981, filed by M/s.\n\nShriram Bearings Ltd., Ranchi (Petitioner in SLP No: 2904/1982) was apparently treated by."}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18582, "end_char": 18591, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18595, "end_char": 18605, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Part II of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19275, "end_char": 19318, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19380, "end_char": 19390, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part II of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "statute": "Part II of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19473, "end_char": 19482, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Part II of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910", "statute": "Part II of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "U.P. State Electricity Board", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 23603, "end_char": 23631, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "purchase of power from the two outside sources, namely, the D.V.C. and the U.P. State Electricity Board and 65% of the total quantity of energy supplied by the Boatd is consumed by the industrial and railway traction consumers."}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24107, "end_char": 24114, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Damodar Valley n Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 24390, "end_char": 24418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The next atgument advanced ori behalf of the appellants wag that even if the Board is legally entitled to levy the fuel surcharge, that can only be for the purp()se of recouping the amounts actuaily\n\npaid by the Board by Way of 'fuel surcltarge' to the Damodar Valley n Corporation and the U.P. State Electricity Board for the quantities of energy purchased by the Board from these sources and the_ el\\tra cost\n\n63 SVJ>REMn COURT°RllfORTS\n\n[1984] 3 S.C.R.\n\nthat the Board had actually to incur on fuel consumed i~ those two generating stations at Patratu and Barauni."}}, {"text": "Patratu", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 24684, "end_char": 24691, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The next atgument advanced ori behalf of the appellants wag that even if the Board is legally entitled to levy the fuel surcharge, that can only be for the purp()se of recouping the amounts actuaily\n\npaid by the Board by Way of 'fuel surcltarge' to the Damodar Valley n Corporation and the U.P. State Electricity Board for the quantities of energy purchased by the Board from these sources and the_ el\\tra cost\n\n63 SVJ>REMn COURT°RllfORTS\n\n[1984] 3 S.C.R.\n\nthat the Board had actually to incur on fuel consumed i~ those two generating stations at Patratu and Barauni."}}, {"text": "Damodar Valley Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 25565, "end_char": 25591, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In respect of the energies purchased by the Board from outside sources, namely, the Damodar Valley Corporation and the U.P. State Electricity Board, the increase in cost per unit incurred by the Board has .been included in the computation of the fuel surcharge."}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh State Electricity Board", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 27289, "end_char": 27326, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "said in'crease, to be calculated with respect to the'base Year 1977-78\" and \"units\n\npurchased from Uttar Pradesh State Electricity Board\" re'spectively."}}, {"text": "Section 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31288, "end_char": 31298, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31716, "end_char": 31725, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31729, "end_char": 31739, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32157, "end_char": 32166, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 49", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32813, "end_char": 32823, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1969) 3 S.C.R. 374", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 35097, "end_char": 35116, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 63", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35400, "end_char": 35410, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 12A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36242, "end_char": 36253, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 66A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36491, "end_char": 36502, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 69", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38174, "end_char": 38184, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "H.S.K.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 39926, "end_char": 39932, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~- - -\n\nH.S.K. Petition's & Appeal."}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_3_623_639_EN", "year": 1984, "text": ".......\n\nEX. CAPT. K.C. ARORA AND ANOTHER\n\nSTATE OF HARYANA AND. OTHERS\n\nApril 26, 1984\n\n6Z3\n\n[0. CHINNAPPA REDDY; E.S, VENKATARAMIAll AND R.B. MISRA, JJ.]\n\n. The Punjab Government Nationai Emergency (Concessions) Rules 1965 Rules 2, and J(ii), as amended by the Haryana Government Gazette Notification No . . GSR 77/Const/AFt 309/Am.end/(1)/76 dated August 9, 1976 amending the definition of the experession \"Mifitar ::, ervice'' in Rule 2, Constitutional Validity-The vested accrued right of a Government Servant cannot be taken away by making. amendments of the rules with retrospective effect.\n\nIn 1962 an emergency was imposed by the Government of India on account of_tbe external aggression by the Chine; e forces 'in the Indian\n\nTrritory. The Government was in great need of youogmen to join the military service at the risk of their lives to serve the nation to cope with the\n\nemergc:ncy needs of the Government-of India. The Government of India as well as the State Governments decided to give certain benefits to encourage\n\nthe young energetic youths to join military service at the critical juncture o~ national emergency and therefore issued different circulars and advertisements on radio and tbe'.press promising certain benets to youngmen who join tho mi!ifary service at the critical junCture.\n\nLater on, on the instructions of the Central Government concessions as were promised through circulas and by 'other. means were incorporated in. the rules framed by the joint Punjab Government under Article 309 of the Constitution, titled as. \"The Punjab National EmergencY (Concessions) Rules. 1965.\"\n\nKeeping' in view the needs of the country and assurances and .concessions contained in conditions of service in executive instructions, the petitioners and appellants and many others like them joined the army during-· the emergency as commissioned office.rs in 19.63-64 and had rendered more than five years of service reckoned from 26.10.1982 i. e. date of proclamation of emergency and after their release froni the Army they were _entitled to benefits vested' in them undez the conditions of service.\n\nThe petitioners and appellants and a number of others similar to the\n\npetitioner~; joined the Haryana Government as Assistant Engineers. conse- quent upon their appointments against tlie vacancies reserved for ex-army Officers, they became entitled to get their seniority fixed giviog them the benefit or their military service; but the gradation list prepared however did not include their miltary service for the purposes o( . fixation of their\n\nseniorit~. The State of Haryana just to deprive the petitioners and others similarly situated, of mil]tary service, amended the Jules with retrospectiveeffect from November 1,1966 vide Haryana Government Gazette Notification No. GSR 77/Const/Art 309/Amendj(l)/76 dated March 22,1976\n\nilltroclucing a proviso to rule 4 (ij) qf the 1965 Rules and vide Haryana' l 9pvcrnment Ga~tte N otication No G~R 182/Const/ Art ~09/ Ar:nend/(2)/. J\n\nSUPREME COU\"R T REPORTS (1984] 3 s.c.R.\n\n76 dated 'August 9,1976. amending Rule 2 of the 1965 Rules.\n\nThese notifications restricted the benefits of military service upto January 10, 19(i8 the date on which the firt emergency , a; lifted with the result that the vested rights which accrued to the petitioners io l969, 1970 and 1971 have\n\nbeen taken away.\n\nThe two writ pe itions Nos. WP 2065/1976and WP 2065/1976 an<:l WP 1088/1980 challenging the same were dismissed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court and hence their appeals Nos. CA 3095 and 3096/1980 by way of special leave. Some others directly filed petitions in the Supreme .Court under Art 32 and they are WPs 6437 and 6436 of 198'0.\n\nAllowing the appeals and the Petitions, tc Court\n\nHELD.: 1:1. The Parliament as also the State; Legislature have plenary powers to legislate within the field of legislation committed to them and subject to certain constitutional restrictions they can legislate pros p'ect.ively as well as retrospectively. [63ZC-D] .\n\n1:2. It is, however, a cardinal principle of construcrioo that every statute is prima facie prospective unless it is expre>sly or by necessary implication made to have retrospective effect, But tho rule in general is applicable where the objct of the statute is to affect the vested rights or to impose new burden or to impair existing obligations; Up less there are words in the statute sufficient to show the intention ()f the legislature to effect existing rights, it is deemed to be prospcc!ive only. Provisions whiclt\n\ntouch a r.ight in existence at t.he passing of the statute are not lo be applied retrospectively in the absence of express enactmeot or necssary intendment. 'The Governor cim also exercise fhe S3me powers under Art. 309 of the Constitution and ther, e is not the slightest doubt that the impugned amendment brought in has been made retrospective.\n\nThe impugned amendments in the_ instant case by necessar~ implication have uodoubtedlda retrospective effect. [6 32Df]\n\nHarbhajan Singh v. Stare o/Punjab [1977} 2 S.L.R. 180; Ex. Major. N.C F Singhal v.. Director General Armed Fors Medical Service: A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 628; State of Mysore v. M.N. Krishna Murty & Ors.~ [19731 2 S.C.R. 575; Raj Kumar\n\n v. Union of llidia & Ors., [1975]3 S.C.R. 963; Wing Commander!. Kumar v.\n\nUnion of India & Ors. [1982]'1 S.C.C. 116; B.S. Vadera v. Union of India & Ors., [1968] 3 S.C.R. 575 ; discussed. . ·\n\n1:3. The Haryana Government cannot take away tbe accrued rights of the petitioners and' the appellants by making amendment of the rules with retrospective effect. The_ impugned rule 4 (ii) of the Punjab qovernment National Emergency (Concessions) Rule, 1965, as amende() by the Haryana Government Gazette Notification No. GSR. 77/Const./Art. 309/Amend/ (1)/76 dated 22nd March, 1976 .and the Notifica!ion No. G.S.R. 182/ Const/Art/309/ Amebd. (2)/76 dated 9th\"\" August, 1976 amending the definition of the t; Xpresio~ 'military service'. in rule 2, are ultra .vires the Constitution, in so far'as they e, ffect pfejudicially persons who bad acquired rights. (639B~C-D-E) .\n\nState of Gujarat v. aman Ita/ l{eshav La! Soni, [1983]2 S.c.c; 33 ;\n\nroUQw~.\n\nl ' ·\n\nK.C. AR?RA Y. HARYAYA (Jfisra, J.) . 625\n\nOl!fGJIIAL ]UIUSDICTI0:-1: Writ Petitions Nos. 6436)? of 1980\n\n(Under .Article 32 of the Constitution of India]·\n\nAND\n\nCivil Appeals Nos. 3095-96 of 1980\n\n: . f\\ppcal by Spccialleav!! from the Judgment and Order dated\n\n1 the lOth October, 1980. of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in c. ! . Writ Petition No. 2065 of 1976 & 1088 of 1980)\n\ni '\n\nI ,. f\n\nP.C. Blwrtari for the Appellant.\n\nDr. Y.S. Clzlta/e and M.G. Ramachandran for Respondents .in Writ Petitions.\n\nV.C •. '!falzajan; J.S. Goel and R.N. Poddar for Respondent.\n\n The Judgment of the Court wa~ delivered by\n\nMISRA, J. The present writ petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution and the civil appeals by special leave aising out of . petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution. raise common ··· questions of law and are, therefore, bing-dispo~d of by II common judgment. ·\n\nThe patte; n of fncts i~ the present group of case~ is the same and. therefore, it is not necessnry to give the facts of each case kparatcly. In onler to bring out the points for consideration in these\n\n~ . cases we would like to give the facts of writ petition No . . 6436 of ' 1980. . . . .\n\nIn 1952 un emergency was imposed by the Government of India on ?ccount of the external nggrcssiQn by the Chinese forces on the\n\nln~, an territory. The! Govcrnmdnt was in great need of youngmen 10 JOin the military service at the risk of their lives to srve the nation ~Cope With the emergency needs of the Go, ernmcnt of India.' The .ovcrnrncnt of Indiol as well as the St:tt~: Govcriuncnts qccided to i•vc c · 1 t • • . . ertam benefits to encourage the young energetiC yout.IS o JOID , ~'htary service at the critical juncture Qf national emergency . . The\n\na ~crnrncnt in the Stat.:s nnd the Centre issued difi'cr-en~ circulars . ,: b adertisements on radio and the press promisin~ ccrtam bc~fits iunu~cn t.o yougmcn who join the military srv1ce at the cn~1cal\n\n• l • J I I A.\n\nI ·;\n\nI , B\n\nI a i\n\ni l (\n\nD . r\n\n' 1.· i d. !l ·• :i ¥ ; }: )' rr\n\n~ !\n\n!J.\n\nJ .\n\n: j '\n\n~ ; I • ; l .\n\n' J G\n\nI ' < ' ;\n\n,.\n\nH \\;\n\n. i\n\nI ' j l\n\n., . t.\n\n\\ , i\n\n'A'\n\n. - c\n\n. . ·. -- I\n\n626 SUPRHIE COURT REPrJRTS . . fl984JJ S, c~\n\nJn .July 1963 a circular was issued by the Financial Com :i:. t sioner, Punjab wit~ :cgard ~the conessions _to civi, lian cmplo:: . and others who Jomed m1htary serv1e, wlncli will account t\n\nincrements, seniority and pension in civil employment.· Later 0r on the instructions of the C'enfral Government concessions as wcr~. promises through circulars and by other means were incorporated in the rules framed by the joint Punjab Government under Article 309 of the Constitution.. ·\n\nKeeping in' view the needs of the. country and assurances l contained in conditions of service iil executive instructions the . petitioners and th.c appellants and many others like them joined the. ,\n\n1 army during the .~:mergcncy . mf C'om missined Officers in 1963-64 .. ' They were commissioned officers in tbc Indian Army for more . r .. than five years and after their release from the Army they were\n\n~ entitled to benefits vested in them u.nder the conditions of service.\n\nThe Haryana Government in tile year 1969 advertised 16 pQsls of temporary Assistant Engineers in P. W.D.,· B & R Branch. At the t:me of the advertisemeat on 28th of January, 1969 8 posts'out . of the total of 16 were reserved for e~-emergency commission~ 'officers and servicemen. Although the advertisement was for 16 ·\n\nposts but at the time of selection s 5 appointment were. made, 'out of . which 20 posts were reserved for ex-emergency . C.:Jmrnissioncd • o1Icers. Out of this quota of 10 po-.u only 7 aptXJintril.ents from :-\n\namont the ex-em.eT~ O:, mmiM1on.:rl oi= .. -as ~= I!IJ.Ik. ' . .Rcqunite qaaiifi..cations f.:>r n:-ema~ roned ofun allJ\n\nic.tmen w-ere as fo~ :\n\n.. I. Diploma in ci, il engineering from a reCQg:nised institu-\n\n.tioo. ·\n\n2, Five 1ears ntinuous service with distinguished record.\n\n. . .\n\n. A:goati:n:eiFoq::Nto:vuke:m:b:erc.:glfe97:0:u:318:~:po s.fitvs. •oyfcaterms'pocroaryntinAusosuisstant ··~ scr:vice; the pcr!od commencing from 26.10.\"1962 will only be . taken into consideration. •· '\n\nEngtncers wc; re advertised out of 18 posts were reserved .. for es . ' emergency commissioned officers. At the time of making appaint- } ments, however, 9~ persons were appointed and out of these 99 pasts ,. ~\n\n- ~-....,., •• -- ~J .. ,~ ... •• j __ ', . ...\n\n•. t.\n\n. K.C. ARORA v, HARYANA (Misra, J.) • 627\n\n90 posts were declared eserved for ex-emergency commissioned officers. But agai~ only 7 ex-emergency commissioned officers were A appointed in' response to te advertisement.\n\nPetitioner No. 1 on selection had joined service. on 17th of August, 1971. The second advertisement also contained the same qualifications as were in the first advertisement. Thus the two petitioners in writ petition Nos. 6436-37 served the Indian Army.for more than five years and thereafter those petitioners were-appointed in the service of the Haryana Government as temporary Assistant Engineers against the posts reserved for the ex-emergecy commis~\n\nsioned officers. There were a number of other persons similar t!) the petitioners who were !llso appointed against the vacancies reserved for ex~Aimy officers.\n\nThe Government ofPuJijab prior to the formation of Haryana made statutory rules under Article 309 of the Constitution w.hich are called 'The Punjab National Emergency (Concession) Rules, 1965 .. The relevant rules 2, 3, 4, and 5 of these rules are as uder:\n\n\"2 .. Definition.:-: For the purpose of these rules, the . . expression 'military service' means enrolled or commissioned service in any of the three wings ofthe Indian Armed Forces\n\n(including service as a Warrant Officer) rendered by a person during the period of operation of the proclamation of' emergency made by the President under ArtiCle 352 of the Constitution of India on. the 26th October, 196.2 or such other service as.may hereafter be declared as military service .\n\nfor the purposes of these rules. Any period of miiitary train- . ing followed by military service shall also be rckoned as Military Service. ·\n\n' ... '\n\n3. Maximum agelimit and minimum qualification :\n\ni) The maximum age-limit , prescribed.for appointment to ,\n\nany service o~ . post . shall be relaxed in, favour of a persop who bas.rendered military ~rvice tq:the extent Of his military Service, provided he pruces a certificate from the competent . .authority that he .hild rendred continuout military service for' a . period of not less . than six months and was discharged because of demo~ bilisation or reduction not more than three year.s prior\n\nto tht: da~~ t;>f i~ reistration at an employment\n\nH ·\n\n. ,\n\n( .. • 628 SUPREME COuRT REPORTS [1984] 3 s.c.R.\n\nexchange or tlle date of his application for employment under the Government.\n\n1i) A person who has become disabled while in military\n\ns'ervice sha11 also\" be entitled to exlude from his' age the period from the date he was disabled up to the date of his application for appointment to any service or post under the Government, or till the end of the present emergency, whichever is shorter.\n\niii) In case a person who has rendered military service does not possess the minimum qualification prescribed . for an~ service or post, he' shall be deeed to possess these qualifications if the appointing authority certifies that such a person has acquired by experience or other~ . wise qualification equivalent to those prescribed for that service or post .\n\nIncrement.s, seniority and pension : period of military service shall count for increments, seniority and pension as under:- ·\n\n. (i) Increments : The peridd spent by a person on military service, after' attaining the minimum age, prescribed ' for appointment to any service or post, to which he is appointed, shall count for increments. Where no such minimum age is prescribed the minimum age shall be as laid down in rules 3.9, 3~10 and 3'11 of the Punjab Civit'Services Rules Volume II. Tbis\" concession shall, however, be admissible ori)y. on first appointment.\n\n(ii) Seniority : The period of military service mentioned in clause .(1) shall be'taken into consideration for the purppse .of determining th~ seniority of a person who !:)as ren~ dered military service. • .. .. .\n\n(iii) Pension: The period of military serv\"ice mentioned in clause (i) shall count towards pension only in the case of appointments to . permanent services or posts under the Government subject to the following conitions : ·\n\n (1) The person concerned should have earned a pension under. military rules in respect. of 'the military service in\n\nquestion.\n\nl .\n\n- -~\n\n• +\n\nK.C. ARORA v. HARYANA-(Misra, J.) 629\n\n(2) Any bonus. or gratuity paid in respect of military service by the defence authorities sl; all have to be. refunded to A the State Government.\n\n(3) The period, if any, between the date of discharge from military service and the date of •appointment to any service or post under the Government shall count for pension, provided su.ch period does not exceed one year. Any period exceeding one year but not ex .. eediog three years may also be allowed to count for penion in exceptional cases . . under the orders of the Gl>v-:rnment.\n\n5: Seniority, promotion, increment, pesion andleave of Government employees :-The p~!riod spent on military ser- · vice by a Government employe~ shall-.eout}t for. seniority promotion, icrement and pension in the service or post held by himimmediately before his joining military service. A\n\npermannt 'Government employee wlio renders military service, shall earn leave during, such service according to the leave rules applicable to him immediately before his joining· military service; A emporary Government employees shall duririg military service, be governed by the mihtary rules in . all respects. The employee concerned shall be entitled to\n\nproforma promotion in his parent department under the 'next below; rule and also to seniority in higher posts to which he would otherwise have been entitled if he had not joined militat'y service.\n\nAccording to these rule, s and the previous assurances given by the Government the petitioners were to be given seniority by countng period of military service for the purpose of determining . seniority, increments and pension etc, Immediately on appointment of the petitioners as temporary Assistant Engineers they became entitled to get their seniority fixed giving them the benefit . ' of their military service but the gradation list prepared, owever, did n, ot include the military service of the pe, titioners for the purpose of fixation of-their seniority. The State of Haryana just to deprive-the petitioi?-ers, and others similarly situated, of military service amended the rules with retrospective effect from lst November, 1966 vide Haryarla Government Gazette Notification .No. G.S.R. 77/Const/Ait. 309/Amend/(1)/76 dated 22nd March . . '\n\n1976. The Amendment was Iilade in the rule 4(ii) by adding a proviso, which is in the following terms ;\n\n. F .\n\nB .\n\n' •\n\n. SUPREME COURT REPORtS. . ti984] 3 s.c.R.\n\n\"Provided. that a person. who has availed of concession under sub-rule (3) of rule L(3) shall not be entitled to the concession under this clause.\"\n\n. The Government also issued a notification No. G.S.R. 182/ Const/Art/. 309/Amed/(2)/76 dated 9th Augut, 1976 making amendment in the definition of the expression 'military service' in • • rule 2 just to .retreat from their previous commitments. , It reads :\n\n.j . , : \"Fo( the purpos\"e of these ruleli the expression 'military service' means the service rendered by a person, who had ben enrolled .or commissioned during the period of pperation of the proclamation of emrgency made by the President under Article 352 of the Constitution of India on '26th October~ 1962 .in any of the three wings of the Indi'an\n\nArm.ed Forces (including the service as a Warrant Officer) du; ing the period of the said emergency or such other\" service as may hereafter. be declared as military ser.vice for the\n\n.'~ purpose of these rules. . An~ period of military training\n\nfollowed by military service shall also be eckoned as military . s.ervice.\"\n\nThis notification has ben issued with retr.ospective effect\n\n...,-\n\nE from Ist cif November, 1966 and restricted the benefits of military service upto lOth of January, 1968, the date on which . the ·.first emergency was lifted with the result that the vested rights which · . .1-....~ accrued to the petitioners in 1969, l97~ and .l971 hve beeli taken\n\naway. '\n\nsome of the ex-milit; uy officers challenged the impugned amendment and the consequent gradatioJ?. list by filing two peti- .tions, writ petition No.:l088 of 19SO and writ petition No. 2065 of 1976 in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana under Article 226 of the Constitution. Both these wri~ petitions were dismissed by the High court and they gave rise to civil appeal Nos. 3096 and 3095 f 1980 -respectively. Some of the ex-military officers have filed writ petitions directly before this Court under Article 32 of the• Constitution and they ar.e writ petition Nos. 6436 nd 6437 of . 1980.\n\n The petitioners in the vrit petitions undet: Article 226 of the Constitution before the High Court challenged the amndment of the Punjab Government National Emergency (Concession) Rules\n\nA. -.\n\n. +\n\n! .\n\nk.C. ARORA V. HARYANA (Misra, J.)\n\n1965 with retrospective effect as violative of Arts. 14, 16, 19,31 and 311 of the Constitution 'and prayed fo~ the following relief :\n\n1. 'lhe Punjab Government National Emergency (Concession) Ha'ryana First Amendment Rules, 1976. pe .declared ultra vlres Article l6 of the Constitution of India.\n\nA writ'in the ature of ceftiorqri quashing the seniority list . of Haryana Service of Engineers, PWD (B & R\n\nBranch), Class II be issued.\n\nA writ in 'the nature of mandamus directing respondents\n\n1 and 2. to declare the pe!itioners senior to respondets. C ...\n\n The High Court came to the conclusion that the petitioners have availed of the concesion un.dcr sub-rule (3) of rule 3 of 1965.\n\nRules inasmuch as the educational qualifications in the case of the petitioners had been relaxed 1n terms ofsub-rule (3) of rule 3 and they had wailed of these concessions at the time of their recruitment as te[)lporary Assistant Engineers. Now by the impugned amendment the concession of doubte benefit has been withdrawn by . adding the proviso to cl. (ii) of rule 4 introduced, in 1976. previo~\n\nsly an ex-servicemen could avail of the concession of . relaxation in the educational qualification at the time of recruitment on the basis of his military seryice. Under rule 4 he could count military . service towards seniority. The proviso has taken. away the second \" benefit. The ex-se, rviceman who has been recruited after availling\n\nofthe cqncession in academic qualifications cannot count his military service towards sepiorlty in the civil post . held by him.\n\nThis concession has been withdrawn by the Governor in exercise of\n\nhis powers under proviso to 'Art. 309 of. the Constitution and the amendment having been made in exercise of the le, gislative powers conferred on the (}Qverhor by the Constitution are valid and suffer fro in no infirmity. The High Court also took the view' th!lt there is no estoppel agains~ tne Government in tlie xercise of its legislative soVereign or executi'#e powers. The State could am.end the 1965 Rules and take away the benefits bestowed on the petitioners. , It also held that the. rules can be f[aiped with retrospective effect\n\nan'd they can take away even vested rights. In the opinion of the High Court the diplqmaholdrs i~ engineering on the basis of their educational qualification formed one class separate from other ex-emergency commissioned officers .who are degree holders in engineering and that classification i~ the service can be made on\n\n632 SUPREME COuRT REPORTS\n\n\n. the basis of educatioal qualifications and such a classification is not bad.\n\nThe appellants in the appeals against this judgment of the High Court reiterated the same contentions before this Court. In the two petitions _under Art. 32 of Constitution also similar points have been raised. The main contention on behalf of the appellants\n\n.. ,.. ..\n\nas well as on behalf of the petitioners is that the rules could not be + • amended with retrospective effect to deprive them of the vested rights and if the appellants and the petitioners are entitled to the benefits of military service perforce t, hey would be much more senior to o.thers and the gradation list .prepared in complete ignorance of the military service will not be according to law.\n\nI It may be pointed out at the very outset that the Parliament as . also the Sate Legislature have plenary powers to legistate within the field of legislation committed to them and subject to certain con- -· stitutional restrictions they can legislate prospectively as well as f\n\nI? r.et_rospectively. It is, however, a cardinal principle of consttuctution\n\n. that every statute is prima facie prospective unless it is expressely or by necessary implicatiqn made to have retrospective effect. But the\n\nle in general is applicable wher.e the object of the statute is to.· . affect the vested rights or to impose new burden or to impair existing obligations; Unless there are word's in the statute su.fficjent to show the .intention of the legislature to effect existing rigQ.ts, it is deemed t'o be prospective only. Provisions which touch a right in existence at the passing of the statute are not to he applied ietros• pectively .. in the absence of express enactment or necessary interidment~· The Governor can also exrcise the same powers under Art.\n\nF 309 of tile Constitution and thereis not the slightest doqbt that the _impugned amendment brought in has been made. retrospective. The impugned amendment in the instant case by necessary implication have undoubtedly a retrospective effect.\n\n. For the petitioners jt was contended that the benefits acquired could not be taken aw\\y by an amendmept with retrospective effect. .\n\nIt was further contended 'that tl!.e amennient was discriminatoJ,\"y . and that the retrospectivity given to the provisions ofthe Amending Act could not cure the discrimination introduced by the Act and sought to be plrpetuated bY\"it. In support ofthis contention reliance was placed upon flarbhfljan Singh v. The State of Pujab(l),\n\n(I) [1977] 2 S.L.R .. l80.\n\n...\n\n; .\n\nK.C. ~RORA v. HARYA]'IA (Misra, J.) 633\n\nIn that case te question that fell for consideration before the Con-,· stitution Bench of the P'unjab and Haryana High Court was regarding the intrprtation of rule 3(iii)(cc)(ii)(b) ofthe Demobilised Indian Armed Forces Personnel (Reservation of Vacancies) in\n\nPunjab Civil Service. (Judi&l Branch) (First-Amendment) Rules,\n\n1976. The Demobllised Indian Armed Forces Persopnel (Reservation of Vacancies) iri the Punjab Civil Service (Judicial Branch) Rules, i969, liad been repealed and the Demobilised Indian Armed Forces Personnel (Reservation of Vacancies) in the Punjab Civil Service (Judicial Branch) Rules; 1975, as amended, were in force and these . exCluded from the category of released Armed Forces Personnel, persons who had joined a civil service :or the Union or a State or a civil post under the Union or a State•after their release from the Armed Forces of the Union. The COl, Jrt dealing with the question '\n\n• I\n\nobserved : ...,_ '\n\n\"Now the rule-making.authority mu\"st have been aware that a competitive examination for appointment to the servic;:e\n\nhad been held under the old rules and appointments were yet . in the offing. Surely, the rule-making authority did not intend to exclude from appointment candidates who were eligible under the old rules but became ineligible by reason of an amendment of the rules made after t)le process of selection had almost reached a finnl stage. The amendment did not in any manner touch the qualifications of the candidates.\n\nHad the amended rule been in force fron;1:the beginning, persons in the tosition of the \"petitioner might not bil.Ve accepted any eploy_nient and preferred to wait for selection and appointment to the Punjab Civil Service (judicial Brancl\\). Are they to be penalised \"by barring their entry into the Punjab Civil Service (Judicial. Braach) because they_ accepted employment at a time when acCeptance of such employment was not a bar to appointment to the service ?\n\nWe do not tbinklhat we wiil be justified in attributing such an unreasonable intention to the rule-making authority. In\n\nQUI view, the only reasonable interpretation of the amended rule, consistent with the prevail'ing; situatiou, is to hold that\n\nonly th_ose prsons who having joined, the service of the\n\nUnion or the State or a pst underthe Union or the State previously continued to hold the post on the date of the com\n\ning into force of the rule, are excluded from appointment to the Punjab Civil Service (Judicial Branch). he eJ~.pression 'joined\n\n~ c\n\n. SUPREME COURT REPORTS,\n\n(1984) 3 S.C.R\n\nor joins' must be_ given a reasonable interpretation in the ·\n\ncontext of tl¢ situation and we think .that our interpretation. does not strain the .language o.r attributes unreasonableness to the rule-making authority. In that View, the petitipner cannot be said to be ineligible for appoi_ntment.\" . .\n\nNext reliance was placed upon Ex-Major N.C. Singhal v. : Director Ge!leral, Armed Forces Medical Service.<1) ln that case the conditions of service of the appellant were.governe~ by paragraph 13 of the Army Instruction No. 1/S of 1954 and his previousfull py · commissioned service shout<! have been taken in the matter, of 'antedate' for the purpose of his pay. The conditions of service were, -however, sought to be altered by Army Instruction No. 176 of 1965 .\n\nto tlie prejudice of tlie ppetlant. Tliis Court held that the condi- . tions . cif service in this regard were not liable to_ e altered or modified to the prejudice of the appellant by a subsequent administrative (Army?) instruction which was gi'.!en retrospective effect from 26th October, 1962.\n\nReliance was also plac, ed upon Sta_te of Mysore v.' M.N.\n\nKirshna Murthy &Ors.(z) In that case also the rules_ of 1959 had been amended which sought to disintegrate the service which had been\n\nintegrate~: This Court held that such amendment made (or the\n\npurpos~ .:flustifying the illegal promotion made, in the teeth of-the\n\nprotection conferred by Articles 14 and:16(1) of the Constitution of ..\n\nIndia upon Indian citizens in Government service, could not be up- . held.. The power of making rules relating to recruitment and conditions of service under the proviso to Article 309 could not be ued to validate unconstitutional discrimintion in promotional_ chances of Government .. servants who belonged to the same category . ..,..\n\n Shri Mahajan appearing for respondent No. 1 in reply on the other hand contended that the rules made under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution are legislative in character and, therefore, can be given: effect retrospectively:. In support of his submission he counted upon Raj Kumar v.· Union~~ India & Or~.(3J\n\nHe also relied oil Wing Cpmmander J. Kumar v. Union of India & Ofs.C'> In that case a ontention was raised that the impugn_ed rule ,, .\n\n(1) A.I.R. [J9?,2] SC 628.\n\n\n(3) [19 sJ 3. s.c.R. 963 ( 4) [1982] 2 s.c.R: 116 ·\n\nk.c. ARORA v. HARYANA (Misra, J.) 635\n\nnot having been specifically declared to be retrospective in operation, its provisions cannot be applied to the appellan! inasmuch as be had been inducted into the R & D cadr~ long prior to the promulgation of the new rules. This Court dealing with th'e point observed :\n\n\"We have aheady found that, as a matter of fact the practice geneially foitowed ·\"in the R. & D Organi.sation even . prior to .the prom!lgation o_f the impugned rules, was to reckon seniority with reference to the date of attainment of the rarik of su6stantive major/equivalent. Even otherwise, when a statutory rule governing seniority is issued in respect of a service, the said ru1e would govern the personnel in the service with effect from the date of its promulgation and in so giving effect to the rul~ -in future, there is no element of retroactivity involved; Of course,. the rules will not operate\n\n.· to deprive any person of promotions already earned in the past, but, forpurposes of future promotions anp seniority in the department, the :principles !slid down in the impugned rule will necessarily govern ~II the personnel alike.\"\n\nThis case instea'd ofsupporting the contention of Shri Mahajan goes to strengthen the contention raised on behalf of the appellant and the petitioners. ..\n\nMuch emphasis was _laid by Shri Mahajan on the case of B.S. Vadera v. Union of India.~ Ors.(l) In t-hat case the ptitioners, , who were woking as Assistants, were reverted as Upper Divisiop\n\nClerk in 1967 by the operation of the Railway Board's Secretariat Clerical Servic~ (Reorganisation) Scheme. The said scheme was framed on February 5, -1957 but was brought into effect from December I, 19-54. Certain modifications to the scheme relating to the manner of filing up f permanent and temporary vac; ancies in Grade I of the Service were , made in 1963. The petitioners challeng ed the orders of reversion as illegal inasmuch as their promotion as Upper D.vision Clerks and later as Assistants had been on a permanent basis and could not be :disturbed .and that the scheme as\n\nwell as the. various orders passed by the respondents were violat.ive of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, that the Railway Board hadno power in law to .frame either. th~ scheme or to modify the · scheme so. as to have retrospective effect from December 1, 1954 ..\n\nThis Cout held ihat the ranking given to the petitioners as a resu)t\n\n(1) [1968] 3 SCR 575.\n\n.,.\n\n' I . ! .\n\n. I i ! ' ,.,\n\ni~ 1.::\n\n; .\n\n. .\n\n636 '\"\"\"'\"\"\"\" wom U984Jh.,, J of which the ipugncd orders of r~ersion were passed was in .\n\nccordance with the scheme as modtfied. m_I963, and once it is held\n\nthat the p-etitioners did not satisfy the requirement of the scherne for being retained as Assistants, there was no quetlon of aoy discrimi 'nation under Article .14 or violation of At1~1c 16, and that tbe Indian Railway Establishment Code had becir Issue~ by the President in exercise of lhc powers vested in him by the proviso to Article 3()9 of the Constitution.\n\nRule !57 of the Cod!! giv<; s the Railway Board full powers 1o .make rules <;>f gcnerl application to non-gettcd\n\nr'aiJw; y servants under their control. ad th.~ power to make rules .l with rctrospelivc effect cannot be-denied to the Railway Board... . l Accordingly, the schcm~ framed by tbe said Board i_n 1957 could be made rctrosiicetivcly' clfcctive fro'm December 1, 1954, This c'ase I undoubtdcly supporli Shri Mahaj:m in his contention that the rules can be made with retro-spective elfcct and there is nothing wrong in such a rule. This case, however, did not dal witll the point specifically raised in the prcscn't csc.\n\nThe question, however, has been pointedly considered 'recntly by a Constitution Bench of this Court . in Sra!<? of Gujarai v. Ramon Lal K<'rhm• La! Soni.(1) Iri that case the Gujarat Panehayats Service . was initully constitued soon after the. passing of the Gujarat\n\nPanchayat~ Act. :There were three cdres :the district cadre, the taluqa cadre and the Iocalcadrc. Secretaries. 00\\eers and servants of the olu village panchayats unJcr the llomb:ty Villag~ Panchayats Act, 1958 bcamc secretaries, officers and servants of the new _gram panchayats under s.325(2)(x) of the Gujarat Panchayats Ac!, 1961.\n\nTalatis aud kotwuls, who were governml!nt scrvallts wcrl! secretaries and olllc.:rs of the oiJ villag.: panchayats .und.:r the Bomb.1y Village . . Panchayats Act :nJ so they became sccrctarks and officers of the\n\nnew gram panchayats unda the Guj;1rat Panchayats Act. 1961.\n\nSvmc munidp<tlitics conslitut.:d for municipal districts and municipal boroughs under the 13omba.y District Municipal Act and lotte Bombay Municipal lloroughs Act, as appli<:d to areas in tlic Stale of Gujarat. were converted into Gram anJ Nugar Panchynts under section 307 of the Gujarat Panchayats Act anu all olficcrs and servants io the cmrh>y of such municip:1litics bcc:1mo: officers nnd scrvnts of interim _l'anchayals and alll)cat..:J t~> the pinchayat scvice. Thus,\n\nccrctanes und olliccrs of dissolved municipalities also became secretaries nnd olllc~:rs of Gram and Nagar pimchayats. District\n\n~~> [I<JKlJ 2 sec JJ •\n\n- ~\n\n' -t\n\n'•) - '\n\nICC. ARORA v. HARYANA (Misra, J.) 637\n\nLocal Boards con'Stituted under the Bombay Local Boards Act stood dissolved on the passing of the Gujarat Panchayats Act and all officers and servants in tl:te employment of the Board were deemed to be transferred to the service of the successor District Panchayat\n\nunder section 326 of the Gujarat Pailchayats Act. Also allocated to the panchayat service were those government servants who are transferred to the panchayat under section 157 and such other officers and servants employed in the state service as wer~ necessary. All these secretaries, officers and servants became p1embers of a service under the State as soon , as they were allocated to the panchayat service. But, by the Amending Act, secretaries, offiers and.servants of Gram and Nagar Panchayat who were allocated to the panchayat service from the ranks of tl1e ex-municipal employees were. sought to be meted out .differwtial treatmnt ·.from the other members of the panchayat service, more particularly the secretaries, officer and serVants of Gram and Nagar Pnchayats who were drawn from the, ranks of secretaries, officer and servants of old village panchayats, that is, the Talatis and Kotwals. Their status as members of a service under the state was to go with no option to them. Rtrospectivity was sought to be given to the AmendingAct so that they could not claim that they were ever' government servants' and so could not be made to cease to be government. servants and so that they could not claim that they were singled out for differential treatment for if the~ were never in the panchayat service they could not complain of being . taken out of the panchayat service. Brother 0. Chinnappa Reddy speaking for the Court emphatically observed:-\n\nNow in 1978 before the Amending Act.was passed\n\n. thanks to the provisions of the principle Act of 1961 the exmunicipal employees who had been allocated to the panchayat service as Secretaries Officer and servants of Gram and Nagar. Panchayats, had achieved the status of gov.ernment servants. Their status as government servants' could not be . extingu.ished so long as the posts were not abolished and their services were not terminated in accordance with the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution. Nor was it permissible to single them out for differential treatment. That would offend Article 14 of the Constitution. An attempt was made to . justify the purported differentiation'on the basis of history and ancestry as it were. It was said . that Talatis. and Kotwals who became secretaries, officers and servants of Gram and\n\n' .\n\nNagar Panchayats were government servants, even .to start\n\n• ' w ' I ' • •\n\n.c\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n\n- with, wbile municipal employees who became such secretaries, officers nnd servants of Gram and Nagar -Panchayats were_ not. Each carried the mark or the 'brand' of his origin and a classification on the . basis of the source from which.· they came into the service~ it was claimed, was permissible.\n\nWe .are-cle.ar that it is not. Once they had joined the common . stream of service to perform the same duties; it is clearly not\n\npemissible to make any classification on the basis of their origin. Such a classification would be unreasonable and entirely .irrelevant to the object sought to be achieved. It is to navigate around these two obstacles of Article 311 and Article 14 that the Amending Act is sought to be made retrospective, to bring about. an artificial sitation as if the erstwhile muitici.pal employees never became members of a service under the State. Can a lw be made to destroy today's accrued constitutional rights by artificially reverting to a situation which existed 17 years ago ? No.\n\nThe legislation iS pure and simple self-deceptive if we may use such an expres<>i9n with reference to a legislaturemade law. The legislature is .. undoubtedly competent to legislate with retrospective effect to take away or impair any vested right acquired under existing laws but since the laws are made under a written Constitution and have to conform to the dos and don'ts of the Constitution, neither prospective nor retrospective laws can be niade s~ to contravene fundamental rights .... The law inust satisfy the requirements of the Constitution today taking into account the accrued or\n\nacquire~ rights of the parties today. The law cannot say 29 years ago the parties had_no rights, tfierefore, the require-. ments of the Constitution will be satisfied if the law is dated back by 20 years. w~ are concerned with today's rights and not yel)terday's. A hgislatur~ cannot legislate today with reference to a situation'that obtained 20 years ago and ignore the march of events and the constitutional rights accrued in the course of the 20 years. That would be most arbitrary, unreasonable and a negation. of history .. .. _ .. ....... Today's . equals cannot be made unequal by saying that they were unequal 20 years ago and we will restore that position by making a law 'today and making it retrospective. Constitutil)nal rights, constitutional obligations and constituti.onal consequences •\n\nnncit be tampeed with that way. A law which if made toc}ay . .\n\n1;- '\n\n-t'\n\n...\n\n• it\n\n• K.C. ARORA v. HARYANA (Misra, J.)\n\n639 , '\n\nwould e plainly invalid as offcll4iing constitutional provisions in the context of the existing situation cannot become val, id by being made retrospective. Past virtue (constitutional) cannot.\n\nbe made to wipe out prese1,1t vice (constitutional) by making retrospective laws. We are, therefore, firmly of the view that the Gujarat Panchayafs ·(Third Amendment) Act 1978 i~ . um,; onstitutiorial as it offends Articles 311 and 14 and is arbitrary and unreasonable.\"\n\nIn view of this late.st pronoun-cement by the. ConstitQtion Bench of this Court, the law appears to be well settled and the Haryana Government cannot take away the accrued rights of the petitioners and the appellants by making amendment of tbe rules\n\nwith retrospective effect.\n\nFor. the foregoing discussion the writ petitions as well as the appeals are allowed and the ordrs of the High Court dated October\n\n10, 1980 are quashed and the impugned rule 4(ii) of the Punjab\n\nGovernment National Emergency (Concessions) Rules 1965 as-a'lrlen- D ded by the Haryana Government Gazette Notification No.GSR 77/ Const/Art. 309/Amendj(l)/76 dated 22nd f\\farch 1976 and the Noti- -~ fication No. GSR. 182/Const/Art. 309/A'rnend/(2)/76 dated '9 August 1976 amending the definition orthe expression 'military service' in . -rule 2 are declared to be ultra vires tlie Constitution in so far as they affect prejud\\cially persons who had acquired rights as stated E above. A writ in the Qature of mandamus is issued directing , respondents Nos. 1 and 2 to prepare the S!!n1ority list afresh in the light of the decision of this Court taking into' consideration the military service rendered by the petitioners as well as the appellants.\n\nIn the circumstances of the case however there will be no order as to costs. F\n\nS.R.\n\nAppeals & Pet, tions allowed . .\n\n! .,", "total_entities": 75, "entities": [{"text": "EX. CAPT. K.C. ARORA AND ANOTHER", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9, "end_char": 41, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "EX. CAPT. K.C. ARORA AND ANOTHER", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF HARYANA AND. OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 43, "end_char": 71, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF HARYANA AND. OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "0. 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The State of Haryana just to deprive the petitioners and others similarly situated, of mil]tary service, amended the Jules with retrospectiveeffect from November 1,1966 vide Haryana Government Gazette Notification No.", "canonical_name": "STATE OF HARYANA AND. 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HARYAYA (Jfisra, J.) ."}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6303, "end_char": 6313, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6321, "end_char": 6342, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "P.C. Blwrtari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6585, "end_char": 6598, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "f\n\nP.C. Blwrtari for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Y.S. Clzlta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6623, "end_char": 6634, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Y.S. Clzlta/e and M.G. Ramachandran for Respondents .in Writ Petitions."}}, {"text": "M.G. Ramachandran", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6641, "end_char": 6658, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Y.S. Clzlta/e and M.G. Ramachandran for Respondents .in Writ Petitions."}}, {"text": "J.S. 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The relevant rules 2, 3, 4, and 5 of these rules are as uder:\n\n\"2 .. 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ARORA V. HARYANA", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19572, "end_char": 19593, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "k.C. ARORA V. HARYANA (Misra, J.)\n\n1965 with retrospective effect as violative of Arts."}}, {"text": "Arts. 14, 16, 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19654, "end_char": 19670, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "First Amendment Rules, 1976", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19809, "end_char": 19836, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19881, "end_char": 19902, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21262, "end_char": 21270, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22356, "end_char": 22363, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Demobllised Indian Armed Forces Persopnel (Reservation of Vacancies) iri the Punjab Civil Service (Judicial Branch) Rules, i969, liad been repealed and", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 25058, "end_char": 25209, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Demobllised Indian Armed Forces Persopnel (Reservation of Vacancies) iri the Punjab Civil Service (Judicial Branch) Rules, i969, liad been repealed and the Demobilised Indian Armed Forces Personnel (Reservation of Vacancies) in the Punjab Civil Service (Judicial Branch) Rules; 1975, as amended, were in force and these ."}}, {"text": "Articles 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28692, "end_char": 28703, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28914, "end_char": 28925, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Mahajan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29085, "end_char": 29092, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Mahajan appearing for respondent No."}}, {"text": "Article 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29202, "end_char": 29213, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Misra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 29644, "end_char": 29649, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ARORA v. HARYANA (Misra, J.) 635\n\nnot having been specifically declared to be retrospective in operation, its provisions cannot be applied to the appellan!", "canonical_name": "MISRA"}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31786, "end_char": 31804, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1968] 3 SCR 575", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 32059, "end_char": 32075, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Indian Railway Establishment Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32494, "end_char": 32527, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 3()", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32620, "end_char": 32631, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Railway Establishment Code", "statute": "Indian Railway Establishment Code"}}, {"text": "Panchayats Act, 1958", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33743, "end_char": 33763, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s.325(2)(x)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33839, "end_char": 33850, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Panchayats Act, 1958", "statute": "Panchayats Act, 1958"}}, {"text": "District Municipal Act and lotte Bombay Municipal lloroughs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34262, "end_char": 34325, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 307", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34425, "end_char": 34436, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "District Municipal Act and lotte Bombay Municipal lloroughs Act", "statute": "District Municipal Act and lotte Bombay Municipal lloroughs Act"}}, {"text": "section 326", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35123, "end_char": 35134, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Stituted under the Bombay Local Boards Act stood dissolved on the passing of the Gujarat Panchayats Act", "statute": "Stituted under the Bombay Local Boards Act stood dissolved on the passing of the Gujarat Panchayats Act"}}, {"text": "section 157", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35281, "end_char": 35292, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Stituted under the Bombay Local Boards Act stood dissolved on the passing of the Gujarat Panchayats Act", "statute": "Stituted under the Bombay Local Boards Act stood dissolved on the passing of the Gujarat Panchayats Act"}}, {"text": "Chinnappa Reddy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 36514, "end_char": 36529, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chinnappa Reddy speaking for the Court emphatically observed:-\n\nNow in 1978 before the Amending Act.was passed\n\n."}}, {"text": "Article 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37054, "end_char": 37065, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37175, "end_char": 37185, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38181, "end_char": 38192, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38197, "end_char": 38207, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 311 and 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40482, "end_char": 40501, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41150, "end_char": 41158, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41241, "end_char": 41249, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_3_640_642_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "640 •\n\n- • •\n\nRAMESH KUMAR\n\nRAM KUMAR & O, RS.\n\nApril 26, 1984\n\n[0. CHINNAPPA REDDY, A.P. SEN AND E.S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.)\n\n-· Indian Penal Code-S. 302 read with S. 34 _ _.:.Acc14sed convicted and stntimced u/s; 302/34-Accused made gift of land to widow .for loss of fife of her burbmd-1/igh Court acquirted one accused and converted conviction of other to one und r s. 304.\n\nHigh Court Judgment-Whether cotreci- Held no.\n\nThe two 'respoitdeilts were convicted under s. -~02 read with s. 34 of the Indian Peri31 Code .and sentenced to life imprisonment by the Sessions Judge.\n\nOn appeal, the High Court was informed that -both the parties.\" were closely relatd and they bad come to some sort of •rrana:ement under which one accused had made a gift' of some land to the widoW as compen .. • sation -for the loss of-1ife of her husband.\n\nThe Hi'gh Court acquitted one of the Jccused and converted the onviction of the- Other from one under\n\nS• 302 to one under s. 304 and reduced _the sentence to)two years.\n\nThe so called arrangement between. the partieS was the only reason for. what tile High Court did. ·\n\nE Setting aside tho judgment of the High Court and remanding. tho\n\nluatter for rehearing~ thi!f Court,\n\nHELD : The entire system of admiilistration of CriminaJ ju_stiCt,-is rsduced to a mockery by the judgment of the High Court. If it is uphel~, it is as if a person who can afford to make gifts of land or money to the heirs of the.victim may get away eVen with a charge of murder.\n\nCourts are to dispense j0:stice, not to dispense with justice.\n\nAnd, jutice to be dispensed is not p8.lm-tree justice or idiosyncratic justice.\n\nThe judgment of the mgh Court cannot .stand a second's scrutiqy. [641 H; 642 A-BJ.\n\nCRIMIN,\\L APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal Nos. 1012 of 1984.\n\n(Appeals by Special leave from the Judgment and Order dated the !st September, 1983 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Cr!. Appeal No. 291 DB of 1983, 511 ))B of 1983 & Cr!. Rev.\n\nNo. 627 of !983.)\n\nGopa/ S1.1bram1mium and S.K._S(lbarwal for the Appellant.\n\n'1- .•\n\nRAMESH KUMAR v. RAM KUMAR (Chinnappa Reddy, J.)\n\n, Kawa/jit Kochar and J.D. Jain for the Respondet No. 1.\n\nMiss Lily Thomas, for Respondent No. 2.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by . . ' .\n\nCaiNNAPPA REDDY, J.\n\nWe are very unhappy about the judg- 'ment of the High Court. Both the respondents were convicted by the learned First. Additional Sessions Judge of.KurukShetra under s. 302 read witk s. 34 of the I_ndia11 Penal Code and 'each of them was\n\nlrentened to. undergo imprisonment for life. On appeal, for very_\n\nstrange reasons, the High Court acquitted the first respondent and converted _the conviction of the second respondent to one under 1 304-A l. P. c: and reduced the sentence. to two years' rigorous\n\nimprisonmet. What the High Court said speaks for itself. This is what the High CourtJsaid:\n\n. \"However, we are told by the learned counsel for the parpes that they being closely related some members of the village have.· intervened and have brought about some sort of arrangement under. which Ram Kumar\n\nappellnt has already made a gift of three-acres . of land in favonr of Smt. Maya Devi widow of Chander Shekhar .·. as compensation on account of the loss of life of.her\n\nhusbaad. 1 ho1,1gh this is not a matter which can be taken notice of by' thi~ Court, yet it has always been our desire to see that-enmity between close relations should be encoura- . ged to come to an end. Since the father of Ramesh Kumar\n\n(P. W. 6) had lost h_is life, he could possibly have indulged in some exaggeration to magnify the nature of the offence.\n\nIn the circumstances, we give• benefit of doubt to Ram Kumar appellant and acquit him. We convert the convition of RatRa appellant from one under section 302 to one under - section 304~A, Indian Penal Code and Sentence him to undergo to years rigorous imprisonment Ram Kumar appel !ant is m bait His bail bond shall siand charged.\"\n\nWe can only say that the judgment.of the High Court has left us shocked and P?rplexed.\n\nWe are at a total loss to understand it. The entire system o~ administration of Criminal justice is reduced to mocke_ry, If the Judgment o( the ffigh Court is upheld, lt is as .1fa person. woc1n afford to make gifts of land or money to t_he )!en's of the v1cttm may get away even with a charge_ of murder;\n\n• \"\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1984] 3 S.C.ll.\n\nCourts are to dispense justice, not to dispense with justice. And, justice to be dispensed is not palm-tree justice o.r idiosyncratic justice. The judgment. can not stand a second's scrutiny. It is accordingly set aside and the matter is remancled to the 'High Court so that the Criminal appeals and revision may he reheard. On\n\nbehalf of the accused a very curious request was made, that the land gifted\" by the father of ihe accused to the widow of the\n\ndecesed may be.directed to be returned to the father of the accused.\n\nWe. take no notice.of the gift and we reject the request.\n\nH.S.K.\n\nAppeals allowed.\n\n• • ,", "total_entities": 31, "entities": [{"text": "RAMESH KUMAR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 14, "end_char": 26, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAM KUMAR & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "0. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 65, "end_char": 83, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A.P. SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 85, "end_char": 93, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "E.S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 98, "end_char": 121, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "E.S. VENKATARAMIAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 127, "end_char": 144, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "S. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 145, "end_char": 151, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "S. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 162, "end_char": 167, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 367, "end_char": 373, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 485, "end_char": 490, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 959, "end_char": 965, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Gopa/", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1996, "end_char": 2001, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gopa/ S1.1bram1mium and S.K._S(lbarwal for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2002, "end_char": 2004, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S.K._S(lbarwal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2020, "end_char": 2034, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Gopa/ S1.1bram1mium and S.K._S(lbarwal for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "RAMESH KUMAR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2063, "end_char": 2075, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'1- .•\n\nRAMESH KUMAR v. RAM KUMAR (Chinnappa Reddy, J.)\n\n, Kawa/jit Kochar and J.D. Jain for the Respondet No.", "canonical_name": "RAM KUMAR & ORS"}}, {"text": "RAM KUMAR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2079, "end_char": 2088, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'1- .•\n\nRAMESH KUMAR v. RAM KUMAR (Chinnappa Reddy, J.)\n\n, Kawa/jit Kochar and J.D. Jain for the Respondet No.", "canonical_name": "RAM KUMAR & ORS"}}, {"text": "Chinnappa Reddy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2090, "end_char": 2105, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'1- .•\n\nRAMESH KUMAR v. RAM KUMAR (Chinnappa Reddy, J.)\n\n, Kawa/jit Kochar and J.D. Jain for the Respondet No.", "canonical_name": "Chinnappa Reddy"}}, {"text": "Kawa/jit Kochar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2114, "end_char": 2129, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'1- .•\n\nRAMESH KUMAR v. RAM KUMAR (Chinnappa Reddy, J.)\n\n, Kawa/jit Kochar and J.D. Jain for the Respondet No."}}, {"text": "J.D. Jain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2134, "end_char": 2143, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'1- .•\n\nRAMESH KUMAR v. RAM KUMAR (Chinnappa Reddy, J.)\n\n, Kawa/jit Kochar and J.D. Jain for the Respondet No."}}, {"text": "Lily Thomas", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2175, "end_char": 2186, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Miss Lily Thomas, for Respondent No."}}, {"text": "CaiNNAPPA REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2263, "end_char": 2278, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CaiNNAPPA REDDY, J.\n\nWe are very unhappy about the judg- 'ment of the High Court.", "canonical_name": "Chinnappa Reddy"}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2450, "end_char": 2456, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2467, "end_char": 2472, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2489, "end_char": 2499, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Ram Kumar", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3081, "end_char": 3090, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "which Ram Kumar\n\nappellnt has already made a gift of three-acres .", "canonical_name": "RAM KUMAR & ORS"}}, {"text": "Maya Devi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3168, "end_char": 3177, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Maya Devi widow of Chander Shekhar .·."}}, {"text": "Chander Shekhar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3187, "end_char": 3202, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Maya Devi widow of Chander Shekhar .·."}}, {"text": "Ramesh Kumar", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 3488, "end_char": 3500, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Since the father of Ramesh Kumar\n\n(P. W. 6) had lost h_is life, he could possibly have indulged in some exaggeration to magnify the nature of the offence."}}, {"text": "RatRa appellant", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3739, "end_char": 3754, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We convert the convition of RatRa appellant from one under section 302 to one under - section 304~A, Indian Penal Code and Sentence him to undergo to years rigorous imprisonment Ram Kumar appel !"}}, {"text": "section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3770, "end_char": 3781, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 304", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3797, "end_char": 3808, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3812, "end_char": 3829, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_3_643_645_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA, ETC.\n\nESCORTS LTD. & OTHERS, ETC ..\n\nApril 30, [984\n\n(S. '.°MURTAZA FAZAL A.LI, AMARENDRA NATH SEN AND v.\n\nBALAKRiSlfNA BRAD!, JJ;)\n\n\\. Companies Act 1956 ss. 166 and 284 Annual general meeting ho/ding of notice:' seeking remov\"al of direttOrs of company-:-High Court granting s.tay\n\nin/u!Jti?!l i~ writ petitioii-interference bf Supreme Court.. ·\n\n- ., . . . , The appellants in their appeals to this Cour.t challenged the order of a Single Judge of the High Courl; admitting the writ petition of tho firsl respondent cOmpany_ and staying of the notice seeking removal of certain Directors. of the company.\n\nHELD: ! .. There will be an order vacating the order of stay/injunc• tion P, aSsed by the Single Judge of the. High Court, prohibiting any action being taken on the basis of the requisition put in by L.I.C.\n\n[644E)\n\n2:; AIL app_ropriate -prQceedings will be.· ta.ken n accordance with law ·. on the basis of th_e requisition. However\", no effect._ should be _-givfn to any\n\nresoJutiotl the con1pany may pass at_ the extraordinafygeneral meeting to Qe held in conseqtience of the requ'isition without obtaining priOr . dirCctions - from thii Court. • [644F•G] . ·\n\n~ 3-. T6e pendency Of q1ese cases in thiS Court Will nofstand in the w'ay of'.bolding the-annual general i; neeting of th\"e cojilpanY in t_he normai course. {644G)\n\n- ·'CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION.: Civil Appeal No. 2317 of 1984 ..\n\n. , From: the Judgment and O, rder dated 14/15.3.1984 of the High Gourt Of Bombay in w.P. No. 3063/1983 .\n\n• And\n\nCivil Appeal No. 2318 of 1984. i'i\n\nFrom. the Judgment a)id. order dated 14/15.3.1983 of the jlombay High Cou.rt iµ W, P. )\"9. 3063/1983, . . . . ' ' .·\n\n• A\n\n• D\n\n.:.~:\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1984] 3 s.c.R. • . With Transfer Petition (Civil) No. 190 of 1984. - .\n\nFor the P;:titioner/Appellant .:\n\nK. Parasan, Attorney General, Milan K. BanerJee, Addi.\n\nSolicitor General, s.A. Shroff, .Mfss A Subhashifli and Dr. V. Gori Shanker, • For the Respondents :\n\nN .. A. Palkhlvala, Soli J. SorabJee, P. R. Mridul, A. B.\n\nDivan, Dr.\" L.M. Singh-Vi, KK. Venugopal, J.B. Dadachanji, iiajinder Narain, Harish Salve, B.S. Bantia,. X.S. Cooper, liedabratta Barua, R .. Nariman, T.M. Ansari, P.X. Rµm, Mrs. A.K. Verma and D.N.\n\nMishra; - The Order of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL ALI, J~ .\n\n.In SU' (C) Nos. 5392/84 & 5412~4.\n\nWe have heard learned Attorney General ..for the petitioriors and Mr. Palkhivala, learned counsel for respqndents at length.\n\nSpecial leave granted. There will be. an order vacating the . order of stay/injunction passed by the Single Ju.\\lge of the High\n\nCo11rt, .prohibiting any action being taken on . the basis of the requisitio.n put in by L.I.C. We direct that all appropriate proceedings will be taken in accordance with Jaw on the basis of tho requisition. .However, no effect should be given to.any resol.ution t:be company may pass at the extra:orginary general meeting to -be\n\nheld in consequence of the requisition without obtaining prior directions from this Court. The pendency of these cases in this Court will no\\. stand in the way of holding the annl general meeting of the . company in the norinal course. These appeals are disposed of except that they will be kept pending for the limited purpoil'e to enable counsel to move this Court for directions as indicated above. In computing the time for taking steps pursuant to the requisititon, the periOd from the.date of requisition till this day wHI be excluded in view of interim stay/injunction granted by the High Court.\n\nTh.e prayer for amendment of the cause title is allowed, .\n\nt- '\n\ni. I. c.. v. ESC, ORTS <Fazal Ali, J)\n\nTransfer Petition (C) No t90 of 1984.\n\nMr. Palkhivala, learned counsel on behalf of the respondents stltes that matter is being liste.d before' the High Court. for final hearing on 11th June, 1984 and he assures this Court that his clients will . fully coqperate so that the case can he heard and fin.ally disposed of in the High Court by the end ofJune, 1984. We request the High. Court to.dipose of the matter finally as expeditiously as possible. In view of this, the learned Attorney General does not pNss the Transfer Petition fo~ the present which is accordingly dismissed.\n\nN.V.K.\n\nWrit Petition allowed. . .\n\nTransfer Petition dismissed .\n\n• •", "total_entities": 30, "entities": [{"text": "LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA, ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 40, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA, ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ESCORTS LTD. & OTHERS, ETC", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 43, "end_char": 69, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "ESCORTS LTD. & OTHERS, ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "AMARENDRA NATH SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 117, "end_char": 135, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "AMARENDRA NATH SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Companies Act 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 173, "end_char": 191, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 166 and 284", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 192, "end_char": 207, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Companies Act 1956", "statute": "Companies Act 1956"}}, {"text": "K. Parasan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1858, "end_char": 1868, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Parasan, Attorney General, Milan K. BanerJee, Addi."}}, {"text": "Milan K. BanerJee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1888, "end_char": 1905, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Parasan, Attorney General, Milan K. BanerJee, Addi."}}, {"text": "s.A. Shroff", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1933, "end_char": 1944, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Solicitor General, s.A. Shroff, .Mfss A Subhashifli and Dr. V. Gori Shanker, • For the Respondents :\n\nN .. A. Palkhlvala, Soli J. SorabJee, P. R. Mridul, A. B.\n\nDivan, Dr.\" L.M. Singh-Vi, KK."}}, {"text": "A Subhashifli", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1952, "end_char": 1965, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Solicitor General, s.A. Shroff, .Mfss A Subhashifli and Dr. V. Gori Shanker, • For the Respondents :\n\nN .. A. Palkhlvala, Soli J. SorabJee, P. R. Mridul, A. B.\n\nDivan, Dr.\" L.M. Singh-Vi, KK."}}, {"text": "V. Gori Shanker", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 1974, "end_char": 1989, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Solicitor General, s.A. Shroff, .Mfss A Subhashifli and Dr. V. Gori Shanker, • For the Respondents :\n\nN .. A. Palkhlvala, Soli J. SorabJee, P. R. Mridul, A. B.\n\nDivan, Dr.\" L.M. Singh-Vi, KK."}}, {"text": "N .. A. Palkhlvala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2016, "end_char": 2034, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Solicitor General, s.A. Shroff, .Mfss A Subhashifli and Dr. V. Gori Shanker, • For the Respondents :\n\nN .. A. Palkhlvala, Soli J. SorabJee, P. R. Mridul, A. B.\n\nDivan, Dr.\" L.M. Singh-Vi, KK."}}, {"text": "Soli J. SorabJee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2036, "end_char": 2052, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Solicitor General, s.A. Shroff, .Mfss A Subhashifli and Dr. V. Gori Shanker, • For the Respondents :\n\nN .. A. Palkhlvala, Soli J. SorabJee, P. R. Mridul, A. B.\n\nDivan, Dr.\" L.M. Singh-Vi, KK."}}, {"text": "P. R. Mridul", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2054, "end_char": 2066, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Solicitor General, s.A. Shroff, .Mfss A Subhashifli and Dr. V. Gori Shanker, • For the Respondents :\n\nN .. A. Palkhlvala, Soli J. SorabJee, P. R. Mridul, A. B.\n\nDivan, Dr.\" L.M. Singh-Vi, KK."}}, {"text": "A. B.\n\nDivan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2068, "end_char": 2080, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Solicitor General, s.A. Shroff, .Mfss A Subhashifli and Dr. V. Gori Shanker, • For the Respondents :\n\nN .. A. Palkhlvala, Soli J. SorabJee, P. R. Mridul, A. B.\n\nDivan, Dr.\" L.M. Singh-Vi, KK."}}, {"text": "L.M. Singh-Vi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2087, "end_char": 2100, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Solicitor General, s.A. Shroff, .Mfss A Subhashifli and Dr. V. Gori Shanker, • For the Respondents :\n\nN .. A. Palkhlvala, Soli J. SorabJee, P. R. Mridul, A. B.\n\nDivan, Dr.\" L.M. Singh-Vi, KK."}}, {"text": "KK. Venugopal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2102, "end_char": 2115, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Solicitor General, s.A. Shroff, .Mfss A Subhashifli and Dr. V. Gori Shanker, • For the Respondents :\n\nN .. A. Palkhlvala, Soli J. SorabJee, P. R. Mridul, A. B.\n\nDivan, Dr.\" L.M. Singh-Vi, KK."}}, {"text": "J.B. Dadachanji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2117, "end_char": 2132, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Venugopal, J.B. Dadachanji, iiajinder Narain, Harish Salve, B.S. Bantia,."}}, {"text": "iiajinder Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2134, "end_char": 2150, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Venugopal, J.B. Dadachanji, iiajinder Narain, Harish Salve, B.S. Bantia,."}}, {"text": "Harish Salve", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2152, "end_char": 2164, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Venugopal, J.B. Dadachanji, iiajinder Narain, Harish Salve, B.S. Bantia,."}}, {"text": "B.S. Bantia", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2166, "end_char": 2177, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Venugopal, J.B. Dadachanji, iiajinder Narain, Harish Salve, B.S. Bantia,."}}, {"text": "X.S. Cooper", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2180, "end_char": 2191, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "X.S. Cooper, liedabratta Barua, R .. Nariman, T.M. Ansari, P.X. Rµm, Mrs. A.K. Verma and D.N.\n\nMishra; - The Order of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL ALI, J~ ."}}, {"text": "R .. Nariman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2212, "end_char": 2224, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "X.S. Cooper, liedabratta Barua, R .. Nariman, T.M. Ansari, P.X. Rµm, Mrs. A.K. Verma and D.N.\n\nMishra; - The Order of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL ALI, J~ ."}}, {"text": "T.M. Ansari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2226, "end_char": 2237, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "X.S. Cooper, liedabratta Barua, R .. Nariman, T.M. Ansari, P.X. Rµm, Mrs. A.K. Verma and D.N.\n\nMishra; - The Order of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL ALI, J~ ."}}, {"text": "P.X. Rµm", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2239, "end_char": 2247, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "X.S. Cooper, liedabratta Barua, R .. Nariman, T.M. Ansari, P.X. Rµm, Mrs. A.K. Verma and D.N.\n\nMishra; - The Order of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL ALI, J~ ."}}, {"text": "A.K. Verma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2254, "end_char": 2264, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "X.S. Cooper, liedabratta Barua, R .. Nariman, T.M. Ansari, P.X. Rµm, Mrs. A.K. Verma and D.N.\n\nMishra; - The Order of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL ALI, J~ ."}}, {"text": "D.N.\n\nMishra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2269, "end_char": 2281, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "X.S. Cooper, liedabratta Barua, R .. Nariman, T.M. Ansari, P.X. Rµm, Mrs. A.K. Verma and D.N.\n\nMishra; - The Order of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL ALI, J~ ."}}, {"text": "FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2326, "end_char": 2335, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "X.S. Cooper, liedabratta Barua, R .. Nariman, T.M. Ansari, P.X. Rµm, Mrs. A.K. Verma and D.N.\n\nMishra; - The Order of the Court was delivered by\n\nFAZAL ALI, J~ .", "canonical_name": "FAZAL ALI"}}, {"text": "Palkhivala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 2449, "end_char": 2459, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have heard learned Attorney General ..for the petitioriors and Mr. Palkhivala, learned counsel for respqndents at length.", "canonical_name": "Palkhivala"}}, {"text": "Fazal Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3660, "end_char": 3669, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "t- '\n\ni. I. c.. v. ESC, ORTS <Fazal Ali, J)\n\nTransfer Petition (C) No t90 of 1984.", "canonical_name": "FAZAL ALI"}}, {"text": "Palkhivala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3718, "end_char": 3728, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Palkhivala, learned counsel on behalf of the respondents stltes that matter is being liste.d before' the High Court.", "canonical_name": "Palkhivala"}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_3_646_675_EN", "year": 1984, "text": ". B.\n\nA. L, KALRA\n\nTHE PJ, lOJECT & EQUIPMENT CORPORATION\n\nOF INDIA LIMITED .\n\nMay 1, 1984 •\n\n{0.A. DESAI, 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY AND A. VARADARAJAN, JJ; J<\n\nA Writ Jm; isdictlon of the High {Co>rt nder Arilcie 22~ of the Constl(uilon- P!fblt'c- sector undertakings a_nd oter \"inst'rumentalities of the State., C whether amenab1e to the \\vrif' jUrisdiCtion.\n\nEf!ttct of Conces$io1i. iit the Supreme Court by_ the State as _tO th~ maintainability or amenablity to the Writ jurisdiction-Though the normal procedure is to ren1it to the High Court, the,. Supreme Court, in order not to protract tne litigatiOtJ \"involving the JivelihoOd of a party\n\nbefof~ it can lt_self hear the appear on nzeri ts. ·\n\nC;_ ConstitutiOn Of Ind1a, 1950 Aft. 1_4'-Whether there should be any\n\n-sp?cific _pleading Jn the _Pe.1ition pofnting out whether anyone else was\n\neither stmilarly situated as tire petitioner or disslffiilar/y treated. for ente.rtaining the charge of discrimination and \"granting relief .on that - ground. . ';...__, • D.· Legislative Policy. wheth-!r judlcia/ly, reVif}wable by the courts-Const/. tution of India, 1950 Arts. 226, 32 ond 13.\n\nC0nstitutloii of India 1950~/Jistifzction between Par( XIV and Part III- . oi the Conslitution-Whethe'r tlze employeeS of.the Corporatioit entitled to the protecti.on under Part ){_JV of the Constitutioni\n\nP .. Project and Equfpment Corpora, i\"an of India _Ltd, Employees• (Coitduct, Discipline and Appeal) Rules, .l975-Rules4, 5 ond 25, Scope of-R\"le\n\n4 dOes not specify any miscand_uct .and Rufe- 5 does not_ specify that violation of Rule 4 'is per se misconduct-No disciplinary_ ach'on, there fore , will arise wider Rule 4 of the 1975 Rules.\n\nG.. The Project allli Equipment Corporation of India House Building Advance\n\n(Grant and Recovery) .Rules !111le 10. (J) (ii) and the Profits and Equipments Corporation af India Ltd. conveyance _Advance (Grant an.d Recovery) Rules 8 and 10 (J)-Whether the non-utilisation of the advances within the StiPulared time for the purposes of and no refund .thereof imn.iediatel; Y On theexpirY. Of the periOd, ciJnstitlfte Hmisco1ufuCt\"\n\nwithin the meaning of the exprwion in Rule 4 (iJ. (iii) o} the 1975\n\n. A L. [(ALRA v. J>ROiECT EQPT. CORPN. . . .• 647'\n\nRules and ifnot whether the domestic enquiry and. the puµishment of ·\n\nA.·. the disniissal of serviCi is warrant\"'ed •\n\n. H.\n\nRttlief for a declaraiion in cases of cqntract for .publ!c etpp/oynient~ whether caJi!iot be :; jJecifically ellfOrced. ·\n\nI.: Domestic. EnqiJiry-Whether the Illquiry Officer. and the Puizishing Authority niust give reasons before /he major punishment is impased..-' Whether non giving of.the reasonsmakes the decision of dismissal arbitrary and against prtncip!es of natural j:1stice.\n\nTh~ i>rojecit and EQuiPIDent CorPoration of India Ltd. -was formed in t 9_71_ as a wholly own.ed subsidiary conip_any of State Trading cOrpo ..\n\nradon, a Q.qvernmcat 'O{ lodia Undc1taking. In .1976 it was separated\n\n C and since then it functions as a sep, ttrate.Government of India Undertaking.\n\n- The appella'nt who joined th~ .!frvice unller the State Trading Corpo. ration origipally and Jater exercised hi> option to serve -the PrOject and .E.quipment Corporation wilh effect rrom NoVenlb\"er 9, 197.6.\n\nThe appeliant while-working as Depuly Finance Manager Grade II ap, PHed for andobtained\n\n(a) an advance in the amount of Rs. 16,050 for purchasing a plot of 1aod on April 4, 1979 for which be e, lecuted the ·.requisite agreement as rCquired .by cthe Project & Equipment Corporation of .Jndia Ltd., House.Buildi:ag Advance\n\n(Grent and Recovery) Rul'es, aµd (b) an advance in the amount of_ Rs. 11,000 for purchase of a n-ew mOior cyCle on July 7, 1979 as admissible under ''the P_roject and -Equipment Corporation conveyance Advanc~ (Grant and Reco. very) Rules .. Under these rulesnori-utilisation of the amounts within tho time. limit will impose a liability of the refund. of t'be entife ainountforth\"\n\nwith. togtherwith penal interest thereon: The appellant failecJ touliiiso the amounts and also to re.fund the same.\n\nTherefore, coercive steps were taken to fecover the en_\\ire amQuot of the House Building adv, ioce .from his pay by_ stopping ihe payment of his salary from 16th: N0Vember1 . 1979.\n\nAs regards the conveYance advance, the receipts• etc. for purchase made: in 1980 were accepted, • . .\n\nOn July 22, 1980 a memorandum was served upon the appellaO.t statirig therein that the competnt authqrity proposeii to Dold an enquiry against him. under Rules 27 of the .Project anJ Equipment Corporation_ of ladia Employees (Conduct, Discipline & -·AppeaH Rules, 1975 in.respect of the aforesaid misutilization or the advances.\n\nThe committee of Manage ..\n\nmnl i_a exerc_ise of.the powers _Conferred by subrule (4) of Rule 27 of the :a: l97S- .rules aPpointed one Sri A.S. Na:ngi.l, its Chief Marketi.lg Manager as the Eriquiry Officer to enquite into the two charges against the appellant.\n\nThe appellant sqbmitted on June 13, 1980 a detailed statement pointing out that for va.rious reasons therein mentioned so as to. explain why there Was delay -in refunding ihe advance and speCifically pleaded .that in view . of . the fat that 'the first advance was sought to be recovered by WithbOldili_g his sala:ry and adjuting the pay _towards-theadvance an_d charging penal H interest and in the second case byaccepting. the ocument evideaCiog purcha.siJ of scoot.er µo niiscond.uot could be said to have be.en committed\n\n• sUPREME cotlRT REPORts !19$4) 3 S.C.!t ..\n\nby the app; llant and the di!iplinary ·enquiry was, uncalled for. . The enquiry Officer in hi.s report after recaputulating_ all.egations and explan'at.ion simply concluded that the appellant bas contravened Rule IO (I) (c) (i) of the House Building Advance Rlllcs, ad also rules 8 and 10 (I) of the Conveyance Advance Rules and therefore committed miscondtiGt punisbable under Rule 4 (I) (iii) of the 1975 Rules. ·\n\nPUf$oant to the.report of the Enquiry Officer, the Executi.ve Director for and on behalf of th-e Committee of Maaagement of the corporation m1de\n\nan order PEC: P .5\n\n(8) 77 dated February 4, 1981. stating that the Committee __ of managment agrees with .he findings of.th¢_ inquiry officer and .imp()s~S the puaisl:imeat of _removi11from ser_vjcc with effect from the date of. the order.\n\nThe appeal preferred to the Appellate Authority wa• rejected as per tho Memorandum dated May 21, 1981 signed by one Anand Krishna. claiming.to aCt for and on behalf of the Bord of Dire.ctors. '\n\nTho. appellat; therefore approacped the High Court of Delhi under Art. 226 of th~ constitutin questioniag4\\he correctness and validity of 'the findings of the inquiry officer and the decision of the Disciplinary Authority as well .as th~ appellate iiuthoriy .. inter. alia <:>n the gro:Und that the. inquiry\n\nD-' was held iu violation o( the princip!Cs of natuial justice and the q.tiasi-. judicial authority failed to. give reasons in support of its order and the action _taken against the appellant- \\Vas per se arbitrary and Wola_tive of Arts.14 arid,\n\n16 of the ConstitUtion inasmuch as the_ . .a11egatiOc contb.ined in the _beads of .1charges, even. if. unre-butted1 do ot constitute . a misconduct within the meaningo_f the expression in 197 5 Rules. In order to susiaiO the maintaioa .. : bility of the writ petition, the app.ellant alSo conten_ded that the r\"espondent E i.s an instiumentality of the State 11.nd is coalprehended i~ the eXpressioo 'othr 3Uthorit.y' in Art. 21 of the - Con.titution.\n\nThe writ p.!titioll cameup. for admission before a Division ~_}nch of the Delhi.· High Court. It WJS ·\n\ndismiSSed in limine observing that 'the Writ petition is oot maiotajn1ble on ... . the facts .preseQtly set ou.t in th\" P'tition.\n\nHJncJ tbi-s app°e1l by sP.ecial leave. ·\n\n. Allowing the appeal, the Court .. •\n\nHELD : 1 : 1. Public sectof u:1dertakiiig1 aa<l other instrumetlta Hties of the State.are compFc.h.ended in 'the expressio::i\n\n1otbcr. allthori.ty~' in Article 12 of the CoustitutioQ.\n\n[660A]\n\n1.~ 2.\n\nOnce it is conceded that the .respondent-corpor.ation is an iilstrumentafity of the s.tate 'and; is therefore, compreherided in the ex'pression 'other authority' in Art. 12 of thel Constitution, it is indisputable that it is amenable to the wrii: jurisdictio:i uoder Arts. 32 and '226of the CopStitution:· Apart from the concessioo, the tests .collated in th~ deCisioii of the. Coastitution B'nch of., his:Court i.n AJay f!asia etc. v. Khalid Mujlb Sheravardi and Others etc. [1981] 2 S.CR. 79 for determining whether a paticular body is .an \"instrumcnta.lity .of the S, tate are fµlly satsfied and therCfore on precedent and conC.:ssioa it is satisfactorily establiShed that ibe respondnt~Corpdration is an instrumentality of the 'State within tho.\n\n. . . _,\n\nA. L. KALRA v. PROJECT EQPl'. CORl~.\n\nnieaning or the expression •other authority' under Art. 12 of t_h_e coasti~ A : tution and is amenable t.o the writ juriS; diction.\n\nThe writ Petition filed by the appellant in the High Court was thus maintainable.\n\n[660D; E]. ·\n\n2. \\Vhen onCe it is conceded that the respondent was amenable to the wr.it jurisdiCtiOo, th~ question _that \\vi11 afise is whether th.e rQatter. should be remitted fo the High Court as (he High Court bas rejected tho writ petit_ion. in limfne on the ground that the reSpoi:iderit was nOt amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court.\n\nIn ord_er not to protract t_he litigatioll hivOlving livC:lihood of tb_e party approaching -the supreme Court for justice, t_he Court can set down the appeal for final hearing on nlerit_s, which they did in the instant case.\n\n[660F-H]\n\n3:1. It cannot be said that executive actioil which results iIJ dellial\n\nC~\"' of equal protection orlaw or equality before law cannot be judicially reviewed n_or can_ be struck dGwa o!l the ground of arbitrariiless as biing· violative\n\nof Art. 14 .. [66JEcFJ\n\n3:2. The scope and ambit of Article 14 have been the subject matter of a catena of' decisions.\n\nIt is well settled that Article 1.4 strikes at arbi trariness in execu1ive/administrative _actioff because any action that is arbitrary i.nust necessarily .invo\\ve the negation Of 'equality.\n\nOne need -not confinO. the ·.denial_ .of equality to a co.mparative evalu..1tion between twci persons to arri've .at a conclusion of discriminatory treatment.\n\nAn action per se arbitrary itself denies equal protection of. law.· It is thus too late in ihe day to contend that an executive actjon shown to be arbitrari _is_ not either judicially rcviewable or wi'1hia the teach of Article 14.\n\n[662A, F-G, 663A-B]\n\n. ,· Ajay.Hasa; a etc. Khaiid MujMSheh>avardi and Ors [I9n] 2 s.c.R• ?9 E. p; Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu and aor. [1974] 2 s.C.R 34S; .D. S. Naka,:a v. Union af India, [1983] l S. C. C. 305 and Maneka Gandhi r. Union af India [1978] 2 S. C. R. 621 followe.d.\n\n4. Wisdom Qf the _legislative-policy may not. be opeo to judicial review btit when the wisdom takes the Concrete form of law, the same must stand the tesfof being in tune with the fundar#ental rights and if it.· t_renches upon any of the_ fundamental rights; it is void as ordained by Art. 13, . Conceding for the preseDt pufpose that legislative action follows a egislative pOlicy and the legislative poli.cy is not judicially reviewable, Qut :whil~ givng coo-• crete shape to the le_giSlative policy in the forrri of a statlile 1 -if the Jaw violates any of te fundamental rights including Art ... 14, the same is void to the . extent 'as provided iq. Ar_t. 13.\n\nI( the law is void. being , in violation . of any of the fuadat1_1entl rights set out in Part JI of the Constitution, it . cannot be shielded on the ground that it enacts a legislative policy. [661P-1;1]\n\n5. Even if .the respondent. Gorporation_ is an intrumentality of the State as comprehended .; n Art. 12, yet the employees of tho Corporation are not governed by Part XIV of the Constitution, Howver it could not bo\n\nSUPRJJME COURT REPORTS [l984j 3 s.c.it .\n\nS<.l; d that ae protection Conferred by Part III on the public servant is com ,\n\np\"aratively !Si lf~t1\\,_, tl:t<\\11 ibo one .conf.::rred. by Part XlV.\n\nThei:efore tne distinction soug't1t t..:> bJ dr-a wn be.tween prcitection. of part .XIV of the Constitution find P>rt Ill has no significance.\n\n[663B-C, 66SA]\n\nMandging Director. Uttar Pradesh Wareh<; Juslng Corpora'1ioh &· Anr. v. n Vinay Narayan Vajpayee; [1980] 2 SC R. 773 at p, 784, relied upon.\n\nc;:\n\nI):\n\n\" G\n\n 6:1.' Even.if the facts a)leged i.n two.heads. of charges are accepted as .wholly -proved,. yet that wold not constitute misconduct as prescribed_in Ruic 5 )J.nd no pen.atty can be impoed '!Or such conduct, for tlle reason that while Rule 25 whi_:;:h pr_scri'bcs penalties specifically provides that, any of\" ' the penalties therein mentioned can be imposed on an employee for miscon'. duct com1nitted by hi1n.\n\nRulo 4 d1es not.specify a rnisc.oiiduct. Rule 4 styled as rGeneral' spe¢ifies a norm of bch1viour .btit do.'s not specify that its viOiation Will. co9stitute misconduct. In Rule 5, it i5 no.where stated .{bat anythirig violative of Rule 4 would be per se a miscon.duct in any of\n\ntho sub-cl:iuses of Rule 5 which specifies misconduct.\n\n[6668 D]\n\n6:2. A general expectation of a .certain decent behaviour in -respect of employes keeping in vi9w corporate :culture may be a moral or -ethical expectation. Failure to keep to s.uch high standard of moral; ethica'I or aecorous b::baviour befitting an officer of the compa'ny by itself ca.noot cons ti\".'\n\ntilt~ mjsconduct unless the specific conduct f?:lls ia any of the enumerated misconduct in Rule s.\n\nAny atte1npt to telescopJRule 4 into Rule 5 must ..\n\nQe looked up.on With appp::hcn.sion becaue Rttle 4 .i~ vague and of a general naturr and what is u11becoming of a public servant may vary with individuals and expose cmp!oyees to vagaries. of subjeGtiv.e cvatu1tion. What in a given context v:ould constitute cOnduct unbecoming_ of a Public servant to ho tfeated as. miscondtict would ex-Pose a grey' area not amJnable to objective evaluation. Where misconduct when prOved entails penal consequences.; 'it is obligatory 9n the employer to specify and if necC:ssafy dfiJJe. it with\n\n.pr.cision and ac.curacy so that any ex post factO intcrprctation of some . incident may not. be Camollfttges as n1isconduct.\n\n[665D-G] '\n\nM/s Glaxo Laboratories (I) Ltd. v.\n\nP'residing Of/icer, Labour Court, Meerut & OthJrs; [1984] l_. S.C.C. I, followed.\n\n7:1. Seeking advance arid grl\\ntiog the same under r-elevant rilles is at best a lan transaction.\n\nThe transaction ma)' itsel{provide for paymens an.d the conseqilenccs. of failure to repay or .to_ abide by the rules.. If the rules for granting . the advance themselves provided the consequence of the breach of conditions, it would be idle io go in. si:arc\"h of any other conse'\" quence. by initiating any disciplinary aclion in that\"behalf unless the 1975 F.ules specifically inCorporate a rule that the bri::ach Of :1fousfl Building Advance Rul; s and the conveyance advance rules, would by themselves constitute a HmiscondUct\". Therefore Rule 4 (l) (l)is not only; not attatac ... ted but u1 tbi~ cas_e no attempt_. was mad'e to establish the correction. And\n\n1'- I , .,\n\n• -I\n\nA L. KARLA v. PROJEC'I' JlQPT. CORPN. 651\n\nas far as Rule 4 (1) (iii). is concerned, an advance not refur\\ded in tinle\n\n; A where it was recovered by withholding the Salary of a highly placid officer may not disclose a conduct uO.beComing of a public servant.\n\nTberefore, the first head of charge is an eye-wash, It , does Dot constitute a misconduct if it can be said to be one even_ if it re1nains unrebutted. The inquiry officer h;!s not said one word_ bow the uncontrOverted facts consistute a conduct unbecoming of a public servant, or be failed to ffiainiain absolute integrity.\n\nRegardi'ng the convey<1ce advancer the.Position is the same. The\n\n.:1 .B apr)eBant for no fai:ilt has been plloished sub-silencio. - .. , .\n\n[667F-H, 668A, DE, 669H)\n\n7:'2.\n\nNow if what is alleged as illisconduct do:s not cOnstitute mis conduct not_ by-· ana1ysis or appraisal Of evidence, but\"per se under l 97S Rules the respondnt had neither theauthority nor the jurisdiction nor the power to impose any penalty for th~ alleged miscondu:; t.\n\nAn administrative C authority \\Vho puports to act by its regutition must b-: h_eld bound bY the regulation.\n\n[670H, 671A] ·\n\n8. be dba, service.\n\nIn the matt.er-of public emptoyment if th.! tCrmin1tion is_ held. to . a declaratioD can. b~ grante!i that the man continues to be in , [67 tG, 672A] . . .\n\nSukhdev Sit:glf & Ors. v. Bhagatra1n Sarda~ Singh ... Raghuvananshi & Anr. [1975). -3 S.C.R,.6l9 _@ 655. Western India Automobile A:, sociation v.\n\nIndustrial Tribunal, Bombay and Ors. [1949] F .. C.R. 321 at 340. ·\n\n9:1. Jbe dut).- tcr give reasons would permit th:;:: court heahig a peti .. tion 'ror a wflt of certiorar-i to•ex fa.::iC aqccrtaln whether there is any errOr apparent on the record. A spaki~~ order will at its bst be. reasonable ind at its _worst be a_t.least a plausible one.\n\nIf reasons for an order are given\n\n. there will be.· Jess scope fOr arbitrary or Partial ex:erci se of power aild the order ex facie . will indicate wbethGr extraneous rn3.tters we're taken into ccmsideration by authoritr passinll. the order.\n\n[672D-E]\n\nM. p. Industries Ltdc . .v. Union of India and Others [1966] l S. C, R. 466 at .472; Vadachala Mnda/iar v. Stare of Madras, A. I .. R. 1952 M; dras 276; Bhagat Raja v. Union of India and Others; [1967].3 S.C.R. 302@ 320; r\"Cferred to.\n\n9:2. l{re, the findings of tho inquiry officer .are merely his ipse dixit.\n\nNo. reasons are assigned for reaching the liµdingand while recapitualating _O evidence seif:contradictpry positiOns were adoptedthat.either there was no .. 1 misconduct or ther~ was some misconduct or double punishment\" was already iinposed.\n\nRule 27 {19) c_asts an obligation upon .th' inquiry officer at the conciu!i.ion of the inquiry ti;> prep.ire a rep:ll:t which must inte.r a!ia inClude\n\nthe \"findings _o.ne:tcb ardcle of cbarg,~ and the rea\"sons therCfor.\n\nThe report is pfep.:ued in co.1travonPon o( tfle afonrrnen_tiOnod rule. The situaliOn .is further compounded by the fact t'iat tb' discipli.1ary authority which ii none .. a other than Com; nittee of Management of the corporatioa while accepting the feport_ of the-inquiry officer which itself was_ defective.did notassigtt any\n\n.' A\n\n' :\n\nSUPREME COURTS REMRTS (1984] 3 sc.R.\n\nreasons. for aCceptini'the.report of the inquiry officer. Further sub rllle (ii) of R_ulC 35 'provide& amongst othcis-.that the Api>ellate \"AUthority' shall consider. whether -the findingS re justified or whether the penalty_ is ex_cesSive or inadequate and pass appropriate Grders within three rnonth1 of th\\J date-of appeal. In order toascertain whetPer .the rule is complied whh, theorder of the appella_te authority must show that it took intq consid.:rdtio,1 the findings the quantum of pen3lty a1ld othr rclevJnt coasideiation'>. -There is no material for showing that the appe!Jato authority acted in COD'>OD tnce with its obligation under Rul.e 35. (67 lE-H, 67 3AD-E]\n\n9:3. '\"Therefore, the orde\"r of removal pas5ed by the_ Disciplinary Authority is illegal and inva.lid tttr the reasons (i) that the :ictio:l is th<,>rougbly arbitrarY and is viola.tive or , Att'. 14; (ii) that the alleged misconduct oes _not Ccnstitute miscoadu:t within the 1975 Rules; (iii) that the inquiry officer him.- elf found tbat pll:!ishment was already jmposed for the alleged miscondq.ct by withholding the salary and the app;, llant could not be e:icposed to double jeopardy; and (iv) th'!-t the finding~ of the inquiryofficer are unSup - ported by reasons and. the order or the Discipliilary Authrity as well a'3 t\"he Appellate Authority suffer from the same vice.\n\n[673H: 674A-B]\n\n10:1; Once the order-of removal from service is held'.to be illegal and invalid arid the appellant being In public mpfoyment, the necJsSary dec1a .. ration must follow that he.continues to be _in service uninterr.uptedly. -Ordi-\n\n~ narily, it is _wellscttled that if termirt1tion of service is held. to be bi\\d, no\n\no-ttler punishtnent in th;~ guise of deaial of back. wages can be imposed and th; irefore; i~ mult as a necessary corollary .follow that he will be entiled to all the back wages oo the footing that h h<is Continued to be in Service uniO.teiruptedly, rr ihe appellant had procured -an alternative employment he wo_uld nofbe entitled to wages and salary -ftom the respondent. . But it is eqtially true that an Cmployee depending.On salary for his survival when_ 'heis exposed to -the vagaries of the court litigation cannot hold on to a slender\n\ndistnt hope Of jndicial process omlng to his rescue and not try to survive by accePtini; an alternative eniploYmem, a hope Whi6h may tun out to b~ a mifage .. Therefore, the appellant .was perfectly Justified _in procuring all 31ternatlve.employment:in \"order to keep his body ancl soul together as also to bear the. expenses of litigatjon to Vindicate his hOaour, integrity and character.\n\n[6748-G] •\n\n10:2.\" ItoWever, in t'1e instarit case, the _appellallt shold be paid SO% of the back wages for the r_est of the_ Period during -which he remah1ed unemployed. This is so because the cOnduct of the appellant cannot be said to be entirely in consonance with corporate clilture. _As.a.highly placed officer e.was bouJd to strengthen the corporate culture and he should bave acted withill. the spirit of ·-the re&ulations both for house building adv<ince and conveyance advance, Which\" are devised to help the employees.\n\nThere has been IaPSe in totallY complying-with ihese regulations -by the appeJlant though it neither constitu.tes: misconduct to attr_act a penalty .ndr substantially good enough for initiation of disciplinary inquiry,\n\n-(6 75A-C]\n\n' .\n\nA.+· KALRA v. PROJECT EQPT. CORPN. (Desai, J.) 6.53 .· .· CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2703 of 1981.\n\nA: , From the Judgment and Order dated the 23rd July, 1981 of the Delhi High Courtin C.W. No, 1648 of 1981.\n\nM.K. Ramamurthi, L.C. Goyal and Ms. Sumitra Goyal for the Appellant.\n\nLal Narain Sinha, M.C. Bhanclare and P.P. Singh for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\n. DE~AT, J.\n\nFailure to adju.st the antena to the operative channel and dipping the. he:d like the proverbial ostrich in the sand so as not to view the changing kaleidos.cope of the law can alone be said to be responsible for. this trivial matter to be liroright to this Com:t.\n\nRespon<ltit is the Projec.t & Equipment Corporation of India Ltd. ('Corporation' for short) since its formation in 1971 a wholly\n\nown~<l subsidiary company of State Trading Corporation ('STC' for short), a Government of India Undertaking upto 1976 when it was ·. separated and since then it functions as a Government. of India undertaking .. The appellant A.L. Kalra joined as Upper 'Division Clerk in the STC on August 6; 1963.\n\nOn November 1, 1969, he came to. be promo.ted as Assistnt and earned a further promotion on M(ly 22, 19.74 as Accountant. On the setting up of the Corporation, the appellant exercising his.option came to be transferred as Accoun- . tarit to the Corporation on November 9, 1976. Under the relevant conditions of transfer,· h.e continued to be governed in the matter of recruitment and promotion by the relevant rules of the STC .. He was promoted in an officiating capawy as Deputy Jlinance Manager Grade II on June 29, 1978 and he was put on probaticin after being promoted as Deputy Finance Manager Grade II on regular basis effective from February 5, I 979.\n\nThe appellant applied for and obtained. all' advance iri the amount of Rs. 16,050 for purchasing a plot of land on April 4, 1979 for which he executed. the requisite agreement on April 4, 1979: The rules under which adfance was oblained are styled as 'The Project and Equipment Corporation was India Ltd. House Building Advance (Grant' & Recovery) Rules . ('Rules for House .Building Advance' for short) framed in exercise of the powers conferred upon the Board of Directors by the Articles of Ass0ciation of the Corporation. The appellant also applied for and obtained an advance in the amount of Rs. 11,000/- for purchase of a\n\n654 .·\n\nSUPRE.ME COURT REPORTS [1984l3 S.C.Jl. •\n\nA new motor cycle on July 7, 1979. This advance is governed by wliat\n\n. are styled as the Projects & Equipment Corporation of Indiit Ltd.\n\nConveyance Advanc~ (Grant & Recovery) Rules ('Conveyance Advance Rules' for short).\n\nIn respect of the house building advance. according to the respondent-Corporation, in view of Rule JO (I) (c) (i) the appellant was required to utilise. the amount drawn by him for the purpose for which advance was granted within two months of drawal and submit the documents evidencing the .purchase of plot within the prescribed\n\ntim~ failing whic!f he.was liable to refund .at once the entire amount together with interest to the Corporation. .The agrement dated April 4, 1979 executed by the appellant also obligated him to utilise the advance for the purpose for which.the same was sanctioned and to produce the; sale-deed for verification by the C'orporation failing .which the whole of the advance had to be refunded with interest. Jt was alleged that the appellant neither utilised the advance for the purchase of plot nor refonded the amount despite several reminders and ultimately on November 13, 1979 a memorandum was served. upon him cautioning him that if he failed to refund (be entire amount forthwith, disciplinary proceedings will be initiated against him. As the.appellant failed to comply with the request made in.· the memorandum, his salary from Nove.mber .7, 1979 as a whole.was withheld for adjusting the amount of advance and the interest payable thereon: He was also charged penal foterest for the default committed by him. . ·\n\nIn respect of the conveyance advance, which was sanctioned on July 7, 1979, the.appellant is. alleged to have committed a default\n\n0 by not purchasing the motor cycle within a period of one month as required by Rule 10 of ihe Conveyance Advance Rules, and 9n Novembet 13, 1979 he was adviseo refund the amount by Novem\" ber 14, 1979 failing which he was t!)reatened with disciplinary action . . It is, however, admitted that the appellant purchased a. scooter in\n\n. April, 1980 and submitted the dbcuments. which. appear to have be.en accepted by the Corporation, The . balance. of advance was also refunded •..\n\nA memorandum dated JuJy 22; 1980. was served upon the appellant stating therein that the competent auth6rity proposes to hold an enquiry against him under Rule 27 of the. Project and Equipment Cotporaticn of India Ltd. Employees' (Conduct, Disci pline & Appeal) Rules, 1975 ('1975 Rules' for short). There were\n\n• -I\n\n. y\n\nA, L. KALRA v. PROJECT EQPT. CORPN. (Desai, J.) 655\n\ntwo heads of charges in the charge-sheet \\)rawn-up against the A appellant 01) which disciplinary enquiry was proposed to.be held, :These two heads of charges read as under.; • .\n\nShri A.L. Kalra while functioning as Deputy Finance Manager-Grade ll in the Finance Division of the PEC during April,· 1979 applied and drew an advance of Rs. 16,050 for purchase of a plot ofland a.t Faridabad .. - \"t\n\nhe did not furnish the relevant docments in the office nor did he refund the amount of advance to the Corporation within two months of the date of drawal of the advance as :required under Rule 10 (I) (c) (i) of PEC House Building Advance (Grant and Recovery) Rules.\n\nShri Kalra by his .above act exhibited lack of integrity\n\nand conduct unbecoming of a public servant and violated\n\n., U ·\n\n· Rule 4 (!) & {iii) and Rule 5 (5) of the PEC Employees' (Conduct, Discipline & Appeal) Rules and :Roule 10 (I) (c) (i) of PEC House Building Advance (Grant & Recovery Rules and thereby committed misconduct punishable under the PEC employees (Conduct, Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1975. . .\n\nArticle-II\n\nShri, A.L. Kalra drew a conveyance advance of Rs. 11,000 in July, 1979 for purchasing a motor-cycle, but did not utilise the amount for the abpv~ purpose and did not furnish cash receipt etc. evidencing purchase of the , vehicle within one month as required under Rule-8 of the , PEC Conveyance Advance (Grant & Recovery) Rules. Nor\n\ndLd he refund the amount of advance to the Corporation as required under Rule 10(1) ibid. .\n\nShri A.L Kalra by his above act exhibitd lack ofinteg-. rity and conduct unbecoming of a Public servant and violated Rule-4 (I) (i) & (iii) and Rule 5 (5) of PEC Employees (Conduct, Discipline & Appeal) Rules and also violated Rule-8 and Rule-10 (is ofthe PEC Conveyance Advanee (Grant & R.ecovery) Rules and thereby committed miscon. duct punishable under. the FEC Employe~;· (Conduct . . . . . . _.' . .\n\n• F\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORfs ·· [1984] 3 s.c.R.\n\nDiscipline & Appeal) Rules, 1975.\"\n\n. The appl!'llant was a.lso asked to submit his defence statement within 10 days from the date .of.the receipt of the memorandum.\n\nThe appellant by .his letter dated Febuary 13, 1980 requested for extension.of time to file the defence statement. fr appears , that he sought further extension of.time by thri; e weeks which request was declined by the memorandum dated Feb: 23, 1980.\n\nThe Committee of Management in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-rule (4) of Rule .27 of the 1975 Rules appoinletl Shri A.'S .. Nangia, Chief Marketi1ig Manager as the Enquiry Officer • to enquire into the charges against the appellant submitted on June T3, 1980 a detailed statement pollltlng out that the inq\"irj' was the outcome of malice for various reasons therein mentioned and also explaining why there was delay in refunding the advances and specifically pleaded that in view of the fact that the first advance was sought to be recovered by withholding his salary and adjusting' the pay towards.advance and charging penal interest and in .the second case by accepting 'he document evidencing purchase of scooter, no misconduct could be said to h11vebeen committed by the appeila.nt and the diseiplinary enquiry was uncalled for.\n\nVarious other contentions were also raised in the defence statement. The iuquiry officer conducted the enquiry in respect of the afore-mentioned two charges.\n\nOne U.S. Aggarwal, Finance Manager of the Corporation appeared as resenting Officer. The apRellant conducted his own defeJJce ..\n\nIn Para 4 bf fris report, the Inquiry officer states that the 'preliminary hearings of the inquiry was held. on 3rd and 9tl1 April, 1980 and then inquiry ws held regularly on various dates from 23rd April 1980 to 22nd May, 1980. The appellant was called upon io submit his statement of defence which he had submitted on June 30, 1~80.\n\nThe findings purported to have been recordedby the jf!quiry officer were the subject matter of.a heated debate between t!ft, parties and therefore,· the report. of the. Inquiry Officer may be broadly scanned here. After recapitulating in paras 1 to 4 the various stages through which the enquiry progressed, in para 5, .it is stated that at the 'preliminary hearing on 3rd April, 1980, Shri A.L Kalra, (appellant} pleaded guilty to all the charges mentioned in Annexure I and . also agreed to the stateinent of imputation of his misconduct in support of the article$ of charges framed against him.' In part 5 (3), the inquiry officer discussed \\he first he&d of charge in respect of the\n\nA. L. KALFA v. PR01£CT EQP l. CORPN. (Desai, J.)\n\nhouse building advance. It was found as a fact that the advance was taken for the purchase o( a pl•t and that the appellant had negotiated for a purchase of a plot from Shri J.C. Chugh. who was examined as a management witness and who admitted that he waited for six months fo complete the transaction but after that he disposed . of the plot. Evidence of Shri J.C. Chugh revealed that the deal was , delayed because Haryana Estate officer demanded so111e additional amount and'there was dispute between the appellant, the vendee an•d J.C. Chugh, the vendor as to who should bear the extra burden. In. paragraph 5.1.4 after 1ecapitulating the reminders sent to the appellant to refund the advance, it is observed that it is not clear from the relevant rule as to which is the competent authority to grant extension of tin1e for utilisation of the amount. And then in para~ graph 5.1.5 he recommended that the sanction of the competent authority should be taken before granting any extension. There ends the discussion on the charge in respect of house building advance.\n\nThe inquiry officer then proceeded to examine the .second head , of the charge. After recapitulating the fact aout sanction of advance and drawal of the same, it was observed that the appellant drew. the advance on July 9, 1979 and on April 7, 1980 he submitted the documents such as cash receipt in respect of purchase of .a scooter, insurance certificate, receipt of .balance amount deposited , with the cashier, original insurance policy and registration. book evidencing the purchase of scooter. It is then observed that under the relevant rules motor cycle had to be purchased within one month from the date of the drawal'Of the advance or else he should have obtained fresh sanctiOn for the purchase of a scooter instead o~ a motor cycle. hen comes the particular observation which may be exira.cted : ..\n\n\"He (appellant) did not obtain any fresh sanction for .purchase of a scooter but simply submitted the papers' for regularisatioµ of the advance and although no specific letter for sanction of the purchase of. a scooter was hued by the Personnel Division yet the fact that lie Was asked to refutid the balance amount taniamomtfs to ag; eeing defacto sanction tor the !'lurchase of the same.\"\n\nH The inquiry officer then proceeds to dispose of the contention of the. appeUant. that in .other case~ of similar advance and default, ' no ac.tion was taken but he was singled out for a harsh treatment •\n\n.' 658\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984]3 s.c.R.\n\nfor the reasons alleged by him but with which we are not concerne<l\n\n. at this stage. The inquiry offieer then noticed that the full salary payable every month to the appellant was stopped'by the CorporationJrom November 16, 1979 in addition to .the inquiry under whicll disciplinary action was proposed to be taken'. The inquiry officer concluded his report as under :\n\n• \"While deciding the oaie, t.he facf ihat the salary was . stopped from 16th November, 1979 may be kept in view as thi• may, I feel, tantamount to double punishment. Normally even where an employee is suspended certain amount . of subsistence allowance is granted whereas in this case the salary was completely stopped and nothing has been paid since then.\"\n\nWhat is referred to as the report of the enquiry which is minu-· tely scanned in the preceeding paragraphs merely seems to be the . record of inquiry and recapitulation of allegations and explanation. what is styled as findings of the inquiry officer are separately filed being Arinexure• M to the petition. This is a bald document of two paragraphs in which. the inquiry officer .records that the appellant has contravened Rule lO (I) (c) (i) of House Building Advance Rules and has thereby committed misconduct punishable urt.der Rule 4 (I) (iii) of 1975 Rules. In paragraph 2, it is stated that the appellant has committed breach of Rule 8 and Rule I 0 (i) of the Conveyance Advance Rules and has thertby committed misconduct punishable under Rule 4 (I) (iii) of 1975 Rules.\n\nBy what process this conclusion is reached or what evidence appealed to him. is left to speculation.\n\nThe reasons in support .of the conclusion ar~ conspicuous by their absence .. The findings are the ipse dixit of the inquir~ officer.\n\nPursuant. to this report of the inquiry officer the Executive Director for 'and on 'behalf of the. Committee of Management of the\n\nCorporatin made an Order No. PEC.P ; 5 (8)/77 dated February 4,\n\n1981. The heads of charges ar, e reproduced in paragraph 1. Pa(agraphs 2 and.3 are devoted to. the stages through which the enquiry progressed. In. paragraph 4, the findings unsupported .by easons are reproduced. In paragraph 5, it is stated. that the Committee of Management agrees with the findings of , the inquiry officer and imposes the punishment .removal from service with effect from the date of the order.\n\nThe appllant preferred an appeal to the Appellate Authority being the Board of Directors. of the Corporatic; iu (, Jn fbruary 211\n\n• ,\n\n. '\n\nA. L. KALRA v. PROJErr EQP'r. CORPN. (Desdi, J.) •\n\n 1981. One Anand Krishna claiming to act for and on. behalf of the Board of birectors, Appellate Authority issued •memorandum dated May 21, '1981, Annexure P to the petition in which it is stated that the appeal of th.e appellant was cpnsidered by the Appellate Authority and after going through the records of the case, the Appellate Authority has dec.ided tt,. uphold the decision of the authority and to confirm the penalty of removal imposed upon him.\n\nThe salient feature which flies into the face about the findings recorded, by the inquiry officer and the order bythe Disciplinary . Authority as well ase Appellate Authority is that none of them made a reasoned order. or speaking order and their conelusions ace . mere ipse dixit unsupported by any analysis of the evidence or r.; ason\n\nin support of the conclusions. •\n\nThe appellant approached the High court of Delhi under. Art. 226 of the Constitution questioning the . correctnegs and validity of the findings of the inquiry officer and the decision of the Disdplinary Authority as well as the Appellate Auth9rity inter a/ia'lon the ground that the enquiry Was held in violation of the. principles'[of natural justie!l and the quasi-jqdicial authority failed to give reasons in support of its order and _the action taken against the -appellant was per se arbitrary and in violation of Art. 14 and Art. 16 . of the Constitution inasmuch as the allegations contained In the heads of charges, even if unreb_utted, do_ not consitute a misconduct within the meaning of the expression iri, l 97 5 Rules. In order to sustain the maintain abilit of the writ petition, the appellant also contended that the respondent is an instrumentality of the _State and is comprehended in the cxpre!lsion 'other authority' in Art. 12 of the Constitution .\n\n. The writ petition came-up for admission _before a Division . Bench. of the Delhi High Court. It was dismissed in Ii mine <¥>serving\n\nthat the writ petition is not maintainable on . the facts presently set\n\no\\\\t in the petition. Hence this appeal by special leave.\n\n. G\n\nIn order to obtain any decision on merits, the appellant will have to clear the roadblock about Jhe maintainability of the writ\n\n•. ptition in the High Court. }tappily this untenable contention was not pursued in this Court. In para: 2 (vi) of the counter-affidayit filed by pne Mahartand Khokher on behalf of the respondents it was\n\nunambiguously stated. that te 'respondent-Corporation is advised not to dispute t)le • piaiptainability of the petitjoner's petition as\n\nSUPREME COUR.T REPORTS\n\n[ 1984} 3 S.C.R.\n\nregards applicability of Art. 12.of the Constitution.' Further in para 5.1 of the same affidavit, it was stated that as regards the assertion of the appellant that the respondent-Corporation is an instrumentality o{ the Central Government and hence withiµ Art. -12. of the Constitution, the respondent Corporation does not dispute the same. This admission was reiterated in para 5.2: Further in the written submisiions dated September 30, 1983 filed on behalf of the respondent, it is conceded that the respondent is a State within the meaning of Art. 12 for the purposes of Par.t III of the Constitu'ion, with this reservation that the employees of the respondent are not members of a civil service of the Union or all India civil service or a civil service . . . of a state or holds the civil posts under the Umon or the State and therefore, would.not be entitled to the protection of Part XIV of.the Constitution. This concession absolves us from the obligation to examine the status and character of the respondent-Corporation to determine. whether it is an instrumentality of the State and therefore,·· comprehended-in the expression 'other authority' in Art. 12 of the Constitution. Once i~ is conceded that the respondent-Corporation\n\ni~ an instrumentality of the State aµd is therefore, comprehended in the expression 'other auth.ority' in Art. 12 o.f t.he Constitution, it is indisputable thitt it is amenable to the writ jurisdiCtion under Arts. 32 and 226 of the Constitution. Apart from the concession, the\n\ntsts collated in the decision of the Cnstitution Bench of this. Court E in Ajay Rasia 'etc. v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi & Qrs. etc.,(l) for \\!eter- ' ·. mining whether a particular body is an instrumentality of the State\n\nare. fully satisfied and therefore on precedent and. concession it is satisfactorily established. that the respondent-Corporation is an\n\n. instrumentality of the State within the meaning of the expression ·\n\n'other authority' under Art. 12 oHhe Constitution and amenable to the writ jurisdiction.· The writ p.etition filed by the appellant in the High Court was thus maintainable.\n\nOnce when in this Court it was connceded .that the respondent was aiioenable to the writ jurisdiction of the H\\gh Court, the question -arose whether the matter should bt remitted to the High Court as the High Court has. rejected the writ petition . in limine on the. grourld that the respondent wao not amenable to the writ juri§dietion of the High Court. Ultimately, in on:Ier not to protract the litigation involving livelihood of the appellant, the. appeal was set down for final hearing on merits. The res):lonant•Corporation was accordingly directed to file its affidavit as also the documents on which it seeks to rely. The appeal ws thereafter heard on merits.\n\n(1) [1981] 2 SCR 79 •\n\n; .\n\nA. L KA•.RA v. PROJECT EQPT. CORPN. ([/esai, J.) 661\n\nBefore we deal with the contentions raised on behalf of the A. appellant, it is necessary to dispose of a contention haing a flavour of a preliminary objectn raised by Mr, Lal Narain Sinha on behalf of the respondent-Corporation. It was urged that in th.e absence of any specific pleading pointing out whether any one else was either Similarly\n\nsituated as the appellant or dissimilarly treated the cl).arge of discri- B mination cannot be entertai.ned and no relief can be claimed on the. allegation of contravention of Art. 14 o.r Art. 16 of the Constitution ..\n\nIt was submitted that the expression discriminat.ion in; iports the concept of comparison between equals and if the resultant inequality is pointed out in the treatment so meted out the charge of discrimina- .tion can be. entertained and one can say that equal protection of law c has been.denied.· Expanding.the submission, it was urged that the use of theexpression 'equality' in Art. 14 imports duality an.d comparison which is predicated upon more than on~ person 'of situ.ation 'and in the absence of available. materiol for compariso11, the plea of discrimination must fail.\n\nAs a corollary, it was urged that ill .the absence of material for 'comparative evaluation not only the charge D • of discrimination cannot be sustained but the execqtive action cannot be struck .down im the ground that the action~!!; per Ile arbitrary. Proceeding' along, it was urged that inaking.faw.is a matter of legislative policy aud the degree of reasonableness jn every such law is equally a matter of policy nd policy . of the legislature is not. judicialljj, reviewable n the specious plea that it is either arbitrary or un- E reasonable.\n\nIt ls difficult to accept the. submission that executive action which results in. denial of equal protection of law or equality before 'law ca.uuot !>e judicially reviewed uor can it bestruckdown on the groupd of arbitrariness as being violative of Art. 14.\n\nF Conceding for the present purpos~ that legislative action follows a legislatiye policy and the legislative policy is notjudicially reviewable, but while giving concrete shape to the legislative policy in the form of a statute, if the law violates , any of.the fundamental rights including Art.. 14, the same is void to the extent as.provided in Ar(.\n\n13. If the law is void being in vio1ation of ny <if the fundamental G rights set out in Part III of the Constitution, it cannofbe .shielded on , the ground that it enacts a legisfative policy. Wi, sdom of the leglslit- .. tive policy may not be open to judicial reviewbut when the wisdom takes the'cOncrete form of law, t!)e same mut stand the test Of being in tune with the fundamental rights and if it trenches upon any of the fundamental rights, it is vaid as ordaiped by Art; 13.\n\n' H\n\n662 ' SUrREME, COURT RE~ORTS [1984i :l s.c.v.:'\n\n _The scope and ambit of Art. 14 have been the subject matter of. a catena of decisions.\n\nOne fact of Art. 14 which has been noticed i? E.P. kvyappa, v. State o/T'amil _Nadu .& Anr,.(1) deserves special men\n\n!ton becaus~ that effective1y answers the contention of Mr. Sinha:\n\n.- ; me Constitution Bench speaking through Bhagwati, J. in con'curring Judgment in Royappq's, case observed as under : - . ,\n\n\"The basic . principle which,- therefore, informs both Atts. 14 aJ!d 16 is equality and inhibition against discrimination.. ]\"ow what is the content and rea9h of this great equalising. principle ? It is .a founding faitJl, to use the words of pedantic or lexicographic.approach.; We cannot cpuntenanCe' any attempt to trnncate its all-emoracing scope_ and meaning, for to do so would be to violate its activist magnitude. Eguality is a dynamic concept with many aspects and _dimensions and it cannot be \"cribbed, cabined and copfuied\" within traditional and doctrinaire limiis.\n\nFrom a pcisitivistic point of view, equality' is antithetic to arbitrariness.·. In fact equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies ; on~ belongs , to /he. ru'le of law in a republic while the other, to the whim ancfcaprice of a:n absolute monarch.\n\nWhe~ an act is arbitrary it is implicit in it that it is unequal l;>oth according to political logic and constitutional law and !s therefore violative of Art. 14, and if it affei!'ts any matt~ relating to public employment, , it is also violativ~ of Art. 16._ Arts. 14 and 16 strike at arbitrariness in State action and ensure fairne~ and equality of treatment.\"\n\n' . , . . : .\n\nF This view was approved by the Constitution Bench ii) 1jay Hasia case It thus appears well-settled that. Art. 14 strikes at arbitrariness in ·[executive/administrative action _because any action that is arbitrary must, necessarily involve the negation of equali\\y, One_ need not confine the denial of equal_ity to a comparative evalaation between two persons to arrive at a conclusion of discriminatory treatent. An G -~ action per se arbitrary itself denie> equal of proteetion by law. The.\n\nConstitution Bi; nch p;; rtinently obsered in Ajay Hasia's case and puJ the matter beyond controversy wh'en it said 'wherever, therefore, there is arbitrariness in _State action whether it be of the legislature or of the executive or ofan \"authority\" under Article 12, Article 14 immediately springs into action _and strikes down such State action.' . ,\n\n1:1\n\n(I) [1974] 2 SCR 348.\n\ny- '•\n\n. ' .\n\n~.··\n\nA. L. KA~RA v: PRoiECT EQPT. CORPN. (Desai, ],) 663,\n\nThis view was further elaborated. and affirmed in D.S .. Nakra v. A!.\n\nUnion of India.(1)-in Maneka Ganifhi v. Union vf IndiiJ(') it was observed that Art. 14 strikes at arbitrariness in State action and ensure fair-. ness and equality of treatment. It is Mius too late in the day to contend that an executive action shown to be arbitrary is not either judicially reviewable or within tlle reach of Art, 14. The contention as\"formulated by Mr. Sinha must accordingly be negatived.\n\nB .-\n\nIt must be conceded in fairness to Mr. Siriha that he_ is right in submitting tj:iat even if the respondent-Corporation is an instrumen~ ta!ity\" of the S\\ate as comp_rehended in Art. 12, yet the employees of the Corporatiou are not governed by Part XIV of the Constitution . . Could it however be said that tt: protection conferred' by Pari III on C ,\n\npublic servent• is comparatively less ffective than tbe one conferred by Part XIV? This aspect was examined by this.Court in Managing\n\nDireetor; Uttar Pradesh. Wareousi!'g Corporation & Anr. v. Vinay Narayan Va; payee(!)where 0 .. Chinnappa Reddy, J. in a concurring _judgment has spoken so eloquently about ii that it deserves quota-\n\n~: D\n\n\"!find it very hard indeed to discover any distinction,' on principle, between_ a person directly under the employment of the Government and a person under the employment of an agency crr instrumentality of the Government or a Corporation; set up under a st'!ltute or incorporated but wholty owned by the Government. It is self evident and trite to s~Y that the function of the Sta_te has long since ceased to be confined to the preservation of the public peace the exaction of taxes and.the defence of.its frontiers. It now the funC!ion of the State to secure 'social, econo)llic and political justice', to preserve 'liberty of thonght,\" expression, belief, faith and worship', and to ensure 'equality .of status and Of opportunity'. That is the proclamation of the people in the preamble to the Constitution. The desire to attain these objectives has necesarily resulted in intense Governmental activity in manifold ways.\n\nLegislative and exe9l!iivity have re_aclled very .. far and have touched very . many aspects of a citizen's life.\n\nThe Government, directly or through the Corporations, set up by .it or owned by it, .now owris . or manages, a large mimber of industries and institutions. It is the. biggest builder in the country.· Mam-\n\n(1) [198311 sec 30;\n\n(2) [1978] 2 SCR 621 ·\n\n(~ [1980] ,2 SCR 773 at p, 784\n\nH .\n\n. 664.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984) 3 s.cJt.\n\nmoth and . minor irrigatici~ projects, heavy and light engineeri.ng projects, projects of various kirids. are undertaken by the Government; TheGovernment is also the biggest trader . in the country. The State and themuLitudionous agencies and Corporations set up bY it are the pi; jncipal purchasers of the produce and the products of our country and they control a vast and cpmplex machinery of distribution. The . Government, its agencies ani:! instrumentalities, Corporations, set up by the Government uder statutes and Corporations incorporated. under the Companies Act but owned by the Government have thus becollie the biggest employers in . the cou'ntry. There is no:-good reason wpy, if Govern··· ment.is bound to observe the equality cl; mses of the constitution in the lljatter of employ merit a'nd in its dealings with\n\nthe employees, the Corporations. set' up or owne<l by the . .\n\nGovernment should not be.equally boundand why, instead, such Corporations, could become citadels of patronage and arbifi; ary action. Jn a country like ours which teems with population, where the State, its agencies, its instrumentalities nd its . .Corporations are th.e biggest employers and. where millions seek employment .and security, to confirm the applicability of the equality clauses of. the constitution, in relation to matters,. of employment; strictly to direct employment {lnder the Government is perhaps to mock at the Constitution and the people. Some element of public employment is all that is necessary to take the employee beyond the reach of the rule which denies him access Jo a Court to enforce a contract of em$Joyment and denies him the protection of Arts.14 and 16 Qf the Constitution. After\n\nall employment in the public sector has grown to vast dimensions and employees in the public sector often disc.barge as onerous duiies as civil servants and. participate in activi ties vital to our country's economy. In growing realization of the importance of' employment in the public sector, Parliament and the Legislatures of .the States have declared persons in the service oT local authorities, .Govefriment companies and statutory corporations aspublic servants an.d extended to. them by express enactment the protection U.Sll• ally extendd to civil servants from suits a.nd prosecution.\n\nIt is, therefore, but right that the independence and integtity of those employed in th~ public sector slfould be secured as much as the independence and integity of civil servants.\" ,\n\n. ;\n\n.... '\n\n.. '\n\nA. t. KALRA v. PRolEct EQPT. CORPN.\" (Desai, J.)\n\nThere fore the dis; inction sought to be drawn between. protection .of\n\nA . part XIV of the Constiution and Part III has no signiticance .\n\n. And now to the facts. The gravamen of the two heads of .• charges is that _the appellant is guilty of misconduct as preScribed in\n\nRule 4 (I) (i) and (iii).\n\nIt reads as under :\n\n\"4 (I) Every employee sall at all times :\n\n(i) .maintain absolute integrity ;\n\n(ii) ~-\n\n(iii) do nothing which is unbecoming of a public , servant:\" Rule 5 prescribs various misconducts for which.action can be taken against au employee governed by the rules.\n\nRule 4 bears the heasJing 'General'. Rule 5 bears in the heading . 'misconduct'. The draftsmen of the 1975 Rules 1'1ade a clear distinction about. what Would constitute misconduct. A general expectation of a certain decent behaviour in respect of employees keeping in view Corporation culture may be a moral or etical expectation.\n\nFailure to keep to 'such high standard of moral, eJhical or decrous behaviour befitting an officer of the company by itself cannoi constitute miscond1!ct unrss the specific conduct falls in any of the o; numerated miscon-. duct in Rule 5.\n\nAny attempt to telescope Rule 4 into Rule. 5 must be lookeil upon with apprehension because Rule 4 is vague and of a general nature and what is unbecoming of a public. servant may vary •\n\nwith individuals and expose employees to vagaries of subjective . evaluation. What in a given context would constitute conduct unbecoming. of a public servant to be treated as misconduct . would expose a grey area not amenable to objective evaluation.\n\nWhere misconduct when proved entnils penal 'consequences, it is obligat:Jry on the employer to specify and if necessary define it with precision and accuracy so that any ex post faeto. interpretation ofome incident inay rrot be camouflages as misconduct. It is not necessary to dilate on this point in view ofa i; ceat decision of this Court in M/s Glaxo • Lobouratories '(l) Ltd. v. Presiding Officer; Lobour Court, Meerut . & Others (1) where.this Court held that 'everything which is required . to be prescribed has .to be prescribed with precision and ob argument can be entertained that some_thing not prescribed can yet be. taken\n\n(I) [1984) I S.C.C. I •\n\nE •'\n\n• SllPREME COURT REPORlS iJ 984) 3 s.c.Ji.\n\ninto account as varying what is prescribed. 1n short it canbOt be left to the vaga, ies. of management to say ex post fucto that some'acts\n\nof omission or 'commission nowhere found to be enumerated inthe . relevant standing Of is ntietheless a misconduct not strictly falling wiihin the _enumerated misconduct\" in ihe relevant standing order but ,, yet a miscondµct for the purpose of imposing a penalty.' Rule 4 styled as 'General' specifies a norm of behaviour but does not specify . that its violation will constitute misconduct. In Rule(>, it is nowhere stated that anything violative of Rule 4 .would be per as a misconduct in the sub-clauses or' Rule 5 which specifies misconduct. It would therefore appear that even if the facts alleged in two heads of charges are accepted as wholly proved, yet that would not constitute misconduct. as pres.cribed in Rule 5 and no penalty can be imposed .for such conduct. It may as well be-mentioned that Rule 25 which prescribes penalities specifically provides thai any of the penalities therein mentioned can be imposed on an emyloyee for misconduct committed by him. Rule 4 does notspecify a misconduc.t.\n\nMr. Ramamu¥hi, learned counsel for the appellant further 'contended that the very. initiation of the disciplinary enquiry and\n\n.imposition of ptlnishment. of removal from service is thoroughly arbitrary and discloses a vindictive attitude on the part of tl\\e respondent Corporation. It was urged that the two heads of charges per se do not constitute any misC'onduct and. they can be styled as. trumf)ed-up 'which even jf held approved wouid not render the .apellant\n\nliable for any pumshment. Thetwo, heads of charges have .been eJ; ttacted herein before. Charge No. 1 refers to the dra\"Cal of a House Building Advance and failure to -comply with the requisite rules . p, rescribed for House Building Advance. According• to the finding\n\nrecorded by the inquiry officer, the failure of ihe appellant to refund the amount of advance to the respondent-Corporation .within two . months of the date of the diawal Would be violative of Rule 10 (1)\n\n(c) (i) df th~ House Building Advance. Rules and it would constitute misconduct within the meaning of the expressioi1 in Rule4(1 \\ (ii1)of 1975 Rules.· Rule 10 0) provides that' the advance-shall. be drawn in instalments as prescr.ibed in vaiious sub, clauses .. The relevant sab-clause in this case is sub-cl.- (C} \"\".l; iic!t provides that \"when\n\na:dance is required partly for purchase of fand and partly for c9nstructing a single storeyed new house thereon.; (i) not more than 20% of the sanctioned advance on execution by th_e applicant employees an agreement in the required form for repayment of the advance. · The amount will be payable to the applicant only for purchasing a\n\n' .\n\nA. ii,, KALRA v. PROiECT EQPT. CORPN. (Desai, !.)\n\ndeveloped plot of land on which construction can commence Imme diately and saJe deed in respect thereof be produced .for the inspection\n\nof CPM/RM within,.tw.o months of th, e date QI) which 2Q% of the advance ii draw~ or within such further time as the. CPM/RM may allow in this behalf failing wh.ich the employee shall be liajile to refund_ at -once the entire amount to. the Corporation together with interest thereon.\" A bare reading of the relevant role wjllshow that it ptovides for obtaining. advance which fa thfs case was taken for purchasing a plot. The inquiry officer accepts the evidence of Mr: Chugh that the appellant had 'negotiated with him for purhase of a plot but some dispute arose about some addition.a!' expenditure aµd . the negotiations protracted over a period of six months, Now para\n\nI sub-cl. (CJ confers on CPM/RM power to extend the rime for finalising' the deal or call upon the employee to refund the entire. amount and he is liable to pay interest thereon. This is the only consequence .\n\no( taking advance and failure to keep to the . time-schedule. The\" relevant rule is a selt contained provision providing for 'the condicion foi grant of advance, time table for repayment and consequence of failure to hep to the time schedule .. The House -Building Advance was drawn on April•4, 1979 .. On November 13; 1979 the appellant was asked to refund the entire amount. Immediately ori November '16, 1979, an order was made withholding the entire .salary of the_\n\nappellant. Even the Inquiry officer ivas constrained to observe that the appeilant was exposed to dqltble jeopardy inasmuch as his salary ·\n\nas a whole waswithhHd and he was bing removed from service. It is also pertinent t~ not\\' that the inquiry officer is not clear when he\n\nS)lid 'that once. the power to extend the time lo repay the advance is conferred anJ Nnal interesi is charged, is any rule.violated.'' This is\n\nnot an attempt .to ieappreciate evidence in the casC' but the entire thing is being analyseq to point out that the action apart from being arbitrary is motivated and unjust. ·\n\nIf the rule• for g!anting the advance themselves provided the\n\n-~- consequence of the breach of conditions, it would be idle lo go in search of any other.consequence by initiating any disciplinary action in that behalf unless the 1975 Rules specifically. idcorporate'a rule . that the breach of Hqjise Building Advance Rules would by itself .constitute a misconduct. Tl:i'at is not the case h<re as will be presently pointed out. - '\n\n.. F\n\nSeeking advance and granting the same under rele:vant .rules is . H. at best a loan transaction. The transaction 'may il$elf provide for\n\n.A .. •\n\n• G\n\n• SUl'REME COURT REPORTS . tI984j 3 S.C.R .\n\nrepayment and. the consequence of failure to repay or 'to abide by the rules. . That 'has beerr done. in this case. Any attept to gq, in search of.a possible Other consequence of breath of contract itself appears to be arbitrary and even motivated. However, the more serious infirmity in framing this head of charge is that according to the inquirJ. oflker this .failure to refund the advance within the time\n\nframe' in which it \\vas sanctioned , constitutes violation of Rule 4 (!) (iii\\.\n\nLet. us turn to the chrge-sheet drawn-up againstthe appellant. Under thlirst head of charge it was stated that the appellant 'was guilty of misconduc't as prescribed i~ Rule 4 (l) (i) and (iii).\n\nRule4 (i),(i) provides that every employee sl)all at all times maintain absolute integrity. How did the que.siion of integrity arise passes com pre- .hens\\ on. The appellant appliec\\ for. Hous.e Building Adv.cane. Inquiry Officer says that the appellant had negotiated with Mr.\n\nChugh.for purchase of a plot. There is not even negative evidence 'or evi.dence which may permit .an inference that the honse building ~\n\nVance was utilised for a purpose cit her than for ',)'hlch it was granted.\n\nTherefore Rule 4 (l) (i) is not only attta.cted hut no attempt was made efore us tci sustain it: Aud. as far as Rule 4 (I) (ii.i) is con: cerned; v.ie fail to see' how an advance not refunded in time where it was recovered by withholding the' salary of a highly placed officer. discloses a conduct. unbecoming of a public servant. Therefore, the first bead or'cnarg., is an eye-wash. It does not constitute a, miscon• ductif it can be said to be one even if it remains unrebutted. The inquiry officer has not said. one word how 'the\n\n0 uncontroverted facts constitute a coildµe, t unbecom, ing of a public servant, or he failed to\n\nmaintairl.' absolute integrity . ·.\n\n..... \\.\n\nA. L. KALRA v. PROJECT EQPN. CORPN. (Desai, J.)\n\nadvance, the whole of the advance together with the interest accrued thereon would become refundable. As the appellant did not keep io the time-schedule, memos dated. August 20, September 24, November 12 and November 13, 1979 were served upon him calling upon him to either furnish the req'uisite documents or to refund the advance latest by November 14, 19.79. The inquiry officer in t9is connection,\n\nrecpitulated the facts in paragraphs 5'2, 5·2·1, and 5·2·2,. Then he proceeded to record a finding that the appellant 'iin April, 7, 1980\n\nsubmitted the docume'nts namelycash receipt in respect of purchase of a scooter, insurance certificate, receipt showing deposit of the balance of advance with cashier, original insurance policy and registration book for purchase of the scoote~. The report does not show the date of purchase which could have been ascertained with certainty from the insurance certificate as well as the cash receipt.\n\nAfter recapitulating these undisputed facts, he stated that the fact . that 'he (appellant) was asked to refund the .balance amount tantamount to agreeing de facto sanction for the purchase of the same .\n\n(scooter)'. In the. last paragraph, he has stated that a stoppage of the salary effective from November 16, 1979. in the opinion of the inquiry officer taniamounts to imposition of double punishments and this is compounded by not,. paying even a subsistance allowance. We scanned the report minutely with the able assistance of the learned . counsel for the respondent subjecting it to microscopic analysis to asceriain whether the inquiry officer recorded any fin.ding in respect of this charge adverse fo the appellant. We found none.\n\nOn the • contrary, a comprehensive reading of the report .clearly indicates that the inquiry officer, was satisfied that the delay in submitting the documents and purchasing a scootet instead of a motor cycle should not have been visited with such. drastic punishment of.stoppage of salary altogether and yet compelling the appellant to render service without qui¢ pro quo. Curiously, however, in a separate document recorded a! finding, the inquiry officer has held that the . appellant contravened Rule 10 ll) of the Conveyance .Advance Rules which . woulr! constitute misconduct within.the meaning of the expression in ·\n\nRule 4 (I) (iii) of the 197:.0Rules. The report and the findings are wholly irrecondlable and left us guessing about the approach of the inquiry officer, his' conclusion and bis finding> This aspect considerably troubled us because we would presently point out thai the .disciplinary Authorfty as well as the appellate authority have declined a peep into the working of their minds by making a reasoned or a speakng order. The appellant app, ears to us to.have been.coqvicted sub sileru; io, .\n\n'A\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORT5 (19841 s.C.~.\n\n'fhe first questlon we. tilust pose to ourselves is whether taking the findings of facts as recorded by the inquiry officer a11d actepiing for the present purpose that they are not. open to '(i judicial review, do tliey constitute misconduct so as to invite penalty.? According to the inquiry officer, failure either to produce the documents or to refund the ai&unt within a period of one n;10nth . from the drawal of the conveyance ai:tvance constitutes cc; mtravention of Rule 10 (l)of the Conveyance Advance Rules. Rule 10 .reads as under : ·\n\n\"10. (1). Where an employee after taking adyance is nnahle to purchase the vehicle for any reasop, he sha:ll refund with• in one month bf drawal of advance the full amount with interest thereon to the Corpotatio~. If he fails to do so, he shall be liable to disciplinary • actionfor misconduct in addi- . . tion to liability for payment ofadditl\\1nal interest in accordance withSub Rule (2).\n\n(2) Where an amount of advance is retained by an em_ployee beyond one month or where the employee fails to produce evidence of purchase, insurance policy of registration book, the normal rate of i!)terest nnder Rule 5 will be charged for the first month and for the period in excess of one .month iil addition to the normal .rate of interest, addi- tional interest at a rate equivalent to difference between the borrowing rate of the . Corporation and the normal rat~\n\nchargeabl~ under Rule 5 wiH be charged. The additional rate of interest will be compound interest and it will be merged with the principal at monthly. inte!vals for the purpose of calculating interest for subsequent periods.\"\n\n. . , I\n\nIn this connection, our attention was drawn to Circular dated .\n\nDecember 11, 1979 issued by the respondent-Corpotation which provides that henceforth a penal iMeest will be lcvicd/cliarged 'on' the total drawn. amonnt under the Conveyance Advance Rules in cash vochers or receipts are .not produced. to the Personnel Division within the prescribed peri9d, or in case !!Te amount drawn is refumled '\"without utilisation.; It thus transpires that drawal of the advance, if not utilised within the prescribedperiod or if not refuded within the saqie time, will expose the drawer to a liability to penal interest. And. in this case, it has been so charged.\n\nNow if what is alleged as misconduct does not constitute miscon- . duct po~ bj analysis er appraisal 9f evidence, but per s~ under )975\n\nA: L. KALRA v. PROJECT EQPN_. GORPN. (Desai, J.) • 671\n\nRules the respondent had neither the authority\" nor: the jurisdiction no,. the power to impose any penalty for the alleged misconduct. An administrative, authority who purports to act by its regulation mµst be held bound by the regulation. 'Even if tliese. regulations have no force of law the employment under these corporatiDns is public employment, and' threfore an emplee would get a >Status which would enable him to obtain a declaration for continuance in service, if he was dismissed or discharged coqtrary to the regulations.' [Sukhdev Singh & Ors. v. Bhagatram SarJar Singh Raghuvanshi and\n\nAnr.(1)]\n\nIf thus it is satisfactorily established that the employment under such Corporation like the respondeqt which is .an instrumentality of the State, is public employment, it is difficult to entertain the submission of Mr. Sinha which did prevail for some time in the days gorieby that contract of public service'cannot be specifically enforced.\n\nMr .. . Sinha in this connection relied upon Sec. 14 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and urged thai where the origin of employment is in a contract the breach of it cannot be remedied by dirtcting specific performance of a contract . of personal service. He also drew our attention to Western India Automobile Association .v. Industrial Tribunal, Bombay and Ors.(') Where a Constitution Bench of this Court has observed as under ;\n\n\"It is true that this Tribunal can do what no Court can, namely, \"!dd to or alter the terms or conditions of the contract of service. Express power to do so is given by the regulation, while there are no words conferring a power to reinstate or revive a contract lawfully determined.\"\n\nReference was also made to Dr. S.B. Dutt v. University of Delhi(•) , , wherein it was held that an arbitrator appointed by the parties and\n\nfunctioning under the Arbitratio11. Act, i940 cannot by bis award enforce a contract of personal service in i:.ontravention of the prov!- . sions of the Specific Relief Act and this discloses an error apparent • on the face of the award. But neither Sec, 14 nor the aforementioned two decisions. can rerider .any assistance to the respondent because it 'is well-sttled that in the matter of public employment if the termina-\n\n(1) (1975] 3 S.CR 619 at 6S~.'\n\n(2) [1949] F.C.'I\\. 32\\ at 34()\n\n(f) [1959].S.C, R. 123~ ..\n\n::B\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1984) 3 S.C.R •.\n\nA •tion is held to be bad; in_ view of the latest decisions in Sukhdev\n\nSingh and Ut(/; lr Pradesh Warehousing Corporation's cases a declaration can be granted that the man continues to be in service.\n\nMr. R, lmamurthi on behalf' of the appellant further contended 'that' the order of removal' from service is void as it is passed iµ violation 0(1he principles of natural justice and at any rate an order imposing penalty by a quasi'judicial tribunal must be supported by . reasons in support of its conclusions. Jt was urged that duty to give reasons would permit the court hearing a petition for a wri!'of certiorari to ex facie ascertain whether thete is any error apparent on the record) n was conceded that for the present submission adequacy or sufficincy of reasons 1s nqt questioned.\n\nWhat is contended is that the inquiry officer has merely recorded his ipse dixif and no reasons are assigned in support of the findings.\n\nThe mental process is conspicuosly silent. A speaking order wiil at its best be reasonable and at its worst be at least a plausible one (M.P. Industries Ltd. v ..\n\nUnion of India &Others).(') What\"prevents the authority authorised to.impose penalty from giving reasons? If reasons for an order are given, there will be less scopefor arbitrary or partial exercise of poiver ancl the orders ex faci~ will indicate. whether extraneous circumstances were taken into consideration by authority passing the order. This view in Vedachala Muda/iar v. Sta.te of Madras(') was approved by this Court in Bhagat Raja v. Union of India and Others.(•) As pointed out earlier, the findings of the inquiry officer are merely his ipse dixit.\n\nNo reasons are assigned for reaching the finding anda'{hile recapitulating evidence. self-contradictory position were adopted that either there was fio misconduct or there was some misconduct or double punishment was already imposed. Rule 27 (19) cast_s an obligation upon the inquiry officer ait the conclusion of the inquiry to prepare a -rep0rt which must inter alia include the findings on each.article of charge and the reasons therefor. The report is prepared in contravention of the aforementione.d rule.\n\nG 1 The situation is further compounded by the fact that the discip , linary authority which is none other than Committee of Management of the Corporation; while accepting the report of the inquiry officer which itself was defective did not assign any reasons for accepting the report of the inquiry officer.\n\nAfter reproducing the findings of the\n\n.ff (I) [1966} l SCR 466 at 472. ·\n\n(2) AIR 1952 M.ldras 276. (3] [1967] 3 SCR 302 at 3~0, •\n\nA,.L. KALRA v. PROJECT EQPN. CORPN. (Desai, J:}\n\ninquiry officer; it is stated that the Oimmittee of Management agrees with th.e same. Ii is even difficult to make out how the ommittee Of\n\nManagement agteed with the 9bservatio'ns of the inquiry officer because at .one stage while recapitulating the evide.nce the inquiry\n\nofficer unmistakably observed that appellant was subjected to1doilbJe punishment and at olher place, it was observed that granting extension of time and acG!lptance of documents and balance advance would tantamount to xtending the time which would make the affair look Wholly innocuous. This shows utter non-application of mind of the biseipliiiary Authority and the order .is vitiated .\n\n. A detailed appeal wa~ submitted by the appellant to the Board of Directors runn.ing itito about 8 . pages .. The only order while di11missing the appeal brougl\\t.to. our notice is communication by_ a gentleman Anand Krishna whose authority and designation are not\n\nstated, but who purported to act on\"behalf of the Board of Directors, that the appellate authority, after going through the records of the \"case, !\\as decided to uphold the decision of the disciplinary authority .andto confirm the penalty ofremoyal fmm service H:\\1posed upon the appellant. Rule ~5 of 1975 Rules deals with app.eals, Sub-rule (ii) of:Rule 35 provides amongst others, tj:iat the Appellate Authority shall consider whe!her the findings are justified oi whether the penlllty is_exces$ive oi inadequate and. pass appropriate orders within three m11nths of the' date of appeal. In order to ascertain whether the rule <jg complied with;' the order of th(}: appellate authority must show thitt it took into consider-ation . the. findings the quantum of penalty\n\nand other relevantconsiderations. There is no material for showing th!iM'he\" allate authority / acted in consonance with its obligation u.nderRule 35: However; in para 5.14 to 17 ofthecounter-iiffidavit, it was statetf.thaf 'full inquiryreport with annexute can be shown to\n\nthe C!JUrt at the time of hearing, if desired.' If the respondentws anxious to sustain its action, it was obJ.igatory upon it to disclose the fu!Hnquiry report. Nothing was shown !o us ?or any attempt to show the proceedings of the appellate authority to disabuse out m.ind ' ' . thaf the appellate authority was guilty of utter non-application of\n\nmind and discharged its duty under Rule 35 .. No attempt was made - . t<i urge that the three authorities had ever assigned reasons in support of their conclusions. Far this additional reason also, the initial order of the Disciplinary Auihority as well as the Appellate Authority are . lial!ki to quashed and set aside.\n\nTo sum uv the order of removal passed by. Disciplinary Author\\!Y is iUega~ an.d , invalid for tl; le rea?ons : (i) thai the action is thoroughly aj:bitrary and is vi<Jlatlve of Art. l 4, (ii) th11t the :alle$ed\n\n673 \\ '\n\n...\n\n\n(1984) 3 S.C .• R.\n\nY-•.\n\nmisconduct does not constitute misconduct within the 1975 Rules; A\n\n(iii) that the inql1iry officer himself found that punishment was already imposed for the alleged misconduct by withholding the salary and the appellant cou.ld riot he exposed to 'double jeopardy ; and (iv) that the findings of the inquiry officer are unsµpported by reasons and the\n\norder of the Disciplinary Authority as well as th~ Appellate Authority suffer .from the same vice. . Therefore, the. order of removal from service as well as the appellate order are quashed and sei !1Side.\n\n The last question then is to what relief the appellant is entitld ? Once the order of removal from service is hekl to be illegal and invalid, and the appe)lant being in public employment, the necessary dy:claration must follow that he continues tobe in service.uninterruptedly. This aspect does not present any difficult\" and. the declaration is hereby granted.\n\nWhen removal from service is held to be illegal and invalid, the next question is.whether~ _the .victim of such action Is entitled to backwages. Ordinatily, it is well-settled that if termination of service is held to be bad, no other punishment iil the guise of denial of back wages can be imposed and therefore, it must as a necessarycorollary . follow that he will _be entitled to .all the back wges on the footing that\n\nhe has continued to be in service uninterruptedly. Bnt it was pointed . ont iri this case that the appellant was employed as Factory Manager by M/s KDR Woollen Mills, A-90, Wazirpur Industrial Area, Delhi from where he resigned with effect from August 8, 1983, It was also submitted that he was drawing a salary of Rs. 2500 per, month.\n\nNow if the appellant had procured an alternative employment, he \\yould not be entitled to wages and salary from the respondent.\n\nB.ut it is equally true that an employee depending on salary for his survi- • val when he is exposed to the vagaries of the court litigation cannot hold on to a slender distant hope of judici;; l .process coming to his rescue and not try to survive by accepting an alternative employment, a hope which may turn out to be a mirage; Therefore, the appellant was perfectly justified in procuring an alternative employment in order to keep his, body arid soul together as also to bear the expenses • of litigation to vindicate his honour, integrity and character.\n\nThe submission of the respndent that the appellant had accepted . employmentwiih M/s _KOR Woollen Mills may be accepted in .view of the evidence tendered in the case. Therefore, the appellant would not be entitled to salary for the period. h~ was employed with M/s KOR . : W oolfon Mills.\n\n. '\n\n\"}.\n\n' A .. L. KALRA v. PROJECT EQPT. COR'PN. (Desai, J.) 675\n\nEven for the rest of the period, the conduct of the appellant .\n\nA cannot be sid to be'entirely in consonance with corporate culture.\n\nAs a highly placed officer he was bound to strengthen the corporate culture and he should have acted within the spirit of the. regulations both for house building advance and conveyance advance, which are devised fo help the employees. There . has been lapse in . totally complying with these regulations by the appellant though it rieiter B [constitutes misconduct to attract a penalty nor substantially good\n\nenotlilh for initiation of disciplinary inquiry. Accordingly, having. regard to all the aspetcs of the case, the 11ppellant should be paid 50 % of the back wages for the period since his removal from service upto his reinstatelllent excluding the period for which he had procured]' an alternative employment. The respondent shall also pay the costs C of the appella9t quantified at Rs. 3000.\n\nS.R.\n\nAppeal al/owed,.", "total_entities": 126, "entities": [{"text": "A. L, KALRA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6, "end_char": 17, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A. L, KALRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE PJ, lOJECT & EQUIPMENT CORPORATION\n\nOF INDIA LIMITED", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19, "end_char": 75, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE PROJECT & EQUIPMENT CORPORATION OF INDIA LIMITED", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "0.A. DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 95, "end_char": 105, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.A. DESAI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "0. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 107, "end_char": 125, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A. VARADARAJAN, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 130, "end_char": 148, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A. VARADARAJAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Arts. 226, 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1115, "end_char": 1128, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Project allli Equipment Corporation of India House Building Advance\n\n(Grant and Recovery) .Rules !111le 10. (J) (ii)", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1694, "end_char": 1810, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G.. The Project allli Equipment Corporation of India House Building Advance\n\n(Grant and Recovery) .Rules !"}}, {"text": "AppeaH Rules, 1975", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4616, "end_char": 4634, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "A.S. Na", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4835, "end_char": 4842, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The committee of Manage ..\n\nmnl ia exercise of.the powers _Conferred by subrule (4) of Rule 27 of the :a: l97S- .rules aPpointed one Sri A.S. Na:ngi.l, its Chief Marketi.lg Manager as the Eriquiry Officer to enquite into the two charges against the appellant."}}, {"text": "Anand Krishna", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6451, "end_char": 6464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appeal preferred to the Appellate Authority wa• rejected as per tho Memorandum dated May 21, 1981 signed by one Anand Krishna.", "canonical_name": "Anand Krishna"}}, {"text": "High Court of Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6570, "end_char": 6589, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "appellat; therefore approacped the High Court of Delhi under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6596, "end_char": 6604, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Arts.14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7071, "end_char": 7078, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7507, "end_char": 7514, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8007, "end_char": 8017, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8221, "end_char": 8228, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Arts. 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8323, "end_char": 8331, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1981] 2 S.CR. 79", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 8532, "end_char": 8549, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8906, "end_char": 8913, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9902, "end_char": 9909, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9951, "end_char": 9961, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10043, "end_char": 10052, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10590, "end_char": 10600, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": ".D. S. Naka,:a", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10762, "end_char": 10776, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1974] 2 s.C.R 34S; .D. S. Naka,:a v. Union af India, [1983] l S. C. C. 305 and Maneka Gandhi r. Union af India [1978] 2 S. C. R. 621 followe.d."}}, {"text": "[1978] 2 S. C. R. 621", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 10854, "end_char": 10875, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11173, "end_char": 11180, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11854, "end_char": 11861, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Mandging Director. Uttar Pradesh Wareh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12328, "end_char": 12366, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[663B-C, 66SA]\n\nMandging Director."}}, {"text": "[1980] 2 SC R. 773", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 12426, "end_char": 12444, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Tberefore", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 15534, "end_char": 15543, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tberefore, the first head of charge is an eye-wash, It , does Dot constitute a misconduct if it can be said to be one even if it re1nains unrebutted."}}, {"text": "Western India Automobile", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 16713, "end_char": 16737, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Western India Automobile A:, sociation v.\n\nIndustrial Tribunal, Bombay and Ors. ["}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 21963, "end_char": 21991, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "M.K. Ramamurthi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 22135, "end_char": 22150, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M.K. Ramamurthi, L.C. Goyal and Ms. Sumitra Goyal for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "L.C. Goyal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 22152, "end_char": 22162, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M.K. Ramamurthi, L.C. Goyal and Ms. Sumitra Goyal for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Sumitra Goyal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 22171, "end_char": 22184, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M.K. Ramamurthi, L.C. Goyal and Ms. Sumitra Goyal for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Lal Narain Sinha", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 22205, "end_char": 22221, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Narain Sinha, M.C. Bhanclare and P.P. Singh for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "M.C. Bhanclare", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 22223, "end_char": 22237, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Narain Sinha, M.C. Bhanclare and P.P. Singh for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "P.P. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 22242, "end_char": 22252, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lal Narain Sinha, M.C. Bhanclare and P.P. Singh for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "DE", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22320, "end_char": 22322, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "DE~AT, J.\n\nFailure to adju.st the antena to the operative channel and dipping the."}}, {"text": "AT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 22323, "end_char": 22325, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "DE~AT, J.\n\nFailure to adju.st the antena to the operative channel and dipping the."}}, {"text": "Projec.t & Equipment Corporation of India Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 22616, "end_char": 22662, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "this trivial matter to be liroright to this Com:t.\n\nRespon<ltit is the Projec.t & Equipment Corporation of India Ltd. ('Corporation' for short) since its formation in 1971 a wholly\n\nown~<l subsidiary company of State Trading Corporation ('STC' for short), a Government of India Undertaking upto 1976 when it was ·."}}, {"text": "A.L. Kalra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 22953, "end_char": 22963, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of India undertaking .. The appellant A.L. Kalra joined as Upper 'Division Clerk in the STC on August 6; 1963.", "canonical_name": "A. L, KALRA"}}, {"text": "August 6; 1963", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23010, "end_char": 23024, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of India undertaking .. The appellant A.L. Kalra joined as Upper 'Division Clerk in the STC on August 6; 1963."}}, {"text": "November 1, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23030, "end_char": 23046, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 1, 1969, he came to."}}, {"text": "November 9, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23287, "end_char": 23303, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "tarit to the Corporation on November 9, 1976."}}, {"text": "June 29, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23537, "end_char": 23550, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under the relevant conditions of transfer,· h.e continued to be governed in the matter of recruitment and promotion by the relevant rules of the STC .. He was promoted in an officiating capawy as Deputy Jlinance Manager Grade II on June 29, 1978 and he was put on probaticin after being promoted as Deputy Finance Manager Grade II on regular basis effective from February 5, I 979."}}, {"text": "February 5, I 979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23668, "end_char": 23685, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under the relevant conditions of transfer,· h.e continued to be governed in the matter of recruitment and promotion by the relevant rules of the STC .. He was promoted in an officiating capawy as Deputy Jlinance Manager Grade II on June 29, 1978 and he was put on probaticin after being promoted as Deputy Finance Manager Grade II on regular basis effective from February 5, I 979."}}, {"text": "April 4, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23803, "end_char": 23816, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "16,050 for purchasing a plot of land on April 4, 1979 for which he executed."}}, {"text": "July 7, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24389, "end_char": 24401, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A new motor cycle on July 7, 1979."}}, {"text": "Conveyance Advance Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24553, "end_char": 24577, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "November 13, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25487, "end_char": 25504, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jt was alleged that the appellant neither utilised the advance for the purchase of plot nor refonded the amount despite several reminders and ultimately on November 13, 1979 a memorandum was served."}}, {"text": "Conveyance Advance Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26173, "end_char": 26197, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "A.L. Kalra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 27121, "end_char": 27131, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri A.L. Kalra while functioning as Deputy Finance Manager-Grade ll in the Finance Division of the PEC during April,· 1979 applied and drew an advance of Rs.", "canonical_name": "A. L, KALRA"}}, {"text": "Kalra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27607, "end_char": 27612, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Kalra by his .above act exhibited lack of integrity\n\nand conduct unbecoming of a public servant and violated\n\n.,"}}, {"text": "Nor\n\ndLd he refund the amount of advance to the Corporation as required under Rule", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 28360, "end_char": 28442, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "A.L Kalra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 28463, "end_char": 28472, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri A.L Kalra by his above act exhibitd lack ofinteg-.", "canonical_name": "A. L, KALRA"}}, {"text": "A.'S .. Nangia", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 29458, "end_char": 29472, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Committee of Management in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-rule (4) of Rule .27 of the 1975 Rules appoinletl Shri A.'S .. Nangia, Chief Marketi1ig Manager as the Enquiry Officer • to enquire into the charges against the appellant submitted on June T3, 1980 a detailed statement pollltlng out that the inq\"irj' was the outcome of malice for various reasons therein mentioned and also explaining why there was delay in refunding the advances and specifically pleaded that in view of the fact that the first advance was sought to be recovered by withholding his salary and adjusting' the pay towards.advance and charging penal interest and in .the second case by accepting 'he document evidencing purchase of scooter, no misconduct could be said to h11vebeen committed by the appeila.nt and the diseiplinary enquiry was uncalled for."}}, {"text": "U.S. Aggarwal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 30339, "end_char": 30352, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One U.S. Aggarwal, Finance Manager of the Corporation appeared as resenting Officer."}}, {"text": "3rd and 9tl1 April, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30577, "end_char": 30601, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on 3rd and 9tl1 April, 1980 and then inquiry ws held regularly on various dates from 23rd April 1980 to 22nd May, 1980."}}, {"text": "22nd May, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30678, "end_char": 30692, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "on 3rd and 9tl1 April, 1980 and then inquiry ws held regularly on various dates from 23rd April 1980 to 22nd May, 1980."}}, {"text": "June 30, 1~80.", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30785, "end_char": 30799, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant was called upon io submit his statement of defence which he had submitted on June 30, 1~80."}}, {"text": "3rd April, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 31170, "end_char": 31185, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After recapitulating in paras 1 to 4 the various stages through which the enquiry progressed, in para 5, .it is stated that at the 'preliminary hearing on 3rd April, 1980, Shri A.L Kalra, (appellant} pleaded guilty to all the charges mentioned in Annexure I and ."}}, {"text": "A.L Kalra", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 31192, "end_char": 31201, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After recapitulating in paras 1 to 4 the various stages through which the enquiry progressed, in para 5, .it is stated that at the 'preliminary hearing on 3rd April, 1980, Shri A.L Kalra, (appellant} pleaded guilty to all the charges mentioned in Annexure I and .", "canonical_name": "A. L, KALRA"}}, {"text": "J.C. Chugh", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 31713, "end_char": 31723, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was found as a fact that the advance was taken for the purchase o( a pl•t and that the appellant had negotiated for a purchase of a plot from Shri J.C. Chugh."}}, {"text": "J.C. Chugh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31900, "end_char": 31910, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Evidence of Shri J.C. Chugh revealed that the deal was , delayed because Haryana Estate officer demanded so111e additional amount and'there was dispute between the appellant, the vendee an•d J.C. Chugh, the vendor as to who should bear the extra burden."}}, {"text": "July 9, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 32825, "end_char": 32837, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the advance on July 9, 1979 and on April 7, 1980 he submitted the documents such as cash receipt in respect of purchase of .a scooter, insurance certificate, receipt of .balance amount deposited , with the cashier, original insurance policy and registration."}}, {"text": "April 7, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 32845, "end_char": 32858, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the advance on July 9, 1979 and on April 7, 1980 he submitted the documents such as cash receipt in respect of purchase of .a scooter, insurance certificate, receipt of .balance amount deposited , with the cashier, original insurance policy and registration."}}, {"text": "House Building Advance Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35245, "end_char": 35273, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Anand Krishna", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 36630, "end_char": 36643, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Anand Krishna claiming to act for and on.", "canonical_name": "Anand Krishna"}}, {"text": "High court of Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 37477, "end_char": 37496, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant approached the High court of Delhi under."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37504, "end_char": 37512, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37967, "end_char": 37974, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37979, "end_char": 37986, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38387, "end_char": 38394, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39228, "end_char": 39235, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "September 30, 1983", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 39628, "end_char": 39646, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This admission was reiterated in para 5.2: Further in the written submisiions dated September 30, 1983 filed on behalf of the respondent, it is conceded that the respondent is a State within the meaning of Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39750, "end_char": 39757, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40363, "end_char": 40370, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40551, "end_char": 40558, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Arts. 32 and 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40653, "end_char": 40669, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41176, "end_char": 41183, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1981] 2 SCR 79", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 41999, "end_char": 42014, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42598, "end_char": 42605, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42610, "end_char": 42617, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43024, "end_char": 43031, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44024, "end_char": 44031, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44951, "end_char": 44958, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45028, "end_char": 45035, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sinha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 45194, "end_char": 45199, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ton becaus~ that effective1y answers the contention of Mr. Sinha:\n\n.- ; me Constitution Bench speaking through Bhagwati, J. in con'curring Judgment in Royappq's, case observed as under : - . ,"}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 45246, "end_char": 45254, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ton becaus~ that effective1y answers the contention of Mr. Sinha:\n\n.- ; me Constitution Bench speaking through Bhagwati, J. in con'curring Judgment in Royappq's, case observed as under : - . ,"}}, {"text": "Royappq", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 45286, "end_char": 45293, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ton becaus~ that effective1y answers the contention of Mr. Sinha:\n\n.- ; me Constitution Bench speaking through Bhagwati, J. in con'curring Judgment in Royappq's, case observed as under : - . ,"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46313, "end_char": 46320, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46409, "end_char": 46416, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Arts. 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46419, "end_char": 46434, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Constitution Bench", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 46570, "end_char": 46588, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F This view was approved by the Constitution Bench ii) 1jay Hasia case It thus appears well-settled that."}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 46644, "end_char": 46651, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ajay Hasia", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 47078, "end_char": 47088, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Constitution Bi; nch p;; rtinently obsered in Ajay Hasia's case and puJ the matter beyond controversy wh'en it said 'wherever, therefore, there is arbitrariness in State action whether it be of the legislature or of the executive or ofan \"authority\" under Article 12, Article 14 immediately springs into action and strikes down such State action.' . ,"}}, {"text": "Article 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47289, "end_char": 47299, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47301, "end_char": 47311, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1974] 2 SCR 348", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 47396, "end_char": 47412, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 47640, "end_char": 47647, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Siriha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 48016, "end_char": 48022, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B .-\n\nIt must be conceded in fairness to Mr. Siriha that he is right in submitting tj:iat even if the respondent-Corporation is an instrumen~ ta!ity\" of the S\\ate as comprehended in Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48155, "end_char": 48162, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Chinnappa Reddy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 48561, "end_char": 48576, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. Vinay Narayan Va; payee(!)where 0 .. Chinnappa Reddy, J. in a concurring _judgment has spoken so eloquently about ii that it deserves quota-\n\n~: D\n\n\"!"}}, {"text": "sec 30", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49930, "end_char": 49936, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1978] 2 SCR 621", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 49943, "end_char": 49959, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 50607, "end_char": 50620, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Arts.14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 51716, "end_char": 51730, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 52054, "end_char": 52064, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In growing realization of the importance of' employment in the public sector, Parliament and the Legislatures of .the States have declared persons in the service oT local authorities, .Govefriment companies and statutory corporations aspublic servants an.d extended to."}}, {"text": "Desai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 52598, "end_char": 52603, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Desai, J.)\n\nThere fore the dis; inction sought to be drawn between."}}, {"text": "Ramamu¥hi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 56073, "end_char": 56082, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Ramamu¥hi, learned counsel for the appellant further 'contended that the very."}}, {"text": "Chugh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 58362, "end_char": 58367, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The inquiry officer accepts the evidence of Mr: Chugh that the appellant had 'negotiated with him for purhase of a plot but some dispute arose about some addition.a!'"}}, {"text": "Hqjise Building Advance Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 60142, "end_char": 60171, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "November 16, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 63636, "end_char": 63653, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "last paragraph, he has stated that a stoppage of the salary effective from November 16, 1979."}}, {"text": "Sec. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68732, "end_char": 68739, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Specific Relief Act, 1963", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 68747, "end_char": 68772, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Specific Relief Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 69699, "end_char": 69718, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "(1975] 3 S.CR 619", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 69976, "end_char": 69993, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sukhdev\n\nSingh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 70175, "end_char": 70189, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "can rerider .any assistance to the respondent because it 'is well-sttled that in the matter of public employment if the termina-\n\n(1) (1975] 3 S.CR 619 at 6S~.'\n\n(2) [1949] F.C.'I\\. 32\\ at 34()\n\n(f) [1959].S.C, R. 123~ ..\n\n::B\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1984) 3 S.C.R •.\n\nA •tion is held to be bad; in_ view of the latest decisions in Sukhdev\n\nSingh and Ut(/; lr Pradesh Warehousing Corporation's cases a declaration can be granted that the man continues to be in service."}}, {"text": "[1967] 3 SCR 302", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 72697, "end_char": 72713, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Anand Krishna", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 73649, "end_char": 73662, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "our notice is communication by_ a gentleman Anand Krishna whose authority and designation are not\n\nstated, but who purported to act on\"behalf of the Board of Directors, that the appellate authority, after going through the records of the \"case, !", "canonical_name": "Anand Krishna"}}, {"text": "KDR Woollen Mills", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 77170, "end_char": 77187, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ont iri this case that the appellant was employed as Factory Manager by M/s KDR Woollen Mills, A-90, Wazirpur Industrial Area, Delhi from where he resigned with effect from August 8, 1983, It was also submitted that he was drawing a salary of Rs."}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 77221, "end_char": 77226, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ont iri this case that the appellant was employed as Factory Manager by M/s KDR Woollen Mills, A-90, Wazirpur Industrial Area, Delhi from where he resigned with effect from August 8, 1983, It was also submitted that he was drawing a salary of Rs."}}, {"text": "August 8, 1983", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 77267, "end_char": 77281, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ont iri this case that the appellant was employed as Factory Manager by M/s KDR Woollen Mills, A-90, Wazirpur Industrial Area, Delhi from where he resigned with effect from August 8, 1983, It was also submitted that he was drawing a salary of Rs."}}, {"text": "KOR Woollen Mills", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 78135, "end_char": 78152, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "employmentwiih M/s _KOR Woollen Mills may be accepted in .view of the evidence tendered in the case."}}, {"text": "KOR . : W oolfon Mills", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 78314, "end_char": 78336, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "h~ was employed with M/s KOR . :"}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_3_676_714_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "I .• ' . . .\n\ni :·\n\nI I\n\n., c\n\nLJBERTY OIL MILLS & OTHERS\n\n. UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS • May 1, 1984 . .\n\n(0. Cl!!NNAPPA REDDY, A.P. SEN AND E.~. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.)\n\nImports (Colltrol) Order, '1955-Promufgated under ss. J and 4-A oft!..\n\nImports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947-Cfmue BB-AJded lattr by woy cj amenilmem-Jnterprelotion of-Contemplates action of .interim !1Qture-01<ftr/ action mu_st satisfy rule• of naruwl jllstkt!-AutlwrilieJ /WI bound lo gireptt- • ·:decisional hearing-Authorities mrw give prJ,1trlccisiona/ hearlng-DeciJion mJIJtbe communicated to person affected-Order need nol .xive rea.>on$ bUIIt!Jl!l illlikalt\n\nsatisfaction furming basis for action and concise statement of aJ/tgalioru-Actic• under Clause BB of dJaslic natttre-IYJust be a11jmctted by .sense of urgency-Sof urgtncy infused by ie1•ual factors-Public .sculiment is otU! sw:fi/Q£tor--PIIbUc\n\nlntere.s to h\" parumowtt collsiderarlott-'-11 is for authorities to coruidu jlub~ . lnt<rt!t-Cuurtt nut to concern themselves wjth sufficiency of grou'nd-<:outlstl\n\nconsider questloH of mala/ide ur patent luck of jurisdicticm.\n\nImport (Control) 0flfer, 1955-C/ause 8B read with C/au.s~ 11 (4)-lnt<,. pretation.. uf-Cious~ BB applies eqttally to goods coyered by Op<n Gtnm( Licenu.\n\nlnterprelatiotl of ltulllles-Rules of-Courts nut pernritud 10 ltlterpret srQIJIJOfT Instruments so as /o exclude nulllrul justice unless lui11JUQ86 of inslrllm<nt /eal'<IJIJ option to Court, . . . ,_\n\n• N\"tural }ustlct!-Rulcs of-Extent of natural jtuti~Must vary Jrem ctJJl 10 ' • case-Interim orr/en Imply /Wtura( justiCe-Seeking comments of person ll<f•rt inYestigution ag\"illst him nvllletessury-Dedsion uffcctiey a pusan must /)teo/It\" nzunicutcd to the ujfeaed pcrsun-Ajfectcd persvn .11mst be giren post-d<ciJiotl4i opport11/ty /WI puu/Nc. .\n\nWords am/ pltrases-'lllvestigatioll' -IYhett commnus. . . . - Oa bein11 uiscovercd tht beef tallow Imported from abroad. was et being 110hl Ill vanapti or used in its panufaturo by certain un.sct_'lputo~ persons, general public f.:eling was rousd ond there was public agitatton ao demands re mude that 1.:vcco nctiou be tukcn gainst those responsible . . 1u a result of the discoveries tho Centcul Government thou&ht that drastic acuo~ wa• called for. So, a notilio:utlon was issud under s 3(3) of tbo Imports\n\n80 • E · tt dptl ports (Control) Act, 1947 totulty bannln_g tho impact of beef, butl\"a 0 bet tallow Inti> Jndill w.e.r. Auaut 24, 1~83. And, on <!ill\"crent dateiJ. in Novl!l J\n\nLIDERTY OIL MILI.Sv: UNION\n\n:, ' ' n~ o\">cmbor ~983, five circlrs. styled 'ahcyance' c'rculr!l-and markd sC::rct' . • . sued by the Doputy Ch1ef Con•rollcr of Imports and E•porls in respect of were\n\n15 y as 19! concerns directing .licensing authorilits to keep in aboyanet for a ., n of six months from the espcctive dtes of the circulars, any application p< ;, ed from any of them for the grant <?f Import l1c.:nce or customs clearance\n\nf . its' and allotment of impo rtod goods through agencies like the Slates\n\n~ding corporation of India Limited or nny other similar agency. Tboush the ,;.-ullfS did not tbcms, lves. e to any statutory authonty, they wcro, ascl•imed I •od ns agreed to by the parties, presumed to be statutory orders made in e..crcise. { of the power conferred by ct. 8 B of th< Import (Control) Orlicr, 1955: Sc>cr..J {' pc:ons 3gainst whom '•beyance' Orders haJ' been made tiled writ petitions in • dilferent llish Courts challenging tl:osc o+dcrs. Lib<rty Oil f>lills wa.s one . of 'l thoSO who filed such a writ petition in the Bombay H1gh Coun. The case was . ·: v ,, th:rawn to the Supreme Court under ':'-rt, 139A of the Constituuoa.\n\nr 1 u:erty Oil M1lls contenJeu: (I) that the requisito satisfacuon , of Ute • . ; ppropria.tc :tuthorhy which was n~\"\"essary for issuing an ord..:r uont!f: cl. Sll was .. \" not only not recorded In the circular but t: '\"'was no material whatsoever upon which such satisfaction could have been arrived at; C) that the circulor was not confined to the banned item of animal ~; tk>w or to items which could be said to have oumo cMncction with the t-anned Hem. but cxt<ndcd to nil item, for\n\nhlch aplic>tiOns for the grant of licenc-es or for allotment had been made by l ihmy Oil Mills; (3) that general nature of the order discloscu n total noa application of the mind: {4) that several firms were clul>bed tgethcr and tlc.Jlt\n\nith by a sinale circula~ and thcce was no indio>tioa whauoevcr that the facts relating to each of the firms hall ba:n considcreli scpar:aely ; (S) that the 'ubcyance circulars' far from auvnncing the public interest would, on the other baed, prcjudicinlly offc:t the public in'terc.>t by bringing to a bait se•ero.l industtie• and throwing hosu of workers out of employment; (6) that there was no ault!tancc io tne ollegation that Uberty Oil Mills were not 'actul users' of beef tallow but th()' l•ad misused the import licenoc~ of other liceos<'C.S' by obtaining letters of authorisation for Import o~ beef tlllw as if they were ootual users; und 17) thJl tho' circumstance that there was put>lk 3gitation about the import or beer tallow \"\"a total irrelevant circumsronce for making an ordor under cr. 88.\n\nThe intervener: contended: (I) that ct. SB should be construed as'providin&\n\nfor on oppprtunity to be heard und sin<-c the al\"Cyonce orders roauc no provis>:>n\n\nor ~1earin~. they •hvu:J be struck down 35 opposed to the prin-.pi<S or naturul\n\n~Ill\", and therefore, arbitrary and viobthe of Article 14 and 19(1)(g) of tho • nstitutin ; (2) tJat !ccret orders aiTcctin~ ights of part.ies _could not awfully\n\n, 01.lde snu:e o<crex:y would militrate ae>nlSt aatural !UStiCC wtl!J agam•t the . ''i!ht or appeal provided by •· 4M of the lm)X'rts and £•Jwrls (Control) Act, and ·\n\n0) that an order under cl. SD could 011ty be nude ufter the investigation under <1. 8 haq commenceJ rh•t i~ ufter a show .-ause ooti<'t hail been issued under cl.8, Dilml • . \"'\"lithe writ petition~. , . . ·. .\n\n1112LO: It Is not perouis.•iblc to intctpn:t any statutory instrument so. as to luJc ll; JturJI jutice, unlc!l the lanuagc of the intru_mc?t leav~ no piton to • Coun. l'roc.:uural fuimess cmhodyini naturul JUSttce ts to be Jmpltcd when\n\nn~~ a<tion Is token affecting the rishts of partie'S. It may be that the oppurtuy to be h<aru may not .,., prc-do:cisioual ; it rnay no:ccssauly ha1e IQ be post.\n\nB '\n\nC '\n\nn :.\n\n, . .. .. ! ..\n\nI ' I:. !'• .. i' .. ..\n\n! ~· .. ,\n\n1. _\n\nI .,\n\n.....\n\n. '618\n\nA ..\n\nB .\n\n. ,\n\n. : SUPREI>lB COURT REPORTS\n\n [1984j 3 ~-c.k.\n\ndecisional where the danger to b~ averted or the act to be preve 1 d. . . or where the action to be taken can brook.ne delay, It may riot n e 15 •mminent • f . d\"· I . ovenbe,_ sary in some sttuat ons \\0 gtve pre ectstona opportunity of makin ··-... _ tation but it would be sufficient but qbligatory to consider any repr!:epreseo• .\n\nmay be made by the aggrieved person and that would Satisfy the re . IJoa th, t . procedural fairocss and natural justice. There can be no tape.m:\"•tnenb of\n\nextent of naturnljusucc.\" It may and indeed it must vary from statutsucc or the\n\n• · t d t p d . . e to !tatute 51tuauon to SJ uauon an case o case. recctstonal natural ju r . • usually contemplated when, the decisions taken are of an interim nat\n\n5 tee\"' not invesiigatioo or enquiry • • Ad-interim orders may nlways be made •\"x\"' !'(ndlllt . . partt and such orders may themseles provtdc f?r at~ opportunity to the aggrieved p:uty 1o be hJ:f!rd at a later stage. Even if the tptenm orders do not make Pl1lYision foe such an opportunity, an aggrieved party_ bas, ncverlhelcss, always the right to make n approptiate representation seeking a review of the order and asking the authority to rescind or moJify the order. The principles of natural ju!lit< would be satisfied if the aggrieved party is given an opportunity at his reqll<!l.\n\nThere is ne> violation of a princi)lc_ of natural justice if an ~.r-partt •dinterim • order is made unles of course, the statute itself provides for a hearing befe the order is made. Natural justice Will be violated if the authority refuses to consider the request .of \"the aggrieved party for an opportunity to make bi> representation against the x.-paru ad-itt!Crim orders. (700H ; 70JA-F)\n\nThere is no rule of justice of fair play whkh requires the authorit~ to 5\"k tbe comments of the person coocc:rned before embarking upon nn investigation.\n\nlnvt.tigatioo commen= as •ooo as the authority concerned to take the 61't step wbelher by way c>f seei:ing evidence or by way of seeking an e•planation from the person concerned. (699F}\n\n\"tn $Orne cases, t:<port~ inerim. orders may be made pending a finll . adjudic.Jtion: But that dves not mean that natural justice is not attracted whca orden or suspension or like orders or an Interim nat uri: arc m~<)e. Some ordm of that nature, intodcd to prevent further mischief of one kind, may lhem!<ll'eS . be product ivc of ifu:er m•schief of another ldnd. An interim order of staY or lospension ti; h hJ; th~ effct o( preventinl! a p~NOR, however, 't<J1l[JOr><~(y,\n\nuy, from pursuing his profenion or line of busin•ss, !D3Y h1ve subsll\"1131•\n\nICciOUI and CYCQ disastrouS .COnSCI]UCltCCS to him and Jtlly ¢'pole him (I) grave risk and hazard. Therefore, tbere mu:11 be observed .ome modicum of rt5Jdual, core n•tural justice, suffident to enable tho atT.:cte.l ~C'IOn to. mnke ao aJu>te representation. The\"' coniiderations may not, however, apply to \"ues of h~t\n\nlln•in11 whicb involve tllo grant or a prlvilell~ and aro not 1 muer of \"' ' Th•l may b: a•J in IJ.n> Clla, it .; tn oaty bJ a(t:r an lniti<41 t:<·[Jatl< t.JttrJJJ\n\norder il made. (70SB-0)\n\n.J. , . • I p~/jef ~I .\n\nQ•-.n v. ll'VI ..... If'' tt al., S6 D.L R. (2Jl 28), Co111 11isslontr o, ,.,., u 1, Tonal, 9~, C.L.R.. 3~1 . Lnis Y. 11•/[tr, (19781 3 All ER 3S4 and Fu tllrs>' . WhW'Mo•rlllih Schools Ed, l97J A(lpeal Cuses 660 and C/tilli/tpul Dof 1973,\n\nM,.f<SIIe 8JII/I•t c, Jmpny, SU,>Nm: CJurt' s Civil App:a I Nos. 197().71\n\n~~\"~~ .\n\n-~--- ·, -···. .-..----·-· -- ·\n\nr .l LIBERTY OIL MILLS v. UNION\n\n~· : . .· . ·. . . : . ent or the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports io debar A ;, Governrn from impor tin& goodS' or from ]<Ceiving licences or allotment of\n\nI a person 11 d d r h f . d gocds tor a pen e perro r sue person if guilty of any of the rmportc commission or omi\"ion enumerated in the Clause.· Clause 8A • acts. or, 5 the Central Government or the Chief Controller of Imports and etnPOW r . ' . f d ·; 15 to suspend the rmrortatwn o goo s by any person or grant of . E•pOr ( .\n\nI d d d. licences or allotmnt o Jpor c . goo s pe~ rng rnrttjgotion ioto one or\n\nI!IO<C of the allegal!ons mcntrond m . cl •• 8 wclhout preJudice to any other B\n\non that miiY be . taktn ngamst hem on that bthalf. Clause 88 empowers\n\n( ·: ~~Central Government. cir. tb_e Chif Controller of Imports and E•porls\n\n10 ke<p in nbeyance apphcn hens for lcccnccs or allotment of imported good' l\n\nwbor< ony inl'estlgatlon 1:; pending rnto ony of 'tbe alkgations mcn•ioned in\n\ncl. s ngainsl a lic<nccc, in>porltr or aoy other pe•'son subject to fulfilment\n\n. •\n\nofthc requirement of tbc sntisfuction of the approrriate auth<'rity rcgordtng C the rub lie interest. Both clauses 8A and 88, which were inserted in the Import (Control) Order, 1955 later by )V3Y or smond'ment. CC'nt•mplate f\n\naccion of an interim nnture pending inns'igalioil in1o aliC!!ti<>n< imder eL 8. Ordinarily in the nbsrnce of anything rr.orc, •t would not bt ncces- ury' to ghe an orportunity to the per sou concerned before proceedingl\n\neo take action under cl. SA or cl. SB. But whtl• cl. 8ll de; lo with tho riJhllo oblftln liccncrs and th~ •ight to ol:lta:n allotments. cl. 8A deals with D right! which have flowered into licen<es and allotments. A person to • •hom licences hnve been sra.nted or alk•tmen<s made lil:lY havt arranged his\n\nliJ'alr~ OR that basis nnd entered into transnctionS with Others. and:to him 1he consequences of aciton under cl. SA may be truly disa<trous whcrra• the IX!nsc:quences of action under cl. Sll may not be so imminently harrr•ful. . It . b presumably because of this ltvely diiTor cncc betwten cl. 8A ar.d sn that\n\ncl. 10 provides for a pn:dccisil>nal opportunity in the case of action under E\n\ncl. 8A and docs not so provide in the case of action under cl. SB. Again, il is presumably bau'c or this difference that ct. 10 while providing f<>r an\n\n.. . lpllcal •gainH n decision under cl. SA docs not provido for an appeal against\n\n. 1 decision undi:r cl, 8D. But that docs not me3n that the requirements of\n\n0-'uraljustice ore nol to be ntent at all in the case or action under cl. SB.\n\nhe requir<men:s of natural justice .will be mel in the ensc of act!on under F '~ C~ SB by cor.sidering, .ona fide, 11ny rtprescnt:Jtion that may bt made in\n\n:b 1 behalf by tte person asgrieved. Clause 88 itsclfaivesan indication ·,. . at such a post-decisional opportunity on <he rrquc•t of the person c••nccr- ; D<d lacont 1 f •\n\nI · . Is . <mp a ted. The action under cl. SB is to be taken 1 t•·• aut torrty 11 lo.Usfied in the public intcrct that such ation may bt taken wi1hout\n\n\"nolnin• f h 1 · r lit:) • Urt cr detail' In rcsord to the all(gations. It clear Y unp tes not::h<n furll•cr facts are ns\"ertaincd by the authority or brousht to tt.c G\n\no; a5e otof d:e authority, such action may bt ri<wed . Th•rcforc, in. tbc\n\nOllportunctroo under cl. 8B it is not r:ec.:s:>arx to atve prc-dccls•_onnl ..\n\n~?'the I.Y but a post-<lcdsion111 opportunitY must bt i<ven tf so rcqutstcd . Persona atr\":tcd, [G9SO; 696D-E; G; 705FH; 706AE) ·\n\nPtrto The dcciaion to keep' in- 'obeyance' shuld communicated to tl; e It w:U~nerncd otherwise the rules of natural justice will not e sa!isfied.\n\nI~ (i) l¥) : lnO&l &lbitrnry and qult clearly violative of Artceles 14 ad . r lhc Constitution j£ cl. 80 is to be inter!>rctcd PS e.tctuding\n\n'l .: .! l •. - .\n\n.. .\n\n~ . 'I.\n\nI • I I '\n\n'i,\n\n.j ': , .. ;\n\nI .\n\n' I ·! .!\n\nstJPR.BME ccniRl>REPORTS.\n\ncommunication qf the decision . taken.\n\nThere ·.is nothing In cl. 8B to suggest that the decision is not to be communicated. On the other hand, the expression ''without assi$niog. any reason\" implies that the decision has . to .be commliticated, but r.ea~Ms for the. decision have not to-be stated . . Reasons of course, must exist for the decision. since the decision may-,.only be taken if the authority in satisfied that the grant of licence or allotment . ofimported good~ will not be is the publi~ interest.\n\nThe expres ion with o:ut assigning reasons' only means that there is no obligation to formulate reasons and 110tbiog more.\n\nFormal reasons may lead to complications when the matter is still under investigatio11.\n\nSo the authority' may not. . . give formal reaso!s, but the skeletal allegations must be mentioned in order to provide. an opportunity to the person affected to make his representation. -\n\n[706H; 707A>c]\n\nOn what should the. satisfaction . be based ? The action under cl. 8S' . is really in aid of the ultimate -order under cl. 8.\n\nTherefore, in order to invite the satisfaction contemplated by ct. 8B there must be present some . strong suspicion of one or other or more of the grounds mentioned in cl.8.\n\nSince the action which is of a drastic nature is to t:ic taken , ex-parte, it must ncessarily be .animated by a sence of urgency.\n\nTbe sense of urgency may be infused by a host of circumstances such as the trafficking and unscru~\n\npulous pe4dling in licences, large scale misuse of imported goods, att~Qlpts .\n\nJ:o mnopolise or corner the market, .wholesale prevalence of improper\n\npractices among classes of importers, public sentiment etc, etc .. -It is true that public dministration is not to 'be run on public sentiment and statutory action may only be taken on grounds permHted by the-statute.\n\nPublic- sentiment is not in some cases the grond for the action but it is what clothes the ground with that sense of urgency which makes it imperative that swm action be taken. [7070-H] ·\n\nPublic intt:rest must nolens volens be the para'l'lount cosideration. !f , the tl1reatened .public mischief is such as to outweigh the likely inj!lry to the party, the authority may take action under cl. 88. If tbe threatened public injury is very slight comp!tred to the harm which may be done to the part~. the authority may DO~ , take action under 'cl. 88. Which elCU!CDt . of the l,)ublic interest should be aiven greater weight and which grounds, should .weigh at all ar~ matters for the authority taking action under cl. ..\n\n• 8B.\n\nCourts do not concern .tbemselve~ 'with the sufficiency of the grounds\n\no which action is taken owith .the balancing of competing consil,'leration!,\n\nin favour of and against the action.\n\n[708A•D] . . \\ .\n\nJ\\n 'abeyance' order under cl. 8B is directed not against any particular typeof ·, goods but against l!n importer, licensee or other persoQ 'against whom an investigation into anegations under cl, 8 fs pending.\n\nTherefore the question is whether it is not tri the public interest that a particular person shuuld be prevented, from obtaining import licences or\n\nhnpo.rted goods of any description .pding investigation into the allegaions under cl.SB.\n\nThat would .rlepend .on the natU't'e of the a\\legations, the extent of 1nvblvement of the person concerned an~, most important, the ehintent of the 'public interest wb1ch are for the consideration of th~ . authol'itY 111akina the order under cl. SB' aodnot for the Court.\n\n[708B-G] . • . ~\n\nUBEltfY OIL MILts v. tJNlON\n\nAction under cl. 8B -is or an interim nature and it may be ex-parte, in whiob case the affected -party maymake a suitable representation bringing out an~: the outweighing circumstances id his. favour.· Tfiat is the real . remedy of the party. courts do not enter the picture at !hat . stage . unless\n\nthe action is mala fide or patently without jurisdiction.\n\nThe action will be\n\npatntly without jurisdic\\ion if it is not based on any rlevant . matial ' whatsoever. If the authority declines to consider the representation, orif the authority after cons.idera\\ion or from o-blique motive, or tho decision is such. as no reasonable nian properly cire.:ted on the law would arrive at on ihe matcriaUacts, it will be open to the.party to seek. the , intetvntion of the court t that stage.\n\n[70SEG] ·\n\nBarium Chemicals v. Company Law Board {1966} Supp, SCR 311\n\n.J./ Rohtas lr.ilustries. v. S. D. 'Agarwal, [1959] 3 S.C:~. I 08~ M. A. Rasheed . \\.,;\n\nv. State f Kerala, [1975] 2 S.C.R\". 93, Shalin(Soni v. Unianoj India, -{1981)\n\n1 SCR 952 and Commissioner of Income Tax v. Mahindra and Mahlndra, [1983] .4 S.C.C. 392, referred to. ,\n\n. -The Court cannot consider • the question whether ther.e . is r.ufficitrit relevant matefial in support of tbe allegations m.tde against the petitioners.\n\nTlie Court may properly consider the qqestion of mala fide or patent !lick oi' jurisdtction .. Therefore in the instant case the Cort cannot cmisider the question whether the m:.terial avllable justifies a prima focie conclus'ioli that tbe petitioners have made Hiegal imports of beef tallow.\n\n[711AB]\n\nTbe submission that sine~ the ab0yance ·order wa~ never formally\n\nconmiunlcatd to the petitioners, it must be , rea ted as non elt has nG sub\n\nstance. The al?eyance order was undoubtedly communicated to the .concern ed authorities.\n\nDespite the attempt at secrecy made by the concerned authority and the failure to formally communicate the decision to tho party, the eyauce circular was very soon public know:edge aod the petitioners did come to know ofthe orders.\n\n[71013; E-F] · .\n\nThe argument that cl. 11 (4) excludes the application of cl. BB to ioods .covered by Open, Gener\\\\1 LicetJce h s 'no subtance. Clause 8Bexpressly provides that action under the Clau a may be taken \"not withe' standing anything contained in this Order\". - In view of 'this non; obstante . clause _there is no doubt that cl. 8B applies equally to goods covered l; y\n\nOpen General Licnce. [698B-C] ·\n\nThe argument-that the order as embodied in ths abeyapce cfrcu.lar did not fulfil the conditions precedent prescribed by the statuto bas some 'substa.lice.\n\nThe_ircular did _p.ot contain a recital of the allegations consti tuting the basis of the satisfacti}>n contemplated by Cl. 8B for action. under\n\ntht l)rovision, andwitho:ut arecital of the allegations-it was impossible to say that the action was notbasCd on irrelevant material. It d.id not even recite that which. was thefoimdatioil of any action underct. 813, namely, the\n\n1J. satisfaction of the authority 'that the action was n tbe pul>liciriterest.\n\nAgain a large number of concerns were lumped together and purp?rted to\n\n• .\n\n. .\n\n·. ..\n\n. • : ,1 '\n\n. 682 suPRilMil couR.t R.l!roins tl984)3 s.c.a .\n\nA ·· b~ deal! with by a single aby11.ncc circular.\n\nThre WdS e:r.-focic oo:hio tho circular which could poior to the authority having npplied its ITliod gat~ considered tb~ case of his cooccroed separa loly; (t Is true that the a bey• n circular sulfeu from everyone of these info(miios.\n\nBut the Court's attc~ ·.'• tlon. was invited to\", the statcnents mtdo 1<1 th~ couotaa!Ud•vlt by te : .. Dputy Chief Cootrol)cr of Imports and Exports th~ author of the abcy•lc• ·: circular;, :td th' relcVlot fils p!&ced b•fore tho COU!t for perusal whic I B sh?wl .that tbe pdnc•pJI nllcg.llio:n ag:fin't tho J)elitio.1ers wcr> \"tb1t they . • had. prima facie indulged in illegal imp.>, tatio t of b\" f tallow nod h•~ atsa\n\nmisutil isd the beef tallow. Why the authority took this prima faci< view has been explained in I be counter-affidavit.\n\nFrom a poru1al of tho tiles it is foun.I th't t:o~ C:t1cs of Lib; tty Oil M•lls as wdl n• other Coilccro! were SCplCafcly a od ind•viduJIIY c\"o~ dcred. Thus it does oo: m •ke nny uitT!roncc on tho\"peculilr facts of this C\\Sc thnt ., sinalc circular .was is; ucd 'co.verlns <! . a large number of concerns.\n\n[712A-B; U:G]\n\n. ·\n\nIt is imores.ed upon the nothoritiel that tho so' cnlru<lcd by. stutate wnh tb! ta1k of Ulci•tg prcjudoci•l a; tion oo th~ basi• of their suh]cctivo satisflcthn should.\" first, bos•ow cardula ttention to tho nllg.uion• furmio1 . the basis of the proposed ncdon nod the probable con<cqucnccs which m1y . ensue ucb acti?n •ntf, t; xt . tko the trouble of reciting in the O'dcr iuucd by . them the Ut is(oction forming the b'l!! ·~ o( the ftCtiO\" Ond a COilciSC State• : \"tncnt of the :tlleations formill& the b;; SiS of the autisfactioo. 'If the D<CtS• aary recitols are ot fou 1d, thcro may b, ZQrious sequels. . [7! 38-D]\n\nl•l the in<t>nt ca;~, tbe roal remedy of !be parly b. to .. m, kc :1 .reP\"· sentation to the c•Jncemed auth:>rity which is directed to considc lcb ropresenutioa if made • . [71 JF] ·\n\n0RIGISAI.. JUtU~ItJfCrtOS Tr.insf.:rred Cas~ No. 22 of 1984.\n\nfJ Arising out of Civil Appeal No; 274 of 1984 from Spcial l Leave Ptition No. 17128 of 1933 from tho .Judgmntund Ord?r .. ·. dated 13th & 23rd December, \"1983 of the Dombay High Court tn _ in Writ Petition No.\"2855 of 1983. · • ,\n\nA1h:1k II. DeJa/, S.S . . Ray, A.N. Ocmatw.Jiu, G.l:.:. Ve/tattvatl, '.j B R. Ag lfWCI/a, . P.G. Guklr!lle, . 11!.11!. Jctycikar, V.K. Chiure, R.H. ._, RllllchrJ/1, M. Jayakar &: A. Suhba Rao for tit.: Petitioner in WP & for Respondent in C.A. No. 274/84.\n\nK. Parasuran, Attorny General. M.K. JJimerjel!, Ajdl. Sol., General, A.K. Ga•rgull, G. Subram{miam and R.N. Poodar, for the\n\nRepontlcnt in T.C. & for the Appellants in CA. No. 274 of 1984.\n\nS.S. Rcty, Ahk II. De;;,/, Stt/111/t; el Kachm1•al; a, Run/ Ktrunjall'ala,\n\n.M~. M. Kuru, jawula, Ku/Jeep /'ah/ay, A.N. Bunat!twa/a,- G.E. Vulumvclll,\n\n:-. -· .\n\nI J\n\n. -; +\n\n-~'\n\nLIBERTY .011: MILL': v. UNION (Chinnappa Reddy,. J.) 681.\n\n' Ms,-Bina Gupta, Rainu Walta, T. M. Ansari and D. N. Misra for the · 4\n\nInterveners. \\ ..\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHINNAPP~ REDDY, J. A few months ago; orthodox Hindu sentiment was outraged and genera~ public feeli-Qg was roused by the disc0very that beet: tallow hnpoted from abroad was either being sold as vanasplti or use 1 in its manufacture by certain unscrupul?us persons. There was a furore in the country.\n\nThee was public agitation: Questions were asked in Parliaent Outside the House, Press and Politician mde capital of it. There were demads 'that severe action be taken against those responsible. Assurances were given in Parliament.\n\nBureaucracy went into actini. It was discovered that though the import of beef talloW, like other animal tallow, . had been canalised through the State Trading Corporation w1th effect from June 5, .. 1981, there had beenconsiderable importofbeeftallow out-side the chanel of the State Trading Corporation even subsequent to June 5, 1981_, on the ostensible pretext that licences ha, d been issued and firm contracts had aleaqy been. entered . into before that\n\ndate. It wa~· also discovered 'that beef tallow had been allowed to be imported -even by 'non-actual users' under letters of authority given by licensees. wh : had obtail; ted import licences against i'he entitlement based on the value of their exports. . A.s a result of these discoveries it . was thought that drastic action was 'Called for.\n\nSo, a notification was issued under S. 3 ('3) of the Imports and Exports Control Act totally bam1.ing the import of beef, buffalo and pig tallow into India with effect from August 24, 1~83. And, on 7th, 9th and lOth November and 17th and !1st Decen1ber, fiye circulars, styled ''abeyance circulars' and marked . 'secree were issued by the Deputy Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, in respect of as .many a~ 192 concerns (business houses), directing licensing. authorities to kep in 'abeyance' fo.r a period of six. months from • the respectve dates of th,~. circulars any application received .from .any of them for the grant of import Jic, ence or Cus\n\ntoms clearnce Permits and allotment of imported goods through ' agencies like the State Trading Corporation of India Limited, the Minerals and Metals Trading Corporation of India Ltd. or any Other' similar. agency. It may be U)leful to CX; tract one of these 'abeyance.' circulars; all of which are in substanJially similar terms. • The'abeyance circular dated November 9, 1983 which 'lists' we will not use the word 'black-lists'-as many as 61 concerns incluins Liberty Oil Mills (P) Ltd. is as follow$; .\n\nE ..\n\n, I~\n\nI~: :il! ,,:\n\nI 1 .. '\n\nI ' I' I\n\ni. I f'. t: I\n\nI:;\n\n:1 :1\n\n1''1 l Iii '.'.1\n\n: l J\n\n~ L :,•\n\nI I 1!1\n\n~ .\n\n' I 1:1 ::i\n\n;: .! •I ! ' \\\n\n. ~: 684\n\n., . A\n\n.. . -·- --· --:~-_.\n\n' GOVERNMENf OF INDIA ·\n\n. MINISTRY OF COMMERCE .\n\nOFFICE OF THE CHIEF CONTROLLER\n\nOF IMPORTS & EXPORTS\n\nUDYOG BHA VAN, NEW DELHI-11\n\n. . .\n\nSECRET\n\ndated, tbe 9th Nv. 1983 . ! .\n\n.. ABEYANCE CIRCULAR No. 28/83-84/HQ.\n\n1 c Whereas investigation into certain allegation mentioned onder , . . Cl. 8 of the .Imports (C:ontrol) order, 1955 are pending against the-\"'\n\nII . D\n\nt E\n\n. . I F\n\nunder mentioned concerns, all the licensing authorities are herebY . requested to keep in abeyance for six months from the date of issue\n\nof this circular any application received from them for the grant of import Jicnce of Customs Clearance Permit and allotment of imported goods through agencies like the State Trading Corpn. of India Ltd-./Minerals and Metals Trading Corpn. of India ltd. or auy other similar agency ;. • .\n\n. . .\n\nSl.\n\nName & addres . Name & address of . Name of ibc prop.{ N'o. of the concern. the branches as partner; Director etc. available. as available.\n\n2 3 4 '\n\n• • .. : .\n\n14 M/,. Liberty Oil\n\nMills (P) Ltd., 16 llll llahadur Shastri Marg, Kurla, llombay--:-400070 • .. • •\n\n.. ) '\n\n...\n\n. • . LlliERl~ Oli. MILLS. V~ U~JO~ (C/timtappa Reddy, J.)\n\n. . 2. These instructions may be kept secret and if any of the above mcntiond firms mae any enquiry abOut t6c position of their\n\n! application (s), they may s1mply be informed the matter is under\n\n(.~ .. coosiderntivn. .\n\n3. This does not, however; preclude the licensing autboritie3 from rejecting their applications if they are otherwise illlldmissible or\n\n1'i, suffer from discrepancies in terms of the licensing instructions. Only\n\n' these applications may be kept in abeyance where the party is entitled ~- to licences or Customs. Clearance Permits etc, except for the allega ,.., tioos against tberu. ·\n\n. ~\n\n. . .\n\n4. Full details of all applications kept in abeyance as a result . of the above instructions may be reported to tbe Headquarters.\n\n. 5. The receipt of this circular may please b.: acknowled in the .. st3ndard proform<\\. • r Sd/·\n\n(J.P. SHARMA) l\n\nDY. CHIEF-CONTROLLER OF\n\nIMPORTS & EXPORTS\n\n; (Issued fro~ file o . 3/42/HQ/83/ECA- 1);,\n\nTo say the !cost and to put it mildly, it is a .very. odd circular, tmaoating as it does from a high dignitary of the Government of .\n\nIndia. Wby the secrecy aod why the instruction to mislead, ns it Were? . Are. statutory orders to be made and given effect in this , \"':' furtive manner, almost as if the autboritks tat be are afrnid of\n\nWOunding the susceptibilities of the prsons in respect. of whom 'f the o; d(rs are made 1 We presume thq arc statutory orders mnde in nerc1sc of the powers conferred by clause ,8 B of the Import Control ·: Order, though they do not themselves cite any statutory authority. ;... TJ:e actual direction, tho use of the word 'abcyancc• and the pres-·-\n\ncnptioo of the six-month period are indicative tbat clause 8 B is .. the SOurce or power. In the counter aOidavits fikd on behalf of the ' Government of India and the Chief aod D(putry Chief Controller ' of Import& aut! Exports it is cluimed that the power exercised was\n\nGt COnferred by clause SB It was 50 asserted by the Add I. Solicitor ·•\n\neo I ' d d tr'd • The !carded counstl who appeared for the parllcs pro\"e e ' . l.\n\ntt basis. So, we may also proceed on that' basis. lncotJ1•. Por•ttng, as the~ did, directions under c; lau'st' SD, vitnllr affecting thlf'' '. . -.. -· ·~ . ·--.~ .....\n\n685 .: •\n\nA '\n\nB . '1\n\nE , t '\n\nF I\n\nGl\n\n\"· ' . ..\n\n' t J\n\n\\ I,\n\n'I\n\nSUPREME COURT ~PORTS [!984] 3 s.c.R._ :rt\n\nbusiness of the oncerns concerned, one wo-uld e .. pect the circulars to be communicated to the affected. parties, even. if they were to be kept secret f.rom other prying eyes. That was_ not done tor reasons whi_ch no on.e has been abe to explain to . U:s.\n\nCurisously, enough; _ despite the circular, supplies of. imported goods appear to have been continued to be .made for about a month to some parties. But soon the circulars ceased to be secret. Everyone came to knw of them. True but unauthqrised versions were even publishd in commercial newspapers: The Circulars also came to b~ acted upon.\n\nLicenses were not granted. Customs Clearance Permits . were not . . issued.· Allotments were not made. Several persons against whom 'abeyance' -orders had been made filed Writ Petitions in different High Courts cnallenging those . orders. Liberty Oil Mills (P) Ltd. was one of those who filed such a Writ Petition in .the BombaY..\n\nHight Court. The case h.as been withqrawn to this Col:lrt under Art 139A of the Constitution and it. is . this• case that has been heard by us. We heard Shri Ashok Desai for the Liberty Oil Mills (P).\n\nLtd. and Shri Soli Sorabji, . Shri V.P. Raman and. Shri Ram Jethmalani for the intervners. We heard Shri Milon Banerjea, Addl'. Solicitor . Generala.bly assisted by Sri Gopala subrahmanyam . for the Union of India and the Chief Controller and Deputy Chief\n\ncontroller of Imports and Exports and Shri M.C. Bhandare and Shri A. Subba Rao for the State Trading Corporation . .\n\n Liberty Oil Mills (P) Ltd. is a 'Trading House' recognised as such in terms of the etrpression as defined in the 'Import Policies' for several years. Their exports for the period 1982~8l are stated to have exceeded RS. 19 crores. They claim to deal in egetable Oils~ export of Frozen Marine Products, Frozen foods, Te)\\tiles, Chemicals, Agricultural Products and imports of diverse commoditie~ such as Oil and Oil seeds, Chemicals~ Drugs, etc. They claim to have a factory refining egetable Oil at Kula and ll factory for manufactur~ ing vanaspati at Shahpur. They have plants for processiag frozen food at Madras, Tuticorin, Calcutta and Vishakhapatnm .; they also have sol\\>ent extraction and Industrial Oil Plants. They claim that they require a continous and steady flow of various imported goods for their sevetal Industrial activities. They 'allege that if import iicences for which they have applied are not granted to them and . if the imported goods fr. which they have applied are nt allotted to them, their faclories and their plants will have to be closed down; their business will be seriously affected and many of their employees will b(l tbrown out of employmet .. They state .-that . they have nevet\n\n)'' ..\n\n< '\n\n687 LIBERTY OIL MILLS v. UNION (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) , ..\n\nadulterated .the vanaspati anufacturd in their factory_ at Sbahpur and that the samples taken from their factory on as many as thirty 'six occasions. had never been found to contai.n any type of animal\n\ntatlow. They further state that they had not impor\"d any tallow after July, 1982. Such tallow as as , U; nported by them before July,'\n\n1982 was sold to them by other Jicencees to them as actual users. The tallow so purchased was air~ treated by them in .theil: premises at Kurla and s'old by' them to soap manufacturers and other fatty cid pJants. The. import of tallow was on the strength of letters of authority issued by licences in respect of. additio:aal licences and, replenishment licences held.by them. All the a, dditional licences bad been 'issued prior to June 5, 19.81 and import ofOGL items was permitted against the said licences. Beef tallow became canafised from Jupe s. 198! 'but the, canalisatiqn was not retrospective and couJd not affect the licences previously issued. All the contracts for the import ofbeef tallow had been cntcr.ed into before June.S, 1981 and in r..:spect of seven of the . cotracts letters of redit.had also been opened before that date. The beef tallow im'ported upto July,\n\n1982 was duly cleared'by Custom Authorities without any dispue or question. Thereafter the. tallow was Sl!hjected to air-treatment .and soid to soap manufcturers and fatty acid plants. There was never\n\n, . ... \\ any allegation ag, Ftinst the petitioners that any portion of the tallow imported by them had ever been diverted for the adulteration of vanaspati. Liberty Oil Mills therefore, claim that there was no . justification whatsoever for making an order under clause 8B against\n\n.them. They accordingly seek the .issue of Writ to quash the .• circular.\n\nShri Ashok Desai for Liberty dii Mills (P) Ltd. contended tliat an order und:!r cl; wse ~B of the Import Control Order cold only be made if te Central Government. or the Chief Controller 9f Imports .,· and Exports was satisfied that the grant of licences and allcitmeni of imported goods would not be in the public interest. In the present case, not only was. the . requisite satisfaction of the appropriate )uthority not recorded in the circulr said to have been: issued under . _Clause 8B but there was no materhil whatsoever upon which such iatisfaction could have been arrived it. .Before June 5, J98J, beef\n\nt.allow was not cancalised and co, uld therefore, be freely imported. as an OGL item. It wson June 5. 1981 that the import ofbeeftaUow came tq be canalised_' but such canalisation could not affect . liences >vhich had already been .granted. Beef tallow could be imported under the preexistng licences as an OGL item l':ven after June 5, 1981\n\n~ ' ' . • •.\n\nA ...\n\n.E ....\n\n, G ' '\n\nc1I .\n\n... :\n\n68_!.\n\n[1984]3 S.C.R. ·•\n\n•i I)\n\n. ll\n\n. - ' and upt .. the d.~e on which the import of beef tallow was totally\n\nbanned. Our attention was 'repeatedly invited to the two cases of A.rv:ind Exports (P) Ltd, and Jayant Oil Mills (P) Ltd., here deing . with appeals and decisions under .Sections 128 and 131 of the Customs\n\nAct, the CeJ!tral_ Board of Excie and, Customs and 'the Govrnment ofthe India to<; k the view\n\nI . uThe licence issued during a Policypeiod is governed by that\n\npolicy as amended upto the date of issue of ; be licence and fl; mendments made after the date f issue do not have any -application to tbe licences.\" and .;:.\n\n\"A licence is governed by the Policy which is made applicable _ .to it. Restrictions placed on-the import of good~ in the policy for the subsequent years have to be ignored, unless of courset . any. such restriction has .been specifically made4 applicable to licences issued eariier either generaUy or in the partic~J¥ cases.\n\nIn this case the licences were issued during the policy for the\n\nperiod AM-81 and were gove:med by this policy only particularly para 174(v) thereof. 'These licences were valid for the goods in questi9n as only Mutton Tallow was in the list of cana .Used items.' In t; rms Of para 222(3) of the. policy for the periQd\n\nAM-82 these licences continued to be valid_ for beef tallow as this item continued in the list of OGL Items even after the com- . ing into force of the policy for the period AM82. When vide_\n\nPublic_ Notice. No. 29/81 ated June 5, 1981 beef tall()w'was put in the canalised items it is from this date only that it became canalised: Jn the public notice there is no specific pmvision · invalidating_licences previoysly issued so far as beef tallow is concerned,· in cae such licences were valid earlier to import thisitem. In tbe.absence of any specific prohibition the licences poduced by the importer in this.case had to be accepted for the clearance of beef tallow.\"\"'\n\n. Jt. was furthe't contended that the circular order under 'Clause 8B\n\nas ~.!?tuaJcy . issue, d . was not confin'ed to the banned. item ,..of-animal\n\ntallow or to:item~ wbih.uldb~d to have. some cannction with the banned item but extendeq t~ all items for which applica.tions for ' the Sf~\\lt, Qflicen~. or fot llqtn,1ent hacJ. been maqe .b.Y Liberty-Oil MiHs-.'(P) Ltd., whether or not.snch items had the reotest connnc: tion with animal tallow Shri. Ashok Dsai connected, that: the, very\n\ngeirer~J natue of the order disdosd a total non•applkation of the tnind sipce tee was no e:ll:us pet ween the alle~d misllse oflkee~~\n\n.. ~\n\n.; I\n\nLIBERTY OIL MILLS v. UNION (Chinnappa Reddy, J.)\n\nfor importing beef tallow or the misuse of the imported beef tallow and the abeyance of applications for grant of import licences and for allotment of other items. It was .also argued that as many as 61 firms were Clubbed together and dealt with. by single circular and . there was no indication whatsoever that the (acts relating to each of the firms had been cons, idered separately. The circular was an omnibus. one and revealed a 'total non-application of the min~. It was suggeste~ thatthe abeyance' orders far from advancing the public 'interest, would, on the otlier hand, prejudicially affect the .public\n\ninterest by bringing to a halt several industries and throwing hosts of workers out of employment. It would <;~.!so affect exports from India and reduce forign echange earnings. 'It was submitted that there was no substance in the allegation that Liberty Oil Mills Pvt.\n\nLtd. were not .'actual users' of beef tallow but th.ey had nqne the\n\nless obtained letters of uthorisation for import of beef tallow as if they were actual users and they had thus misused the lmort 'licences of other licencees. It was pointed out that the beef tallow imported by the un<ler letters of authority bad either been sold by them to\n\n~Ct!Jal users On the, high seas or. had been. actually used by them tq produce marketable beef tllow for use by soap manufacturers and fatty a<; id. plants, by subjecting the imported beef tallow to air treatment•. It was also argued, by Shri Ashok De:sai that the circumstances that there was public agitation about the import of beef tallow was a totally irrelevant circumstances for making an ord_er\n\nunder claus.e 8B. Shri , V .P. Raman, learned counsel for one of the interveners suggested that clause 8B did not apply to goods covered byOpen General Licence in view of clause 11(4) of the Import Control Order which provided, \"Nothing in this order, except paragraph 3-I of sub-clause 3 of Clause 5, Clause 8, Clause SA, Clause 8-C and Clause 10-C shall apply to the import of any goods covered by Open General Licence or Special General Licence issued • by\"the Central Government.\" Shri Soli Sorabjee, who appeared for\n\nmother. interyener, submhted that clause 8B should be construed as providing for an opportunity to b~ heard and since the abeyance _?rders made no provision for hearing, they should be struck down, as opposed to t'lte principles of natural justice, and therefore arbitrary\n\nand violative of Art. 14 and 19(i) (g) of the Constitution. !twas also urged y. the learned counsel that the satisfaction contemplated by clause 8B was not an omnibus satisfaction but a satisfaction _which must, disc!ose an ~~:pplicatin or' the mind to the fats of each individual case and each indhddual application. for licence or allotme 't\\ t. Shri Ram Jetb!llalapi1 wlw appe_ared fpr another intervener •\n\n-·· F\n\nSUPRF, ME COllRT REFORTS {t984~ 3 S.C.R • . -rj\n\nurged that secret orders affecting rights of parties could not lawfully\n\nbe made since secrecy would militate against natural justice and against the right of appal provided by sec. 4-M of theJmports and Exports (Control) Act.\n\nHe also submitted that in the .absence . of an express recital 'of satisfaction which was the foundation for the exercise of the jurisdiction under clause 8B, the order must be held not to confotm to clause 8B and therefore, vitiated. He also contrasted clause 8A and clause 8B and argued that the :public ~-·· interest contemplated by clause 8B should be such as to exclude a ·~ pre-decisional. bearing. There was no such public interest involved . in the case. There was ot even . recital to that effect. For that -\" reason .also the order was vitiated.· He further submitted that an order clause 8B could only be made after the inVestigation under clause 8 had. commenced, that is after a show cause notice, had been issued under clause 8.'\n\n. Shri Millon Bannerjee; learned Additional Solicitor General urged that the only questi0n for the consideration of the court was whether there was any relevant materjal before the authority com- . petent to take action under clause 8B to reach the satisfaction contemplated by 1hat clause. Since the satisfaction contemplated by ·\n\nClause 8B was the subjective satisfaction of the authority concerned, the court was not to concern itself with the sufficiency of the\n\nmatrial in a.iriving at the requisite satisfaction.\n\nHe howeverJ invited opr attention to various facts and circumstances which, according to him,. wholly justifiq the action taken against liberty Oil Mills (P) Ltd. Though Liberty Oil Mills itself held several licences. it nevertheless indulged in the. collection of a large number of licences of other imported beef ta11ow as their. authorised agts, sold part of the beef tallow to alleged actual .users on high seas or puacbased the beef tallow after importation, subjected it to the so-called air-treatment a treatment which could 'by no means be cal1ed a manufacturing\n\n.... process and which lef( the cbarac.ter of beef tallow unaltered-and sold it tQ'innumerable. parties stated to be soap manufacturers and fatty acid plants.' The claim of Liberty Oil Mills (P+ Limited that Liberty\n\nOil 'Mills was an 'actual users•, who had purchased beef tallow for subjecting it to air treatment was no more than a pretence. It was .. stated that full particula~ 'or the parties to whom the beef tallow was claimed to have been sold ere not made avaiable despite requests for \"the same. There , was great public concern about. the manner in which beef tallow had been imported and used by some importers and the. authorities very naturally felt that, it thei.l •\n\n\"!;\n\n: ~\n\nUBERTY oiL MiLLS v. UNiON (Chinnappa Reddy, !.) 691\n\nduty in the public interest to investigate into .malpractices -conneted\n\nwith the import of beef tallow and the misuse of beef tallo~ aftel import. The learned Additional Solicitor General placed before us . the relevant files which accordingto )lim indicated that the case of Liberty 0 il Mills (P) Limited as well as the cases of each of the other firms who were included in the abeyance circular hd been separately considered and satisfaction duly and properly arrived at by tbe appropriate authority on relevant material . The lear ed Additional Solicitor General very fairly did not urge that the decision to keep in 'abeyance' need not be communicated or that the principles of natural justice were not reqQ; ired to be observed.\n\nBut he argued that a pre-decisional hearing was not contemplated.\n\nHe submitted that rule 8B did not.iute out a post-deCisional hearing and stated .that the appropriate authorities were ready even now to consider faithfully any representation made by the parties affected.\n\nWith reference to the views expressed by the .Central Board to Excise and Customs and the Government of India, in the cases of Arvind Exports and. Jayant Oil Mills, Sbri Banne..rjee submitted that those cases did not represent the correct position in law. Those decisions were rendered in proceedirigll under the Customs Act and did not pre.clude .appropriate action under the Import . and Export Control Act and the Import Control Rules. Shri Bannerjee also invited out attention to several provisions of the Import Control Order.\n\nBefore considering the questions at issue, it wi11 beuseful to t#'- refer to our Import Policy and to take a cursory look at the various statutory an!l non-statutory instruments embodying the policy. The import policy of any country, particularly a developing country, has necessarily to be tuned to. its general econ..omic policy f(mnded upon its constitutional goals, the requirements of its internal and internation~\\ trade, its agricultural and industrial development plans; its\n\nmnetary and financial strategie's and last but not the least the internatinal political and diplomatic overtones depending on 'friendship, neutrality or hostility with other countries' (G/ass.Chotans Importer3 ·\n\nand Users' Association v. Union of India1).\n\nThere must also be a considerable number of other factors which go in:to the making of an import policy: Expertise in . public and political, nationa~ and \\nternational economy, is necessary before one may engage m the\n\nmaking or in the criticism ofan import policy. Obviously courts do not possess \"the expertise and are consequently. incompetent to pass\n\n(1) [1962] I SCR 862.\n\n• F\n\nSUf'REME COURT REPORTS Il984] 3 s.c.R. ,..__,..\n\njudgment oc the appropriateness or the adequacy of a particular import policy. But we may venture to assert with some degree of accuracy that our present import policy is export oriented. Incentives by way of import licences are given to promote exports. Paragraph 173 of Chapter 18 of the 'Import Policy' for April 1981 to March:I982 published b~ the Government of India, Ministry of Coqtmerce-in the first week of April every year, an annual '1mport and Export Policy' to. be in force during the financial year is published-expressly states ......... \"the objectiye of the scheme of registration of Export Houses and\n\n, J the grant of special facilities to them. is to strengthen their negotiating capacity in' foreign trade and to build up a more enduring relationship between them and their supporting manufacturers\".\n\nParagraphs 183 and 184 enumerate the various import facilities available to Export I:Iouses. Paragraph 185(1) allows Export Huses to import OGL {Open General Licence) items-against REP (Reple nisbment) Licences is$ued in their own names or transferred to them by others. The facility is stated to be .availab1e to them for '~ .import of (a) capital goods Iited _in Appendix !I and placed on.\n\nOpen General Licence for Actual_ Users and (b) Raw Material9, components, consumables and spares (excluding items covered by Appendix V) which have been placed on Open General Licence for Actual. Users. Paragraph 185 (I) further stipulates that Capital\n\nGoods so imported shall be transfred by them only to such Actual Users as are authorised to prchase the~ by the concerned-Licensing •A1;1thority and that raw materials, components and consumables so imported may be transferred by . them to eligible Actual Users.\n\nImported spares may be sold to any person. Paragraph 185 (2) provides. that import replenishment licences issued in their own names or transferred to them by others, against which. Export . HQuses wish to take advantage of the facility provided in Paragraph 185, shaH . be non-transferable. Therefore, the Export HouS'es wisbiug to take advantage of. the facility are required to get the licences concerned endorsed by the licensing authority as under r- .\n\n• 'The licence will also be vaJid for import of OGL items under paragraph 185 of import policy, 1981-82, subject to the conditions, laid down arid; shall be non-transferable.\"\n\nParagraph 185 (3) further stipulates that import of OGL items under these provisions sbal1 be subject to the condition' that the shipment of goods shall takes place within the va1idity of the OGL, that is,\n\nMarch 31, !982 or wllin the' validity peri9d of.tlle import Ikenc~\n\n: ...\n\n. ~\n\n.....\n\nLIBERTY orL MILLS v. UNION (Chinnappa Ready, J. ). 693\n\nitself, whichever date is earlir. Paragraph 186 (1) broadly entitles\n\nEport Houses to Additional . Licences upto the value of 15% of the\n\nf~.b. value ofseiect products made in i981·82 and manufactured by small scale and cottage indus.tries, plus 7-1/2% of the f.o.b. value of other exports of select products made in tbe same year. All such Additional Licences shall be non~ transferable .. Paragraph 186(7) provides that the Additional Licences will also be valid for import of Raw Materials, Compone[)ts, Consumablcs. and Spares (including\n\nitems covered y Appendix V) whicl1 have been placed on Open General I.icence for Actual Users (Industrial). While Spares so . imported may be sold to any person, Raw Materials, Components and Consumables may only be sold to eligible Actual Users.\n\nParagraph 192. requires every Export. Houses to maintain proper accounts of all its exports, 'imports and disposed of imported itemsand are further required to furnish detailed information in the ·\n\nprscribed forms.\n\nSome Export Houses are reognised as 'Trading Houses D 'depening on their performance. Trading Houses are entitled to all the facilities available to Export Houses, but their entitlement to additional Jicences against. exports of products manufactured in the small scale and cottag~< sectors is to be 20 per cent and not 15 per cent.\n\n' , Paragraph 222(1) prescribes that additinal licences issued to Export Houses in 1980-81 hall cease to be valid for items which do .nNappear\\n Appendices 5 and 7 of-Import Policy, 198lg2, But it is said that restriction will not apply to the extent that the licence holders have made firm comm:itments by opening irrevocable letters of credit through authorised dealers of foreign exchange before April 1, J<; gl, Paragraph . 222(3) provides that REP licences and . additional hcnces held by .Export Houses shall.cease to be valid for import of any item which could be imported under Open General Licences during 1980-81, but it is no longer so in the Import Policy\n\n1981-82 except for such commitments as have been made by opening irrevocable lettrs of credit through authorised dealers in foreign exchange before April, 1981. We may notice here that Appendices 1,\n\n.. 3, 4 and 6 contain lists of banned items. Appendix 5 and Appendix 7 contain a list of restricted items. Appendix 8 contains a list of items import of which is canalised through public sector agencies, Appendix 2 contains a list of C-apital Goods allowed under Open General Licences and Appendix 10 contains a list of Items allowed to be imported. under Open. General Licences, sub$ct t6 the condi~ .\n\nSUPREMB COURT REPORTS (19&4] 3s.C.R.\n\nA tions. set out therein. It appear~ that prior to 197S, QGL was\n\ncopfined to certain restricted items only. But in April, 1978, the Government of India issued Import Trade Control Or.der No. 9 of 1978: the OGL No. 3 of 1978 granting general permissio~ to import . into India from any country of the world, Raw Materials and . Com(lonents by Actual Usrs (industrial) if the items to be importe9\n\nB · were not covered by aey 9f . the lists of banned, restricted and\n\n. canalised items and did not figure in Appendix IX of the Import\n\nPolicy for 1978:79. One of the results was that anmal tallow which could not be imported as a!) OGL item .prior to Aprill978, could be so imported after 1.978 as it was not one of the banned, restricted or canalised items. In the Import Policy for Ayrill9SO to March 1981, mutton tallow was included in the list of canalised items. Therefore, white mutton . tallow could be . impqrted thereafter through the agency of the 'State Trading Corporation only, beef tallow could still be imported as an OGL item. The position was the same in the Ip1port Policy isucd for the period. April 1981-March 1982. However, on June 5, 19.81 by a Public Notice for the word 'mutton . tallow' in the list of canalised items, the expression \"tallow of any · animal orgin including mutton tallqw\" was substituted.. Therefore with effect from June 5, 1981 beef .tallow also became a canalised item. One of the questions posed is regartling the effect of th~ public. notice dated June 5, 1981 by which the expression 'tallow of animal origin or including mutton tallow' was Sl, lbstitutep for the wprd .'mutton tallow'. The question posed is whether the ban of import\n\nexcept through the State Trading Crporation was applicable to beef tallow imported . into India after June 5, 1981 but against licences issued earlier and in respect of whici1 contacts hlfd already been into. We have already mentioned that on Agust 24, 1983, the Government of India made an order under Section 3 of the Exports and Imports (Control) Act totally banning the import Into India of / beef,, buffalo and pig tallow. .\n\nWe may mention here that the Import Policy for earlier as well as later years, contain more or less similar provisions as .those in the Import Policy for April 1981-March 1982. ·\n\nThe statutory regulation of imports is COJ)tained in the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947 and the Imports Control Order .1955. Section 2 of the. Imports and Exports (Control) Act\n\ndefinnarious exprcs$ions .. 'Lettr of. authority' is defined a letter\n\nH-.. meaning as authorising the licensee to permit another person, named in the.said letter, to import goods against the licence grantl)d to thepcensee. Licence is. defined to mean a licence granted and including\n\n.·~\n\n) .\n\n..... . )\n\nUBERTY OIL MILLS v. UNIO~ (Chinnapp, l Reddy, J.)\n\n69S\n\na custos clearance permit issued, under any control .order. _Section 3 of the Act is the pivotal sct ion. Section 3(3) empowers the Central Government, n6tw; t1Htaading anything contained in the Customs Act, by order published -in the official Gazette, to prohibit: restrict or impose condtrons o:1 the clearance wheter for human consumption or for shipment' abroad, of any goods or. class of goods imported ioto India. Sectiol'l. 4A empowers the Central Gover*'nent to levy fee in respect of licences granted , or\n\n. renewed under any order. made or deemed to be made under the Act. Sections 4 B, 4 C, 4 D, 4 E and 4 F .are provisions _relating to the power to enter. and inspect the power to search, the\n\n'powr to seize imported' goods or material, the power to stop and\n\nse'ize conveyances. Sections 4 G and 4 H provide for confiscatioiJ and Section 4 I for the levy_-of penalty.\n\nSection 4 J preservs the power to inflict any other punishment under the provisions of the Act or under any other la; v despite the confiscation or penalty imposed under the Act. Section 4 K. povielcs for adjuication and Section 4 L entitles the owner of the goods, matrials, conveyance or animals or other persons concerned to be given a reasonable oppor(unity of making a representation before any order of adjudication of confiscation or imposition of a penalty is made. Section 4 M provides for an appeal against any decision or orer made -under the Act and Section 4 N einpowers the Chief Controller to exercise power of revision in cases. where DQ appe, al . has been preferred. SeCtion 5 makes contraventions of any orde.c, made or deemed to be made under the Act or any condition of a licence granted under such order punis)lable with imprisonment and fine as mentioned in that provision. Section 8 empowers the Central Government , to make rules for arrying out the provPilions ofthe Aot. ·\n\nThe Imports (Cntrol) Order, 1955 is an order made by the . Central Government in exercise of the powers conferred by Section\n\n3 and 4A of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act. Clause 3 of the Imports (Control) Order prescrib_es that no person shall import any good:; of the description specified in Schedule-! except unde.J; and inaccordance with the licence or a customs clearance permit granted by the Central Government or by a specified officr. Clause 5 providesfor the imposition of conditions• subject to which licences . ni!lY be issued. Clause 6 prescribes the situations when the Central\n\nGovernment or the Chief Controller . of Imports and Exports may\n\nrefse to grant a licence or direct any other licensing authority not to grant a licente. One of the situations is 'if the applicant is for the time being subject to any action under clause 8, 8A or 8B'! .\n\n' '\n\nSUPREMB COURT RBPOil.TS [1984] 3 sc. R.\n\n Clause 8( 1) empowers the CeQtral Government or the Chief Control- . Jer of Imports and Exports to . debar a licencee or importer or any\n\nother pe.rson froni imp!>rting any goods. or receiving licences or\n\naotment of the imported goods through the State Trading Corporation ofiudia, the Minerals and Mctals. Trding Corporation of India, or _any other similar agencies and direct, without prejudice to any other act.ion that may be taken ag'airist him in this half and that no licence or allotment of imported goods shall be granted to him lnd be sbaH not be permitted toim.port' any goods for a specified period for any of the reasons specified in the clause. Two of the reasons men-· tioped in th~ clause.are : \"If he fails to comply with -or contravenes or attempts to contravene or abets the contravention of any conditions embodied in or accoJI1panying, a .licence or an application for a licence\" and 'If he commits a breach of any law (including any rule, order or regulatio.n) relating to custom or the import or export of g.oods or foreign exchange\". Clause 8A empowers the Central\n\nGovetnent or the Chief Controller of Imports to suspend the importation. of goods by any person or grant of licer.ces or allotment of importec1 goods through the State Trading Corporation of India', the Minerals and Metals Trading Corporation of India, or any other . similar agency, to u licensee or im'iJOrt¢r or any other person penaing investigation into on-e or more of the allegations mentioned in. Clause 8 without prejudice to any other notice that may be taken against him init.hat behalf. The first proviso to Clause SA prescribes tbat'thegrant of a licence or allotment of imported goods shall not ordinarily . be suspended under this clause for a period exceeding 15 months.\n\nThe second proviso stipulates that on the withdraw I of such_ sus.pension a licenee 91; allotment of imported goods \"may be granted to hm for a priod of suspension, subject to such cbnditions, restrictions or limitations as may be deciaed by the authorities aforesaid keeping in view cif the- .foreign exchange position, indigenous production and other relevant factors. Clause 8B empowers the Central Government or the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports to keep in abeyance applications for licences or allotment of imported goods where any investigation is pending into any of the allegation& mentioned in Cla]Jse 8 against a lincensee, importer or any oth~ person subject to the fulfilment of the req~ iremcnt of the satisfaction of the appropriate authority regarding the public-interest. Since we are primarily concerned in this. case with the vires, the width and the intt:rprdation of , Clause. 8B, the whole of it may 9e 'usefully extracted :-\n\n1'88 : Power t9 keep in abeyance applications for licencesor allot meuts of imported goods-Where any investigation into.\n\n...-- . -r .\n\n':- '\n\n. .\n\nLIBERTY OIL MILLS V. UNION (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 691\n\nany of the anegations mentioned in clause 8 is pending against a licensee or importer or any other person,-and the Central Government or the Chief Controller of Impo.J; ts and Eltports in satisfied that without ascertaining fuFther details in rgard to such allegation, the grarit of licence or allotment of imported goods will not be in the public interest~ then notwithstanding anything c-ontained. in this Order, the Central Government\" or\n\nth~ Chief .ControHer of Imports and Exports may keep in abeyance any application for grant of licence from such.persop,\n\nor direct the State Trading Corporation of India, the Minerals and Metals Trading Corporation of India, or any other similar\n\nagency to keep in abeyance allotments of impoted goods tb\n\nsU<; h prson, without assigning any . reason and without preju. dice to auy, other action that may be taken in this behalf:\n\nProvided that the period ror which the grant of such lice.nct.: or allotment is kept in abeyance under this clause spall not ordinarily exceeds ix months.\"\n\n'i' • Clause 8C authorises the Cenral Govermnent to publish or . cause to be published the name . of such persons or class of persons\n\ngainst whom action under clause '8 or 8A is taken.. Clause 9 empowers the Central Government or the Chief Controller of Imports and Exports or any other 0fficer authorised in that behalf to cancel any licence granted under the order or otherwise to tender it ineffec\n\ntive for any of the reasons mentioned in the clause. One of . the reasons is ' lf the licensee has committed a breach of any of the conditions of a licence\". Another reason is \"If the Cent, ral Government is or such officer is satisfied that the licence will not serve the purpose for which it has en grauted.\" Yet another reason in \"If the licensee has'committed a breach of aziy law relating to customs or the rules or regulations relating to' Imports and.Exports.of g?ods or any other law relating to foreign exchange.\" Clause lO(i) provides that no actioq shall be taken, inter alia, under 'clause 8(1) or Clause 8A or Clause 9(1) against a licensee , or importer or ariy other. person uniess he has been given a reasonable opportunity of being heard. cJausel0(2) enables any person aggrieved by any acriontaken under Clause 8(1) or lS(3) or 8(A) or 9(1) to prd(:r ao appeal to the autho- . rity constituted by the Central Goyernnient for that _purpose. Clause 11 ( 4) prescribes,\n\n\"Nothing in this order, except paragrapil (iii} of sub.clause(3) of Clause 5, Clause 8, Clause. 8A, Clause 8C and Clause IOC,\n\n, , F\n\nSUP~EME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1984] 3 $.C.R.\n\nshall appiy \"lo the import of any goods covered by Open Genera) Licence or Special General Licence issued by the Central Government.:•\n\nWe may notice here the argument of Shri V.P. Raman that.\n\nClause-11 (4) excludes the application of Clause 8B to good~ covered by Open General Licence .. We find no substance in this submjssion.\n\nClause 8B expressly provides that action under the clause may be taken \"notwithstandinganything contained in this order\". In view' of this non-obstante clause, we have no doubt tht Clause SB applies equally to goods povered by Open General Licence.\n\nWe may mention at this juncture that Clauses 8A and 8B were not to be found in the Imports (Control) Order 1955 originally but ' were introduced into it later by way of amendment, to make provision for the making of ~.Jterim orders pending investigation into. allegation under Clause 8. . The amendment was af consquence of the lacuna being pointed out by the Bombay High Court in some cases which came before it.\n\nTo be fair to the learned counsel for the petitioner and the other learned counsel for the interveners, all ofthem were unanimous\n\nabout the necessity for a provision like Clause 8!3, and none of them arg!Jed that Clause 8B would be ultra vires if the principles of natural justice could be read into it. The' learned Additional Solicitor General, . a~ mevtioned by us earlier, agreed -that natural jwtice . . should be read into Clause 8B so as to provide for a post-decisional\n\nhearing at the request of the. affected party. Let us examine Clause\n\n8B in the scheme and setting of the Imports (Control) Order a\"Qd consider whe_ther natural justice is excluded and, if no.t, when and what opportl.J~.ity may be provided to the affected party~ ·\n\n' . ' Clause 8,. we have seen, empowers the Central Government or the Chief Controller. of Imports and Exports to debar a person from importing goods or from receiving licences or allotment of imported goods for a specified period if such person is gullity of any of the acts of commission or omission enumerated in the Clause. An order of this immensity cannot obviously be made without due investigation and wit'hout giving a reasonable opportunity to the affected party.\n\nClause 8A and SB refer to. orders which may be made pending investigatio~ into the alkgations uner Clause 8 and bynecessary impljca~ tion expose the investigative content of Clause 8. Clause 10 expressly stipulates that action under Clause may not be taken unless a reasonable opportunity is given .to the party concerned. Neither\n\n.. •\n\n--), ,\n\nLIBERTY OIL MILLS' v. U '!IO~ (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) 69.9.\n\nClauses g nor Clause 10 precribes the procedure to be followed before a final order uude.r Clause 8 is made. Has a show-cause notice to be issued first, then followed by an investigation. and finally con- . eluded by yet another shbw cause notice ? Or is it enough if a showcause notice is issued after the investigation is concluded and the ·\n\nperson concerned is asked to explain the evidence gathereci.• against. him ? When may investigation be sad to have commenc.ed ? Should investigatiqn be necessarily preceded by a show-c; mse notice.? We do not think that the Central Government or the Chief Controller is\n\nboud to follow any rigid, hide-bound, pre-determined procedure.\n\nThe procedure may be different in each case and may be determined by the facts circumstances and exigencies of each ce. The authority may design its own procedure to suit the requirements of a_n indvi\n\ndual case.\n\nThe procedure must be fair and not so designed as. to *defeat well known principls of justice an.d thus deny justice. That. is alf. If the procedure is fair it matters not whether the investigation is precded, interjected or succeeded by a show-cause notice. The. word 'Investigatirn' is not defined but in the context it means no • more than the process of collection.of evidence or the gathering of ' material. It is not necessary that it should commence iih the communication of an accusation to the person whose affairs are to be investigated. , That may follow later.\n\nWhen facts come to the notice of he Government or the Chief Controlle)' of Imports which prima facie disclose an act or omission of the nature mentioned n Clause 8, the authority may straight away communicate the allegations to the person concerned, s_eek his answer and proceed to further investigate or the authority may cons!der it more prudent to further satisfy itself by seeking other .evidence or material before communicating the al.Jega'tions to the person concerned.\n\nThere is 'no rule of justice oi fair play which requires the authority to seek the comruents of the\n\nperson. concerned before embarking upon an investigation. Investigation commences as soon as the authority decides to . take the first step whether by way of seeking evidence or by way of seeking an explanation from the person concerned. On the initiation of a proceeding under Clause 8 by the commencement o'T investigation; the authority has to address itself o the Question whether a'ny'action of an interim nature to prevent further harm or mischief is warranted pending investigation: Licences may ave already been issued and allotment of imported goods may have already been made.\n\nThe authority may consider it . desirable to prevent the person from im 'ported goqds pursuant .to the licences or to prevent him from\n\nobtaining the imported.g0ods allotted to him througq the specified aBencies. If o, the authority may make an order under , Clause 81\\;\n\n• ~-\n\n100 . tJPREME COURT REPORts [1~84] 3 s.c.R..\n\nA ' ...\n\nc .\n\n' a\n\nS.1.5pending the importation of goods, the grant of licences or the allotment of imported goods. But Clause 10 provides that no action under Clause 8A. n:iay be taken without \"giving a reasonable opprtu 4 nity to the person concerned . . It is obvously thought thf the right such as it may be, to obtain a licence or allotment of goods having\n\nbecome.crysalised into a licence or an allotmeut, an order under Clause 8A may have immediate and grave prejudicial reJ:?el'cussions. on the person concerned making it desirable that he should be heard\n\nbefre an ordet of suspension is made. So it is that Clause 8A contempla es a pre-decisional hearing: On the. other hand, licences may not yet have been issued and allotments may yet have to be made. The approprite authoi'iiy may be satisfied that it would~ not be in the public interest to issues Jicences or make allotments to the person concerned, without ascertining further. details with regard to · the allegations against him.\n\nIn such cases, the authority may make • .an order of 'abeynce' under Claus~ 8B. Though the language of .. · Clause 8B is capable of being read as if it applies to both allotments already made and allotments yet to be made, a reference to the marginal head, in the background of what has been provided for in • Clause 8A, makes it clear that Clause SB applies only to allotments . jet to be made and licences yet t9 be issued. That clearly is the . contextual construction of Clause 88. Read in any other manner, there will be a totally unnecessary . \"over-lapping of and a needless conflict between Cfausds SA and 8B, with freedom to, the authority to . to pui:stie action either under Clause 8A or Clause 8B each providing a .different procedure.of of its own. We do not think' that it is per- . . missible for us to read clauses SA and 8B in a manner as to create needJess conflict an.d . confusion when the two Classes. a.rc capable of existing separately, without encroach.ing upon each other. Contextual construction demands such a construction a: d we have no hesitation in adopting it. Clause 10 which ptovides for a reasonable opportu- nity before action is taken under clause 8A, does not make similar provi.sionin the- .case of action under. clause 8A as weU as action under clause S.B are both in the . nature of interim orders of tempo- . rary duration aimed at preventing furt.her harm and mischief pending in\\'estigation into the al)eg11tions under. clause 8.\n\nD~:es it men that . the principl.e ::>f natural justice of procedural fairness is to be alto- . gether exclude~ when action is taken under clause 8B? We do-not think that it is permissible to interpret any statutory instruments so as to exclude natural justice, Qnless the language of the instrument . leaves no option. tq the court. Pro.cedural fairness embodying natural\n\njUstice hr to be implied whenever action is taken effecting the .. rights\n\n\\-· .,\n\n, .\n\n. ~, .\n\n,; -\n\nUBERTY OIL MTLLS v. UNION (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) '701 . of parties. It may be that the opportunity to be heard may not be pre-decisioal ;· it may necessarily have to be pre-decisional where _the danger to be averted or the act to be prevented is imminent or where the action to. be taken can brook no delay. - If an area is devastated by flood, one cannot wait to issue show-cause notices for requisitioning vehicles to evacuate population. If there is an outbreak of an epidemic, we presume one does not -have t<? iss, ue , show~ . cause notices to requisition beds in hospitals, public or private. - In such situations, it may be enough to issue post-decisional notices providing for an opportunity. It may not e'en be necessary in some . situations to issue, such notices, but it would be sufficient but obligatory to consider any representation that may be made by the aggrievedperson and that would satisfy the requirements of proce- ·\n\ndural fairness and natural justice .. There Can be no _tape-measure of the extent of natural justice. It may and indeed it must vary from statute to statute, situatio~ to situation and case to case. Again, it . is necessary to say that pre-decisional natural justic~ is not usually contemplated when the. decisions. taken' are. ofan ii!_tri_m nature. pending investigation or enquiry. Ad-interim orders may always be made ex-parte and suc;:h orders tnay themselves provide for an opportunity to the aggrieved party to be beard at a later fage. Even if the interim ordrs d~ not -m-ake provision for such an' opportunity, an aggrieved party has, nevertheless, always the right to make appropriat~ representation seeking a review of the order and asking the\n\nauthority to re'Scind or modify the order. The principlesof, natural justice would be satisfied' if the aggrieved party isgiyen an opportunity at the request. There is no violation of principle ofnatural justice if an x-parte ad-interim order is made unless of course, the statute its.elf provides for a hea.ring before the order is made-as inclause 8A. Na:tural justfce will be violated if the authority refuses to consider the request of the aggrieve~ party for an opportunity to make his representation against the ex-parte ad-interim orders. .\n\n- In tbe Qeen v. Randolph et az.t, the Supreme Court of Canada had to consider the question whether an interim order uncter s. 7 of ..\n\nof the Post Office Act prohibiting the delivery of mail directed to or deposited by a pcmon in a Post Office may be made without prior potice to the person affected, pending the final determination which CQuld only be made after hearing the party affe<;:ted. The Supreme . . .\n\nCourt said,\n\n(1) S6 D.L.R. (2d) 283\n\nr B\n\nG,.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1984} 3 S.C.R. ·\n\n\"tn s. 7 it has not abrogated It (i.e. the a.pptication of the maxim audi alteram paterm) Rather it has provided that befofl:l any final prohibitory order is made, the party affected shalt have notice and a right to an expeditions hearing and has defined the procedure to be follqwed. It would, in my opinion, . be inconsistent with the scheme of the section to hold that before making an interim order the Post-master-General must hold a hearhig. If sl]ch duty existed it would be a duty to notify the party affected of what was-allged against him and to give him a reasonable opportunity to answer. If this were done the hearing prescribed sub-s. (2) would be an unnecessary\n\nrepetition.\n\nGenerlly speaking the maxim audi alteram partem has reference to the making of decisions affecting the rights' of parties which are final in •their nature, . and this is true also of s. 2 (e) of the Canadian Bill of Rights, 1960 (Can.), c. 44 upon which the respondents relied.\" .\n\n\"The following passage in Broom's Legal Maxims lOth ed~, p. 68 is in point :\n\nAlthough cases may be found in thebooks of decisions un der particular statutes bidl at first might seem to conflict with the maxim, it will be found on conideration that they are not inconsistent with it, for the rule, which is orie of elementary _justice, only requires that a man shall no~ be subject to final .\n\njudgment or to punishment without an opportunity of being \"4heard.\"\n\n\"The main object of s. 7 is to. enable the Postmaster-Gene ral to take prompt action to prevent the use of the' mails for the\n\npurpoe of )iefrauding the public or other criminal activity.\n\nThat purpose might well be defeated if he could take action only after notice and a hearing._,.,.Sub-section (1) enables h)m to act swiftly in performjng the duty of protectipg the public while sub-s. (2) gives protection to the person affected by_\n\nconferring t_he right to a hearing before any ordr made against~ him becomes final. · ·\n\n\\-•\n\n' ...\n\n''In n:iy opnion, the two interim prohibitory orders in ; questionwere validly made.\" . '\n\nIn the Comroission(fr of Po!ie v. Tanos/ the;: High Court c,>f\n\n.~-\n\n~ ...•. '\n\nLIBERTY OIL MILLS v. UNION (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) ,03\n\nAustralia (Dixoll C. J and Webb J.) was considering the question\n\n. A . whether an ex-parte order of closure of a Disorderly House may be . , made. It was observed) ·\n\n\" ...... it is in a broad sense a procedural matter and while the general principle must prevail it is apparent that exceptional cases may be imagined in which because of lome special hazard or cause of urgency an immediate declaration is demanded.\n\nA power.to regulate proedure might be treated as authorising regulations allowjng an exparte ord.er in such cases.\n\nUnder the power conferr.ed by section J5 upon the Governor-in-Council to make regulations this very course seems to have been adopted.\n\nRegulation I provides that if the judge is of the opinion that reasonable grounds have been shown (i) he may make the decl!; l~\n\nration immediately aild exparte if this seems to him necessary\n\nor desirable,· or (ii) if he thinks thaf an opportunity should be given to the owner or occupier . or both to oppos'e the making of the declaration he may direct them to be served with a copy'\n\nof the affidavit and to be notified of the day on which the matter wilt be dealt with, such service and ntification to be effected in such manner as may eem to him sufficient : 9hen\n\nthe matter tomes on, the Superintendent' or Inspector of Police or counsel or solicitor on his behalf' and the owner and occupier or counsel or solicitor on their behalf may attend and be heard, and the matter shall be disposed of iii public .cham\n\nbers.' This regulation may perhaps be read as leaving the choice\n\nof course at large to the judge. But it ought not so to. be interpreted. It should be .understood as meaning that prima facie the l(ourse provided for in para (iii) should be followed and . : onJy in exceptional or special cases should ap immediate declaration be made. The analogy is that of an interim injunction, but the caution should be greater because the declaration; unless it is framed as provisional or conditional, concludes 'the right subject to rescission.·\n\n\"It may be added that probably a declaration improperly made ex-parte may be rescinded or set aside on an application made independently of s. 4(1}.,\n\n In Lewis ;, r; Heffer1, Lord Denning MR distinguished the observations of Megarry J. in John v. Rees and observed,\n\n(1) [1978] 3 All ER, 35~\n\nSU~''RFm couRT RETORTS [1984] 3 s.c.R.\n\n\"Those words... apply, no doubt, to suspensions which are inflicted by way of.punishment, as for instance when a member 'ofthe Bar is suSJ?ended from practice for six months, or when solicitor is suspended from practice . . But they do not apply to suspensions which are made, as a holding operation, pending enquiries. Very often irregularities are disclosed in a govern~ ment department or in a business ho~•se ; and a man Play be suspended on full pay pending enquiries: uspicion may rest on him; and so he is suspended until he is cleared of it. No ' one, so far as I know, has ever questioped .such a suspension on the ground that it could not be done unless he is given i10tice.of the charge and an opportunity of defending himself, and so forth. The suspension .in such a case is merely done by way of 'good administratiQn. .A situation has arisen in which somethingmust be done at once. The work of thei department or the office is. being affected by rumours and suspicions. The others will not trust the man. In order to get back to proper .. work, the man is suspended. At that stage, the rules pf natural justice do not apply ; : see Purnell v. Whangarei High Schools Board. •• ·\n\nIn Frnel/ v. Whangarei High\" , chool Bd. the Privy Council\n\n'II! ' upheld the order of suspension of a teacher pending determination of charges against him. It was observed, · . '\n\n\"Neither in the regulations nor in the Act is suspensioA classi tied as a penalty. Sectiori .1 57 (3) shows that it is not. It must . however . be recognised that suspension may involve hardship . . During suspension salary is not pai<l and apart from this something of a tepporary slur may be .invplwd if a teacher is suspended .. But the regulation~ (by regulation 5) cleady contemplate or lay it down that .tht: written statement of a teacher (under regulation 5(2)) and. the oral personal statement (tinder\n\nregulation 5(3)) will be made after suspension if an~ has taken place. Suspension is discretionary. Decisions as to whether to suspend will often be diffictdt. Members of a board who are appointed or elected to act as the governing body of a school must in the exercise of their responsibilities baveregard not only to the interests of teachers but to the interests of pupils and of parents and of the public. There may be occasions when\n\nha.vin~ regard to the nature of a. chare jt \\'/ill be wise, in tbe\n\n(l) (1973} Appeal Cases 660 .\n\n'-..........__\n\n---._\n\n. ~\n\n' '\n\n. ,\n\nLiBERTY OiL MiLLS v. UNION (Chinnappa Reddy, J.)\n\ninterests of all .concerned; that pending decision whether the charge is substantiated a teacher should be suspend(:d from\n\nduty; In many cases it can be assumed that c11arges' would be . denied and that only after a full hearing could the true position be ascertained. lt is not to be assumed that a board; constituted 'as it is, will. wantonly exercise its discretion.\"\n\nWe have referred to these four cses only to illustrate how exparte interim orders may be made pending a final adjudication. We however, take. care to say that we do not mean to suggest that Natural Just(~ i-; not attraced when orders of suspension or like\n\norders of an interim nature· are made. Some orders of that nature, intended t~ prevent further mischief of one kind, inay themselves be\n\nproductive or greater mischief of nether kind. An interim order of stay or suspension which has the ffect of prventing a person, however, tempor!ll'ily, say, from pursuing his .PrOfession or line of business, niay have substantial, serious hod even disastrous consequences to him and may expoe him to grave risk and hazard. Therefore, we say that there must be observed some modicum of residual, core ' natural jt;1stlce, -sufficient to enable the effected person to make an adequate representation. (These considerations may not, however;\n\napply to case• of liquor licensing wbicti involve the grant of a privilege and are riot a matter of. right : See Chfngleput Bottlers v.\n\nMajstic Bottling, CompallJ, Civil Appeal Nos: 11970-71 of 1983).\n\nThat may be and in some cases, it can only be after. an initial exparte interim' order is made;\n\nAs we have seen, both clauses 8A and 8B contemplate action of\n\nan interim nature pending investigation. into allegations under clause I'\n\n8. Ordinarily, in the absence of anything more, it would not be . necessary to give an opp9rtunity to the person concerned before proceeding to take action' under clause 8A or clause 8B. But while clause 8B deals with the right to obtain licences and the right to obtain allotments, clause 8A deals with rights which hav~ flowered into licences and allotments. A person to whom licences have been G granted or allotments made may have arranged his affairs on that basis and entered into transactions with others, and; to him the consequences of ac.tion under clause 8A may .be truly disastrous whereas tl:le consequences of action under cla\"Use 8B may not be so imminently harmfut )tis presumably because of this lively difference between clauses SA and 8B that clause 10 provies for a pre-deci- H sional opportunity in the case of action under clause SA and does . . ' not w provid~ ip the case of actiotl UTlder cli!U£e 8B.\n\nAaini jt. js.\n\n706. ..• .. _ -;; SUPlt£Mil COURT REPORTS\n\n'[1984] 3 S.C.R.\n\n--r presumably because ofthis dHrerence that clause JO white providing • : - f.or an appeal against a. decision tinder cfause 8A does not provide for A\n\nan appeal against a decision urider c1atise 8B.- -Not that it makes any difference because S. _ 4tvt arid 4N of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act provide for an apptaLarid a revision against any deCision or order made under the Act. which naturally include any\n\ndcision or .made under any subordinate legislation. made under -the\n\nAct, and this right_ of appeai nd revision cannot be whittled down . by the subordinate ie8isJadon. As we mentioned earlier, it does not'\n\n. mean thafthe requirementS of atiual )ustice are not to_be met at all\n\n. m the ca.Se of action under tianse SB. The· requirements bf natural justice will b~ l'llet in the case of actbn..: under . cJ:iuse 8B by copsider.,\n\ng •• bona fide~ any repreSentation that may be made in that behalf . by the person aggtieed. Clause SB . itself-gives an indication tbatsuch a post-decisionalopporttinity .on the. request of the persoii eon- .. '<erned is contemplated. __ We have seen that action underclau-se 8B . . is to be taken if the_' au tbority is' satisfied 'hi the' pubJic interest that\n\nsuch -action may be. taken without ascertaining. further detail, in regard to tbe aUegaUons. n cleatly implies that when further facts- . are ascertained by the aUthOrity ot. brought to tbe notice' -of the -, autb6Hty. ch -action l:miy be reviewed •. As we have earlier pointed\n\n: out while e~patte interim 6tders tnay ah'vays. be made without a pre- -· dedsional opporhmity or- \\ttthou~ the_ o_rdet _ itself providing for a _ E- post~ decisional opportunity. the principleS of natural justice which\"\"\n\n- are never exdudcil will 'be satisfiedif a post-decisional opportvnity .\n\n' G\n\n. is given if demanded. So we hoJd tllllt in the ase of actionunder\n\n- -clause 8B it is not necessary to give a pre.dedsi; nal pportunity but a post decisional ' opportunity must be given if so zequested by _the - . .. . . •· person affected. • \"' .\n\n--· -__ The net question for consideration is.\\Vhthetthe decision to\n\n- .keep in 'abeyance' should 'be communicated to the. person concerned.\n\nThere can be no two opinions on this. _ Ours is a Consthutional Government', an opel:'l 'dernocracyfourided upon the rule of law and not i(cJoak and .1.hgger reimen~ ·. It is io:conceivable that t, mder our eonstitutiona! s::heme a 'decision of the kind contemplated by dause 8B which may 'have the effect of b'rioging to a !startd {still the ntire - \" business 'activity of the person affected and which !flay :even 'spell rui:Q.\n\nto him. ' should be made abd implemented 'without .being communicated to'that person. Intertwined fs 'the question of: observance of 'natural justice and bow 'can ·.oa'tural justice: be satisfied if the decision\n\nis not even communicated ? It would be most arbitrary and-quite . clearly violative of Atticle$ -14 and 19(i)(~) of the t; onstituti<?q -r . . . . _. . ' .\n\n.... _\n\n. 1\n\n•.. -- LIBER.\"IY oiL 1.i1i.Ls v. tH.NoN. (Chinnappa Rddy; j,) . 7ot\n\n' ', + - • - • ' -· • •\n\n,.clause 8B is .to , be interpretd a~ xclud!ng communicatio~ of the , deCision taken.' Cfhere. is oti_n_g , Jn Clause ' 8B t~ ~gest that the\n\n. decision is riot to be communicated. On the other hand, the ex pres .\n\n~\\on ·~.without asigt:tingapyre~on'jn; tplies hat ., tpe .deision bas to be.commuuicated,.l; Jut r.eas.ons for the dcision. have riot to be stated. ; Reasons, of Ct;)Urse, ·, mu~~ xist.forthe.eCisiQn ~.ioce. the decision may\n\nonly .be Jaken iC the autho.rjty is , satisfid ihat.the '.irant of licence or\n\n. a, lltmnt ot, impor_:ed_goos >YH~ pot i, e: ~n', he mb.Iic interest. We ;, must make :it clear .that \\vith9ut asigning , teas9.ns' only means that there· is Jlo ;, opligation io fp!mult~ rea:Sons .a.nd,' nothing .. more. ,\n\n~For mal reasons .m~Y lead , o.oinplic3:tios lle_n: , the .. ~tt.er is still ·:: under ; investigatiqn. ; So be ~_uthoriJy m<, ty not -~h; e formal reasons, - .. :b11t the Se!et~J allegationS ~\\,1St , be mentioned , in , OTler to. proyide an _\n\n f ~PP9.tunity: to . , the _person _affcted ·, to ; mke , s epi'e:s~tl\\tion, : Cbaper ppd :vrse.pe.ed, riot, be .. quot::d . .- Details., may .not be. men-- r tioncd and ~-n PU.tl~e of ; te flllgat~'?DS .S~O!lid_ ~)e. suffid:ent .. ..\n\n- \"-w ••• •'\n\n. :The furtherquestion .is. on .. what , should . the :~:1tisfaction be\n\n1 based ? ~Since ation under. clause S.B .is. to, be..tak, en pending investi gation in.to allegations under clause 8, . we must take it..t.4at :the action under clause 8B is really in aid of the ultimate order under clause 8. It must follow that in order to invite the satisfaction contemplated by...., clause 8B there must be prs; t -some 'strong sspicion of one or . other r more of the grounds' , mentioned in Clause 8. Since te action whi<; h is of a drastic-nature. is to be taken expartc,•if must necessarily -.-be animated by a sense. of. urgency .. Th() sense of urgency may be\n\n~ . - I . . •. .:. . . - I • · infused by a host of circumstances such as the. traffickmg and unscru.\n\npulo~~ peddfiogin licences, trge. scale misuse. ofimpo_rted goods,' .. 'attempts ~0 ni'o!lopolise or corner , the market, wholesale p-revalence .\n\n. of iprop:r practices among-classes -f impor£ers,. public Sentime'nt _ etc .. e.tc: : Oe of the submissions very:strenuously . pressed before us was that public setiroent, was wholly . irr~I~, varii in arriving at the .. _sa tisfacton. coriteplated by Cia use. 8B. ·We , are unable . to agree. It.\n\n_is true that public administration. is not to. be run on public Si:ntiment . and statutory action may only be taken on;-gr(!t; nds permitted by the statute. But strong-public sentiment niay jropart a sense of urgency ·\n\nto a situatin such as' tocompel-tbe ·:authorities to proceed to take\n\n.. action. uuet a statute pr0yided. of. course grounds for taking .action\n\n, under the statute ... Public sentiment knot, in. such.cis'es, the ground\n\nfo~ th~ action but it is what clothes the ground with ,1llt sense of urge:1cy which makes it imperative that swift action be taken. That .. is how we understand the referrenc~ to public . sentiment in the\n\nA'\n\n~ .\n\n1o8 [1984] 3 s.c.it: --f'\n\nA counter affidavit fild on behalf of the Union cj India and the _Chief\n\nController of Imports and Exports. r\n\nPublic interest must nolens yolence be the paramount consideration; If the threatened public mischief is such as to outweigh the likely injury. to the party. the authority may take action under Cla'!lse_\n\n8B~ If the t}lreatened public injury, is very slight C<?mpared 'to the 'harm which may be done to the party, the authority may not take action under Clause 8B. There inay be cases where the 'abeyance' orders may themselves be produQtive of serious public injury as where ' a substantial amount of forign eXchange may be lost or a large number of. workers are likely to' be thrown out of employment etc. In such situations the authorities may pause and have second thoughts, consider the inevitable consequences and be guided by that element of the public interest whiCh ()Utweighs all others. Which element of the public interest should be given greater' weiglrt and' . which' grounds should weigh at all are. matters for the authority taking action under Rule 8B. Courts do not concern themselves. with the sufficiency of the grounds on which action is takea or with the balancing of competing considerations, in favour of and against the action. ' \" ' One of the submissions very strenuously urged before us was that a large number of the applications for import lincen¢es and allotments of imported goods which have been kept in 'abeyance'\n\nrelat~ to goods which are totally. unrelated to beef tallow or any other\" animal tallow and there , wa~ no justification whatever for keeping them in 'abeyance'. But an 'abeyance' order under clause 8B is directed, not against any particular type of goods but against an ' importer. licenee or other person against whom an investigation into allegations under clause 8 is pending.\n\nThe question is not . whether any particular type of goods sbou'd be allowed to be impor--\n\n'ted or allotted to any person-that is a question of policy-, butwhetl; ler • it is not in the. public interest that a particular person should be · prevented from obtaining import licences or imported goods of any description pending investigation into the . allegations under clause 8B. That would depend on_ the nature of tbe allegations, the extent of involvement of the peron concerned ahd, most important. the element . of the public interest. 'f the allegations against a person\n\ninovle hil deeply in trafficking or racketeering in import \\icences and irr1'ported goods, .the authority may consider it inexpdientin the public interest to _keep in abeyance any applicaion of hi~ for the\n\n.. grant of a licence or allotment of goods. on the other hand even if the -alle~tions are grave~ if the effect of an order under clause 8B is .\n\n. ..,_...~- ,\n\nLiBBRTV OIL MILLS v. VNION (Cittnappa Reddy, i.)\n\n likely to result in loses or\" considerable foreign exchange or. to shut down an if.idustry throwing large number . of workers' out of employment, the authority should restrain itself in larger public interest, from making an order under clause 8B or may mae a.n. order confining the abeyance order to . applications atid goods of certain descriptio~ oa\\y instead of making a, general order which. extend') to alt . applications for import licences and allotment of . imported goods. . Again, the allegations. may reve<!l that the involvement o.f the person in illegal a..ctivity' is so remore or minimal that . it would t5e entirly inexpdient to inake an order clause.~B. A. person ho eg itimately purchse's ..,.importe<; l goods or imports gOOQS unde( a licence .lawfully acquired by him and who has used the goods in the manufacture of a different kind of goods in which industry the person . is en, gaged may not be visited with an o.rder\n\nunder clat111e 8B merely because the original licensee's actions may be suspph;:ious. , Again where a person's bonafides are not susP._ct ar all but he may be technically at fault or he inay have acted on tr bonafide interpretattion of the rules and regulations, it may -not be a case for making an order under clause SB. Bt -these are all matters for the consideration of tl:e auttority making the order uiider clause . 8B and not for the Court.\n\nWe have held that action under Clause 8B is f. an interim nature and it may be ex-parte, in which case the affecteq party may makea suitable representation bringing out all Jhe outwbeighing\n\nJ . Circumstances in his favour . . That is the real remedy of the party . . Courts do not enter the picture at that r.tage unless . the action is\n\nlJ.lalafide or patently without'juiisdiction. The action will be patently without jurisdiction if it is not based on any relevant material whatsoever. f the authority delines ' to consider therepresentation, or if the authority after consideration of the representation eschews relevant consWerations and prefers to act on irrelevant considerations or from oblique motive, or the decision is such as no . reasonable man\n\n_, propefly \"directed on the . law would arriv~ at on the material facts, it will be open to the party to seek the intervention of.the Court at ·\n\nthat stage. Our attention was drawn to tbe well known. cases of Barium Chemicals v. Company Law Board1, Rohtas Industries v. S.D.\n\nAgarwala, M.4. Rasheed v. State of Keralas, and the recent cas-es\n\n(1) [1%6) Supp. SCR 311\n\n(2) [1969]3 S.C.R. 108 . .\n\n(3) [19751 z sc.R. 93\n\nB .\n\n ...\n\n\nA of SlmfiniSoni v~ :fJtrfon .Offndia1, 'And @oNJmissivner of /nc(Jme Tax\n\n1'. Maltindra and Mt.t#fttdraz Mid •dm~ conaide.roo all oft.hesi in\n\n-llrrivnrg at our cooolusi6n;\n\n• ' ' In the present case~ the party instead of representing his . case to the appropriate authority ch-ose the path. of rJitigaiion\n\nobviously deterred by the clumsy.· at'tempt at secrecy made by the concerned authority arid the failure to communicate the decisien to ihe party.' One of the sul:mli~ioos made touswas that the:abeyance order was never rorroiiny commurricatodto-the-petitioners and it.was, . therefore, to be_ 'treated a~ non est. :•Reliance :was placed onthe decisions of Bathhittar Singh v. Stttte of Punjab8 and -State qf :Run jab v. Balbir sig'i 4• We do n6t think that fbese decisions are of any facility to us on th'e fa¢ts of'the present case. 1'ln 13achittcir Sirrghs case, what was decided \\'.las 'that a decilion taken •in -tthe privacy of a Minister's Chamber, which was DOt communicative to 1hepanty and . which was tevers.ed without ever ,; lt1g communicated was of no effect at all. In B-olbir Sin'gli's Cltse, it '\\~''l<;'held:that once an: order was sent out, aQd went out 'beyond thc\"ConiTol ohb.e ailthor.ity, the order niust be said to have 'been issued no\"'l'latr when the party affected actually received. it. Communication,_ according toilearned • Judges, was the process of setting in motion the despatc~ of the -order. It was .held in that case that forwarping of copies to tne\n\nAccountant General and to the Chef Engineer was sufficient communication. n the , present case, the 'abeyance' order was undoub. tedly communicated to the licensing. authorities, the State Trading Corporation, the Minerals.,.and Metals Trading Corporation and.\n\noter similar.genci:es. Despite the attempt at secrecy made by the concerned authority and tht failure to formally commnicate the decision to the party, the abeyance circular was very soon public knew ledge.\n\nThe affected party also learnt~ about it. but ·· probtlbiy deterred by the attempt at secrecy, chose. the pth .of litigation, instead.of teprcsentil)g hi& case to the appropriate authority.\n\nWe might have considered the question of what relief the petitiones were entitled to had the .secreqy.been maintained and knowldge . of the order continued to be h.eld back from the party. But the person affecte.d did come to 'know of theorJer-he filed a copy of the circular a tong with: thewrit petition-, and in ther final natysis, the\n\n-·-~---- -- -·-·----...-~.---__...___ , O> _198ll s.c.R. 962.\n\n(2) [l983 4] s.c.c. 392\n\n(3) 11962] Suppl. S.C.R. 37 ·\n\n(4) [1976) 2 S.C.R. 115\n\n.....\n\n------,.--~- -.....,. __ ~\n\ntmEnTY OIL MILLS V. UNION (CJ.innappa Reddy, , J.). 711\n\nobject of communication is oniy to impart knowlcdg~. Since tllcn, a volume of water has flown under the bridge and we must proceed on the basis that the affected party is aware of the decision and so, what next 7 We C30 not, of course, pro:ced to consider the qustion whether there is sfficient relevant material in support of the allegations made against petitioners. In facl we can-not entr upor. the merits of the controversy at all. We cannot, for example, consider the question whether the material a'l':litabte justifies a prima facie conclusion that the petitioners have made illegal imports of beeftallow. Accordiog to the contention of the petitioners, they were entitled to import beef taliO\\V even after June 5, !981 if they had. valid licences and if .they had entered into firm contracts and opened . letters of credit before June 5, 1981. According to the authorities to is was not permissible ; the affect of paragrnph 222(.3) of the Import Policy was th1t the amendment which was made on June 5, 1981 took effect from April I, 1981 and permitted import of beef tallow. under OGL only where 'firm contracts had b.:en entered into and letters of credit had been opened prior to April I, 1981 but if the contracts had not been. entered into and letteo of credit had not been opened hefore April I, I 981, the imports had to be through the channel of the Stute Trading Corp oration only. Though in the cases of A rvind Exports nod Jayant Mills is an appeal and review arising under the provisions of the Customs Act, the question was decided in favotir of the parties, the present stand of the\" Government is that those decisions are not binding on the authorities functioning under the T mports (Controi) Order and that those decisions had been rendered without reference to paragraph 222(3) as welt paragraph 24 ofAppendix 10 of the Jmpolt Policy of 1980-81 which epressly states:\n\n\"Nothing in the Open General Licence shatl affect the applica tion to any goods, of any other prohibition or regulation n!Tccting the import thereof, in force, at the time where they nrc tlctunlty imported.'' . . 'we consider that this i~ not a matter for the court to decide nt this\n\nstage in a peiition under Article 226 of. the Constilution or under\n\nArticle 32 of the Constitution questioning an ad-interim order under Clause SD.\n\nAgain we cannot enter into. the controversy . whethr there has been mis-ur ilisation of the importd goods by the pclltioncrs and whether the petitioners cun be termed as 'actual users' - within the meaning or that expression in the Import , <:ontrol Ordc.r by the mere fact thut they subject the beer tallow to atr-treatmct:\n\nAll thcsequestions pertain to tbo mcr..its of the controvcr1y and 1t ts\n\n9t for us to co; bark info a discussion into these alters.\n\n~--·- .~-· ·\n\n:r\n\nI ;;:.\n\n. :i ,.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS ·: [1984] 3 s.c.R.\n\n. I\n\nBut we may properly consider, even at this stage, the question of mala fides 'or patent lack of jurisdjction: There is no suggestion that the action wa'S mala fides. It was, however, argued that the order as embodied in the abeyance Circulardid not fulfll the con~ . - ditions-precedent prescribed by the statute It did not contain a\n\nreital of the allegations constituting the basis of he satisfaction . contemplated by clause 8B for action under that prov}sion, and without a recital of the allegations it was impossible to say that he 'action was not based on irrelevant materiaL' It did 'riot even recite that which was the foundation of any action under clause 8B, namely, the satisfaction of the authority that the action was in the public interest.\n\nOn the other hand, it isued a directive to the. licensing authorities to keep in abeyance for a period of six mo.nth~ any application received from the concerns specified for the grant of import licence or customs clearance permit and al!otroent of imported goods through' agencies like the State Trading Corpt.ration of india, Minerals and Metals Trading Corporation of India arid similaragencies, making a bare recital that investigations into certain a}ltgation!' under. clause 8 were pending agahist the concerns. Again a large number of concerns were lumped together and purported lo be dealt with by a single abeyance circular. There was e:~:.fcie nothing in the circlar\n\nwich could point to tP.e a'uthority having ~PQlied its mind and considered. the case of , each concern separately. It is true that the abeyance circuiar suffers from every one -of these jnfirmities and if there was nothing more, the parties' would be well entitled to ask us to quash the circular. But the learned Addl, Solicitor Gener.al invited our attention to the statements rpade by Shri J.P. Sharma, Deputy Chief Coiltro11er of Jmp<?rts and Exports and the author of. the abeyance circulars in the counter affidavit filea by him. The ... r - ' learned A.dditional Solicitor General lias also placed before us for our perusal the relevant filesof the .au!hority.~ The counter-affidavit . • of Sbri J.P, Sharma shows that th.e princip!il allegations against the P, eti't, ioners were that they bad prima facie indulged in illega1' importation of beef tallow and had also misutilised the bf tallow. Why ·\n\nG . the authority tOok. the prima facie view that the petitioners had . illegally imported beef.tallow and had mis:utilised the imported beef,· tallow has been explained by him in the countr-affidavit. Illegal importation of beef tallow and mis-utilisation of the imported leef I\" . • . tallow ars ce'rtainly relevant grounds 0n which actio!) may be taken under clause 8B.\n\nWe are, of course, not onj:erned with the question ii · of the .sufficiency of material before the authority in arri•ling at its • conclusion. A persual of the fi1es shows that in respect of nine of\n\nt the firws:covered by the !lbeyap.ce circ\\llar ated :No, erebr 71 19831\n\ntiBERTY OIL MILtS v, UNION (Chinnappa Reddy, J.)\n\nthe decicision to kee) their applications and allotments in abeyance\n\n\".as taken at the highest level, that is, at the level of the Minister • for Commerce, Government of fndia. Thereafter the Deputy Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, the files show, considered the cases of 61 concerns including that of Liberty Oil Mills Limited . . and issued the a!>eyance circular dated No.-ember 9, 1983. We find\n\nthat the <; ases of Liberty Oil Mills Limited as well as other concerps were separately and individually considered. Their cases having been considered by the authority separately and individually before the circular was issued, we do not think that it makes any difference on the peculiar facts of this case that a single circular was. issued, covering a large number of concerns. Ho}vever, we wish to impress upon the authorities that those entrusted bY, statute 'With the task of taking prejudicial action on the basis of their s.ubjective satisfac- . tion should, first, bestow careful attention to the allegations forming the basis of the proposed action and !he probable consequences which may ensue such action and, next, take the trouble of reciting iQ the order issu.ed by them the satisfaction forming the basis of the action and a concise statement of the allegations forming the basis of the satisfaction .. If the necessary recitals are not found, there may be serious sequels. In cases involving civil liberties, the orders will necessarily have to be quashed. In other cases also, it is possible to envisage similar results depending on the _rights'involved, th~ object of the statute and other facts ansi circumstances. As it is the circulars in question are hopelessly drafted adding to the confusi'On created by .\n\nthe sadly drafted Clause 8B. In the facts and circumstances of this, case, the real remedy of the party, as we conceive it, is to make a representation to the concerned authority setting out his version of the facts and the. law and the prejudice to himself-and the public inteyest as a consequence of the action under clause 8B. We would have first directed the authority to communicate, within a specified . time, to the party ihe allegations forming the bMis of the action.\n\nBut we do not consider !t necessary to do so as the party is now fully apprised of the allgations against him. In the circumstances, we think that it would be proper if we direct the authority concerned to consider any representation that PlaY hereafter be made by the party within 10 days from the date of its receipt. Subject to this directions, the writ petition is dismiss.ed but without any order as to eosts.\n\nCivil Appeal No. 274 arises out of an interlocutory order made by the Bombay High Court bfore th! wCit ptition was transferred\n\n7i4\n\nSUPREMB COURT REPORTS [1984] 3 s.c.i.\n\nA . to this court. In view of our final decision diposing ofihe main\n\nwrit petition, it is unnecessary to pass any orders iu this civil appeal, which is disposed of accordingly.\n\nH.S.K.\n\nPetitions dismls1 e\n\n. .\n\n: ...•. -:_", "total_entities": 270, "entities": [{"text": "c\n\nLJBERTY OIL MILLS & OTHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 28, "end_char": 57, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "LIBERTY OIL MILLS & OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 61, "end_char": 84, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "0. Cl!!NNAPPA REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 105, "end_char": 124, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A.P. SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 126, "end_char": 134, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "E.~. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 139, "end_char": 162, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "E.S. VENKATARAMIAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "s 3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2299, "end_char": 2305, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3551, "end_char": 3557, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of 'l thoSO who filed such a writ petition in the Bombay H1gh Coun."}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3607, "end_char": 3620, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v ,, th:rawn to the Supreme Court under ':'-rt, 139A of the Constituuoa."}}, {"text": "Uberty Oil Mills", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4818, "end_char": 4834, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jlt\n\nith by a sinale circula~ and thcce was no indio>tioa whauoevcr that the facts relating to each of the firms hall ba:n considcreli scpar:aely ; (S) that the 'ubcyance circulars' far from auvnncing the public interest would, on the other baed, prcjudicinlly offc:t the public in'terc.>t by bringing to a bait se•ero.l industtie• and throwing hosu of workers out of employment; (6) that there was no ault!tancc io tne ollegation that Uberty Oil Mills were not 'actul users' of beef tallow but th()' l•ad misused the import licenoc~ of other liceos<'C.S' by obtaining letters of authorisation for Import o~ beef tlllw as if they were ootual users; und 17) thJl tho' circumstance that there was put>lk 3gitation about the import or beer tallow \"\"a total irrelevant circumsronce for making an ordor under cr."}}, {"text": "Article 14 and 19(1)(g)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5484, "end_char": 5507, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl.8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5927, "end_char": 5931, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9723, "end_char": 9725, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 8A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10390, "end_char": 10399, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 10418, "end_char": 10436, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "or, 5 the Central Government or the Chief Controller of Imports and etnPOW r . ' ."}}, {"text": "Clause 88", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10787, "end_char": 10796, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11624, "end_char": 11629, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 8A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11711, "end_char": 11717, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 8A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12171, "end_char": 12177, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12192, "end_char": 12198, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 8A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12272, "end_char": 12278, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 88", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12859, "end_char": 12868, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 8B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13414, "end_char": 13420, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 80", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13848, "end_char": 13854, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 8B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14061, "end_char": 14067, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 8S", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14994, "end_char": 15000, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15050, "end_char": 15055, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl.8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15226, "end_char": 15230, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 88", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16223, "end_char": 16229, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 88", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16375, "end_char": 16381, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 8B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16794, "end_char": 16800, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 8B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17551, "end_char": 17557, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "1981)\n\n1 SCR 952", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 18557, "end_char": 18573, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "cl. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19631, "end_char": 19637, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 8B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19740, "end_char": 19749, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "cl. 8B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19932, "end_char": 19938, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Cl. 8B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20287, "end_char": 20293, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "A.N. Ocmatw.Jiu", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 23067, "end_char": 23082, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ray, A.N. Ocmatw."}}, {"text": "Jctycikar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23155, "end_char": 23164, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jctycikar, V.K. Chiure, R.H. ._,"}}, {"text": "V.K. Chiure", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 23166, "end_char": 23177, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jctycikar, V.K. Chiure, R.H. ._,"}}, {"text": "R.H. .", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 23179, "end_char": 23185, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jctycikar, V.K. Chiure, R.H. ._,"}}, {"text": "M. Jayakar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 23201, "end_char": 23211, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RllllchrJ/1, M. Jayakar &: A. Suhba Rao for tit.:"}}, {"text": "A. Suhba Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 23215, "end_char": 23227, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "RllllchrJ/1, M. Jayakar &: A. Suhba Rao for tit.:", "canonical_name": "A. Suhba Rao"}}, {"text": "K. Parasuran", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 23293, "end_char": 23305, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Parasuran, Attorny General."}}, {"text": "M.K. JJimerjel", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 23324, "end_char": 23338, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M.K. JJimerjel!,"}}, {"text": "A.K. Ga•rgull", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 23362, "end_char": 23375, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "General, A.K. Ga•rgull, G. Subram{miam and R.N. Poodar, for the\n\nRepontlcnt in T.C. & for the Appellants in CA."}}, {"text": "G. Subram{miam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 23377, "end_char": 23391, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "General, A.K. Ga•rgull, G. Subram{miam and R.N. Poodar, for the\n\nRepontlcnt in T.C. & for the Appellants in CA."}}, {"text": "R.N. Poodar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 23396, "end_char": 23407, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "General, A.K. Ga•rgull, G. Subram{miam and R.N. Poodar, for the\n\nRepontlcnt in T.C. & for the Appellants in CA."}}, {"text": "S.S. Rcty", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 23483, "end_char": 23492, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.S. Rcty, Ahk II."}}, {"text": "Chinnappa Reddy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23694, "end_char": 23709, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "+\n~'\n\nLIBERTY .011: MILL': v. UNION (Chinnappa Reddy,.", "canonical_name": "CJ.innappa Reddy"}}, {"text": "Rainu Walta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 23740, "end_char": 23751, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' Ms,-Bina Gupta, Rainu Walta, T. M. Ansari and D. N. Misra for the · 4\n\nInterveners. \\ .."}}, {"text": "T. M. Ansari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 23753, "end_char": 23765, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' Ms,-Bina Gupta, Rainu Walta, T. M. Ansari and D. N. Misra for the · 4\n\nInterveners. \\ .."}}, {"text": "D. N. Misra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 23770, "end_char": 23781, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' Ms,-Bina Gupta, Rainu Walta, T. M. Ansari and D. N. Misra for the · 4\n\nInterveners. \\ .."}}, {"text": "CHINNAPP~ REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23858, "end_char": 23873, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHINNAPP~ REDDY, J. A few months ago; orthodox Hindu sentiment was outraged and genera~ public feeli-Qg was roused by the disc0very that beet: tallow hnpoted from abroad was either being sold as vanasplti or use 1 in its manufacture by certain unscrupul?us persons.", "canonical_name": "CJ.innappa Reddy"}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 24379, "end_char": 24389, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Assurances were given in Parliament."}}, {"text": "June 5, .. 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24581, "end_char": 24596, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "had been canalised through the State Trading Corporation w1th effect from June 5, .. 1981, there had beenconsiderable importofbeeftallow out-side the chanel of the State Trading Corporation even subsequent to June 5, 1981_, on the ostensible pretext that licences ha, d been issued and firm contracts had aleaqy been."}}, {"text": "June 5, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24716, "end_char": 24728, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "had been canalised through the State Trading Corporation w1th effect from June 5, .. 1981, there had beenconsiderable importofbeeftallow out-side the chanel of the State Trading Corporation even subsequent to June 5, 1981_, on the ostensible pretext that licences ha, d been issued and firm contracts had aleaqy been."}}, {"text": "S. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25234, "end_char": 25238, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 25348, "end_char": 25353, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So, a notification was issued under S. 3 ('3) of the Imports and Exports Control Act totally bam1.ing the import of beef, buffalo and pig tallow into India with effect from August 24, 1~83."}}, {"text": "August 24, 1~83.", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25371, "end_char": 25387, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So, a notification was issued under S. 3 ('3) of the Imports and Exports Control Act totally bam1.ing the import of beef, buffalo and pig tallow into India with effect from August 24, 1~83."}}, {"text": "7th, 9th and lOth November and 17th and !1st Decen1ber", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 25396, "end_char": 25450, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "And, on 7th, 9th and lOth November and 17th and !"}}, {"text": "State Trading Corporation of India Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 25940, "end_char": 25982, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "months from • the respectve dates of th,~. circulars any application received .from .any of them for the grant of import Jic, ence or Cus\n\ntoms clearnce Permits and allotment of imported goods through ' agencies like the State Trading Corporation of India Limited, the Minerals and Metals Trading Corporation of India Ltd. or any Other' similar."}}, {"text": "Minerals and Metals Trading Corporation of India Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 25988, "end_char": 26041, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "months from • the respectve dates of th,~. circulars any application received .from .any of them for the grant of import Jic, ence or Cus\n\ntoms clearnce Permits and allotment of imported goods through ' agencies like the State Trading Corporation of India Limited, the Minerals and Metals Trading Corporation of India Ltd. or any Other' similar."}}, {"text": "Liberty Oil Mills (P) Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 26321, "end_char": 26347, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The'abeyance circular dated November 9, 1983 which 'lists' we will not use the word 'black-lists'-as many as 61 concerns incluins Liberty Oil Mills (P) Ltd. is as follow$; ."}}, {"text": "GOVERNMENf OF INDIA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 26558, "end_char": 26577, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' GOVERNMENf OF INDIA ·\n\n."}}, {"text": "Cl. 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26847, "end_char": 26852, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State Trading Corpn. of India Ltd-./Minerals and Metals Trading Corpn. of India ltd", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 27249, "end_char": 27332, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "requested to keep in abeyance for six months from the date of issue\n\nof this circular any application received from them for the grant of import Jicnce of Customs Clearance Permit and allotment of imported goods through agencies like the State Trading Corpn."}}, {"text": "Liberty Oil\n\nMills (P) Ltd., 16 llll llahadur Shastri Marg, Kurla, llombay--:-400070 • .. • •\n\n.. ) '\n\n...\n\n. • . LlliERl~ Oli. MILLS", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 27552, "end_char": 27685, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Liberty Oil\n\nMills (P) Ltd., 16 llll llahadur Shastri Marg, Kurla, llombay--:-400070 • .. • •\n\n.. ) '\n\n...\n\n. • ."}}, {"text": "timtappa Reddy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27699, "end_char": 27713, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V~ U~JO~ (C/timtappa Reddy, J.)\n\n. ."}}, {"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27877, "end_char": 27879, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "J.P. SHARMA", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 28573, "end_char": 28584, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The receipt of this circular may please b.: acknowled in the .. st3ndard proform<\\. • r Sd/·\n\n(J.P. SHARMA) l\n\nDY.", "canonical_name": "J.P. SHARMA"}}, {"text": "clause 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29419, "end_char": 29427, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 29506, "end_char": 29525, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the counter aOidavits fikd on behalf of the ' Government of India and the Chief aod D(putry Chief Controller ' of Import& aut!"}}, {"text": "Art 139A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31073, "end_char": 31081, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ashok Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 31167, "end_char": 31178, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We heard Shri Ashok Desai for the Liberty Oil Mills (P).", "canonical_name": "Ashok Desai"}}, {"text": "Liberty Oil Mills (P).\n\nLtd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 31187, "end_char": 31215, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We heard Shri Ashok Desai for the Liberty Oil Mills (P)."}}, {"text": "Soli Sorabji", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 31225, "end_char": 31237, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ltd. and Shri Soli Sorabji, .", "canonical_name": "Soli Sorabjee"}}, {"text": "V.P. Raman", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 31246, "end_char": 31256, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri V.P. Raman and.", "canonical_name": "V .P. Raman"}}, {"text": "Ram Jethmalani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 31267, "end_char": 31281, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Ram Jethmalani for the intervners."}}, {"text": "Milon Banerjea", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 31316, "end_char": 31330, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We heard Shri Milon Banerjea, Addl'.", "canonical_name": "Millon Bannerjee"}}, {"text": "Gopala subrahmanyam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 31380, "end_char": 31399, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Generala.bly assisted by Sri Gopala subrahmanyam ."}}, {"text": "M.C. Bhandare", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 31511, "end_char": 31524, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "for the Union of India and the Chief Controller and Deputy Chief\n\ncontroller of Imports and Exports and Shri M.C. Bhandare and Shri A. Subba Rao for the State Trading Corporation . ."}}, {"text": "A. Subba Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 31534, "end_char": 31546, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "for the Union of India and the Chief Controller and Deputy Chief\n\ncontroller of Imports and Exports and Shri M.C. Bhandare and Shri A. Subba Rao for the State Trading Corporation . .", "canonical_name": "A. Suhba Rao"}}, {"text": "Kula", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 32085, "end_char": 32089, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They claim to have a factory refining egetable Oil at Kula and ll factory for manufactur~ ing vanaspati at Shahpur."}}, {"text": "Shahpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 32138, "end_char": 32145, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They claim to have a factory refining egetable Oil at Kula and ll factory for manufactur~ ing vanaspati at Shahpur."}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 32194, "end_char": 32200, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They have plants for processiag frozen food at Madras, Tuticorin, Calcutta and Vishakhapatnm .;"}}, {"text": "Tuticorin", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 32202, "end_char": 32211, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They have plants for processiag frozen food at Madras, Tuticorin, Calcutta and Vishakhapatnm .;"}}, {"text": "Calcutta", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 32213, "end_char": 32221, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They have plants for processiag frozen food at Madras, Tuticorin, Calcutta and Vishakhapatnm .;"}}, {"text": "Vishakhapatnm", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 32226, "end_char": 32239, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "They have plants for processiag frozen food at Madras, Tuticorin, Calcutta and Vishakhapatnm .;"}}, {"text": "687 LIBERTY OIL MILLS v. UNION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 32817, "end_char": 32847, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "they have nevet\n\n)'' ..\n\n< '\n\n687 LIBERTY OIL MILLS v. UNION (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) , ..\n\nadulterated .the vanaspati anufacturd in their factory_ at Sbahpur and that the samples taken from their factory on as many as thirty 'six occasions."}}, {"text": "Kurla", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 33353, "end_char": 33358, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The tallow so purchased was air~ treated by them in .theil: premises at Kurla and s'old by' them to soap manufacturers and other fatty cid pJants."}}, {"text": "June 5, 19.81", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 33647, "end_char": 33660, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "All the a, dditional licences bad been 'issued prior to June 5, 19.81 and import ofOGL items was permitted against the said licences."}}, {"text": "s. 198", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33764, "end_char": 33770, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Liberty Oil Mills", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 34458, "end_char": 34475, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Liberty Oil Mills therefore, claim that there was no ."}}, {"text": "clause 8B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34564, "end_char": 34573, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ashok Desai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 34663, "end_char": 34674, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Ashok Desai for Liberty dii Mills (P) Ltd. contended tliat an order und:!r cl; wse ~B of the Import Control Order cold only be made if te Central Government.", "canonical_name": "Ashok Desai"}}, {"text": "dii Mills (P) Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 34687, "end_char": 34705, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Ashok Desai for Liberty dii Mills (P) Ltd. contended tliat an order und:!r cl; wse ~B of the Import Control Order cold only be made if te Central Government."}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 34801, "end_char": 34819, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Ashok Desai for Liberty dii Mills (P) Ltd. contended tliat an order und:!r cl; wse ~B of the Import Control Order cold only be made if te Central Government."}}, {"text": "ind Exports (P) Ltd", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 35851, "end_char": 35870, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Our attention was 'repeatedly invited to the two cases of A.rv:ind Exports (P) Ltd, and Jayant Oil Mills (P) Ltd., here deing ."}}, {"text": "Jayant Oil Mills (P) Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 35876, "end_char": 35901, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Our attention was 'repeatedly invited to the two cases of A.rv:ind Exports (P) Ltd, and Jayant Oil Mills (P) Ltd., here deing ."}}, {"text": "Sections 128 and 131", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35950, "end_char": 35970, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 8B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 37686, "end_char": 37695, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ashok Dsai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 38078, "end_char": 38088, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ashok Dsai connected, that: the, very\n\ngeirer~J natue of the order disdosd a total non•applkation of the tnind sipce tee was no e:ll:us pet ween the alle~d misllse oflkee~~\n\n.. ~\n\n.;", "canonical_name": "Ashok Desai"}}, {"text": "Liberty Oil Mills Pvt.\n\nLtd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 39175, "end_char": 39203, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was submitted that there was no substance in the allegation that Liberty Oil Mills Pvt."}}, {"text": "Ashok De", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 39787, "end_char": 39795, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "actually used by them tq produce marketable beef tllow for use by soap manufacturers and fatty a<; id. plants, by subjecting the imported beef tallow to air treatment•. It was also argued, by Shri Ashok De:sai that the circumstances that there was public agitation about the import of beef tallow was a totally irrelevant circumstances for making an ord_er\n\nunder claus.e 8B. Shri , V .P. Raman, learned counsel for one of the interveners suggested that clause 8B did not apply to goods covered byOpen General Licence in view of clause 11(4) of the Import Control Order which provided, \"Nothing in this order, except paragraph 3-I of sub-clause 3 of Clause 5, Clause 8, Clause SA, Clause 8-C and Clause 10-C shall apply to the import of any goods covered by Open General Licence or Special General Licence issued • by\"the Central Government.\"", "canonical_name": "Ashok Desai"}}, {"text": "V .P. Raman", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 39973, "end_char": 39984, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "actually used by them tq produce marketable beef tllow for use by soap manufacturers and fatty a<; id. plants, by subjecting the imported beef tallow to air treatment•. It was also argued, by Shri Ashok De:sai that the circumstances that there was public agitation about the import of beef tallow was a totally irrelevant circumstances for making an ord_er\n\nunder claus.e 8B. Shri , V .P. Raman, learned counsel for one of the interveners suggested that clause 8B did not apply to goods covered byOpen General Licence in view of clause 11(4) of the Import Control Order which provided, \"Nothing in this order, except paragraph 3-I of sub-clause 3 of Clause 5, Clause 8, Clause SA, Clause 8-C and Clause 10-C shall apply to the import of any goods covered by Open General Licence or Special General Licence issued • by\"the Central Government.\"", "canonical_name": "V .P. Raman"}}, {"text": "clause 8B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40044, "end_char": 40053, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 11(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40119, "end_char": 40131, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40228, "end_char": 40236, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40240, "end_char": 40248, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40250, "end_char": 40258, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40271, "end_char": 40279, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40286, "end_char": 40295, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Soli Sorabjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 40438, "end_char": 40451, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Soli Sorabjee, who appeared for\n\nmother.", "canonical_name": "Soli Sorabjee"}}, {"text": "clause 8B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40505, "end_char": 40514, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 14 and 19(i)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40762, "end_char": 40779, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 8B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40883, "end_char": 40892, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ram Jetb!llalapi1", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 41098, "end_char": 41115, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "for licence or allotme 't\\ t. Shri Ram Jetb!llalapi1 wlw appeared fpr another intervener •\n·· F\n\nSUPRF, ME COllRT REFORTS {t984~ 3 S.C.R • ."}}, {"text": "sec. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41389, "end_char": 41395, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 8B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41588, "end_char": 41597, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 8B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41640, "end_char": 41649, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 8A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41694, "end_char": 41703, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 8B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41708, "end_char": 41717, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 8B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41776, "end_char": 41785, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 8B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42032, "end_char": 42041, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42091, "end_char": 42099, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42173, "end_char": 42181, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Millon Bannerjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 42192, "end_char": 42208, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Millon Bannerjee; learned Additional Solicitor General urged that the only questi0n for the consideration of the court was whether there was any relevant materjal before the authority com- .", "canonical_name": "Millon Bannerjee"}}, {"text": "clause 8B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42411, "end_char": 42420, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 8B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42518, "end_char": 42527, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "liberty Oil Mills (P) Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 42842, "end_char": 42868, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "wholly justifiq the action taken against liberty Oil Mills (P) Ltd. Though Liberty Oil Mills itself held several licences."}}, {"text": "Liberty Oil Mills (P+ Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 43451, "end_char": 43480, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The claim of Liberty Oil Mills (P+ Limited that Liberty\n\nOil 'Mills was an 'actual users•, who had purchased beef tallow for subjecting it to air treatment was no more than a pretence."}}, {"text": "Liberty\n\nOil 'Mills", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 43486, "end_char": 43505, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The claim of Liberty Oil Mills (P+ Limited that Liberty\n\nOil 'Mills was an 'actual users•, who had purchased beef tallow for subjecting it to air treatment was no more than a pretence."}}, {"text": "Liberty 0 il Mills (P) Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 44302, "end_char": 44332, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the relevant files which accordingto )lim indicated that the case of Liberty 0 il Mills (P) Limited as well as the cases of each of the other firms who were included in the abeyance circular hd been separately considered and satisfaction duly and properly arrived at by tbe appropriate authority on relevant material ."}}, {"text": "Arvind Exports", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 45163, "end_char": 45177, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "With reference to the views expressed by the .Central Board to Excise and Customs and the Government of India, in the cases of Arvind Exports and."}}, {"text": "Jayant Oil Mills", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 45183, "end_char": 45199, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jayant Oil Mills, Sbri Banne..rjee submitted that those cases did not represent the correct position in law."}}, {"text": "Sbri Banne", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 45201, "end_char": 45211, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jayant Oil Mills, Sbri Banne..rjee submitted that those cases did not represent the correct position in law."}}, {"text": "Those decisions were rendered in proceedirigll under the Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 45292, "end_char": 45360, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Export Control Act and the Import Control Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 45426, "end_char": 45473, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bannerjee", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 45480, "end_char": 45489, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Bannerjee also invited out attention to several provisions of the Import Control Order."}}, {"text": "Open General Licence for Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 47961, "end_char": 47989, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Open General Licence for Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 48124, "end_char": 48152, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Goods so imported shall be transfred by them only to such Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 48215, "end_char": 48276, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Components and Consumables may only be sold to eligible Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 50184, "end_char": 50243, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Agust 24, 1983", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 54041, "end_char": 54055, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We have already mentioned that on Agust 24, 1983, the Government of India made an order under Section 3 of the Exports and Imports (Control) Act totally banning the import Into India of / beef,, buffalo and pig tallow. ."}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54101, "end_char": 54110, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 54543, "end_char": 54552, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55019, "end_char": 55028, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 3(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55064, "end_char": 55076, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Htaading anything contained in the Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 55118, "end_char": 55164, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sections 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55542, "end_char": 55552, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Htaading anything contained in the Customs Act", "statute": "Htaading anything contained in the Customs Act"}}, {"text": "Sections 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55752, "end_char": 55762, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Htaading anything contained in the Customs Act", "statute": "Htaading anything contained in the Customs Act"}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55803, "end_char": 55812, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Htaading anything contained in the Customs Act", "statute": "Htaading anything contained in the Customs Act"}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 55842, "end_char": 55851, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Htaading anything contained in the Customs Act", "statute": "Htaading anything contained in the Customs Act"}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56021, "end_char": 56030, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Htaading anything contained in the Customs Act", "statute": "Htaading anything contained in the Customs Act"}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56063, "end_char": 56072, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Htaading anything contained in the Customs Act", "statute": "Htaading anything contained in the Customs Act"}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56316, "end_char": 56325, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56404, "end_char": 56413, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56739, "end_char": 56748, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section\n\n3 and 4A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 56960, "end_char": 56977, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57020, "end_char": 57028, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57293, "end_char": 57301, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57389, "end_char": 57397, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central\n\nGovernment", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 57433, "end_char": 57452, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Clause 6 prescribes the situations when the Central\n\nGovernment or the Chief Controller ."}}, {"text": "clause 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57689, "end_char": 57697, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 8( 1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 57760, "end_char": 57772, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "CeQtral Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 57786, "end_char": 57804, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.\n\n Clause 8( 1) empowers the CeQtral Government or the Chief Control- ."}}, {"text": "State Trading Corporation ofiudia", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 58008, "end_char": 58041, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "or receiving licences or\n\naotment of the imported goods through the State Trading Corporation ofiudia, the Minerals and Mctals."}}, {"text": "Minerals and Mctals. Trding Corporation of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 58047, "end_char": 58095, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "or receiving licences or\n\naotment of the imported goods through the State Trading Corporation ofiudia, the Minerals and Mctals."}}, {"text": "Clause 8A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58819, "end_char": 58828, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State Trading Corporation of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 59013, "end_char": 59047, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of goods by any person or grant of licer.ces or allotment of importec1 goods through the State Trading Corporation of India', the Minerals and Metals Trading Corporation of India, or any other ."}}, {"text": "Minerals and Metals Trading Corporation of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 59054, "end_char": 59102, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of goods by any person or grant of licer.ces or allotment of importec1 goods through the State Trading Corporation of India', the Minerals and Metals Trading Corporation of India, or any other ."}}, {"text": "Clause 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59256, "end_char": 59264, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 8B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59910, "end_char": 59919, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause. 8B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60438, "end_char": 60448, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 60734, "end_char": 60742, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 8C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61736, "end_char": 61745, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 61917, "end_char": 61925, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 8(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62728, "end_char": 62739, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 8A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62743, "end_char": 62752, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 9(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62756, "end_char": 62767, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 8(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62955, "end_char": 62966, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63091, "end_char": 63100, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63187, "end_char": 63195, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63197, "end_char": 63205, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause. 8A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63207, "end_char": 63217, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 8C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63219, "end_char": 63228, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "V.P. Raman", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 63469, "end_char": 63479, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "8A, Clause 8C and Clause IOC,\n\n, , F\n\nSUP~EME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1984] 3 $.C.R.\n\nshall appiy \"lo the import of any goods covered by Open Genera) Licence or Special General Licence issued by the Central Government.:•\n\nWe may notice here the argument of Shri V.P. Raman that.", "canonical_name": "V .P. Raman"}}, {"text": "Clause 8B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63529, "end_char": 63538, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 8B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 63625, "end_char": 63634, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64152, "end_char": 64160, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 64235, "end_char": 64252, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The amendment was af consquence of the lacuna being pointed out by the Bombay High Court in some cases which came before it."}}, {"text": "Clause 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64462, "end_char": 64470, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 8B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64504, "end_char": 64513, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 8B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64720, "end_char": 64729, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause\n\n8B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 64832, "end_char": 64842, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65042, "end_char": 65050, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 8A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65511, "end_char": 65520, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65610, "end_char": 65618, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65685, "end_char": 65693, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65695, "end_char": 65704, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65930, "end_char": 65939, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66007, "end_char": 66015, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67540, "end_char": 67548, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68242, "end_char": 68250, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 81", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68811, "end_char": 68820, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S.1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68895, "end_char": 68898, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 68996, "end_char": 69005, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 8A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69036, "end_char": 69045, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 8A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69304, "end_char": 69313, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 8A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69494, "end_char": 69503, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 8B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69984, "end_char": 69993, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 8A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70186, "end_char": 70195, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 88", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70351, "end_char": 70360, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 8A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70562, "end_char": 70571, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 8B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70575, "end_char": 70584, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70969, "end_char": 70978, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 8A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71054, "end_char": 71063, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 8A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71128, "end_char": 71137, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71340, "end_char": 71348, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 8B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71490, "end_char": 71499, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Supreme Court of Canada", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 74112, "end_char": 74135, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In tbe Qeen v. Randolph et az.t, the Supreme Court of Canada had to consider the question whether an interim order uncter s. 7 of ..\n\nof the Post Office Act prohibiting the delivery of mail directed to or deposited by a pcmon in a Post Office may be made without prior potice to the person affected, pending the final determination which CQuld only be made after hearing the party affe<;:ted."}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 74197, "end_char": 74201, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 74504, "end_char": 74506, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 74580, "end_char": 74584, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 75450, "end_char": 75454, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Broom", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 75575, "end_char": 75580, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\"The following passage in Broom's Legal Maxims lOth ed~, p. 68 is in point :\n\nAlthough cases may be found in thebooks of decisions un der particular statutes bidl at first might seem to conflict with the maxim, it will be found on conideration that they are not inconsistent with it, for the rule, which is orie of elementary _justice, only requires that a man shall no~ be subject to final ."}}, {"text": "s. 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 76032, "end_char": 76036, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Dixoll", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 76788, "end_char": 76794, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the Comroission(fr of Po!ie v. Tanos/ the;: High Court c,>f\n\n.~-\n\n~ ...•. '\n\nLIBERTY OIL MILLS v. UNION (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) ,03\n\nAustralia (Dixoll C. J and Webb J.) was considering the question\n\n."}}, {"text": "Webb", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 76804, "end_char": 76808, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the Comroission(fr of Po!ie v. Tanos/ the;: High Court c,>f\n\n.~-\n\n~ ...•. '\n\nLIBERTY OIL MILLS v. UNION (Chinnappa Reddy, J.) ,03\n\nAustralia (Dixoll C. J and Webb J.) was considering the question\n\n."}}, {"text": "Denning", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 78985, "end_char": 78992, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Lewis ;, r; Heffer1, Lord Denning MR distinguished the observations of Megarry J. in John v. Rees and observed,\n\n(1) [1978] 3 All ER, 35~\n\nSU~''RFm couRT RETORTS [1984] 3 s.c."}}, {"text": "Megarry", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 79030, "end_char": 79037, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Lewis ;, r; Heffer1, Lord Denning MR distinguished the observations of Megarry J. in John v. Rees and observed,\n\n(1) [1978] 3 All ER, 35~\n\nSU~''RFm couRT RETORTS [1984] 3 s.c."}}, {"text": "clause 8A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 83558, "end_char": 83567, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 8B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 83571, "end_char": 83580, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 8B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 83592, "end_char": 83601, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 8A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 83678, "end_char": 83687, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 8A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 83954, "end_char": 83963, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 84157, "end_char": 84166, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 8B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 86267, "end_char": 86276, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 8B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87500, "end_char": 87509, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88921, "end_char": 88929, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 8B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88974, "end_char": 88983, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 89029, "end_char": 89037, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 8B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 89116, "end_char": 89125, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 89226, "end_char": 89234, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 8B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 91099, "end_char": 91108, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 8B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 92286, "end_char": 92295, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 92454, "end_char": 92462, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 8B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 92846, "end_char": 92855, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 8B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 93392, "end_char": 93401, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 8B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 93711, "end_char": 93720, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Clause 8B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 94896, "end_char": 94905, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Maltindra", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 96137, "end_char": 96146, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Maltindra and Mt.tfttdraz Mid •dm~ conaide.roo all oft.hesi in\nllrrivnrg at our cooolusi6n;\n\n• ' ' In the present case~ the party instead of representing his ."}}, {"text": "B-olbir Sin'gli", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 97149, "end_char": 97164, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In B-olbir Sin'gli's Cltse, it '\\~''l<;'held:that once an: order was sent out, aQd went out 'beyond thc\"ConiTol ohb.e ailthor.ity, the order niust be said to have 'been issued no\"'l'latr when the party affected actually received."}}, {"text": "[1976) 2 S.C.R. 115", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 98676, "end_char": 98695, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "CJ.innappa Reddy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 98759, "end_char": 98775, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~\n\ntmEnTY OIL MILLS V. UNION (CJ.innappa Reddy, , J.).", "canonical_name": "CJ.innappa Reddy"}}, {"text": "June 5, !", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 99504, "end_char": 99513, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordiog to the contention of the petitioners, they were entitled to import beef taliO\\V even after June 5, !"}}, {"text": "April I, 1981", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 99981, "end_char": 99994, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "under OGL only where 'firm contracts had b.:en entered into and letters of credit had been opened prior to April I, 1981 but if the contracts had not been."}}, {"text": "Customs Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 100305, "end_char": 100316, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 100996, "end_char": 101007, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Though in the cases of A rvind Exports nod Jayant Mills is an appeal and review arising under the provisions of the Customs Act", "statute": "Though in the cases of A rvind Exports nod Jayant Mills is an appeal and review arising under the provisions of the Customs Act"}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 101039, "end_char": 101049, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Though in the cases of A rvind Exports nod Jayant Mills is an appeal and review arising under the provisions of the Customs Act", "statute": "Though in the cases of A rvind Exports nod Jayant Mills is an appeal and review arising under the provisions of the Customs Act"}}, {"text": "clause 8B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 102082, "end_char": 102091, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 8B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 102320, "end_char": 102329, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State Trading Corpt.ration of india", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 102709, "end_char": 102744, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "licensing authorities to keep in abeyance for a period of six mo.nth~ any application received from the concerns specified for the grant of import licence or customs clearance permit and al!otroent of imported goods through' agencies like the State Trading Corpt.ration of india, Minerals and Metals Trading Corporation of India arid similaragencies, making a bare recital that investigations into certain a}ltgation!'"}}, {"text": "clause 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 102892, "end_char": 102900, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "J.P. Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 103489, "end_char": 103500, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But the learned Addl, Solicitor Gener.al invited our attention to the statements rpade by Shri J.P. Sharma, Deputy Chief Coiltro11er of Jmp<?rts and Exports and the author of.", "canonical_name": "J.P. SHARMA"}}, {"text": "clause 8B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 104367, "end_char": 104376, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Liberty Oil Mills Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 105014, "end_char": 105039, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter the Deputy Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, the files show, considered the cases of 61 concerns including that of Liberty Oil Mills Limited . ."}}, {"text": "Clause 8B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 106463, "end_char": 106472, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 8B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 106764, "end_char": 106773, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "H.S.K.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 107690, "end_char": 107696, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "H.S.K.\n\nPetitions dismls1 e\n\n. ."}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_3_715_733_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "J, ..\n\nSTATE OF HARYANA & ORS.\n\nv. •\n\nLAL CHAND & ORS:\n\nMay 2, 1984 B\n\n. (D.A. DESAI, A.P. SEN AND V. BALAKR!Sf!NA ERADI, JJ.J\n\nConstitution of India 1950, Article 299(1) Condition , to be satisfied before .:z\n\nbfndig Co!Uract between the Union or State cmes into existen1:e-What are. Con 0 tracts execued in exercise of statutary power and contracts which are Statu.f_ory.in nature-Existence of distinction indicated--.Article 299(1) inappli<able wizen Uni.1n\n\nor StGte .enters int(] a contrart.'which is statutory in nature,\n\nExcise_Contract;_A statutory contract-Requirements Of Article 299(1) cannot be invoked.\n\nPunjab Excise Act 1914, Section 60 &.- Punjab .Lf{zuor Licence Rules 1956, .Rules 32(2), 36(22), 36(23), an:/ 36(23A) .\n\nExcise Contract-Reauction-Recovery of difference between bid amount in original auction aiid that fetch€d in reauctidn_;_State whether entitled to recove,. the\n\ndijferetia/ amoqnl from the original licencee.\n\nIndian Contract Act 1872. Co1nmercial Contrat:t-:Perforn1ance of-Definit.e time fixed and mode ofpa; iment specified-Time essence of such contract-Excise\n\ncontract-Time whether essence of contract. ·\n\nThe I)puty Excise&· Taxation Coni1nissiorier held an auction for gfantiog the right to sell country-Liquor 'for liquor vnd.. The respondents olTered tfie ·\n\nhighest bid.which \\vas .provisionally acc.epted and they were declared the highest bidder under Rule 36(2)' of the Punjab 'Liquor Licence Rules J956.\n\nSubsequently, the Excise and Taxation Coin missioner accepted the bid as. requi.red Rule 36{22). The resp0ndents however failed to depos'it the security amount as required under Rule 3fi(22A)' and thereby contravened -conditions No- 15(1) of the coditions o.f auction and Rule 36(23)'. the Deputy EXcise & Taxation Commissioner therefore serVed the respond:.::nt<; with a notice to show-cauc why the licence for cuntry liquor vend, shoul-i not be rc-:iuction under Rule 36('!3A) and ihe , eficicncy in price, a n_d all expenses of su-.:h re-auctjon rl?covered from them under S:!ction 60 of the Punjab Excise Act, 1914. The nspondents\n\nreprcse.nted t4at b:'!forc the auction it \\Vas announcej that no wine shop would be opened wit-bin a radius of thrCe miles of the liquor vend but acro5s\n\nthe bo1der the State Government of J'unjab had sanctioned the establishment of\n\na liquor Shop Which was hardly 2-1 {1 miles from the border and tbis-would inean that there would be two_ country liquor shops one in the State of IIaryana and the Other in the State of Punjab and this was in breach of condition No. 13(iii) . real! with. Rule 37(88) of the Rules. The Deputy Excise and Taxation Commis\n\nsioner reJected the representation alld directed the re.sale of the licence fot retail vend of the cOuntry•liquor shop under :Rule 36(23). Th•shop_Was reauctioned. ·: At the time. of re-auction f~1ere were 52 bidders and the shop Was resold at the highest bid of Rs. 6.65 lakhs. The respondents were served with a notice of demand of Rs 3.46 lakhs representing the loss on re-.sale.\n\nIll their writ petitions. to the.High Court the res pendents asailed the notice of demand. Followiilg the decision in Ka~1hi'ya Lal_ Bhatia & Co. v. State of Ha•yaita & Ors. the High Court held that.the State had no authority to demand the amounts for failure of which the.vends were put to re,;.auction on the ground 1hat the licence fee levied was in the nature .of excise duty ..\n\n' Jn the. Appeals to this Court, on the question whether_ the State Governn1ent was-entitled to realise the difference which the respondents had agreed to. pay un(\\er the terms of aucton of a liquor vend and the amo1.Jnt realized ori re~\n\nauction of the vend, as also the defaulted instalments of the licence fee payable\n\nn respect of a liquor vend :\n\nAllowing the appeals,\n\nHELD: t. (i) There i~ a distinction between contracts which are executed in exercise of _the executive powers and contracts which are statutory in natureA Under Att.299 (1), thrr!e conditions b'ave to be satisfied before a binding contract. by the Union or th~ Statein exercise.of the executive power comes into t--Xistence :\n\n(1) The contract must be expressed' to be made by the PresiJent or the Governor.\n\nas the case may be . .(2) It must be executed in writing. And - (3) the execution .thereof shollld be by such person and in such manner. as the President or the.· ·\n\nGovernor' may direct or. 3.uthoriZe. There call be doubt that acontract which has to be execut.ed iri accordance with Art. 299(1) is nulli6ed a;-id.becomes vOid if the contr; ct is not executed in conforffiity with the provis'ions .of Art. 299(1) -an(i\n\n.• there is no question Of estoppel or ratificati6n in such,.case;. 'Nor can there by\n\n any irqplied Contrac~ between the Government and another person. [726CE]\n\nSmi. Nanhibai v. The Excise. Commissioner, M.P. & Ors., AIR (1963) MP 352, ieferred to. ·\n\nG Ram Rattan Gllpta v. State. of M-P., AIR (1974) MP 101. Ajodhya Prasad\n\nShaiv & Anr. v. State of Ori<Sa & Ors.; AIR (1971) Ori., 158, M/S shree Krishna Gyanoday_ Sugar Ltd. & Anr. v, State of Bihar & Anr., AIR (1975) Pat. 123; approved.\n\n(ii) Art. 299(1) applies to a Contract made in exercise of the executive power of the Union or the Sta.te~ but not to a contraCt made in exercise of statutory-power. Art. 299(l) has no application to a case where_a particular statutory authority a-s distinguished from the Union or the States enters into a contract which is statutory in nature. Such 'a contract. even though it is for\n\n. ,\n\n. ' ~\n\n• . ·)..... ~-\n\n• •\n\nsecuring the interests of the Union or the States. is not a contract which has been entered into by or on behalf of the Union or the State in exercise. of it'i executive powers. [726F-G]\n\nK.P. Chowdhary v. S!.7te of MP., [1966] 3 SCR 9!9, Mulamchand v. State of M.P., [1968] 3 SCR 214, State of MP. v. Rattan Lal, [196l] MPLJ 104, State of 1!f.P., v. Firm Gobardhan DaS9 Kai/ash Nath, AIR [l97'J SC I 160, referred to.\n\n(iii) Jn ~Ii excise contract, the Collector acting as Depl1ty Excise & Taxa tion Commissioner conducting the auction undr Rule 36(22) ad the Excise Commissioner eXercising the functions of the Finanical Commissioner accepting\n\nthe bid under Rule 36(22A) although they act for and op behalf of the State Government.for raising public revenue, have the requisite authority to do so. under the Act a; d th~ 1:ules fraoy:d. thereunder and therefore such a contract which comes -into being a_n acceptance of. the bid, is a s.tatutori contract fal1ing outside the purview of :Article 299(1)- of the Constitu'tion. In such a coritract the requirements of Article 299(1) cannot.be invoked. [727BEl . . ' . . .\n\nA. Damodaran & 4nr. v. Staie /Jf Kera/a & Ors., [1976] 3 SCR 780;\n\nreferre~ to,\n\nIn the instant case, there was unconditional acceptance of the highest bid of the respondents by the Dputy Excise & Taxation Commissiorie~ at the time of the auction on March 11, 1969, and also by the Excise & Taation Commissioner on.March 21,.1969 as required µndt!r Rule -36(22A). 'fhe respondents could not uniJat_e1rally by their Jetter dated.April 12, 1969 r.escind the contract on the prete'xt that the State Gove_rnment of Punjab had opened a new iiquor shop across the State border. Evln thOugh this may have been in breach of tlie inter-state agreenient beiween the. State Govdrninents o( Punjab and Haryana,_ the oPening of such a liquor vend by the State Government of Punjab\n\ncould not justify the re'Spondents in not making the secuity deposit.' This would not.amount to a breach of the .conditions: on the part qf the Sra1e Government of Har.yana or furnish a ground absolving the res_IJ)ndent~ of their liability to pay the shortfall. [7JOE-G; 7l!A-B]\n\nPeisons who offer their bids at an auction to vend country i\"iquor witb.\n\n1- full knowledge of the _terms and condi'tions attaching thereto, carinot be permit\n\nted to wriggle out of the .contractual -obligations arising out of\" the acceptance of their bids.by a pet_ition under Article226 of Constitution. [73JGJ\n\nHar Shanker&' Ors.v. The Deputy Excise & Taxation Commislioner & Ors.,\n\n(1975) S SCR 255, State of Haryana & Ors v, !age Ram & Ors., (1980) 3 SCR 746,. State of Pujab v. M/s Dial Chand Gian Chand & Co., [1931] 2 SCC 303: referred to.\n\n3, (i) In a commercial Contrct for the performance of which a• definite time has peen fired and the contract spetifies the mode 9f payment. , i.e. specifies the dates on whiG1'1 the.instnJments of the licence fee are to be paid. time is of t.he essence of the contract. [732H]\n\n• • •\n\n• B\n\n• • •\n\n(ii) Rule 36(23)(1) of the Rules specifically makes lime of the essence. It therefore folfows that payment of the instalments On the due dates was a condition pre-requisite to the performance of the contract. [733A]\n\nIn the instat case, the failure of the respoJitlents to make. payments relieved thi:: State Govrnn1ent of their obligatioris. The Excise ·& Taxation Commis~ sioner would have been.justified if he had cancelied the, liCence under Ruie 36(23) and put the li.t\\uot venc\\ to reauction forthe remainig peri0d of the . financial year .. Instead of taking 'this drstic step of cance_llation of the 'contract, the Deputy xcise & Taxatioll Commissioner served the respondents with the impugned notice of den1and for payment of the fi{St fortnightly irista1ment.\n\nThe respondents w.re Oound to p'ay the defaulted instalment on the due date. ' f. • . . • . ·\n\n[733B-CJ •\n\n4. The decision of the High Court in Kanhiya/a/ Bhati\"a'&.Co. v. Slate of Haryana & Ors. has been reVersed by this Courfin State of HaryanCz v. Jage Ram & Ors.,[1983] 4 SCC556. [720G] '\n\nCIYIL APPELLATE JURISDCJTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 154 & . 155(N} of 1971.\n\nFrem the Judgment and . Order dated the I Ith November, 1969 Civil ofthe'Punjab & Haryana High Court in writ Nos. 1207 and 1607 of1969 respectively. '\n\n. Harbans Singh, 1.S. Gujral, C.V. Subbarao and R.N. Poddar E for the Appellants in both the appeals .\n\n• G.K. Arora for the respondents in C.A. 154/71.\n\nT.S. Munjra/ and Mrs. Urmila KaJ!oor for the Respondent in\n\n. CA 155/1971.\n\n• The Judgment of the Court was delivere~ by\n\nsm~, J.· These appeals on ce\"rtificate are directed against the Judgment and orders of the Punjab High Court dated November 19, 1969 allowing the writ petitions filed by the respondents and quashing the impugned notices of .demand for recovery of the difference between the amount which they had agreed to pay under the terms of auction of a liquor vend and the amount realized on re-auction of the vend a.s 8, lso. the defaulted instalments of the licence fee payablein respect of a liquo~ vend issued under s. 60\n\nof the Punjab Excise Act 1914 ('Act' for short).\n\n• Put very shortly; the ssential facts are these. On March 11, 1969, tb~ Deputy. Exdse & Taxation Collllllissioner, Hissar held an\n\n- --\n\n.. ....,\n\n).. .\n\n' . ,.\n\ni!ARYANA v. LAL CHAND (Sen, J.) 719\n\nauction for granting the right to sell country liquor for Mandi Dabwali for the rar 1969-70 at the Colleetorate. At the commenceme!1t of the auction, the Deputy Excise & 'Taxation Commissioner had read out theauction :mnounccments and conditions of auction as required under r. 36(4) of the Punjab Liquor Ucence Rules, 1956 ('R, ules' for short). The respondents Messrs Lal Chand Bal Rai,.ctc. offered the highest bid of Rs. 10, ll, OOO and their bid was provisionally accepted by the Deputy Excise & Taxation Commissioner and they were declared to be the highest bidder as .. required under r. 3,6(2) of the Rules. Subsequently, the bid was\n\n accepted by the Excise & Taxation Commissioner exorcising the powers of the Financial commissioner on March ~I. 1969 as requi red under r. 36(22) of the Rules. The respondents however failed to deposit Rs. 50,550 \\IS security amount as required under r. 36(22A) and thereby contravened condition No. 15(i) of the' condi- tions of auction and r. 36(2~) of the Rules .. They were accordingly . served .with a notice.dated April 9, 1969 by the , Deputy Excise & Tax.ation Commissioner requiring them to show cause why the licence for country liquor vend, Ma!ldi Dabwali should not be put to re-auction under r. 36(23AJ. of the Rules and the deficiency in price and all expwses of such re-auction recovered. from them in the manner' laid dowh ins. l50 of the Punjab Excise Act, 1914. in\n\nresponse to the same, the respondents by their letter dated .April 12, 1969 tried to wriggle out of their contractual obligations by saying that before the auction.it was announced.that no wine shop shall be opened .within a radius of three miles of liquor vend, Mandi Dabwali, but across the border the. State Government of Punjab had sanctioned the establishment ofa liquor shop at village .. Killlanwali. which was hardly 2-1/2 miles from the State border and this would mean that there would be two country liquor shops-·\n\none at Mandi Dabwali in .the State of Haryana and the other at village Killianwali in the State of Punjab and this was in breach of condition ~, o, !3(iii) read with r. 37(8B) of the Rules, as applicable to the State of Haryana.. Upon this basis, the respondents represented that before requiring them to deposit the security amount, they should be given an assnrance that no other liquor. shop would be opened.\n\nAlthough in. the show-canse noiiee, the respondents wete intimated that in case they desired to be heard-· in person, they should appear before the Deputy Excise & Taxation commissioner a\\ Chandigrah on April 14, 1969, but none of them tured up on\n\nthat date.\n\nOn the same day, the Deputy Excise & Taxation _ y-< Commissioner rejected the representation of the respondents and directed resale of the licence for retail vend_ of the country liquor shop at Mandi Dabwali for the year 1969-70 under r. 36(23) of the Rules. The respondents have purposely kept back the reply that they received frnm the Deputy Excise & Taxation commissioner conveying the rejection of their representation which intimated to them that the licence for retail yend of country liquor shop at , Mandi Dabwali would be re-auctioned on April 23, 1.969 at the \"' Collectorate, Hissar.\n\nBy his letter dated April 15, 1969 addressed f to all the Excise & Taxation Officers in the State, the Deputy Excise & Taxation commissioner forwarded the notice of re-auction asking them to give wide publicity to the notice alo11g with the announcements to be made at the time of re-auction. Copies of the circularletter and the notice of re-auction were sent not only to the commissioner, Ambala and all the Deputy Commissioners in the State but also to tle Chief S_ ecretaries and the Excise Commissioners of diffo- 1, - rent States and they were also requested \"to give wide publicity in their States regarding the re-auction of the licence. At the. time of re-auction held on April 23, 1969, there were as many as 52 bidders and ultimately the liquor vend, Mandi Dabwali was re-sold at the highest bid of Rs, 6,65,000 for the remaining part of the financial year. On May 8, 1969, the respondnts were served with a notice of demand of Rs. 3,46,000 representiog the loss on re-sale .. The High Court by the judgment under appeal quashed the notice of demand following the d_ecision in Kanhiya Lal Bl1atia &Co. v. State \"\"·\"f,· of Haryana & Orsl').\n\nThe High Court following its decision in Kanhiya Lal's case, fopra, held that the State Government had no authority to demand the amounts for failure of which the vends were pot to re-auction on the ground that the licence fee l_evied was in the uature of excise duty. Recently, this Conrt has in State of fiaryana v.\n\nJage Ram & Ors.(') reversed the decision of the High Court in Kanhiya Lat's .case, supra, and held that the amo.unts which the State \"- ' Government had charged to the respondents were neither in the nature of a tax nor in the nature of an excise duty but were.in the nature of a price. wl; ichthe State 'Government were entitled'to charge as .consideration for parting with its privilegein favour of the .licensees. That being so, the appeals must succeed on this short ground alone.\n\nNormally, this would have entailed remitting the writ petitions to the High Conrt for a decision on merits but looking >-\n\n(1) CW. No. 343of1969 decided on July 23, 1969.\n\n(2) ll98Jj4 s.c.c. 556.\n\nto the fact. that the demands raised were for the financial year 1969-70, we felt that no useful purpose would be served in remitting A the matter to th; High Court and heard the parties on merits.\n\nApart from the question of. validity of the charge which is co'lnmon to both the appeals, the. questions raised in the two appeals arc distinct and separate and they will have to b<; dealt with separately ..\n\nIt is convenient at this stage to set out the relevant statutory provisions. s.27 of the Punjab Excise Act, 1'914 empowers the State Government to\"lease' no such conditions and for such period as it may deem fit the right of selling by wholesale or retail any country liquor or intoxicating drug within any specified local area. .On said lease being granted the Collector, under sub-s.(2J thereof, has to grant to the lessee a licence in the from ofa lease. S.34 of the Act provides inter a/ia that\"(!) Every licence granted under the Act shall be subject to payment of such fees, if any, as the Financial Commissioner may direct ; and (2) The authority granting such licence may r.equire the ltcensee to give such security for the. obserance of the terms of his licence, or to make such deposits by way of security. as he may think fit. s.5£(1) of the Act confers power on the State . Government, by notification, to make rules for the purpose of carrying out foe provisions of the A<f In particular and without prejudice to the generality of s.~8(1), sub-s. (2) thereof provides that the State Government may makerules with respect to matters enumerated therein. Under .cJ.(f) the State .Government may make rules regulating the manner of holding auctions of liquor shops. S.59 provides that the Financial Commissioner may, by notification, make rules by d. (a) lo regulate the manufacture, supply,·. storage or sale of any in toxic.ant, cl.(d) prescribing the scale of fees or the manner of fixing fees payable in respect of. any. such licence and by cl.(f) prescribing the authority by, the restrictions under, and the conditions on which, any licence may be granted. The licences, in a large measure, owe their existence to the rules framed by the Financial Commissioner under S.59. S.60 of the Act, insofar as\n\n\\ material, reads :\n\n\"60. (I) Recovery of dues-The following moneys namely:-\n\n(a) all excise revenue ;\n\n(b) .• * •••••. • •\n\n' c\n\n(c) all amounts due to ihe Government by any person on account of any contract relating to the excise\n\nrevene;\n\nmay be recqvercd. from the person primarily liable to pay the same, or from his surety (if any), by distress.and sale of his moveable property or by any other process for the recovery of arrears of land rcve1\\ue due from land holder& or from farmers of land or their mreties.\"\n\nThe Punjab Liquor Licence Rules, 1956 framed by the Finan- . cial Commissioner in exercise of his powers under s.59 of the Act. make detailed provisions regulating(.• the manner -in which a licence tor the retail venJ or country liquor shall .be grarited by public auction, and the conditious to which it shall be subject. R.36(22A) of the Rule provides that a person to whom a country liquor shop has bee!' sold shall deposit by way of security an amount equivalent to one-twenty-fourti1 of the amount of licence fee determined under .r.36(16) within a period of seven days of the date of auction.\n\n,. . ' R.36\\23)(2) provides tliat a persun to whom country liquor shop is sold shall pay the amount of licence fee so, calculated in 22 equal instalments, each instalment being paya'ble.on tho 10th and 26th of each month sfarting from the month of April. In the event of failure to pay the instalment by the due date, his Hcence may be cancelled.- R.36(23A) interdicts that any person whose bid has been accepted at the auction Jails tJ make the deposit of the amount of security equivalent to one-twenty; fourth of the total licence fee as required under r.36(22A), the Collector may resell the licence by public auction and deficiency in licence fee .and all expenses for such resale shall be recoverable from (he _defaulting bidder in the \"manner laid down in s.60 of the !'unjab.Excise Act, 1914;\n\nIn Har Shanker & Ors: v. The Deputy Excise & Taxation Commissioner & Ors.,\\') this Court held that the writ jurisdiction of the Hinh Courts under Art.226 was not intended to facilitate avoidance f obligations voluntarily incurrd. It was observed that one of the-important purpose of selling the exclusive right to vend liquor in wholesale or retail is_to raise revenue. The licence fee was a price for acquiring such privilege. One who makes a bidfor the orant of such privilege with a full knowledge of the terms and\n\nonditions attaching to the auction cannot be permitted to wriggle\n\n(I) (1975]3 SCR 255\n\n-- '(' ..\n\n. .\n\n' .\n\nHARYANA \"LAL CllAND (Sen, J.) 723\n\nout of the contractual .obligations arising out of the acceptance of his bid .. Chandrachud, J. (as he then was) interpreting the provisions of the Punjab Exci.se Act, 1914 and of the Punjab Liquor Licence A Rules, 1956 and speaking for the Court, said:\n\n\"The.. announcement of conditions governing the auction were in the nature of an invitation to an offer to .those who were interested in thesaleof country liquor. The bids given in the auction~ were offers m.ade by the prospective vendors to the Government. The Government's acceptance of those bids was the acceptance of willing offers made to it. On such accepta1ice, the contract between the bidders and the Government became concluded and a binding agreement came into existeuce between them . •• •• • • The powers of the financial commiss_ioner to grant liquor licence by auction and to collect licence fees through the medium of auctions cannot by writ petitions.iJe questioned by those who, had thoir vendure SUfceeded, would have relied upon those very powers to found a legal claim.\n\nReciprocal right and obligations arising out of contract do not depend for their enforceability upon whether a contract- . ing .Party finds it prudent to abide by .the terms of the contract. By such a test no contract could ever .have a binding force.\"\n\n To the same effect are the decisions of this Courtin State of Haryana & Ors. v. Jage Ram & Ors.(1) and the State of P1in}ab v. M/s Dial Chand Gian Chand & Co. 12> laying uown that persons who offer their bids at an auction lo vend country liquor with full knowledge of the terms and conditions attaching thereto, cannot be permitted to wriggle out of the contractual obligations arising out of and acceptance of tcir bids by a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution .\n\nThe. observations in Har Shanker's .case, supra, did not touch. upon the questioh . whether such a contract must be. in\n\ncompliane with Art, 299 (I) of the Constitution, The question whether the process of licensing by public auction of liquo~ vend involves a contract at al\\ or is merely the. grant of a privilege and the bidding at a public auction is with _a .view merely to .fix the pnce for the purchase of the privilege, has been en.gaging the •\n\n(1) [1980] 3 SCR 746.\n\n(2) [19831 2 sec 503.\n\nSU~REME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1984] 3 S.C.R. _..,\n\nattction. of the . High Courts for quite some time. In Smt.\n\nNanhibai v The Excise Commissioner, M.P. & Ors.(1) the Madhya Pradesh High Court held ihai the. State _Government .has the exclusive privilege of manufacturing, selling and possessing intoxicants which it has power to lease for consideration under s: i 8 of the !\\1.P. Excise Act, 1915 and that every • auction of excise contract for sale of intoxicants is a leasing of the Government's right of selling intoxicants. P.V. Dixit; C.J .. speaking for the • •.' Court made following observations on. this point which are _,. pertinent : '\n\n\"The principle that the State Government has exclusive right of manufacturing, selling or possessing intoxicants . or • any country liquor intoxicating drug runs through. ss. 13 to )8 of the Act. •• •• •• • •• .\n\nThe important condition that must be.satisfied before any licence. can be granted to a person for manufacture or ' . sale of any country liquor intoxicating drug is that the person must first obtain the privilege or the right of manufacturing or selling the intoxicating drug . ** •• •• ••\n\nIn every auction sale of a liquor shop at which liquor is sold in wholefale or retail, there is a sale of the lease of the Government's right of selling country liquor intoxicating drug.· On the acceptance of a bid of a person at an auction sale, a contract . for thedemise of the Government's .interest is brought into. exist\"'1ce and this is followed by the grant ofa licence to the person whose bid has been accepted.\"\n\nThese observations of t1e learned Chief Jtistice have sine~ been approved of by a Full Bench of the High Court in Ram Rattan Gupt~ v.\n\nState of M.P.(2 ) The other•two cas~ on the point. which we must notice are : Ajodhya Prasad Shaw &. Anr. v. State of Orissa & Ors.(3> and M/s Shree Krishna Gyanoday Sugar Ltd. &' Anr. v. State of Bihar & Anr.('! ' ·\n\n.• (I) A.I.R. [19631 M.P. 352.\n\n(2) A.LR. [1974] M.P. 101.\n\n(3) A.J.R. [1971] Ord. 158.\n\n(4) A.LR. [1975] Pat., 123 •.\n\n\" < t ...<.\n\nIn A, iodhya Prasad Shaw's case, the Orissa High Court and in. M/s. Shree Krishna Gyanodaj\"s case, th'e Patna High Court interpreting like provisions oftheBihar & Orissa Excise Act, 1915 held that where the State Government in exercise of its powers\n\nunde~ s .. 22 of that Ac.t grants exclusive pivilege to any perso~ on certain conditions under s. 22 (I) and a licence .is received. by that person under s. 22 (21, it cannot fo contended that it amounts . to.a contractniade in exercise of the executive power of the State within the meaning of Art. 299 (!)of the Comtitution. R:N. Misra, J. speakin'g for the Court in Ajo1ihya Prasad Shaw's case tried to highlight the problem in these words:\n\n\"Law. is well settled and parties before us do not seek to .canvass that this constitutional requirement' is not mandatory. In the field it covers it is a pre-requisite to bring into existence a vaiid contract.\n\nThe question for examination in the present case is, however, different.\n\nIs there a contract at all and in case it involves a contract is it one purported to be made in exercise of tne executive power of the .State Government is the question for exami'. . n?-tion.\"\n\nThe learned Judge went on to say :\n\n\"In case t\\1e result of our invstigation is that it is not a contract in exercise of the executive power of the State in terms of '.he language used in the Article, it would follow that this constitutional requirement has no application. I have already indiciitcd that the settlement of the shop, the collection of the fee and the grant of the licence are all statutory acts by the prescribed authority. The intention of the Constitution is not to extend the principles in Art. 299 (!)to cover all possible contracts. This is why specific teference has been made to contracts \"in exercise of tbe executive power\". It 1s not necessary for the present purpose to examine whether the licensing process involves a contrnctul agreement. Possibly there is an element of contract in the settlement, but certainly it is noi one entered into in the executive power of the State but is . regulated by the statute or the rules made thereunder.\n\nJn the circumstances in the case of a statutory licence even based upon 'a contract the requirements of this Article cannot be invoked.\"\n\nIn M/s. Shrce Krishna's case, supra, !'LP. Singh, J. speaking for the Court rightly observed that when the State Government in exercise of its powers under s 22 of the. Act grants . tlie ex.elusive privilege of manufacturing, or supplying or selling any intoxicant like litjuor to any person on certain condition, there . comes into cxis:once a contract mde in exercise of its statutory powers and such a contract does not 9mount to a contract made by the State in exercise of the executive powers.\n\nThere is a distinction between. contracts which are execµted in ex'1'.cisc of the qecutive powers and contracts which are statutory in nature.\n\nUnder Art. 29,9(1), three conditions have to be satisfied before a binding contract by the Union or the State in excercise of the executive. power comes into existence: (I) The contract must be expressed to be made by the President or the Governer, as the case may be. (2) It. must be executed in. wntmg.\n\nAnd (3) The execution thereof.should be. by such person and in such manner as the Presid.ent or; the'Govenor may direct or . authorize. There. can be no doubt that a contract which has to be. executed in accordance with Art. 299(1) is nuilified and becomes void if the contract is not executed in conformity with provisions of Art. 299(1) audthere is no question of cstoppel or ratification in swh case, s.\n\nNor ca.n there be any implied co!1tract between the Governmet and another person : K.P. Clzowdhmy v. Srate of M.P.,('J Mulmnchand v. State uf M.P.,(2! State of M.P. v. Rattan La/(3) and State of M.P. v. Firm Gobardhan Dass .Kai/as/I Nath,\\4!\n\nIt is well settled thafArt. 289(1} applies to a contract made in exercise of the executive power of the Union or. the State, b.ut not to a contract made in exercise of statutory power, Art. 299(1) l1as no application to a case where a particular statutory -authority as . distinguished from the Union or the States enters into a contract which is statutory in nature. , Such a contract, even though it is. for securing the interests of the Union.or the States, is not a c\"ontract which has .been entered into by or on behalf of the Union or the State in xercise of its executive powers. In respect of forest contracts which are deal( wifa. by this Court i11 K.P. Chowdhary's, M ulamchand; s, Rattan-Lal' s and Firm Gobardhan. D/Jss' s cases, supra,\n\n(I) [1966) 3 S.C.R. 919\n\n(2) (19681 3 sc.R. 214\n\n(3) 11967) M.P.L.J. 104\n\n(4) A.J.R. [1973] S.C .. 1160\n\n' ..\n\n' ., .\n\nthere are provisions in.the Indian Forest Act, 1927 and the Forest Contract Rules framed thereunder for entering into a formal deed . between the forest contracter and the State Government .to be executed aud expressed in the name of the Governor in conformity with 'the requirements of Art. 299(1), whe.-eas unde1: the Punjab Excise Act, 1914; like some other State Excise Acts, once .the bi.d offered by a person at an auction-sale is accepted by the authority competent, a completed contract comes into existence and all that is required is the grant, of a licence to the person whose bid has been accepted. It.is settled law that.contracts made in exe:cise of statutory powers are not covered by Art. 299(1) and. once this distinction i's kept in view, it will be manifest that tlie principles laid down in K.P. Chowdhary's, Mulamchand's, Rattan Laf's and Firm Gobardhan Dass' cases are not applicable to a statutory contrah. In such' a case, the Collector aeting as the Deputy Excise & Taxation Commissione~ conducting the auction under r. 36(22) and\n\n1 the Excis.e Commissioner exercising the functions of the financial\n\n, Commissioner acceptillg the bid under r. 36(22A) although they undoubtedly act for and on behalf of the 'state Government for raising public revenue, they have the requsite authority to do so under the Act and the rules framed thereunder and therefore such a contract wliich comes into being on acceptance of the bid, is a statut9ry contract failing outside the purview of Art. 299(1) of the Constitution.\n\nWe are clearly of the opinion that in the case of a statutory contract like the one under the Excise Act,. the requiremf!nts of Art. 299(1) cannot be. invqked. In A. Damodaran & Aur. v. State of\n\nKera/a & Ors<•!., the Court interpreting s.28 of the Kerala Abkari }l Act, 1967.which was in pari materia with s.60 of the Punjab Excise Act,. 1914 he.Id th(!t even if no formal deed had been executed as required under Art.299{1), still the liability for payment of the balance of the licence amount\" due could ):le enforced by taking recourse.to s.28 of the Act. The Kera\\a High Court rejected the contention of the appellants by holding that the li\\bility to satisfy G the dues arising out of a bid was enforceable uncler s.28 quite apart from any contractuai' liability and this view was upheld by this C, ourt on the ground that the word 'grantee' in s.28 has a wide'.connota:tion to mean a person who had been.granted the privilege by acceptance of his bid. It was further held that the stat\\ltory duties and liabiJic Q\n\n(1)\n\n[1976) 3 S.C.R: 78Q.\n\nties arising on acceptance of the .bid at a public a\\lction of a liq\\lor contr<1ct may be enforced in accordance with the stritutory provisions\n\nad that it was !lot a condition precedent for the ; ccovery of an amount due under s.28 of the Act, that the amount due and recoverable shoufd be under a formally drawn up and executed contract.. This is in recognition of the principle that the provisions of Art.299(1) of the Constitution are not attracted to the grant of . such a privilege to vend liquor under the A'.ct.\n\nIn Kishori Lal Minochu's case, supra, there was reauction of a liquor vend on the highest bidder's failure to deposit one-sixth of the bid amount as security deposit and the question was whether the\n\nSate.waserititled to recover in a suit the deficiency on reauction.\n\nThe decision. in Minocha's case Is clearly distinguishable fqr two reasons : first, there was nothing to show that the bid had been accepted by the Excise Commissionerunder r . .359(2) of the U.P.\n\nExcise Manual. Further, r. 357 under which the exCise authorities , put the vend to reauction -had not ben published in the official gazette as requlred by s.77 of the U.P. Excise Act, 1910 and thus had no statutory force.< No such question arises in these cases as. the liability that is sought to. be enforced against the respondents by the impugned notices of .demand is a statutory liability in terms of condition 150).ofthe conditions of auction read with r.36(23) of the Rules and the amount is recoverable from them in .'the manner laid down in s.60 of the Act.\n\n• The short question that falls for determination in these appeals is whether the State Government was entitled to realise the difference which the respondents had agreed to .pay under the terms of auction of a liquor vend and the amount re.alized on reauction of the vend, as also the defaulted instafment o(the licence fee payabie in respect . of a liquor vend. The first of these questions arises fn Civil Appe.al\n\nNo.154(N) ofl971 while the second in Civil Appeal No.155(N) of\n\n1971. y/e will deal with them in that order .\n\n• CivU Appeal.No. 154.(N) of 1971\n\nThere is no substance in the contention that the respondent were not served with a notice under r.36(3) of the Rules. The date of reauctiori was fixed by the Excise & Taxation Commisaioner under r.36(2) .. On fipril 14, 1969, the Deputy Excise & Taxation Commis sioner rejected the representation made by the respondents and directed resale onhe licence for retail vend of cou11try liquor shop,\n\n...\n\nMandi Dabwali for the year1969.-70 .. It is accepted before us that the D.eputy Excise & Taxation Commissioner had conveyed to the\" • respondents that their representation had been rejected and that the licence for retail vend for Mandi Dabwali shop would be reauctioned . on April 23, 1969, at the Collectorate, Hissar. The respondents have withheld the document and an axlverse inference must necessarily be • drawn against them. It is quite obvious that the respondents were ; du1¥ given notice of re-auction as under r.36(3). It is evident fr9m\n\nthe return filed by the State Government that copies of circular letter dated April 15, 1969 by the.Deputy Excise & Taxation Commissioner and the notice of re-auction of even date issued by him were sent. not only to the Commissioner, Ambala but to all the Deputy Commissioners as well as to all the Ex\n\n0 cise & Taxatiop Officers in the State but also to tbe Chief Secretaries and the Excise Commissioner of different State. From this, it is quite apparentthat wide publicity\n\nA ) was given throughout. the State of Haryana as well as in other States\n\n' regarding the date and place of re.auction as. enjoined by r.36(3) of the Rules. As. already stated, there were as many .as 52 bidders present at the time of re.auction. The decision in Jage Ram's case, supra is clearly distinguishable on facts. There, the Court on a consideration of the material on record found that there was no substantial compliance either in the letter or in spirit with the . requirements of r.36(3) ofte R1.1Ies. Since the re-auction in that case did not conform fo the rules,. the Court held that the defanlting \"\"!\"\"f-- bidders could not be held liable to make. good the difference between the amount which was payable by them and the amount which was fetched at the re-auction. The principle laid down in Jage Ram's case, sµpra is clearly npt ttracted in 'the facts and circumstances of the prhent case. The first contention regarding the invali.dity of reauction held on April 23, 1969 based on r.36(3) of the Rules must therefore faiL\n\n' Equally fntile is the contention that the respondents had with drawn their bid and therefore they could not.be mulcted for the difference between the amount which they were liable to pay and the amount realized 'by re-sale of the vend.\n\nThis is not a case. of the type reported in Union of India & Ors. v. M/S. Bhim Sen Wa/ait:\n\nRam(') which laid down. the well-settled:princip\\e tftat an offer can always be withdrawn before it is finally accepted and that a conditional acceptance is not an acceptance in law.\n\nIn Bhim-Sen Wa/aiti\n\n(1) [1970) 2 SCR $94,\n\nB.\n\nc •\n\n. Ram's case, supra, the Court held that.the contract of sale was not complete till the bid was confirmed by the Chief Commissioner and till snch confirmation the person who.sc bid had been provisionally accepted was entitled to withdraw his bid and that when the bid was withdrawn before the confirmation of the Chief Commissioner, the bidder was not liable for_ damages on account of any breach of contract.or for the shortfall on the re-sale. It was observed:.\n\n'lt is not disputed that the Chief, Cmnmissioner .has disapproved the bid offered by the respondent. If the Chief Commissioner had granted sanction\"under cl.33 of Ex. D-23 the auction rnle in favour of the respondent would have been a completed transaction and he would have been liable foraliy . shortfall .on the resale.\n\nA~ the essential. pre-requisites bf a completed sale are mifsing in this case there is no liability imposed on th~ respondent for payment of the .deficiency in the price.\"\n\nIt is luged on the strength of these observations that the res~ pondents were entitled to withdraw their bid by declining to make the security deposit.\n\nThe contention cannot be accepted.\n\nFor onething, this was not a case where there was .mere co.nditional acceptance of the highest bid _of the respondents by the Deputy . Excise .& Taxation Commission.er at the time of the auction on: March. 1; 1969, but their bid .was also accepted by the Excise & Taxation Cotnmissioner on March 21, 1969 as required under r.\n\n36(22A).\n\nThe responoents could not unilaterally by their letter da\\ed 'April 12, 1969 rescind the contract on the pretext that the State\n\nGovernment of Punjab hud opened a new liqur shop at village Killianwali across the State border whfoh was contrary to condition No. l3(iii) f the conditions of auction read with r. 37(8B) of th~ Rules.\n\nEven though this may have been in breach of the interstate agreement between the State Governments of Punjab and\n\nHeryaria, the opening of such a liquor vend by the State Government of Punjab at village KHiianwalicould not justify the respondents in not maki11g the secu.rity deposit of Rs. 50,550. It appears from the roturn filed by the State Government that although conditio~ No.13(iii) had been read out. before the. auction began as required under r. 36(4), there was no mention that there was an jnter-State areement between the two State Governments nd tha\\\n\nHARYANA v. LAL CUAND (Sen, J.) 731\n\nit was a condition of sale that the Slak Government of Punjab would not open a liquor vend within a radius of three miles from the State border. Nor would this amount to a breach f the con- .. ditions on the part of the State Government of Haryana or furnish a ground absolving the respondents of the\\r liability to pay the\n\n~ • shortfall. The second contention that the respondents had withdrawn their bid and were therefore not liable for the loss on re- . ' ,\\\n\n~ ,•\n\n' ;...\n\nauction or\"liquor vend at Mandi Dabwali cannot be sustained.\n\nIn Har Shanller's case, supra, this Court held that the writ jurisdiction of the High Courts under Art. 226 was not i_ntended to facilitate avoidance of obligations voluntarily incurred. It was . observed that one of the important purposes of selling the exclusive right to vend liquor in wholesale or retail is to raise revenue. The licence fee was a price for acquiring such privilege.\n\nOne who makes a bid for the grant.of such privilege with full knowledge of the terms and eonditions attaching to the auction cannot be permitted tQ wriggle out of the contractual obligations arising out of the . acceptance of his bid. In dealing with the question, Chandrachud, J. said :\n\n\"The pow.ers of the Financial Commissioner to grant liquor licences by auction and !o collect licence fees. through the medium of auctions cannot by writ petitions be questioned by those who. had their venture succeeded, would have relied upon those very powers to found a legal claim. Reciprocal° rights and obligations 'arising ut of contract do not depend. for their enforceability upon whether a contracting party finds it prudent to abide by . the terms of the contract. By such a test no contract could\n\neve11 have a binding force.\" ·\n\nTo the same effect are the decisions of this Conrt in State of Hai yana & Ots. v. Jage Rame & Ors(l). and the State of Punjab\n\nv. M/s. Dial Chand Gian Cha.nd & Co.(2} laying down that persons who offer their bids.at an auction to vend country liquor with full knowledge of the terms' and conditions attaching thereto, . cannot be permitted to wriggle out of the contractual obligations arising ouf of the_ acceptance of their bids by a petition under Art .• 226 of the Constitution.\n\n(I) [ 1980] 3 SCR 746.\n\n(2) [t983l 2 sec so3.\n\n732 SlJPREM, E COlJRT REPORTS\n\n[1984) 3 S.C.R -\n\nCivil Appeal No. 155 (N) of 1971\n\nAt an auction for the licence of retail vend for.Butaila in the . Rohtak district for the financial year 1968-69 held by the Deputy Excise & Taxation Commissioner on March 11, 1968 at the Collectorate, Rohtak, the respondents Messrs Ram Kishan Pritiam Singh & Co. offered the highest bid of Rs. 1,40,000. The Deputy Excise & Taxation Commissioner accepted their bid at the conclusion on the auction. On the same day, the respondents deposited Rs. 5,~11 equivalent to one-twentieth of the licenc.e fee repres!'nting the security amount and started operating the said licence w.e.f. April 1 1968.\n\nIt appears that they drew their supplies by making applications to the Excise & Taxation Officer, Rohtak for the issuance of challans for deposits of still-head duty in the treasury, and after crediting into the trsury a sum equivalent to the excise duty payable on the. strength of permits issued by him.\n\nAdmittedly, the respondents worked the contraet throughour the . period without making any payment of Rs. 1,40,000 towards the'licence fee which was payable in 23 fortnightly instalments. The respondents on being served with a notice of demand for payment of Rs. 13,000 representing the first of such fortnightly instalmants filed a writ petition in the High Court and the High Court following its decision in Kanhiya Lal's ca.se, supra, struck down the notice o( demand. It is accepted at the bar that the respondents have not paid anything towards the licence fee of s. 1,40,000 due and payable by them.\n\nUpmfthese facts, the Excise & Taxation Commissioner would have been justified in!cancelling1(the licence-in terms of r.36(23)(2) of the Rules which is' in these terms :\n\n\"A p, erson to whom a country spirit shop is sold shall pay the annual licence fee in 23 equal instalments, e.ach instalment being payable\" on the 10th and 26th of each month starting.from the month of April.\n\nIn the event of G failure to pay the instalment by the due date, his licence may be cancelled.\"\n\nThere was a fundamental breach of an essential condition by the respondents. In a commercial contract of this nature, for the H performance of which a definite time has been fixed arid the contract specifies the mode of -payment i.e. specifies -the dates on which the instalments of the licence fee are to be paid, time is of the essence\n\n- ·{\" ..\n\n. .\n\n...._'\n\nof the contract. R .36(23)(1) of the Rules specifically makes time of the essence: It therefore follows that payment to the instalments on the due dates was a condition pe-requisite to the performance of the contract, and that the failure of the respondents to make such payments relieved the State Government. of their obligations.\n\nThe Excise & Taxation Commissioner would therefore have been justified if he had cancelled the licence l!nder r. 36(23) and put the\" liquor vend to reauction for the remaining period of the financial year.\n\nInstead of taking this drastic step of fancellation of contract, the Deputy Excise & Taxation Commissioner served the respondents with the impugned notice of demand for payment of . the first fortnigtly instalment of Rs. 13,000. The respondents were bound to pay the defaulted instalment on the due date but without complying .with the notice of demand moved the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution challenging the demand on the ground that the licence fee partakes of ihe nature on an excise duty. As already stated, the High Court following its decision in Kanhiya Lal's case struck down the notice of demand. The result has been that the respondents enjoyed the privilege of retail vend of country liquor, Butana for the entire piod without payments of any licence fee. On merits, learned counsel appearing for the respondents had nothing to urge against the impugned notice of demand. 4\n\nThe result therefore is .that the appeals succeed and are allowed with costs throughout. The judgment and orders of the High Court dated November 11, 1969 quashing the impugned notice of demand served on the respondents are set aside and the writ petitions filed by the respondents are dismissed.\n\nN.V.K. 4ppeals allowed.\n\nD ..\n\nE ,", "total_entities": 138, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF HARYANA & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7, "end_char": 29, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF HARYANA & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "LAL CHAND & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 38, "end_char": 53, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "LAL CHAND & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "May 2, 1984", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 56, "end_char": 67, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. •\n\nLAL CHAND & ORS:\n\nMay 2, 1984 B\n\n. ("}}, {"text": "D.A. DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 74, "end_char": 84, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.A. 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"ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The nspondents\n\nreprcse.nted t4at b:'!forc the auction it \\Vas announcej that no wine shop would be opened wit-bin a radius of thrCe miles of the liquor vend but acro5s\n\nthe bo1der the State Government of J'unjab had sanctioned the establishment of\n\na liquor Shop Which was hardly 2-1 {1 miles from the border and tbis-would inean that there would be two_ country liquor shops one in the State of IIaryana and the Other in the State of Punjab and this was in breach of condition No."}}, {"text": "Art. 299(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4482, "end_char": 4493, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 299(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4599, "end_char": 4610, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 299(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5116, 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'"}}, {"text": "April 12, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7082, "end_char": 7096, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "April 12, 1969 r.escind the contract on the prete'xt that the State Government of Punjab had opened a new iiquor shop across the State border."}}, {"text": "State Government of Punjab", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7395, "end_char": 7421, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "April 12, 1969 r.escind the contract on the prete'xt that the State Government of Punjab had opened a new iiquor shop across the State border."}}, {"text": "Har Shanker", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8017, "end_char": 8028, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "73JGJ\n\nHar Shanker&' Ors.v.", "canonical_name": "Har Shanker"}}, {"text": "(1980) 3 SCR 746", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 8150, "end_char": 8166, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "CIYIL APPELLATE JURISDCJTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9614, "end_char": 9642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "720G] '\n\nCIYIL APPELLATE JURISDCJTION : Civil Appeal Nos."}}, {"text": "Harbans Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9842, "end_char": 9855, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Harbans Singh, 1.S. 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Munjra/", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9994, "end_char": 10006, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T.S. Munjra/ and Mrs. Urmila KaJ!oor for the Respondent in\n\n."}}, {"text": "Urmila KaJ!oor", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10016, "end_char": 10030, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "T.S. Munjra/ and Mrs. Urmila KaJ!oor for the Respondent in\n\n."}}, {"text": "s 8", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10522, "end_char": 10525, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 60", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10625, "end_char": 10630, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Punjab Excise Act 1914", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10639, "end_char": 10661, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Punjab Liquor Ucence Rules, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11173, "end_char": 11205, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Lal Chand Bal Rai,.ctc", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11252, "end_char": 11274, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondents Messrs Lal Chand Bal Rai,.ctc."}}, {"text": "March ~I. 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11628, "end_char": 11642, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subsequently, the bid was\n\n accepted by the Excise & Taxation Commissioner exorcising the powers of the Financial commissioner on March ~I. 1969 as requi red under r. 36(22) of the Rules."}}, {"text": "Punjab Excise Act, 1914", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12281, "end_char": 12304, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Mandi Dabwali", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12573, "end_char": 12586, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in\n\nresponse to the same, the respondents by their letter dated .April 12, 1969 tried to wriggle out of their contractual obligations by saying that before the auction.it was announced.that no wine shop shall be opened .within a radius of three miles of liquor vend, Mandi Dabwali, but across the border the."}}, {"text": "Killlanwali", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12705, "end_char": 12716, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State Government of Punjab had sanctioned the establishment ofa liquor shop at village .. Killlanwali."}}, {"text": "Killianwali", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12908, "end_char": 12919, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "which was hardly 2-1/2 miles from the State border and this would mean that there would be two country liquor shops-·\n\none at Mandi Dabwali in .the State of Haryana and the other at village Killianwali in the State of Punjab and this was in breach of condition ~, o, !"}}, {"text": "April 23, 1.969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14059, "end_char": 14074, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondents have purposely kept back the reply that they received frnm the Deputy Excise & Taxation commissioner conveying the rejection of their representation which intimated to them that the licence for retail yend of country liquor shop at , Mandi Dabwali would be re-auctioned on April 23, 1.969 at the \"' Collectorate, Hissar."}}, {"text": "Ambala", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 14499, "end_char": 14505, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Copies of the circularletter and the notice of re-auction were sent not only to the commissioner, Ambala and all the Deputy Commissioners in the State but also to tle Chief S ecretaries and the Excise Commissioners of diffo- 1, - rent States and they were also requested \"to give wide publicity in their States regarding the re-auction of the licence."}}, {"text": "April 23, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14789, "end_char": 14803, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "time of re-auction held on April 23, 1969, there were as many as 52 bidders and ultimately the liquor vend, Mandi Dabwali was re-sold at the highest bid of Rs, 6,65,000 for the remaining part of the financial year."}}, {"text": "May 8, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14980, "end_char": 14991, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On May 8, 1969, the respondnts were served with a notice of demand of Rs."}}, {"text": "Kanhiya Lal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15301, "end_char": 15312, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court following its decision in Kanhiya Lal's case, fopra, held that the State Government had no authority to demand the amounts for failure of which the vends were pot to re-auction on the ground that the licence fee l_evied was in the uature of excise duty.", "canonical_name": "Kanhiya Lal"}}, {"text": "Kanhiya Lat", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15641, "end_char": 15652, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "reversed the decision of the High Court in Kanhiya Lat's .case, supra, and held that the amo.unts which the State \"- ' Government had charged to the respondents were neither in the nature of a tax nor in the nature of an excise duty but were.in the nature of a price.", "canonical_name": "Kanhiya Lal"}}, {"text": "July 23, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16221, "end_char": 16234, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "343of1969 decided on July 23, 1969."}}, {"text": "s.27", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16747, "end_char": 16751, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S.34", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17128, "end_char": 17132, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17508, "end_char": 17511, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S.59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17945, "end_char": 17949, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S.59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18452, "end_char": 18456, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S.60", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18458, "end_char": 18462, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Punjab Liquor Licence Rules, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19011, "end_char": 19044, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s.59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19118, "end_char": 19122, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "The Punjab Liquor Licence Rules, 1956", "statute": "The Punjab Liquor Licence Rules, 1956"}}, {"text": "s.60", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20370, "end_char": 20374, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Excise Act, 1914", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20390, "end_char": 20406, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Hinh Courts", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 20537, "end_char": 20548, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "this Court held that the writ jurisdiction of the Hinh Courts under Art.226 was not intended to facilitate avoidance f obligations voluntarily incurrd."}}, {"text": "Art.226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20555, "end_char": 20562, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Excise Act, 1914", "statute": "Excise Act, 1914"}}, {"text": "HARYANA \"LAL CllAND", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21037, "end_char": 21056, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "HARYANA \"LAL CllAND (Sen, J.) 723\n\nout of the contractual .obligations arising out of the acceptance of his bid .. Chandrachud, J. (as he then was) interpreting the provisions of the Punjab Exci.se Act, 1914 and of the Punjab Liquor Licence A Rules, 1956 and speaking for the Court, said:\n\n\"The.. announcement of conditions governing the auction were in the nature of an invitation to an offer to .those who were interested in thesaleof country liquor."}}, {"text": "Chandrachud", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 21152, "end_char": 21163, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "HARYANA \"LAL CllAND (Sen, J.) 723\n\nout of the contractual .obligations arising out of the acceptance of his bid .. Chandrachud, J. (as he then was) interpreting the provisions of the Punjab Exci.se Act, 1914 and of the Punjab Liquor Licence A Rules, 1956 and speaking for the Court, said:\n\n\"The.. announcement of conditions governing the auction were in the nature of an invitation to an offer to .those who were interested in thesaleof country liquor."}}, {"text": "Punjab Liquor Licence A Rules, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21256, "end_char": 21291, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22817, "end_char": 22825, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Har Shanker", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 22870, "end_char": 22881, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "observations in Har Shanker's .case, supra, did not touch.", "canonical_name": "Har Shanker"}}, {"text": "[1980] 3 SCR 746", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 23306, "end_char": 23322, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sec 503", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23338, "end_char": 23345, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "SU~REME COURT", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 23348, "end_char": 23361, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SU~REME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1984] 3 S.C.R. _..,\n\nattction."}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 23509, "end_char": 23534, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nanhibai v The Excise Commissioner, M.P. & Ors.(1) the Madhya Pradesh High Court held ihai the."}}, {"text": "Excise Act, 1915", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23723, "end_char": 23739, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "P.V. Dixit", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23871, "end_char": 23881, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.V. Dixit; C.J .. speaking for the • •.' Court made following observations on."}}, {"text": "ss. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24162, "end_char": 24168, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Excise Act, 1915", "statute": "Excise Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "iodhya Prasad Shaw", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25410, "end_char": 25428, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In A, iodhya Prasad Shaw's case, the Orissa High Court and in."}}, {"text": "Orissa High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 25441, "end_char": 25458, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In A, iodhya Prasad Shaw's case, the Orissa High Court and in."}}, {"text": "Shree Krishna Gyanodaj\"s", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 25472, "end_char": 25496, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M/s. Shree Krishna Gyanodaj\"s case, th'e Patna High Court interpreting like provisions oftheBihar & Orissa Excise Act, 1915 held that where the State Government in exercise of its powers\n\nunde~ s .. 22 of that Ac.t grants exclusive pivilege to any perso~ on certain conditions under s. 22 (I) and a licence .is received."}}, {"text": "Orissa Excise Act, 1915", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 25567, "end_char": 25590, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25750, "end_char": 25755, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Orissa Excise Act, 1915", "statute": "Orissa Excise Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "s. 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25809, "end_char": 25814, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Orissa Excise Act, 1915", "statute": "Orissa Excise Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "Art. 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25950, "end_char": 25958, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Orissa Excise Act, 1915", "statute": "Orissa Excise Act, 1915"}}, {"text": "R:N. Misra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25982, "end_char": 25992, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R:N. Misra, J. speakin'g for the Court in Ajo1ihya Prasad Shaw's case tried to highlight the problem in these words:\n\n\"Law."}}, {"text": "Ajo1ihya Prasad Shaw", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26024, "end_char": 26044, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R:N. Misra, J. speakin'g for the Court in Ajo1ihya Prasad Shaw's case tried to highlight the problem in these words:\n\n\"Law."}}, {"text": "Art. 299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27089, "end_char": 27097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Shrce Krishna", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27696, "end_char": 27709, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In M/s. Shrce Krishna's case, supra, !'"}}, {"text": "LP. Singh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27727, "end_char": 27736, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "LP."}}, {"text": "s 22", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27844, "end_char": 27848, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 29", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28338, "end_char": 28345, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 299(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28858, "end_char": 28869, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 299(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28965, "end_char": 28976, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 299(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29474, "end_char": 29485, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "K.P. Chowdhary", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29947, "end_char": 29961, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "by this Court i11 K.P. Chowdhary's, M ulamchand; s, Rattan-Lal' s and Firm Gobardhan."}}, {"text": "[1966) 3 S.C.R. 919", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 30043, "end_char": 30062, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Indian Forest Act, 1927", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30186, "end_char": 30209, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Art. 299(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30445, "end_char": 30456, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Forest Act, 1927", "statute": "the Indian Forest Act, 1927"}}, {"text": "Punjab Excise Act, 1914", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30478, "end_char": 30501, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State Excise Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30519, "end_char": 30535, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 299(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30858, "end_char": 30869, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "State Excise Act", "statute": "State Excise Act"}}, {"text": "Mulamchand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 30987, "end_char": 30997, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "once this distinction i's kept in view, it will be manifest that tlie principles laid down in K.P. Chowdhary's, Mulamchand's, Rattan Laf's and Firm Gobardhan Dass' cases are not applicable to a statutory contrah."}}, {"text": "Rattan Laf", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31001, "end_char": 31011, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "once this distinction i's kept in view, it will be manifest that tlie principles laid down in K.P. Chowdhary's, Mulamchand's, Rattan Laf's and Firm Gobardhan Dass' cases are not applicable to a statutory contrah."}}, {"text": "Firm Gobardhan Dass", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31018, "end_char": 31037, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "once this distinction i's kept in view, it will be manifest that tlie principles laid down in K.P. Chowdhary's, Mulamchand's, Rattan Laf's and Firm Gobardhan Dass' cases are not applicable to a statutory contrah."}}, {"text": "Art. 299(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31660, "end_char": 31671, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 299(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31822, "end_char": 31833, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "We are clearly of the opinion that in the case of a statutory contract like the one under the Excise Act", "statute": "We are clearly of the opinion that in the case of a statutory contract like the one under the Excise Act"}}, {"text": "s.28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31931, "end_char": 31935, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "We are clearly of the opinion that in the case of a statutory contract like the one under the Excise Act", "statute": "We are clearly of the opinion that in the case of a statutory contract like the one under the Excise Act"}}, {"text": "s.60", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32001, "end_char": 32005, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "We are clearly of the opinion that in the case of a statutory contract like the one under the Excise Act", "statute": "We are clearly of the opinion that in the case of a statutory contract like the one under the Excise Act"}}, {"text": "Art.299", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32109, "end_char": 32116, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "We are clearly of the opinion that in the case of a statutory contract like the one under the Excise Act", "statute": "We are clearly of the opinion that in the case of a statutory contract like the one under the Excise Act"}}, {"text": "s.28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32237, "end_char": 32241, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "We are clearly of the opinion that in the case of a statutory contract like the one under the Excise Act", "statute": "We are clearly of the opinion that in the case of a statutory contract like the one under the Excise Act"}}, {"text": "s.28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32414, "end_char": 32418, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "We are clearly of the opinion that in the case of a statutory contract like the one under the Excise Act", "statute": "We are clearly of the opinion that in the case of a statutory contract like the one under the Excise Act"}}, {"text": "s.28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32545, "end_char": 32549, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "We are clearly of the opinion that in the case of a statutory contract like the one under the Excise Act", "statute": "We are clearly of the opinion that in the case of a statutory contract like the one under the Excise Act"}}, {"text": "s.28", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32971, "end_char": 32975, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art.299(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33147, "end_char": 33157, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Kishori Lal Minochu", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33267, "end_char": 33286, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Kishori Lal Minochu's case, supra, there was reauction of a liquor vend on the highest bidder's failure to deposit one-sixth of the bid amount as security deposit and the question was whether the\n\nSate.waserititled to recover in a suit the deficiency on reauction."}}, {"text": "Minocha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 33550, "end_char": 33557, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in Minocha's case Is clearly distinguishable fqr two reasons : first, there was nothing to show that the bid had been accepted by the Excise Commissionerunder r ."}}, {"text": "s.77", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33887, "end_char": 33891, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Excise Act, 1910", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 33904, "end_char": 33920, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s.60", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34283, "end_char": 34287, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Excise Act, 1910", "statute": "Excise Act, 1910"}}, {"text": "State of Haryana", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 36324, "end_char": 36340, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the State of Haryana as well as in other States\n\n' regarding the date and place of re.auction as."}}, {"text": "Jage Ram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 36557, "end_char": 36565, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decision in Jage Ram's case, supra is clearly distinguishable on facts."}}, {"text": "cl.33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38524, "end_char": 38529, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State\n\nGovernment of Punjab", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 39515, "end_char": 39542, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The responoents could not unilaterally by their letter da\\ed 'April 12, 1969 rescind the contract on the pretext that the State\n\nGovernment of Punjab hud opened a new liqur shop at village Killianwali across the State border whfoh was contrary to condition No."}}, {"text": "Slak Government of Punjab", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 40364, "end_char": 40389, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "auction began as required under r. 36(4), there was no mention that there was an jnter-State areement between the two State Governments nd tha\\\n\nHARYANA v. LAL CUAND (Sen, J.) 731\n\nit was a condition of sale that the Slak Government of Punjab would not open a liquor vend within a radius of three miles from the State border."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40968, "end_char": 40976, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "1980] 3 SCR 746", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 42579, "end_char": 42594, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Ram Kishan Pritiam Singh & Co.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 42936, "end_char": 42966, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rohtak district for the financial year 1968-69 held by the Deputy Excise & Taxation Commissioner on March 11, 1968 at the Collectorate, Rohtak, the respondents Messrs Ram Kishan Pritiam Singh & Co. offered the highest bid of Rs."}}, {"text": "April 1 1968", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 43284, "end_char": 43296, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "April 1 1968."}}, {"text": "s. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44175, "end_char": 44179, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 45973, "end_char": 45981, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Butana", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 46312, "end_char": 46318, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The result has been that the respondents enjoyed the privilege of retail vend of country liquor, Butana for the entire piod without payments of any licence fee."}}, {"text": "November 11, 1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 46632, "end_char": 46649, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The judgment and orders of the High Court dated November 11, 1969 quashing the impugned notice of demand served on the respondents are set aside and the writ petitions filed by the respondents are dismissed."}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_3_734_737_EN", "year": 1984, "text": ", RAM SARUP\n\n-STATE OF BARY ANA & ORS.\n\nMay3, 1984 .. [Y.V. CHANDRACHUD c;.J, D.P. MADON, AND RANGA NATH f\n\nMISRA, JJ.J\n\nPanchayat Samitls, and Zilla Paris'1ads Act, 1961 a.r amended by Harayna Ame1Jdment .Act of 1973 de!etiilg Section 33, Effect of-Whether af)y tzppointlizenf made after the deletion of Section 33 valid effective. rf\n\nSection 33 of the Punjab Panchayat Samitis and Zilla Parishads Act, 1961 provided that subject to rules made by the Govetnment, a Panchayat Sariliti may employ such servants as it n1ay consider necessary for the efficienrPerfor- mancc of the dufies imposed upon it by the Act,. i; ules or bye-laws.made there- unde( o~ by any other law for the time beilig in force. The Punjab Panchayat Samitis and Zilla Parishads (Haryana Amendment Act, j973 which came into force from June, 13, 1973', introduced extenSive ar!lendments. Section 33 of the Act was deleted by Section 13 of the Amending Act, Sub section (4) of Section\n\n14 theAmending Act, provided that persos.empJoyed by a Panchayat Samiti before April 4, 1973 and who .were in service .at the commecement of the Amending Act, \"shall colninue to serve on the. same terms and conditions on which they \"'ere employed by the J>anchayat Samiti\" until th.ey are absorbed in the G.overnment Service or retire in sch mannei as m.cy be prescribed. Section . 35(1) of the Act empowers the State-Government to place at the disposa 1 of a\n\n. Panchayat Samiti such of its servants as lrc required for the implementation of the schemes annexed therewith and for such other duties and .fUnCtions as may be assigned to then1 by the Panchayat Samitis from time to timee.\n\nThe appellant was appointed as a clerk on Julle I, 1963 by the Panchayat Sarniti, Loharu; He .was confirmed. in that post in course of rime. On January 21,.1974, he was promoted as a Head Clerk lQn an adhoc basis. On March, 14 -1975 a resolution was passed by the Samitl regularising the post of Head Clerk.\n\nOn April 1, 1975, the appellant'was appoioted ~:s a Head Cl.erk. Acting in pursuance of the provision of Section 14(4) of the the Amending Act, the Government of Haryana notified the absorption o_f the appellant-as 3. clerk. though hC was worki'ng as a:Head Clerk' since January 21, 1974.\" B:ing aggriev~ ed the appellant filed a Writ Petition and prayed for il direction to absofb him as a\"Head Clerk .. The Writ Petition having been. dismised by the High Court, the appellanths filed this appeal by special leave;\n\nDismissing. the appeal, the _Court,\n\nHELD: LJ. The Panchayat Samiti had no right to appoint the appellant to the post of Had Clerk on the date on Which it purported tQ dO so. As a result of the <leletion of Section 33 of the Act by the Amending Act of 1973, the\n\n\\ .\n\nRAM Si\\RUP v. HARYANA (Chandrachud, C.J.) 735\n\nPanchayat Samiti lost its. power to make appointment to the Parichayat. It could not ther.efore have appointed the appellant as a Head Clefk, as it purported to d(}-so, in January,· 1974 on an adhoc basis or in April 1965 On a , regular basis. [737D]\n\n, J .2. Thoughthe right to be considered. for promotion is a term and condi-\n\n- tion of service, in the instant case, the_ appointment .of the appellant to the post\n\nofa Head CJerk being without the authority of law, the Government was nOt bound to absorb him in. the post of a Head Clerk; He was appointed 1awfu1Jy to the post of a clerk and that fs the pst in which the Government' has absorbed him; [737C ; El\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1433 of . c 1977\n\nAppeal by Special leave from the Judgment and Order. datd the !6th.February, 1977. of the Punj1b and Haryana High Court in\n\nCivil Writ Petition No. 752 of 1977.\n\nJ.D. Jain & Mrs. Kawa/jit Kocher for the Appellant.\n\nHarban.; Lai, l.S. Goel & R.N. Poddar for the Respondent.\n\n• The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRACl!UD, CJ. Section 33 of the Punjab Panchayat Samitis and Zilla Parishads Act, 1961 (\"The Act\")\" provided in so far as relevant, that subject to rules made by the Government, a Pai:J.chayat Samiti may employ such servants as it may consider ne.cessary for the efficient performance of the duties imposed upon it by the Act, rules or bye-laws made thereunder or by any other law for the time being in force.\n\nIn p, ursuance of this power, the appellant was appointed as a clerk on June 1, 1963 by the Panchayat Samiti, Loharu, which is respondent 3 in this appeal.\n\nHe was confirmed in that po.st in course of time. On J'anuary 21, 1974 he was promo.ted as a Head Clerk on an ad lzc basis. On March 14, 1975 a resolution was passed by .respondent 3 regularising the post of Head Clerk . . On April 1; 1975, the appellant was appointed as a Head Clerk.\n\nThe Punjab Panchayat SamitisJ Zilla Parishads (Haryana Amendment) Act, 1973 introduced extensive.amendments in the Act of 1961. Section 13 of the Amending Act deleted section 33 of the Act. , A plain consequence of this deletion was that the Panchayat Samitis were divested of their power to make allPointments to the Panchayats. The Amending Act re1ieived the assent of the Governor\n\n736 '.'lll'RJMB COURT REPORTS l\\9S4J 3 S.C.ll\n\non April 25, 1973 and was published in the Haryana Gazette on June 13, 1973:\n\nSections 35(1) of the Act empowers tbe State Govrnment to place at the disposal of a Panchayat Samiti such of its servants as are required for the implementation of the schemes connected therewith and for such other duties and fuµctions as may be assigned to them by the Panchayat Samiti from time to time. Section 35(3) which dealt with the conditions . of. service of the Government servants allotted to the Panchayai Sam.tis, was amended by section · 14 of the Amending AC! of 1973. Sub-section (4) of section 14 of the Amending Act provides that persons employed by a Panchayat\n\nSamiti before April 1, 1973 and who were in s.ervice at the commencement of the Amending Act, \"shall continue to service on the same terms and conditions on which they were employed by the Panchayat Saroiti\", until they are absorbedin the Government service or retire in such manner as may be pres?ribed.\n\n• 'Acting in pursuance of the provision of section 14(4) of the Amending Act, the Government of Haryana notified the absorption of the apellant as a clerk though, as stated earlier. he . wa.s working as a Head Clerk in the Loharu Panchayat Samiti. Being aggrieved by his absorption on a lower post, he filed a writ petition in the High Cput of Punjab and Haryana, asking that he .should be absorbed as a Head Clerk. The writ ptition having been dismissed by th~ High Court, the appellant has filed. this appeal' by special leave. ...\n\nThe appellant was appointed as a clerk by the Loharu Panchayat Samiti in 1963, long before the .. Amending Act came into for<; e on June 13, 1973.\n\nHe was, therefore, entitled to be absorbed in Government service as a clerk in any event. But, as a result of the deletion of section 33 of the Act by the Amending Act of 1973, the Panchayat Samiti lost its power to make appointments to the Panchayat. The fact that th, e appellant was promoted as a Head Clerk of\\ an ad hoc basis in January 1974, or the further fact.that he was appointed as a Head Clerk on April l; 1975, cannot improve his position for the simple reason that these appointments we.e made after June 13, 1973, being the date on which the Panchayat\n\nSamiti lost its power to make appointments to the Panchayat.\n\n' ' .\n\n• • .,\n\n;.. . . !-\n\n. ,./\n\nRAM SARUP v. HARYANA (Chandrachud, CJ.) 131\n\nIt is urged by Shri Jain who appears on behalf of the appellant that by reason of section 14(4) of the Amending Act, the appellant was entitled to continue in the service of the Panchayat on the same terms and conditions on which he was employed by the Panchayat Samiti until he was absorbed in Government service. Since the appellant, according to the terms and conditions of his service with the Panchayat, was entitled to be considered for promotion to the post of a Head Clerk, his appointment s a Head Clerk prior to his\n\nabsorption in Government service had to be recognised and protec- ted, despite the fact that such appointment was made after June 13, 1973 when the Amending Act came into force. There is no substance in this contenion. Even assuming for the purposes of argument that the right to be considered for promotion is a term and condition of service, what is relevant for . our purpose is not whether the appellant was entitled to be considered for promotion but, whef(el' the Panchayat. Samiti had the right to appoint him t6 the post of Head Clerk on the date on which it purported to do so. Clearly, it had forfeited that right on June 13, 1973.\n\nIt could not, therefore, have appointed the appellant as a Head Clerk, as it pnrported te> do, in January 1974 on an ad hoc basis or in April 1675 on a regular basis. .The. appointment of the appellant to the post of a Head Clerk being without the authority of law, the Government was not bound to absorb. him in the post of a Head Clerk. He was appointed lawfully to the post of a Clerk and that is the post in which the Government has absorbed him.\n\nFor these reasons, the appeal fails and is dismissed. There will be \"no order as to costs.\n\nS.R Appeal dismisseJ.", "total_entities": 42, "entities": [{"text": "RAM SARUP", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2, "end_char": 11, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAM SARUP", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF BARY ANA & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 14, "end_char": 37, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF HARYANA & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Y.V. CHANDRACHUD", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 55, "end_char": 71, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Y.V. CHANDRACHUD*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "D.P. MADON", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 78, "end_char": 88, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.P. MADON", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MISRA, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 108, "end_char": 117, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RANGANATH MISRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 228, "end_char": 238, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 305, "end_char": 315, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 337, "end_char": 347, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Punjab Panchayat Samitis and Zilla Parishads Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 355, "end_char": 409, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Haryana Amendment Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 753, "end_char": 774, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 860, "end_char": 870, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Haryana Amendment Act", "statute": "Haryana Amendment Act"}}, {"text": "Section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 897, "end_char": 907, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Haryana Amendment Act", "statute": "Haryana Amendment Act"}}, {"text": "Section\n\n14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 948, "end_char": 959, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Haryana Amendment Act", "statute": "Haryana Amendment Act"}}, {"text": "April 4, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1036, "end_char": 1049, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 33 of the Act was deleted by Section 13 of the Amending Act, Sub section (4) of Section\n\n14 theAmending Act, provided that persos.empJoyed by a Panchayat Samiti before April 4, 1973 and who .were in service .at the commecement of the Amending Act, \"shall colninue to serve on the."}}, {"text": "January 21,.1974,", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1789, "end_char": 1806, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On January 21,.1974, he was promoted as a Head Clerk lQn an adhoc basis."}}, {"text": "April 1, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1957, "end_char": 1970, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 1, 1975, the appellant'was appoioted ~:s a Head Cl.erk."}}, {"text": "Section 14(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2059, "end_char": 2072, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of Haryana", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2102, "end_char": 2123, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Acting in pursuance of the provision of Section 14(4) of the the Amending Act, the Government of Haryana notified the absorption o_f the appellant-as 3."}}, {"text": "Section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2678, "end_char": 2688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "J.D. Jain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3680, "end_char": 3689, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J.D. Jain & Mrs. Kawa/jit Kocher for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "Kawa/jit Kocher", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3697, "end_char": 3712, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J.D. Jain & Mrs. Kawa/jit Kocher for the Appellant."}}, {"text": "S. Goel", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3749, "end_char": 3756, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lai, l.S. Goel & R.N. Poddar for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "R.N. Poddar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3759, "end_char": 3770, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lai, l.S. Goel & R.N. Poddar for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "CHANDRACl!UD", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3838, "end_char": 3850, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nCHANDRACl!UD, CJ."}}, {"text": "Section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3856, "end_char": 3866, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Punjab Panchayat Samitis and Zilla Parishads Act, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3874, "end_char": 3928, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Loharu", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 4363, "end_char": 4369, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In p, ursuance of this power, the appellant was appointed as a clerk on June 1, 1963 by the Panchayat Samiti, Loharu, which is respondent 3 in this appeal."}}, {"text": "J'anuary 21, 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4463, "end_char": 4480, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On J'anuary 21, 1974 he was promo.ted as a Head Clerk on an ad lzc basis."}}, {"text": "March 14, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4537, "end_char": 4551, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On March 14, 1975 a resolution was passed by .respondent 3 regularising the post of Head Clerk . ."}}, {"text": "April 1; 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4636, "end_char": 4649, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On April 1; 1975, the appellant was appointed as a Head Clerk."}}, {"text": "Section 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4825, "end_char": 4835, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Punjab Panchayat Samitis and Zilla Parishads Act, 1961", "statute": "the Punjab Panchayat Samitis and Zilla Parishads Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4864, "end_char": 4874, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Punjab Panchayat Samitis and Zilla Parishads Act, 1961", "statute": "the Punjab Panchayat Samitis and Zilla Parishads Act, 1961"}}, {"text": "June 13, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5191, "end_char": 5204, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Amending Act re1ieived the assent of the Governor\n\n736 '.'lll'RJMB COURT REPORTS l\\9S4J 3 S.C.ll\n\non April 25, 1973 and was published in the Haryana Gazette on June 13, 1973:\n\nSections 35(1) of the Act empowers tbe State Govrnment to place at the disposal of a Panchayat Samiti such of its servants as are required for the implementation of the schemes connected therewith and for such other duties and fuµctions as may be assigned to them by the Panchayat Samiti from time to time."}}, {"text": "Sections 35(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5207, "end_char": 5221, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 35(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5514, "end_char": 5527, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5712, "end_char": 5722, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 14(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6139, "end_char": 6152, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "High Cput of Punjab and Haryana", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6427, "end_char": 6458, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Being aggrieved by his absorption on a lower post, he filed a writ petition in the High Cput of Punjab and Haryana, asking that he .should be absorbed as a Head Clerk."}}, {"text": "section 33", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6905, "end_char": 6915, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Jain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7508, "end_char": 7512, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "131\n\nIt is urged by Shri Jain who appears on behalf of the appellant that by reason of section 14(4) of the Amending Act, the appellant was entitled to continue in the service of the Panchayat on the same terms and conditions on which he was employed by the Panchayat Samiti until he was absorbed in Government service."}}, {"text": "section 14(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7570, "end_char": 7583, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Samiti", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8496, "end_char": 8502, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Samiti had the right to appoint him t6 the post of Head Clerk on the date on which it purported to do so."}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_3_738_742_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "'. >n\n\n; ' .\n\n_.--.\n\nF.',\n\n. ' ...\n\nSTATE.OFU:P.·\n\n.v.\n\nsURESH CHANDRA s.RIVASTAVA & ORS.·\n\n. . . . .\n\nMay 3, 1984 .\n\n[S. MURTAZA FA.zAL Au, A VARA~AAA1AN AND .\n\n· ·· · RAN~A~Arn MISR~, JJ, J\n\n. ; ' . . -- ' ,, Code of Criminal Procedurec...s, 195(/)(b)(ii°r-Scope of.,. . - . . .\n\nThe respondCntS.in the 3pp:al and the petitiones in\" th~ special lave . petitions were the same persoris arid ere erDvioyees o( : the.- AJlab-abaci_ High\n\n'CoUrt .. The:Y W(re found to. have femoved some. used court fee stamps from.\n\nol_d files and [e-usd them in new cases:· e Reiistrar_ with, th_e perinission of, . tbe.Chfof Justice of\"the High Court reported~., tlie matter: to ·.the .PoliCe~ . The\n\n.. Pofic.e after investigai.iofi subinitteci before the1rial Co~Ct three chargesheets for\n\noffnCes undei ss. 262. 263,. 467--471 and 120B, I.P.C. - In an application tiledby the resPondent for quashini-th~ PrOceedings, the High Cotirt. held that so far as the offences undcrsS:-467. 471 and 120B,. f.P.C. werC:concerned as they .fell\n\nwtbin the 3mbii o(secti_gn_ 195(J)(b)(ii)- Of the Criminal Procedure rio cogni-\n\n- zance could be en by thejriatcoU:rt without a complaint being filed, b\"ut for\n\nOthet offences the_ pro'ceeding~ Would continue. Hence these' cross appeitS and $pecial _Jeavc:: ptititofls. \" . '\n\n-:riisisSing the appe.als and the petitionS, ..\n\n. . - .\n\nHELD : The 1:aw .iS: ri0w wen 'settledthat Whe-re. an accused commits som~ Offences _which are: separate and distiflct frOm those contained_ in s.195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, s.195 .will affect.Only the offece; meritiOned there- . in unJesS: such offences form an intgral part scr aS-to amount to offl!nces committed _'as a part .Of the Sarrie transaction,_ in which case the other offences also. __ would fall within the ambit of s. !95:orthe Code. [741 Di .· ...\n\nIl\"the isiaiit case: On .the factsnarrated by the Registrar in his cOmPiaint no _offen-ce unciCr ss. 467, 471 and l20B, I.P.C. is at.all revealed. At the most\" the .· offe.nces against the accused would fall withiri. the ambit or sections 262, 263,' 380\n\n-.'-\" -\n\n.. I\n\n·~\n\nand 4iO, I.P.C; which do not require a compJ.ifnf under s. 195 of the Code of \\i....\n\nCriminal Prcicedurl!. .. As uch it._ is-ncit necessary -'to go iD.tO the qllesdon as 'to what offences are connected with ss~ 467.-471 and_ ·-120B and hkh are Severable-· -· .· from them .. The lligh Court waS fullY justifi.C_d. in quashirig the proCeediu&s • agaui\"st theaccµsed as far as. offe_D.ces under Ss-:' 467~-471 and 120B. I.P.C. were\n\nconrnd, not because they Were covered_ bys.~ 195. of .the. Code but because ciUegatiOns contained in. thC complaint_ did not . contstitUte these offences.• The\n\n_ lJ-igh Couti was_ further rutlr jtistified in dirCcting that other oences men\\ioned above did flat require a __ c_omplaintunder s.195.and _would veto be.tried. .., . \\ ·. . . ' .\n\n[741E-G[ , ..\n\n. •' \":. -~ -\n\ntJ.P, STATE v. s.c. SRIVASTAVA (Fazal Ali, J.) 739\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURSDICTION : Criminal Appeal Nos. 461-466 of 1980 • From the Judgment & Order dated 9.11.78 High Court in Criminal Misc. Application Nos. 1691 and 1698 of 1979.\n\n. AND\n\n' of the Allahaba<l 1655, 1656, 1657,\n\nSpecial Leave Petition Nos. 903-908 of 1984\n\n. Da!veer Bhandari & H.M. Singh for the appellant.\n\nP. Govindan Nair and Pramod Swarup for the respondent-.\n\nPramod Swarup for the petitioner in SLP Nos. 903-908 of 1984.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was deliveed by\n\nFAZAL ALI, J. These appeals by pecial leave 'arise out of a judgment dated January 9, 1979 of the Allahabad High Court refus.ing to quas\\l<lhe proceedings in toto which were pending before ·\n\nthe Chief J1,1dicial Magistrate, Allahabad, in exercise of ihe powers under s. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 {hereinafter to be referred to\" as the 'Code'). The High Court, howevet, quashed the proceedings only in respect of offences under ss. 467, 471 and 120B of the Indian Peria! Code and directed prosecution .of the respondents in respect of other offences to proceed according to law.\n\nIn order to understand the implication of the judgment of the High.\n\nCourt, it may be necessary to narrate a few facts.\n\nIt appears that some time in the year 1967 S.hankar Lal Bhargava, who was officiating as Stamp Reporter in the Registry of the Allahabad High Court, with the aid of Suresh Chandra Srivastava and Bishan Swarup, who were clerks of Advocates, removed used stamps and out of them reused three court-fee stamps\n\nof the value of Rs. JOO each. in First Civil Appea\\Nos. 281/67, 282/67 and L.57/67.\n\nWhen the niatter was detected; an enquiry was ordered and the Judidal Department of the High Court reported to the Registrar that court-fee stamps of the value of Rs. 23,007.50 p. (9n 15 sheets) were missing from the judicial file of First Appeal No. 186 of 1960. The enquiry further revealed that in several other cases also court-fee stamps had been taken out from the original files and reused in new cases. The Registrar of the High Court suspected that a ell-organised gang of racketeers was opeting in ihe High Court to defral!d the Government by urreptitiously\n\nI •\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984] 3 s.c.R.\n\n. ' \"'mciving the used stamps from the judicial files and re-using them in new cases.\n\nTh~ Registrar, with the permission o( the Chief Justice of the High Court, reported .. the matter to'the Inspector General of Police, l~, P., who ordered the Criminal Investigation Department of U.P. to investigate into the matter and ultimately three charge-s.heets Were submitted for offences under ss. 262, ;263, 467, 471, 420 and l'fOB of the Indian Penal Code.\n\nThe responde*ts filed an application before the High Court contending that as Offences under ss. 467, 471 and t20B, I.P.C. fell within the purview pf s. 194 of the Code, no prosecution could be launched without the procedure, laid down ins. 195, followed.\n\nIt is common ground hat no complaint as requ.ired by the mandatory proyisions of s. 195 of the Code having been made, the proceedings . . could not be proceded. The High Court held that so far as the offence under ss. 4p7, 47land 120B, l.P.C. were concerned as they fell within the ambit of s. 165((\\)b)(ii) of the Code, no co11nizance could be taken by 1the Magistrate without a complaint being filed.\n\nThe relevant portfon of s. 195(1J(b) inay be extracted thus :\n\n\"195.(1)\n\n1No Court shall take cognizance- . xx I xx xx\n\n(b)(ii) tjf any offence described in section 463, or punishable uder section 471, section ~475 or section 476, of the said I Code, when such offence is alleged to have been committed in respect of a document produced or given in evidence i~ a proceeding in any court, or\n\n(iii) of Jny criminal conspiracy to commit, or attempt to commit, r the ahtment of, any offence specified.in subclause (i) or sub-clause (ii), . ·\n\nexcept on th¢ complaint in writing of that Court, or of some other Court Ito Which that Court is subordinate.\"\n\nOn the fac)s mentioned above, it is clear to us that in the complaint sent byl the Registrar to the Inspector General of Police, offences mentiond were offences under ss. 262, 263,_ 467, 380, 420, and 4 71 but frbm a perusal of. the recitals in the original Memorandum which formed the basis of the complaint it seems to ns that the only offences which have made ont would be offences undet ss. 262, 26~, 380 and 420 which are obviously not covered, by ... s, 195 of the Cod'e.\n\n' . ' l.\n\nJ, ..\n\n\\J.P. STATB v. S.C. SRIVAS1AVA (Faza/ A/i, J.) 141\n\nThe High Court held that the offences under ss. 467, 471 and 120B, I.P.C. even if made out could not be taken cognizance of by the trial CO)lrt with.out a complaint under s. 195 of the Code.\n\nA perusal of the facts shows that there is .not even a hint regarding forging any document or using a forged document.\n\nTaking the complaint at its face \\alue, at the most the cases against the accused would fall within the ambit of ss. 262, 263, 380 and 420, I.P.C; which.do not require a complaint under s. 195. The fact that some persons aided and abetted the detaching Of the used stamps from the old Jiles and re-using them in the other cases does not involve\n\nany process of forgery or use of a. forged document.\n\nIn these circumstances, therefore, it is not necessary for. us to go into the broader question as to whether if offences under ss. 467, 471 and UOB, I.P.C. are committed, 1he complaint could proceed or not. The law is now well settled that where .an accused commits some offences which are separate and distinct from lhose contained in s. 195, and section 195 will affect only the offences mentioned therein unless such offences form an integral part so as to amount to oifellces committed as a part of the same !ransaction, i~ which case the other offences also would fall within the ambit of s. 195 of the Code.\n\nIn the instant case\", a(already pointed out by us, on the facts narrated by the Registrar in his complaint no offence under ss. 467, 471 and 120B, l.P.C. is at all revealed and as such it is not necessary to -go into the question as to what offences are connected with ss. 467, 471 and l 20B and which are severable from them.\" The High Court was fully justified In quashing the proceedings against the accused as.far as offences under ss.,467, 471 and 120B, I.P.C. were concerned, not because they were covered by s. ]f)5 of the Code but \"because allegations contained in the complaint did not constitute these. offences. The High Court was further fully justified in directing. that other offences mentioned above did not require a . complaint under s. 195 and wou.ld have to be tried.\n\nrn the view , that we . take it is not. necessary for us to decide the broader question of law posed by the High Court, i.e., whether\n\nor not offences under ss. 467, 471 and 120B, I.P.C. along with other H offences, were covered bys. 195 of the Code . •\n\nB ,\n\n SVPREME COURT REPORTS\n\nI (1984] 3 s. fl R.\n\nWe, therefore, affirm the judgment of the. High Court and dismiss theappeals and the special leave petitions and direct that\n\nI . . cases under sections 262, 263, 380/34 and 420/34, Indian Penal Code be tried without aily complaint under section 195 of the Code.\n\nH.S.K.\n\nAppeals & Petitions dismissed;·\n\n' • I", "total_entities": 60, "entities": [{"text": "\n\n. ' ...\n\nSTATE.OFU:P", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 25, "end_char": 47, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF U. P", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "sURESH CHANDRA s.RIVASTAVA & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 56, "end_char": 88, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "sURESH CHANDRA s.RIVASTAVA & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ss. 262", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 791, "end_char": 798, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 825, "end_char": 830, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s.195", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1501, "end_char": 1506, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1514, "end_char": 1540, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s.195", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1542, "end_char": 1547, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "ss. 467, 471", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1930, "end_char": 1942, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1953, "end_char": 1958, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "sections 262, 263", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2063, "end_char": 2080, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2116, "end_char": 2121, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 195", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2163, "end_char": 2169, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2526, "end_char": 2531, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s.195", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2830, "end_char": 2835, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Da!veer Bhandari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3239, "end_char": 3255, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Da!veer Bhandari & H.M. Singh for the appellant."}}, {"text": "H.M. Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3258, "end_char": 3268, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Da!veer Bhandari & H.M. Singh for the appellant."}}, {"text": "P. Govindan Nair", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3289, "end_char": 3305, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Govindan Nair and Pramod Swarup for the respondent-."}}, {"text": "Pramod Swarup", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3310, "end_char": 3323, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P. Govindan Nair and Pramod Swarup for the respondent-."}}, {"text": "FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3452, "end_char": 3461, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was deliveed by\n\nFAZAL ALI, J. These appeals by pecial leave 'arise out of a judgment dated January 9, 1979 of the Allahabad High Court refus.ing to quas\\l<lhe proceedings in toto which were pending before ·\n\nthe Chief J1,1dicial Magistrate, Allahabad, in exercise of ihe powers under s. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 {hereinafter to be referred to\" as the 'Code')."}}, {"text": "s. 482", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3720, "end_char": 3726, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3734, "end_char": 3766, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 467, 471 and 120B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3898, "end_char": 3919, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973"}}, {"text": "S.hankar Lal Bhargava", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4214, "end_char": 4235, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that some time in the year 1967 S.hankar Lal Bhargava, who was officiating as Stamp Reporter in the Registry of the Allahabad High Court, with the aid of Suresh Chandra Srivastava and Bishan Swarup, who were clerks of Advocates, removed used stamps and out of them reused three court-fee stamps\n\nof the value of Rs."}}, {"text": "Suresh Chandra Srivastava", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4336, "end_char": 4361, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that some time in the year 1967 S.hankar Lal Bhargava, who was officiating as Stamp Reporter in the Registry of the Allahabad High Court, with the aid of Suresh Chandra Srivastava and Bishan Swarup, who were clerks of Advocates, removed used stamps and out of them reused three court-fee stamps\n\nof the value of Rs.", "canonical_name": "sURESH CHANDRA s.RIVASTAVA & ORS"}}, {"text": "Bishan Swarup", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4366, "end_char": 4379, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that some time in the year 1967 S.hankar Lal Bhargava, who was officiating as Stamp Reporter in the Registry of the Allahabad High Court, with the aid of Suresh Chandra Srivastava and Bishan Swarup, who were clerks of Advocates, removed used stamps and out of them reused three court-fee stamps\n\nof the value of Rs."}}, {"text": "Criminal Investigation Department of U.P.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5421, "end_char": 5462, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Th~ Registrar, with the permission o( the Chief Justice of the High Court, reported .. the matter to'the Inspector General of Police, l~, P., who ordered the Criminal Investigation Department of U.P. to investigate into the matter and ultimately three charge-s.heets Were submitted for offences under ss."}}, {"text": "ss. 262", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5564, "end_char": 5571, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "OB of the Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5600, "end_char": 5627, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ss. 467, 471", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5723, "end_char": 5735, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "OB of the Indian Penal Code", "statute": "OB of the Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5746, "end_char": 5751, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 194", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5780, "end_char": 5786, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 195", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5968, "end_char": 5974, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "ss. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6101, "end_char": 6106, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 165((\\)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6178, "end_char": 6188, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 195(1J(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6315, "end_char": 6327, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 463", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6448, "end_char": 6459, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 471", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6480, "end_char": 6491, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 476", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6509, "end_char": 6520, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "ss. 262, 263", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7110, "end_char": 7122, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 262, 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7334, "end_char": 7345, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "ss. 467, 471 and 120B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7535, "end_char": 7556, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7558, "end_char": 7563, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 195", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7662, "end_char": 7668, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "ss. 262, 263, 380 and 420", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7916, "end_char": 7941, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7943, "end_char": 7948, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 195", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7989, "end_char": 7995, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "ss. 467, 471", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8330, "end_char": 8342, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8352, "end_char": 8357, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 195", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8539, "end_char": 8545, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "section 195", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8551, "end_char": 8562, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "s. 195", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8797, "end_char": 8803, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "ss. 467, 471 and 120B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8942, "end_char": 8963, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "ss. 467, 471", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9087, "end_char": 9099, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9277, "end_char": 9282, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 195", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9570, "end_char": 9576, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "ss. 467, 471 and 120B", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9764, "end_char": 9785, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9787, "end_char": 9792, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "sections 262, 263, 380", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10056, "end_char": 10078, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10094, "end_char": 10111, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 195", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10150, "end_char": 10161, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Indian Penal Code", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_3_743_751_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "74~\n\nDULAREY LODH\n\nTHE. IIIRD ADDL. DISTRICT JUDGE, KANPUR & ORS.\n\nMay 3, 1984\n\n[S. MURTAZA fAZAL, ALI AND A VARADARAJAN, JJ,]\n\nU.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting1 Rent a1.d Eviction\\ Act 1972, Section 9 & U.P. Urban Build:ngs (Regulation of Letting. Rent and Evict.ion) (Amendinent) Act )9'76- Decree of ev;.: ti on passed' again!d tenant under 1972 Act-Executing court holding decree fne-xecutable-'1976 Amendn1ent Act making ; ection 9 of 19]2 Act applici!blie with retrospective ef!ett--Decree of .. eviction whethef :revived and becorning operative and executable-Doctrine of\n\neclipse-Appllcability of:\n\nInterpretation of Statutes-Doctrine, of e'cliPse-Appllcability. of-When D arises .\n\n• The respondent 1and1ord filed a suit for ejectment in the year 1971 and obtained a decree for ejectment agatnst the appellant-tenant. By virtue of the provisions Qf the U.P. Urban Buiidings (Regulation of Letting, Rent\n\nand Eviction} Act, 1972; the cuse waS transferred to the court of -the Judge, Small Causes, who tried the case and passed a decree in ravour of the respondent. No appeal or revision was fil_cd agaii1st tbe saidjudgment.\n\nThereafter, the.decree-holders filed an execiition petition. The apPeJJant, raised a jurisdictional objection, on the basis of tlie judgmeDt of th\"e AJJaha~ bad High Court,.(K.K. Saksena v. S.N. Misra 1975ALR 360) to the effect\n\nthat the_ transfer of :the suit. before conferment Of the jurisdiction to the Judge, Small Causes Cort was.not coinpeteat and therefore, the decree \\vas not executable. The respondent's counsel contended that the suit would have to be tried all over ag<i.in and the Court held that t-he decree was without jurisdiction. The decree remained inexecutable, but bY vjrtue of the U.P.\n\nUrban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) (Amendment) Act, 1976 _s. 9 of the 1.972 Act was made applicable with reirospctive\n\neffect to remove 'he.injustice and remedy the mischief which had been caused to the decree-holders. As a reu't -of the amendment, the aforfsaid judgment of the Allahabad High Court stood .over ruled and effaced .\n\n.Jn view of the aforesaid amendment, the respondents filed an application before the EXecuting Court for revival of the suit and the decree, which was acceptd bYihe Court, and a Civil Revision ij.Jed against t_be siiid Order\n\nwas dismissed by the Hish Court, ,\n\n,744\n\nSUPREME COURT. REPORTS [1984] 3 s.c.R.\n\nA Jn the appcii.l lo this Coi.irt, it was contended on behalf of the\n\nappellant, that in icw of the Al!ahabad High Court decision and the r97 2 Act, the decree st9od set aside and could not be revived or made executable .even by the 1976 Aendment Act. ·\n\nDismissing the appeal,\n\ni ' HELD : I. iThe courts below Juve rightly decided that after the 1976 Amen.drnetit Act tfe decree became legally executable. [747A]\n\n2. By virh~ of the l 97 2 Act the decree could not have been set aside or invaHdafed and the only conequcnce wh.ich would ensue is that the decree wo'11d Pe lying dormant and could not be ext!:utd. OnCe the bar C placed by the 19V Aet is removed, by virtue of the doctrine of eclipse th<>\n\ndecree will revive. and become at once operative and executable,\n\n[7SOH; 75 IA]\n\n3. 'Even i1 the 1972 Act were to apply, the utmost\" consequence would be that th~ decree would remain inexecutable but could not bo struck off from the reco.Tds of the case. This is a clear case Where the doctrine of eclipse would ap1)ly, and {n view of the 1976 Amendment Act, the decree D will revive and ecome ·-executable. This principl~ has been applied by this Court. in severaf cases and 11.ows from the well-known doctrine of eclipse.\n\nwhich bas been rnunciated not only ip. India but in other countries also.\n\n. · .\n\n(7470-H)\n\nI . Bhikajl t\\{arain Dhakrai & Ors. v. Stats of Madhya Pradesh & Anr; [1955] 2 SCR S89, Deep Chandv' SrQte ofU.P. &Ors; (1959] 2 Supp. SCR E s, Mahendra Lal.laini v. The State of Urtar Pradesh & Ors; [1963] I Supp.\n\nSCR 912, S .A.balag; P v.n. Dcvarajan; [198\"4] 2 SCC 91, Kai/ash Sankar v.\n\nSmt. Maya Dev(; (1984] 2 SCC 91, referred to ..\n\nC1v1L ~~PELLATE Ju1so1cnoN : CiviJ Appeal No. 1574 of'l980.\n\nAppeal lby Special leave from the, Judgment and Orcler dated' F tlie27.719791ofthe Allahabad High Conrt i.n C.M.W .. No. Nil of 19.79.\n\nAnil DJv Singh, S.L. Aneja and KL. Taneja for the Appellant.\n\nM.C. 'ftanchanda, Mrs. S, hobha Dikshit and Pramod Swarup G for the Resiiondent. ·. .\n\nThe J1ldgment of the Court was deliver< d by\n\nI FAZAJr ALI, .J. This appeal by special leave against a judgment of the Allahabad High Court. unfolds a te!Ha\\e plight of an unfortunate litignt who, after obtaining a deeree for ejectment, was driven H .from pi1lar\n\n1to post to get the said decree executed .. Hisattempts to get the sai4 decree executed were stalled sometimes by objections\n\nfl\\ed by thi; tenant-appellant and, sometimes by amendments. made\n\n. ,\\\n\n' .\n\nDULAREY LODH v. DISTT. JU8GE (Fazal Ali, J.) 745\n\nin the law with the resµlt that even after 13 years .of litigation the A landlord respondent was not able to get possession of the premises.\n\nThis was because of a statutory amendment which made the dcree\n\nobtained by him inexec\\itable and was, therefore, lying dormant and ineffective. ·\n\n.The .legislature having realised the hardship of such landlords came to their rescue by an amendment in 1976• to the UP. Urban\n\nBuildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Evition) Act. 1972 (for short, to be referred to as the •19;2 Act') which was expressly given retrospective operation so as to revive the decrees which had become inexecutable.\n\n•When the appeal was heard .and the arguments were ccincluc)ed the respondents had made a good gesture in agreeing to. allow the tenant two years' time to vacate the premises on giving the usual undertaking and accordingly we adjourned the case to en.able the parties to coine to a settlement. However, we were informed by counsel for the parties that no settlemt could be reached; hence we have now to decide the case on merits.\n\nAnd now to the facts of the case. The respondent.landlord filed a suit for ejectment in the year 1971 and obtained a de.cree for ejectment against the appellant-tenant. By virtue of the provisions of 1972 Act; the ca§e was transferred to the court of the Judge, Small Causes, who tried the case and passed a decree in favour of the respondent on 4;4.1973. It may be noted that the tenant did not object to the jurisdiction no• did he prefer and appeal or revision against the said judgment dated 4.4. 73 and the same became' final.\n\nThereafter, the decree\"holders filed an execution petition beiqg Execution Case No. 4 of 1973. The appellant, however, raised a jurisdictional obje?tion qn the basis of a judgment of the Allahabad\n\nHigh Court reported in 1975 (l.L R. 360 that the transfer of a suit before conferment of jurisdiction to the Judge, Small Causes. Court was not competent and, therefore, the decree was not execuiable.\n\nCounsel for the respondents unger some misconception conceded that the suit would have to be fried all over 'again and the Execution Case was, therefore, disposed of by an Order dated 3!.l.1976 passed by the Executing Court. The Court held that the decree was without 'jurisdiction. The respondents, however, took the stand that a concession on a point of law was not. binding on him .nor was his Advocate authorised to make such a concession. However, the decre~\n\n' SUPREM!l COURT RflPORTS [i984) 3 S.C R.\n\nremained inexecutal1Ie but by virtue of the U.p. Urban Buildings (Regulat10n of Lettmg, Rent and Eviction) (Amendment\\ Act 1976 (hereinafter referred to as th; '197(, Ame:idment Act'), ; ectio~ 9 of the 1972 Act was made applicable with retrospective effect to remove the injustice and remedy the mischief which had been caused to the dec.ree-holders. The relevant portion of the said amendment may be extracted thus : •\n\nu26. Transftory Provision\n\nxx xx xx\n\n(6) The prov1s10n of section 9 of the Uttar Pradesh Civil Laws Amcndmeni Act, 1972 shall apply ahd shall be deemed always to hwe applied in relation to suits of the nature rferred to therein which before the commencement of tht Act had been transferred to a competent court and were pending immediately before the date of commencement of that Act_in such tnn.cree court as they apply in relation to .suits which were pending in the court in which they were instituted:'\n\nProvided that any such suit decided by the transferee court between the commencement of the said Act and the commencement of this Act on the assumption that the said Section 9 did not apply to such suits shall be deemed to have been validly decided as if the mid section did not apply to such suits.\"\n\nAs a result of the nmendment extracted above, the judgment of the Allahabad High Court reported in 1975 A.L.R. 360 stood overruled and effaced. ·\n\nIn view of this amq1dment, the respondents file.d an applica- G tion before the Executing Court for revival of the suit and the decree which was accepted by the court and a civil revision filed against the said Order was dismissed by the Jigh Court; hence this appeal by special leave in this Cour.t.\n\nH In order to understand the implication of the 1976 Amendment Act, it may be necessary to peruse s. 26(5) of the said Amendment, which is extracted thus\n\n.. ' ( ~·\n\nDULAREYLODH v. 01s1r JUDGE (Fnzal Ali, J.)'\n\n \"(5) Notwithstanding any judgment; d'ccree or order of any court or authority, the provisions of Rule 16 of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972 shall be deemed to have been made under the pcovisions of the principal Act as amend,, d by. this Act as if this Act were in force on all material dates.\"\n\nA close analysis of the above reveals that the inteniion of the legislature was to remove the injustice done to the landlords whose decrees b.ecame inexecutable. The logical consequence which flows\n\nfrom an interpretation of clauses (5) and (6) of s. 26 of the 1976 C . Amendment Act would be that all decrees which hitherto had been lying dormant would revive an.cl the landlord could get the decree executed.\n\nThe Executing Court as also \\he High Court upheld the conten- D tion of the respondents and directed execution of the decree.\n\nThe sheet-anchor of the arguments of the counsel for the appellant was that in view of the Allahabad High. Court decision .\n\n(supra) and tho 1972 Act, the decree stood set aide and could not be revived or made executable ven by the 1976 Amendment Act.\n\nIt is; however, impossible for us to acc; pt this contention, because the dominant i; iurpose of the 1976 Amendment. Act was to remedy the injustice done to the landfords (Jy the 1972 Act.\n\nAnother flaw in the argument of the counsel for the appellant is that it presumes tht the decree became completely without jurisdiction and stood set aside. That, however, could not be the position in Jaw. Even if the 1972 Act were to apply, the utmost\n\nconsquence would be that the decree would remain inexecutable but could not be .struck off from the records of the case. This is a clear case where the doctrine of eclipse. would apply and in view of the\n\n1976. Amendment Act, the decree will rvive and become executable.\n\nTliis principle has been applied by this Court in sever~! cases and\n\nflows from the well known doctrine of eclipse which has been enunciated not only in India but in other countries also. In Sutherland Statutory Construction by Horack (Vol. I, 3rd Edn.), the following pasages may be noted :\n\n\"In a majority of the jurisdictions the courts r~.cosnise\n\n• •\n\nSUPRD,!E COURT REPORTS\n\n(1984) 3 S.C.R. '\n\nthe mistake of the legislature and try to determine and give effect to its intent. If the legislature .has expressed its purpose intelligibly in the amendatory act and provided fully upon the subject considered, a majority of courts hold that it is a reasonable conclusion that the legislature did not intend to make the enforcement of the statute contingent on the continued existence of the repealed -statute ... (p. 329)\n\n1'he unconstitutional act physically exists in the ofticial statutes of the state and is there available for reference, and as it is only unenforceable, the purported amendment is given effect. If the law as amended is constitutional, it will be enforced.\" (p. 335)\n\nIt is true that the American Constitution as also the American coum have been most reluctant to apply the doctrine of eclipse but this Court has pointed out in more than one case that the American view cannot be applied to our Constitution. The matter first came up. for consideration before this Court in Bhikaji. Narain Dhakras &.\n\nOrs. v. Stqte of Madhya Pradesh & Anr.C') where in a similar situation the doctrine of eclipse was fully applied and the court observed thus:\n\n• \"The true position is that the impugned Tu.w became, as it were, eclipsed, for the time being, by the (undamental right. The effect of the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951 )Vas to remove the shadow and to make the impugned Act free froI\\l a!l blemish or infirmity ...... Such laws were not dead for all purposes .. They existed for the purposes of pre-Constitution rights and liabilities and they remained operative, even after the Constitution, as against non-citizens ...... Jn our judgment, after the amendment, of\n\nclause (6) of Article 19 on the I8ih June 1951, the impugned Act ceased to be unconstitutional and. became revivified and enforceable against citizens as well as against non-citizens ...\n\nBut after the amendment of clause (6) the impugned Act immediatei'y became fully operative even as against the citizens.\" ·\n\nIn Deep Chand\"' State of U.P. & Ors.(') simi!ai:, observations\n\n' ' t\n\n• •\n\nPULAREY LODH v. PISTT iUDGE (Fazal Ali, J.) .\n\nwere made by this Court which may be extracted! hus :\n\n\"As, however, our learned Brother has thought fit to embark upon a discussion of these questions, we desire to guard ourselves against being understood as accepting or acquiescing in the conclusion that the doctrine of eclipse cannot apply to any post-Constitution Jaw. A post-Constitution law may infrlnge either a fundamental right .conferred on citizens onJyor a fundamental right conferred on any person, citizen or non-citizen. In the first case the law will not stand in tlie way of the exercise by the citizens of that fundamental right and, . therefore, will not have any operation on the rights of the citizens, but it will be quite effective as regards non-citiiens. Jn such a case, the fundamental right will, qua the citizens,- throw a shadow on the law which will evertheless be on the Statute Book as a valid law binding on non citizens and if the shadow is removed. by a constitutional amendment, the law will immediately be applicable even to the citizens w'thout being re-enacted ......\n\nIn other words, \\he doctrine of eclipse as explained by this Court. in Bhikaji Narain Dhakras v .. The State of Madhya Pradesh [1955 (2) SCR 589] also applies to a post-Constitution law o.f this kind .... ;. · ·\n\nA pre-Constitution law, stating in the words of Pas, J., as he theri was, exists notwithstanding that it doe.s not exist v; ith respect to the future exercise of the fundamental rights. 'Jhat principle has been extended in this decision, by invoking the doctrine of eclipse. A\" ihe law existed on the statute book to support pre-Constitution acts, the Court held that the said law was eclipsed.for the time being by one or other of the fundiimental rights and when the shadow was _removed by the amendment of the Constitfltion, the impugned Act became free from ll blemish or infitmity.\" ·• (Emphasis ours)\n\nIn Mahendra Lal Jaini v. The State.of Uttai' Pradesh &.Ors.(1l G this Court held as follows :\n\n\"The preConstitutionJaws which were perfectly valid when thy were passed and the existence of.which is recognised. in the opening words. of Art. 13(1) revive by the removal of the inconsistency in question. This in effect is\n\nSUPRBMB COURT REPORTS\n\n(1984] 3 S.C.R.\n\nthe , doctrine nf eclipse, which, if we may say so with respect, was applied in Bhikdji Narain's case.;.... . .. • .\n\nSo far as pre-Constitution laws' are concerned, the amendment of the Constitution which removes the inconsiste:ticy will result in the revival of such laws by virtue of . the doctrinepf eclipse, as laid down in Bhikaji Narain' s case, for .the pre-existing laws Were not still-born nd would still exist though eclipsed on account of the . inconsistency to govern pre-existing matters.\" (Emphasis supplied)\n\n' , In two recent decisions, this Court has applied the doctrie of eclipse .in similar situations. In S. Anhalagan v. B. Devarajan(1) the following observations were made :\n\n\"Unless.the practice of the caste makes it necessary no expiatory rites need be performed and: ordinarily, he regains his cate unless the community does not accept him ...... The practiae of castr however irrational it may appear to our reason and however repugnant it may appear to our moral and social sense, is so deep-rooted in the Indian people that.its mark does not seem to disappear on conversion to a different religion,, If it disappears, it dis-. appears only to reappear on reconversion.\" (Emphasis ours)\n\nSimilarly, in the case of Kai/ash 'Sankar v. Smt. Maya Devi,(1) to which one of us (Fazal Ali, J.)was a party, this Court made the following observation:\n\n\"In our opinion, when a person is converted to Chris: tia'nity or some other religion the original caste remains under eclipse and as soon as during his/her life-time the . person is reconverted to the o, riginal religion the eclipse .\n\n. disappears and the caste automatically revives.\"\n\nThus, applyipg the rule of law . laid down by this Court, \\hero would . be no difficulty in upholding the judgments of the courts below in this particular appeal. By virtue f the 1972 Act, the decree could norhave been set aside or invalidated and the only consequence whfoh would ensue is that the decree would belying dormant and could not be executed. Once the bar placed. by th~ 1972 Act is ·\n\n(t l [1984] 2 sec 91.\n\n\\2l] {1984) 2~SCC 91.\n\nj._\n\n\\.: .\n\n' '.\n\n.. )\n\nbiJiAR.EY LODH v. 01.sn JUDGE (Fazal Ail, J.) . 151\n\nremoved, by virtue of the doctrine of eclipse the decree will revive '' and become at one' operative an<l executable. The courts below\n\nhave rightly decided th1t after the 1976 Amendment Act the decree became legally executable. .\n\nSome other arguments were also advanced on behalf of the appellant but in view of the expresE language of the 1976 Amendment Act and the doctrine of eclipse, they seem tobe futile.\n\nFor the reasons given aboue, we uphold the decree for eject- • men! passed by the courts below aginst.the appf!llant and dismiss the appeal with costs. As the litigation has taken more than a decade; it is hot possible for us to giv~ any time to the tenant for vaqating the premises and the decrre may now be executed forthwitla and the landlord put into possession.\n\nNV •• K.\n\nAppeal dismissed .\n\n. ,", "total_entities": 33, "entities": [{"text": "DULAREY LODH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5, "end_char": 17, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DULAREY LODH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE. IIIRD ADDL. DISTRICT JUDGE, KANPUR & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19, "end_char": 64, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE IIIRD ADDL. DISTRICT JUDGE, KANPUR & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 99, "end_char": 102, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A VARADARAJAN, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 107, "end_char": 124, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A. VARADARAJAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 203, "end_char": 212, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S89", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3825, "end_char": 3828, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Anil DJv Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4280, "end_char": 4294, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Anil DJv Singh, S.L. Aneja and KL."}}, {"text": "S.L. Aneja", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4296, "end_char": 4306, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Anil DJv Singh, S.L. Aneja and KL."}}, {"text": "KL. Taneja", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4311, "end_char": 4321, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Anil DJv Singh, S.L. Aneja and KL."}}, {"text": "M.C. 'ftanchanda", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4342, "end_char": 4358, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M.C. 'ftanchanda, Mrs. S, hobha Dikshit and Pramod Swarup G for the Resiiondent. ·. ."}}, {"text": "S,", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4365, "end_char": 4367, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M.C. 'ftanchanda, Mrs. S, hobha Dikshit and Pramod Swarup G for the Resiiondent. ·. ."}}, {"text": "hobha Dikshit", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4368, "end_char": 4381, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M.C. 'ftanchanda, Mrs. S, hobha Dikshit and Pramod Swarup G for the Resiiondent. ·. ."}}, {"text": "Pramod Swarup G", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4386, "end_char": 4401, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M.C. 'ftanchanda, Mrs. S, hobha Dikshit and Pramod Swarup G for the Resiiondent. ·. ."}}, {"text": "I FAZAJr ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4475, "end_char": 4487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The J1ldgment of the Court was deliver< d by\n\nI FAZAJr ALI, .J. This appeal by special leave against a judgment of the Allahabad High Court."}}, {"text": "4;4.1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6364, "end_char": 6372, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "By virtue of the provisions of 1972 Act; the ca§e was transferred to the court of the Judge, Small Causes, who tried the case and passed a decree in favour of the respondent on 4;4.1973."}}, {"text": "Allahabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6738, "end_char": 6747, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant, however, raised a jurisdictional obje?tion qn the basis of a judgment of the Allahabad\n\nHigh Court reported in 1975 (l.L R. 360 that the transfer of a suit before conferment of jurisdiction to the Judge, Small Causes."}}, {"text": "section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7939, "end_char": 7948, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh Civil Laws Amcndmeni Act, 1972", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7956, "end_char": 8000, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8555, "end_char": 8564, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Provided that any such suit decided by the transferee court between the commencement of the said Act and the commencement of this Act", "statute": "Provided that any such suit decided by the transferee court between the commencement of the said Act and the commencement of this Act"}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8757, "end_char": 8777, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As a result of the nmendment extracted above, the judgment of the Allahabad High Court reported in 1975 A.L.R. 360 stood overruled and effaced. ·"}}, {"text": "s. 26(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9238, "end_char": 9246, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Provided that any such suit decided by the transferee court between the commencement of the said Act and the commencement of this Act", "statute": "Provided that any such suit decided by the transferee court between the commencement of the said Act and the commencement of this Act"}}, {"text": "s. 26", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9953, "end_char": 9958, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Allahabad High. Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10335, "end_char": 10356, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The sheet-anchor of the arguments of the counsel for the appellant was that in view of the Allahabad High."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 11366, "end_char": 11371, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "cases and\n\nflows from the well known doctrine of eclipse which has been enunciated not only in India but in other countries also."}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13325, "end_char": 13335, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "State of U.P.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13640, "end_char": 13653, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Deep Chand\"' State of U.P. & Ors.(')"}}, {"text": "Pas", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 15068, "end_char": 15071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A pre-Constitution law, stating in the words of Pas, J., as he theri was, exists notwithstanding that it doe.s not exist v; ith respect to the future exercise of the fundamental rights. '"}}, {"text": "Art. 13(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15863, "end_char": 15873, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "SUPRBMB COURT REPORTS\n\n(1984] 3 S.C.R.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 15949, "end_char": 15987, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This in effect is\n\nSUPRBMB COURT REPORTS\n\n(1984] 3 S.C.R.\n\nthe , doctrine nf eclipse, which, if we may say so with respect, was applied in Bhikdji Narain's case.;.... . .. • ."}}, {"text": "Bhikdji Narain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16069, "end_char": 16083, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This in effect is\n\nSUPRBMB COURT REPORTS\n\n(1984] 3 S.C.R.\n\nthe , doctrine nf eclipse, which, if we may say so with respect, was applied in Bhikdji Narain's case.;.... . .. • .", "canonical_name": "Bhikdji Narain"}}, {"text": "Bhikaji Narain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16318, "end_char": 16332, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the doctrinepf eclipse, as laid down in Bhikaji Narain' s case, for .the pre-existing laws Were not still-born nd would still exist though eclipsed on account of the .", "canonical_name": "Bhikdji Narain"}}, {"text": "Fazal Ali", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17290, "end_char": 17299, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Maya Devi,(1) to which one of us (Fazal Ali, J.)was a party, this Court made the following observation:\n\n\"In our opinion, when a person is converted to Chris: tia'nity or some other religion the original caste remains under eclipse and as soon as during his/her life-time the ."}}, {"text": "sec 91", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18062, "end_char": 18068, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_3_74_92_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "• D\n\nA.C. JOSE\n\n• v.\n\nSIVAN PILLAI & QRS.\n\n. March 5, 1984\n\n(S. MuRTAZA FAZAL Au, A. VARAOARAJAN\n\nANO RA\n\n0NOANATH MISRA, JJ.).\n\n_Constitution of lndia-1950, Articles 324; 327 and 329. . . -\n\n~ The Reprer'entation of te PeOple Act 1951, Section 59. - - ' ' . '\n\n .• The Conduct of Election Rules 1961; Rule 49 Elections-Voting-Carting . oj ballots _by use. of :electronic' machine-Whether valid Cznd legal.\n\nWods and P_hrases: uBal/ot'-;-Meaning of.\n\n. .__ The first reswn4eot was elected to the State. Legislative A; embly.\n\nVoting in the ConStituency was by the conventional method provided in the Conduct of Election Rules-1961, the votes. cast manually; 3.nd also by the mechaiiical proCess, viz., the use of 'electroniC' machines.\n\nThe appellant Challenged the _election of the first respondent: The tTial court upheld the validity of.voting by machines and held. that the first resP_Ondent was duly., elected. ,\n\nIn appeal. to -Jhis Coo; t, it was contended on behalf'of the appellal that voting by, mechanical process was not permissible either uD.der the Re-Pre.: sentation 'of the People Act 1951, or under the Conduct of Election Rules\n\n1961.\n\nAllowing the appea.1, . ..\n\nHELD : 1. The order of the Election Coinmission dirCciing casting of ballots by machines in some of the polling stations, was without jurisdiCtion . and could n.othave been resorted to~ [900] _\n\n2. When the Representation of the People Act 1951 and the Conduct of Election Rules 1961, prescribed a particular method of voting the Commllsion could not innovate a new method arid c?ntend that use of the meChani ca_l pi:ocess_wa~ not Covered.by the existing law and, therefore, did fnbt -coma.· ·.in conflict with the law in the field. The Act and the Rules complit.ely excluded the mechanial process' which,' if resorted to, wOUiddefeat in a large.· measure the mandatory requirements of the RUies. [86G, SSF]\n\n.. . 11\n\n' >\n\nA.C. Josi! v. s. PiLLAi\n\n3. (a) When there is no Parliamentary legislation orrule made under • the said legislation, the Commission is free to pas-s any orders in respect of the\n\nCondUct of elections. [86 HJ · • . . . . . '\n\n(b) Where there is an ACt and tber\"e are express Rules made thereunder, it is not open to the Commission to Over-ride the Act or the Rules and pass Orders in direct disObedience to the mandate _contained in the Act or the Rule! • . The PowerS of the Commission are•meant to supplement rather than supPiant the Jaw (bOth statut.e 'and Rules) in the matter Of superintendence, directon_ and\n\nSontrol as provided by Article 324. [87 A-Bl '\n\n(c)-- Where the Act or the Rules are silent, the Commission his no doubt plenary powers under Article 324 tO give any direction in respect of. the conduct o~ elect.ion. [87C] . . .\n\n(d) Where a partiCular directi9n by the Commission is ubmitted to th~ governriient for approval, as rtquired by the RuleS, it .is .not open to the Commissio.n to go ahead with implemenation of it at its own sweet will even if the approval Or the Government snot given. [870] ..\n\n4. It is a w\"ell-settled rule of interpretation of 'statutes that words;\n\nPii.raes o! Sentences of a statute should o\"rdinarily be underStood in their D 03.tural, ordinary, pOpuiar and grammatiCal sense unless such a construction - leads to absurdity. [880] · ·\n\n5. Legisiatures must be deemedto be aware of the modern tendencies . in various den1ocratic countrie.s .. of the wo'rld where the mechanical system has -\n\nbCen intioduced and if despite the plain nleaning of the word •ballot' they did not choose to extend the definition given as far back as- 1950, 'it may be safely, presumed\n\n0that Parliainent intended to use the word •bJllot 9 in its popular rather_ than a technical sense. [89G] ·\n\n6. The word •ballof _h3s been derived from the wotd 'ballota' which .existed at atime when there was no question. of any system of voting-by-·.'\n\nmachine. Even in .1951 when the Act was passed or the-Rules were made~ the- .sYstem of voting by machine was not in vogue in this country .. In these circ~- . P-i stances the word 'ballot\" in its strict sense would not include voting by the use of voting rOachines; [89FJ . . . . . .\n\nSadiq Ali & Anr. v. Election Commission of India & Ors • .\"[1972] 2 S.C.R; 318; Mohinder Singh Gill & Anr. v. The Cheif_Election Commissioner,· New_ JH/hl & Ors,, [1978] 2- S.C.R. 272 and N.P.' Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer, Namakka/ Constituency & Ors., [1952] S.C.R. 218 i referred to. ·\n\n G:\n\n. cMr. APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appal No. 3839 of 1982. - -. . . From the Judgment and• Order dated the 12th October, 1982 qf the Kerala High Court in Election Petition No. I of 1982.\n\n' . '. . ' .\n\nK.K. Venugopal; G. Vishwanathalyefand E.M.S. Aliam for the Appellant. . , , ..\n\n- .\n\nStil'REME cbuil.r REPORTS ' [1984] 3 s.c.R.. ..\n\nA Ram Jethamalani, M.M. AbdulKhader, Dileep Pillai and ' . M.A. Firoz for Respondent No. I.\n\n• K.G. Bhagat, A_dd/, Sol. General and Miss A. Subhashini for\n\nUnion.\n\nS.S. Ray, A.K. Sen and Miss A. Subhashini for the. Election Commissioner.\n\nRam Jethamalani and Miss Rani Jethmalani for the Intervener.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nf:_'\n\nFAZAL ALI,.J.\n\nThis election appeal has been filed by. the appellant, who was a candidate for election to \"No. 70 Parnr Assembly Constituency\" .in Kerala but was not elected. Six candi- . dates contested .the said election which was'held on May 19, 1982, out of whom the first respondent '(Sivan Pillai), who was a candidate of the Communist Party of India, and the appellant were the •wo principal contestants. The result of the election was announced on May Z0,1982 in which the first respondent was declared elected having secured 30450 votes as against 30327 vJJtes secured by the appellant. Thus, the first respondent secured 123 more votes than the appellant. Of the 30450 votes,' 11268 were cast manually, according to-the conventional method provided in the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961 (for short, to be referred to as the 'Rules') made under the Representation of th~ People Act, 1951 (hereinafter to be referred to as the 'Act'), and 19182 v, otes were cast by means of electronic machines (for short, to be referred to as 'voting machines'.). This was done in pursuance of the directi<>n issued by the Election Commission of India (for facility, to be referred to as the 'Commission') by virtue of a notification published in the Kerala Gazatte on 13.5.82. The said notification was purported to have been made under Art. 324 of the Constitution of India, and has been extracted on pages 3 to 5 of the judgment of th_e High Court ad it is not necessary for us to -repeat the same having regard to the point of law that we have to decide in the instant case.\n\nIt may be mentioned that prior to issuing the notification the commission had sought the sanction of the Government of India which was however refused. As mentioned abov~, the votes . . ,\n\n' '\n\n. .\n\nA.C. JOSE v. s. PILLAI (Fazal Ali, J.) 77\n\nby the mechanical process were cast in. 50 out of the 85 polling . stations.\n\nThe trial Court upheld the validity of voting by machine and held that the resp.ondent was duly elected to the Assembly seat.\n\nHence, this appeal by the appellant.\n\nArt. 324 of the Constitution gives full powers to the Commis sion in matters of Superintendence, direction and control of the preparation of electoral rolls and also for the conduct of elections to the Parliament and State Legislatures. It was argued that the Com-mission being a creatur~ of the Constitution itself, its plenary powers flowing directly from Art. 324 will prevail over any Act passed by the Parliament or Rules made thereunder, l!)Order to buttress this argument, it was contended that the manner of voting was a matter coming within the ambit of Arts. 324 and 327 which empowered the Parliament to make laws in respect of mters relating to or in connection. with . the elections to the Parliament or the State Legislatures and would be deemed to be subsidiary to the power contained in Art. 324 and if there was any conflict between a law enacted by the Parliament and . the powers given to the Cpmmission regarding regulating the conduct of elections to Parliament that law must yield to_ Art. .324, otherwise the very object of Art. 324 would be de(eated. Notice was given by this Court both to the Union of India as also the Commission though in terms of s. 82 of the Act they are not necessary parties and wete not before the High Court.\n\nThis is a very attractive argument but on a closer scrutiny and deeper deliberation on this aspect of the matter, it is not possible to read into Art. 324 .such a wicte and uncana!ised power, which is entrusted to' the Commission as Mr. Jethmalani would have us belie.; e. Part XV of the Constitution contains Arts. 324 to 328 which relate to the manner in whfrh elections are to be held, the rights of persons who are entitled to vote, preparation of electoral rolls, delimitati.on of constituencies, etc., but this is merely the storehouse of the powers and the actual exercise of thes.e powers is left to Parliament under Arts. 325 to 329. In other wrds, Art. 324 has to be read in harmony with, and not in isolat, ion of Arts. 326 to 329. Art. 324 may be extracted thus :\n\n\"324. Superintendenc.e, direction and control of\n\nletions t1,> b~ veste~ in ~!l Elctioq Commissio!!·\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1984] 3 S.C.R.\n\n( J) The superintendence, direction and control of the preparation.of the electoral rolls for, and the conduct of, all elections to Parliament and to tlie Legislature of every State and. of elections to the offices of President and Vice- President .held under t4is Constitution -shall be vested in a Commission (referred to in this Constitution as the Election Col!lmission).\n\n(2) The Election Commission shall consist of the Chief Election Commissioner and such number of othr Election Commissioners, if any, as the President may from time to time fix and the appointment of the Chief Election Commissioner and other Election Commissioners shall, subject to the provisio.ns of any law made in that behalf by Parliament, be made by the President.\n\n(3) When any other Election Commissioner is s~ ilppointed the Chief Election Commissioner shall act a-s the Chairman of the Election Commission.\n\n(4) 'Before each general election to the House of the People and to the 'Legislative Assembly of each St.ate, and before the first general electionand thereafter before each biennial election to the Legislative Council of each Stale having such Council, the President may also appoit after consultation with the Election Commission su.ch Regional Commissioners as he may consider necessary to assist the Election Commission in the p, erformance of the functions conferred on the Commission by clause (I).\n\n(5) Subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament, the conditions of service and tenure o\"f office of the Election Commissioners and the Regional Commissioners shall be such as ti\"\\e President may by rule deterine:\n\nProvided that the Chief Election Commissioner shall not beremoved from his office except in li!ce manner and on the like grounds as a Judge of the Supreme Court and the conditions of service of the Chief Election Commis sioner shall not be varied to his disadvantage after his appointment.\n\nProvided further that any other Election Commissioner or a Rc¥io!)l <;; ommisioner shall nt be' removed from\n\n' .\n\nA.C. JOSE v. s. PILLAi (Faza/ Ali, J,)\n\noffice except on the recommendation of the Chief Election Commissioner.\n\n' (6) .The President, or the Governor of a State, shall when so requested by the Election Commission, make available to the Election Commission or to a Regional Commissioner such staff as may be necessary for the disvharge of the functions conferred on the Election Commission by clause(!).\" •\n\nWhile interpret(ng a constitutional provision we must remember the memorable words of Chief Justice Marshall :\n\n\"We must never forget that it is the Constitution which we are expounding.\"\n\nAnother golden rule laid down by this Court on the 'interpretation of statutes is that we should: so interpret the language of a Statute .as to suppres~ the mischief and advance the o'bject. It is true that Art. 324 does authorise the Commission to exercise powers of superintendence, direction and control of preparation of electoral rolls and the conduct of elections to Parliament and\n\nState legislatures but then the Article has to be read harmoniously with the Articles that foll<;>w and the powers that are given to the Legislatures under entry No' 72 in the Ubion List and entry No. 37 of the State List of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. The Commission in the garb of passing orders for regulating the conduct of elections cannot take upon itself a purely legislative activity which has been reserved under the scheme of the Constitution only to. Parliament and -the State legislatures. By no\n\ntandards can it be said that the Commission is a third Chamber in the legislative process within the scheme of the Constitution.\n\nMerely being a creature of the Constitution will not give it plenary and absolut~ power to legislate as it likes without reference to the Jaw enacted by the legislatures.\n\nIt was further argued that this power was necessary in order . to make the Commission an independent body and in this connection our attention was drawn to speech of Dr. Ampedkar in the\n\nConstituent Assembly when the, qustion 'of making the Election Commission an independent body was being debated, At page 905, Constituent Assembly Debates. (Vol.8), Dr. Ambegkar ob~r ved thusi\n\n• •\n\n\n(1984] 3 S.C.R,\n\n\"But the House affirmed without any kind of dissent that in the interests. of\" purity and freedom of elections to the legislative bodies, it was of the utmost importance that they should .)le freed from any kind of interference from the executive of the day. In pursuance of the decision of the.\n\nHouse, the Drafting Committee removed this question from the category of Fundamental Rights and put it in a separate part containing Articles. 289, 290. and so on, Therefore, so far. as the fundament\\l question is .concerned that the ele'ction machinery should be outside the control of the execu- ; tive Government, there has been no dispute. What article 289 does is to carry out that part of the decision of the Constituent Assembly. It transfers the superintendence, direction and control of the preparatfon of the electoral roUs and of all elections to Parliament and the Legislatures of $tates to a body outside the executive to be. called the Electfon Commission.\"\n\nThese observations merely show tha< the intention of the founding fathers. of our Constitution was fo make the Commission a separate and independent. body so that the election machinery may .be outside the control of the executive Government. What Dr. Ambedkar, or for that matter the founding fathers, intended was that the superinteodel!ce, direction and control of the preparation of electoral rolls and of all elections to Parliament and State .• Legislatures should be left to the Election Commission. This object has been fully carried out by the provisions in Arts. 324 to 329.\n\nNeither the observations . of. Dr. Ambedkat nor the provisions of\n\nF.. the Constitution could ever have intended to make the Commission an apex .. body in respect of matters relating to elections, conferring on it legislative powers ignoring the Parliament altogether.\n\nMr. Asoke Sen, appearing for the Commission, speaking in the same strain asMr. Jethmalani, contended that Art. 324 was a Code in itself and was couched in a very plain and simple language which adoiits of no ambiguity and, if so construed, itgives fulJ powers and authority to the Commission to give any direction in connection. with the conduct' of elections. It was further submitted that if this interpretation is not given then Arts. 325 to 329 would amount to defeating the very object which wa; wught to be achieved by Art: 324. Supporting argument was built up by\n\nMr. Seo by !w11vily relying upon the opeoins 'words in An. 327 to\n\n. r, ..\n\n• • A.O. JOSE VI s. PILLAI (Fazal Ali, J.) • 81 • the effect: \"subject to the provisions of this Constitution\" and\n\nabsence of any such rider in Art. 324. For the reasons which we will give hereafter, it is not possible for us to accept the somewhat far-fetched argument of the learned counsel.\n\nReliance was placed on a decision of this Court in Sadiq Ali and Anr. v. Election Commission of India and Ors. 1 where the Court observed tlius:\n\n\"Art. 324 of the Constitution provides inter alia. that the superintendence, direction and control of the preparation of electotal rolls for a'.nd the conduct of all elections to\n\nParliament and Legislative Assemblies of the States and aJ\\ C • elections to the offices of P.resident and Vice'President held under the Constitution shall be vested in the Commission ...\n\nWithout prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, sub-section (2) enumerates some of the matters for which provisioh may be made in the rules. Sub-section (3) requires that the ruies framed shoufd be laid betore each\n\nouse of Parliament. Conduct of Election Rules, 1961 were thereafter framed by the Central Government. Rule 5 of those Rules requires the Commission to specify the symbols that may be chosen by candidates at elections in Parliamentary hnd Assembly elections abd the restrictions to which that choice shall be subject. Rule 10 makes provision for allotment of symbols to the contesting candidates by the Returning Officer subject to general or special directions issued by the Commission,\" ·\n\nThe first part of the above observations merely repeats the , language of Art. 324 but the second part clearly shows that the power under Art. 324 is: conditioned by the Rules made by the Central Government for the conduct of all lections. These observations, therefore, do not appear to us to be-of any assistance to the stand taken by the appellant. • .\n\nReliance was also placed on the following observations in the said case:·\n\n\"Question then arises as to what is the binding nature of the decision given by the Commission under paragraph 15 In this respect, it has to he borne in mind that the Commission only decides the question as to whether any of the\n\n'1(1) [1972] 2 SCR 318\n\n. D\n\n82 '\n\nSUJ>REMB COURT RBJ>ORTS [1984] 3 s.c.R,\n\nrival sections or groups of a recqgnised political pitrty, each of whom claims to be that patty, is that party. The claim maddn this respect is only for the purpose of symbols in connection with the elections to the Parliament and State 'Legislatures and the decision of the Commission pertains to this limited matter.\"\n\n(Emphasis ours)\n\nThese observations also . do not advance the matter. any further because it was clearly held that the claim made in respect of symbols pertained only to the limited matter which was being considered by the Commission.\n\nThe following observations of tliis Court, in that case completely clinch the issue,. against the appellant: •\n\n\"It would follow from what .has been discussed earlier in this judgment that the Symbols Order makes detailed provisions for the reservation, choice and alloiment of symbols and the recognition of poiitical parties in connection therewith. That the Commission should specify symbois for elections in Parliamentary and assembly constituencies . has also been made obligatory by rule 5 of Conduct of Election R, ules.\"\n\n(Emphasis supplied)\n\nThus, it is manifestly apparent from this decision that the rule-making power of the Commission underthe Act, with respect to symbols, would have to prevail over any ordet that it may pass and the words \"conduct of elections\" would not make, the Commis sion a purely legislative body.\n\nAnother case on.which great reliance was placed is: Mohinder Singh Gill and Anr. v. The Chief Election Commissioner, New De/hi and Ors.1 In this case, it was held that an Order passed by a ' statuiory functionary on certain specific grounds cannot be .supple .\n\nmented by external evidence like affidavits or otherwise. This case also nowhere lays down \"thanhe Commission possesses plenary. powers-both executive and legislative-in the guise of concluct of elections. One of the main questions posed by Krishna Iyer, J .. speaking for the Court, was as follows:\n\n\"Can the Election Commission, clothed with the comprehensive funtions under , A, rticle 324 of the Constitu- . tion, cancel the whole poll qf'a constituenc¥ after it bas !/eq\n\n(I) (1978] 2 S.Q.R .. 27Z\n\n. t-4\n\nA.C. JOSE v:. s. PILLAI (Fazal Ali, J.)\n\nheld, but before the formal declaration of the result has been made, and direct a fresh .poll witho11t reference to the guide lines under ss. ~8 and 64(a) of the Act, or other legal prescription or legislative backing. If such plenary p0wer\n\nexists, is it exercisable on the basis of his inscrutable 'sub . jective satisfaction' or\n\n0 only on a reviewable objective assess ment reached on the basis of circumstances vitiating a free and fair election and warranting the stoppage of declaration of the result and . directions of a fresh poll not merely of particular polling st.ations but of the total constituency ?\"\n\n' .\n\nThe learned Judie while answering the question observed thus: • '.'Article 324, which we have set out earlier, is a plenary provision vesting the whole responsibility for natio 'nal and State elections and, therefore, the nec.essary powers to discharge that function. It is true that Art. 324 has to be read .in the light of the constitutional scheme and the 1950 Act and the 1951 Act.\n\nSri Rao is right to the extent hdrisists that if competent legislation is enacted asvisualized in Article 327 the Commission cannot make himself free from the enacted pr.escriptions ..•. And the supremacy of valid law over the Commission argues itself.\n\nNo one is an imperium in imperio in' our constitutional order. it is reasonable to hold that the . Commissioner cannot defy the law armed by Art. 324. Likewise, his functions are subject to the norms o(fairness and he cannot act arbitrarily. Unchecked power is.alien to our systein ...... Article 324, in our view, operates in areas left unoccupied by legislation and the words 'superin tendence, direction and control' as well as 'conduct' of all elections' are the broadest terms.\"\n\n(Emphasis ours)\n\nThe observations, extracted above, furnish a complete. answer\n\nto the arguments of Mr. Jethmalani and Mr. Asoke Sen as it has.\n\nG been clearly held that Art 324 would operate only in areas left unoccupied by legislation, even if the widest possible connotation is given to the language of Art. 3Z4. W\n\n0hile sqmmarising the propo- . sitions, the Court made the following observations:\n\n\"Two limitations . at least are laid on its plenary H\n\n(I) ]1878) 2 SCR, 272,\n\n• c\n\n• '\n\n84 . ·\n\nSU~REME COURT REJ?ORTS [1984] 3 s.c.R\n\ncharacter in the exercise . thereof. . First!;, when Par /iament or any State Legislature has made valfd law relating to or in connection with elections.' the Commission.shall act in con . formity with, not in. violation of such provision but where such law is silent Art. 324 is a reservoir of power to act for th_e avowed purpose of, not divorced from pushing forward a free .and f:rtr election with expedition.\n\nSecondly, the Commission shall be responsible to the rule of law, act . bona fide and be amenable to the norms of natural justice in _so far as conformance to such canons can reasonably and realistically be required of it as fairplay-in-action . ' ·• ' . m a most important area of the constitttional order, viz.,\n\nelections.\" • (Emphasis ours)\n\nThis is actually the main spirit and' gist ofthe decision which. appears to have been relied upon by the appellant but which does not at all support his stand. In the aforesaid case, there did not appear to be any conflict between the Order passed by th_e Commis . sion and the Act o.r the Rules. The question at issue in the instant case did.not really arise in the form and shape as has been .presented.before us. On the other hand, the matter seems to have been fully settled. by an earlier decision of this Court in N.P. Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer, Namakkal Constituency and Ors.' were Faz! Ali, J. (as he then was) while making a very pointed and crisp approach, scientifically analysed the positipn thus:\n\n\"Broadly speaking, before an. election machinery can be brought into operation, _there are. three requisites which require to be attended to, namely, (I) there should be a sei of laws and rules making provisions with respect to all matters relating to, or in connection with, elections, and it 'should be 'decided as to how these laws and rules are to he made; (2) there should be an executive charged with the duty of securing the due conduct of elections; and (3) there should oe a judicial tribunal to deal with disputes arising out of or in.connection with elections. Articles 327 and 328 deal with the first of these requisites, Art. 324 with the second and article 329 with the thid requisite. The other two articles in Part XV, viz., articfes 325 and 326, deal with two\n\n• ' • ' • ' - • I '\n\nC ll [19S21 SCR l~.\n\n• •\n\n• A.G. JOSE v. s. PILLAI (Faza/ Ali, J.)\n\nmatters of principle to which the Co.nstitution-framers_ have attached. much importance .. They are:-(1) prohibition 11gainst discrimination in the preparation of, or eligibility for inclusion in, the electoral rolls, on grounds of religion race, caste, sex or any of them; and (2) adult suffrage. Part XV of the <;:onstitution is really a code in itself providing the entire ground-Work for enacting appropriate laws and setting up suitable machinary for the conduct of elections.''\n\nWe fully endorse and follow the above observations of the\n\nConstitutio~ Bench which lay down the correct la\\Y on the subject and we have.nothing further to 'add to the approach made by this Court in the case referred to above. on the other hand, our view e: that Arts. ~24 to 329 have to be construed harmoniously flows as a logical' corollary from the ratio in Ponnuswami's c.ase .\n\n. The pointed an pungent observations extracted. above, really amount to a Bible of the 'election law as culled out from an interpretation of the provisions of Arts. 324 to 329 of tb.e Constitution, and were referred to with. approval even in M ohinder Singh Gill's case (supra).· During the \"last three decades this case has neither .been distinguished nor dissented from and still holds the field and with due respect, very rightly. No other case ever made such a dynamic and clear approach to the problem, perhaps due to the fact that no such occasion arose because the Commission has always been following the provisions of the Act and the Rules alid had never attempted to arrogate to.itself powers which were not .tf meant to belong to it. Indeed, if we were to accept the conteqtion' -.\n\nof the respondents it would convert the Commission into an abo lute despot in the field of election so as to give directions regarding . ., the mo.de and manne.r of elections by passing the provisions of the Act, and the Rules purporting to exerci_se. powers -11nder cover of.\n\nArt, 324. If the .Commission is armed with such unlimited and arbitrary powers and ifit eyer happens that the persoll!J manning the commission shares or is wedded to a particular ideology, he could by giving odd directions C'ause a political havoc or bring about a constitutional crisis, . setting at naught the intesrity anq independence of electoral process, so important and indispensible to the democratic system.\n\nFurther, such an absolute and uncanalised power given to the Commission without providing any guidelines would itself destroy the basic structure of the Rule of Law. It is manifew\n\n• .,\n\nSUFREMB COURT REPORTS [!984J 3 s.c.a.\n\ntha_t such a disastrous consequence could never have been c ontemplatea by the Constitution makers, for such an interpretation, as suggested by the counsel for the respondent, would be far from attaining the goal of purity and 'sanctity. of tha electoral process.\n\nHence, we must construe Arts. 324 to 329 as an integral part of the same scheme collaborating rather than colliding with one another.\n\nMoreover, a perusal of Arts. 324 to 329 would reveal tht the~ 'legislative powers ih respect of matters r\"elating to Parliamnt or\n\nthe State Legislatures vests . in. Parliament and in nci other body. ,. The Commission would come into the picture only if no provision has been made by Parliament in regard to the elections to the Parliament or State Legislatures.\n\nFurthermore, the power. under Art. 324 relating to superintendence, direction and control was actually vesting of merely all the executive powers , and not the .legislative powers. In other words,. the legislative power of\n\nParliament or of the legWature of a State being \"?ade subject to Art. 324 Dnly mea_ns that no law made by Parliament nnder Art. 327 or by a State legislature under Art. 328 can take away or deprive the Commission of the executive power in regard to matters entrusted to ii'; . viz. superintendence, direction and control of elections. The right to file an election petition directly flows from Art, 329 and cannot be affected in any manner by the exercise of executive power by {he Commission under Art 324.\n\nId view of the above, it is not neeessary for us to consider a number of other authorities . that were cited befQre us as they do not appear to be directly on point. '\n\n1t is pertinent to indicate that the High Court fll into an obvious fallacy by acceptance of the position that the direction of the Commission was intended to operate in an uncovered field.\n\nWhen the Act and the Rules prescribed a particular method of voting, the Commission could not in'novate a new method and contend that use of the.mechanical process was not covered by tbe etisting Jll'.v and, therefore, did not come in conflict with the law in the field.\n\nTo sum up, therefore, the legal and constitutional position is as follows:\n\n~ . . .\n\n(a) When there is no Parliamentary legislation or rule made under the said legislation, the Commission is free to pass any orders in respect of the conduct of elections,\n\nA.C. JOSll v. s. PILLAI, (Fazal Aii, J.) 87\n\n(b) 'where there is an Act and express Rules made thereunder it is not open to \"the Commission to override the Act or the Rules and pass orders in direct disobedience • to the niancfate contained in the Act or the Rules. In other words; the powers of the Commission are meant to supplement rather than supplant the law (both statute .\"and Rules) in the matter of superintendence, direction and control as provided by Art. 324,\n\n(c) where -the Act or the Rules are silent, the Commissiori ·\n\nhas no doubt plenary powers under_ Art. 324 to give\n\n• any direction in respect of.the conduct-of election, and 0\n\n(d\\ where .a particular direction by the Commission is submitted to the government for .approval, as required by the Rules, it is not open to the Commission to go ahead with implementation of it at its own sweet will even if the approval of the, Government _is _not given. _D\n\nApart from the arguments referred to above, an alternative a{gume_nt put forward before us was that even the_ Rule_s framed under the Act authorise the Commission to give direction to hold voting by the use of a voting machine and this is covered by s. 59 of the Act and Rule 49 of the Rules. This argument merits Serious E consideration. In the insta,_t case, the main grievance-of appellant i s that \\he voting by mechanical process was not permissible either under the Act or under the Rules, Reliance was, however, placed by the appellant on s. ?9 of the Act which runs thus :\n\n\"59. Manner of voting at elections~\n\nAt every election where a poll is taken votes shall be given by ballot in such mamrer as may be prescribed, and no votes shall be received byproxy.': ·\n\nIt is obvious thats. 59 uses the words \"ballot in such mann~\n\nas may be prescribed\", which means prescribed by the Rules made G under the Act. A reference to s. 61 of the Act would show that Parliament intended use of ballot papr only for casting of votes.\n\nThis takes us to rule 49, the relevant part of which may be extracted thus:\n\n\"49. Voting by ballot at notifiedpolling stations-\n\n(!) Notwithstanding any thing contained . in the\n\nStil'RBME COURT REPORTS t19s4i 3 s.c.il, k\n\np(eceding provisions of this Part, the Election Commission may, by notification published in the Official Cazette at least 15 days before th.e date, or the first ol the dates, of poll appointed for an election, direct th.at the method of voting by ballot shall be followed in that election at such polling statiens as miy be specified in the notification.\" • It was submitted that having regard to the modern and changing conditions of the society a dynamic approach should be made to the interpretation of the aforesaid two legal requirements. The matter does not rest here: something could be said for \"the view that the word 'ballot' includs voting by machines.\n\nSection 59 prnceeds to explain its.intention in setting up the mode, manner and method of voting' by prescribing express rules as to how the voting should be done. In this connection, reference may be made to Rui.e.22 which relates to the form ofba11ot.paper and its contents. Rule 23 requires the Returning Officer to record on the counterfoil of the ballot paper the lectoral roll number of the elector as entered in the marked copy of the electoral roll. Rule 27 refers to the return of ballot paper after an elector has recorded his vote or made iiis declaration. Rule 30, which, prescribes the contents of ballot papers, is co.mpletely contrary to the concept of ballot by machine. Similarly, Rules 33, 38, 39 and 40 seem to be wholly inconsistent with the mechanical process but seem to adopt the conventional method. As we have already indicated, these Rules ate binding on the Commission and it cannot by an executive fiat either override them or act contrary to the statutory provisions of the Rules, •\n\nOn a proper and detailed analysis of these Rules it is clear that the Act by framing the. •Rules completely' ex.eluded the mechanical process which, if resorted-to, would defeat Ill a large measure the mand;:\\tory requirements of the Rules,\n\nIt is a well settled rule of interpretation of st.a tut es that words, phrase or sentences of a statute should ordinarily be understood in their natural, ordinary, popular and grammatical seµse unless such a constniction leads to absurdity. Mr. Jethmalani argued'that the word 'ballot' is wide enough to include the mechanical process and, therefore, the direction of the Commission falls squarely within the four .corners of both s'. 59 and Rule 49.\n\nReliance was placed on the dictionary meaning of the word 'ballot' Which has been defined in Black's Law Dictionary (Fourth Edn.) at page 182 thus : . . .\n\n\\ ,_.\n\nA.C. JOSE v. s: PiLLAI (Faza/ Ali, J.)\n\n.\"means act of voting, usually in secret, by balls orb~ written or printed tickets or slips of paper ; the system of voting by balls or tickets, or by any device for castmg or ' 'fecording votes, as by voting machine.\"\n\n. In Stroud's Judicial dictionary (Third Edn.), however, 'ballot' means \"votes recorded-all ballot papers put into the ballot boxes by the electors (p. 3.239)\". Stroud therefore, does not subscribe to the view of casting of vote through a voting machine and we agree with this view because casting of votes by machine is a mechanical process, which has come into existence long after the Act was passed and is nofgenerally invoked in most of the 'democratic countries of the world.\n\nConcise Oxford dictionary defines the word 'ballot' thus :\n\n. \"(usu. secret) voting,· small ball, ticket or. paper used in\n\nvting; votes so recorded; lot-drawing.\"\n\nIn Webster's Third New International Dictiona; y (Vol. I) at page 168 'ballot' is defined .thus :\n\n\"to obtain a vote from ·(a .body of voters) (the men on the\n\n. '. t\n\nproposal), to select by b.allot or by the drawing of lots.\" B\n\nItmay be mentioned here that the word 'ballot' has been derived from the word 'ballota' which existed at a time when there was no question of any system of voting machine. Even in 1951 when the .. Act was passed or the Rules were made, the system of voting by machine was not in vogue in this country. In these circutnstances, therefore, we are constrained to hold that the word 'ballot' in its strict sense wonld not in, clude voting by the use of voting machines. Legislatures must be deemed to .be aware of the modern tendencies in various .democratic countries of the. world where the mechanical system has been introduced and if despite the plain meaning of the word 'ballot' they did not choose to extend the definition given as far' back as 1950, it may\" be safely presumed that the Parliament intended to use the word 'ballot' in its popular. rather than a technical sense. Our view finds good . deal of support from the circumstance that.even though the system of voting by mechanical process was submitted to the Government for approval yet the same was declined which shows that the rulemaking authority was not prepared to switch over to the system of\n\n. c.\n\n....\n\nSUPREME COUR'f REPORTS . . . tt984l 3 s.c.k.\n\nvoting by machines, perhaps on account of the legal bar .as. indicated by us.\n\nIt is ratl:ier .unfortunate that the Union of India which is a party to this case, bas taken a very neutral stand by neTtber supporting nor opposing the directio~ given by the Commission.\n\nHaving regard to these circumstances,\" therefore, we are clearly of the opinion that according to the Law as• it stands. at present, the Order of the 'Commission directing casting of ballot by macb.ines in some of the polling stations, as indicated above, was without juisdiction and could not have been res()rted to .\n\nIt was further pointed out by the respondent tht the process of votingl:iy machines is very useful as it elimin_ates a nfitnber of drawb.acks and expedites, to a great exfent, the declaration of the result of the election by elimillating the process of counting of votes from t-he ballot boxes. On the other hand, the appellant has pointed out a number of defects, some of them being of a vital nature, which would.defeat the electoral prcess. We would now indicate some of the apparent defects which were pointed out to us by the counsel for the appellant after giving a demonstration of the voting machine before us : . .\n\n\"The absence of a provision for identifying the candidate for whom a void vote has been cast-\n\n. (a) by impersonating a dead vot.er,\n\n(b) by impersonating an absentee voter,\n\n(c) by the genuine voter who tenders a vote after a\n\nvote has been cast in his name by1m impersonator\n\n(R. 421,\n\n(d) where a vote is void having been cast after clcsing\n\ntime (R. 43),\n\n(e) where the voter ha~ cast vote~ in more than one bopth in the same constituency [s. 62(2)],\n\n(f) where the voter has cast two votes in two constituencies [s. 63(3)],\n\n(g) where the voter is disqualified unaer s. 16 of the Act. [s. 62(4)],\n\nA.c. Josil v. s.-PILLAI (Fazal Ali, i.)\n\n(h) where an elector marks a ballot paper wrongly\n\n• for a candidate, he loses the right to get a fresh ballot paper ror easting his vote correctly (R. 41).\n\nThe provisions of S. !OO(l)(d) and more so S. IOl(a) and\n\n(h) under which by excluding the void vol.es or votes cast as a result of corrupt practices any other candidate can be declared duly elected as the true representative of the . constituency,\"\n\nOn the other hand, a number of advantages which could be obtained by using the mech&nical process were pointed out by. the respondent, the suin and substance of which was that despite some defects the elecl!lral process would be expeditious and would cut out a number of delays or mistakes committed at various, stages. The fact, 'however, remains that if the mechanical process is adop- . ted, full and proper training will have to be given to the vot<rs\n\nwhich will take quite some time. . However, we refrain from making any comments on either the defects or advantages of voting machines because it would be for the Legislature and the Government, if it revises its decision at one time 'tir the other, to give legal sanction to the direction given by the Commission. For these resasons, it.is not necessary for us to go into the very detailed notes of arguments subniitted by the parties in respect of this aspect of the matter;\n\nLastly, it was argued by the counsel for the respondents that the appellant would qe estopped from challenging the mechanical process because he did not oppose the introduction of tl)is process although be was present in the meeting personally or through his agent. This argument is wholly untenable because when we are considering a constitutional or statutory provision there can be no estoppel against a statute and whether or not the appellant agreed or participated in the meeting which was'held b\\fore introduction of the voting machines, if such a process is not permissibleor autho rjsed by law he cannot be estopped from chaJlenging thesame .\n\nFor the reasons given above, we allow. th~ appeal, set aside' the election of the respondent with respect to the 50 polling stations where the voting machines were used and we direct a\n\nrepoll to be held in these 50 polling station.s: We, however, do H not touch or disturb the results of the votes secured in tjie other\n\n3<1 polling stations which was, done in accordance with Jaw, viz.,\n\n92 SuPREME COURT REPORT\n\n• l' [19S4] 3 s.c.R.\n\n'A the use of ballot papers.\n\nAfter the repoll, the result of the election would b.e announced afresh after taking into account the votes already secured by the candidates, including the Res-pondent.\n\nWe make no order as to costs.\n\nIn course of argument, Mr. Sen for the Cornrnision informed us that at eleven elections held, under the Act, the mechanical B . device Was used and in nine, no challenge has been raised. It\n\n' •\n\nfollows that -our judgment will not affect those nine elections in\n\n' any manner.\n\nN.V.K.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\n• •", "total_entities": 121, "entities": [{"text": "C. JOSE\n", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7, "end_char": 15, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.C. 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Venugopal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4664, "end_char": 4678, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K.K. Venugopal; G. Vishwanathalyefand E.M.S. Aliam for the Appellant. . , , .."}}, {"text": "G. Vishwanathalyefand", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4680, "end_char": 4701, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K.K. Venugopal; G. Vishwanathalyefand E.M.S. Aliam for the Appellant. . , , .."}}, {"text": "E.M.S. Aliam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4702, "end_char": 4714, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K.K. Venugopal; G. Vishwanathalyefand E.M.S. Aliam for the Appellant. . , , .."}}, {"text": "A Ram Jethamalani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4798, "end_char": 4815, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.. ..\n\nA Ram Jethamalani, M.M. AbdulKhader, Dileep Pillai and ' ."}}, {"text": "M.M. 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PILLAI (Fazal Ali, J.) 77\n\nby the mechanical process were cast in.", "canonical_name": "FAZAL ALI,"}}, {"text": "Art. 324", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7208, "end_char": 7216, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7410, "end_char": 7420, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "324 of the Constitution gives full powers to the Commis sion in matters of Superintendence, direction and control of the preparation of electoral rolls and also for the conduct of elections to the Parliament and State Legislatures."}}, {"text": "Art. 324", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7566, "end_char": 7574, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Arts. 324 and 327", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7771, "end_char": 7788, "source": "regex", "metadata": 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"source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 324", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9126, "end_char": 9134, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Arts. 326 to 329", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9193, "end_char": 9209, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 324", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9211, "end_char": 9219, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Election Commission", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9772, "end_char": 9791, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(2) The Election Commission shall consist of the Chief Election Commissioner and such number of othr 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"label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12634, "end_char": 12650, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ampedkar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13400, "end_char": 13408, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to make the Commission an independent body and in this connection our attention was drawn to speech of Dr. Ampedkar in the\n\nConstituent Assembly when the, qustion 'of making the Election Commission an independent body was being debated, At page 905, Constituent Assembly Debates. 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("}}, {"text": "Ambegkar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13586, "end_char": 13594, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vol.8), Dr. Ambegkar ob~r ved thusi\n\n• •\n\n(1984] 3 S.C.R,\n\n\"But the House affirmed without any kind of dissent that in the interests.", "canonical_name": "Ampedkar"}}, {"text": "article 289", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14280, "end_char": 14291, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ambedkar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14856, "end_char": 14864, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "What Dr. Ambedkar, or for that matter the founding fathers, intended was that the superinteodel!ce, direction and control of the preparation of electoral rolls and of all elections to Parliament and State .• Legislatures should be left to the Election Commission.", "canonical_name": "Ampedkar"}}, {"text": "Arts. 324 to 329", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15171, "end_char": 15187, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ambedkat", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15225, "end_char": 15233, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Ambedkat nor the provisions of\n\nF.. the Constitution could ever have intended to make the Commission an apex .. body in respect of matters relating to elections, conferring on it legislative powers ignoring the Parliament altogether.", "canonical_name": "Ampedkar"}}, {"text": "Asoke Sen", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 15464, "end_char": 15473, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Asoke Sen, appearing for the Commission, speaking in the same strain asMr.", "canonical_name": "Asoke Sen"}}, {"text": "Art. 324", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15566, "end_char": 15574, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Arts. 325 to 329", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15892, "end_char": 15908, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Seo", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16036, "end_char": 16039, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Supporting argument was built up by\n\nMr. Seo by !"}}, {"text": "Art. 324", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16253, "end_char": 16261, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 324", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16551, "end_char": 16559, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Conduct of Election Rules, 1961", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17167, "end_char": 17198, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17229, "end_char": 17247, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Conduct of Election Rules, 1961 were thereafter framed by the Central Government."}}, {"text": "Art. 324", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17712, "end_char": 17720, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Conduct of Election Rules, 1961", "statute": "Conduct of Election Rules, 1961"}}, {"text": "Art. 324", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17776, "end_char": 17784, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Conduct of Election Rules, 1961", "statute": "Conduct of Election Rules, 1961"}}, {"text": "[1972] 2 SCR 318", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 18306, "end_char": 18322, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "SUJ>REMB COURT RBJ>ORTS [1984] 3 s.c.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 18335, "end_char": 18372, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D\n\n82 '\n\nSUJ>REMB COURT RBJ>ORTS [1984] 3 s.c."}}, {"text": "Krishna Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20273, "end_char": 20285, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One of the main questions posed by Krishna Iyer, J .. speaking for the Court, was as follows:\n\n\"Can the Election Commission, clothed with the comprehensive funtions under , A, rticle 324 of the Constitu- ."}}, {"text": "A.C. 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PILLAI (Fazal Ali, J.)\n\nheld, but before the formal declaration of the result has been made, and direct a fresh .poll witho11t reference to the guide lines under ss."}}, {"text": "Article 324", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21274, "end_char": 21285, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 324", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21491, "end_char": 21499, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Rao", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 21598, "end_char": 21601, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sri Rao is right to the extent hdrisists that if competent legislation is enacted asvisualized in Article 327 the Commission cannot make himself free from the enacted pr.escriptions ..•. 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"end_char": 30659, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 324", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30760, "end_char": 30768, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s. 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31367, "end_char": 31372, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 61", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32047, "end_char": 32052, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 59", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 33036, "end_char": 33046, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "On a proper and detailed analysis of these Rules it is clear that the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34049, "end_char": 34122, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Stroud", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 35171, "end_char": 35177, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Stroud's Judicial dictionary (Third Edn.),"}}, {"text": "s. 62(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38925, "end_char": 38933, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 63(3)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38999, "end_char": 39007, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39053, "end_char": 39058, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 62(4)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39072, "end_char": 39080, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sen", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 41818, "end_char": 41821, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In course of argument, Mr. Sen for the Cornrnision informed us that at eleven elections held, under the Act, the mechanical B ."}}, {"text": "N.V.K.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 42070, "end_char": 42076, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.V.K.\n\nAppeal allowed."}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_3_752_762_EN", "year": 1984, "text": ", INDER PAL GUPTA\n\nTHE MANAGING COMMITTEE, MODEL INTER COLLEGE\n\nTHORA\n\nMay 3, 1984\n\n[O. CHINNAPPA REDDY, A.P. SEN AND E .. s. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.]\n\nTermination of the ser11ices of a P.ri'nclpal 011 probarlon-P.racedure .Prescribed under section 16 G artd _K..egulations 35 to 38 being 1he saffie as provided bY Article 311 (~) of the Constit.ttion of ft1dl11, the princ!ples which govern .such ca yes of terminatio 1 should be the sami a~ fiigse' u11der!ying Article 3JJ t2) of-the Con1titurion-lnterpfeiation of Sttiture~-Abence of enquiry coniemplated under Regulations 35 ii; 36 before the termination of the pro.vision casting a stigma is ilteg:il.\n\nThe appellant was app_ointed. on probatiOn as the' Principal of the Model Inter College, Th,)ra on August, 28,_ 1967.\n\nHis priod of proba~ \"tion was extended bY one yc1r 'ind .thereafter by a letter d.; iied June_ 3p,\n\n1969 addressed to him with a copy o.f a _resolution dated 27th. April, 1969 passed by the Managi'lg Committee wherein various allegations were made regarding his conduct, his services were termin1ted by the respondent •.\n\nAggrieved by the said orders of termi1r1tlon of his services, the appellant filed a \\Wit'petiti'n NS. 4Si3 of l9iO on the file of the High Court of Allahabad. 1he said writ p3tition was allowed on January 23, 1.973 and the order of (errnina_tion was quas, hed.\n\nHowever; the special Appeal No. 31of1973 filed by Resp.oident was ac9epted and allC>wed by the Division Bench; Hence the appeal by special leave of tQe Court.\n\nAllowing tbei appe3l, \\he Court,\n\nHELD :\n\n1. Section 16 G of the Uttar Pradesh Intermediate Education Act, (Act ([.of 1921) provides that every person employed in a recognised institution shall b~ governed by such conditio1s of service as may be prescribed by ReguLtions and that the Regulationg, inter alla , may be made in r~p:!ct 'of tl.1e period of probJ.tion; the conditions of confiratioo and the procedure for the i nposition of punishmei; it.\n\nRgulations 35 to., 38 relate to the procdure to be followed before imposing the punishment of dismissal or removdl fromservice and they being virtually the same as .provided by Article 3.1-1 (2) Of the Constitution, the principles wbjch should\n\ngovern this.i11Sta-nt case should therefore be t\\le same as those under lying Articlc'.\\11 (2).\n\nAd\"mitte-d!y here no e~1quiry was held as provided . fc;>r in. Rr-gulationc; 35 and 36.\n\nTherefore th_e nonco 111plian.::~ with the ·\n\nl. J> •. GtiPTA v. INTER. C(JLLEGB, THOR.A (Venkataramiah, J.) .153\n\nr>rovisions or Section '16 G of the Act and Regulalions 35 to 3& vit.iates the termination order.\n\n[747F-G; 759G; 760E]\n\nParshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India [1958) S •. C.R. 828; Shamsher ·\n\n.S/ngh.nd Anr.v. Stateaf Punjab, [1975] l S.C.R. 814; Anoop.faiswalv.\n\nGovernment of India and Anr. [ 1984] I <icalc.105; referred to.\n\nIf the order of terminatiori carried a stigma it has to~ fall to the groUnd unless it is prec_eded by 2,11 enquiry .as contemplated by law.\n\nreding of the letter of termination of the service and the resolution which\n\nfims part of-that letter clearly shows~ that they bear a mark of disgrace $d infamy and the appellant is visited with evil consequences.\n\nThe order of' the Division Bench is tberefore unsustainable. [762D-E]\n\n[The Cou1t declared. that the appellant continues to be in the service of the College. with eotitl ement to all consequential ben.efitS\n\nirlcludiog the salary and allowances as if there was no break in his service.] [762G] .\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION :.\n\nCivil. Appeal No. 571 of 1975'\n\nAppeal by Special leave from the judgment and Order dated the 14th March, 1973. of the Allahabad High Court in Special Appeal No. :'I of 1973.\n\nR.K. Garg and D.K. Garg for the Appellant.\n\nS. Rangaran and N.N. Sharma for Respondent.\n\nS. Markandeya for Respondent:\n\nGopa! Subramaniam and Mrs. Shobha Dikshit for Respondent.\n\nThe Jndgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKA'I; ARAM!AH, J. The appellant was appointed on probation as the Principal of the Model Inter College, Thora, District.\n\nBulandshahr (hereinafter refer.red t<:> as 'the College;) on August 28, 1967 in'accorda.nce with the procedure prescribed by the Intermediate Education Act, 1921 (U.P. Act No. II of 1921) (herernafter referred to as '(he Act') and the Regulations made thereunder. The period of probation prescribed was one year. Shortly before the expiry of the p; rlod of probation on August 25, 1968, ihe. Managing Committee of the College passed a resolutir>n extending the period o(probation of the appellant by one year. Thereafter on April 27,\n\nsUPREME couttt REPOltTS\n\n(1984] 3 S.C.R.\n\n1969, the Mana3ifig Committee met to consider the question of confirmation of the appellant in.the post of the principal.\n\nAs the Managing Committee . was not satisfied with . the services of the appellant, it resolved i.o terminate his services and after obtaining the approval of the District Inspector of Schools wrote a letter dated June 30, 1969 to.the appellant communicating its decision to tcrmi; nate the services of the appellant enclosing therewith a copy of its resolution dated April 27, 1969.- The letter dated June 30, 1969 reads thus :\n\n\"From\n\nThe Manager Mqdel Jnter College Thora (Bulandshahr)\n\nRef. No ..\n\nShri I.P. Gupta Chilkana House, Xumaran, Bridge, Saharanpur.\n\nDated the 30th June, 1969\n\nSub: . Termination of your service as Principal.\n\nDear Sir,\n\n• With reference to the above, I have to mention that in view of the resolution N.o. 2 of the Managing Committee dated 27.,!.1969 (copy enclosed) and subsequent pproval by the D.1.0.S. Bulandshahr you are hereby infored that your _sei; vice as Princip~I of this Institution is tenninated with immediate effect. You will however be entitled to your dm:s in lieu of notice .. Please hand over complete charge to Sri D.D. Gupta, who is being instruct.ed accordingly, Without delay.\n\nPlease note that you cease to function as Principal of this Institution forthwith: You-are neither authorised to operate any account nor will you perform any other act in the capacity of the Principal of this Institution henceforth.\n\nOf course the civil suit filed .by Shri S.P. Jain of Meeiut for the recovery of his dues.is your sole.· responsibility . . Please see that the matter is reasonably settled failing which you shall be. liable to any loss caused to the institution in that respect: While handing over charge please do not forget to return all papers or documents re la ting to the college, .\n\n\\ .\n\ni. P. GUPTA ' INTER COLLEGE, THORA (Venkataramiah, J.)\n\n7SS. ·\n\nor any other college property in your possession.· All accounts also may kindly be cleared.\n\nSince . despite sever11\\ assurai1ces you have failed to return during the complete summer vacation, this nitima\n\ntin is being conveyed to you at your Sahaninpur .address, in this staie ofuncertainty under registered cover to ensure safe delivery. Recently you are reported to have been to ·\n\nBland'shahr for a few day~. Please come immediately and do the needful in. the matter . •\n\n. Sri D.O. Gupta.is to assume.office of the Principal of C this institution wiih immediate effect in officiating capacity till further instruction. He may take over .charge from Sri J.P. Gupta when he returns.\n\nYours faithfully,\n\nsd/- . Manager Model Inter College, Tohra (Bulandshahr)\"\n\nThe copy of the resolution of the . Managing Committee sent alongwith the above letter reads thus. :\n\n\"Resolution passed by the Managing Committee in its meet iilg held on 27.4.69 terminating the prQbationary period of the\n\nPetitioner. ' . . . ·\n\n 2.\n\nThe report of the Manager was read. Sri I .P. Gupta, who was present in the meeting also heard it. He was asked by the Committee to have his say in respect of the report,. At first he refusod t? say anything but when the Col)lmittee requested him to consider it serio usly and let the Committee have the benefit of his views, he said that he had nothing to say in that respect since he wantedto quit himself due to circumstances.\n\nOn this the Committee agarn requested him to put some such suggestion in consultation with the manager as may be helpful for. the Committee to arrive at some conclusion. In the absence of any satisfactory sugges\n\nSUPREME.COURT REPORTS !1984j 3 s.c.Ii:\n\ntion the Committee took the d'cision. At this stage the . Principal retired out of courtesy.\n\nOn the basis of the Service Book of the Principal, the mamger told tha.t last year his confirmation was due on 28.8. 1968 but in the meeting of the Committee held on 25.8 68 in wbih the Principal was also present, the report of the Manager, dated 4.7 .. 68 was put as desired by the President Reso1ution 3 date.I 25.8.68 under the head '.'Consideration qn confi.rmatioh of . Shri LP. Gupta; Principal\" incorporates the decision of the Commitlee as \"According to the Manager's report the period of probation of the Principal extende\\f by one year.\" The proceedings book contains signatures of Sri J.P. Gupta for rceiying a copy of the said resolution. At the end of. the prooeedings the minute book contains signaturei of Sri I.P. Gupta alongwit]l other members or' the Committee present.\n\nThe facts contained in the report of the Manager being serious and not in the interest~ of the institution, this Committee unanimously resolves th1t the period of probation of Sri I.P. Gupta, Principal, be terminated without waiting for ihe period to end and the manager is. empowered to take' necessary steps in this respect. Any thing done by him in this respect 'hall be considered . to have een done by this Committee. The manager is also authorised to hand over charge to Sri D.D., Gupta when necessary.\n\nSri LP. Gupta. also came in 'With a Vote of thanks to tile Chair the ri1eeting ended.''\n\nThe English trnnslation of the relevent part of the report of the Managor on the basis of which the above esolution.was passed which is im:orporated in the counter affidavit filed on beh'.1lf of the Managing committee reads thus : \" . .\n\n\"It will . be evide.nt from the above that the Principal's stay will not be in the interest of the institution. It is also evident that the seriousness. of the lapses is enough to justify dismissal but no eductional institution should take all\n\n1. P, GUPTA v. H-ITER COLLEGB, Tl{ORA (Venkataramiah, f) 757\n\nthis botheration. As such my suggostion is that our purpose will be served by termination of his ser¥ices, Why, then, we .should enter into any both, ration. For this, i.e. for termination of his period of probation, too, the approval of the D.I.O.S. will be necessary. Accordingly any delay , in this matter may also be harmful to our interests.\n\nAccordingly I suggest that instead of taking any serious action, the period of probation of Sri Inder Pal Gupta be , terminated without waiting for th!! period to end.\"\n\nAggrieved by-the order of termination of his services referrd to above, the appellant filed a P'titi.on u_;1dr artile 226 of the Constituti0n in Writ Petitiol) No. 4823 of 197.0 on the file of the High Court of Allahaba, J chalbngii; g its correctness and pr-Lying. for appropriate reliefs. The learned Sinle Judge who heard the writ petition allowed it by his order dated January 2, 1973 by quashing the order of terminati.on: The Managing Committee of the College preferred an appeal. against that decision to the Division Bench of High Court in Special Appeal No. 31of1973. The Division Bench allowed the appeal and dismissed the Writ 'retition filed by the appellant by its order dated .March 14, 1973. This appeal is filed by the. appellant against the Judgment of the Division Bench after obtaining the special' leave of this Court under Article 136 . of the Constitution.\n\nThe College is an institution recognised under the Act and is\n\ngovmed by the provisions of the Act.\n\nSection 16-G of the Act provides that every person employed in a recognised i.nstitution shall be'governed by such conditions of service as may be prescribed . by Regulations and that the Regulations inter alia may be made in respect of the period of probation, the conditions of confirmation and the procedure for the imposition of punishment.\n\nThe Board of High School and Intermediate Education is authorised to make Regulations in respect of all matters which by the Act are to be provided for by Regulations with the previous sanction of the State Government. Under the Regulations so made uncler the Act, the period of probation prescribed is one. year whether a person is a direct recruit or has been promoted from'a lower grade in service of the institution to a higher grade The period of probation of a Principal or Head Master may be extended by a maximum period of twelve months.\n\nAt least six weeks before the date of which t4e ·\n\nconfirmation of a Principal or a Head Master is due, the Manager . of the institution is required to prepare his confirmation papers and place them before the Committee of Managemnt and the decision of the Committee of Management in each case is required to be re.corded in the form of a resolution.\n\nRegulation 10 provides that a person placed on probation shall be. confirmed if he fulijls the requirements of regulation 9, bas worked with dili'genee and otherwise proved bimelf fit for the post for wh'ch.be was recru:ted and his integrity is certified.\n\nWhenever the punishment of dismissal, removal or discharge, reduction in rank or diminution in emoluc ments is imposed, prior approval of the Inspector should. have 10 be obtained. Regulations 35 to 38 of the Regulations made under the .Act which prescribe tbe procedure for termination of the serv'ces of an employee b~ way of punishment read. thus :\n\n \"35. On receipt of'a. complaint. or an adverse report of facts of a serious nature of the Committee may in the ases of ieacbers appoint the Headmaster or Principal or Manager as the 'mquiry officer (or the Manager may himself set up the enquiry if such power bas been delegated to )lim\n\nby the Comroitlee under rules) and iu tbecase of the Head- . master or Principal, a small sub-committee, with instructions to submi.t the report as expeditiously as possible.\n\n36, (1) The grounds on which it is propose.ct to take action shall be reduced in the form of a definite charge m\n\ncharges which shall be communicated to the employee charged . and which shall be so clear and precise as to gi.ve . sufficient. indication to the charged employee. of the facis\n\nand circumstances against him.\n\nHe shall be required within three weeks of the receipt of the charge.-sheet to put in a written statement of his defence and to state whether be desired 'to be heared . in person. If he or ihe inquiring authority so desires, an oral enquiry shall be held in respect of such of the allegations as are not admitted.\n\nAt that enquiry such oral evidence will be heared as.the inquiring authority , considers necessary. The person charged shall he entitled to cross-examine the witness, to give evidence in person, and to have such witnesses called as he may wish; · provided that the inquiring authority conducting the enquiry mav, for sufficient reasons to be recorded in writing, refuse to call a witness. The proceedings shall contai11 a sufficient\n\n, 1\n\n). P. GUPTA v. INTEJ\\ COLLEGE, THORA (Venkataramiah, J.) 75'l\n\nrecord of the. evidence and statement of the findings and A the grounds thereqf. The inquiring authority conducting the enquiry may also, separately from these. proceedings, make his own recommendation regarding the punishment to be imposed on the employee.\n\n(2) clause (I) shall not apply where the person concern- . ed has absconded, or where it is for other reasons. impracticable to communicate with him.\n\n(3) .All or any of tl, J.e provisions of clause (I) may for sufficientreasons to be recorded in writing be.waived. where there is difficulty in observing exactly the requirements thereof and those requirements can in•the opinion of the inquiring authority be waived without injustice to the person charged.\n\n37. Soon after the report of the proceedings and recommendation from the inquiring authority are received, .the .\n\nCommittee of Management shall meet to consider tl;>e report of the p'roceedings and recommendation made and take., decision on the case. The employee shall, however, be allowed, if he so desires, to appear before the Committee in person to state his case and answer any question that may be put to him by any member present at the meeting, The Committee shall then send a complete report together with all connected papers to the Inspector 11r Regional Inspectress as the case may be, for approval of action propos_ed by it.\n\n38. If it is felt at any stage that the matter can be more properly dealt with by action to terminate service with notice, this may be qone with the approval of the Inspector or Regional Inspectfess, _as the case may be.\"\n\nIt is seen from the foregoing that that the above provmons relating to the procedure to be followed before imposing the punishment of dismissal or removal from service ate virtually the same as provided by Article 311 (2) of the Constitution and the principles which should govern this case should, terefore, be the same as those underlying Article 311 (2).\n\nThe decisions in Parshotam !-al Dhingra v. Union of Indla,(1) Shamsher Singh & Anr. v. State of\n\n(1) [19S8} S. C. R• 8~8;\n\nA Punjab(1) and Anoop Jaiswalv. Government of India & Anr(~) explain the true legal position governing the terminaiion of the services of a probationer.\n\nIn Parshotam Lal Dhingra's case (supra), this Court observed at prge 862 thus :\n\n\"In short, if the termination of service is founded on the right flowing from contract or the service rules then, prima facie, the termination. is not a punis)1ment and carries with it no evil consequences and so Art. 311 is not aitrac- .. . \\ ted. But even if the Government has, by contract or under the rules, the right to terminate the employment without going through the procedurli prescribed for inflicting the punisbment of dismissal or removal or reduction in rank, the Government• may, nevertheless,· choose to puuish the servant and if.the termination of service is sought to be founded cm misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification, . \\hen it is a punishll)ent and the requirements of Art. 311 must be complied with.\"\n\nThe above rule applies to probationers too .\n\nAdmittedly no enquiry was held in this ase 'as provided in Regulations 35 and 36 of the Regulations made under the Act.\n\nApparently iti. the light of the principles enunciated in Parshotam Lal Dhingra's case (supra) the learne.d Single Judge who decided the Writ Petition at the first instance itl the High Court observed in the course of his order 'thus :\n\n.. G\n\n\"In this petiti.on nnder Article 226 of the Constitution the petitioner questio'ls the validity of the so-called termination of his service by the resolution passed by the Managing Committee on 27.4.1969. His case~ that-the termination in the circumstances in which it has been made. by the Managing Committee 'amounts to punishment of removal or dismissal from service and, the.punishment having been imposed upon him without following\" the proedure prescribed rtnder sec. 16-G of the Intermediate Education Act and the regulations framed thereunder becomes vitiated.\n\nIndeed it has not been denied or controverted in the counter affidavit that the action against the petitbner was taken by •\n\n(I)\n\n(2) [1975] l S. C.R. 814.\n\n[1984-] I.SCALE !OS,\n\n{ P. GUPTA v. INTER C:OLLEGE, THORA (Venkaiaramiah, J.)\n\nthe Managing Committeo on serious charges of 1nismauagement brought against the Principal by the Manager. But it was submitted py the learned counsel for the . opposite parties that a reasonable opportunity was affordee to the petitioner by the Managing Committee when he was faced with the charge~ and asked to. explain qn 27.4.69, at the meeting of the Managing C)mmittee. But the learned counsel for opposite parties when faced with the relevant regulations and Sec. 16-G of the Intermediate Education 'Act found it difficult to. justify t!tat what was done at the meeting of the Managing Committee on 27.4.1969 complies with those provisions. The attack made by the peti.tioIJer based on -non-compliance of the relevant regulamins and the provisions of Sec. 16-G of the Act on the validity of the action taken, appear< to be sound and sustainable: No -matter the ; ietitioner was not a permanent Principal yet he was entitld to a regular show cause notice against the charges brought and an opprtunity to be heard as required by the regulations. The impugned o; der of termination ihus was a mere camouflage and cannot be regarded in the circumstances as having been passed by the Managing COmn; tittee in the normal course. The District Inspector of Schools was in error in approving the termintio.n in tho.se circumstances.''\n\nBut the Division Bench of the High Court took a contrary view. The first error in the judgment of the Division Bench lies in its observation :\n\n'Firstly, the order of termination is innocuous. It does not refer to any allegations or. even to the report of the Manager.'\n\n. 761\n\nIt is seen from the letter dated June 30, 1969 by which the services of the appellant were terminated that the resolution of the G\n\nMangig Committee dated April 27, 1969 1s made a part of it by treatmg 1t as an enclosure to that letter. '.fhe resolution actually begins with a. reforence to the report of the Manager, and slates . that the facts contained in the report were 'serious' and 'not in the interests. of the institution'. It further refers to the fact that the appelllmi9 was asked to give his explanation to the alleations J11adq H ip the said report.\n\nThat reort state4 : ;~\n\n\"It is also evident that the seriousness of the lapses is enough to justify dismissal but no educational institution should take that botheration.\"\n\nG.\n\n. The above report was the real foundation on which the deci sion of the Managing Committee was based. This is a case where the order of termination issued is merely a camouflage for an qrder imposing the penalty of termination of service on the ground of ·\n\nmisonduct. Secondly, the Division Bench has tried to justify the . action of the Management by observing that since the management !iad to secure the approval of the District Inspector to its action, it was.neoessary for it to give its assessment of the work of the appel~ laiit as Pfltcipal and, therefore, 'in the context of the statutory requirements, it cannot be said that merely bec.ause the Manager's report or the resolution of the Managing Committee -refers to the various aspects of the assessment of the performanc~ of the Principal in terms unfavourable to him, it wpuld in law, amount to casting a stigma upon the Principal'. It is difficult to en graft an exception of the above type to the well-settled r, ule that if the order of termination carries a stigma, it has to fall to the ground unless it is proeeded by an enquiry as contemplated by law.\n\nA reading of the letter of termination of the service and the. resolution which forms.• part of that letter clearly shows that they bear a mark .of disgrace or. infamy and that the appellnt is visited with.evil consequences 'as explained . in Parshotam Lal Dhingra's case (supra).\n\nThe. Division Bench,\n\nther~(ore, erred in holding that on 'the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the order of termination was. a11 innocuous one and did not earry any stigma. .The order of the Division Bench is, our opinion, an unsustainable one and is liable to the .set aside.\n\nJn the result, we allow this appeal, set aside the. judgment. of the Division Bench of the High Court and restore the judgment of the learned Single. Judge. We hereby declare that the appellant continues to be' in the se.rvice of the College. He is entitled to all the benefits flowi11g from this declaration including .ihe sabry and . allowances as if there was no break in his service. The: respondent College shall also pay the costs of this appeal to the appellant.\n\ns.R,.\n\nAppeal allowed.\n\n• •\n\n. {\n\n,.;;·", "total_entities": 50, "entities": [{"text": "INDER PAL GUPTA", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2, "end_char": 17, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "INDER PAL GUPTA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "THE MANAGING COMMITTEE, MODEL INTER COLLEGE\n\nTHORA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19, "end_char": 69, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE MANAGING COMMITTEE, MODEL INTER COLLEGE, THORA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 85, "end_char": 103, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "O. CHINNAPPA REDDY*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A.P. SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 105, "end_char": 113, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "E .. s. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 118, "end_char": 144, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "E.S. VENKATARAMIAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 236, "end_char": 246, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 310, "end_char": 321, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 3J", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 458, "end_char": 468, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1561, "end_char": 1571, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2145, "end_char": 2154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shamsher", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2697, "end_char": 2705, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[747F-G; 759G; 760E]\n\nParshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India [1958) S •. C.R. 828; Shamsher ·\n\n.S/ngh.nd Anr.v."}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3498, "end_char": 3526, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION :."}}, {"text": "R.K. Garg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3707, "end_char": 3716, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.K. Garg and D.K. Garg for the Appellant.", "canonical_name": "R.K. Garg"}}, {"text": "D.K. Garg", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3721, "end_char": 3730, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.K. Garg and D.K. Garg for the Appellant.", "canonical_name": "R.K. Garg"}}, {"text": "N.N. Sharma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3767, "end_char": 3778, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Rangaran and N.N. Sharma for Respondent."}}, {"text": "S. Markandeya", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3796, "end_char": 3809, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Markandeya for Respondent:\n\nGopa!"}}, {"text": "Gopa! Subramaniam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3827, "end_char": 3844, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S. Markandeya for Respondent:\n\nGopa!"}}, {"text": "Shobha Dikshit", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3854, "end_char": 3868, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subramaniam and Mrs. Shobha Dikshit for Respondent."}}, {"text": "VENKA'I; ARAM!AH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3930, "end_char": 3946, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Jndgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKA'I; ARAM!AH, J. The appellant was appointed on probation as the Principal of the Model Inter College, Thora, District."}}, {"text": "Intermediate Education Act, 1921", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4184, "end_char": 4216, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "(1984] 3 S.C.R.\n\n1969", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 4615, "end_char": 4636, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "D.D. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5821, "end_char": 5831, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "You will however be entitled to your dm:s in lieu of notice .. Please hand over complete charge to Sri D.D. Gupta, who is being instruct.ed accordingly, Without delay.", "canonical_name": "D.D., Gupta"}}, {"text": "S.P. Jain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6161, "end_char": 6170, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Of course the civil suit filed .by Shri S.P. Jain of Meeiut for the recovery of his dues.is your sole.·"}}, {"text": "Meeiut", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6174, "end_char": 6180, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Of course the civil suit filed .by Shri S.P. Jain of Meeiut for the recovery of his dues.is your sole.·"}}, {"text": "P. GUPTA", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6502, "end_char": 6510, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "i. P. GUPTA ' INTER COLLEGE, THORA (Venkataramiah, J.)\n\n7SS. ·", "canonical_name": "LP. Gupta"}}, {"text": "Venkataramiah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6535, "end_char": 6548, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "i. P. GUPTA ' INTER COLLEGE, THORA (Venkataramiah, J.)\n\n7SS. ·"}}, {"text": "D.O. Gupta.is", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7045, "end_char": 7058, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sri D.O. Gupta.is to assume.office of the Principal of C this institution wiih immediate effect in officiating capacity till further instruction."}}, {"text": "J.P. Gupta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7221, "end_char": 7231, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He may take over .charge from Sri J.P. Gupta when he returns.", "canonical_name": "I .P. Gupta"}}, {"text": "I .P. Gupta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 7619, "end_char": 7630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sri I .P. Gupta, who was present in the meeting also heard it.", "canonical_name": "I .P. Gupta"}}, {"text": "4.7 .. 68", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8604, "end_char": 8613, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1968 but in the meeting of the Committee held on 25.8 68 in wbih the Principal was also present, the report of the Manager, dated 4.7 .. 68 was put as desired by the President Reso1ution 3 date."}}, {"text": "LP. Gupta", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8737, "end_char": 8746, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri LP.", "canonical_name": "LP. Gupta"}}, {"text": "I.P. Gupta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9082, "end_char": 9092, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the prooeedings the minute book contains signaturei of Sri I.P. Gupta alongwit]l other members or' the Committee present.", "canonical_name": "I .P. Gupta"}}, {"text": "D.D., Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9627, "end_char": 9638, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The manager is also authorised to hand over charge to Sri D.D., Gupta when necessary.", "canonical_name": "D.D., Gupta"}}, {"text": "Inder Pal Gupta", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10734, "end_char": 10749, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly I suggest that instead of taking any serious action, the period of probation of Sri Inder Pal Gupta be , terminated without waiting for th!!", "canonical_name": "INDER PAL GUPTA"}}, {"text": ".March 14, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11498, "end_char": 11513, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Division Bench allowed the appeal and dismissed the Writ 'retition filed by the appellant by its order dated .March 14, 1973."}}, {"text": "Article 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11652, "end_char": 11663, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11789, "end_char": 11799, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17037, "end_char": 17048, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17172, "end_char": 17183, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Anoop Jaiswalv", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17329, "end_char": 17343, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. State of\n\n(1) [19S8} S. C. R• 8~8;\n\nA Punjab(1) and Anoop Jaiswalv."}}, {"text": "Parshotam Lal Dhingra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 17470, "end_char": 17491, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Parshotam Lal Dhingra's case (supra), this Court observed at prge 862 thus :\n\n\"In short, if the termination of service is founded on the right flowing from contract or the service rules then, prima facie, the termination."}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17761, "end_char": 17769, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 311", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18265, "end_char": 18273, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18734, "end_char": 18745, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "27.4.1969", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18903, "end_char": 18912, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the light of the principles enunciated in Parshotam Lal Dhingra's case (supra) the learne.d Single Judge who decided the Writ Petition at the first instance itl the High Court observed in the course of his order 'thus :\n\n.. G\n\n\"In this petiti.on nnder Article 226 of the Constitution the petitioner questio'ls the validity of the so-called termination of his service by the resolution passed by the Managing Committee on 27.4.1969."}}, {"text": "sec. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19178, "end_char": 19185, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.SCALE !", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 19444, "end_char": 19453, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[1984-] I.SCALE !"}}, {"text": "27.4.69", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19839, "end_char": 19846, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "explain qn 27.4.69, at the meeting of the Managing C)mmittee."}}, {"text": "Sec. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19980, "end_char": 19987, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20272, "end_char": 20279, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_3_763_771_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "• •\n\n. SMT. RAJ RANI\n\nCHIEF SETTLEMENT. COMMISSIONER DELHI AND ORS .\n\n• May 3, 1984\n\n[D A. QESAI, AMARENDRA NA TH SEN AND R.B .MISRA JJ .]\n\nEvidence Act-S. 35-Scope of • . fJhether .certificate of _di:ath. given by respectable persons of the place where decea.\\ed once resided admisible in evidence. Held no.\n\nNanak Chand, father of tbe appeJJ; nt, a displiced 'person from West Pakistan and having a verified claim in tlis name for _some Jand, disappeared\n\nome time in December 1954.\n\nA report about his_ disappearance was lodged by the aopellant's brother, Dewan Chand, Respondent No. 2, with t.he local. police-in Punjab.\n\nTbe police made an enquiry ill the matter and ultimately aave out that Nanak Chand could not be traced.\n\nIn response to a: notice isiiued o the year 19'6 in suo 1noto revij)ion in regard to.the verified claim, jn tho absrnce or Nanak Charid, Dewnn Chand appeared and alleaed t.bat Nanak Chand.bad died leaving behind three. sons il; icluding him as the only Ie:gal heirS.\n\nDewan Cbilnd produced a certificate to the effect that Nanak Chand had died one year and 10 months prior to 25th Octo.bCr, 1956.\n\nThe certificate \\Vas issued on his request by some rfspectable persons .of the place wber~ lbe family once resided.\n\nThe Additional Settlement Commissioner, Delhi, by his order d1ted. 27th October, 1956 allowed the application for substitutiorl and directed the three sons to be brougqt on record as legal repreentative!'i of the deceased Nanak Chand although NaAak Chand bad left behind three 1!ons, three daughters including theappellant and his widow.\n\nThe appellant, in an attempt to have her name substitufedt) filed a revision application against the order of the Additional Settlement Commissioner before the Chief Settlefnent Cornmis~ sloner under. s 5.of the Diplaced Persons (Claims) St1pplementary Act,\n\n1954 ..\n\nBy his order dated 2.Sth September, 1965, the Chief SetUemeot\n\n.- Commissioner ccnfirrned the orde_r of the Additional Settlement Commis .. sioner dated 27th October, 1956 an~ dismissed the revision appli .. ca.tion of -the appe-llant without affording; an opportunity of being_ heard to the rppella-nt.\n\nThe High Co1, lr1 dismissed the appellanfs writ petition and Letters_ Patent Appeal against the order o~ the Chief settlement Commis!!'ioner.\n\nThe High Court observed. 1J1at the Additional Settlement Commissioner acted right11 in re1'ing upon 1he death ceftificate _ prci; luc.ed by'\"bewanChand and ubstilutir.g the sons .of Nnnak Chand as heirs of the deceased of his\n\n~, riP, rd cl'aim.\n\nHence this appeal.\n\n,'\\llowiog t!ie appeal, .\n\n• •\n\nHELD.: A certificate given by repectable persons of :the place . where the d>tceasrd once resided,- to say the least, is not ad.missible in\n\nf:v.idence, Sec. ~5 of 1he evidence Act povides that an elltry in any public or other official book, register, or record, stating a fact in issue or reiCvant fd'ct, and mede by a public servant in the disCbarge of his official duty,_ or by _any 01her person in performance A of a duty, specially enjoined by the law of the country in which such book, register or record iS kept; is itself a relevant fact. [769BC] ·\n\nIn the instant case a certificate by certain respectable person of tho place whCre the family once resided doesnot satisfy the fequirements of s.35 of the evidei; icC Act.\n\nTberfl is no. p_roof th, at any statutory duty WM cast upon the person issiiing the certificate to keep a record of birth 3nd death .andtherefore, the certificate of death hasno evldeotiary value. It is Very easy for .a. person to obtain a deat-h certificate from 'the soca11ed respectable persons in ordfr to grab the property.· If according to Dewan Chand, Nanak Charid had died heust also indicate where did be die aD.d it is the pl_ace. of .his eath which will be _relevant and not the place of bis birth or residence.\n\nThe certificate obviously is not of -the place where :Nanak.Chand ded\". The authorities have graveJy-erred in relying upon tho\n\ncortific, ate of death which was inadmissible in evidence. [769DE) ·\n\nTo •ee whether daughters would be entitled to interest in the pro perty left by Nanak Chand will depend upon the death of Nanak Chand before .. or after the enforcement of Hindu Suctession Actand to decide as to when'Nanak Chand died it was absolutely essential that an opportunity Sbc;>uld have been .offered to the appellant in acordance with the principles\n\nof natural justice. [769H; 770A]\n\nCiyIL APPELLATE JURiSDictioN 1971.\n\nCivil Appeal No. 485 of\n\n• From the Judgmeut and Order .dated the 29th January, 1970 of the .Delhi High Court in Let ers Patent Appeal No. 8/70. ' . . .\n\nD.D. Thakur, E.G. Agarwala and V.X. Pcnditia for the Appel 1 !ant.\n\nCharnan Lal ltrora for the Respondent.\n\n• The. Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nM1sRA, J. The. present appeal by certificate is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Delhi dated 29th January, 1970 ' in letttrs pattnt arperlccnJirrning the judgment and order of tho Je11rped Single judge of the High Court date\\! 7t!i January, 1970,\n\nRAJ RANI v. SETTLEMENT COMMR. (M; sa, J.) 165\n\nNanak Chand, father of the appellant was a displttced person from West Pakistan where he had le!t agric\\lltural lands i~ village Chhota Bhukh Auta(, tehsil Bahawal .Nagar, district Bahawalpur.\n\nAfter the partition of the country his claim beating Index No. B/BP- 3/259 was verified in his name for 26 standard acres 12! units. Nanak Ch!\\lld disappeared sometime in December, 1954 and a rport about his disappearance. was lodged. by the appellant's brother Dewan ,\n\n• Ciiand, arrayed in this appeal as respondent No. 2, on 25th ·\"'- December, t'954 with. the local police, Malhout, district Ferozepnr, Punjab.\n\nAn enquiry was made by the police in the matter and ultimately the police gave out that Nanak Chand could not be traced.\n\nIn the year 1956 a notice was issued in suo moto revision in. regard to the verified claim referred to above, .by the Additional Settlement Commissioner, Delhi. to Nannk Chand, claimant. As Nanak Chand could not and did not appear in compliance with the notice, the. eldest brother of the appellant, namely, Dewan Chand, appeared before the Additinal Settlement Commissioner, Delhi on o.ctober 25, 1956 and altegca that Nanak Chand had 'died leaving behind thre sons, namely, Dewan Chand, Prabhu Dayal and Ashok Kumar (minor) as the only legal heirs of the deceased . •\n\nThe learned Additional Settlement Commissioner by his order dated 27th October, .1956 altowed the application for. substitution and directed Dewan Chand, Prabhu Dayal and Ashok Kumar alone . to .be brought 0n the record as legal represrntatives of the deceased Nanak Chand, alth0ugh Nanak Chand had left behind the aforesaid . three sons; three daughters, namely, Satnam' Devi, Laj,,; anti and\n\nSmt. Raj Rani, and h.is widow Smt. Chandan Bai. .\n\nPrabhu Dayal; one of the three sons of Nanak Chand died in 1961 leaving behind his daughter Santosh Kumari. His .widow Smt.\n\nLajwanti appliedfor being substituted as an heir of the deceased alongwith her minor daughter Sailio; h Kumari. Jn 1904 the mother of the; appetlant also ; ipplied to the Settlement Officer that she and . her three d.aughte.rs may also be substituted as heirs and legal representatives of Nanak Chand deceased regarding payment ofcompel)- ·\n\nsa(ion in re.spec! of the vorified claim They also prayed for cond.o:nation of delay in fi]ing the application for substitution an(! f9r initiating proceedings under s. 9 of the Displaced Persons. '{Compensation aµd Rehabilitation) Act~ 1954. The Settleme11t\n\nSUPR!!ME COURT REPORTS [l 9841 3 S.C.R.\n\nOfficH cocerntd recomtended for condonation of delay in_ hfr report dated 24th March, 1964 to the Regional Settlement Commissioner Rajasthan with the_ delegated powers of Chief Settlement Commis:\n\nsioner, Rajas!han, who by his order dated 6th April, 1964 condoned the delay and directed that the case niay• be processed and finalised accordiiig to rules.\n\n. .,\n\nWhen the relevant -record was received by the M.O./S.O.\n\nRajasthau, the appellant's mother alleged that the previous order of substitution of heirs of Nanak Cliand, deceasad, had been obtained by fraud and mis-representation practised by her sous inasmuch as . they did not disclose in their application for substitution the existence of the appellan, t, her mother and si\"sters. The M.0.-cumS.O. by his order dated November 16, 1964, dismissed the application of the mother of the appellant on the ground that tho previous order dated 27th Ocfober, _1956 passed by the Addition~! Settlement Commissiner declaring only three sorts of Nanak Chand deceased as his heirs, to the exclusion of deceased's. widow and daughters-was never challeµged by way of an appeal or revision, so the said order had assumed' finality.\n\nHe, therefore, declined to interfere and refused to grant redress. The ntbther of the appellant on ' he• own behalf and on behalf of . her three daughters, including the appellant,. filed an appeal in the Court of the Regional Settlement\n\nCommissioner which came up before Shri S.S. Govilla, S.O. with delegated powers of Regionat Settlement Commissioner (Rajasthan) and he by his order dated 22nd December, 1964 C!ismissed the same.\n\nThe mother of the appellant undaunted by the failures, filed a revision petition before the Chief Settlement Commissioner, which came up for hearing before Shri D.N. Vohra, Settlement Commis sioner with delegated powers of Chief Settlement Commissioner, and he also took the view that the order dated lg th December,\n\n1954 passed by the Additional Sttlement Commissioner had. become final and he had no jurisdiction to revise or amend the said order, and accordingly he dismissed the revision'. Thereafter the mother moved the Central Government under~. 33 of the Displaced Persons • (CQmpensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 .!Jn. her own ef as well as on behalf of the appellant but the apphcat1on was _d1sm1ssed by the Central Government, Ministry of Rehabilitiation. On 30tb:\n\nAugust, !96S the appellant als_o filed a revision against the ordet of the Additional Settlement Commissioner before the Chief Settlement Commissioner under. s. 5 of the ;:>isplaced Persons (Supplementary)\n\n. 1 '\n\n' >\n\n\"-· .\n\n, • . ,,.l\n\nilAJ RA!!I v. SETTLEMENT COMMR. (Misra, J.) 767.\n\nVerification of Claims Act, 195~. but this also met with the same A. fate on 25th September, 1965.without affording an opportunity of being heared to the appellant.\n\nThe appellant eventu11ly filed a writ petition before the High Court. of Delhi giving rise to the present appeal against the orders dated 25th September, 196}, passed by the Chief Settlement Commissioner, Delhi whereby he CDnfirmed the ord<; r, dated 27th October, 1956 passed by the Additional Settlement. Commissioner, refusing to substitute the appelhnt as legal heir of Nanak 'chand, deceased.\n\nThe. writ petition w.is dism'ssed by an order dated 7th January, 1970.\n\nThe appellant unsuccessfully filed a letters patent appeal which was dismissed on 29th January, 1970. Feeling aggrieve<l the appellant applied fot a certificat.e under Art. 133 of the Constitution, which waj grnnted. Thi> is how the appellant has come to this Court ..\n\nIt_ is cor(tended for the aJ?pe!lant that on 27th October, 1956 she was a minor when the order was. obtained by fraud and misrepresontation by Dewan Chand, without disclosing the names of . other heirs viz. the appel.lant and her mother and two sisters. The\n\nappellant file~ Nvision petitfon under s. 5 of Claims (Supplementary) .\n\nAct (12 of 1954) on 27th of November, 1964 before the learned Chief Settlement Commissioner, who without hearing the appellant an!i without affording her any opportµqity to substantiate her pleas, dismissed the revision petition on 25th September, 1965. This was in Viol.ation of the principles of f)atural justice.\n\nThe High Court chose to rely on the deposition ofDewan\n\nChand, respondent No. 2, to the etfeat that his father had been.\n\nF murdered and he produced a certificate of death before the Chief Settlefrlent Commissioner certifying that Nanak Chand dd one year ten months prior to 25th October, 1956 and this certificate is alleged to have been .given on the applic; ition flied by Dowan Chand before the Prsident of the Municipal Committee, Abohat. The learn.e.d Single Judge ofthe High Court observed that the Additionah • Settlement Commissioner acted rightly in relying upon the cirtificate and substituting the sons of Nanak Chand as heirs of the deceased to his verified claim, on the ground that as Nanak Chand had died , prior tci the enforcement of the Hindu Succession Act his daughters.\n\nould not be heirs and could not succeed to the property of their father.\n\nShri Thakur, learned counsel for the appellant strenuously contended that if he had been given an opportunity by the <; hief\n\nSettlement Commissioner he would have been able to produce the. evidence before him. that on the own admission of Dewan Chand: Nanak Chand had dlsappeared sometime in December, 1954 and a report about his disappearance was lodged by Dewan Chand .on 25th December, 1954 with the local police; Malhout, di'stric.t . Ferozeimr and a;, a result of. an enquiry. the police gave out that\n\nNanak Chand could riot be traced. This evidence could not be . produced before the Chief Settlement Commissioner beause the\n\n appellant was not lieard, ·\n\nThe decision of this case hing~ on the question whether . Nanak Chand had died before or after the enforcement of tJ.e Hindu Succession Act.· If he died before the enforcement of the Hindu Succession Act obviously the daughters could not get any sh&re in the property left by Nanak Chand. If on the_ otlrer hand he died after the enforcement of the Hindu Succession Act, the daughters would be equally entitled to .a share in the property le ff by Nanak\n\nChnd. In 2.ny case the widow of Nauak Chand would be entitled to a share in the property irrespective of the fact whether Nanak Chand died before or after the Hindu Succession Act. This aspect of the case has been completely lost sight of by the High Court. If Nanak Chand disappeared in December, 1954 on the report of D'wan Chand himself and has nofbeen heard of for seven years by those who would naturally have heard of him if h.e has been alive, there could be raised. a presumption Of death when the quetion arises.. But in the instant case no presumption arises as the question . arose just two years after the date of disappearance.\n\nAs regards the actual date of death the High Court dealing with. the death certificate observed as .follows : ·\n\n\"A:s an administraiive officer doing quasi-Judicial work, the Additional Settlement Commissioner was entitled to give credence to the death certificate. He was bound only to make a preliminary enquiry as to who were the heirs of.\n\nNanak Chandc He did not hove to.decide that question finally.\n\nFor a preliminary enquiry the death certificate singed by the respectable persons .of the place where the famiiy resided was sufficient. therefore,· the Additional Settlement Commissioner was satisfied that the substitution\n\n.. '\n\n• •\n\n RAJ !\\AN! v. SETTLEMEtlT COMMR. (Misra, J.) 769.\n\nof the sons of NanakChand in place .of th.e deceased would not prejudicially affect his daughter. It was not, therefore, necessary for him to hwe given an oppJrtunity to the daughter of being heard under sub-section (2).of section 5 of •the Displaced . Persons (Claims) Supplementary . Act,\n\n1954.\"\n\nA certificate given. by cespectable persons, of the place where the deceased once resided, to say the least, is not admissible in evidence. Sec. 35 of the evidence Act provides that an entry in any public or other official book, register, or record, . st1ting a fact , in issue or relevant fact, and.made by a public servant in the discharge\n\nof.his official duty, or by any othor person in performance of a duty specially enjoin'd by the law of.the co1ntry in which such book, register or record is kept, is itself a relevant fact.\n\nIn the instant case a certificate by certain respeciable person of the place where the family oncJ re.sided does not satisfy the requirments of s. 35 of the evidence Act. There is n) proof that any statut9ry duty was cast upon the person issuing the certificate to keep a .record of birth and death and therefore, the certificate of death has no evidentiary .value. lt is very easy for a person to obtain death. certificate from the socalled. respectable persons in order to grab .the property. If according to Dewan Chand, Nanak Chand had died he must also indicate where did he die and itis . the place of his death which-will be relevant -and not the place of his birth or residence. The certificate obviously is not of the place where Nanak Chand died. We.are of the view the authorities have gravely '.erred in relying upon the certificate of death which was indmissible\n\n!n ((Vidence,\n\nThe High Oiurt repelled thecontcntion raised on behalf of the appellant tht opportunity. should have been given to the appellant\n\nunder s. 5 (L) of the Displacd Persons (Claim) Supplemeqtary Act, 1954 merely on the assumption that Nanak Chand had died muc.h before the enforcement of the Hindu Succession Act and, therefore, no. prejudice has been caused to the daughters as they would not be· ari heir._ It is simply begging the question.\n\nWhether daughers would be entitled to an interest in the propert; left by Nanak Chand • will depend upon the. deatli of Nanak Chand before or after the enforcement of Hindu. Succession Act. It .wasan important question, . therefor a, to decide whether Nanak Chand died before th\\i enforce .\n\nA ..\n\n• 710\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984] 3 S; C.ft.\n\nment of Hindu Succession Act or not.· For that it was absolutely 'essential that an opportu\"ity should h1; e been afforded to the appellant in accordance with the principle of natural justice.\n\nAs observed earlier, if ail opportun'ity had been. given w the appellant she would have produced the admission of Dewan Chand that his father Nanak Chand dtsappearcd sometime in December, I J54 and . as a result of an enquiry by the police, no trace of him could be found out.\n\nThe finding th'.lt Nanak Ch1nd died before the enforcement of the Hindu Succes>ion. Act, based on the death certificate, cannot be sustained for .a moment as it is based on an inadmissib\\e piece of evidence. If that finding is set aside, there is no escape from the conclusion that Nahak Chand died not before but after the enforcement of the Hindu Success.ion A<; j, that is, after 25th October, 1956.\n\nThere is no dispute that Nanak Chand died leaving behind . his widow,. three sons and three danghters. Dewan Chand fraud;;. fontly obtained on 'order alleging that Nanak Chand died leaving behind only .three sons. If Nanak Chand died after the enforcement of the. Hindu.\n\nSuccession Act, as found ear1ier, .obviously, his widow, three sons and three daughters wold succeed . to his interest in equal shares, which would work out to I/7th. Now the question• arises what was the. interest of Nanak Chand at the ti.ne of his death.\n\nAs the prop_erty in question was Mitaksharil coparcenery P'.operty, his interest wonlcf be determined in ace0rdance with the provisions of Explanation I of s. 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, It would be. appropriate at this stage lo read s. 6. insofar as it is material for the purpose Of this case :\n\n\"6. When a male Hindu dies after the commencement of this Act, having at the time of his death an interest in a Mitakshara copareenery property, his interest in the property, shall devolve by survivorship npon the sntviving\n\n G members of the coparcenery and not in aceordance with this Act :\n\nProvided that, if the deceased had left him. surviving a . female relative specified in Class I of the Schedule or a male . relative, specified in that class who claims, through such female relative, the interest of the. deceased in the Mitakshara coparcenery property shall devolve by testamentary\n\n• > •\n\nl. .\n\n.\\.\n\nRAJ , RANI V. SETTLEMllNT C0M.Md. (Mi; ra, J.) ?1[\n\nor intestate succ; ssion, as the casi may be,. under this Act A and .. not by survivorship.\n\nExplanatio!l' I.-For the purposes of this section,. the interest of a Hindu Mitakshara coparcenery shall be deemed to be the share in th' property that would have been_\n\nallotted to him if a partition of the property had taken place immediately before his death, irrespective of whethr he was entitled lo claim partition or not.\"\n\n' The interest of Nanak Chand shall bo 'deemed to be the share in the prop,, ty that would han' bem allotted to him if a partition ofthe property had taken place im1mdiately before his death irres pective c;>f wheth'r he wai entitled t_o claim putition or not. In view of Explanation I ofs. 6, Nanak Chand would hwe got I/5th interest on p>ttition between him 11nd h, s ivife and three so1is. If once -the intere>t of Nanak Chand is determined to be I/ 5th before . . hii. death, his itµerast would devolve upon his widow, three sons and three daughters equally and thus the share of each one of them would be 1/5 Xl/7, that is, i/35theach. The. claim of these heirs. cannot be denied merely because some of them have not advanced the claim.\n\nWhen the questfon of determination of hare among the heirs crops up before the Court, the Court hai to see that.every heir gets his duo.\n\nShri Itror,1 appearing for the. respond, nts could not successfully meet the point raised on behalf of the appellant.\n\n For the foregoing discussion the appeal must succeed and it is accordingly allowed atrd the judgment of the High Court as well. as of the authorities below are setjaside and share~ of the lhree sons, three daughters and.the widow are determined as follows: Each of the three sons-1/35; each of the hree daughter;-1/35; the widow- J/35+1/5. As the widow has inherited the interest of her husband after his death her _share would be augmented by 1/5. Therefore, her share would come to 1/35+ l/5.'...8/35.\n\n. In the circumstances of the case we direct the parties to bear their own costs.\n\nH.S.K.\n\nAppeal allowed •", "total_entities": 75, "entities": [{"text": "RAJ RANI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 12, "end_char": 20, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAJ RANI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "CHIEF SETTLEMENT. COMMISSIONER DELHI AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22, "end_char": 66, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "CHIEF SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER DELHI AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "May 3, 1984", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 72, "end_char": 83, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• May 3, 1984\n\n[D A. QESAI, AMARENDRA NA TH SEN AND R.B .MISRA JJ .]"}}, {"text": "AMARENDRA NA TH SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 98, "end_char": 117, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "AMARENDRA NATH SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R.B .MISRA JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 122, "end_char": 135, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.B. MISRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 153, "end_char": 158, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Dewan Chand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 559, "end_char": 570, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A report about his_ disappearance was lodged by the aopellant's brother, Dewan Chand, Respondent No.", "canonical_name": "Dewan Cbilnd"}}, {"text": "Nanak Chand", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 697, "end_char": 708, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Tbe police made an enquiry ill the matter and ultimately aave out that Nanak Chand could not be traced.", "canonical_name": "Nanak Chand.bad"}}, {"text": "Nanak Charid", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 854, "end_char": 866, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In response to a: notice isiiued o the year 19'6 in suo 1noto revij)ion in regard to.the verified claim, jn tho absrnce or Nanak Charid, Dewnn Chand appeared and alleaed t.bat Nanak Chand.bad died leaving behind three.", "canonical_name": "Nanak Chand.bad"}}, {"text": "Dewnn Chand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 868, "end_char": 879, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In response to a: notice isiiued o the year 19'6 in suo 1noto revij)ion in regard to.the verified claim, jn tho absrnce or Nanak Charid, Dewnn Chand appeared and alleaed t.bat Nanak Chand.bad died leaving behind three.", "canonical_name": "Dewan Cbilnd"}}, {"text": "Nanak Chand.bad", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 907, "end_char": 922, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In response to a: notice isiiued o the year 19'6 in suo 1noto revij)ion in regard to.the verified claim, jn tho absrnce or Nanak Charid, Dewnn Chand appeared and alleaed t.bat Nanak Chand.bad died leaving behind three.", "canonical_name": "Nanak Chand.bad"}}, {"text": "Dewan Cbilnd", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 999, "end_char": 1011, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "sons il; icluding him as the only Ie:gal heirS.\n\nDewan Cbilnd produced a certificate to the effect that Nanak Chand had died one year and 10 months prior to 25th Octo.bCr, 1956.", "canonical_name": "Dewan Cbilnd"}}, {"text": "NaAak Chand", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 1489, "end_char": 1500, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "27th October, 1956 allowed the application for substitutiorl and directed the three sons to be brougqt on record as legal repreentative!'i of the deceased Nanak Chand although NaAak Chand bad left behind three 1!ons, three daughters including theappellant and his widow.", "canonical_name": "Nanak Chand.bad"}}, {"text": "s 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1786, "end_char": 1789, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3301, "end_char": 3305, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Nanak.Chand", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 3909, "end_char": 3920, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The certificate obviously is not of -the place where :Nanak.", "canonical_name": "Nanak Chand.bad"}}, {"text": "Hindu Suctession Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4225, "end_char": 4245, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "D.D. Thakur", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4638, "end_char": 4649, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D.D. Thakur, E.G. Agarwala and V.X. Pcnditia for the Appel 1 !"}}, {"text": "E.G. Agarwala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4651, "end_char": 4664, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D.D. Thakur, E.G. Agarwala and V.X. Pcnditia for the Appel 1 !"}}, {"text": "V.X. Pcnditia", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4669, "end_char": 4682, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D.D. Thakur, E.G. Agarwala and V.X. Pcnditia for the Appel 1 !"}}, {"text": "Charnan Lal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4706, "end_char": 4717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Charnan Lal ltrora for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "High Court of Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4878, "end_char": 4897, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "present appeal by certificate is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Delhi dated 29th January, 1970 ' in letttrs pattnt arperlccnJirrning the judgment and order of tho Je11rped Single judge of the High Court date\\!"}}, {"text": "Nanak Chand", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5106, "end_char": 5117, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M; sa, J.) 165\n\nNanak Chand, father of the appellant was a displttced person from West Pakistan where he had le!t agric\\lltural lands i~ village Chhota Bhukh Auta(, tehsil Bahawal .Nagar, district Bahawalpur.", "canonical_name": "Nanak Chand.bad"}}, {"text": "Nanak Ch!\\lld", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5433, "end_char": 5446, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nanak Ch!\\lld disappeared sometime in December, 1954 and a rport about his disappearance.", "canonical_name": "Nanak Chand.bad"}}, {"text": "Dewan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5562, "end_char": 5567, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "by the appellant's brother Dewan ,\n\n• Ciiand, arrayed in this appeal as respondent No."}}, {"text": "Nannk Chand", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6002, "end_char": 6013, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to Nannk Chand, claimant.", "canonical_name": "Nanak Chand.bad"}}, {"text": "o.ctober 25, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6223, "end_char": 6240, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "eldest brother of the appellant, namely, Dewan Chand, appeared before the Additinal Settlement Commissioner, Delhi on o.ctober 25, 1956 and altegca that Nanak Chand had 'died leaving behind thre sons, namely, Dewan Chand, Prabhu Dayal and Ashok Kumar (minor) as the only legal heirs of the deceased . •"}}, {"text": "Prabhu Dayal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6327, "end_char": 6339, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "eldest brother of the appellant, namely, Dewan Chand, appeared before the Additinal Settlement Commissioner, Delhi on o.ctober 25, 1956 and altegca that Nanak Chand had 'died leaving behind thre sons, namely, Dewan Chand, Prabhu Dayal and Ashok Kumar (minor) as the only legal heirs of the deceased . •", "canonical_name": "Prabhu Dayal"}}, {"text": "Ashok Kumar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6344, "end_char": 6355, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "eldest brother of the appellant, namely, Dewan Chand, appeared before the Additinal Settlement Commissioner, Delhi on o.ctober 25, 1956 and altegca that Nanak Chand had 'died leaving behind thre sons, namely, Dewan Chand, Prabhu Dayal and Ashok Kumar (minor) as the only legal heirs of the deceased . •"}}, {"text": "Satnam' Devi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6773, "end_char": 6785, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "three sons; three daughters, namely, Satnam' Devi, Laj,,; anti and\n\nSmt."}}, {"text": "Laj", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6787, "end_char": 6790, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "three sons; three daughters, namely, Satnam' Devi, Laj,,; anti and\n\nSmt."}}, {"text": "Raj Rani", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6809, "end_char": 6817, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raj Rani, and h.is widow Smt.", "canonical_name": "RAJ RANI"}}, {"text": "Chandan Bai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6839, "end_char": 6850, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chandan Bai. ."}}, {"text": "Prabhu Dayal", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6855, "end_char": 6867, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prabhu Dayal; one of the three sons of Nanak Chand died in 1961 leaving behind his daughter Santosh Kumari.", "canonical_name": "Prabhu Dayal"}}, {"text": "Santosh Kumari", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6947, "end_char": 6961, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prabhu Dayal; one of the three sons of Nanak Chand died in 1961 leaving behind his daughter Santosh Kumari."}}, {"text": "s. 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7488, "end_char": 7492, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Nanak Cliand", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 8136, "end_char": 8148, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "When the relevant -record was received by the M.O./S.O.\n\nRajasthau, the appellant's mother alleged that the previous order of substitution of heirs of Nanak Cliand, deceasad, had been obtained by fraud and mis-representation practised by her sous inasmuch as .", "canonical_name": "Nanak Chand.bad"}}, {"text": "S.S. Govilla", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9080, "end_char": 9092, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "filed an appeal in the Court of the Regional Settlement\n\nCommissioner which came up before Shri S.S. Govilla, S.O. with delegated powers of Regionat Settlement Commissioner (Rajasthan) and he by his order dated 22nd December, 1964 C!ismissed the same."}}, {"text": "22nd December, 1964", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9195, "end_char": 9214, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "filed an appeal in the Court of the Regional Settlement\n\nCommissioner which came up before Shri S.S. Govilla, S.O. with delegated powers of Regionat Settlement Commissioner (Rajasthan) and he by his order dated 22nd December, 1964 C!ismissed the same."}}, {"text": "D.N. Vohra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9398, "end_char": 9408, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The mother of the appellant undaunted by the failures, filed a revision petition before the Chief Settlement Commissioner, which came up for hearing before Shri D.N. Vohra, Settlement Commis sioner with delegated powers of Chief Settlement Commissioner, and he also took the view that the order dated lg th December,\n\n1954 passed by the Additional Sttlement Commissioner had."}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9764, "end_char": 9782, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter the mother moved the Central Government under~. 33 of the Displaced Persons • (CQmpensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 .!Jn."}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10178, "end_char": 10182, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Verification of Claims Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10308, "end_char": 10334, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "High Court. of Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10532, "end_char": 10552, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant eventu11ly filed a writ petition before the High Court."}}, {"text": "Art. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11113, "end_char": 11121, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Verification of Claims Act", "statute": "Verification of Claims Act"}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11513, "end_char": 11517, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "25th September, 1965", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11779, "end_char": 11799, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Act (12 of 1954) on 27th of November, 1964 before the learned Chief Settlement Commissioner, who without hearing the appellant an!i without affording her any opportµqity to substantiate her pleas, dismissed the revision petition on 25th September, 1965."}}, {"text": "ofDewan\n\nChand", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11911, "end_char": 11925, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court chose to rely on the deposition ofDewan\n\nChand, respondent No."}}, {"text": "Dowan Chand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12240, "end_char": 12251, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F murdered and he produced a certificate of death before the Chief Settlefrlent Commissioner certifying that Nanak Chand dd one year ten months prior to 25th October, 1956 and this certificate is alleged to have been .given on the applic; ition flied by Dowan Chand before the Prsident of the Municipal Committee, Abohat.", "canonical_name": "Dewan Cbilnd"}}, {"text": "Municipal Committee, Abohat", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12279, "end_char": 12306, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F murdered and he produced a certificate of death before the Chief Settlefrlent Commissioner certifying that Nanak Chand dd one year ten months prior to 25th October, 1956 and this certificate is alleged to have been .given on the applic; ition flied by Dowan Chand before the Prsident of the Municipal Committee, Abohat."}}, {"text": "Hindu Succession Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12620, "end_char": 12640, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Thakur", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 12736, "end_char": 12742, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri Thakur, learned counsel for the appellant strenuously contended that if he had been given an opportunity by the <; hief\n\nSettlement Commissioner he would have been able to produce the."}}, {"text": "Hindu Succession Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13514, "end_char": 13534, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Hindu Succession Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13578, "end_char": 13598, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Hindu Succession Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13744, "end_char": 13764, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Nanak", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 13843, "end_char": 13848, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If on the_ otlrer hand he died after the enforcement of the Hindu Succession Act, the daughters would be equally entitled to .a share in the property le ff by Nanak\n\nChnd.", "canonical_name": "Nanak Chand.bad"}}, {"text": "Hindu Succession Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14009, "end_char": 14029, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "D'wan Chand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14170, "end_char": 14181, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If Nanak Chand disappeared in December, 1954 on the report of D'wan Chand himself and has nofbeen heard of for seven years by those who would naturally have heard of him if h.e has been alive, there could be raised.", "canonical_name": "Dewan Cbilnd"}}, {"text": "Nanak Chandc", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 14836, "end_char": 14848, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nanak Chandc He did not hove to.decide that question finally.", "canonical_name": "Nanak Chand.bad"}}, {"text": "NanakChand", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 15201, "end_char": 15211, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the sons of NanakChand in place .of th.e deceased would not prejudicially affect his daughter.", "canonical_name": "Nanak Chand.bad"}}, {"text": "section 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15409, "end_char": 15418, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15626, "end_char": 15633, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 35", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16164, "end_char": 16169, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17048, "end_char": 17052, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Supplemeqtary Act, 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17089, "end_char": 17112, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Hindu Succession Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17200, "end_char": 17220, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Hindu Succession Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17707, "end_char": 17727, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Nanak Ch1nd", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 18190, "end_char": 18201, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The finding th'.lt Nanak Ch1nd died before the enforcement of the Hindu Succes>ion.", "canonical_name": "Nanak Chand.bad"}}, {"text": "Nahak Chand", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 18453, "end_char": 18464, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If that finding is set aside, there is no escape from the conclusion that Nahak Chand died not before but after the enforcement of the Hindu Success.ion A<; j, that is, after 25th October, 1956.", "canonical_name": "Nanak Chand.bad"}}, {"text": "25th October, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18554, "end_char": 18572, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "If that finding is set aside, there is no escape from the conclusion that Nahak Chand died not before but after the enforcement of the Hindu Success.ion A<; j, that is, after 25th October, 1956."}}, {"text": "Mitaksharil coparcenery P'.operty", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19138, "end_char": 19171, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As the prop_erty in question was Mitaksharil coparcenery P'.operty, his interest wonlcf be determined in ace0rdance with the provisions of Explanation I of s. 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, It would be."}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19261, "end_char": 19265, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Hindu Succession Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19273, "end_char": 19293, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19342, "end_char": 19346, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "RANI V. SETTLEMllNT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 20024, "end_char": 20043, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".\\.\n\nRAJ , RANI V. SETTLEMllNT C0M.Md. ("}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_3_772_788_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "BABULAL NAGAR AND ORS.\n\nSHREE SYNTHETICS LTD. & ORS.\n\nMay, 4, 1984\n\n[D. A. DEsAi, o. CaINNAPPA REDDY AND A.\n\nVARADARAJAN, JJ.J\n\nMadhya Pradesh Industrial Relations Act 1960-Sctions 61 and. 66-:- 0rder of dismissal or remo'la! front service made agalnst an employee- Jurl&-\n\ndicrin af Lfibu.' Court ro t'nterfere in an app/catlon under sect/On 6/.-Lahour\n\nCourt e1; titled to. exanine thf! proprlety .or irnproprlety of the order-Jurisdiction of Industrial Court to interfere with the .order of Labour Court-lnduStriaI\n\nc~Urt can cone to a different co.1clusio.1 ori same set ; I facts.\n\nWords and Phrases-r~As.it tzifiks fit\"-Legalltj and propr/ety\"-Meaniq of-Madhya Prade, h Industrial Relations Act, 1960. ,; c:ion 66 (J).\n\nThe D.ppellants were workmen emplo)'ee5 of the first respondent com .. pany.\n\nItwa~ allegd that .they assault_ed a11otber workmari as a result of which he sustaineJ bleeding.lnjuries.oa his had.\n\nA ch1rgsb~'!t WJS draWQ• up _by the m1nagemen!, was served on the appellants,. hich .. was followed by a comi)osit' domestic enquiry at the end :of which all of them were dismissed rom service •.\n\nThe appellants moved five different applications before the Labour CoUrt _questioning the validity of the don1cstic enquiry as also the legality and propriety of the oiders te_rmioating their services; The Labour Court -'findirig that the domestic_ enquiry was held according to the relevant rules, and that there W:is evidence in S\\JPP.ort of the alleged misconduct, held that the managemant fYas justified . in. imposing_ the Penalty of dismissal from' service.\n\nG The appellants flied five separate revision petitions befOre the Industrial Courtunder sections 66 aad 67 of the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Relations Act, t 960.\n\nThe President of the lnciustcial Court, findillg that the entire approach of-tho Inquiry Officer.-Man'lger in -arriving at the fia lings_ of' mis .. collduct in the domestic enquiry ppoaied to be biase(I and qnfair,_ and that the Conclusions neither fair nor reasonable, held that the dismissal could not H bo sustained.\n\nAll the revision petitions were therefore .allowed, and the orders of. the Labour Court dismising the applications were set aside, and\n\n' )..\n\n. '\n\nllABULAL v. SHREB SYNTHBTics '173.\n\nthe matters were remanded for a fresh decision after giving the pirties due A opr)ortunity to adduce' evidence ia respect of the alleg'ed mis..::onduct.\n\nThe respondent-company filed Writ pe_titions before the High Court questioning tile correcJness of the-order of _the Industrial Court and a Divi- . sioo Bench held that the Industrial Court e:x; ceeded 'its jurisdfction by inter\n\nfering with the findings of\n\n0 facts, and' as this was an erro~_apparent on the face of the award, quashed the decision of the Industrial Gourt.\n\nAlloWing the appeals to t'his Court;\n\nHELD : I': (i) Times without numb\", it h1s been po!nted out . that Art. 226 is a device t~ secur~ and advance juslice and. not otherwis.,;. [7 d7E]\n\nSadhu Ram v. Delhi Tra, sport Corporaiion, [ 1983] 4 SCC 156, referred\n\nto. • (ij) Ordinarily, th~ Courts exercisi11g cxtraordia1ry jurisdL:tion is loathe to interfere With an order remandicig the m1tter io the athority. directed to iovCstigate facts. [787F] ·\n\n.D. P. Maheshwarl v. Delhi Administratio1 and Ors., [1983] 4 SCC 293;\n\nref1.rr.ed tp.·\n\nIn the instant case, the Indutrial. Court had made an Order of rem1nd.\n\nThe High Court was not justified in interfering with the Same .. By tllis\n\nuncalle~ for iiJtcrference, it has merely .Prolonged the agony of the unem-. ptOyed workmen and permitted the jurisdiction of the Higll Court urider Art. 226 'to be explojted by thOse who can well afford to Wait to t'he detriment Or those wlio can illaff\"rd to wait by drJggiag the 1.ltter from cou.rt to court for.adjudication of peripheral is_ues more vital to thm. [787F-GJ\n\n. . .. '\n\n2. (i) DisrnisSal frolil service is an order made under th6 relevant stnding orders. A relief agaiQst sU.ch an order can be obtained by making all application under section 6 l to the Labour Court. Agaibst the order\n\nmad~ by the ~1hour Court un.der se'ction 0 l, a reviSion would lie Under section 66 to the Industrial Court. [779H; 780C]\n\n(ii) If and when an application under ection 61 is made the Labour\n\nCourt will have jurisdiction to decide the legality and propriety of the order G or'dismiSsal or removal from service.\n\nWhen jurisdiction is conferredupoa the babour Court, not oi:ily to examine tho 1e8aHty of the order as also the proprie!y of the Order, the. Labour Court ca.a in exefcise of th~• jurisdiction examine the propriety ot imp'ropriety of tho order. [181C]\n\n3. (i) The main put .of Sec. 66 elearly spells out the jurisdiction of ' the Industrial _Court to pass any order in reference to the case. brought-. before it 'as-it thinks fit.' The expressio1 'as it thinks fitr confers a, very\n\nH . '\n\n• •\n\n114 SiJPRBMB COURT REPORTS [!9S4J 3 s.c.ll.\n\nA wide jurisdiction enabling it to take an entirely.different view on the same set of facts.\n\nThe expression 'as it thinks fit' has the same connotation, unless the context othrwise indicates 'asb~ de\"em; fit\\ [7858-C]\n\n8aja Ram Mahadev_ Paranjype and Ors. v •. Aba Maruti Mali and Ors.1 [1962] Suppl. l.SCR 739; referred to.\n\n(ii) Sub.cl. (c) of tho first proviso to S!ction 66 (1) will permit tho Industrial Court to interfere with th'e order m1.de by the LabJur Cout, if the Labour Court has acted with m1terial irregularity in di5posal of the _dispute before it~ If the finding rec0rded by th~ •Labour C'Jurt is such to which no reason1ble man can arrive, the Indultrial CJurt in x:rcise of 1 its revisiorial jurisdictiOn would be entitled to inttJrfere eve11 if p1tent juridic_ .. tional error is, not poiated out. [78Sll -F]\n\nThe -expression 'propriety' is variou.ly urtderstooJ; oae mJ1uin~ assigned to it-bing 'justice'.\n\nArnJn.gst va&ds sbad.;:s of mJ.1.ning asiigad to the expression, th3 dictionary sets out: 'fitness, appro?riate1.;:sJ; ap~HuJ.;:; suitability etc.' as some of them. [7810-E]\n\nS If the justice or the justness in relation to a Jegal procee4ing where evidence is led is questioned and th;) authority is coaferred wHb jurisdiction to examlne the pop'riety of tb3 ord.;:r or deisio:i thit avth:Jrity will h:i.ve the. slm~ jurisdiction as the originalauthority tocom~ to a dffferent conclusion o:i the same set of facts-• If a11y other vieN is taken, the expressiqn 'propriety' woulj lo;~ all sig1ifi;:111::e.\n\nThe expre3sioJ 'I_eg1lity a1d propriety' b1s been i.lied iii!. varioui statutei wh.;:re appJliate o; revisiooal jurisdiction is confecred up1n a su}orior authority. o[781E-'3]\n\nRa'llan nd Rama• Lt</. v. Th? State of M>ira; and Aiir., ( 1956] S.C.R. 2S6, Moti Ram v. Suraj Bhan a\"dOs., [1960] 2 S.C.R. 895, Awdesh Kumar Bhatnagar v. The Gwalior Rayon Silk Mfg. ( .Yeaving) Co. Ltd. and Anr. [1972] Llb. and I_C. 84i; referred to. .\n\nIn the insta1t cise, the lod03triiil C:>urt. while h'1rlng th' ievi3ion Petitloii.s \"'found that th~· p.HitioJers wre; tradunioJ WJrkers and tb.1t three , of them w<!re offi.; e-aers of th' union, and . that a m ltedal p:ece of e\\ridence clearly' pJiriting tO th.;: coatrary was whcilly overlookd by th' Inqniry officer. Tho Indu•triai'Court also pointed out th1t report (E< D/18) purpJr-ting to have ben. m1de by the ass1ulted w.>rker to th3 factory Manlger on the day following the date of the occilrrence When P.rop_3tJy scanned appeared to be highly suspiciou~ evidenc;:: hJcau3e: 'it WJS not dated 3.nd did not bear the eadorsement of the officer to whrn it Was preSerited. . After referring to other infirmities in theapproach of tho Labour Court, the Industriiil Court concluded that the entir_, approach Or the 'M1nager in arriving at the find-ings of roisCondu:t in bis enquiry -'app:::ared to be biased and unfair', and 'tha coaclusioi:is o; iither fair nor reasonable aild any order of dismisal blsed thereon collld not b~ sustained.' The ... InduStrial Court was, therefore perfectly ju<; tifi d in iOter .. ferin$ with the order of the Labour Court. lt m>rely set aside the awar4\n\nBABULAL v. SHREE SYNTHETICS (Desai, J.) 775\n\nof the Lo bour cOurt and d.id not proceed to reappraie the evidence but A femitted the case to the Labour Court for fresh deciSion.\n\nIt was thus an -eminently just order.\n\nThe High Ccurl however; observed that tho Labour Court could only interfere wi.th the decision of the inquiry officer if the findings atrived at were perverse.\n\nThe High Court comptetely missed the - ambit of jurisdiction of the Labour Court in that it had the jurisdiction to decide the legality and propriety of the order.\n\nImpropfiety. as converse of propriety cannot be equated with perversity. _The ll:igb Courl wholly,\n\n:JJ misread the relevant provfsiorf and interfered with the dedsion of the Industrial Court which was pre-eminently just and within the four corners of its jurisdiction. [7850; 786A-G; 787A-D]\n\n• CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 1891-1895 of 1982.\n\n. C\n\nAppeals by Special leave from the Judgment and Order dated the !\\th September, 19i9 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc. Petitions Nos; 77 !o 81 of 1979.\n\nJ. Ramamurthy and Ms. R. Vaigaifor the Appellants.\n\n• G.B. Pal, S.K: G, imbhir, Ashok Mahajan and Ms. Sun/ta Kripalani for the Respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDesAT, J. Nothing appears more well settled than that the extraordinary ju~diction under Art. 226 conferred on the High ·\n\nCourt was a -.veapon forged to overreach injustice and secure and advance justice. When therefore, this extraordinary power is. used to defeat justice and to promote technicality not only its raison d'etre is violated but. it becomes a handy instrument for those to whoni litigation cost is a luxury enjoyed at the cost of others and employed toexhaust and harass an unequal opponent. Sad as it may appear that unfortunate situation emerges in this appeal.\n\nThe first respondent-Shree Synthetics Ltd. ('respondnt' for short) appears to be a company governed by the Companies Act,\n\n1956. It has.set up a factory at Ujjain where it manufactures. polyester fibre. 'Appellants in eacli of these appeals were the wdtkmen\n\nof the respondent. Th.ere is a trade union of the workmen e)llployed\n\nby the respondent of which at the relevant time three out of the five appellants in this group of_appeals'wer~ office bearers. Babula!\n\nNagar was the President of the Union : Babula! Jaiswalwas the General Secretary and Ramesh Candra was the Secretary.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1984J 3 S.C.R.\n\nAccording to the respondents on June 3, 1975 around 11.10 P. M one Verma a workman of the respondent on the shift being. over Wdnt, out. of the compound gate-and took his seat in a tempo when Babula! Nagar a_Tld Babula! Jaisw'al along with three other. appellants approached him and asked Verm1 to alight from the tempo as they wanted to talk to him .. On Venm's disinclination to come ou~ of the vehicle, it was all>ged that Babula! Nagar and Babula! Jaiswal pulled Verma out of the vehicle and all the appellants. assaultod him with fists and kicks and felled him down as a result of which Verma sustained .bleeding injuries on his head. On hearing the commotion, sta!T of the security department. intervened. and rescued him. ·\n\nSetting out these allegations a charge-sheet was drawn-up .and served on the five appellants followed by a composite cjomestic enquiry at the end of which all of them were dismi&sed frpm service.\n\nThe appellants moved five different .applications before th.e Labour Co trt questioning the validity of the domestic efiquiry held againat them as also tlie]egality and propriety of the orders terminating their services. The Labour Court .was of -the opinion that the domestic enquiry was held according to the relevant ru \\es and as there was evidence in support of the alleged m!sconduct the manage,, mentwas justified in imposin'g the penalty of dismissal from service and accordingly all the five applications were dismissed. ,\n\nThe appellants filed five separate revision petitions before the Industrial Court under Secs, 66 and 67 of the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Relations Act, J 950.('Act' for short). All the five revision petitions were he1rd by the President of the Industrial Court at Indore who. was q{ the opinion that the entire approach of the inquiry officer-Manager-in arrivingat the findings of misconduct in his enquiry. appear to be biased aµd unfair and that the conclusions are neither fair nor reasonable and as such the dismissal cannot be sustained on the basis thereof. Accordingly he, by, a common judgment dated Febrnary 26, 1979, allowed all the revision petitions and set '!lside the orders of the Labour Court dismissing the applications and n; manded the matters.to the Labour Court for a fresh. decision after giving both the parties due opportunity to adduce evidence in respect of the alleged misconduct. ·\n\nThe respondent moved five separate misc, petitions in.the Hih\n\n; 1\n\n'r .\n\nDABULAC v. SHREE SYNTHETICS (Desai, J.)\n\nCourt of Madhya Pradesh,\" Jabalpur at Indore under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution questioning the correctness of the decision of the Industrial Court. A Division Bench of the High Court he .Id that the Industrial Court exceeded its jurisdiction by interfering 'with the findings of facts and this was in error apparent on the face of the award. Accordingly, it issued a writ of certiorari and quashe_d\n\nthe decision of the Industrial Court. Hence these five civil appeals by special leave. ·\n\nConditions of service in respect of the cniployees employed by the respondent are governed by the Certified Standing Orders. s. o.\n\n12 (f) which was relied upon by the respondent for imputing mis- ' r. conduct to the appellants reads asunder : C\n\n\"12. Disciplinary action for !llisconduct (1) The folio- . wing ts or omissions on tM part of an employee shall amount to a major misconduct :\n\n(a) to (el xx xx xx\n\nxx xx xxxx xx xx\n\n(f) drunkenness, riotous or disorderly behaviour, during working hours at the undertaking or condut:t endangering the life or safety of any person, intimidation, physical duress, or any act subversive of dmcipline.\" - • The allegation in the charge-sheet on the basis of which the domestic enquiry wa~ held reads as under : ' .. . • ...Babula! was on duty on 3.6.1975 in the B Shift from 3 p. m. to 11 p. m.\n\nAt about 8.15 p.m. when Shri Satya- Prakash Verma, a Telephone Operator and Shri K. C. Bagdi, Shift-time keeper were coming out ofthe canteen after taking their meals, Babula] Nagar and Babula\\ Jaiswalwere sitting in the lavyn in front of the canteen. At that time, Babula! Jai'swal asked Babula! Nagar to explain to Verma the whole position in Hindi. There upo11 Babula! J\\'agar went to Bagdi and Verma and uttered the following meanjngful words : _:_\"You are just a child now. You do not understand anything; if you interfere in this, you will have to pay a heavy price, (true transl; ltion)\" Verma ave no reply and both Veq:na and Ba¥di ·\n\n' 778\n\nSUPREME C\\tURT REPORTS • • [1984] 3 s.c.R\n\niv.ent into the office. Thereafter, at 9.15 p. m. A. K. Awdsthi and Rajendra Jain went to the canteen to iake their meals. At that time both the petitioners namely, Babula! Nagar and Babula! Jaiswal we.re. present there. Babula! Nagar took oµt\n\na false token and . challenged that it may be checked b) any security officiaL Rajendra Jain thereupon said that he was not in his uniform. At. that time, Babula! Jaiswal uttered some filthy words and thereafter both Babula! Nagar and Babula! Jaiswal left the cantoen uttering filthy abuses.\n\nAt 9.30 p. m. Babula! Nagar spoke to Verma on telephone that he should. come. out of the Plant as he wanted to talk to him. Verma, therefore, come ont in the lawn from his office where both Bbulal Nagar and Babula! Jaiwal were present. At that time, Babula! Jaiswal said to Verma as under :-\n\n• \"You. have put end to our movement. Jn future things -will not be ri, gllt, if you interfere with us, and threatened, , that we shall see at 11'0 clock outside the gate.\" (true traµslation)\n\nAfter the shift was over at about 11.10 pm. when Verma went outof the gate and too.k his seat _in the tempo Babula! Nagar and Babula!. Jaiswal along with the otl!er three petitioners wtnt to him and asked Verma to come cut of the tempo as they Mnted to talk to him .. Verma replied that they could talk to him there.' Thereupon both Babula!\n\nNagar and Babula! Jaiswal pulled Verma out of fhe tempo and all the petitioners as•aulted Verma with fists and kicks and felled him dJwn as a result of which he sustained a. bleeding injury on his head.\"On hearing the cries of Verma members. of the security Department rescued him an~ took him inside the gate.\" ·\n\nApart from anything else, a very serious question touching upon the jurisdiction of the Disciplinary Authority to hold an enquirf on the , allegation that S. 0. 12 (!) (f) was violated would arise before the Labour Court more particularly in view of the recent decision of this Court in M/s Glaxo Lcboratorles (I) Ltd. v.\n\nPresiding Office;, Labour Court, Meerut & Ors. \\1) wherein S. 0. 22 11pplicable to. Glaxo l, aboratori_!!S (I) Lt<;!. wh:vb. is in pari materia\n\n(O [1984) 1 src 1,\n\n.. -(\n\n' \\ . ' . .....-...._\n\n\"r .\n\n' •\n\nllABULAL \\', ~H~EE SYNT!IETlCS (Desai, J.)\n\nwith the S. 0. 12 (!) (f) came up for construction nt' this Court.\n\nAfter an exhaustive rcvie\\.v of the various di.; cisions on the subject, this Court after repelling the construction canvassed on behalf of the appellant in thaf'c<1se th1t such acts as drunkenness, riotous or disorderly behaviour are per se misconduct unconnected with time place content and wherever committed would constitute misconduct, held that the various acts of misconduct therein set out would be misicondnct for the purpose of the relevant standing orders, if commit ted within the premises of the establishment or in the vicinity thereof. The Court further held that what constitutes 'establishment' or 'its vicmity' wouldde pend-upon the facts and circumstances\n\nof each case.\n\nBut we shall not flr.ally pronounce on this point c as the Industrial Court had remanded the matter to the Labour Court which has jurisdiction to examine this cesc and we are inclined to uphold that order.\n\nTherefore, the narrow question which we propose to examine in this case is whether the High Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Art,. 226 and 227 should have by giving undue importance to a technical objection of jurhdiction which on proper fathoming, it itself lacked should have set a.ide a well-con, idered reasoned judgment of the President of the Industrial Court which again had merely remanded the matter thus prolonging to some extent the agony of the unemployed workers commencing from 1975,\n\nLet us at the commencement acquaint ourselves with the scope and ambit of the power of the Labour Court as well as.the Industrial Court under the Act which would provi:ie a correct perspcclive to determine whether the High Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Arts. 226 and 227 was at all justified in interfering with the order made by the Industrial Court or that legalese prevailed over substantial social justice.\n\nSec. 61 prescribes the powers of the Labour Court which inter alia includes the power-(A) to decide-(a) disputes regarding which application has been m1dc to it under sub-section (3) of section 31 of the Act. Sec. 3 l enables an employee to make an application for relief against an order of an employer made under any of the standing orders. D:smissal from service is an order made under the relevant standing orders.\n\nA relief against such order can be obtained by making an application under Sec. 61.\n\nEntry l in\n\n\n[ 1984) 3 S C R.\n\nA Schedule II of the Act prior to the amendment of l \"81 provided that the Labour Court may examine :\n\n\"the propriety or legality of an order passed or action taken by an employer acting or purporting to act under the Standing Orders.\"\n\nTile only feature worth-noticing is that the scope ambit and contours of the jurisdiction of the Labour Court in such an appli cation would have to be determined within the parameters or the expression 'the propriety or legality of an order.' Against an order made by the Labour Court under Sec. 61, a revision would lie under Sec. 66 to the Industrial Court.\n\nSec. 66 has been wholly recast in I 98 l. However at the relevant time, Sec. 66 read as under :\n\n\"66; Revision. (!) The Industrial Court may, on the application by any party to a case which has been finally. decided by a Labour Court other than a case decided under paragraph (D) of sub section (l) of section 61, call for and examine the record of such case and may pas• order in reference thereto as it thinks fit :\n\nProvided that the Industrial Court shall not vary or reverse any order of the Labour Court under this section unless-\n\n(i) it is satisfied that the Labour Court has-\n\n(a) exercised jurisdiction not vested in it by law; or\n\n(b) failed to exercise a jucisd1ctbn so vested; or\n\n(c) acted in exercise or its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity;\n\n(ii) note has been served on tho part_ies to the case and opportunity given to them for bemg heard.\n\n(2) No application under sub-section (I) shall lie to the Industrial Court unless it is made within thirty days of the date on which the case has been finally decided by:the Labo11r Court;\n\n' •\n\n' •\n\n'r .\n\n> .\n\nDABULi\\L ,._ SllREE Si'NT!llTlCS (Desai, J.) 781\n\nProvided that in computing the p(riod of thirty days the A period requisite for obtaining a copy of the order shall be excluded.\" ..\n\nHaving noticed the relevant provisions, it is now necessary to ascertain with precision the jurisdiction of the labour Court under\n\nSec. 61.\n\nThe scheme of the standing orders applicable to jhe respondont-Company would show that a penalty of dismissal or removal from service can be imposed after hold:ng a domestic enquiry.\n\nAccording to the relevant provis:ons in the standing orders,· such an order when made would be opeu to challenge by a substantive application under Sec. 66 (I) and in st1clr an application, if and when made, the Labour Court will have jurisdictinn to decide the legality and the propriety of the order. When jurisdiction is conferred upon the Labour Court, not onl:)'. to examine the legality of the order as also the propriety of the order, the Labour Court can in exercise of the jurisdiction examine the propriety or 1mpro priety of the order. The expression 'propriety' is variously understood, one meaning assigned to it being 'justice' in Legal Thesaurus by Burton at page 902.\n\nAmongst various shades of meaning a&signed to the expression, the Oxford EPglish Dictionnry, Vol. VIII page 1484 sets out 'fitness; approprfateness; apt'tude; suitability; appropriateness to the circumstances or conditions, conformity \\vith requirement; rule or principle, rightness, correctness, justness etc.' If therefore, the justice or the justness in relation to a legal proceeding where evidence is led is questioned and the authority is cunferred with jur:sdiction to examine the propriety of the order or decision that authority will have the same jurisdiction as the orig'nal authority to come to a different conclusion on the same set of facts.\n\nIf uny\n\nothr vic\\v is taken the cxpress:on 'propriety' would Jo'.\"c all sgnift cance. The expression 'legality and propr'ety' hm bc:e; i med in various statutes where appellate or revisional jurisdiction is conferred upon a superior authority. Jn Raman & Ranum Ltd. v The State of Madras & Anr\\1) while examining the ambit of the jurisdiction of the State Government under Sec. 64A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 as amended by the Motor Vehicles (Madras) Amendment Act, 1948 to interfere with the orders of subordinate Regional 1 ransport Authority on the ground of propriety, this Court observed as under :\n\n\"The word \"propriety\" has nowhere been defined in the Act and is capable of a variety of meanings. fn the\n\nOlH19l6) SCR 256.\n\n. Ii\n\nSUPREME COURT R~PORTS\n\n(1984] 3 S C.R.\n\nOxford English Dictwnary (Vol. VIII), it has been stated to mean \"fitne>'S; appropriateness; aptitude; suitability; appropriateness to the circumstances or condtions; conformity • with requirement, rule or principle; rightness, correctness, justness, accuracy\". If the State Govenment was of the opinion .thatrespondent No. I had better facllities for operation than the appellant and their servic! to the public would be more beneficial, 1t could not be said that the State Government was in error in thinking that the order of the Board confirming the order of the Regional Transport Authority was improper.\"\n\nIn Moti Rom v. Suraj Bhan & Ors. 11) while exammmg the scope and ambit of junsdiction of the High Court under Sec. 15\n\n(5) of the East Punjab Urban Rnt Restriction Act, 1949, this Court observed as under :\n\n\"Under Sec. 15 (5) the High Court has jurisdiction to examine the legality or propriety of the order under revision and that would clearly justify the examination of the propriety or legality of the finding made by the 1uthorities in the present case about the requirement of the landlord under s. 13 (3) (a) (iii) ...\n\nAfter referring to these two decisions, in Ching Chong Sine v.\n\nPuttay Gowdr,(') Alagiriswami, J. held that the court exercising revisional jurisdiction to decide the legality or propriety of an order has the power to come to a conclusion different from that arrived by the subordinate court on the same set of circumstances. In Ahmedabad Sarangpur Mills Company Ltd. v. Industrial Court, Ahmedabad and Anr.(3) a Div'sion Bench of the Gujarat High Court held that the expression 'legality and propriety' in S. 78(1J of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act does not limit the jurisdiction of the labour court to a revisional jurisdiction. And that any order made by the employer undor the standing order is subject to the jurisdiction conferred on the labour court under Sec. 78, which can scrutinise the legality and propriety of the order.\n\nThis jur; sdiction was described by the court as original jurisdiction meaning thereby that the labour\n\n(1) [1960] 2 SCR 896.\n\nH (2) AIR 1968 Madras 152. (3)\n\n[1965] 1 LLJ;155,\n\n... /\n\n,. •\n\n. ~.\n\nllABULAL v. SHREE SYNTHETICS (Desai, J.)\n\ncourt c1n come to an entirely differer.! conclusion on the same set of facts. This viow was followed by another Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Manekchown and Ahmedabad Manufacturing Company Ltd v. Industrial Court and another.(1) In Vithoba Maruti Chavan v. S. Tuki Bilgrami, Member Industrial Court, Bombay and Anr.,(2) a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court held that the power to decide 'propriety' and legality of the order made under standing order doos not confer a mere revisional jurisdiction but a wider jurisdiction wh'ch will enable the Labour Court to set aside the order of the employer depending upon the facts and circumstances of tile case.\n\nMr. Pai on the other hand C:rew our attention to Vaidyanath v.\n\nThe Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation and Ors.(3) While observing that a Labour Court c1nnot exercise the power of an appellate court and cannot rea;1~:aise the evidence, yet both the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal can interfere with the findings of fact of the inquiry otlicer of the employer only where they are not supported by any legal evidenco or are so perwrse that no reasonable p:::rson would arriv~ at such findings on the materials placed before him. It was held that the power of the Labour Court or the Industrial Court under the Act are not wider than those of Industrial Tribunal under the Indu5trial Disputes Act, 1947 before the introduction of Sec. llA in the latter Act. In Kymore Cement Mazdoor Congress v. Industrial Court, Indore and Ors.,(') it was held that the expression 'illegally or with material irregularity' in sub-cl.\n\n(c) of the first provho of Sec. 66(1) do not cover either errors of facts or law and they do not refer to the decisi0n arrived at but to the manner in which it is reached. Approaching the matter from this angle, the High Court set aside the decision of the Industrial Court in rcvhion against the order of the Labour Court on the ground that the Industrial Court had interfered with a finding of fact which even if erroneous would not confer jurisdiction on the Industrial Court to interfere in exercise of revisional jurisdiction.\n\nMr. Pdi emphasised that the view of M.P. High Court on the interpretation of Sec. 61 should prevail over the view of Gujarat High Court interpreting a different statute. This does not carry conviction because Sec. 61 of the Act is iJi pari materia with Sec. 78\n\n(l) (1967) I LLJ 463.\n\n(2) AIR 1965 Bombay 81.\n\n(3) 1974 Lab. & I.C. 1447.\n\n(4) (1966) 1 LLJ 117,\n\n\n(1984) 3 S.C.R.\n\nof the Gujarat Act. However, it would be profitable to refer to the decision of this Court in iwdesh Kumar Bhatnagar v. The Gwalior Rayon Silk Mfg. (Weaving) Co. Ltd. and Anr.(1) in which this Court while examining the scope of the jurisdiction conferred by Sec. 66 on the Industrial Court under the Act held that if the Labour Court has committed serious mistakes, the Industrial Court has jurisdictio!l to interfere with the same and upheld the decision of the Industrial Court which had interfered with thefind ings of facts recorded by the.\n\nLabour Court A full Bnch of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Nandkumar Singh v. The State Industrial Court, Indore and Ors(.2) held that perverse or arbitrary findings based on no material fall within foe ambit of the phrase \"exercise of jurisdiction illegally or with rnaterbl irtegularity\" justifying interference in revision. It is not necessary to farther multiply the authoritis. Therefore, it appears.well-established that the Labour Court having jurisdiction to examine the legality and propriety of the order made by the employer under the standing order will have jurisdiction to examine the propriety of the orJ.er which will permit it to come to a con\n\nc!usion dilforent from the one to which the employer arrived at.\n\nSuch being the amplitude of the jurisdiction of the Labour Court if upon a wrong view of ambit of its jurisdiction Labour Court approaches the matter as if it exercises narrow revisional jurisJiction, the ludustrial Courr in rJvision cin interfere on the ground of failure to exercise jurisdiction vested in the Labour Court or material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction.\n\nSec. 66(1) of the Act provides that the Industrial Court omit· ting the portion nm relevant for the present purpose, may call for and examine the record of such case and pass order in reference thereto as it tbinks fit. If the Industrial Court has the jurisdiction to pass any order in reference to a case called for by it thinks fit, obviously it c:in come to a conclusion on the same set of facts different from the one to which the Labour Court had arrived. It was however urged that this jurisdiction of wide amplitude has been cut down by the proviso which provides that the Industrial Court shall not very or reverse any order of the Labour Court under Sec. 66(\\) unle'5-(i) 1t is s_atisfied that the Labour Court has-(a) exercised jurisdiction not vested in it by law; or (b) failed to exercise a\n\n(I) (1972) Lab. & I.C. 842.\n\n(2) (1977) Lcb. & l.C'. i279.\n\nBABULAL v. SHREE SYNTHETICS (Desai,.J) .\n\njurhdiction so vested; or (c) acted in exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with mitcrial irregularity. It was urged that these clauses so circumscribe and cut down the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court under Sec. 66 as to be on par with Sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The maill part of Sec. 61 clearly spells out the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court to pass any order in reference to the case brought before it as it thinks fit. The expression 'as it thinks fit' confers a very .wide jurisdiction enabling it to take an entirely different view on the same set of facts. The expression 'as it thinks fit' confers a very wide jurisdiction enabling it to take an entirely different view on the same set of facts. The expression 'as it thinks fit' has the same connotation, unless context otherwise indicates, 'as . he deems fit' and the btter expression was interpreted by this Court\n\n78~\n\nin Raja Ram Mahadev Paranjype & Ors. v. Aha Maruti Mali & Ors.(1) to mean to make an order in terms of the statute, an order which would give effect to a right w'.iich the Act has elsewhere conferred. Is this jurisdiction so circumscribed as to bring it on par with Sec. ll5 of the Code of Civil Procedure? Proviso does cut down the ambit of the main provision but it cannot be interprted to denude the main provision of any efficacy and reduce it to a paper proviSion. Both mus.t be so interpreted as to permit interference which if not undertaken there would be miscarriage of justice.\n\nSub-cl. (c) of the first proviso to Sec. 66(1) will permit the Industrial Couit to interfere with the order made by the Labour Court, if the Labour Court has acted with material irregularity in disposal of the • dispute before it. If the finding recorded by the Labour court is such to which no reasomble man can arrive, obviously, the Industrial Com t in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction would be entitled to interfere with the same even if patent jurisdictional error is not pointed out.\n\nReverting to the facts of this case, the Industrial Court while hearing the revision petitions found that the petitioners were trade union workers and the three of them were the office-bearers of the Union. It was further found that a material piece of evidence clearly pointing to the contrary was wholly overlooked by the inquiry officer. It extracted the relevant portion of the evidence of witness Balchand and pointed out in no uncertain terms that if the inquiry officer had taken note of the relevant piece of evidence and\n\n(1) [1962] Suppl. I SCR 739.\n\n'786\n\n• E\n\n• SUPREME COURT AEPORTS\n\n\nhad applied its mind to it and dealt with it in the report, it would have been difficult to hold the charge proved. The non-application of mind of the inquiry officer was pointed out by referring to that part of the final order which manifestly overlooked the material piece of evidence which would go to the root of the matter. The Industrial Court observed that the inquiry officer quitely skipped over very ma'.erial portion of the evidence of Balchand which went a long way to falsify the charges relating to the incidents which preceded the actual assault on Verma. 'The Industrial Court then pointed out that report \\Ex. D/18) purporting to have been made by victim Verma to the factory Manager on the day following the date of the occurrence when properly scanned appears to be a highly suspicious evidence because: 'it is not dated and does not bear the endorsement of the officer to whom it was presented.' This is permissible bocause the revisional jurisdiction enables the authority to point something which is no evidence legally speaking or in the eye of law. It was pointed out that Verma did not identify the report. The Industrial Court concluded that the possibility of this report being intwduced at a later stage to strengthen the case against the five appellants cannot be rukd-out. After referring to other infirmities in the approach of the Labour Court, the Industrial Court concluded that the entire approach of the Manager in arriving at the findings of mISconduct in bis inquiry 'appear to be biased and unfair', and 'the conclnsions are neither fair nor reasonable and any .order of dismissal based thereon cannot be sustained.' Can it ever be said that in reaching this conclusion, the Industrial Court exceeded its revisional jurisdiction '/ The whole approach .of the Labour Co11rt dealing with tile report of the inquiry as also th~ inquiry itself clearly disclosed material irregularity and thereby the Labour Court failed to exercise jurisdiction vested Ill it namely, to examine the propriety of the order wilith it failed to do. The Industrial Court, in our opinion, was perfectly justified in interfering with the order of the Labour Court. Even then the approach of the Industrial Court, being conscious of the severe constraints on its jurisdiction was of digmlied restraint and just. It merely set aside the award of the Labour Court and did not proceed to reappraise evidence but remitted the case to the Labour Court for a fresh decision. It was thus an eminently just order.\n\nIs it such an order which the High Court could have interfered H with in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction 1 Ihe High Court\n\n• j\n\n' - UABULAL v. Sl!REE SYNTl!ETICS (Desai, J.)\n\nobserved that the Labour Court can only interfere with the decision of the inquiry officer, if the findings arrived at by him were p_erverse.\n\nThe High Court completely missed the ambit of jurisdiction of the Labour Court in that it had the jurisdiction to decide the legality and propriety of the ord; r. Improprioty as converse of propriety cannot be equated with pervorsity as understood by the High Court.\n\nThe High Curt further observed that if 'the finding of ihe misconduct is a plausible conclusion flowing from the evidence adduced at the enquiry, the labour tribunals have no jurisdiction to sit in judgment over the decision of the employer, as an appellate body. This betrays complete fack of understanding of the jurisdiction of th' Labour Court in re>pect of an order made under the standing order as set out m Schedule II item I to the Act which enables the Labour Court to examine the legality and propriety of the order. The High Court therefore, wholly misread the relevant provision and interfered with the decision of the Industrhl Court which was pre-eminently just and within the four corners of its jurisdiction. What left us guessing was that according to the High Court the Industrial Court had narrow jurisdiction while dealing with the order of the Labour Court, yet the High Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction interfered with the decision of the Industrial Tribunal. Times \"ithout number, it has been pointed out that Art. 226 is a device to secure and advance justice and not otherwise. (Sadhu Ram v. Delhi Transport Corporation)(l)\n\nOrdinarily, the courts exerc1smg extraordinary jurisdiction is loathe to interfere with an order remanding the matter to the authority directed to investigcite facts.\n\nThe Industrial Court had made an order of remand. The High Court was not justified in interfering with the same. By this uncalled for interference, it has merely prolonged the agony of the unemployed workmen and permitted the jurisdiction of the High Court under Act. 226 to be exploited by those who can well afford to wait to the deteriment of those who can ill afford to wait by dragging the latter from court to court for adjudication of peripheral issues avoiding decision on issues more vital to them. (D.P. Maheshwari v. Delhi Administration and Ors.\\2)\n\n(Il [1983] 4 sec 156.\n\n(2) [1983] 4 sec l93.\n\n?88\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS IJ984] 3 s.c.R.\n\n. {.,,.\n\nAccordingly these appeals succeed and are allowed and. the decision of the High Court is set aside and the one of the Industrial Court is restored with costs.\n\nAs the matter is an old one, the Labour Court is directed to give top priority to this matter and dispose this of as early as possible and not later than six months from today.\n\nN.V.K.\n\nAppeals allowed.'<", "total_entities": 101, "entities": [{"text": "BABULAL NAGAR AND ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 21, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "BABULAL NAGAR AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SHREE SYNTHETICS LTD. & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 24, "end_char": 51, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SHREE SYNTHETICS LTD. & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "D. A. 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VARADARAJAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh Industrial Relations Act 1960", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 128, "end_char": 172, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Industrial Relations Act, 1960", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 676, "end_char": 706, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sections 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1673, "end_char": 1684, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Industrial Relations Act, 1960", "statute": "Industrial Relations Act, 1960"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2889, "end_char": 2897, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3617, "end_char": 3625, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4021, "end_char": 4030, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4146, "end_char": 4156, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4660, "end_char": 4667, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1960] 2 S.C.R. 895", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 6743, "end_char": 6762, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "J. Ramamurthy", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9157, "end_char": 9170, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. Ramamurthy and Ms. R. Vaigaifor the Appellants."}}, {"text": "R. Vaigaifor", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9179, "end_char": 9191, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J. Ramamurthy and Ms. R. Vaigaifor the Appellants."}}, {"text": "G.B. Pal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9211, "end_char": 9219, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• G.B. Pal, S.K: G, imbhir, Ashok Mahajan and Ms. Sun/ta Kripalani for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "Ashok Mahajan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9237, "end_char": 9250, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• G.B. Pal, S.K: G, imbhir, Ashok Mahajan and Ms. Sun/ta Kripalani for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "Sun/ta Kripalani", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 9259, "end_char": 9275, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• G.B. Pal, S.K: G, imbhir, Ashok Mahajan and Ms. Sun/ta Kripalani for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "DesAT", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9342, "end_char": 9347, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nDesAT, J. Nothing appears more well settled than that the extraordinary ju~diction under Art.", "canonical_name": "DesAT"}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9431, "end_char": 9439, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shree Synthetics Ltd.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9944, "end_char": 9965, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The first respondent-Shree Synthetics Ltd. ('respondnt' for short) appears to be a company governed by the Companies Act,\n\n1956.", "canonical_name": "SHREE SYNTHETICS LTD. & ORS"}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10030, "end_char": 10043, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Ujjain", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 10079, "end_char": 10085, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It has.set up a factory at Ujjain where it manufactures."}}, {"text": "Babula!\n\nNagar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10379, "end_char": 10393, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Babula!", "canonical_name": "Babula\\ Jaiswalwere"}}, {"text": "Babula! Jaiswalwas", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10427, "end_char": 10445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nagar was the President of the Union : Babula!", "canonical_name": "Babula\\ Jaiswalwere"}}, {"text": "Ramesh Candra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10472, "end_char": 10485, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jaiswalwas the General Secretary and Ramesh Candra was the Secretary."}}, {"text": "Verma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10613, "end_char": 10618, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1984J 3 S.C.R.\n\nAccording to the respondents on June 3, 1975 around 11.10 P. M one Verma a workman of the respondent on the shift being.", "canonical_name": "Verma"}}, {"text": "Verm1", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10835, "end_char": 10840, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "appellants approached him and asked Verm1 to alight from the tempo as they wanted to talk to him .. On Venm's disinclination to come ou~ of the vehicle, it was all>ged that Babula!", "canonical_name": "Verma"}}, {"text": "Venm", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10902, "end_char": 10906, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "appellants approached him and asked Verm1 to alight from the tempo as they wanted to talk to him .. On Venm's disinclination to come ou~ of the vehicle, it was all>ged that Babula!"}}, {"text": "Babula! Jaiswal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 10990, "end_char": 11005, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nagar and Babula!", "canonical_name": "Babula\\ Jaiswalwere"}}, {"text": "Febrnary 26, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12616, "end_char": 12633, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Accordingly he, by, a common judgment dated Febrnary 26, 1979, allowed all the revision petitions and set '!"}}, {"text": "Court of Madhya Pradesh,\" Jabalpur at Indore", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 13034, "end_char": 13078, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "DABULAC v. SHREE SYNTHETICS (Desai, J.)\n\nCourt of Madhya Pradesh,\" Jabalpur at Indore under Arts."}}, {"text": "Arts. 226 and 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13085, "end_char": 13102, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Babula", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14300, "end_char": 14306, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Babula!"}}, {"text": "Satya- Prakash Verma", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14402, "end_char": 14422, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was on duty on 3.6.1975 in the B Shift from 3 p. m. to 11 p. m.\n\nAt about 8.15 p.m. when Shri Satya- Prakash Verma, a Telephone Operator and Shri K. C. Bagdi, Shift-time keeper were coming out ofthe canteen after taking their meals, Babula] Nagar and Babula\\ Jaiswalwere sitting in the lavyn in front of the canteen."}}, {"text": "K. C. Bagdi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14454, "end_char": 14465, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was on duty on 3.6.1975 in the B Shift from 3 p. m. to 11 p. m.\n\nAt about 8.15 p.m. when Shri Satya- Prakash Verma, a Telephone Operator and Shri K. C. Bagdi, Shift-time keeper were coming out ofthe canteen after taking their meals, Babula] Nagar and Babula\\ Jaiswalwere sitting in the lavyn in front of the canteen."}}, {"text": "Babula\\ Jaiswalwere", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14559, "end_char": 14578, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was on duty on 3.6.1975 in the B Shift from 3 p. m. to 11 p. m.\n\nAt about 8.15 p.m. when Shri Satya- Prakash Verma, a Telephone Operator and Shri K. C. Bagdi, Shift-time keeper were coming out ofthe canteen after taking their meals, Babula] Nagar and Babula\\ Jaiswalwere sitting in the lavyn in front of the canteen.", "canonical_name": "Babula\\ Jaiswalwere"}}, {"text": "Babula! Jai'swal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14639, "end_char": 14655, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At that time, Babula!", "canonical_name": "Babula\\ Jaiswalwere"}}, {"text": "Babula! J\\'agar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 14737, "end_char": 14752, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There upo11 Babula!", "canonical_name": "Babula\\ Jaiswalwere"}}, {"text": "Bagdi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14761, "end_char": 14766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J\\'agar went to Bagdi and Verma and uttered the following meanjngful words : :\"You are just a child now."}}, {"text": "A. K. Awdsthi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15116, "end_char": 15129, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter, at 9.15 p. m. A. K. Awdsthi and Rajendra Jain went to the canteen to iake their meals."}}, {"text": "Rajendra Jain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15134, "end_char": 15147, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter, at 9.15 p. m. A. K. Awdsthi and Rajendra Jain went to the canteen to iake their meals."}}, {"text": "Babula! Nagar", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 15231, "end_char": 15244, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At that time both the petitioners namely, Babula!", "canonical_name": "Babula\\ Jaiswalwere"}}, {"text": "Babula! Nagar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15528, "end_char": 15541, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jaiswal uttered some filthy words and thereafter both Babula!"}}, {"text": "Babula! Jaiwal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 15811, "end_char": 15825, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Verma, therefore, come ont in the lawn from his office where both Bbulal Nagar and Babula!", "canonical_name": "Babula\\ Jaiswalwere"}}, {"text": "Babula!. Jaiswal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16216, "end_char": 16232, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Nagar and Babula!.", "canonical_name": "Babula\\ Jaiswalwere"}}, {"text": "Babula!\n\nNagar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 16423, "end_char": 16437, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereupon both Babula!", "canonical_name": "Babula\\ Jaiswalwere"}}, {"text": "S. 0", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16902, "end_char": 16906, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 0", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17129, "end_char": 17133, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "EE SYNT!IETlCS", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17292, "end_char": 17306, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' •\n\nllABULAL \\', ~H~EE SYNT!IETlCS (Desai, J.)\n\nwith the S. 0."}}, {"text": "Desai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 17308, "end_char": 17313, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "' •\n\nllABULAL \\', ~H~EE SYNT!IETlCS (Desai, J.)\n\nwith the S. 0.", "canonical_name": "DesAT"}}, {"text": "S. 0", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17329, "end_char": 17333, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Arts. 226 and 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19091, "end_char": 19108, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 61", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19250, "end_char": 19257, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19436, "end_char": 19446, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19459, "end_char": 19465, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 61", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19745, "end_char": 19752, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Schedule II of the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19788, "end_char": 19810, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sec. 61", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20314, "end_char": 20321, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Schedule II of the Act", "statute": "Schedule II of the Act"}}, {"text": "Sec. 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20350, "end_char": 20357, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Schedule II of the Act", "statute": "Schedule II of the Act"}}, {"text": "Sec. 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20384, "end_char": 20391, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Schedule II of the Act", "statute": "Schedule II of the Act"}}, {"text": "Sec. 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20456, "end_char": 20463, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Schedule II of the Act", "statute": "Schedule II of the Act"}}, {"text": "section 61", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20686, "end_char": 20696, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Schedule II of the Act", "statute": "Schedule II of the Act"}}, {"text": "Sec. 61", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21790, "end_char": 21797, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22132, "end_char": 22139, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Burton", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 22648, "end_char": 22654, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The expression 'propriety' is variously understood, one meaning assigned to it being 'justice' in Legal Thesaurus by Burton at page 902."}}, {"text": "Sec. 64A", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23699, "end_char": 23707, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23715, "end_char": 23739, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Amendment Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 23782, "end_char": 23801, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sec. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24830, "end_char": 24837, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "East Punjab Urban Rnt Restriction Act, 1949", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 24850, "end_char": 24893, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sec. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24934, "end_char": 24941, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the East Punjab Urban Rnt Restriction Act, 1949", "statute": "the East Punjab Urban Rnt Restriction Act, 1949"}}, {"text": "s. 13", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 25222, "end_char": 25227, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the East Punjab Urban Rnt Restriction Act, 1949", "statute": "the East Punjab Urban Rnt Restriction Act, 1949"}}, {"text": "Alagiriswami", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 25328, "end_char": 25340, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "15 (5) the High Court has jurisdiction to examine the legality or propriety of the order under revision and that would clearly justify the examination of the propriety or legality of the finding made by the 1uthorities in the present case about the requirement of the landlord under s. 13 (3) (a) (iii) ...\n\nAfter referring to these two decisions, in Ching Chong Sine v.\n\nPuttay Gowdr,(') Alagiriswami, J. held that the court exercising revisional jurisdiction to decide the legality or propriety of an order has the power to come to a conclusion different from that arrived by the subordinate court on the same set of circumstances."}}, {"text": "Gujarat High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 25682, "end_char": 25700, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Ahmedabad Sarangpur Mills Company Ltd. v. Industrial Court, Ahmedabad and Anr.(3) a Div'sion Bench of the Gujarat High Court held that the expression 'legality and propriety' in S. 78(1J of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act does not limit the jurisdiction of the labour court to a revisional jurisdiction."}}, {"text": "[1960] 2 SCR 896", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 26196, "end_char": 26212, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Bombay High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 26685, "end_char": 26702, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ",(2) a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court held that the power to decide 'propriety' and legality of the order made under standing order doos not confer a mere revisional jurisdiction but a wider jurisdiction wh'ch will enable the Labour Court to set aside the order of the employer depending upon the facts and circumstances of tile case."}}, {"text": "Pai", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 27005, "end_char": 27008, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Pai on the other hand C:rew our attention to Vaidyanath v.\n\nThe Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation and Ors.(3) While observing that a Labour Court c1nnot exercise the power of an appellate court and cannot rea;1~:aise the evidence, yet both the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal can interfere with the findings of fact of the inquiry otlicer of the employer only where they are not supported by any legal evidenco or are so perwrse that no reasonable p:::rson would arriv~ at such findings on the materials placed before him."}}, {"text": "Disputes Act, 1947", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 27704, "end_char": 27722, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Sec. 66(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 27966, "end_char": 27976, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Pdi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 28476, "end_char": 28479, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Pdi emphasised that the view of M.P. High Court on the interpretation of Sec."}}, {"text": "M.P. High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 28508, "end_char": 28523, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Pdi emphasised that the view of M.P. High Court on the interpretation of Sec."}}, {"text": "Sec. 61", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28549, "end_char": 28556, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Sec. 61", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28681, "end_char": 28688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Disputes Act, 1947", "statute": "Disputes Act, 1947"}}, {"text": "Sec. 78", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28725, "end_char": 28732, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29109, "end_char": 29116, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 29429, "end_char": 29454, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Labour Court A full Bnch of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Nandkumar Singh v. The State Industrial Court, Indore and Ors(.2) held that perverse or arbitrary findings based on no material fall within foe ambit of the phrase \"exercise of jurisdiction illegally or with rnaterbl irtegularity\" justifying interference in revision."}}, {"text": "Sec. 66(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30511, "end_char": 30521, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 66(\\)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31170, "end_char": 31180, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 66", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31635, "end_char": 31642, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 115", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31664, "end_char": 31672, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31676, "end_char": 31703, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sec. 61", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 31723, "end_char": 31730, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "the Code of Civil Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32606, "end_char": 32633, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sec. 66(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 32953, "end_char": 32963, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Balchand", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 33817, "end_char": 33825, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It extracted the relevant portion of the evidence of witness Balchand and pointed out in no uncertain terms that if the inquiry officer had taken note of the relevant piece of evidence and\n\n(1) [1962] Suppl."}}, {"text": "Balchand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 34460, "end_char": 34468, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Industrial Court observed that the inquiry officer quitely skipped over very ma'.erial portion of the evidence of Balchand which went a long way to falsify the charges relating to the incidents which preceded the actual assault on Verma. '"}}, {"text": "Schedule II item I to the Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37542, "end_char": 37571, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 38180, "end_char": 38188, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Schedule II item I to the Act", "statute": "Schedule II item I to the Act"}}, {"text": "sec 156", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 39040, "end_char": 39047, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_3_789_797_EN", "year": 1984, "text": ".. .\n\nSTATE OF UTTAR PRADESH\n\nZAVAD ZAMA KHAN\n\nMay4, 1984\n\n'.(D.A. DESAI, A.P. SEN AND V. BALAKRISHNA ERADI, JJ.]\n\nPub/\" Safety Laws-Natianal Security Act (Act XLV of 1980), Section 14- Revocation of orders of detention-Due compliance with requirements of section 8(1) read with Article 22(5) of the Constitution though con1plied with, subsequent representation for revocation to Prime Minister made through the counsel filed by t'ie Central Government-Whether non-passing of any order on the revocation representation vitiates the detention.\n\nThe facts are that the respondent made a represenation dated June 18, 1983\n\naainst an order of detention passed by the District Magistrate, Morada bad dated Noven1ber 6, 1982 for his detention under sub-s. (3) of s. 3 of the National Security Act, 1980, and the same was duly forwarded by the District Magistrate to the Advisory Board on June 21, 1983. The State Government had in the mean while on June 13, 1983 made a reference to the Advisory Board under s- 10 of the Act i.e. within three weeks from the date of detntion together with the order of detention and the grounds therefor for its opinion. On June 23, 1983 the representation was examined by the Joint Secretary, Home Department who marked the file to the Home Secretary on June 27, 1983 who on his turn placed the file before the Chief Minister for his comments on June 27, 1983. The Chief Minister tooA. to daysto study the file and ultimately passed an order rejecting the representation. On July 2, 1983 the Stat_e Government forwarded the representation made together with the commens to the Government of India and the Central\"Government rejected the same on July 19, 1983.\n\nIt appears th<it on July 5, 1983 the respondent through his counsel simultaneously addressed two representations for revocation-of his detention under s. 14 of the Act, one ad(ressed to the Prime Minister of India and the other to the Slate\n\nGovernment. The representation made to the Central Government addressed in the name of the Prime Minister was received in the Prime Minister's Secretariat on July 7, 1983 and the grievance of the respondent before the High\n\nCourt was that the Central Government h<id not dealt with his application for the revocation of the order of detention under s.14 of the Act. The l-ligh Court obser~ ved that the right of the detenu to make a representation to.the Central Government\n\nfor r .... vocation of the order of detention unde_r s. 14 of Act was intended to be an additional ch{'C1< or safeguard against the improper exercise of its power of H detention by the detaining authority or the State Governfnent and therefore the failure on the part of the Central Government to consider the same was tantamount 10 a denial of the consitutional safesuard as contemplated by Art. 22(5)\n\nA ofthe Consti'.ution. It accordingly held the continued detention of the respon dent to be illegal.\n\nAggrieved by the Order, the State preferred an Special Leave.\n\nAile wing the appeal, the Court,\n\n• HELD : (1) The constitutional imperatives of Art. 22(5) enjoin that where a detenu simultaneously makes representation to the detaining authority as well as an application under s. 14 of the Act, they must not be dealt with by the appropriate Government at the same tin1e and there was no question of any conflict of jurisdiction. If the Central Government were to revoke the order of detention under s. 14 of the Act, there would be no representation for the State Governn1ent to consider, or refer to the Advisory Board under s. 8(b) of the Act nor will thre arise any question of Advisory Board making a report to it, or on receipt of such a report, confirming the order of detention under section 8(f).\n\nThe other type of cases can be where notwithstanding that the order of detention has been confinned under s. S(f) the appropriate Government may, at any time, revoke the same under s. 14. The power of revocation conferred on the appro~ priate Government un<ler s. 14 is independent of the power of confirming or setting aside an order of detention under s. S(f) [795H ; 796A-D]\n\n2. The pO\\\\'Cr of revocation conferred on the Central Government under s. 14 of the Act is a statutory power which may be exercised on information reCeived by the Central Governn1ent from its own sources including that supplied by the State Gov:::rnment under sub-s. (5) of s. 3, or from the detenu in the form of a petition or representation. It is for the Central Governn1ent to decide whether or not it 'should revoke the order of detention in a particular case.\n\n[796G-H]\n\n-Any lapse on the part of State Government in forwarding the representation n1ade by the detcnu to the Central Government for revocation of the order of detention under s. 14 of the Act or non-consideration of the same by the Central Government makes the continued detention of the detenu bad. [793B-C]\n\nIn the present case, however, the detenu was not deprived of the right of making a representation to the detaining authority under Art. 22(5) of the Constitution read Withs, 8(1) of the Act. Although the detenu had no right to simultaneouly make a representation against the order of detention to the Central Govcrn111ent under Art. 22(5) and there was no duty cast on the State Government to forward the same to the Centr:il Government, nevertheless the State Government forwarded the same forthwith.\n\nThe Central Government duly considered that representation which in effect was nothing but a representation for revocation of the order of detention under s. 14 of the Act. That being so. it was not obligatory on the parr of the Central Government to consider a second representation for revocation under s. 14 of the Act. [797A-D]\n\nCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 57 A of 1984.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 25-10-1983 of the Allahabad High Court in Habeas Corpus WP. No. 8420 of 1983.\n\nManoj Swarup and Dalveer Bhandari for the appellant.\n\nMrs. & Mr. Qamaruddin, Rizwan A. Hajiez and Desh Raj for the respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\n• c SEN, J. The State Government of Uttar Pradesh has preferred this appeal by special leave from the judgment and order of the Allahabad High Court dated October 25, 1983 by which the High Court issued a writ in the nature of habeas corpus quashing an order of detention passed by the District Magistrate, Moradabad dated November 6, 1982 for the detention of the respondent under sub-s. (3) of s. 3 of the National Security Act, 1980 on being satisfied that his detention was necessary \"with a view to preventing him 'from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.\"\n\nIt appears that the respondent is alleged to have committed an offence of murder punishable under s. 302 and of causing disappearance of evidence punishable under s. 201 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 in connection with the communal riots that occurred in the Moradabad city.\n\nOn November 6, 1982, the District\n\nMagistrate, Moradabad passed the impugned order of detention ll but it could not be served on the respondent as he was absconding.\n\nAs required under sub-s. ( 4) of s. 3, the District Magistrate forthwith made a report of the fact to the State Government of Uttar Pradesh that he had passed an order for the detention of the respondent under sub-s. (3) of s. 3 of the Act, together with the G grounds on which the order had been made and such other particulars as, in his opinion, had a bearing on the matter.\n\nThe State Government received the order of detention on November 8, 1982 and approved of the same on November 11, 1982 under sub's. (5) of s. 3, and as required thereunder, forwarded a report to the Central Government on the next day i.e. on November 12, 1982. ff The respondent surrendered to the police on May 24, 1983 and the impligned order of detention was served on him in District Jail, ·\n\n792 SUPREME COURT Rb1'0RTS [1984] 3 s.C, R,\n\nA Moradabad on June 1, 1983 and the grounds of detention were fur• nished to hirn on June 2, 1983.\n\nThe respondent made a representation dated June 18, 1983 through the Superintendent, District Jail, Morada bad and he immediately forwarded the same to the District Magistrate.\n\nOn June 20, 1983 the District Magistrate forwarded the representation to the Advisory Board and the same was received by the Advisory Board on June 21, 1983. The State Government had in the meanwhile on June 13, 1983 made a reference to the Advisory Board under s. 10 of the Act i.e. within three weeks from the date of detention together with the order of detention, and the grounds therefore, for its opinion.\n\nOn June 23, 1983 the representation of the respondent forwarded by the District Magistrate together with his\n\ncomment; was examined by the Joint Secretary, Home Department The file was placed before the Home Secretary on June 27, 1983 who placed it before the \\ hief Minister with his comments. The Chief Minister took two days to study the file and ultimately passed an order rejecting the representation on June 30, 1983.\n\nOn July 2, 1983 the State Government forwarded the representation made by the respondent together with its comments to the Government of India and the Central Government rejected the same on July 19, 1983.\n\nOn July 5, 1983 the respondent through his counsel D.S. Misra simultaneously addressed two representations for revocation of his detention under s. 14 of the Act, one addressed to the Prime Minister of India and the other to the State Government.\n\nIt appears that the representation made to the Central Government addressed in the name of the Prime Minister was received in the Prime Minister Secretariat on July 7, 1983 and the grievance of the respondent was that the Central Government had not dealt with his application for revocation of the order of detention under s. 14 even\n\nIlO\\V,\n\nIn his counter-affidavit by one M.L. Miglani, Desk Officer, Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi, it was stated that the Central Government had fully discharged its functions by expedi- . tiously taking a decision on the earlier representation directly addressed by the respondent and it was under. no statutory obligation to consider the subsequent representation for revocation addressed by the respondent through his counsel to the Prime Minister, I was not a statuto1y representation for revocation of the impugned\n\norder of detention under s. 14 and therefore it was not at all neces- A sary for the Central Government to deal with jt,\n\n The High Court placing reliance on the decision of this Court in Phillippa Anr.e Duke v. Stara of Tamil Nadu & Ors.(1) and certain of its own decisions held that the respondent had a right to make an application to the Central Government for revocation of the order of detention and the failure on the part of the Central Government to apply its mind to it made the continue<! detention illegal.\n\nThe only question canvassed in the appeal before us is that the judgment of the High Court betrays complete lack of awareness of the nature of the constitutional safeguards enshrined under Art. 22(5) of the Constitution. It is urged that the constitutional impe i ratives enacted in Art. 22(5) are two-fold ; (I) The detaining authority must, as soon as may be i.e. as soon as practicable, after the detention, communicate to the detenu the .grounds on whic.h the order of detention bas been made. And (2) The detaining authority must afford the detenu the earliest opportunity of making representation against the order of detention. In the present ease, it is said that the requirements of Art. 22(5) of the Constitution . read with s. 8(1) of the Act had been duly complied with. There is no question of any violation of Art. 22(5) or cif s. 8(1) and further that the grounds for detention set out the facts with sufficient degree of particularity and they did furnish sufficient nexus for\n\nforming the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. The order of detention cannot therefore be challenged on the ground that the grounds furnished were not adequate or sufficient for the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority, or for making an effective representation. It is further urged that there being due compliance with the constitutional requirements of Art. 22(5) and of s. 8(1), the High Court was wrong in holding that the continued detention of the respondent was invalid merely because the Central Government refused to act on his application for revocation of the order of detention under s. 14 of the act.\n\nWe find considerable force in the submission.\n\nWe are not oblivious of the fact that this Court has in certaii:i cases given expression to the view that any lapse on the part of the\n\nState Government in forwarding the representation made for revo-\n\n(1);[1982h3 SCR ?69.\n\nSUPREMH COURT REPORTS\n\n[1984) 3 S.C.R.\n\ncation of his order of detention under s. 11( i)(b) of the COFEPOSA Act, 1974 or the failure of the Central Government to expeditiously consider the same was a denial of the constitutional right of beil}g afforded \"the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order\" as contemplated by Art. 22(5).\n\nAt one time it was thought thats. 14 of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971 which was in pari materia with s. 14 of the Act, did not confer any right or privilege on the detenu but there is a definite shift in the judicial attitude, for which there appears to be no discernible basis. .J In Shyam Ambalal Siroya v. Union of India & Ors(1)., the contention Ji was that be'cause a representation properly addressed to the Central Government to order revocation under s. 11 of the COFEPOSA Act was not forwatd\"d by the detaining authority to the Central Government, the detention was illegal. The Court construed the power conferred on the Central Government to direct revocation of an order of detention under s. 1! of that Act to be \"statutory\". It was observed that the power of the Central Government to revoke the order of detention implies that the dctenu can make a representa- • tion for exercise of that power and a petition for revocation of an order of detention should be dealt with reasonable expedition.\n\nSince a representation properly addressed by the detenu of the Central Government was not forwarded to the Central Government, the continued detention of the detenu was held to. be ille.gal.\n\nIn Sabir Ahmed v. Union of India & Ors(2)., the Court held that non-consideration by the Central Government of a representation for revocation made by the detenu under s. 11 of the COFEPOSA Act made the continued detention to be bad, following the decision in Shyam Amba/al Siroya's case, supra. It was however observed that the power conferred bys. 11 on the Central Government was a supervisory power and it was intended to be an additional check or safeguard against the improper exercise of its power of detention by .the detaining authority or the State Government.\n\nG In Rattan Singh v. State of Punjab & Ors.(3), the Court went\n\nstill further. There was, in that case, a lapse on the part of the State Government in forwarding the.· representation simultaneously made by the detenu to the Central Government for revocation . of the order of detention under s. 11 of the COFEPOSA Act. The\n\n(I) [1980] 2 SCR 1078\n\n(2) [1980] 3 SCR 738\n\n(3) [1982] l SCR 1010\n\nCourt struck down the order of detention on the groud that there was a denial of the right of making representation to the Central Government for revocation f the order of detention under s. II of the Act and this was tantamount to!a denial) of the constitutional safeguard of Art. 22(5). ' . Soon thereafter, the'Courtin Sat Pal v. State of Punjab & Ors.(') examined the nature of the power of revocion conferred on the Central Government under s. 11 of the COFEPOSA Act and he1d that it was iiUpervisoryin natre, and. it was observed : ·\n\n\"That is, as it should be, as~ under .our federal structure the Centre must always keep a vigilant eye in the matter oflife and Jiberty of a citi.ren guaranteed under Article 21.\n\n• Ours is a Constitution where there is a combination of federal structure with unitary features while in a unitary State there is only one Government; federal State involves multi-Governments namely, national or federal Goyern-· ment and the Governments of component . States. A federal State, in short, is a fusion ofseveral States into a single State in regard to matters affeding common interest leaving each component State to enjoy autonomy in regard to other matters. Under o'llr Constitution, certain powers vest in the central Government leaving certain to its component units to exercise autonomy in spheres assigned to. them in the Constitution itself. The component States are not merely delegates or agents of the federal Government. .Both federal and Stale Governments draw their authority from the same source, the Constitution. The conferment of executive power on the States in relation to a subject with respecfto which the1legisfatures of the States have no' • power to make a law undr Art. 258(2) must necessarily .be subject to the administrative control of the Union under Arts. 256 and 247(1),'fo the giving of such directions to the States as.· may appear to the Government of India to be necessary for that purpose.\"\n\nIt.was then . observed that the constitutional imperatives of Art. 22(5) enjoin that where a detenu simultaneo11sly makes a re-\n\n(1). ~1982) 1 sec 12,\n\n• D\n\npresentation to the c(etaining authority as well.as an application for revocation under s.· 11 of the Act. they must both be dealt_ with by the appropriate Government at the same time' and there was no question of any conflict of jurisdiction. To illustrate, it was said that i_f the Cent, ial Government were to revoke an order of deten, tion under s. 11 of the Act, there would . b~ no. representation for the State Government. to consider, or refer' the. Advisory Board under s. 8(b) ; nor will there arise any question of Advisory Board submitting a report to it, or Q~ receipt of such a report confirming the order of detention under s. 8Cf). It was further observed that t!ie other types of cases would be where . notwithstanding that the order of detention has been confirmed under s. S(f), the appro' priate Government may, atany time, revoke the same under s. _ H of the Act. It was accordingly held th:it the power of revocation .conferred on the appropriate Governmet unders. 11 is independent of tfie power of confirming or setting aside an order of detention under s. 8(f) ..\n\nAs to the nature of th~ power of revocation conferred on• the Central Government under s. 11 of the COFEPOSA Act,· it was stated :\n\n\"The making of an application for revocation to the Central Governmet under s. 11 of the Act is therefore part of the con_stitulicnal right a .citizen has against his_ \"detention under a law relating to preventive detention,\n\nWhile Art. 72(5) contemplates the making of a representation against the order of detention to the detaining authority, which has to be referred by the appropriate Government to the Advisory Board constituted under s. 8(a) of the Act, Parliament has, in its wisdom, enacted s .. 11 and\n\nconferred an additional safeguard agninot arbitrary _executive action.'?\n\nThe principle that emerges (rcim. all these decisions is that the power of revocation conferred oil tl1e Central Government under s.\" 14 of the Act is a statutory power which may be exercised on information received by the Central Government from .its own sources including that supplied by the State Government under sub-s. (5) of s. 3 or from the detenu in the form of. a petition or representation. It is for the Central Government to decide whet!:ter o~ pot it should revoke tile order of detention in a par*ular\n\ncase, In the present case, the dete.nu was not deprived• of the right of making a representation to the detaining authority under Art. 22(5) of the Constitution read with s. 8(1) of the Act. Al though the deteriu had no right to simuijaneously make a repre• . senfafion against the order of qetention to the Central . Government nnder Art 22(5) and there was no duty cast on. the State Government to forward the same to the Central Government, neverthe less the State Government forward the same forthwith. The Centrai Government duly considered that representation whfoh in effect was n()thing but a Representation for revocation of the. order . of detention under s. 14 of the Act. That being so, it was nofobliga- . tory on the part of the Central Government to consider a second . representation for revocation under s. 14.\n\nWe may profitably refer to Phi/Uppa Anne D1ike's case, supra, where in somewhat ·. similar circumstances it was held that failnre of the Central\n\n. Government to consider a representatlQD for revocation of an order of detention under s: ll(l)(b) of the COFEPOSA Act handed over to the Prirµe Mi.nister during her visit to England did not render the continued detention invalid. It was observed :\n\n\"Representations f; om whatever source addressed to whomsoever officer of one or other department of the Government cannot be treated as a representation to the\n\nGovernmeritunder s. ll(S)(b) of the COFEPOSA Act.\" Jil • > The re.suit therefor.e is. that the appeal Succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and order of the. High Court is set aside and the oroer .of detention passed by the District Magistrate under sub-s. (3) ofs. 3 of the National Security Act, 1980 is maintained.\n\nS.R.\n\nAppeal allowed.", "total_entities": 121, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6, "end_char": 28, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ZAVAD ZAMA KHAN", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 30, "end_char": 45, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "ZAVAD ZAMA KHAN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "D.A. DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 62, "end_char": 72, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.A. DESAI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A.P. SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 74, "end_char": 82, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. BALAKRISHNA ERADI, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 87, "end_char": 112, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. BALAKRISHNA ERADI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Safety Laws-Natianal Security Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 121, "end_char": 154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 174, "end_char": 184, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Safety Laws-Natianal Security Act", "statute": "Safety Laws-Natianal Security Act"}}, {"text": "section 8(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 256, "end_char": 268, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Safety Laws-Natianal Security Act", "statute": "Safety Laws-Natianal Security Act"}}, {"text": "Article 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 279, "end_char": 292, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Safety Laws-Natianal Security Act", "statute": "Safety Laws-Natianal Security Act"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 757, "end_char": 761, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Safety Laws-Natianal Security Act", "statute": "Safety Laws-Natianal Security Act"}}, {"text": "National Security Act, 1980", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 769, "end_char": 796, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "June 13, 1983", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 943, "end_char": 956, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State Government had in the mean while on June 13, 1983 made a reference to the Advisory Board under s- 10 of the Act i.e. within three weeks from the date of detntion together with the order of detention and the grounds therefor for its opinion."}}, {"text": "June 23, 1983", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1151, "end_char": 1164, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 23, 1983 the representation was examined by the Joint Secretary, Home Department who marked the file to the Home Secretary on June 27, 1983 who on his turn placed the file before the Chief Minister for his comments on June 27, 1983."}}, {"text": "June 27, 1983", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1282, "end_char": 1295, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On June 23, 1983 the representation was examined by the Joint Secretary, Home Department who marked the file to the Home Secretary on June 27, 1983 who on his turn placed the file before the Chief Minister for his comments on June 27, 1983."}}, {"text": "July 2, 1983", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1503, "end_char": 1515, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 2, 1983 the Stat_e Government forwarded the representation made together with the commens to the Government of India and the Central\"Government rejected the same on July 19, 1983."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1605, "end_char": 1624, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 2, 1983 the Stat_e Government forwarded the representation made together with the commens to the Government of India and the Central\"Government rejected the same on July 19, 1983."}}, {"text": "July 19, 1983", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1673, "end_char": 1686, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 2, 1983 the Stat_e Government forwarded the representation made together with the commens to the Government of India and the Central\"Government rejected the same on July 19, 1983."}}, {"text": "July 5, 1983", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1709, "end_char": 1721, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears th<it on July 5, 1983 the respondent through his counsel simultaneously addressed two representations for revocation-of his detention under s. 14 of the Act, one ad(ressed to the Prime Minister of India and the other to the Slate\n\nGovernment."}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1840, "end_char": 1845, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1974, "end_char": 1992, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The representation made to the Central Government addressed in the name of the Prime Minister was received in the Prime Minister's Secretariat on July 7, 1983 and the grievance of the respondent before the High\n\nCourt was that the Central Government h<id not dealt with his application for the revocation of the order of detention under s.14 of the Act."}}, {"text": "July 7, 1983", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2089, "end_char": 2101, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The representation made to the Central Government addressed in the name of the Prime Minister was received in the Prime Minister's Secretariat on July 7, 1983 and the grievance of the respondent before the High\n\nCourt was that the Central Government h<id not dealt with his application for the revocation of the order of detention under s.14 of the Act."}}, {"text": "s.14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2280, "end_char": 2284, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2459, "end_char": 2464, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2798, "end_char": 2808, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3056, "end_char": 3066, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3189, "end_char": 3194, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3412, "end_char": 3417, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 8(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3539, "end_char": 3546, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 8(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3704, "end_char": 3716, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3900, "end_char": 3905, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3980, "end_char": 3985, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4169, "end_char": 4174, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4372, "end_char": 4376, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4744, "end_char": 4749, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5010, "end_char": 5020, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Govcrn111ent", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5180, "end_char": 5200, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Although the detenu had no right to simultaneouly make a representation against the order of detention to the Central Govcrn111ent under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5207, "end_char": 5217, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Centr:il Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5296, "end_char": 5315, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "22(5) and there was no duty cast on the State Government to forward the same to the Centr:il Government, nevertheless the State Government forwarded the same forthwith."}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5537, "end_char": 5542, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5687, "end_char": 5692, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5836, "end_char": 5856, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From the Judgment and Order dated 25-10-1983 of the Allahabad High Court in Habeas Corpus WP."}}, {"text": "Manoj Swarup", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5897, "end_char": 5909, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Manoj Swarup and Dalveer Bhandari for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Dalveer Bhandari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5914, "end_char": 5930, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Manoj Swarup and Dalveer Bhandari for the appellant."}}, {"text": "Qamaruddin", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5962, "end_char": 5972, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mrs. & Mr. Qamaruddin, Rizwan A. Hajiez and Desh Raj for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Rizwan A. Hajiez", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5974, "end_char": 5990, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mrs. & Mr. Qamaruddin, Rizwan A. Hajiez and Desh Raj for the respondent."}}, {"text": "Desh Raj", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5995, "end_char": 6003, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mrs. & Mr. Qamaruddin, Rizwan A. Hajiez and Desh Raj for the respondent."}}, {"text": "State Government of Uttar Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6085, "end_char": 6118, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\n• c SEN, J. The State Government of Uttar Pradesh has preferred this appeal by special leave from the judgment and order of the Allahabad High Court dated October 25, 1983 by which the High Court issued a writ in the nature of habeas corpus quashing an order of detention passed by the District Magistrate, Moradabad dated November 6, 1982 for the detention of the respondent under sub-s. (3) of s. 3 of the National Security Act, 1980 on being satisfied that his detention was necessary \"with a view to preventing him 'from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.\""}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6465, "end_char": 6469, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "National Security Act, 1980", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6477, "end_char": 6504, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6763, "end_char": 6769, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the National Security Act, 1980", "statute": "the National Security Act, 1980"}}, {"text": "s. 201", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6828, "end_char": 6834, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the National Security Act, 1980", "statute": "the National Security Act, 1980"}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code, 1860", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6842, "end_char": 6865, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Moradabad city", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6925, "end_char": 6939, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that the respondent is alleged to have committed an offence of murder punishable under s. 302 and of causing disappearance of evidence punishable under s. 201 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 in connection with the communal riots that occurred in the Moradabad city."}}, {"text": "November 6, 1982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6945, "end_char": 6961, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 6, 1982, the District\n\nMagistrate, Moradabad passed the impugned order of detention ll but it could not be served on the respondent as he was absconding."}}, {"text": "District\n\nMagistrate, Moradabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6967, "end_char": 6998, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 6, 1982, the District\n\nMagistrate, Moradabad passed the impugned order of detention ll but it could not be served on the respondent as he was absconding."}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7142, "end_char": 7146, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Penal Code, 1860", "statute": "the Indian Penal Code, 1860"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7333, "end_char": 7337, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Penal Code, 1860", "statute": "the Indian Penal Code, 1860"}}, {"text": "November 8, 1982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7544, "end_char": 7560, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State Government received the order of detention on November 8, 1982 and approved of the same on November 11, 1982 under sub's. ("}}, {"text": "November 11, 1982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7589, "end_char": 7606, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State Government received the order of detention on November 8, 1982 and approved of the same on November 11, 1982 under sub's. ("}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7627, "end_char": 7631, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Indian Penal Code, 1860", "statute": "the Indian Penal Code, 1860"}}, {"text": "November 12, 1982", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7730, "end_char": 7747, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5) of s. 3, and as required thereunder, forwarded a report to the Central Government on the next day i.e. on November 12, 1982."}}, {"text": "May 24, 1983", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7796, "end_char": 7808, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ff The respondent surrendered to the police on May 24, 1983 and the impligned order of detention was served on him in District Jail, ·\n\n792 SUPREME COURT Rb1'0RTS [1984] 3 s.C, R,\n\nA Moradabad on June 1, 1983 and the grounds of detention were fur• nished to hirn on June 2, 1983."}}, {"text": "s. 10", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8470, "end_char": 8475, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "June 30, 1983", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9030, "end_char": 9043, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Chief Minister took two days to study the file and ultimately passed an order rejecting the representation on June 30, 1983."}}, {"text": "D.S. Misra", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9304, "end_char": 9314, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 5, 1983 the respondent through his counsel D.S. Misra simultaneously addressed two representations for revocation of his detention under s. 14 of the Act, one addressed to the Prime Minister of India and the other to the State Government."}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9398, "end_char": 9403, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 9455, "end_char": 9460, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On July 5, 1983 the respondent through his counsel D.S. Misra simultaneously addressed two representations for revocation of his detention under s. 14 of the Act, one addressed to the Prime Minister of India and the other to the State Government."}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9824, "end_char": 9829, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "M.L. Miglani", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9876, "end_char": 9888, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that the representation made to the Central Government addressed in the name of the Prime Minister was received in the Prime Minister Secretariat on July 7, 1983 and the grievance of the respondent was that the Central Government had not dealt with his application for revocation of the order of detention under s. 14 even\n\nIlO\\V,\n\nIn his counter-affidavit by one M.L. Miglani, Desk Officer, Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi, it was stated that the Central Government had fully discharged its functions by expedi- ."}}, {"text": "Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9904, "end_char": 9939, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that the representation made to the Central Government addressed in the name of the Prime Minister was received in the Prime Minister Secretariat on July 7, 1983 and the grievance of the respondent was that the Central Government had not dealt with his application for revocation of the order of detention under s. 14 even\n\nIlO\\V,\n\nIn his counter-affidavit by one M.L. Miglani, Desk Officer, Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi, it was stated that the Central Government had fully discharged its functions by expedi- ."}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10388, "end_char": 10393, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11072, "end_char": 11082, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11166, "end_char": 11176, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11575, "end_char": 11585, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 8(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11618, "end_char": 11625, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11707, "end_char": 11717, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 8(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11725, "end_char": 11732, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12263, "end_char": 12273, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 8(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12281, "end_char": 12288, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12504, "end_char": 12509, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "SUPREMH COURT", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 12794, "end_char": 12807, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREMH COURT REPORTS\n\n[1984) 3 S.C.R.\n\ncation of his order of detention under s. 11( i)(b) of the COFEPOSA Act, 1974 or the failure of the Central Government to expeditiously consider the same was a denial of the constitutional right of beil}g afforded \"the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order\" as contemplated by Art."}}, {"text": "s. 11( i)(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12873, "end_char": 12885, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "COFEPOSA Act, 1974", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12893, "end_char": 12911, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13139, "end_char": 13149, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the COFEPOSA Act, 1974", "statute": "the COFEPOSA Act, 1974"}}, {"text": "Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13196, "end_char": 13238, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13270, "end_char": 13275, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971", "statute": "the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971"}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13628, "end_char": 13633, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971", "statute": "the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971"}}, {"text": "s. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13871, "end_char": 13875, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971", "statute": "the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971"}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14539, "end_char": 14544, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Shyam Amba", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14631, "end_char": 14641, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Court held that non-consideration by the Central Government of a representation for revocation made by the detenu under s. 11 of the COFEPOSA Act made the continued detention to be bad, following the decision in Shyam Amba/al Siroya's case, supra."}}, {"text": "al Siroya", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14642, "end_char": 14651, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Court held that non-consideration by the Central Government of a representation for revocation made by the detenu under s. 11 of the COFEPOSA Act made the continued detention to be bad, following the decision in Shyam Amba/al Siroya's case, supra."}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15235, "end_char": 15240, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "[1980] 2 SCR 1078", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 15271, "end_char": 15288, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1980] 3 SCR 738", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 15294, "end_char": 15310, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Art. 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15612, "end_char": 15622, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15781, "end_char": 15786, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Article 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16043, "end_char": 16053, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 258(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17061, "end_char": 17072, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Arts. 256 and 247(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17151, "end_char": 17171, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17361, "end_char": 17371, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec 12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17442, "end_char": 17448, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17806, "end_char": 17811, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 8(b)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 17935, "end_char": 17942, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 8C", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18095, "end_char": 18100, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 8(f)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18534, "end_char": 18541, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18633, "end_char": 18638, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18754, "end_char": 18759, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 72(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18910, "end_char": 18920, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 8(a)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19119, "end_char": 19126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19597, "end_char": 19601, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Art. 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19913, "end_char": 19923, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 8(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19954, "end_char": 19961, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central . Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20091, "end_char": 20111, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "senfafion against the order of qetention to the Central ."}}, {"text": "Art 22(5)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20118, "end_char": 20127, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Centrai Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20294, "end_char": 20312, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Centrai Government duly considered that representation whfoh in effect was n()thing but a Representation for revocation of the."}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20449, "end_char": 20454, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20604, "end_char": 20609, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Uppa Anne D1ike", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20643, "end_char": 20658, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We may profitably refer to Phi/Uppa Anne D1ike's case, supra, where in somewhat ·."}}, {"text": "Central\n\n. Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 20749, "end_char": 20770, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "similar circumstances it was held that failnre of the Central\n\n."}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 20934, "end_char": 20941, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Government to consider a representatlQD for revocation of an order of detention under s: ll(l)(b) of the COFEPOSA Act handed over to the Prirµe Mi.nister during her visit to England did not render the continued detention invalid."}}, {"text": "National Security Act, 1980", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21446, "end_char": 21473, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_3_798_805_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "KATHEEJA BAI\n\nTHE SUPERIN\"iENDJNG ENGINEER & ORS.\n\nMayJO, 1984\n\n[0. CHINNAPPA l!-EDDY, A.P. SEN AND\n\n• E.S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.]\n\nTamil Nadu.-Electrictjr Board Cotribulorj ProvidelJI Fund RegulatiOn1 frcimed by Tarilil Nadu Electricity Board .under Electricity Supply Act, 1948- Regulation 37-Whether_SP, t; Cial Contribiltion to be made by ElectriCity BQard. to the Contributory Provident Fund of the einpJOyees is _Same as Gr.atuity tinder Payment' of G; atufty Act, 1.912-W.hethi PaylTll!nt of Gratuity under Payment of _Gratuity A.ct debars paym.e\"nt of SpeCial ConttibJ,(lion. to be made under Regula\n\nion 31.\n\nPublic Interest L'it1'gation-Letfer-to 1udgetreated wrii petition~\n\nRegaiation 37 of the. Tamil Nadu Electricity Board Contributory Provident Fund Regulations framed by the Tamil Natlu Electricity Board under the Electricity-Supply Act, 1948 provides that the Electricity Board shall credit.to a member's.-provident fund acCount a special contribution calC\\1lated in the specified ·rnanrier, in addition to. the contribution credited under Regut3.ti0n. ll, if the Board is satisfied that the service of the member has been good efficint and-_ faith .. ful and th¢_ member ha~ not beCn diSJ:n-issed from erviCe or the member hjs Jl(lt been removed ftom service. in which Case the sanction of the Board hiid to be obtained. ·\n\nThe Payment of Gratuity Act, 1!i12 which was also applicable .. to' the Tamil Nadti Electricity Board provided for the Payment of greatiuty to em .. ployees _who would fetife after rendering service for a specified number of . years .\n\n. . The petitioner's huband retired in 1976 after serving the Tamil Nadu Electricity B0ard for about 34 _years and died three.mo.n1hs thereafter. The petitioner was paid_ her husband's stibscription to the Contributory Provident Fund and interest and the.Electdity Bo1lrd's contribution and intereSt and also thc-gratUity under the payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 .. The Electricity Board did not pay theSJ)ecial Contribrition to be ma.de by it to the contributory Provident Fund under. 'Regulation 37. on tqC grond that-the specia~· contributioll being nothing other than tbe payment of gratuity, they could n.ot be asked to. pay gratuity t\\Vice Over, once under Payment of Gratuity Act and ain under _ Regii1ation 37. The petitiorier having got no relief from ailywhere wrote a letter tQ a!Judge of the Supreme Court which wa.• treated as a writ petitioll:\n\nAllowins!the petition,\n\n• •\n\nKATilEEJA BAI v. SUPDT ENGINEER (Cb; nnappa Reddy, 'J.) 799.\n\nHELD :. The Electrjcity BOard cannot avoid payn1ent of the special -Contribution to Provident Fuiid under their own Provident Fund RegulatiOlIS on the pretext that ii is a.kin to or_ the same as Gratuity payable_ under the Payment of Gratuity Act. In the first place, the Board, in thC:ir Regulations, h3ye themselves IabllC:d the Speci31 Contribution under Regulation 37 .as a Special -contribution to Provident Fund .andnOt as Gratuity. It is not as if they were\n\nutiaware of the word '_Gratuity' -and what it meant Since it -is found that there is a reference in Regulation 5 to aGratuitt,.Scheme of.. th~.-Tilmil a~ Government which had been adopted by the.Bd!rd .. The Special Contr1but1on under Regulation 37 is part of a Well thought out _Provident Fund Scheine designed tO\n\nbenefit ·good-, efficient and faithfur employees (borrowing th:e wordsfrom the Regulation'itself) by _making annual contributions in_ additionto the monthly contributions .undr Re!iulation JI.· This is what apnears from Regulation 37 itself. There is no justification ror first dubbing it as a gratuity on the ground that it Ii.as some or the known ch_aractcristics of gratuity and then proceeding to deny the employees the benefit o.f it Qn the-gt\"ound that the Beard are paying gratuity under the. Pa:yment of Gratuity Act. If the Special Contribution has so.me _cOII)mon features with gratuity, it has also distinctive features which ctis\n\ntiguish it .from gratuity payable under the Ir.yment of Gratuity At. [803B-F]\n\n. . in view of the finding that . .Special. Contribtion un<; te~ Regulation 37 is not the same as grat_uityunder Payment of Gratuity Act; the argument that the provision for Special Contribution under Regulation 37 was inconsistent With • the provisions of the Payment of Gratuity Act .and therefore the Jatier should prevail to the eXclusion of the former must fail. [804H ; 805A] ·\n\nORIGINA~ JURisDier10N : Writ Petition .No. 13009 of 1983.\n\n(Under article 32 of the Constitution of India)\n\n.G; pal Subra aniam (A.C) for the Petitioner.\n\nDr. Y.S. Chitale, AY. Rangam and Mrs: Sar/a Chandra for the Respondeni. • The Judgm; niof the Court was delivered by\n\n. CHINNAP.PA REDDY, J. Smt. .Kathoeja Bai, is the widow of Abdul Salam who retired .as a Line Inspector, Grade l, in the employment of the Tamil Nadu State Electricity Board on 31.7.76 and who unfortunately. died on 15.10.76. Smt. Katheeja Bai failed to get from her late husband's employers .certain amounts\" which she clamd werl!o due to her husband. She. knocked contii)Uously, but m varn, at the doors of the Regional Provident Commissioner\n\nMadras, Central Provident Commissioner, New Delhi ad th; Minister for Labour Government of India for several years for\n\nMo SUPREME CotJRT REPORTS [1984] 3 s.c.ll..\n\nredress. In sheer :desperation she nltimately turned to this CQurt as a last resort. Unable to engage a lawyer, she addressed a letter to . a learned judge of the Court setting forth her grievance. After being processed in the. Registry; the letter was t)'eated asa Writ Petition under Art 32 of th~ Constitution. A Rule Nisi was issued and the Tamil Nadu .. State. Electricity 'Board have app.eared before • us through connsel. At our request Sri' Gopala Subramanyam argued the case for the widoJ' i!S amicus curiae. He presel)ted the case with understanding and .thoroughness and yie are grateful to bim, as also fo Dr. Chitaley who' presented the employer's case with his usual fairness.·\n\nIn exercise of the powers conferred by s. 79( c) of the Electricity Supply Act, .1948, the Tamil Nadn Electricity Bo.ard made the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board Contributory Provident , fund.Regulations.\n\nRegulation 3 Provides for the estabfahment. of a fund kno.wn as the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board Employees' Contributory Provident Fund; with effect from 1.7.57. Regulation 3A to 3-K provide for the managemnt and administration of the fund by the Board of .\n\nTruste&. Regulation 4 prescribes that the. Fund .shall be governed •\n\nby regula!iou as may be in force for the . time being but provides that no addition, alteration or repeal, of any .regulation which may adversely effect a subscriller shall be. retrospective. Regulation 5 provides th.at all en; ployees who are eligible for the Contributory Prov.ident Fund (Tamil Nad1,1) Scheme and Gratuity Scheme oft.he Governfi1ent of Tamil Nadu except certain categories of employees with whom we are not. co.ncerned shall become subscribers to the fund o~ completion of three months continuous service. Regulation. 6 prescribes that. an account shall be opened in the name of eac.h member in which shall be credited, the member's subscriptions and interest thereon, the contributions maie by the Electricity Bo'ard to his account and interest thereon and the J)reexisting account before. the Electricity Department was taken.over by thil Electricity Board.\n\nRegulation 9 provides ror subscription to the fund by member~ at the rate of 7-1/2 % of pay' iJlus dearness allowance. RJ)gnlation 11 provides for contribution byjhe Electricity Board to the account of. each member at the. rate of7t% of pay plus dearness allowance.\n\nThe member's subscription along with the Electricity B.oard's Contri- . bution is required to be credited to the individual. acount ofthe mem\n\n. ber before the 15th of every month. Regulation 37 prescribes that the\n\nElectricity Board shall credit to a memb<; r's Provide!lt Fund account a special contribution calculated in the specified maimer. in addi-\n\n• •\n\n' '\n\n~ATHESJA. BAI l'. SJPDT ENG!NEER (G:/iinnappa Raddy, J.j 80i\n\ntion to the contributi'oncrediled under Regulation 11, ifthe Board .A is .satisfied that tlie service of the member has been .good, .efficient and faithful and the member has not bon dismissed from service or the membor h:ls not been removed from service in which case the sanction of the Board bas to be obtained. In the case of a Class I or Class Hcmpbyee who quits service on attainment of'the age of supernnuation, ne is to be credited, if his service exec.eds 18 years B with six months pay plus. half a month's pay for each completed year of service afte;- the J8t~1 but not so 1s to e<cced, in all, twelve . months' pay or rnpees tw:n!y:five thonsand, h1chever is less. If the employee's service does not exceed 1.8 years, he is to be credited with half a month's pay for each completed year of si:rvice\".so as . • . .\n\nG not to exceed six months' pay. In the case of a Class Ill or Class IV employees who bas attained tltc'age of superannuation after 15 years' . • service, th~ Electricity B.oard is requiccd to 9redit .his account with half a month's pey for each completed year of service., but no.t so as to exceed to 15 montl1s' pay. Jf the service is short of 15 years, he is to be credited .with half a month's pay !or e'ach completed yer .D of service so-as n0t 15 exc;!ed six mopths' pay. rt is provided in Regulation 37 that pay for the purpose. of reckoning special contri bution shall be the pay last drawn during the lastthree years .of service, whichever is more. The Board is also empowered to withhold or reduce the Special Contribution in any particular case. . . : . ~\n\nAt this stage, we may refer to s.12 of the Emloyees' Provident Funds, And Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 which prohibits an employer from rcducinr; directly or indirectly the total quantum of benefits in the nature of uld age pension-, gratuity or Provident Fund or Life Insurance to whic:1 the employee is entitled under the terms of his employment, express or implied, by reason only of his liability for the payment of any contribution to th.e Fund (wh°ich. is defined by i.2 (h) as meaning a. Provident Fund . established under the Employed Provident Fund Scheme framed under s.5). . '\n\nG In 1972, Parliament enacted the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 to provide for' a schem<\": for the payment of gratuity to emplo:. yees in cert1iin establishments. There 'is no. dispute that the Act applies to the Tamil Nadu 'State Electricity }3oard. Section 4 of the .Act.,.equircs payment of gratuity to, an employee who .as rendered . continnous s; rvico for not less than-five years, on the termination H of his employment' on superannuation or on retirement or on. his . . '\n\n. '\n\n.· c\n\n802 . SUPREME COURT RliPORrs . [l 984] 3 S.C.R. , c '\n\ndeath or disable.ment due.to accideut or disease. The employer is required to pay the gratuity to.the employee at tbe rate of fifteen days' wages for each completed year of service or part thereof in excess of six months. The amount of gratuity. is not to exceed 20 'months' wages. The employer is not requfred to pay any gratuity to an employee if .the service of the employe.e has. been terminated for any act, wilful omission or negligence causing any damage or '. loss tci; or destruction of, property belonging to the employer, or if '< the services of the employee have been terminated for riotous or disorderly conduct or any other act of violence on his part or if his servicea have \\)een terminated for any act involving moral turpitude provided ihat suc}). offence' is committed by him i.n the course.of his employment. Section 14 provides tl\\at the contribution of the Act shall have effect notwithhstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any enactment other than tbis Act or in any instrumenJ; or contract }).aving effect by virtue of any enactmsnt other than the Payment of Gratuity Act.• •\n\nAbdul Salam, w!io held a non-pensionable post, retired on 31.7.76, after a service. of 34 years.and five months. He died on 15.10.76 within three months after his retirement. He was entitled or, in this case his widow was entitled to the paymorit of the entire amount standing to. his credit in his Provident Fund account and the gratuity pa.yable u.nder the Payment of Gratuity Act. The . Electricity Boai:d, however-, took the stand that she was entitled to\n\nhe paid the member's subscription and interest, the employer's contribution. and 'inte.rest and. gratuity but not the special contribution under Reg'!lation 37 of the Tamil Nudu State Electricity Board Contri.butory Provident Fund Regulitions .. The reason Jor the Board's .attitude was that the sp, ecial contribution required to be paid under Regulation 37 was nothing other than payment of gratuity and that !hey could not be asked to pay gratuity twice over, once under the Payment of Gratuity Ac( and again under Regulatio~ 37, Since they were ready to pay the gratuity payable under the Payment of Gratuity Act,. which. was more .favourable to the employee, they. were not obliged to make payent of tbe contribution under Regulation 37. We may mention here that tl)e Board B has paid to the widow, the member's subscription with interest and the employer'& contribu.tion with interest. but not the special ont.ri-. bution under Regulation 37. The Board has paid a sum ofRs.4275/- towards gratuity under the payment of Gratuity Act but a um of ·•\n\n'\\ -\n\nKATHEEJA BAI v. SUP!)T, ENG!l:!EE'R (Chinnappa Raddy, J.) 803\n\nRs, 3167/- is admittedly yet due from the Board to_wards gratuity.\n\nIn the coun_ter affidavit filed on bhalf of the Electricity Board we A are not able to find any reason.for non-payment of the balance_ of gratuity .\n\nWe are unable to appreciate how the Electricity. Board can . avoid payment of the Special Contribution to Provident Funct'\n\n_under their own Provident Fund Regulatio11s on the pretext that it is akin to or the same as Gratuity payable under the Payment of Gratuity Aci. In the first place, the Bqard, in their Regulations, have themselves labelled the Special Contribution under Reglilation 37 as a Special Contribution to Provident' Fund not as Gratuity. 'It is not.as if .they were uriaware of the word 'Gratuity' and what it meant since w.e find that there is a reference in Regulation 5 to a Gratui_ty Scheme -of the Tamil Nadil Government which had beeri adopted by the Board. The Special Contri- 'bution under Regulation 37 is part of a well thought out Provident Fund Scheme designed. to benefit 'good; efficient and faithful . \"employees (we borrow the words from the . Regulation itself) by\n\nmaking annual contributiOns ina\\ldition the monthly contributions. under Regulation 11. This is wbat appears from Regulation or itself, we see no justification for first dubbing It as a gratuity on the ground that it has some of the known cbaracteristics of gratuity and then proceeding to. deny' the employees the benefit of it on the ground that the Board are paying gratuity under the Payment of Gratuity Act. If the Special Contribution has some common: features with gratuity, it has also. distinctive features which .distinguish It.from gratuity payable under the payment of Gratuity Act; For example, one important feature which discrimin_ates the Special Contribution under Regulation 37 from gratuity under the.Payment of Gratuity Act is that while tlie Payment of the latter is-obligatory and. can only be denied if the employee's services have been termi~ nated for his riotous or disorderly conduct or any other act of\n\n'violence on-his part or.any act which 'Constitutes an offence involving - G moral turptitude and can also be denied to the_ extent. ofthe damage orlosscaused by the employee, where the employee's services have been terminated for any act, wilful omission or negligence causing any damage or to loss, or destruction of, property belonging to the . emp1oyer, the payment of the former is_ discretionar_y and may not -\n\nbe made if the service of the employee has not been good, efficient ani.l faith(ul. The employer has also the discretion to with, ho)d or reduce the Special 8ontribution in any. particular case. Of course,\n\n. \" . ,..\n\nSUPREME CoURT REPORTS [l9g4j j S.C.R •.\n\nthe einpfoyer canhot arbitrarily clai'm that th~ employee's service. . was not good., efficient and faithful, . or with-hold or reduce the\n\nSpecial Contribution in an arbitrary fashion. Even so,. the distinction between the mandate of the Payment of Gratuity Act and the . discretion involved in makin,!J the Special Contribution under Regula1ion 37 is iriielligibly clear, Another feature which di1tinguishes the.two is that the benefit of the Payment of Gratuity Act is confin- .ed to persons drawing wages not exceeding Rs. 1000 and does :not extend to persons employed in a managerial or administrative capacity .wliereas the SpeCial Contr, ibution under Regulaiion 37 is not so confined and extends to every employee of the Board° except casual employees, State or Cenfral Government employees employed with the Board on foreign service terms etc. etc. For the ·\n\npurpose of contibution of, Provident Fund under Regulation 11 or Regulation 37 it makes no difference that a person is employed in a managerial or administtarive capacity on that he draws wages more than Rs. 1000 pet month. A thin;\\, feature which marks the two apart is that the contribution to the. Provident Fund whether under Regulation 11 or Regulation 37 becomes .part of the Fund established py Regulation 3 andis to be managed and administered by trustees u.nder Regulation 3-A to 3-K, whereas the payment of Gratuity Act does .not provide for the Constitution of a fund to be managed and administered by trustees.. In addition -to th.ese broad feature;, we have the outstanding circumstance that the Board themselves have describ.ed the contribution under Reguiation 37 as a contribution to Provident Fund and have chosen to include it in their Provident Fund Scheme. That should conclude the matter.\n\n Dr. Chitaley invi.ted our attention to s.14 of the Payment of• Gratuity Act; i972 which provides, ·\n\n\"The provisions of this Act or any rule mae there .under shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in an enactment other than th.is Act or in any instrument or contract having effect by virtue of any enactmel/.t other thau this Act,\" ..\n\nHe argued that the provision for Special Contribution under Regulation 37 was inconsistent with.the provisions of the Payment of Gratuity Act and therefore the latter should prevail to the H exculusion of the former .. This ,'argument is. dependent on the assumption that the SpeCial Contribution nuder Regulation 37 is the samething as the gratuity contemplated by the Payment of .\n\n. ,.J\n\nKATl!imJA BAI v. SUPDT. ENGINEER (Chinnappa Raddy, J.) 805 '\n\n' Gratuity Act. We have held that it. is not and the argument, \"therefore, fails.\n\nThere was then the usual lament that a large number of employees were involved and, therefore, the cost will be.heavy. We do not understand this argument at all .. Does it inean that beneficent. legislations . and beneficent schemes must be confined to small establishments emploY, ing a Jew workers only ? On the other hand, it is misreading to say that the cost is heavy. The cost is made to appear heavy divorced from the size of the establishment. If the. establishment is huge and if a large number of workmen are employ- . ed the total wagejbill may appear to bepeayy, but is it really so? ls it disproportionate to the size of the estblishmeut,' its resourees, . -its revenues and its other expenditure ? Is the individual wage-bill. also very high ? To talk of heavy cost without refere.nce to .other circumstances is to present an entireiy unfaithful pictl!re. We need . . <-rnake no further .comment. ·\n\nIn the resuJt we direct the respondent Board to pay to the . petitioner the whole of the. Special Contribution under Regulation\n\n37\" which was payable. to her husband and the balan.ce of the gratuity payable under the Payment of Gratuity Act, part of which we are told has beenpaid leaving the sum of Rs. 3167 unpaid. Tbese amounts should be paid to the. petitiouer with interest at 15% per annum froin the date on w.hich the amO.unts fell due. The respondent Board -shol!ld also pay a sum of Rs. 2500 to the \"petitioner towards compensatory costs. We must add that the case haa left us with the.feeling of: uneasiness and distress at the plight.of helpless persons like the petitioner whose repeated representations to those in authority were left uncared for. so the tediously long despite frequent protestations pf social j)lstice .\n\nH.S.K.\n\nPetirion allowed.", "total_entities": 57, "entities": [{"text": "BAI\n\nTHE SUPERIN\"iENDJNG ENGINEER & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9, "end_char": 48, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "THE SUPERINTENDING ENGINEER & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A.P. SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 87, "end_char": 95, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "E.S. VENKATARAMIAH, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 103, "end_char": 126, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "E.S. VENKATARAMIAH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Electricity Supply Act, 1948", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 248, "end_char": 276, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Payment of Gratuity Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1344, "end_char": 1367, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "St and also thc-gratUity under the payment of Gratuity Act, 1972", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1873, "end_char": 1937, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Payment of Gratuity Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2238, "end_char": 2261, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 2379, "end_char": 2392, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitiorier having got no relief from ailywhere wrote a letter tQ a!Judge of the Supreme Court which wa.• treated as a writ petitioll:\n\nAllowins!the petition,\n\n• •\n\nKATilEEJA BAI v. SUPDT ENGINEER (Cb; nnappa Reddy, 'J.) 799."}}, {"text": "Payment of Gratuity Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2748, "end_char": 2771, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Payment of Gratuity Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4142, "end_char": 4165, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Special Contribution under Regulation", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4203, "end_char": 4240, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Payment of Gratuity Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4290, "end_char": 4313, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4480, "end_char": 4490, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Special Contribution under Regulation", "statute": "Special Contribution under Regulation"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4498, "end_char": 4519, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "; pal Subra aniam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4524, "end_char": 4541, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(Under article 32 of the Constitution of India)\n\n.G; pal Subra aniam (A.C) for the Petitioner."}}, {"text": "Y.S. Chitale", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4573, "end_char": 4585, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Y.S. Chitale, AY."}}, {"text": "AY. Rangam", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4587, "end_char": 4597, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dr. Y.S. Chitale, AY."}}, {"text": "Sar/a Chandra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4607, "end_char": 4620, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rangam and Mrs: Sar/a Chandra for the Respondeni. •"}}, {"text": "CHINNAP.PA REDDY", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4689, "end_char": 4705, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "CHINNAP.PA REDDY, J. Smt."}}, {"text": ".Kathoeja Bai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4715, "end_char": 4728, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".Kathoeja Bai, is the widow of Abdul Salam who retired .as a Line Inspector, Grade l, in the employment of the Tamil Nadu State Electricity Board on 31.7.76 and who unfortunately.", "canonical_name": ".Kathoeja Bai"}}, {"text": "Abdul Salam", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4746, "end_char": 4757, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".Kathoeja Bai, is the widow of Abdul Salam who retired .as a Line Inspector, Grade l, in the employment of the Tamil Nadu State Electricity Board on 31.7.76 and who unfortunately.", "canonical_name": "Abdul Salam"}}, {"text": "Katheeja Bai", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4918, "end_char": 4930, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Katheeja Bai failed to get from her late husband's employers .certain amounts\" which she clamd werl!o due to her husband.", "canonical_name": ".Kathoeja Bai"}}, {"text": "Art 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5584, "end_char": 5590, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Gopala Subramanyam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5747, "end_char": 5765, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "At our request Sri' Gopala Subramanyam argued the case for the widoJ' i!S amicus curiae."}}, {"text": "Chitaley", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 5920, "end_char": 5928, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He presel)ted the case with understanding and .thoroughness and yie are grateful to bim, as also fo Dr. Chitaley who' presented the employer's case with his usual fairness.·"}}, {"text": "s. 79( c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6030, "end_char": 6039, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Tamil Nadu", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6878, "end_char": 6888, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Regulation 5 provides th.at all en; ployees who are eligible for the Contributory Prov.ident Fund (Tamil Nad1,1) Scheme and Gratuity Scheme oft.he Governfi1ent of Tamil Nadu except certain categories of employees with whom we are not."}}, {"text": "~ATHESJA. BAI l'. SJPDT ENG!NEER", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8036, "end_char": 8068, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in addi-\n\n• •\n\n' '\n\n~ATHESJA."}}, {"text": "G:/iinnappa Raddy", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 8070, "end_char": 8087, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SJPDT ENG!NEER (G:/iinnappa Raddy, J.j 80i\n\ntion to the contributi'oncrediled under Regulation 11, ifthe Board .A is .satisfied that tlie service of the member has been .good, .efficient and faithful and the member has not bon dismissed from service or the membor h:ls not been removed from service in which case the sanction of the Board bas to be obtained."}}, {"text": "s.12", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9724, "end_char": 9728, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "And Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9763, "end_char": 9801, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s.5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10277, "end_char": 10280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "And Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952", "statute": "And Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952"}}, {"text": "Parliament enacted the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10299, "end_char": 10351, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10539, "end_char": 10548, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Parliament enacted the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972", "statute": "Parliament enacted the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972"}}, {"text": "Section 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11665, "end_char": 11675, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Payment of Gratuity Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11925, "end_char": 11948, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Abdul Salam", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 11954, "end_char": 11965, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 14 provides tl\\at the contribution of the Act shall have effect notwithhstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any enactment other than tbis Act or in any instrumenJ; or contract }).aving effect by virtue of any enactmsnt other than the Payment of Gratuity Act.• •\n\nAbdul Salam, w!io held a non-pensionable post, retired on 31.7.76, after a service.", "canonical_name": "Abdul Salam"}}, {"text": "31.7.76", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12012, "end_char": 12019, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Section 14 provides tl\\at the contribution of the Act shall have effect notwithhstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any enactment other than tbis Act or in any instrumenJ; or contract }).aving effect by virtue of any enactmsnt other than the Payment of Gratuity Act.• •\n\nAbdul Salam, w!io held a non-pensionable post, retired on 31.7.76, after a service."}}, {"text": "15.10.76", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12078, "end_char": 12086, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He died on 15.10.76 within three months after his retirement."}}, {"text": "Payment of Gratuity Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12313, "end_char": 12336, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Since they were ready to pay the gratuity payable under the Payment of Gratuity Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12948, "end_char": 13031, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "payment of Gratuity Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13428, "end_char": 13451, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Tamil Nadil Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14376, "end_char": 14398, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is not.as if .they were uriaware of the word 'Gratuity' and what it meant since w.e find that there is a reference in Regulation 5 to a Gratuity Scheme -of the Tamil Nadil Government which had beeri adopted by the Board."}}, {"text": "Payment of Gratuity Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15044, "end_char": 15067, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "payment of Gratuity Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15226, "end_char": 15249, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Payment of Gratuity Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15376, "end_char": 15399, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "SUPREME CoURT REPORTS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 16224, "end_char": 16245, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME CoURT REPORTS [l9g4j j S.C.R •.\n\nthe einpfoyer canhot arbitrarily clai'm that th~ employee's service. ."}}, {"text": "Payment of Gratuity Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16504, "end_char": 16527, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Payment of Gratuity Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16710, "end_char": 16733, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Provident Fund under Regulation", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17161, "end_char": 17192, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Provident Fund whether under Regulation", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17435, "end_char": 17474, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "payment of Gratuity Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 17640, "end_char": 17663, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s.14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18085, "end_char": 18089, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Provident Fund whether under Regulation", "statute": "Provident Fund whether under Regulation"}}, {"text": "argued that the provision for Special Contribution under Regulation", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18422, "end_char": 18489, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Payment of Gratuity Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18537, "end_char": 18560, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Special Contribution under Regulation", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19959, "end_char": 19996, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Payment of Gratuity Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 20087, "end_char": 20110, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_3_806_814_EN", "year": 1984, "text": ", A\n\nANANDILAL & ANR.\n\nRAM NARAIN & ORS.\n\nB May 10, 191J4\n\n[A.P. SEN AND V. BALKRISHNA ERADI, JJ, j\n\nLimitation Act 1908 s: 15 U) and Code of Civil Procedure 1908 s. 48.\n\nExecUtion of decree-Partial .s\"ay of-Decree_ holder whether etitftled to cliwm C eXlusion of j)erioi in computation -of limitation.\n\n• • J Words and Phrases : l•Eecution'~-Meani'ng o/-_S. 15 . ( J) Limilatlon -1 Aci1908.\n\nThe predecess_orl.i:i-title of respon; Jeot No. 1 obtained a decree agaitist. the p_r-edeCessorin-:title 9f respondent Nos. 2and 3.\n\nThe decrtie was affirmed by the State High Court on April S, 1938. During the pendenoy of the app-al, the Higb-Cocirt &tayed execution of the decree uader Order XLI, r. 5 of the Code Clf Civil Procedure on .condition that the api)ellentsdefendants furn\\sb.ed security for the\"dlte satisfaction of the dCcree.· Against the decree Passed- .by the High Cciu.it tht defendants preferred all appeal\n\nbefr~ the' Judicial CotQmftteA of the State-~ -In.the_ appeai, the Judicial\n\nCommitte~ passed an interi.m order d1td August J.6, 194_0 directing that until .further orders \"the prop.:.rties attached ill ex:ecutionshall -continue to remain undr attahrrient but further proceedings for the.saJe thereof Shall i-en1ain stayed on --Novomber 24, .-1944. the Judicial Committee distUissed th~ _sid -appeJl-anJ the ini'erim stay.stood diSsolved.\n\nRespodent Nu. 1 ·-who h.td purGhased th~ decree fcom the beirS of ihe original dcreeholder resumcd-thC eXccution of th:i decree.\n\nThe exeCu tion applicati9n filed by him .wJs dismissed for default on June 11, 192f.5, restored 6n DeCemhcr I.\"4,- \"1946 but again disdlisscd for default on Jai:iuary 2_1, 1954.\n\nThei'_eafter,. a fresh application for execution, was filed on FcbruarY. '1 s i 19 54.\n\nThis application was oPposed by 1hc surety .appeij_an ls on th~ grcund that it was barred by limitation having be-en filed beyond tho period of 12 years presCfibd .hY s, 48 of the Co'de of Civil Procedure ..\n\nThe DiStricf Judge rcjecied the objection by the appellants holding th.at alth.ouith the stay of execution wa:; par.tial .as only s.ale of. the attached properties had been ___ stayed .bytne Judicla_l Committee, the decree-holder was entilled to the benefit of s. lS (1) of the Limitation Act.\n\n-'f\n\nThe appellants preferred an appeal before the. High Court which was\n\n, A allowed by a Single JUdge, who held that an order of partial stay like .\n\nthe one granted by the Judicial Committee only postponed the sale of the\n\nattached properties .d did not have the .effect of making the decree inexecutable ond therefore s. 15 \\!)of .the Limitation Act was not attractd.\n\nRespondent No. 1 preferred a Letters Patent Arpeal and a Full Bcch of the High Court held tha.t the word . \"execU:tioii'-' ins: tS (1) must .be\n\ncontrued in a broad sense, tha:t fr did not exlude a part'ial stay of exeCll ·\n\ntion aod therefore the deciecholder was entitled to tho exclusion o, f the\n\nperiod from August 16, 1940 to November 24, 1944 under s. JS (l) of the -Limitation Act for_ computation of the period of 12 years prescribed under s .. 48 of the Code. of Civil Piocedurr.\n\nDismfasing the Appeal to this Court~ ·.\n\nHELD,: 1:. The word ''execution,' ins; 15 (1) embraCes all the\n\nappropriate means by which a decree is .• eriforcd.\n\nIt includes all processes and procedings iff.aid of, or supplemental to execution.\n\n[814B]\n\n- i\n\n2. .There is no rational basis for adopting a narrow arid~ restricted construction On a beneficient provision Uke s, 15 (l).\n\nThere is no reason why I!. 15 (1) !ihould be giveil a -restricted meaning _as allowing the benefit to a decrcehoider where there is a complete or abolute stay of executioll. 3nd not a ':partia; i stay i.e. a sfay which makes the decree altogether inexe..\n\nE eatable.\n\n[814C] ,.\n\nStay of any process of execution is stay of executi_on within the , meaning of-s. 15 { 1).\n\nWhere an injunction or order has preventd the\n\ndetee .. holder from execut'iog the decree, then irrespe_ctive of the partiular stage of execution, or the\"partic.ular proprty: against \\Vhich, Or the Parti .. cular judgment-debtor against '\\vhom, execution was stayed~ -ibe effect or such injunction or order is . to prolong tbe life of. the decree itself by the period during wbicb the injunction or oder remaided in force.--· [s-140.-El\n\nKundo Mal & OrS. ~· Firm Dau/at. Ram Vidya Prakash, AIR 1940 Lab. 15, Virchanif Kapur Chand v. Morua/appa. & Anr., AIR 1944 Born. 303, Chanbasappa v. Holibasappa, ILR (1924) 48 Bom. 485 and Kirtyqnand Singh v. PrithiC/umd Lal., AIR 1929 Pat: 59.7, reversed.\n\nBail/jam v. Bai Ruxmani, AIR 1914 B.om. 2i1 and GovindnaJh Chaudhuri v. Basiruddin Monda/, AIR 1921 Cot. 606, and Sitar.am and Others v. Chunnilalsa ILR 1944 Nag. 250 approved.\n\nKirtyanand Singh v. Prithi Chndla/, AlR 1933 PC $2 explioed.\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JUIUSDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 109 of 1971.\n\n' Appeal by Certificate from the Judgment and Decree.dated 17th October, 1969 of the Madhya Pradesh .High Court, in Letters Patent Appeal No. 16 of i962\n\nV.A .. Bobde and A.G.Ratnaparkhi for the appeilants.\n\nS.S: Khanduja for the. respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\n. . SJJN, L The shmt point involved in this appeal by certificate fr?m the judgment and order of a Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh H/gh Court dated October 17, !969 is whether a partial stay of execution. of the decree like the one. in question staying sale of the attached property is within sub-s (1) of s, 15 of the Iimita•ion Act,\n\n.... 1\n\n\\ -\\:' ..\n\n190$ so as to erititle the decree-holder fo claim exclusion of the period durig whi.ch there .. was stay of sale but the property ·. was to .co.nt nue under a.ttachment,. for the purpose of computation of the p(jtiod of limitation provided by s .. 48 of the Code of' Civil Procedure, 1908.\n\nSince the question involved is a substantial Question of law, the High Court _has granted a certiticae of fitness Under Art. 133 (!) CC'1 of the Constitution. ·· .\n\nFacts are somewhat comp!ic'ated but it is necessary to diseri- . tangle them to bring out the poirit in controvers~. . One Ghasiram, the predecessor•in-title of the present respondent No, 1. Ram Narain obtained a decree for Rs. 5,548.18 p. from the Court of the District Jµdge, Ujjain against one Bheraji, the predecessor-in-title of 1espon• dents Nos. 2 and 3 Chunnilal and Anndilal, now the Judgment- debtors. The decree was affirmed in appeal by the Gwalior High Court : on April 5, 1938.\n\nDuring the pendency of the appeal, the High Court stayed execution of the decree under Order XLI, r. 5 of the Code on condition that the appelfants-defendants furnished security . for the due satisfaction of. the decree.\n\nRatanlal, father of the two appellants Anandifal ancl Jarikilal; executed a surety dated August 3, 1927.\n\nAgainst the decree passed by the High. Court, the defendants preferred a revision before the Judicial Committee of the. Gwalior\n\nState .which came to be dismissed .oJL February 14, !94l. While the revision was pending before the Judicial. Committee, the decreeholder Ghasiram put the decree in execution against the judgmentdebtors as also against the surpty on February 23, 1939 for attachment and sale of their immoveable properties. It appears that some\n\n• '\n\n. )\n\nhouses and certain zamindari. lands of the surety Ratanlal were A attached in execution .,, f the decree.\n\nHe. raised objections to the attachment of his property but the same were rejected on December 9, 1939. Against the order dismissing his objections, the surety Ratanlal filed an appeal before the Gwalior High Court which was dismissed on July 22, 1940. He then filed a Mi8cellaneous Appeal before the Judicial Committee of th~ Gwalior State. B\n\nIt is common ground.that in thai appeal the Judicial Committee passed an interim order dated Augut 16, 1940 directing that until further order; the nroperties attached in execution shll conti!rne to rema; n under attachment but further proceedings for the sale thereof shall remain stayed. On November 24, 1944 the Judicial Committee dismissed the said appeal and consequently the interim stay stood dissolved. Thereafter, the present respondent No. 1 Ram Narain appears to have purchased the decree from the heirs of the original decree holder 11nd the execution proceedings were resumed. The execution application filed by him was however dismissed for default on June lt, l 945 . .It was restored on December 14, 1946 but was again dismissed for default on January 21, 1954 as the counsel for the dscreeholder stated that he had no instruction. : Thereafter, a fresh 'application for execution was filed by the decreehold<rr on February 18, 1954. This application was opposed by the surety Ratanlal inter ali'!. on the ground that it wa; barred by limitation having been filed beyond the period of 12 years prescribed by s. 48 ofthe Code.\n\nThe question is whether respondent No. 1 Ram Narain, the assignee'holder, was entitled.to exclusion.of the period from August 16, 1940 to November 241 1944 under. s. 15 (l) of the Limitation Act for computation of the period of 12 years prescribed under s. 48 of.the Code. The District Judge, Ujjain rejected the objection raised by the appellants holding that although the stay of execution was partial in as much as only sale of t]\\e attached pro.perties had been staye'd by the Judicial Committee, the decreeholder was entitled to the benefit of s. 15 (!). The appellants preferred an appeal. beforethe High Court which was allowed by the learned Single .Judge by his order dated February 9, 1962.\n\nThe learned Single Judge held that an order of partial stay like the one in question granted by the Judicial Committee which only postponed the sale of the attached properties did. not have the effect of making the decree inexecutable. and therefore s. 15 (I) of the Limitation Act . •\n\n81()\n\nSUPRE!JE COURT REPORTS (1984] 3 s.cR.\n\nI\\ . was not attracted. He understood the decision of Grille, C.J. and J .. Sen, J. in Sitaram & .Ors. v. Chunilalsdi}) as laying. down that s. 15 (I) was applicable only when there is absolute stay of excution ..\n\na,\n\nAggrieved by the decision of the learned Single judge, respon- • dent No. 1 preferred a Letters Patent Appeal which was referred by a Division Bench to a Full Bench as the question wh, et.her a partial stay was within s. 15 (I) of , the Limitation Act was o! considerable importance. After dealing with.all the authorities on the subject, the Full Bench answered the question in the affirmative. It was of the view that the Limiiation Act . like any other enactment must receive a -, construction which the language in its . pl;\\ in meaning is capable of bearing and that there was no justification for placing a narrow and restricted construction. on the word, ·\"exec.ution\" occurring in the phrase \"execution of the decree'' in s. 15 (1) of the .\n\nLimitation Act as implying an absolute bar to the execution of the , decree-~ AcGording to the Full Bench, such a construction was not warranted as it would involve reading into the section words such as \"totally; wholly, as a whole, or. by all possible means\" which are D.\n\n. E.\n\nnotthere. According to its plain language,.it held, thats. 15(1) did not exclude a partial stay of execution. After referring. to several decisions of differcnf High Courts, the Full 'Aench particularly. placed\n\nrelianc~ on the deeisjon of the Culcutta High Court in Sreenath Roy\n\nv. Radhanath. Mookerjfj!(2) holding that. the words \"executioa of the decree\"· mean enforcement of. the decree by what is known as by any of the \"processes of execution'.'. It accordingly held that the word \"execiltion\" in S; 15 (I) mut be cconstrued in a broad sense taking in all or any of the v; irious processes of execution and ob- . served that the decision in Sitaram's case,' supra, does not fake a contrary view.. The Full Bench therefore held that the decreeholder was entitled to the exclusion of the•period from August 16,\n\n1940 to November 24, 19.44 under s. 15 ( l) of the Limitation A.ct· ' in reckoning theperiod of 12 years prescribed by s. 48 of the Code.\n\nWe concur with the view expressed by the Full Bench.\n\nG It is well settled that s. 48 ofthe Cde was controlled by\n\n8, 15 (!) of the Limitation Act. S, 48 of the Code enacted a rule of limitation and prescribed a period of 12 years for an application fbr execution of decrees and orders.·· It has since been. repealed bys. 28 of the Limitation Act, 1963 which enact~ that \"in the Code of Civil\n\n(1) IL!l. (1944) Nag. 2SO\n\n(Z) lLR (1983) 9 cal. 773.\n\n\\ .\n\n~·.·\n\nProced.ure. 190.8, (Act V of 1908), s. 48 shall be omitted\".\n\nIn its phcj a new provision Art. 136 has been introduced and that prescribes \"for the execution of anydecree (other than a decree .granting a m1ndatory injunction)' or order of any Ci vii Court a period of 12 years, etc.\" Thus, the substanc' ofs.48 continues to be, the law and for that reason, and also for. the reason that with regard to pending applications,· the .law as laid down in the decisions foterpreting\n\ns. 48 might have to be referred to, it is necessary to give reasons.\n\nThere has been a sharp divergence of jµdicial authority on the ._question whether a partial stay was within s. 15 (l) cf the Limitation\n\nAct, The preponderance of judicial opinion appears to be in favour 'of the view that s. 15 ( l) contemplates an absolute stay. There .is aJong line of decisions starting from Kundo Mal & Ors. v. Firm\n\nDaul~! Ram Vidya PrakashC'l where Din Muhammad, J. laid down . that if execution is not compktely and abs.olutely s\\ayed, s. 1·5 {I)\n\nof the Limitation Act does not come into play, down to Virchand Kapw Chand v. Maruq/appa & Anrl2l where Sen, J. reaffirmed . thats. 15 (!) contemplates an absolute stay which reneders the\n\ndecree-holder incapable of taking ont any proceeding for execution of the decree, w)lich are all b1sed on the dictum of. M2cleod, C. J .. in Chanbasappa v. Holiba.wppal3J to the effect that s. 15 (I) . only applies to an absolute stay. The Patm High Court also took the same view in Kirtyanand Singh v. Prithi Chand La/(4).\n\nThe dicta of Maclood, C. J. in Chanbbsappo's case and of Din Muhammad, J. in Kundo Mal's case do not give any reasons for the view taken.\n\nSen, J .. in Virchand's case and however gave .reasons for taking the view that s. 15 (1) contemplates an.absolute stay which renders the decree-holder incapable of taking out any proceeding for execution of the decree. The learned Judge observed that a partial stay e.g. a stay of ex, cution in one particular mode is not stay of execution 'within tho meaning -of s. 15 (I) if it is open to the decree.-holder to execute his decree in any other manner. He referred to the contrary . view taken by the Bombay. High Court in Bai Ujam v. JJai Ruxmani('l by the Rangoon High Court in Nachiappa Reddy v. M3tmg fe(6)'and\n\n(I) AIR (1940) Lah. 75.\n\n(2) AIR ( 194 0 Born. 303.\n\n(3) !LR (1924) 48 Bom.4 85.\n\n(4) AIR (1929) Pat. 597 • . (5) AIR (1914 Born. 2J.l.\n\n(6) AIR 0918) UB 4.\n\nby the Culcutta High Court in Govindnath Chqudhur; v. Basiruddin\n\nMondo1(1) where it had.'been held that st-;, y of execution Qf a part of the decree or against a particular property will nevertheless save limitation for execution of the decree as a whole, and remarked that in view of the decision of the Privy Council in Kirtyanand Singh v. Pl'i/hi ChandLaf,(2) these decisions were no longer good law. We find it difficult to accept the reasoning.\n\nThe decision of the Privy Council in Kirtyanand Singh' s case -\\' does not lay do\\vn any. contrary proposition. There, the point appears to have arisen from an order passed by the Court in the c Raj Suit to the effect that \"the decre.e-holder were to wait for some time for payment\". That order .was subsequently set aside having been in operation for about . seven months.. 1 he decree-holders' .contention was that they were entitled to the benefit of s: 15 (!)with\n\nrespect to the afore.said peri9d of seven months.\n\nLord Tomlin, deliv, ering the judgment of the Judicial Committee, construed the 4 D foresa; d order as meaning not an order staying execution within , s. 15 0) of the Limitation Act, and observed:\n\nNow the first thing to be observed is that at lhe time when that order was made, there was in fact no application for execution pending tall. It was an order again made in the Raj Snit and not in the rent suits; it was a.n .order . made on application by the decr-ee-holders seeking leave to proceed against property in the hnds of the receiver in the Raj snit.\n\nIt was an order which did no: stay at al/, but simply said that so far as I.hat application in that suit. was con.cerned the appellants were to wait.\n\nThat seems to their Lordships not to to be in any sen!Je within th.e meaning of the section a stay of the execution by injuncti011 or order.\" - . (Emphasis supplied)\n\nIn Lala Baijnath Prosad & Ors. v. Nursinghdas Guji'ati(3) the Calcutta High Court appears to have adopted a middle , course.\n\nChakravarti, C. J. delivering the judgment of the Court observed:\n\n\"If the decreeholder is prevented altogether from --------·----\n\n(I) AIR (1921) Cal. 606.\n\n(2)· AIR (1933) PC 52.\n\n(3) A{R (1958) Cal. J,\n\n• ' 'f\n\n, .\n\nexecuting his decree, it is but reasonable that time should not run against him so long as he remaills disabled arid the section says so. But there seems to be no reason why the section should be construed as meaning that even when the ..\n\ninjunction or order is limited to one or some of sveral judgment-debtors or to one or some of their properties or to some particular mode. of execution and ve.n when the de, ree-holder is left free to proceed against the other judgement-debtors or other properties or in other way, he will be entitled to the benefit of the section.\n\nThe learned Chief Jutice observed tliat in such a case the execution of the !lecree is n()t stayed but only execution in c'ertain waysand against certain persons or properties 1s prevented, and then added : '\n\n\"B\\lt assuming 'stayed' include 'stayed iu part', the utmost that Can be claimed under the terms of the section is that if a decree-holder is restrained for a time from proceeding against some particular judgment-debtor or some particular property or in some particular way, aud'whcn the bar is . lifted, he applies for execution against the same judgment' debter or the same property or in the same way, he will be entitled to exclude the period during ivhich )le remained Le.\n\nstrained.'~\n\nWe feel that, there is no justification for placing a rigid con: struction on a beneficent provision like s. 15(1) of the Limitation Act. It is not necessary for us to go into the history of the legisJa, lion which has been dealt with at length in many of the decisions laying down that s. 48 of the Code is controlled by s, 15('l) of the Limitation Act., All that' we need say is that both the enactments . have throughout been treated as supplementary to each other, and concern w:ith procedural law. rt is also true that in costruing statutes of limitati'on considerations of hardship and anamoly are out of place. Nevertheless, it is, we think, permissible to adopt a beneficent construction of a rule of limitation if alternative constructions arc possible. It is plain on the terms of s. 15(1) t)at the word \"execution\" appearing in the collocation of words \"the executionof which has been stayed\" must be consfru, d in a liberal and brod sense. As observed by the Calcutta High Court in\n\nSreeath Roy's case, Sl!pra, the w9rds \"execution of the decree\"\n\nmean the enforcement of the decre by what js known as \"process\n\nof execution\".\n\nSUPREME COURT REPQKTS [1984) 3 s.c.a\n\nAgreeing with the Full Bench, we aie inclined to the view that \\he word \"execution\" ins. 15(1) embraces all the appropriate means by which a decree is enforced. It includes all process an, d proceeding in aid of, or supplemental to, execution. We find no rationai basis for adopting anarrow and restricted coµstniction on a beneficent provision like the one contained in s. 15(1).\n\nThere is no reason wby s 15 (!)should be given a restricted meaning as allowing the benfit to a decree-holder where there is a complete or 'absolute stay of execution and not a partial stay i e. a stay which make& the decree altogether inexecutable. Nor can we subscribe to the proposition that in cases of partial stay, the benefit nder s. 15(1) can be had only where &n execution application is directed against the same judgment-debtor or the ame property, as gainst whom an execution was previously. stayed. Stay of any process of execution is therefore. stay of execution within the meaning of the. section.\n\nWhere an injunction cir order has prevented the dec; n, eholder from executing the decree, then irrespective o~ the particular stage of execution, .or the particular property against which, or the particular judgment-debtor against whom, execution was stayed, the effect of such injunction or order is to prolong the life of the decree itself by lhe period during which the injunction or order. remained iu force. The majority view to the contrary taken by some of the High Courts overlooks the well settled principle that when the law prescribes more than one modes. of execution, it i~ for the decree-holder to choose which of them he will pursue ..\n\nFor these reasons, the appeal must fail and is dismissed with costs.\n\nN.V.K.\n\nAppeal dismis.•ed.\n\n' ''", "total_entities": 94, "entities": [{"text": "A\n\nANANDILAL & ANR", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2, "end_char": 20, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "ANANDILAL & ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RAM NARAIN & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 23, "end_char": 39, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RAM NARAIN & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A.P. SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 60, "end_char": 68, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "V. BALKRISHNA ERADI, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 73, "end_char": 96, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "V. 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Bobde", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5030, "end_char": 5042, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "16 of i962\n\nV.A .. Bobde and A.G.Ratnaparkhi for the appeilants."}}, {"text": "A.G.Ratnaparkhi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5047, "end_char": 5062, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "16 of i962\n\nV.A .. Bobde and A.G.Ratnaparkhi for the appeilants."}}, {"text": "Khanduja", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5089, "end_char": 5097, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.S: Khanduja for the."}}, {"text": "Art. 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5932, "end_char": 5940, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ghasiram", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6100, "end_char": 6108, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Ghasiram, the predecessor•in-title of the present respondent No, 1.", "canonical_name": "Ghasiram"}}, {"text": "Ram Narain", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6168, "end_char": 6178, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Narain obtained a decree for Rs.", "canonical_name": "RAM NARAIN & ORS"}}, {"text": "Bheraji", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6274, "end_char": 6281, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "5,548.18 p. from the Court of the District Jµdge, Ujjain against one Bheraji, the predecessor-in-title of 1espon• dents Nos."}}, {"text": "Chunnilal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6338, "end_char": 6347, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 and 3 Chunnilal and Anndilal, now the Judgment- debtors."}}, {"text": "Anndilal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6352, "end_char": 6360, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 and 3 Chunnilal and Anndilal, now the Judgment- debtors."}}, {"text": "Gwalior High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 6430, "end_char": 6448, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decree was affirmed in appeal by the Gwalior High Court : on April 5, 1938."}}, {"text": "Ratanlal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6692, "end_char": 6700, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ratanlal, father of the two appellants Anandifal ancl Jarikilal; executed a surety dated August 3, 1927.", "canonical_name": "Ratanlal"}}, {"text": "Anandifal ancl Jarikilal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6731, "end_char": 6755, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ratanlal, father of the two appellants Anandifal ancl Jarikilal; executed a surety dated August 3, 1927."}}, {"text": "August 3, 1927", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6781, "end_char": 6795, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ratanlal, father of the two appellants Anandifal ancl Jarikilal; executed a surety dated August 3, 1927."}}, {"text": "Ghasiram", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7065, "end_char": 7073, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Committee, the decreeholder Ghasiram put the decree in execution against the judgmentdebtors as also against the surpty on February 23, 1939 for attachment and sale of their immoveable properties.", "canonical_name": "Ghasiram"}}, {"text": "Ratanlal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7533, "end_char": 7541, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Against the order dismissing his objections, the surety Ratanlal filed an appeal before the Gwalior High Court which was dismissed on July 22, 1940.", "canonical_name": "Ratanlal"}}, {"text": "Judicial Committee of th~ Gwalior State", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7674, "end_char": 7713, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He then filed a Mi8cellaneous Appeal before the Judicial Committee of th~ Gwalior State."}}, {"text": "Augut 16, 1940", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7811, "end_char": 7825, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "B\n\nIt is common ground.that in thai appeal the Judicial Committee passed an interim order dated Augut 16, 1940 directing that until further order; the nroperties attached in execution shll conti!rne to rema; n under attachment but further proceedings for the sale thereof shall remain stayed."}}, {"text": "November 24, 1944", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8011, "end_char": 8028, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November 24, 1944 the Judicial Committee dismissed the said appeal and consequently the interim stay stood dissolved."}}, {"text": "December 14, 1946", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8421, "end_char": 8438, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".It was restored on December 14, 1946 but was again dismissed for default on January 21, 1954 as the counsel for the dscreeholder stated that he had no instruction. :"}}, {"text": "January 21, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8478, "end_char": 8494, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".It was restored on December 14, 1946 but was again dismissed for default on January 21, 1954 as the counsel for the dscreeholder stated that he had no instruction. :"}}, {"text": "February 18, 1954", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8649, "end_char": 8666, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thereafter, a fresh 'application for execution was filed by the decreehold<rr on February 18, 1954."}}, {"text": "s. 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8842, "end_char": 8847, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "August 16, 1940", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8980, "end_char": 8995, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 Ram Narain, the assignee'holder, was entitled.to exclusion.of the period from August 16, 1940 to November 241 1944 under."}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9024, "end_char": 9029, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9041, "end_char": 9055, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9115, "end_char": 9120, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "District Judge, Ujjain", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9138, "end_char": 9160, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The District Judge, Ujjain rejected the objection raised by the appellants holding that although the stay of execution was partial in as much as only sale of t]\\e attached pro.perties had been staye'd by the Judicial Committee, the decreeholder was entitled to the benefit of s. 15 (!)."}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9410, "end_char": 9415, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "February 9, 1962", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9544, "end_char": 9560, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "beforethe High Court which was allowed by the learned Single .Judge by his order dated February 9, 1962."}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9813, "end_char": 9818, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9830, "end_char": 9844, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Grille", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9949, "end_char": 9955, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He understood the decision of Grille, C.J. and J .. Sen, J. in Sitaram & .Ors."}}, {"text": "Sen", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9971, "end_char": 9974, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He understood the decision of Grille, C.J. and J .. Sen, J. in Sitaram & .Ors."}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10036, "end_char": 10041, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10332, "end_char": 10337, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10351, "end_char": 10365, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10844, "end_char": 10849, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 10864, "end_char": 10878, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sitaram", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11793, "end_char": 11800, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "served that the decision in Sitaram's case,' supra, does not fake a contrary view.. The Full Bench therefore held that the decreeholder was entitled to the exclusion of the•period from August 16,\n\n1940 to November 24, 19.44 under s. 15 ( l) of the Limitation A.ct· ' in reckoning theperiod of 12 years prescribed by s. 48 of the Code."}}, {"text": "August 16,\n\n1940", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11950, "end_char": 11966, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "served that the decision in Sitaram's case,' supra, does not fake a contrary view.. The Full Bench therefore held that the decreeholder was entitled to the exclusion of the•period from August 16,\n\n1940 to November 24, 19.44 under s. 15 ( l) of the Limitation A.ct· ' in reckoning theperiod of 12 years prescribed by s. 48 of the Code."}}, {"text": "November 24, 19.44", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11970, "end_char": 11988, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "served that the decision in Sitaram's case,' supra, does not fake a contrary view.. The Full Bench therefore held that the decreeholder was entitled to the exclusion of the•period from August 16,\n\n1940 to November 24, 19.44 under s. 15 ( l) of the Limitation A.ct· ' in reckoning theperiod of 12 years prescribed by s. 48 of the Code."}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11995, "end_char": 12000, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12081, "end_char": 12086, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12181, "end_char": 12186, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12233, "end_char": 12247, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Limitation Act, 1963", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12433, "end_char": 12453, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12597, "end_char": 12602, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Limitation Act, 1963", "statute": "the Limitation Act, 1963"}}, {"text": "Art. 136", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12651, "end_char": 12659, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Limitation Act, 1963", "statute": "the Limitation Act, 1963"}}, {"text": "s. 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13039, "end_char": 13044, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Limitation Act, 1963", "statute": "the Limitation Act, 1963"}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13217, "end_char": 13222, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Limitation Act, 1963", "statute": "the Limitation Act, 1963"}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13331, "end_char": 13336, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Limitation Act, 1963", "statute": "the Limitation Act, 1963"}}, {"text": "Din Muhammad", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13481, "end_char": 13493, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ram Vidya PrakashC'l where Din Muhammad, J. laid down ."}}, {"text": "s. 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13569, "end_char": 13573, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 13588, "end_char": 13602, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "M2cleod", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13891, "end_char": 13898, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M2cleod, C. J .. in Chanbasappa v. Holiba.wppal3J to the effect that s. 15 (I) ."}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13960, "end_char": 13965, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Patm High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 14010, "end_char": 14025, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Patm High Court also took the same view in Kirtyanand Singh v. Prithi Chand La/(4)."}}, {"text": "Maclood", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 14108, "end_char": 14115, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The dicta of Maclood, C. J. in Chanbbsappo's case and of Din Muhammad, J. in Kundo Mal's case do not give any reasons for the view taken."}}, {"text": "Chanbbsappo", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14126, "end_char": 14137, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The dicta of Maclood, C. J. in Chanbbsappo's case and of Din Muhammad, J. in Kundo Mal's case do not give any reasons for the view taken."}}, {"text": "Kundo Mal", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 14172, "end_char": 14181, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The dicta of Maclood, C. J. in Chanbbsappo's case and of Din Muhammad, J. in Kundo Mal's case do not give any reasons for the view taken.", "canonical_name": "Kundo Mal"}}, {"text": "Virchand", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14247, "end_char": 14255, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sen, J .. in Virchand's case and however gave .reasons for taking the view that s. 15 (1) contemplates an.absolute stay which renders the decree-holder incapable of taking out any proceeding for execution of the decree."}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14314, "end_char": 14319, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14599, "end_char": 14604, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay. High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 14736, "end_char": 14754, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "view taken by the Bombay."}}, {"text": "Culcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 15016, "end_char": 15035, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "by the Culcutta High Court in Govindnath Chqudhur; v. Basiruddin\n\nMondo1(1) where it had."}}, {"text": "Kirtyanand Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15498, "end_char": 15514, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decision of the Privy Council in Kirtyanand Singh' s case -\\' does not lay do\\vn any."}}, {"text": "Tomlin", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15986, "end_char": 15992, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Lord Tomlin, deliv, ering the judgment of the Judicial Committee, construed the 4 D foresa; d order as meaning not an order staying execution within , s. 15 0) of the Limitation Act, and observed:\n\nNow the first thing to be observed is that at lhe time when that order was made, there was in fact no application for execution pending tall."}}, {"text": "s. 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16132, "end_char": 16137, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16148, "end_char": 16162, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Calcutta High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 16922, "end_char": 16941, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. Nursinghdas Guji'ati(3) the Calcutta High Court appears to have adopted a middle , course."}}, {"text": "Chakravarti", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16986, "end_char": 16997, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chakravarti, C. J. delivering the judgment of the Court observed:\n\n\"If the decreeholder is prevented altogether from --------·----\n\n(I) AIR (1921) Cal."}}, {"text": "s. 15(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18587, "end_char": 18595, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18603, "end_char": 18617, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 48", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18768, "end_char": 18773, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Limitation Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18820, "end_char": 18834, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "s. 15(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19272, "end_char": 19280, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sreeath Roy", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 19476, "end_char": 19487, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "As observed by the Calcutta High Court in\n\nSreeath Roy's case, Sl!pra, the w9rds \"execution of the decree\"\n\nmean the enforcement of the decre by what js known as \"process\n\nof execution\"."}}, {"text": "s. 15(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20030, "end_char": 20038, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20064, "end_char": 20068, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 15(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20379, "end_char": 20387, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "N.V.K.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 21378, "end_char": 21384, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.V.K.\n\nAppeal dismis.•ed."}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_3_815_821_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "• s1?\n\nPUNJAB U, NIVERSITY CHANDIGARH A\n\nDEVJANI CHAKRABARTI & OTHERS\n\nMay 17, 1984 '\n\n.. B . '\n\n~ j [A.P SEN, A. VARADARAJAN AND V. BALAKRiSHNA ERADI, JJ.]\n\n Punjl:b University Act, Section 20 (5) and Section 31-Power of the Syndicate, to make rules, relating to the pattertr of education- No rule can -be S(lid to be retrospective merely because they subsequently applied to students C who. had earlier started their educadonal careers. ·\n\nWith the introduction of the system known as f'lO plus 2 plus 3\" in the educat_ional L1sti1utions in the couutry, the Asscciation of the Indi'an Universities decided the equivalence of this 10+2+3 system with the old\n\n11+3 yeafs degree course system still prevalent is some States and it suggested that in all States where the paitern of education is such as to require 14 years for the first degree i.e.-11 +3 years the new plus 2 stage of the Central Board of Seconda-ry Education be ireated as equivtilent to a pass in 1he first year or the three years degree course or fOr admission to\n\nthe first Y~'<ff of the t\\vo years degree Course.\n\nThe appellant Punjab University, drcidd on 10:2.1977 that the 12th standard• exa, mination conducted by the Bords/Univcrsities under the new 10+2+3 system be recognised as equiva-lent to the Pre-Medical/Pre-Engineering/B.A. Part I/\n\nB.sc:Part I/B. Com. Part I examination according to the combination of\n\nthe subjects.\n\nSubsequently~ on .4.(i.1978 the Punjab Uliiversity decid6d to ireat the 11th standard of the new to+2+3 system as equivalent to . the Pre~LTniversity cxaminatioi:; i. of the Universi_ty.\n\nThese recognitions of the equivaleoce of th£se twO txaminations continued till the beginning of the year 1980.\n\nBut on 18.4.1980 the Punjab University decided that the first year student of 1he plus 2 course in the 10+2+3 system of the Central Board's schools who does not take a pub-lie examination at the-' end cf the first year should not be considered as equivalent to the student who has passed lhe pre-University examination of-the PuQjab Unive.rsity for joinirg the Pre-Medical/Prc.Enginceriog/B.A. Par! I/B. Sc. Part I/B Corn.\n\nPart I of the University.\n\nOn 7.5.1980, the Punjab University decided that Ille 12th Standard Exainination in the new 10+2+3 system conducted \" b)'. any recognised Board/Council/Unlv, er.sity shall be treated as equivalent to the prelJniversity Examination df the University.\n\nlhe respondents in C~ 1977/80, namely 1 to 37 who had passed the I \"th Stardard Examination in tbe!O+ 2+3. system of the Central Board of Education and respondents 38 to. 9.! who had been promoted. from the 11th . Standad to the 12th Standard in that system cha!Jeoged the two decisions\n\n. F\n\nli16\n\nSUPREME COUl!T l!EPOl!TS\n\n(1984) 3 s.C.R.\n\nof the Pqnjab University dated 18.4;.1980, and 7.5.1980 by filing W.P.\n\n1917 of 1980 contending that in view of the earlier\" decisions Of the Universitynamely,.Annexures P. 2 and P. 3.dated 10.12.1977 and 4.6.1978 respec, tively they bad joined the classes in the plus 2 course with the object of joining .the coj\\ege, s affiliated to. the University in the next class of . equivalence as alsq Engineering and Medical Colleges. and that the lJniversity cannot, therefore, change those decisions by the subsequent decisions,\n\n(Annxures R. 2 and- R. 3) to their detrinient.\n\nThey invoked the doctrine of promissory cstoppCI in regard to th_at ground Or attack on ti:u::.c two decisions; The second groudd of<.1ttack by the petitioners in. _W.P. 1917 of 1980 was that the dcisions Annexures R-: 2& R-. 3 are _retrospective .in operation and they have taken away their vested right and. that the Univer~ sity bas no power, either under lhe Punjab University Act or under any, statute, regulation or rule to make any regulatio'o,) rule or ordinance adversely affecting their vested rights retrospectively,\n\nThe learned Judges of the D'ivision Bench rejected the con_teotipn of the petitioners before them thattb_e Syndicate bas no power which th6 Senate has under s.31 of the Act and held that the Syndicate has similar powe; rs under s.20 (5) of the Act.\n\nThey rejected the further contention .that there is any bar of promissory estoppel against the University in regdrd\n\nto the mattt..\"r and, however, held .that petitioiiers 1 to 37 had joined the t0+2'coursC in the Central School lying within the territOrial jurisdicti.oo of the Punjab Univorsity in 1978 and had passed the 12th Standard Examination and had _planned their education in a particular manner to join the co1leges ffili_3ted t.o the Punj<ib University in the second year of the 3 year degree course and other courses after passing the 12th staildard exa .. mination in the plus 2 system, Thfy. held that Annexure R.J wiil deprive petitioners f to 37 and Anncxtire R.2 will dep.rive petitioners 38 t'o 92 of right to seek admission in Engineering and -Medical Colleges after passing the 12th Standard in the 10+2 system.' and Anrtexures R.2 and and R.3 take away that r_igbt and are retrospective in nature.\n\nIn coming to this conciution the learned Judges of the DiVisioo Bt:nch relied vefy strongly upon the decision of the Full Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High. Court in Punjab University vs. Subflash Cander, 1976 P.L.R. 920.\n\nIn view of their decision in W.P. 1917 of 1980, another Bench allowed another W.P.' 2349 of 1980 fiied by the respondents Inc.A.. 2667/83. Hence the appeals by the. University. . ·\n\nAllowing the appeals, the Court,\n\nHELD : !. The decisions dated 10.12.1977. 4,6.1978, 18.4.1980 -and 7.5.1?80. respectively _are intra vireS the powers of the Syndicate' to make rules etcunder seation 20(5) of the Puajub University Act in tho same manner as the Senate can do undet's. 31 of that Act.\n\n[819F)\n\nIn view of the decision ofthe Supreme Court dated 17.S 1984 rendered in Subha.ih Chander v. Punjab University (Civil Appeal No. 2828/ 1979 arising out. of 1976 I!.L.R. 920) and reversing the said decision of the Punjab High Court relying. on which the two Judgments . now uµder\n\nl ·\n\nPUNJAB v. D. Cl!A!<RABARTI (Varadarajqn, J.)\n\nappeal, were pls<>ed,. in. the pre1e:1t ca<; e al'>O th3 two inpugl'l'd d~::id ons . ure prlma facie Po:; pctiv~ in op.::raUo'.l and th:y did not b.::,;:on1c rctro<; v pcctive merely b;:c:1.uc; e they sub5equntly applied. to stud.::nts who hld already started their edu:.itioual car.!ers: . HJwver, thi:r decision will not effect the right which nlight have bJen grailted to th~ peti'ipners in the writ petitions on the basis of the Judgments of the High Court which have been reversed io tllese appe1h [810F; 82lEF]\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISD!Cf!ON: Civil Ap 1eal No. 13.81 of 1980\n\nAppeal by Specil leave, from the Judgment and Order dated the 7th July, 1980 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Civil Writ Petition No. 1917 of 1980.\n\nA.nd\n\nCivil Appeal No. 2667 of!983.\n\nAppeal.by Special leave from the Judgment and: Order dated t]\\c 8th July, 1980.ofth,; Punjab and. Haryana High Court in Civil Writ No. 2349 of 1980.\n\n. Jawahar Lal Gupta, Janendralal abd B.R. Agarwal for the Appellant; .\n\nRandhir Jain for the Respondents.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court , was delivered by\n\n• A\n\nVAR<ADARAJAN; l These appeals by special leave are 1'y the Punjab University and directed against two Division Bench judg- E men ts of tho Punjab and Haryana High Court in writ Petitions 1917 of 1980 and 2349 of 1980, allowing those W1it Petiiions without an~ order as to costs. W.P. 23~9 of 1980 was allow; d at the motion stage on 18 7.1980 as being covered by the decision in W.P. 19 l 7 of\n\n1980 which was disposed of on.7.7.IY80. Kulwant Singh Tiwan.a, J. is a. pa, ty to both ti1e judgments and he sat with Harbans Lal,. J, for F hearing W.P. 1917 of J980 .. and with'M.M. Punchi,'J. for hearing W.P. 2349 of 1980. In these circumstances, it is necessary to state only the facts relating to W, P. 1917 of1980 alone briefly.\n\n The system known as \"IO plus 2 plus 3 system\" was introduced in the educational institutions in the cobl.lltry some years ago. The Association Of Indian universities c!ecided the equivalence of thiS ·\n\nI 0+2+3 system with the .. old I l + 3 ye'ars degree course systein which was prevalent in some States and it suggested that in all States where the pattern of education is such as to require I 4 years for the first degree, i.e. 11 +3 years, the new plu; 2 stage of the Central Board of Secondary Education be treated as equivalent to a pass in the first year of the three-years dagree'course or for admission to the. first year 9f the twoyears degree cou'rse. This suggestion was ·\n\nSUPREME COURT REPoi!.ts (1984] 3s.c.R.\n\nconveyed by the Associatio.n of the Indian Universitre.s to the Chairman of the Central Board of Secondary. Education by a letter dated 18.4.1978. The appellant, Punjab University, decided on 10.2.1977 that the 12th .standard examination conducted by the Boards/Universities under thJ new rn+2+3 system be recognised as equivalentto the Pre-Medical/Pre-Engineering/]J.A. Part .!/B.Sc.\n\nPart rm. Com Part I examination according to the combination of the subjects. Subsequently, on 4.6..1978 the Punjab University decided io treat the !Ith standard of the ew !0+2-f!3 system as . quivalent to Jhe pre-University examin.ation of the University.\n\nCopies. of thoe dccis'ons dated 10.12.197'1 and 4.6.1978 , were\n\nAnnexures P. 2 and P. 3 .respectively in W.P. 1917 of 1980. These recognitions of the equ'lvalence of those tw'oexami, nations continued till the beginning of the year 1980. But on 18.4.1980 the Punjab University derided that the first y, ear student of the plus2 course in the 10+2+3 system of the Cent.ml Board's schools who does not take a public examination at the end of the f:trst year should not be considered as equivalent to the student who has p'1ss.ed the . pre- University examination of the Punjab University for joilling the Pre- Medical/Pre-Engineering/B.A Part I/B. Sc. Part I/B. <:'om. Part I oqhe Uniwrsity. On 7.5. 1980, the Punjab University decided that the IZth Standard Examination in the 'new 10+2+3 ystem conducted by any .recognized Board/Council. University shll M treated as equ:valenl to the pre University Examination of the University' These decisions dated 18.4.1980 and 7.5.1980 are Anaexures R2 and R.1 respectively in W.P, 1917 of !980.\n\nPetitioners 1 to 37 in W.P. 1917 of 1980 had passed the 12th standard examination in the 10+2+3 system of the Central Board . of Education and petitioers 38 to 92 in the Writ Petition ad been promoted frotrJ.the 1 lth standard to the 12th standard in that system.\n\nThese 92 pctititll1ers f:t!ed W.f>. 1917 of 1980 challenging the Punjab University's decisions (Annexuies R-2 and R-3) dated 18.4.1980 and 7.5.1980 contending that in view of the earlier decisions of the University, namdy, Annexures P. 2 and P. 3 dated 10.12.1977 and 4.6.1978 respectively they had joined the classes in the plus 2 course with object ., f joining the colleges affiliated to the University .in tlie next class of equivalence as also Engineering and Medical Colleses and that the University cannot, therefore, change those decisiOns by the subsequent decisions, Anncxurcs R-2 and R-3 to their deteriment. They invoked the doctrine of promissory estoppel in regard to that g.round of attack on those two decisions. The sccoi1d ground of attk by the petitioners\n\n' ;\n\n• ' 'f\n\nPlJNJl\\il v. D. CHAKRABARTI (Varadarajmi. J.) 819\n\nin. W.P. 1917 of 1980 was that the decisions Annexures R-2 aiid R-3 are retrospective in operation and they have taken away their vested right and that the University has no power, either under the\n\nPunjab University Act or under any statute, reulation or rule to make any regulation, rule . or ordinance adversely affecting their vested. rights retrospectively.\n\n' The: defence of the appellent-University was that' the deciswns, Annexures R-2 and R 3 were taken in the place' of the earlier deci- . sions, Annexures P.2 and P.3 in th\" interest of eduction oi{ the ground that the I Ith standard examonation in the new 10+2+3 system was not a pubPc 'examination and the standard of education in the schools where that system was in vague was low and even themarking system in the examination Was lenient. The University further contended that even the syllabi in the equivalent examination in the schools and colleges were. not the same. The University stated that the Committee of Experts which was consti'tuted by the Vice-Chancellor of the University when the students in the engineering colleges started an agitation, went into the question and submitted a report suggecting the change in rgard to equivalenc~ in view of the difference in the syllabi and the deficiency in the teaching imparted in some subjects in the schools. The University, theteforc contended .that .the new decisions Annexures R.2 and R.3 were taken bonafide:i.nd are only prospective in'operetion anc( that the doctrine of promissory estoppel pleade-a by te petitioners in the Writ Pcti\n\ntions does not appty to the University. •\n\nThe decisiops Annexures P.2, P.3, R.2 and R.3 arc of the Syndi<; ate wl1ich has power to make rules etc. under s'. 20 (5) of the Punjab Uniersity Act in the same manner as the Senate has similar power under s. 31 of that Act. The ]earned Judges of the . Divisio,-i Bench rjected the con{ention of th: petjtioners before ·.\n\nthem that the Syndicate has no power which the Senate has under\n\ns. 31 of the Act and held that the Syndicate has similar powers under s . .20 (5) of the Act They rejected .the further contention that there is any bar of promissory estoppel against the University in regard to, the matter and, however, held. that petitioners 1 to 37 had j0ined the 10+2 co, urse in the Central Schools lying within the territorial jurisdiction of the Punjab University in 1978 aud passed • the 12th Standard Examination and had planned their education in a particular manner to join tlre colleges affiliated. to the Punjab University in the second year of the 3-year degree course and other courses after passing the 12th standard exmiintion in the plus 2\n\n8 20\n\n. -E\n\nSl; PREME COURT REPORTS [1984j 3 S.C.R.\n\nsystem. They foJnd that similar is the cas~ of petitinors 38 to 92 in W.P. 1917 of 1980 who had l:ioen promoted from the 11th to the 12th standard i11 the plus 2 syscem. fhey held that Annexure R .. 3 will Jeprive petitioners 1 to 37 and Annexurn R.2 will deprive petiti, nicrs 38 to 92 of the right to seek admission in Engineering .and Medical Colleges after passing the 12th Standard in the 10+2\n\nsystem, and Anncxnres R.2 and R.3' tah away that right and are retrospcetivc in natu1\"<1.\n\nIn coming to this conclusion. the learned Judges of the Division Bench relied very strongiy upon. the decision of a Full Bench of the Punjab and HITTyana High Court in Punjab\n\nUnirersity vs. S 1bhash Chander.(l) Tlie learned Judges accordingly allowed W.P. 1917 of 1980 on the sole. ground, namely,· that Annexures R.2 qnd R.3 arc bad as being retrospective in operation, without any order as to costs and held that Annexnres R.3 and R.2 will not stand in the way of potitio)1ers I to 37 and 38 to 92 respectively bofore them from seoking admission t() higher classes or in Engineering and Medical colleges on. tho basis of the old decisions, Annexnres P.2 and P3. The other Division Bench 'which heard W.P. 2349 of 19SO allowed that peiition Without any order as to\n\ncots as being covered by the decision in WP. 1917 of \\.98 I.\n\nWe are of the opinion that these appeals have to be allowed.\n\nThe learned Judges of the High Court allowed the Writ Petitions\n\nonly on the ground that the new dec:sions Annexures R.t and R.3 a<e. rtrospoctive in operation and that they cannot affect the writ petitioner> before them from seeking admission to higher classes cir in Engineer; Jl.g or Medical Colleges on tho basis of the earlier decis; ons Annexures P.2 and P .3, relying m 1inly upon the decis_ion of the Full Bench in Punjab University v. Subhash Ch1ner (supra).\n\nWe have, in our separc1te judg•mnt , clvered tod•1y in C.A. 2828 'of 1977, which arose out of that Full Bench decision, reversed that decision and hdd that there is nothing retrospective in the order challenged in that case.\n\nIn. that case one Subhash Chander was acijnitted to the integrated M.B.B.S. course in the Daya Nand Medical College, Ludhiana in tl)e y, ear 1965.\n\nAt the time of his. admission, under Regulation 25 read with r.7.l, a student who fails in one subject/paper was entitled to grace marks at I per cent of the total aggregate marks of all the subjects for which he appeared.\n\nBut in 1970. the rule was amended to the effect that the grace marks will be 1 per cent of the total aggregate marks for any particular subject of the examination in which he has failed. Subhash Chander appeared for the. final M.B.B.S, examination in 1974 and sec11red\n\n(I) 1976° P.L.R, 920.\n\n(- t\n\nI .\n\n. '\n\nPUNJAB v. D. CHA,[(RAJlARTI (Varadarajan, J.) 821\n\n106 out of 200 marks in the , practical examination and 95 out 200 marks in the teory. examination in Midwifery, which was one of the four subjects for which he appeared at that time. He had passed the examinations in the other three subjects for which the total aggregate was 1200 marks. Under the old rule he would have been entitled to 16 grace marks at 1 per cent of the total aggregate of all the four subjects, namely, 1600 marks. But he was allowed only 4 grace marks under the new rule being I p!r cent of the aggregate .for the subject in which he had failed, namely, Midwifery. The High CoUrt accepted his conten.tion that amendment of the rule made in 1970 was retrospective in operation .though it was made applicable Jo Subhash.Chander only' in 1974 merely becal!se\n\nhe had joined the integrated course in 1965 wlien the rule regarding the award of grace marks was more liberal. In allow\\ng the appeal against the judgment of the Full Bench we have field that (there was no question of the rule having any retrospective operative as it was framed in 1970 and it did not say that it was operative from any earlier date and it was applied to Subhash Chander only in 1974. : It coul.d not be stated to be retrospeptive in operation nierely because\n\n it was applied to Subhash Chander who had joined the course in . 1965 before the amendment was made in 1970.\n\nIn the present case also the new decisions are prima facie prospective in operation and they did not become retrospective\n\nerely because they; ubsequently, applied to students yvho. had already started their . educational careers. We, therefore, allow these appeals but without any order as'to costs and set aside the judgments of the High Court and dismiss the Writ Petitions . .How ever, this decision will not effect the right which might have been granted to the petitioners in th~ writ petitions on the basis of the judgments of the High Court which have been reversed in these appeals.\n\nS.R.\n\nAppeals allowed.\n\nB •\n\n' E", "total_entities": 34, "entities": [{"text": "s1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2, "end_char": 4, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "PUNJAB U, NIVERSITY CHANDIGARH", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7, "end_char": 37, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PUNJAB UNIVERSITY CHANDIGARH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A\n\nDEVJANI CHAKRABARTI & OTHERS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 38, "end_char": 69, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "DEVJANI CHAKRABARTI & OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A.P SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 102, "end_char": 109, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. 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BALAKRISHNA ERADI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 183, "end_char": 193, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 202, "end_char": 212, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "18.4.1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1711, "end_char": 1720, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But on 18.4.1980 the Punjab University decided that the first year student of 1he plus 2 course in the 10+2+3 system of the Central Board's schools who does not take a pub-lie examination at the-' end cf the first year should not be considered as equivalent to the student who has passed lhe pre-University examination of-the PuQjab Unive.rsity for joinirg the Pre-Medical/Prc."}}, {"text": "Punjab University", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1725, "end_char": 1742, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But on 18.4.1980 the Punjab University decided that the first year student of 1he plus 2 course in the 10+2+3 system of the Central Board's schools who does not take a pub-lie examination at the-' end cf the first year should not be considered as equivalent to the student who has passed lhe pre-University examination of-the PuQjab Unive.rsity for joinirg the Pre-Medical/Prc."}}, {"text": "7.5.1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2158, "end_char": 2166, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 7.5.1980, the Punjab University decided that Ille 12th Standard Exainination in the new 10+2+3 system conducted \" b)'."}}, {"text": "Punjab University Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 3683, "end_char": 3704, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s.31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4006, "end_char": 4010, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Punjab University Act", "statute": "Punjab University Act"}}, {"text": "s.20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4077, "end_char": 4081, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Punjab University Act", "statute": "Punjab University Act"}}, {"text": "s. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5708, "end_char": 5713, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5766, "end_char": 5779, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[819F)\n\nIn view of the decision ofthe Supreme Court dated 17.S 1984 rendered in Subha.ih Chander v. Punjab University (Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "S 1984", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5789, "end_char": 5795, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Punjab High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5948, "end_char": 5965, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of 1976 I!.L.R. 920) and reversing the said decision of the Punjab High Court relying."}}, {"text": "Jawahar Lal Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6992, "end_char": 7009, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jawahar Lal Gupta, Janendralal abd B.R. Agarwal for the Appellant; ."}}, {"text": "Janendralal abd B.R. Agarwal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7011, "end_char": 7039, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jawahar Lal Gupta, Janendralal abd B.R. Agarwal for the Appellant; ."}}, {"text": "Randhir Jain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7062, "end_char": 7074, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Randhir Jain for the Respondents."}}, {"text": "Kulwant Singh Tiwan.a", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7583, "end_char": 7604, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kulwant Singh Tiwan.a, J. is a. pa, ty to both ti1e judgments and he sat with Harbans Lal,."}}, {"text": "Harbans Lal", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7661, "end_char": 7672, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Kulwant Singh Tiwan.a, J. is a. pa, ty to both ti1e judgments and he sat with Harbans Lal,."}}, {"text": "with'M.M. Punchi,'J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7717, "end_char": 7737, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J, for F hearing W.P. 1917 of J980 .. and with'M.M. Punchi,'J. for hearing W.P. 2349 of 1980."}}, {"text": "10.2.1977", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8798, "end_char": 8807, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The appellant, Punjab University, decided on 10.2.1977 that the 12th .standard examination conducted by the Boards/Universities under thJ new rn+2+3 system be recognised as equivalentto the Pre-Medical/Pre-Engineering/]J.A. Part .!/B.Sc."}}, {"text": "7.5. 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9944, "end_char": 9953, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 7.5."}}, {"text": "s. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13209, "end_char": 13214, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 13391, "end_char": 13396, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Unirersity", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 14787, "end_char": 14797, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the decision of a Full Bench of the Punjab and HITTyana High Court in Punjab\n\nUnirersity vs. S 1bhash Chander.(l) Tlie learned Judges accordingly allowed W.P. 1917 of 1980 on the sole."}}, {"text": "S 1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14802, "end_char": 14805, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Subhash Chander", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 16216, "end_char": 16231, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that case one Subhash Chander was acijnitted to the integrated M.B.B.S. course in the Daya Nand Medical College, Ludhiana in tl)e y, ear 1965."}}, {"text": "Daya Nand Medical College, Ludhiana", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 16288, "end_char": 16323, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that case one Subhash Chander was acijnitted to the integrated M.B.B.S. course in the Daya Nand Medical College, Ludhiana in tl)e y, ear 1965."}}, {"text": "sec11", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16830, "end_char": 16835, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Midwifery", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 17032, "end_char": 17041, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "examination in Midwifery, which was one of the four subjects for which he appeared at that time."}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_3_822_832_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "PUNJAB UNIVERSITY\n\nSUBASH CHANDER AND.ANR.\n\nMay -17, }984 • [A.P. SEN, A. VARADA\\lAJAN AND V. BALAKRIS!lNA BRAD!, JJ.)\n\nPunfab University Calendar, 1965Rule 7.1 re'tating to M.8.B.S. course read - with Regu!dti(Jn 25 of Punjab University Regulations framed under P, iinjah. University Act'-Rule 7.1 a'\"'!nded by Univmlty in May 1970 by way of addition of excep\"tif; n to-Rule 2.J .of Punjab Univefsity.CalenUar, 1970 co_iresponding_ to ]J.ule 7.1of1965-Incorporated in Punjab University Calendar 1974-Whether amendtd rule had retrospective o'peration-Whether candidate joining ~M.\"B.B.S. course in 1965 and appearing for final exarnination in 1974 governed by old rule in force in 1965-or new rule in force in 1974-Whether student has ested right to claim benefit ofdny regulationot ru1e which was in 'force when he was admitted to th'e ' . c-ourse.\n\nWords and Phrases-'etros.pctive\"-Meaning of.\n\nThe first respondent joined M.B.B.S. course of the appellant Punjab University in 1965. At that ti1ne Regulation 25. of the Punjab University framed under s.31 of the Punjab Universit\\)\"-Act required a minimum of 50 pe~ cent of lnarks to pass in each subject and Rule 7.1 relating, inter alia, to M.B.B.S. \"course IJfOvided that a candid<ite who fails in one or more papetsfsubjects /or aggregate may be given grace m1rks up.to 1 pr cent of the .total aggregate marks excluding-for _practical and internal assessment to h\n\n0 is best advantage in order to have im declared tohave passed. the examination. In 1970, Rule 7.1 Was amended by the addition of an exception to Rule 2.1-which provided that in the case of M.J; i.B, S. examitlation however the grac; e marks shall be given upto 1 per cent of the total ms.rks of each subject and not upto t per cent of the aggregate marks of all the subjects. The first. respondent who appeared for the final M.B.B.S. examination in 1974 Was declared to have failed in one SUbjeCt b,:CaUS~ he COU]d fl Qt s'ecure. 50 petA cent in that Sl, lbject even after being award'ed the grace ars according to the new rule. This was cha1lenged before. the Hii:; h Court by the first respondent ort the grouud that the old R.egulaion 25\n\nr, ed with the old Rule 7.1 which was in force when he joined the course in 1965 should be made applicable to him and he should be declared to.have Passed in that subj_ect. The Punjab University~ wntended that there was no element of retrospectivity in the application of the . amended rule and that students were bound to seure 1narks as per the regulation in force at the time of Commencement of the exaa1ination concerned and they had no !vested right to claim. the benefit of any regulation or rule.Which was in force when they , were admitted to the course. Confirming the judgment of a single Judge, a Fun Bench _of the High Court in a Letters Patent ilppealopined that there was nothing ill s.31 of the Punjab University Act bich would' clothe the Senat~, explicitly or iffipliedly\n\nA •\n\n,. .\n\nPUNJAB UNIVERSITY v. S. Clli\\NDER 823\n\nWith the power to frame-regulations retrospectively and held that the regulation, as amended in 1970, ha4. fetrospectively altered tJ?.e condition_ of the firsf respondent taking the examination to his detriment and could not be applied to him and that he was governed only by Regulation 25 read with Rule. 1.1 as it wa\"' in force whl!n he joined the course in 1965. The 1-ligh CoU!t observed that M.B.B.S. was a siOgle integrated composite coure and the change in the regulations was a change in the C!?urse of that single Integrated course and was retrospective in natqre. Hence this iippeal.\n\nAllowing the appeal,.\n\nHELD : The Senate of the Punjab University had the necessary power under s.3J of the Act to fix, trom time to tin1e, the percentage of marks required for passing the examination and to grant or to refuse to grant grace marks o~ G to enhance .or reduce the quantum of grace marks. [8308]\n\nThe\"re is rio element of retrospectivity in the change brought about by the addition of the excepti.on to Rtile 2.1 of the Ca la lid er for the year 1970. ''Retrospective\" according to the Shorter Oxford English !Dictinoary, Third Edition. in relatiorito StatUtes etC. means ''Operath,·:;: \\Vith regafd to past tirne 0 • The\" change brought about by the addition of the exception to Rule 2.1 does not say tha'.t ; t sbaJl be oP'erative with effect from any earlier date. It is ob:viousljr.prospective.\n\nJt is Dot Possible to hold that it is retrospective in operation merely because though introduced in 1970 it was applied to the first rcspondent; who apperred for the final eAamina:tion in 1974, after he had joined t.he courS\"\"e earJ.ier in 1965. 'No prOmise was made or could be deemed to have been made to him at the time\n\nof his admission in 1965 that there will be no ~Iteration of the rule or regulation in regrd to the percentage of marks required for passing any exatnination or award of grace marks and that the rules relating thereto which' were in force at the: time of his adII1iSsion Would continue to be applied to bim _until he finished his whole course. [8JOE-G]\n\nShorter Oxford English ictionary, Third Edition, referred to~\n\nThere is no question of the Cban.ge in the rule made in the year 1970 hav , ing retrospective operation merely because it was applied in 1974 to the firt\n\nrespondent who had joined the M.B.B.S. course in 1965 when the rtile regard ing award of grace marks was different. [832C]\n\nThe University was right in holding_ .that the first respondent was not -entitled to grace inarksunder the old rule but was entitled to grace marks under tho new rule and had therefore not passed the examination. (8320]\n\nSewa Ram v. Kurukshetra University.I LPA 97 of 1961 decided on 17.7.1968 by Punjab and Haryana High' Court, upheld.\n\nB.N. Mishra v. State, [1965) 1 SCR 297, referred t9,\n\nG ·.\n\n...\n\n('. r : A\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JuR1smc110N: Civil Appeal No. 2828\n\nof 1977.\n\nAppeal by Special leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 7th Septep'l.ber, 1976 of the Punjab &Haryana High Court in Letters Patent Appeal Nq. 352 of 1975. ·\n\nJmvahar Lal Gupta, . Janendralal and B.R. Agarwala for the -\\ , Appellant.\n\nRandhir Jain for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court Was delivered by\n\nVARADARAJAN, J. This appeal by special leave is bY. Punjab University against the Judgment of a Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in tqe Letters \"Patent Appeal. 352 of 1975 confirming the judgment of a learned Single Judge in W.P. 1017 of 1975;\n\nSubash Chander, respondent 1 in this appeal,, joined the Daya Nand Medical College, Ludhiana, for the M.B.B.S. course in 1965 when Regulation 25 of t~ Punjab University was in . force.\n\nThat regulation required a minimum of 50 per cent of. marks to pass in each subject. However Rule 7.1 relating to the M.B.B.S, and certain 0ther courses provided that-\n\n\"a candidate who fails in one .or mor~ papers/subjects and/or aggregate may be given grace marks up to 1 per cent of th.e total aggregate marks (including marks for practical and illtemaf assessment) to his best advantage in or de: tn be declared to have passed the examination.\"\n\nBut in May 1970 an amendment was made by the University in the form of an exception to Rule 2.1 which corresponds to Rule 7.1 which was in force in 1965 iri the following terms~ .\n\n\"2.\\-, A candidate who appears in all subjects of the examination and who fails in one or . more subjects (written, practical, session al or viva voce and/or aggregate (if there is a separate requirement.of passing in the.aggregate) shall. be. given grace marks upto 1% of the total aggregate lll.arks ( excluiling marks for internal !ISSessment) to !Dake.\n\nPUNJAB UNIVERSITY I'. s. CHANDER (Varadrajan, J.) 825 .. up forthe deficiency if by such addition the candidate can A pass the examination. While awardilltl grace marks fraction working to l /2 or more will be rounded to a whole.\" ' .\n\nException-}n the case of M.B.B.S. and B.D.S. examinations, however, t]je grace marks shall be givn up to one per cent of the total of each subject and not upto one percent of aggregate of all thesubjects. In \"other words, each subject will be, for this purpose, a separate unit, an.ct a candidate who fails in a subject \\\\jl not more than one per cent of the aggregate marks Of that subject may be given the requited number of marks in order to. pass in that subject.\"\n\nSu bash Chander, ref pondent I, appeared for the final M.B.B.S. examination in 1974 and secured the following marks • and remarks :-\n\nMedicine-202 out of 400 p.\n\nSurgery--'-225 out of 400 p.\n\nEye and ENT-204 out.400 p. ·\n\nMidiwifery : (i) Theory -95 out of 200)\n\n(ii) Practical-106 out of 200) Reappear\n\nAccording to Regulation 25 read with Rule 7.1 which was in force when Subash Chander joined the course in 196~ he would be eligible for grace marks .at I per cent of th.e aggregate marks of 1600 for all the above four subjects, which will be 16, and he would have passed in Midwifery also.\n\nBut he was given only I per cent of the total marks of 400 for Midwifery _as per the amended Regulation 25 read with Rule 2.1. of the Punjab. University Calendar, 1974, namely fo\\lr as grace marks and held to have failed in Midwifery as the total of 95 marks which he actually scured and the 4\n\ngrac~ marks in the theory in that suhjed't fell short of 50 per cent by 1 mark. His contention is that the old Regulation 25 read with the old Rule 7.J which was in force when he joined the course in 1965 should be made applicable to him and he should be declared to hve passed the final ex, amination in ft)!! including Midwifery . . .\n\n. Before the High Court, it was contended for the Punjab University that there is no clement of etrospetivity in the appli~ cation of the amended regulation and rule to students appearing for the examinations subsequent to the amendment. and that students are bound to secure marks as per the regulation in force at the time. of commencement of the examination concerned and they have no vested right to Claim the benefit of any regulation or rule which was in force when they were admitted to the course.\n\n'Chief Justice .S.S. -Sandhawalia who spoke for the Full Bench in the Letters Patent Appeal out 'of which this appeal before us has arisen noticed certain decisions of the Punjab and Haryana High Court and obsenred that they did not lay down clear guidelines for deciding the question at issue, namely whether the University is entitled to changij_ the regulation relating to tile percentage of gaace mrks to be awarded to students and the basis for awarding the same i..e. whether it is on the aggregate or' the marks of an the subjects for which the students. appeared in the concerned • examination or the aggregate of the marks of tlie subject in which they had failed in that examination. The learned Chief Justice noticed this Court's observation in Hukum Chand v. Union of lndial1) which is this ;-\n\n\"The qnderlying principle is .that unlike sovereign legislature which has power to enact laws with retrospec- . tive operation authority vested with the power of makin_g\n\nsubordinate legislation has to act within the limit oi:: its power and.cannot transgress the same.\"\n\n- And he proceeded to consider whether s. 31 of the Punjab University Act under which the regulations in question have been framed empowers the Senate to frame regulation with retrospective effect. Sectio'n 31 reads thus :-\n\n\"S. 31(1) The Senate,· with the Sanction of the G , Government, may from 'time to time make •regulations\n\nconsistent with this Act to provide for all matters relating to the University.\n\n. . (2) In particular and without prejudice to the, generality of the foregoing power, such regulations may provide for.\n\n(I) AIR 1972 SC :!427\n\n,_ r .. ;; w\n\n• ,,,,\n\n,._y \" ,, .\n\nPUNJAB lJ,'l!VERi!TY v. s: ClH~DlR(Vara.larajan, J.). 821\n\n(a) to (m) x x x x x\n\n(n)° the courses of \"study to be followed and the conditions to be comp.lied with by candidates. for any University exmination, and for degrees~ diplomas, licences, titles, niarks of honour .. scholarships and prizes conferred or granted by the University.''\n\nThe words ·\"other than an examination for matriculation\" . which previously occurred in sub-clause (n) have. been omitted by the Government of India notification dated 6.12.1969.\n\nThe learned <; hief Justice opined that there is not)iing in s.31 . c of the Punjab University Ac1 which would clothe the Senate, explicitily or impliedly, with the power to frme regulations retrospectively and held that the regulation, as amnded in 1970, has retrospectively altered the condition of Subash Chander, respondent 1, taking the exall}ination to his detriment and could not apply to him and that fa, is governed only by Regulation 25 read with Rule D 7.1 as it was in force when he joined the course ii). 1965 .. The learned Chief Justice thus differed from the view taken by a Division •Bench of the Punjab and Haryana .High Court (D.K. Mahajan and,· P.C. Jain, JJ.) in Sewa Rain v. Kurukshetra University(') in which it has been held thus:....:.\n\n\"The University is an autonomous body and has every . right in the matter of altering the . requisite rules concerning the conduct of examinations and the qualifying marks necessary. for a degree provided the xegulation are made well in advance [to the examination which a candidate is •. . . . reqmred to take.\" ' . ·· .\n\nThe learned .Chief Justice, rejected the submission made \\ln behalf of the Punjab University thaf the change in .in th~ regulation made in 1970 by the addition or an exception to Rule 2.1 related to examinations to be held only in future and there is no question of . th, e rule having retrospective operation apd.held that when Subash\n\nChander respondent I, joined the course in 19.65 he Obviously did so with the intention of obtaining the degree in Medicine and Surgery ijnd that it \\(a single integrated' composite course. The learned Chief Justice obseryed that the change in the regulation .. by\n\n(I) LPA 97of1967 decided on 17.7.}!i68.\n\n. ,\n\nway of addition of the exception to Rule 2.1 is a change in th~ •tourse of that single integrated course and is.retospective in nature. The other two learned Jridges agreed with' thisvjew of the learned Chief Justice and the . Full Bench accordingly dismissed tlie appeal and directed the Punjab University to declare the result of Su bash . Chander, rcspond.ent l, afresh \\lfter atforaing hini the benefit of .J 6 grace marks in accordance with the old Regulatioll' 25 read with Rule .J. l w4ich was . in force at the time of his adipission to the course in 1965 and no(only4 marks as per the amended regulation.\n\n. We are of the opinion that thi{appeal bas to succeed. Section 31(1) of the Punjab University Act. extracted above 'enables the. Senate of the Punjab University, with the sanctions .of the Govern- : men!, to make from time to time, regulations, consistent. with the. ; provisions of that Act to provide for all matters relating to the\n\nUniversity. Sectfon 31(2)(n) provides that i!l'particular a!Jd with- . out prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power rnch regulati<in may provide for the courses •or study to be followed an<) the conditions to be compned with by candidates for any University examination and for degrees, diplomas, licences, tit!~, marks 1n honour, scholftrships net prizes conferred or granted by the, Universiry. Obtaining the requisite percentage of marks in the subject of the' examination falls under .the cliuse .\"onditions .to be complied by candidates for any University examination\" occuring in sub-clause (n) of s.31 of the. Act. Thyrefore, tlte S.enate had the power to award some percentage of marks as grace marks to candi• dates appearing in University exaiµinations in c0nsiderillg whether they are eiigible to pass the examination in the subject or'subjects . in which they had appeared. There is no dispute that the 'minimum . number of marks required for'passing the examination in a paper/ subject is 50 per cent of mar~. When Su bash Chander, respondent 1, was admitted to the .J\\1.B.B.S. cpurse.in' 1965, Rule 7.1 as ii stood . then and extract; d above provided that the candidate who fails in\n\none or more papers/subjects/oraggregate may'be given grace marks upto I per cent of the fotal aggregate marks .. excluding for practical and internal assessment to his best advantage in order to have him declared to have passed the eJ1amination, Suhash Chander, respon dent 1, who appe.ared for the final M.B.B.S, .. examination only.nine years latter in 1974 had to pass in four subjects, namely, Medicine,· . Surgery Eye and ENT and Midwifery for each of which th.e aggre- . gate was 400 marks. He secured. 202, 225 and 204 marks in\n\nMedicine, Surgery, arid Eye and ENT respectively and was 'declare<f\n\n>-~ .\n\n, .\n\nI, . .1\n\nPUNiAB uNfyERSITY v. s. CHANDER (Varqdarajan, J.) 829\n\nA to have passed the examination jn those subjects. Midwifery .con· sists of two parts, namely, theory and practical for each of which the aggregate was 200. marks. Snbash Chander, respondent 1, secured\n\n106 out of200 i.n the practical examination and only 95 out of200 in the theory examination. Since the total aggregate of all the four subjects fat.which he appeared in 1974 was 1600 m(!rks, under the old Regulation 25 ref!d with Rule 7.1 as. it stood at the tiine of his admission to. the course in 1965. he would be entitled .to Hi grace . marks and would have been declared to have passed the examination\n\nas the addition of 16 grace marks to the 95 marks actiially secured\n\nby him in the practical examination in Midwifery would satisfy the required minimum of 50 per cent. But long before Subash Chander. . C appeared for the final M.B.B.S. examination in.1974 the rule relat•·. ing to award of grace marks toM.B.B.S .. and B.D.S. students was changed by the Seate of the University in.1970 by the. t1ddition of an exception to R.ule 2.1 as men.tioned above. It is not contended that the S&rtction df the Government had not been obtaineded for making . this change. The exception says that in the case of M.B.B.S. and\n\nB.D.S. examinations however the grace marks shall be given upto 1 per cent of the total marks of each subject. and not up to 1 per cent of the aggregate marks of all the subjects ; in other words each subject will be, for this purpose, a separate unit and a candidate who fails in a subject by not ate. than 1 per cent may be given the . requir.ed number of marks in order to pass in that subject. Uµder\n\nthis rule as amended in 1970 Subash Cltander, respondent 1, was. entitled to only 4 marks as grace marks being 1 per cent of the aggregate or4oo marks for-Midwifery alone.\n\nA, s the addition or' 4 grace marks t~ . 9.5 marks actually secured by him in the practical examination in Midwifery for which the aggregate was 200 out of that total aggregate of 400_marks for that subjeci marks only 99 out of 200 it was less than 50 per cerit, and he was declared to have failed in. Midwifery and.asked.to eapper for that subject.\n\nr \"\n\n The minimum prescribed'for passing in each subject is' 50 per\n\ncent~ Under the. old rule .as itslaod prior 1970, Subash Chander could have passed by getting 16 grace inarks being 1 per cent of the aggregate of all the four subjects, namely;· Medicine, Surgery, Eye\n\n•. ' ' f . . and ENT a11d Midwifery even if he had secured only 84 marks out of 200 in the pra'ctical examination in Midwifery which comes to ovly 42per cent and he had secured more. than 50. per cent in the other subjects/papers. The Senate thought it fit to remedy this gladbg defect so for as M, B.B.S. andIB.D.S. examinations are con-\n\n• 830 StlPRedB cot/RT RBPORTS\n\n(1984) 3 S.ll.C •.. , -<-\n\ncerned by:adding the excepection to Rule 2.1 in 1970 under which the.· grace marks would be only l per cent of the aggregate marks in the particular subject .. We do not think that the Senate did not have the necessary power to effect tha.t hange or-had acted unreasonably in making the change. We thillk that the Senate had the necessary power under s .. 31(2)(n) of the Act to fix, from time to time, the percentage of marks required for passing the xaminatio11 and to grant or to refuse togrant grace marks or to enhance.or yeduce the quantum of grace marks.. It has not been contended .. before us . that there. was any ma/a fides on the part of the Senate , in making :this change .. It could not be contended that .Subash\n\n' ' Chander who appared for the final examination in 1974 did not :have . sufficient notice of the change brought about iri 1970 in the rule relating to award of grace marks or that he was prejuiced by the change;\n\nWe do not agree with the learned Judges of the Full Bench . of ~_, the High Court that there is any element of retrospectivity in the chimge b.rought about by the addition of the exception to ule :i..1\n\n of the Calender for the year 1970. ··. \"Refrospe_ctive\" according to the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Third Edition, in relation to Statutes etc. means \"Operatiye with regard to past .time\". The change brought about by the.addition ofthe exception to Rule 2.1 does not say that it shall .be operative with effect from any earlier .r . date. It is obviously prospective. It.is not possible to hold that it.is ' retrospectivein operation merely because though introduced in 1970 'it was applied to Subash Chander, respondent l, who appeared for \" the final exmip.ation in 1974, after he had joined . the course earlier , . in 1965. N.o promise was made or could be deemed IQ have.· ben p. made to him at the time•ofhis admission in 1965 that there will be ·\n\nno alteration of the rul~ or regulation in regard to the percentage of marks. required for passing any examination or award of. grace marks aild that the rulesrelating there to which were in force at the time bf his admission would continue to be applied to.· him until he finished his whole course. In the Calendar for 1979 we . find . tl)e folfowing at page 1 :\n\n\"Notwithstanding the integrated nature of a c.ourse spread over mote than one academic year; the regulations ·\n\nin force at the tiine a'studentjoins a'course shall hold good . only for the e11aminations held during or -at the end of the academic. year. Nothing in these regulations shall e <Jeemed to debar . the University from. amending .· ihe\n\n, I\n\nPQNJAa ONlvERSiTY v. s. CHANDllR(Varai!arajan, /,) 831\n\n regulations subsequently and the amended regulations,. if any, shall apply to all students whether old or new.\"\n\n• This is as it should be, though there was no such provision in .the Calendar of 196S when Subash Chander was admitted to the course. It is admitted that it was introduced only in 1971. The absence of such a provision. in the Calendar of 1965 is of. no consequence. It is necessary to note in this connection what this Court had said in regard to retrospectivity in such matters in B.N. Mishfa ,\n\nv. State.(1) It is this : · .. \"The next contention on behalf of the appellant is that the rule.is retrospective and that no retrospecti'(e rule can be made. As we read the rule we do not find any retrospectivity in it. All that. the rule provides is that from the date it comes into force the age of retirement wbuld he SS years: It _would therefore apply from that date to all government servants, even .though they may have been recruited before May 25, 196\\in the same way as the rule o_f 1957 which incre_ased the age from 55 years to 58 years applied to all government servants. even though they were rec(uited before 19S7. Btit it.is urged that the proviso shows that the rule was applied retrospectively. We have already referred to .the proviso which lays down that government servants who had attained the age of 55 years on or be!ore.\n\nJune 17., 1957 and had not attained the age of 58 years on May. 25, 1961 would be deemed to have been retained in '\n\nservice after the dat_e of superannuation, namely 55 years.\n\nThis proviso _in our opinion does not m_ake the rule retrospective; it only provides as to how the period of servke beyond S5 years should be treated in view of the, earlier ·\n\nrule of 1957 which was .being changed by the rule.of 1961.\n\nFurther the second order issued on the same day alo clearly shows. that there was no retrospective operation of the rule, for in actual effect no government servant 'was retired before the date ofnew rule i.e. May 25, 1961 and all of them were continued in service up to December 31, 1961 and were therefore to retire ou reaching the _age of superannuation according to the old rule. We ar_e, therefore, of opinion that the new ru\\e reducing the age of retirement\n\n~I) [1965] 1 S.C.R, 297.\n\nfrom 58 years to 55 years camot be said to be retrospective.\n\nThe proviso to new rule and the second notification are oniy methods to tide over the difficult situation which would arise i~ the' public service . if the new rule was applied at once and als.o to meet any financial objectipn arising 0ut of the enforcement of the new rule. The new rule therefore, cannot be struck down <Jn the ground that it is retrospective in operation,\"\n\n• Therefore, we are clearly of the' opinion that there is no\n\n. qu.estion of the change in the . rule made in. the year !'970 having retrospective operation merely because it was applied in 1974 to Subash Chander who had joined the M.B.B.S. coure in 1965 when the rukregardiug award of grace marks was different. ln these circumstances, we affirm the view of D.K. Mahajan and P.C. Jain, JJ. expressed .in the Division Bench judgment in Sewa Ram v.\n\nKurukshetra University (Supra) and; disapprove the view taken. by the. learned Judges of the Full Bench in the dec.ision under appeal in this case and bold that; the • u'nivetsity was right in holding that Su bash Chander, respondent I, was not entitled to 16 grace marks. under the old rule but was entitled to only. 4 grace marks under the ne.w rule and had therefore not passed the examina\\ion: in Midwifery. We allow the appeal but without any order as to .costs. However, this decision will not effect the result of the examination of Subash €hander in Midwifery if it had been declared as per the directfon of . the learned Judges of the FulfBench in the Letters Pa.tent Appeal;\n\nH.S.K.\n\nAppeifl allowei", "total_entities": 50, "entities": [{"text": "PUNJAB UNIVERSITY", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 17, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PUNJAB UNIVERSITY", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "SUBASH CHANDER AND.ANR", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19, "end_char": 41, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "SUBASH CHANDER AND.ANR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A.P. SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 61, "end_char": 69, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Punjab University Regulations", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 220, "end_char": 249, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "s.31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1052, "end_char": 1056, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Punjab University Regulations", "statute": "Punjab University Regulations"}}, {"text": "Punjab University~", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2340, "end_char": 2358, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Punjab University~ wntended that there was no element of retrospectivity in the application of the ."}}, {"text": "s.31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2861, "end_char": 2865, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Senate of the Punjab University", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 3633, "end_char": 3664, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "HELD : The Senate of the Punjab University had the necessary power under s.3J of the Act to fix, trom time to tin1e, the percentage of marks required for passing the examination and to grant or to refuse to grant grace marks o~ G to enhance .or reduce the quantum of grace marks. ["}}, {"text": "s.3J", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3695, "end_char": 3699, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Punjab and Haryana High' Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5731, "end_char": 5761, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I LPA 97 of 1961 decided on 17.7.1968 by Punjab and Haryana High' Court, upheld."}}, {"text": "[1965) 1 SCR 297", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 5794, "end_char": 5810, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Jmvahar Lal Gupta", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6074, "end_char": 6091, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jmvahar Lal Gupta, ."}}, {"text": "Janendralal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6095, "end_char": 6106, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Janendralal and B.R. Agarwala for the -\\ , Appellant."}}, {"text": "B.R. Agarwala", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6111, "end_char": 6124, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Janendralal and B.R. Agarwala for the -\\ , Appellant."}}, {"text": "Randhir Jain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6150, "end_char": 6162, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Randhir Jain for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "VARADARAJAN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 6228, "end_char": 6239, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court Was delivered by\n\nVARADARAJAN, J. This appeal by special leave is bY. Punjab University against the Judgment of a Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in tqe Letters \"Patent Appeal.", "canonical_name": "VARADARAJAN"}}, {"text": "Subash Chander", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6488, "end_char": 6502, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "352 of 1975 confirming the judgment of a learned Single Judge in W.P. 1017 of 1975;\n\nSubash Chander, respondent 1 in this appeal,, joined the Daya Nand Medical College, Ludhiana, for the M.B.B.S. course in 1965 when Regulation 25 of t~ Punjab University was in .", "canonical_name": "SUBASH CHANDER AND.ANR"}}, {"text": "Daya Nand Medical College, Ludhiana", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6545, "end_char": 6580, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "352 of 1975 confirming the judgment of a learned Single Judge in W.P. 1017 of 1975;\n\nSubash Chander, respondent 1 in this appeal,, joined the Daya Nand Medical College, Ludhiana, for the M.B.B.S. course in 1965 when Regulation 25 of t~ Punjab University was in ."}}, {"text": "Varadrajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 7697, "end_char": 7707, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "s. CHANDER (Varadrajan, J.) 825 .. up forthe deficiency if by such addition the candidate can A pass the examination.", "canonical_name": "VARADARAJAN"}}, {"text": "Su bash Chander", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8369, "end_char": 8384, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Su bash Chander, ref pondent I, appeared for the final M.B.B.S. examination in 1974 and secured the following marks • and remarks :-\n\nMedicine-202 out of 400 p.\n\nSurgery--'-225 out of 400 p.\n\nEye and ENT-204 out.400 p. ·\n\nMidiwifery : (i) Theory -95 out of 200)\n\n(ii) Practical-106 out of 200) Reappear\n\nAccording to Regulation 25 read with Rule 7.1 which was in force when Subash Chander joined the course in 196~ he would be eligible for grace marks .at I per cent of th.e aggregate marks of 1600 for all the above four subjects, which will be 16, and he would have passed in Midwifery also.", "canonical_name": "SUBASH CHANDER AND.ANR"}}, {"text": "Reappear\n\nAccording to Regulation", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8663, "end_char": 8696, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Subash Chander", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8743, "end_char": 8757, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Su bash Chander, ref pondent I, appeared for the final M.B.B.S. examination in 1974 and secured the following marks • and remarks :-\n\nMedicine-202 out of 400 p.\n\nSurgery--'-225 out of 400 p.\n\nEye and ENT-204 out.400 p. ·\n\nMidiwifery : (i) Theory -95 out of 200)\n\n(ii) Practical-106 out of 200) Reappear\n\nAccording to Regulation 25 read with Rule 7.1 which was in force when Subash Chander joined the course in 196~ he would be eligible for grace marks .at I per cent of th.e aggregate marks of 1600 for all the above four subjects, which will be 16, and he would have passed in Midwifery also.", "canonical_name": "SUBASH CHANDER AND.ANR"}}, {"text": "Punjab University", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9647, "end_char": 9664, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Before the High Court, it was contended for the Punjab University that there is no clement of etrospetivity in the appli~ cation of the amended regulation and rule to students appearing for the examinations subsequent to the amendment."}}, {"text": ".S.S. -Sandhawalia", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10119, "end_char": 10137, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'Chief Justice .S.S. -Sandhawalia who spoke for the Full Bench in the Letters Patent Appeal out 'of which this appeal before us has arisen noticed certain decisions of the Punjab and Haryana High Court and obsenred that they did not lay down clear guidelines for deciding the question at issue, namely whether the University is entitled to changij_ the regulation relating to tile percentage of gaace mrks to be awarded to students and the basis for awarding the same i..e. whether it is on the aggregate or' the marks of an the subjects for which the students."}}, {"text": "Punjab and Haryana High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10276, "end_char": 10305, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'Chief Justice .S.S. -Sandhawalia who spoke for the Full Bench in the Letters Patent Appeal out 'of which this appeal before us has arisen noticed certain decisions of the Punjab and Haryana High Court and obsenred that they did not lay down clear guidelines for deciding the question at issue, namely whether the University is entitled to changij_ the regulation relating to tile percentage of gaace mrks to be awarded to students and the basis for awarding the same i..e. whether it is on the aggregate or' the marks of an the subjects for which the students."}}, {"text": "s. 31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11222, "end_char": 11227, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S. 31(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11409, "end_char": 11417, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Senate", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 11422, "end_char": 11428, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Sectio'n 31 reads thus :-\n\n\"S. 31(1) The Senate,· with the Sanction of the G , Government, may from 'time to time make •regulations\n\nconsistent with this Act to provide for all matters relating to the University."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12245, "end_char": 12264, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "been omitted by the Government of India notification dated 6.12.1969."}}, {"text": "s.31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12357, "end_char": 12361, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Subash Chander", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 12597, "end_char": 12611, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "c of the Punjab University Ac1 which would clothe the Senate, explicitily or impliedly, with the power to frme regulations retrospectively and held that the regulation, as amnded in 1970, has retrospectively altered the condition of Subash Chander, respondent 1, taking the exall}ination to his detriment and could not apply to him and that fa, is governed only by Regulation 25 read with Rule D 7.1 as it was in force when he joined the course ii).", "canonical_name": "SUBASH CHANDER AND.ANR"}}, {"text": "D.K. Mahajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12942, "end_char": 12954, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1965 .. The learned Chief Justice thus differed from the view taken by a Division •Bench of the Punjab and Haryana .High Court (D.K. Mahajan and,· P.C. Jain, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "P.C. Jain", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12961, "end_char": 12970, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1965 .. The learned Chief Justice thus differed from the view taken by a Division •Bench of the Punjab and Haryana .High Court (D.K. Mahajan and,· P.C. Jain, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Subash\n\nChander", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13710, "end_char": 13725, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "th, e rule having retrospective operation apd.held that when Subash\n\nChander respondent I, joined the course in 19.65 he Obviously did so with the intention of obtaining the degree in Medicine and Surgery ijnd that it \\(a single integrated' composite course.", "canonical_name": "SUBASH CHANDER AND.ANR"}}, {"text": "Section 31(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14701, "end_char": 14714, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "s.31", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15596, "end_char": 15600, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Su bash Chander", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16020, "end_char": 16035, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "number of marks required for'passing the examination in a paper/ subject is 50 per cent of mar~. When Su bash Chander, respondent 1, was admitted to the .J\\1.B.B.S. cpurse.in' 1965, Rule 7.1 as ii stood .", "canonical_name": "SUBASH CHANDER AND.ANR"}}, {"text": "Suhash Chander", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16437, "end_char": 16451, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "then and extract; d above provided that the candidate who fails in\n\none or more papers/subjects/oraggregate may'be given grace marks upto I per cent of the fotal aggregate marks .. excluding for practical and internal assessment to his best advantage in order to have him declared to have passed the eJ1amination, Suhash Chander, respon dent 1, who appe.ared for the final M.B.B.S, .. examination only.nine years latter in 1974 had to pass in four subjects, namely, Medicine,· .", "canonical_name": "SUBASH CHANDER AND.ANR"}}, {"text": "Varqdarajan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 16850, "end_char": 16861, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": ".1\n\nPUNiAB uNfyERSITY v. s. CHANDER (Varqdarajan, J.) 829\n\nA to have passed the examination jn those subjects.", "canonical_name": "VARADARAJAN"}}, {"text": "Snbash Chander", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17037, "end_char": 17051, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Snbash Chander, respondent 1, secured\n\n106 out of200 i.n the practical examination and only 95 out of200 in the theory examination.", "canonical_name": "SUBASH CHANDER AND.ANR"}}, {"text": "Midwifery", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 18785, "end_char": 18794, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "9.5 marks actually secured by him in the practical examination in Midwifery for which the aggregate was 200 out of that total aggregate of 400_marks for that subjeci marks only 99 out of 200 it was less than 50 per cerit, and he was declared to have failed in."}}, {"text": ".Subash\n\n' ' Chander", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 20419, "end_char": 20439, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was any ma/a fides on the part of the Senate , in making :this change .. It could not be contended that .Subash\n\n' ' Chander who appared for the final examination in 1974 did not :have .", "canonical_name": "SUBASH CHANDER AND.ANR"}}, {"text": "May 25, 196\\in", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23344, "end_char": 23358, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the rule provides is that from the date it comes into force the age of retirement wbuld he SS years: It would therefore apply from that date to all government servants, even .though they may have been recruited before May 25, 196\\in the same way as the rule of 1957 which incre_ased the age from 55 years to 58 years applied to all government servants."}}, {"text": "June 17., 1957", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23742, "end_char": 23756, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "June 17.,"}}, {"text": "May. 25, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 23801, "end_char": 23814, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1957 and had not attained the age of 58 years on May. 25, 1961 would be deemed to have been retained in '\n\nservice after the dat_e of superannuation, namely 55 years."}}, {"text": "S5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 24043, "end_char": 24045, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "May 25, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24367, "end_char": 24379, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that there was no retrospective operation of the rule, for in actual effect no government servant 'was retired before the date ofnew rule i.e. May 25, 1961 and all of them were continued in service up to December 31, 1961 and were therefore to retire ou reaching the age of superannuation according to the old rule."}}, {"text": "December 31, 1961", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 24428, "end_char": 24445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that there was no retrospective operation of the rule, for in actual effect no government servant 'was retired before the date ofnew rule i.e. May 25, 1961 and all of them were continued in service up to December 31, 1961 and were therefore to retire ou reaching the age of superannuation according to the old rule."}}, {"text": "Subash", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 26076, "end_char": 26082, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "However, this decision will not effect the result of the examination of Subash €hander in Midwifery if it had been declared as per the directfon of ."}}, {"text": "H.S.K.", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 26222, "end_char": 26228, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the learned Judges of the FulfBench in the Letters Pa.tent Appeal;\n\nH.S.K.\n\nAppeifl allowei"}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_3_833_838_EN", "year": 1984, "text": ".... i\n\nL.D. JAIKWAL\n\nv . • •\n\nSTATE OF U.P.\n\nMay 17, 1.984\n\n. [A.P. SEN AND M.P. THAKKAR, JJ .]\n\nContempt a/Courts Act 1971, Section 2(c)Jl)\n\nAd_vocate making written app/ichtion couched in sc.uri/lous language-Itn-putarion-Judgt! a corrupt Judge' 'and-_conta1ni11ating the seat of ju'stice'.- High\n\nGour~ convicting a_nd sentencig advocate_for contemPt of Court - appeal 10 . Supre1ne Court-Written apology'tendered to Judge 'as directed by the suPreme.\n\nCourt ·whether sufficient to set aside coni, iction by Ei[gh Cou'rt.\n\nThe appellant was a senior advocte. He was required to_ appear before the Special Judge to make his submissiori on the question of sentence to be imposed UpOn his cliept who was conVicted for an offence under s.5 (2) of the Prevention of Corru\"ption Act, 1947: As .he appeared in a shirt-and-trous'!roUtfit aud n•t in Court attire, the Judg~ asked him to-<ippe\"ar_ in the prescribed. formal attii\"e for be_ing heard in his professional capacity. The appellant took um brage and left the.Court. -Sonle other advqcate appeared in the matter and the accused having being found gi:iilty of_the-thqrge ot corruption the Judge impOsed. a sentence of _four years R._I. ·\n\nThe appellarit niade a written application to the Judge couched in scurillous -lan8uage making the imputation that the Judge-was a 'corruPt Jlldge~ and added that he was 'contaminating the seat Of justice' ; andforwarded Copies, of the application, withOut occasion or Deed to the AdrnjnisttatiVe Judge, Chief Secretary and Other authOrities.\n\nThe 'High Court initiated contempt proceedings, found 't_heappellarit _guilty of having con1mitte<t cfiminal contempt under s. 2(c)(l) of the.Contempt of. , Courts Ao::t, 1971 and after affording fUll opportunity Of hear-ing, iinposed a . 1'Jt . sen.teoce Of simple imprisonment for one Week and a fine _of. Rs. 500. ·\n\nDismissing the Apl,·\n\nHELD : 1. eonsideratiOns regarding maintenance of theindependence of the :i.uiiciary and' the morale of the Judges dema.nd that the appellant should not escape with iinpunify on the mere .tendering of an apology which in any case does not wipe_ o.ut the mischief. If uch a apology Were to be accepted, as a rule, an<i not as '.an eception, it \\vo_uld vfrtua-IJy be tantamount to issuing 'licence' to i; Candalize corts and .commit OOQ.tompt of court with impunity. The\n\nHigh ourt was justifiedin impoing a substantive Sentence and .the said sentence cannot be said to be excessive or out of proponion.[838E ; 837E ; 83.SFJ\n\n834 SUPRl!ME COURT REPORTS. [19841.3 s.c.R.\n\nNo J adge can takea deCiSiori which does Dot displease one side or the other. By the vety flature of his work.he as to decide matters against One-or\n\noher_ of the parties. lf the fact that heenders a decision which is resented to -by a liigarit or _his lawyer Were to expose hitri to such a risk, it .will sound the death knell of the institution. The day must be dreaded when a Judge cannat work with independence ·-by (eaSon O:f tl1e fear that a disgruntleid member of the_ Bar can publicly humiliate him and heap disagree on himwith._lmpunity, if any ot his_ otdets, or the decision rendered by him displeas_es any-of the 'Advoc.ates ·-.11ppearing in the miittcr. A line has therefore to be drawn some ..\n\nWhere, some day, by some one, That -is why the Court is impelled to act (rather than merely. sermonise) much as the.Court dis1ike.s im:posiiig punish~ ment whilst.excising: tQe contempt jufisdiction; Wbih rto doubt has to be.\n\neercised .very sparingly and withcircurnspection. [837ll ; 838A-Bl . 2: An attituCI~ of unerited enienc.y cannot be adopted at the cost of princip.le an; d at the ex;1ense Of the Judge who has .been scanqalized. TO pursue a popl.llist line of showing indulgence _is not very difficult in fact jt is more difficult to resist the temptation .to do sO rather 'than tc;> ad4, Cre to. the m3.il~ studded. path of duty. Institutiorial perSpective demahds that considerations of populism are not allowed to.obstruct the path of duty. [338C]\n\n. In the .instnt cse, the aPpeUan t sought to justify hiS co_ndct before the High C.ourt on the gronnd of the treatment alloged to have .been meted out'to him by the Special Jµdge. '.No remOr_se was felt.\n\nNo sorrow Was epfessed.\n\nNo apology was off erred. He .expressed his sorrow only before this Court •• saylng that ha had lost his m¢nta1 balaace, alld was granted ; an oPportunity to tender® apology. He appeared before the Special Judge and tendered a written apOJOgy indicaiing that be was doing so : ('as Qirected by the Hon'ble Si1prme Court. 0 This circumstance showS.it Was a -paper' apology, and that' the eXpression of sorrow came from bis pen, not fr6m-his heart.. It is one: thing to \"say\"\n\nsorryit:_ is another to .\"fetl\" sorry. This Court cannot subscribe to the' ·\n\n'slapsay sorryand forget' .school of thought in administration of contempi jurisdiction. [886H; 837A-C] ·\n\nCRiMINAL APPELLAIB JUR1so1cr10N : Criminal Appeal No . . 611 of 1982.\n\nFrom.the Judgment and Order dated the 5t!\\ November, 1982 of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Contempt Case No.\n\n144/SL. •\n\nN.N. Sharma, Mrs. Pankaj Appellant.\n\nVerma & Mrs. Vijay Gupta for the\n\n~ . .\n\nDalveer Bhandari for the Respondent. ·\n\nT]le Judgment of the Court was delivered by . . ' . .\n\n• •\n\nii.\n\nj l\n\nL.D. JAIKWAL v. U.P. STATE (Thakkar, J.) 835\n\nTHAKKAR, J. We are sorry to say we cannot. subscribe to the 'slap-say sorry-and forget' school of thought in administration of contempt j11risprudence, Saying 'sorry' does. not make the slapper poorer. Nor does the cheek which has iakell the slap smart less upon the said hypociitical word being uttered through the very lips which not long ago slandered a judicial officer without the slightest compunction. •\n\nAn Advocate whose client had been convicted by the learned Special Judge, Dehra4un; was required to appear before the learned . Judge to make his submissious on the question of 'sentence' to be imposed on the accused. upon his being found guilty of au of(ence . under Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act by the Court.\n\nThe learned Advocate app'eared in a shirt-and-trouser-outfit in disregard of the rule requiring him to appear only in Court attire\n\nwhen appearing in his professional Gapacity, The learned Judge aske.d him to. appear in the prescribed formal attire for being heard in his professio.nal capacity. The learned Advocate apparently took umbrageand left the Court. Some .other Advocate appeared on: behalf of. accused who had been found guilty of a . chatge of corruption. The learned. Judge iplposed a senteqce of 4 .\n\nyears' R.I. which may have been considered to be on the high side.\n\nThe matter in that case could have been carried to the High Court by way of an appeal, both, on the question of conviction as iilso, on the question of sentence.· But so far as the Court of the Special Judge was concerned; as .the judgment had been pronounced anci nothing more remained to be done by that Court, the matter should have rested there. The. appellant, a senior Advocate of longstanding (not an immature inexperienced junior), however made a wriiten application to the learned Special Judge couched .in scurillous language making the !tnputation that the Judge was a \"corrupt\n\nJudge'' and adding that he was . \"contaminating the seat of justice\".\n\nA threat was also held 'OU! that a complaint was being lodged to higher authorities that he was corrupt and did not deserve to be retained in service .. The offending portion may better be quoted :- . .\n\n\"I am making a complaint against you to the' highest authorities in the country, that you are corrupt and do not deSe!'Ve to be retained in service. The earlier people like . ypu are bundled out the better for us all. ·\n\nAs for (juantUm of sentence, I will neyer bow down before you. You maY, award the mm11m senten9e. Any,\n\n836 SDPREME COURT JiEPORTS (1984] 3 s.c.&. ,. -\n\nway, you should feel ashamed of yourself that you are con taminating the seat of justice.\" • There is no known. pr.ovision for making such an application after a matter is disposed of by a Judge. Nor was any legal pur' pose to be .served by making such an application ..\n\nObviously application was made to terrorize and harass the . Judgfor imposing a sentence which perhaps be considered to be on\n\nthe high side whether or .not it was really .so was for the higher.\n\nCo11rt to decide.\n\n. . ''\\\n\nC As pointed.out carler, it was however notperinissible to adopt. a course of intimidatfori in order to frighten the Judge. His malicious purpose in making the application is estaplished by another telltale\n\ncircumstance by forwarding copy _of this application, witho11t any • occassion or need for it, to severaLauth.orities and; diginitaries. ·\n\n. . (·\n\nI. Administrative Jl!dge, Allahabad for favour of requisitioning case file S.T. No. 2 from.Dehradun and scann ing through the facts.\n\n 2, Chief Secretary, Uttar Pradesh.Government Lucknow ..\n\n3. Director~ Vigilance Commission; U.P., Lucknow:\n\n.4. Prime Minister, Secretariat, Delhi..\n\n5: State Counsel, Shri Pooran Singh, Court of Shri V.K. ·\n\nAgarwal, Dehradun.\n\n6. Shri D. Vira, I.C.S., Chaifman, Indian Police Comniis,\n\nJ ..\n\nF sion, Delhi.\n\n7. President, Bar Association, Dehradu~.\n\n8. The Hon'ble. Chief fostice of Bharat ... . . .\n\nThe High Court of Allahabad intitiate.d contempt proceedings, found the appellant gulity of having committed.criminal contempt . under Section 2(c)(l) of. the Contempt of Courts Act, 197-1, after affording him full opportunity of hearing, and imposed a sentence of S:L for 1 week and a fine of Rs. 500/- (in default to undergo a further term of s:L for 1 week). Hence this appeal.\n\n\" Before the High Court the appellant sought to justify his\n\nonduct on the ground of the treatment alleged to have been meted\n\n' .\n\n' •\n\n• J\n\n.J t\n\n• LD. JA.iKWAI, v. U.i>. STATE (Thakkar, J.) . 837 \" .out to him by the learned Judge. No remorse was felt. No .sorrow ·\n\nwas expressed. No apology was offered. Only when the appellant approached this Court he expressed his sorrow before this Court saying that he had lost his mental , balance. Upon finding that thi~ Court was reluctant to hear him even on the question of sentence, . . ' . as he had not even tendered his apology to the learned Judge who was scandalized, he .prayed for three weeks' time to.give him an opportunity to do:so. His request was granted. He appeared before the learned Judge and tendered a written apology wher.ein he stated that he was doing so \"as directed by the Him'ble Supreme Court.\" . This circumstance in a way shows that it was a 'paper' apology and the expression of sorrow came from his pen, not from his heart.\n\nFor, it is one thing to \"say\" sorry-it is .another to \"feel\" .sorry. It is in this context that we have been obliged to make the opening remarks at the commencement of this judgment ..\n\nWe do not think that merelybecause the appellant hhs tendered his apology we should set asid~ the sentence and allow him to go unpunished. Otherwise, all that a person wanting to intimidate a Judge by making tlie grossest imputations against him has to do, is to go ahead and scap:dalize him, and later on .tender a formal empty apology which costs him practically nothing. ' ·\n\nIf such an apology were to be accepted, as a. rule, and not as an exceptiou; it would in virtually be tentamount to issuing a 'licenc.e' to scandalize courts and commit contempt of court with impunity; •\n\nIt will be rather difficult to persuade members of the.Bar, w)lo care for their self-respect, to join the judiciary if they are expected to pay such a price fodt. And no sitting Judge will feel free to decide any matter as pet the dictates of his conscience' on account\n\nC>f .the fear .of being scandalized and persecuted by an Advocate who does not mind making reckless allegations if the Judge goes against his wishes. If this situation . were to .be countenanced, advocates ·- . -. . who can cow down the Judges, make them fall in line with their wishes, by threats of character ass.asination and persecution, will be preferred by the litigants to the advocates who are. mindful of profes sional ethics and believe in maintaining the decorum of Courts. .\n\nNo Judge cah take a decision . which doi;~ not displease one side or the.othe.r. By the very nature of his work he has to decide . matters against one or other of the parties; If the fact that he\n\n• .. .\n\nSUPREME .COURT REPORTS\n\n. (1984) 3 S.C.R.\n\nrenders a decision wh!th fa resented to by a. litigant or his laWyer ' were to expose him to.such risk, jt wmsound the death knell of the instituti0n, A line has therefore to be drawn somewhere, some day, by some orie. That is why the Court is impelled to act (rather than merely sermonize), much as the Court dislikes imposing punishment. whilst exerCising the'contempt jurisdictiop, which no doubt has to be . exercised very sparingly and with cir9umspection. we do not think that we can adopt an attitude of unmerited leniency at the cost of\n\npriftcipe and at the expense <;>f th~ Judge who' has been sca.ndallzed.\n\nWe are fully aware that it is not very difticult to .show magnanimity when some one else is the victim rather than when oneself is the victim: To pµrslle a populist line of showing indulgence is not. very difficult-iii fact it is more difficult to resist the temptation to do so rather than to adhere to the nail-studded path of duty. Institutional perspective demands tlrnt considerations of populism are not allowed to obstructthe .path of duty.. We, therefore, . cannot take a lenient . or indulgent view of this matter,. the day. must be dreaded when a Judge cannot w9rk with independence by reason of the fear that a disgruntled member of the Bar can publicly humiliate him and heap disgrace ori.himwith impunity, if any of his orders, or .the decision rendered. by him,· displeases any of the Advocates appearing in the matter. . ',' . .\n\nWe firmly believe that considerations. regarding maintenance of the independence of'l)le judiciary and the morale of the Judges demand that we do not allow the appellant to escape with impnity on the mere tendering of an apology which in any case does not wipe out the mischief. We are of the opinion tba t the High Court was therefore justified in imposing a substantive sentence. And the sentence imposed cannot be said to be excessive or out of propor-\n\n-.. .. t~OD.· '\n\nG Appeal is accordingly dismissed. •\n\nN.V.K.\n\nAppeal dismssed.\n\n\"\"\"' '\n\n1 •\n\n.~ I", "total_entities": 29, "entities": [{"text": "D. JAIKWAL\n", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 10, "end_char": 21, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "L.D. JAIKWAL", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "v . • •\n\nSTATE OF U", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22, "end_char": 41, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF U.P", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A.P. SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 64, "end_char": 72, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M.P. THAKKAR, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 77, "end_char": 93, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M.P. THAKKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Courts Act 1971", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 109, "end_char": 124, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section 2(c)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 126, "end_char": 138, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Courts Act 1971", "statute": "Courts Act 1971"}}, {"text": "s.5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 736, "end_char": 739, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Courts Act 1971", "statute": "Courts Act 1971"}}, {"text": "s. 2(c)(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1660, "end_char": 1670, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5045, "end_char": 5065, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From.the Judgment and Order dated the 5t!\\ November, 1982 of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Contempt Case No."}}, {"text": "N.N. Sharma", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5108, "end_char": 5119, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.N. Sharma, Mrs. Pankaj Appellant."}}, {"text": "Pankaj", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5126, "end_char": 5132, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.N. Sharma, Mrs. Pankaj Appellant."}}, {"text": "Verma", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5145, "end_char": 5150, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Verma & Mrs. Vijay Gupta for the\n\n~ . ."}}, {"text": "Vijay Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5158, "end_char": 5169, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Verma & Mrs. Vijay Gupta for the\n\n~ . ."}}, {"text": "Dalveer Bhandari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5186, "end_char": 5202, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Dalveer Bhandari for the Respondent. ·"}}, {"text": "THAKKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5342, "end_char": 5349, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "j l\n\nL.D. JAIKWAL v. U.P. STATE (Thakkar, J.) 835\n\nTHAKKAR, J. We are sorry to say we cannot.", "canonical_name": "THAKKAR"}}, {"text": "Section 5(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6022, "end_char": 6034, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prevention of Corruption Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6042, "end_char": 6070, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Chief Secretary, Uttar Pradesh.Government Lucknow", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8898, "end_char": 8947, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2, Chief Secretary, Uttar Pradesh."}}, {"text": "Director~ Vigilance Commission; U.P., Lucknow", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8955, "end_char": 9000, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Director~ Vigilance Commission; U.P., Lucknow:\n\n.4."}}, {"text": "Prime Minister, Secretariat, Delhi", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9007, "end_char": 9041, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prime Minister, Secretariat, Delhi..\n\n5: State Counsel, Shri Pooran Singh, Court of Shri V.K. ·\n\nAgarwal, Dehradun."}}, {"text": "State Counsel, Shri Pooran Singh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9048, "end_char": 9080, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prime Minister, Secretariat, Delhi..\n\n5: State Counsel, Shri Pooran Singh, Court of Shri V.K. ·\n\nAgarwal, Dehradun."}}, {"text": "D. Vira", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9132, "end_char": 9139, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shri D. Vira, I.C.S., Chaifman, Indian Police Comniis,\n\nJ ..\n\nF sion, Delhi."}}, {"text": "President, Bar Association, Dehradu~.", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9208, "end_char": 9245, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "President, Bar Association, Dehradu~.\n\n8."}}, {"text": "Chief fostice of Bharat", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9263, "end_char": 9286, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chief fostice of Bharat ... . . ."}}, {"text": "High Court of Allahabad", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 9302, "end_char": 9325, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court of Allahabad intitiate.d contempt proceedings, found the appellant gulity of having committed.criminal contempt ."}}, {"text": "Section 2(c)(l)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9433, "end_char": 9448, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Contempt of Courts Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9457, "end_char": 9479, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Thakkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 9860, "end_char": 9867, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "STATE (Thakkar, J.) .", "canonical_name": "THAKKAR"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10533, "end_char": 10546, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He appeared before the learned Judge and tendered a written apology wher.ein he stated that he was doing so \"as directed by the Him'ble Supreme Court.\" ."}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_3_839_846_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "STATE OF PUNJAB\n\nNOHAR CHAND\n\nMay 17, 1984\n\n{D.A. DESAI AND AMARiNDRANATH SEN, JJ.]\n\nTerritoriQi Juris4ic1io1,- of the Crlminal cOUrt, wltether the Court where\n\nsubstandard fertiliser War found be marketed will have the jurisdiction tO take, cognizanceDnd try the manufacturer of sub.-Standard fertilizer, even if th~ fnanufacliµ-ingactiviiy is _a't an entirely different plticeand -under different court illrisdiction along with the marketing agent-Codi of Criminal frocedure, 1973 \"<Act. II of 1974), sections 179 and 180, scope of.\n\nThe respondent was caryiogon business of mnufactUring fertilizers at Ltidhiana under the name andstYie' of MeSsrs Variader Agro-Cbemical_s (India}- :ind arketcd his proudct through his' age\"nt Messrs S1chdeva Enterprises.KapU:rthala. Ori finding the sample collected by a FertiiiZer; Inspector fr9m the said agent on Decernbe~ ti~ 1978-to'be of sub-stand<trd, quiliity the Chief -A.gricultur-al Officer. Kapurtliala filed a .-crimirial com ... plaint being CC No. 156-C of 1980 on December 2·4, 1980 in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistfate, K.apurthala against the. two partners .of Messrs SaChdeva Enterprises and th-e Respolld_ent under s. -1 'lA. of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 read with s. 13(1) (a) of the Fertilizers Control Ordr. 19.57. On. July 20,. 198 l respondent , moved rut application. -before tb_e trial courtraying that he be dischlrged andthe proceedings be\n\ndropped against him on the ground that the KapurthalaCourt Md no territorial Jurisdiction tO try him because he ca; r.ied on .:business of manu facturc of-fertilizers at Ludhiana.\n\nRelyi_ng on the _decision -Or the G_ujarat High. Court in .state of Gujarat v. Agro-Chemicals etc.\n\n0(1980 cr:L. J: p. 5J6), the Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate discharged the respondent and. dropped the proceedings (Jgainst him. The Criminal Jlevn, Application No. 48 of 1981.filed by the Stat<> of Punjab was allowed by the Additional Se_ssions Judge; Kapurthafa hotdillg. that-in Vie.w of the pro, visions of Section.· 180 of the Code of C:rimina! Procodure, the Kapurthala Court bad jurisdic tion to. try the respondent along with the o'ther coaccused. Thereupon the respondent preferred a revision petition being Cr!.. Miac. No. 1473 M of\n\n1982 \"in the High Court >f Punjab and Haryana. A learned Single Judge of the High Court relying on the decision of that Court in Satinder Singh and.\n\nOrS.' vo Staie of Punjab,\" Cr!. Misc. Appia. No. IISBM/19$1 dated 24·2;1982 which. accepted the view t.akeu by. the Gujarat High Cuurt,. alloWed t:he revision petition and setaside the 4eC1sion Qf. the AdditiQnal Se\"ions Judge. Hence the State Appea\\ by SpeciaLLeave of the Court.\n\nA Jlwing the appeaJ, t.he Court\n\n840 SUPREME <;, OUR! Rl!'ORTS (1984]3 s.c.R.\n\nJ{ELO.: 1. The CoUft in whose jurisdiction sub-standard fertilizer was found to be maketed will hae.the.jurisdiCtiOn to try manufacturer of sub.standafd .feMflizer even if the rn_anufacniring activity is at 3.n entireIY different. pJace. The manufact'uref is. well as te. dealer can be tried at a piace where .the conseqlJ-ences of the manufacturing and selling of sOb standard fertilizer had ensued as envisiged in ss. 179 and L80 of the .Code of Cri.minal Procedure.\n\n{843C-D]\n\n. . . -. .· . . 1 :2._Now ifniaufactu~'ing sub-standard fertilizer is l)y itself an Offence .. and marketing the suhJitaiidard fertilizer is _itself-.a-dis_tioct offence bllt they are So inter connected 'as cau:. e and effect, both can be tried at. Oneor tbe other place. If one_inanufactures'thc sub-standa.i;, d ferfilizer, wherever it is marketed the inter-relation' or' casua:t connection ii or' cause aad effect.\n\nThe situa\\ion ;._, ill be adequately covered bys;,: 17'9 and '180 of the Code of .Criminal Procedure.\n\n[8430-H]\n\n. .\n\nJnChargs Production, Harydna State Coopt. Supply And Market ing [1ederation Lid. (HAFE IJ) Fertilizer v .. State. of Punjab; Crl: Misc. No. 676.3. M of 1982 decided by the High Court on 9·3·1983 approved,\n\n1 .: 3. \\vh.en a samPle o.f _fertilize~ js taken from a. bag Which was io the _same cooditiOn as dCliv.ercby the m3.Dufacturcr and. it Was ln po_ssess.ion ·of a markett'ng agent manufacture .and sale of -sub-standard fertilizer would constitute indiSptitably one . tran$aCtion.·- But this . is predicated upon thC facts which may be disclosed in the trial and proved.\n\n[844DE)\n\nBhagwan Das Jagdish Chander v. Delhi. Administration [l975]\n\nSup. s.C:R 30, distinguished.\n\n. ..\n\n. CRIMINAf. APPELLATE J1jRJSDICTJON: Criminal Appeal No .. 247 of 1984.\n\nAppea1 by Special leave from the Judgment apd Order dated the 28th July, 1982 of th.e Punjab and Haryana High Court in Criminal Misc. No. J472-M/82:\n\n K.C. Dua and S.K. Bagga forllie Appellant.'\n\nFrank Anthony and Suhil Kumar for the Respondent .\n\n. '1.be Jugment of the Curt was delivered. by\n\nDllsAI, J. Special leave granted.\n\nOne Nohar Chand; the respondent herein, was carrying on\n\n.~ I\n\n~ \\ '\n\n, ...\n\n' '\n\n, ; .\n\n. . . . . b11.5iness of manufacluring fertilisers at Ludhiana under the name , and style of Mis Varinder Agrpc-Chemicals (lndia).\n\nOn, e inspe, cwr designated as Fertillscr. Inspector visited the premises of M/s\n\nSachdeva Enterprises, Kapnrtha[a ('agent' for short) on De, cember , 12, 1978 and obtained a sample of the fertiliser manufactured by Nohar Chand .which was being marketed by the agent. The sample was obtined for the purpose of al)alysis to, ascertain whether it conformed to the prescribed standard: On analysis it was foupd to be sub-standard,. The Chief Agricultural Officer, Kapurthala filed a criminal com plaint being CC. No., 156-C of 19.80 on December24,\n\n1980. in the Court of the Chief Judicial :Magistrate, Kapurthala against the two pariners of M/s Sachdeva Enterprises, one Raj Shetty and respondent Nohar Chand Gupta, the manufacturer of sub-standard fertiliser uis 13-A cf the Essential Commodities Act, ' '1955°read, with Section l 2(l}(a), ofthc Fertilisers Control Order,\n\n1957. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate framed the charge , again sf all the accused for the afore, mentioned offence:, on July 20, ,\n\n1981 respondent Nohar, Chand iuoved an application before the .\n\nJearned Magistrate praying thathe, be discharged andthe proceedings be dropped against him on the ground t]Jat the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kapurthala had no territoriiil jurisdiction to try him because he carried on business of manufacture of fertilisers at , Ludhiana. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, following the ·\n\ndecision of the Gujarat High Court in St'ate , of Gujarat v, Agro- Chem/cals e!c,,(1) discharged the respondent and dropped the, proceedings against him,., The State of Punjab preferred Criminal Revision Application No, 48 of 1981 in the Court C!f the learned Additional Sessfons Judge, Kapurfhala who by his judgment, and order dated February 13, 1982 set aside the order of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate holding that in view of the provisions contained'in Section\n\n180 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Court of ihe Chief Judiclal Magistrate, Kapurthala had jurisdiction to try the respon de, nt along with the other co-accused. Thereupon Jhe respondent pteferred a revision p :tition being Criminal Misc,, No. 1473-M of 1982 in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana. A learned Single Judge of the High Court held th'at in view of , the decision in Satinder\n\nSingh and Ors. v. State of Punjab<2> which accepted the view\"taken , by the Gujarat High Court, the learned , Additional Sessions Judge\n\nwas in error in interfering with the order of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate and that the Couri of the Chief Judicial , Magitrate, ,\n\n(!) 19so'criminal LawJournaI 5i6. ,\n\nq)' Cr!. Misc. Applicati9n No. ll58M of 1981 da1ed 24.2.1982 . . . . .\n\nc , .\n\n, . -ii,'\n\nSUPRm.ill coURt iuli>oilts [1984) 3 s.c.tt.\n\nK,.apurthal!i. had no jurisdiction t~ try Nohar Chand, the manufac mrer._ Accllrdingly the revision applicai'O)l was allowed and the\n\nd~1swn of the learned Additional Sessions Judge was. set aside and ' ihe one bythe learned Chief Judicial Magistrate was restored. Hence this appeal by special leave.\n\n The allegation against the resportdent was that he manufactured sub, standard fertiliser and. through his marketing agents M/s Sachdeva Enterprises, Kapurthala marketed the same. The offence was discl.osed when the Fertiliser ll}spector took a sample of the sul:Jstandard fertiliser from the marketing agents at Kapurthala. It is an admitted position 1#, at the respondent who 'is the manufacturer ·\n\ncarries on-his bussiness of manufactuiing fertilisers at Ludhiana. Th~ question posed is : • whether the Court of Chief Judicia! Magistrate, Kapurthala where the l)larketlng agents of sul:J-staudard fertiliser manufactured by the respondent marketed the same, wi)l have. jurisdiction to try .the: respondent; the manufacturer of the sub standard fertiliser along with the marketing agents. · . . , . .\n\nThe learned Single Judge of the High Court following the deeision in Satinder Singh's case held ihat the .1nanufacturer•of sub\"standard fertiliser cannot be tried where the commodity was being marketed The view taken l:\\y the High Court with. respect is wholly untenable in law. But before examining the legal position .··. subsequent devlopn1ertt of law in the sa1ue High Cou'rt on this very point may be .noticed. ·\n\nTo begin with, let it be pointed out that the decision.agaist which the present appeal is being heard was quoted bef<;>re another . . learned Single Judgv of the same High Court and as the.learned\n\nSin°gle Judge had grave doubt abo:J.tthe correctness of the -view taken. by the learned.Judge in this case, he referred the matter for ay.thori, tative pronouncement. to a larger bench ofthe same High Court.\n\nThis referred matter : Incharge Production, Haryana State Co- . operative. Supply and Marketitig Fedtration Ltd. (HAFED.) Fertilizer.\n\nv. Swte of Punjab(l) chme up for hearing before a Division _Bench . of the High Court. 1he Division Bencl; t referred to the deci.sion . rendered by the learned S)ngle Judge in this case., and clearly · disapproved it and in terms overruled it, Simultaneously it also.· overruled.the de:ision in Satiiuler Singh's case which the learned Judge had followed in this case. 'It can be safe(y said. that the lirger\n\n.----·~--~\n\n(I) Criminal Misc. No. 6763-M of 19.82 dated 9.3.83.\n\n-::._\n\nI -\n\nr' \\ _,\n\n. '\n\n~-.\n\n...\n\n) ) .\n\nPUNJAB v; NOHAR CIIAND (Desai, J.) 843\n\nbench of the High Court has disapproved the view taken by the A learhed Judge in this case.\n\nThe respondent, the manufacturer of the sub-standard fertiliser is. to be tried alongwith those who marketed the sub-standard fertiliser manufactured by him as his agents. The question iS whether .B the court where the sub-standard fertiliser i) marketed would have jurisdiction to try the manufacturer of. the sub-standard fertiliser whose. manufacturing activity is at a different plae. This very . argument was posed before the Division Bench ot the High Court.\n\nThe High Court after referring to Secti.ons 179 and 180 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 held that the court where sub-sta.ndard\n\n C\n\nfeiliser was found to be marketed wili have the jurisdiption to try the manufacturer of sub-standard fertiliser even if the manufacturing activity is at an entirely different place. The Division Bench held that the manufacturer as well as. the dealer can be tried at .a plac.e where the consequences .of the manufacturing and selling of sub standard fertiliser had ensued as envisaged in Sections 179 and 180 ·.o of the Code of Ciminal Procedure. That in our opinion (appears to be the correct view in law.\n\nSection 179 prnvides that when an act is an offence; by reason of anything which has been <jone and of a consequence which has E ensued, the offence may be inquired into or tried by a court within whose local jurisdiction such thing bas been done 'or such conse\n\nquence has ensued. Section 180 provides .that where irn act is an offence by reason of its relation to any other act which is also an offence or which wot\\ld be an offence if the doer were capable . of committing an offence, the first-mentioned offence may be inquired \" F into or tried by a court within whose local jurisdiction either act was done .\n\n. . . .\n\nNow if manufacturing sub-standard fertiliser is by itself an offence and marketing the sub-standard fertiliser is itself a distinct offence but they are so-inter-connected as cause and eff; ct, .both can be tried at one or the other place. If one manu.factures the substandard fertiliser, wherever it is marketed the inter-relation or casual connection is of cause. and effect.· The situation will be adequately covered by Secs. 179 and 180 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. We are in agreement with the later decision of Jhe Division Bench rendered on March 9, 1983 that the court where the sub-standard fertiliser is being marketed will qually have the •\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1984) 3 S.C.R.\n\nA jurisdicil0n to try the manufacturer of sub-standard fertiliser. 1 his is so obvious that any further discussion appears to us to t>e superfluous.\n\nMr. Frank Amhouy, learned counsel who appeared for the respondent urged that the concurring decision of Alagiriswami, J. in Bhagwandas Jagdish Chander v. Delhi Administration( I) would clearly show that the manuiacture of an adulterated article of food and selling the same c, annot be said to be part and parcel of the same transaction and that unless therefore the complaint shows that the sample of fe.rtiliser was taken from a bag of fertiliser as delivered by the manufacturer, it is. distinctly possible that adulteration may have taken. place on a subsequent occasion and therefore one cannot infer . . ' manufacture of sub-standard fertiliser from it being so marketed when the sample was taken from the marketing agency.\n\nThis approach overlooks the fact that the trial is yet to be held. One can envisage two situations. When a sample of fertiliser is taken from a bag which was in the same condition as delivered by the manufacturer and it was in possession of a marketing agent manufacture and sale of sub-standard fertiliser would constitute. indisputably one . transaction. But this is predicated upon the facts which may be disclosed in the trial and proved. In Bhagandas Jagdish (:hander's case, the allegation was that the appellant before the court sold ghee to a vndor which was on analysis found io be adulterated ahd both were jointly tried under ection 7 read with Sec. 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. In the course of trial, the purchaser of ghee wanted warrantor to be discharged so that he can be examined as a defence witness to prove his own purchase of the offending article. This application was granted and the warrantor was acquitted.\n\nAfter the acquittal of the warrantor, the learned Magistrate impleaded the manufacturer Mr. Gauri Shanker Prem Narain .under section 20-A of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. An appeal was preferred by the Municipal Corporation ' of Delhi against the \":cquittal of the warrantor and the other accused.\n\nThe High Court maintained the acquittal of Lakshmi Narain but set aside the acqitial of warrantor. That i.s how the matter came up to this Court.· We fail to see how this decision can at all help the respondent in this' case. However, reliance was placed on one observation in the' concurring judgment of Alagiriswami, J. which reads as under :\n\n(!) (1975) Suppl. SCR 30 •\n\ni.,.\n\nt '\n\n' - '\n\n\\ _l,.\n\n; I\n\n\"It would b.e noticed that while the charge states that . the sample of ghee purchased from Lakshmi Narain was found to be adulterated, there i_s no allegation that the ghee sold by the appellant to Lakshmi Narain was adulterated.\n\nWhile it may be readily conceded that the common object or common intention or unity of purpose. between the manufacturer, the distributor and the vendor was tq sell the article of fMd sold, it is not said that 1t was to sell the adulteraiedi>rticle of foo.d.\"\n\nAt a later stage, it is observed that 'the validity of th~ charge has (o be decided oo the facts put forward as the prosecution case. If' it is not established against anyone of them that, the article of food manufactured, distributed or sold by him was adulterated that person will be acquitted, not because the charge was not valid or was defective but because there was no proof to substantiate the. charge.\n\nBut without that allegation there canuot be said t.o be a unity of purpose or common object or common intention on the part of all of them who manufactur~, distribute or sell the adulterated food.' It was further observed that \"the manufacture, distribution and sale Of adulterated ghee would be the same transaciion if it was found to be adulterated at all the three stages. Otherwise it only means that they were all same transaction only in the sense that the common object of all ofthem is the selling of the ghee.'' How the extracted_ observation in any way helps the respondent passes comprehension. Firstly, the question of jurisdiction of the court trying the offender was never raised in that case. l}nd, here the respondent was discharged pn the ground of want of jurisdiction. Secondly, the decision proceeded on the facts of the case as would be evident. from the . extracted passage which recites the charge. That aspect does not\n\nfii:ure in this case. Let it be made clear that no affidavit was filed on • behalf of the respondent in this Court, nor the complaint was read over to us. And the case proceeds on he averments not presently disputed. Therefore in this case we are leftwith the allegations as found in the judgment of the High Court and the learned Additional Sessions Judge and it clearly establishes that where the . marketing. agent of the manufacturer of fertiliser which is found to be sub standard is being prosocuted for marketing sub-standard fertiliser . . . ' the manufacturec can be tried with him and the court where the sub standard fetiliser was marketed will have jurisdiction to try them both. ...\n\n. '\n\n._;._\n\nSUPREME COURT REl'ORTS\n\n[1984] 3 S.C.R.\n\n\"Therefore the High Court was in error iu setting aside the order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge. This was the only point in this appeal and as it clearly transpired that the High Court was in error in interfering with the order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, this appeal is allowed and the judgment of the High Collrt is quashed and set aside and the judgment of the learned Additional Sessions Judg<; is restored.\n\nS.R.\n\nAppeal allowe~ ,•\n\ni '\n\n+ -\n\n•• I", "total_entities": 54, "entities": [{"text": "STATE OF PUNJAB", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 15, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Swte of Punjab(l", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "NOHAR CHAND", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 17, "end_char": 28, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Nohar Chand Gupta", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "May 17, 1984", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 30, "end_char": 42, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "STATE OF PUNJAB\n\nNOHAR CHAND\n\nMay 17, 1984\n\n{D.A. DESAI AND AMARiNDRANATH SEN, JJ.]"}}, {"text": "D.A. DESAI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 45, "end_char": 55, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "D.A. DESAI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "AMARiNDRANATH SEN, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 60, "end_char": 82, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "AMARENDRA NATH SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "sections 179 and 180", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 503, "end_char": 523, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "S1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 736, "end_char": 738, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "December 2·4, 1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1017, "end_char": 1035, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "156-C of 1980 on December 2·4, 1980 in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistfate, K.apurthala against the."}}, {"text": "Court of the Chief Judicial Magistfate, K.apurthala", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 1043, "end_char": 1094, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "156-C of 1980 on December 2·4, 1980 in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistfate, K.apurthala against the."}}, {"text": "Essential Commodities Act, 1955", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1199, "end_char": 1230, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "s. 13(1)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 1241, "end_char": 1249, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Essential Commodities Act, 1955", "statute": "the Essential Commodities Act, 1955"}}, {"text": "Satinder Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2383, "end_char": 2397, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A learned Single Judge of the High Court relying on the decision of that Court in Satinder Singh and."}}, {"text": "CoUft", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 2780, "end_char": 2785, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The CoUft in whose jurisdiction sub-standard fertilizer was found to be maketed will hae.the.jurisdiCtiOn to try manufacturer of sub.standafd .feMflizer even if the rn_anufacniring activity is at 3.n entireIY different."}}, {"text": "ss. 179", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 3181, "end_char": 3188, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "K.C. Dua", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4688, "end_char": 4696, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J472-M/82:\n\n K.C. Dua and S.K. Bagga forllie Appellant.'"}}, {"text": "S.K. Bagga", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4701, "end_char": 4711, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "J472-M/82:\n\n K.C. Dua and S.K. Bagga forllie Appellant.'"}}, {"text": "Frank Anthony", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4733, "end_char": 4746, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Frank Anthony and Suhil Kumar for the Respondent .", "canonical_name": "Frank Anthony"}}, {"text": "Suhil Kumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 4751, "end_char": 4762, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Frank Anthony and Suhil Kumar for the Respondent ."}}, {"text": "Nohar Chand", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 4871, "end_char": 4882, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "One Nohar Chand; the respondent herein, was carrying on\n\n.~ I\n\n~ \\ '\n\n, ...\n\n' '\n\n, ; .", "canonical_name": "Nohar Chand Gupta"}}, {"text": "Ludhiana", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5009, "end_char": 5017, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "b11.5iness of manufacluring fertilisers at Ludhiana under the name , and style of Mis Varinder Agrpc-Chemicals (lndia)."}}, {"text": "Sachdeva Enterprises", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5169, "end_char": 5189, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Inspector visited the premises of M/s\n\nSachdeva Enterprises, Kapnrtha[a ('agent' for short) on De, cember , 12, 1978 and obtained a sample of the fertiliser manufactured by Nohar Chand .which was being marketed by the agent."}}, {"text": "De, cember , 12, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5225, "end_char": 5246, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Inspector visited the premises of M/s\n\nSachdeva Enterprises, Kapnrtha[a ('agent' for short) on De, cember , 12, 1978 and obtained a sample of the fertiliser manufactured by Nohar Chand .which was being marketed by the agent."}}, {"text": "Nohar Chand", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5303, "end_char": 5314, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Inspector visited the premises of M/s\n\nSachdeva Enterprises, Kapnrtha[a ('agent' for short) on De, cember , 12, 1978 and obtained a sample of the fertiliser manufactured by Nohar Chand .which was being marketed by the agent.", "canonical_name": "Nohar Chand Gupta"}}, {"text": "Kapurthala", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5548, "end_char": 5558, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Chief Agricultural Officer, Kapurthala filed a criminal com plaint being CC."}}, {"text": "December24,\n\n1980", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 5620, "end_char": 5637, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "156-C of 19.80 on December24,\n\n1980."}}, {"text": "Court of the Chief Judicial :Magistrate, Kapurthala", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5646, "end_char": 5697, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in the Court of the Chief Judicial :Magistrate, Kapurthala against the two pariners of M/s Sachdeva Enterprises, one Raj Shetty and respondent Nohar Chand Gupta, the manufacturer of sub-standard fertiliser uis 13-A cf the Essential Commodities Act, ' '1955°read, with Section l 2(l}(a), ofthc Fertilisers Control Order,\n\n1957."}}, {"text": "Raj Shetty", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5756, "end_char": 5766, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in the Court of the Chief Judicial :Magistrate, Kapurthala against the two pariners of M/s Sachdeva Enterprises, one Raj Shetty and respondent Nohar Chand Gupta, the manufacturer of sub-standard fertiliser uis 13-A cf the Essential Commodities Act, ' '1955°read, with Section l 2(l}(a), ofthc Fertilisers Control Order,\n\n1957."}}, {"text": "Nohar Chand Gupta", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5782, "end_char": 5799, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "in the Court of the Chief Judicial :Magistrate, Kapurthala against the two pariners of M/s Sachdeva Enterprises, one Raj Shetty and respondent Nohar Chand Gupta, the manufacturer of sub-standard fertiliser uis 13-A cf the Essential Commodities Act, ' '1955°read, with Section l 2(l}(a), ofthc Fertilisers Control Order,\n\n1957.", "canonical_name": "Nohar Chand Gupta"}}, {"text": "Essential Commodities Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5861, "end_char": 5886, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Nohar, Chand", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6115, "end_char": 6127, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate framed the charge , again sf all the accused for the afore, mentioned offence:, on July 20, ,\n\n1981 respondent Nohar, Chand iuoved an application before the .", "canonical_name": "Nohar Chand Gupta"}}, {"text": "State of Punjab", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6662, "end_char": 6677, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Punjab preferred Criminal Revision Application No, 48 of 1981 in the Court C!f the learned Additional Sessfons Judge, Kapurfhala who by his judgment, and order dated February 13, 1982 set aside the order of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate holding that in view of the provisions contained'in Section\n\n180 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Court of ihe Chief Judiclal Magistrate, Kapurthala had jurisdiction to try the respon de, nt along with the other co-accused."}}, {"text": "Section\n\n180", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6964, "end_char": 6976, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6984, "end_char": 7010, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "High Court of Punjab and Haryana", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7246, "end_char": 7278, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1473-M of 1982 in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana."}}, {"text": "Court of Chief Judicia! Magistrate, Kapurthala", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 8630, "end_char": 8676, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Th~ question posed is : • whether the Court of Chief Judicia!"}}, {"text": "Incharge Production, Haryana State Co- . operative. Supply and Marketitig Fedtration Ltd. (HAFED.) Fertilizer", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 9777, "end_char": 9886, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This referred matter : Incharge Production, Haryana State Co- ."}}, {"text": "Swte of Punjab(l", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9892, "end_char": 9908, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "v. Swte of Punjab(l) chme up for hearing before a Division _Bench .", "canonical_name": "Swte of Punjab(l"}}, {"text": "Satiiuler Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 10185, "end_char": 10200, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "overruled.the de:ision in Satiiuler Singh's case which the learned Judge had followed in this case. '"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11071, "end_char": 11103, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sections 179 and 180", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11537, "end_char": 11557, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973"}}, {"text": "Section 179", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11657, "end_char": 11668, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973"}}, {"text": "Section 180", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11939, "end_char": 11950, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973", "statute": "the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973"}}, {"text": "Code of Criminal Procedure", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 12730, "end_char": 12756, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "March 9, 1983", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12836, "end_char": 12849, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are in agreement with the later decision of Jhe Division Bench rendered on March 9, 1983 that the court where the sub-standard fertiliser is being marketed will qually have the •\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1984) 3 S.C.R.\n\nA jurisdicil0n to try the manufacturer of sub-standard fertiliser."}}, {"text": "Frank Amhouy", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 13135, "end_char": 13147, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Frank Amhouy, learned counsel who appeared for the respondent urged that the concurring decision of Alagiriswami, J. in Bhagwandas Jagdish Chander v. Delhi Administration( I) would clearly show that the manuiacture of an adulterated article of food and selling the same c, annot be said to be part and parcel of the same transaction and that unless therefore the complaint shows that the sample of fe.rtiliser was taken from a bag of fertiliser as delivered by the manufacturer, it is.", "canonical_name": "Frank Anthony"}}, {"text": "Alagiriswami", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 13235, "end_char": 13247, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mr. Frank Amhouy, learned counsel who appeared for the respondent urged that the concurring decision of Alagiriswami, J. in Bhagwandas Jagdish Chander v. Delhi Administration( I) would clearly show that the manuiacture of an adulterated article of food and selling the same c, annot be said to be part and parcel of the same transaction and that unless therefore the complaint shows that the sample of fe.rtiliser was taken from a bag of fertiliser as delivered by the manufacturer, it is."}}, {"text": "Bhagandas Jagdish", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14308, "end_char": 14325, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In Bhagandas Jagdish (:hander's case, the allegation was that the appellant before the court sold ghee to a vndor which was on analysis found io be adulterated ahd both were jointly tried under ection 7 read with Sec."}}, {"text": "Sec. 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14518, "end_char": 14525, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14533, "end_char": 14574, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Gauri Shanker Prem Narain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14911, "end_char": 14936, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After the acquittal of the warrantor, the learned Magistrate impleaded the manufacturer Mr. Gauri Shanker Prem Narain .under section 20-A of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954."}}, {"text": "section 20", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14944, "end_char": 14954, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954", "statute": "the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954"}}, {"text": "Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14964, "end_char": 15005, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Municipal Corporation ' of Delhi", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15038, "end_char": 15070, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "An appeal was preferred by the Municipal Corporation ' of Delhi against the \":cquittal of the warrantor and the other accused."}}, {"text": "Lakshmi Narain", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15178, "end_char": 15192, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court maintained the acquittal of Lakshmi Narain but set aside the acqitial of warrantor."}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_3_847_916_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "P.S. MAHAL & ORS.\n\nUNION OF INDIA & ORS.\n\n23rd May, 1°984\n\n[P.N. BHAGWATI AND R.S. PATHAK, JJ.]\n\nExecutive Engineets, CentrG/ Engineering and Central Electrical Engineering Service (Group A) '(Regulation of Seniority) Rules, 1976, brought into force with retrospective effct from 10th Dec.ember, 1974-Rules 2(ii) and 2.(iv)-Con~ stitutional validiiy of-Whether the rules viol<; ite the provisions of Arlie/es 14 and 16.(i) of the Constitution.\n\nlnter-se Senioriti of Executive Engineers promoted regularly within their respective quota from and afier 22nd December 1959 but before_ Jlth- December, 1974 .from the posts of Assistaht Executive Eagineers governed by the Central Engineering Service (Class-I) Recruitment Rules, 1954 and Assistant Engineers governed by Central Engineering Service (Class-II) Recruitment Rulq 1954, as re.fixed by the seniority List dated August 14, .. 1975-Whether irreiular and contrary to Jhe guidelineS indicated in the decisions reported as A.K. Subraman v.\n\nUnion of India [1975] 2 S.C.R. 979\"=Qnota rule in Rule 4 of the Centra/.\n\nEngineering Service (Class-I) Rules,.1954 when applicable. .\n\nIn the Central Public Works Department of the Ministry of Works and Housing, Government of India, the promotions to the posts of Executive Engineers are made from amongst.Assistant Executive Engineers .(Class-I ) who have rendered. more than fiv~ years of their service in their grade on the basis of Seniorit~-cum fitness and alio from Assistant Engineers (Class-II) who haVe rendered more than eight years Of service in their grade on the basis' Or nirit, the selection \"being made through a dep_artmental pro:notion comffiittee pres.ided over by a member of the Union Public Service Commission, since for the latter the P.P&t of ecutive Engineer is a selection post. For promotion to .the 'giade of Exective\n\nEngine::rs~ for the first time, on,4Sth August, 194·9, a quota in the ratio o.f 75% to 25% was prescribed by the Central Government. this was con ..\n\ntinuCJi right upto the Recruitment Rules 1954 werenacted for these two categories .. From Septenlber 7, 1955~ this quota was altered wjth reti'oseec .. tive effect to 66-2/3% and 331/3% and it was again altered 'with effect from April I, 1.972 to SO: 5~ for a period of seven years.\n\nHowever, at the time of promoti.ons not onJy the quota was not\n\nadhered to with the result that Assistant .Baginoers came to be promoted \"H\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n\nwith Executive .Engineers far in excess of th.eir quota, while there was .a shortfall in the promotions of Asistant 'Elt.ecutive Engineers, sO rar as their quota was concerned, but all of them were treated as officiating E; xecutive\n\nEngineers .\n\n• There was no statutofy rules _govcro'ine; inter.se seniority of Executive Engineers pro1J1oted fro~ these two grades. They wer~ th'.!refore, gov0raed by th, e Memorandum issued by the Home Mini-; try .on June 22nd, 1949 which laid down the general principles of seniority applicable to all departments of the government. The Memorandum provided that \"in respect Of -persons employed in any part\"iCu\\ar grad~, seniority should, as a general rule, be determined on thC basis of length of service in th<lt grad~ as well as service in .ao equivaleilt gra4e irrespective whetb:; r the latter was under Central or Provincial Governnient in Iildia or Pakistan.'' The. length of contin'uous officiatiO!J in thegrade was thus take'1 as the yardstick for_ the purpose of deterniining seniority in all depatt!Il-ents pf the government and a fortioraYi, in the grade of ExcctiVe Engineers.\n\nOn the basis of this yardstick, Assistarit Engineers .promoted as officiating Exeutiv¢ Ei1.giaeers within their quota would clearlY. e senior to Assistant ExecutiV-e Engineers promoted Ia_ter as officiating. Executive Engineers.\n\nRespondentS 1 t_o 3 issued a seniority list on Ist July, 1971 in which\n\nExecutiv~ Engineers promoted. from the grade of Assist<tnt Eng-ineers ia. r.Cgular manner on the basis of selection made by Departmental Promotion\n\nCommitte and within their quota were shoW~ as junior to Several Executive Engineers promoted much later from the frade of Assistant Executive Engineers .. Respondents 1 to 3, in making this seniority list proceedd , on the basis that the quota rule spedfied ia the last par~ of sub-rule ( i) of Rule 4 of the Recruitment Rules nece>Ssatily imi)Iied a system of rotation and it was required to be strictly applied at the stage of confirmation in the grade of Executive Engineers. In other wOrds, out of three vacancies in the grade of Bxecv_five Engineers, unless two reserved for promotion of Assistant Executive Bilgineer_s were filled up by confirmation of such promo.tees, the third O_oe for confirmation of an AssiStant Enginyer promotr.d as Executive Engineer-could no~ be ti.fled.\n\n\nacCepted the contention of the petifloners that the quota rule was t6 be applied at the stage of initial promotion in officiating capacity, to the grade of Executive Engineers and not at the stage of cOnfiration.and that it' did not necess<,1.rily imply the roational system aod since the general principles\n\nI '\n\n' ' . '\n\nP. s. MAilAt v. UNION 849\n\nfor determining seniority laid down in the Memorandum dated 22nd June, A 1949 were, on their plain tern1s, applicable, seniority in the grade of ExecQtive Engine.ers was liable tO be fixed on the btsis of length of continuous officiation in that grade as provided iii the Memorandum. The Court allowed the appeal after. summarising its conclusions i~ the form of folio.wing six propositions nemely :\n\n(I) When Assist.ut Engineers {ClassJl) are initially appointed in a regular manner iri accOrdance with the rules to-. officiate as Executive Ergineers, their sniority ia the service in Grade-I will count from the date of their initial officiating appointment in Class I provided., their initial\n\no'fliciating appointment as Executive Engineers was within their Quota;\n\n(2) Their seniority will not be reckoned ffom the date of their future confirmation in CiassI. The above principle is, however, subjeC:t l_o one reservation, namely, if an Assistant Engineer, 6ef-0re his Confirmation in Class IC were appointed to officiate in Class I in the grade Or Exe.cutive Engineer; although within _bis quotii, his seniority will count only from the date of bis confirmation 1.n Class II as permanent Assistant.Engineer not- _ withstanding is earlier officiating appointme_nt as Executive Engineer;\n\n(3) The quota rule will be enforced at the time of i_nitial recruitment, in an officiating capacity to the grade of Executiv~ Eag_ineC:r and not at the time oj confirmation;\n\n• B\n\nl4) The quota rule will be enforced with reference to vacancies in all E posts, wbether permanent or emporary including in the sanctioned Strength of the cadre (except such vacancies as are purely of a fortuitous or adventitious nature) and th6 operation of the quota rule will depend upon the avai ]ability or non availabiii~ of Assii; tant Executive Engineels for appointment as Executive Engineers. The non-availability of Assistant Executive Eo\n\n0gicienrs for recruitment to the grade of Executive Engineer will not postpone the regular recruitment ?f the Assistant Executive Engineers within theit quota.\n\n(5) Oncetbe As.sistant Engineers ai-e reglllarly\"appoiuted to officiate as Executive Engineers w'ithin their quota tby _will b6 entitlei.:I to coaSideration in their own rights as- Class I officers to fu\"rther promotions.\n\nTheir \"bi.rtb rllarks'' in their earlier servicewill e of no relevance once they. are regularly officiating in th~. grade of Executive Engineer within their quota.\n\n(6) U Assistant Engineers are recruited. as Executive EQgineers in excess of thei~ quota in a particular year they wi!l be pushed dowll to later years for absorption when due within their quota.\" and directed the' respon dents Nos .. I to 3 to amend and revise the\" seniority list of 1st July 197; in.\n\nthe Ji-ght of the directions give1,1 in.· the judgment and to give effect to the ff revised seniority list so prePared •\n\nSUPREME COUR')\" REPORTS ll 984] 3 s.c.R.\n\nRespqadents Nos. 1 to 3, thereafter, i&sued a seniority list on 14th August, 1975.accompanied by a memon1ndum beadag the same date in which it was stted that the seniority list of Executive ErigiOeers had been raised in the light of the judgment of tbe Supreme Courtdated 11th December,\n\n1974 in acCordanco With the principle set out In the memorandum.\n\nPoi the .purpose of determining the seniority in the grade of Executive Ellgineers\n\nfrom and after 22lld December-, 1959 resp\"ondents Neis. 1 to 3 int_roduc-:-d te carry forwArd principle and applied the r0tationa1 formula. The o'fficers who bad becD, with thl' concurrence of the Union Public Service CoffinlissiOn, . officiating as Executive Eogioi::ers prior to 25th August, 1949 nd continued to do so thereafter were shown en blqc.senior to the officers appOinte:d after 25th August, 1949 and so far as the period between 25th August 1949 and 21st December, 1959 was conCerned thd inter se Senior.ity .of persons promote~··\n\n~ during.that period from the grades of Assistant Engineers and A:;; sistant\n\nExecutive Engineers withintheir respective quotas was determined in accordance with the length of their regular continuous service as Executive Engineers, subject to the q6aHfication that. in case of Assistant Engineers who were promoted as Executive.Engfoeers.tbe iength of their regular continuqlls seryice as Executiv_e Engineers for the pupos\"e of determining . seniority would be computed only _from the date when they were confirmed as-AssSist ant Engineer. ' p ..\n\nBut with effect from 22nd December 1959, a departure was made by respondent Nos. 1 to 3 from th~ principle of continuous officiation and\n\ncarry fOrward principle Was applied by prov.'iding that s'6 posts earmarked for promotiro of Assistant Executive Engineers to the gade 'of Exee; utive Engineers in accordance with their quota 9uring the period prior tO. 22rl(t December,· 19.S 9 which hid reaia'ine~ unfilled owing to noa.availabhity of ·.\n\nAssistant Executive Engineers up to 22nd_ D'ecember 1959 shotJld, be-carried forward and. 86 Assistant_ Executive Engineers promoted after 22nd Decmber;\n\n1959 should be adjusted against these posts and they should be assigned sCDioiity en-bloc imO'lediately below the last EXecutive Ei:igineer promoted regularly prior to.22nd December, 1959.\n\nThe result was that the Assistant Engineers who had been promoted as Executive Engineers regulaly wit bin thei!' qu\"ota subsequent to 2 ?nd _December 19 59 became junior to the , Ass.istant. EvecutivO Engineers promoted against these 86 carried forward posts, • even though they migh~ have been: _promoted as Executive Engineers long prior to tho promotion of such Assistant Executive Engineers. The Assistand ExecutiVe Engineers promoted and adjusted against these 86 Carried for\"'\n\nwad posts were given seniority -bove the ASsi$tant Engineers promQted rogUlarly within their quota after 220:d. December, 1959 irrespectiVe as to w'hen such_ Assistant Executjve Engineers were actuallY promoted. These . posts were aajusted on the basis of theorder in 'which the vacancies in the respectiVe quotas of Assistant Executive EngineerS and Assistant Engineers for promotion as Executive Engineers were allociited from time to time. The seoioril)'.' lnter-se of Assistant Executive Enginees. and Assistant Engineers promoted r.egularly within heir respective quotas subsequent to _22nd December, 19:59 was thus determined by the application of the rotational formula based on the quota pfevailing at tho relevant time. But since it had not been P:oS:sib.le to .fill all the poJts 'allocated to the Assistant Eecutive Engineers' qaota and son1~ p6_st~ emained unfiled, theyJwere shown Us vacilnt\n\n. '\n\n.. . - ,\n\nvl . '\n\n. ,\n\nP, S. MAHAL v. UNION 851\n\nin the senio:itylist prepafed according to the roste• based on'the rotationa.1\n\nformula so that as and when .Assistant Exceutive Engineers might be pro.mo .. ted as Executive Engineers regularly within their quota, they would occupy the, vaCant posts e8.rmarked. for them in the seniority list.\n\nThe disastrous effect of th~ revised seniority list was that most of the Assistant Engineers prcunoted as Executive. Engineers r\"\"egularly within their quota subscqµent to 22nd December, 1959_lost a considerable nurnber of places in seniority and\n\nWer~ Piaced in a much worse situati.on. than what they were in under the seniority list dltted Ist Jilly,_ ~971 which was quashed at their inst'anCe, in writ petitions. A contempt application against respondents Nos, .1 to 3 wus\n\ntherefore.moved.but, befofe the Court could hear the objeCtioils agai.nst the seniority list on merits; theftrst respondent issue~ on .8th June, 1976 th~ Executive Engineers, Centfal Engineering and Central Electrical' Engineering . service (Group A) (Regulation of Seniority)' Rules _1976.\n\nThese ruies were 'deemed to have cOme into fotce with effect from 10th December, 197_4,\n\nthat is orie day before the delivery of Judgment., by 'this Court and they substantially enacted in statutory form the same pririciples which were se~ out iii the memorandum that aCcompanied the seniority list dated l 4tli AUgust, 197S_aJid on which.that senirity list was based. ·\n\nThe petitioners, thereupon, filed the present writ petitions contending thaf the Rules of 1916 wefe not applicable to the petitioners and other\n\nAsSistnt Engineers pron1oted as Executive Engineers regularly within t'heir\n\nquota prior to 10th December 1974 and if these Rules were held to be applicable, they were unconstitutional and 'void. , Th'e petitioners challenged the validity of the seniority list d:tted 14th Augusr,1975 and the Rules of 1976 on t'be following grounds, namely; (_i)' th\"t it was the case of .the petitioners and other Executive Engineers promoted from the gr3-4e or Assistant Engioeers regularly within their quota frOm and after 22nd December 1959 but beforC 11th December 1 19$4 js covered by the decision of this Court in A. K. Subraman's. c; se;\n\n(ii) that they are entitled t9 claim seniority, on the basiS of Ieng.th of conti'nrious officiation, over. Assistant Executive Engineers promoted as Executive Engineers later in .Point of tim'e; Gii) that the Assistallt Executive Engineers_ promoted and adjusted against 86 carried forwarp posts cannot be given seniority en bloc over Assistant Enginers 9i'Ori1oted as Executive Enginers earlier; (iv) th'at the rotational formula cannot' be applied retrospectively so 'as to deprive AssiStant. Engineers promoted as Executive Engineers of their snio.rity on the basis of_ length of coritinuous officiation lri t)je grade of Executive Engineers; (v) that the Rules of 1976 are, 'to that extent, UoconStitutional and void as'. b(:ing outside the pwer of _the Central Government; (vi) that since fhe Rules of-1976 have been bougbt_intO (orce with effect from 10t.h December, 1974, they cannot affect the .Petitioners and other. Assistant Engineers , promoted as Executive Engineers regularly within thei_r quota\n\nptir to that date and their St'.niority vis-a-vis Assistant Executive Engineers promoted as Executive Engineers must _contiriue to be governed by the\n\nprjociple of length Of continued officiation in thegrade of Executive Engineers; and (vii) that if the Rules of 1976 are applicable for determining inteT se sniority of Executive En.gineers promoted rfom 'the grades of Assistant Engineers and Assistant ExecutiVe Engineers within their respective quotas from and after 22nd December, 1959, they are unconstitutional and\n\n• •\n\nStll'!IEME COURT REPORTS [1984] 3 s.c.lt.\n\nvOid as offiending Articles 14 ad 1'6 of the Constitutton, since the::niority rules enunciated in tbe H.ules of 1976 being closely. linked with. the quota rule continued massive departure from the quota rule over a long period of t.ime must resUlt in the break down or the seniority.rules apd to hpply lhe seniority 1uh; s in such a situation would create gros$ inequality of oppor .. tunity Of employment violative of Articles 14 and 16.\n\nAllowing the petitions~ te C0urt,\n\n, HELD : 1.1 Rule 2(iii) of the Central Engineering and Central \"Electrical Engineering Service Rules, 1976, i~ so far as it gives en foe Jeniotity to the AsSiStadt Executive Engineers promoted to the eighty ix . vacancies carried .forward from the period prioi;. to 22·12-1959 irrespective of the dat.e \\Vben theY. were a.Ctually promoted and· pushed down in seniority As5istant Er.gineers though' promoted regularly within their quota prior to ·\n\nthe actual promotion.of such Assistant. Executive Engineers, merely prejudicially affecting their promotiQnal opportunities is violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.\n\n[9068-D]\n\n1.2 Rule 2(iv) of the said Rules also suffers from the same infirmity as it provides for rotational rule of seniority based oa the prevailing quota for determining inter-se seniority between Asitant Engineers and Assistant Executive Engineers promoted to the grade of Executive Engineers from and after 2 nd December, 1959, subject to an en blac seni.ority being given, to the Assistant Ex_ccutive Engineers promoted to the eighty six J\"'carried forward\" vacancies as set' out in Rule 2(iii). Obvious; ly, if Rule '2{iii) providing for en bloc seniority to be given to the Assistant Executive Engilleers promoted to tlie eighty six \"carried' forward\" VacJ.ncie::i is unconstitutional and void, Rule 2(iv) is also unconstituti0nal and vOid; when there has been enormous dCviation from the quota .rU1e ia lht1 p'romotions of Assistant Execufive Engineers and such deviatin has continued from year to year over a period of almost tweaty five years. [906D-H] '\n\nJ.3 The rotational rule of stniority is inextricably linked up with the quota rule,. and -if the quota rule is not strictly imPiemented and there is large dCviation from it regularly from year tO year; it would grossly be indiscriminatory and unjust to givq effect to the rotatienal rllle of seniority.\n\nThe rotational ·-rule .of sen'iority must Obviously br<.Jak down when there is such massive dcPJ..rture from the quota rule regularly from year to year leading to contiOuOusIY )ncreasiog deficiency in promotions of Assistant Executive Engineers and corresponding excess in promotions of Assistant \" Engineers.\n\n[908C-D, 909D-E] . .\n\nT. Devdasan v. Union of India, AIR, [1964].S.C. 179; Mervin Contindo\n\nv. The tollector of Customs, Bombay [1966] 3 SCR. 600; G.D. Kelkar v.\n\nChief Collector of mports mid Exports [1967] 2 SCR 29; V.S. Badami v.\n\nState of Mysore [!976] I SCR 815; N.K. Chauhan v. State of Gujarat, [1973] SCR 1037; A. Janardhan v .. Union of India AIR [1983] SC 769; Bishan Swarup Gupta v. Union of India [1975] ! SCR 104 referred to.\n\n.I.\n\nl -\n\n' .\n\n• .\n\n' .. ) .\n\nP. S. MAHAL v. UNION 853\n\n2.1 Notwithstanding Rules 2(iii) and 2(iv) of the Rules of 1976, the A inter se seniOrity between Assistant Engineers.and Assistant Executive Engineers promoted regularly within theiit respective quota uptO 1 ltb December, 1974 must be determinrd on the basis of length of continuous officiation in the grade of Executive Engineers. subject of course to the length of continuous officiion in the .case of Assistant Engineers being conlputed from the date of their confirmation as' Assistant Engineers in view of decision o.f .. the Supreme Couft in Su\\>rainan•s case. ID. this view carrYing forward of B eighty six .posts of Executive Engi.neers a110cable to Assistant Execu:ive\n\nEngineers and giving u_p seniority en bloc to the AssisL 1nt, Executive Eogin.eers promoted to the -carry forward posts\".by applying the rotatio1lal ·formula for the purpose of determining seniority amongst Assistant Engineers and Assistant Executive Engineers promoted to the subsequenc \\'acancies i.s ineffective quota Assistant Engineers and Assistant Executive Ertgineers promoted uptottth December 1974 and so far as these Assistant C Engineers'an.d Assistant Executive Engineers are concerned, their i-.ter se seniority must\"be held to be governed by the length of continuous officjation in the grade of Exeutive Engineers.\n\n[888H, 889AB]\n\n2.2 Oil a plain reading of the .decision in Subraman's case, it is obvious that the direction given by it in regird tO determination of inter se seniJrity On thia. basiSof length of continuous officiation was not limited to Executive Engineerl.' promoted from the grade .of Assistant Engineers.and\n\nAssistant Executive Engineers upto 2 nd December, 1959 .but \\las on its plain terms. applicable. tc all Executive Engineers promoted from tht:: .grade of Assistant Erigineers an'd Assistant Executive Engineers with'in their respective quota right upto 11th December, 1974 being the date of the decision of the Court. But the evised se'niority list dated 14th. August, 19?5 issued by the Government Of India was plainly in defiance of this direction given by the Court.\n\n[872AC, PG)\n\n~.3 When , this Court in so many terms laid down that the inter se seniority of Executive Engineers promoted from the grades of Assistant : Engineers and Assistant' Executive Engineers upto December 1 J, 1974 must be held to be_governed by the .rule of length of cotinuous officiatioil and. th~ Government of India has ben directed by a writ of the Court to amend and revise the seniority~ the effect cff this decision cannot be set at naught and the binding character of the writ issued 'a8ainst the Government of India c1D.· be abrogated by the mere prOmulgation of the Rules of 19i6' with r'etros~ pective effect' from. 10th December 1974.\n\nIt i• significant to note that the Explanatory Memorandum whi_ch was in the nature of statement of objects and reasons forthe Rules of 1976 did not seek to overridethe effect of the decision in subraman's case -but on the cOntrary affir'med that the principles of seniority set out in.those.rules were laid_down on.the baSis of the said . decision.\n\nSince the Rles of 1976 purports _merely to. carry oUt the direc .. tion given in the said .de.cision they cannot have the effect of overriding that .. decision. and absolving the Govt, of India and the Goyernment of India, fnust: therefore, amend and revise the seniority list of 1st July~ 1971. bf api)lyiog the 1ule of seoiority based on length of contlnuous officiation for d6terininiilg\n\n\n• (1984) 3 S.C.R.\n\ni11t::r se seniority of Exe_cutive. Engineers prom\"oted from the grades of AssistaOt Engineers and Assistant Executive Engineers. tlp'to 11th December, 197 -t.\n\nThe relative position of the Executive Engneers in regard to their inter se seniority having been crystailised in the deciion in Subraman'scase I.ind a \\Vrit havillg been isSued-by he court directing the inter. se seOiority of the Executive Engineers to be fixed on the basis of 1ength of contl.nuous officiation the Executive Engineers pron1oted from .the grade of Assistant . Engineers ... were entitled to.enf6rce the writ fo..r 'determining the inter se seniority with the Executive Engirieers in aCc.ordance with the rule of length of C'ontinuous officiation:.\n\nThe right of the Executive Engin_eers prorr.oied from the-grade of Assistant Engineers under the said decision could not be taken. away by\n\nanYthing contained in the Rules of 1976.\n\nThe decis\"ion in Sahara.man's caSe Continued to subsist and the GoverQment of_ India Was. bound to a determine intet: .re senio.rity amongst Executive Engineers in accordance with the direction contained in that decision.: If by reasoo. of retrospective alteration pf ·-the rule of seniority the decision fa rendered erroneous, the remedy may be by way of reyiew, but so long as the decision stand~ it. cannot be disregarded or igno_red <ind it must be .obeyed by the Government of fndia, despite Rule 2(iii) itnd 2(iv) so far as the Executive Engineers p, rornoted from the gr8de of Assistarit Bogin.eCI'.S and. Assistant Executive Engineers upto 11 t~ December, 1974 are concerned.\n\n(8.73EH, .874BF, 877A-B]\n\nFurther, the rule of seniority sefout in par3.graphs 5(i~) and 6 of the M_emorandum of the Ministry of Home Affairs dated 22.12-1959 has no application to the instant case. ·[878E] •\n\nM.M. Pathak v. Unio1 of_India and Ors. [1978]. 3 SCR 346 Followed.\n\nE Shri Pri1hvi Cotton Mills l'd. v. Broach Borough Municipality [1970]\n\nI SCR 388 distinguished ..\n\nPatel Go-,.dhandas Ha, govindas \".· Munic1\"pal Com-ni!isioner, Ahmeda bad {1964] 2 SCR 608 referred to.\n\n3.1 If a vacancy arises on account of an incumbent going on leave or for' training or on deputajOn for a sbort period, it would be a fortuitous or adv\"eiititiOU<> vacancy and the quota ro'le would n )t be attracted in case of such a vac.lncy.\n\nBut where a vacancy. arises o;;, i account of. the incumbent going on dt'putatiOn. for a l'.eaSonablylong perio:l and there is no reasonable likelihood of the person promoted -tO )ill su_cb vacancv having to revert; the,. vacancy woUld be subject to te:quota rule,. Qecau_se it would be a .regular vacancy in the post of Executive Engineers and the person _promoted to fif( the vacancy would' be an officiating Execiltive Engiffeer would contiriue as sticb without reversion uutil confirmed and bts promotioD. would, therefore, be by way Or_ recruitment to.thecadre-of Executive Engineers. Or course, t-he vacancy which attracts the applicability of the quota ru!e,_is the vacancy in the posi -included ia the sanctioned strength of the cadre of Executive , Engineers and 'not the vacaDcy in the d.;:putation post.\n\nThere. may be a\n\nacn.ncy in a deputation post ip. anothe~ department or organisation and an Executive Engineer holding a pOst included in the sanctioned strength of tbe cadre of Executive Engineers may be sent to such deputation pOst, but the\n\nP. S. MAHAL v. UNION &55\n\nvacancy which Would call for the applcation of the quot!! rule in such a case A would be the vncancy arising in the post of Executive Engineer within the cadre by reason of the incumbent of I hat post going to the deputation_ post and not the vacancy in the deputation post which would be filled up by the ExeCutive Engineer_ going on. deputation: Therefore, what has to be conside'red for the applicability of the qu<,>ta rule is a vacancy in a poS:t included\n\nin the sanctioned strexigth of the cadre of Executive Engineers and the sa\"nctioned strength whicJl. has to be taken into account, is 'not merely the ll sanctioned strength of the Cadre ofEXecutive Engineers in the entire Central Eilgineering Service, Class I.\n\nThe sanctioned strength of the 'cadre of Executive Engineers in the 'central Engineering Ser.vice, Ciass. I, maY jncludci not only.posts of Executive Engineers in the Central Publ.ic \\Vorks Depart~ rnent but also Posts or Executive Engineers in \"othefdepartn1eilt.s and organisations.\n\n[890H, 89!A-G] c\n\n5.2 Therefore, t cannot be said that promotion to the post of Executive Engineer' contemplated. 1:1nder the Rules can be made\" only where there is no lien of any officer on tba:t post because promotion acc:ording. to the quota rule \"is initial promotion in officiating caPacitYttand not conCerned with confirmatiOn .. It is true that a confirmed ExeCutive Engineer who goes on deputation may re Vert to the. post 011 which he bas a lien and -so D also an officiating Executive.Engineer who g_oes on deputation may revert\n\nback on termination of hiS-deputation and theoretically, in either case, an Assistant Eiigineer or Assist-ant Executive El'lgineer ho is promoted to . flJI\n\nthe vacancy arisiiig on account\" of deputation .may have to revert, but in actual practice -and reality, not a single Assistant Engineer or 'Assistant Executive. -ngineer promoted to fill a vacancy arising on account of.deputation, bas had to revert, because deputation is a normal featurein this E service and 20 to' 25 per cent of the Executive Engineers are conlinuosly on dePutation.\n\nEven, if one Executive Engineer comes back on termination of his deputation, another has to be sent in'1lis plce and deputations thus go on rotating with the result that the vacancy in the post of ExecutiVe Engineer arising on accorint of .deputation does not cease and the Assista:Dt Engineer of\"Assistant Executive Ellgineer promoted as Executive. Ene:in.efil. to liU the vacancy does not ever have .to revert and consequently the vacancy F filled by bi.in is really .and truly a perµianen.t and long term . vacancy which has to be filled according to the quota rule, In fact, if the quota rule were not to be applied with reference to such a .vacancy°,. the position would be that Whenever an Exe.cutive Eogineer goes od deputation for a period\n\nwhicbay extelld anything between three :to.fi.ve years, the Central Government would be entitled to promote a_n Assistant Engineer i.gaoring the claims of Assistant Executive_ Engineers and this would totalJy be arbitrary G in a sit11ation where 20 to.- 25 per -cent of Executive Engineers are on\n\n.eputation.\n\nFor tbiS purpose the vacancies in tbe pas.ts of Executive :Engineers arisi11g on account of deputation of Executive Ellgineers to other departments, organiations and public Uiidertakings. for a period of one or more years were long term vaCancies. and they could not be regarded as fortu tious or adventitious in· character . and hence they were subject to the qqqta role. [8910-H, 89SH, 896A, 897A-F, Gj H •\n\n8,55\n\n• E\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS {1984) 3 .s.C.R.\n\n3'_ 3 However, the vacancy pro tempore filled irregularly by an Assis .. tant Engineer Would continue to beloag to the quota of-Assistant Executive .\n\nEngineers and it can be filled only by the Assistant Executive Engineer, if the quota rul~ is to be strictly observed.\n\nThe death or retiremept of an\n\n, irrgular promotee to the vacancy cannot therefore give rise to a fresh vacancy : . it -is the same vacancy which continues until properly filled'by\n\npromotion of nn Assi5tant Executive Engineer-at a subsequent date.\n\nIf in such a case the death or retirement cf an irregular appointed ASsistant Fngineer were tq be treated as creating a fresh acancy; it _would lead to gross distortion.\n\nSimil:1rly while pushing down Executive Engineers prcmOted from the grade . of Assistant Engineers in eXcess oft heir quota in a subsequent yCar, the Government must treat them as absorbed from. the date when a vacancy .in that year aries in the quota of Assistant Engineers and not' on a national basis from 1st January of that year.\n\n. .\n\n(900 C-G, 901 CD]\n\nORIGINAL JuRISDICfION Writ Peiition Nos. 157- I 62 of 1976\n\n (Under article 32 of the Constitution of India)'\n\nM.C. Bh8ndare; A.K. Ganguli, D.P.-Mukherjee.and Miss. C.K.\n\nSuchirata for the Petitioners .\n\n. M.M. Abdul Khader, Girish Chandra and Miss A. Subhashini for Respondent. ·• •\n\nM.!e. Ramamurthi, J.\n\nRomamurthi and Mrs. R. Vaigai for Respondent.\n\nTiie Judgment. of the Court .was delivered by\n\nBHAGWATI, J. This wlit. petition marks yet another round of :litigation between two groups of Executive Engineers in Central Public Works Department of the Ministry of Works and Housing, Government of India, one group consisting of promotees from the grade of Assistant Executive Engineers ·.and t)le other. consisting of promotees. from the grade of Assistant Engineers. The dispute between these two groups in regard to .seniority has been going on for quite some time and it has created considerable discord and bitterness between these two groups which must inevitably affect the efficiency of the Service. It is really a matter of regret that the Central Government should not have been able to bring these two groups together and evolve a: commonly agreed formula acceptable to both sides. We hope that our decision in this writ petition will finally ring the curtain down on this unfortunate controversy and both groups of Executive Engineers wiH accept the decision ungrndgingly without any rancour pr resentment n'd wholeheartedly engage themselves in the nation building task entrusted to thero.\n\n• P.$. MAHAL v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.)\n\nThere is in the Central Public Works Department of Ministry of Works and I:Iousing, Government of India a Service known as Central Engineering Service (Class I). This Service comi;>rises various grades; the highest gr!(de is that of Engineer-in-Chief and then in descending hierarchical order are the grndes of Chief Engineer, Su, ierintending Engineer, Executive Engineer and Assistant Executive Engineer. The Central Governmenl has. made rules of recruitment to this Service known as the Central Engineering Service (Class I) Recruitment Rules 1954 (hereinafter .referred to s 'Recruitment Rules') and they are issued undet SRO 1841 d'}.ted 21st May. 19.54.\n\nPart I of the Recruitment Rules contains tlie definition and Clause (c) of Rule 2 occurring in this Part defines \"Service\" as Centrnl Engineering Service Class I. Rules 3, 4. and 5 contained in Part II of the Recruitment Rules lay down the modes of recruitment to various grades in this Service in the following terms : ·\n\n\"3.\n\nRecruitment to .the service shall be made by any.of fae following methods ;-\n\n(a) By competitive examination in India in accordance with\n\nPart III of these rules.\n\n(b) By.promotion in accordance with Part IV of these rules.\n\n(c) By transfer in accordance with Part V of these Rules.\n\n4. (I) All appointments to the service. or to posts borne upon • the cadre of the Service shall be made by Go•ernment, ·\n\n(2) Subject to' the provisions of the rule 3 Goernment. sha, ll determine the method or methods of requirement (Sio) . (recruitent ?) to be employed for. the ·· purpose of filling any parllcular vacancies in the Service or such vacancies therein as may be . required to be file'd during. any particular period and the number of candidates to be recruited by each method.\n\nProvided that all recruitment by competitive examination G .(vide Part III of the rules) shall be to the grade of Assistant Executive Engineer, Class I only.\n\nSventy-fie per. cent of the vacancies in the grade of Executive Engrneer, Clasfl, shall be filled by promotion of\n\nAsistant Executive Engineers, Class I, the est of the vacancies\n\n H be!ng filled by promotion and/or by -transfer in accordance\n\nwtth Parts IV aJ]d V of the Rules espectively. '\n\n' 858\n\n\n(1984] 3 S, C.R.\n\nA 5.\n\nAppointment to the Service made otherwise than by promotion will be subject to ordelS issued from time to time by the Ministry of Home Affairs regarding . special representation in the Services for specific sections of the people''.\n\nAssistant Executive Engineers bi:long' to the !owes\\ grade in this\n\n.. B service and they are recruited.only through a competitive examination in accordance with 'Part III of the Recruitment Rules. On their initial recruitment, Assistant Executive Engineers are required to . '\n\nundergo a period of probation fcfr two. years and they are confirmed in the grade of Assist!lnt Executive Engineers after successful completion of the.period of probation. '\n\nThere is also another Service in the Central .Public , Works Department called . Central Enginering Service Class II. This Service consists only of.the grade of Assistant Engineers. The rules ofrecruitment to the 'grade of Assistani Engineers are to be found in the Central Engineering Service Class II Rcruitment Rules. There are two modes of recruitment laid down in these Rules; one is by direct recruitment through the fame competitive examination which is held for selection of Assistant Executive Engineers, the candidates lower down in rank than ihcise selected for the grade of Assistant Executiv.e Engineers, being selected for the grade of Assistant Engineers and the other is py process of selection from a subordinate\n\n\" ' - -· Service called Class Ill SerVice. Assistant Engineers . belong to Class II service, .unlike Assistant Executive Engineers who belong to Class I Service !tut the posts which they hold are interchangeable, each of them being in charge of a sub-division aud 'the nature of work, responsibilities, powers and dutie~ discharged by them all is ,.identical. There is only a minor difference in the pay scales but. otherwise for all practical. purposes, there is no difference between them so far as their functions 'ppwers and duties are con11erned. '\n\nThe next higher grade above that of Assistant Ei!; ecutive Engineers is \"that of Excecutive Engineers. Recruitment to the grade of Executive Engineers is made by .promotion from two sources, namely Assistant Executive Engineers and Assistant Engineers.\n\nAssistant 'Executive Engineers are eligible . for . promotion to the 'grade of Executive Engineers after completion of five years of service and they are promoted on the basis of seniority-cum-fitness.\n\nAssistant Engineers on the other hand are eligible for promotion io the grade of Executive Engineers only after eight years of Service in their grade and for them, the post of Executive Engineer is a selection post and they are selected\n\nP.S. MAHAL v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 859\n\nfor promotion on the basis of merit; the selection being made through a departmental promotion committee presided over by a member of the Union Public Service Commission. Prior to 25th August 1949, there was no quota for promotion to the grade of Executive Engineers from the grades of Assistant .Executive Engineers and Assistant Engineers but. for the first time on 25th August 1949, a quota was. prescribed by the Central Government and i~ was provided that the vacancies in the grade of Executive Engineers shall\n\n' be filled by promotion from the grades of Assistant Executive Engineers ad Assistant Engineers in the ratio of 75% to 25%. this continued right up to the time the Recruitment Rules were enacted in 1954 and that is why the last part of clause (2) of Rule 4 of the Recruitment Rules provided that 75% of the vacancies in the grade of Executive Engineers shall be filled by promotion of Assistant Executive Engineers, the rest of the . vacancies being filled by promotion and or by transfer in accordance with Parts IV and V of the Rcruitment Rules. This quota was altered with retrospective\n\n- I effect from 7th September 1955 from 75 and 25 per cent to 66i and\n\n33! per .cent and it was again altered with effect from !st April 1972 to 50: 50 for a period of seven years.\n\n' '\n\nItappears that whenever , Assistant Executive Engineers and Assistant Engineers were promoted to the grade of Executive Engineers, they were first appointed on officiating basis. The quota was however, for reasns which we shall present.ly discuss not adhered to at the time of such promotions with the result that Assistant Engineers came to be promoted as officiating Executive Engineers far in excess of their quota while there was a shortfall in. the promotions of Assistant Executive Engineers so far as their quota was concerned. Now there were no statutory rules governing inter se seniority of Executive Engineers promoted from the grades of Assistant Executive Engineers and Assistant Executive Engineers but there was a Memorandum issued by the· 1'fome Ministry on 22nd June 1949 which laid down general principles of seniority applical;>le to all departments. This Memorandum provided that \"in respect of versons employed in any particular grade, seniority should, as a general rule, be determined on the basis of length .of service in that grade as well a~ seJ1Vice in an equivalent grade irrespective ofwhetherthe latter was under Central or Provin- cial Government iu India or Pakistan.\" The length of continuous, officiation in the grade was thus taken as the yardstick for the purpose of determining seniority in all departments of the g v _ td r.· .. h oern meu an a , ort1orari; m t e grade of Executive Engineers o th ·\n\nbais. of this yardstick, Assistant Engineers promoted as fficatin:\n\nSUFREME COURT REPORTS [l 984) 3 S.C.R. ' .\n\nA Executive Engineers within their _quota would clearly be senior to officiating Executive\n\nAssistant Executive Engineers promoted later as Engineers.\n\nHowever, Respondent No.\n\nI to 3 issued a seniority list on !st July 1971 in which Executive Engineers promoted from the grade of Assistant Engineers in regular manner on the basis of selection made by Departmental Promotion Committee and within their quota were shown as junior to several Executive Engineers promott\\d. much later from the grade of Assistant Engineers. Respondent No.\n\nI to 3 in .making , this seniority list proceeded on the basis that the quota rule specified in the last part of sub-rule (2) of Rule 4 of the Recruitment Rules necessarily implied a systm of rotation and it was required to be strictly applied at the stage of confirmation in the grade of Executive Engineers. In other words, out of three vacancies in the grade of Executive Engineers,\" unless two reserved for promo ti op of Assistant Executive Engineers were filled up . by confirmation of such promotees, the third one for confirmation 'of Assistant Engineer promoted as Executive Engineer could not .be filled.\n\nConsequently, all Assistant Enginers were treated as ad-hoc appointees without any claim to seniority until such time as they were confirmed as Executive Engineers within their quota. The impact of this decision of Respondent No. l to 3 was disastrous for a large number of Executive Engineers promoted from the grade of Assistant Engineers on officiating basis, .. since many of them had to retire without being confirmed and therefore, without any claim of seniority .in the grade of Executive Engineers and even tod.ay, according to the petitioners, there are. hul'ldreds of officiating Executive Engineers promoted .from the grade of Assistant Engineers who are working .in the Central Public Works Department for decades without confirmation and .according to the principle adopted in prnparing the seniority list of lst July 1971, they would have no claim to seniority iii the grade of Executive Engineer~ and woul.d become junior even to recent promotees from the grade of Assistant Executive G Engineers.\n\nThe senioriiy list dated !st July 1971 was preceded by provisional seniority lists which were prepared annually on the basis of the same formula and some of the Executive Engineers promoted from the grade of Assistant Engineers, therefore, without waiting H for the publication .of .the final seniority Jist dated !st July 1971 preferred writ petitions in the Delhi High Court challenging the\n\nI> alidity of the provisional seniority lists. There writ petitionS\" were\n\n• •\n\n. '\n\n. ;\n\nP.S. MAHA1. UNION (Bhagwati. J.) • 861\n\n' referred to a Full Bench since they involved questions of some importance and the Full Bench by a common judgment dated, 20th . M:fy 1971 rejected the contentions of theptitioners and concurring . with the stand adopted by respondent Nos. 1 to 3, held that the quota rule applied not at the stage of initial promotion on officiating basis but at the stage of confirmation and rotational formula for the purpose of determining seniority was implicit in the. quota rule and on this view, the Full Bench upheld the provisional seniority lists which, as already pointed out above, were on the same lines as the final seniority list dated !st July 1971 and which fixed seniority in the grade of Executive Engineers according to the rotational formula based on the quota rule.\n\nThe petitioners in\n\nthse writ petitions thereupon preferred Civil Appeal Nos. 1745, 1746 & 1747 of 1974 after obtaining special leave to appeal against the judgment of the Delhi High Court. Some other Executive Engineers promoted from the grade of Assistant Engineers also filed a direct writ petition in this Court being writ petition 489 of 1972, challenging the seniority list of !st July 1971 on the ground. that the seniority worked out by applying the quota rule at the stage of confirmation and adopting the rotational formula was illegal and that the seniority ought to have been fixed on the basis of length of continuous officiation in the grade of Executive Engineers. These three civil appeals and writ petition were heard together and decided by_ a common judgment of this Court dated 11th December 1974 vidc : A.[(. Subraman & Ors. etc. v. Union of India & ors~(').\n\nThis Court accepted contention of the petitioners that the quota rule was to be applied at the stage of initial promotion in officiating capacity to the 'grade of Exec11tive Engineers and not at the stage of confirmation and that it did not necessarily imply the rotational system and since the . general principles for determining seniority laid down in the Memorandum dated 22nd June 1949 were, on their plain terms, applicable, seniority in the grade of Executive Engineers was liable to be fixed on the basis of length of continuous officiation in that grade as provided in the Memorandum dated 22nd June 1949. Some of the Executive Engineers promoted from the grade of Assistant Execu.tive En.gi_neers who were respondents 'in the writ petition as also 1~ the civil appeal tried to pieet the contention of the petitioner by relymg on a subsequent Memorandum dated 22th December 1959 issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government -0r'rndia but the learned Solicitor General appearing on behalf of the Union of India conceded that t.he said Memorandum had no application to the c d 1 ase an was me evant and this Court also acce!lted the same vie\\j'. This\n\n(IJ (1975)2 S.C.R. 979\n\n\n(198~] 3 S.C.R\n\nCourt pointed out that since the cadre of. Executive Engineers . consisted both of permanent as. well as temporary 'posts, the vacancies referred to in the quota rule comprised vacancies not only in the permanent posts but also in the temporary posts included in the sanctioned strength of the cacfre, barring only such vacancies as were purely of a fortuitous or. adventitious nature and the quota rule applied at the stage when Assistant Engineers and Assistant Executive Engineers were promoted even if it be in an officiating capacity, irrespective of whether the vacancies . were in permanent posts or in temporary posts. This Court also observed that for the purpose of applying the quota rule, .the year must be taken as a unit and the quota rule must be applied in relation to the vacancies occuring in any particular year. This Court also held, relying on the observations in Bishan Swaroop Gupta v. Union of India & Ors('). (hereinafter referred to as the Ist Bishan Swaroop Gupta case) that the ratio of promotions in the grade of Executive Engineers in any particular year was not dependnt upon whether any persons from one class or the other .1ere promoted or not and this was made ch; ar by giving an Illustration that if there were three vacancies in a particular year, two would go to Assistant Executive Engineers while one would go to the Assistant Engineers and even if there were no eligible Assistant Executive Engineers who could be promoted to fill in the two. vacancies belonging to their quota, one vacancy would have to be filled by promotion of an Assistant Eqgineer. If in such a case, having regard tcf the exigencies of the situation two vacancies belonging to the quota of Assistant Executive Engineers had to be filled in by Assistant Engineers for want of availability of eligible Assistant Executive Engineers, the appointment of Assistant Engineers to fill in such two vacancies would be irregular because that would be outside t.heir quota but in that event, .observed the Court; they would have to he pushed down to later years when their appointment could be regularised as a result of absorption in their lawful quota for those three years.\n\nThese conclusions reached by the court were summarised in the form of following six propositions at the close of the judgment:\n\n(I) When Assistant Engineers Class (II) are initially appointed in a regular manner in accordance with the rules to officiate as Executive Engineers, their seniority in service in Grade I will count from the date of their initial officiating appointment in Class I provided, their initial officiating appointment as Executive Engineers was withiv their quota.\n\n(1) (1975) Supp. S.C.R. 491\n\n> -\n\n) h,\n\nP.S. MAHAL v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.)\n\n(2) Their seniority will not be reckoned from the ; late of their A\n\nfutur~ confirmation in Class L\n\nThe above principle is, however, subject to one reserva- . tion, namely, if an Assistant Engineer before his confirmation in Class JI were appointed to officiate in Class I in the grade of Executive Engineer, although within his quota, his seniority will count only from the date of his col)firination in Class II as permanent Assistant Engineer notwithstanding his earlier officiating appointment as Executive Engineer.\n\n(3) The quota rule will be enforced at the time of initial . recruitment, in an officiating capacity, to the grade of\n\nExecutive Enginter a:nd not at the time of confirmation.\n\n( 4) The quota rule will be enforced with reference to. vacancies in all posts, whether permanent or temporary including in the sa.nctioned strength of the cadre (except such vacancies as are purely of a fortuitous or adventious nature) and the operation of the quota rule will depend upon the availability or nonavailability or Assistant Executive Engineers for appointment as Executive Engineers. The non-availability of Assistant Executive Engineers for recruitment to the grade of Executive Eugineer will not postpone the regular recruitment of the Assistant Executive Engineers within their quota. ·\n\n(5) On.ce the Assistant Engineers are regularly appointed to\n\nofficiate as Executive Engineers within their quota they will.be entitled to consideration in their own rights as Class I Officers to further promotions. Their \"birth matks\" in their earlier servic.e will be .of no relevance once they are regularly officiating in the grade of Executive Engineer within .their quota.\n\n(6) Jf Assist; rnt Engineers are recruited as Executive Engineers in excess of their quota in a particular year they will be pushed down to later years for absorption when due within their quota.\n\nThis Court accordingly allowed the writ petition and the civil ap; uals anj directed respondent Nos.·~ to 3 to a111end ad revise the\n\n\n[1984] 3 $.C.R.\n\nseniority list of !st July 1971 in the light of the directions given' in . the judgment and to give effect to the . revised seniority list so prepared.\n\nThough the aforesaid directions were given by this Court for preparation of a revised seniority list as far back as 11th December 1974 respondents Nos. I to 3 delayed implementation of those . directions for a period of over three months and hence the .petitioners in writ petition No. 489 of 19.72 as. also petitioner No. 3 iri the present writ petition filed CMP No. 2563/75 on 18th April 1975 for taking action against respondent Nos. I to 3 for contempt of court.\n\nRespondent No. I however, instead of complying with the directions given by this Court and purging itself of the contempt alleged to have been committed by it, filed CMP No. 3911 of 1975 dated 18th July 1975 for clarification of the judgment on. the ground that they felt 'some difficulty in implementing the directions issued by the Court.\n\nThis application for clarification was rejected by the Cou'rt on 21st July 1975 on the ground that the principles laid down in the judgment dated !I th December 1974 were clear and the Courtt.did not \"see need to clarify them any further,\" and once again the Court. ordered the first respondent to prepare and publish a final seniority \\ list in compliance with the directions given on !I th December 1974.\n\nThe Court kept th_e application for contempt pending and adjourned it to !st.September 1975. Respondent Nos. I to 3 thereafter issued a revised seniority list on 14th August 1975. This seniority list was accolnpanied by a Memorandum also dated 14th August 1975 in which it was stated that the seniority list of Executive Engineers had been revised in the light of the judgment oLthis Court dated I Ith December 1974 . in acco'rdaoce with the principles set out in that Memorandum.\n\nWe shall discuss these principles in detail when we deal with the various arguments advanced on behalf of the parties.\n\nWe may, however, point Out at this stage that, broadly. speaking, for the purpose of determining . seniority in the grade of Executive Engineers from and after 22nd December 1959, respondent Nos .•\n\nI to 3 introduced the carry forward' principle and applied the rotational formula. The officers who had been, with the concurrence of the Union Public Service Commission, officiating as Executive Engineers prior to 25th August 1949 and continued to do so thereafter were shown en, bloc senior to the officers al\\'ointed after 25th August 1949 and so far as the period between 25th August 1949 and 21st December 1959 was concerned, the inter se seniority of persons promoted during that period from the grades of Assistant'Enginees and Assistant Btecutive Engineers within their respective quotas was\n\n1 .\n\n; .\n\n\\ ·,,\n\n1'.s. MAHAL v .. ONION (Bhagwati, J.)\n\n86S\n\ndetermined in accordance with the length of their regular continuonus service as Executive Engineers, subject' to the qu tlilication that in case of Assistant Engineeis wl10 wore promoted as Executive .Engineers prior to their confirmation in the grade of Assistant Engineers, the length of their regular continuous service as Executive Engineers for the purpose of determining seniority would .be computed only from the date when they were confirmed as Assistant Engineers. So far there was no dispute raised on behalf of the petitioners and it was concded that the principle for determining •eniority applied by respondent Nos. I to 3 for the period upto 21st Oecembel' 1959 was valid.\n\nThe petitioners also conceded that those Assistant Engineers \"who had been promoted in excess of the.ir quota were rightly pushed dowri and adjusted within their quota in subsequent years.\n\nThus, for example, Shri AK. Subraman, the first petitioner in writ petition No. 489 of I 912, though promoted in officiating capacity as Executive L1gineer on 27th December 1956. with the approval of the Departmental Promotion. Committee was pushed down, since his promotion was not within the quota of Assistant Engineers at the time when h~ was promoted and his promotion was regularised on absorption within his lawful quota 1ll a subsequent year, But .with effect from 22nd December 1959 a departure was macte by respondent Nos. l to 3 rom the principle of continuous officiation and carry forward principle wa• applied by providing that 86 posts earmarked for promotion of Assistant Executive Engineers to the grade of Executive Engineers in accordance with, their quota during the period prior to 22nd December 1959 which bad remained unfilled owing to non-availability of Assistant Executive -Engineers upto 22nd December 1959 should be carded forward and 86 Assistant Execuiive Engineers promoted after 22nd December 1959 should be adjusted against these posts and they should be assigned seniority en bloc immediately below the last Executive Engineer promoted regularly priof' to 22nd December 1959.\n\nThe result was that the Assistant Engineers who.had beelf promoted as Executive Engineers regularly within their quota subsequent to 22nd December 1959 became junior to the Assistan.t .Executive Engineers promoted against these 86 carried forward_ posts, even though they might have been promoted as Executive Engineers long pr.ior to the promotion of. such Assistant Executive Engineers.\n\nThe Assistant Executive Engineers promoted and adjusted agiinst these 86 carried forward posts were given seniority above the Assistant E, pgineers\n\npromoted regularly within 'their quota after 22nd December 1959 . ' . irrespective as to when such Assistant Executive Engineers were actua\\ly promoled. After the Assistant Executive. Engineers .promoted\n\n8~6\n\n$UPREME COURT REPpJ.tr$\n\n[1984} 3 S.C.R •\n\n• as Executive Engineers were adjusted against these 86 carried forward posts and given seniority en bloc over all Assistant Egineers promoted n; gularly within their quota subsequent to 22nd December 1959, th~ rotatioiful formula was applied in respect of the posts for the period subsequent to 22nd December 1959 and these posts were adjusted on the basis of. the order in which the vacancies in. the respective quotas of Assistant Exec'utive Engineers and Assistant Engineers for promotion as Executive Engineers were allocated from time (o time. The seniority inter-se of Assistant Executive Engineers and Assistant Engineers promoted regularly within their respective quotas. subsequent to 22nd December 1959 was thus. determined by the application of the rotational formula based on the quota prevailing at .the relevant time. But since it had not been possible to fill all the posts allocated to the Assist.mt Executive Engineers' quota and some posts remained unfilled, they were shown as vacant in the senio_rity list prepared according to the roster based on the rotational formula, so that as and when Assistant Executive Engineers\n\nmiht be promoted as Executive Engineers regularly within their quota, they would occupy the vacant posts earmarked for them in the seniority list. The disastrous effect of this senip; ity list was that most of te Assistant Engineers promoted as Executive Engineers regularly within their quota subsequent to 22nd December 1Y59 lost a considerable number of places in seniority and were placed in much worse situation than what they were in under the seniorty list dated 1st July 1971 which was quashed at their instance in writ pettion no. 489 of 1972. The petitioners in writ petition no. 489 of 1972 therefore !lied an additional affidavit on 26th Augµst 1975 pointing out that the seniority list dated 14th August 1975, though purporting to be iu compliance with the directions given by this court, .was. totally in defiance of such directions and respondent Nos. I to 3 should therefore be committed for contempt of this court. It seems that some of the Assistant Ex; cutive Engineers promoted as .Executive Engineers were also dissatisfied with the seniority list dated\n\n14th August 1975 since it took into account deputation vacancies in the grade of Executive Engineers as regular vacancies for the purpose of application of the quota rule and they also therefore filed their objections to this seniority list. The parties filed their respective affidavits in answer to the objections raised against the seniority. list and after the record was completed, 'the court was invited io decide the entire controversy between the parties. on the basis of these objections and affidavits. But . before the court could hear the objections against the seniority list on merits, the first respondent issued on 8th June, 1976 the Executive Engineers, Central\n\n. . .\n\n.t .\n\nP.S. MAHAL v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.)\n\nEngineering and Central Electrical Engineering Service (Group A) (Regulation of Seniority) Rules 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules of 1976) in exercise of the power conferred . under the proviso to Article 309 of the- Constitution. These Rules. were deemed to have.come into force with effect from 10th December 1974, that is one day bc; fore the delivery of judgment by this Court in writ petition\n\n• no. 489 of 1972 and . they substantially enacted in statutory form the same principles which were . set out in the Memo, randum that accompanied the seniority list dated 14th August 1975 and on which that seniority list was based. Rules 2(iii) and 2(iv) which are the material rules provided inter alia as under :\n\n\"2(iii) :. The vacancies in the grade of Executive Engineer, which were earmarked for promotion. from the grade of Assistant Executive Engineer in accordance with quotas prescribed for them during the period from 25th August, 1949 to 21st December, 1959, but could not be filled would be carried forward and filled by Assistant Executive Engineers promoted on or after 22.12.1959. The inter se seniority of such officers will be determined in the order of their seniority in the grade of Assistnt Executive Engineer-those who were considered unfit for promotion being omitted and. they will rank immediately below the.last Executive\n\nngineer, promoted prior to (12.12.1959).\n\n(iv) After all the vacancies in the grade of Executive Engineer, which were earm:rked. for promotion from the grade of. Assistant Executive Engineer in accordance with the quotas prescribed for them during the\n\nperiod from 25th August, 1949 to 21st December, )959, but could not be filled, are filled by Assistant Executive Engineers prompted on or after 22. 12.1959 and such officers assigned seniority as indicated in (iii) above; all subsequent vacancies in the grade of Executive Engineer will . be filled by rotation of vacancies beiween the Assistant. Executive Engineers .and Assistant Engineers on the basis of quotas prescribe'.! for. them ll:ir promotion as Executive Engineer from 'time to time. The inter se seniority of Assistant Executive Engineers and Assistant Engineers so promoted to . the grade of Executive Engineer,\n\n• A\n\nSUpREME COURT REpORTS [l 984] 3 s.c.R.\n\nwill also be determined on the basis of such rotation of quotas. For this purpose, .the recruitment roster shall be drawn as under:-\n\n. (a) When the reservation of the vacancies in the grade\n\nof Executive Engineer for Assistant Executive Engineer and Assistant Engineer is 66-2/3% and 33-1/3% respectively (that is, upto 3i.3.1972)\n\n!st Position ) ) Asstt. Executive Engineer 2nd Position ) 3rd Position Assistant Engineer 4th Position ) . ) Assistant Executive Engineer 5th Position ) . 6th Position . Assistant Engineer and. so on.\n\n(b) Wherr the reservation of the. vacancies in the grade of Executive Engineer for Assistant Executive Engineers, and Assistant Engineers, is 50% each (i.e. from 1.4.1972 and for a period of 7 years:)\n\n!st Position Asst!. Executive Engineers . 2nd Position Asstt. Engineer 3rd Position Asstt. Executive Engineer 4th Position Asst!. Engineer and so on.\" ..\n\nThe petitioners thereupon filed the present writ petition contending that the Rules of 1976 were not applicable to the. petitioners andother Assistant Engineers . promoted as Executive Engineers regularly within their quota prior to 10th December 1974 and if these Rules were held to ,. be applicable then they were unconstitutional and void. The petitioners, in the Circumstances, prai ed in th~ writ petition that the seniority list dated 14th August 1975 should be, quashed and a new seniority list should be prepared on the basis of length of continuous officiation in the grade of Extcutive Engineers so that Assistant Engineers promoted as ilxecutive Engineers regularly • within their quota should have seniority over Assistant Executive Engineers promoted later in point of time .. The writ petition . was admitted and rule nisi was issued upon it and after affidavits. in\n\ntply were flied on behalf of the respondents, the writ\n\n-{ I\n\n\\. .\n\n) > P.S. MAHAL v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 869\n\npetition taken up for 4earing by this Court. - In the A ctmrse of the hearipg, we made a strenuous effort to bring about settlement of this long standing dispute between Assistant Engineer and Assistant Executive Engineers promoted as Executive Engineers but our effort proved futile and hence we are now proceeding B . .\n\n~ deliver our judgment. ' • The peiitioners challenged the validity of the seniority list dated 14th August 1975 and the Rules of 1976 on the following grounds: . . (A) The case of the petitioners apd other Executive Engineers promoted from the grade of Assistant Engineers regularly within their quota from and after 22nd December 1959 but c before I !th December 1974 is covered by the-decision of\n\n1 this Court in Writ Petition No. 489 of 1972 and Civil Appeal Nos. 1745 to 1747 of l\\74\"and hence they' are •f entitled to claim seniority, on the basis of length of continuous officiation, over Assistant Executive Engineers promoted as Executive Engineers later in point of li!J:\\e and the Assis- D tant Executive Engineers promoted and adjusted against 86 carried forward posts cannot be_ given seniotity en bloc over Assistant Engineers promoted as_ Executive Engineers earlier nor can the rotational formula be applied retroj, - spect1vely so as to deprive Assistant Engineers promoted E\n\n~ Executive Engineers of their seniority on the basis of length of continuous officiation in the grade of Executive Engi- • neers and the Rules of 1976 are, tJ that -extent, uncons_titutional and void as being outside the power Of the Central .\n\nGovernment.\n\n(B) Since the Rules of 1976. have been brought into force with .F\n\neffect from I 0th December 1'974, they cannot affect the ·- petitioners and other Assistant Eng inters promoted as\n\n• JI Executive Engineers regularly within their quota prior to ' that date and their seniority vis-a-vis Assistant Executive Engineers promoted as Executive Engineers must continue G , tq be governed by the principle of length of continuous officiation in the grade of Executive Engineers.\n\n(C) If the Rules of 1976 are applicable for determining inter\n\n.rf\n\nse seniority of Executive Engineers promoted from the grades of_ Asistant Engineers and Assistant Executive H Engineers within their respective quotas from and after 22nd December 1959, they are unconstitutional and void\n\n\nas offending Articles 14 and 16 of the ConstitutiQn, since the seniority rules en1r0ciated in the Rules of 1976 being closely linked with the quota rule cor, tiµued maSj!ive departure from the quota rule over a long period of tirlie must result in the break down of the seniority rules and to apply the seniority rules in suc!La situation would create gross inequality of opportunity of employment violative of Artie, lt:s 14 and 16.\n\nThese were the broad grounds of challenge urged on behal( of tire petitioners and we shall now proceed to deal with them in the order c in which we have set them out.\n\nRE : GRouN~ (A). This ground i.s based on the .decision re11dered by this Court in writ Petition No. 489 pf 1972 and Civil.\n\nAppeals Nos. 1745 to 1747 of 1974. It is necessary in order to appreciate this .ground to know wholwere the partfos in writ petition No. 489 of 1972 and Civil Appeal Nos. 1745 to 1747 of 1974.\n\nThe petitioners in writ pe!ition No. 489/1972 were Assistant Engineers promoted as Executive Engineers between 27th December 1956 and 8th September, 1959 by a properly constituted Departmental Promotion Committee and barring one petitioner: all the oihers had been promoted to the grade of Executive Engineers prior to their confirmation as Assistant •Engineers. The promotion of each of the petitioners when made was in excess of the quota of Assistant Engineers and all of them were therefore required. to be pushed down tp later years for absorption in their lawful quota for those years and through this process, their promot.ions were regularised on. different dates subsequent to 22nd Decem.ber. 1959.\n\nThe petitioners were thus all officiating Executive Engineers promoted fromthe grade of Assistant Engineers regularly .within their quottrnfter 22nd December 1959..\n\nThe contesting respondents Nos. 4 to 66 were Assistant Executive Engineers promoted as Ex..:cutive Engineers within their quota between ! Ith March 1957 and 23rd February 1966 and obviously therefore some. of them were Assistant Executive Engineers promoted on dates subsequent to 22nd December\n\n1959. The contest between the petitioners and. respondent Nos. 4 to 66 was therefore not confined only to those Assistant. Engineers and Assistant Executive Engineers who were promoted \\IS Execntive Engineers regularly within their respective qupta prior to 22nd December .1959. but it elltended also to Assistant Engineers and\n\n.. '\n\nr •\n\nP.S. MAl!A'.L v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.,) 871\n\nAssistant Executive Engineers promoted as executive Engine'ers . subsequent to that date. The sanie position obtained also in regard to the contest between the appellants and the respondents in C.A.\n\nNos. 1745-1747of1974. The appellants in these appeals were all Assistant Engineers promoted as Executive Engineers, and though some of them were promoted prior to 22nd December 1959, they were.regularised irt their appointment by. absorption wit.hin their legitimate quota. subsequent to 22nd December 1959, since at the time when they were in initially promoted, their promotions were in exce1?5 of the quota of Assistant Engineers and they were therefore required to be pushed down to later years for absorption within their quota. The large majority of the appellants, if uot all, were thus Assistant Engineers promoted as Executive Engineer regularly within thei.r quota after 22nd December 1959 and in C.A. N_os. 1745-47 of 1974 preferredjby them, they claimed seniority over the contesting respondents who were Assistant Executive Engineers promoted later in point of time. This claim of the appellants was disputed on behalf of the contesting respondents who submitted tnat they had been rightly given seniority over the appellants by adopting the rotational formula. This controversy as to seniority between two groups of Executive Engineers, on the one hand, the petitioners and the appellant!, a\n\nlarge number of whom wre promoted within their quota subsequent to 22nd December 1959 and on the other, the contesting respondents of whom also a sizeable number were promoted as Executive Engineers after 22nd December 1959, was resolved by this Court by its decision dated 11th December 1974 and it was held that the quota rule has . to be applied at the. time of initial recruit- · men! in offiiciating capacities to the gf!ide of Executive Enginerrs and if any Assistant Engineers are promoted Executive Engi-\n\n• c\n\nneers in excess of their quota in a particular year, they would F have to be pushed down to later. years for absorption when due withfo their quota and more importantly, when Assistant Engineers are promoted as officiating Executive Engineers regularly within their quota, their seniority in the grade of Executive Engineer would count from the date of their regular promotion within their quota and op 1he basis of thiiholding, the Unin of India was directed to G amend and revise the seniority list and to give effect to the seniority iists so revised. It is therefore clear and we do not think this position can admit of any doubt whatsoever, that even in regard to Executive Engineers promoted from the grades of Assistant Engineers and Assistant Executive Engineers subsequent to 22nd December 1959, H the direction' given by th' Court was that their seniority inter se should be determined on the basis of lenth of continuous officiatioq\n\n• c\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984] 3 s.c.ll.\n\nin the grade of Executive Engineers counted from the date of their regular promotion witqin the r-espective quota. It is also obviOus on a plain reading of the decision of this Court that the direction given by it in regard• to determination of inter se seniority on the basis of length of continuous officiation was not limited to Executive Engineers promoted from the grades of Assistant Engineers and Assistant E'Xecutive Engineers upto 22nd December 1959 but was on its plain terms applieable to all Executive Engineers promoted from the grades of Assistant Engineers and Assistant Executive Engineers within their respective quota right upto !Ith December 1974 being the date of the decision of theiCourt.\n\nMoreover, it may also be noted, and this is .a circumstance of considerable weight, that in any event the seniority list which wasairected to be amended and revised .by following the rule of seniority based on length . of .continuous officiation was seniority list of !st July 1971 which\n\ndeterminei; I inter sc seniority amongst the Executive Engineers promoted from th~ grades Of Assistant Engineers and Assistant Executive Engineers righi upo June, 1971. It is the inter se senio rity amongst these Executive Engineers covered by the seniority list of !st July 1971 that was directed to be amended and revised on the basis of length of continuous officiation in the. grade of Exe cutive Engineers. The Government of India was therefore bound to revise the seniority list of Executive Engineers on .the basis that the inter' se seniority of Executive Engineers!drawn from the grades . of Assistant Engineers and Assistant Executive Engineers should be determined on the basis oflength of continuous officiation in service after regular appointment within their respective. quota irrespective of whether such regular promotiol! within the respective quota was ' before or after 22nd December 1959.\n\nBut the revised seniority list dated 14th August 1975 issued by the Government oflndia was plainly in defiance 'or this dinction given by the Court and what the Government of India did was to adjust the first 86 Assistant Executive Engineers promoted after 22nd December 1959 against 86 carried forward posts and to give them seniority en.bloc over all Assistant Engineers promoted as Executive Engineers regujarly . within 'their quota subsequent io 22nd December 1959 and then to apply the rotational formula in regard to the other vacancies suJ>. sequent to 22nd December 1959.- The result was that most of the Assistant Engineers promoted as Executive Engineers . lost a large number of places in seniority and were reduced to a position much worse than that in which they were under the earlier seniority !ist of !st July 1971. The success which the petitioners and the appellants\n\n. r\n\nI •\n\n.. ;\n\n•'•\n\nP.$. MAHAL v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 873\n\nhad achieved in writ petition No. 489 of 1974 and Civil .Appeal Nos. 1745-47 cif 1974 was turned into a defeat ano they were badly mauled in t)le ultimate.result. The question is whether despite the direction given by this Court in its decision da(ed 11th December 1974 and in face of it, ihe Government of India was justified in fixing inter se seniority between .Assistant Engineers and Assistant Executive Engineers promoted regularly within their quota from and after 22nd Thlcember 1959 on tl)e basis set out in the Memorandum dated 14th August 1975 and the Rules of 1976. . .\n\nThe Governmeut oflndia sought to avoid the binding obligation of the direction given by the Court in its decision dated 1 lthDecember\n\n1974 by making'the Rules of 1976 effective from 10th Decemher 1974, one day prior _to the date of the decision. The assumption underlying this menoeuvre on the part of the 'Gove'rnment of India was that if the Rules of 1976.were brought into force with effect from a date prior to the decision of the Court in A.K. Subraman's case (supra) they would, nullify'that decision and notwithstanding that decision recognising and giving effect to a different rule 'of seniority, namely, the. rule of length of continuous officiation, the Rules of 1976 would prevail and the inter' sc. seniority between Executive Engineers promoted form the grades of Assistant Engineers and Assistant Exc.cutive Engineers subsequent to 22nd December 1959 would be governed by those Rules. This assumption, we are afraid, is wholly unfounded and the argument base.d upon it camrot be sustained. When this Court has in so many terms'faid.down that the inter se seniority of Executive Engineers promoted from the grades of Assistant Engineers and Assistant Executive Engineers upto 11th December 1974 must be held to be governed by the rule of length of continuous officiation and' the Government of India has been. directed by a writ of the Court to amend and revise, the seniority list of !st July 1971 on the basis of this rule of seniority, it is difficult to see how the effect of this decision can be set at naught. and. the binding character Of the writ issued against the Government of India can be • abrogated by the mere promulgation of the Rules of1976 with retrospective effect from 19th December 1974. It is significant o note that the Explantory. Memorandum which was in the nature of statement of objects and reasons for the Rules of 1976 did not seek to override. the effect of the decision in A.K. Subraman's case (supra) but on.\n\nth~ contrary affirmed thal the principles of seniority set out in those rules were Jaid down on lhe basis of the decision in A, K. Subraman's case (supra), The Rules of 1976 were in no way intended to set at\n\nA -\n\n874 SUPREME COURT Rlll'ORTS [1984] 3 s.G ....\n\nnaught the decision in\" A.K.Sub\"raman's case (supra) in so far as it laid down . the rule of seniority based on length of continuous . officiation for Executive Engineers promoted rrom the grades of .\n\nAssistant Engineers and Assistant Executive Engineers, but it was ciaimed that they were made with a view to giving effect to the . direction contained in that .dcision. That is the reason why we do n\"ot find any non-obstante clause giving overriding effect to the rules of seniority enunciated in tpe Rules of 19_76 notwithstanding the decision in A.K.. Subraman's case (supra). Since the Rules of 1976 purport merely tc;> carry out the direction given in the decision irr A.K. Subraman's case (supra) they cannot have the effect of overrid-' ing that decision and absolving the Government of India from the obli.gation to implement this direction and the Government of India must'therefore amend and revise the seniority list of !st July 1971 by applying the rule of seniority based on length of contiflnous officiation for determining inter se seniority of Executive Engineers promoted from the grades of. Assistant Engineers and Assistant Executive Engineers upto 11th .December 1974. The relative position of the Exe((utive Engineers in regard to their inter se seniority having been 'Crystallised in the decision in A.K. Subarman's case (supra) and a writ having been issued by this Court directing the inter se seniority of the Executive Engineers to be fixed on the basis of leugth of continuous officiation, the Executive Engineers promoted from the gn1d~ of Assistant Engineers were entitled to enforce the writ for determining their\" inter se seniority with the Executive Engineers promoted from the grade of Assistant Executive Engineers in accordance with the rule. of length of continuous officiation. This right of the Executive Engineers . promoted from the grade of Assistant .Engineers under the decision in A.K. Sub.raman's .case (supra) could not be taken away by any thing contained in th~ Rules of 1976. The decision in A.K.\n\nSubraman's case (supra) continued to subsist and the Government of India was bound to determine inter se seniority amongst the Executive Engineers in accrodance with the direction contained in that' decision.\n\nThe respondents in answer to this contention of the petitioners ieaned heavily on tbe decisiop. of this Court in Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Broach Borough Municipality(') and submitted that whatever might have been the rule of seniority on which the decision of this Court in A.K. Subraman' s case (supra) was based, the basis\n\n(1) [1970) I SCRj388.\n\n~ t . ;. _,.\"\n\n... ,\n\nr ,,\n\nP.S. MAHAL v. UIBON (Bhagwati, J.) 875\n\nof that decision was fundamentally altered in so far as inter se seniority of Executive Engineers promoted from the,-grades of Assistant Engineers and Assistant Executive Engineers subsequent to. 22nd Decemeber 1959 was concerned, because Rules 2(iii) and 2(iv) of the Rules of 1979 retrospectively'provided for a different rule of seniority and that rendere.d the decision ineffective. and not binding on the parties We have carefully considered the decision of this Court in Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills case (supra) but we do not think that this decisio!) lays down any such wide proposition .as is conten- . ded for on behalf of .the respondents. It does not say that whenever any actual or legal situation is altered by retrospective legis- lation, a judicial decision rendered by a Court on the basis of such factual or legal situation prior to the alteration would straight. away without more, cease to be effective an}! binding on the parties. It is true that there are certain observatios in this decision which seem to suggest that a court. decision may' cease to be binding when the.conditions on which lt i; based are so fundmentally altered that the decision could not have been given in the altered circumstances.\n\nBut these observations have to be read in. the light of the he question which arose for consideration in that case. There, the validity of the Gujbrat imposition of Taxes by Municipaltities (Validation) Act, 1963 was assailed on behalf of the petitioners.\n\nThe Validation Act had to be enacted because it was held by this Court in Patel Gordhandas. Hargovindas v. Municipal Commfrsioner, Ahmedahad(l) that since section 73 of the Bombay Municipality Boroughs Act, 1925 allowed the Municipality to levy a 'rate' on buildings or lands and the term 'rate' was confined to an imposition on the basis of annualetting value, tax levied by the MJJnicipality on\n\nland~ and buildings on the basis of capital value was invalid. Section\n\n3 of the Validation Act provided that notwithstanding any thing contained in any judgment, decree or order of a court or tribunal . or any other, authority, no tax assessed or purported to have been assessed by a municipality on the basis of capital value of a building or land and imposed, collected or recovered by the municipality at any time before the commencement of the Validation Act shall be deemed to. have 'invalidly assessed, imposed, colle.cted or recovered and the imposition, collected or recovery of the tax so assessd shall be valid and shall be deemed to have ·-always been valid and' shall not be called in question merely on the ground that the assessment of the tax on the basis of capital value of the building or land\n\n\n' H\n\n\n(1984] 3 S.C.R.\n\nwas not authorised by' 1aw and accordingly any tax so assessed befor the com!llencement of the Validation· Act and leviable for a\n\n~- ' period prior to such commencement but not collected or recovered before such commencement may be collected or recovered in accrodance with the relevant municipal law. .It will be seen that by section 3 of the impugned Act the Legsilature retrospectively imposed tax oil' building or Ja11d on the basis of capital value and if the tax was already imposed,. levied and collected on that basis, made the imposition levy, collection and recovery of the tax valid, notwithstanding the declaration by the Com:t that as 'rate', the levy was incompetent: This was ~!early permissible to the Legislature because in .doing so, the Legislature did not seek to reverse the decision of this Court on the interpretation of the word 'rate', but retrospectively amended the law by providing for imposition of tax on land or building on the basis of capital value and validated the imposition, levy collection and recovery of tax on that•basis. The decision of this Court holding the levy of tax to be incompetent on the basis of the unamended law, therefore, became irrelevant and could not stand in the way of fhe tax be.ing assessed, collected and recover ed on the basis of capital value under the law as retro, speciively amended. That is why this Court held that the Validation Act was effective to validate imposition, levy, collection and recovry of tax on land or building on the basis of capital value. It is difficult to see how this decision given in the context of a validating statute can , be of any help to the respondens. Here the decision in A.K.\n\nSubraman's case (supra) which is relied upon by the petitioners is not a mere declaratory judgment holding an impost or tax to be invalid, so that a validation statute. can remove the defect pointing out by that judgment and validate such impost or tax. )3ut it is a . decision giving effect to the right of the Executiue Engineers promoted from the grade of Assistant -En\"gineers.to have their inter se seniority with Executive Engineers promoted from the grade of Assistant Executive Engineers determined on the basis of rule oflength of continuous officiation by issue of a writ directing th.e Government of India to amend and revise the seniority list in accordance wirh such rule of seniority. Rules 2(iii) and 2(iv) seek to substitute with retrospective effect a totally different rule. of seniority in place of that recognised and given effect by the decision in A.K. Subraman's case (supra). That oviously cannot be done. Rules 2(iii) and 2(iv) cannot by retrospective alter ation of the rule of seniority nullify the decision in A.K. Subraman's case which has recognised and . given effect to an existing' rule of seniority and issue\\I a writ against .\n\n'\"\"\n\nI ~\n\nP.S. MAHAL v. UNION (Bhagwati, J) 877\n\nthe Government of lndia'on that basis. If by reason of retrospeetive\n\nA .. ' .alteration of.the rule of seniority the decision is rendered erroneous, the remedy may be by way of review, but so long as the decision stands, it cannot be disregarded or ignored and \"it must be obeyed by the Government of India despite Rules 2(iii) and 2(iv) so far as the ,.. Executive \"Engineers promoted from the grades of Assistant Engineers } and Assistant Executive Engineers; upto 11th December 1974are con- B cerned. This view taken by us finds coq1plete snpport from the judg-\n\n,.. '\n\nment of one of us namely Bhagwati, J. in M.M. Pathak v .. Union of India & Ors .(1) •\n\nThe respondents also relied heavily on 'the decision of this Court in Bishan Sarup Gupta v. Union'~{ India<.') (hereinafter referred to .as ihe 2nd Bishan Sar11p Gupta caJe). It was contended on behalf of the respondents that in the 2nd Bishan Sarup Gupta case, this Co.urt upheld the rotaticinal rule of seniority which determines seniority according to a roster of 1:1 amongst direct recruits and promotees in the Income-Tax Officer& (Class I) Service in the-circumstances closely resembling the present case and Rules 2(iii) and 2(iv) of the Rules of 1976 in so far as they gave senrity en bloc to the . Assistant Executive Engineers promoted to the 86 carried forward posts of Executive Engineers and applied the rotational formula for the purpose of determining seniority amongst Assistant Engineers and. Assistant Executive Engineers promoted to the subsequent vacancies in the grade of Executive Engineers, must, therefore, be upheld by us on analogical reasoning. This contention, plausible though it may seem, is, in our opinion, withouf force and must be, rejected. The situation in the 2nd Bishan Sarup Gpta case was fundamentally oiffe\"rent from that in the present case. The Court, in the J st Bishan Sarup Gupta case, . came to the conclusion that on 16th January, 1959 the quota rule for filling up vacancies amongst\" I nco!!Je-Tax Officers (Class I) collapsll!! by reason of upgrading of 100 Class II posts and with!that'also went. the seniority rule set out in Rule 1 (0 (iii), .because this'rule of seniority could be upheld as constitutionally valid only ifthe'rquota rule was strictly observed, with only minor deviations permitting, and the question, therefore, arose that \"if the seniority_ rule 1 (fl (iii) ceased to be operative from 16th January, 1959' how. is the.inter-se seniority between the.direct recruits and the promotees to be fixed thereafter ?\" There was no\n\n(I) [1978] 3 SCR 346,\n\n(2) [!975) I SCR J04.\n\n• c\n\n87!f\n\n\n[1984) 3 S.C.R\n\nspecific seniority rule to determine inters.e seniority between the direct recruits and the proinotces appointed regularly within their respective quota from and after 16th January, 1959 and though, in the absence of any specific seniority rule, the Court could 'have applied the' residuary rule based on length of continuous officiation, the Court did not do so.because it felt that since the old seniority . rule Jiad ceased to operate by reason of the Infringement if the . . guota rule, it would be for the Government to devise \"a Just and fair seniority rule as between the direct recruits and the promotees for being given effect to from 16th January, 1959.\" It was pursuant to this direction given by the Court that the rotational rule. of seniority impugned in the 2nd. Bishan Sarup Gupta case was made the Government and this seniority rule did not seek to undo the effect of that decision. Now, in the present case also,· by reason of clause 3 of the Memorandum dated 22nd December, 1959,' the rule of seniority based on length of continuous officiation enun ciated in the Memorandum dated 22nd June, 1949 came to an end and the(eafter until the Rules of 1976, were formulated, . there was no specific rule of seniority which governed inter-se seniority bet ween Assistant Engileers arid Assistant Executive Engineers promo te.d as Executive Engineers regularly within their respective quota subsequent to 22nd Decemb!!r, 1959. The Memorandum dated 22nd December, 1959 was undoubtedly in force, but for reasons which we shall presently state, neither Paragraph 5(ii) relied on by the petitioners nor paragraph 6 relied on by the respondents had any application for determining inter-s_e seniority in the grade of Executjve Engineers. The Court could hve, therefore, followed the same course as in the I st Bishim Sarup Gupta case and in the . absence of a spcific rule of seniority to determine icter se seniority amongst Assistant Engineers and Assistant ExecJ!tive Engineers promoted to the grade of Executive Engineers from and . after 22nd December, 1959, the Court could have directed the Governmeq.\\ of In.dia to evo\\e a new rule of seniority. But the\"'Court instead chbse to adopt the rule of seniority based on length of continuous officiation and directed inter se seniority amongst Assistant Engineers and Assistant Executive Engineers prom_oted to the grade of Executive Engineers regularly within their re speetive quota upto the date of its decision, to be determined on the , application of this rule of seniority based on length of continuous officiation. This course, the Court was clearly entiled to adopt, because, as we shall presently point out, when there is no specific rule governing deter- . . mination of seniority in a grade, the norll!al rule applfoable would be\n\n.. ;\n\np .s MAHAL •. UNION (Bhagwati, J.)\n\n~ 879\n\nto determine seniority on the basis of length of continuous officiation in the grade and the Court could certainly adopt this residuary rule and direct inter se seniority in the 'grade to be fu\\ed on the application of this seniority rule. It will .thus be seen that while in.\n\nJst Bishan Sarup Gupta case, the Court left it to the Government to decide what rule of seniority should be dev.\\sed for determining inter se seniority .between !he direct recruits and. the promotees appointed from and after 16th January, 1959, the Court in the present case did not 'leave .it to the Government to evolve a riew Rule of seniority for determining inter se seniority amongst Assistant Engineers and Assistant-Executive Engineers promoted as Executive Engineers from and after .22nd December, 1959 but itself laid down that su, ch inter se se11iority shall be determined on the application of the rule of seniority based on length of continuous officiation. This constituted a 'vital difference between the I st .Bishan Swarup Gupta case and the present case and the government was not . entitled, as in the case .of Bishan Swamp Gupta and other Income-Tax Officers; to evolve a new rule of seniority different from that recognised and given efftct to by the Court in A.K.\n\nSubraman's decision for determining. seniority amongst Assistant Engineers and Assistant Executive Engineers promoted as Executive Engineers regularly with in their respective quota from and after 22nd December, 1959. To permit the Government to do so would be in plain defiance of the direction given by the Court in A:K.\n\nSubraman's case.\n\nThe petitioners reiled strongly on paragraph 5 (ii) of the Memorandum dated 22nd December, 1.959 and contended that the seniority rule laid down in th.is Paragraph governed the determination of seniority amongest f:xecutive Engineers promoted from the Grades of Assistant Engineers and Assistant Executive Engineers from and after 22nd December, 1959 and if this rule of ' seniority as applied, the Assistant Engineers promoted regularly within their quota after selection by the Departmental promotion ,\n\nCommittee in any year would rank higher .than the Assistant Executive Engineers promoted; in the subsequent years and in that view, the seniority list dated 14th August, 1975 and the Rµles of 1976 in so far as they give seniority en bloc to the .Assistant Executive EngineeI.s. promoted to the 86 carried forward posts of Executive Engineers and apply the rotational formula for the pur- ' pose of determining seniority amongst Assistant Engineers and Assistant Executive Engineers promoted to the subsequent vacau...\n\nB ..\n\nSUPREMi COURT REPORTS [1984] 3 s.c .. R. ..\n\ncies in the Grade of Executive Engineers, would clearly be unconstitutional and void as retrospectively affecting the seniority of the Executive Engineers promoted .from the Grades of Assistant Engineers and Assistant Executive Engineers within their respective • qyota from and after 22nd December, 1959. This contention was urged before us with a certain degree of plausibility but 0:1 close scrutiny we find th-at it is not well founded. There are two formidable answers to this contention and. each answer is sufficient to warrant rejection of this contention.\n\nIn the first place, it may be pointed out that this contention i~ no longer open to the petitioners in view of the decision 1n AK Subraman's case where the Court applied the rule of siority based on len.gth of continuous officiation for determining inter-se seniority amongst Assistant' Engineers and Assistant Executive Engineers D promoted as Executive Engineers regularly within their respective quota upto 11th December, 1974, being the date of the decision and directed such inter•se seniority to be determined on the application of this seniority rule. Even if the rule of seniority. set out in Paragraph S(ii) were otherwise applicability must stand negatived by the decision in A.K. Subraman's case which is binding on 'the E parties. Moreover; it may noted that in A.K. Subraman's case it was conceded on behalf of respondents Nos. 1 and 2 that this Memorandum was not relevant to the question of determination of seniority between the petitioners and the respondents. In that cas~ though the promotion of some of the petitipners was regularised by F absorption in their lawful quota subsequent to 22nd December, 1959 and some of the respondents were also promoted as officiating Executive Engineers within the -their quota after that date, the learned counsel appearing on b.ehalf of the petitioners did not contend that Paragraph 5(ii) of the Memorandum dated 22nd G December, 1959 was applicable to determine interse seniority amongst such of the petitioners and respondents as were promoted after 22nd December, 1959 and agreed with the concession made on behalf of fespondents Nos. 1 and 2 that the Memorandum dated 22nd December 1959 was irrelevant :and likewise no discordant notewas struck also by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the e respondent Assistant Executive Engineers and it , was not contended on their behalf that so far as the petitioners and the respondent Assistant Executive EIJtineers promoted rcguh1rly within iheir lawful quc:ie subsequent to 22nd December, 195919Cre concerned, their senioriyt ' . .\n\n• '\n\n)...\n\n-'I .. '\n\nP.s. MAHAL v. UN(ON (8hagwati, J.) 881\n\nwas governed by- Paragraph 5(ii) or any other paragragh of the Memorandum dated 22nd December, 1959.\n\nTherefore, it was the common case of all the parties including the Assistant Engineers . and the Assistant Executive Engineers promoted as Executive\n\nEnginees that neither the rule of seniority set out in paragraph 5{ii) nor the seniority rule set out in any other paragraph of the Menwrandum dated 22nd December, 1959 ivas applicable.\n\nI But; since the case has been argued fully before us we would consider the applicablity of Paragraph 5(ii) of the Memorandum dated 22nd December, 1959 on merits. There can be no doubt that the contention of the petitioners 'based on Paragraph 5(ii) would have had great force if on a true interpretatiol) of that paragraph, the rule of seniority set out in that provision could be held to govern the. determination of seniority amongst the Executive Engineers promoted from the. Grades of A sistant E'ngineers and Assistant Executive Engineers from and after 22nd December, 1959 being th~ date when this rule of seniority came into force. But we are of the view that' the rule of seniority set out in Paragraph 5(ii) of the Memorandum dated 22nd December, 1959 could have no application in case of promotios made to the Grade of Executive Engineers from the Grades of Assistant Engineers and Assistant Executive Engineers. Paragraph 5(ii) of the Memorandum dated 22nd .Deceinber, 1959read.as follows:\n\n\"5(ii) : . Where promotions to a grade are .made from more than one grade, the eligible persons shall be arranged in sep\n\nerate lists in the order of their relative seniority in their respective grades. Thereafter, the Departmental Promotion Committee shall select persons for promotion from each list upto.the prescribed quota and arrange .all the candidates selected from diffeent lists in a consolidated order of merit which will determine the seniority of the persons on promotion to the higher grade.\"\n\nand the rule of seniority set out in this provision was explained by the folfowin g illustration given in an Explanatory Note attached to the Memorandum dated 22nd Decembr, 1959 ;\n\n\"Note : If separate qu.otas for proµiotion have not already been prescribed in the relevant recruitment rules, . the Ministries/Oepartments .may do so, now in consultation with.the Oommission wherever necesssary.\"\n\n. SUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1984) 3 S.C.R. • This rule of seniority, on the plain terms of Paragraph S(ii) applied only in a situation \"where promotions to a Grnde are made from more than one . Grade\" and the .argument of respondents Nos. 4 to 190 was that when this provision spoke of promotions to a Grade from more than one Grade,' it referred to promoiions within the same service, that is, where the grades from which promotions are made as also the grades of promotion are all grades .within the same service, but where one of the grades. from which promotions\n\nar~ made belongs to a lower service than the grade of promotion and the promotion is therefore from a lower service to a higher\n\nservic~, the rule of seniority set out in this provision could have no application. Respondents Nos. 4 to 190 in the circumstances submitted tliat since the grade of Assistant Engineers was in Class II Service while the grade of E:xecutive Engi_neers was in Class I Service, the rule of seniority laid down in this provision was not applicable for determining seniority in the grade of Executive Engineers. We do not think this argument advanced on behalf of. tespondents Nos. 4 to 190 is well.founded. The postulate for the applicability of the rule of seniority set out in this provision simply _reads : \"Where promotions to a Grade are made from more than one Grade\" and it. does not introduce any requirement that the grades from which the promotions are made should belong to the s.ame service as the gaade of promotion. It.is no _doubt true that E . the illustration given in the Explanatory Note refers to promotions. from the grades of Upper Division Clerks and store keepers to the grade of. Head Clerk and all these grades beloug to Class III Service but it would not be right to limit the applicability of the seniority i:ule set out in this provision. by reading into it a limitation which is not there, merely because .an illustration of the applicability of the seniority rule given in the Explanatory Note relates to a case where the grades are all in the same service.\n\nIf the interpretation contended, for on behalf of respondents Nos, 4 to 190 were correct, the rule of seniority set out in this provision would not be applicable where both the grades, from which the\n\npromotions are made, belong to a lower service while the grade of promotion belongs to a higher service and for such a case, there would be no rule of seniority laid down in the Memorandum date 22nd December, 1959 which would be applicable. We are clearly of the view that the rule of seniority set out in Paragraph S(ii) would . be attracted in all cses where promotions to a grade are made from more than one grade, irresp.ective as to whether these grades all belong to the same service or not and, therefore, the applicability of of this rule of seniority could not be repelled in the present case on\n\n•••\n\nl'.S. MAHAL v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 883\n\nthe ground that the grade of Assistant Engineers belongs to Class II A Service while the grade of Executive Engineers belongs to Class I Setvice.\n\nBut, there is a more fundmental rea$on why the rule of seniority et out in paragraph S(li) of the Memorandum. dated 22nd December, 1959 must be held to be inapplicable in the case of promotion to the grade of Executive Engineers. The promotion from the grade of Assistant Executive Engineers was by selection on merit while the promotion from the grade of Assistant Engineers was on the basis of senior.ity-cum-fitncss. Then; was no element of selection on merit in the case of Assistant Engineers as in the case of Assistant Executive Engineers and .the entire basis of promotion from the two grades was different. Moreover, this provision postu lated the existence of one single Departmental Promotion Committee for the selecting persons the promotion from the grades of Assistant Engineers and Assistant Eicecutive Engineers and it was this single Departmental. Promotion Committee, which was to \"arrange all the candidates selected from different lists in a consolidated order of merit which wilt determine the seniority of persons on promotion\" to the grade of Executive Engineers. Now, there was some controversy between the parties whether in the case of promotions to the grade of Executive Engineers, there was one single Depart- . mental Promotion Committee for selecting person from the grades of Assistant Engineers and Assistant Executive .Engineers or there were separate Departmental Promotion Committees-one for selection from the grade of Assistant Engineers and '.the other for -selection from the grade of Assistant Executive Engineers. Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 in the counter affidavit filed by S.R. Roy Choudhury asserted that in case of selectionifrom the grade of Assistant Engineers; the Union PubliciService Commission was associated with . the Departmental Promotion Committee~ while in case of selection •from the grade of Assistant Executive Engineers, the Union Public.\n\nService Commission was not so associated and a combined grouping\n\nof the persons sought to be promoted from the two groups was, therefore, not possible. The first petitioner however, jn the rejoinder affidavit filed by him on behalf of the petitioners disputed the correctness of this avernment made on. behalf of respondents Nos. I and 2 and submitted that it was wrong to suggest \"that the UPSC is not associated with the DPC because in all the selections concerned with the petitioners and the respondents, a Member of the UPSC\n\n• B\n\n\n(1984] 3 S.C.R.\n\nwas on both the DPCS\" and in this. connection he relied on rule 4 of Section 7 of Chapter Vat page 48 of the CPWD Manual, Volume I (1970 Edition). It is not necessary for the purpose of determining t, he applicability of the rule of seniority in Paragraph. 5(ii) of the Memoranrlum. dated 22nd December, 1959 to decide whether a . Member of the Union Public Service Commission was associated with the Departmentar Promotion Committee for selection of AssistantExecutive Engineers or not. It is implicit in the statement of the first .petitioner in his rejoinder affidavit that there were two different Depar.mental Promotion Committees for selecting persons for promotion from the grades of Assistant Engineers and Assistant . Executive Engineers. The composition of the Departmental pro-,\n\nmotion Committees being different and the criteria for promotion to ·!lie grade of Executive Engineers z.lso being different in the case of Assistant Engineers and Assistant Executive Engineers, it is difficult to conceive how combined merit rating on the persons sought to be promoted from the two groups could . possibly be made as envisaged in paragraph 5(ii) of the Memorandum dated 22nd December, 1959.\n\nIt was suggested that a comparative assessment of the merits of the persons chosen from two groups could made on the basis of still be as to which Departmental Promotion Committee would their confidential reports, bnt the. question would still be as to which Departmental Promotion Committee would make the comparative assessment and eyen if the Departmental Promotion Committee\n\nfo~ seleciion of persons to be promoted from the two groups was the same, it is difficult to appreciate how and comparative assessment of the merits .could be made on the basis bf onfidential reports.\n\nThe confidential reports of the officers from the two groups would not be written by the same officer or even by officers of equivalent rank, because in the case of Assistant Engineers promoted as officia- . ting Execµtive E.ngineers in excess of their quota and cnsecjuently\n\npushed down for being absorbed within their quota in fater years, their confidential reports for the preceding three years would be writ~ ten in respect of their performance as officiating Executive Engineers by the Superintending Engineers, while in the case of Assistant Executive Engineers, their confidential reports for the preceding three years would be wrirten in respect of their performance as Assistant Executive Engineers by the Executive Engineers. Thus at the point of time when in any particular year, the officers of the two streams meet for their seniority in _the grade of Executive Engi.neers, their confidential reports would not be by the same officers or eve.n by officers of equivalent rank and it would be .almos 't\n\n• •\n\nP.S. MAHAL v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 885\n\nimpossible to arrive at a comparative .assesment of their respective merits for the ptlrpose of working out the seniority rule.in Paragraph 5(ii) of the Memorandum dated 22nd December, 1959: Moreover, in fact tliis seniority rul~ was never regarded as applicable in case of promotions to the grade of Executive Engineers and the procedure set ont there was not followed at any time while making promotions from the grades of Assistant Executive Engineers and Assistant Engineers to the grade of Executive Engineers. It is, therefore, clear that the seniority rule set out in Paragrah 5(ii) of Memorandum dated 22nd December, 1959 could not be invoked for determining inter se seniority between Executive Engineers promoted from the grades of Assistant Engineers and Assistant Executive Engineers , and' the petitioners could not legistimately found any argument upon thaf seniority rule for the purpose of invalidating the seniority . list dated 14th August, 1975 and the Rules of 1976.\n\nIt is interesting to note that while the petitioners relied on Paragraph 5(ii) of the Memorandum dated 22nd December 1959, respondent Nos. 4 to 190 rested their argument on Paragraph .6 of this.\n\nMemorandum. They contended that the rotational formula adopted for determining seniority a: ongst Assistant Engineers and Assistant Executive Engineers promc <ed to the grade of Executive Engineers from and after 22nd December, 1959, 'Subject to precedence being given ; n bloc to Assistant Execeutive Engineers promoted to fill in 86 carried forward posts of Executive Engineers, was in consonance with Paragraph 6 of the Memoranduni dated 22nd December, 1959 and did not in any way affect retrospectively the inter se seniority of the Executive Engineers promoted from the grades of Assistant Engineers and Assistant Executive Engineers. We are afraid this contention is not open to respondent Nos. 4 to 190 in view of the decision of this Court in AK. Subraman's case and moreover as already pointed out by us while rejecting the contention of the petitioners based on Paragraph S(ii), it was the common case of all the parties including the Assistant Engineers and the Assistant Executive Engineers promoted a~' Executive Engineers that the Memorandum dted 22nd December, 1959 was irrelevant for the purpose of determining the inter se seniority amongst the Assistant Engineers and Assistant .Executive Engineers promoted fr()m and after 22nd December 1959 and .neither the.seniority rule set out Jn Paragraph 5(ii) nor that set out .in Paragraph 6 wa~ applicable.\n\nBut eyen so since full arguments have been advanced before us, we propose to consider the applicability of Paragraph 6 on merits. It is necessary. in order to appreciate the contention raised on behalf .\n\n'o.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS ' .\n\n(1984] 3 S.C.R\n\nof respondent Nos. 4 to 190 to examine t])e scope and ambit of Paragraph 6 of the Memorandum dated 22nd December, 1959 which reads as follows :\n\n \"6. Relative seniority or Direct Recruits and Promotees:\n\nThe relative seniority of Direct recruits and of pro-. motees shall b!J determined according to the rotation of vacancies between direct recurits and promotees which shall be based on the quotas of vacancies reserved for direct recruitment and promotion rspectively in the Recruitment\n\nRules.\" ·\n\nThis paragraph on its plain. terms laid down a rule for deiermining the r.elative seniority of direct recruits and promotees in a grade to which appointments were required to be' made by direct reeruitment and promotion according to a certain fixed quota.· This rule of seniority obviously could have no application for determining inter se seniority in the grade of Executive Engineers, since both Assistant Engin>ers'and Assistant Executive Engineers were inducted ill the grade of Executive Engineers hy. promotion and Assistant Executive Engineers apointed in the grade of Executive Engineers did not bear the character of direct rec.ruits. It is, of course, true that Assitant Executive Engineers wete initialy taken up as direct recruits in the grade of Assistant Executive Engineers in fact that was only method of entry into the grade of Assistant Executive Engineersbut when they. entered the grade of Executive Engineers, they did so by way of promotion just like the Assistant Engineers. There . was, therefore, in the present case, no question of determining relative seniority between direct recruits and promotees. Both the Assistant Engineers as well as the Assistant Executive Engineers were promotees to the grade of Executive Engineers and Paragn1ph .. 6 of the Memorandum dated 22nd December, 1959 had, therefore, no application for determining inter se seniority between thell) in the grade of Executive Engineers.\n\nWe have considered the applicability of Paragraphs. 5(ii) and 6 of the Memorandum dated 22nd December, 1959 on merits and\n\ncome~ the conclusion that the rule ol'seniority set' out in neither . ofthese two .t>aragraphs could have any application. in the present case. But at the same time, we cannot escape the conclusion that by reason of clause 3 of the Memorandum dated 22nd December,\n\n~ , _1\n\nP.S. MAHAL v. UNION .(Bhagwati, J.) 887\n\n1959, the rule of seniority prescribed in the Memorandum dated 22nd June, '1949 stood repealed, except in regard to .determination of seni)lri~ of persons appointed to the grade of Executive Engineers 'prior to 22nd December, 1959. There was, therefore, no rule of seniority )aid down either statutorily or by any executive order or instruction for determining seniority amongst Executive Engineers promoted from the grades of Assistant Engineers .and Assistant Executive Engineers regularly within their respective quota from and after 22nd December, 1959. But it is now wellsettled as a result of several decisions of this Court that in the absence of any statutory rule or executive memorandum or order laying down a rule for determining seniority in a grade, the normaJ rule applicable would be to determine seniority on the basis of length of continuous officiation in service..\n\nVid'e the observations of Palekar J. in -B.S. Gupta v. Union of India.(1) To the some effect we find the observations Krishna Iyer, 1., speaking on behalf of the Court in Chauhan v. Stale of Gujarat(•) where the learned Judge said at page 1057 of the report :\n\n''Seniority, normally, is measured by length of con tin nous officiating service-The actual'!s easily accepted as the legal.\" .\n\nChandracl\\ud, J., as he then was, also . reiterated the same. principle when he said in S.B. Patwardhan v. State of Maharashtra(•) that \"all other factors being equal, continuous officiation .in a non. fortuitous vacancy ought to receive due recognition in determining rules of. seniority as between persons recruited from different sources, so Jong as they be long to the same cadre, dircharge similar functions and bear similar responsibilities.\" 'The inter se senfority of Executive Engineers promoted from the grades of Assistant Engineers and Assistant Executive Engineers regulariy within their • respective quota from and after 22nd December, 1959 was, therefore, determinable on the basis of !ength of continuous officiation in the grade of Executive Engineers and the Court was, in the circumstances, justified in A.K. Subraman's case in holding in. paragraph 1 of the summary of its co11clusions that \"when Assistant Engineers (Class II) are initially appointed in a regular manner in accordanee with the rules to officiate as Executive Engineer, their seriio.\n\n(I) [1975] I s.C.R. 104 at 113.\n\n(2) [1977) l S.CR. 1037.\n\n(3) (1977] 3 S.C.R. 775 at P•J• 800,\n\nG ,\n\n88& SUPRllME COURT REPORTS [1984] 3 s.c.R •.\n\nrity in service in Gr.ade I will counHrom the date of their initial officiating appointment as Executive Engineers was within their quota.\" It is undonbtedly irue that in reaching this conclusin the :Court proceeded on the assumption that ''the Memorandum dated 22nd June 1949 was clearly applicable\" and equally jt must be conceded that this assumption was erroneous in so far as inter se seniority between Assistant Engineers and Assistant Executive Engineerrs promoted from and after 22nd December, 1959 .was copcerned, sine the ruJe. of seniority based on length of conti nuous officiation enunciated in the Memorandum dated 22nd June,\n\n1949. was repealed by the Memorandum dated 2nd December,\n\n1959. But it can hardly be disputed that the conclusion reached by the Court was correct in law, because in the absence of any specifi¢ rule of seniority governing determination of inte[-se seniority bet ween Assistant Engineers and . Assistant Executive Engineers pro moted fro'm and after 22nd December 1959 their interse seniority ' ' was clearily governed by the rule of seniority based on length of Continuous officiation. We do not think it ivould be right to assnme that .the Court in A.K.\n\nSubraman's case overlooked that the rule ofseniority laid down in the Memorandum dated 22nd .June, 1949 was repealed by the Memorandom dated 22nd December, 1959 and it is, therefore, quite possible that when the Court said that \"the Memorandum of June 22, 1949 will clearly apply\", whafthe Court meant was that the rule of seniority based on lengih of continuous officiation would clearly apply for deter mination of inter-se seniority between Assistant Engineers and Assistant Executive .Engineers promoted to the grade of Executive -Engineers. We 'may point out that in any event. the decision in A.K. Subhrama11,'s case holding that the inter-se seniority bet ween Assistant Engineers. and Assistant Executive Engineers prornoted as Executive Engineers should be governed by the rule of seniority based on length of continous officition and that their inter-se seniority should be determined on the application of thi~ rule of seniority, must be regarded as binding on the parties and it ·\n\nis not open to the petitioners or .to the respondents to rai-se any contention contrary to. this conclusion reached by the Court; This conclusion, we may repeat, was not limited to Assistant Engineers and Assistant Executive Engineers promoted as Executive Engineers prior to 22nd December, 1959 but also covered Assistant E:ngineers and Assistant Executive Engineers promoted. subsequent to that date. right upto the date of the decision of the Court. We must, therefore, hold that, notwithstanding Rules :i(iii) (Ind 2(iv) of the ·\n\nP.S. MAHAL v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 889'\n\nRules of 1976, the inter-se seniority between Assistant Engineers A and Assistant Executive Engineers promoted regularly within their respective quota upto ilth December, 1974 must be determined on the basis of length of continous officiation in the grade of Executive Engineers, subject of course to the length of continuous officiation in the case of Assistant Engil)ecrs being computed from the date of their confirmation as Assistant Engineers. . 11\n\nBefore we proceed to consider grounds B and Cit would be conventions at this stage to deal with some of the contentions advanced by respondent Nos. 4 to 190 on behalf of the Assistant Executive Engineers promoted as Executive Engieers against the va!ldity of the seniority list dated 14th August 1975 ; n .so far as ce.rtain. aspects of that seniority list are concerned. Though the seniority list dated 14th August, 1975 was substantially in . favour of Assistant .Executive Engineers promoted as Executive Engineers, they were not wholly satisfied with if and they attacked it in three respects. They urged that respondent Nos. l to 3 had egregiously erred in formulating the seniority list dated 14th August, 1975 in as much as (I) respondents Nos. t to 3 had treated vacancies ari.sing on account of deputation of Executive Engineers to other organisation or departments as vacancies to be filled up in accordance with the quota and so also where an Assistant Engineer or Assistant Executive Engineer . was, promoted for being sent on deputation as' Executive Engineer in another organisation or department, respon dent Nos. 1 to 3 had treated such promotion as filling up of vacancy subject (o the quota rule:; (2) respondent Nos. l to 3 had inclu ded, for the purpose of allocation of quota, also those vacancies which arose on account of death or retirement of Executive Engineers who were promoted from the grade of Assistant Engineers in excess of their quota and whose promotions were not regularised within their quota prior to their death or retirement, as if those vacancies were fresh vacancies governed by the quota rule and (3) while pushipg down Executive Engineers who were promoted from the grade of Ass.istant Engineers in excess. of their quota and adjusting them within their quota in a subsequent year, respondent Nos. 1 to 3 had treated them as absorbeb not from the date when the vacancy arose in their quota but from .Ist January of that year.\n\nThis three-fold grlevaoce .made on behalf of respondent Nos. 4 to\n\n190 cannot be said to be wholly unjustified, We find that_ the second and third 'heads of grievance are well-founded while the nrst is not.\n\nOur reasops for saving so ae. as fo1!ows,\n\nG •\n\n. SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984] 3 s.c.R •\n\nSo far as the first head of the grievance. of respondent Nos. 4 to 190 is concerned, their argument was that on a true interpreta tion of the judgment of this Court in A. K. Subraman's case, the quota i:ule was applicable only to permanent vacancies in t!ie posts,. whether permanent or temporary, included in the sanctioned stren gth m the cadre of Executive Engineers \"except sucjl vacncies as were purely of a fortuitors or adventitious character\" llnd since the vacancies arising on account oT depu.tation of Executive Engineers to other organisations or department could not be regarded as per\n\n- manent vacancies but were vacancies -of fortuitous or adventitious character, they were not subject to the .quota rule and could not be t.11ke1;1 into account for applicability of the quota rule. This argument, plausilile though it may seem at first sight, cannot be su.stained.\n\nIt is, first of all, necessary to clear the ground by pointing out that according to the judgment of this cQurt in A.K. Subraman's case, the qnota rule was to be applied not with reference to the posts in the cadre of Executive Engineers but with reference to vacancies. in . such posts. There might he more than one vacancy in a post in the course of a year or any other unit o(time aJJ.d it was with reference to each such vacancy that the quota rule had to be applied. Now a vacancy may arise in a post on account of death, retirement or resignation of the incumbent of the post or it may arise on account of bis dismissal, discharge a reversion from the post or promotion to a higher post oi: by reason of his deputation to a11other department or organisation. Whenever, therefore, a vacancy arises in a post, whatever he the reason by which the vacancy is caused, it would have to be filled up by promotion of an Assistant Engineer or av Assistant Executive Engineer and the quota. rule would apply so. long as the vacancy is a permanent vacancy, that is to say, in the words of Palekar J. in the 1st Bishan SarupGupta's case, a .acancy which is not \"for a few days or a few months\" or otherwise adventi tious\". We have in these words of Palekar, J., adopted wholly and completely in A.K. Subraman's case, a negative definition of what may be regarded as a permanent vacncy for the purpose of. appli cation of the quota rule ad it clearly shows that a vacancy which is of a short duration arising on account of fortuitous or advel\\, litous circumstances would not be regarded as permanent vacancy and in such a case, by reason of the very nature of the va<:ancy, there would be no question of making recruitment to the cadre as to attract the applicability of the quota rule. It is therefore obvious that if a vacancy arises on account of an incumbent going on leave or for training or on deputation for a short period, it would be a fortui-\n\n''\\\n\nP.S. MAHAL v. UNION (Bhagwati. J.) 891\n\ntous Qr adventitious vacancy and tlie quota rule would not be attracted in case of such a vacancy. But wher~ a vacancy arises on account\n\nof the incumbent going on deputation for a reasonably long period and there is no reasonable likelihood of the person promoted to fill such vacancy liaving to revert, the vacancy would be subject to the quota rule, because. it would be a regular vacancy in tlfe post of Executive Engineer (\\nd the person promoted to fill the vacancy would be. an officiating Executive .Engineer who would continue as such without reversion until confirmed and his promotion would, ·\n\ntherefore, be by way of recruitment lo the cadre of Executive Engineers. Of course, it should be made clear . that the vaclmcy which .\n\n. attracts the applicability of the quota rule, is the vacancy in the post included in the sanctioned strength of tlie cadre of Executive Engineers and not the vacancy in the deputation post. There may be a vacancy in a deputation post in another department or ori; anisation and an Executive Engineer holding a post included in the sanctioned strength of the cadre of Ex, ecutive Engineers may lie .sent to such deputation post, but the vacancy which would call for the application bf the quota rule in such a case would be the vacancy arising in the pest of Executive Engineer within the cadre by reason of the incumbent of that post going to the deputation post and not the vacancy\n\nin the deputation post which would be filled up by the Executive Engineer going on deputation\" It is,. therefore; apparent that what bas tq be considetec! for the applicability of the quota rule is a vacancy in a post included in the sanctioned strength of the cadre of.Executive Engineers nd the sanctioned strength; which. has to be taken into account, is not merely the sanctioned strength of .. the cadre of Executive Engineers in the Central Public Works Department btit the sanctioned strength of the cadre of Executive Engi- F neers in the entire Central Engineering Service, Class I. The sanctioned strength of the cadre of Executive Engineers in the\n\nCentrl Engineering Service, Class I, may include not only posts of Executive Engineers in the Central Public Wor'ks Department but also posts of Executive Engilleers in other departments and organi-\n\nG sations. ·\n\nNow, so far as the Central Engineering Service, . Class I, is\n\n~ . - . concerned, the deputation of officers in various grades including the grade of Executive Engineers is a normal feature. of the 'Service.\n\nThe Central Public Works Department is an agency 9f the Centr~J H Government operating .throghout Country. for construction, maintenance and repair of all works .and buildings financed from Civil\n\n.. D\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1984] 3.s.C.tl.\n\nWorks Budget except for certain. departments which bad their own engineering units or which may get their Civil works executed through private agencies. The ofilr.ers borne ou the cadres of Chief Engineers, Superintending Engineers .and Executive Engineers in the ·\n\nCentral Engineering Ser; vice, Class I, are therefore sent on deputation to various departments and organisations and some of them are also on deputation with the Government of Bhutan, Delhi Municipal Corporation, New Delhi Municipal Committee and various. other public undertakings. The normal duration. of such deputation is one to three years and it may even be extended beyond three years.\n\nThe record shows that the ni)mber of Cl1ief Engineers, Superintend il, lg Enginee; s and Exec11tive. Engineers on deputation to various departments, organisations.· and public sector undertakings has always been substantial and by way of illustration, it may be pointed out that there were as on !st January, 1975, 90 out of\n\npproxin:iately 360 Executiv~ Engineers, 33 out of 80 Superin.tetiding Engineers and S out of 20 Chief Engineers on deputaiion. On an . average, about 25 to 40% of the Executive Engineers are on deputa tion to various organisations, departments and public sector under-, takings and whenever any such Executive Engineers are sent .on deputation and the vacancies in.the posts arising on account of such deputation are filled up by Assistant Engineers or Assistant Executive Engineers regularly se\\ected through Departmental Promotion Committee,. such promotees have never bad .to .revert, because the deputations are for a minimum period of one year and in most cases for three yearsand they go on rotating. The vacancies arising in the posts of Executive Engineers orr account of deputation to other departments, organisations and public sector undertakings ai:e, therefore, .Jong term .vacancies and cannot be characterised as vacancies of fortuitous or adventitious character and, consequently, according to the judgment in A.K. Subraman:s case, the quota rule must be held to be applicable with reference to such vacancies.\n\nThis has always b.een the view taken by the Government of Ind.ia,\n\naSis clear from ihe letter-dated 19th qctober, .1971 addressed by the Ministry of Works and Housing, Government of India to the Secretary,. Union Public j/; ervice Commission; where, we fihd the following observation :\n\n\"Jn accordance with the recruitment rules the posts at' the level of Executive Engineers are to be filled by promotion of Assistant Executive Engineers and Assistant\n\nEnineers iii the ratio of 2: I, ·. This ratio is pplicble tq\n\n~. ~. \"\n\nP._S. MAHAL v. UNION (Bltagwati, J.)\n\nboth permanent and temprary . Vc!incies including the deputation. vacancies\". (Emphasis supplied) ·\n\n~93\n\n. It is significant to.note that the view that deputation vacancies being long term vacancies should be regarded as . permanent vacan-·\n\n~ ci; s for the aplcability of the quota '. rule prevailed with' the .\n\n~.oven1ment of India as. far back as 19th October 1971 long before the present cntroversy arose between the parties and even prior to the decisions. in Bishan Sarup Gupta's case~ and A.K. Subraman.'s\n\ncase~ . We find that this view was reaffirmed by the _Government of India in the Office Memorandum dated 30th December. 1976 issued by the Department of Personnel and Administrative Reforqis, Cabinet .\n\nSe.cretariat \\Yher'e it has been stated as foJlows under the heading\n\n\"etermination of Regular Vcancies\":- . \". ' . ciu j~ essential that the number of vacacies . in respect of which a pan.el. is to be prparfd _by a o:P.C. . should be estimated a~ accurately a.s possible. For this purpose the vacan.ties to be taken into account should be t.be clear vacancies arising in post/ grade/scfrvice due 'to death, retirement, resignation, regular long term promo tion, of incumbents of one. post/grade to higher. post/ .-.. 'grade and vacancies arising from creation of additional\n\n'pots ' on a long term bais and thse arising:out of depu\n\ntation.' As. regards vacancies arising out of deputation it is clarified that for . the. purpose of drawing up a . slect list. for promotion, vacancies arising out of depritatio~ for periods more than one year should be taken into\n\naccount~ due note however. eing kept also o.f the number of the dt:putationists likely to return to the cadr\"e and who\n\n• , gave to. be provide'd for. Purely short term .vacancies\n\narising. as a resu)t of officers proceeding on lea_ve, on . . deputation for a shorter period, training etc., should not . . be taken into account for the purpose o~ -preparation. of\n\n1 . a panel\":\n\nThe same stand .has been consistetly taken. by th~ Governmet l of India. in the various affidavits fiied on its behalf' in these proceedgg as \".also in the miscellaneous proceedjngs arising in A.K. '!; ubi:amap's case. W_e may usefully reproduce the following para\n\ngraphs from the Counter-Affidavit 'filed on behalf of the Government oflndia in C.M.P.No. 6689 of 197S'in A..K.. Subraman's case:.\n\n. E\n\n\n\"8. With reference to paragraph 2(a), J submit that this Hon 'ble Court, no doubt, stated that all the vacancies except fortuitous and adventitious ones in the sanctioned strength in the cadre have to be taken in.to account. So far as the deputation vacancies are concerned, the position is that the post of.the borrowing a.uthority tow. hich a deputa- \"'!' tll . tion is made is certainly outside the cadre of the Central. ..\n\nEngineering _and Electrical Engineering.._ Service, but the consequential vacancies which arise because of the deputa . tioil are certainly vacancies in the cadre. The deputations are generally for a periocl of a year and more and the con- . sequential vacancies are also long term vacaru::ies, which cannot be aUed for.tuitions or adventitious\". \"15. With reference to paragraph 4 (8) (I) (a); I say that the post in the '' borrowing department is certainly a post outside .the sane- . , .tioned strength of the C.P.W.D. However, deputatiol)\n\nof an officer belonging .to the C.P.W.D. to fill such a post causes a vacancy in the C.P.W.D ..• It is this vacancy which\n\nhs been added and not then post on tlfe borrower's estab. lishment. This has been done because in our case, the quota allocation is linked to vacancies and not to post ; of course, the' vacancies must be in posts in the cadre\". . , .•\n\nSo also the Union of India reiterated the same view .in . the Counter Affidavit filed on its be.halfin C.M.P. No. 2663 of 1975 in A.K. Subraman's case :\n\n \"Vacancies : The quota system, based on w\\llch the date of commencement of the regular appointment of eithdr side' had to be fixed,, in accordance with the directives of the Hon'ble Court, had been introduced by the-~\n\nCentral Engineering Service (and Central Electrical Engin\" - eering Service) Recruitment• Rules promulgated on 25 .. 8.1949 ... Hence the vacancies had to be identified right from this date.\n\nVacancies in ihe grade of Executive Engineers had occurre!l not only due to death, retirement, resignation etc. ill the grade but. also be.cause of promotion (to higher >-- , grade) dismissal from this or higher grades, reversion to ., lower grades and degutation to other organisations like the Delhi Development Authority; undertaking, he retains his lien on the post in th.e parent department and he has !I\n\n>-.\n\nP.S. MAHAt v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 895\n\nright to come back to that post which he can exercise at any time .and hence the vacancy caused by his deputation cannot be regarded as a prmanent vacancy. liable to be filled by regular . recruiment to the cadre of Executive . Engineers. It was urged that so long as an Executive Engineer who has \"gone on .deputation retain~ his lien on the post in the parent department, that post canno.t be filled by promotion of another Assistant Engineer or Assistant Executive' Engineer by way of substantive recruitment to ·.the cadre of Executive Engineers, because two officers cannot hold a )ien on the same post simultaneously. We do not ' think this argument is wellfounded. There is here no question of violation of the ba&ic principle of service jurisprudence that two officers cannot simultaneously have a lien on the .same post. .It issignifipant t, o note, and this was common ground b;.tween the parties, that the vacancy which atrracts the applicability of the quota rule is not {)nly a vacancy in a permanent post but also a vacancy iii a temporary post and obviously no Executive Engineer\n\nc:i.n haye a lien on a temporary post and therefore, extingurshment of a lien on a post is not ne\"cessary in . order that there should be .an available vacancy for the. applicability of quota rule. It is now settledas a result of the decision A.K. Subraman's case that the quota rule is to be applied at the time of initial other Central or State Government undertakings or Departments, UN assignments etc. none of which could be called fortuitous or adventitious because they were all long term appointments covering a .\n\nperiod of one to two years or. more.· F\n\nCalculafions of all such vacancies with reference to the ca so and .circumstances as called out from the original papers right from 25.9.1949\" was a herculean task and it was difficult to he sure that there had been no errors r . omissions. Hence, to be sure, the answering respondents decided to treat each long term promotion to the grade of Executive Engineer, for whatever reasons, as a vacancy, oli the assumplion that such a promotion could not have been made without the existence o~ a vacancy\" .. . \"\n\n- -< It is thus clear that the vacancies in the posts of Executive 'Engineers arising on accounfOf deputation of Executiv1; Engineers\n\n. fl\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984] 3 s.c:r •\n\nto other. departments~ organisations and public undertakings for a period of one. or more years were long term vacancies and they . could not be regarded as fortutitous or adventitious iu character and hence they were subject to the quota rule. . . .\n\nBut the answer sought. to be given on behalf of respondents Nos. 4 to 19.0 to repel this conclusion was that when an . Executive Engineers goes on deputation to another department, organisatiQ.11 .; or .public sector recruitm.ent in an officiating capacity to the cadre<. of Executive Engineers and not at the time of confirmation. It' is, therefore, not necessary hat the lien of an officer on a post of Executive Engineer must be extinguished before any promotion to •that post can be made jn accordance with the quota rule, Even where a confirmed. Executive Engineer is promoted to the. pot of Superintending Engineer but continuous to have his lien on the post of Executive Engineer, a yacancy wollld undoubtedly arise in . the post of Executive Engineer by reason of his promotion and such vacancy would clearly be a permanent vacancy liable to b.e filled according to the quota rule. So also a vacancy attracting ihe applicability of the 11uota rule. would arise where an Assistant Engineer or Assistant Executive Engineer regularly promoted with in his lawfui quota dies or retires before confirmation .. The occurrence of a vacancy in the.post of Executive Engineer inviting the\n\napplication•of the quota rule has, therefore, nothing to do With the extinguishment of lien on the. post; The argument of respondenf+ Nos. 4 to 190 proceeds on the assumption that promotion to the' post of Executive Engineer contemplated under the recruitment rules can be made only when there is no liep of any other officer on that post,· for otherwise there will be two. officers having lien on the same post. But this assumption is . wholly fallacious, because promotion according to the quota rule envisaged in the Rcruit ment Rules is, as pointed out in A.Ko Subraman's case, initial promotion in an officiting capacity and has nothing ta do wh confirmation. The contention of respondents Nos. 4 to 190 woillc!l. have had considerableforceif promotion to the cadre of Executive Engineers were dependent' on confirmation and the quota rule\n\nwere applicable at the stage of confirmation. But this position stands compietely negatived by the decision. in A.K. Subraman's. case. Therefwe, Whenever there is a permanent vacancy, that is t~ say; a long 1erm vacancy in a post of Executive Engmeer, it . would have to b~ filled according to the quota rule irrespective .of , the fact whet.her there is any. officer having a lien on that post,. It ,\n\n. '\n\n\").-•\n\np .s. MAHAL y. UNION (Blzagwati, J.) .891\n\nis true that a confirmed Executive Engineer who goes on deputation may revert to the post .on which he has a lien and so also an officiating Executive 'Engineer who goes on deputation may revert back on termination of his deputation and theoreticaUy, i11 either case, an Assistant Engineer or Assistant Executive Engineer who is promoted to fill the vacancy arising on account of deputation may have to revert, but in actual practice and rt'ality,. not a single Assistant Engineer or Assi.stant Executive Engineer promoted as Executive Engineer to fill a vacancy arising n account of depta tion, has had to revert, because deputation is a normal feature in this service and 20 to 25 per cent of the Execvtive Engin.eers are continuously on deputation. Even if one Executive , Engineer com.es back on termination of his deputation, another has to be sent in his place and .the deputatio11s thus go on rotating wi, th the re.suit thai the vacancy in the post of Execvtive Engineer arising on account of deputation does not cease and the .Assistant Engineer or Assistant Executive Engineer promoted as Executive Engineer to fill tlie vacancy does not ever have to revert and. consequently, the vacancy filled by him is really and truly a permanent or long term vacancy which has to be filled according. to the quota ; ule.\n\nIn fact, if the quota-rule were l)ot to be , applied with reference to such a vacancy, the position would be that w]lenever an Executive Engineer goes on deputation for a period . which may extend to .anything between three . to five years, the Central Government\n\nwould be entitled to ijromote an Assistant Engineer ignoring the claims of Assistant Executive Engineers and this would be. totally arbitrary in a situation, where, as mentioned above, 20 to 25 per cent of Executive.Engineers are on deputatiou.\n\nBut then it was contended on behalf of respondents Nos. 4 to 190 that even if a vaca.ncy arising by reason of an. Executive Engineer going on deputation were regarded as ·.a permanent vacancy attracting the applicability of the quota rule, the position .would be .different where an Assistant Engineer or Assistant Executive Engineer Was promoted for being. posted as Executive Engineer in a deputation post. To such a promotion, it was urged, the quota ule' would not arPlY• because the promotion in' sq.ch a case would not be to fill a po; t in the sanctioned strength of the . cadre of Exepµtive Engineers but would be to fill a deputation post of Executive. Engineer in an:Qther department,. organisation or public. sector imdertaking. This argument; plausible though it may seem at first sight, is in our opinion not sustainable. When a\n\n898 SVPREME COURT REl>ORTS [1984] 3 s.c.R ..\n\ndepartment, organisation or public sector undertaking. requests the\n\nCntral Public Works Department to make available the services of an Executive Engineer on deputation, The Central Public Works . Department has two options available to it : either to send an Executive Engineer . who is occupying a post in the cadre of Executive Engineers, whether confirmed or on officiating basis or to promote an Assistant Enginer or .Assistant Executsve Engineer as Executive Engineer and straightaway send hi111 outside to the depu: talion post. Now if the former mode of proceeding could lead to a vacancy attracting the applicability of the quota, it is difficult to appreciate how the latter mode of proceeding should not lead .to a • similar result. In both cases, the ultimate result would be pro · motion of an Assistant Engineer or Assistant Executive Engineer as Exeutive Engineer against demand for . deputation. Where an Assistant Engineer or Assistant Executive Engineer is promoted as Execqtiv'e Engineer and immediately sent t6 a deputation post ii) another department, organisation or public sector undertaking, whaf really happens is that in the eye of law, a pµst is temporary created in the cadre of Executive Engineers to which the Assistant Engineer or Assistant Executive Engineer is promoted and then sent on deputation. Obviously, an Assistant Engineer or. Assistant Executive Engineer cannot be promoted . directly to the post 0f Executive Engineer in another departi; ient, organisation or public sector undertaking : he can be promoted only to a post of dxecutive Engineer In Centrai Engineering Service Class I and then asked to go on deputation .. Of co11rse, an Asistant Engineer Or Assistant Executive Engineer can be directly sent on deputatiort .to the post of Executive Engineer in another department, organisation or public sector undertaking without being promoted. as Executive Engineer in his own department and in such a case there will be no question of filling a vacancy according to thequota rule. The Assistant Engineer or Assistant Executive Engineer who goes . on deputation as Executive Engineer fo another department, organi sation or public sector undertaking would in such a case continue to remain an Assistant Engineer or Assistant Executive Engineer in his own department, but would be merely occupying the post. of Executive Engineer in the other department, organisation or public sector undertaking as a deputationist and on the termination of his deputation, he wo<uld revert. as Assistant Enginee.r or Assistant' Ex.ecutive Engineer in .his own depatment. Such a deputation cannot be regarded as filling Of a vacancy in the post of Executive . :Engineer in the Central Engineering Service Class I so as to attract\n\n< •\n\n,,1\n\nP.S. MAHAL v. u.NION (Bhagwati, J.) 899.\n\nthe applicability of the quota . rule. But .when an Assistant Engineer or Assistant Executive Engineer is promoted as Execut.ive Engineer in his own department .and simultaneously With such promotion, he is sent on deputation to another department, orga nisation or public .septor undertaking, he goes on such deputation as Executiv~ Engineer, so that if for any reason his deputation comes to an end, he reverts to his own department as Executive Engineer and not as Assistant .Engineer or Assistant Executive Engineer. The petitioner filed before us several orders of pro\n\nmotion of Assistant Engineers as Executive Engineers for being sent on deputation to other departments or organisations and these orders clearly showed that the Assi.stant Engineers in. respect of whom these orders were passed, were promoted as Executive Engineers and then, simultaneously, under the. same orders, sent on deputation to other departments or organisations. Obviously, in cases of this kind, the promotion of the Assistant Engineer or Assistant Executive Engineer would be to a post in the cadre of Executive Engineers and it would be subject to the quota rule. The present contention of respondents Nos. 4 to 19_0 seeking exclusion of deputation -:acancies.from. the applicability of the quota rule must, therefore, be rejected, provided bf cour.ge the promotion of the As.sistant Engineer or Assistant Executive Engineer to .a deputation vacancy is a regular promotion, that is, after selection by the Departmental Promotion Committee and. is not an ad hoc promotion.\n\nRespondent Nos. 4 to 190 are however on firmer ground. in regard to the . second head of complaint urged by them against the validity of the seniority list dated 14th August, 1975 It is true that in preparing the seniority list dated 14th August, 1975 respondent Nos. 1 to 3 included, for the purpose of allocation of quota, also those vacancies which arose on account of death or retirement of Executive Engineers who were promoted from the grade of Assistant Engh, eers in eitcess of their quota and.whose promotions were not regularised by absorption within their quota prior to their death di' retirement and treated these vacancies as if they were fresh vacan . cies governed by the quota rule. This was clearly an error on the part of respondent Nos. 1 to 3. It is difficult to see how a vacancy in the post of Executive Engineer which, according to the quota rule, is aliocable to an Assistant Executive Engineer but which is filled up by irregular appointment of an Assistant Engineer cn be treated as a fresh vacancy when the Assistant Engineer irregularly promoted . .\n\n' B\n\n• F\n\n' .\n\n900 . SUPREME COURt REPORts\n\n(!984] 3 S.C.!L\n\ndies. or retires fro1n ser.vice before regularisation of. his promotion by absorption within his .quota. So long as the quota rule is binding and enforceable, the Assistant E.ngineerwhois irregularly promoted to fill in a vacancy which belongs ti> the qu.ota of Assistant Executive Engineers is an illegal oc.cupant of the vacancy. and the vacancy ; continues to be & vacancy belonging to the. quota of Assistant Executi'{e Engineers and liable to be filled by promotion of an Assistant Execu.tive Engineer. In fact, the promotion of an Assistant Engineer to the vacancy would be invalid as being contrary to .the quota rule, but in .the 1st Bishart Sarup Gupta case, the Court, in order to . obviate undue:Jiardship, evolved the theory of temporary invalidity of the promotion by holding that the promotion would only be irregular and it could be regularised by absorption within the quota in later years. The vacancy though pro tempore filled irregularly by an.\n\nAss.istant Engineer would continue to belong tothe quota of Assistant Executive Engineers and it can be filled only by an Assissant Executive Engineer if the quota rule is to be strictly. observed. The ·.death or retirement of an irregular promotee to the vacancy.cannot therefore give-Tise to a fresh vacancy : it is the .sanic vacancy which continues until properly filled by promotion of an Assistant .Executive Engineer at a subsequent date. If in .such a case the death or retirement of an irregularly appointed Assistant Engineer were to be treated as creating a fresh vacancy, if would lead to gross distotion.\n\nLet us take a hypothetical case where in a particular year say 1956, there are 12 vacancies in the posts of Executive Engineers out of which 8. vacancies belong to the quqta of Assfstant Executive Engineer and 4 vacancies belong to the quota of Assistant Engin er. but only 2 Assistant Executive Engineers .are available with the result that 6 Assistant .Engineers are irregularly appointed !o fill the remain, ing 6 vaca.ncies allocabletb 'the Assjstant Executive Engineers. Now suppose in the next year 1957 there are no new allocable vacancies but 6 Assistant . E)lgineers irregularly appointed in the earlier year 1956 die or retire, If the socalled vacancies arising by reason of the death or retirement of these 6 irregularly appointed . Assistant E.ngineers were to be treated a's fresh vacancies 4 out of them would go to Assistant Executive Engineers while 2.would go to Assistant Engineers The result would be that the Assistant Engineers would get 2 . ore vacancies which they would not have\n\nP.s. MAHAL v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 901\n\ngot if all the 8 vacancies allocable to Assistant Exe.cutive Engineers i~ the year 1956 \\Jad been filled by promotion of :Assistant Executive Engineers and there had been no irregular promotion of 6 Assistant Engineers. Thus the Assistant Engineers would gain two more vacancies within their quota.by reason of irregular appointment of 6 Assista.nt Executive Engineers. That would be allowing Assistant Engineers to profit from irregular :appointments which result can never be countenanced. We must; therefore, accept the contention of respondent Nos. 4 to 190 under the. second head ofcomplaint. • •\n\nThe third head of complaint urged on behalf of respondent Nos. 4 to 190 must also likewise be held to be well-founded. Respondent Nos. 4 to 190 are right in contending that while pushing down Executive Engineers promoted from the grade of Assistant Engineers in excess of their quota and adjusting them within their quota in .a subsequent year, respondent Nos. !. to 3 must treat them as absorbed from ti)e date when a vacancy in t):lat year arises in the quota of ,\\ssistant Engineers and not on a notional basis from !st 'January of . that year. What the decision in A.K. Subraman 's case requires is that Assistant Engineers promoted as Executive Engineers in excess of their quota must be pushed down and their promotion must be regularised by absorption when tl\\le within their quota in a subsequent year and therefore they can be adjusted only in a vacancy which arises in that year and is allocable to the quota of Assistant Engineers. There is nothing in the decision in A.K. Subraman~ case which warrants that when Assistant Engineers promoted in excess of their quota are pushed dowh and absoroed within their quota i.n a subsequent year, their absorption should be reckoned nationally from 1st January of that year. What respondent N'os. 1 to 3 have done is that all Assistant Engil)eers who had been promoted in excess of their quota and who having been pushed down were entitled to be. abs<)rbed within their quota in a particular year, are treated as absorbed from !st January of that year and placed en hloc senior to the Assistant Executive Engineers promoted tn that year within their quota. The.re can be no doubt that respondent Nos. I to 3 were not entitled to determine seniority on this basis. This Assistat Engineers promoted in excess of their quota and therefore pushed down for absorption within their quota in a subsequent year could be absorbed . only in a vacancy arising in that year and allofable to the quota of Assistant Engineers. ·\n\n' '\n\nI .\n\n\n(1984] 3 S C.R.\n\n Re : Ground B\n\nThis ground of challenge i.s clearly qnsustainabJe lmd must be rejected. It is true that the Rules of 1976 have been brought into force with effect from 10th December, 1974'.bui in rules 2(iii) and 2 (iv) they lay down a rule of seniority. affecting Assistant Engi- . neers and Assistant Executive Engineers . promoted as Executive Engineers reguhrly within their respective quota from and after • 22nd December, 1959. It iS therefore not possible to say as a matter of plaih grammatical construction that the Rules. f 1976 cannot affect. tlie petitioners and other Assis Lant Engineers promoted ·.regularly within there quota prior to 10th December, 1974.\n\nThe question 1; vould however remain whether Rules 2 (iii) and 2 (iv) of the Rules of 1976 in s6 far as they lay down a rufo of senior; ty different from the .rule of length of continuous offiiciation.for Executive Engineers promoted fro:n and after 22nd Dcember, '1959, are constitutionally valid. This is the question which we shall proceed to consider under Ground C.\n\nRe : Ground C.\n\nWe have already pointed out that though the Rules ofl976 havo been broug1t into force with effect from. IPth Dcem'Jer 1974, th•y do notlhve the effect of over-riding the dcision in A.K.\n\nSubraman's case directing th' Government to amend and revise the Syniority list. so. as to fix int.er se seniority between. Assistant Engineers and. Assistant Executive Engineers promoted regularly within iheir Nspective quota up to 11th Docember 1974, by applying the rule of seniority based on length of continuous officiation. On this view, Rules 2(iii) aq, d 2(iv) of the Rules of 1976, in so far as they provide for seniority being given en bloc to the Assistant Executive Engineers promoted to the 86 . carried forward posts of Ex, ecutive . Engineers and apply the rotat; onal formula for the pmpse of determining seniority amongst .Assistant Engineers and Assistant .Executive Engineers promoted to the ubsequent vacancies, must be held to be ineffective \"qua Assistant Engineers & Assistant .Executive Engineers promoted up to 11th December, 197 4 and so far as these Assistant Engineers and Assistant Executive Engin•ers are concerned, their i1lter se seniority must be held to be governed by the length of.conti nuous officiation in the grade o( Executive Engineers.\n\nBut the q\\lestion wou_ld still survive whether inter se seniority be.tween Assistant Engineers and Assistant Executive Engineers promoted\n\nsubsequent to 11th December, 1974 would have to: be determined in acordance with th~ rotational rule of seniority.· set out in Rule\n\n' .\n\n\" '\n\n• • •\n\nP. s, MAHAL V UNION (Bhagwati, J.) ..\n\n2(iv) or this rotational rule of senirioty is unconstitutional and void as offending Articles 14 and 16 of the Costitution, It may also be considered in the alternative, on the assumption that Rules 2{iii) and 2(iv) of the Rules of 1976 govern the determination of inter se seniority between Assistant Engineers and Assistant Executive Engineers promoted from and after 22nd December, I 959 despite the decision in A.-K. Subraman case, whether tnese rules can successfully meetthe challenge of Article I 4 and 16 or they would be liable to be. condemned as constitutionally invalid\n\nWe may firill consider the constitutional validity of Rules 2(iii) and 2(iv) of the rules of 1976 in. so far as they affect the inter se seniority of Assistant Engineers and Assistant Executive Engi,- neers promoted regulrly within their respective quota from and after 22nd December, 1959. Now the position which obtained on 22nd December 1959 was that there were 86 _Assistant.\n\nEngineers who had been promoted m excess of their quota and correspondingly there was short-fall of: 86 in pre-motions of Assistant Executive Engin'eers.\n\nW~ are no1 sure whether in the light of what we have said . above, the excess in promotions of.\n\nAssistant Engineers and the deficiency in promotions of Assistant .\n\nExecutive Engineers would stand redued, but that would not make any difference so far as the present question' is concerned and we shall therefore proceed on the• footing that the excess in\"promotions of Assistant Engineers and the short-fall in' promotions of Assistant Executive Engineer s was 86. The question. 'is whether, consistently with the constitutional requirement, of Articles 14 and 16, en bloc seniority could be given to the Assistant Executive Enginers promoted to fil, l the 86 vacancies allocable to the qu9ta of Assistant Executive Engineers and remaining unfilled by them up to 22nd December 1959. These 86 vacancies were under Rule 2(iii) directed to be carried forward and filled by Assistant Executive Engineers promoted on or after 22nd December 1959 and the Assistant Executive Engineers no promoted were\"given seniority en bloc. The petitioners objected to this movision in Rule 2(iii) for carry forward of these 86 vacancies and contended thatthere could be no carry forward of any vacancies which were not filled by Assistant Executive Engineer~ and so promotions of Assistant Executive Engineers could be made to fill such vacancies as from thedate when they arose in any particular year. This objection raised on behalf of the petitfoners is partly sustainable and partly. not. Where the quota rule is a statutory rule which h, as to be scrupulously observed, the vacancy which according to the quota rqle is allocable to promotees\n\n• •\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (198 4] 3 s.c'R ..\n\nfrom one source cannot be fllled by a promo tee from another source . and if, notwithstanding the quota rule, the. vacancy is filled by a promotee from that other source, such promotion would be irregular and as pointed out above, the vacancy would continue to remain a vacancy, Hable to be filled. by a promotee from the first mentioned source.· Ii would not be strictly accurate to say that in such a case the vacancy is carried forward in the sense in which. that exepression has been used in T. Devda!an v. Union of India(1). llt was pointed out by this Court in Mervin Cou/inhs v. The Co/lee tor of Customs, Bomb.ay (2) : \" ...... in the case of the carry forward ruk certain quota is fixed annually for a certain lass of persons and it is carried . forward from year to year. This is.very different , from a case where a service is qivided into.two parts and there are. two sources of recruitment, one of promotion and the othe.r by direct recruitment.\n\nIn such a case the whole cadre .of a particular service is divided into two parts and there is no question of carrying. anything forward . from year.to year in (he matter of annual intake\". These observations were quoted with approval by a Bench of Five Judges of this Court in G.D. Kelkar v: Chief Collector of Imports and Exports(a) . . What therefore happens in such a case is that the . vacancy which is\n\nro temporc irregularly occupied by a promotee f:om another source remains available for being filled by a protnotee from the source to . which the vacancy belongs'and in that sense,.it may loosely be said that the vacancy i.scarried forward from the year in which it arose to a subseqifent year in which it is properly filled by a promotee .from the right source. This is precisely what Ray, C.J. speaking on .\n\nbehalf of the Court in V. S. Badami v. State of Mysore('> said at page 823 of the Report :\n\n\" ...... if promotions are madetcJ vacancies m excess of the promotional quota, the promotions. may no.t be total illegal but would be irregular. The promotees cannot claim any right to hold the promotionafposts unless the vacancies fall within their quofa. Ifpromotees occupy any vacancies. \"which are within the qu\"1a of direct recruits when direct recrui.tme:tit takes place the direct .recruit will occupy the vacancies within their quota. Promotees who were occupy:\n\ning the vacancies wirhin the quota of direct recruits will ' . . .\n\n(I) AIR [1964) S.C. 179.\n\n(2). [1966] 3 SCR 600.\n\n(3) Jt 967] 2 SCR 29. ·\n\n(4) .[1976] 1 SCR 815 .. •\n\n'_..,_--.:\n\n. '\n\n- +.\n\nP. s. MAHAL v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 905\n\neither be reverted or they will be absorbed in the vacancies A within their quota in the facts and circumstances of a case.\" . .\n\nWe must therefore hold. that Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 were right in proceeding on the basi~ that 86 vacancies allocable to. the quota of Assistant Executive Engineers remained unfilled as on 22nd December, 1959 and were available for being filled by Assistant Executive Engfoeers subsequent.to that date.\n\nBut the question arises whether the Assistant Executive Engineers promoted to fill these 86 vacancies which were, to use the expression in Rule 2(iiil, carried forward from the period prior to 22nd December 1959 could be deeme.d to have been promoted from the dates whert tnese 86 vacancies arose or they could. be said t9 have been promoted only from the date.s of their actual appointment.\n\nNow obviously there could not be any appointment of Assistant Executive Engineers to these 86 vacancies with retrospective effect and they must be taken to have been promoted to these 1l6 vacancies\n\nonly from.the dates of their actual appointment and from no earlier dates. Tf that be. so, it is difficult to appreciate how, consistently with the mandate of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, an Assistant Executive Engineer appointed io one of these 86 vacancies could under Rule 2(iii) be given seniorit:,; as if he were promoted to . . that vacancy.on 22nd December 1959, though he might in fact have , been promoted years later and on this basis given precedence over Assistant Engineers promoted regularly within their quota long prior to theactual.proril.otiol). ofsuch Assistant Executive Engineer.\n\nThe consequence of giving effect to Rule. 2(iii) providing en bloc seniority to the Assistant Executive Engineers promoted to fill these 86 vacancies . would be that a lar-ge number of Assistant Engineers though promoted regularly within their quota years before the actual promotion of such Assistant Executive Engineers would become junior to such Assistant Executive Engineers and their promotional opportunities would be seriously prejudiced .. In fact, they would . have to wait until the Assistant Executive Engineers promoted to\n\nthese 86 vacancies were promoted further as Superintending Engineers and then only they would have a chance of being considered fot further promotion and .even such chance would recede and be reduced to almost nil.if the rotational rule of seniority were to be applied irt respect of promotions to subsequent vacancies as set out in Rule 2(iv}. This would become amply clear if we look at the chart Annexure I to the writ petition which reproduces the seniority list d:ited 14th August 1975 along with other particulars relating\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS • [1984] 3 s.c.R.\n\n. to the Assistant Engineers and Assistant. Eitecutivc Engineers promoted as Executive Engineers. The .Assistant Execµtive Engineers promoted to these ,86 'carried forward' vacancies figure in the seniority list dated 14th Augusn975 at Sr. Nos. 100 to 185 and the particulars given in regard to them 'in the chart Ex. I show that though the Assistant Executive Engineers at Sr. Nos. 122 to 185 were promoted (IS Executive Engineers after 1962, they were placed higher h seniority than petitioner No. 1 who was as Assistant Engineer promoted as Executive Engineer and absorbed within his legitimate . quota in .1962 and so also the Ass.istant Executive Engineers at Sr. Nos. 173 to 185 though promoted after 1966 were given seniqrity above petitioner No. 2 who was an Assistant Engineer promoted as Executive Engineer and absorbed within his lawful quota in 1966, . Rule 2(iii) in so far as it gives en bloc seniority to the Assistant Executive Engineers promoted to these 86 vacancies irrespective of the date when they were actually promoted and pushes down in seniority Assistant Engineers though p'romoted regularly within their quota prior to theactual promotion of such Asstt. Executive Engineers, thereby prejudicially affecting their promotional opportunities, must therefore be held to be violative of Articles .14 and 16 of the Constitution.\n\nWe find that rule 2(i'1) also suffers from.the same infirmity, It provides for rotational rule of seniority based on. the prevailing quota for determining inter se seniority between Assist.ant Engineers . and Assistant Executive Engineers promoted to the grade of Exe cutive Engineers from and after 22n~ December 1959 subject to en bloc seniority being given to the. Assistant Executive En$ineers • promoted'- to the 86 'carded forward' vacancies as set out in Rule\n\n F 2(iii). Obviously, if Rule 2(iii) providing for en bloc seniority to be given to the Assistant Executive Engineers promoted to the 86 'carried forward' vacancies is unconstitutional and void as held by us in the . preceding paragraph of this judgment, it mu; t follow that the inter se seniority between Assistant Engineers and A; sistant Executive Engi;, eers promoted from.and after 22nd December 1959 ..\n\nG would be governed wholly by the rotational. rtile of seniority set out in Rule 2(iv). Now there can be no doubt that a rule of seniority . based . on rotation of vacancies according fo the quota prevailing at the time. would be constitutfonally acceptable if the quta nik were strictly implemented, barring minor deviation.s.\n\nIt is well settled as Hl a result of. several decision of this Cou{t that there is nothing . inherently wrong in working out the quota rule. by adopting .the\n\n rotational rule of seniority. But, as pointed out by this Court in\n\n) ..\n\nP. s. MAHAL v. UN!ON (Bhagwati, J.)\n\nN.K. Chauhan v. State of Gujarat (supra) quota is not 'so inter-locked with rota that where the former is expressly prescribed, the latter is impliedly inscribed\". The quota rule does not inevitably invoke the appfoation of the rotational rule of seniority. Even where a quota is prccribed for recruitment from different sources, there may be different modes prescribed for determining seniority of officers on entry into the cadre. In fact, right from 25th August, 1949 when the quota rule was introduced upto 22nd December, 1959, the seniority amongst Assistant Engineers and Assistant Executive Engineers promoted as Executive Engineers was governed not by the rotational rule by but the length of continuous officiation. It is therefore obvious that even where there is a quota rule governing recruitment to a cadre from differnt sources it is not necessary that there should be any particular rule of seniority.\n\nThe Government may in its wisdom adopt an appropriate rule of seniority which may be base'!! on length of continuous officiation or may follow a roster arranged in conformity with the quota rule so that seniority may be determined according to the rotation of vacancies under the quota rule. Th're may also be any other appropriate rule for determining seniority in a cadre. Iiideed, a• pointed out by Krishna Iyer, J. in N.K. Chauhan's case, myriad ways can be conceived \"for determining seniority of officers on .entry into a cadre.\" But whatever may be the rule of seniority adopted by the Goverrncnt, it is well settled that it must satisfy the best of equality enshrined in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The question in each case would be whether on the facts and circumstances of the case, the rule of senioritv prescribed by the Government meets the challenge of the constitutional provision enacted in Articles 14 and 16.\n\nWe have already pointed out thattlierc is no inherent vice in the quota rule being operated through the rotational rule ofseniority.\n\nWhere the rotational rule of seniority is adopted, the relative seniority of promotees from different sources has to be determined on the basis of a roster maintained in accordance with the quota rule, so that when promotion of an officer is regularly made wi.thin his quota, he is fitted into the vacancy'reservd for promotees from his sowce and his seniority is reckoned from the date when such vacancy arose. But this rotational rule of seniority can work only if the quota rule is strictly implemented from year to year. Some slight deviations from the quota rule may not be material but as pointed out by Palekar, J. in the Bishan Swarup Gupta's case, \"if there is enormous deviltion, other considerations may arise\". If the rota-\n\n\n(1984] 3 S.C.R.\n\ntional rule of seniority is to be applied for determining seniority amongst officers promoted from different sources, the quota rule must be observed. The application of the rotational rule of seniority when thee is large deviation from the quota rule in making promotions is bound to create hardship and injustice and result in impermissible discrimination. That is why this court pointed out in A. K. Subarmans's case that \"when recruitment is from two or several sources, it should be observed that there is no inherent invalidity in introduction of quota system and to work it out by a rule of rotation. The existence of a quota and rotational rule, by itself, will not violate Article 14 or Article 16 of the Constitution ,;, ......... It is the unreasonable implementation of the same which may, in a given case, attract the frown of the equality clause.\" The rotational rule of seniority is inextricably linked up with the quota rule and if the quota rule is not strictly implemented and there is large deviation from it regularly from year to year, it would\"be grossly discriminatory and unjust to give effect to the rotational rule of seniority. We agree wholly with the observation of D.A. Desai, J. in A. Janardhan v. Union of India(!) that \"the quota rule is linked with the seniority rule; if the first breaks down or is illegally not adhered to, giving effect to the second would. be unjust, inequitous and improper\". This was precisely the reason why the Court in the first Bishan Sarup Gupta's case held that with the collapse of the quota rule, the rule of seniority set out in Rule l(f) (iii) also went.\n\nNow in the present case the record shows that there has been enormous deviation from the quota rule in the promotions of , Assistant ExecutiveEngineers and such deviation has continued from year to year over a period of almost 25 years.\n\nWe have in an earlier part of this judgment adverted to the fact that as on 22nd December, 1959 there was a short fall in the promotions of Assistant Executive Engineers to the extent of 86, because the quota rule had not been properly implemented from 1953 up to 22nd December, 1959 and promotions of Assistant Executive Engineers had not been effected according to the quota applicable to tl)em. It is interesting to note that even after 22nd December, 1959, the quota was consistently breached from year to year except for four or :five years and there was massive under recruitment of Assistant Executive Engineers, with the result that as on 31st July, J975, the cumulative shortfall in promotiom of Assistant Executive Engineers was 206 while there was corresponding excess in promotions of Assistant\n\n(I) Cl\\ No. ~~O of 1980 decided on 26t~ i\\wil IQ/!~\n\n' ••\n\nP. s. MAlfAL v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.)\n\n; Engineers to the extent of the same number. Though there was such large deficiency in promotions of Assistant Executive Engineers and corresponding excess in promotions of Asstt. Engineers npto 31st July, 1975, no attempt was made by the Government to set right this imbalance by stepping up the recruitment of Assistant Executive Engineers in the subs•quent years so as to restore the balance in the composition of tho cadre of Executive Engineers. On the co'trary, the under recruitment of Assistant Executive Engineers continued uninterrupted and by the end of f981 the short-fall in the promotions of Assistant Executive Engineers increased to 247 with corresponding excess in the promotions of Assistant Engineers.\n\nThis enormous deviation from the quota rule on account of massive under recruitment of Assistant Executive Engineers has led to grave distortion and it is difficult to see how, in this situation, the rotational rule of seniority can be applied consistently with the mandate of equality enshrined in Articles 14 and 16. The rotational rule, of seniority must obviously break down when there is such massive departure from the quota rule regularly from year to year leading to continuously increasing deficiency in promotions of Assistant Executive Engineers and corresponding exces~ in promotions of Assistant Engineers.\n\nIt is obvious that by reason of under-recruitment of Assistant Executive Engineers and over-recruitment of Assistant Engineers in breach of the quota rule over a period of almost 25 years, most of the Assistant Engineers having been promoted in excess of their quota would have to be pushed down to subsequent years when they could be absorbed within their lawful quota aud many of them would have to wait for 7 to 12 years on an average before their promotions could be regularised by absorption within their quota. But, despite regularisation of their promotions after a wait of seven to twelve , years, they would not be entitled to claim seniority over Assistant Executive Engineers promoted later in point of time because by reason of the application of the rotational rule of seniority based on the roster maintained in accorance with the quota rule, the Assistant Executive Engineers though promoted subsequently would be entitled to have their seniority reckoned from the date when the vacancy .allocable to their quota arose. The Assistant Executive Engineers though promoted long after the regularisation of the promotion of the Assistant Engineers would gain seniority over such Assistant Engineers, beause they would be fitted into the vacancies kept reserved for them and artificial seniority would be given to them on\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1984] j S.C.R.\n\nthe fictional hypothesis that such vacancies were filled by them at the time when they arose. The result would be that Assistant Executive Engineers who were promoted years after the regularisation of the promotions of Assistant Engineers by absorption within their quota which regularisation also would have taken place after they had been working as Executive Engineers for a period of about 7 to 12 years would become senior to such Assistant Engineers even thOugh at the time when they were promoted, such Assistant Engineers would have already been functioning as Executive Er.gineers for a number of years. The Assistant Executive Engineers promoted later in polnt of time would shoot up in seniority irrespective of the length of their service in the grade of Executive Engineers, by reason of the rota tional rule of, seniority based on the roster ma.intained in accordance with the quota rule. It is obvious that giving such artificial se11iority to Assi.stant Executive Engineers promoted years after the regular promotions of Assistant Engineers would completely blight the promotional opportunities of such Assistant Engineers, because for promotion to the higher grade of Superintending Engineers, they would have to wait for consideration of their case until the Assistant Executive Engineers who are given artificial seniority oyer them arc\n\npromote~. even though they would have put in a much longer period of service as Executive Engineers than such Assistant Executive Engineers. The point we are making would become obvious if we consider a few illustrative instances.. Take, for example, the case of petitioner No. I. He was promoted as Executive Engineers on !st October, 1956 but since his promotion was out side the quota of Assistant Engineers, he had to be pushed down and he was ultimately absorbed within his lawful quota in 1962 and though he became a regular promotee within his quota since 1962, he was placed at serial No. 273 in the seniority list dated 14th August 1975 'While many Assistant Executive Engineers promoted much later in point of time than 1962 were placed higher than him in seniority. The result was that he never got a ehance for being considered for promotion as Superintending Engineer and he ultimately retired as Executive Engineer on 31st January, 1978. The case of petitioner No. 1 may now be contrasted with that of J.P. Singhal, who was recruited as Assistant Executive Engineer on !st Februarv, 1967 and who was promoted as Executive Engineer on 14th Janu\"y, 1972. Though J.P.\n\nSinghal was not even in service at 'the date when petitioner No. 1 became a regular promotee Executive E:agineer in 1962 and he was promoted as Executive Engineer almost ten years after the regular promotion of petitioner No. 1 by absorption within his quota, JP.\n\nSinghal was placed in seniority at Sr. No. 113 while, as pointed out\n\nP. s. MAHAL )'. UNION (E!wgwuti, J.) .9tl\n\nabove, petitioner No. l was placed at Sr. No. 273 in the seniority list dated 14th August 1975, with the result that J.P. Singhal came to be promoted as Superintending Engineer on 15th February 1979\n\nwhile petitioner No. I did not even have a chance of being considered for such promotion. Similarly we may also contract tj, J.e case of pcUioner No. 2 with that of R.A. Armugam. Petitioner No. 2 was promoted as Executive Engineer on 7th April, 1959 but since his ptomotion was not wjtbin the quota of Assistant Engineer, he had to be pushed down and he was ullimately absorbed within his quota in 1966 and though he was regularly promoted as Executive Engineer within his quota since 1966, he was placed at serial No. 396 in the seniority list dated 14th August, 1975 while R.A. Armugam who was recruited for the first time as Assistant Executive Engineer on 20th JanuJry .1971 and promoted as Executive Engineer only on 14th April, 1975 .was placed higher in soniority at serial No. 260. Thus, the resultof the application of the rotational rule of seniority was that R.A. Armugam who was not even in service at the date when petitioner No. 2 became a r, gularly promoted Executive Engineer and who was promoted as Executive Engineer 9 years after petitioner No. 2, acquired several places above petitioner l'/o. 2 in seniority. It is not necessary for us to multiply instances where Assistant Executive Engineers promoted years after the regular promotion of Assistant Engineers have sh.ot up in seniority above such Assistant Engineers by reason of the applicability of the rotational rulo of seniority, with devastating effect on the promotional chances of such Assistant Engineers. Such instances are legion and, in fact, Q!most every Assistant Engineer has in the process suffered loss of seniority vis-a-vis Assistant Executive Engineers promoted years later in point of time. The application of the rotational rule of seniortty h1S thus resulted in gross discrimination against Asstt.\n\nEngineers promoted as Executive Engineers, in so far as their opportunities for promotion to the higher grades are concerned.\n\nTh~ seed of discrimination attracting the frown of the equality clause\n\nh'8 germinated from the fact of reg-liar undue deviation in actual implemenation of the quota rule and obviously the deviation from tho quota rula, the greater and more intense 1s the discrimination.\n\nWe. have already pointed out the enormity of the deviation from the deviation from the quota rule in the present case and this deviation continued from year to year for a period of over 25 years has consid•crab Y aggravated the discrimination against the Assistant Engineers.\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1985] 3 s.c.R.\n\nNow it is obvious that if Assistant Executive Engineers recruited at a young age are given artifical seniority several years above the Assistant Engineers who have already been pushed down 7 to 12 years bdore absorption within their lawful quota, they would get chances of promotion much earlier than the Assistant Engineers and once promoted, they being young in age would occupy the posts in the higher grades for a much longer period and that to a large extent block the chances of promotion of Assistant Engineers even when their turn comes for consideration though at a much belated point of time. If officers from two sources are promoted according to quota, then officers from both so,1rces get promotion to posis in the higher grade on the basis of continuous officiating service in the grade, reckoned from the initial date of appointment subject, of course, to merit and this process goes on continuously due to progressive retirement of officers in the higher grades, such officers being of an appropriate higher age group. But if, as in the present case, relatively younger officers drawn from one source are given artificial seniority over older offiicers promoted from the other source, such younger officers would, by the reason of the artificial seniority given to them progressively occupy most of the posts i~ the higher grades and because they belong to a younger age group, they would block the promotional avenues open to the officers drawn from the other source. This disastrous situation has occurred here because of the rotational rule of seniority and the result is that, as at the end of 1981, out of 101 Superintending Engineers 93 were fro!ll the source of Assistant Executive Engineers and so far as the higher cadre of Chief EngiJieers is concerned, all the 19th Chief Engineers were from the same source, namely, Assistant Executive Engineers, though in the grade of Executive Engineers, out of a total of 384 Executive Engineers, 103 only were from the source of Assistant Executive Engineers while 281 were from the source of Assistant Engineers.\n\nThese statistics clearly highlight how discriminatory and unjust has been the application of the rotational rule of seniority to the Assistant Engineers.\n\nIt was c.ontended on behalf of respondent Nos. 4 to \\90 that the under recrnitment of Assistant Executive Engineers during the period from 1949 to 31st July, 1975 was due to the fact that the Government took the view, which of course was found erronebus by the court in A.K. Subraman's case that the quota rule wa; to be applied only at the stage of conflrmation and it was because a differe.nt view was taken in A.K. Subraman's case, namely, that the\n\n, .\n\n- '\n\n.,. ..\n\n!>. s. MAHAL v, UNION (Bh; gwatf, J,)\n\nquota, rule was applicable at the stage of initial promotion in an\n\nofficiating capacity to the grade of Executive Engineers and not at the time of confirmation that this imbalance in seniority took place.\n\nThis contention is clearly unfounded but even if it were not so, it is entirely immaterial, because the constitutional validity of the rotational rule of seniority cannot depend upon what the government thought to be the correct position in regard to the applicability of the quota rule. The question whether the rotational rule of seniority is constitutionally valid or not has got to be determined in the light of the interpretation placed on the application of the quota rule by the decision in A.K. Subraman's case, because that must be accepted as the correct interpretation and in the context of that interpretation, the constitutional validity of the rotational rule of seniority must be judged. But, as pointed out above, we do not thi.Jk this contention urged on benalf of respondent Nos. 4 to 190 is correct. We are not inclined to accept the submission of re; pondent Nos. 4 to 190 that under-recruttment of Assistant Executive Engineers took place because the government thought that the quota rule was to be applied only at the stage of confirmation. There is considerable material placed before the court to show that the government rightly understood the quota rule to be applicable at the stage of initial promotion but failed to strictly implement it Paragraph 4 of the minutes of the meeting held on 14th May, 1968 in the office room of Shri B.R. Patel, Secretary, Ministry of Works and Supply, clearly emphasii:<:s this position by stating that \"the intake of Assistant Executive Engineers should be increased by considering 2/3rd of all the temporary and deputation posts in the grade of Executive Engineers and above in the departmeat as permanent ones for the purpose of working out th\" strength at the junior scale.\" So also we find a categorical statement to the same effect in the letter dated 19th October, 1971 addressed by Shri Kartar Singh, Joint Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Works and Housing-a letter to which we have already referred earlier. The Government also took up a positive stand in the affidavit in reply filed by P.B. Kulkarni in\n\nA.K. Subraman's case where it was stated: \"I submit that the quota rule is to be applied as and when vacanqies in the grade of Executive Engineers are required to be filled but as already stated earlier, it ha5 not bee\\) possible to apply this quota rule rigidly at the time of officiating promotions as promotions from the grade of Assistant Engineers have been in excess of t!J.eir quota.\" (Emphasis supplied).\n\nIt will thus be seen that the government was under no illusion in regard to the true position relating to the applicability of the quota. rule. But the government deliberately resorted to the policy of under\n\n91~\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS !1984] 3 s.C R.\n\nrecruitment of Assistant Executive Engineers because, as set out in the Note regarding Cadre Review of the Central Engineers Service Class I, prepared and submitted to the Government in June, J 978 it was felt that \"it is not po; sible to recruit enough officers in Clas; I junior scale to fill up lhe quota at Executive Engineers level as it\n\nwould worsen the promotion prospects of direct recruits to <ilass I and make the service totally unattractive\". The Note regarding Cadre Review also pointed out:·\n\n\"A. perusal of form VI would indicate that in the next ft ve years the annual • recruitment would be of the order of 80 and in the subsequent five years it would be of the order of 40. According to the existing Rules, the vacancies in the grade of Executive Engineers are to be filled up by the promotion of Asstt. Executive Engineers (Group A) and Asstt. Engineers (GroupB) in the ratio of 1 : I Sine<: the annual intake of Asstt. Executive Enginers is to be corelated with the vacaacies that would be available in the grade of Executive Engineers, the ., innual intake of Asstt.\n\nExecutive Engineers (CES GROUP A) would be 40 in the next ftve years arid 20 in the subsequnt five y'earn. It has been already explained in para 2 : 3 : 6 that when the annual recruitment was less than I 0, the direct recruits were able to reach the Junior Administrative grade in 10 to 11 years.\n\nWhen this was subsequently increased to 20 per annum the period taken for promotion has increased to 14 years which is likely to increase further if the annual intake is main tained at the same level. For this reason, it is not considered desirable to appoint direct recruits to C.E.S. Group A in large number. In the Indian Railways Service of Engineers, the recruitment to the Junior Scale in Group 'A' is related to the number of posts at the level of Chief Engineer and above and the annual intake has generally been less than the number of posts of Chief Engineers. In the CPWD we have only 12 posts of Chief Engineers and it is, therefore, recommended that the annual intake to Junior Scale Class I through UPSC compotitive Examination should e restricted to 10 only.\" ·\n\nThere can be no doubt that the failure to recruit Assitant Exe\n\ncutivc Engineers in sufficient numbers, so that when vacancies in the grade of Executive Engineers allocable to the quota of Asst!. Exe cutivc Engineers arose from year to year, there would be Asst!. r\n\nP. s. MAHAL v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) .915 ,, Executive Engineers available for promotion to fill such vacan• A cies, was responsible for the gross distortion which took place in the cadre of Executive Engineers over the years.\n\nWe must in the circumstances hold that Rules 2(iii) and 2(iv) of the Rules of 1976 are violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and they must be declared to be unconstitutional and void. It that be so, then obviously the seniority between Assistant Engineers and Assistant Executive Engineers regularly promoted within their respective quota mmt be determined by the length of continuous officiation in service in the grade of Executive Engineers, subject to the qualification that in case of Assistant Engineers the length of continuous officiation shall b~ reckoned from the date when their promotion is regularised by absorption within their lawful quota.\n\nWe would therefore allow the writ petition and quash and set aside the Memorandum and the seniority list dated 14th August 1975 and the Rules of 1976. We would direct the government to prepare a new seniority list of ExecJtive Engineers in the light of the observations contained in this judgment. The Govern!llcnt will prepare such seniority list within a period of two months from today. When th~ seniority in the grade of Executive Engineers is rearranged in accordance with the directions given in the judgment, the cases of Assistant Engineers who would have been due for considaration for promotion as Superintending Engineers and thereafter as Chief Engineers on the basis of their revised seniority, will be considered by a duly constituted Departmental Promotion Comn.ittee as on the dates on which they would have been due for such consideration if the correct seniority had been given to them, and if on the basis of their performance and record as on those dates they would have been selected for promotion, they must be given promotion with retrospective effect from such dates and if necessary, supernumerary posts in the grades of Superintending Engineers and Chief Engineers shall be created for the purpose of accommodating them and all arrears of salary and allowances shall he paid to them on the basis of such retr.>spective promotions. We may make it clear that those Assistant Executive Engineers who have been promoted as Superintending Engineers or Chief Engineers upto the date of this judgment shall not, on account of revised seniority in the grade of Executive Engineers, be disturbed from the positions which they are occupying at present but their seniority in sachJ!igher grades will\n\nStlPRllME COURT REPORTS . (1984] 3 s c.l.\n\nhave to be earranged on the basis of the . directions given in the. judgment.\n\nWe hope and trust that this judgment will put a quictous to . the Jong ranging controversy between Assistant Engineers and Assistant Executive Engineers. The writ petition will stand disposed of in the above terms with no order as to costs.\n\nS.R.\n\nPetitions allowed.", "total_entities": 184, "entities": [{"text": "P.S. MAHAL & ORS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 16, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.S. MAHAL & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "UNION OF INDIA & ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 19, "end_char": 39, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA & ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P.N. BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 60, "end_char": 73, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.N. BHAGWATI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R.S. PATHAK, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 78, "end_char": 94, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. PATHAK", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Recruitment Rules, 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 706, "end_char": 729, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1975] 2 S.C.R. 979", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 1008, "end_char": 1027, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Union Public Service Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1694, "end_char": 1725, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "more than fiv~ years of their service in their grade on the basis of Seniorit~-cum fitness and alio from Assistant Engineers (Class-II) who haVe rendered more than eight years Of service in their grade on the basis' Or nirit, the selection \"being made through a dep_artmental pro:notion comffiittee pres.ided over by a member of the Union Public Service Commission, since for the latter the P.P&t of ecutive Engineer is a selection post."}}, {"text": "CJi right upto the Recruitment Rules 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 1995, "end_char": 2036, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Septenlber 7, 1955~", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2081, "end_char": 2100, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "this was con ..\n\ntinuCJi right upto the Recruitment Rules 1954 werenacted for these two categories .. From Septenlber 7, 1955~ this quota was altered wjth reti'oseec .. tive effect to 66-2/3% and 331/3% and it was again altered 'with effect from April I, 1.972 to SO: 5~ for a period of seven years."}}, {"text": "Iildia", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3323, "end_char": 3329, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Memorandum provided that \"in respect Of -persons employed in any part\"iCu\\ar grad~, seniority should, as a general rule, be determined on thC basis of length of service in th<lt grad~ as well as service in .ao equivaleilt gra4e irrespective whetb:; r the latter was under Central or Provincial Governnient in Iildia or Pakistan.''"}}, {"text": "Pakistan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3333, "end_char": 3341, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Memorandum provided that \"in respect Of -persons employed in any part\"iCu\\ar grad~, seniority should, as a general rule, be determined on thC basis of length of service in th<lt grad~ as well as service in .ao equivaleilt gra4e irrespective whetb:; r the latter was under Central or Provincial Governnient in Iildia or Pakistan.''"}}, {"text": "Oncetbe As.sistant Engineers", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 7245, "end_char": 7273, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(5) Oncetbe As.sistant Engineers ai-e reglllarly\"appoiuted to officiate as Executive Engineers w'ithin their quota tby _will b6 entitlei.:I to coaSideration in their own rights as- Class I officers to fu\"rther promotions."}}, {"text": "S 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10008, "end_char": 10011, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "11th December 1 19$4", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 13986, "end_char": 14006, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Th'e petitioners challenged the validity of the seniority list d:tted 14th Augusr,1975 and the Rules of 1976 on t'be following grounds, namely; (_i)' th\"t it was the case of .the petitioners and other Executive Engineers promoted from the gr3-4e or Assistant Engioeers regularly within their quota frOm and after 22nd December 1959 but beforC 11th December 1 19$4 js covered by the decision of this Court in A. K. Subraman's."}}, {"text": "A. K. Subraman", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 14051, "end_char": 14065, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Th'e petitioners challenged the validity of the seniority list d:tted 14th Augusr,1975 and the Rules of 1976 on t'be following grounds, namely; (_i)' th\"t it was the case of .the petitioners and other Executive Engineers promoted from the gr3-4e or Assistant Engioeers regularly within their quota frOm and after 22nd December 1959 but beforC 11th December 1 19$4 js covered by the decision of this Court in A. K. Subraman's.", "canonical_name": "A.K. Subhrama11"}}, {"text": "Articles 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15677, "end_char": 15688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16077, "end_char": 16095, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Electrical Engineering Service Rules, 1976", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 16198, "end_char": 16240, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 16722, "end_char": 16740, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Electrical Engineering Service Rules, 1976", "statute": "Electrical Engineering Service Rules, 1976"}}, {"text": "[1966] 3 SCR. 600", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 18474, "end_char": 18491, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1967] 2 SCR 29", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 18547, "end_char": 18562, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Subraman", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 20212, "end_char": 20220, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[888H, 889AB]\n\n2.2 Oil a plain reading of the .decision in Subraman's case, it is obvious that the direction given by it in regird tO determination of inter se seniJrity On thia."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 21245, "end_char": 21264, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "th~ Government of India has ben directed by a writ of the Court to amend and revise the seniority~ the effect cff this decision cannot be set at naught and the binding character of the writ issued 'a8ainst the Government of India c1D.· be abrogated by the mere prOmulgation of the Rules of 19i6' with r'etros~ pective effect' from."}}, {"text": "Assistarit Bogin.eCI'", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 23850, "end_char": 23871, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "cannot be disregarded or ignored <ind it must be .obeyed by the Government of fndia, despite Rule 2(iii) itnd 2(iv) so far as the Executive Engineers p, rornoted from the gr8de of Assistarit Bogin.eCI'."}}, {"text": "1964] 2 SCR 608", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 24404, "end_char": 24419, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 28669, "end_char": 28687, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the position would be that Whenever an Exe.cutive Eogineer goes od deputation for a period\n\nwhicbay extelld anything between three :to.fi.ve years, the Central Government would be entitled to promote an Assistant Engineer i.gaoring the claims of Assistant Executive Engineers and this would totalJy be arbitrary G in a sit11ation where 20 to.- 25 per -cent of Executive Engineers are on\n\n.eputation."}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 30501, "end_char": 30511, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 30519, "end_char": 30540, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "M.C. Bh8ndare", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 30544, "end_char": 30557, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "157- I 62 of 1976\n\n (Under article 32 of the Constitution of India)'\n\nM.C. Bh8ndare; A.K. Ganguli, D.P.-Mukherjee.and Miss. C.K.\n\nSuchirata for the Petitioners ."}}, {"text": "A.K. Ganguli", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 30559, "end_char": 30571, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "157- I 62 of 1976\n\n (Under article 32 of the Constitution of India)'\n\nM.C. Bh8ndare; A.K. Ganguli, D.P.-Mukherjee.and Miss. C.K.\n\nSuchirata for the Petitioners ."}}, {"text": "D.P.-Mukherjee.and", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 30573, "end_char": 30591, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "157- I 62 of 1976\n\n (Under article 32 of the Constitution of India)'\n\nM.C. Bh8ndare; A.K. Ganguli, D.P.-Mukherjee.and Miss. C.K.\n\nSuchirata for the Petitioners ."}}, {"text": "C.K.\n\nSuchirata", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 30598, "end_char": 30613, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "157- I 62 of 1976\n\n (Under article 32 of the Constitution of India)'\n\nM.C. Bh8ndare; A.K. Ganguli, D.P.-Mukherjee.and Miss. C.K.\n\nSuchirata for the Petitioners ."}}, {"text": "M.M. Abdul Khader", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 30639, "end_char": 30656, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M.M. Abdul Khader, Girish Chandra and Miss A. Subhashini for Respondent. ·• •"}}, {"text": "Girish Chandra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 30658, "end_char": 30672, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M.M. Abdul Khader, Girish Chandra and Miss A. Subhashini for Respondent. ·• •"}}, {"text": "A. Subhashini", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 30682, "end_char": 30695, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M.M. Abdul Khader, Girish Chandra and Miss A. Subhashini for Respondent. ·• •"}}, {"text": "Ramamurthi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30724, "end_char": 30734, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ramamurthi, J.\n\nRomamurthi and Mrs. R. Vaigai for Respondent.", "canonical_name": "Ramamurthi"}}, {"text": "Romamurthi", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30740, "end_char": 30750, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ramamurthi, J.\n\nRomamurthi and Mrs. R. Vaigai for Respondent.", "canonical_name": "Ramamurthi"}}, {"text": "R. Vaigai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 30760, "end_char": 30769, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ramamurthi, J.\n\nRomamurthi and Mrs. R. Vaigai for Respondent."}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 30834, "end_char": 30842, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the Court .was delivered by\n\nBHAGWATI, J. This wlit.", "canonical_name": "BHAGWATI"}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 31964, "end_char": 31972, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• P.$. MAHAL v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.)\n\nThere is in the Central Public Works Department of Ministry of Works and I:Iousing, Government of India a Service known as Central Engineering Service (Class I).", "canonical_name": "BHAGWATI"}}, {"text": "Central Public Works Department of Ministry of Works and I:Iousing, Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 31995, "end_char": 32082, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• P.$. MAHAL v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.)\n\nThere is in the Central Public Works Department of Ministry of Works and I:Iousing, Government of India a Service known as Central Engineering Service (Class I)."}}, {"text": "Central Governmenl", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 32390, "end_char": 32408, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Central Governmenl has."}}, {"text": "Recruitment Rules 1954", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32507, "end_char": 32529, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "21st May. 19.54", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 32622, "end_char": 32637, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "made rules of recruitment to this Service known as the Central Engineering Service (Class I) Recruitment Rules 1954 (hereinafter .referred to s 'Recruitment Rules') and they are issued undet SRO 1841 d'}.ted 21st May. 19.54."}}, {"text": "Part I of the Recruitment Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32640, "end_char": 32671, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Part II of the Recruitment Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 32834, "end_char": 32866, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 33080, "end_char": 33085, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Recruitment to .the service shall be made by any.of fae following methods ;-\n\n(a) By competitive examination in India in accordance with\n\nPart III of these rules."}}, {"text": "Part III of the Recruitment Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 34628, "end_char": 34661, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Central .Public , Works Department", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 34956, "end_char": 34990, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is also another Service in the Central .Public , Works Department called ."}}, {"text": "Assistani Engineers are to be found in the Central Engineering Service Class II Rcruitment Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 35142, "end_char": 35238, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "25th August 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 37120, "end_char": 37136, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prior to 25th August 1949, there was no quota for promotion to the grade of Executive Engineers from the grades of Assistant .Executive Engineers and Assistant Engineers but."}}, {"text": "Parts IV and V of the Rcruitment Rules", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 37967, "end_char": 38005, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "7th September 1955", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 38066, "end_char": 38084, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This quota was altered with retrospective\nI effect from 7th September 1955 from 75 and 25 per cent to 66i and\n\n33!"}}, {"text": "22nd June 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 39011, "end_char": 39025, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now there were no statutory rules governing inter se seniority of Executive Engineers promoted from the grades of Assistant Executive Engineers and Assistant Executive Engineers but there was a Memorandum issued by the· 1'fome Ministry on 22nd June 1949 which laid down general principles of seniority applical;>le to all departments."}}, {"text": "Delhi High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 42316, "end_char": 42332, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "st July 1971 preferred writ petitions in the Delhi High Court challenging the\n\nI> alidity of the provisional seniority lists."}}, {"text": "st July 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 43117, "end_char": 43129, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "st July 1971 and which fixed seniority in the grade of Executive Engineers according to the rotational formula based on the quota rule."}}, {"text": "11th December 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 44052, "end_char": 44070, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "These three civil appeals and writ petition were heard together and decided by_ a common judgment of this Court dated 11th December 1974 vidc : A.[(."}}, {"text": "Ministry of Home Affairs, Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 45037, "end_char": 45073, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Some of the Executive Engineers promoted from the grade of Assistant Execu.tive En.gi_neers who were respondents 'in the writ petition as also 1~ the civil appeal tried to pieet the contention of the petitioner by relymg on a subsequent Memorandum dated 22th December 1959 issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government -0r'rndia but the learned Solicitor General appearing on behalf of the Union of India conceded that t.he said Memorandum had no application to the c d 1 ase an was me evant and this Court also acce!lted the same vie\\j'."}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 45145, "end_char": 45159, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Some of the Executive Engineers promoted from the grade of Assistant Execu.tive En.gi_neers who were respondents 'in the writ petition as also 1~ the civil appeal tried to pieet the contention of the petitioner by relymg on a subsequent Memorandum dated 22th December 1959 issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government -0r'rndia but the learned Solicitor General appearing on behalf of the Union of India conceded that t.he said Memorandum had no application to the c d 1 ase an was me evant and this Court also acce!lted the same vie\\j'."}}, {"text": "21st July 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 51151, "end_char": 51165, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This application for clarification was rejected by the Cou'rt on 21st July 1975 on the ground that the principles laid down in the judgment dated !"}}, {"text": "21st Oecembel' 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 53614, "end_char": 53633, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I to 3 for the period upto 21st Oecembel' 1959 was valid."}}, {"text": "AK. Subraman", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 53860, "end_char": 53872, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thus, for example, Shri AK.", "canonical_name": "A.K. Subhrama11"}}, {"text": "27th December 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 53995, "end_char": 54013, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "489 of I 912, though promoted in officiating capacity as Executive L1gineer on 27th December 1956."}}, {"text": "22nd December 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 54309, "end_char": 54327, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Committee was pushed down, since his promotion was not within the quota of Assistant Engineers at the time when h~ was promoted and his promotion was regularised on absorption within his lawful quota 1ll a subsequent year, But .with effect from 22nd December 1959 a departure was macte by respondent Nos."}}, {"text": "22nd December 1Y59", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 57291, "end_char": 57309, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The disastrous effect of this senip; ity list was that most of te Assistant Engineers promoted as Executive Engineers regularly within their quota subsequent to 22nd December 1Y59 lost a considerable number of places in seniority and were placed in much worse situation than what they were in under the seniorty list dated 1st July 1971 which was quashed at their instance in writ pettion no."}}, {"text": "1st July 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 57453, "end_char": 57466, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The disastrous effect of this senip; ity list was that most of te Assistant Engineers promoted as Executive Engineers regularly within their quota subsequent to 22nd December 1Y59 lost a considerable number of places in seniority and were placed in much worse situation than what they were in under the seniorty list dated 1st July 1971 which was quashed at their instance in writ pettion no."}}, {"text": "26th Augµst 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 57628, "end_char": 57644, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lied an additional affidavit on 26th Augµst 1975 pointing out that the seniority list dated 14th August 1975, though purporting to be iu compliance with the directions given by this court, .was."}}, {"text": "8th June, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 58690, "end_char": 58704, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "before the court could hear the objections against the seniority list on merits, the first respondent issued on 8th June, 1976 the Executive Engineers, Central\n\n. . ."}}, {"text": "Engineering and Central Electrical Engineering Service (Group A) (Regulation of Seniority) Rules 1976", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 58788, "end_char": 58889, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.S. MAHAL v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.)\n\nEngineering and Central Electrical Engineering Service (Group A) (Regulation of Seniority) Rules 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules of 1976) in exercise of the power conferred ."}}, {"text": "Article 309", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 58995, "end_char": 59006, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "25th August, 1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 59727, "end_char": 59744, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "from the grade of Assistant Executive Engineer in accordance with quotas prescribed for them during the period from 25th August, 1949 to 21st December, 1959, but could not be filled would be carried forward and filled by Assistant Executive Engineers promoted on or after 22.12.1959."}}, {"text": "21st December, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 59748, "end_char": 59767, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "from the grade of Assistant Executive Engineer in accordance with quotas prescribed for them during the period from 25th August, 1949 to 21st December, 1959, but could not be filled would be carried forward and filled by Assistant Executive Engineers promoted on or after 22.12.1959."}}, {"text": "22.12.1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 59883, "end_char": 59893, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "from the grade of Assistant Executive Engineer in accordance with quotas prescribed for them during the period from 25th August, 1949 to 21st December, 1959, but could not be filled would be carried forward and filled by Assistant Executive Engineers promoted on or after 22.12.1959."}}, {"text": "12.12.1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 60176, "end_char": 60186, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "they will rank immediately below the.last Executive\n\nngineer, promoted prior to (12.12.1959)."}}, {"text": "22. 12.1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 60545, "end_char": 60556, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Assistant Executive Engineer in accordance with the quotas prescribed for them during the\n\nperiod from 25th August, 1949 to 21st December, )959, but could not be filled, are filled by Assistant Executive Engineers prompted on or after 22."}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65314, "end_char": 65332, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "s 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 65722, "end_char": 65733, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Unin of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 70137, "end_char": 70150, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "years for absorption when due withfo their quota and more importantly, when Assistant Engineers are promoted as officiating Executive Engineers regularly within their quota, their seniority in the grade of Executive Engineer would count from the date of their regular promotion within their quota and op 1he basis of thiiholding, the Unin of India was directed to G amend and revise the seniority list and to give effect to the seniority iists so revised."}}, {"text": "14th August 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 72643, "end_char": 72659, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But the revised seniority list dated 14th August 1975 issued by the Government oflndia was plainly in defiance 'or this dinction given by the Court and what the Government of India did was to adjust the first 86 Assistant Executive Engineers promoted after 22nd December 1959 against 86 carried forward posts and to give them seniority en.bloc over all Assistant Engineers promoted as Executive Engineers regujarly ."}}, {"text": "Government oflndia", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 72674, "end_char": 72692, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But the revised seniority list dated 14th August 1975 issued by the Government oflndia was plainly in defiance 'or this dinction given by the Court and what the Government of India did was to adjust the first 86 Assistant Executive Engineers promoted after 22nd December 1959 against 86 carried forward posts and to give them seniority en.bloc over all Assistant Engineers promoted as Executive Engineers regujarly ."}}, {"text": "Governmeut oflndia", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 74141, "end_char": 74159, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Governmeut oflndia sought to avoid the binding obligation of the direction given by the Court in its decision dated 1 lthDecember\n\n1974 by making'the Rules of 1976 effective from 10th Decemher 1974, one day prior _to the date of the decision."}}, {"text": "A.K. Subraman", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 74582, "end_char": 74595, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The assumption underlying this menoeuvre on the part of the 'Gove'rnment of India was that if the Rules of 1976.were brought into force with effect from a date prior to the decision of the Court in A.K. Subraman's case (supra) they would, nullify'that decision and notwithstanding that decision recognising and giving effect to a different rule 'of seniority, namely, the.", "canonical_name": "A.K. Subhrama11"}}, {"text": "19th December 1974", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 75841, "end_char": 75859, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the binding character Of the writ issued against the Government of India can be • abrogated by the mere promulgation of the Rules of1976 with retrospective effect from 19th December 1974."}}, {"text": "A, K. Subraman", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 76219, "end_char": 76233, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "th~ contrary affirmed thal the principles of seniority set out in those rules were Jaid down on lhe basis of the decision in A, K. Subraman's case (supra), The Rules of 1976 were in no way intended to set at\n\nA -\n\n874 SUPREME COURT Rlll'ORTS [1984] 3 s.G ....\n\nnaught the decision in\" A.K.Sub\"raman's case (supra) in so far as it laid down .", "canonical_name": "A.K. Subhrama11"}}, {"text": "A.K.Sub\"raman", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 76379, "end_char": 76392, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "th~ contrary affirmed thal the principles of seniority set out in those rules were Jaid down on lhe basis of the decision in A, K. Subraman's case (supra), The Rules of 1976 were in no way intended to set at\n\nA -\n\n874 SUPREME COURT Rlll'ORTS [1984] 3 s.G ....\n\nnaught the decision in\" A.K.Sub\"raman's case (supra) in so far as it laid down .", "canonical_name": "A.K. Subhrama11"}}, {"text": "A.K.. Subraman", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 76906, "end_char": 76920, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That is the reason why we do n\"ot find any non-obstante clause giving overriding effect to the rules of seniority enunciated in tpe Rules of 19_76 notwithstanding the decision in A.K.. Subraman's case (supra).", "canonical_name": "A.K. Subhrama11"}}, {"text": "A.K. Subarman", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 77679, "end_char": 77692, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The relative position of the Exe((utive Engineers in regard to their inter se seniority having been 'Crystallised in the decision in A.K. Subarman's case (supra) and a writ having been issued by this Court directing the inter se seniority of the Executive Engineers to be fixed on the basis of leugth of continuous officiation, the Executive Engineers promoted from the gn1d~ of Assistant Engineers were entitled to enforce the writ for determining their\" inter se seniority with the Executive Engineers promoted from the grade of Assistant Executive Engineers in accordance with the rule.", "canonical_name": "A.K. Subhrama11"}}, {"text": "A.K. Sub.raman", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 78283, "end_char": 78297, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "promoted from the grade of Assistant .Engineers under the decision in A.K. Sub.raman's .case (supra) could not be taken away by any thing contained in th~ Rules of 1976.", "canonical_name": "A.K. Subhrama11"}}, {"text": "A.K.\n\nSubraman", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 78399, "end_char": 78413, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The decision in A.K.\n\nSubraman's case (supra) continued to subsist and the Government of India was bound to determine inter se seniority amongst the Executive Engineers in accrodance with the direction contained in that' decision.", "canonical_name": "A.K. Subhrama11"}}, {"text": "Prithvi Cotton Mills", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 79523, "end_char": 79543, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and not binding on the parties We have carefully considered the decision of this Court in Shri Prithvi Cotton Mills case (supra) but we do not think that this decisio!)"}}, {"text": "section 73", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 80679, "end_char": 80689, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Bombay Municipality Boroughs Act, 1925", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 80697, "end_char": 80735, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Section\n\n3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 80985, "end_char": 80995, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Bombay Municipality Boroughs Act, 1925", "statute": "the Bombay Municipality Boroughs Act, 1925"}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 82088, "end_char": 82097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of lndia'on", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 84661, "end_char": 84683, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "'\"\"\n\nI ~\n\nP.S. MAHAL v. UNION (Bhagwati, J) 877\n\nthe Government of lndia'on that basis."}}, {"text": "Bishan Sarup Gpta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 86419, "end_char": 86436, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The situation in the 2nd Bishan Sarup Gpta case was fundamentally oiffe\"rent from that in the present case.", "canonical_name": ".Bishan Swarup Gupta"}}, {"text": "Bishan Sarup Gupta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 86525, "end_char": 86543, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Court, in the J st Bishan Sarup Gupta case, .", "canonical_name": ".Bishan Swarup Gupta"}}, {"text": "16th January, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 86583, "end_char": 86601, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "came to the conclusion that on 16th January, 1959 the quota rule for filling up vacancies amongst\" I nco!!Je-Tax Officers (Class I) collapsll!!"}}, {"text": "[1978] 3 SCR 346", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 87217, "end_char": 87233, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "clause 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 88232, "end_char": 88240, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "22nd December, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 88265, "end_char": 88284, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now, in the present case also,· by reason of clause 3 of the Memorandum dated 22nd December, 1959,' the rule of seniority based on length of continuous officiation enun ciated in the Memorandum dated 22nd June, 1949 came to an end and the(eafter until the Rules of 1976, were formulated, ."}}, {"text": "22nd Decemb!!r, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 88703, "end_char": 88723, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "there was no specific rule of seniority which governed inter-se seniority bet ween Assistant Engileers arid Assistant Executive Engineers promo te.d as Executive Engineers regularly within their respective quota subsequent to 22nd Decemb!!r, 1959."}}, {"text": "I st Bishim Sarup Gupta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 89098, "end_char": 89121, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Court could hve, therefore, followed the same course as in the I st Bishim Sarup Gupta case and in the ."}}, {"text": ".Bishan Swarup Gupta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 91141, "end_char": 91161, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This constituted a 'vital difference between the I st .Bishan Swarup Gupta case and the present case and the government was not .", "canonical_name": ".Bishan Swarup Gupta"}}, {"text": "Bishan Swamp Gupta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 91246, "end_char": 91264, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "entitled, as in the case .of Bishan Swamp Gupta and other Income-Tax Officers; to evolve a new rule of seniority different from that recognised and given efftct to by the Court in A.K.\n\nSubraman's decision for determining.", "canonical_name": ".Bishan Swarup Gupta"}}, {"text": "A:K.\n\nSubraman", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 91721, "end_char": 91735, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "To permit the Government to do so would be in plain defiance of the direction given by the Court in A:K.\n\nSubraman's case.", "canonical_name": "A.K. Subhrama11"}}, {"text": "14th August, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 92408, "end_char": 92425, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioners reiled strongly on paragraph 5 (ii) of the Memorandum dated 22nd December, 1.959 and contended that the seniority rule laid down in th.is Paragraph governed the determination of seniority amongest f:xecutive Engineers promoted from the Grades of Assistant Engineers and Assistant Executive Engineers from and after 22nd December, 1959 and if this rule of ' seniority as applied, the Assistant Engineers promoted regularly within their quota after selection by the Departmental promotion ,\n\nCommittee in any year would rank higher .than the Assistant Executive Engineers promoted; in the subsequent years and in that view, the seniority list dated 14th August, 1975 and the Rµles of 1976 in so far as they give seniority en bloc to the .Assistant Executive EngineeI.s."}}, {"text": "AK Subraman", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 93514, "end_char": 93525, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the first place, it may be pointed out that this contention i~ no longer open to the petitioners in view of the decision 1n AK Subraman's case where the Court applied the rule of siority based on len.gth of continuous officiation for determining inter-se seniority amongst Assistant' Engineers and Assistant Executive Engineers D promoted as Executive Engineers regularly within their respective quota upto 11th December, 1974, being the date of the decision and directed such inter•se seniority to be determined on the application of this seniority rule.", "canonical_name": "A.K. Subhrama11"}}, {"text": "22nd G December, 1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 94758, "end_char": 94779, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In that cas~ though the promotion of some of the petitipners was regularised by F absorption in their lawful quota subsequent to 22nd December, 1959 and some of the respondents were also promoted as officiating Executive Engineers within the -their quota after that date, the learned counsel appearing on b.ehalf of the petitioners did not contend that Paragraph 5(ii) of the Memorandum dated 22nd G December, 1959 was applicable to determine interse seniority amongst such of the petitioners and respondents as were promoted after 22nd December, 1959 and agreed with the concession made on behalf of fespondents Nos."}}, {"text": "22nd .Deceinber, 1959read.as", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 96899, "end_char": 96927, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Paragraph 5(ii) of the Memorandum dated 22nd .Deceinber, 1959read.as follows:\n\n\"5(ii) : ."}}, {"text": "S.R. Roy Choudhury", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 102538, "end_char": 102556, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 and 2 in the counter affidavit filed by S.R. Roy Choudhury asserted that in case of selectionifrom the grade of Assistant Engineers; the Union PubliciService Commission was associated with ."}}, {"text": "Union PubliciService Commission", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 102635, "end_char": 102666, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 and 2 in the counter affidavit filed by S.R. Roy Choudhury asserted that in case of selectionifrom the grade of Assistant Engineers; the Union PubliciService Commission was associated with ."}}, {"text": "UPSC", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 103215, "end_char": 103219, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I and 2 and submitted that it was wrong to suggest \"that the UPSC is not associated with the DPC because in all the selections concerned with the petitioners and the respondents, a Member of the UPSC\n\n• B\n\n(1984] 3 S.C.R.\n\nwas on both the DPCS\" and in this."}}, {"text": "DPC", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 103247, "end_char": 103250, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "I and 2 and submitted that it was wrong to suggest \"that the UPSC is not associated with the DPC because in all the selections concerned with the petitioners and the respondents, a Member of the UPSC\n\n• B\n\n(1984] 3 S.C.R.\n\nwas on both the DPCS\" and in this."}}, {"text": "Section 7", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 103447, "end_char": 103456, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "clause 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 111305, "end_char": 111313, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Palekar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 112314, "end_char": 112321, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But it is now wellsettled as a result of several decisions of this Court that in the absence of any statutory rule or executive memorandum or order laying down a rule for determining seniority in a grade, the normaJ rule applicable would be to determine seniority on the basis of length of continuous officiation in service..\n\nVid'e the observations of Palekar J. in -B.S. Gupta v. Union of India.(1) To the some effect we find the observations Krishna Iyer, 1.,"}}, {"text": "Krishna Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 112406, "end_char": 112418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "But it is now wellsettled as a result of several decisions of this Court that in the absence of any statutory rule or executive memorandum or order laying down a rule for determining seniority in a grade, the normaJ rule applicable would be to determine seniority on the basis of length of continuous officiation in service..\n\nVid'e the observations of Palekar J. in -B.S. Gupta v. Union of India.(1) To the some effect we find the observations Krishna Iyer, 1.,", "canonical_name": "Krishna Iyer"}}, {"text": "Chandracl\\ud", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 112678, "end_char": 112690, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Chandracl\\ud, J., as he then was, also ."}}, {"text": "(1977] 3 S.C.R. 775", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 113813, "end_char": 113832, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "2nd December,\n\n1959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 114582, "end_char": 114601, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was repealed by the Memorandum dated 2nd December,\n\n1959."}}, {"text": "A.K. Subhrama11", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 115694, "end_char": 115709, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the decision in A.K. Subhrama11,'s case holding that the inter-se seniority bet ween Assistant Engineers.", "canonical_name": "A.K. Subhrama11"}}, {"text": "Bishan SarupGupta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 121377, "end_char": 121394, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "long as the vacancy is a permanent vacancy, that is to say, in the words of Palekar J. in the 1st Bishan SarupGupta's case, a .acancy which is not \"for a few days or a few months\" or otherwise adventi tious\".", "canonical_name": ".Bishan Swarup Gupta"}}, {"text": "Central Public Wor'ks Department", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 124446, "end_char": 124478, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "has to be taken into account, is not merely the sanctioned strength of .. the cadre of Executive Engineers in the Central Public Works Department btit the sanctioned strength of the cadre of Executive Engi- F neers in the entire Central Engineering Service, Class I. The sanctioned strength of the cadre of Executive Engineers in the\n\nCentrl Engineering Service, Class I, may include not only posts of Executive Engineers in the Central Public Wor'ks Department but also posts of Executive Engilleers in other departments and organi-\n\nG sations. ·"}}, {"text": "Central Public Works Department", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 124779, "end_char": 124810, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Central Public Works Department is an agency 9f the Centr~J H Government operating .throghout Country."}}, {"text": "Government of Bhutan", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 125448, "end_char": 125468, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The ofilr.ers borne ou the cadres of Chief Engineers, Superintending Engineers .and Executive Engineers in the ·\n\nCentral Engineering Ser; vice, Class I, are therefore sent on deputation to various departments and organisations and some of them are also on deputation with the Government of Bhutan, Delhi Municipal Corporation, New Delhi Municipal Committee and various."}}, {"text": "Delhi Municipal Corporation", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 125470, "end_char": 125497, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The ofilr.ers borne ou the cadres of Chief Engineers, Superintending Engineers .and Executive Engineers in the ·\n\nCentral Engineering Ser; vice, Class I, are therefore sent on deputation to various departments and organisations and some of them are also on deputation with the Government of Bhutan, Delhi Municipal Corporation, New Delhi Municipal Committee and various."}}, {"text": "New Delhi Municipal Committee", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 125499, "end_char": 125528, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The ofilr.ers borne ou the cadres of Chief Engineers, Superintending Engineers .and Executive Engineers in the ·\n\nCentral Engineering Ser; vice, Class I, are therefore sent on deputation to various departments and organisations and some of them are also on deputation with the Government of Bhutan, Delhi Municipal Corporation, New Delhi Municipal Committee and various."}}, {"text": "Cl1", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 125717, "end_char": 125720, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Government of Ind.ia", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 127178, "end_char": 127198, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This has always b.een the view taken by the Government of Ind.ia,\n\naSis clear from ihe letter-dated 19th qctober, .1971 addressed by the Ministry of Works and Housing, Government of India to the Secretary,."}}, {"text": "Bltagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 127681, "end_char": 127690, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This ratio is pplicble tq\n\n~. ~. \"\n\nP._S. MAHAL v. UNION (Bltagwati, J.)\n\nboth permanent and temprary .", "canonical_name": "Bltagwati"}}, {"text": "amap", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 129868, "end_char": 129872, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ubi:amap's case."}}, {"text": "A..K.. Subraman", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 130034, "end_char": 130049, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6689 of 197S'in A..K.. Subraman's case:.", "canonical_name": "A.K. Subhrama11"}}, {"text": "25 .. 8.1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 131882, "end_char": 131894, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2663 of 1975 in A.K. Subraman's case :\n\n \"Vacancies : The quota system, based on w\\llch the date of commencement of the regular appointment of eithdr side' had to be fixed,, in accordance with the directives of the Hon'ble Court, had been introduced by the-~\n\nCentral Engineering Service (and Central Electrical Engin\" - eering Service) Recruitment• Rules promulgated on 25 .. 8.1949 ... Hence the vacancies had to be identified right from this date."}}, {"text": "Delhi Development Authority", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 132259, "end_char": 132286, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lower grades and degutation to other organisations like the Delhi Development Authority; undertaking, he retains his lien on the post in th.e parent department and he has !"}}, {"text": "25.9.1949", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 134211, "end_char": 134220, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F\n\nCalculafions of all such vacancies with reference to the ca so and .circumstances as called out from the original papers right from 25.9.1949\" was a herculean task and it was difficult to he sure that there had been no errors r ."}}, {"text": "A.Ko Subraman", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 136770, "end_char": 136783, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "wholly fallacious, because promotion according to the quota rule envisaged in the Rcruit ment Rules is, as pointed out in A.Ko Subraman's case, initial promotion in an officiting capacity and has nothing ta do wh confirmation.", "canonical_name": "A.K. Subhrama11"}}, {"text": "Blzagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 137493, "end_char": 137502, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "MAHAL y. UNION (Blzagwati, J.) .891\n\nis true that a confirmed Executive Engineer who goes on deputation may revert to the post .on which he has a lien and so also an officiating Executive 'Engineer who goes on deputation may revert back on termination of his deputation and theoreticaUy, i11 either case, an Assistant Engineer or Assistant Executive Engineer who is promoted to fill the vacancy arising on account of deputation may have to revert, but in actual practice and rt'ality,.", "canonical_name": "Bltagwati"}}, {"text": "Bishart Sarup Gupta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 146392, "end_char": 146411, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In fact, the promotion of an Assistant Engineer to the vacancy would be invalid as being contrary to .the quota rule, but in .the 1st Bishart Sarup Gupta case, the Court, in order to .", "canonical_name": ".Bishan Swarup Gupta"}}, {"text": "A.K. Subraman~", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 149960, "end_char": 149974, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is nothing in the decision in A.K. Subraman~ case which warrants that when Assistant Engineers promoted in excess of their quota are pushed dowh and absoroed within their quota i.n a subsequent year, their absorption should be reckoned nationally from 1st January of that year.", "canonical_name": "A.K. Subhrama11"}}, {"text": "10th December, 1974'.bui", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 151146, "end_char": 151170, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is true that the Rules of 1976 have been brought into force with effect from 10th December, 1974'.bui in rules 2(iii) and 2 (iv) they lay down a rule of seniority."}}, {"text": "s6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 151745, "end_char": 151747, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "11th December, 197 4", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 153062, "end_char": 153082, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Engineers and apply the rotat; onal formula for the pmpse of determining seniority amongst .Assistant Engineers and Assistant .Executive Engineers promoted to the ubsequent vacancies, must be held to be ineffective \"qua Assistant Engineers & Assistant .Executive Engineers promoted up to 11th December, 197 4 and so far as these Assistant Engineers and Assistant Executive Engin•ers are concerned, their i1lter se seniority must be held to be governed by the length of.conti nuous officiation in the grade o( Executive Engineers."}}, {"text": "MAHAL V UNION", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 153600, "end_char": 153613, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\" '\n\n• • •\n\nP. s, MAHAL V UNION (Bhagwati, J.) ..\n\n2(iv) or this rotational rule of senirioty is unconstitutional and void as offending Articles 14 and 16 of the Costitution, It may also be considered in the alternative, on the assumption that Rules 2{iii) and 2(iv) of the Rules of 1976 govern the determination of inter se seniority between Assistant Engineers and Assistant Executive Engineers promoted from and after 22nd December, I 959 despite the decision in A.-K. Subraman case, whether tnese rules can successfully meetthe challenge of Article I 4 and 16 or they would be liable to be."}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 153718, "end_char": 153736, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "22nd December, I 959", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 154003, "end_char": 154023, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\" '\n\n• • •\n\nP. s, MAHAL V UNION (Bhagwati, J.) ..\n\n2(iv) or this rotational rule of senirioty is unconstitutional and void as offending Articles 14 and 16 of the Costitution, It may also be considered in the alternative, on the assumption that Rules 2{iii) and 2(iv) of the Rules of 1976 govern the determination of inter se seniority between Assistant Engineers and Assistant Executive Engineers promoted from and after 22nd December, I 959 despite the decision in A.-K. Subraman case, whether tnese rules can successfully meetthe challenge of Article I 4 and 16 or they would be liable to be."}}, {"text": "A.-K. Subraman", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 154048, "end_char": 154062, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\" '\n\n• • •\n\nP. s, MAHAL V UNION (Bhagwati, J.) ..\n\n2(iv) or this rotational rule of senirioty is unconstitutional and void as offending Articles 14 and 16 of the Costitution, It may also be considered in the alternative, on the assumption that Rules 2{iii) and 2(iv) of the Rules of 1976 govern the determination of inter se seniority between Assistant Engineers and Assistant Executive Engineers promoted from and after 22nd December, I 959 despite the decision in A.-K. Subraman case, whether tnese rules can successfully meetthe challenge of Article I 4 and 16 or they would be liable to be.", "canonical_name": "A.K. Subhrama11"}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 155298, "end_char": 155316, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Ray", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 158184, "end_char": 158187, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This is precisely what Ray, C.J. speaking on ."}}, {"text": "[1966] 3 SCR 600", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 158872, "end_char": 158888, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1976] 1 SCR 815", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 158921, "end_char": 158937, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 160193, "end_char": 160211, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Krishna Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 165906, "end_char": 165918, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Iiideed, a• pointed out by Krishna Iyer, J. in N.K. Chauhan's case, myriad ways can be conceived \"for determining seniority of officers on .entry into a cadre.\"", "canonical_name": "Krishna Iyer"}}, {"text": "N.K. Chauhan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 165926, "end_char": 165938, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Iiideed, a• pointed out by Krishna Iyer, J. in N.K. Chauhan's case, myriad ways can be conceived \"for determining seniority of officers on .entry into a cadre.\""}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 166183, "end_char": 166201, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 166424, "end_char": 166442, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Bishan Swarup Gupta", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 167208, "end_char": 167227, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Some slight deviations from the quota rule may not be material but as pointed out by Palekar, J. in the Bishan Swarup Gupta's case, \"if there is enormous deviltion, other considerations may arise\".", "canonical_name": ".Bishan Swarup Gupta"}}, {"text": "A. K. Subarmans", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 167731, "end_char": 167746, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That is why this court pointed out in A. K. Subarmans's case that \"when recruitment is from two or several sources, it should be observed that there is no inherent invalidity in introduction of quota system and to work it out by a rule of rotation.", "canonical_name": "A.K. Subhrama11"}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 168016, "end_char": 168026, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 168030, "end_char": 168040, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "D.A. Desai", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 168529, "end_char": 168539, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We agree wholly with the observation of D.A. Desai, J. in A. Janardhan v. Union of India(!)"}}, {"text": "31st July, J975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 169842, "end_char": 169857, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is interesting to note that even after 22nd December, 1959, the quota was consistently breached from year to year except for four or :five years and there was massive under recruitment of Assistant Executive Engineers, with the result that as on 31st July, J975, the cumulative shortfall in promotiom of Assistant Executive Engineers was 206 while there was corresponding excess in promotions of Assistant\n\n(I) Cl\\ No."}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 171122, "end_char": 171140, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "st October, 1956", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 174497, "end_char": 174513, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "st October, 1956 but since his promotion was out side the quota of Assistant Engineers, he had to be pushed down and he was ultimately absorbed within his lawful quota in 1962 and though he became a regular promotee within his quota since 1962, he was placed at serial No."}}, {"text": "31st January, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 175105, "end_char": 175123, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The result was that he never got a ehance for being considered for promotion as Superintending Engineer and he ultimately retired as Executive Engineer on 31st January, 1978."}}, {"text": "J.P. Singhal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 175189, "end_char": 175201, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 may now be contrasted with that of J.P. Singhal, who was recruited as Assistant Executive Engineer on !", "canonical_name": "J.P.\n\nSinghal"}}, {"text": "st Februarv, 1967", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 175257, "end_char": 175274, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "st Februarv, 1967 and who was promoted as Executive Engineer on 14th Janu\"y, 1972."}}, {"text": "14th Janu\"y, 1972", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 175321, "end_char": 175338, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "st Februarv, 1967 and who was promoted as Executive Engineer on 14th Janu\"y, 1972."}}, {"text": "J.P.\n\nSinghal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 175347, "end_char": 175360, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Though J.P.\n\nSinghal was not even in service at 'the date when petitioner No.", "canonical_name": "J.P.\n\nSinghal"}}, {"text": "E!wgwuti", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 175711, "end_char": 175719, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "UNION (E!wgwuti, J.) .9tl\n\nabove, petitioner No."}}, {"text": "R.A. Armugam", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 176096, "end_char": 176108, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "2 with that of R.A. Armugam."}}, {"text": "20th JanuJry .1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 176591, "end_char": 176609, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "396 in the seniority list dated 14th August, 1975 while R.A. Armugam who was recruited for the first time as Assistant Executive Engineer on 20th JanuJry .1971 and promoted as Executive Engineer only on 14th April, 1975 .was placed higher in soniority at serial No."}}, {"text": "14th April, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 176653, "end_char": 176669, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "396 in the seniority list dated 14th August, 1975 while R.A. Armugam who was recruited for the first time as Assistant Executive Engineer on 20th JanuJry .1971 and promoted as Executive Engineer only on 14th April, 1975 .was placed higher in soniority at serial No."}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1985] 3 s.c.R.", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 178403, "end_char": 178440, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1985] 3 s.c."}}, {"text": "31st July, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 180825, "end_char": 180840, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "4 to \\90 that the under recrnitment of Assistant Executive Engineers during the period from 1949 to 31st July, 1975 was due to the fact that the Government took the view, which of course was found erronebus by the court in A.K. Subraman's case that the quota rule wa; to be applied only at the stage of conflrmation and it was because a differe.nt view was taken in A.K. Subraman's case, namely, that the\n\n, ."}}, {"text": "B.R. Patel", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 182755, "end_char": 182765, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is considerable material placed before the court to show that the government rightly understood the quota rule to be applicable at the stage of initial promotion but failed to strictly implement it Paragraph 4 of the minutes of the meeting held on 14th May, 1968 in the office room of Shri B.R. Patel, Secretary, Ministry of Works and Supply, clearly emphasii:<:s this position by stating that \"the intake of Assistant Executive Engineers should be increased by considering 2/3rd of all the temporary and deputation posts in the grade of Executive Engineers and above in the departmeat as permanent ones for the purpose of working out th\" strength at the junior scale.\""}}, {"text": "Ministry of Works and Supply", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 182778, "end_char": 182806, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is considerable material placed before the court to show that the government rightly understood the quota rule to be applicable at the stage of initial promotion but failed to strictly implement it Paragraph 4 of the minutes of the meeting held on 14th May, 1968 in the office room of Shri B.R. Patel, Secretary, Ministry of Works and Supply, clearly emphasii:<:s this position by stating that \"the intake of Assistant Executive Engineers should be increased by considering 2/3rd of all the temporary and deputation posts in the grade of Executive Engineers and above in the departmeat as permanent ones for the purpose of working out th\" strength at the junior scale.\""}}, {"text": "19th October, 1971", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 183214, "end_char": 183232, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So also we find a categorical statement to the same effect in the letter dated 19th October, 1971 addressed by Shri Kartar Singh, Joint Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Works and Housing-a letter to which we have already referred earlier."}}, {"text": "Kartar Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 183251, "end_char": 183263, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So also we find a categorical statement to the same effect in the letter dated 19th October, 1971 addressed by Shri Kartar Singh, Joint Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Works and Housing-a letter to which we have already referred earlier."}}, {"text": "Ministry of Works and Housing", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 183309, "end_char": 183338, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So also we find a categorical statement to the same effect in the letter dated 19th October, 1971 addressed by Shri Kartar Singh, Joint Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Works and Housing-a letter to which we have already referred earlier."}}, {"text": "P.B. Kulkarni", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 183471, "end_char": 183484, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Government also took up a positive stand in the affidavit in reply filed by P.B. Kulkarni in\n\nA.K. Subraman's case where it was stated: \"I submit that the quota rule is to be applied as and when vacanqies in the grade of Executive Engineers are required to be filled but as already stated earlier, it ha5 not bee\\) possible to apply this quota rule rigidly at the time of officiating promotions as promotions from the grade of Assistant Engineers have been in excess of t!J.eir quota.\" ("}}, {"text": "Indian Railways Service of Engineers", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 185862, "end_char": 185898, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the Indian Railways Service of Engineers, the recruitment to the Junior Scale in Group 'A' is related to the number of posts at the level of Chief Engineer and above and the annual intake has generally been less than the number of posts of Chief Engineers."}}, {"text": "CPWD", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 186122, "end_char": 186126, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "In the CPWD we have only 12 posts of Chief Engineers and it is, therefore, recommended that the annual intake to Junior Scale Class I through UPSC compotitive Examination should e restricted to 10 only.\" ·"}}, {"text": "Articles 14 and 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 186916, "end_char": 186934, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_3_917_925_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "NIRANKAR NATH WAHI AND OTHERS\n\nFIFTH ADDL. DISTRICT JUDGE,\n\nMORADABAD AND ORS.\n\nJwie 7, 1984\n\n[A.P. SEN AND M.P. THAKKAR, JJ.]\n\nCode of Civil Procedure 1908 Order 17 and Order 20-Adjournment,..-Request for further adjournment to engage Senior Counsel refused-District. Judge keeping judgment ready and pronouncing judgment dismissing appeal-Procedure whether just, fair and reasonable.\n\nPractice and Procedure : Adjourment-Request for by appellant to engage Senior Counsel~Refused of-District Judge keeping judgtnent ready and deiivering judgment-Whether there is denial of reasonable opportunity of hearing- Whether procedure adopted by District Judge in preparation Of!.d pronounce~ ment of judgment vitiated.\n\nThe appellant in the appeal was the landlord. He sought an adjournment of the hearing of his appeal that was pending before the Additional District Judge on the ground of indisposition of his senior . counsel. The respondent tenant was a leading member of the local bar. The Additional District Judge refused the prayer, but granted three days' time for making alternative arrangements and directed that the appeal be posted for hearing of further arguments and that on fail'; lre to urge arguments, the judgment would be pronounced. On the adjourned date, the appellant again sought adjournment on the ground that he could not secure the services of his out!.station\n\nsenior counsel and that his counsel wolfld not be able to appear fo.r at least a month and that he ffiay be granted further time to engage another senior counsel.\n\nThe Additional District Judge refused the adjourment on the ground that more than sufficient time had been garnted for additional arguments, and added : \"The judgment is ready which is delivered\".\n\nThe appeal was dismissed by pronouncing the judgment which had been kept 'ready for being delivered'.\n\nA writ petition to the High Court by the apellant uJllier Art. !27 was rejected in limine. ·\n\nIn the appeal to this Court, it was contended on behelf of the appellant that: (!) as the respondent was-a leading and influential member of the local bar, members of the local bar were not willing to appearin41fp.e matter .and that the\n\nappellant was genuinely handicapped in securing the services of an out-station senior counsel and (2) that even though the appeal was fixed for making further oral submissions on the adjourned date, the Additional District Judge kept the judgment rady and pronounced it w\"'n the appellant appeared and requested for further time to engage a senior counsel. · .. '' ' : ' ' ' \\\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[1984] 3 S.C.R.\n\nAl1owing the appeal,\n\nHELD: The judgn1ent rendered by the District Judge is vitiated by reason of the failure to grant reasona_ble opportunity of hearing to the appellant and by reason of the procedure adopted in connection with the preparation and pronounce1ncnt of the judgment. The High Court also erred in rejecting the 'vrit petition sumn1arily. The judg1ncnt and order passed by the High Court as well as those passed by the Additional District Judge are set aside and the matter remitted to the Court of the District Judge for being disposed of, after affording a reasonable opportnity of hearing tu both the parties.\n\n(924-G-925 B]\n\nIn the eyes of Jiiigant a senior member of the bar when shed personaliy, n1ight enjoy certain amount of syn1pathy with the members of the judiciary before whom he is practising day in and day out. This aspect cannot be overlooked having regard to the realities of life.\n\n[922 D}\n\nThe learned Judge should have shown awareness of this dimension of the matter and bearing in 1nind the adage that ijustice must also arpear to have been done', ought to have dealt with the request for a short adjournment with a degree of understanding. [922 E]\n\nIt is common knowledge that when a leading men1ber of the Bar is sued • or sues in a personal capacity, the members of the Bar \\vhere he is practising are more than reluctant to accept a brief against the colleague and friend on account of personal relations Of' on account of likelihood -of embarrassment.\n\nIn a matter like this, the litigant pitted against a leading member of the Bar, inay also want to engage a cou_isel of his choice and confidence for it n1ay well appear tO hin1 that not every member of the Bar might present his case with the degree of zeal, enthusiasn1 sincerity and conviction which ordinarily a litigant c::xpects fron1 his advocate. {922 H; 923 A]\n\nThe learned Judge could not have armed himself with a readymade ,.._ judg1nent dismissing the appeal when further arguments on behalf \"f. of the appellant were yet to be heard. And apparently there was no timecompulsion to pronounce the 'judgment on that very day. The Judgment rendered by the learned Judge is thus vitiated by reason of the failure to grant reasonable opportunity of hearing to the appeallant and by reason of the procedure adopted in connection \\vith the preparation and pronouncement of the judgment. [924 F-G]\n\nIt was also not difficult to realise that a landlord is the last person intercSted in prolonging the eviction proceedings or the appeal arising from the order passed in such proceedings. The Additional District Judge should have shown awareness of this dimension of the matter, and under the circumstances, might wel.1 have granted a short adjournment to enable the appellant to engage a senior counsel of his choice and confidence. [922 F-Gj\n\nCIVIL APPBLLAT1i JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2562 of 1984.\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated 21.7.1983 of the Allahabad High Court in WP No. 8933 of 1983. ·\n\nR.B Mehrotra Advocate for the appellants.\n\nK.P. Gupta Advocate for the respondents.\n\nN.N. WAHi v. DiSTT. JUDGE (Thakkar, J.) 919\n\nThe Judgment of the Court wa~ delivered by\n\nTHAKKAR, J. \"Justice\", we do not tire of saying, \"must not only be done\", but \"must be seen to done\". And yet at times some Courts suffer from temporary amnesia and forget these words of wisdom. In the result, a Court occasionally adopts a procedure which does not meet the high standards set for itself by the judicia; y, The present matter falls in that unfortunate category of cases. That is the reason why, though we do not feel very happy in doing so, we have had to grant special leave for disposing of the appeal not on merits, but only for the purpose of setting aside the impugned judgment rendered by the learned Additional District Judge, Moradabad. To set it aside on the ground that the prOcedure adopted by the learned Judge at the hearing of the appeal was not just and fair. And in order to consequently remand the matter for hearing the appeal afresh with a view to dispose it of on merits in accordance with law.\n\nThe ordersheet of May 20, 1983 of the record of the appeal in the .Court of the learned District Judge shows tha.t the appellant sought adjournment on the ground of indisposition of his senior eounsel from Saharanpur with a request that the appeal be adjourned to some date in July. The learned Additional District Judge refused the prayer but granted three days' time for making alternative arrangement and directed that the appeal be posted for hearing of further arguments on May 23, 1983. He further directed that in the event of failure to urge arguments on May 23, 1983, 'the judgment will be pronounced.\" Even so, the appellant again sought an adjournment on the ground that he could not secure the services of his senior counsel from Sharanpur as he was not able to appear till the month of July, and prayed for some time to engage a senior counsel from Moradabad. The learned Additional District Judge refused the adjournment on the ground thc, t more than sufficient time had been granted for additional arguments, rejected the prayer for adjournment, and then added : • \"The judgment is ready which is delivered.\"\n\nThe appeal was dismissed by the learned Additional District , Judge by pronouncing the judgment which the learned Judge had kept ready • for being delivered. As the Act does not provide for any further appeal or revision •. the High Court was approached llnder Art. 227 of the Constitution of India, but the High Court rejected the Writ Petition in limine. Hence the present appeal by special leave.\n\n\n[1984] 3 S.C.R\n\nThe following facts emerge from the order-sheet :\n\n(I) On May 1 ~. 1983 the learned Additional District Judge had felt that the request made by the appellant for further arguments was justlfied and had granted it.\n\n(2) On May 20, 1983 the Court granted only three days' ·\n\ntime to make alternative arrangement in view of the fact that the senior counsel from Saharanpur engaged by the appellant was not in a position to appear on account of illness.\n\n (3) On 23rd May, 1983, the arguments were to be heard. c Notwithstanding that the arguments were yet to be heard on this date, the learned Judge had kept the judgment ready for pronouncing, which he pronounced forthwith wilst refusing the prayer for adjournment made by the appellant with a view to engage a senior advocate from the local bar since the Advocate from Saharanpur D already engaged by him was not available.\n\nTwo infirmities have been pointed out to us in support of the plea that the procedure adopted was not just and fair :\n\n(i) Even though the appellant was genuinely handicapped in securing the services of a senior advocate to appear for , him In the matter having regard to the fact that respon- dent No, 3 Kailash Sahai Mathur was a leading and foffuential member of the Moradabad Bar and members, of the local Bar were not willing to appear against him In his personal matter, the learned Additional District Judge did not afford him a reasonable opportunity for engaging an Advocate ;\n\n(ii) Even though the appeal was fixed for making further oral submissions, on the day fixed for this purpose, the learned Additional District Judge hd kept his judgment ready and prononced it when the appellant applied for further time to engage a senior ll)ember of the Bar to represent him.\n\nWe do not consider it necessary to delve deep into the facts.\n\nIt is sufficient for our purposes to say that the said Respondent, on >- ', his own showing, is a leading and influential member of the H Moradabad Bar as is evident from the following passage extracted from the written objections filed by the said Respondent himself at thoi'.trlalj;\n\nN.N. WAHi v. PISTT. JUPGE (Thakkar, J.) 921\n\n\"He has been a member of the State Bar Council for a number of years and also been Vice President of the U.P. Lawyers Conference .. The opposite party has been Secretary, Vice-President and President of the Bar Association, Morada bad. He is also manager of S.R.A.N.\n\nIntermediate College, Moradabad. He is a founder lifemember of the Moradabad Civil Courts Club. He has been President of the Moradabad Rotary Club and is its member for the last about 33 years. He has also been Worshipful Master of the Masonic Lodge.\"\n\n\"He has been member of the Senate, Law Faculty and Board of studies of the Agra University. He is also connected with other Clubs and social and educational institutions. The opposite party was also the founder Secretary of the Moradabad Branch of the Indian Law I, nstitute. In his various capacities, the opposite party has to meet a variety of persons, junior lawyers, teachers, rotarians, social worker, clients etc. each day. He has also a huge library and so stated above a fairJy good number of family members staying with him, all this makes even the space at the disposal of the opposite party such too cramped.\" ·\n\nIt has also been established that the appellant was finding it extremely difficult to engage a lawyer to represent him as he was pitted against a senior and influential member of the Bar personally, and was seeking his eviction from premises in his personal occupation for use as his residence-cum-office. A leading member of the Bar had already returned the brief, and a senior member of the Bar from Saharanpur Bar engaged by the appellant had been repeatedly asking him to seek adjournments instead of appearing in the Court to argue the matter on the appointed day. The ·\n\nadjournments were sought presumably because of his understandable reluctance to appear against a professional brother in a matter where he was personally concerned.\n\nWe have no hesitation in assuming that no Court would ever be influenced by the fact that the Respondent was a leading member of the Bar and influential person inasmuch as in the eye of law all citizens are entitled to equal treatment having regard to the doctrine of equality before law. If a case for eviction was made out under the relevant statute, the Court would not hesitate to\n\n-' B\n\nD t!\n\nG \"\n\n922 SUPJtEME COURT REPORTS\n\nU984] 3 S.C.R.\n\nrelease the accommodation by ordering eviction against the respondent notwithstanding his status in the legal world or in the society.\n\nIf on merits, the application under Sec. 21 (I) (a) and/or under\n\nSec. 21 (IA) of the Act deserved to be disallowed, the appeal would be dismissed just as it would be dismissed against any other tenant by reason of the fact that it was wanting in merits, not because the respondent enjoyed a particular status in the profession or in the society. This is what everyone associated with the world oflaw is doubtless expected to know. But a litigant who is pitted against such an influential member of the Bar having such a high status in the society, who himself mentions in his affidavit these facts, can be excused for not being aware of the doctrine of equality before law, not only in theory but also in practice.\n\nSo also the learned Judge might well have realised that the appellant was fighting a litigation in which a very senior member of the bar was personally impleaded. as a defendent (respondent) apd that it was understandable if he was labouring under a psychological complex. The complex is understandable because in the eyes of a litigant a senior member of the bar when sued personally, might en'joy certain amount or sympathy with the members of the judiciary before whom he is practising day in and day out. This aspect cannot be overlooked having regard to the realities of life.\n\nThe learned judge should have shown awareness of this dimen sion of the matter and bearing in mind the adage that .'justice must also appear to have been done', ought to have dealt with the request for a short adjourment with a degree of understanding.\n\nMore particuiarly as it was not difficult to realise that a landlord .is the last person intersted in prolonging the eviction proceedings or the appeal arising from the order passed in such proceedings. The learned Additional District Judge, under the circumstances, might well have granted a short adjounrment to enable the appellant to engage a senior counsel of his choice and confidence. For this reason: It is common knowledge that when a leading member of the Bar is sued or sues in a personal capacity, the members of the Bar where he is practising are more than reluctant to accept a brief against their colleague and friend on account of personal relations or on account of likelihood of embarrassment. In a matter like this, the litigant pitted against a leading member of the Bar may also want to engage a counsel of h'is choice and confidence for it may well appear to him that not every member of the Bar might .\n\n... ,\n\n·-\n\nN.N. WAHi v. DiS'IT. JUDGE (Thakkar, J.) 923\n\npresent his case with the degree of zeal, enthusiasm, sincerity and conviction which ordinarily a litigant expects from his advocate.\n\nWe are afraid that these vital aspects were overlooked by the learned Judge when ihe granted only three days' time to make atternative arrangement for engaging a local senior counsel by reason of the fact that the Saharanpur Advocate engaged by _the appellant was not in a position to appear on . the ground of illness.\n\nThis short adjournment for three days was granted vide order dated May 20, 1983. But 011 May 23, 1983, the learned Judge refused to grant further time to the appellant who had not been able to make suitable arrangement for e_ngaging a counsel on that .date.\n\nWe are of the opinion that the appellant has been denied a reasonable opportunity of hearing, and that the grievance made by the appellant, as regards the procedure adopted by the learned Judge on this score, is not unfounded. This is one of the two reasons which has impe!led us to set aside the order passed by the learned Additional District Judge and to remand the matter for a fresh decision in accor.dance with law after affording reasonable opp<Jr tunity of hearing to the parties.\n\nThe second ground has also been substantiated in the sense . that the appellant cannot be faulted for entertaining the misgiving that the procedure adopted was not in tune with one's sense of justice .. The grievance this time arises on account of the fact that even though May 23, 1983 was fixed for hearing of further oral arguments, the learned Judge had kept a judgment ready for being . pronounced and he proceeded to pronounce it forthwith whilst refusing the prayer for adjournment made by the appellant. It is not in dispute that on May.23,)983 the. learned Additional District Judge had granted three days' time to the appellant to enable him to engage an advocate to make furthev oral submissions. Since the matter was posted on 23rd May, 1983, for further oral arguments, the learned Judge could not have commenced writing his judgment till further arguments were heard on that , day or the request for adJonrnment, if any, was refused. No objection could have been'!aken if on turning down the request for adjournment on May 23, 1983, the learned Judge had commenced writing or dictating his judgment in the Court. But he had kept his judgment (dismissing the appeal) ready for being pronounced. When the appellant made a request for an . adjournment for engaging an advocate, thereqi•cst was turned down and the judgment prepared\n\nA •'\n\n924 SUPllEME COURT REPORTS [1984] 3 s.c.R.\n\nin advance, dismissing the appeal, y<as straightaway pronounced.\n\nAs we pointed out earlier, the learned Judge could be expected to. be aware of the fact that the appellant being a landlord seeking an eviction order was not interested in unnecessarily prolonging the hearing of.the appeal. He also could not h'ave been unaware of the\n\nfact that the respondent was a leading member of the local Bar and an influential person and that under the circumstances a citizen who was pitted against him in a personal litigation was likely to feelthat he was not getting just and fair treatment if the judgment was kept ready in anticipation that the request for adjournment was going to be made and. was. going to be refused. Supposing no request for adjournment was made and a senior advocate had appeared on behalf of the appellant what would have happened ? Before hearing his arguments, the learned Judge had already made up his mind and kept ready a judgment wherein he had reached the conclusion that there was no substance in the appeal. These embarrassing facts star'e one in the eye. We do not think that fault can be found with the appellant if he felt, as any other litigant. would have perhaps felt, that.the procedure adopted was lacking in fairness.\n\nIn fairness to th-. learned Judge; we must mention that in his order dated May 20, 1983, he had observed as under:--,- '\n\n\"Appeal adjourned to 23-5-83 for additional arguments falling which judgment would be pronunced.\"\n\nBut the fact remains that the learned Judge could not have armed himself with a ready-made judgment dismissing the appeal when further arguments on behalf of th\"'appellant were yet to be heard.\n\nAnd apparently there was no time-compulsion to pronounce the judgment on that very day. . The judgment rendered by the learned Judge is thus vitiated by reason of the failure to g.ant reasonable opportunity of hearing to the aP, pellant and by reason of the procedure adopted in connection with the preparation and pronouncement of the judgment. We may incidentally observe that we are also distressed that the High Court rejected the petition summarily in the face of thesefeatures and obliged the appellant to apprnach this Court.\n\nUnder the circumstances the appeal must be allowed. The judgment and order passed by the Allahabad High Court as well as those passed by the learned Additional District Judge are set aside 11nd -the matter is •emitted to the- Court of the District Je,\n\nN:N. WAHi v. DISTT. JUDGE (7 hakkar, J.) 925\n\nMoradabad for being disposed of in accordance with law. In view of what has transpired, we direct that the learned District Judge . himself shall hear the appeal, and after affording reasonable opportunity of haring to both the parties to make their submls sions, dipose it of in accordance with law uninfluenced by anything that might have been stated in the judgment. which is being set aside. The learned District Judge sha!! dispose of the appeal as expeditiously as possible, and, in any event, not later tha.n within four months fFom the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment,. which we hereby direct the Ofll.ce to send to the learned DitriCt Judge 'l>rthwith'. '\n\nThere sha!! 'be no order a1 to coill.\n\nN.V.K ..\n\nAppe1J/ a/lowed .", "total_entities": 32, "entities": [{"text": "NIRANKAR NATH WAHI AND OTHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 29, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "NIRANKAR NATH WAHI AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "FIFTH ADDL. DISTRICT JUDGE,\n\nMORADABAD AND ORS", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 31, "end_char": 77, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "FIFTH ADDL. DISTRICT JUDGE, MORADABAD AND ORS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "A.P. SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 95, "end_char": 103, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "A.P. SEN*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "M.P. THAKKAR, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 108, "end_char": 125, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "M.P. THAKKAR", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Code of Civil Procedure 1908", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 128, "end_char": 156, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Jiiigant", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3253, "end_char": 3261, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(924-G-925 B]\n\nIn the eyes of Jiiigant a senior member of the bar when shed personaliy, n1ight enjoy certain amount of syn1pathy with the members of the judiciary before whom he is practising day in and day out."}}, {"text": "CIVIL APPBLLAT1i JURISDICTION", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5433, "end_char": 5462, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "922 F-Gj\n\nCIVIL APPBLLAT1i JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Allahabad High Court", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5548, "end_char": 5568, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "From the Judgment and Order dated 21.7.1983 of the Allahabad High Court in WP No."}}, {"text": "R.B Mehrotra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5596, "end_char": 5608, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.B Mehrotra Advocate for the appellants."}}, {"text": "K.P. Gupta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5639, "end_char": 5649, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K.P. Gupta Advocate for the respondents."}}, {"text": "THAKKAR", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5770, "end_char": 5777, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "JUDGE (Thakkar, J.) 919\n\nThe Judgment of the Court wa~ delivered by\n\nTHAKKAR, J. \"Justice\", we do not tire of saying, \"must not only be done\", but \"must be seen to done\".", "canonical_name": "THAKKAR"}}, {"text": "Moradabad", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6420, "end_char": 6429, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That is the reason why, though we do not feel very happy in doing so, we have had to grant special leave for disposing of the appeal not on merits, but only for the purpose of setting aside the impugned judgment rendered by the learned Additional District Judge, Moradabad."}}, {"text": "May 20, 1983", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6720, "end_char": 6732, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The ordersheet of May 20, 1983 of the record of the appeal in the .Court of the learned District Judge shows tha.t the appellant sought adjournment on the ground of indisposition of his senior eounsel from Saharanpur with a request that the appeal be adjourned to some date in July."}}, {"text": "Saharanpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6908, "end_char": 6918, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The ordersheet of May 20, 1983 of the record of the appeal in the .Court of the learned District Judge shows tha.t the appellant sought adjournment on the ground of indisposition of his senior eounsel from Saharanpur with a request that the appeal be adjourned to some date in July."}}, {"text": "May 23, 1983", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7181, "end_char": 7193, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The learned Additional District Judge refused the prayer but granted three days' time for making alternative arrangement and directed that the appeal be posted for hearing of further arguments on May 23, 1983."}}, {"text": "Sharanpur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7444, "end_char": 7453, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Even so, the appellant again sought an adjournment on the ground that he could not secure the services of his senior counsel from Sharanpur as he was not able to appear till the month of July, and prayed for some time to engage a senior counsel from Moradabad."}}, {"text": "Art. 227", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 8089, "end_char": 8097, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Constitution of India", "statute": "the Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 8105, "end_char": 8126, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "23rd May, 1983", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8705, "end_char": 8719, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(3) On 23rd May, 1983, the arguments were to be heard."}}, {"text": "Kailash Sahai Mathur", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9426, "end_char": 9446, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Two infirmities have been pointed out to us in support of the plea that the procedure adopted was not just and fair :\n\n(i) Even though the appellant was genuinely handicapped in securing the services of a senior advocate to appear for , him In the matter having regard to the fact that respon- dent No, 3 Kailash Sahai Mathur was a leading and foffuential member of the Moradabad Bar and members, of the local Bar were not willing to appear against him In his personal matter, the learned Additional District Judge did not afford him a reasonable opportunity for engaging an Advocate ;\n\n(ii) Even though the appeal was fixed for making further oral submissions, on the day fixed for this purpose, the learned Additional District Judge hd kept his judgment ready and prononced it when the appellant applied for further time to engage a senior ll)ember of the Bar to represent him."}}, {"text": "Moradabad Bar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9491, "end_char": 9504, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Two infirmities have been pointed out to us in support of the plea that the procedure adopted was not just and fair :\n\n(i) Even though the appellant was genuinely handicapped in securing the services of a senior advocate to appear for , him In the matter having regard to the fact that respon- dent No, 3 Kailash Sahai Mathur was a leading and foffuential member of the Moradabad Bar and members, of the local Bar were not willing to appear against him In his personal matter, the learned Additional District Judge did not afford him a reasonable opportunity for engaging an Advocate ;\n\n(ii) Even though the appeal was fixed for making further oral submissions, on the day fixed for this purpose, the learned Additional District Judge hd kept his judgment ready and prononced it when the appellant applied for further time to engage a senior ll)ember of the Bar to represent him."}}, {"text": "Thakkar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10378, "end_char": 10385, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "JUPGE (Thakkar, J.) 921\n\n\"He has been a member of the State Bar Council for a number of years and also been Vice President of the U.P. Lawyers Conference .. The opposite party has been Secretary, Vice-President and President of the Bar Association, Morada bad.", "canonical_name": "THAKKAR"}}, {"text": "Bar Association, Morada", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10603, "end_char": 10626, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "JUPGE (Thakkar, J.) 921\n\n\"He has been a member of the State Bar Council for a number of years and also been Vice President of the U.P. Lawyers Conference .. The opposite party has been Secretary, Vice-President and President of the Bar Association, Morada bad."}}, {"text": "S.R.A.N.\n\nIntermediate College, Moradabad", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10654, "end_char": 10695, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He is also manager of S.R.A.N.\n\nIntermediate College, Moradabad."}}, {"text": "Moradabad Civil Courts Club", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10731, "end_char": 10758, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He is a founder lifemember of the Moradabad Civil Courts Club."}}, {"text": "Moradabad Rotary Club", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10789, "end_char": 10810, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "He has been President of the Moradabad Rotary Club and is its member for the last about 33 years."}}, {"text": "Agra University", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10992, "end_char": 11007, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "\"He has been member of the Senate, Law Faculty and Board of studies of the Agra University."}}, {"text": "Saharanpur Bar", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 11944, "end_char": 11958, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A leading member of the Bar had already returned the brief, and a senior member of the Bar from Saharanpur Bar engaged by the appellant had been repeatedly asking him to seek adjournments instead of appearing in the Court to argue the matter on the appointed day."}}, {"text": "Sec. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12904, "end_char": 12911, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sec. 21", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12934, "end_char": 12941, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "May.23,)983", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17152, "end_char": 17163, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is not in dispute that on May.23,)983 the."}}, {"text": "23-5-83", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 19404, "end_char": 19411, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "learned Judge; we must mention that in his order dated May 20, 1983, he had observed as under:--,- '\n\n\"Appeal adjourned to 23-5-83 for additional arguments falling which judgment would be pronunced.\""}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_3_926_929_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "RAM JETHMALANI, ETC\n\nUNION OF INDIA, ETC.\n\nJune 19, 1984\n\n[E.S. VENKATARAMIAH, J.]\n\nConstitution of India_ i950, Article 32. National Security Act, 1980, Sectioh 3 and The Supreme Court Rules 1966, O.rder II rule 6 and Order, VII rule 4 (5).\n\nWrit petitions assailing detention of de(enu ·.under National Security Act.-.\n\nVacatio11 Judge hearing petitions-Itnportant questions touching security of nation and personal /jberty involved-Larger Bench hearing matter-Necessity of.\n\nThe petition_ers in their writ petitions to this Court assailed the detention of a member of the Sikh Community under the National Security Act, 1980.\n\nHELD: 1. These are not ordinary criminal cases involving'a few individuals. coming from a smalt loca1ity. These ae extraordinary cases involving serious questions of great public importance touching the security of the nation as well as personal liberty of a s, izeable section of the community.\n\nThese cases hitve to be dealt v.ith differently from the usual cases which come up before this Court. [927 C-D]\n\n2. In handling these cases the highest judicial talent and statesmanship are needed and hence. these cases cannot just be rejected reserving liberty to the applicants to approach a Judicial Magistrate, a Sessions Judge or even the High Court. Every step taken in these cases should serve as a healing touch bringing solace .to all concerned and lessening by some degree the , pain and suffering through which the country and its peace-loving people have passed and are passing. These procedings should \"have the effect of assuaging the outraged feelings of many who till now may not be aware of.what has actually happened. [927 F-G]\n\n3. The questions involved are too large and complex for the shoulders of a Single Judge to bear. These and other cases of like nature should be heard by at least seven learned Judges of this Court whose unquestioned judicial authority, erudition and acumen would be, of great assistance in 'the restoration of peace in one of the States known for valour, devotion, spirit of sacrifice and sense of duty towards the country of the people residing in it.\n\n[927 H ; 928 A]\n\n4. Even ir' alle°'gations of serious offences against the Stat~ may_ 'be forthcoming against the arrested persons, the Court n1ay stilt consider whether it is not possible -enlarge at least some of them, who may be in 'a repentant mood, on bail to facilitate early restoration of normalcy in the State. There may be many other things which may be done and they are within the domain of the Judges, who may .hear these cases. Jf this Court in the end can succetd in establishing peace and , harmony in ihe country, it would be its finest !tour. {9280-H ; 929 A[ •\n\n(Cases reffene~ to Larscr Jlnch.)\n\nIi.AM JETH MALANi v. UNION ( Venkataramiah, i.) 921\n\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition (Criminal) Nos. 920 A and 934 of 1984. (Under article 32 of the Constitution of India)\n\nP.R. Mri1ul, R.D. Agarwala and R.N. Poddar for the Applicant/Respondent.\n\nMiss 'Rani Jethma/ani, G.S. Cheema and Shailendra Bhardwaj for the Opp. side/petitioners.\n\nThe 01der of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMIAH, J; These cases are just two in number.\n\nThere may be many other cases of this nature which bave , not yet\n\nreached this Court but may be filed shortly. These are not ordinary c criminal cases irtvolving a few individuals . coming from a small locality. These are extraordinary cases involving serious questions of great public importance touching the security of the nation as well as pers'onal liberty of a sizeable section or the community, many of whom may have been made to believe by a dominant section of sopiety, may be wrongly, that what they were doing was D right and for that reason may not have been free agents. Hence these cases have to be dealt with differently from the usual cases which come up before this Court.\n\nFirst a word of caution. In the course of these proceedings every word uttered on either side of the Bar should be weighed before it is used. There is no room for heat and passion ; logic and reason alone .should rule the debates. There should be an all round sympathy in dealing with the complex issues which may arise for determination. In handling' these cases the highest judicial talen~ and statesmanship are. needed and hence these cases cannot just be rejected reserving liberty to the applicants to approach a Judicial Magistrate, a Sessions Judge or even the High Court. Every step taken in these cses should serve as a healing touch bringing solace to all concerned and lessening by some degree the pain and suffering through which the country and its peace-loving people have passed and are passing. These proceedings should have the effect . of assuaging the outraged feelings of1nany who till now may not be aware of what has actually happened. Any amount of time spent by the highest Court of this land on these cases would not go in vain. There is no. duty more. sacred than this.\n\nI, however, feel that the questions involved are too.large and complex for the shoulders of. a Single Judge to bear. It is my humble view that these and other cases of like nature should be heard by at least seven learned Judges of this Court whose unques-. tioned judicial authority, erudition and acumen would be of great\n\n92S SUPi.EME COURT REPOJ.TS \\.19\\\\4) 3 s.C. R..\n\nassistance in the restoration of peace in one of our great States known for the valour, the devotion, the spirit of sacrifice and the sense of duty towards the country or' the people residing in it\n\nMay I say that thr¢ can be no compromise on the following matters, namely, unity and integrity Of India, lhe secular and democratic form of the Indian Government arid the supremay of the Indian Constitution ? They must be uppeld in any event. There cannot be.any doubt abonnhe right of the established Government to run the administration of the country. We should remember, that India is no doubt a Union of States, but the boundarie,. of the States are not unalterable. There is only one citizenship in India and that all.of us.:. Indian citizens-belong to the whole oflndia and the whole of India belongs to all of us, Man-made boundaries , cannot divide us.\n\nLanguage, religion, caste and other factors can not be allowed to drive a wedge between one section and another.\n\nIr is good to 'remembeF here what Abrahaip. Lincoln said though in another context in 1858, 'A house divided againt itself cannot stand'.· The issue now before . the Court involves more than the future of India .. Again to quote Lincoln from what he said in the American context :\n\n\"It presents to tl'l.e whole family of man, the ~111estion wnether a constitutional republic or a democracy-a govern- . ment of the people, by the same people-can or cannot maintain its territorial integrity, agai.nst its own domestic foes''..(')\n\nTue above words appear to be relevant in the present Indian conteiot.too. ·\n\n The unfolding of facU in these cases may make those who may have erred to realise where they hav; erred and how they have erred. It may help the Court to suggest solutions for rectilying the undesirable effects of such errors, , Even if allegations of serious offences against the State may be forthcoming against the arrested persons, the Court may still consider whether it is not possible to enlarge at least some of them, who may be in a repentant mood, on bail to facilitate early restoration of normalcy in the State. The Court may at some stage have occasion to consider whether it •\n\n(1) (Vide; The first message to the Congress after the fall of Fort Sumter r during the American civil \\Var). ·\n\nll.AM JETHMALANI v. UNION (Venkataramiah, J.) 929\n\nshould recommend to Parliament to pass an Act of Indemnity which may be an act of great sagacity, thus drawing the curtain on this un happy page of the. history of tb!indian Republic. These may be many other things which may be done and they are within the domain of my learned Brothers who may hear these cases. - If this Court.in the end.cah succeed in establishing peace and harmony in the country, it would be its finest hour.\n\nI, therefore, refer these cases to a larger. Bench with the fond hope that our country would have no occasion .in the future to face a similar situation.\n\nThese papers may be placed before the Hon'ble the Chief C Justice of India fot appropriate directions.\n\nN.V.K .\n\nCases referred to larger bench.", "total_entities": 21, "entities": [{"text": "ETC\n\nUNION OF INDIA, ETC", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 16, "end_char": 40, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA, ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "June 19, 1984", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 43, "end_char": 56, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "June 19, 1984\n\n[E.S. VENKATARAMIAH, J.]\n\nConstitution of India_ i950, Article 32."}}, {"text": "E.S. VENKATARAMIAH, J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 59, "end_char": 81, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "E.S. VENKATARAMIAH*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 84, "end_char": 105, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 113, "end_char": 123, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "National Security Act, 1980", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 125, "end_char": 152, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Supreme Court Rules 1966", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 172, "end_char": 196, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "National Security Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 296, "end_char": 317, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Court assailed the detention of a member of the Sikh Community under the National Security Act, 1980", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 527, "end_char": 627, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2881, "end_char": 2891, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2899, "end_char": 2920, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "P.R. Mri1ul", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2923, "end_char": 2934, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under article 32 of the Constitution of India)\n\nP.R. Mri1ul, R.D. Agarwala and R.N. Poddar for the Applicant/Respondent."}}, {"text": "R.D. Agarwala", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2936, "end_char": 2949, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under article 32 of the Constitution of India)\n\nP.R. Mri1ul, R.D. Agarwala and R.N. Poddar for the Applicant/Respondent."}}, {"text": "R.N. Poddar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 2954, "end_char": 2965, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Under article 32 of the Constitution of India)\n\nP.R. Mri1ul, R.D. Agarwala and R.N. Poddar for the Applicant/Respondent."}}, {"text": "Rani Jethma", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3003, "end_char": 3014, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Miss 'Rani Jethma/ani, G.S. Cheema and Shailendra Bhardwaj for the Opp."}}, {"text": "G.S. Cheema", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3020, "end_char": 3031, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Miss 'Rani Jethma/ani, G.S. Cheema and Shailendra Bhardwaj for the Opp."}}, {"text": "Shailendra Bhardwaj", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 3036, "end_char": 3055, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Miss 'Rani Jethma/ani, G.S. Cheema and Shailendra Bhardwaj for the Opp."}}, {"text": "VENKATARAMIAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 3129, "end_char": 3142, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The 01der of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMIAH, J; These cases are just two in number."}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5644, "end_char": 5649, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "EME COURT REPOJ.TS \\.19\\\\4) 3 s.C. R..\n\nassistance in the restoration of peace in one of our great States known for the valour, the devotion, the spirit of sacrifice and the sense of duty towards the country or' the people residing in it\n\nMay I say that thr¢ can be no compromise on the following matters, namely, unity and integrity Of India, lhe secular and democratic form of the Indian Government arid the supremay of the Indian Constitution ?"}}, {"text": "Abrahaip. Lincoln", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6357, "end_char": 6374, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ir is good to 'remembeF here what Abrahaip."}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 7707, "end_char": 7717, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "AM JETHMALANI v. UNION (Venkataramiah, J.) 929\n\nshould recommend to Parliament to pass an Act of Indemnity which may be an act of great sagacity, thus drawing the curtain on this un happy page of the."}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_3_930_941_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS\n\nATIC INDUSTRIES LIMITED\n\n• Jwte 22, 1984 . . .\n\n[P.N. BHAGWATI, R.S. PATHAK AND\n\n!\\MARENJ?RA NATH SEN, JJ.J\n\nCentral Excise. and Salt Act, 1944-Clause (c) of sub-section (4) of section 4 as i( stood after its amendmentby sec. 2 of the Central Act 22 of 1973~ >-- ConsitUtationaJ validity of. ·\n\nCentral Excise and Salt Act, 1944-The words \"related person\" occurriflC in claitse (c) of subSection (4) of sec. 4 as it stood after it~ amendment by sec. 2 of the Central A.ct 22 of 1973-Dejinitton and applicability of.\n\n' Bank Guarntee-Whether the High Court was right in directing the costs of /urilishing bank guarantee to be paid by the Revenue to (he assessee in cases wh.ere the demand for duty is quashed a~ unjustified.\n\nThe reSpondent-assessee, a limited company, was engaged in the business of manufacturing dyes. Its 50 per cent share capital was held by Atul • products Ltd. and the remaining 50 per cent by Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. London wHich also had a subsidiary company fully owned by it,\"called\n\nmperial Chemical Industries (India) Pvt. Ltd. The Impenal Chemical Industries (India) pvt. Ltd, ceased to be a subsidiary company wholly owned_ by the Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. London on 13th March 1978, since 60 per\n\ncent of the share capital of Imperial Cheniical Industries (India) Pvt. Ltd, was offered to the pub.lie in pursuance of the policy of the Government of India requiring ihat not more !ha~ 40o/oof the share Capital of an ltdian copany should be held by a forign sharehplder. ConSequent up<in this dilutiQn e forcii&'n Shareholding, the name of Imperial Chemical Industries (lnQJa) Pvt. Ltd, was changed to Crescent Dyes and Chemicals Ltd.\n\nThe assessee at all material times sold the large hulk of dyes rnanufac~ tured by it in wholesale to Atul Products Ltd. and Imperial Chemical Illdus~ tries (India) Pvt. Limited which subsequently came to be known as Crescent Dyes and chemicals Ltd. at a uniform price applicable alike to both these wholesale buyers and these wholesale _buyers sold these dyes to dealers and consumers at a higller price which inter. alia. included the expenses incurred by\n\nUNION v. ATIC INDUSTRIES 931\n\nthem as also their profit. The traCsactions between the assessee on the one A hand and Atul Products Ltd. and Crescent Dyes and Chemicals Limited on the other were as principal to principal and the wholesale price charged by the assessee to Atul Products Ltd and Crescent Dyes and. Chemicals Ltd. was the sole consideration for the sale and no ex:tra-crimmercial considerations entered in the detrmination of such price.\n\nThe aSsessee went on clearing the dyes manufactlired by it after payment of excise duty as per the price 1ist submitted by it on the basis of the wholesale price charged to Atul Products Ltd. and Crescent Dyes and Chemicals Ltd. as the same was approved by the Asst. Collector on 29th October, 1975.\n\nThe Superintendent Of Central Excise, however, isued a notice to the assessee on 31st July: 1976 calling upon the assessee to show cause why the earlier decision approving the price list should not b\"° reviewed and.the differential duty worked out on the basis of selling price charged by Atul Products Ltd. and Cresceat Dyes & Cheinicals Ltd. should not be recovered w.e.f. 1st October 1975 on the ground . that the assessee on the one hand and Atul\n\nProduct~ Ltd. ~-nd Crescent Dyes and Chernicals Ltd. on the other 'vere \"related pesons\" and the assessable value .of *'he dyes manufactured by the assessee was therefore liable to be calculated on the basjs of the price at which Atul Products L1d. and Crescent Dyes and Chemicals- Ltd. sold the Dyes to the dealers and the consumers. The assessee in its reply dated 31st . August 1976 pointed out that the assessee on the one hand and Atul Products \"\"' Ltd. and Crescent Dyes and Chemicals Ltd. on the other Were not \"related\n\npersons\" within the meaning of the definition of that term contained in clause\n\n(c) of subsection (4) of section 4 of the amended Central Excise and Salt Act\n\n1944. The Asstt. Collector was however not satisfied with the explanation offered by the assessee and viewed, his earlier order of approval of the price list and confirmed the demand Of differentia 1 duty which came to an aggregate amount of Rs 1, 17, 77, 737,65 with retrospective effect from 1st October, 1975 and directed th<:> asscssee to file a fresh price list on the basis of the selling price cllarged by Atul Products Ltd. and Crescent Dyes and Chemicals Ltd.\n\nThe assessee thereupon fl.ld a \\vrit p ctition in the High Court of Gujarat challenging the validity of the demand made by the Asstt.\n\nCollector on two grounds namely, (i) that the concept of \"related .per- . son\" occuring in , clause (c) of sub-section (4) of section 4 of the amended Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944. was outside the legislative competence Of Parliament under Art. 226 read with Efltry 84 in the Union List and was therefore u.nconstitutional and void ; &\n\n(ii) that the assessee .on the one hand and A tu l Products Ltd. and Crescent Dyes & Chemicals Ltd. on the other were not ''related persons\" and the wholesle cash price charged by the assessee to .A tul Products Ltd. and Cres-· cept Dyes and Chemicals Ltd., and not the price at which the latter sold the dyes to the dealrs or the consumers represented the true measure of the value of the yes for the purpose of Chargeabiiity to excise duty. The High Court llowed the writ petition dn these two grounds and also gave direction 'to the Revenue for paying the costs incurred by, the assesse:e in\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984] 3 S.C.Ii.., •. cJnneCtion with the bank guarantee furnished by it.\n\nHence the apJ, eal to this Court by certificate granted under Art. 132 and 133 (1) of the Constitution.\n\nAllowing the appeal in par~,· !he Court.\n\nHELD : (1) On a proper interpretation of the definition of \"related person\" in subsec'tion (4) (c) of sec. 4, the words \"relative and a distributor of the assessee\" do not refer to any distributor but they are li.rnited only to a_ diStributor who is a relat_ive of, the assessee within the meaning of thi! Companies Act, 1956. The definition of •irelated person\" is not und_uly wide and does a( suffei' from any constitutional infirmity. It is within the legislative compe, ence of Parliament. The decision of the High Court holding that \"the concept of related person occurring in\n\narnendd section 4 is ultra vires the. legislative corn petence of Parliament under Article 256 read \\vith Entry 84 in the Union List and striking down clause (c) 'or sub-section\n\n(4) of sec. 4 as also. the ex.Pression \"the buyer -is P_ot arelated perSon nd'' in clause '(a) of sub-section (1) of sec.\n\nand proviso\n\n(lii) to that clause mllst ccnsequently be set aside and it must :be -held that these provisioi:ts are .constitutionally valid.\n\n[937 E-H]\n\nUnion of Iµdia v. 467 applied,\n\nHigh Court judgment in 21F ebruary 1979 reversed.\n\nBombay. Tyres International Ltd. [1984] I SCC\n\nSpecial: Civil Appln. No. 119.of 1976 decided on 20 ·\n\n(2) , The first part-of the definition of \"related person\" in clause ( c) of sub-section (4) of sec. 4 defines 'related persbn' to mean \"a t:erson who is so assoicated with the assessee that they have.interest directly or indirectly in the business of each other\" It is not enough that the .asses.see has an .interest, direct or iodi'rect _ in, the business of the person a11eged to, be a related person nor is it ertough that the person allehged to be a related pesson\n\nas an. inte:est, direct or indirect in the business of the assessee.\n\nTo attract the applicability of the first part .of the definitiorl, the assessee and the person alleged to be a related 11erson must b3.ve interest, direct of indirect in the bu_siness of each other. Each of them must ba('e a diiect or indirect interest in the business of the other. The quality 'and degree of interest which .each -has in the business of the other m'ay be di°lferent ; the interest of one in the business of the other may be direct while the interest of the latter in th~ business of the former may be indirect.\n\nThat would nOt make . any difference so long as each has got some interest, direct Of indirect in the business of the other.\n\n(93~ G-H; 939 A-BJ\n\n(3) (i) Jn the present case Atul Products J., td. has undoubtedly interest in the business of the assessee Since it holds 50% of the share c'!pital\n\nof the assessee and has interest as shareholder in the business carried on by the a.sessec.\n\nB_ut, it connot be said that tfte assessee, a Ltd. company, has any interest, d, irect or indirect in the business carried on by one of its shareholders,\n\n• •\n\nIJNION v. ATIC INDUSTRIES. 933\n\nnamely Atul , Products Ltd., even though the share-holding of such shareholder may be 50 per cent. Secondly, Atul Products Ltd. is a wholtsale buyer of the dyes manufactured by the assessee but even then, since the transactions between them are .as principal to principal~ it is difficult to appreciate howl:he assessee could be said by virtue of that Circumstan_ce to have any interest, direct or indirect, in the business of Atul Products Ltd.\n\nThe assessee is not concerned whether Atul Products Ltd. sells or does not sell the dyes purchased by it from the asscssee nor is it concerned whether Atul Products Ltd. sells such dy<s at a profit or at a loss.\n\n[939 C-F]\n\n(ii) Perhapsthe position in regard to Crescent Dyes and Chemicclls Ltd. is much stronger than that in regard to Atul Pro!=lucts Ltd.\n\nCrescent Dyes and Chernjpals Ltd. is not even a shareholder of the assessee and it has therefore no interest direct or indirect in the business of' the assessee.\n\nEqually, the assessee has .no interest, direct or indirect in the business of Crescent Dyes . and Chemicals Ltd., Which i:; just a , wh0Iesalc dealer purchasing dyes from the asscssee in wholesale on principal to principal basi&.\n\n[939 G-H]\n\n(iii) The first pat of the definition of related persons inclause\n\n(c) of Sub-section\n\n(4) of section 4 of the amended Act is therefore clearly not satisfif; d both in. relations to Atul Products Ltd. as also in relation to Crescent Dyes and Chemicals Ltd. and neither of them can be said to be a \"related person\" vis-a-vis the assesseee within 'the 1neaning of the definition of that term in clause. (c) of subsection (4) ·of sec. 4 of _the amended Act. Therefore, the assessable value of the dyes: manufactured by the assessee cannot be determined with reference to the. selling price charged b)'.\n\nAtul Products Lid. and Crescent Dyes and Chemicals Ltd. to their \\)ruchases but must be determined on the basis of the wholesale cash price charged by. the ass0sset;' to Atul Products Ltd. and Crescent Dyes and Chemicals Ltcl. The demand made by the Asstt. Collector for differential duty mu;:; t therefore be held to be i; ightly quashed by the High Court. [940 D-F]\n\n(4) Th~ High Court was not right in giving direction to the Revenue to pay costs inCurred by thS assessee in conneCtion with the bank. guarantee furnished by the assessee. The bank guarantee was required to be furnished by the assessee as a condition of\"grant of' interim !tay of enforcement of the demand for differential duty and if it is u.ltimately found i:hat the demand for differential duty was not justified, 'the bank guarantee would certainly have to be discharged. But, it is difficult to see how the costs of furnishing the bank guarantee could be directed to be paid by the Revenue to the as.sessee. This direction of the High Court which directs the revenue to pay to the assessee the costs in conn'ection with the bank guarantee furnished by \"it in pursuance of the.interim order of the High Court is set aside.\n\n[940 H; 941 A-BJ\n\n934 '\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS (1984] 3 s.c.!l..\n\nCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION; Civil Appeal No. 3.260 df 1979\n\nFrom the Judgment and Order dated the 22/23rd day of February, 1972 of the Grjarat High Court in Sp!. Civil Appln. No. 52/77. .\n\nR.N. Poddar for the Appellants.\n\n• N.A. Palkhivala, Atul Setalved, F.H.J.\n\nTalyar Khan,\n\nRavindar Narain, Kamal Mehta, A. Manjra, T, M. Ansari and Miss Rainu Walia for the Respondc; nts ..\n\nThe Judgment of of the Court was delivered by\n\nBHAGWATI, J.\n\nThis appeal by certificate granted under Articles 132 and 133 (I) of the Constitution raises a short question relating to the applicability of the definition of \"related person\" contained in clause (c) of sub-section (4) of section 4 of the Central Exeise and Salt Act, I 944 as it stood after its amendment by section 2 of Ceniral Act 22 Of 1973 which came into force with effect from !st O_ctober, 1975. The facts giving rise to t4is appeal are few and may be briefly stated as follows :\n\nThe assessee is a limited company engaged in.the business of manufacturing dyes and it has its factory situate in Atul near Bulsar in the State of Gujarat. The share capital of the assessee is held by two limited companies ; Atul products Limited holds 50 per cent of the share capital while the remaining 50 pe~ cent of the share capital is held by Imperial Chemical Industries Limited, London. The assessee at all material tin'les sold the large bulk of dyes manufactured by it in wholesale to Atul products . Limited and Imperial Chemical Industries (India) Private Limited at a uniform price applic.able alike to both these wholesale buyes and these wliolesale buyers in their turn sold the dyes purchased by them from the assessee to dealers as well as consumers. Now, until 13th March 1978, Imperial Chemical Industries (India) Private Limited was a subsidiary company wholly owned by Imperial _Chemical Industries Limited, London. But, in pursuance of the policy of the .\n\nGovernment of India requiring that not more than 40 per cent of the share capital o, f an Indian company should be held by a foreign share-holder, 60 pr cent of the share capital of Imperil Chemical .\n\nIndustries (India) Priv'ate Limited was offered to the upblic, with\n\n_,.•\n\nUNiON v. Alic INDUSTRIES (Bhagwati, J.) 935\n\n.the result that since 13th March, 1978 ouly 40 per cent of the share capital of Imperial Chemical Industries (India) Private Limited was held by Imperial Chemical Industries Limited, Londqn and\n\n60 per cent came to be held by Indian citizens and. Imperial Chemical Industries <India) Private Limited ceased to be a subsidiary 'company wholly owned by the Imperial Chemical Industries Limited, London. Consequent upon this dilution of freign share holding, the name of Imperial Chemkal Industries (India) Private Limited was changed to Crescent Dyes and Chemicals Limited. Atul\n\nProducts Limited and Crescent Dyes ati.d Chemicals . Limited contjnued'to he the wholesale dealers of the dyesmanufactured by the assessee throughout the relevant period with which we are concerned in this appeal. It was common ground between the parties that the transactions between the assessee on the one hand and Atul Products Umited. and Crescent Dyes and Chemicals Limited o.n the other were as principal to principal and the wholesale price charged by the assessee to. Atul Products Limited and Crescent Dyes and Chemicals Limited was the sole consideration for the sale and no extracommerciai considerations entered in the deterimation of such price. Atul Products Limited and Crescent Dyes and Chemicals Limited, of course, sold the dyes purchased by them from the assessee at a higher price which inter alia included the .expenses incurred by them as also their profit.\n\n. On 15th Sept;:mber, 1975 the assessee submitted a price list s)lowing the assessable value of the dyes manufactured by it on the basis of the wholesale price charged by it to Atul Products\n\nLimited and Crescent Dyes and Chemicals Limited. The Superin tendent of Central Excise demanded certain information from the assessee with a view to satisfying himself as regardi the correctness of the price list submitted by the assessee and the requisite in formation was furnished by the assessee by its letter >dated 23rd September, 1975. Thereafter correspondence ensued between the assessee on the one hand alld the Superinteudent of Central Excise on the other and ultimately on 29th October, 1975 the Assistant Collector of Central Excise approved the price list submitted by the assessee. The assessee thereafter went on clearing the dyes manufacthred by it after payment of excise duty OJ} the basis of the price list submitted by the assessee and appr.oved by the Assistant Collector. Then again some further correspondence took place between the assessee an.d the Central Excise Authorities by which c; erta, in information dmanded by the Central Excise Authoritie~\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1984] 3 S.C.R.\n\nwas supplied by the assessee.\n\nTl:ie Superintendent of Central Excise, however, issued a no' ice to the asscc.see an 3bt July, 1976 calling upon the '!lssessee to show eause why the .earlier descision of the Assistant Cllector approving the price list should not be reviewed on the ground that the assessee on the one hand and Autal Products Limited and Crescent Dyes and Chemicals Limited on the other were '.'related persons\" and the assessable value of the dyes manufactured by the assessee was, therefore, liable to be calculated on the basis of the price at which Atul Products Limited and Cre.scent Dyes and Chemicals Limited sold th~ dyes to the ' dealers and the 7onsunters. The assessee was required to show cause why the differential duty worke<I out on the basis of the selling price charged by Atul Products Limited and Crescent Dyes and Chemicals Lhrited should not be recovered from the assessee with .effect from ·!st October, 1975. The assessee in its reply dated 31st August 1976 raised several contentions in answer to the show cause notice and pointed out inter alia that the assesseeon the one band and Atul Products Limited and Crescent Dyes and Chemicals Limited on the other were noi \"related persons\" within the meaning of the definition of that term contained i'n sub-clause\n\n(c) of sub-secfon (4) of section 4 of the amended Central Excise 'and Sait Act, 1944 .. The Assistant Collector was, however, not satisfied with the explanation offered by the assesee and be ultimately by an order dated !Otb December, 1976 reviewed his earlier.order of approval of the price list and confirmed the demand differentjal duty with retrospectlve effect from !st October, 1975. and directed the assessee to file a fresh price list on the basis of the selling price charged oy Atul Products Limited and ere.scent Dyes and Chemicals Limited. The demand for differential duty computed by the Superintendent of Central Excise for the period from !st October, 1975 to 31st December, 1976 came to an .aggregate amount of _ Rs. 1, 17)7 ,737,65. The asses see thereupon filed a writ petition in the High Court of Gujarat challenging the validity of the demand made by the Assistant Collector and in the meanwhile also perferred an appeal before the Appellate Collector. The Appellate Collector rejected the appeal of the assessee withol)t ex?mining ihe merits of the grounds raised by the assessee since be took the view that all these grounds would be decided in the writ petition pending before the High Court and no useful purpose would be served by bis consideri'nll the self-same 'grounds.\n\nUNiON v. ATIIC INDUSTRIES (Bhagwati, J.) 937\n\nThe assessee urged several grounds in support or the writ petition before the. High. Court but it is not ecessary to refer to them in detail, because the High Court ultimately <; lecided the writ . petition in favom of the assessee only on two grounds and it will, therefore, be enough if we refer to those two.grounds alone and consider whether the decision of the High Court is correct in so for as it decided those two grounds in favour of the assessee. The first ground was that the concept of \"related person\" occurring in clause (cl of sub-section (4) of section 4 of the amended Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944 was outside the legislative compe•ence\n\nof Parliament under Article 246 read with Entry 84 in the Union List and was, therefore, unconstitutional and' void. This .ground\n\nfound favour with the High Court in view of the earlier \\lecision given by the same Bench on 20/21 February, 1979 in Special Civil Appjication No. 1.19 of 1976. But, this decision of the High Court striking down clause (c). of sub-section (4) of section 4 of the amended Act cannot stand in view of the decision of the Court in Union of India v. Bombay Tyres International Limited(') where an Identical challenge to the consiitutional validity of the definition of the term \"related person\" was negatived by this Court. The definition of the term \"relatedperson'' was read down and it was held by this Court that \"On a proper interpretation of the definition of \"related person\" in s.ub-section (4) (c) of section 4 the words • \"ralative and a distributor of the asssesee\" do not refer to any distributor but they ate limited only to a distributor who is .. a selative of the assessee within the meaning of the Companies Act,\n\n1956. So read, the definition of\"related person\" .is. not unduly wide and does not suffer from any constitntional infirmity. It is within the legislative· competence of Parliaent. The decision of the High Court holding that \"the concept of. related person occurring in amende<j section 4 is v/tra vires the legislative competence of P.arliament under Ariicle 246. read with Entry 84 in the Union List\" and striking down clause (c) of sub-section (4) of section 4 as also the expression \"the buyer is not a related person and\"· in clause (a) of sub-section (I) of section 4 and proviso\n\n(iii) to that clause must consequently be set aside and it must be held that these provisions are constitutionally valid.\n\n• The second ground on which the assessee assailed the validity of the demand made by the Assistant Collector for difrerential duty\n\n{I) [1984) I S.C.C. 467,\n\n, .G\n\nSUPREME COURT' RH ORTS [19841 3 s.c.R.\n\nrelated to applicability of the definition of \"rel.ated person\" in clause\n\n(c) of sub-section (4) of section 4 of the amended Act. The Assistant Collector took th c 'icw tht tbe acselsee on the one hand and Atul Products Limited and Crescent Dyes and Chemicals lirrited on the other were.related persons whhhin the meanirg of the first .Part of the definition of the term \"related person\" and the assessable vlue\n\nof the dyes manufactured by the assessee for the purpose of excise duty was, therefore, liable to be determined with reference to the . price' at which the dyes were ordinarily sold by Attul Products\n\nLimited and Crescent Dyes and Chemicals limited. This veiw taken by the Assistant Collector was set aside by the High Court on the ground that the . assessee on the one hand and Atul Products Limited and Crescent Dves and Chemicals limited on the other were not \"related person~·· and the wholesale cash price charged by the assessee to Atul Products Limited and Crescent Dyes and Chemicals .limited and not the price at which the latter sold the dyes to the dealers or the consumers, represented the true measure of the value of the dyes for the purpose of chargeability to excise duty. This conclusion reached by the High Coµrt was assailed . before us by the learned Attorney General appearing on behalf of the Revenue. }le fairly conceded that the only part of the definition of \"relited person\" in clause (c) of sub-section (4) o section 4 on which h; could rely was the first part which defines \"related person\" to mean \"a person who is, so associated with the\n\nassesse~ that they have interest directly or indirectly in the business of each other.\" The secoi; d part of the dejlnition which adds an inclusive clause wrs admittedly not applicable, because neither Atul Products Limited nor Crescent Dyes and Chemicals limited . was a holding companyor a subsidiary company nor was either of them a relative of the assessee, so as to fall within the second part of the definition. But we do not ibink that even the limited contention urged by be learned Attorney General on behalf of the Revenue based on the first pa•t of the definition can suceed.\n\nWhat .the firi; t part of the definition requires is that the person who is sought to be branded as a '\"related persqn\" must be a person who is so associated with the assessee that they have interest, directly or indirectly, in the business of each other. It is not enough that the assesse bas an. interest, direct, or indirect in the business of the gerson alieged to be a related person nor. is it eno11£h that the person alleged to b.e a related person has an interest, direct or indirect, in the business of the assesee. It is esential to attract the applicability of the first part of the definition that the .asswee\n\nand the person alleged to be a rdated person must haw interest,\n\n, ' .\n\nljNION v. AllG lNDUSlRIES (Bhagwati, J.) 939\n\ndirect or .indirect, in the business of each other. Each of them miist have a direct or inciirect interest in the business of the other, The equality and degree of interest which each has. in the bussiness of the other may be different: the interest of one in the business of !he other may be direet, while the interest of the latter ii) the business of the formel' may be indirect. That would not make any difference, so long as each has got some interest, direct or indirect, in the business of the other. Now, in the present case, Atul. Products Limited ha.s undoubtedly interest in the busine'8 of the assessee, since Atul Products Limited holds 50 per .cent of the share capital of the .assesse and has .interest as shareholder in the biisiness carried on by the assessee .. But it is not possible to say that the . assessee has any interest in the business of. Atul Products Limited. 'J; here are two points of view from which the relationship between the assessee and Atul Products Limited may be considered. First, it may be noted that Atul Products Limited is a shareholder of the '\n\nassessee to the exterit of 50 per. cent of the share capital. But we : fail to see how it can be said that a limited company has any \\intere!; t, direct or indirect, in. the business carried on by one of its . shareholders, even though the shareholding of such shareholder may be 50 per cent. Secondly, Atul Products Limited is a wholesale buyer of the dyes manufactured by the assessee but even. then, • since the transactions between them are principal to principal, it is difficult to appreciate how the assessee could be said by virtue of th.at cricumstance to 'have any interest, direc' .Or indirect, in the.\n\nbusiness of Atul Products Limited. Atul Produets Limited buys dyes from the assessee in wholesale on principal to principal basis and then sells such dyes in the market. The. assessee is not concerned whether Atul Products Limited 'ells or does not sell the .. dyes purchased by i.t from th~ assess.ee nor is. it concerned whether_\n\nAtul Pr.oducts .Limited sells such dyes at a loss. It is impossible to contend that the ass.ess.ee has any direct or indirect interest in th.e business of a wholesale dealer who purchases dyes from .it on principalto principal basis. The same position obtains iri regard to Crescent Dyes and Chemicals Limited. Perhaps the position in regard to Crescent Dyes and Chemicals Limited is much stronger ·\n\nthen that in regard fo Atul Products Limited. Crescent Dyes and Chemicals Limited is not even a shareholder of the assessee and it hl!S, therefore, no interest dfrect or indirect in the bussiness of the assessee. It is Imperial Chemical . Industries Limited, Londo!) which holds 50 rer cent qf the sh?Je capitel of the assessee and this foreign company aim holds 40 per cent of the. share capital of\n\n' . :;,_.-, G\n\n.ff\n\n• •\n\n. a\n\n\n[1984] 3 S.C.R. .\n\nCrescent . Chemicals and Dyes Limited. Imperial . Chemicals .· ..\n\nIndustries Limited, London would admittedly have an interest in tl)e business of the assessee in its capacity as a shareholder, but how. can Crescent Dyes and Chemicals Limited of which 40 per cent of the shares are held by Imperial Chemical Industries Limite<l; London which in_ its turn is a shareholder of the assessee, can not.be ' said to have any interest, direct or indirect, in' the business of the\n\nassessye. Equally the assessee has no. interest diiect or indirect in the business of Crescent Dyes and Chemicals Limited, which is just a wholesale dealer purchasing ayes from the asses see in wholesale on principal t.o principal basis. It is obvfous that fr the same . 'reason's which have prevailed with tis while discussing _the case of\n\nAtul. Products Limited, the assessce has no _direct ot indirect interest in the business of' Crescent Dyes and Chemicals Liniited. The first , part of the definiiion of. related person in clause (c) of sub-section . (4) of section 4 Of the ame11ded Act is, therefore, clearly not\n\nsatisfied both in relation to Atul Products Limited as . also in relation to Crescet;1t - Dyes and Chemicals Limited and neither of them can be said i:o be a \"related person\" vis-a-vis the assessee within the meaning of the definition of that term in clause (c) of iub-scction (4). of section 4 of the amended Act. We, therefore, affirm the view iaken. by the High Court and hold that the assessable value of the dyes manufactured by tb, e assessee cannot be determined with reference to the selling price charged by . Atul Products.\n\nLimited and CresQ'ent Dyes and Chemicals Limited to thei~ purchasers but must be determined.on.the basis of the wholesable\n\nca.sh price cllarged by the assessee to Atul Products Limited and Crescent Dyes aud Chemicals Limited. 'Th.e demand made by the .\n\nAssistant Collector for differential duty must, therefore, l)e held to be rightly quashed by the High Court.. ·\n\nBut there is one small matter on which the High Curt. has, in our. view, erred in giving .direction and iti.s in regard to payment of de costs incurred by . the assessee in connection with the bank guarantee furnished by it in pursuance of the interim order made by the High Court. We do not think the High Court was Fight in giving this direction. The bank. guarantee was required to be fitrnished by the assessee as a condltlon of grant .of interim stay of enforcement of the . demand. for differential duty and if it .is ultimately foun<; I that the 4emand for differntial duty was not\n\n' .·.\n\n• • .. . . . . . .\n\nUNION v. ATIC INDUSTRIES (Bhagwati, J.) 941\n\njustified, the bank guaraniee would certainly have to be dfacharged, A • but it is difficulty to see .how the costs of furnishing the bank , guarantee could be directed to be paid by. the Revenue. to the assessee. We would, therefore, set aside that part of the otder made by the High Court which directs the Revenue to pay 'to the\n\n~ l\\ssessee the costs incurred in conection with the bank guarantee furnishid by it in pursuance of the interrn order of the High\n\n. B Court.·\n\nThe appeal, therefore, fails except in\"regard to the direction •for payment of costs of the bank guarantee. The Revenue will pay the costs of the appeal to the assessee.\n\nS.R.\n\nA]Jpeal dismissed\n\n'·", "total_entities": 137, "entities": [{"text": "UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 0, "end_char": 25, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ATIC INDUSTRIES LIMITED", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 27, "end_char": 50, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "ATIC INDUSTRIES LIMITED", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P.N. BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 76, "end_char": 89, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.N. BHAGWATI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "R.S. PATHAK", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 91, "end_char": 102, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "R.S. PATHAK", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MARENJ?RA NATH SEN, JJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 110, "end_char": 132, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "AMARENDRA NATH SEN", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Salt Act, 1944", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 156, "end_char": 170, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 204, "end_char": 213, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Salt Act, 1944", "statute": "Salt Act, 1944"}}, {"text": "sec. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 248, "end_char": 254, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Salt Act, 1944", "statute": "Salt Act, 1944"}}, {"text": "Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 322, "end_char": 355, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "sec. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 430, "end_char": 436, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944", "statute": "Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944"}}, {"text": "sec. 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 472, "end_char": 478, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944", "statute": "Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944"}}, {"text": "Atul • products Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 889, "end_char": 909, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Its 50 per cent share capital was held by Atul • products Ltd. and the remaining 50 per cent by Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. London wHich also had a subsidiary company fully owned by it,\"called\n\nmperial Chemical Industries (India) Pvt."}}, {"text": "Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. London", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 943, "end_char": 983, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Its 50 per cent share capital was held by Atul • products Ltd. and the remaining 50 per cent by Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. London wHich also had a subsidiary company fully owned by it,\"called\n\nmperial Chemical Industries (India) Pvt."}}, {"text": "mperial Chemical Industries (India) Pvt. Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1047, "end_char": 1092, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Its 50 per cent share capital was held by Atul • products Ltd. and the remaining 50 per cent by Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. London wHich also had a subsidiary company fully owned by it,\"called\n\nmperial Chemical Industries (India) Pvt."}}, {"text": "Impenal Chemical Industries (India) pvt. Ltd", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1097, "end_char": 1141, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ltd. The Impenal Chemical Industries (India) pvt."}}, {"text": "13th March 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1242, "end_char": 1257, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ltd, ceased to be a subsidiary company wholly owned_ by the Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. London on 13th March 1978, since 60 per\n\ncent of the share capital of Imperial Cheniical Industries (India) Pvt."}}, {"text": "Imperial Cheniical Industries (India) Pvt. Ltd", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1302, "end_char": 1348, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ltd, ceased to be a subsidiary company wholly owned_ by the Imperial Chemical Industries Ltd. London on 13th March 1978, since 60 per\n\ncent of the share capital of Imperial Cheniical Industries (India) Pvt."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1411, "end_char": 1430, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ltd, was offered to the pub.lie in pursuance of the policy of the Government of India requiring ihat not more !"}}, {"text": "Imperial Chemical Industries (lnQJa) Pvt. Ltd", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1615, "end_char": 1660, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ConSequent up<in this dilutiQn e forcii&'n Shareholding, the name of Imperial Chemical Industries (lnQJa) Pvt."}}, {"text": "Crescent Dyes and Chemicals Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1677, "end_char": 1709, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ltd, was changed to Crescent Dyes and Chemicals Ltd.\n\nThe assessee at all material times sold the large hulk of dyes rnanufac~ tured by it in wholesale to Atul Products Ltd. and Imperial Chemical Illdus~ tries (India) Pvt."}}, {"text": "Atul Products Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1812, "end_char": 1830, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ltd, was changed to Crescent Dyes and Chemicals Ltd.\n\nThe assessee at all material times sold the large hulk of dyes rnanufac~ tured by it in wholesale to Atul Products Ltd. and Imperial Chemical Illdus~ tries (India) Pvt."}}, {"text": "Imperial Chemical Illdus~ tries (India) Pvt. Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1835, "end_char": 1887, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ltd, was changed to Crescent Dyes and Chemicals Ltd.\n\nThe assessee at all material times sold the large hulk of dyes rnanufac~ tured by it in wholesale to Atul Products Ltd. and Imperial Chemical Illdus~ tries (India) Pvt."}}, {"text": "Crescent Dyes and chemicals Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 1927, "end_char": 1959, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Limited which subsequently came to be known as Crescent Dyes and chemicals Ltd. at a uniform price applicable alike to both these wholesale buyers and these wholesale _buyers sold these dyes to dealers and consumers at a higller price which inter."}}, {"text": "Crescent Dyes and Chemicals Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2309, "end_char": 2344, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The traCsactions between the assessee on the one A hand and Atul Products Ltd. and Crescent Dyes and Chemicals Limited on the other were as principal to principal and the wholesale price charged by the assessee to Atul Products Ltd and Crescent Dyes and."}}, {"text": "Atul Products Ltd", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2440, "end_char": 2457, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The traCsactions between the assessee on the one A hand and Atul Products Ltd. and Crescent Dyes and Chemicals Limited on the other were as principal to principal and the wholesale price charged by the assessee to Atul Products Ltd and Crescent Dyes and."}}, {"text": "Crescent Dyes and. Chemicals Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 2462, "end_char": 2495, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The traCsactions between the assessee on the one A hand and Atul Products Ltd. and Crescent Dyes and Chemicals Limited on the other were as principal to principal and the wholesale price charged by the assessee to Atul Products Ltd and Crescent Dyes and."}}, {"text": "29th October, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 2901, "end_char": 2919, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Collector on 29th October, 1975."}}, {"text": "Superintendent Of Central Excise", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 2926, "end_char": 2958, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Superintendent Of Central Excise, however, isued a notice to the assessee on 31st July: 1976 calling upon the assessee to show cause why the earlier decision approving the price list should not b\"° reviewed and.the differential duty worked out on the basis of selling price charged by Atul Products Ltd. and Cresceat Dyes & Cheinicals Ltd. should not be recovered w.e.f."}}, {"text": "31st July: 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3003, "end_char": 3018, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Superintendent Of Central Excise, however, isued a notice to the assessee on 31st July: 1976 calling upon the assessee to show cause why the earlier decision approving the price list should not b\"° reviewed and.the differential duty worked out on the basis of selling price charged by Atul Products Ltd. and Cresceat Dyes & Cheinicals Ltd. should not be recovered w.e.f."}}, {"text": "Cresceat Dyes & Cheinicals Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3234, "end_char": 3265, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Superintendent Of Central Excise, however, isued a notice to the assessee on 31st July: 1976 calling upon the assessee to show cause why the earlier decision approving the price list should not b\"° reviewed and.the differential duty worked out on the basis of selling price charged by Atul Products Ltd. and Cresceat Dyes & Cheinicals Ltd. should not be recovered w.e.f."}}, {"text": "Atul\n\nProduct~ Ltd. ~-nd Crescent Dyes and Chernicals Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3368, "end_char": 3426, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that the assessee on the one hand and Atul\n\nProduct~ Ltd. ~-nd Crescent Dyes and Chernicals Ltd. on the other 'vere \"related pesons\" and the assessable value .of *'he dyes manufactured by the assessee was therefore liable to be calculated on the basjs of the price at which Atul Products L1d."}}, {"text": "Atul Products L1d.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3604, "end_char": 3622, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that the assessee on the one hand and Atul\n\nProduct~ Ltd. ~-nd Crescent Dyes and Chernicals Ltd. on the other 'vere \"related pesons\" and the assessable value .of *'he dyes manufactured by the assessee was therefore liable to be calculated on the basjs of the price at which Atul Products L1d."}}, {"text": "Crescent Dyes and Chemicals- Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3627, "end_char": 3660, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "and Crescent Dyes and Chemicals- Ltd. sold the Dyes to the dealers and the consumers."}}, {"text": "31st . August 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 3741, "end_char": 3759, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The assessee in its reply dated 31st ."}}, {"text": "Atul Products \"\"' Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 3810, "end_char": 3832, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "August 1976 pointed out that the assessee on the one hand and Atul Products \"\"' Ltd. and Crescent Dyes and Chemicals Ltd. on the other Were not \"related\n\npersons\" within the meaning of the definition of that term contained in clause\n\n(c) of subsection (4) of section 4 of the amended Central Excise and Salt Act\n\n1944."}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4007, "end_char": 4016, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Excise and Salt Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4032, "end_char": 4059, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "1st October, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 4355, "end_char": 4372, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Collector was however not satisfied with the explanation offered by the assessee and viewed, his earlier order of approval of the price list and confirmed the demand Of differentia 1 duty which came to an aggregate amount of Rs 1, 17, 77, 737,65 with retrospective effect from 1st October, 1975 and directed th<:> asscssee to file a fresh price list on the basis of the selling price cllarged by Atul Products Ltd. and Crescent Dyes and Chemicals Ltd.\n\nThe assessee thereupon fl.ld a \\vrit p ctition in the High Court of Gujarat challenging the validity of the demand made by the Asstt."}}, {"text": "Dyes and Chemicals Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4506, "end_char": 4529, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Collector was however not satisfied with the explanation offered by the assessee and viewed, his earlier order of approval of the price list and confirmed the demand Of differentia 1 duty which came to an aggregate amount of Rs 1, 17, 77, 737,65 with retrospective effect from 1st October, 1975 and directed th<:> asscssee to file a fresh price list on the basis of the selling price cllarged by Atul Products Ltd. and Crescent Dyes and Chemicals Ltd.\n\nThe assessee thereupon fl.ld a \\vrit p ctition in the High Court of Gujarat challenging the validity of the demand made by the Asstt."}}, {"text": "High Court of Gujarat", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 4585, "end_char": 4606, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Collector was however not satisfied with the explanation offered by the assessee and viewed, his earlier order of approval of the price list and confirmed the demand Of differentia 1 duty which came to an aggregate amount of Rs 1, 17, 77, 737,65 with retrospective effect from 1st October, 1975 and directed th<:> asscssee to file a fresh price list on the basis of the selling price cllarged by Atul Products Ltd. and Crescent Dyes and Chemicals Ltd.\n\nThe assessee thereupon fl.ld a \\vrit p ctition in the High Court of Gujarat challenging the validity of the demand made by the Asstt."}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4792, "end_char": 4801, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Excise and Salt Act\n\n1944", "statute": "Central Excise and Salt Act\n\n1944"}}, {"text": "Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 4817, "end_char": 4850, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 4894, "end_char": 4904, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "was outside the legislative competence Of Parliament under Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 226", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4911, "end_char": 4919, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944", "statute": "Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944"}}, {"text": "A tu l Products Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5052, "end_char": 5072, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "226 read with Efltry 84 in the Union List and was therefore u.nconstitutional and void ; &\n\n(ii) that the assessee .on the one hand and A tu l Products Ltd. and Crescent Dyes & Chemicals Ltd. on the other were not ''related persons\" and the wholesle cash price charged by the assessee to .A tul Products Ltd. and Cres-· cept Dyes and Chemicals Ltd., and not the price at which the latter sold the dyes to the dealrs or the consumers represented the true measure of the value of the yes for the purpose of Chargeabiiity to excise duty."}}, {"text": "Crescent Dyes & Chemicals Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 5077, "end_char": 5107, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "226 read with Efltry 84 in the Union List and was therefore u.nconstitutional and void ; &\n\n(ii) that the assessee .on the one hand and A tu l Products Ltd. and Crescent Dyes & Chemicals Ltd. on the other were not ''related persons\" and the wholesle cash price charged by the assessee to .A tul Products Ltd. and Cres-· cept Dyes and Chemicals Ltd., and not the price at which the latter sold the dyes to the dealrs or the consumers represented the true measure of the value of the yes for the purpose of Chargeabiiity to excise duty."}}, {"text": "Art. 132 and 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5763, "end_char": 5779, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944", "statute": "Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944"}}, {"text": "sec. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5950, "end_char": 5956, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Companies Act, 1956", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6154, "end_char": 6173, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6439, "end_char": 6448, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Companies Act, 1956", "statute": "Companies Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Article 256", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6514, "end_char": 6525, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Companies Act, 1956", "statute": "Companies Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "sec. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6617, "end_char": 6623, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Companies Act, 1956", "statute": "Companies Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Union of Iµdia v. 467", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 6886, "end_char": 6907, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[937 E-H]\n\nUnion of Iµdia v. 467 applied,\n\nHigh Court judgment in 21F ebruary 1979 reversed."}}, {"text": "sec. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7167, "end_char": 7173, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Companies Act, 1956", "statute": "Companies Act, 1956"}}, {"text": "Atul Products", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 8317, "end_char": 8330, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "(93~ G-H; 939 A-BJ\n\n(3) (i) Jn the present case Atul Products J., td."}}, {"text": "Atul , Products Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8730, "end_char": 8750, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "933\n\nnamely Atul , Products Ltd., even though the share-holding of such shareholder may be 50 per cent."}}, {"text": "Crescent Dyes and Chemicclls Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9432, "end_char": 9465, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[939 C-F]\n\n(ii) Perhapsthe position in regard to Crescent Dyes and Chemicclls Ltd. is much stronger than that in regard to Atul Pro!=lucts Ltd.\n\nCrescent Dyes and Chernjpals Ltd. is not even a shareholder of the assessee and it has therefore no interest direct or indirect in the business of' the assessee."}}, {"text": "Atul Pro!=lucts Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9506, "end_char": 9526, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[939 C-F]\n\n(ii) Perhapsthe position in regard to Crescent Dyes and Chemicclls Ltd. is much stronger than that in regard to Atul Pro!=lucts Ltd.\n\nCrescent Dyes and Chernjpals Ltd. is not even a shareholder of the assessee and it has therefore no interest direct or indirect in the business of' the assessee."}}, {"text": "Crescent Dyes and Chernjpals Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9528, "end_char": 9561, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[939 C-F]\n\n(ii) Perhapsthe position in regard to Crescent Dyes and Chemicclls Ltd. is much stronger than that in regard to Atul Pro!=lucts Ltd.\n\nCrescent Dyes and Chernjpals Ltd. is not even a shareholder of the assessee and it has therefore no interest direct or indirect in the business of' the assessee."}}, {"text": "Crescent Dyes . and Chemicals Ltd.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 9769, "end_char": 9803, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Equally, the assessee has .no interest, direct or indirect in the business of Crescent Dyes ."}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10027, "end_char": 10036, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "sec. 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10360, "end_char": 10366, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Atul Products Lid.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10534, "end_char": 10552, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Atul Products Lid."}}, {"text": "Crescent Dyes and Chemicals Ltcl", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 10727, "end_char": 10759, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the ass0sset;' to Atul Products Ltd. and Crescent Dyes and Chemicals Ltcl."}}, {"text": "R.N. Poddar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 11988, "end_char": 11999, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.N. Poddar for the Appellants."}}, {"text": "Atul Setalved", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12040, "end_char": 12053, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• N.A. Palkhivala, Atul Setalved, F.H.J.\n\nTalyar Khan,\n\nRavindar Narain, Kamal Mehta, A. Manjra, T, M. Ansari and Miss Rainu Walia for the Respondc; nts ..\n\nThe Judgment of of the Court was delivered by\n\nBHAGWATI, J.\n\nThis appeal by certificate granted under Articles 132 and 133 (I) of the Constitution raises a short question relating to the applicability of the definition of \"related person\" contained in clause (c) of sub-section (4) of section 4 of the Central Exeise and Salt Act, I 944 as it stood after its amendment by section 2 of Ceniral Act 22 Of 1973 which came into force with effect from !"}}, {"text": "Talyar Khan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12063, "end_char": 12074, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• N.A. Palkhivala, Atul Setalved, F.H.J.\n\nTalyar Khan,\n\nRavindar Narain, Kamal Mehta, A. Manjra, T, M. Ansari and Miss Rainu Walia for the Respondc; nts ..\n\nThe Judgment of of the Court was delivered by\n\nBHAGWATI, J.\n\nThis appeal by certificate granted under Articles 132 and 133 (I) of the Constitution raises a short question relating to the applicability of the definition of \"related person\" contained in clause (c) of sub-section (4) of section 4 of the Central Exeise and Salt Act, I 944 as it stood after its amendment by section 2 of Ceniral Act 22 Of 1973 which came into force with effect from !"}}, {"text": "Ravindar Narain", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12077, "end_char": 12092, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• N.A. Palkhivala, Atul Setalved, F.H.J.\n\nTalyar Khan,\n\nRavindar Narain, Kamal Mehta, A. Manjra, T, M. Ansari and Miss Rainu Walia for the Respondc; nts ..\n\nThe Judgment of of the Court was delivered by\n\nBHAGWATI, J.\n\nThis appeal by certificate granted under Articles 132 and 133 (I) of the Constitution raises a short question relating to the applicability of the definition of \"related person\" contained in clause (c) of sub-section (4) of section 4 of the Central Exeise and Salt Act, I 944 as it stood after its amendment by section 2 of Ceniral Act 22 Of 1973 which came into force with effect from !"}}, {"text": "Kamal Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12094, "end_char": 12105, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• N.A. Palkhivala, Atul Setalved, F.H.J.\n\nTalyar Khan,\n\nRavindar Narain, Kamal Mehta, A. Manjra, T, M. Ansari and Miss Rainu Walia for the Respondc; nts ..\n\nThe Judgment of of the Court was delivered by\n\nBHAGWATI, J.\n\nThis appeal by certificate granted under Articles 132 and 133 (I) of the Constitution raises a short question relating to the applicability of the definition of \"related person\" contained in clause (c) of sub-section (4) of section 4 of the Central Exeise and Salt Act, I 944 as it stood after its amendment by section 2 of Ceniral Act 22 Of 1973 which came into force with effect from !"}}, {"text": "A. Manjra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12107, "end_char": 12116, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• N.A. Palkhivala, Atul Setalved, F.H.J.\n\nTalyar Khan,\n\nRavindar Narain, Kamal Mehta, A. Manjra, T, M. Ansari and Miss Rainu Walia for the Respondc; nts ..\n\nThe Judgment of of the Court was delivered by\n\nBHAGWATI, J.\n\nThis appeal by certificate granted under Articles 132 and 133 (I) of the Constitution raises a short question relating to the applicability of the definition of \"related person\" contained in clause (c) of sub-section (4) of section 4 of the Central Exeise and Salt Act, I 944 as it stood after its amendment by section 2 of Ceniral Act 22 Of 1973 which came into force with effect from !"}}, {"text": "T,", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12118, "end_char": 12120, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• N.A. Palkhivala, Atul Setalved, F.H.J.\n\nTalyar Khan,\n\nRavindar Narain, Kamal Mehta, A. Manjra, T, M. Ansari and Miss Rainu Walia for the Respondc; nts ..\n\nThe Judgment of of the Court was delivered by\n\nBHAGWATI, J.\n\nThis appeal by certificate granted under Articles 132 and 133 (I) of the Constitution raises a short question relating to the applicability of the definition of \"related person\" contained in clause (c) of sub-section (4) of section 4 of the Central Exeise and Salt Act, I 944 as it stood after its amendment by section 2 of Ceniral Act 22 Of 1973 which came into force with effect from !"}}, {"text": "M. Ansari", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12121, "end_char": 12130, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• N.A. Palkhivala, Atul Setalved, F.H.J.\n\nTalyar Khan,\n\nRavindar Narain, Kamal Mehta, A. Manjra, T, M. Ansari and Miss Rainu Walia for the Respondc; nts ..\n\nThe Judgment of of the Court was delivered by\n\nBHAGWATI, J.\n\nThis appeal by certificate granted under Articles 132 and 133 (I) of the Constitution raises a short question relating to the applicability of the definition of \"related person\" contained in clause (c) of sub-section (4) of section 4 of the Central Exeise and Salt Act, I 944 as it stood after its amendment by section 2 of Ceniral Act 22 Of 1973 which came into force with effect from !"}}, {"text": "Rainu Walia", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 12140, "end_char": 12151, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• N.A. Palkhivala, Atul Setalved, F.H.J.\n\nTalyar Khan,\n\nRavindar Narain, Kamal Mehta, A. Manjra, T, M. Ansari and Miss Rainu Walia for the Respondc; nts ..\n\nThe Judgment of of the Court was delivered by\n\nBHAGWATI, J.\n\nThis appeal by certificate granted under Articles 132 and 133 (I) of the Constitution raises a short question relating to the applicability of the definition of \"related person\" contained in clause (c) of sub-section (4) of section 4 of the Central Exeise and Salt Act, I 944 as it stood after its amendment by section 2 of Ceniral Act 22 Of 1973 which came into force with effect from !"}}, {"text": "BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 12225, "end_char": 12233, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• N.A. Palkhivala, Atul Setalved, F.H.J.\n\nTalyar Khan,\n\nRavindar Narain, Kamal Mehta, A. Manjra, T, M. Ansari and Miss Rainu Walia for the Respondc; nts ..\n\nThe Judgment of of the Court was delivered by\n\nBHAGWATI, J.\n\nThis appeal by certificate granted under Articles 132 and 133 (I) of the Constitution raises a short question relating to the applicability of the definition of \"related person\" contained in clause (c) of sub-section (4) of section 4 of the Central Exeise and Salt Act, I 944 as it stood after its amendment by section 2 of Ceniral Act 22 Of 1973 which came into force with effect from !"}}, {"text": "Articles 132 and 133", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12280, "end_char": 12300, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12463, "end_char": 12472, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 2", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 12550, "end_char": 12559, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "st O_ctober, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 12626, "end_char": 12643, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "st O_ctober, 1975."}}, {"text": "Bulsar", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12854, "end_char": 12860, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts giving rise to t4is appeal are few and may be briefly stated as follows :\n\nThe assessee is a limited company engaged in.the business of manufacturing dyes and it has its factory situate in Atul near Bulsar in the State of Gujarat."}}, {"text": "Gujarat", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 12877, "end_char": 12884, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The facts giving rise to t4is appeal are few and may be briefly stated as follows :\n\nThe assessee is a limited company engaged in.the business of manufacturing dyes and it has its factory situate in Atul near Bulsar in the State of Gujarat."}}, {"text": "Atul products Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 12955, "end_char": 12976, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The share capital of the assessee is held by two limited companies ; Atul products Limited holds 50 per cent of the share capital while the remaining 50 pe~ cent of the share capital is held by Imperial Chemical Industries Limited, London."}}, {"text": "Imperial Chemical Industries Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13080, "end_char": 13116, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The share capital of the assessee is held by two limited companies ; Atul products Limited holds 50 per cent of the share capital while the remaining 50 pe~ cent of the share capital is held by Imperial Chemical Industries Limited, London."}}, {"text": "London", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 13118, "end_char": 13124, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The share capital of the assessee is held by two limited companies ; Atul products Limited holds 50 per cent of the share capital while the remaining 50 pe~ cent of the share capital is held by Imperial Chemical Industries Limited, London."}}, {"text": "Atul products . Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13226, "end_char": 13249, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The assessee at all material tin'les sold the large bulk of dyes manufactured by it in wholesale to Atul products ."}}, {"text": "Imperial Chemical Industries (India) Private Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13254, "end_char": 13306, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Limited and Imperial Chemical Industries (India) Private Limited at a uniform price applic.able alike to both these wholesale buyes and these wliolesale buyers in their turn sold the dyes purchased by them from the assessee to dealers as well as consumers."}}, {"text": "Imperial _Chemical Industries Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13621, "end_char": 13658, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now, until 13th March 1978, Imperial Chemical Industries (India) Private Limited was a subsidiary company wholly owned by Imperial _Chemical Industries Limited, London."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 13710, "end_char": 13729, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Government of India requiring that not more than 40 per cent of the share capital o, f an Indian company should be held by a foreign share-holder, 60 pr cent of the share capital of Imperil Chemical ."}}, {"text": "Imperil Chemical", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 13892, "end_char": 13908, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Government of India requiring that not more than 40 per cent of the share capital o, f an Indian company should be held by a foreign share-holder, 60 pr cent of the share capital of Imperil Chemical ."}}, {"text": "13th March, 1978", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 14055, "end_char": 14071, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Industries (India) Priv'ate Limited was offered to the upblic, with\n\n_,.•\n\nUNiON v. Alic INDUSTRIES (Bhagwati, J.) 935\n\n.the result that since 13th March, 1978 ouly 40 per cent of the share capital of Imperial Chemical Industries (India) Private Limited was held by Imperial Chemical Industries Limited, Londqn and\n\n60 per cent came to be held by Indian citizens and."}}, {"text": "Imperial Chemical Industries Limited, Londqn", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14178, "end_char": 14222, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Industries (India) Priv'ate Limited was offered to the upblic, with\n\n_,.•\n\nUNiON v. Alic INDUSTRIES (Bhagwati, J.) 935\n\n.the result that since 13th March, 1978 ouly 40 per cent of the share capital of Imperial Chemical Industries (India) Private Limited was held by Imperial Chemical Industries Limited, Londqn and\n\n60 per cent came to be held by Indian citizens and."}}, {"text": "Imperial Chemical Industries <India) Private Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14280, "end_char": 14332, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Imperial Chemical Industries <India) Private Limited ceased to be a subsidiary 'company wholly owned by the Imperial Chemical Industries Limited, London."}}, {"text": "Imperial Chemkal Industries (India) Private Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14501, "end_char": 14552, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Consequent upon this dilution of freign share holding, the name of Imperial Chemkal Industries (India) Private Limited was changed to Crescent Dyes and Chemicals Limited."}}, {"text": "Atul\n\nProducts Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14605, "end_char": 14627, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Atul\n\nProducts Limited and Crescent Dyes ati.d Chemicals ."}}, {"text": "Crescent Dyes ati.d Chemicals . Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14632, "end_char": 14671, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Atul\n\nProducts Limited and Crescent Dyes ati.d Chemicals ."}}, {"text": "Atul Products Umited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 14929, "end_char": 14949, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was common ground between the parties that the transactions between the assessee on the one hand and Atul Products Umited."}}, {"text": "Atul Products Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15088, "end_char": 15109, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Atul Products Limited and Crescent Dyes and Chemicals Limited was the sole consideration for the sale and no extracommerciai considerations entered in the deterimation of such price."}}, {"text": "15th Sept;:mber, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15498, "end_char": 15519, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 15th Sept;:mber, 1975 the assessee submitted a price list s)lowing the assessable value of the dyes manufactured by it on the basis of the wholesale price charged by it to Atul Products\n\nLimited and Crescent Dyes and Chemicals Limited."}}, {"text": "Atul Products\n\nLimited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 15670, "end_char": 15692, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On 15th Sept;:mber, 1975 the assessee submitted a price list s)lowing the assessable value of the dyes manufactured by it on the basis of the wholesale price charged by it to Atul Products\n\nLimited and Crescent Dyes and Chemicals Limited."}}, {"text": "23rd September, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16006, "end_char": 16026, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Superin tendent of Central Excise demanded certain information from the assessee with a view to satisfying himself as regardi the correctness of the price list submitted by the assessee and the requisite in formation was furnished by the assessee by its letter >dated 23rd September, 1975."}}, {"text": "Autal Products Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17031, "end_char": 17053, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lssessee to show eause why the .earlier descision of the Assistant Cllector approving the price list should not be reviewed on the ground that the assessee on the one hand and Autal Products Limited and Crescent Dyes and Chemicals Limited on the other were '.'related persons\" and the assessable value of the dyes manufactured by the assessee was, therefore, liable to be calculated on the basis of the price at which Atul Products Limited and Cre.scent Dyes and Chemicals Limited sold th~ dyes to the ' dealers and the 7onsunters."}}, {"text": "Cre.scent Dyes and Chemicals Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17299, "end_char": 17335, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "lssessee to show eause why the .earlier descision of the Assistant Cllector approving the price list should not be reviewed on the ground that the assessee on the one hand and Autal Products Limited and Crescent Dyes and Chemicals Limited on the other were '.'related persons\" and the assessable value of the dyes manufactured by the assessee was, therefore, liable to be calculated on the basis of the price at which Atul Products Limited and Cre.scent Dyes and Chemicals Limited sold th~ dyes to the ' dealers and the 7onsunters."}}, {"text": "Crescent Dyes and Chemicals Lhrited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 17536, "end_char": 17571, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The assessee was required to show cause why the differential duty worke<I out on the basis of the selling price charged by Atul Products Limited and Crescent Dyes and Chemicals Lhrited should not be recovered from the assessee with .effect from ·!"}}, {"text": "st October, 1975", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17634, "end_char": 17650, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "st October, 1975."}}, {"text": "31st August 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 17684, "end_char": 17700, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The assessee in its reply dated 31st August 1976 raised several contentions in answer to the show cause notice and pointed out inter alia that the assesseeon the one band and Atul Products Limited and Crescent Dyes and Chemicals Limited on the other were noi \"related persons\" within the meaning of the definition of that term contained i'n sub-clause\n\n(c) of sub-secfon (4) of section 4 of the amended Central Excise 'and Sait Act, 1944 .. The Assistant Collector was, however, not satisfied with the explanation offered by the assesee and be ultimately by an order dated !"}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 18030, "end_char": 18039, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Sait Act, 1944", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 18075, "end_char": 18089, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "31st December, 1976", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 18680, "end_char": 18699, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "st October, 1975 to 31st December, 1976 came to an .aggregate amount of _ Rs."}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 19912, "end_char": 19921, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 19937, "end_char": 19970, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 246", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20031, "end_char": 20042, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944", "statute": "Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944"}}, {"text": "20/21 February, 1979", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 20235, "end_char": 20255, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This .ground\n\nfound favour with the High Court in view of the earlier \\lecision given by the same Bench on 20/21 February, 1979 in Special Civil Appjication No."}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20388, "end_char": 20397, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944", "statute": "Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944"}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 20848, "end_char": 20857, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944", "statute": "Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944"}}, {"text": "Companies Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 21053, "end_char": 21066, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21347, "end_char": 21356, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Companies Act,\n\n1956", "statute": "the Companies Act,\n\n1956"}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21522, "end_char": 21531, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Companies Act,\n\n1956", "statute": "the Companies Act,\n\n1956"}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 21632, "end_char": 21641, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Companies Act,\n\n1956", "statute": "the Companies Act,\n\n1956"}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 22084, "end_char": 22093, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Crescent Dyes and Chemicals", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 22216, "end_char": 22243, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Assistant Collector took th c 'icw tht tbe acselsee on the one hand and Atul Products Limited and Crescent Dyes and Chemicals lirrited on the other were.related persons whhhin the meanirg of the first .Part of the definition of the term \"related person\" and the assessable vlue\n\nof the dyes manufactured by the assessee for the purpose of excise duty was, therefore, liable to be determined with reference to the ."}}, {"text": "Crescent Dyes and Chemicals", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 22610, "end_char": 22637, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "price' at which the dyes were ordinarily sold by Attul Products\n\nLimited and Crescent Dyes and Chemicals limited."}}, {"text": "Crescent Dves and Chemicals", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 22802, "end_char": 22829, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "assessee on the one hand and Atul Products Limited and Crescent Dves and Chemicals limited on the other were not \"related person~·· and the wholesale cash price charged by the assessee to Atul Products Limited and Crescent Dyes and Chemicals .limited and not the price at which the latter sold the dyes to the dealers or the consumers, represented the true measure of the value of the dyes for the purpose of chargeability to excise duty."}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 23433, "end_char": 23442, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Crescent Dyes and Chemicals limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 23794, "end_char": 23829, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The secoi; d part of the dejlnition which adds an inclusive clause wrs admittedly not applicable, because neither Atul Products Limited nor Crescent Dyes and Chemicals limited ."}}, {"text": "Atul. Products Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 25429, "end_char": 25451, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now, in the present case, Atul."}}, {"text": "Atul Produets Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 26638, "end_char": 26659, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Atul Produets Limited buys dyes from the assessee in wholesale on principal to principal basis and then sells such dyes in the market."}}, {"text": "Atul Pr.oducts .Limited sells such dyes at a loss.", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 26936, "end_char": 26986, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "it concerned whether_\n\nAtul Pr.oducts .Limited sells such dyes at a loss."}}, {"text": "Imperial Chemical . Industries Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 27556, "end_char": 27594, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is Imperial Chemical ."}}, {"text": "Crescent . Chemicals and Dyes Limited. Imperial . Chemicals .· ..\n\nIndustries Limited, London", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 27788, "end_char": 27881, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Crescent ."}}, {"text": "Imperial Chemical Industries Limite<l; London", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 28079, "end_char": 28124, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "can Crescent Dyes and Chemicals Limited of which 40 per cent of the shares are held by Imperial Chemical Industries Limite<l; London which in_ its turn is a shareholder of the assessee, can not.be ' said to have any interest, direct or indirect, in' the business of the\n\nassessye."}}, {"text": "Atul. Products Limited", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 28605, "end_char": 28627, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "reason's which have prevailed with tis while discussing _the case of\n\nAtul."}}, {"text": "Crescent Dyes and Chemicals Liniited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 28698, "end_char": 28734, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Products Limited, the assessce has no _direct ot indirect interest in the business of' Crescent Dyes and Chemicals Liniited."}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 28828, "end_char": 28837, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 29171, "end_char": 29180, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Atul Products", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 29405, "end_char": 29418, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Atul Products."}}, {"text": "CresQ'ent Dyes and Chemicals Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 29433, "end_char": 29469, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Limited and CresQ'ent Dyes and Chemicals Limited to thei~ purchasers but must be determined.on.the basis of the wholesable\n\nca.sh price cllarged by the assessee to Atul Products Limited and Crescent Dyes aud Chemicals Limited. '"}}, {"text": "Crescent Dyes aud Chemicals Limited", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 29611, "end_char": 29646, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Limited and CresQ'ent Dyes and Chemicals Limited to thei~ purchasers but must be determined.on.the basis of the wholesable\n\nca.sh price cllarged by the assessee to Atul Products Limited and Crescent Dyes aud Chemicals Limited. '"}}, {"text": "S.R.\n\nA]Jpeal dismissed", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31099, "end_char": 31122, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "S.R.\n\nA]Jpeal dismissed\n\n'·"}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_3_93_99_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "·\"\n\nVJNODCHATURVEDI ETC. EJ'C. •\n\nSTATE OF MADHYA PRADESH ' .\n\nMarch S, 1984\n\n(S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI AND RANGANATH MISRA, JJ.]\n\n• Appeal against acquittal under section 386 of the Criminal Procedure \"Code, 1973-Convictio11 by re:versal.of th; verdict of acquittal relying on the\n\nevidence of the same wltnesfes; who are .clo_se relatives of the de.ceased and who in the earlier trial categqrical/y implicated someother five persons-Appreciation of evidence-Whether the High_ Co_uri was correct in relying on the said eye witnesses-Evidence Act, -section J...,...AdmissihilitY of Ex. P. ]'and E; v. P. 9, the tWo letters as corroborative evidence-Penal Code, sectionJ 148, 300, 362 and 367-Conviction Under Applicability of section !48 when the state coUnQel conceded tliat the charge u/J 148 cf id nOt relate to charge of bduction, but to murder taking place /ater.\n\nOn the basis or the investigation made on \"a First Information Report that one Brindaban the. deceased son of PW 1 was kidnapped in a jeep fr6m village Budba to the village Rarnpura whee h~ was _done to death, five person_s were put on trial in. Sessions Trial No. 107 of 1973, but they were acquitted by Judgment date.d 29.1.1974. The trial court held that the investigation was defective and the real accused had not been brought ori trial. After a lapse of three years in 1977 a fresh investigati0:n was undertaken and it resulted _in the prosecution of the present appell.., ts in the Court of Sessions as killers of Bfinda.ban. Prosecution examined seven eye-witneSes. The Trial Court assessedthe' evidence in a fair way and was not prepared to rely. on ii and therefore directed acquittal of the appellants. In the State appeal againot acquittal, the High Court heavily relying upon two documents-The first being Ex. l>. 1 a lettersent by PW I Sunderlal (9 the Superintendent of Police on 29.4.1973 nd the second being Ex. P 9 a confidential letter of the Superintendent of olice to the Deputy Inspector• General of the Department-found support 1 or the prosecutioJl case as corroborative evidence with the ocular evidence and reversed the acquittal, by convicting the appellants under section 148 and l6~ IPC. Hence the; appeals by special leave. ·\n\nAllowing the appeals, the Court\n\nHELD : I. When in the first trial on the charge of murder and abduction the prosecution had alleged that the deceased had been murdered by\n\nr .\n\na •et of five persons different from the present appellants and let in evidence of H • three eye-'-witnesses bloing. PWs. 1, 3 and 24 of the Second Trial and who aro iiamittedly close relations of decesed t6 the ~ect that tho~ fiv~ . ~CC¥~ .\n\nSUPREME.COURT REPORTS\n\n(1984) 3 S.C.R.\n\npersons.and no thers incIding the appellants were responsible for the death . of the deceased. acceptance of the evidence of the vey same three eye witnesse1\n\nin tbe second trial conducted after a lapse: of. three years implicating the present appellants as murderers will be higl\\ly imp; oper. . The fact that these alleged eye-witnesses were pi:epared to implicate the five persons who were acquitted on the earlier occasion and the present appellants on the subsequent occasions in a serious charge like murder is indicative of the fact that no credence can be given to the evidence of these witnesses and they were willing< to lend their. oath to any story. that the prosecution. advanced.\n\nTherefore, in an appeal against .acquittal the High Court in whose hands there has been a revirsal of the acquit tat ollght not to have found the remaining evidence to be good basis for conviction ofihe appellants. [96H; 97A-D]\n\n2. The High Co(irt fell into error in relying on the Jetter of PW I Sunaerlal to the Superintendent of Police dated 29.4.1973 which ii subsequent tO the commencement of the 'investigation of the basis on the First Information Report. Such a letter written by PW I who stood in the place of the posecutor would. not ai alt'be admissible inevidence. [97E-F) . '\n\nKali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh.\n\n[1974] I SCR '22; •. followed.\n\n3. To rely on the contents of the lettO:r Ex. P. 9 written bi the Superin tend,; nt. of police to_ his superior officer,. Without examining the writer of\n\nth~ letter and without affording an opportunity to the defence to Crossexamine the writer,. is totally misconceived. The document w-as no.t available to be relied upon for any pupose an~ the High Court in the ins'tant case was wrong in seeking support from it by way of corroboration of the or81 evidence. [9.70\" HJ\n\n.4. In view of the exres§ words i~ the definition of \"abduction\" in Sectioµ 362 of the J.P. C., the offence of. abduction against the accused has .n9.t bee\"n fu.Jly proved, since the name ofVinod the leader of the party has not been mentioned at all during the investigation and even according tO the ro, ajority -ofwitriesses, on the perSuation of the -acused (appellants) he went inside his hous~ and came properly dressed and to accompaily the group to v_illage Rampura. [98CD]\n\n5. The appelJants were not liable to be convicted under section 367 of. the Penal Code because from the rfon aeceptance by the High Court of the G story of murder of the. deceased by the appellants and non recording a finding that the grievous hurt leading 10 death was caued by them, it wiH De clear that the act of picking Of the deceased from hisvillage was unconnected with what happened later. [981'0]\n\n6. The charge under section 148 I.P.C. has been conceded by the\n\n. '\n\n counsel for the S t3.te to relate to what followed at Rampufa and is not -t' H conriected with the accuSation of abduction. The common object as stated • by the proseCution would not b; available fer sustaining the coµvicton ndr section 148 l.P.C. in that background. (980-HJ . . . ·. . . •\n\n...\n\nViNOD CHATURVEDI v; M.f. STATE (Ranganath Misra, J.) 95.\n\nCRIMINAL\n\nAPPELLATE JURISDICTION : . Criminal . Appeal Nos. 192-193 of 1983\n\n Appeals by Special leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 31st January, 1983 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 732 of 1980. ·\n\n• A.N. Mu/fa and S.K. Gambhir, for the Appellant in C.A. 192 of 1983. ·\n\nRajendar Singh a, nd .A.K. Mahajan for the Appellants . in CA. l 93 of 1983. • A.K. Sanghifor the Respondent in both the Appeals.\n\nThe Judgment of the Co, urt was delivered by\n\nRANGANATH MISRA, J.\n\nThese appeals by special leave are directed against the judgment of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh reversing the order of acquittal passed by 'the learned trial Judge. Criminal Appeal No. 192 of 1983 is by Vinod Chaturvedi while the other is by Jive of the co-accused. All of .them had been charged for offences punishable under Sections 148, 364 and 302/ 149 of the Indian Penal Code and were acquitted by the Additional Sessions Judge. The State of Madhya Pradesh carried an appeal being Criminal Appeal No. 732 of 1980. to the . High Court assailing the acquittal and the High Court allowed 'the appeal and while main• tairiing the acquittal under. Section 302/149 of the Indian Penal Code, convicted the appellants for offences punishable under Sections 148 and 367 of the Penal Code and directed each. of them . . to be sentenced 3 years rigorous imprisonment for each of the olrences with a further direction that the two sentenc.es would run concurrently.\n\nAccording to the prosecution on 27th April, 1973, around 4 p.m. the appellants kidpapped Brindaban, the deceased son of P.W. I , from village Budha and took him in a jeep to Rampura about ope kilometre .away on the pretext that a pending dispute between Brindaban and Sol)le villagers of Rampura would be settled amicably. It was further alleged that later in the evening Briµdaban wa~ done to death by being given several b\\ows by blunt and deadly weapons pursuant to the common object of the appellants of killing him .. The dead body was brought to village l}udha on the following day. Investigation as taken ur on tq~\n\nSUPREME COURT' REPORTS .- ·\n\n(1984) 3 S.C.R.\n\nlJasis of the firs1 information report and as a result thereof five persons were put on trial in session trial No. 107 of 1973 but they were acquitted.by the learned trial Judge by judgment dated 29.1.74.\n\nThe trial court came to' hold that the investigation was defective and the .real accused persons had not been brought to trial.\n\nNothing appears to have been done in the matter until 1977 when\n\na fresh inv.estiga ti on was undertaken and it resulted in prosecution of the .appellants in the court of session as killers of Brindaban.\n\nProsecution exmined seven eye-witnesses being P.W. 1 Sunderlal, father of the deceased; P. W. 2 Nathu, a co-villager and claimed toJie a servant of P.W.\" by the qefnce; P.W. 3 Kalua, a nephew of, the deceased; P.W, 23 Jhallu, a brother of tlie deceased, P.W 24, Nanhaibai wife of the deceased, and P.Ws. Band 14, two outsidePs who have been dclared hostile by the prosecu~ tion.c The trial court assessed the evidence in a fair way and was not prepared to rely upon it.\n\nAccordingly he disbelieved the prosecution case and directed acquittal of the accused persons.\n\nThe High Court did not come to the conclusion on the basis of the ocular evidence that the same was acceptable and 0n the basis 1 thereof a conviction could be recorded, but heavily relied on two documents-the first being Exhibit P-1, 'a letter sent by P.W. l Sunderlal to the Superintendent of Police dated 29;4.73 and the second; being Exhibit P-9 a confidential letter of the Superinten dent of Polic.e to the Deputy Inspector General of the Department The High Court found support for the prosecl\\tion case fromthese two letters and acceptillg the pos1tion that their contents corrobo ; ated the oral evidence of the witnesses proceeded to reverse the acquittal. It, however, did not accept the prosecution case relating to the charge of. murder.. Thus, while sustaining the acquittal in respect of the charge of murder the court convicted the appellants under Sections 148 and 367 of the I.P.C. ·\n\n. The peculiar features of this case are that the prosecution had alleged .that Brindaban had been !hurdered by a set of fiv~ persons different from the present appellants and had made them face a regular trial. Three most material witnesses being P.Ws. 1, 3 and 24 of the present trial who are close relations of deceased Brindaban had then testified 'before the Court thpt those f\\ve accused persons and no others including the appellants were.\n\nresponsibl~ for the . death of Brindaban. After the acquittal in .\n\nl9'74 ttothing happened \\n te matter for three yeafs and sudenlf ·\n\n. \" ' ''\n\n, .\n\n' .\n\n!!!f'\" '(\n\nViNOD CHATURVEDi'v. M.P. SrATE (Ranganath Misra, J.) 97\n\non the same old allegations in the hands of the police, fresh investigation was undertaken and the present set of accused persons were arrayed as murderers of Brindaban. Those fliree eye• witnesses 7-Vho on the earlier 01casion had deposed that five named .. assailants were the murderers of the Brindaban changed their version and now spoke that the present appellants were the . murderers. The fact that these alleged eye-witnesses were prepared to implicate the five persons who were acquitted on the earlier occasion add the present appellants on the subsequent occasion in\n\n8 Serious charge like mufder is indicative of the fact that DO credence can be given to the evidence ilf these witnesses and they • were willing to lend their oath to any story that the prosecution_ advanced. Once the evidence of P.Ws. I, 3 and 24 is brushed aside on that grmd, the residue by itself would not be adequate to support the charge. We have grave doubts whether the High Court in whose hands there has been a reversal of the acquittal. would have found th\\) remaining evidence to be good basis for the. conviction;\n\nThe High Court fell into a clear error in' relying on the two letters marked as Exhibit P-1 and Exhibit P-9. Exhibit P-1 was a letter of P.W .. l, Sunderlal to the Superintendent of Police. Admit tedly by 29.4.73 when this letter said to have been written, investigation had started on the basis of the firt information report and therefore, a letter written by P.W. I who stood in the place of the prosecutor would not, at all be: admissible in evidence.\n\nNo detailetl . reasons are warranted for this conclusion as the position is clearly covered by a decision of this Court in the case of Kali Riki v. State of Hirnachal Pradesh', Learned counsel for the State did not refute this conclusion .\n\nSo far as th'e other document is concerned, as already indicated by us, it is a letter written by the Superintende11t of Police to this administrativ • superi<>r.\n\nThe writer of the letter bas not been examined as a witness. No oppor Wnity has been given to the defence to cross-examine the writer. To rely on the contents of that letter in such circumstances' is totally misconceived. The document was not available to be relied .. upon for any purpose and the High Court clearly went wrong. in seeking support from it by way of corroboration of the oral evidence. ·\n\n(U, (1974] 1 s.<;<.it. 722,\n\nSUI'REME COURT REPORTS\n\n(1984) 3 S.C.R.\n\nThere are several other unsatisfactory features in the prose,. cution case which the trial had taken note of but strangely. en0ugh tjiose did not commend themselves to the High Coµrt even for consideration. . Vinod had not betlll named as the leader of the party which came to village Budha to pick up Brinda ban iii the statements given during investigation by several witnesses. These witnesses had been confronted as required by law and apart from pleading either innoceni:e or helplessness, no other answer was given. Some witnesses had .deposed that Vi nod the mfrin architect ot the incident came armed with a gun while others claimed that he was armed with a lathi, There is considerable divergence .in the evidence as to \\Vhether Brinda ban came into the jeep of his own accord or had been forcibly. put into it. Most of the witnesses \"\"· have stated that on being persuaded by the ac4*ised persons and\n\nVinod, in particular, l)e went •inside his house and came.properly dressed to accompany. the group to village Rampura. In that event, it cannot be naid. that Bi'indaban was abducted 'by the 11ccu1ed persl>ns. This is so in view of the definition of 'abduction' in Section 362 of the Code where it has been said: .. \"Whoever bv force compels, or by any deceitful means induce1, any person to go from any place, is said to . abduct that person\" .•\n\nThe High Court has convicted the appellants for the offence punishable under Section 367 of the Penal Code which could be possible . if there is abduction with a view to subjecting the abducted person, to grievous hur(or slavery etc. The High Court did not accept the story of murder of Brindaban by the appellants nor did it record a finding that the grievous hurt leading to death was caused by the appellants. The resultant position from it should have re'en that the act of picking of Brindaban from his village waa unconnected with what . happened to• Brinda ban later.\n\nFrom if should have followed that the appellants were not liable to be convicted under Se•ition 367 of the Penal Code.\n\nThe charge under Section 148, I.P.C. has been .. conccded by the counsel for the State to relate to what followed at Rampura and i1 not connected with the accusation of abduction. The common object as statr.d by the prosecution would not be l\\Vailable for sustaining the conviction under Section 148, I.P .C. in that backaround . ·\n\nThere are many other aspects with reference to which the trial ~C)Urt !w\\I f\\.>111l4 f!\\U!t wit!\\ the prosecutio11 C<\\Se, While WI;\n\n• <\n\n. • J'l\n\nVINOD CHATURVEDI v. M.P. STATE (Ranganath Misra, J.) 99\n\naccept the submission advanced for the State that we should not reassess the whole' evidence with reference to minor details, we are satisfied that the prosecution had failed to establish the chrges and the High Court without a proper appraisal of the materials and without meeting the findings reached by the trial court reversed the acquittal. •\n\nWe accordingly allow the appeals, set aside the jud1mcnt of conviction recorded by the High Court by reversing the acquittal of the trial court and while restoring the judgment of the trial court, we direct that the appellants are acquitted of both the charges and the sentences of imprisonment are set aside. Each of the appellants is discharged from his bail'bond.\n\nS.R .\n\n. '", "total_entities": 63, "entities": [{"text": "VJNODCHATURVEDI ETC. EJ'C", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 4, "end_char": 29, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "VINOD CHATURVEDI ETC. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 34, "end_char": 57, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 79, "end_char": 99, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI*", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "RANGANATH MISRA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 104, "end_char": 124, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RANGANATH MISRA, JJ.", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "section 386", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 160, "end_char": 171, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 645, "end_char": 655, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Brindaban", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 945, "end_char": 954, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the basis or the investigation made on \"a First Information Report that one Brindaban the."}}, {"text": "Budba", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1018, "end_char": 1023, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "deceased son of PW 1 was kidnapped in a jeep fr6m village Budba to the village Rarnpura whee h~ was done to death, five persons were put on trial in."}}, {"text": "Rarnpura", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 1039, "end_char": 1047, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "deceased son of PW 1 was kidnapped in a jeep fr6m village Budba to the village Rarnpura whee h~ was done to death, five persons were put on trial in."}}, {"text": "Bfinda.ban. Prosecution examined seven eye-witneSes.", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1487, "end_char": 1539, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "After a lapse of three years in 1977 a fresh investigati0:n was undertaken and it resulted _in the prosecution of the present appell.., ts in the Court of Sessions as killers of Bfinda.ban."}}, {"text": "Sunderlal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 1816, "end_char": 1825, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 a lettersent by PW I Sunderlal (9 the Superintendent of Police on 29.4.1973 nd the second being Ex."}}, {"text": "29.4.1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 1861, "end_char": 1870, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1 a lettersent by PW I Sunderlal (9 the Superintendent of Police on 29.4.1973 nd the second being Ex."}}, {"text": "section 148", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2158, "end_char": 2169, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "IPC", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2178, "end_char": 2181, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Sunaerlal", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 3676, "end_char": 3685, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Co(irt fell into error in relying on the Jetter of PW I Sunaerlal to the Superintendent of Police dated 29.4.1973 which ii subsequent tO the commencement of the 'investigation of the basis on the First Information Report."}}, {"text": "ofVinod", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 4701, "end_char": 4708, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jly proved, since the name ofVinod the leader of the party has not been mentioned at all during the investigation and even according tO the ro, ajority -ofwitriesses, on the perSuation of the -acused (appellants) he went inside his hous~ and came properly dressed and to accompaily the group to v_illage Rampura. [", "canonical_name": "ofVinod"}}, {"text": "section 367", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5051, "end_char": 5062, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5071, "end_char": 5081, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "section 148", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5423, "end_char": 5434, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5435, "end_char": 5440, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Rampufa", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 5528, "end_char": 5535, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "counsel for the S t3.te to relate to what followed at Rampufa and is not -t' H conriected with the accuSation of abduction."}}, {"text": "section 148", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5703, "end_char": 5714, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}, {"text": "ViNOD CHATURVEDI", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5771, "end_char": 5787, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "...\n\nViNOD CHATURVEDI v; M.f.", "canonical_name": "ViNOD CHATURVEDi'v"}}, {"text": "Ranganath Misra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5803, "end_char": 5818, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "STATE (Ranganath Misra, J.) 95.", "canonical_name": "RANGANATH MISRA, JJ."}}, {"text": "A.N. Mu", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6063, "end_char": 6070, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• A.N. Mu/fa and S.K. Gambhir, for the Appellant in C.A. 192 of 1983. ·"}}, {"text": "S.K. Gambhir", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6078, "end_char": 6090, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• A.N. Mu/fa and S.K. Gambhir, for the Appellant in C.A. 192 of 1983. ·"}}, {"text": "Rajendar Singh", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6134, "end_char": 6148, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rajendar Singh a, nd .A.K. Mahajan for the Appellants ."}}, {"text": ".A.K. Mahajan", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6155, "end_char": 6168, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Rajendar Singh a, nd .A.K. Mahajan for the Appellants ."}}, {"text": "A.K. Sanghifor", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 6213, "end_char": 6227, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A.K. Sanghifor the Respondent in both the Appeals."}}, {"text": "Vinod Chaturvedi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 6540, "end_char": 6556, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "192 of 1983 is by Vinod Chaturvedi while the other is by Jive of the co-accused.", "canonical_name": "ViNOD CHATURVEDi'v"}}, {"text": "Sections 148, 364 and 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6663, "end_char": 6688, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 6701, "end_char": 6718, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "State of Madhya Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6776, "end_char": 6799, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The State of Madhya Pradesh carried an appeal being Criminal Appeal No."}}, {"text": "Section 302", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 6986, "end_char": 6997, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7009, "end_char": 7026, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Sections 148 and 367", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7083, "end_char": 7103, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 7111, "end_char": 7121, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "27th April, 1973", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 7330, "end_char": 7346, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to the prosecution on 27th April, 1973, around 4 p.m. the appellants kidpapped Brindaban, the deceased son of P.W. I , from village Budha and took him in a jeep to Rampura about ope kilometre .away on the pretext that a pending dispute between Brindaban and Sol)le villagers of Rampura would be settled amicably."}}, {"text": "Brindaban", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 7387, "end_char": 7396, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to the prosecution on 27th April, 1973, around 4 p.m. the appellants kidpapped Brindaban, the deceased son of P.W. I , from village Budha and took him in a jeep to Rampura about ope kilometre .away on the pretext that a pending dispute between Brindaban and Sol)le villagers of Rampura would be settled amicably.", "canonical_name": "Bi'indaban"}}, {"text": "Budha", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7440, "end_char": 7445, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to the prosecution on 27th April, 1973, around 4 p.m. the appellants kidpapped Brindaban, the deceased son of P.W. I , from village Budha and took him in a jeep to Rampura about ope kilometre .away on the pretext that a pending dispute between Brindaban and Sol)le villagers of Rampura would be settled amicably."}}, {"text": "Rampura", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 7472, "end_char": 7479, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "According to the prosecution on 27th April, 1973, around 4 p.m. the appellants kidpapped Brindaban, the deceased son of P.W. I , from village Budha and took him in a jeep to Rampura about ope kilometre .away on the pretext that a pending dispute between Brindaban and Sol)le villagers of Rampura would be settled amicably."}}, {"text": "SUPREME COURT' REPORTS", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 7921, "end_char": 7943, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Investigation as taken ur on tq~\n\nSUPREME COURT' REPORTS .- ·\n\n(1984) 3 S.C.R.\n\nlJasis of the firs1 information report and as a result thereof five persons were put on trial in session trial No."}}, {"text": "29.1.74", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 8163, "end_char": 8170, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "107 of 1973 but they were acquitted.by the learned trial Judge by judgment dated 29.1.74."}}, {"text": "Nathu", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 8603, "end_char": 8608, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prosecution exmined seven eye-witnesses being P.W. 1 Sunderlal, father of the deceased; P. W. 2 Nathu, a co-villager and claimed toJie a servant of P.W.\" by the qefnce; P.W. 3 Kalua, a nephew of, the deceased; P.W, 23 Jhallu, a brother of tlie deceased, P.W 24, Nanhaibai wife of the deceased, and P.Ws."}}, {"text": "Kalua", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 8683, "end_char": 8688, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prosecution exmined seven eye-witnesses being P.W. 1 Sunderlal, father of the deceased; P. W. 2 Nathu, a co-villager and claimed toJie a servant of P.W.\" by the qefnce; P.W. 3 Kalua, a nephew of, the deceased; P.W, 23 Jhallu, a brother of tlie deceased, P.W 24, Nanhaibai wife of the deceased, and P.Ws."}}, {"text": "Jhallu", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 8725, "end_char": 8731, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prosecution exmined seven eye-witnesses being P.W. 1 Sunderlal, father of the deceased; P. W. 2 Nathu, a co-villager and claimed toJie a servant of P.W.\" by the qefnce; P.W. 3 Kalua, a nephew of, the deceased; P.W, 23 Jhallu, a brother of tlie deceased, P.W 24, Nanhaibai wife of the deceased, and P.Ws."}}, {"text": "Nanhaibai", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 8769, "end_char": 8778, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Prosecution exmined seven eye-witnesses being P.W. 1 Sunderlal, father of the deceased; P. W. 2 Nathu, a co-villager and claimed toJie a servant of P.W.\" by the qefnce; P.W. 3 Kalua, a nephew of, the deceased; P.W, 23 Jhallu, a brother of tlie deceased, P.W 24, Nanhaibai wife of the deceased, and P.Ws."}}, {"text": "l Sunderlal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 9332, "end_char": 9343, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The High Court did not come to the conclusion on the basis of the ocular evidence that the same was acceptable and 0n the basis 1 thereof a conviction could be recorded, but heavily relied on two documents-the first being Exhibit P-1, 'a letter sent by P.W. l Sunderlal to the Superintendent of Police dated 29;4.73 and the second; being Exhibit P-9 a confidential letter of the Superinten dent of Polic.e to the Deputy Inspector General of the Department The High Court found support for the prosecl\\tion case fromthese two letters and acceptillg the pos1tion that their contents corrobo ; ated the oral evidence of the witnesses proceeded to reverse the acquittal.", "canonical_name": "l Sunderlal"}}, {"text": "Sections 148 and 367", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9939, "end_char": 9959, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 9967, "end_char": 9972, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "ViNOD CHATURVEDi'v", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 10592, "end_char": 10610, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "f'\" '(\n\nViNOD CHATURVEDi'v.", "canonical_name": "ViNOD CHATURVEDi'v"}}, {"text": "Vho", "label": "WITNESS", "start_char": 10849, "end_char": 10852, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Those fliree eye• witnesses 7-Vho on the earlier 01casion had deposed that five named .. assailants were the murderers of the Brindaban changed their version and now spoke that the present appellants were the ."}}, {"text": "Sunderlal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 11904, "end_char": 11913, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Exhibit P-1 was a letter of P.W .. l, Sunderlal to the Superintendent of Police.", "canonical_name": "l Sunderlal"}}, {"text": "29.4.73", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 11962, "end_char": 11969, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Admit tedly by 29.4.73 when this letter said to have been written, investigation had started on the basis of the firt information report and therefore, a letter written by P.W. I who stood in the place of the prosecutor would not, at all be: admissible in evidence."}}, {"text": "Vinod", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 13303, "end_char": 13308, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Vinod had not betlll named as the leader of the party which came to village Budha to pick up Brinda ban iii the statements given during investigation by several witnesses.", "canonical_name": "ofVinod"}}, {"text": "Bi'indaban", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 14164, "end_char": 14174, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "that Bi'indaban was abducted 'by the 11ccu1ed persl>ns.", "canonical_name": "Bi'indaban"}}, {"text": "Section 362", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14270, "end_char": 14281, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Section 367", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 14530, "end_char": 14541, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 14549, "end_char": 14559, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15136, "end_char": 15146, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Section 148", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15166, "end_char": 15177, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "I.P.C", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 15179, "end_char": 15184, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Section 148", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15437, "end_char": 15448, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "I.P.C", "statute": "Indian Penal Code"}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_3_942_992_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "• •\n\n942.\n\n• ..\n\nDR. PRADEEP JAIN ETC.\n\n. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS .. ETC.\n\n22nd June,1984\n\n[P.N. BHAGWATI, AMAR~NDRA NAnl SEN A~D RANG.ANAtH\n\nMISRA, JJ.]\n\n. . . ' . . '<; onstituti'on oflndia-At. 14-Equal opportunity-Reservation ofseati ; n medical colleges for M.B.B .. S .. ari.d Post-graduate medical courses on basts of don1ici'/e ot\"resfdentiaf qualification' and institutional preference-By StateaNJ Union Territories-Jfva1id. Wluit should be the etent of such reservation. For admission to M.B.B.S. and Higher courses-Merit o.nly consideration-Whetlier and. when.departure can be mae. ·\n\nConstitution of Jndia-Art.141-Judgment in this case. applicable to all .\n\nStales and Oni'on Terrfto_•ies .except the States of ndhra:Pradesh and Jammu & .\n\nKashmir. . ,_ Constitution of India-Art .. 5-0nly one domicile-Domicile in lhe territory of Jttdia_:_T'? say dom.icile in one Siate or another-Not rfght. . • Words and{Phrases- 'Domicile' - Concept of-Basicil//y a legal coneept.\n\nWords and Phrases-'Mertt'-Wftat is.\n\nIn regard to admfsion to M.B B.s. and poSisr_aduatefD:edicaJ courses, a somewhat uniform and consisterit )?rach.ce had grown in almost alltbe States and Union Territories -to give.Prefereiice to those candidates who had their doµiiCile _or permanent residence within 'the tate for a specified number of years ranging 'Crom3to2<lyears arid to 'those who had studied in eduCational institutions in the State fof a contin).lous period varying from 4 to 10 years~ SOmetimes thC' requirement was phfased by. saying .that thC app1icant must have his domicile in the State .. The petitioners and the appellant.who sought admission in M.B B.S. an_d M D.S. courss in._different universities of different States and. Union Territory of Delhi chall'enged the \" \"'residential requirement and instiilltiorial preference on the grollnd of being violative of Constitution. The questio.n which arose fo~ consideration was whether, consistently with the 'conSt'itutional values, admissioris to a medical College or any other institution of higher. _Jerning situate in a state could be confined to those who bad their •domicile' within the State or who were resident within the State for a specified n_utDber of_ years or can any reservation'in a<,!roi'S$ioni l>e mac!e fort}lemw as to give t!iem preceden~ over tho~·\n\n.l.\n\n. I\n\nPRADEEP JAIN v. tiNION 943\n\nwho dcrnot p.osseSs •domicile' or residential qualification within the State, A .irrespective of merit.\n\n Disposing of the writ petitions and the civil appeal •\n\nHELD: •\n\n(Per f!hagwati and Ra!Jgana_th Misra, JI.)\n\nThe entire country is taken as one nation with one citizenship and every effort of the ConstitutiOn makers is directed t9viards emphasizi\"ng,, maintaining\n\nad presetving 1heutiity -and _in\"tegfity ot the_ nation. Now if India is one nation_anCI there is ohl)r one_ citizenship, namely, citizenship of India; and evefy citizen has a right to move Weety throughout the territory.of India and . to reside and settle iii any part Of India, irrespective of the place where he is born orthe language which be speaks or the religion which J1e profesSes and he is.guarari.teed freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse throughout theterritory df Indi.i and is enitled to equality before the law and equal protection of the Jaw with other. citizen~ it} every part of the territory of Indi~, it is difficult to see ho\\V a citizen having his permanent home fn ariiilnadu or speaking Tamil language can be regarQed as an outsider in Uttar Pradesh ora citizen having his .permanent home in Maharashtra or speaking Mar.athi l:inguage be)egarded as an outsider in Karnataka. He must be held entitled to the srne .rights_as 'a citizen having his pern1anent home in :tJttar Pradesh or Katnataka, as the ca~ may be. To regard him as an outsider wouldbe to deny him his constitutional rights and to derecognise the essential -unitY and : integrity of thecountry bY treating it a_s if'H were a mere conglomeration of\n\nindepndent States. [954F-H; 955A-13]\n\nArticle 15, claues. Cl) ana (2)-ar discriminatin on grounds no-t only.of -religion, race. caste or sex. but _also of Place of birth. Art. 16(21 goes further and provides that no citizen shall, on groµns Only of religion, racei caste; sex, descnt, place of irth, residence or any of them be ineligible for or\n\n-.· disctiminS.t~ against in. respect of, any employment or office under the state.\n\nTherefore, it would aPt>ear that residential requiremen't would be unconsti- . tutional as a.condition of eligibility ·-ror employmen\"t or appointment to ati. office under the Sta_te which alsq c_overs an office under any !Ocal or other . authority within the State or . any corporation, such as, a public sector corporation which is an instrumentality _or agency Of the Staie. ·\n\n[95SH ; 956A-C[\n\nR 1\n\na 1 ma 1 n 3 a 8 DCaYaRram Shelly v. International Airport Authority of India &\n\n. G rs., [ 9 9 . • •. 1014, referred to,\n\nSo far as_. admissiOns to an educa tlon 'institution such as a medical co11e.ge are ~Oncernedi Ar.t. 16(2) has no app.lication. If, the.ref ore, there is any resid_enpe requirement for admis:; ion \"to a medical college in a State it cannot be condened as unconstitutional on ground Or 'vioJation 'of . Art .• 16(2) .. Nor can Article 15 claus.cs (I) and Ql be invoked l'or invalidating such residen:cc_~qu~emet because these clauses prohibit.discrimination on ground of residece and, as pointed out by this.· Court in D.P. Joshi v. State\n\n944 StJi>REMil COURT REPORts tt98413 s.c.~.\n\nA . of Madhya-Bharat,.residece and place of birth are \"two distict cohceptions with differenf connottipns both in Jaw and i!J fact\", 'Th~ only provision of the Constitution on th.e touch-stone of which such residence 'requirement for . 3.dmission to a medical college in a St\"ate can be required to .be tested is Art. 14 and .that is precisely the challenge which falls to be considered in these . writ petitions. [957C.E]\n\n• E\n\n. 'F\n\n• l>.P. 'Joshi v. State of Madhya Bharat, [1955] 1. SCR 1215, referred to.\n\nThe word 'domicile' is to idenHfy the personal_ law by which an individUal is governecJ-:· in_ respect of Various matters such_ as the essential validit/ of a inarriage, the. ff~Ct o( mar-riagc On 'the proprietbry rights of husband and wife, jurisdiction in divorce and nullity of marriage, illegitimacy, legitima_tiOn and adoption and te\"; tamentary and inteState. succession to.moveables. [957F-.G] , ·\n\nHalsbury's Laws of England (Fourth Edition) vol. 8, garagrap~ 421 & 422 and W.icker .v. Home>, [1858] 7 HL Cases 124, referred to.\n\nDomicile is basicaIJy a legal concept, for the purpose of detern1ining whiit ls the personal law applicable. to an individual \"and even if an individual bas no permanen(bome, he_ is inested -with a domicile by law. There are two main classes of domicile: ddmicile of orig_in that is communicated by Operation of law to each person at birth, th; tt iS tbe domicile of his fii.ther or his mother according as he\"is legitimate.or illegit!m'ate and-domicile of choice. which every person of full age'iS free to acquire in substitu!ion for that_which he presently possesses. The d~-miqiie of origin attache.s to an individual by . birth _wiie th~ .domicile of ch<;>ice is acquird by residence in a territory subjec.t to a distinctive. lega_I _systC:rn 1 • wit~- the intention to. reside there premanently Qr indefinitely. Now the area bf domicile, wether it be . ' . domicile of origin Or domicile of _choice, is the, count-ry which has the distinc .. 1ive Ie&\"al .systeI!land not _merely. the particular pJ<ice In the country-where the inividual reside.s. [958B-E] ·\n\nWhet tier there -can._ be anything like a d:oQ.Jicile in a state forming part of the 'Union of India y -Tfi~ ons_titutio~ recognises only ooe domicile, namely, do'rnicile in India. Art. 5 of the Coqstitution is clear and explicit on this point and it refers only to one domicile_, namely, udomicile inthe territorY of India. \"The legal system which prevails throughout' the territory of Jn:dia is, one single indivisible system. It would be absurd to sugaest that the legal ·ystem -varies fr_om State to Stat_e or that' th.e legal sy'stem nf _3.\n\nState is different. ffom the legal systeffi of the Union of India, 'inerely beCause with respec~ to the suject-s- Within their Iegisl\"ative competence, the States have.Power to make law's. The concept of 'domicile' has no relevance\n\nto tf.c tlpplicability of n1unicipal laws,_whether made by the Union oflndi'a or by tht; States. 1 t would hot, therefore, be _right to say that _a citizen of India is domiciled in one state or_ another forming part of the Union of ltdia. The domicile which _h_e has is only One domicile,\n\nnamely~· dp1nicile in .the territor.y of India_. When a person who is permanentlj resient in one State goe'I to anotlle-r State wifh-i°:tention to-'. reside there peCJuanently or , indefinitely, his domicile doeli not undergo any\n\nPRADEEP JAIN v. UNION 945\n\nchange : he does not acqufre a new do1nicile of chOice. I-lis domkile re1nains A the same, naniely, Ir1d1an domicile. Moreover to think i~ tern1s ofst, ate .domicile wil! be h.ghly detri; nental to. the concept_ of Uniy and integrity of\n\nlndia. [958H;. 959A; D; F-H]\n\nThe. argument of:the State Governments that the v.ord 'domicile' in 1he Rules of some of the State Governments prescribing domiciliary requirement for admission to medical colleges situate within their territories, is used not in its technical legal s.ehse but in a popular sense as meaning residence and is -intended to convey the idca_pf intention to resi9C permanently or indefinitely, is accepted. Therefo'tc, the cou-rt would also _inteipret the. word\" 'don1ici1e' used in. the Rules reu1ating admissions to medical colleges framed by some of the States in. the same loose sense . of permanent residence and not in the\n\ntehnical sense i\"n whieh it is used.in: private international law. But even so the Court wishes to warrt against the use of the wOrd •d.ornicile' with reference to States forming paft of the Union.of India, bcause it is a word whicl; L is likely to conjure 1;1p the notion of an indCpendent_ State and encourage \"in a subtle and insidious manner the dormi:nt sovereign impuls of different regions. [959H; 960A-D]\n\nD.P, Joshi\n\n0 v State of. Madhya Bharat, [1955) I SCR 1215 and Vasundrv v State of Mysore, [1971} Suppl. SCR 381, referred to.\n\nIt iS. dangerous to use a feilll concept for conveying a.sense different from that which iS ordinarily asso:::iated w, ith-it as a result of Iegaf usage over\n\nthe years. Therefore, it is strongly urged upon .thC Sta.te'Government io exercise this wrong use of the expression 'domicile' from the rules regulating . adrnissioils to their educational institutions and particularly_ 1nedical colleges and to desist frotn int!oduciog and maintaining domiciliary require1nent as a' condition or' eligibility Jor such admissio!ls. [960E-G]\n\nAs the position stands today, there. i-s cq.nsiderable paucity of seats. in' medical colleges to satisfy the increasing dentand of students for admission F and Some principle b3s therefore,-· to be evo-lved for making selection of students for admission .to the medical ._colleges and such principle h'as tO be in conformity with the requirement of Art. 14. Now, the pritnary imperative of . -Art. 14 is equal opportunity for all across the nation for education and advance\n\nm::nt aud 'that cannot be made dependent upon where a-itizen resides.\n\nThe'philosoPnY and pr<igrnatism of t!Diversal excellence through equality of opportunity for education and advancement across the nationis.part of pur found\"ing faith and constituti.onal creed. . The effort inust, therefote, always - he to select the best and m_ost meritorious i;; tudents for adinission to technical iost!tutions .and medical colleges by provfding equal opportunity to all citrzc-ns.in the country and no citilen can legitimately, without serious deteri mcnt to the unity-arid integrity of the nation, be rgarded as an qutsider in our C9riStit'utional set up .. Moreover,_it would be against national interest tO adn1it in: medical colleges or.other instit., utions giving instruction in_ specia~ ·\n\nities, less meritorious &tudents when more medtorious $t_udtilts are avaih1.bl~.\n\n! .\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [i984l 3 S, C.!l.\n\nA .\\simply be; au~ the forme~ are permane_nt rsidentS or esidents for a. ce:rtan\n\n llumber' of years in th>t State whil~ the latter are not, though both categories are citizensof India .. Ex:Clusion of mofe .meritrious studentS on the ground .t.hat they are ot resident within the State 'iVOuld-be likely to promote substandard candidates and bring aboutf3H ii?: medical competence,_injurious fn the long run to the very region [96JG-H; 964D-H]\n\n'Jagdish Saran v Union of 1\"dia, (1980] 2 SCR 831, P. Rajendr<in v. • StaJe of Madras. [1968]2 SCR. 786 and .Periakaruppan v. State of Tamil Nadu, [19711.2 SCR 430, referred to.\n\nWhat is merit which ffiust govern the process of selection? It undoubtedly consists Of a .high degree of .intelligence coUpled with a kef:n and incis'ive mind,- sound knowlfdge of the basic subjects aad infiriite capaity for hard woik, but tha.t is not nough it also calls for a sense of sociai commit• ntent and dedication to the Cause of the poor. Me-rit cannot be measured in terms 'or marks alone, but humani.syniPathies are equally inipo'rtant. The heart is as much a. factor as the head in assesing the social value of a member o(the medical-profession., This is <ilso an aspect wllich maY, to the limited xtent possible, be borne in mind while~ detern1ining merit for seleCtion of candidates for admission t.o inedical colleges thotigh cocedediy 1t would not b~ easy to do so, since it is a 'factor which is extremely difficult . to judge_and n_ot easily susceptil;; to ea1Uation.L967B-F; H; 968A]\n\nJagdish Saran v. Union of India, [1980] 2. SCR 8.JI, referred 10.\n\nThe . scheme of adrpission to t1tedical coileges may depart from the -principle of selection bas::d on merit; here it is necessary to do. so_ for the E purpose of bringifl.g <ibout .real eqUality_of ppportU:nity between those whO are unequals •. [969F]\n\nAlzmedahad St. Xavier's COilege Soc; ety and: Anr. v 'State ofGujaYat. [1974] l SCR 717 at 799. and Jagdish Saran v. Union of India. (1980) 2 SCR 831 .. referred to.\n\nThere are, ill the application.of tills prin-Ciple, two, considerations which appear to have weighed ith tlfe, Courts in . justifying depaiture from the princ; iPle of selt!ction based On merit. - One is :hat ay be called Staie has by and large been. fowned Upon by the couft and struck down as invalid interest and the other is what may bedescribed as a fegion's claim of back\"\" wardness. [~69G] ·(\n\nG D.P, Joshi v. State ?f.Madhya Bharat [1955] 1 SCR 1215, referred to ..\n\n. Though intra•state discrjn1inatiort betWeen persons residenfin •differentdistdcts .o~ re_gions of a State as !n ~Minor P. Rajendran's caSe and Perukaruppans case the Court has in D. N. Chanchala's\n\ncs~ an.d othei similar cases Upheld institutional reservatidn effected through univrshY-wi_se distribution _of seat$ for <icffnission t9 medical\n\n(:lleges. 1'.he Court has also by 'its decision in D_, p; Josfli's case\" a'nd N. Jtasundhara's c<1se sustained th._e constitutional vaHdity of reservation based . c; in residence requirement within a Stat_e for the purpse qf admission to\n\n. .\n\n.l.\n\n111\\ADEEP )AIN .V. UNION 947\n\nmedical cJ\\\\eg3S, Th'\" decisiom whioh all relate to admhsion to M.B.B.S.\n\nA cotirse are binding upon the Court aiid it is therefore net pcssible for the Courtto-heldt in the face of these decisions, ti1at residence rcquiremCnt in a State for admission to M.B.B.S. course is irrational and irrelevant and cannot .be introduced as a condition for adh1issio!'.1 without violatirig the mandate of equalitY of opportunity contained in Art. 14. The' C0urt is therefore of the . view: that a certain percentage of reservation of .seats in the medical colleges on-the basis of residence retjuirement may legitimately be xnade in_or-dr to j, qualis-e opportunities for medical. admission on a broader. basis and to bring about. rea:l and tiot formal, actual and not .merely IegaJ, equality. The pe~-. ceiitage of reservation made on this count may also include.institutional reserVation rot students passing the PUC _or pre-medical exainination-of the same universHy or clearing the quilif)'ing examination fron1 the sch:ool systein of the educational hinterland of the medical colleges iO. the.State and for this purpose, there sbouJO be no distinction between schools affiliated to State Board and- chools affiliated to the. Central Board of Secondary Edil'catioo. [979C-F; 981D-F]\n\nP; Rajendran . v, State of Madras, [1968) i SCR 786,. Periakaiuppan v.\n\nState of Tamil Nadu, [1971) 2 SCR 4)(}, D.N. Chanchala v, State of Mysore, [1971) Supp. SCR 608, D.P. Joshi v, State of Madhya Bharat, [1955J I SCR\n\n1215, Vasundra v. State of Mysore, [1971) Suppl. SCR 381, Ahmedabad St. Xavier's College Society and Anr. v. State of Gujarat, [1974] 1 SCC 717 at 799 and'State ofUttar Pradesh v. P. Tando.~, p975J 2 SCR 761, referred to.·\n\nWhat should be the extent of reservation based on resid!ncc requif.e- men.t and institutional preference ? r¥holesale reservation tnade by some of the State or Govcrnmeot<:1 on the basis of don\\icne Qr r:esid-ence requiremeilt witl\\in the State or the basis of institut.ionat Prefrence for students who have passed the qualifying exam.ination.held by.the university or the State exc.ludfng all students not\"satisfying this requirement, regardlss of merit, must be. condemned, and are unconsti ttional and .void as being in voilation of. Art, 14 of the Constitution. [98lG; 98JE-F] •\n\nJagdish.Saran v. Union of.India [1980) 2 SCR 831, referred to.\n\nIt is not possible .to pfovide .a catCJor.ical 3.nser to this question for,. as pointed _out by the poHcy statement of the GOvernmenf of India, tbe extent of such reservation would depend on seVeral factOrs including opportun'itiCs (or professional edu_cation in that Particuhtr area,_ the extent of competition, level of educationl development of the area and other relevant factors. But th.! Court is of the opinion that Such reservatio_n should in _no event exceed the outer limit 9f 70 per cent of the total number of open seats after ta\\cing into account other kinds of reservations validly made .. The Medical Ec'\"uc8.t.i0n Review Committee haS suggested that' th_e _outer litrii~ sboqld.not cxc_eedli5 per cent but in the opinlon of the Conrt it would be. fPir a_nd just tO fix the outer limit at 70 pei; cent This outer limit offes.ervaiion is being\n\naid down . iil an atte1npt to reconcile the apparently conflicting claim Or equality and.excellence. It may be. made clear that this outer limit fixed by the Curt will l?e subject to any reductio.n or attenuation which may be •\n\nl n\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984] 3 s.c.k.\n\n' made by the Indian Medical Counci.l whichis the statutory body of medical\n\nrractitioners whose fun:; tional obligatiO:-is include setting-\" Standards' fot medical educ1tion and-providing ror Its regulationand Coordinarion. This outer limit fixed by the Court must gradually O\\; er the years b~ progres.sively redllcCd b_ut_ that is a task which w1>uld have to b3 perforincd by the Indian Medical Couricil. The Indiau Medicaf Council is directed to consider within.a period of nine inonths f~; m today whether the. o.uter iimit of 70 pe~ cent fixr; d by the Couft needs to be teduc-ed and jf the Indian Mcdia:I Council\n\ndetermi:p.es.- a shorter outer 1in1it, it will\"b~-bindingon tbe States andthe Union-Territ-0rics. The Indian.MedicatrCouncil is also d1f.etted to subjeCt the outer limit.s;) -nxed to !e; o.rrsideration at_ the end of every three yearS but in no. ev'e'nt should the outer Ii mit exCeed 70 per c\"cnefixed by the Court.\n\nThe resu!t'is th:i.t in any event at least 30 per cent-of the oPen seats shall be availa.bl;;_ for admisSiOn Of students on all lndia basis irrespective of the Sfa te or university from which theY con1e and Such admissions shaU be granted ·pur.ely -on merit on the basis of eitheran India. Entrance Exami- .rtation or ntrc:ne exan1inatioh to be held by \"the s\"tate. ol c'ourse, it n.eed .. not b~ added that even \\\\here resrvation on the QaSis ofreSidence requirerllent 01: ii.:situtiaal prefl!rence iS mad~ in-accordance wHh_-the direction~ given \"in this judintat; admis)ions 'frOrq the source or sources indicated by such res:>ryation shall b; based only on mi:rit, because the object must be ·to select the best.and most 1ne:r; itorioi.Is students from within such source or, sources. [98JG-H; 984A-H; 985A-B]\n\nBut different considerations mu.st prevail .while conSidering the question _of fcse.rvation based on resid6ne requirement within the State or on fQstitutional peference for admission .f~ the post-graduate course~ such as.· M.D., M.S. and the like. There. CxceUe\"nCe cannot be allowed tO be compiomised[by. vnyj 01 hrr considiations because that would be deterimenw tal to the interest Qf the natio11. Therefore o fara:s admissionstopostgraduateeou1ses_, suchas M.S-. 1. M.O. nd te like arc CQncerncd~ it wollld\n\nbe_ CminntlY desirable not to provide for any reservatiOn based on residence requireie.nt \\Vi thin the State or on instittion11 prference: But havit'lg reg4rd to. broader considerati_ons 'of equality of Opportunity and institoti'onal continuity in educ.a:tioa which ha~; its own importance and Value, it is dtrected that though . residcfi.ce requirement. within the State shall not b(.: a ground for reervation in a{Ln; ssions -to potgr'adu1te cOurses_, a certain p(!rc-enfage of seats may in the pres.nt circumstance~,-be reservefJ, ontle-basis of ihtitutional preference in· the sense that a stud.:nt Who has . passed M BJl.S course frOm a medical college -or university may be given prefere-ce. for admission to the post-graduate cottrse in the same mdical\n\nco11eg~ or university but such rese_rvation on the basis of ios'hutional preference Should not in any event exceed. 50 per cent of the total number of open seats a'Vailable .for admi.ssi~O to the post-graduate course. This_outer iimit.wli, ich-is being-fixed w;11 also b,- subjeCt to revision on the loY.er side by the Indian Medical Council in the saine m.anner as in the case of adissiOns\n\nto the M.B:B.S. course. B.ut e~Cn ii) r~8:ar.d to,-admissions to 'the post-graduate course, it-is directed that so far as super soecialitiessuchas neu~-surgerY and ca-fdiologY a.r~ c0ncl!.rned, -there Should be no reservati.on at all .. even on the basis bf'ir.stitutional prefererice and admissions _shou_Id. be granted purely. on merit on all India basis. [985C-D;987F-H; 988 A-Bl\n\nPRAl:>EEP iAIN v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 949\n\nWhaths be.en said in regard to admissions. to the: M.B.B.S. ad pOst graduate courses must apply equally in relation to admissions to the B.D.S and M.D.S. courses. So for as admissions to the B:D.S: and M.D, S. courses are concerned, it will he the Indian Dental Council which ls the statutory body of dental pr~Ctitioners, which wiII have-to carrY out the directions given to the Indiari Medical Council jn regard to admissions to M.B.B.S. and posf.:graduate courses. The directions giveq to the Indian Medical Counci~ may therefore be read as_ :applicable_mutatis 1J1lltands to the Indiati Dental Council sofar a_s admissions 'to B.D.S. and M.D.S. courses are concerned. [988C-E]\n\nIn the instant ca§e, the provisional adn1issions given to the petitioners shall not be disturped but they shall be treated as final admissions. [988H]\n\n(Pr Bhagwati, Amqrendra Nath Sen and Ranganath Misra, JJ.)\n\n. The judgment shall. be implen1ented with effect from the next academic year 19~5-86. Whatever .'.admission.s, provisionar or otherwise, have been . made for the academic year 1984-85, sh!lll not be disturbed on the basis of the judgment. The judgment will not apply tq the States of Andhra Pradesh arid Jarnmu &, Kashmir because there were special Constitutional.provisions in regard to them which Would need independent consideration by th:s Court.\n\n[991G-H; 992A]\n\n(Per Amarendra Nath Sen, J,)\n\nI ag-ree with the orders passed by my learned brother Bhagwati J. and also the directiolls given by him. [989A] . ·\n\nThe questin of cOnstitUtiona.i validity of reervat; on of seats w\"thln reasonable .Jimits:on the basis of residence and also the question of institUtion_ci.Hsd rrServation Of seats clearly,.appear to be conc!Uded by various\n\ndcision Of this-couri, as has bt;_cn r:ghtly. pointed out by my learned brother in hfsjudgment in which he has referred at.1en£, th to these decisions. These decisions are biodlng on this Court and are to be followed. 'Constitutional validity of such fesrvatioils within the 'reasonable liillit must, therefore, be\n\nuphld: [989H; 990A-B] .\n\n-The real question-is the questin of the extent of the limfr to which such res~.rv\"3.tions_ may. be considered to be reasonable. The question Or reasonableness Of such. reservations must necessa; ily be dtefmined with reference to thef.icts and circumStances of particular cases and.with rer~.nce . to the situation prevailing at any given time. [990C]\n\nOn the questipn of admissiOn to post-graduate m.e:4ical courses I must confess that I )lave s\"omemisgivings.iit niy mind as to the fuither.c1assification mti:de on the footings of super-specialities. Both iny learned bro1hers however; agree on thiS,. Also in a broa.der perspective this classification ma; serve the intef.ests of the nation.better, thol\\ih interests of.individual tates to. a sn1all extent .may. be effected.· This distinCtion in case of super-SJ:edalities . proceeds on the basis that i~_ these very -important spheres the criterion for , . . r - - - . selectiof.1_ should be mefi_t only without any institutionalised rc.sCrvations or any reservation on_ the ground of residence. I also agree that. the -rders and directions proposed ill regard to. admission to M.jl.B.S. and post-graduate\n\nH •\n\n•' 950\n\n. SUPREME COURT R.EPORTS . (19$413 s.C.R.\n\n..... A courses arb 3.Iso to be read as applicable mutatls mutandis . in relation to admission to B.D.S. and MD, S: courses, [99QE-G]\n\nCIVIL APPBLLATE/OR!<)[NAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition Nos. 6091, 8882-83, 9219, 9820 of l983 and 10658, 10761of19.83 & CMP. No. 2911.6/83 (in WP. No. 9618/83) • 8 (Under. article 32 of the Constitution of India)\n\nWith\n\nCiil Appeal No. 6392 of 1?83\n\nAppeal by Special leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 17th August, 198lofthe Delhi High Court in C.W.P. No. 1791.\n\nC of 1983,\n\n• •\n\n;) G\n\n. V.M. Tarkunde, A.K. Srivastava, S.K. Jain iind Vijay Hansaria,\n\nf~; the petitioners. . ·\n\n R. Venkataramanifor the Appellant in CA. 63 92/83.\n\n A.K. Ganguli, S.K. Baga .& N.S. Das Bahl for the Respondents in CA. No. 6392 of 19.83.\n\nP..P: Rao and A.K. Ganguli for .th; Delhi Universlty ..\n\nSN. Choudhary for the Respondents (State of Assam)\n\nK.G: Bhagat, Addi. Sol. General, Miss , of. Subhashini & R.N. Poddar for the Respondent~Union of Indi~. ·\n\n Kapil Sibal and Mrs ... Shobha Dixit for the Resp0ndent- State qf U.P.\n\nD.P. Mukherjee and G.S. Chatterjee for: the Respondent-· State of West. Bengal.\n\nG.S. Narayan.a; Ashivini Kumar, C.V. Subba Rao, Swaraj Kaushal & Afr. M. Veerqppa, for tbe Respondent-State of .\n\nKariinataka.\n\n K. Parasarali and B. Parthasilrthi for the Respondent~State of Andhra Predesh.\n\nYogeshwar Prasad and.Mrs. Rani Chhabra for the Respondent.\n\nP.K. Pillai, for-the Respondent-'State of Kerala.\n\nP.N.lvag, for the St; te of H.P.\n\nP.R.. Mriduliand R.K. Mehta for tlie State of Oriss~ ..\n\nAlta/ Ahmed for the State .ofJ & K.\n\nThe following Jndgments were delivered\n\n--\\\n\nPRADEEP JAiN v. UNiON (Bhagwati, J.) 951\n\nBHAGWATJ, J .. This group of Writ Petitions raises a question of great national importance affecting admissions to medic~! colleges, both at the. under-graduate and at the post-graduate levels. The question is, whether, consistently w.ith the constitutional values, admissions to a medical college or any other institution c)( higher learning situate in a 'State can be confined to those who have their 'domicile' within the State or who are resident within the State ·.\n\nfor a specified number of -years or can any reserviltion in admissions be made fpr them so . as to give them precedence over those who do' not possess 'domicile' or residential qualification within the'.\n\nState, irrespective of merit. This ques.tion has assumed. consider\n\nable significance in the present day context, because we find that toi!ay. the integrity of the nation is threatened by the divisive. forces of regionalism, iinguism ancl communalism and regional linguistic and communal loyalties are gaining ascendancy in ' national life ancl seeking to tear apart and des\"troy national inte'\n\ngrity. ·. We t.end to forget that India is one nation and we are all Indians first and Indians last. It is time we remind ourselves what the great visionary and buflder of modern India, Jawaharlal Nehru said, \"Who dies if India lives : who lives if India dies?\" We milst realise, and this is unfortunately that many in public life tend -iO. overlook, sometime~ out o_f ignorance of the forces of history and sometimes deliberately with a view to promoting their self interest, that national interest must inevitably and for e, ver prevail over any otlier considerations proceeding from regional, linguistic or , communal attachments. If only we keep these basic. considera tions uppermost in our minds. and follow the sure path indicated by the founding fathers of the Constitution, we do not think the question arising in this group of writ petitions should present (Illy\n\ndifficulty 6f soluti?n .\n\n. the history of India over the past centuries bears witness to the fact that India was at no time a single political unit. Even during the reign of the Maurya dynasty, though a large part of the country was under the overeignty of the Mauryan kings, there were considerable protions of the territory which were under the rule of independent kingdoms.\n\nSo also during the Moghul rule which 'extended over large parts of the territory of India, there were independent rulers who enjoyed political sovereignty over the territories of their respective kingdoms. It is an .interesting fact of history that India was forged into a nation neither on account\n\nof a common language nor on account of the continued existence \\lf a sinle political reime over its territories bu\\ on account of~ . .\n\n• .D\n\n... E\n\n952 SUPRE~E c:ouR:f.REPORTS[l984) 3 s.G.ll.\n\n. common culture evolved over the centuries. . It is cultural unity- . something more fundamental and en.during that any other bond\n\nwhich may unite the people of a country together-which has welded this country into a nation. But, until the advent. of the British. rule, it was not constfruted into a single political unit.\n\nThere were thr0ughout the period of history for which we have fairly uthenticated. account,. various kingdoms and principalities . . which were occasfonally .. engageil in conflict with oneanother.\n\nDuring the Br.itish rule, India became a comact political unit . having one single political regime over its entire territories and this ld to the. evolution of the concept of a nation. This 9oncept ofone nation _took firm roots in the minds and hearts of the people during the struggle for independence under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi ... He has rightly been callt!d the Father of the Nati.on because it was he who awakened in . the people of this' country a sense of national consciousness and instilled in .them a high sense of patriotism. without which it is not possible to build a country irito nationhoodc : By. the time the Constitution of India came to be enacted, insurgent India, breaking a new path of non violent revolution and fighting to free itself from the shackles of foreign domination,. had emerged into nationhood and \"the people . of India\" were inspired by a new enthusiasm, a high noble spirit of sacrifice and above an, a strong sense of nationalism and in the Constitution which . they framed, .they set about the task of a strong nation based. on certain cherished values for which they had fought.\n\nThe Preamble of the Constitution was therefore, framed with' the great care and deliberation so that it reflects the high purpose and noble objective of the Constitution makers. The Preamble ' declares in highly emotive words pregnant with. meaning and significance :\n\n\"We, The People of India, having solemnly resolved to consti lute india into a Sovereign Socialist Seculat Democratic Republic and to seure to all its citizens : Justice, social, economic a:nd political ; Liberty of thought, expression, belief; faith and worship ;\n\nEquality of status and. of opportunity ; and to promote .among them all •\n\nFraternity assuring the dignity of the individual and the unit~ and integrity of the Nation ; ·\n\nPRADEEP JAINv. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 953\n\nIn Our Constituent Assembly this twenty-sil\\th day of A November, 1949, do Hereby Adopt, Enact And Give To Ourselves This Constitution.\"\n\nThese words embody the hopes and aspirations of the people and .capture and reproduce the social, economic and political philosophy underlying the t::onstituti6n and running through the warp arid woof of iis entire fabric. It is 'significant to note that the Preamble emphasises thatthe people who have given to themselves this .glorious document are the people of India, the people ' of this great nation called India and it gives expression to the .resolve ofthe 'people of India to constitute India into a sovereig~. socialist secular democratic republic JDd to promote among all its citizens fraternity assurmg the dignity of the .individual and t!Je unity and integrity of 1he nation. The Constitution makers were aware of the past history.of the c.ountry and they were also cons- 'Cious that the divisive forces of. regionalism, linguism and communalism may <llle. day rajse their ug}y head and threaten the unity and integrity of the nation, particularly ill the context of the partition of India and the ever present danger of the imperialist forces adopting new strategems, apparently innocuo'us, but calculated to destabilise India and re-establish their.hegem.ony and, therefore, they laid great emphasis on the unity .and integrity of . the nation in the very Preamble of theConstitution. Article l of the Constit.ution then proceeds to declare that Illdia shall be a Union of States but emphasizes that though a uniOn of States, it is still one nation with one citizenship. Part 11 dealing with citizenship recogni$eS only Indian citizenship : it does no(recognise citizens11ip of any State forming part of the Union. ' Then follow Articles .J 4 and 15 which are intended to strike against discrimination. and arbitrariness in state aCtion, whether legislatives or administrativ6. They read as follows :\n\n... Article 14 : The State shall not deny to any persons , equality before the law or the equal protention of the laws within the territory o~ India.\"\n\n\"Article 15 : (I) The State shall not disciminate against any Citizen ()D grounds only Of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth of any of them .\n\n. (2) . No ciilzen shall on. gronnds only of religion, race, caste. sx, place of birth or any of them, be siibjec\\\n\nB . ,.\n\n954 . SUPREME COURT RBl'ORTS\n\n(1984) 3 S.C.R •\n\nto. any disability, liabilify, restriction or condition with regard t6-\n\n. (a) access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and places of\n\n, public entertainment; or.\n\n(b) the. use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads and places so pl)blic resort maintained wholly or partly out' of' State funds or d'edicated to the use of the general public:\n\n(3) Nothig in this article or in clause (2) of article . 29 shall prevent the State from making any _special provision for .the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes o( citi!ens orfor the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes.\"·\n\nArticle 19 (1) again recognises the essential nnity and inte- grily. of the nation 'and einforces the concep(of one nation by providing. in cluses (d) and (e) that every citizen shall have the right to move freely throughout the territory of Jpdia and to . reside and settle in any part of the. territory of India. Arti6le 301 . declares that. subject to the, Other provisions of Part XIII, trade,\n\ncommerce and intercourse throughout the territory of.India shall . be free. Then there are situations envisaged in. certain Articles of the Constitution such as Artie.Jes 353 and 356 where the executive.power ofa State forming part of the Union is xercisable' by the Central Government or subject to. the directions of the Central Government. Thus, toe entire country is taken as.· one nation with ohe citizenship anc) every effort of the Constitution makers .is direted towards emphasizing, maintaining and preserving the unity and integrity of the nation. Now if India is one nation and there is only one, citizenship, namely, citizensQ.ip of India, -and every citizen has a right to move freely.throughout' the territory of India and to resid.e and settle in any part of India, irrespective of the place where he is born• or the language which he speaks or the religion which he professes and he is guaranteed freedom of.trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the territory.· oflndia and is .entitled to equaJity before the law and equal protection of the ):iw. with other citizens in every part of the. territory of India, it iS difficult to see how a citizen having his permanent home in Tamilnadn or speaking Tamil language can be regarded as an outsider in Uttar radesh or a citize!l h11Ving his perm\"anent\n\nhQIU~ in Maharashtra or/speakin~ Marathi lantluage b¥\n\n. '\n\nPRADEEP JAIN v. UNION (Bltagwati, J.) 955\n\nregarded as an outsider in KarQataka. He must be held entitled to the same rights as a citizen having bis permanent home in Uttar Pradesh or Karnataka,. as the case may be. To regard him as an oujsider would be to deny him his constitutional rights and to derecognise the essential unity and integrity of the country by treating it as if it were a mere conglomeration of independent states.\n\nBut, unfortunately, we find that in the last few years, owing to the . emergence of narrow parochial loyalties fostered by interested parties with a view to gaining advantage for themselves, a serious threat has developed to the unity and integrity of the nation and the very concept of India as a nation is in peril. The threat is obtrusive at some places while at others it . is still silent and is masquerading urider the guise of apparently innocuous and rather attractive clap-trap. The reason is . that when the Consti\n\ntution came into operation, we took the spirit of nation-hood for granted and p1id little attentfon to nourish it, unmindful of the fact that it was a hard-won concept.\n\nWe allowed 'sons of the soil' demands to develop claiming secial treatment on the basis of residence in the concerned State, because recognising and cnnceding such demands had a populist appeal. The result is that 'sons of the soil' claims, though not altogether illegitimate if confinecf within reasonable bounds,. are breaking asunder the . . . unity and. integrity of the nation by fostering and strengthe'ning narrow parochial loyalties based on language and residence within a state. Today unfortunately, a citizen who has his permanent residence in a state entertains the feeling that he must have a preferential claim to be appointed to an office or post in the state or to be admitted to an educational institution within the state vis-a-vis citizen. who has his permanent residence in another state, because the latter is an outsider and must yield place to a citizen who is a permanent resident of the state, irrespective of merit. This, in our opinien, is a dangerous feeling which, if allowed to grow, indiscriminately, might one day break up the country into fragments, though, as we shall presently point out, the principle of equality of opportunity for education and advancement itself may justify, within reasonable limits, a preferential policy based on residence. ·\n\nWe may point out at this stage that though Article1!5 (2) clauses (! l and (2) bars discrimination on grounds not only of religion, race, caste or sex but also of place of birth, Article 16 (2) gees\n\nSUPREME COURT R~PORTS [1984] 3 s.c.R.\n\nfurther and provides that no dtizen shall on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth, residence or any of them be ineligible for or discriminated against in state employment. So far as employment under the state, or ani local or other authority is concerned, no citizen can be given preference nor can any discrimination be practised against him on ihe ground only of residence. It would thus appear that residential requirement would be unconstitutional as a condition of eligibility for employ- • ment or appointment to an office under the State and having regard to the expansive meaning given to the word 'State' in Ramana Dayaram She tty v. International Airport Authority of India & Ors.\"\\, !tis obvlous that this constitutional prohibition would also cover an office under any local or other authority within the State. or any corporation .. such as a public sector corporation which is an instrumentality or agency of the State. But Article 16 (3) provides an exception to this rule by laying. down that Parliament may make a law \"prescribing, in regard to a class or classes of • employment or appointment to an office under the government of, or any local or other authority, in a state or union territory, any requirment as to residence within that state or union territory prior to such employment .. \" or appintment Parliament alone is given the right to enact an' exception to the. ban on discrimination based on residence and that too only with respect to position.s within the employment of a State Qovernment. But even so, without any parliamentary enactment permitting them to do so,' many of the State Governments have been pursqing policies of localism since long and these policies-are now quite wide spread. Parliament has in fact exrCised little control over these policies States. . The only action whi, ch Parliament has taken under Article 16 (3) giving it the.right to set. residence requirements has been the enactment of'the Public Emp!Oyment (Requirement as to Residence) Act, 1957 aimed at aboiishing all existing residence requirements in the States and enacting exceptions only in the case of the special instanc.es of Andhra Pradesh, Manipur, Tripura and Himchal Pradesh.\n\nThere is therefore at present no parliamentary enactment permitting , preferential policies based on residence requirement except in the case of Andhra Pradesh, Manipi1r Tripura and Himachal'\n\nJ Pradesh where the Central Government bas been given the right to issue directions setting residence requirements in the subordinate servic~. Yet, in the face of Article 16. (2), some of the States are adopting 'sons of the soil' policies prescribing reservation\n\n(I) [1979] 3 SCR 11)14\n\nPllADEEP JAIN v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 957\n\nor preference lxioed on domicile or reoi, lence requirement for employment or appointment to an office under the government of a State or any local oi other authority or public seCtor corporation OP any other .corporation .which is an instrumentality or agency of th~ State. Prima facie this would sem to be consiitutionally impermissible though we do nnt wish to express any definite opinion upon it, since it does not directly arise for consideyation in these writ petitions and civil appeal.\n\nBut, it is clear that so far as admissions to an educational institution such as a medical college are concerned, Article 16(2) has no application, If, therefore, there is any residence requirement for admission to a medical college in a State, it cannot be condemned as unconstitutional on ground of violation of Article 15 clauses (1) and (2). Nor can Article 16(2) be invoked for invalidaiing such residence reqi1irement because these clauses prohibits discrimination on ground of plce of birth and not on ground . of residence and, as pofoted out by this Court in D.P. Joshi v. State of Madhya Bharatr'l, residence and place of birth are \"two distinct conceptions with different connotations both in law and in fact\"'. The only provision of the Constitution on the touch-stone of.which such residence requirment can be required to be tested is Article 14 and that is precisely the challenge which falls to be considered by ns in these writ p_etitions.\n\n Now there are in our country in almost all States residence re9uirements for admission to a medical college. Sometimes the requiremen! is phrased by saying that the applicant mmt have his domicile in the State. We must protest against the use of the ward 'domicile' in relation to a State within the union of India. The word 'domicile' is to identify th.e personal law by which an individual is governed in respect of various matters\n\nsuch as the essential validity\n\n0 of a marriage, the effect of marriage on the proprietary rights of husbandand wife, jurisdiction in divorce and nullity of marrfage, illegitimacy, lgitimation and adoption and testamentary antl intestate succession to moveables. 'Domicile' as pointed out in Halsbury's laws of England (Fourth Edition) Volume 8 paragraph 421, \"is the legal relationship between an individual and a territory with a distinctive legal system which invokes that system as his personal law.\" \"(Emphasis supplied.) It is well settled that the domicile of a person is in\n\n• (I) [1955] I SCR 1215\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984] 3 s.c.R.\n\nthat country in which he either has or is deemed by Jaw to have his permanent home \"By domicile\" said Lord Cranworth. in Wicker v. Homcsl'' we mean home, the permanent home.' The notion which lies at .the root of the concept 'of domicile is that of' permanent home.\" But it is basitally a legal concept for.the purpose of determining what is the personal Jaw applicable to an individual and even if an individual has no permanenthome; he is iuvested with a domicile by law. There are two main classes of domicile : domicile of origin tllat is communicated by 'operation of law to each person at birth, that is the domicile of his. father cir his mother according as he is legitimate or illegitimate and domicile of choice which every person ot full ageis free to acquire in substitution for that which he presently possesses. The domicile of origin attaches to an individual by birth while . the domicile of choice is acquired by residence in a territory subject to a distinctive legal system, with the intention to r.eside there permanently or indefinitely. Now the area of domicile, whether it be domicile of origin or domicile of choice, is the country which bas the. distinctive legal system a'Dd not merely the particular place in the country where the individual resides. This position is brought out clearly and emphatically in paragraph 422 of Halsbury's Laws of England (Fourth Edition) Volume 8 wh_ere _it is stated : \"Each person who has, or whom the law deems to have, his permanent home within the territorial limits of a single system of law is domiciled in the country over which the system extends ; and he is domiciled in the whole of that country even though hishome may be. fixed at a particufar spot within it.\" What woulabe the position under a federal polity is also set out in the same paragraph.of volume 8 of Halsbury's Laws.of England. (Fourth Edition) : \"In fderal states some branches of law are within the competence of the federal authorities and for these purposes the whole federation will be subject to a single system oflaw and an individual may be spoen of as domiciled in the federation as a whole ; other branches of Jaw are within the competenceof the states or provinces of the federation and the individual will be domiciled in one state or province only.'' This being the true legal position in regard to domicile, let us proceed to consider whether there .can be anything like a domicile in !I state forming part of the Union of Ind4t.\n\nNow it is. clear on a reading of the Constitution that it\n\n~·.-\n\nPkADEEP JAIN v. UNION (/)hagwati, J.) 95<)\n\nrecognises only one domicile, namely, domicile in .India. Article 5 A of the Constitutin is clear and explicit on this point and it refers only to one domicile,. nam<; ly, \"domicile in the territory of .\n\nIndia.\" Moreover, it must be remembered that India is' not a federal state in the traditionai sense of that term. It is not a compact of sovereign states which have come fogether to form a. federation by ceding a part of their sovereignty to the federal states. It has undoubetedly certain federal features but it is still not a federal state and it bas only one citizen ship, namely, the citizenship of India. It has also one single unified legal system which extends throughout the country. It is not possible to say that a distinct and separate system of law prevails in each State forming part of the Union of India. The ' leg~! system which prevails through-out the territory of India is ·\n\none single indivisible system with. a single unified justicing system having the Supreme Court of India at the apex of the hierarchy, which lays down the law for the entire country. It is true that with respect. to subjects set out in List II of the Seventh\n\nSchedule to the Constitution, the States have the power to make laws nd subject to the 'over-riding power of Parliament, the States can also make laws witjl respect t.o subjects enumerated in List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, but the legal system unoer the rubric of which such laws are made by the States is a single legal system which may truly be described . as the Indian Legal system. It would be absurd to suggest that the legal system varies from State to State or that the legal system of a State is different from the legal system of the Union of India ; merely because with respect to the subjects within their legislative competence, the States jiave power to make laws .. The concept of 'domicile' has no relevance to the app.licability. of. municipal laws, whether made by the Unioµ of India or by the St.ates. It would not, therefore, in our opinion be right to say that a citizen of India is d.omiciled in one state or.another forming part of the\n\nUni.on of India. The domicile which he has is only one domicile, namely, domicile in the territory of India. When a person who : is permanently resident in one State goes to another State with intention to reside there jlermanently or indefinitely, his domicile does not undergo any .change : he does not acquire a new domicile of choice. His domicile remains the same, namely, Indian domicile. We think it highly deterimental to the concept of unity and integrity of India to think in. terms of State domicile. It is true and there we agre: with the argument advanced cin behalf of the State Governments, that the . word 'domicile' in the Rules of\n\n960 S\\JPREME COURT REPORTs\n\n[1984) 3 S.C.R. . . some of the' State Governments prescriqing domicilary requirement for admission to medical colleges situate .within their territories, is used noUn its technical legal sense but in. a popular sense as meaning residence and is intended to convey tbe idea of intention to reside permanently or indefinitely. That' is, in fact the sense in which the word 'domiile' was underto'od by a 'five Judge Bench of.this Court in D. P. Joshi's case (supra) while construing a Rule prescribing capitation fee for admission to a medical cqllege in the State or. Madhya Bharat. and it was in the same . sens~ that word 'domicile' was unde, stood in Rule 3 of the Selection Rules made by the State of Mysore in Vasundra v. State of MysoreJ'l W~ would also, therefore, interpr.et the word 'domicile' used in the Rules regulating admissions to medical colleges framed by some of the State9' in the same loose sense of. permanent residence .and not in the technical sense .in which it is used in private international law.\n\nBut even so we wish oo warm against the use of the word 'domicile' with reference to States forming part of the Union .. of India, because it is a word which is likely to conju; e up'the notion of an independent State and encourage 'in a subtle and insidious manner the dormant\n\novereign impulses of different regions.\n\nWe think it is dangerous to use a legal concept for conveying a sense different from that which is ordinarily associated with it as a result of legal usage over the years. When we use a word which has come to represent a: coi:; cept or idea, for conveying a different . concept or idea it is easy for the.mind to slide into an assumption that the verbal identity is accompanied in all its sequences by identity of meaning, The concept of domicile if used for a purpose. other tban its legitimate purpose may give rise to lethal radiations which may in the lorrg run tend to break up the unity and integrity of the country.\n\nWe would, therefore, strongly urge upon the State Governments to exercise this wrong use of the expression 'domi-. cile' from the rules regulatfog admissions to their educational . institutions and particularly medical colleges and to desist from.\n\nintroduc!ng and maintaining domiciliary requirement as a condition\n\nf eligibility for such admissions. ·\n\nWe may now proceed to consider whether .residential requirement or institutional preference in admissions to techt; iical and medical colleges can be regarded as constitn.tionally permissible.\n\nCan it stand the test of Article 14 or does it fall foul of it and must be struck down as constitutionally invalid .. It is not posible to answer this qtestion byJ a si1nple \"yes,' or \"no\". It raises a --- ~- ·----~-- -------- . (I) [1971} Suppl. SCR 381\n\n''\n\nPRADEEP JAIN_.v. UNIO.~ (Bhagwaii, J.) 961\n\ndelicate but cJmplex problem involving consideration of divers factors in tbe light of varying social and economic facts and calls for a bitlanced and harmonious adjustment of competing interests.\n\nBut, 'before we embark upvn a consideration of this quei; tion, it my be pointed out that there is before us one Civil Appeal, namely, C.A.No.6392 of 1983 filed by Rita Nirankari and five writ petitions, namely, Writ Petition Nos.8882 of 1983, 8883 of 1983,. 9618 of 1981, 10658 of 1983 and 10761 of 1983 filled by Nitin Aggarwal, Seema Garg, Menakshi, Alka Aggarwal and Shalini Shailendra Kumar respectively. These civil appeal and writ petitions relate to admissions to medical colleges affiliated to the Delhi University and situate in the Union Territory of Deihi.\n\nThen we have writ petition No. 982 of 1983 filed by Dr. Mrs.\n\nReena Ranjit Kumar and writ petition No. 92.19 of 1983 filed by Nandini Daftary which relate.to admission to the M.D.S. Course and M.B.B.S. course respectively of Karnataka Universjty. We have also writ petition No. 6091 of 1983 filed by Dr. Pradeep Jain seeking admission to the M.D.S. course in King George Medical College, Lucknow affiliated to 'the Lucknow University.\n\nWhen these writ petitions and civil appeal were admitted, we made interim orders in some of them granting provisional admission to the petitioners .and we may make it clear that wherever we have -granted provisional admissions shall notbe disturbed; irrespe.ctive of the result of these civil appeal and writ petitions. We may also point out that since these civil appeal and writ petitions challenged the constitutional validity of residentfal requirement and institutional preference in regard to admissions in medical colleges in the States of Karnataka and Uttar Prade>h and the Union \"Territory of. Delhi and we were informed that it is the uniform and \"consistent practice in almost all States to provide for such residential requirement or institutional preference we directed that notices of lhese civil appeal and writ petitions may be issued ro the Union of India and the, States of Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Manipur, Orissa, Punjab; Rajasthan, Tamilnadu .. and West Bengal and the State Governments to which such notices are issued shall file their 'counter •affidavits dealing ii! parti, ula~ .with the quetion of reservation in admissions on the basis of domicile or residential requirement within. two weeks from the date of service of such notic.es. Some of the State Governments could not ftle their counter affidavits within the time granted by us and they accordingly made an application for extension of time and by an order dated 30th August, 1983 we extended the time for filing of counter affidavits\n\n962 SUPREME COURT REPOR ts [1984] 3 s.c.R..\n\nand directed the State Governments to set out in their counter affidavits facts and figures showing as to hat is the procedure which is being followed by them so far as admissions to medical colleges in their States are concerned. It appears that most of the state Governments to whom notices ere issued filed their counter affidavits and though no notice was directed to be issue<) to the State of Himachal Pradesh, the Goverpment of that State also filed a counter affidavit. The Delhi University in its counter affi davit gave a brief synopsis summarising the domicile or residential requirement or institutional preference followed by each State Government for admission to the medical colleges situate within its territory. It is not necessary for the purpose of the present judge ment to reproduce in detail the precise domicile or residential requirement or institutional preference adopted and prevailing in different States in regard to admissions to medical colleges. Suffice it to state that for admission to M.B.B.S. course,' domicile. or perma• nent residence .is required in some States, residence for a specified numb.er of years ranging from three to twe\"nty years is required in some other States while in a few States.the requirement is that the candidate should have studied ill an educationai institution in the State for a continuous period varying from four to ten years or the candidate should be a bona fide resident of one State and in case of admssions to M.D.S. Course 'iµ Uttar Pradesh the candi date should be either a citizen of India, domicile of whose father is in. Uttar Paradesh and who himself is domiciled in . Uttar Pradesh .or a citizen of India, domicile of whose father may not be in Uttar Pradesh but who himself has resided .in Uttar Pradesh for not less than five years at the time of making the application and so far as admissions to M.D.S. Course in Karnataka I' are concerned, the candidate should have . studied for at least five years in an educational institution in the State of Karnataka prior to his joining B.D.S. Course. The position in regard to admissions in medical colleges in the Union Territory of Delhi is a little different, because there, out of a total of 410 seats available\n\nG for admission to the M.B.B.S. course in the three medical colleges\n\naffiliatd to the Delhi University, }48 are reserved seats and 262 are non-reserved seats and for fiiling in the 262 non-reserved seats, an\"\n\nentrance examination is held and the first 50 seats are filled from amongst the eligible candidates who pass the entrance examintion in order of merit and the remaining 212 seats are lied, again on merit, but by candidates who have passe_d t(leir qualifying examination from the schools situate in the Union Territory of Delhi\n\n. J.\n\nPkADEEl> JAIN v. UNION(Bhagwati,-J, l 963\n\nonly. It will thus be seen that in almost all States and Union A Territories admissions to medical colleges are based either on residence requirements or on institutional preferences. The question is ;,, hether such reservations or preferetlces are constitutionally valid.when tested on the touch-stone of Article 14. •\n\nThere can be no doubt that the demarid for admission _to medical colleges has over the last .two decades increased enor- . inously and outstripped the availability of seats in the medical colleges in the country. Today large numbers of young men and women are clamouring to get admission in the medical colleges not only because they can find gainful employment for themselves but they.can also serve. the people and the available eats in the medical colleges are not sufficient to meet the increasing demand. The proportion of medical practitioners to tlie population is very low compared to some other countries and there is considerable unmet need for medical services. It is possible' that in highly urbanised areas, there may be a surfeit of doctors but there are large tracts of rural areas throughout the country where competent and adequate medical services are not available\". The reason partly is that the doctors who have been brought up and educated in urban areas or who are trained in medical colleges situate in cities and big towns acquire an indelible urban . slant and prefer not to go to the rural areas, but moieimportantly, proper and adequate facilities are not provided and quite often even necessary medicines and drugs are not supplied in rural areas with the result that the doctors, even if otherwise inclined to go to rural areas with a view to serving tjie people, find that they cannot be of any service to the people and this acts as a disincentive against doctors setting down in rural areaeyi.\n\nWhat is, therefore, necessary . is to set up proper and . adequate structures in rural areas where competent medical services can be provided by the doctors and some motivation must be provided to the doctors servicing those areas. But, as the posi.tion stands today, there is considerable paucity of seats in 1'.iedical colleges to satisfy the increasing demand of students for admission and some principle has, there\n\nfore, to be evolved for making selection of students for admission to the medical colleges and suGh principle has to be in conformity with the requirement of Article 14.\n\nNow, the primary imperative. of Article 14 is equal opportunity for all across the nation for education and advancement and,· as pointed out by Krishna Iyer, J. in Jagdish Saran v. Union of Indial'l \"this has burning relevance\n\n--(1} (1980] 2 S.C.R. 83!.\n\nF '\n\nSUPl!EME cotiu REPOI! ts\n\ntu our times when the country is gradually being broken up into fragments by narrow domestic walls\" by surrender to narrow parochial loyalties.\n\nWhat is fundamental, as an enduring value of our polity is guarantee to each of equal opportunity to unfold the full potential of his personality. Any one anywhere, humble or h_igh, agrestic or urban, man or woman, whatever be his language\n\n.. or religion, place of birth or residence, is entitled to be afforded\n\nqual chance for admission . to any secular \"educational course for cultural growth, training facility, specialitY\"or employment. It would run counter to the basic principle of equality before the Jaw and equal protl'ction of the law if a citizen by reason of his residence in State A, which ordinarily in the commonality of cases would be the result of his birth in a place silua'.e within that State, should have opportunity for education or advancement. which is denied to. another citizen because he happens to be resident in State B. It is axiomatic that talent is not the monopoly of the resident of any particular State; it is more .or less evenly . distributed and given proper opportunity and env.ironment, every .\n\none has a pr.aspect of rising to the peak.\n\nWhat is necessary is equality of opportunity and that cannot he made dependent npon where a citizen resides. If evety c_itizen is afforded equal opportunity, genetically and environmenally, to evelop his potential he will be able in his own way to manifest his faculties fully leading to all rnunQ. improvement in excellence. The\" philosophy and pragmatism of universal .excellence through equality of opportunity tor cducaction and advancement across thenation is part of our founding faith and constitutional creed. The effort must, therefore, always be to selec.t the best and mJst meritorious students for admission to technical institutions and medical colleges by providing equal opportunity to all citizens in the country and no citizen cn -legitimately, without serious deteriment to the unity and integrity of the nation, be regarded as an outsider in our constitutional set up,. Moreover. it would be against national interest to admit in medical colleges or other institutions giving instruction in specialities, less meritori8us students when more meritorious students are available, simply because the former are pe.rmanent residents or .residents for a certain' number of years in the State While the latter are not, though both categories are citjzenA of India. Exclusion of more meritorious students on the grou1td that they are not resident within the State would be likely. to promote sub-standard candidates and brig about fall in medical competence, injQrious ·\n\n' (\n\nPRAOEEP JAIN v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 965\n\nin the long run to the very region. \"It is no blessing to inflict quacks aild medical midgets on people by whole-sale sacrifice of taient at the thresh-hold. Nor can the very best be rejected from admission beca.use tht will be a national loss and the .interests of no region can be higher than those of the nation.\" TP.e primary consideration in selection af candidates for admission.to the medical colleges must, therefore, be merit. The object of any rules which may\n\n0 be made for regulating admissions to the medical colleges must be to secure the best and most meritorious students\n\n1'his was the consideration which weighed with the Court in Minor f. Rajndran v. State of Madras('\\ in straiking down a rule\n\nmade by the State of Madras allocating seats in medical colleges c on district-wise basis.\n\nWanchoo, C.J. Speaking on behalf of the C.onrt, observed:\n\n\"The question whether distriCtwise allocation is yiolative of Art. 14 will'depend on what is the object tb be achieved in th.e matter , of admission to medi al colleges.\n\nConsidering the fact that there is a large num . ber of candidates' than seats available, selection has got\n\nto be made. ' The object of selection can orily be to secure the best possible material for admission 'to colleges subject the provision for socially and educationally back ward classes. Further whether selection is from the\n\nsocially and educationally backward classes or from the general pool, the object of sele<; tion must . be to secure tbe best possible talent from the two sources. If that jg the object, it must necessarily follow th)lt that object w0uld be defeated if seats are allocated district by dHrict.\n\nIt cannot be and has not been denied that the oltject of selection is to secure the best posible talent from the two sources so that the country may have the best possible doctors lf that is the object, that argument on behalf of the petitioners appellant is that tbat object cannot possibly be served by allocating seats districtw)se. It is true that Art. 14 does not forbid elassification, but the classification has to .be justified on the basis of the nexus between the classification and the object to be achieved, even assuming that territorial classification may be a reasonable cl ssification. Tfie fact however that the classifi: cation by itself 1s reasonable is µot enough to support it unless there is nexus betwe.en the classification and the ------,-\n\n(!) [1968] 2 S, C.R. 786.\n\nF ~-\n\n• F\n\nSUPRFME COURT REPORTS [1984] 3 s.c.Jl.\n\nobject to. be achieved. Therefore, as the object to be achieved in a case of the kind with which we are concer\" ned is to get the best talent for ad\\)lission to professional colleges, the allocation of seats districlwise has no reaso nable relation with the object to be achieved. If anything such allocation will result in many cases ill the object being destroyed, and if that is so; tbe clas!Oification, even if reasonable, would result in discrimination, inasmuch as better ql, la!ified candidates from one district may be rejected while less qualified candidates from other districts may be admitted from either of the two sources.\"\n\nThen again in Periakaruppan v. State. of Tamil Nadu!1\\, the sli:me consid.eration prevailed with tbe Court in striking down the scheme of selection of candidates for admission to medical colleges in the State of Tamil Nadu for the ye!lr 1970-71. It was a unit-wise scheme under which the medical colleges in the city of Madras were constituted as one unit and each of the other medical colleges in the Mofussil was constituted as a unit and a separate selection. committee .was set up for each of these units. The intending applicants wete asked to apply to ·. any one. of the committees but were advised to apply to the committee ne1rest to their place of residence a, nd if they applied fo more than one committee, their applications were to be for-· warded by the Government to only one of. the committees. The petitioners who were unsuccessful in getting admission, challenged the validity of this unit-wise scheme and contended tJtat the unit wise scheme infringed Article 14 of the Constit11tion, inter alia, because the applicants of some of the unils were in a better position rtlan those who applied to other .units, since the. ratio between the applic.ants and the number of seats in each unit\n\nvarid and several applicants who secured lesser marks than the petitioners were selected merely because their upplictions . came to .be considered in other units,, This challenge was upheld by tbe Court and Hegde, J. speakiag on be.half of the Court observed :\n\n\"We shall first take up the plea regrding the division of medical seats on 11nitwise basis. It .is admitted that minim!lm marks required for being selected in some unit is less than.in the other. units.\n\nHence prima facie the scheme in question results in discrimination against some of the applicants. Before a classification can be justified\n\n' . ~ . ' it inust be based on an objective criteria ancl furt!\\er it\n\n(I) [~911J 2 s.cR 430.\n\nPRADEEP JAIN v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 96~\n\nmust have reasonable nexus with the object intended \"to be. achieved. The object intended to be achieved in the present case is to select the best candidates for being admitted to Medical Colleges. That object cannot be satisfactorily achieved by the method adopted.\" These two decisions do not bear directly on the question raised before us, _namely, whether any reservation can be. legitimately made in admissions to medical colleges on the basis of residence requirement within the State or any _institutional pre, fererice can be given students who have passed\" the qualifying examination held by the same university., They deal with two .specific instances of intrastate dis.crimination between citizens residiQg within the same State and strike down such discrimination as violative of Article 14.on the ground that it Ins no /ational relation to the object of selection, namely, to get the best and most meritorious students and, in fact, tends to defeat such object, _But, in taking this view, they clearly and categorically proceed on the basis of the principle that t_he object of any valid scheme of_ admissions . must be to \"select the best candidates for being admitted to medical\n\ncolleges\" and that if any departure is to be made \"from the principle of selection on the basis of merit\" it must be justified on the-touchstone of Art. 14.\n\nBut let us understand what we mean when we say that selection for admission to medical colleges m'i1st be based on merit. What is merit which must govern the process of selection ?\n\nIt undoubtdly cons_ists of a high degree of intelligen£e coupled with a . keen and incisive mind, .sound knowledge of the basic subjects -and infinite capacity -for hard work, but that Js not .\n\nenough ; it also calls for a sense of ocial commitment and dedica .. tion to fye cause of the poor. We agree with Krishna Iyer, J. when he says in Jagdish Saran's case (s_upra) : \"If potential for rural service or aptitude for renderin11 medical attention among backward people is a criterion ef merit-and it, undoubtedly, is in a land of sickness and misery, neglect and penury, wails and tearstheti, . surely' belonging, to a university catering to a deprived regionis a plus point of merit. Excellence is composite and the heart and.its sensitivity are as precious in the case of educational values as the head and its creativity and social medicine for the common people is more relevant than peak performance in Freak cases.\" Merit cannot be measured in terms of marks alone, but human sympathies are equally important.. The heart is as much a factor as the head in assessing the social, value of a member of he l)lcdical profession. This is also an aspect w_hich ma~, tQ\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS\n\n[I 984) 3 S.C.R.\n\nA ·. the limited extent posible, be borne in mind while determining .merit for selection of candidates fot admission to medical colleges though concededly it would-not be easy to do so, since jt is a factor which is extremely difficult to judge and not easily suscepti, ble to evaluation.\n\nWe may now proceed to consider what are the circumstances in which departure may justifiably be made from the principle of selection .based on merit.' Obviously, such departure can be justified only on equality-oriented grounds, .for whatever be the principle of selection fotlowed for making admissions to medical\n\n• ' # • colleges, it must satisfy the testof equality. Now the concept of equality .under the Co.nstitution is a dynamic .concept. It takes within its sweep every pr.ocess of equalisation and protective discrimination. Equalitv mmt not remain mere idle incantation butit must become a: livin.g reality for the large masses of people.\n\nIn a hierachical. sooiety with an indelible feudal stamp and incurable actual inequality, it is absurd to suggest that progressive measures to eliminate group disabilities and promote collective equality are entagonistic to equality on the ground the every individual is entitled to equality of opportunity based prely on merit judged by .the mark. obtained by him .. We cannot counte • nance such a suggestion, for to do so would niake that equality clause sterile and perpetuate existing inequalities. Equality of opportunity is. not simply a matter of legal equality. I ts existence depends riot merely on the absence -of disabilities but on the presence of abilities. Where, therefore, there is inequality, in fact, legal equality always tendsto accentuate it. What the\n\nfamus poet Willian Blanks said graphically is very true, namely, \"One law for the Lion and the Ox is oppression,\" Those who are unequal, in fact, can.not treated by identical standards ; that may be equality in law but it would certainly not be real equality.\n\nIt is: therefore, necessary to take into account de facto in equalities\n\nhich exist in the society and to take affirmative action by\n\n- way of giving preference to the. soc_ial!y and economically disadvantaged persons or inficting handicaps on those more advantageously placed, in order to bring about real equality. Such\n\naffirmative action thourh apparenlly discriminatory is calculated to produce equality. an a broader basis by eliminating de facto inequalities and placing the weaker sections of the community on a footing of equality with the stronger and more powerful section, so that each member of the co Jl'munity, whatever is his births occupation or social position may enjoy <qua! opportunity of\n\n. --',_\n\nPRADEEP JAIN v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 969\n\nusing to the full his natural endowments of physique, of character and of intelligence. We \"may in this connection usefully quote what Mathew, J. said in Ahmedabad St. Xavier's College Society and Anr. v. State of Gujarat11l :\n\n\"It is obvious that \"equality in law precludes discrimination of any kind; whereas equality, in fact, may involve the necessity of differential treatment in order to attain a result which establishes an eq1;1ilibrium between different situations.\"\n\nWe cannot, therefore, have arid equality which does not take into account the so<; ial and economic disabilities and inequalities from which large masses of people suffer in. the country .. Equality\n\nin Jaw must produce real equality ; de ljure equality must ultimately find its raison d' etre in de facto equality. The State must, therefore, resort to compensatory State action for the purpose of making people who are factually unequal in their wealth, . education or social environnient, equal\n\n0in specified areas. The State must, to use again t!:ie words of Krishna Iyer. J. in Jagdish Saran's case (supra) weave those special facilities into the web of equility which, in an equitable setting provide for the weak and promote their levelling up so that, . in the long-.run, the community t large may enjoy a general measure of real equal opportunity equality is not negated or neglected' where special provisions are geared to the 'large goal of the disabled getting over their disablement consistently with the general. good and individual merit.\" The scheme of admission to medical colleges may, therefore, depart from the principle of selection based on merit, where it i, s necessary to do so. for the purpose of bringing\n\nabout\" real equality of opportunity between those who are uMquals.\n\nThere are, in the applipation of this priridple, two consi- . derations which appear to have weighed with' the Court in justifying departure from the principle of selection based on merit.\n\nOne is what may be called State interest and the othe~ is what may be described as a region's claim of backwardness. The legitimacy of claim of State interest was recognised explicitly in one of the early decisions of this Court in D.P. Joshi's case (supra) The Rule impugned in this case }Vas a Rule made by the State of\n\n(1) [1974) l sec 111at799.\n\n\n[1984] 3 S.C.R.\n\nMadhya Bharat for admission to the Mahatma Gandhi Memorial Medical College, Indore providing that 'ho capitation fee should be charged for students who are bona fide residents of Madhya Bharat but for other non-Madhya .Bharat students, there should be a capitation fee of Rs. 1300for nominees and R!;; 1500 for oibers. The expression bona fide resident' was defined for the purpopse of this Rule to mean inter a/ia a citizen whose original domicile was in Madhya Bharat provided he had not acquired a domicile elsewhere or a citizen whose original .domicile was not in Madhya Bharat but who. had acquired a domicile in Madhya.\n\nBharat and had resided there for not Jess than five years at the date of the application for admissioi; i. The constitutional vali dity of this Rule was challenged on the ground that it discrimi nated between students who were bona fide residents of .Madhya Bharat and students who were not and ince this discrimination was based on residence in the State of Madhya Bharat, it was violativ.e of Article 14 of the Constitution. The Court by a majority of four against one held that the Rule was not discrimi natry as being in contravention of Article 14, because the classi fication between students who were bona fide residents of Madhya Bharat and those who were not was based on an intelligible differentia having rational relation to the _object of the Rule.\n\nVenkatarama. Ayyar, J. speaking on behalf of the majority observed':\n\n\"The object of the classification underlying the impugned rule was clearly to help to some extent students who are residents of .Madhya Bharat 'in the prosecution O\"f their studies, and it cannot be disputed that it is quite a legitimate and laudable objective for a State to encourage education within its bordm. Education is a State subject, and one of the\\ directive principles declared in Part IV of the Constitutio~ is that the State should make effuctive provision' for education within the limits of its economy .• (Vide Article 41).\n\nThe State has to contribute for the up keep and the running of its educational institutions. We are in this petition concerned with a Medical College, and it is well known that it requires consi derable finance to maintain such an institution.; lf the State has to _spend money on it, is it unreasonable that it should so order the educational system that the advantage of it would to some extent at least enure for the .benefit of the State 7 A roncession $iven to the reside.nts of the State in the\n\nPRADEEP JAIN V. UNION 971\n\nmallet of fees is obviously calculated to serve that end, ds presumably some of them might, after passing out of the Co/(ege, settle down as doctors and serve the needs of the locality.· The classification is thus based on a ground which has a reasonable relation to th.e subject-matter.of the legislation, and is in consequence not open to attack.\n\nIt µas been held in The State of Punjab v. A jab Singh and Anr. that a classification might validly be made on a . geographical basis.\n\nSuch a classific; ation would be eminently just and reasonable, where it relates to education which is the concern primarily of the State. The contention, therefore, that the rule imposing capitation fee is in contravehtion of Article 14 must be rejected.\"\n\n(emphasis supplied)\n\nIt may be noted that here discgmination was 'based on residence within the State of Madhya Bharat and yet it waJ held\n\njustified on the ground that the object of the State in making the .\n\nRules .was to encourage students who werl' residents of Madhya Bharat to take up the me4ical course so that \"some of th'em might; after passing out from the college, settle down as doctors and serve the 'needs of the locality\" and the Classification made by the Rule had rational relation to this object. This justification\n\nol' the discrimination based on residence obviously rest 011 the\n\nassul!lption that those who were bona fide residents of Madhya Bharat wonld after becoming doctors settle down and serv~ the needs pf the people fa the State. We are not sure whether any facts were pleaded in the affidavits justifying his assumption but the judgment of Venkatarama Ayyar, J. show that the decision of the majority Judges proceeded on this assumption and that was regarded as a valid ground justifying the discrimination made by the impugned Rule.\n\n• We may p9int out that iii Minor P. Rajendran's r:ase (supra) also, an argument was put forward on behalf of the State Government that if selection ws made district-wise, tbose selected from a district were likely to settle' down as practitioners in that-districts so that the districtq were likely to bem:fit from their training.\n\nBut this argument was rejected by the C0urt and district-wise admission to medical colleges was struck down as constitutionally invalid. It is significant to note that the Court did not reject tbis arnme11t M intrinsically irre/vant but the only ground on\n\n• •\n\n• .t\n\n• .·\n\nSUPRBME COURT REPORTS [1984] 3 s.c.R.\n\n• which it was rejected was that \"it was neither pleaded' in the counter affidavit of the State nor had the State placed any facts or figures justifying the plea that. studnts selected district-wise w.ould settle down as medical practitioners in the respective district where .they resided\". It would be interesting to spectulate what court\n\nwould have decided if tbe State Government had placed suffi\n\ncient maierial l;>efore the court showing that students coming from different districts .in the State ordinarily settle down as mdical\n\npraetitioners hi th'e respective districts from where they comr.\n\nThis Court also upheld reservation .. based on residence requirement for a period of not less tlian ten years, for adn:iission to medical colleges jn the then State. of Mysore, in the subsequent .decision in N. Vsaundhara's cirse (supra). The J,'lule whichwas\n\nimpugn.ed in that case was Rule 3 of the Rules for selection of. candidates for admission to the professional course leading tn MB.BS course in the G6vernment Medical Colleges in the then.\n\nState Of Mysore 'and this Rule provided that \"no porson who is. not a citize.n of India and who is not, qomiciled and resident in the State l)fMysore for not less than ten years at any time prior to the'Clate of the application for a seat, shall be eligible to apply.\"· The petitioner's application for admission was rejected on the ground that she had not resided .in the State for a period of ten years as required by Rule 3 and she consequently challenged the constitutional validity of that Rule, oli the plea that it violated the right t9 equality guaranteed by Article 14. The . challenge was however negatived and the .constitutional validity of Rule 3 was upheld by a 3 Judge Bench of this Court. The ' Court relied upon the 'decision itt D''P. Joshi's. ce (supra) and observed: . ·\n\n\"If classification based on residence does not impinge upon the principle of equality enshrined in Art. 14 as 11eld by this Court in the decision already cited which is binding upon us, then•the further condition of the resi dence in the State being there for atleast ten years would . also seem to be equally valid unless. if is shown by the\n\npetitioner that selection of the period of ten years ma)ces : the classification so unreasonable as to render it arbitrary and witht any substantial basis ot.intelligible. differen Ha. The object of framing the impugned rule seems to be to attempt to impart m•dical education to the best talent available out of the class of persons who are /ikeiy, so far .\n\n(IS it c(ln reasonably be foreseen, to serve as doators, thf ·\n\n•• ,,\n\n'*' ·'\n\n. PRADEEP JAIN v. UNION (Bhagwali, J.) 973\n\ninhabitants tJf the State of Mysore. It is true that it is possible to say with absofut_e certainty that all those admit ted to the medical colleges would necessarily stay in Mysore State after qualifying as doctors: they have indeed a fundamental right as citizens to settle anywhere in India. and they are also free, if they so desire and can manage, to go out of India for further studies or even ot_herwise.\n\nBut these possibilities are permissible and inherent in our constitutional set-up and these considerations cannot adversely affect the constitutionality of the otherwise valid rule. The problem as noticed in minor P.- Rajend ran's case and as revealed by a large number of cases which have recently come to this Court is that the number of candidates desirous of having medical e.duca- . tton is very much larger than the number of seats availa\n\nhie in medical colleges. The need and demand for doctori in our country ls so great that young .boys a, nd girls feel that in. medical profession they can both get gainful employment and serve the people. The State has therefore to formulate with reasonable foresight a just schemes of classification for imparting medical education to the available candidates which would serve the object and purpose af providing broad based medical. aid to the people of the State and to provide medical. edu cation to those who are best suited for such education.\n\nProper c1as; ifica\\ion inspired by this consideration and selection on merit from such classified groups therefore cannot be challenged on the ground of inequality violating Art. 14. The impugned rule bas not been shown-by the petitioner to. suffer from the vice.-of unreasonableness.\n\nThe counter-affidavit filef by the State on the other hand discloses the purpose to b.e that of serving the interests of the residents of the Srate by providing me\"dical aid for them.\" ·\n\n. ' . . .\n\nHere also reservation based on residence requirement of not less than ten years was held. to be non-discriminatory though it denied equality of opportunity for admission to the medical . colleges in, the State to all those who did not satisfy this residence re_quirement. The Court took the view that: the object of the State Government in making such reservatiop based on -residence requirement of not less than ten years was to \"impart medical\n\n' .\n\nA. ,\n\nSUPREME COURT RUORTS [1984) p S.C.R.\n\n, education to the best talent available out of the class of persons\n\nwho are likely, so far as it canreasonably be foreseen', to serve as doctors, the inhabitants of the State\". The principle of selection based on merit across the board was thus allowed to be i; nodified by .the claim of State interest in providing broad based medical aid fo the people of-the State\" and reservation based on residence reqt1irement of rlot less than ten years was upheld Sf a valid reservation. We find an echo of the same reafoning in the following words from the judgment of Dua,.J. in. D.N. Chancha/a v. Siate . of Mysore1.\n\n\"the object of selection for admission to \\he medical colleges considered in the background of the Directive Principles of State Policy contained in our Constitution, ajlpears to be to select the' best material from amongst the candidates in order not only to provide them with adequate means of livelihood but also .to provide the much needed medical aid to the people and to improve public health generally\"\n\n(Emphasis supplied)\n\n. The claim . of State foterest in providing adequate medical service to the people of the Sta(e by impartiµg medical education to student:i who by reason -of their residence in the State wonld. be likely to settle down and serve the people of the State as doctors has thus been regarded by the Court as a legitimate ground for laying down residence requirement for• admission to medical colleges in the State. . ·\n\nWe may ~Io conyeniently at. this stage refer to the decision of this Court in. D.N. Chancha/q's case. (supra); The reservation impugned i'u this_ case was univeisity-wise reservation unde_r which preference for admission to a medical college run by a university was !iiven to students who had passed the. PUC examination of that university and only 20 per cent of the seats were available to those passing the PUC Examination of other universities. The petitioner who had passed PUC eicamination held by the Bangalore\n\nuniversity~ applied for admissio_n to any one of the medical .colleges affiliated to the Karnataka . University. But she did no~\n\ncome within the merit list on the basis of which 20 per cent of .\n\n'(IJ p971J Suppl. s.c.R. 60S .\n\n. .\n\nPRADBEP JAIN v. UNIOit (.Bhagwati, !.) • tile open seat; wore filled up anJ sirice sile bad not passed the PUC\n\nExamination held by the Karnataka University, her application for admission to a medical college affiliated to the Karndtaka\n\nUnivrsity was rejected. She therefore filed a writ petition qnder Article 32 of the Constitution contending inter alia that the .\n\nUniversity wise distribution of seats was discriminatory and being withotit any rational basis was violative of Article 14. This contention was however rejected by a Judge Bench of this Court.\n\nShelet, J. speaking on behalf of the Court . held that there was no constitutional infirmit:r, involved in giving preference to students . . . .who had passed t_he PUC Examination of the same University and gave _the\"fol!owing reasons . in supporCof this conclusion:\n\n\"The three universities were set up in three different places presumably for the purpose of catering to the educational and academic needs of those areas, Obviously one university for the \\\\hole of the State could neither have been adequate nor feasable to satisfy those needs.\n\nSince it woul~ !lot be possible t<;> admit all candidates in , the medica\\ colleges run by the Government, some basis for screening the candidates had to be set up.\n\nThere can be no manner of doubt, and it is now fairly well settled, that 1he Government, as also other private agencies, who found such centres for medical training, have the right to frame rules for admission so lon, g as those rul_es are not inconsistent with the university statutes andregulationsand do not suffer from infirmities,_ constitutional or otherwise.\n\nSince the Universities are . set up for satisfying-the educational needs of different areas where they are set up a!ld -medical colleges are established in those areas, it can\n\nsafely be presumed that they also were so set up to satisfy the needs for medical training of those attached to those universities. In our view, there is nothing Undesirable in ensuring that those attached to such universities have their ambitions to have training in specialised subjects, like medicine, satisfied through colleges affiliated to their own universities.. Such a basis for s.election ha.snot .the disadvantage of districtwise or unitwise selection as any student from any part of the State can pass the qualifying examination in. any of the three universities irrespec(ive of the place of his birth or residence.. Further, the. rules confer a discretion on the selection committee to admit\n\n'ff\n\n' , f-\n\n.ff\n\n• SUPREME CO}iRT REPORTS \\.l 9841 3 S.6. R. • outsiders upto 20% of the total available seats in any . . . ~· . one of these . colleges, i.e., those who have passed the equivalent examination held by any other university not only in the State but also elsewhere in India. It is; there fore, impossible to say that the .basis of selection adopted in these rules would defea( the object of the rules as was said in Ra)endran's case or, make possible fess merito rious students obtaining admission at the ost of the better candidates. The fact that a candidate having lessermarks might obtain admission at the cost of ano ther having higher marks from another university does . not necessarily mean that a less mefitorious candidate gets advantage over a. more meritorious one. As a. well known, different universities have different standards in the examinations held by them. A preference to one attached to one university in its. own institutions for post graduate or technical training is not uncommon. Rules giving such a preference are to be found in various uni versities. Such a system for that reason alone is not to be condemned as' discriminatory' particularly when admission to such a university by passing a qualifying exami nation held by it is not precluded by any restrictive\n\nqualifications~ such as birth o~ residence, or any other similar restrictions. In our view, it is not possible to , equate the present basis for selection with these which\n\nwereheld invalid in the aforesaid two decisions.\n\nFurl.her, the Government which bears the financial burden of running the Government colleges if entitled to lay down criteria for admission would be made, provided of course such classification is not arbitrary and has a rational\n\nbsis and a reasonable co1mection with the object of the. rules. So long as. there is no discrimination within. each of such sources, the validity of the rules laying down such sources cannot be successfully challenged. In our . view, tqerules Jay down a valid classification. Candidates\n\npassing through the qualifying examination h.eld by a university from a class by themselves as distinguished from those passing through such examination from the other two un(versities. Such a classification has a reaso nable nexus with the object of the rules, namely, to cater to the needs of candidates who would' naturally look to their own university to advancetheir training in technical studies, such as medical studies. 'In .o.ur opinion, the\n\n' PRADEEP JAIN v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.)\n\nrules cannot Justly be attacjced on the. ground, of hostile\n\nA.· discrimination or as being otherwise in breach of Article 14.\"\n\nUniversity-wise distribution of seats was thus upheld by .the Court as constitutionally valid even though it was not in conformity with the principle , of Selion based on merit and marked\" a departure from it. The view taken by the court was that university-wise distribution of seats was not discriminatory.because it was based on a rational principle .. There was nothing unreasonable in providing that in granting admissions to medical college* • affiliated to a university, reservation shall be made in favour of c'andidates who have passed. PUC examination of that university, lirstl¥, because it would bequite legitimate for student~ w)lo are . attached to a university to entertain. a desire to. \"have training in . ' ' . specialised subjects, like medicine, satisfied through colleges affiliated to their own\" university since that promote institutional continuity which .has its 0°wn value and secohdly, because any student from ally part of the country could pass ihe qualifying examination of that.university, irrespective; of the place cif his birth. or residence.\n\nThe second consideration which has legitimately weighed with the courts in diluting the principle of selection based on merit is the claim of backwardness made on. behaif of any particular region. .There have been cases where stud'ents residing in a backward region have been given preferential tr.eatment in admissions to .medical colleges and such preferential treatment has been upheld on the ground that though.apparently discriminatory against others, it is-intended to correct the imbalance or handicap from which the .students from the backward region are suffering : ans! thus bring about real equality in the larger sense. Such preferential treatment for .those residing in the backward region is designed to produce . equal opportunity on a broader basis by r providing to neglected geographical or human areas an opportu' nity to .rise which they would not have if no preferential treatment is given to them and they are treated on th'e same basis as others for admissions to medical colleges, because -then they\n\nwould never be able to compete with others more advantageously placed. If creatively and imaginatively applied,- preferential treatment based on residen¢e in a backward regfon can play a significa 1 t role in reducing uneven levels of development and such\n\n918 SUPREM'B CouRT REPORTS [1984J 3 s.c.'R.\n\n• . .\n\n~RADEEP JAIN v. UNION (llhagwati, J.)\n\n'requires such assistance, it-cannot be said that the object to be achieved has on relation to the classification made by giving larger representation to the Andlira region.\n\nThe increase in the Telangana quota is consistent with and promotes and advances the object underlying the establishment of the institution.~' ..\n\nJ We are however not' concerned here with a case of reservation\n\nI .\n\nor preference .for persons fro]]} a backward region within a State and we need not therefore dwell any longer upon it.\n\n- It will be noticed from the above discussion that though intra-state discrimination between persons resident in different districts or regions of a State has by an large been frowned upon by the court and struck down as invalid as in Minor P. Rajendran's . \") '. case. (supra) and Perukaruppan's case (supra), the Court has m. /J.N. Chanchal/a's case al\\d other similar cases up-held institutional reservation effected through university wise distribution of seats for admission to medical colleges. The Court has also by its decisions in D.P. Joshi's case and N. Vasundhara's case (supra) sustained the consitutional validity of reservation based on residence within a State for the purpose of admision to medical. college.·\n\nThese decisions which all relate to admission to MBBS course are binding upon us and it is therefore not possible for usto hold, in the. face of these decisions; that residenc~ requirement in at State for admission to MBBS course is irrational and irrelevan and cannot be introduced as a condition for admission without violating the mandate of equality of opportunity cont11ined in Article 14. We must proceed on the basis that at least so far as admission to MBBS course is concerned, residence requirement in a Sta\\e can be introduced as a condition for admission to the MBBS course. It is of course true .that the Medical Education Review Comµi.ittee established by the. Government of India ha~ in its reriort recommended after taking into .account all relevant cotlsiderations, that the \"final objective should be to ensure that all admissions to the MBBS course slrould be open to candidates on an All India basis without the imposition of existing domicilary condition\", but having regard t~ the practical difficulties .of transition to the stage where admissions to MBBS course in all\n\nmclical colleges would be on All India Basis, the medical Education , Review Committee has suggested \"that to begin with not less than 25 per cent sets .in each institution may be open to candidates on all India basis.\" We are not all sure whether at\n\n.. '\n\n\"'\n\n. SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1984] 3 s.c.iL\n\nthe present stage it 'wuld be consistent with the mandate of equality in its broader dynamic sense to provide.that admissions to • . the MBBS course in all medical colleges in the country should. be on all India. basis. Theoretically, of course, if admissions are given . on the ba_sis of all india national entrance examination, each\n\nindi•idual woµld have equal opportunity of securing admission,' but that would not take into account diverse consideration, such as, differing level of social, economic and educational development of different -regions, disprty in the number of seats available for admission to the MBBS co.urse in different States, dffliculties which may be experienced by students. from one region who might in the competition on all India basis.get admission to the MBBS course in another region far remote from their own and other allied factors. There can be no doubt that_ the policy of ensuring ad.missions to the MBB' co•irse 01 all fnlia bHis i; a highly desirable policy, based as it is on _the p)stulatdh1\\ India is on; nation1l and every citizen of India is entitled to lnve equ1l opportunity for education and advancement, but it is an ideal to be . aimed at and it may not be ealistically .possible, in the present circumstances, to adopt it, - for it cannot prujuce real equality of opportunity unless there> is complete absence of disp1rlties and inequalities a situation .which simply does not exist in th~ country today. There are massive social and eonomic dis; nrities ~1:1 inqualities not only between State aqd State but also between region and region wi'thin a state and even between citizens . and citizens within thBsame region.\n\nThere _is a yawning •gap between the rich and the poor and there, are •so many disabilities and injustices from which the poor suffer as a. class, that they cannot avail themselves of .any opportunities which may in law be open to them.· They do not have the social and material resources to take advantage of these opportunities whicb. remain merely on paper recognised by law but non-existent in fact. ·\n\nStudents from backward States or regions will hardly b• able to compete -with those from advanced States or regions because, though possessing an intelligent mirid, they would have liad no adequate opportunities for development so as to be in a position to compete with otfiers. .So also students belonging to - the. weaker sections who have not, by rea_son of their socially or economically disadvantaged position, peen able to secure education in good schools would be at a disadvantage compared to students\n\nPRADEEP JAIN v. UNIO)'I (Bhagwati, J.) 9si\n\nbelonging to the aflluent or well-to-cio failies who have had the best of school education and in open All India Competition, they would be likely to be worsted. There would .also be a number of students who,. if they do not get admission in a medical college near their residence; and are assigned admission in a far . off college in another State as a result of open All India competition, may not be ble to go to such other college on account of lack of resources and facilities and in the result, they would be effec'tively deprived of a real opportunity for pursing the medical course even though on paper .they would have got admission in a medical colle.ge. It would be tantamount to telling these students that they are given an. opportunity. of taking up the medical course, but if they cannot afford it by reason of the medical college to which they are admitte.d being far away in another State, it is their bad luck : the State cannot help it; because the State has done all that it could, namely, provide equal opportunity to all for medical education. But the question is whether the opportunity provided_ is real or illusory? We are therefore of the view that a certain percentage of reservation. on the basis offesidence requirement may legitimately be made i.n order to qualise opportunities for medical admission on a broader basis and to bring about real and not formal, actual and not merely legal, equality. The percentage of reservation m.ade on this count may also include institutional\n\nrserva1ion for students passing the PUC or pre-medical examination of.the same university or clearing the qualifying examination from the school system of the educational hinterland of the medical colleges in th~ State and for this purpose, th ere should be o . distinction between schools affiliated to State Board and schools affiliated to the Central Board of Secondary Education, Jt would . be constitutionally, permissible to provide, as an interim measure . until we reach the stage when we can consistently 'with the broad mandate of the rule of equality in .th& larger sense ; ensure admissions to th.e M.B.B.S, course on the basis of national entrance exa.mination an .ideal which we must increasingly strive to reacl;. for reservation of a certain percentage of seats in the medical colleges for students satisfying a prescribed residence requirement as also for students who have passed .P.U.C. or pre-medical examination or any other qualifying examiqatlon held by the university or the State and for this purpose it should make no difference whether the qulifying examination is conducted by the State Board . or by the Central Board of Secondary Education; because no discfimination can be made between schools affiliated\n\n~. . . .\n\n.SUPREME COURT REPORTS. [1984] 3 s.p.R.·\n\ncan be made between -school$ affiliated to the Central Board of Secondary Education. We may point out that at the qlose of the ·\n\narguments we asl1ed the learned Attorn:ey Geral to inform the court as to what was the stand of the Government ol India i!l the matter of sue& reservation and the learned Attorney General in response to' the inquiry made by the Court filed a policy statement wliich contained the following formulation of the policy of tb.e Government of India :\n\n~·-1\n\n• central Government is generally opposed to the principle of reservation based on domicile or residence for admission to institution or' higher edJcation, whether professional or otherwise. In. view of the territorially articulated nature of the syste~ of inatitutions of higher learning including institutions of professional eduation, there is no objection, however, to stipulating reservation or preference for a reasonable quantum in under graduate courses for students hailing from the school system vf educational .hinterland of the institutions. For this purpose, there should be no distinction between schools affiliated to State BoarJ and schools affiliated to CBSC.'?\n\nWe are glad to find that the policy of the Govern.neut of India in the matter\" of reservatkn bas~ .on residence requirement and institutional preference accords with the view taken by us in that behalf.\n\nWe may pititout that even if at some stage it ,. is decided to regulate admissions to the M.B.B.S. course on the .\n\nbasis of All India .Entrance Examination, some provision would have to be made fur allo;; ation of seats amongst the sele.cted candidatl's on the basis 'of residence or ins.titutional affiliation so as to take into account the afore-mentioned factors;\n\nThe only question which remins to be considered is as to what should be the extent of reservation based on residence ·\n\nrequirllient and insitutional preference. There can be no doubt that such reservation cannqt completely exclude admission of . students from other universities and States on the bsis of merit judged in open .competition. Krishna fyer, J;- rightly remarked in Jagdish Saran's qase (supra) at page 845 and 846 of the Report:\n\n~'Reservation must be kept in check by the demands . .\n\n\"\"'-\n\nPRADEEP JAIN v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.) 983\n\nof competence.\n\nYou cannot extend the shelter of. reservation where minimum qualifications are absent,\n\nSimilarly~ all the best talent cannot be completely exclud.ed by , wholesale reservation. So a certain per centage which may be av.ailable, must be kept open for !Jleritorious performance regardless of uqivernity, State\n\nand the like. Complete &xclusion of the rest of the country for the sake of a province, wholesale ba~!shment of proven abi)ity to open up, hopefully, some dali~ talent, total sacrifice of excellence at the alter <lf. equalisationwhen the Constitution mandates for every one equality before and equal protection of the law-may. be fatal folly, selfdefeating educational technology and antinatic; mal if made a routine rule of State policy. A fair preference, a reasonable reservation, a just ailjustment of the prior needs and real potential of the weak with the. partial recognition of the presence of compe titive merit.,,;, such is the dynamics of social justice which animates the three eglitarian articles of the Cons titution.\"\n\n. We agree wholly with these observations made by the learned.\n\nJudge and we unreservedly condemn wholesale ; eservation mad~· by some of the State G9vernmets 'on the basis of 'domicile' or .reside.nee requirment within the State or on the basis of ins(i\n\ntutional preference for students who have passed the qualifying examination held by the university or the State excluding all students not satisfying this requirement, regardless of merit. We declare such wholesale reservation to be unconstitutienal and void as being in violation of Article 14 ofthe Constitution.\n\nBut, then to what extent can reservation based on residence requirement within the State or on. institutional preference for students iiassing the qualifying examination held by the university or the state be regarded as constitutionally permissible? It is not possible to provide a categorical answer to this question for, as pointed out by the policy statement of Government of India, the extent of such reservation would depend on several factors foclud ing opportunities for professional education in' that particular area, the extent of competion, level of educational deve!Opment of the. \"rea and other rlevant factors. It may be that in a State. wer~ -\n\nC ·\n\nQ -\n\n\n(1984] 3 S.C.R.\n\nthe level of educational development is woefully low, there are comparatively inadequate opportunities for trainining in the medical sepcciality and there is )arge scale social and economic backwardness, there may be justification for reservation of a higher perentge of seats ip the medical colleges in the State and such higher percentage may n'ot militate against \"the. equality \"mandate viewed in the perspective of social justice\". So many variables depending on social and eeonomic facts in the coutext of educational opportunities would enter into the determination of the 'question as to what in the case , of any particular State; ... should be the limit of reservation based onresidence requ.irement ·\n\nwithin the State or on institutional preference. But, in our opinion, such reservation should in no· event exceed the o.uter limit of 70 per cent of. the total number of open eats after taking into a.ccount other kinds of res'ervations val, idly mirde.\n\nThe Medical Education Review Committee has suggested that the outer limit should not exceed 75 per cent but we are the view that it. wo~1ld be fair and just to fix the outer limfr at 70 per cent. We are Jay.fog down this outer limit of reservation in an attempt to reconcile the apparently conflicting .claims of equality and excellence. We may make it clear that this outer limit 1 fixed by us wilf be subject to any reduction or attenuation which may be made by the Inaian Medical Council which is the statutory body of medical practitioners whose functional obligations include setting standards for. medical ed.ucat_ion and providing for its regulation ancl' coordination. We are of the opinion that this outer limit fixed by us must gradually over-the years be progressively reduced but that is a . task which' would have. to be performed by th~ Indian Medical Council. We would direct the Indian Medical Council to consider within a period of nine months from today whether the outer limit of 70 per cent fixed by us needs to be reduced and jf the Jndian Medical Council determines a ·shorter outer limit, it will be binding on the States and the Union Territories. We would .also direct the , Indian Medical Council to subject the outer limit so fixed to reconsideration at the end of\n\nevery three years but. in no event should the outer limit exceed\n\n. 70 per cent fixed by us. The result is that in any event at \\east 30 per cent of th~ open seats shal1 be available for admis- sion of students on all India bais. irrespective. f the State or university from which they. come and such admissiQns slia'll be granted purely on merit Qii the basis of either all India Entran.ce Bxanm. or entra11ce exa1llination ta be held by the State. Of\n\n- .\n\nPRADEEP JAIN v. UNION (Bhagwati, J.)\n\n•' . 985\n\ncourse, we need not. add that even where rservation on the basis of residence requirement or institutibnal preference is made in 11ccordance with tbe directions given in this judgment, admissions from the source or sources indicated by such reservation shall be based only on• m'erit, because the object must be to select. the best and most meritorious student from within such source or sources.\n\nSo much for admission to the M.B.B.S. course: but different considerations must prevail when we come to consiiler the questi.on of reservation based on re.sidence .requirement within the State or on institutional preference for admission to post graduate courses, such as, M.D .. , M.S. and the like. There we cannot allow excellence ta be compromised by any other considerations because that would be deterimental to the interest of the nation.\n\nIt was rightly pointed out by Krishna Iyer, J. in Jagdish Saran's . case, and we wholly endorse wht he has said :\n\n\"The basic medical needs of a region or the preferential push justified for a handicapped group cannot prevail in the same measure at the highest scale of speciality . here the best skill or talent, must be handpicked by selecting according to capability. At the level of Ph. D.; M'.D., or levels of higher proficiency, where international meashre of talent is 'made, where losing one great scientist or technologist in the making is a national Joss the considerations we hafe expended upon as important loss their potency. Here equality, measured by matching excellence, bas more meaning and cannot be diluted muc.b without graverisl<.\"\n\n\"If equality of opportunity for every person in the country is the constitutional guarantee, a candidate who gets more marks then another is entitled: to preference . for admission.· Merit niust be the test when choosing tb.e best, according to. t.his rule of equal ch'ance for .equal marks.\n\nThis proposition has. greater importance when we reach , the higher levels of education Hke. post graduate courses. , A(ter all. top technological expertise in any vital field like .medicine is a nation's human asset without which its advance and development will be stunted . The .role of hign IP'ade sill or special talent may be less ' '' . •'\n\n. II\n\n\n[1984) 3 S.C.R.\n\nat ihe lesser levels of education, jobs no disciplines of social inconsequence, but more at the higher levels of . sophisticated .skills and stfategic employment. To devalue\n\nmrit at the s\\)mmit is to temporise wiih the country's development in.the vital areas of professilmal expertise~ lh science and technology and other specialised fields of developmental significance,·, to relax lazily or easily . in regard to exacting standar.ds of performance may be . running .a .gra.ve national risk because. in advanced\n\nmedicimi\" and other critical departments of higlier know• . ledge, crucial to material progress, the people of India should not be denied the .best the nation's talent lying • latent can produce. If tte. best potential in these fields .is cold-shouldered for populist considerations garbed as reservations •. ·.the victims, . in the long run, may be the people themselves.. Of course, this un-relenting strictness in selecting the best may not be so imp.erativeat other levels where a broad measure of efficiency may be good enol!gh and what Is needed Is merely to weed out the worthless.\"\n\n\"Secondly, and more importantly, it' is difficult to denounce or. renounce the merit criterion when the selection is for post graduate or post doctoral courses iu specialised subjects. There is no substitute for sheer flair, for creative talent,· fqr fine-tuned performance at, the difficult bights of some disciplines wh.ere the best\n\nalone is likely to blossom as the best. To sympathise mawkishly with . the weaker sections by selecting substa.ndard candidates, is to punish society as a whole by denying the prospect, of excellence say in hospital servibe.\n\nEven the poorest, when stricken by critical illness, needs the attentfon of super-skilled specialists, not humdrum . second-rates. So it is that relaxation on merit, by over . . . ruling equality and quality all together, is a social risk where the stage is post graduate or post-doctoral.\" ..\n\n Thes~ pllsages from the jdgment of Krishna Iyet,'J. clearly J H and forcibly express the same view which we have . indepetldently • reached on our own and in deed that view has bee.n so ably\n\nxpressed in .these psaes, that we do v, ot 'thipk we can usefully\n\n• •\n\nI PRADE!P IAIN v. UNloN (Bhagwatl, ].)_ . 987\n\nadd anything to what has. already bee.n said there. We may point out that tile Indfan Medical Council ·.bas also emphasized lhat . playing with merit, so far a, s admissions tu post graduate courses are concerned, for pampering local feeling, will boomeriang. We may with advantage reproduce the recommendation or .the India!!\n\nMedical €Duncil on this pqint which may not be the last word in social wisdom but is certainly worthy or consjderation: .\n\n\"Student for post-graduate trainirig should c ted strictly on merit judged on the basis of iide\n\nrecord in the undergraduate course .. All seleeliO, e,.,. • postgraduite studie~ should be conducted by the Uilier- Bities.\" \"\"'' - • • The Medical Education Re.view Committee has alw eiprelled the opiion that \"all admissions to the post-graduate courses in any institution should b~ open to , candidates on an all India basis and there should b11, no festriction regarding domicile in the State/UT in which the institution is located.\" . So also in the policy statement filed by the leaned Attorney General, the Govern mcnt of India has categorically expressed the view that:. ·\n\n' \"So far aa adm.issions fo the institutions or post graduate colleges and spccjal professional colleges i1 concerned,· it should be entirely on the basis of all India merit subject to constitutional reservations in 'favour of Sc]Jeduled Castes and.Scheduled Tribes.\"\n\n' We are therefore of the view that so far\" as admissions to postgraduate co11rses, such. as M.S., M.D. and th'e like are concerned, i.t would be eminently desir-able not to provide for any reservation based on residence require men• within the S_tate or on institutional preference. . But, having regard' 'to border considerations of equality of opportunity and .. institutional continuity in education which has its own importance and value, we would. direct that tljoU!lch residence requirement within the State sj11ill not be a\n\ngtoud for reservation in . admissions to post g_raduate courses, a certain percentage of seats.· may in the present circumstances, be\n\n. resrved on the basis of institutional 'preference in the 11eµse ilia! a sfuent who bas passed M.B.B.S. course from a medical \\; ollege or umversy may be given preference for admission to i~t- . graduate course in the same me_dical colleges or universjt¥; j>u~ ·· • . '*~ i I .\n\nu ... ·\n\nSUPREME COURT REPORTS.\n\n[1984) 3 S.C.R. • such rseivation on the basis of institutional preference should at in any eyent exceed 50 per cent of the total number of open seats a\\laillible for admission to the post-graduate course. This outer lin1it which •we are . fi.'!; ing will .. also . be subjet to revision oft the . lower side by. the Indian Medical Council in the same mariner as directed by-us in the.case of admissionv.to the M.B.a.s. course. . But,. even In regard, to admissions to the post-graduate course: we would direct that so far as super specialities such. as neuro. surgery and carqiology ar\" concerned, .there should be , nci reserva ti on a, i all even on the basis of institutional preference and admis\n\nions should• be granted purely on merit on all India basis.\n\n• ! '\n\n' What we hav~ sai§ about in regard to admissions to the\n\nM, B.B.S. and post-graduate c01mes must ayply equally in relation ta!-adiniS'Slons to the B.p.s. and l\\; f.D.S. coues. So far as admissions to the B.D.S. and M.D, S. courses are concerned, it will bethe 'Ii:tdian Dental Council which is the statutory body of • dental ptactitioners, which will have to carry out the dirctions given llY,, s to the Indian Medical Council in regard to admission's to M.B.B.'S. and post-graduate courses. The directions given by us to the Indfan Medical Concil u; iay therefore be read a§ appli cable mutatis mutandis to. the Indian . Dental Council o far as admissions to BDS and MDS courses are concerned. - .\n\nThe de9isions reached by us in these writ petition{ will bind the Union of India, the S fate Governments and Administrations , ' of Union Territories because it lays down the law for the entire country and mor.eover we have . reached this decision. after giving . notice to tb, e Union of India an\\! all he State Governments.and.\n\nUnion Territories. We may pofot out that it is not' necessary for us to give any further directions in. these writ p.etitions in l'egard to the' a'driiissions of the petitioners in the writ petitions, because the' academic term for which ihe admjssians were sought bas already, expired and SO far . as concerns tht petitioners Wh5J have 1 already been provisfonally admitted, '\\\"'.'e have directed that the provisional adniissioils given to them shall not be disturbed but\n\n. H,\n\n they shal.1 b~ treated as final admissiOii~· The y.irit etitions and . the. civil appeal WiJI accordingly stand disposed _of ID the above . terms. There will .be 110 order as to costs in the writ xietitions \" ' ' and_th~ civil appeat.\n\n. ;.:\n\n• , '\n\nPRADllEP JAIN v, UNION (Bhagwati,, J,) 989\n\n AMARENPRA NATH SEJ\\\\ J. I have had 'the advantage of reading the judgment of my learned brother; Bhagwati, J. I. agree with the orders passed by my learned brother and also the . directions given by him. I, however, propose io indicates in brief my own reasons.\n\nMrleiil:nect'brother in his judgment has referred to various aspects of national life and has. very aptly emphasised 'on the 'need of Unity of In'dia. My learned brother iri his judgment has set out the relevant facts and circumstances and has also considered the . . relevant decisions. on the question involved in tl; ie present proce'e~\n\ndings.\n\nUnity in diversity is the essential peculiarity . of Indian culture and .co1lstitutes the basic philosophy of Indian nationality.\n\nIt is also a fundamental tenet of our constitution. '}'hich seeks to promote the 11nity wjiife maintaining at the same time the distinctiveness of the various classei and kind\\. of peopfe belonging to <:lifferent States forming the Indian Nation. Equalitr in the eye.\n\nOf law1is the fundamental postulates and is guaranteed under the Constitution. £ach and every -kind of discrimination is not in violation of the Constitutional concept of equality and does not necessarily, undermine the Unity of India. The validity of any discrimination has to 1 be tested on 'the touch-stone of Art. 14 of the Constitution. Appropriate classification may in . very many cases from .the vary core of equality and promote bnity in the true' se11se amdit diversity . •\n\n' F To my mind the questions involved in these proceedings . lies within a short compass. The first question reliltes to reservation of seats for admission to Medical Colleges in any State on the basis of residence of the applicant in tlie State fdt iiileh admission. Connei:ted with this question is the question of , institutionalised reservatfon of se.ats for _admission to Medical\n\nColleges. The other question raised is the.question bf reervatio, n of seats on such .considerations for admission to'' post-graduate medical courses.\n\nTh~ question of constitutional validity of reservation of seats within re.asonable limits on the basis of residence and also the' 'lf buestion of institutionaliselhreservation of seats clearly appear .cf;_ '\n\n,~ .....\n\n- .\n\n• •\n\n9-90 SUPJtEMB CouaT REPORTS\n\n\nto be concluded by various decisions of this Court, ashas rightly pointed outby my learned brother 'ii) his judgment in which he has referred at length to these decisions, These decisions are binding on this Court and are to be followed. Constitutional validity of such reservations within the reasonable limit must, . therefore, be upheld.\n\n. • . . t The real questfon is the question of the extent of the limit to which such reservations may be consitlered to be reasonable. T)le question of reasonabieness of such 'reservations must . neces . sarily be determined.with reference to the facts1 and circumstances or parlicular cases and with reference to the situation prevailing at &.PY given . time. ~Y learned brother in his judgmeqt has .elaboratelii and carefully considered these aspects. On a careful consideration of all the facts and circumstallces and the matei:ials placed, my learned brother has proposed. approptite orders and has given necessary directions in this regard,. The .orders passed by my learned brother and the direct!olis given by him on a co11sideration of th<> materials on. recorJ and . the earlier decisions of thia Court will serve the cause of justice, meet the requirements, • of law and will n'ot affect or undermine national unity. I am, therefore, in entire agreement with the _orders pssed and directions given by him in this regard ..\n\nOn the question of admission to post-graduate .medical. cources I must confess that I have some misgivings jll my . mind as to the further classification maqe on the footings of supper· ipesialities. Both my learned brothers;' however, agree on this.\n\nAl$0 in a broader perspective this clas1ification my .serve the interests. of the nation better, though . interests of individual States to a small exte11t may be affected;'This distinction in cai~ of super-specialities proceeds on the basis that in these very important spheres the criterion for selection should be merit only without institutionalised. reservations~ or. any re1ervation on the sround: of residence. I also .agree thai the orders and directions proposed in reg-ard to admission. to MBBS and 1ostgraduate ciiurses are. 111so to be rea.d as applicable mutatis mutandis in relation t•\n\nadniisslon to BDS and• MDS courses.\n\nii .\n\nTh.e problem of admission to. medical colleges' and. the post . f~A graduate medical. studies can only . be properly and effectively . . . / •. s~.lved bX; he setting up of more medical colleges and .by increas\n\n__ ., ~- .r;/; r'.'f'.:, .\n\n.-\"~\n\n. ,- .\n\n., .\n\nPRADEEP JAIN v. UNION. (Bhagwatl, J.): 991\n\ning the number of seats in such colleges to enable aspirants to have their aim of being qualified as medical practitioners and 1peciaiists in various subjects achieved. The same is also the position witll regard to BOS ad MOS courses. This. aspect has\n\ni:ieri very appropriately noticed 1Jy my learned brother in his judgment.\n\nORDER\n\nWith these. obserVations I agree with the .orders passed an<! the directions give.n by 1'.1Y learned brother Bhagwati,_ J.\n\nSome of the students seeki9g admirsion to the. MBBS. course in this academic year have made an application to this Court that\n\nthe Judgment delivered on 22nd June, 1984 -in the medical adinis. sio1i'cases may be given effect to only from the next academic year, because admissions have already been made in. the medical ·\n\ncolleges attached to Sol!le of the Universities in :the country prior • to the delivery of the judgment on 22nd June, 198l1 -and moreover .some time would be required for the purpose of achieving unifor •.\n\nmity in the procedure relating to admissions in the various Univer sities. We accordingly issued notice on the aJ)pliation to the lear.- ned advocates who had appeared on behalf of the. various -partie~ at the hearing of the \"main writ petitions as also to the Attorney General and after hearing them, we have come to the conclasion and this is accepted by all parties that in view of the fact that all .. formalities for admission, including the holding. of entrance exami\n\nnation, have been completed in some of tlie ttates prior to the judgment dated. 22-6-1984 and also since some time WOIJld we required for making the necessary preparations for implementin)! the judgment, it is notpracticable to give effect to -the judgment from the present academic year and in . fact compelling some States to give effect to the judgment from the present academic year . ' . . . when others have not, would result in producing inequality and if all the States were to be required to implement the judgment immediately, admissions already. made would have to be cancelled and fresh entrance examinations would have to be held and this would require at least.2 or 2! months delaying the commencement of the. academic term apar't froip caUBing immense hardship to the stu -dents. We therefordlirect that the judgment shall be. inrplemented\n\nwi.te effect from the next academic year 1985-86. Whatever admis: sions, provisional or ptherwise, have been made for . the academic year 1984·85, sht be distilrbed on the basis of. the judgment.\n\nWe may make it clear. that. the judg!llnt .\\Viii no~;; ly to tbe States of Andhera Pr:i.dcsh and Jaminu &' K.ashmir:e at tbll ' ' . . . , 'j' . f: :~~!,:'' ' ,.:\n\n--·~, :; ': ·;--·.'.\n\n. ,\n\n992~ SUPREME COURT REPOl\\?S\n\n[1984) 3 S.C.R.\n\n, time' of hMring of the main writ petitions, it was pointed out , to\n\nus by the leaa, ned advocates, appearing on b, ehalf of those States• that there were special Constitutional provisions in regard to them which woufd n'eed independent consideration by this Court.- . ' .\n\nThis order wm form part OT the main judgment delivered on .. ' 22·6·1984,\n\nH.S.K. '\n\n' ;\n\n'··\n\n_ ....\n\nI y.>·:·''\n\n. '", "total_entities": 188, "entities": [{"text": "PRADEEP JAIN ETC", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 21, "end_char": 37, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "PRADEEP JAIN ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "UNION OF INDIA AND ORS .. ETC", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 42, "end_char": 71, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. ETC", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "P.N. BHAGWATI", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 91, "end_char": 104, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "P.N. BHAGWATI", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "AMAR~NDRA NAnl SEN", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 106, "end_char": 124, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "AMARENPRA NATH SEJ\\\\", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "MISRA, JJ.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 141, "end_char": 151, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "RANGANATH MISRA", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "Art.141", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 616, "end_char": 623, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 764, "end_char": 785, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "f!hagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2532, "end_char": 2541, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Disposing of the writ petitions and the civil appeal •\n\nHELD: •\n\n(Per f!hagwati and Ra!Jgana_th Misra, JI.)"}}, {"text": "Ra!Jgana_th Misra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 2546, "end_char": 2563, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Disposing of the writ petitions and the civil appeal •\n\nHELD: •\n\n(Per f!hagwati and Ra!Jgana_th Misra, JI.)", "canonical_name": "Ra!Jgana_th Misra"}}, {"text": "India", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 2791, "end_char": 2796, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Now if India is one nationanCI there is ohl)r one citizenship, namely, citizenship of India; and evefy citizen has a right to move Weety throughout the territory.of India and ."}}, {"text": "Karnataka", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 3621, "end_char": 3630, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "citizen~ it} every part of the territory of Indi~, it is difficult to see ho\\V a citizen having his permanent home fn ariiilnadu or speaking Tamil language can be regarQed as an outsider in Uttar Pradesh ora citizen having his .permanent home in Maharashtra or speaking Mar.athi l:inguage be)egarded as an outsider in Karnataka."}}, {"text": "Article 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 4008, "end_char": 4018, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5254, "end_char": 5264, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5825, "end_char": 5832, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 7806, "end_char": 7812, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8172, "end_char": 8177, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State is different."}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11271, "end_char": 11278, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11315, "end_char": 11322, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "(1980] 2 SCR 831", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 12793, "end_char": 12809, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "(1980) 2 SCR 831", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 14299, "end_char": 14315, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1955] 1 SCR 1215", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 14773, "end_char": 14790, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "D. N. Chanchala", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14989, "end_char": 15004, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "n ~Minor P. Rajendran's caSe and Perukaruppans case the Court has in D. N. Chanchala's\n\ncs~ an.d othei similar cases Upheld institutional reservatidn effected through univrshY-wise distribution of seat$ for <icffnission t9 medical\n\n(:lleges.", "canonical_name": "D. N. Chanchala"}}, {"text": "Josfli", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15212, "end_char": 15218, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1'.he Court has also by 'its decision in D, p; Josfli's case\" a'nd N. Jtasundhara's c<1se sustained th.e constitutional vaHdity of reservation based ."}}, {"text": "N. Jtasundhara", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15232, "end_char": 15246, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "1'.he Court has also by 'its decision in D, p; Josfli's case\" a'nd N. Jtasundhara's c<1se sustained th.e constitutional vaHdity of reservation based .", "canonical_name": "N. Jtasundhara"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 15863, "end_char": 15870, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1971) 2 SCR 4", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 16802, "end_char": 16816, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "[1980) 2 SCR 831", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 17770, "end_char": 17786, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Indiau Medicaf Council", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 19346, "end_char": 19368, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Indiau Medicaf Council is directed to consider within.a period of nine inonths f~; m today whether the."}}, {"text": "Indiati Dental Council", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 23364, "end_char": 23386, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The directions giveq to the Indian Medical Counci~ may therefore be read as :applicablemutatis 1J1lltands to the Indiati Dental Council sofar a_s admissions 'to B.D.S. and M.D.S. courses are concerned. ["}}, {"text": "Pr Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23616, "end_char": 23627, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "988H]\n\n(Pr Bhagwati, Amqrendra Nath Sen and Ranganath Misra, JJ.)", "canonical_name": "P.N. BHAGWATI"}}, {"text": "Amqrendra Nath Sen", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23629, "end_char": 23647, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "988H]\n\n(Pr Bhagwati, Amqrendra Nath Sen and Ranganath Misra, JJ.)"}}, {"text": "Ranganath Misra", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 23652, "end_char": 23667, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "988H]\n\n(Pr Bhagwati, Amqrendra Nath Sen and Ranganath Misra, JJ.)", "canonical_name": "Ra!Jgana_th Misra"}}, {"text": "Amarendra Nath Sen", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24149, "end_char": 24167, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[991G-H; 992A]\n\n(Per Amarendra Nath Sen, J,)\n\nI ag-ree with the orders passed by my learned brother Bhagwati J. and also the directiolls given by him. [", "canonical_name": "AMARENPRA NATH SEJ\\\\"}}, {"text": "Bhagwati", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 24228, "end_char": 24236, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "[991G-H; 992A]\n\n(Per Amarendra Nath Sen, J,)\n\nI ag-ree with the orders passed by my learned brother Bhagwati J. and also the directiolls given by him. [", "canonical_name": "P.N. BHAGWATI"}}, {"text": "article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 26383, "end_char": 26393, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 26401, "end_char": 26422, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "V.M. Tarkunde", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 26609, "end_char": 26622, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V.M. Tarkunde, A.K. Srivastava, S.K. Jain iind Vijay Hansaria,\n\nf~; the petitioners. . ·"}}, {"text": "A.K. Srivastava", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 26624, "end_char": 26639, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V.M. Tarkunde, A.K. Srivastava, S.K. Jain iind Vijay Hansaria,\n\nf~; the petitioners. . ·"}}, {"text": "S.K. Jain iind Vijay Hansaria", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 26641, "end_char": 26670, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "V.M. Tarkunde, A.K. Srivastava, S.K. Jain iind Vijay Hansaria,\n\nf~; the petitioners. . ·"}}, {"text": "R. Venkataramanifor", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 26700, "end_char": 26719, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R. Venkataramanifor the Appellant in CA."}}, {"text": "A.K. Ganguli", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 26753, "end_char": 26765, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A.K. Ganguli, S.K. Baga .&"}}, {"text": "S.K. Baga", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 26767, "end_char": 26776, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "A.K. Ganguli, S.K. Baga .&"}}, {"text": "N.S. Das Bahl", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 26780, "end_char": 26793, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "N.S. Das Bahl for the Respondents in CA."}}, {"text": "Subhashini", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 26994, "end_char": 27004, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subhashini & R.N. Poddar for the Respondent~Union of Indi~. ·\n\n Kapil Sibal and Mrs ... Shobha Dixit for the Resp0ndent- State qf U.P.\n\nD.P. Mukherjee and G.S. Chatterjee for: the Respondent-· State of West."}}, {"text": "R.N. Poddar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 27007, "end_char": 27018, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subhashini & R.N. Poddar for the Respondent~Union of Indi~. ·\n\n Kapil Sibal and Mrs ... Shobha Dixit for the Resp0ndent- State qf U.P.\n\nD.P. Mukherjee and G.S. Chatterjee for: the Respondent-· State of West."}}, {"text": "Kapil Sibal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 27058, "end_char": 27069, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subhashini & R.N. Poddar for the Respondent~Union of Indi~. ·\n\n Kapil Sibal and Mrs ... Shobha Dixit for the Resp0ndent- State qf U.P.\n\nD.P. Mukherjee and G.S. Chatterjee for: the Respondent-· State of West."}}, {"text": "Shobha Dixit", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 27082, "end_char": 27094, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subhashini & R.N. Poddar for the Respondent~Union of Indi~. ·\n\n Kapil Sibal and Mrs ... Shobha Dixit for the Resp0ndent- State qf U.P.\n\nD.P. Mukherjee and G.S. Chatterjee for: the Respondent-· State of West."}}, {"text": "D.P. Mukherjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 27130, "end_char": 27144, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subhashini & R.N. Poddar for the Respondent~Union of Indi~. ·\n\n Kapil Sibal and Mrs ... Shobha Dixit for the Resp0ndent- State qf U.P.\n\nD.P. Mukherjee and G.S. Chatterjee for: the Respondent-· State of West."}}, {"text": "G.S. Chatterjee", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 27149, "end_char": 27164, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Subhashini & R.N. Poddar for the Respondent~Union of Indi~. ·\n\n Kapil Sibal and Mrs ... Shobha Dixit for the Resp0ndent- State qf U.P.\n\nD.P. Mukherjee and G.S. Chatterjee for: the Respondent-· State of West."}}, {"text": "G.S. Narayan.a", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 27211, "end_char": 27225, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G.S. Narayan.a; Ashivini Kumar, C.V. Subba Rao, Swaraj Kaushal & Afr."}}, {"text": "Ashivini Kumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 27227, "end_char": 27241, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G.S. Narayan.a; Ashivini Kumar, C.V. Subba Rao, Swaraj Kaushal & Afr."}}, {"text": "C.V. Subba Rao", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 27243, "end_char": 27257, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G.S. Narayan.a; Ashivini Kumar, C.V. Subba Rao, Swaraj Kaushal & Afr."}}, {"text": "Swaraj Kaushal", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 27259, "end_char": 27273, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "G.S. Narayan.a; Ashivini Kumar, C.V. Subba Rao, Swaraj Kaushal & Afr."}}, {"text": "M. Veerqppa", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 27281, "end_char": 27292, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "M. Veerqppa, for tbe Respondent-State of ."}}, {"text": "K. Parasarali", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 27340, "end_char": 27353, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Parasarali and B. Parthasilrthi for the Respondent~State of Andhra Predesh."}}, {"text": "B. Parthasilrthi", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 27358, "end_char": 27374, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K. Parasarali and B. Parthasilrthi for the Respondent~State of Andhra Predesh."}}, {"text": "Yogeshwar Prasad", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 27420, "end_char": 27436, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Yogeshwar Prasad and."}}, {"text": "Rani Chhabra", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 27446, "end_char": 27458, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Mrs. Rani Chhabra for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "P.K. Pillai", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 27480, "end_char": 27491, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.K. Pillai, for-the Respondent-'State of Kerala."}}, {"text": "P.N.lvag", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 27531, "end_char": 27539, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.N.lvag, for the St; te of H.P.\n\nP.R.. Mriduliand R.K. Mehta for tlie State of Oriss~ ..\n\nAlta/ Ahmed for the State .ofJ & K.\n\nThe following Jndgments were delivered\n\\\n\nPRADEEP JAiN v. UNiON (Bhagwati, J.) 951\n\nBHAGWATJ, J .. This group of Writ Petitions raises a question of great national importance affecting admissions to medic~!"}}, {"text": "R.K. Mehta", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 27582, "end_char": 27592, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.N.lvag, for the St; te of H.P.\n\nP.R.. Mriduliand R.K. Mehta for tlie State of Oriss~ ..\n\nAlta/ Ahmed for the State .ofJ & K.\n\nThe following Jndgments were delivered\n\\\n\nPRADEEP JAiN v. UNiON (Bhagwati, J.) 951\n\nBHAGWATJ, J .. This group of Writ Petitions raises a question of great national importance affecting admissions to medic~!"}}, {"text": "BHAGWATJ", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 27746, "end_char": 27754, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "P.N.lvag, for the St; te of H.P.\n\nP.R.. Mriduliand R.K. Mehta for tlie State of Oriss~ ..\n\nAlta/ Ahmed for the State .ofJ & K.\n\nThe following Jndgments were delivered\n\\\n\nPRADEEP JAiN v. UNiON (Bhagwati, J.) 951\n\nBHAGWATJ, J .. This group of Writ Petitions raises a question of great national importance affecting admissions to medic~!", "canonical_name": "P.N. BHAGWATI"}}, {"text": "Jawaharlal Nehru", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 29005, "end_char": 29021, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is time we remind ourselves what the great visionary and buflder of modern India, Jawaharlal Nehru said, \"Who dies if India lives : who lives if India dies?\""}}, {"text": "Mahatma Gandhi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 31419, "end_char": 31433, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "This 9oncept ofone nation _took firm roots in the minds and hearts of the people during the struggle for independence under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi ... He has rightly been callt!d the Father of the Nati.on because it was he who awakened in ."}}, {"text": "Constitution of India", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 31730, "end_char": 31751, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 34933, "end_char": 34943, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 35082, "end_char": 35092, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Nothig", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 35753, "end_char": 35759, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads and places so pl)blic resort maintained wholly or partly out' of' State funds or d'edicated to the use of the general public:\n\n(3) Nothig in this article or in clause (2) of article ."}}, {"text": "Article 19", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 36008, "end_char": 36018, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Central Government", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 36674, "end_char": 36692, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Jes 353 and 356 where the executive.power ofa State forming part of the Union is xercisable' by the Central Government or subject to."}}, {"text": "KarQataka", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 37856, "end_char": 37865, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PRADEEP JAIN v. UNION (Bltagwati, J.) 955\n\nregarded as an outsider in KarQataka."}}, {"text": "Article 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 40382, "end_char": 40392, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 41411, "end_char": 41421, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Parliament", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 41482, "end_char": 41492, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "down that Parliament may make a law \"prescribing, in regard to a class or classes of • employment or appointment to an office under the government of, or any local or other authority, in a state or union territory, any requirment as to residence within that state or union territory prior to such employment .. \" or appintment Parliament alone is given the right to enact an' exception to the."}}, {"text": "Article 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 42328, "end_char": 42338, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Andhra Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 42822, "end_char": 42836, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is therefore at present no parliamentary enactment permitting , preferential policies based on residence requirement except in the case of Andhra Pradesh, Manipi1r Tripura and Himachal'\n\nJ Pradesh where the Central Government bas been given the right to issue directions setting residence requirements in the subordinate servic~. Yet, in the face of Article 16. ("}}, {"text": "Himachal'\n\nJ Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 42859, "end_char": 42879, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "There is therefore at present no parliamentary enactment permitting , preferential policies based on residence requirement except in the case of Andhra Pradesh, Manipi1r Tripura and Himachal'\n\nJ Pradesh where the Central Government bas been given the right to issue directions setting residence requirements in the subordinate servic~. Yet, in the face of Article 16. ("}}, {"text": "Article 16", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43033, "end_char": 43043, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "[1979] 3 SCR 11", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 43139, "end_char": 43154, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Article 16(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 43812, "end_char": 43825, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 15", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44012, "end_char": 44022, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 16(2)", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44052, "end_char": 44065, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 44546, "end_char": 44556, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Cranworth", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 45845, "end_char": 45854, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "R.\n\nthat country in which he either has or is deemed by Jaw to have his permanent home \"By domicile\" said Lord Cranworth."}}, {"text": "England", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 47591, "end_char": 47598, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "What woulabe the position under a federal polity is also set out in the same paragraph.of volume 8 of Halsbury's Laws.of England. ("}}, {"text": "Article 5", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 48384, "end_char": 48393, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Supreme Court of India", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 49308, "end_char": 49330, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "a single unified justicing system having the Supreme Court of India at the apex of the hierarchy, which lays down the law for the entire country."}}, {"text": "Seventh\n\nSchedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49477, "end_char": 49494, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Seventh Schedule", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 49694, "end_char": 49710, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 50053, "end_char": 50067, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It would be absurd to suggest that the legal system varies from State to State or that the legal system of a State is different from the legal system of the Union of India ; merely because with respect to the subjects within their legislative competence, the States jiave power to make laws .. The concept of 'domicile' has no relevance to the app.licability."}}, {"text": "D. P. Joshi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 51584, "end_char": 51595, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "That' is, in fact the sense in which the word 'domiile' was underto'od by a 'five Judge Bench of.this Court in D. P. Joshi's case (supra) while construing a Rule prescribing capitation fee for admission to a medical cqllege in the State or.", "canonical_name": "D. P. Joshi"}}, {"text": "State of Mysore", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 51842, "end_char": 51857, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "sens~ that word 'domicile' was unde, stood in Rule 3 of the Selection Rules made by the State of Mysore in Vasundra v. State of MysoreJ'l W~ would also, therefore, interpr.et the word 'domicile' used in the Rules regulating admissions to medical colleges framed by some of the State9' in the same loose sense of."}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 53689, "end_char": 53699, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "PRADEEP JAIN_.v. UNIO.~ (Bhagwaii, J.) 961", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 53924, "end_char": 53966, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "SCR 381\n\n''\n\nPRADEEP JAIN_.v."}}, {"text": "Nitin Aggarwal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 54481, "end_char": 54495, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "9618 of 1981, 10658 of 1983 and 10761 of 1983 filled by Nitin Aggarwal, Seema Garg, Menakshi, Alka Aggarwal and Shalini Shailendra Kumar respectively."}}, {"text": "Seema Garg", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 54497, "end_char": 54507, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "9618 of 1981, 10658 of 1983 and 10761 of 1983 filled by Nitin Aggarwal, Seema Garg, Menakshi, Alka Aggarwal and Shalini Shailendra Kumar respectively."}}, {"text": "Menakshi", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 54509, "end_char": 54517, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "9618 of 1981, 10658 of 1983 and 10761 of 1983 filled by Nitin Aggarwal, Seema Garg, Menakshi, Alka Aggarwal and Shalini Shailendra Kumar respectively."}}, {"text": "Alka Aggarwal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 54519, "end_char": 54532, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "9618 of 1981, 10658 of 1983 and 10761 of 1983 filled by Nitin Aggarwal, Seema Garg, Menakshi, Alka Aggarwal and Shalini Shailendra Kumar respectively."}}, {"text": "Shalini Shailendra Kumar", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 54537, "end_char": 54561, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "9618 of 1981, 10658 of 1983 and 10761 of 1983 filled by Nitin Aggarwal, Seema Garg, Menakshi, Alka Aggarwal and Shalini Shailendra Kumar respectively."}}, {"text": "Reena Ranjit Kumar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 54798, "end_char": 54816, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "982 of 1983 filed by Dr. Mrs.\n\nReena Ranjit Kumar and writ petition No."}}, {"text": "Nandini Daftary", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 54862, "end_char": 54877, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "92.19 of 1983 filed by Nandini Daftary which relate.to admission to the M.D.S. Course and M.B.B.S. course respectively of Karnataka Universjty."}}, {"text": "Pradeep Jain", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 55040, "end_char": 55052, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6091 of 1983 filed by Dr. Pradeep Jain seeking admission to the M.D.S. course in King George Medical College, Lucknow affiliated to 'the Lucknow University.", "canonical_name": "PRADEEP JAIN ETC"}}, {"text": "King George Medical College, Lucknow", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 55095, "end_char": 55131, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "6091 of 1983 filed by Dr. Pradeep Jain seeking admission to the M.D.S. course in King George Medical College, Lucknow affiliated to 'the Lucknow University."}}, {"text": "Kerala", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 56076, "end_char": 56082, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Delhi and we were informed that it is the uniform and \"consistent practice in almost all States to provide for such residential requirement or institutional preference we directed that notices of lhese civil appeal and writ petitions may be issued ro the Union of India and the, States of Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Manipur, Orissa, Punjab; Rajasthan, Tamilnadu .. and West Bengal and the State Governments to which such notices are issued shall file their 'counter •affidavits dealing ii!"}}, {"text": "Madhya Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 56084, "end_char": 56098, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Delhi and we were informed that it is the uniform and \"consistent practice in almost all States to provide for such residential requirement or institutional preference we directed that notices of lhese civil appeal and writ petitions may be issued ro the Union of India and the, States of Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Manipur, Orissa, Punjab; Rajasthan, Tamilnadu .. and West Bengal and the State Governments to which such notices are issued shall file their 'counter •affidavits dealing ii!"}}, {"text": "Maharashtra", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 56100, "end_char": 56111, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Delhi and we were informed that it is the uniform and \"consistent practice in almost all States to provide for such residential requirement or institutional preference we directed that notices of lhese civil appeal and writ petitions may be issued ro the Union of India and the, States of Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Manipur, Orissa, Punjab; Rajasthan, Tamilnadu .. and West Bengal and the State Governments to which such notices are issued shall file their 'counter •affidavits dealing ii!"}}, {"text": "Manipur", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 56113, "end_char": 56120, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Delhi and we were informed that it is the uniform and \"consistent practice in almost all States to provide for such residential requirement or institutional preference we directed that notices of lhese civil appeal and writ petitions may be issued ro the Union of India and the, States of Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Manipur, Orissa, Punjab; Rajasthan, Tamilnadu .. and West Bengal and the State Governments to which such notices are issued shall file their 'counter •affidavits dealing ii!"}}, {"text": "Orissa", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 56122, "end_char": 56128, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Delhi and we were informed that it is the uniform and \"consistent practice in almost all States to provide for such residential requirement or institutional preference we directed that notices of lhese civil appeal and writ petitions may be issued ro the Union of India and the, States of Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Manipur, Orissa, Punjab; Rajasthan, Tamilnadu .. and West Bengal and the State Governments to which such notices are issued shall file their 'counter •affidavits dealing ii!"}}, {"text": "Punjab", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 56130, "end_char": 56136, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Delhi and we were informed that it is the uniform and \"consistent practice in almost all States to provide for such residential requirement or institutional preference we directed that notices of lhese civil appeal and writ petitions may be issued ro the Union of India and the, States of Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Manipur, Orissa, Punjab; Rajasthan, Tamilnadu .. and West Bengal and the State Governments to which such notices are issued shall file their 'counter •affidavits dealing ii!"}}, {"text": "Rajasthan", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 56138, "end_char": 56147, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Delhi and we were informed that it is the uniform and \"consistent practice in almost all States to provide for such residential requirement or institutional preference we directed that notices of lhese civil appeal and writ petitions may be issued ro the Union of India and the, States of Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Manipur, Orissa, Punjab; Rajasthan, Tamilnadu .. and West Bengal and the State Governments to which such notices are issued shall file their 'counter •affidavits dealing ii!"}}, {"text": "Tamilnadu", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 56149, "end_char": 56158, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Delhi and we were informed that it is the uniform and \"consistent practice in almost all States to provide for such residential requirement or institutional preference we directed that notices of lhese civil appeal and writ petitions may be issued ro the Union of India and the, States of Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Manipur, Orissa, Punjab; Rajasthan, Tamilnadu .. and West Bengal and the State Governments to which such notices are issued shall file their 'counter •affidavits dealing ii!"}}, {"text": "West Bengal", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 56166, "end_char": 56177, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Delhi and we were informed that it is the uniform and \"consistent practice in almost all States to provide for such residential requirement or institutional preference we directed that notices of lhese civil appeal and writ petitions may be issued ro the Union of India and the, States of Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Manipur, Orissa, Punjab; Rajasthan, Tamilnadu .. and West Bengal and the State Governments to which such notices are issued shall file their 'counter •affidavits dealing ii!"}}, {"text": "30th August, 1983", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 56644, "end_char": 56661, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Some of the State Governments could not ftle their counter affidavits within the time granted by us and they accordingly made an application for extension of time and by an order dated 30th August, 1983 we extended the time for filing of counter affidavits\n\n962 SUPREME COURT REPOR ts [1984] 3 s.c."}}, {"text": "State of Himachal Pradesh", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 57152, "end_char": 57177, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It appears that most of the state Governments to whom notices ere issued filed their counter affidavits and though no notice was directed to be issue<) to the State of Himachal Pradesh, the Goverpment of that State also filed a counter affidavit."}}, {"text": "Delhi University", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 57244, "end_char": 57260, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Delhi University in its counter affi davit gave a brief synopsis summarising the domicile or residential requirement or institutional preference followed by each State Government for admission to the medical colleges situate within its territory."}}, {"text": "Uttar Pradesh", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 58409, "end_char": 58422, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Uttar Pradesh .or a citizen of India, domicile of whose father may not be in Uttar Pradesh but who himself has resided .in Uttar Pradesh for not less than five years at the time of making the application and so far as admissions to M.D.S. Course in Karnataka I' are concerned, the candidate should have ."}}, {"text": "Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 58921, "end_char": 58926, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The position in regard to admissions in medical colleges in the Union Territory of Delhi is a little different, because there, out of a total of 410 seats available\n\nG for admission to the M.B.B.S. course in the three medical colleges\n\naffiliatd to the Delhi University, }48 are reserved seats and 262 are non-reserved seats and for fiiling in the 262 non-reserved seats, an\"\n\nentrance examination is held and the first 50 seats are filled from amongst the eligible candidates who pass the entrance examintion in order of merit and the remaining 212 seats are lied, again on merit, but by candidates who have passe_d t(leir qualifying examination from the schools situate in the Union Territory of Delhi\n\n."}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 59898, "end_char": 59908, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62019, "end_char": 62029, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 62064, "end_char": 62074, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Krishna Iyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 62176, "end_char": 62188, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of Article 14 is equal opportunity for all across the nation for education and advancement and,· as pointed out by Krishna Iyer, J. in Jagdish Saran v. Union of Indial'l \"this has burning relevance\n(1} (1980] 2 S.C.R. 83!.", "canonical_name": "Krishna Iyet,'J."}}, {"text": "(1980] 2 S.C.R. 83", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 62266, "end_char": 62284, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "State of Madras", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 65746, "end_char": 65761, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The object of any rules which may\n\n0 be made for regulating admissions to the medical colleges must be to secure the best and most meritorious students\n\n1'his was the consideration which weighed with the Court in Minor f. Rajndran v. State of Madras('\\ in straiking down a rule\n\nmade by the State of Madras allocating seats in medical colleges c on district-wise basis."}}, {"text": "Wanchoo", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 65883, "end_char": 65890, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Wanchoo, C.J. Speaking on behalf of the C.onrt, observed:\n\n\"The question whether distriCtwise allocation is yiolative of Art."}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 66004, "end_char": 66011, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 67093, "end_char": 67100, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Tamil Nadu", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 68265, "end_char": 68275, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of Tamil Nadu!1\\, the sli:me consid.eration prevailed with tbe Court in striking down the scheme of selection of candidates for admission to medical colleges in the State of Tamil Nadu for the ye!lr 1970-71."}}, {"text": "Madras", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 68544, "end_char": 68550, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It was a unit-wise scheme under which the medical colleges in the city of Madras were constituted as one unit and each of the other medical colleges in the Mofussil was constituted as a unit and a separate selection."}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 69194, "end_char": 69204, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "varid", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 69429, "end_char": 69434, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "ratio between the applic.ants and the number of seats in each unit\n\nvarid and several applicants who secured lesser marks than the petitioners were selected merely because their upplictions ."}}, {"text": "Hegde", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 69636, "end_char": 69641, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "came to .be considered in other units,, This challenge was upheld by tbe Court and Hegde, J. speakiag on be.half of the Court observed :\n\n\"We shall first take up the plea regrding the division of medical seats on 11nitwise basis."}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 70965, "end_char": 70975, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 71516, "end_char": 71523, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Jagdish Saran", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 72050, "end_char": 72063, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We agree with Krishna Iyer, J. when he says in Jagdish Saran's case (supra) : \"If potential for rural service or aptitude for renderin11 medical attention among backward people is a criterion ef merit-and it, undoubtedly, is in a land of sickness and misery, neglect and penury, wails and tearstheti, ."}}, {"text": "Willian Blanks", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 74649, "end_char": 74663, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "What the\n\nfamus poet Willian Blanks said graphically is very true, namely, \"One law for the Lion and the Ox is oppression,\" Those who are unequal, in fact, can.not treated by identical standards ; that may be equality in law but it would certainly not be real equality."}}, {"text": "Mathew", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 75796, "end_char": 75802, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We \"may in this connection usefully quote what Mathew, J. said in Ahmedabad St. Xavier's College Society and Anr."}}, {"text": "D.P. Joshi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 77861, "end_char": 77871, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The legitimacy of claim of State interest was recognised explicitly in one of the early decisions of this Court in D.P. Joshi's case (supra) The Rule impugned in this case }Vas a Rule made by the State of\n\n(1) [1974) l sec 111at799.", "canonical_name": "D. P. Joshi"}}, {"text": "sec 111", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 77965, "end_char": 77972, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Madhya Bharat", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 78454, "end_char": 78467, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The expression bona fide resident' was defined for the purpopse of this Rule to mean inter a/ia a citizen whose original domicile was in Madhya Bharat provided he had not acquired a domicile elsewhere or a citizen whose original .domicile was not in Madhya Bharat but who."}}, {"text": "Madhya", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 78617, "end_char": 78623, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "had acquired a domicile in Madhya."}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79021, "end_char": 79031, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79168, "end_char": 79178, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Venkatarama. Ayyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 79389, "end_char": 79407, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Venkatarama.", "canonical_name": "Venkatarama. Ayyar"}}, {"text": ".Madhya Bharat", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 79587, "end_char": 79601, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Ayyar, J. speaking on behalf of the majority observed':\n\n\"The object of the classification underlying the impugned rule was clearly to help to some extent students who are residents of .Madhya Bharat 'in the prosecution O\"f their studies, and it cannot be disputed that it is quite a legitimate and laudable objective for a State to encourage education within its bordm."}}, {"text": "Article 41", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 79987, "end_char": 79997, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 81243, "end_char": 81253, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Venkatarama Ayyar", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 82145, "end_char": 82162, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We are not sure whether any facts were pleaded in the affidavits justifying his assumption but the judgment of Venkatarama Ayyar, J. show that the decision of the majority Judges proceeded on this assumption and that was regarded as a valid ground justifying the discrimination made by the impugned Rule.", "canonical_name": "Venkatarama. Ayyar"}}, {"text": "Minor P. Rajendran", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 82368, "end_char": 82386, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• We may p9int out that iii Minor P. Rajendran's r:ase (supra) also, an argument was put forward on behalf of the State Government that if selection ws made district-wise, tbose selected from a district were likely to settle' down as practitioners in that-districts so that the districtq were likely to bem:fit from their training."}}, {"text": "N. Vsaundhara", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 83799, "end_char": 83812, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of Mysore, in the subsequent .decision in N. Vsaundhara's cirse (supra).", "canonical_name": "N. Jtasundhara"}}, {"text": "State Of Mysore", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 84042, "end_char": 84057, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "State Of Mysore 'and this Rule provided that \"no porson who is.", "canonical_name": "State Of Mysore"}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 84609, "end_char": 84619, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "D''P. Joshi", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 84789, "end_char": 84800, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The ' Court relied upon the 'decision itt D''P. Joshi's."}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 84933, "end_char": 84940, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "State of Mysore", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 85680, "end_char": 85695, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "PRADEEP JAIN v. UNION (Bhagwali, J.) 973\n\ninhabitants tJf the State of Mysore.", "canonical_name": "State Of Mysore"}}, {"text": "Mysore State", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 85835, "end_char": 85847, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is true that it is possible to say with absofute certainty that all those admit ted to the medical colleges would necessarily stay in Mysore State after qualifying as doctors: they have indeed a fundamental right as citizens to settle anywhere in India."}}, {"text": "P.- Rajend", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 86287, "end_char": 86297, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The problem as noticed in minor P.- Rajend ran's case and as revealed by a large number of cases which have recently come to this Court is that the number of candidates desirous of having medical e.duca- ."}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 87245, "end_char": 87252, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Dua,", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 88615, "end_char": 88619, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We find an echo of the same reafoning in the following words from the judgment of Dua,."}}, {"text": "D.N. Chancha", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 89593, "end_char": 89605, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "D.N. Chancha/q's case. (", "canonical_name": "D. N. Chanchala"}}, {"text": "Bangalore", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 90022, "end_char": 90031, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The petitioner who had passed PUC eicamination held by the Bangalore\n\nuniversity~ applied for admissio_n to any one of the medical .colleges affiliated to the Karnataka ."}}, {"text": "Article 32", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 90571, "end_char": 90581, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 90748, "end_char": 90758, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Shelet", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 90830, "end_char": 90836, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Shelet, J. speaking on behalf of the Court ."}}, {"text": "S.6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 92847, "end_char": 92850, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Ra)endran", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 93224, "end_char": 93233, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is; there fore, impossible to say that the .basis of selection adopted in these rules would defea( the object of the rules as was said in Ra)endran's case or, make possible fess merito rious students obtaining admission at the ost of the better candidates."}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 95450, "end_char": 95460, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Andlira", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 98073, "end_char": 98080, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "~RADEEP JAIN v. UNION (llhagwati, J.)\n\n'requires such assistance, it-cannot be said that the object to be achieved has on relation to the classification made by giving larger representation to the Andlira region."}}, {"text": "Perukaruppan", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 98710, "end_char": 98722, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "supra) and Perukaruppan's case (supra), the Court has m. /J.N. Chanchal/a's case al\\d other similar cases up-held institutional reservation effected through university wise distribution of seats for admission to medical colleges."}}, {"text": "/J.N. Chanchal", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 98756, "end_char": 98770, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "supra) and Perukaruppan's case (supra), the Court has m. /J.N. Chanchal/a's case al\\d other similar cases up-held institutional reservation effected through university wise distribution of seats for admission to medical colleges.", "canonical_name": "D. N. Chanchala"}}, {"text": "N. Vasundhara", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 98990, "end_char": 99003, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Court has also by its decisions in D.P. Joshi's case and N. Vasundhara's case (supra) sustained the consitutional validity of reservation based on residence within a State for the purpose of admision to medical.", "canonical_name": "N. Jtasundhara"}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 99539, "end_char": 99549, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Medical Education Review Comµi.ittee established", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 99774, "end_char": 99822, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is of course true .that the Medical Education Review Comµi.ittee established by the."}}, {"text": "Government of India", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 99831, "end_char": 99850, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Government of India ha~ in its reriort recommended after taking into .account all relevant cotlsiderations, that the \"final objective should be to ensure that all admissions to the MBBS course slrould be open to candidates on an All India basis without the imposition of existing domicilary condition\", but having regard t~ the practical difficulties .of transition to the stage where admissions to MBBS course in all\n\nmclical colleges would be on All India Basis, the medical Education , Review Committee has suggested \"that to begin with not less than 25 per cent sets .in each institution may be open to candidates on all India basis.\""}}, {"text": "Central Board of Secondary Education", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 105046, "end_char": 105082, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "distinction between schools affiliated to State Board and schools affiliated to the Central Board of Secondary Education, Jt would ."}}, {"text": "central Government", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 106474, "end_char": 106492, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We may point out that at the qlose of the ·\n\narguments we asl1ed the learned Attorn:ey Geral to inform the court as to what was the stand of the Government ol India i!l the matter of sue& reservation and the learned Attorney General in response to' the inquiry made by the Court filed a policy statement wliich contained the following formulation of the policy of tb.e Government of India :\n\n~·-1\n\n• central Government is generally opposed to the principle of reservation based on domicile or residence for admission to institution or' higher edJcation, whether professional or otherwise."}}, {"text": "CBSC", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 107143, "end_char": 107147, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "For this purpose, there should be no distinction between schools affiliated to State BoarJ and schools affiliated to CBSC.'?"}}, {"text": "Krishna fyer", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 108066, "end_char": 108078, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Krishna fyer, J;- rightly remarked in Jagdish Saran's qase (supra) at page 845 and 846 of the Report:\n\n~'Reservation must be kept in check by the demands . .", "canonical_name": "Krishna Iyet,'J."}}, {"text": "Article 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 109872, "end_char": 109882, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "Inaian Medical Council", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 112028, "end_char": 112050, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We may make it clear that this outer limit 1 fixed by us wilf be subject to any reduction or attenuation which may be made by the Inaian Medical Council which is the statutory body of medical practitioners whose functional obligations include setting standards for."}}, {"text": "Indian Medical Council", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 112411, "end_char": 112433, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "to be performed by th~ Indian Medical Council."}}, {"text": "Jndian Medical Council", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 112614, "end_char": 112636, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "We would direct the Indian Medical Council to consider within a period of nine months from today whether the outer limit of 70 per cent fixed by us needs to be reduced and jf the Jndian Medical Council determines a ·shorter outer limit, it will be binding on the States and the Union Territories."}}, {"text": "Krishna Iyet,'J.", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 117624, "end_char": 117640, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Thes~ pllsages from the jdgment of Krishna Iyet,'J. clearly J H and forcibly express the same view which we have .", "canonical_name": "Krishna Iyet,'J."}}, {"text": "tdian Dental Council", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 121314, "end_char": 121334, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "So far as admissions to the B.D.S. and M.D, S. courses are concerned, it will bethe 'Ii:tdian Dental Council which is the statutory body of • dental ptactitioners, which will have to carry out the dirctions given llY,, s to the Indian Medical Council in regard to admission's to M.B.B.'S. and post-graduate courses."}}, {"text": "Indfan Medical Concil", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 121576, "end_char": 121597, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The directions given by us to the Indfan Medical Concil u; iay therefore be read a§ appli cable mutatis mutandis to."}}, {"text": "Union of India", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 122030, "end_char": 122044, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "notice to tb, e Union of India an\\!"}}, {"text": "AMARENPRA NATH SEJ\\\\", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 122857, "end_char": 122877, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "• , '\n\nPRADllEP JAIN v, UNION (Bhagwati,, J,) 989\n\n AMARENPRA NATH SEJ\\\\ J. I have had 'the advantage of reading the judgment of my learned brother; Bhagwati, J. I. agree with the orders passed by my learned brother and also the .", "canonical_name": "AMARENPRA NATH SEJ\\\\"}}, {"text": "Art. 14", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 124182, "end_char": 124189, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "Constitution of India", "statute": "Constitution of India"}}, {"text": "22-6-1984", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 129271, "end_char": 129280, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "22-6-1984 and also since some time WOIJld we required for making the necessary preparations for implementin)!"}}]}
{"document_id": "1984_3_993_1000_EN", "year": 1984, "text": "• \\\n\nSTATE\n\n• v.\n\n~ -.\n\nJASPAL SINGH GU:, L\n\nJu~ 25, 19,$4\n\n.. ,·, .,.\n\n• ..-, -\n\nI I) - -- t .- • v ' .. ·.- . ·-.1-· . .\n\n.• ·., {E.8 •• '\\'l!NKA'1'ARkM'lAH, YACATION JUDGE] .\n\nJ, . '. ,, ... \" •••·\n\nSptclal Powers of the High Court to enlarg~. an acrused. 011. ball under stctfon 439. (J) read with section •37 (3) and482 of th~ Codi <if Criminal Pr~ CMhlre, sCOpe of. . . , ; .-) ~~\n\n. ' The re&pondent along with three others wer~ accu9d rirq11v; ji;1omfuii'.. ted offences punishable under ss. 3, 5 and 9 of the ()flicjiil Secre~ Act,. 1923 -rea<I ithco a: 120 B of lhe Indian Penal Code and therefore committed to t, he Court of sessions for the said offences. which ar_e of a serious :ture. Du.ring -\n\nthC -investiga:tiOn, __ the -rsp~dent maq~ a.it .applicitibn .fg_t/.baLlbe~~ the Additional Sesions Judge, New Delhi and it was rejec(!'d .j(i JaliuJii:y; 1984.\n\nThen t1gaili' he ma.de another applicatiotl for bail before,'the St!sij>~S Court.\n\nBefore the aid a.pPlicatiqn could be ta.ken up he made an application under\n\n8, 482 of. tlte Crimfoal Procedure !Code , before !the H)gh Court of Delhi roribaiJ.,. Tu.,:10.riied Judge of the High Court who eard thp bail application ' ,;.,..n_t into the tn\\!rlts of the case and after holding that the-jllaterial. before the . ~/ Couft was insufficient to_sustain the conyic.iion of the respondent. pxoceeded\n\nto enlarge him on !:>'ail subject to his. furnishing a Personal bond in the sum of Rs. 5,000/- with :one surety it'l.· the ti lee arn, ollnt. However, the very same Learned Judge had di&missed earHiif the bail application of Jasbir Siiigh who was the employee of the. re•pondent~ Aggri, eved by the order of the High\n\nCourt enlarging the respondent, on\\bail, the Prosecution has filed this special leave petition for revoking the said order of bail; .\n\nAllowing the petition, tlie Court.\n\nHELD : {: J. The Court before granting , bail in cases, Involving nonbailable olrences particularly wher~ the trial has not yet commenced should\n\n. A'\n\n.•. . ·\n\nH ti\n\nSUPR!M! com T llEPOlTS [1984) 3 s.c.ll;\n\ntak:t into consi.deration-va'rious Matters auch-as the-Oatµre and seriousnesa of theoffence, the character of tht evidence, circumstanc~ which are pectiliar to\n\nhe accused, a reasonable possiQilitY Of.the Presence Of the accused not being\n\n1ecured at thetrial, rea1onable .apprehension Of witnesses being tampred with, the larger intrestsof the public or the. State and similar other considerations. Further, the Court should cxercfsC'& gfcate-r degree ot care in enlirR\n\nging on bail an accused who io charged.wi, th the offence punishable under s. 3 or the Official Secre!I Act when it relate• I\\> military affairs. Here the offeace punishable under,, 3 .of the Official Secrets Act, 1923 with whicp the respon. •ent is charaed relates to military affairs an.d it is punjshable with imprisonment whi1:h may, extend to foartten years. ·\n\n. ,. ,. ., rh1 Stat• v. CM1tain latjit Sinjh,' A.LR. 1962 S.C. 253 Gurcharan.\n\nSinrh .t Orn. Stat• (D1lhl Acim•.J,{1971i 2.S.C.R. 358; Guciikantl Narsaim' hwlil <l Ors. \" uhlic fffleciilr, Hlth Co•ri of Andlva l.'radesh, (!97BJ 2 S.C.R. 361, rcfr•d to.![998C-D; 998A; 997H]\n\n1 : 2 .• The decision oftbe-High Court th,•!.t1ie material collected bYtho . prosecution aatl lhehidenre to be adduced at the trial would not be. sufficien\\ , . to sustain a conviction app~rs tq be.A premature one.in the circumptances or· this case. Tho allegations made by tbe prosecution which no doubt have slill\n\n- to be established •.t the. Wal suggest that the •eapondent pd the person•\n\naccused S:loopjih hi qi a\"'ie persons of eBay conscience in'so far as thC ilitei:reits and security Of the counm• is concerned, 'fhe current Sitpatlon in the COlldlfl' is such .that it can easjlj/, be eXp!Oited by UQlcrupUJOu! men to their OWD Of tO. ·\n\nsome fofeign powet'sadva.ntage. :These aspects. Of thO case do not appear to , have' been c0nsidered by the IftJh Court. Further.' while dismissina theJie.il application of Jasbir Singh on April 24, .1984 •.. the learned Judge of the ljigh; j i Courth.ad relied on.the decision Of \\his:urt in Captain J~Jlt Sillgh's 'ca16;. . hj> tias not even rereired to that di:cisiop while granting'bai) to the respono'h May a, 1984:° some qt the observations (llllde by th• Hieb C11im asainit 'the snstainabliitY of thO ca1.e of criminal conspiracy_alledbi' tbcpl))lecution •.\n\nat this stage were not called for. 'l'he circun1stance of this case .are sue!) that'. , the qUestlOn whether .. the se of ftminaf conspiracy had ben made oµt_or .. not should haV. qeen left to be decided by. the irial court at the. , Po4 of the . trial. op. a onSideraticitt of te c:ntire eviden.cc addued in th.~ case.\n\nTher~:· fore, the High Court should not qave enlirged the respondent on bail in the larger inierest of theStaet. [998B; 999B-F} ·· . . J ' ' •\n\nCRIMINAL APPl!LLATE JURISD!CTIOJ:I ; Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 1543 of 1984. .\n\n. J:rom the JudSo!•rlt and Otder dated the 3rd day ot'My, 1984 'Cir tbe Delhi High Court in Cr!. M(p; f) No.' 421 of 1984 · '\n\n' . ..\n\n. . .,_ i\n\n• STATE ves. GiLL (Venkataramiah, J.) 995.\n\n-· R.N. Poddar for the Petitioner.\n\nMiss Rani Jethmaldni for the Respondent.\n\nThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMIAH, J.\n\nFour persons-Maj. General (Retd.J F.D. Larkins, Air Vice Marshal (Retd.) K.H.. Larkins, Lt. Col. (Retd.) Jasbir Singh and Jaspal Singh Gill aljas Jassi Gill, thci\n\nresponde~ t herein. were accused of having committed offences punishable under sections 3, 5 and 9 of. the Official Secrets Act, 1923 rea.d with section 120-B of the I.ndian Penal Code and of them F.D. Larkins and Jasbir Singh were also accused of having committed the offence punishable under section 6 of the Official Becrets Act, 1923 in a complaint filed by the Deputy Com\n\nmlssoner of Police, Special Branch, Delhi witfi the authorisation of \\he Government of India before the Additional Chief Metro politan Magistrate, Patiala House, New 'Delhi. . ,.,\n\nThe pfosecution case appears to rest inter a/ia on the following facts : On March 24, 1983, Group Captain Jasjit Singh informed the Air. Vice Marshal (now Air Marshal) Shri $.\n\nRaghavendran that for. som.e days immediately prior to that daie AVM (Retd.) K.H. Larkinss then resident of Azad Apartmenis, Mehrau\\i Road, New Delhi, under whom he had served earlier, was inducing him to pass on secret manuals of aircrafts used by the Indian Air Force for a consideration of Rs. 20,000/- pe'r document. AVM Raghavendran brought this to the notice -of his superiors. Thereafter further information was collected and the movements of AVM (Retd.)-K.H. Larkins were kept under. obser vation. The links. of the said K. H. Larkins and his brother Major Geheral (Retd.)- F.D. Larkins were discovered .. A First Information Report was registered at Police Station; Tughlak . Road, New Delhi.\n\n. .\n\nOn November. 11, 1983 raids were conducied at the residence . of K.H. Larkins as. weJI as that of F.D. Larkins. Ccrt:ii!1 incriminating items are stated to have been ecovered from .fie ftltter's H\n\n996 SUPREME COURf REPoifTs [1984] 3 s.c.R.. ..\n\nI house. His alleged that on interrogation after arrest F.D. L.arkins and K.H. Larkins confessed t.hat they had been passing. on classifie0d information relating to the defence of the country' to a foreign agency.\n\nIt is further alleged that Major General (Retd). F.D. Larkins\n\nstate~ that. he had engaged . T:t. Col. {Reid.) Jasbir Slngh as his sub•agent for procuring secret/restricted documents and.manuals relatihg to armament. On this disclosure the search of the house of Jasbir Singh was condubted on November 13 1983 and he was arrested and. remanded. to police custody .. It is stated that on interrogation he disclosed that he had been passing on secret/clas- . sified information to Major General. (Retd.) F.D. Larkins and\n\nJaspal Singh Gill, the respondent, for monetary co'nsideration.\n\nH~ appears to have further disclosed that many secret/restricted manuals and. documents were .uilauthorisedly got issued to him from D.G.J. and E, ME.libraries to which he ined access through the good offices of certain Army. Officers and by impersonating. himself as a serving officer when actually he was retire'1 and that the information contained iii these documents and manuals was . passed on by. him to Major General (Retd.) F.D; Larkins and Jaspal singh Gill alias Jassi Gill . resident. of 82, Sunder Nagar, New Delhi, the respopdent, who representen a private firm namely, M/s EMGEE Tnternational Pvt. LJd., and with whom he, Lt. col (Reid.) Jasbir Singh,. was also. working as consultant.\n\nOn the basis of the said disclosure made by the said Jasbir Singh, the search of the house of Jaspal. Singh GilJ alias.Jassi Dill,· the respondent herein, was co11ducted at 82, Sunder ' Na gar. New Delhi. Some secret/restricted documents .· alongwith . a Defence telephone directory connected with the Army are stated to have bee~ recovered from his. possmion and he was arrested on November 19, 1983.\n\n. It is alleged that ihe respondent herein had obtained cfassified • information on defence m, atters through the aforesaid Jasbir Singh for monetary. consideration .tnd bad passed on the information to the U.S. Intelligence Opergton, During 'the search of the hoJl.'e. of Jaspal Sil)gh as many as l3 invitation cards from the tr.S. cials for. cocklail and \"dinner parties are alleged to have been recovered. showing the' association of the respondent\n\n-,..\n\n. STATE v. s. GILL (Venkataramiah, J.) 997\n\n' with foreign agents as defined in section 4 of the Offieial Secrets Act. It is alleged that the respondent. was paying Rs: 1,000/- per month to Jasbir Singh and Rs. !, OOOf \"per .month to the wife of Jasbir Singh. ·\n\nIt is further alleged that the copy of the Defence telephone directory was a restricted document, the disclosure. of the contents of which to unauthorised persons is prejudicial to the interest and security-of the country. '\n\nAll the accused persons including the respondent have been . committed to the Court of Sessions for the .the vario.lls offences which are really of a serious nature.\n\nDuring the investigation, the respondent made an .application for b!!il before the Addl. Sessions Judge, New J)elhi and it was .. rejectecfin January, 1984. Then again he made another application ·\n\n~' for bail before the Sessions Court. Before the said .!lfil:ll; tation\n\ncould be taken up, he made an application undct section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code befor3 the Hige Court of Delhi for bail..\n\nThe learnd Judge. of .the High Court w.ho heard the bail application went into the merits of the case and after holding that the material before the Court was insufficient to sustain the con• viction of the respondent proceeded to enlarge him on bail Subject t.o his. furnishing a personal bond in the su~1 of Rs: 5,000/- with one surety in the like amount. it may be staled here that•he very same }earned Judge had dismissed earlier the bail application of Jasbir Singh who was the employee of the respondent.\n\nAggrie- . ved. by the' order' of the High Court enlarging the respondent on bail, th~ prosecution has filed ibis Special Leave Pe'tition for revoking the said order of bail.\n\nThe offence punishable unner section 3 of the Official Secrets Act, 1923 with. which the respondent is charged relates to military affairs and it is punishable with imprisoment which may extend to fourteen years. This Court in The State v. Captain Jagjit 3ingh!'\\ has indicated that the Court should eiercise ll ·\n\n. ~I) A.I.R. 1'62 s, c, 2S3\n\n• A\n\ngreater degree or are in enlarging n .bail an accused wlit>1s charged with the offence. punishable under seciion 3 of the Official Secrets Act when it relates to . military affairs: I hve also goe . thr9ugh the decisions oft.his Court . iii Gurcharan Singh & Ors. v.\n\nState (l)clhi Administtation)l1l and Gudikanti Naiasimhulu& Ors. v.\n\nPubli~ Prosecutor, High Court \"/ Andhra_Pradehl') which deal with , the principles 'gov.erning the grarit or bail. Jt may be mentioned.\n\nhere that in ihe l:.st of the above cases, the accnssed had been acquitted by the tTial . court hut convicted by the High Court on , appeal. On. a consideration of the above three decisions, I am of the .view that the Court . before granting bail in cases i1,1volving non-bailable . offences particularly iyhere the trial bas not yet corilmenced should take into consideration .various matters such as the natllfl'. and seriousness of the on.ence, tbe character of the evidence, circumstances which are {leculiar to the accused, a rea$onable posibility of the presence of the accused .not being secured at the trial, reasonable apprehension of witnesses being tampered with, the larger .interests of the public or the State and similar other consideraiions.\n\nQ • On going throvgh the o.rder passed by /he High Court, I feel that its decision that the material collected by the prosecutions and the evidence io be adduced at tfie trial would not be sufficient to sustain a conviction appea; s to be a _premature orie in the circum stances of this case. Since the trial is yet to begin; I do not pro pose to say anythin~ more at this sjage lest it should prejudice either the accused or the prosecution than observipg that on a'\n\nprsual of the complaint .anti the other material available in the case, it cannot reasonably be stated that the prosecution case against the respon.dent is such that _it can bethtown out at t.he threshold. It appears that a prima facie case: is made out against . the respondent. .The gravity of the offences is quite .obvious.\n\nThey relate to the secutity of the State, Espionage and intelligence are utilised to pass n information regarding miii.tary plans; equipment, technical advances etc. of one country to another.\n\nNaturally passing on of . such information from our couni.ry to a foreign count1' is bound to .be most harmful to our country. The\n\nH _.~-'-~~~--'-~~\n\n(l) [1978] 2 S.C.R. 358.\n\n. (2) [1978] 2 S.C-R, 371.\n\n\"' ..\n\nsrAtil v. s. GILL (Venkatdrarniah, J.) 999\n\npersons accused alongwitl: the respondent are. admittedly ex-military men well versed in .. military affairs who are capable of esta\" blishing bridges with the sensitive sections of the defence servkes.\n\nThe respondent is also alleged to be having some dealings with the defence department andJasbir Singh in the employment of the respondent. .The .. allegations made by the prosecution which no doubt have still to be established at the trial sugget that the respondent and tbe persons accused alongwith him are persons of easy conscience. in so far a.s the 'interests and security of the country are concerned .. The current situation in the country is . such that it can be easily be exploited by unscrupulous men to their own or to some foreign power's advantage. These aspects of of the case do not appear to. have . been considered by the High Court. It is seen that while dismissing the hail application of Jasbir Singh on April 24, 1984, the learned Judge qf !he High Court had relied on the decision of this Court in Captain Jagjit Singh's case (supra), he has not even referred to that decision while granting bail to. the. respondent on May 3, 1984.\n\nSome.of . the observations m~<le by the High Couri against the sustainabi ..• lity of the case of criminal conspiracy alleged by the prosecution at this stage were not called for: The circumstances of this case are such that the question. whether the case of criminal conspiracy had been made out or not should have been left to be decided by the trial court at the end of the trial on a consideration of the entire evidence adduced in the case.\n\nIn the circumstances, I am of the view. that the High Court should. not have enlarged the respo_ndent. on bail in the larger i.nterests of the state. It is urged that the responent is a person who has undergone a cardiac operation and 'needs constant medical attention. I am sure .. that the prison authorities will arrange . for proper treatment of the respondent whenever the deed for it .\n\narises ..\n\nI am informed that in a criminal revision petition filed by one of the accused, the High Court has stayed the trial of the case The High Court is requested to dispose of the. case early since the accused are all in judicial custody. . \" The order of bail passed by the High Court was suspende.d by this Court by an order made on June 4, 1984 nd the respon\n\n•· F\n\nA dent was ordered.to be. rearrested and kept in_judicial_custody\n\nThe respondent is now taken back into judicial custody'. ·\n\nIn . the result, . the order . of the High Court enlarging the respondent on bail is set aside and. the respondent is directe<l to ' . - ' . . - . remain judical custoCly until further orders to be passed by a B competent court.\n\n1 The trial court shall proceed to dispose of the' case without feeling itself bound by any of the observations of the High Cou.rt. .\n\nS.R. . Petition aliowed\n\nI \\ ..\n\nJ ;:", "total_entities": 51, "entities": [{"text": "STATE", "label": "PETITIONER", "start_char": 5, "end_char": 10, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "STATE", "offset_not_found": false}}, {"text": "ss. 3, 5 and 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 496, "end_char": 510, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Indian Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 576, "end_char": 593, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Jasbir Siiigh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 1589, "end_char": 1602, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "However, the very same Learned Judge had di&missed earHiif the bail application of Jasbir Siiigh who was the employee of the.", "canonical_name": "andJasbir Singh"}}, {"text": "s. 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 2608, "end_char": 2612, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Official Secrets Act, 1923", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 2725, "end_char": 2751, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Jasbir Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 3996, "end_char": 4008, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "while dismissina theJie.il application of Jasbir Singh on April 24, .1984 •.. the learned Judge of the ljigh; j i Courth.ad relied on.the decision Of \\his:urt in Captain J~Jlt Sillgh's 'ca16;. .", "canonical_name": "andJasbir Singh"}}, {"text": "J~Jlt Sillgh", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 4124, "end_char": 4136, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "while dismissina theJie.il application of Jasbir Singh on April 24, .1984 •.. the learned Judge of the ljigh; j i Courth.ad relied on.the decision Of \\his:urt in Captain J~Jlt Sillgh's 'ca16;. ."}}, {"text": "Venkataramiah", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5111, "end_char": 5124, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "GiLL (Venkataramiah, J.) 995.", "canonical_name": "Venkataramiah"}}, {"text": "R.N. Poddar", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5139, "end_char": 5150, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "· R.N. Poddar for the Petitioner."}}, {"text": "Rani Jethmaldni", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5177, "end_char": 5192, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Miss Rani Jethmaldni for the Respondent."}}, {"text": "VENKATARAMIAH", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 5258, "end_char": 5271, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The Judgment of the Court was delivered by\n\nVENKATARAMIAH, J.\n\nFour persons-Maj.", "canonical_name": "Venkataramiah"}}, {"text": "Jaspal Singh Gill", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 5399, "end_char": 5416, "source": "metadata", "metadata": {"canonical_name": "Jaspal. Singh GilJ alias.Jassi Dill", "offset_not_found": true}}, {"text": "sections 3, 5 and 9", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5520, "end_char": 5539, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Official Secrets Act, 1923", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5548, "end_char": 5574, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "section 120", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5586, "end_char": 5597, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Official Secrets Act, 1923", "statute": "the Official Secrets Act, 1923"}}, {"text": "Penal Code", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5615, "end_char": 5625, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "F.D. Larkins", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 5638, "end_char": 5650, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Official Secrets Act, 1923 rea.d with section 120-B of the I.ndian Penal Code and of them F.D. Larkins and Jasbir Singh were also accused of having committed the offence punishable under section 6 of the Official Becrets Act, 1923 in a complaint filed by the Deputy Com\n\nmlssoner of Police, Special Branch, Delhi witfi the authorisation of \\he Government of India before the Additional Chief Metro politan Magistrate, Patiala House, New 'Delhi. . ,.,", "canonical_name": "F.D. L.arkins"}}, {"text": "section 6", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 5735, "end_char": 5744, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"linked_statute_text": "the Official Secrets Act, 1923", "statute": "the Official Secrets Act, 1923"}}, {"text": "Official Becrets Act, 1923", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 5752, "end_char": 5778, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "Additional Chief Metro politan Magistrate, Patiala House, New 'Delhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 5923, "end_char": 5991, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "the Official Secrets Act, 1923 rea.d with section 120-B of the I.ndian Penal Code and of them F.D. Larkins and Jasbir Singh were also accused of having committed the offence punishable under section 6 of the Official Becrets Act, 1923 in a complaint filed by the Deputy Com\n\nmlssoner of Police, Special Branch, Delhi witfi the authorisation of \\he Government of India before the Additional Chief Metro politan Magistrate, Patiala House, New 'Delhi. . ,.,"}}, {"text": "Jasjit Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6106, "end_char": 6118, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The pfosecution case appears to rest inter a/ia on the following facts : On March 24, 1983, Group Captain Jasjit Singh informed the Air.", "canonical_name": "andJasbir Singh"}}, {"text": "Raghavendran", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6177, "end_char": 6189, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "Raghavendran that for."}}, {"text": "K.H. Larkinss", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6254, "end_char": 6267, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K.H. Larkinss then resident of Azad Apartmenis, Mehrau\\i Road, New Delhi, under whom he had served earlier, was inducing him to pass on secret manuals of aircrafts used by the Indian Air Force for a consideration of Rs.", "canonical_name": "K.H. Larkinss"}}, {"text": "New Delhi", "label": "GPE", "start_char": 6317, "end_char": 6326, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K.H. Larkinss then resident of Azad Apartmenis, Mehrau\\i Road, New Delhi, under whom he had served earlier, was inducing him to pass on secret manuals of aircrafts used by the Indian Air Force for a consideration of Rs."}}, {"text": "Indian Air Force", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 6430, "end_char": 6446, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "K.H. Larkinss then resident of Azad Apartmenis, Mehrau\\i Road, New Delhi, under whom he had served earlier, was inducing him to pass on secret manuals of aircrafts used by the Indian Air Force for a consideration of Rs."}}, {"text": "K. H. Larkins", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6706, "end_char": 6719, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the said K. H. Larkins and his brother Major Geheral (Retd.)- F.D. Larkins were discovered .. A First Information Report was registered at Police Station; Tughlak .", "canonical_name": "K.H. Larkinss"}}, {"text": "Geheral", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6742, "end_char": 6749, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of the said K. H. Larkins and his brother Major Geheral (Retd.)- F.D. Larkins were discovered .. A First Information Report was registered at Police Station; Tughlak ."}}, {"text": "November. 11, 1983", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 6888, "end_char": 6906, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On November."}}, {"text": "K.H. Larkins", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 6950, "end_char": 6962, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of K.H. Larkins as.", "canonical_name": "K.H. Larkinss"}}, {"text": "F.D. L.arkins", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7187, "end_char": 7200, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "His alleged that on interrogation after arrest F.D. L.arkins and K.H. Larkins confessed t.hat they had been passing.", "canonical_name": "F.D. L.arkins"}}, {"text": "F.D. Larkins", "label": "LAWYER", "start_char": 7848, "end_char": 7860, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F.D. Larkins and\n\nJaspal Singh Gill, the respondent, for monetary co'nsideration.", "canonical_name": "F.D. L.arkins"}}, {"text": "Larkins", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 8368, "end_char": 8375, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F.D; Larkins and Jaspal singh Gill alias Jassi Gill ."}}, {"text": "Jaspal singh Gill alias Jassi Gill", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8380, "end_char": 8414, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "F.D; Larkins and Jaspal singh Gill alias Jassi Gill .", "canonical_name": "Jaspal. Singh GilJ alias.Jassi Dill"}}, {"text": "EMGEE Tnternational Pvt. LJd", "label": "ORG", "start_char": 8518, "end_char": 8546, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of 82, Sunder Nagar, New Delhi, the respopdent, who representen a private firm namely, M/s EMGEE Tnternational Pvt."}}, {"text": "Jaspal. Singh GilJ alias.Jassi Dill", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 8726, "end_char": 8761, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "On the basis of the said disclosure made by the said Jasbir Singh, the search of the house of Jaspal.", "canonical_name": "Jaspal. Singh GilJ alias.Jassi Dill"}}, {"text": "November 19, 1983", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 9015, "end_char": 9032, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "possmion and he was arrested on November 19, 1983."}}, {"text": "Jaspal Sil)gh", "label": "RESPONDENT", "start_char": 9308, "end_char": 9321, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "of Jaspal Sil)gh as many as l3 invitation cards from the tr.", "canonical_name": "Jaspal. Singh GilJ alias.Jassi Dill"}}, {"text": "section 4", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 9574, "end_char": 9583, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Addl. Sessions Judge, New J)elhi", "label": "COURT", "start_char": 10233, "end_char": 10265, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "During the investigation, the respondent made an .application for b!!il before the Addl."}}, {"text": "section 482", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 10471, "end_char": 10482, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "section 3", "label": "PROVISION", "start_char": 11273, "end_char": 11282, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"statute": null}}, {"text": "Official Secrets Act, 1923", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11290, "end_char": 11316, "source": "regex", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_gazetteer": true}}, {"text": "Official Secrets Act", "label": "STATUTE", "start_char": 11715, "end_char": 11735, "source": "gazetteer", "metadata": {"confirmed_by_regex": false, "gazetteer_score": 1.0}}, {"text": "Gurcharan", "label": "JUDGE", "start_char": 11834, "end_char": 11843, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "iii Gurcharan Singh & Ors."}}, {"text": "[1978] 2 S.C.R. 358", "label": "CASE_CITATION", "start_char": 13973, "end_char": 13992, "source": "regex", "metadata": {}}, {"text": "andJasbir Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 14364, "end_char": 14379, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The respondent is also alleged to be having some dealings with the defence department andJasbir Singh in the employment of the respondent.", "canonical_name": "andJasbir Singh"}}, {"text": "April 24, 1984", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15004, "end_char": 15018, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "It is seen that while dismissing the hail application of Jasbir Singh on April 24, 1984, the learned Judge qf !"}}, {"text": "Captain Jagjit Singh", "label": "OTHER_PERSON", "start_char": 15100, "end_char": 15120, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "he High Court had relied on the decision of this Court in Captain Jagjit Singh's case (supra), he has not even referred to that decision while granting bail to."}}, {"text": "May 3, 1984", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 15222, "end_char": 15233, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "respondent on May 3, 1984."}}, {"text": "June 4, 1984", "label": "DATE", "start_char": 16416, "end_char": 16428, "source": "ner", "metadata": {"in_sentence": "The order of bail passed by the High Court was suspende.d by this Court by an order made on June 4, 1984 nd the respon\n\n•· F\n\nA dent was ordered.to be."}}]}